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i 

80–769 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–40] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL 

SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 25, 2013 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

STEVE KITAY, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

ERIC SMITH, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, April 25, 2013, Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request for National Security Space Activities .................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, April 25, 2013 ........................................................................................ 27 

THURSDAY, APRIL 25, 2013 

FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ............................................................................ 2 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Klinger, Gil, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Space and Intelligence 

Office (AT&L), U.S. Department of Defense ...................................................... 4 

Loverro, Doug, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Space Policy, U.S. 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 6 

Sapp, Betty, Director, National Reconnaissance Office ........................................ 3 

Shelton, Gen William, USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command, U.S. 

Air Force ............................................................................................................... 2 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Klinger, Gil ....................................................................................................... 63 

Loverro, Doug ................................................................................................... 72 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 31 

Sapp, Betty ........................................................................................................ 53 

Shelton, Gen William ....................................................................................... 33 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 85 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bridenstine ................................................................................................. 105 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 104 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 103 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 89 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 

SPACE ACTIVITIES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, April 25, 2013. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:35 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. Good afternoon. This hearing of the Strategic Forces 

Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee is called to 

order. I want to welcome everyone to the Strategic Forces hearing 

on the fiscal 2014 budget request for the national security space 

activities. 

Our distinguished panel of experts this afternoon are General 

William Shelton, Commander of Air Force Space Command; Ms. 

Betty Sapp, Director of NRO, National Reconnaissance Office; Mr. 

Gil Klinger, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense, Space and Intelligence Office; and Mr. Doug Loverro, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. 

I appreciate your time in being here and the time it took to prepare for this hearing. It is important and very helpful to us for you 

to be able to participate. 

Space is a critical element of our national security in both peace 

and wartime environments. I am very concerned of the impact of 

sequestration on national security space programs, and I appreciate hearing more from you during our opening statements on this 

issue. 

Potential adversaries have taken note of our reliance on space 

and are developing the means to degrade, deny, and destroy our capabilities. Just like the evolution of ground, sea and air platforms, 

when defenses and survivability mechanisms had to be developed 

to keep pace with the threat, now this is happening with space 

systems. 

I am pleased to see the Department’s recognition of the threat, 

as evidenced by the increased investment in space situational 

awareness in the fiscal 2014 budget request. I remain concerned on 

the future implementation of space defense and resilience to include breaking up or disaggregating programs that we have invested billions to develop and are just starting to provide the nec-
2 

essary capabilities for the warfighter. I look forward to further dialogue and study of this important topic. 

Separately, I commend the Department on the significant advances it has made on many space programs. After years of massive costs and schedule overruns, we have entered a new period of 

stable procurement, incremental development. As noted above, I 

am skeptical when I hear that we now may want to break up these 

successful programs. 

For instance, the Air Force recently reported that new block-buy 

strategies for Space-Based Infrared System, Advanced Extremely 

High Frequency Satellite, and the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle programs are resulting in over $2.5 billion in savings over the 

next 5 years. This is a tremendous success for the military and the 

taxpayer, and I hope to see those savings reinvested and provide 

the necessary modernization initiatives in accordance with the 

warfighter requirements. 

Thank you again for being with us today, and I look forward to 

your testimony. Ranking Member Cooper and I have spent a lot of 

time together visiting the NRO and the NGA [National GeospatialIntelligence Agency] headquarters and getting classified mission 

and threat briefs. We are both focused on the opportunities and 

threats we face. 

And with that, I yield to my friend and colleague from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper, for any statement he may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

TENNESSEE, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would just like to add my welcome to yours, and I look forward 

to hearing the testimony of the witnesses. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Shelton, it is all you. 

STATEMENT OF GEN WILLIAM SHELTON, USAF, COMMANDER, 

AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General SHELTON. Mr. Chairman, Representative Cooper, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today as the commander of Air Force Space Command. It 

is also my privilege to appear before you with members of distinguished colleagues and members of the national security space 

enterprise. 

Since its inception a little over 30 years ago, Air Force Space 

Command has made significant progress in evolving and sustaining 

space capabilities to underpin operations across the spectrum of 

conflict. We have established three major goals to ensure these 

foundational capabilities are available to the warfighter and to the 

Nation. First, to provide assured full-spectrum space capabilities; 

second, to develop highly skilled and innovative space professionals; and, finally, to provide resilient integrated systems that 

preserve operational advantage for the warfighter. 

Within the bounds of the current fiscal climate, we are managing 

increased risk across the enterprise, while modernizing, sustaining, 
3 

and acquiring space capabilities consistent with our national priorities. Accomplishing this in an era of declining budgets, growing 

threats, and increasing requirements is no small challenge. And we 

face a new daunting challenge, providing these foundational capabilities in an environment of sequestration. 

In my command alone, I had to find $508 million in reductions 

for the remainder of fiscal year 2013. The chaos created by operations and maintenance account reductions this large in this short 

time period cannot be overstated. At the top of this list is the significant and justifiable angst of my civilian workforce facing the 

prospect of a 20-percent pay cut for the last 14 weeks of this fiscal 

year. 

As we look to the future, I strongly urge your support to amend 

the law to create the flexibility required to enable smarter decisions. Despite our fiscal challenges, we will work together with 

these mission partners and with industry to find innovative approaches to providing vital space capability. 

I thank the committee for your steadfast support of Air Force 

Space Command and our people, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of General Shelton can be found in the 

Appendix on page 33.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, General. 

Ms. Sapp, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your opening 

statement. 

STATEMENT OF BETTY SAPP, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 

RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

Ms. SAPP. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and distinguished members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you today on behalf of the NRO. It is an honor for me to appear alongside our mission partners from the Department of Defense. The NRO’s close relationship and continuing collaboration 

with our DOD [Department of Defense] partners is vital to maintaining this nation’s superiority in space. 

I would like to begin with a few words about the state of the 

NRO today. First and foremost, I am proud to report that all of our 

major system acquisition programs are green, meeting or beating 

all performance, costs, and schedule goals. Additionally, for the 

fourth year in a row, the NRO received a clean audit opinion on 

our financial statements. 

The NRO’s all-green acquisition scorecard and clean audit record 

are best proof of our commitment to excellence and conscientious 

stewardship of taxpayer dollars. We have also continued our record 

of success on the launch front, launching with our partners in Air 

Force four systems in just 5 months last year. The missions were 

so problem-free that we brought most of the systems and the critical capabilities they deliver into operations ahead of schedule. This 

speaks, again, to our commitment to excellence and to the quality 

of our partnership with the Air Force. 

Moving forward, the NRO is leveraging key investments in our 

R&D [Research and Development] and in commercial technologies 

to deliver a future architecture designed to improve persistence, to 

better our performance against hard targets, resilience in the face 
4 

of increasing threats, and affordability in the face of current and 

likely future budget constraints. 

As General Shelton mentioned, the current fiscal year is a challenge, and I want to touch briefly on the effects that sequestration 

is having on the NRO. Internally, we have reduced all infrastructure costs, including those directly supporting the mission. We have 

significantly reduced our core contractors, key to everything we do 

from R&D to operations. We have also had to reduce funding for 

our major system acquisition programs, cuts that represent increased risk to that record of acquisition success. 

We are also proposing—and I stress proposing—that we terminate some of our legacy operational programs. The capability those 

programs provide, while important, are beyond our documented requirements. We are vetting this proposal through the community. 

So while we are doing everything we can to minimize the mission 

impacts of sequestration, some difficult choices will have to be 

made and may be felt by those who count on us. 

Despite our fiscal challenges, the NRO is committed to sustaining the support most critical for our warfighters worldwide. In 

addition to traditional NRO ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance] capabilities, we provide a wide array of systems 

and capabilities integral to the highest-priority missions, including 

identifying, locating, and tracking high-value targets, special communications support, and counter-IED [Improvised Explosive Device] efforts. 

In the counter-IED area, one of our most successful programs 

continues to be RED DOT. RED DOT takes all the sources of indications of warnings available, combines them into an integrated 

picture, then sends that site picture out directly to the tactical user 

to include the HMMWV [High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle] on patrol. Last year alone, RED DOT indications resulted in 

the find and removal of 235 IEDs from the battlefield, a huge success for the program and a real lifesaver for our men and women 

in harm’s way. 

In summary, the NRO remains committed to maintaining our 

record of acquisition and mission success, while also delivering a 

more persistent, resilient, and affordable future architecture. I 

would be happy to follow up with you for more detailed discussions 

as to how our systems directly support our warfighters and the national security of the United States. 

I want to thank the committee for the support you have shown 

me and the men and women of the NRO. Thank you again for the 

opportunity to be here today. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sapp can be found in the Appendix on page 53.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Ms. Sapp. 

Mr. Klinger, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your opening 

statement. 

STATEMENT OF GIL KLINGER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SPACE AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICE 

(AT&L), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. KLINGER. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member 

Cooper, and members. It is my pleasure to be part of this distin-
5 

guished panel representing the spectrum of disciplines that are key 

to ensuring the success of our space acquisition programs, from policy and governance to acquisition oversight, program execution, 

and, finally, to our critical partnership with the intelligence 

community. 

In that vein, I would like to highlight the activities we have undertaken to provide a coherent, balanced national security space 

program that prepares for future challenges, supports our strategic 

guidance, and represents our commitment to accomplish these 

goals, while executing affordable programs, improving efficiency 

and execution, and strengthening the industrial base. 

Last year, I testified that in fiscal year 2012, we evaluated space 

acquisition reform initiatives. I am pleased to report that in fiscal 

year 2013, these initiatives are integrated into the Department’s 

Better Buying Power 2.0 to better manage the costs of acquisition, 

while achieving affordable programs. We are refining our contract 

strategies to incentivize productivity and innovation and to promote effective competition. 

This year, a significant example of promoting competition includes the restructured, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program, which will enable new commercial entrants to compete with 

the incumbent launch provider. We are moving forward to introduce competition as early as possible with a more efficient contracting strategy for acquiring space launch services and associated 

launch capabilities for the Department of Defense and the intelligence community’s satellite programs. These actions resulted in 

an estimated savings of over $1 billion in the Future Year Defense 

Program, below the fiscal year 2013 President’s budget, without excessive and unacceptable risk. 

As we continue to consider potential alternative acquisition and 

procurement strategies across the national security space portfolio, 

we are committed to a disciplined cost approach that incorporates 

full funding and incremental funding. Additionally, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the 

Service acquisition executives have established affordability targets 

for the majority of our large critical space programs. 

We are also assessing how to take better advantage of commercial opportunities. We will continue to pursue more production-oriented processes and quantities as part of each overall mission architecture. This approach may result in greater affordability and 

reduced time to fielding in the future. Your authorization in fiscal 

year 2012 to incrementally fund up to 6 fiscal years to procure two 

Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites and your fiscal year 

2013 authorization to fund two Space-Based Infrared System satellites are reflected in the fiscal year 2014 President’s budget. 

As you know, we are committed to balancing the modernization 

of mission capability with the associated risks, both in acquisition 

and operations. It is paramount that we deliver the capabilities the 

warfighter will need in the future, given the evolving threats. The 

2014 budget proposal increased investments over last year in the 

Space Modernization Initiative for missile warning to inform future 

acquisition decisions and anticipate evolving threats. 
6 

Also, the savings from the Advanced Extremely High Frequency 

fixed-price strategy will support continued Space Modernization 

Initiative research and development activities. Excuse me. 

The Department is implementing various Better Buying Power 

initiatives to make GPS [Global Positioning System] more affordable and to ensure we sustain this critical global utility. These include a modified acquisition strategy for the current buy of GPS III 

satellites five through eight from a cost-plus to a fixed-price contract to limit risk to the Government and encourage the prime contractor to implement cost-cutting measures. 

In fiscal year 2014, the Department’s budget proposal requests 

funding for an assessment to determine if we can accelerate the 

military GPS user equipment program and funds the development 

of the next-generation operational control system. Both are required to enable a new military signal to further improve our GPS 

anti-jamming capability. 

I am pleased to report in fiscal year 2012 we completed the architecture studies for resilient-based satellite communications, 

space control, and overhead persistent infrared capabilities. These 

studies helped the Department frame potential decision points for 

follow-on capability, including alternatives to extend production for 

current programs. 

In calendar year 2013, the Defense Space Council is providing 

the senior steering for ongoing analysis of alternatives for spacebased environmental monitoring, space situational awareness, and 

protected satellite communications. The capabilities we are considering include commercial augmentation, international cooperation, 

hosted payloads, and other key changes to the way we have done 

the space business in the past. All of these initiatives are included 

in our second submission of the 15-year space investment plan. 

Finally, thank you for your continued support. Overseeing space 

acquisition requires a constant steady hand over a long period of 

time. We appreciate your willingness to engage with us as we consider all of the ramifications of the various architecture alternatives, business models, and industry impacts we are addressing 

to provide a space capability that addresses warfighter needs, prepares for future challenges, looks after the broad range of our taxpayer—of our national security interests, and protects the United 

States taxpayer. 

I look forward to reacting to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Klinger can be found in the Appendix on page 63.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Klinger. 

And, Mr. Loverro, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your 

opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF DOUG LOVERRO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SPACE POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Mr. LOVERRO. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member 

Cooper, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify this afternoon. 

A year ago, Ambassador Schulte testified here about the Department’s progress in implementing the national security space strat-
7 

egy. I am pleased to join General Shelton, Ms. Sapp, and Mr. 

Klinger to continue that discussion today. 

Let me start with the basic reality that space remains vital to 

our national security. But that evolving strategic environment increasingly challenges U.S. space advantages, advantages that both 

our warfighters and our adversaries have come to appreciate. As 

space becomes more congested, competitive, and contested, the Department must formulate programs and policies that will secure 

those advantages in the years to come. 

That reality is juxtaposed with the fact that as a nation, we are 

providing these capabilities in an environment that is increasingly 

cost-constrained. The growing challenges of the budget, in addition 

to the increasing external threats, compel us to now think and act 

differently so that in the future what we choose to procure and how 

we choose to provision it reflect both the changed threat and fiscal 

environment. 

While these two realities present a clear challenge, I do not by 

any means view them with a sense of doom or gloom. New entrepreneurial suppliers alongside our legacy suppliers are creating an 

ever-burgeoning commercial space market that can provide a significant advantage to the DOD if we formulate the policies and 

strategies to encourage their growth and use. 

Similarly, there has been a growth worldwide in allied space investment in capability, and that provides significant opportunities 

for the DOD to help us build resilience into our space capabilities. 

The policies and strategies that I will discuss today begin to address these challenges and opportunities, but they are just the initial steps in an area that will continue to demand attention and action from us all. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepard statement of Mr. Loverro can be found in the Appendix on page 72.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. I thank all of the witnesses. 

We will now go into the question period of our hearing, and I will 

start off first with General Shelton. An effective and affordable 

space launch program is an essential capability for the military. 

Please describe the policy for assured access to space and how you 

plan to implement this policy and maintain necessary launch capability, as well as to conduct a fair evaluation during the potential 

future competition of certified launch providers. 

General SHELTON. Mr. Chairman, as you said, this is 

foundational. We have got to have space launch capability, access 

to space. What we have decided to do is continue with our current 

provider, tremendous success record of United Launch Alliance. We 

are so proud of the operational success we have seen from them. 

However, launch is very expensive. 

So we have opted to introduce competition, new entrants into the 

business. However, having said that, we want to have them certified to perform at the mission assurance standard that we have 

come to expect, so there is a very rigorous certification process that 

we will work through with these new entrants, the ones that have 

established a statement of intent with us that they want to have 

national security space launches as part of their business base. 
8 

As we look to the future in trying to provide this level playing 

field, this competitive playing field that is fair and equitable to everyone involved, we have established a block-buy strategy where 

we will buy 36 cores from United Launch Alliance. We have reserved 14 core vehicles for competition. United Launch Alliance, as 

well as certified new entrants, can compete for those 14 launches. 

That level playing field will be interesting to define, and we are 

working through that right now. And the reason for that is, we 

have decided to provide a launch capability with United Launch Alliance that provides for the infrastructure, provides for the operational crew force, provides all those baseline capabilities that are 

necessary to have a space launch capability, and then buy individual boosters, booster by booster. 

There is much more than just the booster cost, obviously, in each 

space launch, so deciding how to allocate those across-the-board capabilities in a per-launch basis will be a challenge for us, but that 

is our strategy, that is our way ahead. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the timeline on that certification process? 

General SHELTON. It actually depends on each provider, sir. As 

they have launches, as they work through the certification process 

with us, it is up to them. It is up to them to have whatever pace 

they would like to have. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. And, General Shelton, would you consider the 

ELC [Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Launch Capability] a subsidy? 

General SHELTON. No, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why not? 

General SHELTON. It is an efficient way to do business when we 

have got a single launch provider, because it gives us the operational flexibility we need, it gives us the ability to exchange crews 

between East Coast and West Coast. It just provides that 

foundational level that we need across the entire enterprise. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Ms. Sapp, can you provide your perspective on the importance of 

maintaining a launch capability and, in general, the unique requirements of the NRO? 

Ms. SAPP. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We do rely on Air Force to provide 

a launch capability for us. We definitely leverage their efforts. The 

NRO is reliant on ULA [United Launch Alliance] right now, just 

as the Air Force is. We are doing our own certification, again, in 

a very cooperative way with the Air Force for other providers. We 

would hope that they are ready by fiscal year 2015. We were actually on contract today with SpaceX for a smaller mission, but we 

would expect them to compete for a mission we have in 2015. 

We are certainly the ones who use the West Coast most often. 

And we are certainly the ones who use heavy lift most often. So, 

again, we rely on what the Air Force provides in the way of launch 

capability. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Changing topics, Mr. Loverro, are you aware of any commercial 

satellite services the Department procures in which the People’s 

Republic of China has significant ownership interest? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I am. We do lease some satellite services from some Chinese companies right now to support 
9 

JUONS [Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements] that were 

issued by some of our operational commanders early last year. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you see reasons why we should be concerned 

about that? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Mr. Chairman, I became aware of these leases as 

I assumed this new post about a month ago. We initiated discussions with DISA [Defense Information Systems Agency], with the 

Joint Staff on better ways to go ahead and manage that capability 

and decisions to enter into those arrangements. We are looking forward to, in fact, coming out with a process that would go ahead 

and examine those closely as we move forward. 

Clearly, we have to go ahead and balance operational need with 

the security arrangements there. In the case of this particular 

lease, it was the only lease available to support the operational 

need, but we also recognize that we need to have a good process 

to assure this is vetted across the Department. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great, thank you very much. The chair now recognizes the ranking member for any questions he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The elephant in the room—and maybe I should say, in the interest of bipartisanship, also the donkey in the room—this startling 

statement from General Shelton on page 16 and 17 of his testimony, when he said, quote, regarding sequestration, ‘‘The chaos 

created in my command by operations and maintenance reductions 

this large in this short time period cannot be overstated.’’ Then he 

goes on to say that, ‘‘The rigidity in the law dictates that we must 

cut every appropriated line item in our budget, severely restricting 

our trade space. I strongly ask for your support for the reprogramming actions that will be needed to enable smarter decisions.’’ 

When I hear chaos in any military program, I get worried. And 

I want to give my colleagues a heads-up—and this doesn’t have to 

be my amendment—but I would encourage my colleagues to jointly 

work together to figure out some way of granting flexibility here so 

that we do not create chaos in an extremely important branch of 

our military or in the—similar problems are being felt throughout 

the military as a whole. 

This does not suggest reducing the amount of cuts. It is just allowing some flexibility. Whether it is in the form of reprogramming 

or in other ways, I think this is an urgent national priority. And 

I just appreciate General Shelton, by having put it in clear language, although it was way back on page 16 or 17 of the testimony, 

that we really need to consider flexibility. 

And, of course, the usual committee procedure would be to wait 

for the NDAA and the markup process and—I am even thinking 

that perhaps this should be a standalone effort to go ahead, because, you know, tomorrow, we will vote on the helium reserve. 

You know, today we quit work at, what, 1:30 in the afternoon? You 

know, there has got to be a more timely way to address this problem, again, not reducing the amount of the cuts, but granting the 

necessary flexibility so that we are not creating chaos in the space 

service or other parts of our military. 

So just a quick heads-up. It doesn’t have to be my approach. I 

would be honored to co-sponsor an approach sponsored by the ma-
10 

jority. But there has got to be a way to minimize the effect of sequester on the Pentagon. 

So, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to put 

in my two cents’ worth. And I don’t know if General Shelton wants 

to add to that, but you made this most clear in your testimony. 

General SHELTON. Thank you, sir. And you are exactly right. It 

is not so much the level of the cut—although none of us want to 

take cuts—but it is the rigidity in the law that requires every line 

item to be cut. So it gives you no opportunity to make smart 

trades. We just have to take the cuts as mechanically assigned. 

Mr. ROGERS. And I thank the gentleman, and I agree with his 

concerns and would like to see something done. I will be talking 

with the full committee chairman and seeing if there is anything 

intended during our upcoming activities. 

But with that, we will turn to Mr. Lamborn for any questions he 

may have. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Shelton, I want to ask you about the joint mission systems program, which is an important program, since it is responsible for tracking and analyzing our space assets. I know this program has had some challenges. It is difficult to replace and upgrade the old, fragile system. This committee has strongly supported using commercial technology to upgrade the system faster 

and to save money, and I understand the Air Force is now starting 

to incorporate commercial software solutions. 

But I am concerned, after reviewing the proposed budget request, 

that there appears to be some slippage and delay in integrating 

commercial technologies. Can you tell me where you stand on this? 

And could you provide me an update and a briefing personally in 

the next couple weeks on how we can accelerate this process? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. I would be glad to provide the briefing. But as you may recall, what we have designed here is a very 

open architecture system, taking advantage as we can of not only 

Government off-the-shelf software, but also commercial off-the-shelf 

software. We are now on contract with two providers of that commercial off-the-shelf software to provide some very interesting capability for both visualization and computational power. 

So this is the system that provides the foundation for space situational awareness. It will in the future, once we get all the capabilities included, give us the ability to fuse all sorts of data from 

disparate sources, so it is not just the dedicated Government space 

surveillance capabilities, but we can also ingest data from commercial providers, from potentially other governments, allies, so on and 

so forth. So we are very happy with where this is going. We would 

like for the pace to be a little bit faster. We are subject—it is almost a level of effort kind of build to funding, if you will, kind of 

program. 

So as we take cuts like we did from the HAC [House Appropriations Committee] this last year, it adjusts the program downward 

a little bit, slows it down a little bit, but we will come back up on 

plane here very shortly with the program. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you very much. 

Mr. Loverro, the Department proposed to terminate the Operationally Responsive Space program again in fiscal year 2014. The 
11 

threats to our space systems are real, and ORS [Operationally Responsive Space] has streamlined acquisition capabilities to address 

urgent warfighter needs. Congress has expressed the importance of 

this program, both in law through the 2007 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], and most recently in the 2013 authorization and appropriations acts, which provided funding for ORS, despite the Department’s request to cancel it. 

How does the Department plan to address the needs that are intended to be met by Operationally Responsive Space? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Thank you, Congressman. The Department clearly 

got the Congress’s message on ORS. We have, as directed in legislation, stood—formed our executive committee, led by the Secretary 

of the Air Force in his role as the executive agent for space, and 

that charter has now been promulgated through the Department. 

We have moved the ORS office that was still in existence under 

the Space and Missile System Center, under Air Force Space Command, under General Shelton’s leadership. We recognize that, obviously, in budget—because of budget restrictions, there were still 

choices that needed to be made in terms of where we were going 

to take money from, and yet we also recognize the value of ORS 

as part of that resilient strategy that we talked about. 

We are working now to go ahead and figure out how we would 

make it a better part of that strategy and how we go ahead and 

reformulate the program to address those needs. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you. 

And lastly, General Shelton, real quickly here, GPS jamming remains something that we have to be very concerned about. As a result, Air Force has been developing the next generation satellite 

constellation, GPS III. Can you give us a status report on this and 

how many GPS III satellites the Air Force would like to procure? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. We are in contract right now—as Mr. 

Klinger said in his opening statement—we are on contract through 

satellite vehicle number eight. Satellite vehicles nine and beyond, 

the acquisition strategy for that will be debated in the fall, and his 

office will be right in the middle of that. 

But we have got a very active GPS III program, that we are 

proud of the progress of it, and we will continue to look to the future on what is beyond the contracted one through eight. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And is it better to continue that, as opposed to 

starting a whole new fourth generation? 

General SHELTON. That is the decision we will have to make in 

the fall. It seems like the answer would be yes, but we will study 

that. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Garamendi, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the 

panel for all that you do in a very complex arena. 

In a hearing last week, the issue of ISR came up. You probably 

have heard about it. I think I said it seems to be confused as to 

exactly what the Air Force wants to do, what the Navy wants to 

do, maybe reconnaissance, also. I am not asking for the answer 
12 

here, but we really need to get into a comprehensive understanding 

of what exactly we need to do. 

Ms. Sapp, you raised one of the issues that would come out of 

it, and that is the current work that is being done in Afghanistan. 

It appears as though the assumption is that the assets that are 

currently used in Afghanistan won’t be needed in the future. And 

everything I hear from others is that that is not likely to be the 

case. 

So my point here is that we need to understand and the confusion that is apparent from the various elements of the ISR community need to be integrated and fully understood, because we are 

likely to make the wrong decision here based upon the confusion 

that we are being presented with. So I will let that go at that. 

There are a series of questions. I want to go to Mr. Loverro. In 

your response to the China issue, your response was incomplete. 

What exactly were you talking about, if you can answer the question here? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Congressman, I am not sure exactly which part is 

incomplete, but let me try to restate it and maybe you will help me 

along. We are—we recognize that there are concerns across the 

community on the usage of Chinese satellites to support our 

warfighter, and yet as I expressed, we also recognize that our 

warfighters need support and sometimes we must go to the only 

place that we can get it from. 

All of the correct procedures were followed in putting those 

leases together. We reviewed all the security concerns, all of the 

business concerns with such a lease. Those were presented to the 

operational commander, who understood those—all the encryption 

necessary to protect U.S. information was put into place. 

So from that perspective, I am very pleased with what we did. 

And yet I think the larger issue is, we don’t have a clear policy laid 

out on how do we assess whether or not we want to do this as a 

Department, as opposed to just a response to a need. And so what 

we have decided with DISA and with the Joint Staff is that we 

would look at how we put together a process to do so. 

I can’t tell you any more on what that process will involve, because we just decided on this literally a week-and-a-half ago. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I think you just supplemented my point about 

confusion. I should ask you exactly, what was it that the 

warfighters needed? And why didn’t we have it? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Congressman, I can’t tell you why we didn’t have 

it. What I can tell you is that the warfighter needed SATCOM [satellite communications] support in his area of operations. He went 

to the Defense Information Services Agency to request that support. In their process, they send out bids to their multiple providers. I think they have 17 on contract. I am not certain of that 

number, if you will let me correct that later if I need to. 

They went out to their providers. Only one provider was able to 

respond to the need. That is to say, only one provider had bandwidth available in order to go ahead and give them, and that 

bandwidth’s available only on a Chinese satellite. And so that is 

the communication capability that DISA presented to the operational commander, who understood what was involved, how it was 

being handled, and accepted that to meet his need. 
13 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you for the completeness of the answer 

and the confirmation of the need for us to have full understanding 

of the ISR requirements, whether they are satellite, ground-based, 

or UAV [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle], or manned. We are being 

asked to make significant changes, but there doesn’t appear to be 

a comprehensive understanding or vision of what is needed. So we 

will go with that. 

I am going to yield back my remaining 42 seconds, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. 

Coffman, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Shelton, as I understand it, the current EELV [Evolved 

Expendable Launch Vehicle] provider, United Launch Alliance, 

meets the full spectrum of capabilities across the EELV manifest 

as outlined by the operations and systems requirements. Will new 

entrants be required to provide launch services across the full spectrum of EELV launches, even the most heavy and complicated mission payloads, as the incumbent provider currently does? 

General SHELTON. Congressman, that is the going-in position. 

That is not to say that that won’t change, but the going-in position 

is that the new entrants would have to come with that full suite 

of capability, but as we compete for those 14 launches in the future, those will be launch by launch. So as we work through those, 

it could be that it is not a full capability across the board. 

But that is our going-in position. We want to have—we don’t 

want to have a launch provider that is just in one little niche. We 

want them to have the full segment of capability. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Well, then do you believe that having a system 

that doesn’t require the full spectrum creates an uneven playing 

field for the incumbent, given that they must maintain capabilities 

and costs across the entire spectrum? 

General SHELTON. That remains to be seen, sir. I mean, we will 

have to judge that at the time, because there could be a host of providers that cover the full spectrum. It is all about assured access 

to space and mission assurance, so we are just going to have to 

work our way through this as this matures. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. General Shelton and Mr. Klinger and Mr. 

Loverro, through the Enhanced View program, commercial space 

imagery is utilized to provide rapid delivery of mission-critical, unclassified imagery for U.S. and coalition partner missions. This is 

the only source of unclassified high-resolution imagery that can be 

immediately disseminated and shared with U.S. and coalition partners. This program was cut by 50 percent in fiscal year 2013, and 

now there is only one U.S. vendor supplying this imagery. 

Will you support stable funding of the remaining portion of the 

contracts so that this extremely valuable capability is not lost or 

weakened? Why don’t we start with General Shelton? 

General SHELTON. Sir, I am going to have to let someone else answer that question. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. 

General SHELTON. That is really not in my area. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Klinger. 
14 

Mr. KLINGER. I think, overall, we certainly support stability in 

funding that program, but with—as you understand, Congressman, 

with sequestration going on and the fiscal environment, budgetary 

environment that we are in, many things are under review right 

now, so there is no question that we support the President’s budget 

at this point, which provides for the continued services of that one 

provider. We will just have to see in the ensuing months how this 

develops. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Loverro. 

Mr. LOVERRO. Congressman, a little bit out of my wheelhouse in 

this particular issue. I certainly agree with everything that Mr. 

Klinger just said. Clearly, Enhanced View provides a capability to 

the warfighter. Again, we have to go ahead and examine in this 

budget environment how we maintain that capability into the future. I don’t think I have anything else to add to that. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. General Shelton, maybe you can answer 

this. How did the Air Force determine what satellite payloads to 

set aside for competition? And which programs were part of the 

ULA block buy? 

General SHELTON. Sir, the only ones we have actually set aside 

so far are two that are really more research and development, 

science and technology kinds of efforts, and we felt like we could 

perhaps take a little bit more risk. So rather than our—one of our 

mainstream programs, which is very critical to national security, 

we could set aside these couple of efforts here and assume just a 

little bit more risk. 

And the advantage of that, of course, is furthering the competition in new entrants and so on and so forth. 

Mr. COFFMAN. General Shelton, will the future EELV launch providers be required to comply with data requirements and cost accounting standards of similar programs and included certified cost 

or price data to protect the taxpayers’ interest? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. They would be held to the same 

standards. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the chairman emeritus of the committee, Mr. Turner of Ohio. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that, 

yes. Thank you. Mr. Garamendi just pointed out that that translates to ‘‘has-been.’’ I don’t know. 

[Laughter.] 

Thank you for that vote of confidence. 

Before I ask my question, I just wanted to say one thing on the 

ranking member, who I have a great deal of respect for. We are 

going to have significant amount of debate here on sequestration 

and what needs to occur. I, for one, as many of this panel are 

aware, because I frequently pointed out, I voted against this mess 

because I was afraid we would be right here, right where we are, 

in a stalemate without any solution. 

But I want to caution against a rush to provide flexibility, because as the ranking member stated, it would not reduce the 

amount of cuts—and I am very fearful that we would be in a time-
15 

frame—in a time where the sequestration number becomes the new 

norm. And many of the cuts that sequestration are going to inflict 

are not going to result in savings. They are actually going to result 

in increased costs later. 

And my concern is, as we just heard from the commandant of the 

Marines and General Odierno today, that both of them state that 

at the sequestration numbers, that they would be unable to have 

confidence of success in one major conflict where our national strategy has been frequently two. 

So although, you know, I certainly agree that what is occurring 

is wrong and should not be done, I know we are going to be receiving—and I don’t want to give the General chills—as we are going 

to be receiving a major request for reprogramming, I certainly 

think that level of cooperation between Congress and DOD and the 

Pentagon needs to occur, but a broad flexibility, I think, would impose that number, which I think is the wrong number on the Department of Defense. So as that debate continues, I just want to 

caution there. 

General Shelton, the Department has made very significant improvements in Overhead Persistent Infrared, or OPIR. And the 

newest Air Force satellite, satellite Space-Based Infrared Systems, 

SBIRS, doing amazing work, as we all know, in the—what is highly 

needed in the area of missile warning, missile defense, battle space 

awareness, and technical intelligence. Last year, we included in the 

NDAA a provision requesting information on the exploitation of 

that information. Specifically in section 915, we asked for an assessment of whether there are further opportunities for the Department of Defense and the intelligence community to capitalize on increased data-sharing, fusion, interoperability, and exploitation. 

My question goes to, have you seen some successes in that cooperation and the sharing of that information the like that our 

committee was hoping would occur? And also, if you could indicate 

any role that you see that NASIC [National Air and Space Intelligence Center] plays in that area of sharing that information, 

thank you. 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. NASIC has been at the forefront of 

OPIR exploitation for quite some time. In fact, the National 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency has designated them as the center 

of excellence for that kind of work. We turn to them for not only 

new ways to apply that data, but also the exploitation of that data 

to look at—to identify new types of missiles to provide what we call 

templates for those missiles so that we can quickly identify, when 

one of those missiles launches, we can say that is that type of missile. That is the work that goes on at NASIC. 

There has been incredible sharing between Ms. Sapp’s people, 

our folks, NASIC, cooperating across the board to further the ability of us to exploit this wonderful data that is coming off SBIRS. 

And we have not even scratched the surface, I think, of the potential that is there. 

We have another sensor that we haven’t fully exploited yet as 

part of that satellite. We are doing a good job on the scanning sensor. The staring sensor, which has much better fidelity, we really 

haven’t fully wrung out yet, because we have been so focused on 

getting the scanning sensor calibrated and certified. 
16 

So I think NASIC is going to be right in the forefront of that and 

the cooperation between us, Ms. Sapp’s people, the NGA people, I 

think, is going to just further that effort. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, General, on a personal note, I told you before 

this hearing, I know the members of this committee and myself 

personally greatly appreciate your strong voice and your highly 

substantive expertise. You have been a great assistance to this 

committee, as we have looked to, you know, what is really occurring and how do we need to respond, and thank you for your personal dedication. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman yields back. 

The chair now recognizes my colleague from Alabama, Mr. 

Brooks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to echo some of the comments of my good friend 

from the State of Ohio, Congressman Turner, and his comments 

concerning sequestration. While flexibility is good, proper funding 

for national security is better. The President’s sequestration idea, 

which was promoted by the Republican House leadership, the Democrat Senate leadership, and a majority of the Democrats in Congress and a majority of the Republicans in Congress, quite frankly, 

is, as the President said in his State of the Union, a bad idea. 

It is inappropriate to make national defense absorb over 60 percent of the cuts in the Budget Control Act, when it is only 16 percent, 17 percent of total Federal Government spending. That is not 

proper prioritization, in my judgment. And as an aside, that is why 

I voted against the Budget Control Act in August of 2011. 

Having said that, General Shelton, quick question for you. Does 

the current Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle provider meet the 

full spectrum of capabilities across the EELV manifest as outlined 

by the operations and systems requirements, which in turn are as 

articulated in the operational requirements document and systems 

requirements document? 

General SHELTON. Easy answer, sir, and that is yes. 

Mr. BROOKS. Will any new entrants into this market be required 

to provide launch services across the full spectrum of EELV 

launches, even the most heavily and complicated mission payloads, 

as the incumbent provider is so required? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir, that is our going-in position. However, as we work our way through this and we look at the ability 

of new entrants to compete for launches, we may adjust that strategy. But our going-in position is they will have to meet the full 

spectrum. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, if new entrants are allowed to ignore some 

elements, does that create an uneven playing field, in your judgment, for the incumbent provider who must maintain capabilities 

across the full EELV spectrum and those added costs associated 

with those added stringent requirements? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir, that is something we are going to 

have to assess as we go. 

Mr. BROOKS. On a different issue now, General Shelton, the Air 

Force currently launches all of its major satellites in a single 

launch configuration, but this year’s budget includes a request for 

development of a dual-launch capability for the GPS mission. Why 
17 

is this important to the Air Force? And what are the anticipated 

savings or advantages? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir, this is all about lowering launch 

costs, so if we can put two GPSs together on a little bit bigger 

booster than what we launch on today, we believe that there will 

be a significant savings. I can’t give you a dollar figure right off the 

top of my head here, but I could get that for you. 

We believe that that will be the best way to launch GPSs in the 

future. And we are talking about GPS III satellite vehicle nine and 

out. The die is already cast one through eight, but nine and out, 

that is what we are looking at. 

Mr. BROOKS. And this next question is for the full panel, whomever may wish to jump on it. As many of you are aware, we have 

considerable reliance on liquid rocket technology from decades ago. 

While our EELV launch program is extremely successful, it 

stretches the performance to the limits of what the engines were 

designed for. Should we be prioritizing efforts for liquid rocket engine development? And if so, is the greatest need in the upper 

stage or main engines? And lastly, how is the Department working 

with NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] to ensure scarce resources in this area are properly utilized? 

Mr. KLINGER. Congressman, the Air Force is reviewing the terms 

offered by ULA in the block-buy strategy to determine the optimum 

contract terms for annual quantity buys. And what that is doing 

is stabilizing the supplier market for liquid rocket engines. In addition, the new entrant, the onset of competition and the prospect of 

competition is also stimulating some work in the industrial base. 

We have needs for both main stage and upper stage, and I will 

be glad to take for the record to provide you a more detailed answer. We do also work very closely with NASA on a number of 

fronts, and both Ms. Sapp’s organization, General Shelton’s organization work in strong partnership with NASA on issues such as the 

liquid rocket industrial base. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the remainder of my time. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes my colleague from Texas, Mr. Veasey, 

for any questions he may have. 

Mr. VEASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I appreciate 

that. 

And just wanted to just talk with you about the—looking forward 

in the future, about what we need to be doing to make sure that 

we maintain, I guess, superiority as far as space is concerned, from 

a defense standpoint. I know that, you know, we are always concerned about other countries developing technologies rapidly and 

quickly. And, like, where are we at as far as space and defense and 

how that all relates versus other countries that may be also trying 

to develop these same sort of strategies that we have or technologies that we have? And anyone that can answer the question, 

be happy to—— 

General SHELTON. [Off mike.] 

Mr. LOVERRO. Thank you, General Shelton. 

Congressman, yes, this is—you know, as you know, in the space 

policy promulgated in 2010 by the President and the national space 
18 

security strategy that we published a little bit later in 2011, we 

recognized fully the growing concerns in threats to our space 

systems. 

I think we have a multifaceted strategy to go ahead and deal 

with those across the lines of industrial competitiveness, some of 

which we have already talked about in the launch market, but just 

as thoroughly in the satellite side, as well, resilience efforts, trying 

to go ahead and make sure that our architectures are adjusted as 

we move to the future to be far more resilient against any enemy 

attacks, protection efforts that we can’t necessarily talk about in 

here, but that we are looking at for all of our space systems, and 

then, quite frankly, and probably most importantly, the space situational awareness efforts that General Shelton has already mentioned to make sure we understand what is going on in space, and 

those we feel are foundational to the protection of our space systems and clearly one of the strongest parts of our investment going 

forward. 

All of those come together to try to address the concerns that we 

see in the future from adversary nations. Clearly, we are at the beginning of this endeavor. And I think we will be happy to talk to 

you more about those as we move forward. 

Mr. VEASEY. Just out of curiosity, are there other countries outside of obvious places like China that may also be competing in this 

arena that we may not be aware of? Or not—I say that we may 

not be aware of, that may not be talked about as often as, let’s say, 

what is going with our—you know, competition with the Chinese 

on just about everything? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes, Congressman. I don’t want to go ahead and 

go into specifics here today, if you will allow me—— 

Mr. VEASEY. Okay. 

Mr. LOVERRO [continuing]. Come back and give you a clearer 

view, but we are aware of most activities across the world in this 

regard. 

Mr. VEASEY. Okay, thank you. 

General SHELTON. Sir, if you would let me follow up, if you consider our military operations for the last 21 years, 22 years, since 

1991, we have been in major combat operations sustained over that 

time. Other nations have had the opportunity to go to school on us. 

They know how involved we are with space capabilities, how integrated they are, and it is a nice way to asymmetrically challenge 

us and our combat capabilities. 

So it doesn’t take a whole lot of imagination to figure out what 

they might be up to in terms of space capabilities and what they 

would do to our space capabilities, given the opportunity. So it is 

a large concern of ours, and it is clear to us that not only with the 

budget challenges, but with the increasing threats, the status quo 

just won’t do. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes my colleague from Florida, Mr. Nugent, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NUGENT. Gentlemen, thank you for being here. And, General, thank you so much for your service, and Ms. Sapp, too, we ap-
19 

preciate it. And I know Mr. Loverro was also in the service. We appreciate all of you. 

And particularly as we talk about space—and Mr. Veasey hit on 

China in regards to—you know, they have taken some proactive actions in regards to showing that they have at least the capability 

or the intent to neutralize satellites in space. In an unclassified 

setting, could you tell me a little bit about how we think we are 

going to be—and you talk about resiliency—how we going to react 

to that? And is there a ‘‘red line’’ in regards to their actions? 

General SHELTON. Well, I will start. Red lines are policy questions, so I will have to punt that to Mr. Loverro. But in terms of 

how we react, we can’t get into much detail here, but let me talk 

about the threat for just a second. 

If you go back to 2007, we saw the Chinese very successfully test 

an ASAT [anti-satellite] capability. That is not easy. Technologically, that is not easy. That is literally a bullet with a bullet, 

and they did a very good job. Unfortunately, they generated tens 

of thousands of pieces of debris at the same time, and I would call 

that polluting the low-Earth orbit, which makes operations for 

some of our mission partners quite a challenge. 

So I think we need to pay very close attention to activities there. 

I think there are technological capabilities that have been revealed 

there that we need to pay attention to. 

Mr. NUGENT. And it is not only the kinetic, obviously, but we 

have issues in regards to the nonkinetic ability. The GAO [Government Accountability Office] annual report hit on a duplication overlap and fragmentation of space launch acquisition process for 

NASA and DOD, that they are not formally coordinated, that they 

may duplicate one another and may not really fully leverage our 

ability in our investment for space exploration, but also space 

defense. 

What are we doing to—and this could go to any one of you—what 

are we doing to work with NASA to see that we are getting the 

best bang for our buck? 

Mr. KLINGER. Congressman, we believe that we work very closely 

throughout the Department of Defense with the intelligence community, with Ms. Sapp’s organization and Air Force Space Command and the corporate Air Force, along with NASA, on a whole 

range of fronts. We have extensive R&D cooperation in the propulsion area. We combine efforts—the new entrant certification guide 

that you heard General Shelton talk about, which underpins competition, was actually jointly developed by NASA, the Air Force, 

and the NRO, so it is a combined activity. 

So we think there is actually a high level of cooperation in those 

areas where cooperation makes the most sense. We don’t think 

there is unnecessary overlap amongst the different efforts. We do 

think there are places where requirements—our mission requirements legitimately diverge, the best example being NASA’s requirement for human rating, and that imposes a level of requirements 

that is somewhat different and arguably more stringent in certain 

ways than are the requirements associated with the satellite 

launch—the booster programs that support the satellite launches 

that we provide, but we believe that there is a high level of cooperation ongoing on a number of fronts on a routine basis. 
20 

Mr. NUGENT. So that report—obviously, you know, GAO puts out 

reports that are somewhat broad-brushed. And you didn’t see anything that would heighten our attention to it, in regards to waste? 

I mean—— 

Mr. KLINGER. I did not, sir. 

Mr. NUGENT. Okay. 

General. 

General SHELTON. I would just say that I believe that—at its 

basis—they would advocate for a single contractual vehicle, and I 

just don’t think that is very realistic. 

Mr. NUGENT. Possible. 

General SHELTON. I mean, as Mr. Klinger said, there is a tremendous amount of cooperation among the space partners in this 

Government. So it doesn’t concern me. 

Mr. NUGENT. I appreciate it. Appreciate your comments, and I 

yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes himself for a second round of questions. 

General Shelton, I believe we both agree on the level of threat to 

our space systems and the need to develop necessary space defenses and a resilient architecture. But there seems to be a significant focus on the disaggregation as the solution to address this. To 

what extent has DOD validated the assertion that disaggregated 

architectures offer greater resiliency, operational efficiency, and/or 

cost savings? 

General SHELTON. Mr. Chairman, those studies are under way 

right now. We haven’t leapt on that bandwagon yet, but it appears 

to us, from the results that we have seen so far, that there is an 

advantage to disaggregation. As I said earlier, with the budget reductions that are here upon us now, with the threat that is here 

upon us now and further developing, there is a recognition that the 

status quo is just not adequate. 

So we have to do something for sure to—even if the budget was 

restored, we have to do something for sure to address the threat. 

And part of that solution set that we have come to thus far has 

been, let’s disaggregate these large, monolithic satellites into less 

complex, smaller satellites, and at least complicate the targeting 

calculus for an adversary. 

So that is what we are about. We are still studying these things. 

We haven’t made any decisions yet, but it sure looks promising. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ms. Sapp, what are your thoughts on this resiliency 

issue and disaggregation in particular? 

Ms. SAPP. I think it is very mission-specific, in terms of what the 

satellites are supposed to be doing for the Nation. So for us, 

disaggregation doesn’t work as well, and we are taking steps to 

provide resilience through both ground measures and space-based 

measures, and we certainly rely on the Air Force to provide space 

situational awareness. 

So, again, we have measures we have in place today, and certainly more we are adding in the fiscal year 2014 plan. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great, thank you. 

I want to talk about commercial satellites right now with Mr. 

Klinger and Mr. Loverro. The Defense Business Board recently finished an interesting study on commercial satellite services. The 
21 

study showed we could save money if we procure commercial satellites services more efficiently. What efforts are under way in the 

Department to address this issue? And we will start with you, Mr. 

Klinger. 

Mr. KLINGER. Mr. Chairman, you are right. It was our boss, Mr. 

Kendall, that went to Dr. Carter, the deputy secretary, and proposed that study that turned into the Defense Business Board. 

Building on those results, the Department has initiated a 90-day 

study to determine the best way forward, and Mr. Kendall announced this a couple of weeks ago. It is a study that will be jointly 

led by the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the CIO [Chief Information Officer], who has a lot of supervisory responsibilities in this area, and the focus will be on how 

best the Department can move forward to take better advantage of 

commercial goods and services in a commercial communications 

space area. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Loverro. 

Mr. LOVERRO. Certainly, Congressman. I, number one, concur 

wholeheartedly with everything that Mr. Klinger says. This is a 

key area for us, as I indicated in my opening comments. The 

leveraging of commercial space is one of the hallmarks of how we 

are going to move forward, both building resilience and to go ahead 

and address the budget issues we have. Commercial space has 

grown immensely over the last two decades. We have taken advantage of them in a—in what many have considered—and I think 

with the report you quoted—it is not the best economic approach, 

and we recognize that, and we recognize that there is a need to 

change that. 

The study that Mr. Klinger talked about, I think, is the exact 

right way to address the best way to go ahead and do that. 

Mr. ROGERS. You know, I was troubled by the fact the report also 

notes that no senior official claims sole responsibility for SATCOM, 

and multiple DOD officials asserted ownership of key components 

of SATCOM. What is being done about this leadership issue, if anything? Mr. Klinger. 

Mr. KLINGER. I think that is within the scope of the study, is we 

are not just going to look externally, Mr. Chairman, in terms of our 

relationship with industry, but one of the things that this study is 

going to look at is our internal processes both in terms of statute 

and policy, as well as how we are organized to manage and adjudicate commercial satellite goods and services, and that is one of 

the issues that will be within the scope of this 90-day study. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, good. Well, in these days of austerity, that is 

something that we need to be focused on like a laser. 

Mr. KLINGER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. The chair now recognizes the ranking member for 

any additional questions he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

If I could return to the topic of sequestration, I have great respect for my colleagues who also focused on this topic. And without 

being in any way adversarial, I would just like to point out for the 

record that the Commander of Space Command in his testimony 

said that he needed flexibility. And without having that flexibility, 
22 

we have what he described as chaos, which could not be overstated 

in his command. 

Now, that would mean to me, trying to read in the testimony, 

that he needs flexibility. Now, that is perhaps not all that he would 

like to have—and I don’t in any way want to limit General 

Shelton—because you are entitled to ask for more money, as well— 

but in your testimony, you acutely need right now flexibility. And 

yet that is what Congress is not providing. 

So reprogramming authority would help reduce the chaos or help 

the command. I am for it. There are many other things I would like 

to have, but I don’t want the best to be the enemy of the good. And 

in the meantime, shouldn’t we be reducing chaos in Space 

Command? 

Now, that is the flexibility issue. And I am not for holding Space 

Command or any part of the military hostage until I get what I 

want, because I want you to have flexibility now when you need 

it. 

On the issue of more funding, I think all of us on this committee 

would like more funding. Right now, we don’t quite know how to 

get it. So in the meantime, let’s offer flexibility. 

Now, there are ways, probably, to provide more funding. You 

know, the House has passed a budget—as it usually does—now for 

the first time in 4 or 5 years. Even the Senate has passed a budget. 

But we are refusing to conference the budgets, so that is our fault, 

and we should not punish the military or Space Command for that 

failure to even have a conference committee. 

I hope, perhaps, one side or the other will relent and we can 

have a conference committee, regular order, and actually maybe 

agree on a budget. That would be nice. But in the meantime, we 

need flexibility. So let’s consider granting flexibility. 

I am not trying to be argumentative or hard here. I am just saying, here we have a commander who is doing an excellent job, 

pointing out a need. Shouldn’t we on the subcommittee and in the 

full HASC [House Armed Services Committee] consider meeting 

that need? That shouldn’t be too hard. And let’s work on the money 

issue at the same time, and I hope we can get more money, because 

that would ease a lot of problems. 

But this is an amazing situation, where we are choosing not to 

listen to our commanders, when they clearly express a need. We all 

have ears. We have got to use them and try to help out when we 

can, because I think this is a problem that is Congress-inflicted. It 

is really a self-inflicted wound. And we should not take out this 

disagreement on our men and women in uniform or in our valuable 

other agencies that, in my opinion, are doing an extraordinary job 

of serving the needs of the nation, even during these very difficult 

circumstances. 

So as I say, I don’t want to be argumentative. I just want us to 

logically try to figure out a way to solve this problem. And I appreciate the excellent job that the witnesses before us are doing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Coffman for any additional questions he may have. 
23 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a quick statement. A comment to what Mr. Cooper has said. I think he raised 

two points. 

First, I think, conferencing on the budget, I—you know, the 

budget is merely a blueprint to show priorities in spending. And so 

it is a nonbinding document. I don’t know that that is important 

for us to conference there, but I think what is important that Mr. 

Cooper said is the need for flexibility. I think that I am disappointed in my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, to include the 

President, when they don’t want to give flexibility merely to prove 

a point, to show how bad sequestration is in order to gain more 

funding or to gain a tax increase, where I think we need flexibility 

for purposes of national security. 

We need flexibility across the board to allow Government to 

work. And this notion that we are going to show the American taxpayers how Government can’t work by not giving them flexibility 

is simply the wrong path. And so I certainly second Mr. Cooper’s 

comments when it comes to providing that flexibility. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes another chairman emeritus, Mr. 

Langevin of Rhode Island, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding this hearing before us, and I want to thank our witnesses for 

being here today, as well. 

Well, let me start off by saying that I would first like to note this 

has been a pretty eventful week in the week of the space launch 

world, with the successful launch of the Orbital Sciences Antares 

vehicle on the practice space station resupply mission. I think we 

would all agree, the successful launch of Antares puts Orbital in 

a similar trajectory, if you will pardon the pun, with SpaceX. 

And obviously, if SpaceX continues forward on its plan to build 

the Falcon 9 Heavy and the—and Orbital is successful, these two 

companies will be positioned to satisfy the Air Force’s demanding 

requirement to have a dual-launch capability and a heavy-launch 

capability. In other words, if SpaceX and Orbital proceed as 

planned, achieving the ‘‘new entrant’’ criteria appears almost certain. And thus, the Government would be well-positioned to reduce 

their launch course radically. So—and this is before we even start 

to consider other entrants that could compete down the line, such 

as Lockheed Martin or—and ATK. 

So if all of the above proceeds as planned and these new entrants 

are certified within 3 years contractually, my question is, how difficult will it be to move the majority of our launches to a less expensive provider? And more specifically, has the Air Force 

provisioned termination options within the block-buy acquisitions? 

And if so, how will the program comply with the Federal acquisitions regulations by which the program evaluates market research 

and alternative sources? And what would be the transition costs in 

that case? 

General, let’s start with you. 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. We have designed this block-buy approach with that flexibility in mind. So we have—we are committing to 36 cores with ULA preserving these 14 cores for competi-
24 

tion. That will certainly prime the pump, so to speak, on new 

entrants. 

So if they get certified, they can compete for those 14 launches. 

And then beyond the 5-year acquisition timeline for this new block 

buy, then it is a brand-new competition, all players involved, all 

certified players involved. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay, very good. Before my time expires, then let 

me turn to something else. With regard to commercial imagery, our 

international competitors are not letting up, as some are currently 

selling imagery at resolutions below what we are protecting via export controls. And others are gearing up to do the same. 

So in order to sustain our industry’s competitiveness, would you 

support a relook at commercial remote-sensing export restrictions 

currently listed in the section 1248 report regarding space export 

control policy reform? Modernization of these items, some would, I 

would say, would help ensure our satellite industry remains not 

only made in America, but also second-to-none. 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes, Congressman. Certainly, as technology 

marches on, we recognize the need to adjust our policies, and so we 

definitely would support a relook as we move forward. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay, I would encourage that. I think that is 

important. 

Let me turn to this. As the Air Force and, to some extent, the 

National Reconnaissance Office currently fund infrastructure and 

other facility support costs for the incumbent provider in order to 

help the committee to understand the current arrangement of the 

contract with the incumbent, can you describe why cost-plus vehicle is in place, given the maturity of the program? 

General SHELTON. I guess I don’t know the basis of why—specifically why that was decided to be cost-plus. 

Mr. KLINGER. Yes, I think, if we may, we would take that for the 

record and get you—get you a more detailed answer, Congressman. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 85.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Fair enough. I will take that one for the 

record. I see my time is about to expire, as well. I will yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Garamendi, for any additional questions he may have. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to continue to pursue some of the questions that Mr. 

Cooper has raised. General Shelton, the—you have asked for flexibility. I assume that is flexibility within your domain and not—or 

are you talking about flexibility within the entire Department of 

Defense? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. Again, the mechanics of the law, 

every line-item appropriation hit—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I understand. 

General SHELTON. So the flexibility would be—let us make those 

choices internal to the Department and make prioritization decisions, as opposed to those decisions being preordained. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. So it is within the entire Department of 

Defense budget, not just your budget? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. 
25 

Mr. GARAMENDI. If you had the opportunity to prioritize within 

your budget, what would you eliminate or reduce? 

General SHELTON. Well, that is a very good question. I would like 

to be able to—I would like to have the flexibility to line the programs up one to n, and we look across the board and determine, 

which programs are we going to—at the lower end of the priorities, 

which programs would we actually cut in terms of paying operations and maintenance bills, in terms of sustaining our acquisition 

programs whole. 

What is being built up here—and I don’t think everyone realizes 

this—but as you take these bites out of every program, there is a 

bow wave of expenses that are going to the right here. At some 

point in the future, these bills come due, and it may be next year. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Bow wave? Is that an appropriate term for the 

Air Force? 

[Laughter.] 

General SHELTON. It could be a term of art. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. It worked. It worked. We understood it. I think 

you have just described the conundrum that we are going to face. 

All members of the House Armed Services Committee have their 

favorite programs, and the prioritization process, if it requires our 

involvement, is likely to lead to a difficult and probably a time-consuming process, which is the normal NDAA. You, I suspect, do not 

want to have to go through all of that, and I suspect your colleagues in the other parts of the Department of Defense don’t, 

either. 

And so I think what Mr. Cooper is probably—I will speak for him 

for a moment—a blanket authority to prioritize, to achieve the 

$85—whatever—the billion dollars that would be required, is going 

to result in some of our sacred cows being sacrificed. 

That may be a good thing at the end of the day. But nonetheless, 

therein lies the problem that I think you are going to face, not that 

we should not do it, but that we would like to know what you are 

going to reduce, prioritize, so that we might participate in what is 

ultimately our authority. 

I will let it go at that, but that is a process that would have to— 

I think have to take place from Mr. Cooper’s suggestion to become 

law. And I do think his suggestion should become law. Thank you 

very much. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman for yielding back. 

The chair believes—is led to believe that the gentleman from 

Rhode Island would like to be recognized again? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. If I could, just—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Absolutely. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

One last question, if I could, General Shelton or Mr. Klinger. 

What is the status of the new acquisition strategy for the Evolved 

Expendable Launch Vehicle program? How did the Air Force determine which satellite payloads to set aside for competition? And 

which programs were part of the ULA block buy? And finally, how 

does the Air Force plan to manage this competition to ensure a 

level playing field? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. As we looked—we set aside two missions, and those missions were research and development, science 
26 

and technology kind of based missions. They weren’t operational— 

mainstream operational missions. So we felt like we could take a 

little bit more risk, set those aside, and provide those as seed corn, 

if you will, toward new entrant certification. So that is just part of 

the process, setting those aside, making them a vehicle toward 

certification. 

We believe that we will have a struggle here, as we try to allocate expenses that are now part of the foundational launch capability, allocate those to an individual mission cost, if you will, because that is not the way we do it right now. We provide the 

launch bases. We provide the launch crews. That is just the cost 

of doing business, if you will. And then we buy booster by booster. 

Allocating those fixed costs, if you will, booster by booster is 

going to be a bit of a challenge for us to do an apples-to-apples 

competition. But that is our job to do, and we will do it. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. True. I think a level playing field in that competition is absolutely essential, to make sure that we are comparing 

apples-to-apples and—— 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Klinger, do you have anything else to add? 

Mr. KLINGER. You asked about—Congressman, you asked about 

the acquisition strategy, and that was signed—the amendment to 

the existing acquisition strategy was signed in February 2013. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Very good. Thank you very much. I will 

yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. And I want to thank our 

witnesses again for your participation and your preparation. I 

would remind all the witnesses that the hearing record will be left 

open for 10 days. There may be some members who could not make 

it today that would have some questions that they would submit 

to you in writing, or maybe some of the members here who think 

of something afterwards they would like to get an answer from. So 

I would ask you to respond to those in writing. 

And with that, this committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 25, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 25, 2013 

(31) 

Statement of Hon. Mike Rogers 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request for National Security Space Activities 

April 25, 2013 

Good afternoon. I want to welcome everyone to the Strategic 

Forces Subcommittee’s hearing on the fiscal year 2014 budget request for national security space activities. Our distinguished panel 

of experts this afternoon are: 

• General William Shelton, Commander of Air Force Space 

Command; 

• Ms. Betty Sapp, Director of the National Reconnaissance Office; 

• Mr. Gil Klinger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 

Space and Intelligence Office; and 

• Mr. Doug Loverro, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Space Policy. 

I appreciate your time in appearing before this subcommittee, 

and I thank you for your leadership in national security space. 

Space is a critical element of our national security, in both peace 

and wartime environments. I am very concerned of the impact of 

sequestration on national security space programs, and I appreciate hearing more from you, during your opening statements, on 

this issue. 

Potential adversaries have taken note of our reliance on space, 

and are developing the means to degrade, deny, or destroy our capabilities. Just like in the evolution of ground, sea, and air platforms, when defenses and survivability mechanisms had to be developed to keep pace with the threat, now this is happening with 

space systems. 

I am pleased to see the Department’s recognition of the threat, 

as evidenced by the increased investment in space situational 

awareness in the fiscal year 2014 budget request. But I remain 

concerned on the future implementation of space defense and resilience, to include breaking-up or ‘‘disaggregating’’ programs that 

we’ve invested billions to develop and are just starting to provide 

the necessary capabilities for the warfighter. I look forward to further dialogue and study of this important topic. 

Separately, I commend the Department on the significant advances it has made on many space programs. After years of massive cost and schedule overruns, we have entered a new period of 

stable procurement and incremental development. As noted above, 
32 

I am skeptical when I hear that we now may want to break up 

these successful programs. 

For instance, the Air Force recently reported that new block-buy 

strategies for the Space-Based Infrared System, Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite, and the Evolved Expendable 

Launch Vehicle program are resulting in over $2.5 billion in savings over the next 5 years. 

That is a tremendous success for the military and the taxpayer 

and I hope to see those savings reinvested to provide the necessary 

modernization initiatives in accordance with warfighter requirements. 

Thank you again for being with us today, and I look forward to 

your testimony. Ranking Member Cooper and I have spent a lot of 

time together visiting an NRO ground station, the NGA headquarters, and getting the classified mission and threat briefs. We’re 

both focused on the opportunities and threats we face in space. 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

APRIL 25, 2013 

(85) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. KLINGER. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space and Intelligence, I am the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on all issues associated with the DOD endto-end Space and Intelligence infrastructure. In this role, I am accountable for acquisition oversight and acquisition related matters. Therefore, I am not able to 

speak authoritatively on this question. However, I am aware that the Air Force’s 

EELV Launch Capability efforts are currently contracted using a cost-type contract. 

The Air Force is assessing the contract type as they implement the USD(AT&L)’s 

direction to commit to up to 36 launch vehicle cores with United Launch Alliance 

and will assess it again if the Launch Capability is retained in future phases of the 

EELV program. [See page 24.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 25, 2013 

(89) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. 1) What steps has DOD taken to improve the management of requirements in order to reduce program risk? 

General SHELTON. The Air Force has taken several steps to reduce program risk 

by improving management of requirements through increased education and improvements to the requirements generation process. First, all Air Force requirements managers must complete the Requirements Management Certification Training through Defense Acquisition University courses. Second, each Air Force program 

entering the requirements process must complete Requirements Risk Assessments 

that are validated through the Air Force Requirements Oversight Council and Joint 

Staff. This validation ensures program requirements are vetted against the most 

significant risks to warfighter missions. Third, during the Analysis of Alternatives 

(AoA) phase of the acquisitions cycle, cost versus capability analyses ensure that decision makers can make smart decisions on cost versus capability trades. Fourth, 

capability development documents, based on decisions from the AoA, focus research 

and development efforts on validated warfighter requirements to guide program 

managers and reduce the risk of requirements creep. 

Mr. ROGERS. 2) How can space acquisitions be made affordable during years of 

budget constraints? What needs to change in the acquisition paradigm, if anything? 

General SHELTON. Making space acquisition more affordable demands greater 

partnership with industry, increased cooperation with our partners and allies, finding ways to decrease launch costs and ensuring our space architectures are resilient. 

With the appropriate legislative and policy guidelines in place, we can increase our 

industry and international partnerships to lower costs in those space mission areas 

best suited for partnership and focus resources on space mission areas that are less 

risk tolerant. The Department also needs to continue to explore distributed architectures during the Analysis of Alternatives portion of the acquisition process. Where 

it makes sense to move away from few, monolithic systems to more, smaller systems, we should do so to both increase resiliency and decrease launch costs. For 

launch costs, we should simultaneously continue to increase competition in the 

launch arena by both encouraging new entrants and leveraging market conditions 

that support more than one viable launch provider. 

Mr. ROGERS. 3) Is there an effort to move toward firm fixed-price contracts? Why? 

General SHELTON. The Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) has 

moved toward use of more fixed-price contracts where appropriate. As SMC’s larger 

programs move from development to production, program requirements have stabilized and manufacturing processes are becoming more mature, making it sensible 

to shift to fixed-price contracts. SMC also uses firm fixed-price (FFP) contracts for 

more commercial-like satellite procurements like the Wideband Global Satellite system. In addition, the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission System (JMS) 

is being executed using commercial, FFP contract vehicles for software applications. 

Mr. ROGERS. 4) What is the status of the new acquisition strategy for the Evolved 

Expendable Launch Vehicle program? How did the USAF determine which satellite 

payloads to set aside for competition, and which programs were part of the ULA 

block-buy? And, how does the Air Force plan to manage this competition to ensure 

a level playing field? 

General SHELTON. The Air Force is implementing a revised Evolved Expendable 

Launch Vehicle (EELV) acquisition strategy approved by the Defense Acquisition 

Executive (DAE) on February 11, 2013, which includes a quantity and rate commitment to stabilize the industrial base, as well as certification criteria for new entrants. All qualified competitors will have an opportunity to compete as early as 

FY15. A quantity commitment of 36 cores (supporting all National Security Space 

programs) allows ULA, the current EELV provider, to purchase economic order-type 

quantities of critical parts and components, run production lines more efficiently, 

and reduce non-recurring engineering costs. The strategy sets aside up to 14 cores 

(based on physical capability of new entrant expected performance), in addition to 

the above commitment, for competition as early as FY15 if new entrants become certified. If no certified competitor is viable at the time of need, these missions will 
90 

be awarded to the incumbent, under variation in quantity and configuration 

(VIQ&C) provisions to be negotiated into a contract with ULA. 

The specific method in which the current incumbent EELV Launch Capability 

(ELC) and EELV Launch Services (ELS) costs will be competed with new entrants 

has yet to be determined, but will be addressed in the Source Selection Plan. The 

details of the competition are being developed and will ensure the best value for the 

Government among all certified providers and will be conducted in accordance with 

Federal Acquisition Regulations. 

Mr. ROGERS. 5) What is the process to assess the risk classification of payloads 

for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle? 

General SHELTON. National Security Space (NSS) Payloads are classified by each 

responsible agency using a common set of criteria as specified in the coordinated 

New Entrant Strategy. These criteria include national significance, complexity, mission lifetime/constellation health, cost, launch constraints, in-flight maintenance and 

re-flight opportunities. NSS missions will usually be assigned a Class A risk designation; however, some may be assessed as Class B based on the above criteria. 

Mr. ROGERS. 6) In GAO’s annual report on duplication, overlap, and fragmentation, it reported that ‘‘Space launch acquisition processes for NASA and DOD are 

not formally coordinated, duplicate one another, and may not fully leverage the Government’s investment because the Government is not acting as a single buyer.’’ 

Please identify cost savings opportunities and identify what is being done to reduce 

duplication and leverage investments. 

General SHELTON. Current U.S. Space Transportation Policy (NSPD–40), December 2004, assigns separate responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense and the 

NASA Administrator to purchase launch services for national security requirements 

and civil requirements, respectively. 

We continue to pursue the goal of improving efficiencies and improving the Government’s buying power for Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) launch vehicles and are working with our NASA colleagues in such a way as to achieve this 

goal while still allowing each agency to perform its assigned space-related responsibilities. 

We believe wholesale consolidation is not viable due to the unique responsibilities 

of each agency. That said, the Air Force is leveraging the combined Air Force/NASA/ 

NRO buying power to obtain a more favorable economic order quantity pricing construct in the FY13–17 Launch Vehicle Production Services contract which will benefit all ULA customers. 

Mr. ROGERS. 7) What is DOD doing, or planning to do, to define and assess its 

mission assurance costs and activities, and to what extent will the strategy protect 

against overly high launch vehicle prices compared with mission assurance changes/ 

efficiencies resulting from these assessments? Further please outline how mission 

assurance for national security space missions differs from commercial space 

missions. 

General SHELTON. The Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) collaborates with our industry partners to ensure our space system acquisitions are 

cost effective with acceptable risk. In the last five years, we have experienced unprecedented success in our launch operations. The experience we have gained based 

on mission assurance priorities and requirements are being used to identify opportunities to reduce mission assurance costs. Also, in collaboration with industry, we are 

identifying non-value added tasks or unnecessary operations. 

The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) new entrant acquisition strategy 

is to permit commercially available launch services with proven mission practices 

and design to compete for contract awards. New entrants wishing to participate in 

the EELV program must meet SMC mission assurance standards for launch systems development and operations. 

Government requirements for risk management and mission assurance are different from those of the commercial market. Commercial space systems, when 

launched, focus on loss to capital and typically use private insurance to offset any 

losses. National Security Space missions measure loss in terms of mission capability 

and are self-insured. Typical mission assurance costs are approximately 5% of the 

total cost of the satellite and launch vehicle. This level of expense is justified in 

light of the operational and financial costs of a launch failure. 

Mr. ROGERS. 8) How will certified cost and pricing data requirements be applied 

to EELV contractors, both currently and in a potential future competition? 

General SHELTON. New entrants will be required to comply with applicable accounting standards related to Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 15, contracts and 

progress payment provisions. 
91 

Mr. ROGERS. 9) What are the projected savings for the dual launch capability for 

GPS III? How will you ensure a level-playing field for new entrants that might compete for GPS launches? 

General SHELTON. Dual launch is an approach to lowering launch costs. It originated in the FY13 President’s Budget as a potential cost savings/risk mitigator and 

relieves operational congestion to the Consolidated Launch Schedule and Launch 

Manifest at the Eastern Range. This effort is not yet on contract, so the cost data 

available is an estimate. We anticipate a total cost avoidance of approximately 

$500M through FY29 if operational considerations allow utilization of dual-launching GPS on a routine basis. 

It is the Government’s intent to provide assured access to space at the best value 

to the Government, and not to posture one launch provider with a competitive advantage. Any costs associated with mission-unique payload integration will be expressly excluded from consideration during competition to ensure a level playing 

field and no unfair advantage for the incumbent. 

There are numerous unknowns concerning potential new entrants and the performance characteristics of the launch vehicles they are developing. Along with certified new entrants, dual launch capability will be an invaluable tool to reconstitute 

a critical constellation of satellites quickly. When a new entrant becomes certified, 

the Air Force will reassess the best solutions with the criteria laid out for any full 

and open competition. 

Mr. ROGERS. 10) How is resilience measured and what are the most important 

steps the U.S. needs to take in order to create space systems that are resilient to 

threats? 

General SHELTON. Resilience is a combination of both quantitative and qualitative 

inputs. The proposed DOD definition of resilience for space is ‘‘. . . the ability of 

an architecture to support the functions necessary for mission success in spite of 

hostile action or adverse conditions. An architecture is ‘more resilient’ if it can provide these functions with higher probability, shorter periods of reduced capability, 

and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions and threats. Resilience may leverage cross-domain or alternative Government, commercial, or international capabilities.’’ As this definition is less than two years old, DOD organizations continue to 

refine ways for quantitative resilience analysis during the budget review and space 

Analysis of Alternatives processes. These quantitative measurements will, necessarily, vary across the space mission areas. 

Air Force Space Command is developing metrics to measure the resilience of providing capabilities to the warfighter and Nation based on warfighter requirements 

and threats. The Air Force is currently evaluating mission areas through Space 

Modernization Initiative (SMI) investments and other studies to determine what 

steps should be taken to ensure the Air Force provides resilient capability in the 

increasingly congested, contested, and competitive space environment. 

Mr. ROGERS. 11) Please describe the current efforts and priority you are placing 

on space situational awareness and space protection. 

General SHELTON. Space capabilities are critical to enable United States and allied forces to accomplish missions ranging from winning wars to humanitarian and 

disaster relief operations. In addition, the United States and global economies have 

become equally reliant on space capabilities. The first step in being able to protect 

those capabilities is having the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) to detect, track, 

and identify human-made objects in Earth orbit; characterize threats, hostile, unintentional and even environmental; and integrate space situational data into decision 

quality information. SSA is fundamental to the protection and sustainment of our 

capabilities. 

For SSA, our first priority is to preserve current capabilities in light of the difficult decisions that were necessary to comply with sequestration. The next priority 

is to narrow the gaps imposed by current system limitations and increasing threats. 

Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) is investing more capable ground sensors, satellites and modernizing data integration and processing. 

In parallel to enhancing our SSA capabilities, AFSPC is also studying approaches 

to protecting our critical space assets. Our current efforts are focused on developing 

more resilient architectures. Leveraging the interest of the entire national security 

space community, we are working to determine the right balance between capability, affordability and resilience that will enable a greater ability of our architecture to respond to threats, both unintentional and intentional. AFSPC will continue 

to work with the newly chartered Space Security and Defense Program, among others, to develop and integrate these concepts into our architectures, providing for 

much needed protection of our critical space assets. 
92 

Mr. ROGERS. 12) To what extent has DOD validated the assertion that 

disaggregated architectures offer to greater resiliency, operational efficiency, and/or 

cost savings? 

General SHELTON. Our efforts to date have focused on evaluating more affordable, 

disaggregated systems as future alternatives to, or evolutions of, existing space architectures. In principle, disaggregation offers more resilience and achieves cost efficiencies through the use of smaller, but individually less capable, satellites. Much 

of the Space Modernization Initiative (SMI) funding will support further investigation of disaggregated architectures in order to inform decisions on future systems 

based on operational efficiency, cost and resiliency. Initial studies show the use of 

hosted payloads could yield operational efficiency, greater resiliency and potential 

savings over the cost of a free-flying satellite. Demonstrations such as the Commercial Hosted Infrared Payload (CHIRP) are validating these potential benefits as are 

other preliminary findings. 

Mr. ROGERS. 13) How will the Department decide whether to apply disaggregated 

architecture principles to future space system acquisitions? Who will make the final 

decision whether a disaggregated approach is used? 

General SHELTON. A standardized methodology for creating and analyzing future 

architectures, including analyses of alternatives, will be employed in order to measure disaggregated architectures against current architectural baselines. System 

demonstrations will also be used to validate performance and cost estimates and 

mature new technologies for elements of the new architectures. Decisions will be 

made through the standard Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process and the acquisition decision process. 

Mr. ROGERS. 14) What steps does DOD plan to take, if any, to begin working toward disaggregated architectures? For example, are there plans to test the applicability of disaggregation at a smaller scale to specific mission areas? 

General SHELTON. The Department of Defense is already taking steps in this area 

through Space Modernization Initiative (SMI) efforts that assist in defining new 

disaggregated architectures in multiple mission areas (e.g., Overhead Persistent 

Infra-Red and MILSATCOM) and demonstrating projects to validate their performance, cost and technology maturity. These efforts will assist the Air Force in evaluating the concept of disaggregation for decisions on future systems. 

Mr. ROGERS. 15) What is the status of the Joint Space Operations Center Mission 

System Program? Is the program structured to provide to meet requirements at the 

lowest cost and shortest schedule? 

General SHELTON. The Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission System 

(JMS) program was restructured in 2011 to significantly reduce cost and to accelerate the delivery of capabilities to the warfighter. The current program of record 

provides capabilities to the JSpOC through a series of incremental deliveries rather 

than a single large package. The program is also specifically designed to maximize 

the use of existing software products including commercial software whenever feasible and affordable. The incorporation of commercially developed software, as well 

as Government developed, is key to meeting cost and schedule targets. 

JMS Increment-1 was fielded at the JSpOC in late October 2012 and has successfully completed its independent operational test and trial period. Increment-1 is currently in use on a daily basis and has supported a number of recent high-profile 

events. JMS Increment-2 began integration in April 2013. Increment-2 service packs 

will be provided to the JSpOC from mid-FY14 and through FY16, with deliveries 

occurring every six to seven months. The use of discrete service packs within the 

larger increments provides capability to the warfighter as soon possible. 

Mr. ROGERS. 16) With the cancellation of the Spaced Based Surveillance System 

(SBSS) follow-on program in the FY14 budget request, what is the Air Force position on the need for space situation awareness from satellites? Are there any gaps 

in coverage? 

General SHELTON. With Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) Block 10 System 

becoming operational in August 2012, we continue to meet USSTRATCOM requirements for the timely detect, track, and identification of deep space objects in all regions of space until its end of life (estimated September 2017). 

Without an above-the-weather space-based Space Situational Awareness (SSA) 

system like this, our deep space architecture relies largely on ground-based optical 

telescopes, which are limited by daylight and weather, and radars which are limited 

by sensitivity. The resultant sensing gaps afford adversaries freedom of action and 

delay identification of potential unintentional threats such as maneuvers and 

conjunctions. 

Because of the capabilities and advantages provided by space-based capability, it 

is critical that we continue to invest in space-based platforms as a part of the SSA 
93 

architecture. This will ensure we maintain custody of threats and support threat 

identification and in turn enable defensive action in deep space. 

Given the current budget challenges, Air Force Space Command is exploring options and timing for a follow on space-based platform to preserve this vital capability at an affordable cost. 

Mr. ROGERS. 17) There are various efforts in the Department, namely Air Force, 

Army, and DARPA, to provide rapid, low-cost launch solutions. How do you foresee 

this type of capability being used by the warfighter? In light of increasing foreign 

threats to our space systems, how important is it that we prioritize these efforts? 

General SHELTON. For many years, the space community has studied responsive 

capabilities. These studies often have been segmented, looking at only responsive 

launch, or only responsive satellites. For the concept to be viable, both satellite and 

launch must be equally responsive, and therein lies the problem. We could easily 

produce responsive launch vehicle capability, but for the full mission capability to 

be truly responsive, satellites would need to be ready to respond at the same pace 

as the booster, likely requiring stored and ready satellites. This approach is too expensive in the current budget climate. 

Additionally, unless offensive action has been taken to neutralize the threat that 

negated existing on orbit capability, responsive systems would be launching into the 

same threat environment that caused the loss of the original satellite. 

We are working with the entire community to ensure viable concepts of operation, 

coupled with affordability, to drive our work on responsive systems. 

Mr. ROGERS. 18) What is being done to monitor any efforts to disrupt or degrade 

our space capabilities? 

General SHELTON. Current systems maintain track of satellites and debris in 

orbit. In addition, these systems respond to events such as launches, maneuvers and 

breakups. Further, in concert with our intelligence community partners, we are 

working to understand the threats those objects or events may pose to our satellites. 

To improve those capabilities, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) has developed 

a comprehensive Space Situational Awareness (SSA) architecture approach spanning the capability areas. The first increment of that SSA architecture is focused 

on affording the best mix of near earth and deep space sensors, along with the requisite data integration and exploitation to process the sensor data, integrate it with 

intelligence, environmental and other data and provide timely, decision quality information to commanders and other users. This architecture will provide a greater 

capacity for predicting events, creating decision space and enabling action. 

To combat the emerging threats to our satellites from cyberspace, AFSPC is collaborating with USSTRATCOM and other space community partners through an 

initiative called Crystal Defender which is in Phase-II of its analysis, currently conducting a vulnerability assessment on the Global Positioning System (GPS) and 

analyzing the nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture. 

Additionally, focused tiger teams are in place to oversee initiatives that establish 

individual computer network defense service providers for each space system. Finally, the integration of space and cyber under one command and the lessons 

learned coming from Crystal Defender enable AFSPC to manage security threats 

and vulnerabilities of the Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) with the 

same rigor that is in place for managing threats in our backbone network for administration, business, and mission systems, the Air Force Information Network 

(AFIN). 

Mr. ROGERS. 19) What is the process to respond to situations where our satellites 

are interfered with or attacked? Are there established ‘‘red lines’’ and responses? 

General SHELTON. Electromagnetic interference (EMI), whether purposeful or nonpurposeful, can be detected by the system user, owner/operator, or through deliberate monitoring activities. Once detected, this interference is reported and mitigated through a standard process: the owner/operator will notify the Joint Space 

Operations Center (JSpOC) located at Vandenberg AFB. The JSpOC will then task 

assets and request support from the intelligence community to assist in determining 

the type and source of the interference. If the interference is determined to be purposeful, it is then reported to USSTRATCOM, who will engage with the Department 

of Defense to determine the best course of action. There are currently no established 

‘‘red lines’’ or responses for the attack on a satellite. 

Mr. ROGERS. 20) What steps has DOD taken to improve the management of requirements in order to reduce program risk? 

Ms. SAPP. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) works with its partners in 

the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to ensure the cost and risk associated with requirements is understood. This partnership, along with NRO’s rigorous acquisition policies and manage-
94 

ment, allow for the responsible management of risk in Major System Acquisition 

(MSA) programs. 

Mr. ROGERS. 21) How can space acquisitions be made affordable during years of 

budget constraints? What needs to change in the acquisition paradigm, if anything? 

Ms. SAPP. The NRO’s evolutionary acquisition approach leverages the investments 

already made in a particular program, and makes adjustments and changes in response to risks and opportunities. By not ‘‘re-creating the wheel’’ for each program, 

the NRO can advance technology and make any major program changes up front, 

saving significant costs in the acquisition of such specialized systems. 

Mr. ROGERS. 22) Is there an effort to move toward firm fixed-price contracts? 

Why? 

Ms. SAPP. The NRO’s contracting policy is to assess each acquisition and utilize 

the appropriate contract type based on technical, cost, and schedule performance 

and the risk associated with each of these factors. The NRO does not have a policy 

that emphasizes the use of any particular contract type. NRO Directorates and Offices are required to brief a proposed acquisition strategy to the NRO Acquisition 

Strategy Council for each Major System Acquisition 12–18 months prior to release 

of the solicitation by NRO senior leadership and prior to any required approvals by 

the program Milestone Decision Authorities at the Joint Intelligence Acquisition 

Board. A proposed contract type with justification is briefed and reviewed during 

both forums to ensure it results in reasonable contractor risk and provides the contractor with the greatest incentive for efficient and cost-effective performance. 

Mr. ROGERS. 23) What is the process to assess the risk classification of payloads 

for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle? 

Ms. SAPP. The NRO, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 

and U.S. Air Force (AF) formalized a common approach and criteria for the risk 

classification of payloads for all missions, including those intended to be launched 

using the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) system. The NRO will assess 

each mission against these common criteria to determine payload risk classification. 

Mr. ROGERS. 24) In GAO’s annual report on duplication, overlap, and fragmentation, it reported that ‘‘Space launch acquisition processes for NASA and DOD are 

not formally coordinated, duplicate one another, and may not fully leverage the Government’s investment because the Government is not acting as a single buyer.’’ 

Please identify cost-savings opportunities and identify what is being done to reduce 

duplication and leverage investments. 

Ms. SAPP. The NRO has taken significant steps to ensure its launch activities are 

fully coordinated with the AF and NASA. As noted in the Government Accountability Office report, the three launch agencies have formalized our approach to 

EELV acquisition in a Memorandum of Understanding. Strategic acquisition planning is discussed at the agency director level at recurring AF–NASA–NRO Summits, while programmatic and tactical planning is addressed at the Government Expendable Launch Vehicle Executive Board (GEEB) and Launch Collaboration Steering Group (LCSG). The GEEB and LCSG provide key mechanisms to foster sharing 

of acquisition planning and lessons learned across the NASA, AF, and NRO launch 

communities. The NRO partners with the AF to acquire launches for national security missions, and the NRO/AF EELV block-buy acquisition currently underway 

seeks to stabilize current EELV suppliers with a 36 core commitment while enabling competition as new launch capability is demonstrated and certified. This strategy was discussed by the three agencies as a means to provide cost savings to all 

Government EELV users by stabilizing production over the next few years. The 

NASA keeps the AF and NRO apprised of their commercial cargo and crew acquisition planning and Space Launch System development plans to further enable stabilization of the broader space launch industrial base. Finally, the NRO, AF, and 

NASA have agreed to a common certification approach for New Entrant launch 

service providers, and the NRO is leveraging the certification efforts of the AF and 

NASA in its certification activities. Through these efforts, the Government is able 

to achieve cost savings and to leverage investments with minimal duplication 

through the established forums for communication across all management levels. 

Mr. ROGERS. 25) What is DOD doing, or planning to do, to define and assess its 

mission assurance costs and activities, and to what extent will the strategy protect 

against overly high launch vehicle prices compared with mission assurance changes/ 

efficiencies resulting from these assessments? Further please outline how mission 

assurance for national security space missions differs from commercial space 

missions. 

Ms. SAPP. In February 2010 the Secretary of the AF commissioned the Broad Area 

Review X Study to provide an updated assessment on the effectiveness of the EELV 

mission assurance process. The study recognized that Government mission assurance builds on the launch contractor mission assurance and quality assurance proc-
95 

esses, and recommended that the AF and DNRO should: ‘‘Maintain the current mission success/mission assurance focus, and continue to provide resources to support 

the Mission Assurance process that has resulted in unprecedented levels of Mission 

Success over the last decade.’’ 

The NRO has a dedicated Mission Assurance Team that is focused on maximizing 

mission success for NRO payloads and provides an independent technical risk assessment to AF EELV system-level mission assurance. The NRO, working with the 

AF, has refined its contribution to AF-managed EELV fleet mission assurance and 

continues to collaborate on ways to maintain the highest possible levels of mission 

success as efficiently as possible. 

Most commercial space missions rely on insurance to cover the risk of launch and/ 

or spacecraft failure as well as loss of commercial revenue streams. Government 

Launch Vehicle Mission Assurance (LVMA) serves as ‘‘insurance’’ for Government 

missions seeking to increase probability of success in lieu of payment for lost sunk 

costs. Most Government missions’ value to the Nation is well beyond the cost expended for the spacecraft and launch, and Government LVMA helps to ensure that 

the critical capabilities of our space systems are not lost due to launch failure. Commercial space customers and the insurance underwriters benefit from the Government LVMA which seeks to increase the overall reliability of the launch system, as 

demonstrated by the current EELV program outstanding success record. 

Mr. ROGERS. 26) How is resilience measured and what are the most important 

steps the U.S. needs to take in order to create space systems that are resilient to 

threats? 

Ms. SAPP. For the NRO, a direct measure of space system resiliency involves assessing the decrease in collection capability as a function of an adversary’s 

counterspace actions. The NRO uses sophisticated modeling tradecraft to help make 

these assessments. The NRO’s modeling tradecraft combines foreign counter-space 

threat information provided by the Intelligence Community (IC) with the projected 

effectiveness of the resiliency enhancement(s) in question. The resulting information 

is then used to calculate the reduction in collection as a function of conflict intensity 

and time. Due to the variability of the data input, statistical analysis is used to obtain the most likely reduction in collection for different threat levels and resiliency 

options. 

The most important step to creating resilient space systems is achieving the appropriate balance of system hardening, mission operations tradecraft, and architecture diversity. Operational tradecraft, including the use of indications and warning 

to trigger courses of action and concepts of operation, offers a cost effective, nearterm solution to the most likely counterspace threats. Architecture diversity, and its 

coordinated use, not only results in more timely and actionable intelligence, but enhances the NRO’s ability to operate through some of the most challenging threats. 

Mr. ROGERS. 27) Please describe the current efforts and priority you are placing 

on space situational awareness and space protection. 

Ms. SAPP. Situational awareness, including the monitoring of space, terrestrial, 

and cyber threats, is a key element of NRO’s survivability strategy. Continuous 

monitoring of these elements establishes both a baseline of normal activity and 

changes to the baseline associated with foreign counterspace actions. Such monitoring and awareness are critical for indicating when potential responses/actions 

may be warranted. Actions available to operators include various courses of action 

and concepts of operation that either minimize or mitigate counterspace threats. 

With regard to Space Situational Awareness (SSA), the NRO has key partnerships 

with the AF to ensure that we have the strongest team possible in addressing these 

critical threats. 

Timely and appropriate response to space situational awareness indications and 

warning is particularly important due to operational requirements. Because of this, 

the NRO places a high priority on monitoring, categorizing, and characterizing potential threats through all possible means, domains, and partnerships. To further 

enhance our capabilities, the NRO is also developing a decision support tool to help 

satellite operators integrate, visualize, and act upon the situational awareness data. 

The NRO places a high priority on space protection, though specific details regarding space protection are classified. 

Mr. ROGERS. 28) What steps does DOD plan to take, if any, to begin working toward disaggregated architectures? For example, are there plans to test the applicability of disaggregation at a smaller scale to specific mission areas? 

Ms. SAPP. The NRO does not have any plans to begin working towards 

disaggregated architectures, as they do not meet the unique mission needs of our 

NRO systems. The NRO is taking steps to address resiliency through ground-based 

and space-based measures and our partnerships with the AF and the IC. 
96 

Mr. ROGERS. 29) There are various efforts in the Department, namely Air Force, 

Army, and DARPA, to provide rapid, low-cost launch solutions. How do you foresee 

this type of capability being used by the warfighter? In light of increasing foreign 

threats to our space systems, how important is it that we prioritize these efforts? 

Ms. SAPP. The NRO requires reliable, predictable, and affordable launch capability, which we address through our partnership with the AF on launch capabilities. We address foreign threats to our space systems through awareness, protection, 

diversity and Concepts of Operations (CONOPS). 

Mr. ROGERS. 30) What is the process to respond to situations where our satellites 

are interfered with or attacked? Are there established ‘‘red lines’’ and responses? 

Ms. SAPP. The NRO continues to refine a process to better respond to satellite interference and/or attack, but these activities are largely classified. The first element 

involves determining if the anomalous behavior is the result of environmental activity (e.g., solar activity or weather-related disruption), system anomaly (component 

or subsystem failures), or counterspace activity. To quickly assess and delineate 

among these factors, the NRO maintains a team of skilled satellite operators with 

reach-back support that continuously monitor operations and satellite state-ofhealth. With respect to counterspace activities, in addition to refining established 

processes, the NRO is developing a decision support tool that integrates an array 

of situational awareness and indications and warning sensors that allow satellite 

operators to anticipate and, when necessary, take appropriate actions to avoid 

counterspace activities. In cases where anomalous activity is detected, but not anticipated, the decision tool can hasten troubleshooting the situation, thereby facilitating operators taking appropriate and timely actions. In addition, the NRO has 

established a process and timeline for senior interagency and Congressional leadership notification in the event of suspect or confirmed satellite interference and/or 

attack. There are few established or prescribed ‘‘red lines’’ other than those captured 

in current treaty language, for example, not to interfere with national technical 

means of verification. The NRO is engaged with others in the interagency to include 

the IC, the Department of Defense, and the State Department to review this and 

related issues. 

Mr. ROGERS. 31) What steps has DOD taken to improve the management of requirements in order to reduce program risk? 

Mr. KLINGER. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space and Intelligence, I am the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on all issues associated with the DOD endto-end Space and Intelligence infrastructure. In this role, I am accountable for acquisition oversight and acquisition related matters. Therefore, I am not able to 

speak authoritatively on this question. However, we are aware that the requirements and acquisition communities are working closely together to reduce program 

risk and incorporate better buying power principles wherever possible. 

Mr. ROGERS. 32) How can space acquisitions be made affordable during years of 

budget constraints? What needs to change in the acquisition paradigm, if anything? 

Mr. KLINGER. The USD(AT&L)’s Better Buying Power 2.0 (BBP 2.0) Initiative is 

intended to help mitigate this era of severe budget constraints. BBP 2.0 was provided to industry and we have received numerous comments from the commercial 

satellite industry including suggestions how the Government might improve the efficiency of procurement of commercial satellite systems and services. Subsequently, 

the Department kicked off a review to determine best practices in teaming with industry to lower costs of space systems and services. 

An excellent example of improved affordability is the Evolved Expendable Launch 

Vehicle (EELV) program. The FY14PB reduced the EELV program budget by almost 

$1B across the FYDP. This is a direct result of improved communication with our 

current provider to stabilize the EELV production rate and supply chain. In addition, the Department has taken actions to introduce competition in the EELV program by publishing a new entrant certification process, providing opportunities for 

new entrants to launch more risk tolerant payloads prior to certification, and establishing early competition opportunities as soon as new entrants are certified. 

The Department is continually reviewing our acquisition legislative, policy, guidelines, regulatory or contracting actions which could be taken to improve the Government satellite procurement process along with our acquisition models to ensure 

space acquisitions are as affordable as possible. 

Mr. ROGERS. 33) Is there an effort to move toward firm fixed-price contracts? 

Why? 

Mr. KLINGER. We continually look for better and more efficient ways to acquire 

the Department’s materiel needs. In November 2010, the USD(AT&L) issued Better 

Buying Power (BBP) 1.0 Guidance for obtaining greater efficiency and productivity 
97 

in defense spending, which included guidance on increasing the use of Fixed-Price 

contracts, where appropriate. Last November, USD(AT&L) issued BBP 2.0 which 

builds upon this guidance to stress using appropriate contract types while encouraging the use of Fixed Price Incentive contracts for early production. Through the 

BBP initiatives, we are striving to incentivize productivity and innovation in industry and Government by utilizing the appropriate contract type for each phase of an 

acquisition. Fixed Price contracts are generally more suitable for the production 

phase of satellite acquisition since the requirements are firm, the design is mature 

as demonstrated in developmental testing, and manufacturing processes with qualified suppliers are in place. The Department follows the Congressional direction in 

section 818 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2007, P.L. 109–364, to select the contract type for a development program at the 

time of Milestone B approval that is consistent with the level of program risk 

Mr. ROGERS. 34) What is the status of the new acquisition strategy for the 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program? How did the USAF determine which 

satellite payloads to set aside for competition, and which programs were part of the 

ULA block-buy? And, how does the Air Force plan to manage this competition to 

ensure a level playing field? 

Mr. KLINGER. USD(AT&L) approved an amendment to the EELV Acquisition 

Strategy on February 10, 2013, authorizing the Air Force to order up to 36 rocket 

cores from United Launch Alliance (ULA) during FY13–17 and to leave open for 

competition up to 14 additional rocket cores during the same period. The missions 

reserved for competition are those that (1) meet the performance capabilities (mass 

to orbit injection) of the potential New Entrant’s launch vehicles (as stated by the 

vendors) and (2) will be ordered after the estimated certification date for the New 

Entrant’s launch vehicles (as stated by the vendors), with a single exception where 

the cost to compete the launch service was not in the best interest of the Government. The 36 cores that the Air Force is negotiating with ULA are either outside 

the New Entrant’s stated lift capability and/or will be ordered before the New Entrant(s) expect to achieve certification; e.g., only those launch service orders that the 

New Entrants cannot satisfy are planned for sole-source award to the ULA. 

The Air Force is currently developing the detailed plan to compete as many of the 

14 cores as soon as the FY15 launch service awards. This plan will address the factors used to ensure a fair and equitable competition. The Air Force plans to obtain 

USD(AT&L)’s approval of this plan late this calendar year. In addition, the Air 

Force will award early integration contracts following a new entrant’s first successful certification flight to provide insight into launch vehicle to satellite compatibility. 

Mr. ROGERS. 35) What is the process to assess the risk classification of payloads 

for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle? 

Mr. KLINGER. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space and Intelligence, I am the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on all issues associated with the DOD endto-end Space and Intelligence infrastructure. In this role, I am accountable for acquisition oversight and acquisition related matters. Therefore, I am not able to 

speak authoritatively on this question. However, the Air Force is responsible for assessing the risk classification of payloads using the common set of criteria defined 

in the ‘‘Coordinated Strategy Among the US Air Force, the NRO and NASA for New 

Entrant Launch Vehicle Certification,’’ signed on October 12, 2011. 

Mr. ROGERS. 36) In GAO’s annual report on duplication, overlap, and fragmentation, it reported that ‘‘Space launch acquisition processes for NASA and DOD are 

not formally coordinated, duplicate one another, and may not fully leverage the Government’s investment because the Government is not acting as a single buyer.’’ 

Please identify cost-savings opportunities and identify what is being done to reduce 

duplication and leverage investments. 

Mr. KLINGER. The concerns cited in the GAO’s report are derived from US Space 

Transportation Policy (NSPD–40), from December 2004, which assigns separate responsibilities to the SECDEF and the NASA Administrator to purchase launch services for national security requirements and civil requirements, respectively. Under 

‘‘Assuring Access to Space,’’ NSPD–40 assigns responsibilities for acquiring launch 

services as follows, ‘‘2) The Secretary of Defense shall be the launch agent for the 

national security sector and shall maintain the capability to develop, evolve, operate, and purchase services for those space transportation systems, infrastructure, 

and support activities necessary to meet national security requirements.’’, ‘‘3) The 

Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall be the 

launch agent for the civil sector and shall maintain the capability to develop, evolve, 

operate, and purchase services for those space transportation systems, infrastructure, and support activities necessary to meet civil requirements, including the ca-
98 

pability to conduct human and robotic space flight for exploration, scientific, and 

other civil purposes.’’ 

Mr. ROGERS. 37) What is DOD doing, or planning to do, to define and assess its 

mission assurance costs and activities, and to what extent will the strategy protect 

against overly high launch vehicle prices compared with mission assurance changes/ 

efficiencies resulting from these assessments? Further please outline how mission 

assurance for national security space missions differs from commercial space 

missions. 

Mr. KLINGER. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space and Intelligence, I am the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on all issues associated with the DOD endto-end Space and Intelligence infrastructure. In this role, I am accountable for acquisition oversight and acquisition related matters. Therefore, I am not able to 

speak authoritatively on this question. However, the Air Force is the responsible 

agency for National Security Space Launch and, as such, defines the Department’s 

mission assurance process. I do believe our Mission Assurance costs, which are on 

the order of 3–5% of the cost of the launch vehicle, are appropriate. In addition, I 

believe there is a fundamental difference between launching a commercial satellite 

and a National Security Space satellite that justifies the Department’s approach. 

While a commercial entity can use insurance to offset the financial losses associated 

with a failure to place the satellite in the correct orbit, the Department loses the 

capability that that satellite would have provided. These systems take many months 

or years to regenerate, leaving our national and warfighting users without capability they were planning to have for their missions. 

Mr. ROGERS. 38) How is resilience measured and what are the most important 

steps the U.S. needs to take in order to create space systems that are resilient to 

threats? 

Mr. KLINGER. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space and Intelligence, I am the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on all issues associated with the DOD endto-end Space and Intelligence infrastructure. In this role, I am accountable for acquisition oversight and acquisition related matters. Therefore, I am not able to 

speak authoritatively on this question. However, I am aware that the intelligence, 

requirements, and acquisition communities are working closely together to address 

this question. 

Mr. ROGERS. 39) Please describe the current efforts and priority you are placing 

on space situational awareness and space protection. 

Mr. KLINGER. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space and Intelligence, I am the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on all issues associated with the DOD endto-end Space and Intelligence infrastructure. In this role, I am accountable for acquisition oversight and acquisition related matters. Therefore, I am not able to 

speak authoritatively on this question. However, assuring required space capabilities are available in a contested environment is a top priority for the Department. 

Space situational awareness is the foundation for all space operations and the key 

enabler for protecting U.S. interests in space. 

In March 2013, the Department and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence jointly established the Space Security and Defense Program (SSDP). The 

SSDP will serve as the center of excellence to inform options and strategies (materiel, non-materiel, cross-Title 10 and 50 United States Code, and cross-domain) to 

enable a more resilient and survivable National Security Space Enterprise. As part 

this effort, the Office of the Director for National Intelligence is establishing a Space 

Threat Assessment Cell to provide long-term threat assessment and evaluation support to the SSDP. 

Mr. ROGERS. 40) How will the Department decide whether to apply disaggregated 

architecture principles to future space system acquisitions? Who will make the final 

decision whether a disaggregated approach is used? 

Mr. KLINGER. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space and Intelligence, I am the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on all issues associated with the DOD endto-end Space and Intelligence infrastructure. In this role, I am accountable for acquisition oversight and acquisition related matters. Therefore, I am not able to 

speak authoritatively on this question. However, I am aware that Air Force Space 

Command is reviewing and evaluating disaggregated architecture principles for future space systems. There will be senior-level Department reviews prior to submission to the Deputy Secretary for final decision about whether a disaggregated approach is used. 
99 

Mr. ROGERS. 41) What steps does DOD plan to take, if any, to begin working toward disaggregated architectures? For example, are there plans to test the applicability of disaggregation at a smaller scale to specific mission areas? 

Mr. KLINGER. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space and Intelligence, I am the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on all issues associated with the DOD endto-end Space and Intelligence infrastructure. In this role, I am accountable for acquisition oversight and acquisition related matters. Therefore, I am not able to 

speak authoritatively on this question. However, I am aware that Air Force Space 

Command is reviewing/evaluating disaggregated architectures. I expect they will assess disaggregated architecture response options as part of the trade space and the 

need to understand performance issues surrounding proposed architectures. 

Mr. ROGERS. 42) There are various efforts in the Department, namely Air Force, 

Army, and DARPA, to provide rapid, low-cost launch solutions. How do you foresee 

this type of capability being used by the warfighter? In light of increasing foreign 

threats to our space systems, how important is it that we prioritize these efforts? 

Mr. KLINGER. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space and Intelligence, I am the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on all issues associated with the DOD endto-end Space and Intelligence infrastructure. In this role, I am accountable for acquisition oversight and acquisition related matters. Therefore, I am not able to 

speak authoritatively on this question. However, I am aware all applicable communities are collaborating on this important issue. 

Mr. ROGERS. 43) There have been major advances in Overhead Persistent Infrared 

with the launch of the Space-Based Infrared System. Are we leveraging this capability to the fullest extent? What challenges and opportunities are ahead? 

Mr. KLINGER. I agree with the comment General Shelton made during the hearing, stating ‘‘we have not even scratched the surface’’ in exploiting and leveraging 

the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) to its fullest extent. Air Force Space Command, as the command responsible for operations and acquisition of the SBIRS system, continues to make progress to further leverage the capabilities of the on-orbit 

spacecraft and sensors, in conjunction with NASIC, NGA, and the NRO. 

While it is most appropriate for the Air Force to provide specific operational plans, 

the OPIR community continues working to leverage the strengths and expertise of 

each other’s respective organizations to effectively operate the OPIR Enterprise to 

address both existing requirements and emerging threats in a cost-conscious and affordable way. The ground segment has sought to exploit our OPIR sensors more effectively by introducing new processing techniques, fusing data streams, and adopting common mission management tools. The ground segment has also sought to 

make both processed and raw data more accessible to a wider base of users. We 

have accomplished much, but have more to do in this area. 

Looking forward, many challenges and opportunities exist. The DOD and IC will 

continue to cooperate in the development of new sensors, technology, tradecraft, 

sources, and collaborative strategies while improving cost performance and ensuring 

mission functional availability. The objective is an effective and affordable OPIR Enterprise that will continue to provide a key strategic advantage for dealing with 

emerging threats and enduring national security challenges of the 21st century. 

Mr. ROGERS. 44) Are we procuring commercial satellite services in the most efficient way, and if not, what opportunities for improvement are there? Also, who has 

sole responsibility for satellite communications in the Department? 

Mr. KLINGER. In response to the USD(AT&L) announcement of his Better Buying 

Power 2.0 Initiative some members of the commercial SATCOM industry provided 

some suggestions to the DOD on how the DOD might improve the efficiency of procuring commercial SATCOM services. The Department has kicked off a review to 

determine any near-term legislative, policy, regulatory or contracting actions which 

could be taken to improve the existing Government SATCOM procurement process. 

There is no sole responsibility for satellite communications within the Department. USD(AT&L) has responsibility for MILSATCOM acquisition programs, DOD 

CIO has the responsibility for SATCOM policy, and DISA has the responsibility for 

commercial SATCOM contracting. 

Mr. ROGERS. 45) What is the process to respond to situations where our satellites 

are interfered with or attacked? Are there established ‘‘red lines’’ and responses? 

Mr. KLINGER. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space and Intelligence, I am the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on all issues associated with the DOD endto-end Space and Intelligence infrastructure. In this role, I am accountable for acquisition oversight and acquisition related matters. Therefore, I am not able to 
100 

speak authoritatively on this question. However, we are aware that there are currently no established ‘‘red lines’’ or responses for the attack of an on orbit satellite. 

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy published the DOD Space 

Policy, updated in October 2012 and it outlines the Department’s multilayered approach to deterrence in the space domain. The policy also declares that purposeful 

interference with U.S. space systems and other space systems upon which the U.S. 

relies is irresponsible in peacetime and may be escalatory in a crisis. 

Mr. ROGERS. 46) How can space acquisitions be made affordable during years of 

budget constraints? What needs to change in the acquisition paradigm, if anything? 

Mr. LOVERRO. The Department has already begun to make great strides in reducing the cost of space acquisition. Using the Efficient Space Procurement (ESP) authority granted by Congress and by following the precepts within the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Better Buying Power 

initiatives, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) has already made substantial 

progress in reducing the cost of multiple production satellites, notably the most recent Wideband Global Service (WGS) satellites, and the Advanced Extremely High 

Frequency (AEHF) satellites. The WGS system as a whole also benefits from the 

international cooperative arrangements that the Air Force has negotiated to increase the number of production satellites and drive down the cost for all. 

In general, these types of good business strategies can be applied across most 

space acquisitions, and AFSPC is in the process of applying these same strategies 

to the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), the Global Positioning System (GPS), 

and the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. 

Still, more can be done. Greater communication and coordination with industry 

in those areas where commercial space has a substantial footprint and increased cooperation with allies and partners can both continue to drive down space acquisition 

cost and create more resilient space capabilities. To that end, the Department is already working with new entrant commercial launch providers, and has entered into 

multiple space situational awareness sharing or cooperative arrangements. We have 

partnered with Taiwan on the COSMIC–2 space weather system, effectively cutting 

the cost of that system by more than two-thirds. 

We need to expand our leveraging of allied space capabilities, where operationally 

suitable. Our allies and partners have significant and growing space-based capabilities in a range of mission areas. By leveraging their systems, we can augment our 

capabilities, add diversity and resilience to our architectures, and complicate the decision-making of potential adversaries all while reducing cost. On the commercial 

side, we need to become more astute buyers of commercial satellite communication 

(SATCOM) services by exploring innovative approaches, such as multi-year contract 

authority or co-investment for commercial space services. Additionally, we believe 

hosted payloads and disaggregated architectures have the potential to allow us to 

take advantage of the most competitive sectors of our space market and drive down 

costs further. The Commercially Hosted Infrared Program (CHIRP) demonstration 

showed the advantages of this approach and the AFSPC Hosted Payload Indefinite/ 

Indefinite Delivery allows the Department to further explore its long term benefits. 

Mr. ROGERS. 47) Is there an effort to move toward firm fixed-price contracts? 

Why? 

Mr. LOVERRO. The specific circumstance of an acquisition is the most important 

determinant of the type of contract to be issued. The Department is exploring methods to improve our acquisition processes, energize the U.S. industrial base, and enhance technological innovation. We are striving to ensure the industrial base is robust, competitive, flexible, healthy, and delivers reliable space capabilities on time 

and on budget. The Department follows the congressional direction in section 818 

of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (P.L. 

109–364) to select the contract type for a development program that is consistent 

with the level of program risk at the time of Milestone B approval. 

In some cases, we have found that these goals can be best accomplished by expanding the traditional focus from primarily cost-plus to those that include fixed 

price arrangements. Such was the case for both SBIRS and AEHF where the baseline was firm and production processes were mature. Similarly, the Air Force intends to investigate whether to buy the next set of GPS III satellites under fixed 

price, and/or to renegotiate several existing cost-plus GPS III satellite contracts, if 

they conclude a sufficient level of maturity has been reached on that program and 

if it is in the program’s best interests. 

In general, when baselines are firm, production processes mature, Government 

and contractor oversight processes are settled, and technology risk has been eliminated, the move to fixed price arrangements can be beneficial for both the contractor 

and the Department. That normally happens as systems enter production. But it 
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can also be true for developmental programs if the acquisition was structured correctly. Such is the case for the Air Force Space Fence program which spent the first 

5 years establishing the right conditions for a fixed price development, significantly 

driving down both cost and risk in the process. 

Mr. ROGERS. 48) In January 2012, the Secretary of State announced a decision 

to initiate formal negotiations with the European Union and other space-faring nations to develop an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. What 

is the status of these activities? What are the advantages and disadvantages of negotiating and signing onto such a Code? What national security considerations 

should the Department take into account as it reviews such a proposal? How do we 

balance increased cooperation with assured access and freedom of action? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Negotiations for the International Code of Conduct are underway. 

As noted in the DOD Space Policy, the Department is working with interagency, 

international, and commercial partners to define and promote safe and responsible 

space operations. The Department of Defense is actively working with the Department of State to conduct bilateral and multilateral discussions with allies and other 

space-faring nations in support of a non-legally binding International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. The congested and contested space environment presents challenges for all space-faring nations. Efforts such as the proposed Code can 

help increase awareness, enhance spaceflight safety, and prevent mishaps, 

misperceptions, and mistrust, thereby helping to ensure that access to space is preserved for all. The proposed Code, drafted as a non-legally binding set of guidelines, 

calls on subscribing states to refrain from activities that create long-lived debris and 

to provide notification of certain space activities, including those that might risk creating debris. Space debris is a growing concern for all space-faring nations. Additionally, the proposed Code reinforces key space norms internationally that the U.S. 

Government has already endorsed but that are not universally followed, including 

pre-launch notifications under the Hague Code of Conduct, UN Debris Mitigation 

Guidelines, and safety of flight practices such as sharing collision warning 

information. 

Importantly, the proposed Code explicitly recognizes nations’ inherent right of 

self-defense. The Code would not constrain either the development of the full range 

of space capabilities, or the ability of the United States to conduct necessary operations in crisis or war. As the Secretary of State noted in January 2012, the United 

States would not subscribe to a Code that in any way constrains our national security-related activities in space or our ability to protect the United States and our 

allies. 

Mr. ROGERS. 49) The Department has made recent efforts to engage in further collaboration with the international community regarding space situational awareness. 

What policies govern the sharing of data associated with space situational awareness? What are the benefits and risks of sharing information? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Title 10 U.S. Code Section 2274, Space Situational Awareness 

(SSA) Services and Information, authorizes the Secretary to provide various space 

situational awareness services and information, and to receive space situational 

awareness data and information. Additionally, the 2010 National Space Policy, the 

2011 National Security Space Strategy, and the 2012 Department of Defense Space 

Policy call for expanding international cooperation and increasing U.S. leadership 

to promote the sustainable and responsible use of space. 

Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is fundamental to all space operations, from 

launch to on-orbit operations to re-entry activities. As the National Security Space 

Strategy states, shared awareness of spaceflight activity must improve in order to 

foster global spaceflight safety and help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust. Effective SSA requires cooperation—we cannot do it alone. U.S. Strategic 

Command has concluded 37 arrangements with commercial owner/operators and 

two arrangements with foreign governments. The Department continues to negotiate additional SSA sharing agreements with both commercial and international 

operators, and to explore the joint development and operation of SSA sensors with 

allies and partners. 

Sharing SSA data, services, and information with Government, intra-governmental, and commercial satellite owner/operators helps to improve spaceflight safety 

by improving space object databases, establishing common international data standards and data integrity measures, disseminating predictions of space object conjunctions and close approaches, and supporting other measures to preserve the space 

environment. 

Mr. ROGERS. 50) How is resilience measured and what are the most important 

steps the U.S. needs to take in order to create space systems that are resilient to 

threats? 
102 

Mr. LOVERRO. Resilience is measured in both qualitative and quantitative terms. 

Qualitatively, the Department of Defense defines resilience for space as the ability 

of an architecture to support the functions necessary for mission success in spite of 

hostile action or adverse conditions. An architecture is ‘‘more resilient’’ if it can provide these functions with higher probability, with shorter periods of reduced capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions and threats. 

As this definition is less than two years old, DOD organizations have now begun 

to refine ways to conduct quantitative analysis of the resilience of space systems 

during the budget review and space analysis of alternatives (AOA) processes. These 

quantitative measurements will, necessarily, be different for different space mission 

areas, space systems, and other aspects of the space enterprise. 

As we look to the future, resilience will be achieved by pursuing a multifaceted 

approach across all space systems. These will include further incorporating and encouraging a more competitive U.S. commercial space service industry, integrating 

space capabilities from allied and partner nations, pursuing a more disaggregated 

model for many system architectures including less complex systems and hosted 

payloads, and investigating the role of reconstitution. 

Resilience may not be solely an internal architecture characteristic. Some alternative orbitology or basing modes may make it easier for external space surveillance 

awareness sensors to provide warning of impending attack and time for potential 

defensive actions to be taken. 

Mr. ROGERS. 51) Please describe the current efforts and priority you are placing 

on space situational awareness and space protection. 

Mr. LOVERRO. Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is fundamental to all space operations and underpins DOD’s space strategy. To protect our high-valued space assets from both unintentional damage as well as hostile interference, we must maintain an awareness of the space environment—one that is increasingly becoming 

more congested, contested, and competitive. U.S. Strategic Command is establishing 

SSA sharing arrangements with commercial and international satellite owner/operators to enhance safety of flight. As the National Security Space Strategy notes, 

shared awareness of spaceflight activity must improve in order to foster global 

spaceflight safety, as well as to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust. 

Additionally, we have made significant progress in pursuing elements of our future SSA architecture. The Space-Based Space Surveillance System (SBSS) became 

operational last year and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 

is successfully testing its space surveillance telescope (SST). We have concluded negotiations with Australia to move a C-band SSA radar to that nation, and with the 

help of Congress, that effort is now underway. We are pursuing a similar arrangement with DARPA’s SST. And the Department has made a substantial investment 

in the Space Fence system and is preparing to award a full development contract 

in FY 13. 

We also continue to increase our focus on protection. To that end, in March of this 

year, we established the Space Security and Defense Program, which will pursue 

studies aimed at providing space protection capabilities for all U.S. space forces. We 

have placed increased emphasis on this program through the President’s budget 

submission for fiscal year 2014. We have ongoing investments in the Global Positioning System (GPS) modernization efforts to emplace a far more secure and jam 

resistant space and user equipment M-code system and also increase the cyber security of the GPS control segment. We are also beginning efforts in other areas, such 

as the Wideband Global System to enhance jam resistance. Finally, we have made 

substantial strides in defining and fielding an advanced command and control system through the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission Systems (JMS) 

program to help us better understand and warn of possible threats to our systems. 

Mr. ROGERS. 52) There are various efforts in the Department, namely Air Force, 

Army, and DARPA, to provide rapid, low-cost launch solutions. How do you foresee 

this type of capability being used by the warfighter? In light of increasing foreign 

threats to our space systems, how important is it that we prioritize these efforts? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Timely, low-cost launch capability might be one part of a capability 

to allow reconstitution of a space-based capability should it be degraded by attack 

or mishap. The role of reconstitution in a resilient architecture is still being investigated and the efforts by the Air Force, Army, and DARPA help serve to provide 

the data through demonstration that would allow those architectural trades to be 

made. 

For example, the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command’s (SMDC) Soldier-Warfighter Operationally Responsive Deployer for Space (SWORDS) is an effort 

to develop a relatively low-cost nanosatellite launch system for the U.S. Army. The 

Department approved SWORDS as a 2012 Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD). 
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Additionally, DARPA’s Airborne Launch Assist Space Access (ALASA) system is 

designed for launch from an aircraft to improve performance, reduce range costs, 

and enable more frequent missions. ALASA completed initial trade studies and a 

market/business case analysis in fiscal year 2011, and has entered into a Design 

Risk Reduction phase. 

At this point, it is too early to commit to responsive launch as a high priority until 

those demonstration and trades are complete. 

Mr. ROGERS. 53) Are we procuring commercial satellite services in the most efficient way, and if not, what opportunities for improvement are there? Also, who has 

sole responsibility for satellite communications in the Department? 

Mr. LOVERRO. We are not procuring commercial satellite communications 

(SATCOM) services in the most efficient manner. The commercial business model 

looks for a return of initial investment within 3–5 years. As such, the cost of a commercial SATCOM lease must include all the amortization to achieve that return for 

the service provider. While longer-term leases lower the bill they can only reduce 

the cost of business risk encompassed in a one-year lease (about 10 percent), but 

they still bear the huge expense of investment recoupment. In order to do better, 

the Department should begin to explore innovative partnerships with industry that 

involve a DOD capital investment and shared access across a global footprint. This 

approach has the potential for far greater savings while significantly enhancing both 

DOD resilience and long term commercial stability. 

Although historically there has been no component with sole responsibility for satellite communications within the Department, the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD/AT&L) has responsibility for military 

SATCOM (MILSATCOM) acquisition programs; the DOD Chief Information Officer 

(DOD/CIO) has the responsibility for SATCOM policy; and the Defense Information 

Systems Agency (DISA) has the responsibility for commercial SATCOM contracting. 

DOD’s current efforts to examine how the Department procures SATCOM includes 

addressing this issue. DOD/CIO, for example, has recently initiated a SATCOM governance construct, and SATCOM coordination occurs as part of the actions of the 

Defense Space Council. In addition, USD/AT&L and DOD/CIO have jointly launched 

a Commercial Satellite Study to examine ways to better leverage, integrate, and acquire commercial satellite (COMSATCOM) services. 

Mr. ROGERS. 54) What is the process to respond to situations where our satellites 

are interfered with or attacked? Are there established ‘‘red lines’’ and responses? 

Mr. LOVERRO. There are currently no established ‘‘red lines’’ or responses for the 

attack of an on-orbit satellite. The DOD Space Policy, updated in October 2012, outlines the Department’s multilayered approach to deterrence in the space domain. 

The policy also declares that purposeful interference with U.S. space systems and 

other space systems upon which the United States relies is irresponsible in peacetime and may be escalatory in a crisis 

Mr. ROGERS. 55) Please describe the urgent warfighter requirement that led DISA 

to procure satellite services from the Chinese company. When you testified, you stated that this was done in response to a JUON. Is this still your best understanding 

of the facts? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Beginning in mid-2012, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) required wider geographic coverage using a single satellite to cover the entire African 

continent. This bandwidth is to support intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in the eastern, central, and southern portions of the continent. These operations range from counter-piracy to counter-Lord’s Resistance 

Army (LRA), plus a host of other operations. The bandwidth also supports coalition 

networks enabling time-sensitive information sharing with African partner nations 

that help support counter-Violent Extremist Operations and the USAFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan. 

With regards to whether this was a Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON), while 

I indicated during testimony that we were leasing some satellite services from a 

Chinese company to support a JUON, as we continued to analyze the situation, I 

learned that USAFRICOM’s need, although operationally critical and requiring expedited service, was not in fact a JUON. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 56) As the Air Force and, to some extent, the National Reconnaissance Office currently fund infrastructure and other facility support costs for the incumbent provider, in order to help the committee understand the current arrangement of the contract with the incumbent, can you describe why a cost-plus vehicle 

is in place, given the maturity of the program? 
104 

General SHELTON. The Phase 1 Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) 

Launch Capability (ELC) efforts will continue under the Cost Plus Incentive Fee 

(CPIF) construct. The EELV program requires operational flexibility to meet its National Security Space (NSS) mission. ELC provides the program flexibility to manage changes to mission requirements without Request for Equitable Adjustments 

(REAs) or schedule penalties (e.g., launch slips due to satellite vehicle acquisition 

issues, first time integration delays or anomaly resolution from a previous mission). 

The Air Force is examining options to restructure ELC to allocate appropriately the 

discrete and unambiguous costs to the launch vehicle and each individual payload 

customer. The plan is to incorporate these adjustments into the Phase 1 contract 

and consider them for future acquisition phases of the program. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 57) In last year’s hearing, General Shelton, in a response to a 

question for the record, you stated that you plan to meet warfighter needs for responsive space capabilities through programs of record and mechanisms such as the 

Joint Urgent Operational Needs process. Given that ORS is intended to foster lowcost launch methods, as well as common design and interfacing methods, and that 

ORS is zeroed out in the FY14 budget, I’m curious as to how you propose to address 

the problem of space responsiveness through existing procurement programs and a 

variety of initiatives that, according to the GAO, have not been planned for in a very 

robust or strategic manner. 

General SHELTON. The Department of Defense (DOD) understands the importance 

of the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) concept and recognizes the progress 

made under the ORS Office. In accordance with the FY13 NDAA, the transition of 

the ORS Office to the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) will be formalized 

in June 2013. DOD is currently incorporating ORS lessons learned and responsive 

processes into SMC processes and programs to ensure it continues to develop responsive and affordable space capabilities. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. 58) The U.S. Air Force announced late last year that certified 

New Entrants would be allowed to compete along with ULA for up to 14 rocket 

cores through FY17. Given that the incumbent provider currently receives over 

$1.2B annually in cost-plus payments under the Launch Capability contract line, 

how does the Air Force intend to ensure that the competition will occur on a level 

playing field when the incumbent competes against New Entrants? What specific actions will the Air Force take to ensure that the incumbent properly allocates ELC 

payments in a competition against New Entrants? Will ULA be allowed to bid only 

a launch service price (marginal price) when it competes against a New Entrant’s 

full price, since the Government is paying for ULA’s fixed costs? 

General SHELTON. We have not yet determined the specific methods to address 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Launch Capability (ELC) costs in the 

New Entrant competitions. However, they will be addressed in the Source Selection 

Plan. The details of the competition are currently being developed and will ensure 

the best value for the Government among all certified providers and will be conducted in accordance with Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. 59) Given that the Air Force and, to some extent, the National 

Reconnaissance Office currently fund infrastructure and other facility support costs 

for the incumbent provider, can you help us understand why the funding of fixed 

costs requires a cost-plus contract? What infrastructure requirements are unknown 

at this time? 

General SHELTON. The Phase 1 Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) 

Launch Capability (ELC) efforts will continue under the Cost Plus Incentive Fee 

(CPIF) construct. The EELV program requires operational flexibility to meet its National Security Space (NSS) mission. ELC provides the program flexibility to manage changes to mission requirements without Request for Equitable Adjustments 

(REAs) or schedule penalties (e.g., launch slips due to satellite vehicle acquisition 

issues, first time integration delays or anomaly resolution from a previous mission). 

The Air Force is examining options to restructure ELC to allocate appropriately the 

discrete and unambiguous costs to the launch vehicle and each individual payload 

customer. The plan is to incorporate these adjustments into the Phase 1 contract 

and consider them for future acquisition phases of the program. Range requirements 

are considered to be sufficiently mature for a fixed-price contract and, as a result, 

the Government is in source selection now to select a range provider on a fixed-price 

incentive fee vehicle. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. 60) Space launch procurement is the single largest line item in 

the Air Force space budget. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has re-
105 

peatedly argued that the Air Force can generate significant savings by reintroducing 

competition into its space launch procurement program. What savings do you 

envision in the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program associated with 

competition? 

General SHELTON. Based on the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD CAPE) independent cost estimate (ICE), implementation of the Air Force Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle acquisition strategy 

in FY13 is projected to save $1.1B over the Future Years Defense Program as compared to the FY12 budget assumptions from FY13–18. These savings were factored 

into the FY14 Air Force budget submission. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. 61) The Launch Capability cost-plus contract structure was instituted in 2006 as a measure to achieve ‘‘assured access’’ for the Government by maintaining the industrial base capacity of the only remaining domestic company capable 

of conducting space launch. Air Force has now recognized the existence of multiple 

new providers. Once these New Entrants are certified and competing for all 

launches in the program, does the DOD have a plan to phase out the ELC cost-plus 

contract? 

General SHELTON. The specific method in which the current incumbent Evolved 

Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Launch Capability (ELC) and EELV Launch 

Services (ELS) costs will be competed with new entrants has yet to be determined, 

but will be addressed in the Source Selection Plan. The details of the competition 

are being developed and will ensure the best value for the Government among all 

certified providers and will be conducted in accordance with Federal Acquisition 

Regulations. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. 62) I would like more information on space-based infrared systems. What is its capability and purpose? 

General SHELTON. Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) is an infrared-sensing 

satellite that supports four missions: Missile Warning (MW), Missile Defense (MD), 

Battlespace Awareness (BA), and Technical Intelligence (TI). 

Missile Warning: SBIRS provides reliable, unambiguous, timely, and accurate 

MW information to the Missile Warning Center (MWC), North American Aerospace 

Defense Command (NORAD), National Command Authority (NCA), Combatant 

Commanders, and allies. This mission includes both global and theater functional 

requirements to support strategic and theater ballistic MW, and the notification and 

implementation of passive defense and force posturing. 

Missile Defense: SBIRS supports MD by providing missile event queuing to the 

Missile Defense Agency (MDA) systems. The MD mission includes both national and 

theater functional requirements to support active MD and attack operations against 

hostile forces. 

Battlespace Awareness: SBIRS provides non-missile threat warning data, in support of Battlespace Awareness for battle damage assessment and intelligence information for land, sea, air, and space decision support to Combatant Commanders, 

Joint Task Force Commanders, and other users. 

Technical Intelligence: SBIRS supports the National Geospatial Agency (NGA) TI 

mission by providing threat performance and infrared (IR) target signature data to 

warfighters and weapons developers; provides target classification and identification 

profiles and algorithms to support SBIRS operational missions; and monitors and 

provides policymakers and other users’ information on observed military tactics, 

new foreign technology development, arms control compliance, and proliferation 

activities. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. 63) Given that the Air Force and, to some extent, the National 

Reconnaissance Office currently fund infrastructure and other facility support costs 

for the incumbent provider, can you help us understand why the funding of fixed 

costs requires a cost-plus contract? What infrastructure requirements are unknown 

at this time? 

Ms. SAPP. The AF is currently negotiating the Launch Capability contract with 

the incumbent provider, and would be better suited to respond with specific details 

of the contract structure. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. 64) DOD is currently evaluating options to move us away from 

the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program. Can you share with us the status of 

this ‘‘architecture study’’? When can members of the committee expect a final decision on the way forward? 

Mr. LOVERRO. A comprehensive Analysis of Alternatives for a replacement capability for the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) is currently ongoing 
106 

as part of a study on DOD’s Space-Based Environmental Monitoring (SBEM) capabilities. The first phase of the study included an analysis of military utility and effectiveness, and was completed in March 2013. The current Analysis of Alternatives 

work, which is scheduled to be completed at the end of June 2013, will help guide 

the Department’s strategy at the end-of-life of DMSP. The study’s final report is expected to be completed by August 2013. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. 65) The Department has implemented an interesting capacitysharing process for the Wideband Global SATCOM constellation. I think that signing Memorandums of Understanding with partner nations is a ‘‘win-win’’ for the 

U.S. and these countries. Can you talk about the cost savings associated with the 

MOU-model of satellite operation? Do you intend to use this model for other national security space systems? 

Mr. LOVERRO. The Department’s partnership with six countries on Wideband 

Global SATCOM (WGS) has expanded the WGS constellation size and capacity, contributing to interoperability between participating nations, improving the ability of 

the United States and partner nations to perform space-enabled missions, and increasing the inherent resilience of this system. In November 2007, we signed a 

memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Australia, resulting in the purchase of 

the sixth WGS satellite. In January 2012, a second MOU, signed with Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, resulted in the purchase of 

an additional 10th satellite. Together with our six international partners, we have 

invested $10 billion in this system, expanding capability at minimal cost to the U.S. 

Air Force. The WGS agreements leverage $1.3 billion in partner funds while providing over 40 percent more capacity for U.S. warfighters. 

We believe this model is one of many possible partnering models to help reduce 

system cost while increasing resilience. Different but similar arrangements have 

been negotiated with the government of Australia to emplace a C-band Space Surveillance Radar there with part of the cost borne by the United States and part by 

Australia. We also envision a joint operating model for that system. We hope to extend that model with the conclusion of an MOU on DARPA’s space surveillance telescope. We anticipate additional opportunities in the position, navigation, and timing 

mission areas, as well as commercial remote sensing. While these will differ in character to the WGS MOU, they seek the same goal of enhancing U.S. and allied capabilities at reduced cost, and with increased resilience, by appropriately sharing 

space capabilities. We are also interested in exploring if this model can be extended 

to the commercial world, especially in the SATCOM arena as opposed to the expensive short-term lease arrangement we now use. 

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