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i 

80–189 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–19] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. EUROPEAN 

COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 15, 2013 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

ALEX GALLO, Professional Staff Member 

KIMBERLY SHAW, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

MARK LEWIS, Professional Staff Member 

AARON FALK, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Friday, March 15, 2013, The Posture of the U.S. European Command and 

U.S. Africa Command .......................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Friday, March 15, 2013 ........................................................................................... 27 

FRIDAY, MARCH 15, 2013 

THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA 

COMMAND 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Ham, GEN Carter F., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command ....................... 2 

Stavridis, ADM James G., USN, Commander, U.S. European Command, 

NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe ...................................................... 1 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Ham, GEN Carter F. ........................................................................................ 99 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 31 

Stavridis, ADM James G. ................................................................................ 33 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 123 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 123 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 132 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 130 

Mr. McKeon ....................................................................................................... 127 

Mr. Veasey ........................................................................................................ 135 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 131 

(1) 

THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND 

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Friday, March 15, 2013. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. I would like to 

welcome everyone to today’s hearing on the posture of the U.S. European Command and the U.S. Africa Command. We have two men 

that have devoted their lives to the service of this country, and this 

will be their last hearing. 

Gentlemen, thank you for many years of service that we can 

never repay you for, but your country is in your debt. 

You know, we are going to have votes about 11:15, so I am going 

to just put my statement in the record. It was wonderful. And anybody interested can read it. Mr. Smith is not with us here today. 

And in his place that seat is looking up a lot prettier, Ms. Sanchez. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Smarter, Mr. Chairman, smarter. 

With respect to time, of course, gentlemen, thank you for your 

service. I think it is the last time you are before us. With respect 

to that, I will submit the opening statement for Mr. Smith into the 

record and go straight to the hearing. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. And with that, Admiral Stavridis. 

STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, COMMANDER, 

U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, NATO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I will follow your lead, as I always do, 

and simply say three things. One is thank you to the members of 

the committee, the chairman, to Congresswoman Sanchez for sitting in and being part of this today. Secondly, I think Europe continues to matter greatly for the United States, and I hope in our 

discussion today I can illustrate why that is a bit. And then thirdly, on behalf of the men and women of U.S. European Command 

and the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] alliance, again 

I say thank you to the committee for the terrific support we receive. With that I will, with your permission, enter a statement in 
2 

the record also, Chairman, and I will turn to Carter Ham, my very 

good friend. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis can be found in 

the Appendix on page 33.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General. 

STATEMENT OF GEN CARTER F. HAM, USA, COMMANDER, 

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND 

General HAM. Thanks, Mr. Chairman and Congresswoman 

Sanchez. I had about a 20-minute opening statement, but I think 

I will follow the lead of all, which makes a lot of good sense. But 

it is great to have the opportunity to talk about what the women 

and men of AFRICOM [Africa Command] have done. We are the 

newest of the combatant commands. This year is our fifth year in 

existence and we have changed a lot over those 5 years, and I look 

forward to have the opportunity to talk with you a bit about that. 

We are in the midst, obviously, all of us, of some serious resourcing 

challenges as we move forward. That is going to take all of our best 

efforts to address those to ensure that all of us collectively can 

meet the national security needs of our country. 

I would join with my great friend and colleague, former boss, Admiral Stavridis. We are closely joined between Africa Command 

and European Command. In just about every endeavor in Africa I 

rely on European Command for support. That support has been unwavering and enduring. And similarly, the support from this committee for our troops, for their families, for our civilian employees 

has been similarly unwavering, and for that, we are deeply appreciative. 

I will depart the command in about a month and be replaced 

most ably by General David Rodriguez, again an old friend and exemplary leader who will take Africa Command and its women and 

men to even greater heights, and I look forward to that. And again 

thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ms. Sanchez, for your great support. 

[The prepared statement of General Ham can be found in the Appendix on page 99.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Both your records, without objection, will be submitted to the record. So ordered. 

Admiral, you are our senior combatant commander. You will be 

leaving your command shortly. And one of the things that we are 

hearing a lot around the Hill here is maybe we don’t need forces 

in Europe anymore. You know, we are so far advanced there, 

maybe we could pull all those troops home, and it would be a big 

money savings, and the way things are going right now financially 

that would probably be a great thing. That is what we are hearing. 

I would like you to, from your experience on the ground, tell us 

why it is important to have troops in Europe. And with four combat 

brigade teams you have supported, and now that has changed, if 

you could tell what you think we do need there, why, and address 

that in light of the fiscal constraints that we have. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Chairman, I will be glad to. To put the discussion in context, I think it is worth looking back to the Cold War, 

when we had 450,000 troops in Europe and we had 1,200 bases in 

Europe. That is the height of the Cold War. We have reduced that 

by 80 percent. So we have come down very significantly in the 
3 

forces in Europe. I would argue that our current level is roughly 

right, and I will give you four or five reasons why I think it is important to continue to be forward in Europe. 

The first is really the most basic, it is values. We share with democracies in Europe freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, freedom of education. Nowhere else in the world 

will we find a pool of allies who share our values. Secondly, it is the economy. There is a $4 trillion trade route 

across that Atlantic Ocean. And that binding of our economic interests will continue to make Europe our most important trading partner collectively. 

Thirdly, it is geography. You know, Robert Kaplan just wrote 

this terrific book, ‘‘The Revenge of Geography.’’ Geography matters. 

Europe, in that regard, is critically important. People sometimes 

say, you know, those bases in Europe, they are kind of the bastions 

of the Cold War. They are really not. They are the forward operating bases for 21st century security. They allow us to support 

Carter Ham in Africa. They allow us to support Jim Mattis in the 

Levant, in the near Middle East, and indeed in Central Asia. So 

geography matters as well. 

Fourthly, it is the alliance, it is the NATO alliance. Fifty-one percent of the world’s GDP [gross domestic product], 28 nations, 

24,000 combat aircraft, 800 oceangoing ships, 50 AWACs [Airborne 

Warning and Control] aircraft. This is a powerful, capable alliance 

that has stood with us, most obviously at the moment in Afghanistan, where today we see 90 percent of the non-U.S. troops are indeed from Europe. So the alliance matters. 

And then, fifth and finally, I would say nowhere else in the world 

will we find so many trained, capable soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 

marines who will stand with us on missions from the Balkans, to 

Libya, to the Levant, to Afghanistan, and indeed around the world. 

In terms of posture, we are about right now. We have reduced 

the numbers of brigade combat teams. But, Mr. Chairman, we are 

going to rotate forces in to make up that shortfall. And I think we 

are about in balance. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

General Ham, your special ops force unit was established on the 

1st of October of last year. The committee has learned that this 

force doesn’t have the necessary enablers to operate in certain environments. Obviously, if this is correct, this is extremely concerning, 

as it would appear that we are not postured for the next crisis in 

the region, like the attack in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11 of 

last year. What is the projected timeline to get your special ops 

forces outfitted with the appropriate enablers? 

General HAM. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. You are correct in that the 

Commander’s In-extremis Force was formally established on the 

1st of October of 2012. It had been about a year or more in building 

that capability. Prior to the 1st of October, Admiral Stavridis and 

I shared a Commander’s In-extremis Force. It was assigned to European Command, but available to AFRICOM should that be necessary. 

Today, that force is home-based in Colorado, but always with an 

element forward stationed in Europe. We have also deployed elements of it already to Africa on occasion. It has most of the 
4 

enablers that are required, but not all. The principal shortfalls are 

in dedicated special operations aviation. Again, I rely on Admiral 

Stavridis on a sharing arrangement with special operations aviation forces that are forward stationed in Europe. It is my preference to have those elements dedicated. 

Then there are some other enabling capabilities, such as special 

operations surgical teams and some others, that I would prefer to 

have dedicated exclusively for that force, and at present we borrow 

those forces from other organizations. So we have a better capability, and a quite good capability now, but not the full capability 

that I think is necessary in the long term. Ongoing dialogue with 

Admiral McRaven at Special Operations Command as to when we 

might be able to build those capabilities and station those capabilities. I think for the next year, we will probably be in a sharing arrangement. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I think as the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs, General Dempsey, pointed out, that if we have any further 

cuts in defense it will have to change our strategy, we won’t be able 

to carry out the strategy that they devised when we were hit with 

the $487 billion in cuts. And then with the sequestration on top of 

that, we are going to have to revise that strategy, and we will not 

be able to respond quickly in all parts of the world at all times. So 

I think that it is a reality that we are going to have to decide if 

that is what the American people want. Thank you. 

Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you again, Admiral and General, for being before us. 

You know, I am from California, so I have always thought that 

the United States was pivoted towards the Pacific, you know, but 

there seems to be a lot of consternation, especially among our allies 

out in the European theaters, that somehow we are going to slip 

away from this very critical alliance that is not only NATO, but all 

our European allies there. And, you know, it has really gone from 

having our troops there in order to defend Europe and now really 

being pretty integrated and having their own troops doing their 

thing. 

One of those things that is important is, you know, the interoperability and the training and the mission readiness for a decision 

that is made to go and intervene in places that are important for 

stability around the world, like Libya, for example, or other places. 

So my question to you, Admiral, is how are the Europeans feeling? 

Where are they with respect to their defense spending given that 

they are watching us lower our defense and most of them have not 

met the 2 percent threshold over the last few years? And how is 

that affecting our interoperability and our readiness for missions 

should new fires erupt out in an area that we would think together 

we should handle the situation? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, Congresswoman. And as you 

know from our discussions in Munich at the Security Conference 

there, the Europeans are indeed watching the United States, both 

in regard to our rebalancing to Asia and in our potential significant 

reductions in defense spending. To kind of put it in perspective, the 

United States spends $600 billion, roughly, on defense base budget. 

Europeans actually spend about $300 billion per year collectively. 
5 

So it is a very significant expenditure on their part. It is more than 

China and Russia spend combined. So they spend a fairly significant amount. 

The bad news is, in my view, and we have discussed this, and 

as you alluded to, they are not meeting their own targeted 2 percent of GDP, which I think is a minimum in order to continue to 

maintain the appropriate level, as you said, of interoperability with 

the United States. So on the one hand we want to have full advantage of their spending and their integration with us. On the other 

hand, we need to encourage them to step up and to spend appropriately so that we are in balance with them. We continue to do 

that. I work that very hard within both NATO, in my hat as the 

Supreme Allied Commander, but also in the U.S. European Command context. 

Lastly, as to the rebalancing to Asia, again, as you and I have 

both seen in Munich, the Europeans themselves are kind of rebalancing toward Asia. And I think the key is that we maintain both 

military integration and interoperability as well as the diplomatic, 

cultural connections that we have. 

So on balance, I continue to be pushing of the Europeans to get 

their spending levels up. But we should recognize they already 

spend a fairly significant amount, and they have, as you said, stood 

with us, Afghanistan, Libya, the Balkans. Today the forces in Mali, 

in Carter Ham’s region, are essentially all European. So it is a balance. We need to continue to encourage them. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And with respect to Bosnia and Kosovo and some 

of what I call the unfinished business there, can you give us an update of where are our allies there and where Europe seems to be 

going, and if the current economic conditions that we are experiencing and others, and how that is affecting that? What do you 

think we need to do to really make that, the Balkans work? I know 

that is a big question in 2 minutes. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It is, and I will do it quickly. Whenever we 

think about the Balkans, it is instructive to look back 10 to 15 

years when the Balkans of 15 years ago looked a lot like Syria 

today. Fifteen years ago in the Balkans we saw 100,000 killed, we 

saw 2 million pushed across borders, we saw open combat across 

Bosnia-Herzegovina, we saw a definite follow-up in Kosovo, which 

continues today to have a lot of tension. So we have come a long 

way in 10 to 15 years. At one time collectively there were about 

50,000 Allied troops in and around the Balkans. 

Here is the good news. Today we are down to only about 6,000 

troops total, and of those only about 700 are from the United 

States. So this is now about an 85, almost 90 percent European 

mission. There are about 2,000 to 3,000 European Union troops 

that are in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where there are no U.S. troops. So 

the good news is the Europeans have stepped up and are doing 

this. What we need to do is continue the dialogue, notably between 

Kosovo and Serbia, as well as between Croatia and Serbia, so that 

in the Balkans, instead of reaching for a gun to solve their disputes, as they did 10 years ago, they reach for the telephone for 

a negotiation. I think it is moving in that direction. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that there are 

so many of our members here today for this hearing. And for that 
6 

reason, even though I have many, many more questions, I will end. 

And thank you so much for the time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for being here, for your service to the country, and for your families’ service to the country over many years. 

Let me start with just something brief that has come to my attention. I understand we have an airfield in the Azores that we are 

going to mothball by the end of 2014. Some people are concerned 

about that because of its proximity to North Africa, and especially 

not having to have overflight rights and so forth. 

General Ham, are you comfortable with where we are headed 

with this? Or is it on your radar screen at all? 

General HAM. It is, sir. One of the things that we are always concerned about is access. I think losing access to one place won’t be 

a show-stopper. But we have got to look at this more holistically, 

and I know Admiral Stavridis does that and spends a lot of time 

on making sure that we have enough points of entry and enough 

redundancy so that we can have the access that is needed when it 

is needed. So I am not overly worried about one particular case, 

but I do think it is important that we look more broadly. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. I just raise the point because I think 

there are some people concerned. 

If I can ask you one other question right quick. We had a hearing 

earlier this year about the various authorities to build partnership 

capacity. Nowhere is that more important than your region. If you 

had to give us two or three improvements in current law, whether 

they be tweaks or major reforms, what would you suggest we at 

least consider to make our existing authorities more effective in 

building partnership capacity across the region that you are responsible for? 

General HAM. First, I would thank the committee and all for providing the authorities that you have. That is a significant improvement over past years. 

I think as we look to the future, though, we probably need to 

look at something that is akin to today’s overseas contingency operations, authorities and fundings that are not specifically tied to Afghanistan and to Al Qaeda, but rather give us some broader authorities to address a growing number of violent extremist organizations that don’t necessarily fit neatly under the Al Qaeda umbrella. So I think that would be the first one. 

And secondly, probably some increased authorities for some of 

the geographic regions. So the Global Security Contingency Fund 

I think is a good step in that direction, and authorities to apply 

some of DOD’s [Department of Defense] capabilities, in partnership 

with State, in new partners. Libya, I think, is a great example of 

that. So I think there are some minor tweaks, but I think we are 

moving in the right direction. 

Lastly, I happen to be a fan of the so-called dual key authorities, 

where both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State 

have vested interests. I think that ensures a closer alignment of 

Defense and State as we move forward. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 
7 

Admiral Stavridis, you have been not only combatant commander 

in Europe, but in the southern region as well. This is an unfair 

question with such limited time, but if you were to give us on this 

committee the top three things you think we ought to be focused 

on in the years ahead from our standpoint, not just for Europe but 

for our total responsibilities, what would they be? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Very quickly, I would actually put cyber at 

the top of the list. I think in cyber we find the greatest mismatch 

between our level of preparation and the level of danger. I think 

that, in other words, we prepare an awful lot for counterterrorism, 

for spread of weapons of mass destruction, for many conventional 

scenarios we are very well prepared for. But I think cyber we have 

a lot of work to do. I mean the big we, not just DOD, obviously. 

This is something that cuts across all parts of government and all 

parts of society. So I put cyber at the top. 

Secondly, may or may not surprise you, I think trafficking is an 

enormous problem. The movement of narcotics, weapons, humans 

as in slaves, humans as in terrorists, cash, and God forbid, the 

weapons of mass destruction. So countertrafficking, which means 

ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], intelligence, 

understanding what is moving in the seas and the ways around 

you, both land, sea, and air, I think is critically important. 

And then I would say my third thing would be special operations. 

I believe that as we move forward, that is going to be the comparative advantage for the United States. And I think we should continue to focus on how we can use, improve, and interoperably work 

with our allies in the special operations zone. Thanks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country and for appearing here this morning. 

General Ham, if I could just start with you. East Africa remains, 

obviously, a key operating and training area for Al Qaeda and associates, and specifically the Somali-based terrorist group Al 

Shabaab. How concerned is the Department about Al Shabaab’s 

ability to attract and train foreign fighters, including recruits from 

the United States, who may project violence outward from East Africa? And what exactly is the Department doing to counter this 

threat? 

General HAM. Al Shabaab is, in my assessment, significantly 

weakened from where they were a year ago, and that is because 

of the concerted effort of African forces, certainly supported and enabled by the United States and others. But there has been good 

progress. We are seeing Al Shabaab continuing to have strong linkages with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, in Yemen, specifically, and we have seen continued effort by Al Shabaab to recruit 

foreigners from other parts of Africa, from the Mideast, to a lesser 

degree in Europe and the United States. But there are certainly 

those efforts. 

We think we are most effective in countering that approach by 

supporting the African-led approach to countering Shabaab by the 

restoration of a legitimate government, which the United States 

now recognizes, focusing on development, countering the under-
8 

lying causes that has allowed Shabaab to gain traction. There are 

some specific efforts in the information domain that we work in 

partnership with other nations and with the Government of Somalia, again, to help convey the legitimacy of the African-led effort in 

Somalia, and we hope that that is helping to diminish the ability 

of Shabaab to recruit externally. 

And lastly, sir, we are seeing, because of the increased pressure 

on Shabaab, we are seeing a bit of a split between the foreign fighters who are there and those who are native Somalis who are part 

of Shabaab. The foreign fighters are very rapidly losing influence 

inside that organization. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, General. I think that is so important, 

that if we can get to some of the root causes of why Al Shabaab 

had been able to adequately recruit fighters we can obviously further degrade their ability to be an effective fighting force. So I 

think that is important, especially working with local populations. 

Let me ask you this. Do we have a sufficient amount of Department resources, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets working on the problem? And is AFRICOM adequately 

resourced in general? Do you have to beg, borrow, and steal too 

much from the other area commands or do you feel you are adequately resourced? 

General HAM. I have significant shortfalls in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. So that causes us to apply a pretty 

sharp prioritization. Unsurprisingly, Somalia has been near the top 

of that prioritization because of the effort against Al Shabaab. And 

so we have conducted a lot of reconnaissance missions in support 

of the African-led effort in Somalia. That has been pretty effective. 

But it has left us short in other areas across the continent. So that 

would be at the top of my list, sir, is shortfalls in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, General. 

Admiral, let me turn to you, if I could, before my time expires. 

Previously you have shared, you touched on something that is very 

important, something that I spend a lot of time on, is the issue of 

cyber. Can you further summarize for us EUCOM’s [European 

Command] evolution in this area over the course of your tour and 

where you believe more work needs to be done on cyber from a 

EUCOM perspective? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I can very quickly, Congressman. We have 

worked very closely with my very good friend, General Keith Alexander, at U.S. Cyber Command to create a cyber center within U.S. 

European Command, a kind of a nascent version of the Special Operations Command that we enjoy. I think having such centers in 

each of the combatant commands is important, and we should move 

forward. 

Secondly, we have worked very closely with NATO to build a 

NATO cyber center in Tallinn, Estonia, a nation which has experienced a cyber attack, as you know quite well, being an expert in 

this area. 

And thirdly, we are working operationally across the alliance to 

have an appropriate NATO cyber incident response center mirroring what we have here in the United States. So those are three 
9 

quick things, and I would like to add, for the record, a few more 

for you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. I would appreciate that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Admiral and General, thank you again, as everyone else 

has said, for your service to our Nation. You all are real heroes to 

America. You really are. 

General Ham, I want to read you a statement, and then I will 

get to my question. 

‘‘Africa cannot be thought of as a monolith. It is a hugely complex landmass with a hugely diverse population. The nature of the 

people, the diversity of cultures and religions, and the tribal factions all combine to make Africa far more dangerous than Afghanistan. We need to be wary of being drawn into a morass.’’ 

Would you agree with that statement? 

General HAM. Yeah, I agree with the first part, about the complexity and the diversity. I don’t think that the threats that are 

present in Africa yet rise to the seriousness that existed with Al 

Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan or in—or in Afghanistan, pardon me—and in the Federally Administered Tribal Area, but the 

trend is not good. 

Mr. JONES. Okay. Your statement, and thank you, has not at this 

point risen to a situation where maybe we would have to start 

thinking about committing more men and women to Africa. As you 

begin to leave your service and become a citizen outside of the military, do I understand you correctly that you would not want to see 

this Nation make such a commitment that we begin then to be in 

a situation, as we have been in Afghanistan for 12 years, in a 

failed policy that will not lead to any success at all? History says 

that, not me, but history. 

I mean I understand the intelligence importance of having a 

presence in Africa. I have no problem with that at all. But to see 

the footprint get larger, where we are committing more than 300 

or 400 troops to be there primarily as advisers and intel officers. 

But to see this thing start to grow and expand, would you rather 

not see that happen? 

General HAM. Congressman, I believe that if the threat that is 

present in Africa is left unaddressed it will over time grow to an 

increasingly dangerous and imminent threat to U.S. interests and 

certainly could develop into a threat that threatens us in other 

places. We have already seen from some places in Africa, individuals from Nigeria, for example, attempt to enter our country with 

explosives. I think we have an opportunity now to work preventive 

effort, in concert with African forces and with allies and friends 

globally, to suppress the threat, to reverse the trend, which is increasingly worrisome to me. And that does not necessitate a large 

commitment of U.S. forces, and I do not believe that a large commitment of U.S. forces is either necessary nor appropriate under 

the current circumstance. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the admiral and the 

general again. And I appreciate you indicating that you would hope 

that we will not get into a situation where it would be Congress 
10 

funding a larger military presence. As long as we can work with 

other countries, which, you know, the situation in Afghanistan of 

the coalition forces at best was limited. And what I am concerned 

about is that we are here cutting every program for the American 

people and the military is getting hit very hard by sequestration. 

And I would like to believe that as time goes forward that we 

would have leaders like yourself and the admiral to say that we 

need to really limit our commitment to these countries, where we 

can let other countries come in and take the lead instead of America. So I thank you very much for your question. 

My time is about up. And again, I thank you both for your service to our Nation. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

Admiral and General, thank you for your service. My wife and 

I recently returned from a trip to South Sudan. General Ham, 

could you please give us your assessment of the situation there, 

considering the financial near bankruptcy of the country, the presence of Lord’s Resistance Army in the southwestern part of the 

country, and the overall outlook as you see it for South Sudan? 

General HAM. I had the great pleasure and honor, Congressman, 

of on the 9th of July of 2011, of attending as a member of the U.S. 

delegation the independence celebration for South Sudan in Juba, 

and it was an exuberant moment. But one of the lasting memories 

from that was after the celebration, the chief of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, the South Sudan’s Army, we were having a 

discussion, and he rightfully said, now the hard work begins. Independence is important, we are glad, the U.S., obviously, has been 

supportive of that for a long time. There are many, many challenges that South Sudan faces. The army is far too large. It consumes an exorbitantly large portion of the national budget, upwards of 40 percent. That is obviously not sustainable. 

So one of the key priorities that we and those in the State Department are helping with South Sudan is defense structure and 

reform, which is very important. In the same time, we are also 

working with the South Sudanese on some specific leader development training. We think that is probably an area where we can 

provide a very positive influence. I am concerned about the continuing inability of Sudan and South Sudan to resolve their lingering border conflicts. It is promising to see now indications that 

South Sudan will soon begin oil production. That will help both 

countries, frankly, Sudan and South Sudan. 

And to your point, sir, about the Lord’s Resistance Army, the 

South Sudanese have been very supportive in terms of supporting 

the African Union-led effort. They have welcomed us, our advisers, 

and the capabilities that the U.S. team brings in terms of aviation 

support, logistics support, and advisers. And they have been an active and supportive participant with the other nations, Uganda, 

Central African Republic, and Democratic Republic of Congo, in the 

effort for the Africans to resolve the Lord’s Resistance Army challenges. 
11 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you for that. On a different line, there 

are numerous violent extremist organizations in the Sahel. It is argued and pointed out by many NGO [non-governmental organization] groups, wildlife groups and the rest, that the organizations 

are supported through the slaughter of elephants and the ivory 

trade. Do you have authority to assist the governments in the 

Sahel in dealing with this issue? And do you need authority if you 

don’t have it? 

General HAM. Congressman, we have very limited specific authorities to help with the specific challenge of poaching. But we do 

have some, and we work with State Department and with the U.S. 

ambassadors in that regard. But where we can have an effect and 

are having an effect is many African militaries do have responsibilities within their own nations for countering poaching. And I would 

cite as one example in Cameroon the Rapid Intervention Battalion, 

a special operations organization which we have had a long relationship with. It is an exceedingly capable force. They have been 

designated by their President to take on a counter-poaching role. 

So our support for them extends, while not directly to counterpoaching, the equipment, the training, the advising that we have 

provided helps enable that force. 

And so I think our best efforts, again, probably will be in a more 

indirect approach. The one exception, sir, would be if we see that 

financing has a direct relationship, financing from poaching has a 

direct relationship, then there are some law enforcement authorities that the United States possesses in terms of addressing the finance aspect of that which could be helpful. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you. In my last 9 seconds, I am told by 

wildlife organizations operating in the region that they do in fact 

have evidence that these violent extreme organizations are using 

ivory and other animal parts as a financing mechanism. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, General, thank you very much for being here. I apologize for missing some of your opening statements. General Ham, I 

would like to know a little bit about the cooperation of Boko Haram 

and AQIM [Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb], Al Shabaab. Talk 

to me about the level of cooperation between those organizations, 

if you will. 

General HAM. Congressman, it is very worrisome to me. The 

three organizations which you mentioned, Al Shabaab in Somalia, 

Boko Haram in northern Nigeria for the most part, and Al Qaeda 

in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb in Mali and in that region, 

each individually presents a significant challenge. But when they 

collaborate, and we are seeing them increasingly collaborate, I am 

very worried about that, particularly the relationship between Boko 

Haram and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, as you mentioned. 

We have seen indications of sharing of financing. 

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is, we believe, Al Qaeda’s bestfunded, wealthiest affiliate, if you will, mostly from kidnappings for 

ransom, but also through drug trade. And we believe they have 

provided financing directly to Boko Haram. We believe that they 

have shared training, to include explosives training. And we be-
12 

lieve that fighters from Nigeria, Boko Haram-sponsored fighters 

have found their way over the past year to training camps in 

northern Mali. So the relationship, sir, is very worrisome to me. 

Mr. MILLER. Do you assess that Boko Haram has it within their 

desires to come to the United States and do something here on our 

continent? 

General HAM. Sir, Boko Haram, like most terrorist organizations, 

is not monolithic. There are a couple of different elements within 

Boko Haram, some of which are exclusively focused on domestic Nigerian issues, but there are others who more closely align, while 

not directly part of Al Qaeda, but an Al Qaeda-like global ideology. 

And so I would say that in my view there are elements of Boko 

Haram who aspire to a broader regional level of attacks, to include 

not just in Africa, but Europe and aspirationally to the United 

States. And I think that is why it is important for us, in partnership with Nigeria and others, to help them counter this before their 

capability matches their intent. 

Mr. MILLER. That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Ham, my question pertains to Mali. My understanding 

is that when the coup happened, the United States, all non-humanitarian aid had to be pulled out of Mali because technically it is a 

military junta and a coup and not a legitimate government because 

there was an overthrow of the government. I am interested to know 

if there are any future training plans or any other types of engagement that we may be thinking about into the future with the military in Mali, even though it is technically not a legitimate government. 

General HAM. Congresswoman, we do want, we very much would 

like to reengage on a military-to-military basis with Mali, but it is 

premature to do so. But we are starting to think now what we 

would like to do when there is a legitimate government in Mali, 

and we have gotten some indications that the Malians are very interested in restoring that normalized military-to-military relationship. I think our efforts probably will initially focus perhaps on 

helping the Malians develop a capable counterterrorist force, but 

there are other aspects of an enduring relationship that I think 

would be helpful. 

I would just note also, ma’am, that while we are prohibited from 

having a direct relationship, as Admiral Stavridis mentioned, the 

European Union and others are already present and are working 

with the Malians to good effect. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. If I could, Congresswoman, just to amplify 

quickly, the European Union has 200 soldiers. They are going to 

ramp that up very quickly. And they are stepping up in this. And 

I am encouraged to hear what General Ham says about potentially 

us as well. Thank you. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. General Ham, I have a slightly different followup question. This is really with regard to trying to use our forces 

more wisely and with greater cost savings. And specifically, I would 

like to talk about the State Partnership Program, which in the admiral’s testimony really talks about the success of the program 
13 

being used by the European Command. Do you have any plans, 

looking to the future, to really capitalize on this? I see that, for example, California, which participated in the State Partnership Program in 1993, later, 10 years later took on the role of helping work 

with the Nigerians. North Carolina, after 12 years’ experience 

working with Moldova, is now working with Botswana since 2008. 

For a program that has demonstrated its successfulness and its 

cost savings by using the National Guard and that institutional 

knowledge and those long-term relationships that can be established by the cadre of the National Guard in particular States, are 

you looking to expand this program in AFRICOM? 

General HAM. I would like to think that you probably have the 

co-chairs of the State Partnership Program fan club seated here. It 

is an extraordinarily effective and low-cost effort to achieve our national security objectives. We have eight partnerships presently in 

Africa. I think we are close to having a few more. Don’t have any 

in East Africa. We have had discussions with some East African 

countries, and I think we are close to getting a couple to formally 

request. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is already, you 

know, working with the state adjutants general to see who might 

be willing to take on some relationships. 

Another aspect, ma’am, that I would highlight, we have a couple 

of instances where States have State partnerships both in Europe 

and in Africa. And I think that is something that we can leverage 

to a further extent in the future. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yeah, if I could, three I would really highlight. Illinois-Poland is terrific. Kosovo is married up with Iowa. 

And Georgia, imaginatively enough, is married up with Georgia. 

And they are bang for the buck one of the best things going. We 

had an earlier question about authorities and what we could do. 

Anything that enhances State partnership is money in the bank for 

the regional combatant commanders, ma’am. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. That is good to hear. I, too, am a fan of State 

Partnership Programs because of two things. One, that long-term 

institutional knowledge. I am, of course, biased being from Illinois, 

but also because of the great cost savings. You do not have to have 

Active Duty troops carry that load for the whole time. So thank you 

for your answers, gentlemen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Admiral, General, thank you for your service. 

General, each year I am always interested in finding out what 

the latest is on potentially relocating AFRICOM command. I know 

that last October there was a determination not to relocate because 

of one-time relocation costs, even though there could be a savings 

from $130 million to $60 million to $70 million to relocate back in 

the United States. I have information from the Charleston Metro 

Chamber of Commerce that puts in perspective a benefit of relocating AFRICOM back to the United States. It is clear that in 

Charleston, with the joint military complex, there are assets to 

support the command. The Charleston Air Force Base already supports the African air cargo channel missions. It is the largest C– 

17 wing, and the only C–17 special operations unit. SPAWAR 
14 

[Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command] at Charleston is already an integrator of joint communications for DOD, Department 

of Homeland Security, State Department, and other Federal agencies. The Port of Charleston provides approximately 50 percent of 

import-export seagoing container traffic between the United States 

and Africa. The Department of Homeland Security’s Project 

SeaHawk command and control center in Charleston integrates 

nearly 50 Federal, State, and local law enforcement, intelligence 

agencies, technologies, and assets. With two-thirds of Africa’s nations having sea access, SeaHawk could be a major contributor to 

AFRICOM’s training and security missions. The Charleston Federal Law Enforcement Training facility can accommodate maritime 

and law enforcement training for African nations, and currently operates an international training site at Botswana. Charleston and 

the State of South Carolina already have close ties with African nations in the field of medicine, agriculture, education, religious institutions, business, as well as a shared heritage with a large percentage of the Lowcountry Charleston population originating in West 

Africa. 

In light of the defense cutbacks, particularly sequestration, will 

this be looked at further, to relocate the AFRICOM command? 

General HAM. Congressman, I am uncertain. As you are aware, 

Congress did require the Department of Defense to conduct a 

study. They did. That was led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Obviously, Africa Command had an operational role in that. 

The Department did respond, and it was the Department’s determination that the command is best retained in its current location 

in Stuttgart, Germany. But clearly, having been part of the discussion, the cost factors were a significant aspect of this, and I know 

that Secretary Panetta, as he was in office at the time, wrestled 

hard between many of the attributes that you spoke of, the cost 

savings and the operational impact. But the Department’s conclusion was that the command is best retained in its current location. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, and do understand that we appreciate what 

you have done so much and recognize how important it is. That is 

why we would love for you to relocate to South Carolina. And we 

like to point out we have the right climate. It is meteorological, and 

you would appreciate that. And then the people are very warm and 

would be very supportive. 

Admiral, at the last several posture hearings before this committee you strongly advocated for retaining four Army brigade combat teams in Europe. How has the decision to withdraw two of the 

brigade combat teams affected your ability to meet operational and 

training requirements? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Obviously, it decrements them. What we are 

doing to substitute for them, Congressman, is instituting a rotational policy so we can bring a brigade combat team that is located 

back in the United States. As you were just talking about, Charleston is a good place to be located, we are rotating out of Georgia. 

They will come to the European theater, they will train, operate, 

interoperate, be part of NATO exercises, and be part of assurance, 

reassurance, and deterrence. So we are substituting a rotational 

structure. And so far, so good. 

Mr. WILSON. And would it be rotating out of Fort Stewart or—— 
15 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Initially, that is the indications we are getting. It will probably bounce around within the United States. But 

we would like to see it centralized in a particular unit so we could 

build the experience base working that piece of it. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Castro. 

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you, Chairman. 

Thank you, Admiral and General. The question I have is one that 

I asked on my other committee, which is Foreign Affairs, and the 

answer there was that it would be more appropriate for you guys 

at Defense. That is, as we try to understand the emerging terrorist 

groups, in North Africa in particular, how do we distinguish between those with legitimate ties to Al Qaeda and those that are 

simply posers trying to take advantage of the credibility and the 

prestige that comes to wrongdoers who are attached to Al Qaeda. 

General HAM. It sometimes can be a tough challenge, Congressman, because, again, many of these organizations have multiple 

personalities. So some of them are relatively easy. So Al Qaeda in 

the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, they are very clearly an Al 

Qaeda-associated organization. They have said so, Al Qaeda senior 

leaders have said so. So that makes it pretty easy. 

But others have not quite so clear views. Some of them originate 

with dissatisfaction with the host government. And then sometimes 

an element of that group may get co-opted by an ideologically motivated entity. And so there are a number of those types of organizations that operate in North Africa that make it very difficult. 

What that necessitates for us is that we cannot paint with too 

broad a brush to say that every VEO [violent extremist organization] has an Al Qaeda-like ideology. We really have to be very precise in our application. It requires us to work very carefully with 

host nation governments, particularly with their intelligence organizations, so that we can more clearly understand where are the 

hard-core, ideologically committed extremists that require one approach, and where are those others who have perhaps unfulfilled 

expectations or have been a long-disaffected population whose concerns can be addressed through nonmilitary means. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. If I could add a thought on that, it is the importance of cyber and the social networks as tools that allow us to 

do the kind of discriminatory analysis. So it is another aspect to 

this. Traditional intelligence has its merits, obviously, but here you 

can learn more about these groups by getting inside them because 

so many of them are using the cyber world in articulating their vision, as well as actually conducting operations. 

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you, gentlemen. And I think we all agree 

that our understanding of those relationships affects the United 

States engagement with those different groups and the level of resources and energy we attend to those groups. So thank you all 

very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
16 

Admiral Stavridis, thank you for being here. And I want to thank 

you also not just for the confidence that we here in this committee 

have in you, but also the confidence that you have earned with our 

NATO allies. And it certainly is, I think, very important both for 

the credibility of the United States and for our relationships that 

you have such high regard from our NATO allies. 

I want to talk about an issue of which I have concern about that 

relationship with our NATO allies. I serve on the Strategic Forces 

Subcommittee and have served as chair, and missile defense is one 

of those areas where you have worked very diligently to obtain support from our NATO allies for adding missile defense as a NATO 

mission. As you and I have talked previously, I was very concerned 

with the way the Obama administration ended the Bush plan to 

put ground-based missiles in Poland, both because I thought it was 

going to be essential for the protection of our mainland United 

States, but also because of the way in which the Poles were treated 

in that retreat. They had made a political commitment, and I think 

it was done in a way that was detrimental to our relationship. 

Now we are to the Phased Adaptive Approach, which I have 

some concerns about, and the GAO [Government Accountability Office] has recently issued a report that the SM–3 IIB [Standard Missile-3 Block IIB] missile may have, I believe their view is, very little national missile defense contribution from land-based sites in 

Poland and Romania. My concern from that report is it begins to 

signal again that perhaps we could disappoint our allies in commitments that we have made. 

Secretary Miller recently said in remarks to the Atlantic Council 

that the Pentagon, in view of the internal DOD reports, was looking very hard at the future of the SM–3 IIB missile. And I am concerned about the DOD commitment to this missile and the administration’s commitment to this missile. Now, I don’t see this as an 

alternative to ground-based sites, because I believe that they are 

complementary and they could be both used together, but in looking at the SM–3 IIB, I mean this Republican House has always 

funded the IIB missile. The Senate Democrat appropriators have 

cut funding for that. And when the Department of Defense in the 

conference report issued its objections of the appeals with respect 

to the appropriations, defense of the SM–3 IIB was not there. So 

we have the administration saying they are going to the SM–2, the 

SM–3 IIB funding being cut from the Democratic-controlled House, 

the administration not objecting, the Republicans on the House 

side funding it, and now technical issues having been raised. I am 

concerned about the DOD’s commitment both to our allies, the Romanians and Poles, with respect to this missile, but also the protection of the mainland United States. 

What is the Department of Defense’s commitment to the SM–3 

IIB? And how do you see its role both with our allies and in protecting the homeland? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, as you know, Congressman, from our 

long conversations about this, let me start with the Poles and Romanians. At the moment, in my conversations with my interlocutors, military to military, and indeed conversations with ministers 

of defense, ministers of foreign affairs, they appear to me to be 

comfortable with the EPAA [European Phased Adaptive Approach] 
17 

and the upcoming addition of shore-based sites, as you know, coming into Romania and then into Poland 2015 and 2018 and so forth. 

So my sense is the allies have adjusted to EPAA, and they are 

in fact looking for ways to contribute. The Dutch, the Spanish, the 

Italians are all looking at maritime-based contributions. The Germans and Italians are looking at point defense solutions. Germany 

is providing command and control. So I think the structure under 

the NATO hat that you know from your time as a NATO Parliamentarian, sir, is in fact coming together. 

In terms of where we are going through this progress, as you 

know, SM–3 IIB is scheduled to come online in 2020, so that is 7 

years from now. I suspect there will continue to be technical discussions regarding it. What I would like to do is take that for the 

record and come back to you with a defined departmental position 

that includes some technical analysis, because I sense that is what 

you are hungry for, and I will obtain that from MDA [Missile Defense Agency] and come back. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 123.] 

Mr. TURNER. Admiral, I would appreciate that. But the other aspect of this is that, as we look to the emerging threats we are going 

to need to make certain that we have every technological available 

means to address it. The SM–3 IIB certainly has additional capabilities. I am concerned by the press reports that seem to indicate 

that Congress is the one that is cutting it because this side of Congress has been funding it. The administration, if it really wants it, 

certainly has influence with the Democratic Senate to be able to obtain it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, good to see you again, sir. We were just recently in Europe, visited EUCOM headquarters, and I want to thank you and 

your staff for your outstanding support during that trip. And I also 

have a little egg on my face because I think I assured you that 

there is no chance that sequestration would kick in. And I have got 

egg on my face. Really it is more like manure on my face, I feel. 

And so, bam, it is what it is. 

But the chairman asked you during his questioning about the 

need for troops in Europe, and you mentioned that from the height 

of the Cold War we have decreased by 80 percent the troop 

strength in Europe. I have heard questions from those who would 

question why we need those other 20 percent troops in Europe: 

Why can’t we just bring them all home and let Europe take care 

of itself? Can you rebut that assertion? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I think I can give you the view from U.S. 

European Command. I mentioned earlier values, the economic base 

we share, the significant geography and access we enjoy in Europe, 

as well as the alliance itself, which is a treaty obligation which 

goes back and forth across the Atlantic for mutual defense. And finally this very pragmatic reason: that Europe is this largest pool 

of allies we have in the world, trained soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, as well as high technology. So I think that basket of reasons 

is very strong. 
18 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, what threat, though, is posed to our allies 

and ourselves that require us to maintain such a presence in Europe? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think as you look around the periphery of 

Europe, particularly, as Carter Ham knows extremely well, look to 

the south, along the Sahel, and the northern rim of the Mediterranean, as well as the Levant—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. And the Levant, for those who don’t know, is 

what? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Near Middle East, Syria and that region, sir. 

So that arc of crisis, if you will, that runs today from Syria down 

through and across the northern part of Africa, I think represents 

threats to the United States, as well as to our allies. So I would 

argue that we continue to have enduring presence needs, enduring 

interoperability needs, and a treaty obligation that would require 

some level of forces in Europe. Again, we have come down 80 percent. I think that is probably about right for the moment, but we 

should keep looking at it as we go forward. 

General HAM. Mr. Johnson, may I? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. 

General HAM. Sir, I would make two points to that, hardly as a 

guy who is reliant upon Europe-based forces to a large degree. And 

I would make two points. 

One, in terms of near-term response, when the President, when 

our President made the decision to commit forces initially in Libya, 

that simply would not have been possible on the timelines that 

were required absent Europe-based air and maritime forces. Had 

those forces been in the continental United States the timelines 

would have been significantly different and we don’t know what 

might have happened if we had not been able to respond on 

timelines. 

Second is, one of the many missions which combatant commanders are given is to assure access for the United States and for 

others in the global trade. And so as we look to Europe, the Straits 

of Gibraltar, a strategic chokepoint, the Suez Canal, further down, 

the Bab el-Mandab, access through the Gulf of Guinea, all important economically not just to our country but to many others, and 

the presence of U.S. forces nearby helps assure that access that is 

vital to our economy. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. I will yield back the balance of my 

time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thank you both for your service and for being 

here today. 

Admiral, could you give us a rough order of magnitude as to the 

size of our nuclear weapons in Europe, forward deployed. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes. Sir, if I could, that is classified, so I will 

take that for the record and provide you with a precise number. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 
19 

Mr. ROGERS. Let me ask this then. Can you tell us how many 

so-called tactical or nonstrategic weapons that Russia has that are 

forward deployed in Europe? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think you will find press reports that Russia possesses some low number of thousands of tactical nuclear 

weapons. They are on Russian territory. The United States possesses orders of magnitude, smaller numbers than that. Again, I 

will respond on a classified basis. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. And I understand, and I appreciate it. And you 

have painted the picture that I was after. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Okay, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. As you know, I have taken over the chairmanship 

of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. So I am concerned about press reports about the administration’s intent to pursue reduction talks with the Russians 

and not through a treaty structure, which I find disturbing. Is it 

your professional opinion that if those talks were to proceed, that 

they should include tactical weapons as well as strategic weapons 

parity? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I would obviously defer to the State Department for negotiations and treaties. I will say from a military perspective we have a small number of weapons, as you know, that 

are in Europe, and that any changes to that structure would need 

to be first and foremost negotiated within NATO so we had an 

overall position before we could even move to a discussion with 

Russia. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, it is my observation that as we continue to 

discuss reductions in our strategic weapons, not only with Russia 

but our position in the world, Russia, China, and other countries 

continue to dramatically increase their tactical weapons and we 

don’t seem to ever take account for that. And I think that is mistaken. 

But the next question, on the subject of tactical weapons, are you 

familiar with the Presidential Nuclear Initiative of 1991 between 

President Yeltsin and George H.W. Bush? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir, in general terms. 

Mr. ROGERS. In 2006, then Assistant Secretary Stephen 

Rademaker noted President Yeltsin committed to similar reductions in Russian tactical nuclear weapons but considerable concern 

exists that the Russian commitments have not been entirely fulfilled. What are your thoughts about that? Do you think the Russians are fulfilling their commitments and are we able to verify 

that? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, you are correct that we are not able to 

verify that. With some treaties, as you know, in a treaty structure 

you have verification regimes, think Nunn-Lugar. Here we don’t 

have that. So it is difficult to say with certainty. I think you are 

correct in the assumption that there is a wide disparity in terms 

of numbers of such weapons. And at the moment there is no mechanism for monitoring, verifying, or following up on those discussions. 
20 

Mr. ROGERS. I appreciate that. I do want to follow up on a couple 

of things. Mr. Turner talked about the SM–3 IIB. I completely concur with his position. I think that it appears that the administration and some in the Congress on the other side of the Hill have 

lost their enthusiasm for that program and my concern is that the 

DOD may be in a similar situation. When you do respond to him 

in a follow-up, I would appreciate a copy of that. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Like to know what your perspective is about the 

DOD’s long-term commitment—— 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS [continuing]. To that weapon system. 

And then lastly, you talked a little bit about Romania and Poland. I fear that what happened in Poland is about to happen in 

Romania. I am very concerned about that and our credibility going 

forward to negotiate with our European allies. So I would urge you 

to be sensitive to making sure that we don’t leave the Romanians 

feeling like that we left them at the altar, as we did the Poles. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir. Understood. 

Mr. ROGERS. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to both of you for your extraordinary service. I 

have enjoyed working with you. 

General Ham, I wonder if you could just take a moment and talk 

about our partnership capacity. We have certainly dealt with that 

on this committee, but I am referring particularly to our humanitarian assistance missions. And I know that San Diego was very 

proud last evening, or I guess Wednesday evening, they honored 

the USNS [United States Naval Ship] Mercy for its work. This was 

the Center for Conflict Resolution, which usually honors individuals, but in this case they honored the Mercy. And certainly from 

my experience in working with them in Papua New Guinea, I really appreciate that honor to them. 

But I also know that the USNS Comfort has not been deployed 

to the coast of Africa. And I am wondering, you know, number one, 

where you feel that this humanitarian mission lies in terms of the 

needs that we have to support our friends around the world. We 

have already talked about the importance of cyber, trafficking, special operations. I know that those are certainly high priorities, but 

I wondered where humanitarian assistance lies in this, but also 

whether or not we should be using the tools that we have better, 

and particularly the USNS Comfort as part of that growing partnership. 

General HAM. Both ships and their crews are extraordinary. 

Comfort and Mercy have been great symbols for the people of the 

United States in a wide variety of contingency operations and other 

engagements globally. And so I think they do offer great capability. 

But it is also a capability that is best applied when there is some 

host nation capability to reciprocate and can build upon the capabilities that Comfort or Mercy provide. So we do look at that and 

we look for opportunities to deploy those ships. We haven’t found, 
21 

frankly, quite the right circumstance just yet where in an engagement purpose it might be useful. 

But rather our humanitarian assistance, and I would wrap into 

that umbrella also disaster response, is a high priority for us in Africa. There are many circumstances in which African military 

forces are required for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. 

And a large number, the preponderance of the exercises that we do 

both bilaterally and regionally with African forces, are built on a 

humanitarian assistance or disaster relief scenario. We have seen 

some improvements in their regional capabilities and I think that 

is an area of enduring effort for us. 

I think there are ways we can improve that. We have a good relationship with USAID [United States Agency for International Development]. I have a senior development adviser at my headquarters; also folks from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. 

They are hugely beneficial. I have got a planner embedded at 

USAID that helps as well. And we have got to tighten the relationship with the many nongovernmental organizations that do such 

good work in humanitarian assistance missions. 

So I think there is significant room for improvement. And for us 

the trick is how do you bring the African militaries and capabilities 

so that they are increasingly capable of responding. I think Admiral Stavridis had a point. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. In my previous life, when I was commander 

of U.S. Southern Command for 3 years, I was lucky enough to have 

Comfort deploy several times to Latin American and the Caribbean. I cannot overstate the impact of that. When you see a little 

8-year old boy who has hiked through the jungle with his mother 

for 3 days to get to the Comfort put on his first set of eyeglasses 

and say, ‘‘Mama, veo el mundo—Mom, I see the world’’—multiply 

that times 400,000 patient treatments, that creates security for the 

United States because it portrays us in a very different and positive way. 

Mrs. DAVIS. As we grapple with budgetary concerns, is this a 

place that you think people would naturally go to and think we 

should just cut out this kind of assistance? And how would you respond? 

General HAM. I don’t think so, because for us on the military side 

it is pretty low cost. I mean, it is typically small teams of medical 

experts, whether they are preventive medicine or veterinarians, or 

as Admiral Stavridis mentioned, deployable eye surgical teams that 

can go into the heart of Africa. I think we will be okay, ma’am. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. And can I add that on the Comfort about a 

third of the personnel are volunteers from the private sector. So 

this is a good example of private-public partnering. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Right. Thank you. And the Mercy as well. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. You know, we always want to take the 

opportunity to express appreciation because we know that American freedom is anchored in the freedom that is alive in your 

hearts, that you dedicate yourself to that end for your whole lives. 
22 

Admiral Stavridis, I know that it is difficult to kind of have a 

dual-hatted challenge of being in the role of SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander of Europe; that is not an easy challenge, and I 

would commend you on that. And I am, like so many others on this 

committee, committed to seeing a robust missile defense capability 

against whatever enemies might challenge us. And with that in 

mind, would you provide us with an update on your command’s 

missile defense capacity and force structure requirements, specifically highlighting any concerns that you might have about our ability to meet the European Phased Adaptive Approach policy and its 

requirements? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir. As you know, we are in phase one, 

which means we have an Aegis ship deployed, typically to the Eastern Mediterranean. We have what is called a TPY–2 [Transportable Radar Surveillance], it is a phased-array radar. That is hosted 

by Turkey. The command and control that lashes it together is in 

Ramstein, Germany. It is a NATO command and control structure. 

At the moment it is manned by the nations of NATO with a very 

strong U.S. underpinning to it. So that is phase one, and it relies 

on the SM–3 IA missile system, which can be launched from the 

Aegis ship. 

The next phase, phase two, will add a land-based side in Romania, which we discussed earlier this morning. It will upgrade the 

missile. That will come in, in about 2015, and it will include an enhanced command and control structure, tying more exactly to overhead systems. 

The third phase, which will come in, in 2018, will include a landbased site in Poland, another upgrade to the missile, a further upgrade in the overhead sensor system. And then it gets a little less 

defined as you get into that fourth phase, but the current plan, as 

we have been discussing this morning, is to add another upgrade 

to the missile system. So that is kind of the flow of this over the 

next 7 years, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you. Let me, if I could, ask you about 

the Russian missile defense system. Is it true—and I am asking 

these questions sort of like a lawyer does, you know, you have some 

perspective of the answer already, but for the sake of the record 

and the committee—is it true that Russia is undertaking a significant modernization of its system? Is it true that they use nucleararmed interceptors? And have we, the United States, gotten assurance that Russia’s missile defense system is not aimed at our nuclear deterrent? You know, I suppose that is a pretty relevant question since we witnessed Russia’s hysteria about our relatively small 

non-nuclear-armed missile defense system when Russia deploys 

one that seems so clearly aimed at deterring ours. So I have given 

you a lot to shoot at there, but I might not get a chance to rephrase 

the question. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, let me begin by saying I will respond 

for the record in a classified manner to several elements of what 

you say. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It is very true that Russia is expanding generally in their defense spending to include missile systems, sea-
23 

going systems, as well as advanced air and so forth. So Russia is 

increasing their defense budget by about 12 percent this year, for 

example. I am sure that will include enhanced systems. Beyond 

that we would probably get into a classified realm there that I 

would like to address for the record. 

I want to state for the record that the U.S. missile defense system, and therefore the NATO missile defense system, poses no 

threat to Russian strategic systems, and the science and the kinematics of that are very clear. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I guess I would just close by 

suggesting that during the Bush and Obama administration both 

of them have spent much time and political capital in trying in 

good faith, in my opinion, to assuage the Russian concerns or its 

stated concerns about our missile defense system. At the same time 

Russia has this extensive missile defense system in place that 

seems clearly aimed at our deterrent, and at some point we need 

to realize that Russia may be playing us to some degree. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

The vote has been called. It looks like we are going to be 45 minutes to an hour. What I am going to try to do is get Mr. Enyart 

and Mr. Conaway, if we can get those questions in, and we probably will conclude the hearing at that time. 

Mr. Enyart. 

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Ham, it is good to see you again. 

Admiral Stavridis, good to see you again. 

You know, I was certainly glad to hear that you are the co-chairs 

of the State Partnership fan club, and I would like to think that 

that may be in large part due to the great partnership you saw between the Illinois National Guard and Poland. 

I would like to ask you a couple of questions about the State 

Partnership Program, and I know it is a very small part of the 

budget. You know, at $22 million it is really dust, but I think it 

is a very effective program and I know that you do, too. So I would 

ask that you relay your thoughts on that to your incoming commanders when you get replaced eventually. 

Now, the State Partnership Program has been such a great success because what we tried to do was take those Eastern European 

nations that were formerly part of the Warsaw Pact and bring 

them close to the West and eventually integrate them into NATO, 

which we have successfully done. And of course we align States like 

Illinois with Poland because of cultural ties. Chicago is the secondlargest Polish city in the world. And so we had some very firm 

bases there to work with. Do you believe that that model would 

translate also to Africa? 

General HAM. I do, Congressman. And we have some clear examples of that with the eight partnerships that we do have. And I 

think you are exactly right, the real benefit in the State Partnership Program is the enduring nature of the relationship, that sergeants and lieutenants and captains grow up together and have 

multiple engagements. So I think the premise is exactly right. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. If I could, because I have seen State Partnership both in Europe and in Latin America and the Caribbean, I can 
24 

tell you it is easily transportable from significant and advanced to 

developing nations. It is a very powerful tool, and bang for the 

buck it is unmatched. 

Mr. ENYART. Has there been any thought given to what is called 

a multilateral partnership, where you would take a long-established partnership, like Illinois and Poland, which has been in existence for 20 years, and pairing that partnership then with an African nation? Has there been any thought given to that? 

General HAM. There has, and we have one good example of that 

with Michigan and—— 

Mr. ENYART. Latvia. 

General HAM. Estonia and Liberia. So that three-part relationship I think is a model for what might be possible in the future. 

Mr. ENYART. Admiral Stavridis, you indicate that the brigade 

combat teams [BCTs] that are leaving will be replaced on a rotational basis. Can you tell me how long a period of time you are 

talking about rotating the BCTs into Europe? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Very much still under discussion. We are 

starting with a big exercise later this year called Steadfast Jazz. 

We will bring in headquarters elements and probably company 

level-size formations to do this. Then we will build it up to a battalion level phase the following year, and then we are hopeful to 

bring in the first brigade-size unit in about 3 years. So we are 

building up to doing this. I am very confident of the support from 

the U.S. Army, they are enthusiastic about this, and we will mature the process as it goes along and make sure, Congressman, that 

it plugs into the NATO exercise schedule so we are getting the 

maximum bang for the buck both bilaterally, as well as within the 

alliance. 

Mr. ENYART. Any thought to using National Guard BCTs as part 

of those rotational forces? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think it is a terrific idea. And I am sure 

the Army is looking at a wide variety of different units to support 

this over time. 

Mr. ENYART. It sounds like what we are talking about is essentially a 2-week, maybe a 3-week training exercise. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes. 

Mr. ENYART. Not any kind of permanent rotational. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Correct, correct. Probably longer than 2 to 3 

weeks so that would get the efficiencies out of bringing them over, 

but probably a couple of months on the ground type of thing. 

Mr. ENYART. The Kosovo and Sinai peacekeeping missions have 

been a National Guard mission for the last 10 years, and I think 

that has been great for the Guard in terms of training. It has also 

saved our country money when you consider the fully burdened 

cost. Do you envision those missions continuing to be a Guard presence or are those going to become an Active Duty? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think that is up to the Army to sort 

through that. I noticed the next rotation in Kosovo is going to be 

an Active Duty unit. You are correct that for the previous decade 

it has been National Guard. I think the Army really values that 

flexibility. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time expired. 

Mr. Conaway. 
25 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you both for your long, distinguished service 

to our country, and it is a heartfelt thank you. 

General Ham, you have had forces in Congo and Uganda for a 

little better than a year now on the hunt or helping hunt some 

folks. Can you give us a quick couple of sentences on whether that 

is working or not or how you see the value of those resources? 

General HAM. Congressman, I think the U.S. presence both in 

terms of the 100 or so special forces advisers, some other enabling 

capabilities, aviation, intelligence, logistics, medical, I think has 

provided a valuable service. We have seen significant increases in 

the number of defections from the Lord’s Resistance Army, we have 

helped enable the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces to conduct 

long-range patrols that have resulted in capturing some, to include 

some senior leaders from the Lord’s Resistance Army. So positive 

steps. But Joseph Kony remains at large. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Right. The dustup in Mali, the collapse of the 

Mali armed services, what appeared to be, in the face of whatever 

fight—I don’t know who trained them, if we were involved in any 

of the training in that regard. But are there lessons learned from 

what happened with the Mali forces that we can extend across Africa, to say, here is how we train, here is how we don’t train, here 

is what works and doesn’t work? 

General HAM. There are, Congressman. And certainly we looked 

introspectively in the aftermath of the military coup. First of all, 

from an intelligence perspective, did we miss indicators? We don’t 

think so. We think this was very much a spur of the moment thing. 

Secondly, did we miss something in our training, in our engagement? I am glad to say that the units with which we were primarily engaged in Mali did not participate in the coup. 

Mr. CONAWAY. How did they perform in the fight? 

General HAM. They didn’t. The units that we were mostly engaged with were largely suppressed by those who did participate in 

the coup. 

My greatest disappointment, though, sir is with the senior leaders, senior military leaders in Mali, who neither supported the 

coup, but they didn’t resist it either. And this goes from the former 

chief of defense and to some other senior leaders. It is my belief 

that because this was not long planned, this was a very junior 

level-led coup, it could have been stopped relatively quickly had 

senior leaders in the Malian armed forces taken positive steps to 

counter the coup. They didn’t, and that is a failure on their part. 

We are looking at ourselves to say, in our engagements with leaders we have got to continually emphasize the military ethos, the 

professionalism, the subordination to legitimate civilian control, operating according to the rule of law, and that military coups are not 

anywhere within the realm of possibility of a professional military. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Let me take one for the record on the fight 

that they had with the Tuaregs and the extremists in the north. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 123.] 

Mr. CONAWAY. That was really the subfocus of the question. 

Great answer to the other part because that was a big deal as well. 
26 

Your forces in extremis, given the tyranny of distance and geography that Stavridis mentioned earlier with respect to Africa, is it 

rational for you to have the kind of enablers and others available 

to respond to the next Benghazi-like event in Africa. 

General HAM. Congressman, what we are seeking to do is to 

have forces postured regionally. So one in East Africa, Djibouti, one 

in West Africa, maybe maritime-based, maybe something ashore, 

and then a Southern Europe force that can respond to North Africa. In conjunction with the State Department, the Department of 

Defense is looking at what are the other capabilities. Do there need 

to be more Marines in more places at U.S. diplomatic facilities? 

Mr. CONAWAY. Have we dealt with the chain of command issues 

and the ability of whoever has AFRICOM’s command, that you will 

be able to use those forces when you need them without having to 

go through other layers? 

General HAM. Yes, sir. The Secretary of Defense is my boss and 

that is who tells me where and when we can use forces. There is 

always a diplomatic aspect in terms of access. But I think we are 

clear. The chain of command has never, in my view, never been in 

question. 

Mr. CONAWAY. When in the Benghazi issue and the excitement 

about trying to respond there, there was clear lines of authorities 

and clearly operational issues that didn’t—or were there—that got 

in the way of the response? 

General HAM. Sir, there was no lack of clarity on my part as to 

chain of command and no impediment. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. Thank you. 

Yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. If we hurry, we can make the vote. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much. And if you could leave your 

entire statement it will be taken into the record. But I would also 

like staff to make copies and get them to all of the members of the 

committee, because you were so expeditious. 

I know I had requests from members that they wanted to hear 

that whole testimony, so that we will get it to them so they can 

read it. Thank you again for your great service to this Nation. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 15, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 15, 2013 

(31) 

Statement of Chairman Howard P. "Buck" McKeon, 

House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

The Posture of the U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command 

March 15,2013 

I'd like to welcome everyone to today's hearing on the posture of the U.S. 

European Command and U.S. Africa Command. And thank you to our two 

witnesses for agreeing to testifY before the committee this morning. We have 

Admiral James Stavridis, Commander of EUCOM and Supreme Allied 

Commander of NATO, and General Carter Ham, Commander of AFRICOM. 

Admiral Stavridis, you are currently the longest serving combatant 

commander. I understand that you'll be retiring after more than 36 years of 

service in the coming months, once your successor is nominated and confirmed. 

On behalf of a grateful nation, thank you for your service and dedication to this 

country and our men and women in uniform. 

General Ham, you also have said that you intend to retire this year. You 

have served as an enlisted infantryman and as a senior leader in our nation's 

military. The nation owes you a great debt of gratitude for your selfless years of 

service and dedication to this nation and the men and women in uniform. 

Admiral Stavridis, many believe Europe is now one of the most secure 

regions in the world. Even the President's Defense Strategic Guidance says "most 

European countries are now producers of security rather than consumers. In 

keeping with [the] evolving strategic landscape, our posture in Europe must also 

evolve." I think it's important to recognize that many of our European allies are 

also NATO allies, and they have been an integral part of the ISAF effort in 

Afghanistan. However, Russia still remains a serious concern-to U.S. national 

security interests and to our regional allies and partners. Some may also forget that 

Europe is strategically located in the vicinity of the Middle East and North Africa. 

So, I'd like you to fully explain why Europe is still relevant, why the U.S. 

should remain engaged with and forward deployed in Europe, and how the 

ongoing instability in the Middle East and North Africa affect Europe and NATO. 

Especially given the events of the last 6 months, I firmly believe the U.S. cannot 

further reduce its presence or engagement in Europe. Our forward presence helps 

facilitate a more rapid response, not only to emerging regional threats but to the 

defense ofIsrael. I'd also like to hear your thoughts on the impact of the current 
32 

fiscal environment on your ability to execute your missions and respond to crises. 

General Ham, the AFRICOM area of responsibility remains a critical focal 

point for u.s. vital national security interests-particularly over the last year. The 

attack in Benghazi, Libya, on September lIth, 2012; the resurgence of Al Qaeda in 

the north; the ascending threat in Central Africa; and the lingering terrorist threat in 

the Horn of Africa reminds us that AI Qaeda, its affiliates, and associated forces 

continue to pose a threat to the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests in the region. 

To that end, AFRICOM must be sufficiently postured-both strategically 

and operationally-as well as capable to execute combat operations if called upon 

to do so. Yet even after the events of September 11 th, AFRICOM still lacks an 

organic special operations force that can effectively deploy into non-permissive 

environments on the continent. In addition to deployable forces, I would like to 

gain a greater understanding of: 1) the assumptions underpinning the decision to 

maintain the totality of the AFRICOM headquarters in Europe and 

2) the approach of disaggregating the AFRICOM intelligence analytical capacity 

from the headquarters. It is not clear to me whether these are the right 

approaches. We must continue to evaluate both the assumptions and analysis 

shaping our view of the threat picture as well as our posture in the region-in 

order to ensure that we can effectively respond to the next Benghazi attack or 

other operational requirements on the continent. 

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to observe that these questions 

of strategy, missions, and US force posture are not unique to Europe and Africa. 

Last year, the Department issued its new strategic guidance. We have been told 

that with further cuts to the military, that strategy is no longer supportable. But 

this year the Department will conduct a Quadrennial Defense Review and has the 

opportunity to re-examine these issues. While I gather that the QDR may be 

getting off to slow start given the budget issues DOD is dealing with, I want to 

encourage DOD to proceed with the independent National Defense Panel, now 

that all Congressional panelists have been appointed. There is significant 

expertise in this group and there should be no delay in allowing them to start their 

work. 

With that, I want to thank you both again for being with us today. 

2 
33 

HOUSE AND SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES 

TESTIMONY OF: 

ADMIRAL JAMES STAVRIDIS, UNITED STATES NAVY 

COMMANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND 

BEFORE THE 113TH CONGRESS, 2013 
34 
35 

INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Distinguished Members of the Committee: Thank you for the 

opportunity to appear again before you today. For nearly four years now, I have commanded the exceptional 

men and women of the United States European Command and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), Allied Command Operations. It has been the privilege of a lifetime, for a mission I deeply believe 

in: one that directly links U.S. national security and the American way of life with our most steadfast allies 

and partners in vital strategic partnerships that produce global security and stability. I can report to you today 

that we continue to make strong progress-in military operations, theater security cooperation, strategic 

rebalancing efforts, and important initiatives with our international, interagency, and public-private partnersto protect America's vital national security interests and provide stability across Europe and Eurasia. In 

meeting this enduring mission, most recently endorsed and mandated in the Department's 2012 Defense 

Strategic Guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21" Century Defense, these exceptional 

men and women continue to provide for the forward defense of the United States and ensure the collective 

security and continued viability of the NATO Alliance. 

Today, tbanks to decades of sustained leadership, tireless devotion, and ironclad commitment 

on both sides of the Atlantic, the United States and our historic allies enjoy an unprecedented degree of 

freedom, interconnectedness, economic opportunity and 

prosperity, and interdependence toward achieving these 

common goals of global security and stability. Indeed, as 

former Secretary of State Clinton remarked in assessing 

the legacy of the last century and its impact on the current 

one: "Today's transatlantic community is not just a defining 

achievement of the century behind us. It is indispensable to 

the world we hope to build together in the century ahead:' 

This partnership and investment, made in the 

twentieth century, continues to pay us considerable 

dividends in the twenty-first. For even as the global economy fights through its current perturbations, the 

fact remains that the transatlantic partnership-rooted in the stability that flows from security-constitutes 

nearly half the world's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and a third of global trade. The transatlantic economy 

is valued at nearly $31 trillion,' generates approximately $4 trillion in annual trade revenue, and supports 

15 million jobs.' Acting together, the United States and Europe still command the heights of the global 

economy, and maintain the advantage that position offers. 
36 

In support of that position, our European partners continue to make important financial and military 

contributions to our shared security. For, in spite of recent and oft-repeated criticisms focused exclusively 

on single national contributions, the fact is that, collectively, our European allies and partners are annually 

investing nearly $300 billion on defense, second only to the United States ($600 billion) and well ahead of 

available figures on annual defense expenditures by China ($140 billion) and Russia ($70 billion).l 

It is also a fundamental reality of the modern security environment-one recognized in the 2012 

Defense Strategic Guidance-that these defense contributions and NATO's continued evolution have 

transformed Europe, in the span of' a single generation, from a security consumer to one of the world's most 

important security producers. Today, NATO militaries include 750 ships, 24,000 aircraft, and over three 

million active duty personnel. Over the past decade, as these assets were vigorously put to use, our European 

allies and partners made conscious national decisions to set aside the security paradigms of the previous 

century and stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States, making unprecedented deployments on 

out-of'-area expeditionary operations to confront 21" century threats. And it remains one of history's more 

ironic twists that NATO's only Article 5 declaration was made by our NATO allies in the defense of the 

United States after the events of September 11, 2001. 

In the decade of war and military operations that followed, European military personnel comprised 

80% of non-U.S. forces in Iraq and 90% of non-U.S. forces in Afghanistan-essentially a third of the 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In addition, our European partners provided substantial 

military support-in command and control, basing, air sorties, and maritime interdiction-to execute 

Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya successfully in 2011. They also sustain 90% of the mission in 

l(osovo, provide 6,000 troops for U.N. peacekeeping operations across the world, and continue providing 

important support to current missile defense and counter-piracy operations. These are extraordinarily 

valuable contributions, both diplomatically and in terms of their relief on U.S. force generation requirements. 

They represent burden-sharing unparalleled in any other region of the world, showcasing the vital importance 

of our European allies and partners to U.S. national security interests and the viability of coalition warfare as 

we continue moving into the 21" century. 

Yet, even as we acknowledge these extraordinary contributions and commitments, the fiscal realities 

and current inflection point that follow a decade of war have prompted necessary national deliberation 

to reconsider the U.S. defense strategy and rebalance global U.S. posture. Indeed, the Cold War and its 

strategic imperatives are long over. And, as the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance makes clear, after ten years 

of combat operations "our nation is at a moment of transition" requiring us to put "our fiscal house in order 

here at home and renew our long-term economic strength:' These considerations have increased scrutiny 

of U.S. posture in Europe. Yet, the reality is that U.S. posture in Europe has been steadily declining for more 

than two decades. 

2 
37 

At the height of the Cold War, more than 450,000 US. forces were stationed across 1,200 sites on the 

European continent. Today, US. forces on the continent have been reduced by more than 85% and basing sites 

reduced by 75%. Indeed, shortly after release of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, European Command 

announced further significant force structure cuts, phasing out the Army's V Corps Headquarters, the 170,h 

and 172"d Brigade Combat Teams, three forward-stationed Air Force squadrons, and a host of Army and Air 

Force enablers in concert with the Department's strategic rebalancing effort. Additionally, over the past six 

years, the US. Army has dramatically consolidated its theater footprint, closing six garrisons and over 100 

sites across Europe to consolidate and align its much smaller presence with enduring 21" century missions. 

In light of these reductions, European Command is today comprised of approximately 64,000 joint 

forces-representing less than 5% of the military-strategically located across 21 main operating bases 

and smaller supporting sites. The command is sharply focused on the goals outlined by the Secretary of 

Defense in his own preface to the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. That guidance seeks to ensure that 'joint 

Force 2020' is capable of: "maintaining our defense commitments to Europe; strengthening alliances and 

partnerships across all regions; deterring and defeating aggression by our adversaries, including those seeking 

to deny our power projection: countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD): effectively operating in 

cyberspace, space, and across all domains: maintaining a safe and effective nuclear deterrent; and protecting 

the homeland:' For European Command, these remain our existing and most critical missions, performed 

from forward-stationed locations that protect the United States through strategic depth and distance, while 

providing our nation the strategic agility and responsiveness to deal rapidly with 2l" century crises and 

complex contingencies in an environment of unforgiving speed. 

Despite these realities, there persists in some quarters a notion that the strategic rebalance represents 

a zero-sum game for US. global posture, recalling debates from the last century pitting advocates of'Europe 

first' or 'Asia first' against each other. Yet, what that century taught us, and what the 2012 Defense Strategic 

Guidance makes clear, is that the United States must retain its global reach, access, and prerogatives to 

maintain its status and influence as a global superpower, particularly in regions vital to US. economic wellbeing such as Europe and the Middle East. Power, like nature, abhors a vacuum. A zero-sum withdrawal 

or substantial diminishment of US. presence, influence, and supporting infrastructure across these vital 

regions provides opportunity for other rising powers to displace the United States, and gain the geostrategic 

benefits from that substitution. 

The new strategic guidance is also clear in identifying the nation's evolving strategic challenges, as 

well as its enduring strategic partnerships. While the guidance directs that the US. military will "of necessity 

rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region;' it also articulates that, in addition to working with America's 

allies in the Pacific, Europe remains "our principal partner in seeking global and economic security, and 

will remain so for the foreseeable future:' Chairman Dempsey echoed this point at the strategy's roll-out: 

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"Our strategic challenges are shifting, and we have to pay attention to those shifts. But what we do will 

always be built on the strong foundation of our traditional strategic partnerships, and NATO is chief among 

them:' Thus, NATO remains an essential vehicle, given its more than 60 years of security experience, strong 

and progressive direction from the Lisbon and Chicago summits, and a decade of sustained investment 

and gains in expeditionary out-of-area operations, capabilities, and interoperability. Within this construct, 

European Command remains the essential catalyst, driving and strengthening that principal partnership 

through vital theater security cooperation and multilateral training events, particularly at places like us. 

Army Europe's full-spectrum Joint Multinational Training Command, centrally located and accessible in 

southern Germany. 

Geographically, Europe provides the critical access and infrastructure to meet the Defense Strategic 

Guidance's priorities and expand us. global reach across half the world, to Europe and on to Eurasia, Africa, 

and the Middle East. America's enduring presence and leadership in Europe provides our nation with 

an indispensable geostrategic platform-a metaphorical forward-deployed "unsinkable aircraft carrier"-

to facilitate and conduct global operations in direct support of NATO, six US. Combatant Commands 

(European Command, Central Command, Africa Command, Transportation Command, Special Operations 

Command, and Strategic Command), a wide host of US. Government interagency organizations, and 51 US. 

Embassies. In accordance with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, our evolved but enduring presence 

will continue to support these missions, assure our allies, deter potential adversaries, promote enhanced 

capabilities and interoperability for future coalition operations, support and provide leadership for NATO's 

continued progressive evolution, and provide critical forward defense against the rising threats of the 21" 

century. 

The timing of the U.S. strategic rebalance-coming simultaneously with a number of other rapidly 

unfolding events in and around our theater, in places like Israel, Turkey, Syria, North Africa, the wider 

Middle East, and Afghanistan-has also provided the command with a strategic inflection point of our own 

to consider and to focus on as we move into the future. 

European Command has aggressively leveraged this opportunity to undertake a significant strategic 

review last fall, guiding our implementation of the Defense Strategic Guidance and ensuring the responsible 

utilization and maximum efficiency of increasingly precious defense resources. That strategy acknowledges 

the environment we are witnessing: one characterized by decreasing resources and increasing instability; 

one that endorses the Department's emphasis to work with America's "most stalwart allies and partners" to 

maintain our commitments to allied security; one that promotes enhanced allied capacity and interoperability, 

ensuring that a decade of sustained investment and combat experience with these partners is not lost; and 

one that leverages resource pooling and sharing opportunities-such as NATO's 'Smart Defense' programto economize our efforts as we meet the challenges of the 21" century. 

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39 

In light of this environment and the path forward, European Command's new strategy tightly 

aligns our enduring posture with the command's most pressing 21" century missions and priorities. Those 

priorities include: the command's readiness to execute NATO Article 5 missions and other priority U.S. 

contingency plans; preservation of our strategic theater partnerships, both to enable a successful ISAF 

transition and to preserve the return on past U.S. investment in partner capability and interoperability; and 

European Command's charge to defend the homeland forward against rising threats from ballistic missiles, 

international terrorism, WMD proliferation, transnational illicit trafficking, piracy, and malevolence in 

cyberspace. European Command's new strategy will serve to ensure that our resources are harmonized 

effectively and efficiently across the command, that we are prepared to address conflict across the spectrum 

of operations with a focus on the most likely scenarios, and that we are meeting the growing need, based 

on fiscal realities, to align high-end training opportunities, capability development, and sustained outreach 

with our allies and partners on future coalition operations and military burden-sharing. 

The transatlantic alliance is and will remain an essential foundation for sustained global security, 

stability, and freedom. It is a precious and profound generational inheritance from those who preceded us; 

a tool forged in the fire of the last century to provide us the edge we need in this one. In candid remarks on 

his departure, outgoing Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned against the growing devaluation among 

American leadership of this inheritance: "The policymakers who will follow us will not have the same 

historical, personal, and, indeed, emotional ties to Europe and may not consider the return on America's 

investment in Europe's defense worth the cost...and that will be a tragedy:' Former Secretary Panetta has 

also stated it clearly: "We live in a world of growing danger and uncertainty where we face threats from 

violent extremism, nuclear proliferation, rising powers, and cyber attack. We cannot predict where the next 

crisis will occur. But we know we are stronger when we confront these threats together. It is precisely because 

of these growing security challenges and growing fiscal constraints that we need to work more closely than 

ever as partners:' 

To summarize, there are five key responses to the question: "Why is Europe of such importance 

to the United States?" First, Europe is home to most of the world's progressive democracies; nations with 

which we share the fundamental values that are a critical element in building effective coalitions. Second, 

with a GDP of $19 trillion-a quarter of the world's economy-and approximately $4 trillion in annual 

trade with the United States, Europe's importance to the U.S. and global economies cannot be overstated. 

Third, the European theater remains critical geostrategic terrain, providing the United States with the global 

access it needs to conduct worldwide operations and crisis response. Fourth, Europe is the backdrop for 

NATO, history's most successful and effective alliance, and a vital partner for dealing with the challenges 

of the 21" century. Fifth, Europe is today a security exporter, possessing among the most highly trained 

and technologically advanced militaries in the world. No other region possesses such a comparable pool of 

capable and willing partners able to conduct global operations with the United States. 

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Therefore, our nation must take care-even as we grapple with significant economic challenges and 

chart the necessary strategic reorientations-to protect, preserve, and continue evolving this extraordinary 

partnership. We must keep the transatlantic light burning brightly. It will help guide us as we continue 

navigating the shadows, complexity, and continuous evolution of the 21" century security environment. 

And it will prove, as we persevere and rise to meet today's economic and security challenges, that we are 

still, and will remain, STRONGER TOGETHER. 

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MISSION, VISION, PRIORITIES 

Mission: The mission of the U.S. European Command is to conduct military operations, international 

military engagement, and interagency partnering to enhance transatlantic security and defend the United 

States forward. 

Vision: We serve the nation as an agile security organization executing full-spectrum activities in a wholeof-government framework to deliver solutions that contribute to enduring security and stability across the 

world. 

2013 THEATER PRIORITIES 

I. Ensure readiness to execute European Command's NATO Article 5 commitment 

and other contingency plans. 

2. Preserve our strategic partnerships. 

• Sustain relationship with our allies to ensure a strong NATO Alliance; 

• Preserve recently developed allied and partner capability and interoperability; 

• Maintain regional stability and security. 

3. Enable ISAF's transition to Afghan security lead. 

4. Counter transnational threats, focusing on: missile defense; weapons of mass 

destruction; counter-terrorism; illicit trafficking; counter-piracy; and cyberspace. 

3. Maintain US. strategic access across Europe in support of global operations. 

6. Maintain particular focus on {elUr key countries: Israel, Poland, Russia, and Turkey. 

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SUCCESS & PROGRESS: 

Meeting the Chairman's Strategic Priorities 

Aligned and Supporting Joint Force 2020 

The Defense Strategic Guidance provides a blueprint for 

optimizing the u.s. joint Force by the year 2020. This blueprint provides 

a 21st century fighting force that sustains U.S. global leadership, is 

postured to protect America's vital national security interests, stands 

ready to confront and defeat aggression anywhere in the world, and 

maintains the missions, capabilities, and capacity to prevail in the 

complex security environment of the 21st century. As part of that 

blueprint, the Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff has outlined ten 

critical mission areas for joint Force 2020: 

1. Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare 

2. Deter and Defeat Aggression 

3. Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent 

4. Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities 

5. Project Power Despite Anti-Access I Area Denial Challenges 

6. Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction 

7. Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space 

8. Provide a Stabilizing Presence 

9. Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations 

10. Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations 

U.S. European Command is closely aligned with, and executing, all ten of these mission areas. Every 

day, through a wide array of operations, exercises, and supporting initiatives, conducted in conjunction 

with our allies and partners, European Command is providing the forward defense of the United States and 

preserving America's vital national security interests across multiple continents in each of these priority 

areas. Over the past year, we have achieved significant progress in line with the Chairman's strategic 

priorities. Highlights include: 

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1. Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare 

Afghanistan. European Command continues a wide range of activities to enable a successful 

transition to Afghan security lead at the end of 2014. Our European allies and partners, who constitute a 

third ofISAF, have made an "in together, out together" commitment, with some countries, including Georgia, 

Hungary, and Romania, having recently increased their ISAF contributions to address critical shortfalls. 

Allied and partner special operations forces, working in concert with Special Operations Command Europe 

(SOCEUR) under the Partnership Development Program, have demonstrated a particularly noteworthy 

level of commitment, indicating their willingness to continue contributing to Afghan stabilization efforts 

beyond 2014 should this requirement exist. European 

Command leverages a number of essential programs 

and authorities, including Section 1206 (global train 

& equip), the Coalition Support Fund, the Coalition 

Readiness Support Program, and the SOCEUR 

Partnership Development Program to assist our 

allies and partners with necessary pre-deployment 

training and equipment needs. 1hrough these vital 

programs, we have provided training in critical combat 

skills and specialized equipment to enhance our 

partners' downrange interoperability and operational 

effectiveness. 1he continued availability of these programs is essential to support the transition and post2014 missions in Afghanistan. 

In quarterly training rotations this year through U.S. Army Europe's Joint Multinational Readiness 

Center in Hohenfels, Germany, European Command has also prepared a total ofn Security Force Assistance 

Teams from 16 countries for ISAF deployment. Additionally, we provided life-saving Counter-Improvised 

Explosive Device training to 2,481 personnel from 22 countries. To date, the command's Expeditionary 

Intelligence Training Program has developed counterinsurgency intelligence, analysis, and operational skill 

sets for over 1,000 personnel from 26 countries. And European Command has expanded our 'Georgia 

Deployment Program' to support the simultaneous deployment of two Georgian battalions every six months 

to ISAF's Regional Command Southwest, where they operate in conjunction with the U.S. Marines without 

caveats. U.S. Air Force Europe's Warrior Preparation Center has also contributed to the ISAF mission by 

training 60 Joint Tactical Air Controllers from 19 partner nations. Finally, in 2012, European Command 

obtained and delivered critical life-saving equipment for deploying partners from ten Central and Eastern 

European countries. 

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Theater Counterterrorism. Exercise JACKAL STONE is US. European Command's premier 

Special Operations Force (SOF) training event. In 2012, this theater-wide SOF exercise was conducted in 

Croatia involving over 1,700 personnel representing 15 countries: Canada: the Czech Republic: Denmark: 

Estonia: Finland: France: Hungary: Italy: Lithuania: Latvia: Norway: Poland: Romania: Slovakia: and the 

United Kingdom. Exercise JACKAL STONE honed theater SOF capabilities in all mission sets from 

counterterrorism to high-intensity conflict. The exercise validated Special Operations Task Force-Europe's 

ability to conduct special operations, and enhanced SOF relationships with these key partners who continue 

deploying to ISAF and fully support our strategy of active security. 

2. Deter and Def'eat Aggression 

AllSTERE CHALLENGE. In its eighth year as European Command's premier joint force 

headquarters exercise, AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12-the largest and most significant exercise ever to 

Israeli Minister of Defense Ehud Barak speaks with u.s. forces during Exercise AUSTERE CHALLENGE in Octobet; 

2012. AUSTERE CHALLENGE UIt1S the largest exercise 

conducted in EUCOM since the end of the Cold"Wttr. It 

involved 3,500 U.S. and 1.000 [sracH forces exercifing 

critical air and missile defense capabilities. 

take place in US. European Command since the end 

of the Cold War-continued to provide world-class 

training opportunities for US. European Command 

Headquarters, our Service Component Commands, and 

the Israel Defense Forces. An extensive, multi-phased 

event, AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12 exercised existing 

US. European Command plans and capabilities in the 

Levant, focused on combined missile defense training and 

interoperability with a critical partner in a challenging 

strategic environment. The exercise involved 3,500 US. 

personnel from all four military services, integrating US. 

Army Patriot batteries, Air Operations Center command 

and control capabilities, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD) ships, and other air defense systems to sharpen combined defensive capabilities against a variety of 

threats. As part of the broader AUSTERE CHALLENGE event, European Command also conducted the 

largest of our combined exercises and engagements with Israel, Exercises JUNIPER COBRA and JUNIPER 

FALCON. These exercises also sustain the U.S.-Israeli political-military relationship, exercise important 

theater capabilities, and provide further demonstration of the United States' strong commitment to the 

security of Israel. 

The Combatant Command Exercise and Engagement Fund continues to be a linchpin for theaterwide joint and Coalition training. In 2012, the fund supported 31 joint and Coalition exercises, training 

European Command Headquarters staff and more than 25,000 U.S. military personnel across a full spectrum 

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45 

of critical missions from integrated air and missile defense to counterterrorism. This funding enables 

European Command and NATO to be a net exporter of security, from ISAF operations to the defense of 

Israel, and was instrumental in ensuring the success of Exercise AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12, demonstrating 

a fully-rehearsed, seamlessly integrated missile defense capability and clear US. commitment to a key ally 

during a critical period. 

3. Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent 

Theater Nuclear Forces. U.S. European Command maintains a safe, secure, and effective theater 

nuclear deterrent in support of the NATO Alliance and enduring US. security commitments. Through 

rigorous and effective training, exercises, evaluation, inspection, operations, and sustainment, European 

Command ensures US. nuclear weapons, dual-capable aircraft, nuclear command centers, materials, 

procedures, and personnel are fully ready to support national strategic nuclear directives. Our annual 

program includes command-only exercises, such as FIG LEAF and CLOVER LEAF, as well as participation 

in the NATO STEADFAST exercise series, and multiple joint Staff, NATO, and US. European Command 

assessments and inspections. 

4. Def"end the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities 

Collective Security Defends the US. Homeland. In 2012, US. European Command continued its 

mission to defend the homeland forward by expanding our planning efforts with, and in support of, NATO. 

Through America's fulfillment of its Article 5 commitments, and a strong and enduring NATO Alliance, 

we support our national and collective security, manifested so clearly in NATO's historic and only Article 5 

declaration, made in the wake of September 11, 200l. 

Supporting the Fight against Transnational Organized Crime. Additionally, through the work of 

European Command's joint Interagency Counter Trafficking Center (jICTC), we continue to provide strong 

support to the President's Transnational Organized Crime Strategy, the US. Government interagency, and 

numerous U.S. Country Teams working to counter global transnational illicit trafficking and terrorism. 

With profits from illicit enterprises estimated in the trillions, these efforts focus on disrupting versatile illicit 

networks who traffic in a wide host of destabilizing influences, including narcotics, terrorism, weapons 

(from small arms to WMD), human trafficking, and illicit finance. These networks pose a growing threat to 

the U.S. Homeland, as well as the security of our allied and partner nations. Through these efforts, we are 

contributing to US. interagency efforts to disrupt and dismantle these networks, and assisting our partner 

nations develop and refine the counter-trafficking and counterterrorism skills and capacity needed to keep 

these threats as far as possible from American shores. 

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5. Project Power Despite Anti-Access / Area 

Denial Challenges 

Ballistic Missile Defense. Throughout 

2012, European Command continued to improve 

its ballistic missile defense (BMD) readiness for the 

defense of Israel and Europe. In particular, 2012 saw 

the AN/TPY-2 radar-on-line at Kiirecik, Turkey, 

since 2011-transition to NATO control as part of 

the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to 

missile defense. Additionally, important EPAA Phase 

Two progress was made last year, as we successfully 

A critical COmpOHeut of the European PbasedAdaptive 

Approach (E'PAA) to missile defense, this graphical 

depiction portrays what the Aegis Ashore facilities wiD 

look like in Romania and Poland. 

completed all international negotiations to forward-station four U.S. Navy Aegis BMD warships in Spain, 

and continued to prepare the Aegis Ashore site in Romania. 

European Command has also taken a number of proactive steps to set the theater and increase 

our readiness in response to heightened instability in the Levant. Increased Intelligence, Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance (ISR) operations enable the command to maintain a close watch on that region. As the 

situation in the Levant became increasingly serious last year, we significantly increased our coordination 

and collaborative planning with our counterparts in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). European Command 

also took steps to increase our force posture and readiness during this time frame, in order to be prepared 

to rapidly execute operations in the Levant should it become necessary. 

6. Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction 

European Counter-Proliferation Stakeholders. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the 

hands of a rogue state or non-state actors continue to represent a grave threat to the United States, our 

allies, and partners. In confronting this high-stakes challenge, one that possesses far-reaching and highly 

destabilizing consequences, several factors intersect across European Command's theater: the bulk of the 

world's WMD resides here; European population centers and U.S. military installations present numerous 

targets for terrorist organizations; and European ports and terminals are the last line of defense for much of 

the commercial traffic that enters the U.S. port system. 

Our allies and partners share these concerns, and we continue to leverage their capabilities as we 

pursue efforts, both bilaterally and regionally, to reduce the potential for successful WMD trafficking. We 

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have increased our preparedness through several military-to-military and military-to-civilian engagements, 

joint training events, NATO's annual consequence management exercise (conducted in conjunction with 

over 30 European nations), US. interagency cooperation, defensive consequence management planning 

with Israel, the work of the Joint Interagency Counter Trafficking Center, and other partnering to bolster 

our collective capabilities in this critical mission area. 

7, Operate Effectively in Space & Cyberspace 

Cyberspace Operations, European Command is pursuing a cyber posture that ensures mission 

assurance by protecting the command's critical data, information systems, and networks against an 

expanding number of increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. Over the past year, European Command has 

refined the organization and functionality of its Joint Cyber Center ()CC), which serves as the focal point 

for coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing the theater's cyber activities. It is an integral part of the 

command's contingency planning efforts and operations, working closely with US. Cyber Command and 

Service cyber components to ensure responsiveness to priority mission requirements in the cyber domain. 

In an effort to enhance the security of its networks and enhance their operational effectiveness, 

European Command is also working with US. Africa Command and the U.S. Army to implement the initial 

increment of the Joint Information Environment. This is a multi-phased effort supporting the Department's 

migration from Service-centric networks to a single information technology infrastructure and common 

network architecture. This undertaking will allow analysts at each combatant command to assess potential 

cyber threats on a near-real time basis and react to potential adversary activity in a more cohesive and 

effective manner. 

Cyber Defenses. European Command's cyber posture also includes military engagement to 

strengthen coalition networks and the cyber defense capabilities of our NATO Allies and Partnership for Peace 

nations. Thirty-seven European Command country cooperation plans include activities that help partners 

strengthen their cyber defense programs and exchange information about cyber threats and vulnerabilities. 

Successful again last year, European Command conducted Exercise COMBINED ENDEAVOR 12, the largest 

communications and information systems interoperability exercise in the world. The event drew delegates 

from 40 nations (26 NATO and 14 Partnership for Peace countries) focused on partnership capabilities, 

operational preparation of deployable command, control, communications, and computer forces, cyber 

training and professional development, and the development of interoperability standards for cyberspace. 

European Command also hosted Exercise CYBER ENDEAVOR, which promotes a common standard 

for network defense processes and procedures. The exercise involved 175 participants from 32 countries, 

including NATO members and Warsaw Initiative Fund-resourced Partnership for Peace nations. It focused 

on malware analysis and reverse engineering, cyber incident response, and network and computer forensics. 

Through this capstone event with NATO, partner nations, academia, and industry, European Command is 

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48 

enhancing theater-wide cyber capabilities, and building strong defense partnerships to ensure that the U.S. 

and NATO are prepared to prevail in this critical domain. 

8. Provide a Stabilizing Presence 

Israel and the Levant. European Command's sustained engagement with Israel, through our 

theater security cooperation program and numerous annual military-to-military engagement activities, 

continues to strengthen our nations' enduring ties and military capabilities. European Command chairs four 

bilateral, semiannual conferences with Israel addressing planning, logistics, exercises, and interoperability. 

Additionally, the U.S.-Israeli exercise portfolio includes eight major recurring exercises. Through these 

engagements, our leaders and staff maintain uniquely strong, recurring, personal, and direct relationships 

with their IDF counterparts. 

U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority. European Command's 

comprehensive engagement strategy with Israel complements other U.S. government security cooperation 

initiatives, including the important work of the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian 

Authority (USSC). USSC's mission is to help Israel and the Palestinian Authority meet security conditions 

to support a two-state solution; to transform and professionalize the Palestinian Authority's security sector; 

and to support U.S. and international whole of government engagement, with both the Israelis and the 

Palestinians through security initiatives designed to build mutual trust and confidence. Continued U.S. 

support for this engagement and the progressive capacity and capabilities of the Palestinian Authority 

Security Forces remain in the interest of overall Israeli-Palestinian regional security. 

Kosovo. In advance of the Serbian elections last year, for which there were indications Serbia 

would attempt to organize illegally in the territory of Kosovo, European Command worked closely with 

Senior Department of Defense officials to identify Kosovo Force (KFOR) capacities, capabilities, and risks 

to mitigate against a deterioration in security resulting from such an effort. We prepared ground forces, 

forward-stationed in Germany, to deploy rapidly to reinforce KFOR if required. Though this augmentation 

was ultimately not needed as a diplomatic solution was found to allow the OSCE to administer polling sites 

where dual national Kosovo Serbs could vote, the proximity and presence demonstrated important U.S. 

resolve to continued stability in the Balkans. 

Caucasus. With U.S. assistance, Georgia conducted cross-border Humanitarian Assistance and 

Disaster Response training with Armenia in 2012, and also continued to develop their biohazard threat 

analysis capabilities to enhance regional stability. Further south, European Command facilitated Armenia's 

participation in Exercise COMBINED ENDEAVOR and the U.S. Marine Corps' Black Sea Rotational 

Force, efforts focused on regional security, while also providing non-commissioned officer training to the 

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Armenian military. In Azerbaijan, European Command 

also involved Azerbaijan forces in the Black Sea 

Rotational Force, coordinated training events at the Joint 

Multinational Training Center in Germany, and provided 

Section l20G-funded explosive ordnance disposal (EO D) 

training to Naval Special Operations Forces. 

9. Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency 

Operations 

Pennsylvallia National Guard Soldiers participating in 

a live-fire drill with Lithuanidn soldiers during Exercise 

SABER STRIKE held in AJazi, Latvia. Lithuania is 

paired with Pennsylvania under the State Pa1'tttel'ship 

Program. Lithuanian troops joined with 2,000 other 

forces from Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Canada, France 

and the Uldted Kingdonl for this impo/·tmJt Balticfocused multinational security exercise. 

Baltic States. In support of this priority, focused on 

stability and expanding military-to-military cooperation 

to strengthen partner capabilities and reduce reliance on 

U.S. forces, European Command sponsored the 420d annual Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) engagement, 

a maritime exercise which has grown to become the largest military-to-military event in the region. 

BALTOPS '12 continued America's highly visible outreach and engagement in the Baltic region, supporting 

development of Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian maritime capabilities, enhanCing regional and NATO 

Alliance unity of effort, and exercising a host of key military competencies focused on joint and combined 

air, land, and sea training. The exercise brought together 12 European nations-including Russia-27 ships, 

33 aircraft, and one submarine to conduct tactical unit actions, in-port and at-sea events, and a culminating 

exercise employing multi-national sea and air forces. The exercise was important in promoting assurance 

and stability in this key maritime region, and expanding our engagement with Russia, one of European 

Command's leading priorities. 

State Partnership Program. The National 

Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) remains 

one of European Command's most effective and 

efficient programs to enhance theater stability and 

influence the development of partner nation military 

capabilities. Launched in 1993 to reach out to former 

Warsaw Pact and Eastern European countries after 

the Cold War, the program accounts for 25% of 

European Command's theater security cooperation 

and military-to-military engagement programs with 

these nations. In the European Command Theater, 

15 

Dr. Darko Nisavic, a member of Montenegro's emergency 

medical team is hoisted aboard a UH-60 Black Hawk 

MEDEVAC helicopter by Sgt. Joseph Campbell o/U.S. 

Army Ettrope's 12th Combat Aviation Brigade during 

last year's humanitarian assistance mission to rescue 

stranded Montenegrins affected by severe weather. 
50 

SPP partners U.S. National Guard forces from 21 participating states with 22 allied and partner nations. SPP 

in the theater leverages other programs and authorities, such as National Guard annual training and Overseas 

Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid program activities to conduct military training and education, pursue 

key theater security cooperation objectives, and foster positive relationships among junior and mid-grade 

military professionals. These relationships pay dividends as these professionals progress to ever higher 

positions of responsibility in their militaries. The program has also delivered a significant operational 

return on investment, with 19 participating nations contributing forces to ISAF, and nine of these nations 

training, deploying, and serving side-by-side with participating U.S. National Guard units in Security Force 

Assistance Teams and Provincial Reconstruction Teams across Afghanistan. 

10. Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Reliet: and Other Operations 

Disaster Relief In 2010, in coordination with the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID), European Command provided critical firefighting support to control wildfires raging across 

Russia and Israel. A year later, in August 2011, the Command provided Significant disaster relief to Turkey 

in the wake of a devastating earthquake. Last year, in response to a particularly harsh winter, European 

Command provided rapid disaster response across the Balkans. In February 2012, blizzard conditions 

caused widespread power outages across Bosnia and Herzegovina, prompting officials to request emergency 

assistance from the international community. On short notice, European Command delivered badly needed 

parts and supplies to repair degraded military helicopters so that Bosnians could respond to isolated 

mountain communities. A short time later, Montenegro declared a similar state of emergency. European 

Command again answered the call, providing intra-theater lift to transport required material, personnel, 

and equipment to Montenegro, and dispatched two U.s. Army UH-60 helicopters to assist the government 

with emergency resupply and medical evacuation operations. 

Humanitarian Assistance. European Command also supports civil-military engagement 

programs that focus humanitarian assistance and disaster response along four key lines of operation: 

disaster preparedness; education; health; and water and sanitation. These programs provide training 

and construction support to develop disaster preparedness in poorer regions of southeastern Europe and 

Eurasia. This program, also coordinated with USAID, generates significant 'soft power' for the United 

States, as efforts to renovate clinics, schools, orphanages, and water lines build tremendous goodwill and 

leave a lasting positive American legacy for a relatively modest investment. In 2012, the program obligated 

$9 million across 17 countries in the region to help build and reinforce stability. 

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To summarize, through the execution of the command's combined operations, theater exercises, 

interagency outreach, and security cooperation across each of these ten national mission areas, European 

Command is protecting and preserving everyone of America's vital national security interests. 'These 

interest, defined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs are: 

+ Survival of the nation (deterrence of nuclear attack): 

+ Survival of the global economic system (enabling physical and virtual flow of global commerce): 

+ Prevention of catastrophic attacks on the nation (from ballistic missiles, WMD, or terrorists): 

+ Freedom of action for the United States (facilitate the exercise of American power): 

+ Secure, confident, and reliable allies and partners (fulfilling obligations to our partner states): 

+ Protection of American citizens abroad (defending diplomatic facilities and conducting 

hostage rescue, counterterrorism, and evacuation operations); 

+ Preserving and, where possible, extending universal values (human rights, democracy, 

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief). 

Supporting each of these vital national security interests, European Command is making a difference, 

keeping America safe, and ensuring the nation's defenses are Stronger Together with our European allies 

and partners. 

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CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, and INITIATIVES 

"European secunl::jl remains ancancnor of :u.S. foreign and secunl::jlpohcy. A strongEurop€ 

is cntlcal to our seeunty and our prosperity. Much of what we hope to accomplish globally • 

depends on workmg together with Europe7 • 

- Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary @lInton 

. . The most important challenge facing :u.S. European Command is maintaining our readiness to conduct 

unilateral operations, as well as combined operations with our European allies and partners, to support 

our collective NATO Article 5 responsibilities, out-of-area operations, and other contingency missions. 

Today, rising tensions-stemming from declining resources, long-simmering ethnic strife, regional 

hegemonic desires impacting :u.S. European Command area of responsibility partners' security, and 

a host of demographic, social, political, and economic forces-pose challenges and risk to security and 

stability in and around our theater. Enduring u.s. presence and engagement remains critical to preventing 

destabilizing influences or simmering resentments from erupting into violence or escalating into open 

conflict. While these challenges are real, European Command remains vigilant, proactive, and engaged to 

seek out opportunities in each of these challenges and leverage our presence, leadership, and capabilities 

to continue to protect U.S. vital national security interests and meet our collective security commitments. 

Afghanistan. We have entered the critical transition period in Afghanistan. Over the next 20 months, 

ISAF must continue to fully recruit and field the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), both army and 

police, in order to shift the main security effort to the Afghans later this year. We must also prepare to support 

the Afghan presidential election and the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), while planning to 

A Turkish UH~60 Black Hawk helicopter is loaded 

onboard a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemnster at blcirlik 

Air Base, Turkey, for deployment to Kabul EUCOM will 

p"ovide indispeusable wgistical capacity and collaboration 

with U.S. Transportation C01n11Ulnd to conduct significnut 

U.S. and nUkd retrograde nud redeployment operatioflS 

from Afghanistan in 2013 and 2014. 

redeploy thousands of ISAF forces and restructure our 

basing readiness to ensure that European Command is 

postured to support this redeployment and the post2014 mission. 

European Command is involved in a wide range 

of supporting activities to enable a successful transition 

in Afghanistan in accordance with the 2012 Defense 

Strategic Guidance and NATO's Chicago Summit 

Declaration. As mentioned, European Command 

continues to leverage Section 1206, Coalition Support 

Fund, Coalition Readiness Support Program, and a 

host of other security assistance programs to provide 

the critical training and equipment that enable our 

European allies and partners-particularly Central and 

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53 

Eastern Europeans who are punching far above their weight in ISAF-to continue contributing to security 

and stability in Afghanistan. The continued availability of these authorities, particularly Section 1206, is 

essential to helping us meet the transition timeline and our post-20l4 responsibilities. European Command 

is also providing critical logistical support to the mission in Afghanistan. We are working closely with U.S. 

Transportation Command to ensure the existing capacity, versatility, and responsiveness of redeployment 

mechanisms, routes, and infrastructure can cover the size and scope of the Afghanistan redeployment 

mission. To that end, European Command's recently established multi-modal logistical hub at U.S. Forward 

Operating Site Mihail Kogalniceanu Airfield in Romania represents an extremely valuable addition to this 

logistical capacity, helping to mitigate risk from existing logistical ground and sea lines of communication 

in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

NATO Evolution. While progress continues, in step with the Lisbon and Chicago summit 

declarations, budget pressures and the transition in Afghanistan will continue to affect NATO's ongoing 

evolution. This challenge is characterized by several elements. First, NATO will discover new force capacity 

when troops, both U.S. and European, return home from Afghanistan as we move closer to 2014. This will 

facilitate support to the NATO Response Force (NRF), which provides the alliance with Article 5 and other 

crisis response capabilities. Second, the allies will naturally re-focus on training, exercising, and initiatives 

inside alliance borders, even as they seek to retain hard-earned counterinsurgency and expeditionary 

capabilities. The Department's decision to reinvigorate U.S. participation in the NRF offers a Significant 

opportunity to ensure America's allies and partners sustain their expeditionary capabilities and maintain 

their interoperability with U.S. forces. European Command is working to implement this decision, through 

support to rotational U.S. battalion task forces participating in NRF exercises and important training events 

with our European allies and partners. Third, the importance of counterinsurgency skill sets will give way to 

other priorities, including missile defense, cyberspace, and regional stability. Fourth, NATO will continue 

to adjust to its recently reduced command structure. Fifth, the alliance will seek to integrate increasingly 

capable allies, such as Turkey and Poland, into high-end planning, command structures, and exercises. 

Lastly, the alliance will become more aware of, and focused on, evolving transnational challenges, including 

illicit trafficking, piracy, terrorism, WMD proliferation, and energy security. 

The challenge to NATO presented by the current evolution is to develop a capable force structure to 

ensure enduring alliance credibility. European Command continues to support NATO's ongoing evolution 

through our bilateral and multilateral engagements, exercises, training, theater security cooperation 

programs, participation in the NATO Centers of Excellence, and a wide variety of other initiatives. One 

of the most effective enablers in this effort continues to be the U.S. International Military Education and 

Training (IMET) program. Through this invaluable program, the United States has trained and educated a 

number of our partner nations' top performing military personnel and future leaders, increasing international 

understanding, cooperation, and interoperability. IMET beneficiaries have risen to the highest echelons of 

their defense establishments, which today include three Eastern European Chiefs of Defense, eleven partner 

19 
54 

nation Service Chiefs, and eight Sergeants Major of our partner nations' militaries. The IMET program 

continues to build and expand on these vital relationships, strongly supports NATO's continued evolution, 

and provides the US. with considerable advantage in outreach and connection as we maintain these 

relationships over the years. Through these programs, European Command reinforces US. leadership in 

NATO and reenergizes our enduring commitment to the alliance's collective security. These efforts sustain 

confidence in NATO's aggregate strength, shared democratic values, recognition of global responsibilities, 

and continued adherence to operational competence. 

By supporting NATO's continued viability and success, the United States encourages European nations 

to approach global security issues from within the alliance, ensuring that European and US. viewpoints are 

shared, considered, and weighed together in the decision-making process. Today, NATO stands at a second 

major crossroads, similar to the decision point that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall. Our challenge is to 

work diligently to support the broader US. government effort to demonstrate tangible US. commitment 

to the alliance, ensuring that the correct choices are made to maintain NATO's capabilities, capacity, and 

credibility. 

"NATO not only serves to protect our collectIve natIOns but our Homeland as weiI:' 

- Cungressman MIChael Turner (R-OH), House Armed Services CommIttee 

" , \ t 

Israel and the Levant. The 'Arab Spring' movement is significantly reshaping leadership across 

the Middle East and North Africa. New strategic challenges are emerging. Several Arab countries are 

undergoing major internal changes resulting in a more dynamic, less predictable region. For Israel, a 

country inside European Command's area of responsibility, these movements bring increased uncertainty 

for enduring stability in the region. The Sinai's growing instability is of increasing concern to Israel. Over 

the past three decades, Israel has made significant military reductions along its southern border based on a 

stable Egyptian/Israeli border. Internal developments in Egypt have now put the stability of that border into 

question. Additionally, aggressive actions by elements inside Gaza eventually compelled Israel to launch its 

7 -day 'Pillar of Defense' operation last November. To the north, events in Syria have severely destabilized 

Israel's northern border. Israel must be prepared to deal with the actions of the current Syrian regime as 

well as a range of possible successors. In addition, Lebanese Hezbollah continues to grow as a powerful 

actor on the Israel/Lebanon border, possessing lethally accurate rockets and missiles with the potential to 

severely damage Israeli infrastructure. To the east, Iran continues to increase its ballistic missile stockpile 

and pursue a nuclear weapons program, further narrowing Israel's strategic depth and decision space. Given 

this situation, it is feasible that increasing violence or war could erupt from multiple directions within the 

Levant with limited warning and grave implications for regional stability, Israeli security, and US. interests. 

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55 

Accordingly, European Command continues to work with our IDF partners to ensure strong U.S. support 

to the defense of Israel. European Command works closely with U.S. Central Command to keep abreast of 

all emerging threats and intelligence regarding Iran, Syria, the Sinai, Hamas, and Hezbollah, ranging from 

missile threats to terrorist activity. Lastly, European Command continues a robust program of security 

cooperation and military-to-military activities with Israel to demonstrate U.S. resolve and ensure a high 

degree of defense synchronization between our two nations. 

Russia. Though a significant actor who 

at times disagrees with U.S. and NATO policies, 

Russia still presents potential for future engagement. 

The military component of the relationship 

exists principally in the annual bilateral U.S.-

Russian Military Cooperation Work Plan. Since 

its re-establishment in 2008, focused on 'zones of 

cooperation' where our interests overlap and that 

avoid enhancing Russian combat capabilities, our 

bilateral activities have increased from 10 events in 

2009 to no events and exercises in 2012, in areas 

of mutual interest including: combating terrorism; 

counter-piracy; counter-trafficking; crisis response; 

maritime capabilities; search and rescue; the Arctic; 

and support to coalition stabilization efforts in 

uss Normandy (eG 60) and Russwn Ferkratlon Ship 

(RFS) Kaliningrad (LSTM 102) ('ondact anti-piracy 

training on the high seas. Navaloperations,jrom 

counte1'-piracy to counter-trafficking to search~and-resclle, 

1'emabJ an important zone of cooperation for continued 

C01Mtructive U.S.-Russian engagemem. 

Afghanistan. Despite recent disagreements over missile defense, we continue to seek out additional areas for 

cooperation, such as security for the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and Russia's recent request for assistance 

developing its new Military Police organization, which the U.S. Army is working diligently. The ability to 

effectively work together not only provides important strategic access for ongoing NATO and coalition 

operations, but continues to satisfy our mutual strategic goals. 

Militarily, Russia seeks to enhance its regional influence and leverage through participation with 

former Soviet states in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (membership includes Armenia, 

Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan), as well as a robust defense build-up through its 

'State Armament Plan: That plan calls for the construction and modernization of: naval surface combatants 

and submarines; air defense brigades; attack helicopters; developments in fifth generation fighters; and the 

continued maintenance of its existing strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. At the same time, Russia faces 

many challenges, including declining demographics, a high rate of drug and alcohol abuse, a relatively narrow 

economic base stemming from oil and gas, and uneven infrastructure. While appropriately anticipating 

these developments, European Command will continue to seek and leverage existing and emerging zones of 

cooperation as a priority and focus for our current and future engagement with Russia. 

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56 

Turkey. A NATO ally since 1952, Turkey continues to make important contributions to vital US. 

national security interests, particularly in its support for regional missile defense with the AN/TPY-2 radar 

site located in eastern Turkey as well as ongoing counter-terrorism operations. Turkey is an indispensable 

partner in addressing the increasingly complex challenges in the Levant and across the broader Middle 

East. Turkey's own challenges include a growing refugee crisis on the Syrian border, threat of Syrian ballistic 

spillover (hence NATO's Patriot deployment to southern Turkey), and increased terrorist activity, specifically 

with the Kongra-Gel (KGK, formerly the Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK) along their border with Iraq. 

We continue to support U.S. efforts with the Government of Turkey to ensure optimum cooperation 

and outcomes given the Assad regime's uncertain future in Syria. European Command and the Turkish 

General Staff are engaged in a dialogue that will serve as the foundation for deeper cooperation as the 

situation requires. Turkey's status as a stable, democratic nation, its sizable security resources, and its 

influence as a regional power broker combine to make this NATO ally a critical component in achieving 

US. regional objectives. In return, Turkey is raising its expectations for US. cooperation and partnership, 

specifically with access to high-end Foreign Military Sales (FMS), cooperation on counter-terrorism activity, 

and increased leadership opportunities in NATO and coalition political/military structures. That said, 

Turkey's eroding relationship with Israel bears special emphasis. Resumption of good relations between 

these two US. allies, and willingness to facilitate these relations on a military-to-military level, remain a 

priority for European Command. 

Poland. Poland remains a pivotal nation in our theater, and an emerging leader in eastern Europe 

and the NATO Alliance. The strong cooperation between the United States and Poland remains important 

to overall regional security. European Command sees value in the increased visibility and presence of US. 

forces in Poland, through military engagements and regionally-hosted exercises, to assist Poland in realizing 

its full potential as a capable and reliable security partner, able to contribute forces that can operate sideby-side with the United States in future NATO and coalition operations. U.s. military engagement with 

Poland is multi-faceted. Recent cooperation across a variety of initiatives, to include missile defense, Patriot 

battery rotations, the establishment of the US. Air Force aviation detachment, and multinational exercises, 

has allowed the United States to maintain strong defense ties with this important regional power. 

Balkans. In the Balkans, the overarching US. goal is to achieve stability and advance Euro-Atlantic 

integration. However, strong enmity remains between former warring factions, especially within Bosnia 

and Herzegovina and between Serbia and Kosovo. Bosnia and Herzegovina possesses a stagnant economy. 

Public sector spending accounts for an unsustainable 40% of GOP. Efforts at post-conflict economic 

revitalization have proven fitful at best. The complex governmental structures created by the Dayton Peace 

Accords are inefficient and prone to obstruction by political interference, and resistant to reforms promoted 

by the international community. European Command continues its outreach and engagement with Bosnia 

and Herzegovina through theater exercises, humanitarian assistance activities, disaster readiness training, 

theater exercises, and the State Partnership Program. We are also energizing defense reform efforts to 

address chronic problems in logistics, procurement, and defense institution building. 

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57 

Serbia's efforts to realize its aspirations to join the European Union, as well as advance military-tomilitary relations with the United States, will be strained until and unless Belgrade makes real progress to 

normalize relations with Kosovo and reach durable solutions on northern Kosovo. European Command 

is looking to the EU-facilitated Pristina-Belgrade dialogue to deliver progress in these areas, while further 

engaging Serbia in regional exercises and engagement to encourage a constructive relationship. 

Serbia's refusal to date to normalize relations with Kosovo as well as actions by hardliners and 

criminal elements in northern Kosovo - have hampered Pristina's ability to extend its authority to its 

u.s. mId German Soldiers assigned to the Kosovo Force 

(KEOR) provide perimeter security during roadblock 

removal operations on June 1, 2012 ncar Mitrovica, 

KOSOl!O. Border tensions in northern Kosovo continue 

to bear close watchin~ and require KFOR to maintain 

current force levels for now to Cllsure stability and support 

the ongoing Pristil1a~Belgrade dialogue. 

northern borders without significant international 

presence. Tensions in northern Kosovo remained high 

in 2012, including at least one serious violent incident 

that required the rapid deployment of KFOR personnel 

to control the situation. Accordingly, despite earlier 

NATO plans to continue drawing down alliance force 

levels in Kosovo, of which U.S. troops comprise only 

15%, KFOR should remain at current levels until 

further progress is made. In addition to KFOR support, 

European Command continues to facilitate State 

Partnership Program engagement between Kosovo 

and the Iowa National Guard, as well as traditional 

military-to-military efforts aimed at professionalizing 

the Kosovo Security Force's training program and noncommissioned officer corps. These efforts are designed to assist in the eventual transition of international 

security responsibilities to Kosovo institutions. 

Overall in the Balkans, European Command continues its work to encourage greater collaboration 

among partners in regional venues such as the Adriatic Charter. The Adriatic Charter serves as the flagship 

forum for regional cooperation, and builds on U.S.-provided support toward the goals of eventual integration 

into NATO and other Euro-Atlantic institutions. Europeau Command's objectives remain focused on 

facilitating regional solutions to challenges, promoting regional stability, protecting and strengthening 

borders through counter-trafficking and counter-proliferation initiatives, and promoting a safe and secure 

environment in Southeast Europe's most fragile countries. 

Caucasus. Similar to the Balkans, instability and fragility in the Caucasus will continue. That 

instability is highlighted by Russia's continued non-compliance with the August 2008 cease-fire agreement 

with Georgia, as well as the ongoing political struggle between Georgia and Russia over the occupied regions 

of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The North Caucasus may very well experience more violence in the near 

term, as persistent economic stagnation, lack of government investment (outside of Sochi, the site of the 

2014 Winter Olympics), social instability, and wholesale emigration by ethnic Slavs seeking safer territories 

all take their toll, resulting in challenges to governance and susceptibility to the increasing influence of 

radical Islamists. Though not as volatile as the North Caucasus, the South Caucasus remains a concern 

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58 

in the absence of an agreed political resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and 

Azerbaijan and continued violent incidents on the Line of Contact separating the opposing forces. 

European Command continues vigorous engagement across the Caucasus, given the region's strategic 

importance as a global energy corridor, key node on the Northern Distribution Network, source of national 

contributions to ISAF, potential for narcotics and illicit weapons trafficking, interest area for both Russia 

and Iran, and location of frozen conflicts that have potential to flash into wider and more destabilizing wars. 

In 2012, Armenia deployed a platoon of peacekeepers to serve alongside the United States in KFOR, and 

Georgia remains a key partner in the region, one who continues to make extraordinary ISAF contributions. 

European Command is involved in defense cooperation assessments and efforts with Georgia as directed 

in the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. Additional security cooperation program priorities 

in the South Caucasus are focused on developing and sustaining relationships that: ensure U.S. access and 

freedom of action (focused in the near term on Northern Distribution Network areas); counter regional 

and transnational threats, especially violent extremist organizations, counter-WMD proliferation, and illicit 

trafficking; solidify defense institutional reforms; and sustain partner capacity to enhance regional security 

while not hindering diplomatiC efforts to settle the region's frozen conflicts. 

European Economic, Social, and Demographic Dynamics. Europe will continue to feel the 

cumulative effects of several economic and associated socio-cultural stresses for the foreseeable future. 

These stresses include: the lasting impact of the Euro zone debt crisis; the aging and retirement of a large 

segment of the population, with its attendant pressure on already stressed social services; increased labor 

demand that exceeds worker supply, with a resultant pressure to assimilate a growing immigrant work 

force; and the draining of human resources and intellectual capital in countries experiencing slow or no 

growth. These economic and demographic forces pose a challenge to European economic and political 

clout in the near term, stress transnational and national governance structures, including the European 

Union and NATO, and increase the potential for instability around the continent. The result of these forces 

is also magnified on European militaries, as national GDPs have fallen and governments reduce the GDP 

percentage dedicated to defense spending in order to deal with increasing deficits and reduced revenue. 

European Command's response is a campaign of active engagement with allied and partner Ministries of 

Defense across the theater to keep national defense funding at effective levels, encouraging wise investment 

of available defense spending and supporting the broader U.S. interagency effort to assist newly democratic 

nations develop well-crafted government institutions and reduce the effects of corruption. 

Pooling Resources, Sharing Capabilities, In response to this climate of fiscal austerity and 

corresponding defense cuts, European Command is working with NATO to make the most of available defense 

expenditures by pooling resources, sharing capabilities, setting priorities, and enhancing coordination of 

effort-in initiatives like the NATO Centers of Excellence-that sustain the required military capabilities 

that underpin the alliance's core tasks, evolving needs, and priorities set in Lisbon and Chicago. Additionally, 

we must also continue to strongly encourage our allies to meet the minimum NATO goal of spending at 

least 2% of their GDP on defense. 

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59 

Ballistic Missile Defense. Unfortunately, our adversaries continue efforts to procure, develop, and 

proliferate advanced ballistic missile technologies, posing a serious threat to U.S. forces and installations in 

the theater, as well as to the territory, populations, and forces of our European allies and partners. 

Accordingly, European Command continues to make significant progress in implementing the 

President's European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense. EPAA Phase One is complete, 

with the AN/TPY-2Iand-based radar established and operating from eastern Turkey, U.S. Navy Aegis BMD 

warships on-station in the Mediterranean, and NATO's 

declaration last May in Chicago of its interim ballistic 

missile defense (BMD) capability. EPAA Phase Two is 

currently in progress, with planning and construction 

efforts on track to home port four forward-deployed 

U.S. Navy Aegis BMD warships at Naval Station Rota, 

Spain, and with work progressing on the first of two 

Aegis Ashore facilities, with the first site located in 

Romania. The BMD agreement with Poland for the 

second Aegis Ashore site, as part of EPAA Phase Three, 

is signed and in force. 

Admiral James Stavridis. NATO Supreme Allied 

Commander, Burope, describes shipboard capabilities 

for the NATO BaDistic Missile Defense program to 

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO 

Milita,'Y Committee Chairman General Knud Bartels, 

and other officials during the NATO Summit in Chicago 

lastMay. The BMD mission also offers another excellent 

example of the tangible benefits of cooperative 

resource pooling with our allies and partners in a critical collective security mission. At last year's 

European Command-sponsored BMD conference in Berlin, the U.S. and our allies conferred on existing 

advanced maritime air defense systems that could be upgraded to provide European-procured upper-tier 

BMD surveillance or interceptor contributions to NATO's BMD mission, augmenting the U.S. national 

contribution. The conference also explored ways to burden-share through a multi-national interceptor 

pool. This is an important dialogue that, adequately supported, can generate ideas and realize initiatives to 

increase allied upper and lower-tier BMD contributions complementary to, and interoperable with, existing 

high-demand, low-density U.S. assets. European Command efforts in this area are already achieving results, 

as we contributed to the recent Dutch decision to procure upper-tier maritime surveillance BMD systems. 

Terrorism & Violent Extremism. With more than 700 kinetic terror incidents occurring in the 

theater over the past several years, ongoing instability and terrorism (both international and indigenous) 

existing in, and transiting through, our theater will continue to threaten Europe and the United States. The 

diversification of the threat landscape in Europe combined in some cases with the destabilizing social and 

economic factors described earlier will increase the number of disaffected groups across the political and 

cultural spectrum that may support extremist groups or seek to express their growing frustrations through 

violence. The concern is that, stretched increasingly thin by fiscal and policy constraints, theater national 

governance mechanisms, including law enforcement and intelligence agencies, may be hard- pressed to 

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respond to these trends. Meanwhile, AI-Qaida and other Islamist extremist groups, with extensive ties to 

individuals and groups in Western Europe, continue to pose a signifIcant regional threat. These groups 

regard Europe as an important venue for recruitment, logistical support, financing, and the targeting of 

U.S. and \Vestern interests. Additionally, Iran's Qods Force continues to operate in Europe, and the rising 

influence and actions of Lebanese Hezbollah in our theater also operates against U.S. and partner interests. 

In addition to designating Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) as the lead organization 

for theater counter-terrorism efforts, and the associated creation of the SOCEUR CT-Core Cell organization 

described in the SOCEUR appendix, European Command continues to work closely with theater-based U.S. 

Intelligence Community partners, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. 

Northern Command to track terrorist threats across Europe and the Levant which may pose a risk to the 

security of the Homeland, forward-stationed or deployed U.S. forces, or our allies and partners. 

In fighting back against theater terrorism and extremism, influence operations constitute a key 

element of the command's 21st century strategy and military activities. In the literate and wired societies 

of Europe, these operations provide us with the ability to communicate and influence key target audiences 

using traditional print and broadcast media, as well as increasingly pervasive 21st century tools, including 

web sites, social media, and cell phones. Our ongoing influence program, Operation ASSURED VOICE, 

is a vital contributor to the pursuit of our military objectives and theater campaign plan. Through these 

increasingly necessary 'soft power' activities, we seek to counter violent extremist messaging and mitigate 

the potential loss of' influence given reduced force presence in Europe. We must be able to compete 

effectively in the information environment, confront violent extremist ideology and recruitment, and reach 

out to fence sitters wherever ideas compete. Success on the front lines of the information age is critical to 

preserving stability in our theater and shaping the information environment should a crisis occur. 

Transnational Organized Crime & Illicit Trafficking. In addition to, and often in collusion 

with, terrorist and extremist threats is another source of growing instability inside the European Command 

theater: the expanding reach and influence of transnational organized crime. Transnational organized 

crime networks are using increasingly sophisticated business models, operations, and networks to perpetrate 

global illicit activities. These networks are highly adaptable, bold in technique, ruthless in execution, and 

are expanding and diversifying their activities at an alarming rate. Some estimates project their revenue at 

8-15% of the $70 trillion in global GOP.' The result is a convergence of well-funded transnational organized 

crime networks that can destabilize entire economies, undermine good governance, and create national 

security threats to the United States, our allies, and partners. 

There is also growing evidence of an evolving relationship among terrorists, criminals, and financiers, 

as each group attempts to exploit the seams that exist in national policies to further this growing illicit 

global enterprise. Additionally, the pace and scope of 21st century global commercial activity is increasing 

smuggling venues and innovation to facilitate the movement of a wide range of threats from small arms 

to threat finance to human trafficking to, in a worst-case scenario, WMD agents and delivery systems. 

4 u.s. National Defense Uniwfsity, "Final Report of the Trans-AtlanUc Dialogue on Combating Crime-Terror Pipelines: June 25-26, 2012. 

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Continued pressure on European security budgets, along with Europe's open borders and eased customs 

checkpoints, could increase the difficulty in combating these threats. Yet, as the President's strategy makes 

clear, we must continue our collective efforts to understand, disrupt, and dismantle these growing threat 

networks. In an increasingly interconnected world, the threat from transnational organized crime represents 

a 21st century national and global security imperative. 

Joint Interagency Counter-Trafficking Center. 

In support of the President's National Strategy to Combat 

Transnational Organized Crime (TOC), European 

Command has stood up the joint Interagency CounterTrafficking Center (jICTC). It is important to note that 

jICTC is a facilitator in support of U.S. Country Teams, 

and that jICTC is not a law enforcement organization and 

does not conduct law enforcement activities. Created from 

existing European Command personnel and infrastructure, 

jICTC uses existing legal authorities to support U.S. security 

cooperation activities conducted by U.S. Embassy personnel, 

operating in countries within the European Command area 

of responsibility. All of the support and training provided 

to any particular European nation is done at the request, 

and through the auspices, of the U.S. Country Team in that 

nation. jICTC's operations are focused security cooperation 

activities in the areas of counter-narcotics and support to 

law enforcement. jICTC provides a single point of contact 

u.s. EuropedtJ Command's joint Interagency 

Counter-Trafficking Center (J/erC) supports 

the President:~ National Strategy to O)mbat 

Transnational Orgdtlized Crime (TOC) by working 

with U.S. interagency ilnd international partners 

to fight global illicit trafficking networks. These 

networks raise an estimated $7 trillion in aminal 

revenue from drugs, weapons7 human trafficking, 

material support to terrorists, Imd threat finance. 

for U.S. Country Teams to provide training to host-nation partners in these areas. The emphasis on counternarcotics is consistent with NATO's priorities, and has been a European Command mission for many years. 

In support of these objectives, jICTC supports U.S. Country Team and interagency efforts, and 

collaborates with similar European organizations, to assist our partner nations build self-sufficient countertrafficking skills, competencies, and capacity to defend the United States and Europe from rising TOC threats. 

Importantly, jICTC does not seek a leadership role for combating organized crime; rather it simply serves 

as an important forward, theater-based facilitation platform for U.S. agencies and international partners 

to synchronize counter-trafficking efforts in a collaborative, whole of government approach. In a recent 

example of its contributions and effectiveness last year, jICTC partnered with Southeastern Europe nations 

to implement biometric screenings at border entry ports in order to rapidly identify potential terrorists and 

TOC figures. In just the first day in operation, these enhancements netted two arrests, including a known 

terrorist. 

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Whole of Government Approach. Given the likelihood of reduced budgets for years to come, 

a 'whole of government' approach to finding and implementing solutions to sources of instability and 

conflict is more important than ever. Partnering unlocks efficiencies and avoids costly duplication of effort. 

European Command's J-9 Interagency Partnering Directorate, a model that is also in use at numerous other 

US. combatant commands, applies the multiple perspectives of US. Government interagency partners to 

address complex 21st century problems that transcend military-only solutions. For three years, European 

Command has diligently worked to assemble a diverse team of representatives from eleven US. Government 

agencies, including the Departments of State, Justice, Treasury, Energy, Homeland Security, the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency and the US. Agency for International Development. Their expertise, skills, 

and direct linkage to their Washington D.C.-based headquarters make these team members an invaluable 

resource in taking a more probative look at sources of regional instability across our theater, including 

terrorism and extremism, and applying the collective wisdom and inteHectual resources of the interagency 

community to form more comprehensive long-term solutions. 

Public-Private Partnering. 'Whole of society' solutions are the next evolution to build upon 'whole 

of government' success. European Command continues to support the Department of Defense initiative 

to integrate the capabilities and expertise of the private and non- profit sectors, in coordination with our 

interagency partners, to support theater objectives. Our long-term strategic partnership with the Business 

Executives for National Security (BENS) group continues to enhance our partner nations' abilities to provide 

for their own security. This year, BENS sent a delegation of volunteer business executives to the Azores in 

Portugal to help identify economic development opportunities in anticipation of projected force structure 

reductions at Lajes Airfield. BENS also teamed with cyber experts to assist the Government of Iceland cope 

with a host of cyber security challenges. 

In direct support of the transition mission in Afghanistan, European Command has developed 

strategic partnerships with the private sector, non-profit organizations, and US. interagency partners 

to improve access and economic opportunities for countries along the Northern Distribution Network. 

Additionally, we are working with partner nations in the South Caucasus to develop and improve treatment 

capabilities for their wounded warriors who have suffered complex amputations from combat in Afghanistan. 

Lastly, these public-private efforts are focused on assisting partners improve their disaster preparedness and 

response capabilities by working with private sector and non- profit partners to enhance the ability of local 

commercial sectors to assist national recovery efforts in vulnerable areas. 

Cyberspace. Cyberspace remains largely indifferent to national borders and traditional security 

arrangements. Continuous technology evolution and the relative ease of employing disruptive effects in 

cyberspace have elevated its strategic significance in the military arena. Challenges in attribution and 

identity management in cyberspace make it diflicult to differentiate between state-sponsored and non-state 

threat actors, while employment of non-state proxies in cyberspace allows states to mask their involvement 

in malign activity. Traditional deterrence strategies and defensive concepts still need to be adapted to the 

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unique character and functions of this increasingly vital operational domain, without negatively impacting 

the vital global connectivity, commerce, and free flow of information that cyberspace provides. 

Apart from developing technologically superior defensive countermeasures and seeking multinational 

commitment to ensuring fundamental freedoms, privacy and the free flow of information in cyberspace, 

European Command continues to work collaboratively with regional allies and partners in a whole of 

government effort to build strong and resilient collective cyber security. These efforts include assisting our 

partners develop and sustain information assurance and cyber defense programs, capable cyber defense 

workforces (including a cyber incident response capacity), and promoting shared situational awareness 

about existing threats and the best practices to mitigate them. The command pursues these initiatives 

through our annual cyber exercise program, COMBINED ENDEAVOR, our ongoing coordination with U.S. 

Cyber Command, and our participation in the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence in 

Tallinn, Estonia. 

Energy. Reliable access to affordable energy remains a core issue for countries across the European 

Command theater, whether they are energy exporters, importers, or transit states. The reality is that 

dependence on Russian natural gas will continue to drive energy security considerations for many of our 

European partners. We continue to support alternatives and monitor changes to the energy status quo in 

Europe, including changes in global oil markets, the potential large-scale development of unconventional 

gas resources, alternate hydrocarbon supply lines (such as those from the Caspian Sea region), and the 

increased supply of liquefied natural gas. 

European Command's )-9 Interagency Partnering Directorate assists our partners in this area by 

working with the U.S. Department of Energy and other U.S. agencies to investigate and expand alternative 

opportunities, primarily in support of partner nation military forces and facilities. Advances in hydrocarbon 

exploration and extraction, developments in current and next-generation renewable energy technologies, 

and improvements in energy efficiency all combine to provide European states a significant opportunity to 

reduce their energy dependence. The) -9 Directorate continues to work closely with these nations to explore 

these issues and identify energy solutions. Last fan marked a milestone, as European Command's bilateral 

engagement and 2011 Memorandum of Understanding with Lithuania's Energy Security Center assisted 

in elevating the importance of that Center's work; one which was recently certified by the North Atlantic 

Council to become NATO's fully-accredited Energy Security Center of Excellence. Closer to home, )-9 

continues its work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to implement the Department's Operational 

Energy Strategy Implementation Plan, focused on energy security and efficiency for U.S. forces, defense 

installations, and critical infrastructure. 

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THEATER POSTURE 

Force Laydown. The United States will sustain a military presence in Europe that meets our NATO 

Article 5 commitment, enables execution of our likely European Command contingency plans, continues 

to support America's leadership position in NATO, ensures a credible deterrent against aggression, and is 

sufficiently robust to maintain and sustain the strategic access, infrastructure, and lines of communication 

that enable the United States to conduct global operations. Global access through Europe remains a critical 

aspect of America's ability to execute our existing contingency plans in and beyond Europe. This strategic 

access is dependent upon continued success in sustaining the long-term relationships we enjoy with our 

European allies and partners, who remain our hosts. We recognize the challenges of the fiscal environment 

and, in accordance with the Defense Strategic Guidance, continue to consolidate our installations and seek 

additional efficiencies in U.S. overseas posture while maintaining the necessary capacity to meet our mission 

requirements. We will continue to advocate for a deliberate and balanced approach to posture in Europe to 

ensure that future changes meet minimum requirements to conduct U.S. contingency operations, support 

U.S. global strategic access, and meet our NATO commitments. 

U.S. posture in Europe provides unparalleled proximity and access to three continents (Europe, Asia, 

Africa), stands ready to support U.S. and NATO operations on extremely short notice, and is critical to U.s. 

planning, logistics, and operations in support of U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. 

Africa Command, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Strategic 

Command. Forward-stationed active duty service members, forward-deployed rotational units, and reserve 

forces remain the nation's primary tool to maintain influence across our theater and, when called upon, to 

project power quickly within and beyond it. U.S. posture in Europe is an incontestable manifestation of 

our commitment to the region, preserving strategic relationships and trust, helping build interoperability 

with our allies and partners, and facilitating progressive transformation within European militaries. The 

U.S. approach throughout the recent defense strategy review was guided by our enduring need for, and 

commitment to, these objectives. 

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65 

There are approximately 64,000 military personnel authorized for the support of US. European 

Command and our Service component commands. Additionally, there are approximately 10,000 additional 

US. personnel supporting US. Africa Command, US. Transportation Command, NATO, and other US. 

Government and Department of Defense activities in Europe. Moving forward into the future, European 

Command's mission focus for our enduring forces is as follows: 

• Id.Lound_fQ.rses: US. Army Europe will retain a deployable Contingency Command Post, two Brigade 

Combat Teams (BCT), and theater enabling forces to include aviation, signal corps, medical, engineers, air 

and missile defense, logistics units, and the Joint Multinational Training Command. From a pool of globally 

available forces, the US. Army will also allocate a BCT, with rotational assignments described previously, to 

be part of the NATO Response Force (NRF) beginning this year. 

• Air Forces: US. Air Forces Europe will retain the capability to conduct air superiority, theater nuclear 

support, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), and strike missions. In addition, the Air Force will 

maintain its current capability in terms of operational and tactical-level command and control, theater 

airlift, air refueling, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, special operations forces, and base 

operations support. 

• Naval and Marine Forces: US. Naval Forces Europe will retain the USS MOUNT WHITNEY and provide 

command and control of rotational naval forces. Additionally, the US. Navy will begin to base four Aegis 

destroyers at Naval Station Rota beginning in FY 2014. US. Marine Corps presence includes the US. 

Marine Forces Europe Headquarters, the USMC Prepositioning Program in Norway, and rotational forces, 

including those assigned to the Black Sea Rotational Force. 

• Special Operations Forces: Special Operations Command Europe will retain a headquarters element, 

along with an Army Special Forces Battalion, an Air Force Special Operations Group, and a Naval Special 

Warfare (SEAL) unit. 

Strategic Rebalance, In accordance with the Defense Strategic Guidance, US. European Command 

continues to rebalance its force levels and base footprint in order to help the Department of Defense divest 

itself of legacy forces, reapportion forces toward regions of greater instability, and save money. Several 

recent inactivation decisions will make significant changes to our posture. The most notable change is the 

inactivation of the US. Army's V Corps Headquarters (2013), 170th Brigade Combat Team (2012), and 

172nd Brigade Combat Team (2013). Additionally, as the US. Army reduces force structure in the coming 

years, there will be an additional reduction of approximately 2,500 enabling forces and their equipment. 

Lastly, the Air Force de-activated an air support operations squadron (2012), and plans to inactive an A-lO 

squadron and an air control squadron. 

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Consistent with the Defense Strategic Guidance and the new NATO Strategic Concept, we will also 

continue to adapt and develop our theater requirements by: 1) reinvigorating our contribution to the NATO 

Response Force, allocating elements of a rotational BCT to train in a multi-national European environment 

and leveraging the premier U.S. Army training facilities located at the Joint Multinational Training Center 

in Germany; 2) meeting the objectives of the European Phased Adaptive Approach by supporting the ANI 

TPY-2 radar in Turkey, home-porting four Aegis BMD-capable ships in Spain, and establishing land-based 

Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland; 3) enhancing regional SOF responsiveness by stationing CY-22 

aircraft in the United Kingdom, and continuing our strong partnership with the NATO SOF Headquarters 

in Belgium; and 4) continuing C-130 and F-16 aircraft rotation to the newly established aviation detachment 

in Poland to enhance Eastern European aviation training and interoperability. 

Military Construction. Thanks to strong and continued Congressional support, previous annual 

military construction authorizations and appropriations have enabled us to address a balanced mix of our 

most pressing requirements to support the missions and priorities articulated above. The goal of our FY 

2014 military construction program is to support our posture initiatives, recapitalize key infrastructure, and 

consolidate at enduring locations. Of particular importance in the coming year is support for our EPAA 

missile defense projects and the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center I Rhine Ordnance Barracks theater 

medical consolidation and recapitalization project. 

Congressional support for EPAA Phase One projects, including approval to replace expeditionary 

facilities in Turkey with semi-permanent facilities, was critical to achieving a high degree of readiness at 

the AN/TPY-2 radar site. In FY 2013, the command will begin EPAA Phase Two projects, including an 

Aegis Ashore site in Romania. Additionally, a request for an EPAA Phase Three Aegis Ashore site in Poland 

is being developed in FY 2015 as part of the budget submission and will provide the U.S. and our allies 

improved deterrence against rogue BMD activity. 

The Landstuhl I Rhine Ordnance Barracks 

Medical Center replacement project remains one of the 

command's highest military constructions priorities. 

FY 2012 and 2013 funding support have greatly 

facilitated the project's progress to date. The new 

facility consolidates duplicative medical facilities in the 

Kaiserslautern Military Community, and provides a 

vitally important replacement to theater-based combat 

and contingency operation medical support from 

the aged and failing infrastructure at the Landstuhl 

Regional Medical Center. This recapitalization project 

will provide life-saving intervention, combat trauma, 

32 

1he aeromedical evacuation system and trauma care 

provided at U.S. medical facilities in Germany have 

saved thousands of lives and driven u.s. combatrelated deaths to historic lows. Sustaining these 

capabilities is cri"Heal to ensU1ing their continued 

availability for U.S. military pe1'sonnel serving across 

half the globe, including areas of persistent conflict in 

Afrka and the Middk East. 
67 

emergency care, and other medical support to warfighters operating in the U.S. European Command, U.S. 

Central Command, and U.S. Africa Command theaters, as well as forward-stationed U.S. forces in Europe 

and their families. Continued support and progress with this critical project will ensure the continued 

availability of the highest level trauma care to future U.S. warfighters at this medically significant half-way 

point between the United States and areas of persistent conflict in the Middle East, Africa, and other regions 

across half the globe. 

European Command continues to carefully assess our investments at enduring locations. We have 

reduced our footprint dramatically over the past 22 years, consolidating all operations to approximately 21 

main operating bases, with smaller supporting sites. As mentioned earlier, tbis represents a 75% reduction 

in installation inventory since the end of the Cold War. Additionally, the command is on a trajectory to 

reduce our footprint further, to 17 main operating bases with the closure of the U.S. Army communities 

at Heidelberg, Mannheim, Darmstadt, Schweinfurt, and Bamberg. While further theater consolidation 

at enduring locations remains a command priority, it is important to note that continued reductions and 

consolidations to gain greater efficiencies may require additional military construction. 

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OUR MOST IMPORTANT RESOURCE 

Taking Care of our People & their Families. As the Department of Defense continues to deal 

with the effects of more than a decade at war, we have a solemn obligation and responsibility to continue 

successful programs and seek new and innovative ways to support our forces and families. In that effort, 

European Command's' Force and Family Readiness' priorities are closely aligned with the Administration's 

'Strengthening Our Military Families' initiative. 

While maintaining our focus on mission readiness, we continue to seek avenues and resources to 

respond to the significant stress placed on our forces and families due to protracted combat operations and 

cyclical unit and personnel deployments. There remains a need for sustained behavioral health services 

to support our warriors and their families, particularly in an overseas environment with few private sector 

options. It remains a command priority that the members of our all-volunteer force and their families 

continue receiving the quality care and responsive support they need in a stigma-free environment. 

European Command also supports the efforts being led by the Department of Defense Education 

Activity to transform and modernize our 1950s-era, aged and, in some cases, failing overseas school 

infrastructure. European Command is fortunate to have some of the best and most committed teachers 

at work in our theater. We are committed to providing the resources these educators need to ensure the 

children of our military and DoD civilian families receive a first-rate education. 

Lastly, as total force levels continue to change, service members must transfer more often than 

originally expected, placing yet another burden on the military family. The inability of the military spouse 

to remain in his or her chosen career field is a part of that burden, adding further economic strain in difficult 

times. Of the 26,000 active duty and reserve spouses who live in our theater, 25% possess a college degree 

and 10% hold graduate degrees. Accordingly, in order to support greater spouse employment, European 

Command launched our first-ever 'Spouses Virtual Job Fair' last year. Part of the wider 'Military Spouse 

Employment Partnership' program, this initiative provided key assistance by linking military spouses with 

employers seeking a highly qualified 21st century workforce. 

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69 

NATO & ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS (ACO) 

NATO's Strategic Direction. The NATO Alliance remains the center of a transatlantic framework 

focused on the strategic concept of 'Active Engagement, Modern Defense: The core principles of collective 

defense, crisis management, and cooperative security contribute to the peace and safeguarding of the United 

States and our European allies and partners. The alliance has evolved from a Cold War construct, consisting 

of a few nations, to twenty-eight member nations today with a shared vision and growing interoperability to 

provide expeditionary capabilities for out-of-area operations. To safeguard the alliance against the evolving 

challenges of 21st century security, including ballistic missile defense, cyber attack, proliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction, and terrorism, NATO is evolving through institutional reform, programs and initiatives, 

and increased interoperability and partnerships. 

NATO Command Structure Reform. The Lisbon Summit set the glide path for a new NATO 

command structure that is leaner, more affordable, and more effective at conducting operational and 

transformational tasks across the full range of alliance missions. NATO Command Structure reform is 

on track to reduce its staff manpower from 13,000 to 8,800 and cut major headquarters from eleven to six. 

Organized under two Strategic Commands (Operations and Transformation), it will include two deployable 

joint force headquarters OFHQs), land, air, and maritime components, and the NATO communications 

and information systems group. The NATO command structure links the alliance's over three million 

active military personnel, 24,000 aircraft, 750 ships, and 50 AWACS to operate stronger together in the 21st 

century. 

NATO Forces 2020. NATO's vision for future capability improvement was unveiled at the Chicago 

Summit as a framework to build the concepts of 'Smart Defense' and the 'Connected Forces' initiative. 

NATO's Smart Defense initiative proVides the path to develop the capabilities; the Connected Forces 

initiative is how NATO will employ these capabilities. 

Smart Defense. The Smart Defense initiative is a means to provide access to crucial capabilities 

while collectively taking multinational and innovative approaches to pooling resources. As mentioned, this 

initiative creates opportunity [or the alliance to work together, wisely using individual defense budgets to 

make NATO greater than the sum of its parts. In critical areas-such as sustainment, training, engagement, 

ballistic missile defense, force protection, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance-Smart Defense 

gives nations the ability to contribute to projects and acquire capabilities that they may otherwise be unable 

to afford individually. To date, the Europeans participate in everyone of the 147 Smart Defense projects. 

More importantly for the transatlantic partnership, they lead over two-thirds of them. Smart Defense aims 

to assure continued capability development commensurate with global security challenges in order to meet 

NATO's Strategic Concept, even in the prevailing resource-constrained global economy. 

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70 

Connected Forces Initiative. The Connected Forces initiative presents an opportunity to contribute 

to the 'NATO Forces 2020' vision and goal, by building on alliance experience in recent operations, and 

maintaining and enhancing NATO's combat effectiveness-hard earned over the past decade-through 

expanded education and training events, increased exercises, and the better use of technology. 

Major Operations. Over the past year, NATO and Allied Command Operations have executed 

multiple major operations, demonstrating the alliance's impressive capabilities. Today, roughly 150,000 

military personnel are engaged in NATO missions around the world, successfully managing complex 

ground, air and naval operations in every type of environment. Every day, NATO forces are operating in 

Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Mediterranean, with the African Union, in the skies over the Baltic and North 

Intermttional Security Assistance Force (ISAF) efforts 

continue to build the strength, confidence, and competencies 

of Afghan National Security Forces, supporting the 

transition of security 1Y!SP0l1sibilities to Afghans in 2013 

and 2014. Asia Foundation's 2012 Survey of the Akhan 

People reflected Afghmts' contiuued confidence in the Afghan 

National Army and National Police as the country:~ most 

trusted public institutions. 

Seas, and in the waters off the Horn of Africa. 

Afghanistan. NATO's operation in Afghanistan 

continues to remain the top priority and operational 

commitment of the alliance and our partner nations 

comprising ISAF. There are 106,000 troops from 50 

troop-contributing nations sharing the combined 

burdens and sacrifices of the Afghanistan mission 

as we press forward with a balanced drawdown of 

combat forces and provide sustainment post -2014. 

The sacrifices shared by ISAF and our Afghan partners 

will ensure that Afghanistan will never again become a 

safe-haven for terrorists. Since NATO's intervention, 

the lives of Afghan men, women, and children have 

significantly improved with respect to security, health 

care, education, and opportunity. Today, over 80% of 

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71 

Afghans have access to health care. Since 2002, school enrollment for children has increased from two 

million to eight million with girls representing 38% of this enrollment, up from a dismal low of 3% under 

the Taliban. Infant, child, and maternal mortality rates have decreased by over 34% since 2002, and adult 

life expectancy has gone from 42 to 62 years of age. NATO's goal remains to turn over full responsibility for 

security to Afghanistan by December 31, 2014. 

The strategy outlined at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, assured at the May 2012 Chicago Summit, and 

reinforced at the July 2012 Tokyo Conference is on track to build the capacity, capability, and profeSSionalism 

of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Today, ANSF stand at a force level of 335,000: 182,000 

from the Afghan National Army: 6,000 from the Afghan Air Force: and 147,000 from the Afghan National 

Police. In October 2012, ANSF reached their recruiting goal of 352,000. The transition-which started in 

2011, and is being sequentially expanded through five tranches of selected districts and cities to encompass 

all of Afghanistan by mid-2m3-is underway in some part of all 34 provinces, all provincial capitals, and 

two-thirds of all districts. The ANSF have assumed lead responsibility for areas that encompass 76% of 

the Afghan population, and conditions in these areas have remained stable or improved. In fact, civilian 

casualties have fallen for the first time in six years, down 12%, and ISAF casualties are down 27% compared 

to last year. Last December, the 'Tranche 4' announcement transitioned security responsibility for the 

remaining internal and border areas. Once the full transition is complete by the end of 2014, the ISAF 

mission will end. 

In support of post-2014 operations in Afghanistan, NATO will launch the NATO Train, Advise, 

and Assist Mission, tentatively named 'Resolute Support' in Afghanistan. In October 2012, NATO Defense 

Ministers approved the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Initiating Directive for developing the concept of 

operations for the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. It is due this spring. This demonstrated resolve 

ensures the gains made during the transition are irreversible. 

Tangible signs of the gains in Afghanistan continue to be shown. In findings recorded by the Asia 

Foundation in their 2012 Survey of the Afghan People, 52% of Afghans polled conveyed their belief that the 

country is "headed in the right direction;' up from 46% last year.' It is worth noting that this statistic is higher 

than the percentage found in most Western countries. Moreover, the survey noted a moderate decrease in 

the percentage of Afghans who fear for their safety, while reflecting Afghans' continued confidence in the 

Afghan National Army and National Police as the country's most trusted public institutions. NATO will not 

leave a security vacuum in Afghanistan. 

Kosovo. The international supervision of Kosovo has ended four and a half years after it became 

independent. The situation remains outwardly calm, but there remain underlying tensions and fragility while 

Serbia and Kosovo proceed within the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue to resolve their differences 

peacefully. To ensure this outcome, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission maintains 5,600 troops 

5 The Asia foundation. 'Afghanistan in 2012: A Surwy of the Afghan People;' http://asiafoundation,org/publkations!pdf/1155. 

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72 

from 30 contributing countries in Kosovo. KFOR will be staying there for the time being, along with the 

1,250 international legal experts and police supporting the EV's rule of law mission. While progress will 

require committed political dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, KFOR continues to create positive 

conditions for this dialogue by helping to maintain a safe and secure environment and facilitate freedom of 

movelnent. 

Counter-Piracy and Operation OCEAN SHIELD. Operation OCEAN SHIELD is NATO's 

counter-piracy Inission, consisting of up to seven 

ships working alongside EV and U.S. task forces 

to counter piracy in waters surrounding the Horn 

of Africa. These relationships and the shipping 

companies' use of armed security teams and industry 

best practices have notably reduced piracy. During 

the first six months of 2012, there were 69 incidents 

involving Somali pirates, down from 163 during the 

same period in 2011, a reduction of over 40%. Today, 

2 vessels and less than 100 hostages are being held, 

compared with 30 ships and 682 mariners in 201l. 

Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR. As 

NATO's only current Article 5-based operation, 

Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR provides maritime 

A l!essei burns off the Somali coast after being used by 

pirates to attack the Dutch warship HNIMS Rotterdam. 

NHLMS Rotterdam, NATO's counter-piracy flagship, 

returned fire, diStlbling the vessel and scattering the 

attackers. NATO's Operation OCEAN SHIELD, in 

coordination with shipping industry best practices, 

continues to reduce episodes of piracy in waters off the 

Horn of Africa. 

situational awareness through operations in the Mediterranean to demonstrate NATO's resolve to deter, 

defend, disrupt, and protect against terrorism. Ongoing since 2001, ACTIVE ENDEAVOR is on a path to 

transform from a platform-based to a network-based operation, based on an intelligence and informationsharing network among the 63 nations and regional partners that contribute to the Maritime Safety and 

Security Information System. 

NATO Members Defense Commitments & Budgeting Outlook. The European financial crisis has 

had a security impact on NATO and partner nations. Few allies currently meet the NATO goal that each 

ally commits 2% of GDP to defense spending. The Smart Defense Initiative, Connected Forces Initiative, 

and NATO Forces 2020 all strive to fill capacity and capability gaps. However, at a time of uncertain 

security challenges and severe fiscal austerity it remains difficult, but still critical, to adequately fund defense 

spending. 

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Enduring 21st Century Impact & Relevance. The 2012 U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance addresses 

Europe and NATO prominently, noting: "Europe is home to some of America's most stalwart allies and 

partners, many of whom have sacrificed alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere;' One 

of NATO's most important priorities is to maintain working relationships, at the tactical, operational, and 

strategic levels, with those allies who have recently developed capabilities and interoperability with each 

other and with U.S. Forces. The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a key way to meet this priority. 

As announced by the Secretary of Defense last year, our commitment of U.S. forces to the NRF 

is a means to reinvigorating and bolstering the NRF. By providing a rapid demonstration of force or an 

early establishment of NATO military presence in support of Article V or crisis response operations, NRF 

mitigates force structure reductions in Europe by improving interoperability and capitalizing on flexibility. 

Over the long term, NRF will be a vital asset for post -ISAF interoperability ensuring adherence to, and 

constant improvement of, Standing NATO Agreements (STANAGS). The NRF will also serve as both a 

key training resource and valuable tool for evaluating the status of European forces. As they remain our 

most likely companions in any security effort-from 

humanitarian assistance to full-spectrum conflictthe U.S. must have confidence in the interoperability 

and readiness of European forces. 

Ballistic Missile Defense. The protection of 

NATO European territory, populations, and forces 

against ballistic missiles from increasing threats to 

the alliance is vitally important. NATO declared an 

Interim Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability 

at the May 2012 Chicago Summit. As mentioned, 

the U.S. AN ITPY-2 surveillance radar based in 

Turkey has been declared to NATO as a part of 

EPAA's Phase One implementation. The initial 

operational capability of NATO BMD is anticipated 

in 2016, with full operational capability in 2020. 

39 

uss The Sullivat15 (DDG-68), a guided missile destroyer, 

conducts at-.~ea training with Royal Netherlands Navy 

frigate HNLMS De Ruyter (F804). Allied maritime 

support inc/uths 'riding shotgun' to protect U.S. Aegis BMD 

platforms, an importatJt contribution to the Ballistic Missile 

Defense mission. The Netherlands Navy is al~o purStling 

maritime upper-tier BMD tracking capabilities for their 

ves$el~. 
74 

Moreover, NATO's recent decision to provide Patriot missiles to defend Turkey against the threat of Syrian 

ballistic missiles is yet another sign of the alliance's solidarity and effectiveness in this area. 

Cyber Defense. NATO's policy on cyber defense focuses on the protection of cyber assets and 

sharing of cyber situational awareness among NATO nations. The fielding of the NATO Computer Incident 

Response Center was a significant milestone as we progress towards full operational capability in 2013 to 

support alliance operations and missions. 

NATO Special Operations Forces. U.S. leadership of the NATO Special Operations Headquarters 

(NSHQ) remains instrumental in driving the rapid transformation of' NATO Special Operations Forces 

(SOF) and creating a NATO allied and partner SOF collaborative network. A deployable core of the NATO 

Special Operations Component Command Headquarters will achieve initial operational capability in 

20l3, providing an assured, responsive, and agile command and control entity for NATO SOF under the 

operational command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. This core will be capable of coordinating 

NATO military operations within the complex and asymmetric environments of the 21st century. Today, 

over 2,000 NATO allied and partner SOF are conducting SOF missions in Afghanistan. Additionally, NSHQ 

is moving forward with several initiatives to develop interoperable SOF standards. NATO SOF brings 

unprecedented opportunities to leverage partnerships, improve interoperability, and deliver expanded 

NATO exercises remain a critical venue to align and sustain 

high-end capabilities among NATO's most developed 

parhlcrs for continued burdel1~sharing; preserve a decade 

ofhnrd-earnedAUiance expeditionary capahilities; and 

support newer Allies' capabiHty development for current 

ami future NATO operations. 

capabilities for NATO to ensure peace and stability 

for the alliance and our partner nations. 

Keeping the Edge through Exercises. The 

planned reduction of NATO forces supporting 

ISAF, combined with U.S. reinvigoration in the NRF, 

provides a unique opportunity for NATO to modify 

and align exercise programs with U.S. combatant 

commands and regional partners. After ten years 

of combat deployments against an asymmetric 

enemy, NATO will need to dedicate itself to flexible 

training that emphasizes traditional skill sets, while 

incorporating lessons learned from recent conflicts. 

Additionally, these exercises provide the opportunity 

for newer members of the alliance, as well as our other NATO partners, to pair with some of the highlycapable founding members, continuing to burden-share collective defense while raising the overall quality 

of NATO forces. 

"The NATO Alliance continues to wleld unp.recedented mfluence m our world, and remams a 

CrItICal element of u.s. and European security.' 

- Senator jeanne Shaheen (El-Nfl), Senate Armed ServICes CommIttee 

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CONCLUSION 

Every day, the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Civilians of US. European 

Command and NATO Allied Command Operations are making vital contributions to the forward defense 

of the United States, the preservation of America's vital national security interests, and the continued 

evolution and effectiveness of NATO. As they continue their work, through the seamless execution of 

combined military operations, interagency cooperation, and whole of society activities, I ask that you keep 

faith with these extraordinary men and women, and their families, to ensure they receive the care and 

benefits they have earned and so rightly deserve. 

I entered Annapolis and joined the Navy over forty years ago. Among the many things I have learned, 

one of the clearest lessons is that the most reliable constant in this world is change. But in today's world 

of accelerating change, connectivity, and complexity, another anchor has also held remarkably constant, 

recognized by national leaders time and again, for providing the essential foundation of continued security 

and stability in the 21st century. That anchor is the transatlantic alliance. It is simply a fact, one bridging 

two centuries and continuing to evolve in a dynamic security environment, that Europeans remain our most 

steadfast, reliable, battle-tested, and important global partners as we confront the strategic risks and military 

challenges of the 21st century. No other region so readily combines the same commitment to shared values, 

high-end military capabilities and capacity, and willingness to stand with America-as our European Allies 

and partners have demonstrated at great cost and sacrifice over the past decade-in this century's fight 

for freedom and the pursuit of global security and stability. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance states it 

clearly: "Europe is our principal partner in seeking global and economic security, and will remain so for the 

foreseeable future:' 

The world is changing again. Yet, as we consider the contributions and future of the transatlantic 

alliance, the numbers are worth repeating, especially in an era of significant fiscal pressure and austerity: 

Together, the US. and Europe generate half the globe's GOP. Our European partners collectively spend 

$300 billion on defense, second only to the United States and well ahead of China and Russia. As essential 

contributors to an alliance comprised of750 ships, 24,000 aircraft, and over three million active-duty forces, 

and with over 40,000 European forces currently devoted to NATO and UN operations, our European allies 

and partners are significant and necessary global security providers, fielding forces for combat and stability 

operations that have stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the US. in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Kosovo, and 

other hot spots across the world. Europeans have willingly shared the burden of war over the past ten years, 

conSistently comprising the bulk of non-U.S. coalition forces for the missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, 

and Libya. 

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Even as we acknowledge these facts, the convergence of several factors last year-the 2012 Defense 

Strategic Guidance, rising tensions in the Levant, North Africa, and the Balkans, and the global tightening of 

defense resources-has provided an opportunity for European Command to reconsider and rebalance our 

present priorities and enduring capabilities to ensure that we are providing the most efficient and effective 

support to the nation and to NATO. This effort offered several conclusions. First, European Command is 

actively contributing to everyone of the Defense Department's ten national missions for Joint Force 2020, 

protecting America's vital national security interests, and defending the nation against the threats of the 

21st century: ballistic missiles; WMD proliferation; terrorism; piracy; cyber attack; and transnational illicit 

trafficking. Second, u.s. presence and infrastructure in Europe, which continues to be right-sized for these 

enduring missions and the future security environment, provide the United States with an indispensable 

strategic platform for engagement across the globe, directly supporting the operations of six U.S. Combatant 

Commanders, numerous U.S. Government Interagency functions, and 51 U.S. Country Teams. Third, U.S. 

leadership and commitment to the NATO Alliance continues to support the evolution of that institution 

into the world's premier security organization, contributing highly capable and interoperable forces to 

Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Kosovo, and preparing them for future coalition expeditionary operations. 

As such, the alliance has also become a hub for continued cooperation and outreach with like-minded 

partners in the Pacific, including Australia, South Korea, Singapore, New Zealand, and Japan, essential in 

the years ahead. In this capacity, the transatlantic partnership-one the President calls the "cornerstone of 

global security" -remains one of the nation's most valuable and enduring strategic investments. Properly 

sustained, it will continue providing critical security dividends in the challenging decades ahead. 

To safeguard that investment, European Command continues to leverage the funding and authorities 

that Congress has provided to preserve our strategic partnerships and maintain the essential warfighting 

capabilities and interoperability that our allies and partners have gained, with our help, over a decade of 

sustained deployment and combat operations. In the near term, European Command is working to enable 

a successful ISAF transition and preserve partner capability and commitment to the post-2014 mission 

in Afghanistan. To that end, we request that Congress continue supporting Section 1206 (Global Train 

and Equip) and other ISAF coalition support programs, in order to meet our goals to transition security 

responsibility in Afghanistan over the coming year and, in concert with our allies and partners, to continue 

training, advising, and assisting the ANSF after they assume full security responsibility in 2014. 

Over the longer term, we seek your assistance and support to sustain the value of the transatlantic 

alliance and its continued contributions to global security. As you know, the key to that future is ensuring 

our European allies and partners can and will continue contributing deployable, capable, and interoperable 

forces for future conflicts and coalition military operations. Despite the economic constraints we all face, 

this future is within reach if we sustain the necessary investments to maintain critical gains in expeditionary 

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capabilities and interoperability that have been achieved in recent years, and preserve the vital strategic 

relationships that have been painstakingly built over the past six decades. 1he preservation and future 

employment of these capabilities represent the impending return on our investment when crises arrive on 

our doorstep at their unscheduled hour, seeking urgent, multilateral, and coalition-based solutions. 

Mitigating the risks posed by the fiscal environment to U.S. influence in the region and NATO's 

enduring strength and cohesion also requires a clear and unequivocal U.S. commitment to our theater 

and Article V responsibilities. Those responsibilities require that we maintain a balanced and enduring 

U.S. presence in Europe; reinvigorate U.S. participation in the NATO Response Force; continue resourcing 

important security assistance programs such as Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education 

and Training, the Warsaw Initiative Fund, and the Combatant Commanders' Exercise and Engagement 

Fund; and support NATO's Smart Defense, Connected Forces, NATO 2020, and related initiatives. 

History may not repeat itself, but its patterns are clear. After a decade of war, and facing significant 

fiscal challenges, we stand once again at the crossroads: on one side, the military retrenchment and risk that 

has traditionally accompanied the end of every period of American war; on the other, a belt-tightening but 

balanced approach that sustains U.S. leadership and engagement in the world, with a focus on continued 

global security and prosperity. Each choice entails risks, and the future is hard to see. But one thing history 

has also shown us, time and again, is the enduring value of this remarkable transatlantic alliance. 

Though the strategic and fiscal challenges are very real on both sides of the Atlantic, this historical 

moment offers us a critical opportunity, one acknowledged by former Secretary Panetta: "I believe that 

today's strategic and fiscal realities offer NATO the opportunity to build the alliance we need for the 21" 

century-an alliance that serves as the core of an expanding network of partnerships around the globe in 

support of common security objectives. But it is an alliance that remains rooted in the strong bonds of 

transatlantic security cooperation and collective defense:' 

The men and women of U.S. European Command and NATO Allied Command Operations are 

building, strengthening, and preserving those vital bonds to provide for the forward defense of the United 

States, our collective security, and the viability of this critical partnership. This is critical work, as the 

transatlantic partnership continues to serve as the security foundation for the world's economic center of 

gravity, America's secure Eastern flank, and the "vital cornerstone of global security and stability" to deal 

with the challenges of a rapidly changing century and security environment. Through this work, European 

Command and NATO form that vital "core" of an "expanding network of partnerships"-through joint and 

coalition forces, civil-military security partnerships, and international security structures-that provide us 

with what I call the "sum of all security:' 

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In his remarks at last year's NATO summit in Chicago, President Obama reiterated and reinforced 

the importance of this security and an enduring truth of the global security environment; one that bridges 

the past and current centuries in order to guide us into the future. In that statement, the President 

acknowledged: "NATO has been the bedrock of common security, freedom and prosperity for nearly 65 

years. It hasn't just endured-it has thrived-because our nations are stronger when we stand together:' 

For nearly four years now, the motto of U.S. European Command has been that we are, clearly and 

unequivocally, 'Stronger Together: For nearly 65 years, this has been NATO's historic organizing principle. 

It is even truer today in light of the economic challenges and increasing threats we face. We must continue 

to work together, trust each other, and continue building and evolving this historic partnership to meet the 

needs and challenges of the 21st century. In doing this, we will not only endure; we will prevail, we will 

thrive, and we will continue to grow and to be STRONGER TOGETHER. 

"Our transatlantic pattnership is the most successful alliance and the greatest 

cataLyst for global action. I am determined to keep it that way:' 

- President Obama 

" . 

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APPENDIX 

EUROPEAN COMMAND SERVICE COMPONENTS 

Service Component Commands. Except when assigned to a joint task force for military operations 

or participating in joint exercises, European Command forces are managed, trained, and equipped by our 

five Service component headquarters: US. Army Europe: US. Marine Forces Europe; US. Naval Forces 

EuropelNaval Forces Africa; US. Air Forces Europel Air Forces Africa; and US. Special Operations 

Command Europe. These organizations provide forces for our military-to-military engagements, serve 

both an assurance and deterrence function in the region, deploy units for contingency operations, and, 

when necessary, may be tasked to provide a tailored joint task force headquarters. Understanding our 

service component commands is essential to understanding European Command, as they conduct the 

majority of our steady-state activities. A brief description of each Service Component Command, and its 

recent activities, is provided in this appendix. 
80 

U.S. Anny Europe 

Wiesbaden, Germany 

Introduction & Overview: United States Army Europe leads Army forces in support of US. 

European Command and the Department of the Army by training and preparing for unified land operations, 

strengthening alliances, and conducting theater security cooperation. Executing this mission, U.s. Army 

Europe supports numerous US. combatant commands around the world as America seeks to prevent 

conflict, shape the global environment with our international partners, and win any contemporary fight. 

US. Army Europe plays a critical role in strengthening and preserving European Command's strategic 

partnerships, specifically by increasing interoperability, building partner capacity, and enhancing allied and 

partner expeditionary capabilities. 

Major Accomplishments: In 2012. US. Army Europe provided trained and culturally aware 

units and enabling forces, capable of conducting full-spectrum operations in support of ISAF and other 

contingency operations. Supporting ballistic missile defense in Europe, US. Army Europe played a leading 

role in operating and maintaining the ground-based AN/TPY-2 radar site in Turkey. Theater enabler units 

also provided vital intelligence, logistics and sustainment support to US. European Command, US. Africa 

Command, and US. Special Operations Command forces operating across Europe and Africa. 

In accordance with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. US. Army Europe is aggressively 

continuing consolidation efforts and theater force rebalancing. As mentioned, key modifications include 

the inactivation of the 170th Iufantry Brigade Combat Team (BCT) last year, and the inactivatiou of the 

172nd BCT and US. Army V Corps Headquarters this year. As a result of ongoing reductions, the US. 

Army will have closed 102 theater sites from FY 2006 to FY 2012. The closure of an additional 30 sites, 

including the entire communities of Heidelberg, Mannheim, Darmstadt, Schweinfurt, and Bamberg, has 

also been publicly announced and is on track for completion by FY 2015. 

Operations & Operational Support: US. 

Army Europe stands ready to support contingency 

operations and meet future global threats. Though 

some operations have been ongoing for years, others 

are completely new and unexpected, requiring 

flexibility and innovation to support. Last year, an 

average of 20% of US. Army Europe's forces were 

deployed to support to US. Central Command and 

ISAF. In 2012 alone, the US. Army's V Corps, 173rd 

Airborne BCT, and 12th Combat Aviation Brigade 

all deployed to Afghanistan. 

SoMkrs from u.s. Army Europe's 1st Battalion, 503rd 

infantry, 173rd AiI'borne Brigade Combat Team fire an 

81 ~mm mortar while executing opel'ations at C-ombat 

Outpost Kherwar, Afghanistan, on August 6, 2012. 

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Critical to supporting operations in Afghanistan, US. Army Europe has established and maintained 

a transportation node in Romania. Located at Mihail Kogalniceanu Airfield and operated by US. Army 

Europe's 21st Theater Sustainment Command, this transportation node is a critical link in the Northern 

Distribution Network. Since its establishment, this facility has supported over 130 flights, transporting 

nearly 10,000 service members and approximately 800 tons of equipment between the United States and 

Afghanistan. In addition, U.S. Army Europe personnel have established a trans-shipment point at Naval 

Station Rota, Spain, transporting 141 helicopters out of Afghanistan and redeploying them by sea to the 

United States. 

In cyberspace, U.S. Army Europe's 5th Signal Command is addressing the array of rising challenges 

while, at the same time, providing the backbone for communications between deployed forces and the United 

States. Already partnered with multinational experts, 5th Signal Command is incorporating simulated 

cyber threats into US. and multinational training exercises and improving operational approaches to these 

threats. 

Exercises, Theater Security Cooperation, and Partnerships: The U.S. Army Europe exercise 

program remains critical to the pre-deployment training of US. and coalition forces supporting ISAF 

and other contingency operations. It serves to prepare these same forces for future operations across 

U.S. European Command, US. Africa Command, 

and US. Central Command. In 2012, US. Army 

Europe prepared two Polish brigades, two Romanian 

battalions and, in close cooperation with the Marine 

Corps, two Georgian battalions for deployment to 

ISAF. 

Leveraging US. Army Europe's forward 

deployed brigades and America's long-standing 

investment in the premier training facilities at the 

Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) in 

Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, Germany, US. Army 

Europe trained and mentored 2,481 multinational 

soldiers from 22 countries in counter-improvised 

explosive device (C-IED) skill sets, and trained 1,204 

U.S. Army Europe's Joint Muhinational Training 

Command (jMTC) is a strategic national asset, pr()viding 

u.s. forces and our multinational partners an uupttrallekd 

training venue to prepare for [SAP deployments and 

exercise critical theater security skills. Here, Polish Special 

Operations Forces conduct search~and~''esclle dlills as part 

of a downed~aircraft exercise in Hohel1fils, Germany. 

multinational drivers on Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. U.S. Army Europe teams also 

mentored and advised the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. In partnership with NATO, 

four mission rehearsal exercises were conducted at JMTC in 2012, training 72 mentoring and advisory 

teams from 16 European partner nations to support ISAF. US. Army Europe also enabled 190 National 

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Guardsmen to co-deploy as part of 14 advisory/mentoring and embedded support teams, deploying with 

over 4,200 multinational personnel in support of ISAF operations. 

Additionally, US. Army Europe participated in 21 joint and combined Army exercises last year, 

including four major mission rehearsal exercises conducted in 14 countries with 44 participating nations. 

Highlights from those highly successful events include: 

• AUSTERE CHALLENGE 12, supported by the 10th Air and Missile Defense Command, which 

partnered with the Israeli Defense Forces to exercise missile defense capabilities. 

• ATLAS VISION 12, conducted with forces from the Russian Ground Forces Central Military 

District as an important confidence-building measure and the first exercise of its kind since 2006. The 

exercise supported European Command's priority for increased cooperation with Russia. 

• SABER JUNCTION, a decisive maneuver action training event conducted last October by the 2nd 

Calvary Regiment (2CR) with over 1,800 multinational soldiers from 19 partner nations-the largest and 

most sophisticated such exercise in 20 years. 

Way Ahead: With approximately 90% of multinational forces in Afghanistan contributed by our 

European allies and partners, European armies remain our most likely, willing, and able coalition partners. 

Accordingly, it is critical that we maintain the strong alliances that US. Army Europe has forged over the 

past 60 years. Forward-based US. Army forces in Europe do this, and continue making major contributions 

to US. vital national security interests by extending US. strategic reach, assuring access, preserving 

strategic partnerships in Europe in a post-ISAF environment, addreSSing a wide array of hybrid threats, 

and maintaining regional security and stability. Importantly, the consolidation of US. Army Europe's 

command leadership continues, with US. Army Europe Headquarters finishing its move from Heidelberg 

to Wiesbaden this year, the inactivation of V Corps, and the reduction of2,500 enabler forces. Also in 2013, 

the Army will commit a CONUS-based brigade to reinvigorate US. participation in the NATO Response 

Force (NRF). As part of this commitment, elements of this brigade will rotate twice annually to Europe to 

train with our NATO and non-NATO partners. jMTC will play an important role in hosting and supporting 

this U.S. component as we implement the Department's pledge to reinvigorate US. participation in the NRF. 

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U.S. Marine Forces Europe 

Stuttgart, Germany 

Introduction & Overview. Marine Forces.Europe leverages rotational expeditionary Marine Forces 

and prepositioned capabilities-based equipment to reassure allies, deter potential adversaries, and maintain 

strategic access while supporting rapid response to crises and contingencies. Throughout 20l2, Marine 

Forces Europe strengthened strategic partnerships, assured access, enhanced interoperability, and prepared 

forces for operations in Afghanistan through three critical programs: the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground 

Task Force, Black Sea Rotational Force; the Georgia Deployment Program for the International Security 

Assistance Force (GOP ISAF); and the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program Norway (MCPP-N); as well 

as an aggressive annual exercise program. Additionally, Marine Forces Europe's 2012 security cooperation 

activities focused on the Caucasus, Black Sea, Balkan, and Baltic regions, contributing to European stability 

and the forward defense of the United States. 

Major Accomplishments. During the summer of 20l2, Marine Forces Europe coordinated with 

Naval Forces Europe to support three simultaneous theater requirements: configuring vessels in the 

Mediterranean to posture for contingency operations; supporting Exercise Baltic Operations (BALfOPS 

12) with Baltic NATO partners; and trans-loading vital equipment and ammunition from a Military 

Sealift Command vessel in support of the MCPP-N initiative. This concurrent planning and execution 

demonstrated extraordinary in-theater flexibility, organization, and teamwork. 

Marine Forces Europe also continues to serve as a vital and integral contributor to US. relations 

with Georgia. Following last year's meeting between the US. and Georgian Presidents, Marine Forces 

Europe was tasked with leading assessments of the Georgian junior officer and non-commissioned officer 

professional development programs as well as Georgian combat engineer training and education. These 

efforts have informed the ongoing development of US. security cooperation engagement plans directed 

in the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. Marine Forces Europe is also coordinating Georgian 

field grade officer augmentation to deploy Marine Regimental Combat Teams. This effort will support 

enhanced security cooperation for Georgian Brigade command and staff development. Finally, Marine 

Forces Europe enhanced the Black Sea Rotational Force in 2012 by adding capabilities to support noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief missions. 

Georgia Deployment Program-International Security Assistance Force (GDP-ISAF). In 

support of nationally directed theater strategic end states, Marine Forces Europe is leading European 

Command's mission to train the Georgian Armed Forces. Performing this mission since 20 lO, Marine 

Forces Europe has developed and implemented a program that applies the USMC organizational model 

for Security Force Assistance, using general purpose forces and security cooperation organizations to train 

MARFOREUR - i 
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Georgian battalions for full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations supporting ISAF. The program's first 

iteration, GDP-ISAF 1, contributed four battalions to the fight in Afghanistan. GDP-ISAF 2 is contributing 

an additional nine battalions, making Georgia one of the largest non-NATO contributors providing fullspectrum counterinsurgency support to ongoing ISAF coalition operations. 

In order to simultaneously train two battalions, the Georgians have added the Vaziani South 

Training Area (VSTA) to enduring training activities at the Krtsanisi Training Area (KTA). Pre-deployment 

training at these locations have incorporated lessons learned from previous deployments, and optimized 

the training curriculum to include biometrics, counter-lED tactics, Pashtu language training, blue force 

tracker, medical training, driver training, and improved squad and small unit level tactics. This highly 

successful program continues to develop Georgian institutional capacity to conduct its own full-spectrum 

counterinsurgency training. It also takes advantage of proximity to the training facilities at U.S. Army 

Europe's Joint Multinational Training Center for mission rehearsal exercises prior to ISAF deployment. This 

program's success is clear, as deployed Georgian battalions currently constitute half of the ground combat 

power in ISAF's Regional Command Southwest. GDP-ISAF Rotations 10 and 11 are currently conducting 

their pre-deployment training evolutions for subsequent rotation into Afghanistan later this year. 

U.S. Marine Corps' Black Sea Rotational Force. Marine Forces Europe also deploys and supports 

the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force, Black Sea Rotational Force (BSRF), a program that 

demonstrates U.S. commitment and maintains strategic access across the Caucasus and Black Sea regions 

through theater security cooperation and security force assistance. The BSRF uses the well-placed U.S. 

Forward Operating Site at Mihail Kogalniceanu Airfield in Romania as its staging base. 

BSRF focuses its partner engagement on tasks that prepare and train these regional partners for 

out-of-area operations. The program builds enduring trust while enhancing U.S. strategic objectives in the 

region. In 2012, BSRF supported European Command crisis response requirements through its capabilities 

Maced.f)nian soldiers participating with U.S. Marines 

from the Black Sea Rotational Force in the Marine 

Corps Combat Marksmansbip Program sharpening 

their tactics, techniques, tltld procedures in essential 

military skiDs. 

to conduct non-combatant evacuation control center 

actions and provide support to humanitarian assistance 

and disaster relief operations. Equipped by the Marine 

Corps Prepositioning Program Norway (MCPP-N), 

BSRF executed 97 engagement events with 20 countries 

(15 of which contribute forces to ISAF), participated in 

three Joint Chiefs of Staff OCS) exercises, and conducted 

five community relations projects. This year, BSRF 

will continue supporting European Command's crisis 

response mission, is scheduled for 85 engagement events 

with 22 countries, will participate in four JCS exercises, 

and will conduct at least five community relations 

projects. 

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85 

Marine Corps Prepositioning Program Norway (MCPP-N). In 2012, the Marine Corps began 

transforming this program from the current Marine Expeditionary Brigade pre positioning objective to 

an equipment set capable of supporting an ashore-based, balanced Marine Air Ground Task Force, built 

around the core of an Infantry Battalion Task Force. This Marine Air Ground Task Force, equipped through 

the MCPP-N for crisis response, can support operations up to the mid-intensity conflict level. European 

Command has supported MCPP-N's transformational effort in coordination with the Norwegian Ministry 

of Defense, the Department of State, Joint Staff, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, and Marine 

Forces Europe to obtain the necessary Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) entitlements to store 

USMC combat vehicles in Norway. MCPP-N transformation mitigates, but does not replace, the divestiture 

of the theater's Maritime Prepositioning Squadron which occurred last September. MCPP-N also continues 

to support the reinforcement of Norway, reaffirming America's strategic relationship with this important 

partner. 

Exercises. Marine Forces Europe participated in 18 joint, bilateral, and multilateral exercises in 2012, 

reassuring theater allies and deterring potential adversaries by demonstrating rapid assembly, deployment, 

and maritime expeditionary capabilities. Noteworthy 

exercises last year included: 

AGILE SPIRIT, a Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF)-

resourced pre-deployment training workup 

for Georgian Battalions slated for the Georgia 

Deployment Program; 

BALTOPS 12, training important amphibious 

assault, arrival, and assembly skills with our 

Baltic NATO partners; and 

NOBLE SHIRLEY, building and maintaining 

critical interoperability with our Levant partners. 

Way Ahead. Marine Forces Europe will 

Germany hit the beach during Exercise Baltic 

Operations (BALTOPS) 2012. BALTOPS <12 -reinforced 

key theater security cooperation effm7s through joint 

maritime, air, and land operations conducted across the 

Ealtle region. 

continue to pursue an innovative task-organized expeditionary force presence in the European Command 

theater to meet crisis and contingency response requirements. \l(fe will provide bilateral combined arms 

and amphibious training with key partners, including Israel, Turkey, France, and the United Kingdom. 

Establishing and exercising expeditionary presence supports important theater reassurance and deterrence 

objectives. Marine Forces Europe will continue to support Service-led efforts to transform the MCPP-N, 

while maintaining our commitment to the reinforcement of Norway. Additionally, Marine Forces Europe 

will continue to evolve BSRF's crisis response capability, fully aligning this force with maritime crisis response 

capabilities inside the European Command theater. 

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86 

Commander Naval Forces Europe I Commander Naval Forces Africa 

Naples, Italy 

Introduction & Overview: Commander, US. Naval Forces Europe and Commander, US. Naval Forces 

Africa is a unified organization that reports to bQth US. European Command and US. Africa Command. 

It is responsible for leading full-spectrum maritime operations in concert with allied, coalition, joint, and 

interagency partners to advance US. interests and enhance maritime security and stability in Europe and 

Africa. US. Naval Forces Europe performs Navy Component Commander functions that support daily 

fleet operations and Joint Force Maritime Component Commander/loint Task Force Commander missions, 

strengthen US. relationships with enduring allies, and provide leadership for the development of maritime 

capabilities with emerging partners, particularly in European Command's southern and eastern regions. 

Major Accomplishments: US. Naval Forces Europe met all mission requirements in 2012 and 

retained its certification as Joint Force Maritime Component Commander. By concentrating on key theater 

security cooperation initiatives, the command advanced vital US. and partner-nation skills in maritime 

domain awareness, security, and sea control in the European Command area of responsibility. The 

command also supported numerous global security and stability operations in 2012, including US. Central 

Command's Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and US. Africa Command's Operation JUKEBOX LOTUS, 

while maintaining its readiness posture for regional crisis response operations. 

Operations & Operational Support: 

North Africa. Responding last September to attacks on US. facilities in Libya, US. Naval Forces 

Europe's forward-stationed and rotational forces played a critical role in the response mission. The 

availability of Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy, and Naval Support Activity Souda Bay, Greece, enabled 

US. forces to be rapidly postured, employed, and sustained as tasking evolved over the course of the crisis 

response, designated Operation JUKEBOX LOTUS. US. Navy and Joint force operations could not have 

occurred without these bases and the direct support they provided. Additionally, the command flagship, 

USS MOUNT WHITNEY, operating from international waters with the Commander, US. Sixth Fleet, 

embarked, provided command and control, planning, and support coordination during the initial phase of 

the crisis. 

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Ballistic Missile Defense. Through the deployment of US. Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD)-capable surface combatants, Naval Forces Europe supported Phase One implementation of the 

European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to the ballistic missile defense of Europe. The command 

also supported EPAA Phase Two, with efforts to complete implementing agreements and prepare for 

construction of an Aegis Ashore site in Romania. US. Naval Forces Europe facilitated NATO's declaration 

of interim BMD capability through its participation in the European Air and Missile Defense Exercises and 

NATO Exercise RAPID ARROW, which was the first live fire test of NATO's BMD capability. Weekly BMD 

exercises with NATO participants are being conducted to sustain the proficiency gained through these 

events and others, and are expected to continue for the foreseeable future. 

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). US. Naval Forces Europe supported theater 

ISR objectives with persistent coverage of vital operating areas, using air, surface, and subsurface assets. 

US. Navy surface combatants conducted active radar surveillance of airspace over or near regions of 

potential volatility to provide indications and warnings of aircraft activity as well as surveillance of surface 

USS McFAUL (DDG~74), anArkigh-Burke class guided 

missile destruyer launching a <Scan Eagle' UAV during 

Operanon JUKEBOX LOTUS last September. These 

versatile pi4tfo1"ms covel' multiple theater missions, 

and subsurface vessels. In addition, P-3 Maritime 

Patrol Aircraft and EP-3 Reconnaissance Aircraft 

operating from bases in Italy, Spain, and Greece, as 

well as ship-based Remotely Piloted Aircraft missions 

(SCAN EAGLE and FIRE SCOUT), also provided 

mobile, flexible ISR coverage in areas of interest within 

the theater. Employing a mix of these platforms and 

capabilities, US. Naval Forces Europe was able to 

support NATO forces in Kosovo, Operation JUKEBOX 

LOTUS, and operations in the Baltic Sea. 

Forward Deployed Naval Forces, Spain. The 

decision to station four Aegis destroyers at Naval 

Station Rota, Spain, will significantly increase the 

availability of these multi-mission surface platforms for training, interoperability, and crisis response 

from Ballistic Mi~sile Defense to maritime interdiction 

to expanded U.S. Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance. 

operations in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. Tasking will include theater BMD, maritime 

security operations, humanitarian missions, and bilateral and multilateral exercises in support of regional 

security and stability. 

Theater Submarine Operations. US. submarine forces provided assurance, deterrence, and unique 

ISR capabilities, while maintaining their readiness to execute anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare 

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operations, ensure undersea dominance, deliver 

precision strike weapons, and provide high-value unit 

protection. 

Exercises, Theater Security Cooperation, and 

Partnerships: US. Naval Forces Europe participated 

in seven )CS exercises and 15 NATO and European 

Command exercises in 2012. As mentioned, Exercise 

USS GEORGIA (SSGN~ 729) heads out on patrol in the BALTOPS 2012 broughttogether 12 European nations, Mediterranean, on-call for m£ssions supporting multiple 

U.S. Combatant Commands. including Russia, to conduct maritime operations and 

interoperability training in the Baltic Sea. Exercise 

SEA BREEZE 12, another WIF-funded event, aggregated 13 ships and personnel from 15 nations to train 

in and around the Black Sea. Exercise FRUKUS (France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States)-

led by Russia in 2012-joined maritime forces 

from all four nations for a high-end multi-lateral 

engagement focused on maritime capabilities and 

interoperability. US. Sixth Fleet also led Exercise 

NORTHERN EAGLE, which involved Russia and 

Norway, and culminated in a successful US. ship 

visit to Severomorsk in northern Russia. 

US. Naval Forces Europe continued to lead 

Eurasia Partnership Capstone, an initiative designed 

to integrate numerous efforts across Eurasia into 

a comprehensive maritime partnership. Training 

with naval forces from Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, 

Georgia, Greece, Israel, Russia, Poland, Romania, 

Turkey, and Ukraine, US. Naval Forces Europe 

u.s. Sailor greeting It Ukrainian Marine at the launch 

of Exercise SE4 BREEZE '12. Co~hosted by the U.S. and 

llkI'dinUtn Navies, SE4 BREEZE brought together naval, 

ain and land forces from Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belgium. 

Canada, Georgia, Germany, IsraeL Moldova, Norway, 

Qatar Sweden. TurkCJ', UAE, Ukriline, aud the United 

States. The largest multinational exercise conducted in the 

Black Sea region, SEA BREEZEpl'oviJes an important 

venue for U.S. nll£es and partner nations to improve 

maritime safety, seCllrity, and stabiNty in this vital area. 

focused on non-commissioned officer development, maritime interdiction operations, visit/board/search/ 

seizure, search and rescue, maritime law enforcement, and environmental protection. In associated outreach 

to the Caspian Sea region last year, US. Naval Forces Europe coordinated with US. Central Command to 

include participation from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as well. The Partnership of Adriatic Mariners, a 

similar regional effort, was led by US. Naval Forces Europe and joined by Albania and key partners along 

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89 

the Adriatic Sea to increase maritime domain awareness and enhance counter-illicit trafficking capabilities. 

Way Ahead: U.S. Naval Forces Europe remains focused on maintaining maritime safety, security 

cooperation, and crisis response capabilities to defend the nation and secure its interests across Europe 

and Africa. The command will support, develop, and expand BMD capabilities afloat and ashore in 

synchronization with other European Command Service component commands and NATO. U.S. Naval 

Forces Europe will continue to exercise command and control of forward-stationed and rotational forces, 

focus on its primary mission of warfighting, and provide the nation with robust power projection capabilities 

across two combatant commands. Equally important, the command will continue to strengthen allied and 

partner maritime capabilities in foreign humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and other operations, while 

responsibly balancing these initiatives within a fiscally constrained environment. 

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U.S. Air Forces Europe I US. Air Forces Africa 

Ramstein Air Base, Germany 

Introduction & Overview: US. Air Forces Europe I US. Air Forces Africa is a unified organization 

that reports to both US. European Command and uS. Africa Command, postured to provide forwardbased, full-spectrum airpower in support of global, national, alliance, and coalition operations. US. Air 

Forces Europe provides credible, capable, and responsive air forces for US. European Command prepared 

to defend the Homeland forward and respond at any time to crises across the world. Furthermore, US. 

Air Forces Europe maintains critical infrastructure to provide mobility and communications throughput, logistical support. contingency bed-down, and command and control capabilities in support of 

global operations. Additionally, Europe is a critical entry and relay point for all cyber activities across US. 

European Command, US. Central Command. and U.S. Africa Command, including 90% of all ISR feed data. 

Our forward posture allows us to project US. power globally, support the NATO Alliance and multilateral 

coalitions. and reduce the burden on US. forces while providing ready access to European bases, as required. 

Major Accomplishments: US. Air Forces Europe flew over 37,500 hours in support of ongoing 

European Command operations in FY 2012. Forward-based air forces were essential to the US. rapid 

response to emergent requirements following the attacks on our diplomatic facilities in Benghazi. Libya, 

providing forces to support US. Africa Command's Operation JUKEBOX LOTUS. The command leveraged 

its strong international partnerships to facilitate the basing of CONUS forces in Europe in less than five days. 

US. Air Forces Europe's forward-based presence and partnerships also enabled execution of aeromedical 

evacuation and subsequent security missions in Libya. 

US. Air Forces Europe has made major contributions to ongoing operations in Afghanistan, deploying 

aircraft for multi-role ground attack, refueling, combat search and rescue, and operational support missions. 

Airmen from across the command have deployed in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and US. 

Air Forces Europe continues to provide critical lift and sustainment for the deployment and redeployment 

of forces and equipment into and out of the U.S. Central Command theater to support current operations 

and the future transition in Afghanistan. 

U.s. Air Forces Europe supported four nuclear logistics missions, successfully conducted three 

nuclear surety inspections of its nuclear-capable units, as well as two joint safety and security inspections, 

and a strike evaluation in concert with NATO. All of these events ensured that the United States and NATO 

maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear capability. 

A critical global communications hub, US. Air Forces Europe provides vital data links for worldwide 

communications, unmanned aerial system command and control, intelligence collection, and space 

operations. US. Air Forces Europe has worked diligently to implement new technologies and expanded 

USAFE-i 
91 

systems enhancing European Command's air component capabilities. In support of EPAA, the command 

acts as a force provider and performs vital command and control (C2) functions for U.S. BMD forces. Last 

year, U.S. Air Forces Europe transitioned the NATO European territorial missile defense C2 mission from 

a U.S. capability to an alliance interim operating capability, and is working with NATO to develop initial 

operating capability requirements. In other areas, the command's land mobile radio capabilities matured 

into radio over internet protocol terrestrial connections, maximizing the resources available to emergency 

services across the region and enabling real-time crisis notification. U.S. Air Forces Europe has also become 

a defense leader in the improvement of base infrastructure and investment to develop a resilient command, 

control, communications, computer, and information (C4I) architecture, providing improved support to 

flight operations and contributing to the BMD mission in Europe. 

Operations & Operational Support: U.S. 

Air Forces Europe supports the operations of U.S. 

European Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. 

Central Command, U.S. Transportation Command, 

and NATO, while conducting combat deployments 

at the same or higher rate than U.S.-based air forces, 

and maintaining the throughput of over 60% of 

global air mobility missions. U.S. Air Forces Europe 

maintains combat air patrols supporting NATO's 

Icelandic and Baltic air policing and surveillance 

missions, and conducts ISR missions across the 

greater Levant. 

Recent combat support operations in North 

Africa highlighted the importance of our ability to 

i'''orces Europe conducts operationsfor 411.S. Combatant 

Commauders-European Command, Africa Command, 

Central Command. Trallsp01'fation COllt11umd-and 

support.i U.S. c01mnihnents to NATO. 

interoperate with NATO and non-NATO coalition partner nations in all phases of the ISR mission. To 

this end, we have dramatically increased our contact with potential partners to build partner ISR capacity. 

Leading the success in this area is the joint U.S. I U.K. 'Project Diamond' initiative, begun in 2007, which 

seeks to develop a Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) ISR imagery processing, exploitation, 

and dissemination capability. This capability, located in the United Kingdom, is tied to the 693rd ISR 

Group at Ramstein Air Base. A significant success story, Project Diamond has resulted in U.K. analysts 

conducting processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) of U.S. Predator and Reaper Unmanned 

Aerial System operations in Afghanistan since April 2011. These efforts have supported ISAF warfighters 

while demonstrating the high degree of cooperation that exists between the U.S. and U.K. ISR communities. 

Building on these lessons, we have launched the Coalition ISR I PED Integration Initiative. This initiative 

seeks to build and integrate partner ISR capacity among key partner nations in the U.S. European Command 

and U.S. Africa Command theaters. These efforts will enhance cooperation, facilitate greater burden-sharing, 

USAFE-ii 
92 

share ISR information and methodologies, and incorporate important PED objectives and capabilities into 

NATO and non-NATO exercises in order to ensure the alliance is better postured in these critical mission 

areas for future contingency operations. 

Exercises, Theater Security Cooperation, 

and Partnerships: In addition to our operational 

missions and support, US. Air Forces Europe 

participated in 21 ICS exercises, to include Exercises 

AUSTERE CHALLENGE, BALTOPS, and RAPID 

TRIDENT, and accomplished over 1,870 outreach, 

engagement, and training events with 21 US. 

allied and partner nations in direct snpport of US. 

European Command, US. Africa Command, and 

US. Central Command. These efforts sustained 

America's strategic partnerships and achieved a 

number of significant milestones in 2012. First, 

engaging one of NATO's newer and increasingly 

November 9,2012: Members of the 52nd Operations 

Group, Defae/fluent 1, conduct tbe activation ceremony for 

u.s. Air Force Europe's AVDET on the flight line at Lask 

Air Base, Poland. Comprised of 10 U.S. Airmen supporting 

the periodic rotation of u.s. F-16 ami C-130 aircraft the 

AVDEr will make important contributiolls to Poland's 

d.efense modernwtion and NATO interoperability. 

important allies, US. Air Forces Europe personnel activated the Aviation Detachment (AVDET) at Lask Air 

Base, Poland, last November. The AVDET will support the rotation of U.S. military aircraft to Poland, enable 

cooperative training events between U.S. and Polish Airmen, enhance the capabilities and interoperability 

of our nations' air forces, and ultimately increase the air resources available for future NATO operations. 

Second, US. Air Forces Europe achieved initial operational capability at the newly established 

European Integrated Air and Missile Defense Center, the only one of its kind, dedicated to advancing BMD 

General Philip Breedlove, Commander. U.S. Air Forces 

Europe and U.S. Air Forces Africa, briefs Ge17l1ll1l 

Chancellor Angela Merkel alld u.s. Ambassador to Germany 

Philip Murphy during atouI' o/U.S. military aircraft at the 

Berlin Air Show in September 2012. 

education, training, and wargaming for our European 

partners. Third, supporting Joint Force 2020's emphasis 

on humanitarian and disaster relief operations, we 

recently celebrated the 20-year anniversary of our 

'Eagle Vision' Program, a cooperative agreement 

with France that has provided imagery for numerous 

disaster relief operations over the past year. Fourth, 

eying efficiencies, U.S. Air Forces Europe continued 

its successful 'Tactical Leadership Program: preparing 

next-generation combat air leaders from ten allied 

nations for worldwide operations augmenting, or in 

some cases reducing the need for, US. Airmen. Finally, 

USAFE-iii 
93 

u.s. Air Forces Europe continues to help develop a strong cadre of non-commissioned officers through 

engagement and training, at the Kisling Non-Commissioned Officer Academy, with senior enlisted leaders 

from nations across Europe and Africa. 

Way Ahead: Recognizing the current inflection point and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, 

U.S. Air Forces Europe continues to implement significant efficiencies executing its mission to support two 

combatant commands. Most notably, U.S. Air Forces Europe has consolidated its subordinate numbered 

air forces and their associated Air and Space Operations Centers to create an extremely lean, agile, and 

flexible headquarters with leadership and staff supporting both U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa 

Command while maintaining essential service support to forces in and across the theater. As we look to 

the near term, U.S. Air Forces Europe will continue aggressively implementing EPAA and associated BMD 

initiatives, and support u.s. global reach and access to achieve national and military objectives through 

our forward-based forces and infrastructure. Europe's strategic location and our strong international 

relationships remain critical enablers for rapid unilateral, joint, and multinational response to contingency 

missions across Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. 

USAFE-iv 
94 

U.S. Special Operatiolls Commalld Europe 

Stuttgart, GermallY 

Introduction & Overview: Special Operations Command Europe operates from two main forwarddeployed locations, in Stuttgart, Germany, and the Royal Air Force (RAF) station at Mildenhall, England. 

The Command is comprised of three assigned components: 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group 

(Airborne); Naval Special Warfare Unit 2; and the 352nd Special Operations Group (Air Force Special 

Operations Command). Special Operations Command Europe continues to focus on expanding theaterwide special operations forces (SOF) capabilities, mainly by developing and enabling allied and partner 

nation SOF to deploy to Afghanistan in support of ISAP. Through the development of allied and partner 

SOF skills, we seek to enable niche capabilities which, taken together, can translate into unified SOF actions 

that support U.S. national security objectives, NATO, and our shared security interests. 

Major Accomplishments: Special Operations Command Europe focused its efforts to deliver 

significant results across multiple areas in 2012. First, as mentioned above, the command maintained its 

emphasis on engagement activities with allied and partner nation SOF preparing them for deployment to 

Afghanistan. Additionally on this front, the command conducted numerous Joint Combined Exchange 

Training and other bilateral training activities, Partnership Development Program events, bilateral counter 

narco-terrorism training, an intelligence conference on Iranian activities in Europe, and numerous key leader 

and staff engagements to sustain partner SOF development. Second, Special Operations Command Europe 

continued to develop its important counterterrorism-related bilateral relationships with Russian and Turkish 

SOP. Third, Special Operations Command Europe 

was tasked to lead the theater counterterrorism 

(CT) mission and is responsible for monitoring, 

facilitating, coordinating, and synchronizing all 

CT efforts across the European Command area of 

responsibility. 

Exercises, Theater Security Cooperation, 

and Partnerships: Special Operations Command 

Europe continued to facilitate SOF interoperability 

and prepare partners for current and future 

contingency missions through an intensive 2012 

exercise schedule. Last September, Croatia hosted 

JACKAL STONE '12, our capstone SOF exercise, 

including 15 nations and over 1,700 participants, 

By $'ea, Air, or Land: Participants in Special Operation 

Command Europe's Exercise JACKAL STONE display 

the uniforms and tools 0/ their trade. The purpose of 

this capstone exercise is to enhtl1lce Special Operntiolls 

Forces (SOP) capacity and illteroperability among 15 

pnrt/cipnting Allied and parnter nations, simultaneously 

bUilding cooperation and key partnerships for current 

and future coalition SOF missions. 

SOCEUR-i 
95 

with Croatian President Ivo Josipovic making a personal appearance to observe joint u.S.-Croatian exercise 

projects. Other JACKAL STONE activities included a vigorous aviation component featuring Slovakian and 

Croatian Mi-17 helicopters, and U.S. MH-60 Blackhawks facilitating exercise movements and parachute 

operations. 

Special Operations Command Europe has also developed and strengthened important theater CT 

bilateral relationships across a wide range of FY 2012 activities, including: 

Russia: The U.S. Army's 10th Special Forces Group hosted Russian airborne forces at Ft. Carson, 

Colorado. This is the first time U.S. SOF have worked together with Russian forces since 2008. This threeweek tactical training event fostered positive relationships, helped to further important interoperability 

goals, and developed a mutual understanding and working knowledge of each other's CT capabilities. This 

successful bilateral training event culminated with the stated intention to conduct similar training events 

annually, another potential area for continued U.S.-Russian engagement. 

Turkey: After a two-year hiatus to develop a new memorandum of understanding (MOU) with 

Turkey, we are once again working closely with our Turkish SOF counterparts. The establishment of the 

MOU with Turkish Army Special Forces will greatly improve the U.S.-Turkish bilateral SOF relationship, 

enabling exchanges that will continue to pay strong dividends for both countries in the near future. Special 

Operations Command Europe key leader engagements with CT forces from the Turkish Ministry of the 

Interior have also increased potential for important future cooperation. 

Operations & Operational Support: Special Operations Command Europe continues to lead 

European Command's SOF support to u.s. Central Command and the mission in Afghanistan. For the 

sixth year in a row, Special Operations Command Europe has provided U.S. forces, directly supporting 

ISAF through the deployment of Combined Special Operations Task Force 10 (CSOTF-10), providing 

S()CEUR:~ Partnership Development Program provide,f 

valuable support and pre~deployment training/or 

partner-nation SOF forces, including Polal1d (shown 

above). These nations have made, and continue to make, 

vital contributions to lSAP' 

military assistance to five Afghan Provincial Reaction 

Companies. Notably, CSOTF-IO, commanded by 

Special Operations Command's 1" Battalion, 10'" 

Special Forces Group, is comprised of multinational 

special operations forces from eight European nations: 

Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Macedonia, 

Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Additionally, 

Special Operations Command Europe continues to 

provide advisory assistance to Polish SOF in ISAF. 

By coordinating the Special Operations Command 

Europe Partnership Development Program with other 

security cooperation resources, we have been able to 

SOCEUR-ii 
96 

assist these developing allies and partners with their concerted national effort to create SOF capabilities 

that are, at the tactical level, on par with US. Special Operations Forces. Once developed, these allies and 

partners have demonstrated the willingness to employ these forces in a manner that supports and enables 

heavily-tasked US. SOF. Most importantly, these combined efforts have made critical contributions to 

the Government of Afghanistan and the transition effort, mentoring Afghan National Security Forces and 

reinforcing their sustained progress into a self-run, confident force capable of contributing to security 

operations across sizable Afghan population centers. 

Special Operations Command Europe also chairs the Stuttgart Effects Group, a multi-headquarters 

interagency forum established to increase understanding of transnational threats and de-conflict associated 

efforts with US. combatant commands and US. Government interagency partners. 

As the European Command lead for all theater CT execution, Special Operations Command 

Europe is focused on intelligence, information-sharing, and developing partner capabilities in step with the 

Department's highest prioritization for Joint Force 2020's 'Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare' mission. 

To meet these responsibilities and synchronize the theater's CT Regional Campaign Plan, the command 

established the Special Operations Command Europe CT-Core Cell. The CT-Core Cell monitors, facilitates, 

coordinates, and synchronizes CT efforts across the theater, in concert with other US. Government agencies 

and our partner nation counterparts, in order to disrupt violent extremist organizations and promote an 

environment inhospitable to terrorism. These efforts, and ongoing coordination with the International 

Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), have assisted investigations in more than 80 countries to date. 

Special Operations Command Europe continues to work closely with our allies and partners, the US. 

Intelligence Community, and other US. combatant commands to identify and counter threats to the United 

States and US. forces originating from Europe, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. 

Lastly, Special Operations Command continues to refine and adapt theater-wide strategic SOF 

requirements while also taking care of our people. Operational concepts, to include the Distributed SOF 

Network and ongoing coordination with allied and partner SOF through our US. Country Team SOF 

liaison elements, continue to pay dividends. Importantly, after a decade of sustained combat operations, 

the command remains focused on ways to take care of our warriors and their families. We continue to 

prioritize several family events and increase service member awareness regarding comprehensive health 

and well-being. 

Way Ahead: Special Operations Command Europe will continue to focus its Partnership 

Development Program (PDP) efforts on contributing to ISAF SOF preparation beyond 2014. In 2012, the 

command increased its footprint from a company-size U.S. Special Forces element to a battalion-size task 

force, while increasing partner nation participation through staff positions, special operations task units, 

and special operations task groups. Beyond ISAF, Special Operations Command Europe will coordinate 

SOCEUR-iii 
97 

and direct its critical security cooperation resources and authorities (PDP, 1206, etc.) toward working with 

our allies and partners to develop the national and institutional mechanisms reqUired to sustain the SOF 

capacity that we have collectively built over the past decade. Our European allies and partners have proven 

their willingness, with relatively minimal assistance, to deploy their SOF to combat and other operations 

important to the United States. Our strategic objective is to ensure that we sustain this vital investment in 

order to have world-class, interoperable SOF available for employment where our national security interests 

converge in the future, without having to begin capacity building efforts anew. Looking forward, Special 

Operations Command Europe will continue to support U.S. European Command, national, and NATO 

objectives, maintain our combat edge, further develop allied and partner SOF, and always be ready for crisis 

response-a vanguard force for the forward defense of the United States. 

SOCEUR-iv 
98 

Admiral James G. Stavridis 

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe 

Commander, United States European Command 

Admiral Stavridis assumed duties as commander of European Command and as Supreme 

Allied Commander, Europe in early summer 2009. 

Stavridis is a 1976 distinguished graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and a native of South 

Florida. 

A Surface Warfare officer, he commanded the Destroyer USS Barry (DOG 52) from 1993-

1995, completing UN/NATO deployments to Haiti and Bosnia, and a combat cruise to the 

Arabian Gu!t Barry won the Battenberg Cup as the top ship in the Atlantic Fleet under his 

command. 

In 1998, he commanded Destroyer Squadron 21 and deployed to the Arabian Gulf, winning 

the Navy League's John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership. 

From 2002-2004, he commanded Enterprise Carrier Strike Group, conducting combat 

operations in the Arabian Gulf in support of both Operation fraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. 

From 2006-2009, he commanded U.S. Southern Command in Miami, focused on Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Ashore, he has seIVed as a strategic and long range planner on the staffs of the chief of Naval Operations and the chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has also seIVed as the executive assistant to the secretary 01 the Navy and the senior military assistant to 

the secretary of Defense. 

Stavridis earned a PhD and MALO from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in International Relations in 

1984, where he won the Gullion Prize as outstanding student. He is also a distinguished graduate of both the National and Naval 

War Colleges. 

He holds various decorations and awards, including two awards of the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior 

Service Medal and five awards of the Legion of Merit. He is author or co-author of several books on naval ship handling and 

leadership, including Command at Sea, Destroyer Captain, and Partnership for the Americas about Latin America. 
99 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL 

CARTER HAM, USA 

COMMANDER 

UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND 

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

15 MARCH 2013 
100 

INTRODUCTION 

This year marks the fifth anniversary ofthe formation of the command. Since our 

standup in 2008, our operational capabilities and capacities have markedly increased. In 

parallel, our relationships with African partners and our security cooperation engagements 

have matured in both focus and effectiveness. Our integrated approach seeks to address the 

greatest near-term threats to our national security while simultaneously building long-term 

partnerships and fostering regional cooperation. 

The past year has witnessed both positive developments and sobering reminders of the 

threats in the U.S. Africa Command Area of Responsibility. Many African partners are more 

capable of addressing national and regional security challenges today than they were a year 

ago, and we have strengthened both new and enduring partnerships. In Somalia, sustained 

operations by African forces, with enabling assistance from the United States and the 

international community, significantly weakened al-Shabaab, providing space for Somalia's 

transition to a constitutionally based government. We are deepening our relationship with the 

Tanzanian military, a professional force whose capabilities and influence increasingly bear on 

regional security issues in eastern and southern Africa and the Great Lakes region. Senegal 

and Ghana, anchors of regional stability in West AtTica, held peaceful, democratic elections 

last year and remain important U.S. partners in efforts to counter transnational threats. 

Similarly, in Botswana, a highly capable partner and positive influence throughout southern 

Affica, we are strengthening an enduring partnership grounded in shared commitments to 
101 

democracy and the rule oflaw. Liberia is progressing toward the establishment of a 

professional, capable military that is a force for good, as demonstrated by its border 

deployment in response to Cote d' lvoirian rebel activities last fall. In Libya, a nation that 

witnessed its first election of the General National Congress since the overthrow ofQadhafi, 

we are developing a strong partnership with the new military. 

Despite these positive trends, the regional security environment continues to challenge 

U.S. interests and increase the operational demands on U.S. Africa Command. In the past 

year, the United States lost four Americans in deadly attacks in Benghazi and three more in 

the ten'orist attack on a British Petroleum facility in Algeria; al-Qa'ida in the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQIM) emerged stronger and better armed following the coup d'etat in Mali; and 

Boko Haram continued its campaign of violence in Nigeria. 

STRA TEGle ENVIRONMENT 

Emerging Terrorist Networks 

As al-Qa'ida has syndicated its ideology and violence, its affiliates and adherents in 

Africa and the Arabian Peninsula have become increasingly networked and adaptable in their 

recruiting, training, financing, and operations. Violent extremist organizations, insurgents, 

and criminal organizations are exploiting weak governance and under-governed spaces, and 

remain determined to harm the United States, our partners and Allies, and innocent civilians. 

The need to put pressure on al-Qa'ida affiliates and adherents in East, North, and West Africa 

has never been greater. The September 2012 attack on the U.S. Special Mission Compound 

and Annex in Benghazi and the January 2013 attack on the British Petroleum oil facility in 

Algeria illustrate the growing threat posed by violent extremist organizations in Africa to U.S. 

citizens and interests. This network of al-Qa'ida affiliates has already developed into a threat 
102 

to U.S. regional interests and ifleft unchecked, could pose a threat to Europe and the U.S. 

Homeland. Coordinated approaches that integrate diplomatic, development, and military 

eilorts are needed to achieve both short- and long-term counter-terrorism objectives, 

including the disruption often'orist financing and undermining of recruitment effOlis by 

violent extremist organizations. 

Arab Awakening 

The Arab Awakening redefined the North African political landscape and continues to 

impact countries across the region. Two years ago, the actions of a single Tunisian citizen 

catalyzed a wave of change that continues to reverberate throughout North Africa and the 

Middle East. The post-revolutionary transitions currently underway in Tunisia and Libya are 

extraordinarily important to the fiJture of these countries and to the region and have had 

significant consequences for regional security. The flow of fighters and weapons from Libya 

to violent extremist organizations in northern Mali serves as one example of how political 

instability in one nation can have a profound effect across a broad region. The United States 

has a stake in the success of these transitions, not least of all for their potential to serve as a 

powerful repudiation of al-Qa'ida's false narrative that only violent extremism can drive 

change. U.S. Africa Command's relationships with the Tunisian and Libyan militaries have 

important roles in supporting these transitions as new governments in Tunisia and Libya work 

to develop accountable and effective institutions, strengthen civil society, and improve 

security. 

Increased Regional and International Integration 

The rising political and economic influence of emerging powers is transforming the 

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103 

international system, and this change is evident in Africa. Asian economic expansion is 

inflating global commodities prices, a major driver of strong economic growth in some African 

nations. Increased Chinese engagement in pursuit of economic development is deepening 

China's political and economic influence and increasing its access in the region. Other rapidly 

growing economies, including Brazil and India, are similarly increasing their engagement and 

investment in Africa. As Africa becomes more fully integrated into the global economy, 

African maritime security is growing in importance to the free llow of global commerce. In 

parallel with Africa's continuing integration into global political and economic systems, 

A frican nations are strengthening their regional economic and political integration. African 

nations and regional organizations are increasingly taking a lead role in multilateral responses 

to regional security threats, both within and outside the structure of the African Union and the 

regional standby forces that comprise its continental security architecture. 

COMMAND APPROACH 

u.s. Africa Command's approach reflects strategic guidance provided in the 

National Security Strategy, the Defense Strategic Guidance, the National Military Strategy, 

the Presidential Policy Directive for Political and Economic Reform in the Middle East and 

North Africa (PPD 13) and the United States Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. Based 

on this strategic guidance, U.S. Africa Command protects and advances vital U.S. national 

security interests in Africa, including protecting the security of the global economic system, 

preventing catastrophic attacks on the homeland, developing secure and reliable partners, 

protecting American citizens abroad, and protecting and advancing universal values. These 

universal values include the respect for and protection of human rights, the prevention of 

mass atrocities, and the provision of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In Africa, 
104 

military-to-military engagement plays a limited but important role in sustaining progress in 

countries undergoing democratic transitions, as well as those emerging from conflict. 

In support of advancing regional peace and security, U.S. Africa Command focuses 

on priority countries, regional organizations, and programs and initiatives that build defense 

institutional and operational capabilities and strengthen strategic partnerships. Cooperative 

security arrangements are key to addressing transnational threats, and U.S. Africa Command 

utilizes operations, exercises, and security cooperation engagements to foster multilateral 

cooperation and build the capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations. U.S. 

assistance, including focused military support, has contributed to significant progress by 

African forces in the past year in both peacekeeping and combat operations. 

U.S. Africa Command's strategic approach addresses both threats and opportunities. 

We simultaneously address the greatest near-term threats to our national security while 

building long-term partnerships that support and enable the objectives outlined in the U.S. 

Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa: strengthening democratic institutions; spurring 

economic growth, advancing trade and investment; advancing peace and security; and 

promoting opportunity and development. Countering terrorism is the Department of 

Defense's (000) highest priority mission in Africa and will remain so for the foreseeable 

future. While prioritizing addressing emerging security challenges through both direct and 

indirect responses, U.S. Africa Command views these challenges also as opportunities to 

deepen enduring relationships, strengthen partner capabilities, and foster regional cooperation. 

Our theater strategy and four subordinate regional campaign plans guide our 

operations, exercises and engagements, which focus on five functional areas: countering 

violent extremist organizations; strengthening maritime security and countering illicit 

trafficking; strengthening defense capabilities; maintaining strategic posture; and preparing 

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105 

for and responding to crises. These activities are primarily executed by U.S. Africa 

Command's components: Army Forces Africa, Air Forces Africa, Naval Forces Africa, 

Marine Forces Africa, Special Operations Command Africa, and Combined Joint Task ForceHorn of Africa. Our headquarters interagency representatives from nine Federal agencies and 

liaison of1icers from eight countries are integral to the success of U.S. Africa Command's 

efforts. 

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND PRIORITIES 

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZA TIONS 

The September 2012 attack on the U.S. Special Mission Compound and Annex 

in Benghazi and the January 2013 attack on the British Petroleum oil facility in Algeria 

arc evidence of the growing threat posed to Americans and U.S. interests by African 

violent extremist organizations (VEO) and the global YEO network. In the past year, 

U.S. Africa Command worked closely with regional and interagency pUliners to 

strengthen counter-terrorism partnerships grounded in shared security interests, assisted 

pUliner military forces and U.S. interagency pUliners in discrediting and defeating the 

appeal of violent extremism, and strengthened partner capabilities to provide security as 

an element of responsive governance. 

Three violent extremist organizations are of particular concern in Africa: al-Qa'ida in 

the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), active in northern Ulld western Africa; Boko 

Haram in Nigeria; and al-Shabaab in Somalia. Although each organization individually poses 

a threat to U.S. interests and regional stability, the growing collaboration of these 

organizations heightens the danger they collectively represent. Of the three organizations, 

AQIM, which exploited the instability that followed the coup d' etat in Mali Ulld seeks to 
106 

establish an Islamic state in northern Mali, is currently the most likely to directly threaten U.S. 

national security interests in the near- tcrm. 

To counter AQIM and support the restoration of governance in Mali, U.S. Africa 

Command is providing support to French and African military operations in northern Mali, 

which are achieving gains against AQIM and other terrorist organizations. We are 

supporting French efforts with information, airlift, and refueling, and are working with the 

Department of State (DoS) to support the deployment of west African forces to the Atl'icanled International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). Recently, we began unarmed, 

remotely piloted aircraft operations from Niger in support of intclligence gathering efforts in 

the region. Although French, Malian, and AFISMA forces are achieving success in 

removing AQIM fighters from population centers, eliminating the long-term threat posed by 

AQIM will require the restoration of Malian governance and territorial integrity, political 

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107 

reconciliation with northern indigenous groups, the establishment of security, and the 

sustained engagement of the international community. 

While international focus is currently on Mali, AQIM is not solely a Malian challenge. 

The organization is spread across the Sahel region and requires a regional approach to effectively 

address the threat. U.S. Africa Command continues to work closely with the Department of 

State (DoS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (US AID) to support regional 

counter-terrorism efforts under the umbrella of the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership 

(TSCTP). A partnership between 10 northern and western African nations and the United States, 

TSCTP is designed to support the development of partner nation military counter-terrorism skills 

and capabilities and foster regional cooperation among participating nations to address the 

evolving threat of AQIM and related extremist groups. One aspect ofTSCTP's impact can be 

seen in the troop contributions of five participating countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, 

Nigeria, and Senegal) to AFISMA. Although Mali has historically been a TSCTP partner, U.S. 

Africa Command is not currently engaged in capacity-building with the armed forces of Mali, 

9 
108 

consistent with U.S. legal prohibitions on the provision of security assistance to any military 

force that has been involved in a military overthrow of a democratically elected government. 

In Nigeria, where Boko Haram is conducting a destabilizing campaign of violent 

attacks focused on the northern part of the country, U.S. Africa Command engages with the 

Nigerian Armed Forces to improve their military capabilities. We seek to suppOli the 

development of a professional military that will support a coordinated Nigerian Government 

effort to address Boko Haram and provide the citizens of Nigeria with responsive governance 

and improved economic opportunity. Boko Haram is in contact with al-Qa'ida and recently 

kidnapped a French family in retaliation for French actions against AQIM in Mali. If pressure 

on Boko Haram decreases, they could expand their capabilities and reach to pose a more 

significant threat to U.S. interests. 

10 
109 

In Somalia, al-Shabaab has been greatly weakened by the operations ofAtiican Union 

Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Ethiopian, and Somali forces. While al-Shabaab is less 

el1ective, the group is still dangerous and capable of conducting unconventional attacks to 

disrupt AMISOM operations and the newly formed Somali government. 

The significant gains achieved by AMISOM forces over the past year were critical in 

providing space for the political process that resulted in Somalia's transition to a government 

now formally recognized by the United States. While Somalia faces many challenges ahead, 

it is on a positive path. As military-to-military relations are normalized with Somalia, U.S. 

Africa Command will work with the DoS to develop security cooperation activities to assist 

with the development of a unified Somali security force. For the foreseeable future, focus 

must be maintained on Somalia to sustain security progress made to date. 

Overall, we believe that our efforts to counter violent extremist organizations are 

having a positive impact. Our African partners are demonstrating strengthened capabilities 

11 
110 

and are increasingly cooperating with other nations to address shared security challenges, 

including supporting African Union and United Nations operations and programs. The 

leadership of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States in 

addressing the security challenges in Mali is indicative of the growing willingness and 

capability of Africans to address African security challenges. 

MARITIME SECURITY AND COUNTER ILLICIT TRAFFICKING 

Multilateral cooperation in addressing regional maritime security challenges continued 

to improve over the past year. Maritime security is not only vital to countering terrorism and 

illicit trafficking, but is also a critical enabler of trade and economic development. Coastal 

nations contend with a range of challenges off their coasts including trafficking in narcotics 

and arms, human trafticking; piracy and armed robbery at sea; oil bunkering; and illegal, 

unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU). Piracy and armed robbery at sea in the western 

Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea elevated insurance rates and shipping costs, resulting in 

increased costs to consumers. IUU fishing devastates African fisheries, which playa vital role 

in Alrican economic growth and food security. Criminal organizations leverage ungoverned 

maritime space that could also be exploited by violent extremist organizations. 

African partners are making progress in addressing challenges in the maritime domain 

through cooperative regional approaches supported by the international community. U.S. 

Africa Command and our Naval and Marine components work closely with the U.S. Coast 

Guard in the execution of our two primary maritime security programs, the African 

Partnership Station program (APS) and the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership 

(AMLEP), which are contributing to strengthening regional maritime capabilities and 

interoperability. African maritime forces used skills gained through participation in AMLEP 

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111 

and APS to conduct operations that resulted in the seizure of over $100 million worth of 

cocaine and the levying of over $3 million in fines. Benin and Nigeria now conduct joint 

maritime patrols while South Africa, Tanzania, and Mozambique signed a counter-piracy 

agreement codifying their efforts and reflective of the trend of increasing regional cooperation 

in addressing maritime security challenges. 

Countering illicit trafficking is linked to the challenge of increasing African maritime 

security. Illicit trafficking in the maritime, air, and land domains provides income to 

international criminal networks, has a destabilizing int1uence on governance, and is 

increasingly exploited by violent extremist organizations as a source of financing. U.S. Africa 

Command coordinates closely with U.S. government agencies and embassy law enforcement 

teams to conduct programs to counter illicit trafficking. Our efforts focus on increasing 

partner nation capacities to detect and interdict illicit trafficking throughout the African 

continent. Counter- trafficking skills are applicable to combating a wide range of criminal 

activity, including poaching. 

As part of our enduring partnership with Liberia, we are supporting the development 

of the Liberian Coast Guard and recently renovated the coast guard's pier to enable 

operations. U.S. Affica Command constructed a new Senegalese maritime operation center 

with follow on training and assistance to the new center's staff and advanced training to the 

Cape Verde Counter Narcotics and Maritime Operations Center. The U.S. Africa Command 

also assisted Cape Verde and Senegal in developing maritime operations centers that have 

facilitated the interdiction of suspect vessels. 

STRENGTHENING DEFENSE CAPABILITIES 

Strengthening partner defense capabilities enables African nations to provide for 

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112 

their own security and helps U.S. Africa Command to develop enduring relationships that 

support freedom of movement and assured access for U.S. forces. We assist African 

nations in developing capable, accountable, self~sustaining military forces and defense 

institutions. Our capacity-building activities complement DoS programs and are planned 

in close coordination with embassy country teams and partner nations. Our engagements, 

which span the range of essential military capabilities, include combined humanitarian and 

medical assistance programs conducted in coordination with the USAID. 

The success of AMISOM forces against al-Shabaab illustrates the positive impact of 

U.S. defense capacity-building efforts in the region. AMISOM forces receive pre-deployment 

training through the DoS Global Peace Operations Initiative's Africa Contingency Operations 

Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. U.S. forces support and complement ACOTA 

activities with specialized training in skills that have played a critical role in enhancing the 

operational success of AMISOM forces, including intelligence analysis and countering 

improvised explosive devices. To date, the forces of five AMISOM troop contributing 

countries (Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Uganda) were trained through the 

ACOT A program. 

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113 

Advice and assistance from U.S. forces enhanced the capabilities and cooperation of 

military forces of Uganda, South Sudan, Central African Republic, and Democratic Republic of 

the Congo currently engaged in operations to counter the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). 

Operational gains made by regional forces over the past year, combined with civilian elIorts, 

resulted in increased LRA defections, the capture of key LRA leaders, and decreased LRA 

attacks on civilian populations. The formation of an African Union Regional Task Force will 

facilitate further cooperation among countcr-LRA forces. 

U.S. Africa Command is broadly supp0l1ing U.S. commitments to countries 

undergoing democratic transitions by assisting in the development ofprofessional militaries 

that respect civilian authority, are respectful of the rule oflaw, and are increasingly capable of 

securing their borders and combating mutual threats, including transnational terrorism. We 

continue to develop our and strengthen partnerships with the armed forces of Libya and South 

15 
114 

Sudan. In South Sudan we have developed a comprehensive program that supports the 

ongoing DoS security assistance program. Our current focus is on education of key 

institutional-level personnel and small-scale civil action projects with the South Sudanese 

military. Our engagement with the Libyan Armed Forces similarly focuses on education and 

also emphasizes the strengthening of Libyan counter- terrorism capabilities. As these 

relationships continue to develop, we look forward to deepening our partnership with both 

militaries. 

U.S. Africa Command's engagements with African land forces will be enhanced as 

the command becomes the first combatant command to be supported by a brigade through 

the Anny's Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept. Beginning in March 2013, 2nd 

Brigade, I st Infantry Division will support U.S. Africa Command in developing enduring 

relationships and cooperation with partner nation land forces. RAF engagements will likely 

range from small travelling contact teams to support to major exercises. Initial planning for 

the RAF includes support to State Department-led ACOTA training for African forces 

deploying in support of United Nations and African Union peacekeeping operations. 

An area of emerging focus is strengthening partner defense capabilities in air security 

and safety. Last year, our dual-hatted Air Force component, USAFE-AF AFRICA, launched 

the African Partnership Flight (APF) program, which promotes regional cooperation and 

strengthens the capabilities of partner nation air forces to provide airlift support to United 

Nations and African Union peacekeeping operations. 150 airmen from five African nations 

participated in APF's initial event last year, which addressed air mobility and logistics for 

peacekeeping operations, priority arcas in which African air forces have very limited 

capabilities. API' will expand this year to include 175 students from eight nations. 

The State Partnership Program (SPP) provides unique capabilities that augment our 

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115 

ability to build enduring relationships with strategic partners in the region. SPP 

engagements build mutual U.S. and partner nation capacity to address shared security 

challenges. SPP activities currently contribute to our security cooperation with eight partner 

nations; Botswana, Ghana, Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Tunisia. 

SPP engagements account for over 40 percent of military-to-military engagements each year. 

Expansion of the State Partnership Program, particularly in East and North Africa, would 

assist in developing stable and enduring relationships with additional strategic partners, 

providing a foundation for capacity-building efforts by rotational forces. 

Over the past year, U.S. Africa Command increased activities in support of the 

National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, including integrating gender training, 

which is tailored to partner nation socio-cultural dynamics, into our security sector reform 

activities. Liberia has established a goal of 20 percent female representation in its armed 

forces, a development that reflects the increasing regional interest in expanding opportunities 

for women in the armed forces. We are also working with the Botswana Defence Forces to 

assist in its efIorts to expand the integration of women into their forces. 

PREPARING AND RESPONDING TO CRISIS 

U.S. Atrica Command stands ready to respond to crises across the continent. Several 

incidents in the last year caused the Command to act to ensure the safety and security of 

American citizens including the January 2012 rescue of American citizen Jessica Buchanan 

and Danish citizen Poul Thisted from captors in Somalia. In November 2012, when rebel 

activities in the Central Alrican Republic required the suspension of U.S. Embassy 

operations, we assisted the DoS in evacuating U.S. Embassy personnel and American 

citizens. 

17 
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The dynamic security environments that followed the Arab Awakening have increased 

requirements for crisis response capabilities. U.S. Africa Command capabilities to respond to 

crisis have matured over the past year, including the establishment of a headquarters 

Command Center and the allocation ofa Commander's In-extremis Force in October 2012. 

The Commander's in-Extremis Force is currently based in Colorado, with a rotational element 

forward in Europe. Forward basing in Europe would increase the capability of the command 

to rapidly respond to incidents on the continent. Our Special Purpose Marine Air Ground 

Task Force, which previously focused on supporting security cooperation activities, will be 

expanded to allow support to crisis response, further increasing our capabilities in this regard. 

HOW CONGRESS CAN HELP 

Sequestration and potentially, a year-long extension of the current continuing 

resolution, will have a negative impact on the command. The combined em~cts may force 

signiticant reductions in theater security cooperation activities and joint and combined 

exercises, potentially endangering progress in strengthening partner defense capabilities, 

gaining access to strategic locations, and supporting U.S. bilateral policy objectives. 

Meeting Africa's many challenges requires the collaboration and support of all agencies of 

the U.S. government and the support of Congress. Enactment of full year appropriations for 

defense, military construction, DoS, and USAlD programs is critical to effective program 

planning and mission execution. Because U.S. government efforts are interconnected and 

often mutually dependent, fully resourcing one of these pillars without the others compounds 

the difficulties of planning and execution, and hinders mission completion. 

Many of our programs use a mix of DoS and DoD authorities and funding. For 

example, DoS peacekeeping operation authority provides for training our African partner 

18 
117 

nation forces, while 000 section 1206 authority provides for equipping those forces. The 

usc of dual authorities requires close coordination between departments, and full funding of 

the DoS's security assistance programs is critical to success. We work with our interagency 

partners to ensure the resources provided by Congress are appropriately tied to our defense 

and foreign policy priorities. 

We are keenly aware of the current fiscal environment and support all ongoing DoD 

efforts to decrease spending and ensure funds are wisely utilized. Our efforts under the 

Campaign to Cut Waste resulted in budget plans which reflect a savings of $1 million in both 

monetary and process efficiencies. We have also taken a hard look at our staffing levels, 

contracts, and conferences to determine where savings can be realized. We applied a selfimposed 5 percent personnel reduction for both FYl3 and FYl4 and are on a path to all but 

eliminate temporary hires and overhires. But sequestration and a possible year-long extension 

of the current continuing resolution will have serious negative consequences for our efforts. 

T thank this committee and Congress for its support of our team and our mission. 

You have provided key authorities at appropriate times, as in extending through FY 14 the 

temporary authority to build the counter-terrorism capacities of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, 

and countries engaged in AMlSOM. Pursuant to this authority, we have worked with the 

DoS to plan and execute our support to counter-terrorism capacity-building at a critical time. 

We are currently providing logistical equipment to Djiboutian and Kenyan forces 

participating in AMlSOM. We appreciate this authority and believe it will enable AMlSOM 

forces to continue their progress against al-Shabaab. 

We also appreciate the enhanced train and equip authority under section 1206 of the FY 

2006 NOAA, as amended in the FY 2013 NOAA, to permit small scale military 

construction among the authorized elements. 

19 
118 

Your annual reauthorization ofthe temporary, limited authority to use operation and 

maintenance funding for military construction in support of contingency operations in our area 

of responsibility has permitted us to meet critical operational support needs in a timely fashion, 

and we appreciate your recognition of its importance. 

The recent volatility in North and West Africa demonstrates the importance of 

sufticicnt Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets to cover multiple crises 

simultaneously. ISR capabilities are required to protect American interests and to assist our 

close allies and partners. We appreciate the authorization in the FY 2013 NDAA of an 

additional $50 million for ISR in support of our counter-LRA efforts. 

We appreciate your continued support for the Combatant Commander Exercise and 

Engagement Program. This program is the foundation of our exercises in Africa and funds 

strategic Ii fl requirements as well as providing Service Incremental Funds to our 

components, ensuring we can provide the forces to work and exercise alongside our African 

partners. 

Finally, we welcome visits by Congressional Members and their starts. The Members 

and staff who have had the opportunity to travel in Africa gain a deeper appreciation for the 

challenges and the many opportunities that are presented in this large and diverse continent. 

CONCLUSION 

The African continent will continue to present a complex and fluid set of challenges 

and opportunities. African nations, the African Union, and regional economic communities are 

increasingly demonstrating their willingness to address African security challenges. At U.S. 

Africa Command, we will continue to engage with our African partner militaries to strengthen 

their skills and capabilities, so they are bettcr able to address shared security concerns and are 

20 
119 

able to contribute to regional stability and security. We also look forward to strengthening our 

existing partnerships and developing new partnerships, such as we have with the Libyan 

military. 

Our contributions to protecting and advancing our national interests would not be 

possible without our interagency partners across the government, including the Department of 

State, U.S. Agency Jor International Development, the incredibly dedicated women and men of 

the U.S. intelligence community and others. Our team of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines 

and Coastguardsmen - and our DoD and interagency civilian teammates - is dedicated to our 

mission and their achievements would not be possible without the strong support of their 

families. 

Thank you for your enduring support to our men and women in uniform and for 

your interest in this increasingly important region of the world. 

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United States Africa Command 

General Carter F. Ham 

Commander, United States Africa Command 

General Carter F. Ham beeame eommander of U.S. Afriea Command 

headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany on Mareh 9. 2011. U.S. Africa 

Command is one of six unified geographic eommands within the 

Department of Defense unified eommand structure. 

General Cruter F. Ham served as an enlisted Infantryman in the 82nd 

Airborne Division before attending John Carroll University in Cleveland, 

Ohio. He was commissioned in the lnfantry as a Distinguished Military 

Graduate in 1976. 

His military serviee has included assignments in Kentueky, Ohio, 

Califomia, Georgia, Italy and Gennany to name a few. He has also served 

in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Macedonia. and Iraq. 

He has held a variety of positions to include Recruiting Area 

Commander; Battalion Executive Officer at the National Training Center; 

Advisor to the Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade; Commander, I st Battalion, 6th Infantry; Chief of Staff. 1st 

Infantry Division; Commander, 29th Infantry Regiment; commander, Multi-National Brigade, Mosul. Iraq; 

Commander, 1st Infantry Division; Direetor for Operations, J-3, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC. 

His previous assignment was Commanding General of U.S. Army Europe and 7th Anny. 

His military education includes the Annor Omcers Advanced Course, Naval College of Command and Staff. 

graduating with distinction, and the U. S. Air Force's Air War College. 

General !lam's awards and decorations include Army Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service 

Medal with three oak leaf clusters, the Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, the Bronze Star Medal, and the 

Joint Service Commendation MedaL 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 15, 2013 

(123) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. As of 15 MAR 2013, Secretary Hagel announced U.S. policy 

changes with regard to ballistic missile defense (BMD), including European Phased 

Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase 4. Phase 4 was cancelled and the prime component of Phase 4, the SM–3 Block IIB, was put on hold. This hold allows for SM– 

3 Block IIB engineering development to continue, but no acquisition milestones will 

be met. EPAA Phases 1–3, including Polish and Romanian sites, will provide the 

BMD resources to meet U.S. requirements to defend U.S. interests and support 

American commitments to our Allies in the 2018 timeframe. The loss of EPAA 

Phase 4 will have no effect on EUCOM’s regional BMD requirements. [See page 17.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

General HAM. The 2012 Tuareg rebellion was the latest of several Tuareg rebellions intended to gain economic resources and greater political autonomy from 

Bamako. In mid-January 2012, Tuareg rebels from the National Movement of the 

Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar al-Din groups conducted a series of 

attacks on Malian Armed Forces (MAF) outposts in northern Mali in reaction to the 

MAF’s increased presence in the region. Weapons and fighters associated with the 

2011 Libya crisis enhanced Tuareg rebel military capabilities against the MAF. 

Rebel forces isolated and overwhelmed the inadequately supplied MAF outposts in 

northern Mali. The 22 March coup d’e ́tat led by Malian soldiers in Bamako expedited the MAF’s retreat from northern Mali. Islamic violent extremist organizations 

al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb and Tahid wal Jihad in West Africa, 

in alliance with Ansar al-Din, took advantage of the Tuareg rebellion, and expanded 

their control throughout northern Mali—largely expelling the MNLA—until early 

January 2013. [See page 25.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 15, 2013 

(127) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON 

The CHAIRMAN. General Dempsey has stated that ‘‘recognizing longer-term uncertainty, I’ve also begun to reassess what our military strategy should be as well as 

institutional reforms necessary to remain an effective fighting force.’’ Given the fact 

that the Department of Defense is undertaking a reassessment of military strategy 

due to sequestration, what would be the implications for EUCOM? Through this reassessment, what aspects of EUCOM’s strategy will you be able to execute, and 

what aspects will you not be able to conduct under sequestration? What are the implications for U.S. force posture in Europe? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. EUCOM is participating in the Secretary’s Strategic Choices 

and Management Review, but the implications of this reassessment of military 

strategy are not yet clear. However, the fundamental importance of our strategic 

partnership with Europe to U.S. military strategy remains unchanged. This includes 

the strategic access that European Allies and partners provide for crisis response 

and global operations, the military forces that Europeans contribute to operations 

worldwide, and the military operations they lead around the globe. Therefore, preserving the U.S. strategic partnership with Europe and adapting it to meet the challenges of the 21st century will remain central elements of EUCOM’s strategy. Being 

ready to fulfill our commitment to Article 5, which underpins the strategic partnership with Europe, and execute other contingency plans will also remain an enduring 

EUCOM mission. While these core tenets of EUCOM’s strategy will persist, a reassessment of that strategy and potential impact of sequestration could affect how we 

execute the strategy and the level of risk to achieving our strategic objectives. 

The CHAIRMAN. To what extent is EUCOM adjusting the command’s size and 

structure in light of the January 2012 strategic guidance? To what extent is 

EUCOM adjusting the command’s size and structure in light of the current fiscal 

environment? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. DOD’s strategic guidance, ‘‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,’’ looked out over the next 10 years and 

identified the plan for strategic rebalancing of U.S. defense posture in Europe. The 

Strategic Guidance also recognized that ‘‘Europe is our principal partner in seeking 

global and economic security, and will remain so for the foreseeable future.’’ In 

keeping with this evolving strategic landscape, our posture must also evolve to ensure we have the right force posture in Europe for the next 10–20 years. Our 

planned reductions include V Corps headquarters, two heavy brigades (one is already inactivated), an A–10 squadron, an Air Control Squadron, and approximately 

2,500 Army enabler forces. This reduction of general-purpose forces is offset by the 

addition of four ballistic missile defense capable destroyers at Main Operating Base 

(MOB) Rota, Spain; a CV–22 squadron at MOB Mildenhall, United Kingdom; a 

small aviation detachment in Poland which was established in late 2012; and potentially, more special operations forces in Germany to support contingency requirements. There are also plans to enhance rotational force presence to include elements 

of a U.S.-based brigade combat team to support the NATO Response Force (NRF). 

This strategic rebalancing ensures the U.S. has the right capabilities needed to accomplish military missions within and from the United States European Command 

Area of Responsiblity (USEUCOM AOR). 

The CHAIRMAN. As the second largest geographic combatant command, EUCOM 

appears to have a close to half its authorized staff dedicated to providing intelligence support or performing security cooperation activities. Given DOD’s recent 

strategic guidance and the shift in priorities to the Pacific and Middle East, please 

explain EUCOM’s continued requirements for these personnel in further detail. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in 

the committee files.] 

The CHAIRMAN. To what extent, if any, has EUCOM been affected by sharing 

Navy and Air Force component commands with U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The sharing of Navy and Air Force Component Commands between AFRICOM and EUCOM is an imperfect but manageable command and control compromise caused by a resource constrained environment. Because it violates 

the principal of ‘‘Unity of Command’’ it has occasionally created operational, organi-
128 

zational, resource and doctrinal friction. The EUCOM staff, AFRICOM staff, and 

service components continue to overcome the associated challenges to provide effective oversight, direction, and control of subordinate organizations in pursuit of national and theater strategic objectives. This sustained success is a testimony to the 

leadership of the component commanders as well as the hard work, can-do attitude, 

and professionalism of the EUCOM, AFRICOM, and component staffs. 

The CHAIRMAN. How does the command manage personnel within its directorates 

and the directorates of its subordinate unified commands to ensure that resources 

are being efficiently allocated and that there is no unnecessary overlap in functions? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. USEUCOM is manned via the Joint Table of Distribution 

(JTD) and managed via the Organization and Functions Manual. These two documents ensure the exact number of personnel required to perform specific duties are 

allocated to each directorate, and the functions of those directorates are outlined in 

the Organization and Functions Manual. The Personnel Strength function within 

the J1 works specifically with each Service Personnel headquarters to man the billets outlined in the JTD with qualified personnel at the specific service manning 

rate. 

The CHAIRMAN. DOD issued Instruction #1400.25 in July 2012 establishing procedures and guidelines for civilian employment in foreign areas. The instruction also 

stated it was DOD policy that ‘‘Civilian employment in the competitive service in 

foreign areas shall be limited to a period of 5 continuous years unless interrupted 

by at least 2 years of physical presence in the United States or nonforeign area.’’ 

a. Is this DOD policy part of the calculus for EUCOM staff drawdown? If not, why 

not? Is EUCOM on track to meet its projected reduction in staff without following 

the DOD policy? b. How many EUCOM civilians have transitioned back to the U.S. 

because of the 5-year policy? c. How many EUCOM civilians have asked for an extension? d. How many EUCOM civilians have been given an exception to the policy 

and allowed to stay beyond the 5-year policy? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. a. The DOD five-year policy is always part of the calculus 

when planning any staff drawdown or restructuring. EUCOM is on track to meet 

its projected reduction in staff. 

b. From July 2012 to present, 21 individuals have transitioned back to the U.S. 

because of the five year policy. 

c. From July 2012 to present, management requested 62 tour extensions. 

d. 40 of the 62 extension requests were approved; 22 requests are pending decision. 

The CHAIRMAN. General Dempsey has stated that ‘‘recognizing longer-term uncertainty, I’ve also begun to reassess what our military strategy should be as well as 

institutional reforms necessary to remain an effective fighting force.’’ Given the fact 

that the Department of Defense is undertaking a reassessment of military strategy 

due to sequestration, what would be the implications to AFRICOM’s strategy? 

Through this reassessment, what aspects of AFRICOM’s strategy will you be able 

to execute, and what aspects will you not be able to conduct under sequestration? 

General HAM. Our strategic approach entails the synchronous execution of operations, exercises, and security cooperation programs which contribute to increased 

security, stability, and prosperity across the expanse of the African continent. U.S. 

Africa Command, while remaining vigilant to threat to U.S. National Security Interests emanating from the region, specifically those posed by al-Qa’ida, violent extremist organizations, and illicit trafficking, undertakes a range of activities focused 

on strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations so that over the long run African partners are able to address African security 

challenges. 

We believe that we will be sufficiently resourced and capable of planning and executing counterterrorism related activities. However, we are concerned about the impact of reduced resources as we see an increase in threat activity in Africa. Specifically, we are concerned with: 

• The availability of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to 

maintain awareness across a large area of threat activity. 

• The availability of Personnel Recovery capability as our engagement and presence on the African continent increases. 

• The availability of Special Operations Forces and enablers to rapidly respond 

to crisis and contingency operations on the African continent. 

• The impact of resource degradation on our interagency partners since we leverage interagency resources to accomplish objectives on the continent. Cuts to 

other agencies could potentially impact the execution of our theater strategy. 

Specifically, budgetary reductions associated with the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a suite of Global Peacekeeping Operations 
129 

Initiative (GPOI) programs, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 

(PEPFAR), and pandemic response. 

Increased—but modest and focused—investments today in counterterrorism and 

in strengthening the defense capabilities of our African partners will contribute to 

the conditions for a stable and prosperous Africa and reduce the risk to our National 

Security Interests. U.S. Africa Command’s ability to sustain gains already made in 

East Africa, while responding to emergent security challenges in North and West 

Africa, depends upon adequate resources and responsive partner building authorities. 

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee understands that AFRICOM is in the process of 

conducting an internal review of its size and structure. a. What is the status of the 

study? Do you anticipate any changes in military, civilian, or contractor positions? 

b. Can you provide details of any potential areas of concern for the command in 

terms of staffing? Please describe how these staffing needs will fulfill ongoing mission requirements. 

General HAM. AFRICOM is currently conducting our annual internal organizational review to ensure manpower and personnel are aligned appropriately to support our mission critical needs. This review is the Combatant Commander’s title 10 

responsibility for organizing to meet mission requirements. We are currently 75% 

complete on the study. Once the study is complete we will align manpower to ensure 

mission critical needs are being met. We will not make any staffing decisions until 

the study is complete. 

The CHAIRMAN. AFRICOM has several temporary task forces that are not reflected in its permanent authorized personnel numbers. To what extent is 

AFRICOM considering realignment and staffing of its temporary joint task forces 

(Special Operations Command and Control Element–Horn of Africa, Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara, and Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa)? a. 

To what extent has AFRICOM evaluated whether these are enduring missions? b. 

Given the command’s initial focus on phase zero/interagency activities, what is the 

command doing to prepare itself to respond to the growing conflicts occurring in 

northern and eastern Africa? Do you see an expansion in the role of any of these 

task forces? 

General HAM. In coordination with the Director of the Joint Staff, we are conducting a mission analysis of CJTF–HOA to determine what missions are enduring. 

We do not anticipate an expansion of CJTF–HOA; however, we are currently working through the Joint Manpower Validation Process to pursue a permanent force 

structure for CJTF–HOA and SOCCE–HOA. Given recent events in Northwest Africa, we continue to assess the mission requirements and structure of OEF–TS. 

The CHAIRMAN. To what extent, if any, has AFRICOM been affected by sharing 

Navy and Air Force component commands with U.S. European Command 

(EUCOM)? 

General HAM. We have shared our Navy component command since the inception 

of the command and our Air Force component command for the past two years. 

There has been no change in support for U.S. Africa Command operations, exercises, 

and theater security cooperation engagements attributable to sharing component 

commands. 

The CHAIRMAN. How does the command manage personnel within its directorates 

and the directorates of its subordinate unified commands to ensure that resources 

are being efficiently allocated and that there is no unnecessary overlap in functions? 

General HAM. As part of the Command’s annual review process we strive to ensure appropriate resources are allocated efficiently to support our mission critical 

requirements. During the annual review we assess our core and non-core functions 

to identify overlap and duplication of functions. Through this annual review process, 

we determine the best allocation of our resources by assessing priority of and risk 

associated in not resourcing the function. Where sufficient manpower is not available, we accept risk in lower priority mission areas. The Command also uses a Joint 

Resources Board (JRB) to prioritize and make resourcing determinations to support 

emerging manpower requirements throughout the year. 

The CHAIRMAN. DOD issued Instruction #1400.25 in July 2012 establishing procedures and guidelines for civilian employment in foreign areas. The instruction also 

stated it was DOD policy that ‘‘Civilian employment in the competitive service in 

foreign areas shall be limited to a period of 5 continuous years unless interrupted 

by at least 2 years of physical presence in the United States or nonforeign area.’’ 

a. What is the role of DOD policy as AFRICOM reviews and manages its personnel 

structure? b. How many AFRICOM civilians have transitioned back to the U.S. because of the 5-year rule? c. How many AFRICOM civilians have asked for an extension? d. How many AFRICOM civilians have been given an exception to the policy 

and allowed to stay beyond the 5-year policy? 
130 

General HAM. Response A: The five-year limitation on foreign area employment 

provides headquarters, U.S. Africa Command the necessary flexibility to accommodate the ever-changing foreign area workforce requirements. It provides developmental and career-enhancing opportunities for employees in the U.S. as well as periodically renews the knowledge and competencies of the overseas workforce. The 

DOD-wide policy provides consistency of application between the many commands 

in the Stuttgart area. 

Response B: Since July 2012, 46 extension requests have been denied. Of those, 

eight employees transitioned back to the U.S., 10 employees were denied extension 

and are currently registered in the DOD Priority Placement Program (PPP) for job 

placement assistance in CONUS, and 28 were denied extension, but have yet to register in DOD PPP or make plans for departure due to non-extension. This last category is primarily due to the delay between when employees are notified about 

whether they will be extended (a year in advance of their scheduled departure date) 

and when they are allowed to register in the PPP program (six months in advance 

of their scheduled departure date). 

Response C: Since July 2012, 66 overseas tour extension requests were submitted 

by either the employee or the management/supervisor. Seven requests were approved for compassionate reasons (1–6 months), 13 requests were approved for mission related reasons, and 46 requests were denied. 

Answer D: Since July 2012, 20 overseas tour extensions beyond five years were 

approved based on mission related reasons and compassionate reasons (allow dependents to finish the school year). 

*Snap Shot of Overseas Tour Extension 

Approved Overseas Extension beyond 5 years 13 

Extension approved for Compassionate Reasons 7 

Extension requests that were denied 46 

(10 on PPP/8 departed HQ USAFRICOM) 

Overall Number of Extension Requests 66 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral, are the lines of command, control, communications, and 

information sharing adequately defined between EUCOM, CYBERCOM, STRATCOM, NATO and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, as 

well as those allies with whom we work on a bilateral basis on cyber? What, in your 

view, can we do to better integrate our allies into network operations? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The current lines of Command, Control, Communications and 

information sharing between EUCOM and STRATCOM/CYBERCOM are strong and 

getting stronger everyday through continual exchanges to include EUCOM’s daily 

participation in CYBERCOM’s morning J3 update and CYBERCOM’s participation 

in EUCOM’s weekly Cyber Defense Working Group. As to NATO and allies with 

whom we work on a bilateral basis, EUCOM is the Executive Agent for a number 

of DOD Information Assurance agreements with NATO and select countries in the 

Area of Responsibility (AOR). These formal agreements govern both what and how 

cyber-related information is shared and has been sufficient to date. In regards to 

the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, while numerous informal exchanges have occurred between EUCOM and the Center to discuss how we 

can best support each other’s efforts, there only exists a Memorandum of Agreement 

on administrative support to U.S. military members embedded in the Center. 

EUCOM is working on multiple lines of effort to achieve greater cyber integration 

with allies to include: participating in a number of bilateral/multinational network 

operations exercises, sponsoring seminars on best cyber defense practices, and working with NATO to establish a framework for coalition communications operations 

based on the lessons learned from ISAF’s Afghan Mission Network. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral, we understand the Department is considering a legislative proposal that would increase the authorized funding amount of the NATO Special Operations Headquarters from $50 million per year to $75 million per year. Can 

you tell us why this increase is needed in a time of declining budgets and sequestration? When can the committee expect to see this legislative proposal and what priority would your command assign to this proposal? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. As you know, section 1272 of the FY 2013 National Defense 

Authorization Act (Public Law 112–239) amends section 1244 of Public Law 111– 

84 to authorize $50 million per year from the Operation and Maintenance, Army 
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account for the NATO Special Operations Headquarters for fiscal years 2013 

through 2015. At this point, the President has not approved a legislative proposal 

that would increase that amount, so that any such proposal would be pre-decisional. 

I am not at liberty to address pre-decisional matters and, respectfully, must decline 

to discuss this matter further at this time. 

The Department is currently working with the White House to begin providing 

the Committee with legislative proposals in the very near future, and with as much 

of the Department’s legislative program as possible before the Committee begins to 

mark up the fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act in late May. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, do you feel that your building partnership capacity missions have a proper amount of oversight and control, or does this committee need 

to consider additional authorities? 

General HAM. Under current oversight requirements, I see no risk to the development and submission of building partner capacity proposals. We are able to develop 

and submit proposals to meet our highest priorities for near-term, emerging partner 

capacity building. 

In general, I believe oversight is sufficient, but more flexible authorities that enhance our ability not only to respond to emerging challenges, but to provide stability 

and consistency in our approach, would be of strategic and long-term benefit. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, how does your command currently address building partnership capacity (BPC) missions in a country where counter-terrorism functions may 

be carried out by forces other than the military, such as a gendarmerie or Interior 

Ministry? 

General HAM. We strive to develop programs in coordination with non-Department of Defense (DOD) agencies who can work with the police and border security 

in support of numerous militarized border security forces. Department of State led 

programs such as Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) include non-DOD 

agencies who can work with the police and border guards. The Global Security Contingency Fund provides for an integrated approach to border security where U.S. Africa Command’s military requirements can be blended with interagency law enforcement initiatives. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Mr. WITTMAN. The Readiness Committee was recently told by a Departmental 

witness that the Secretary of Defense has initiated a European Infrastructure Consolidation. We were also told that force structure drives infrastructure. Can you provide us the future force structure numbers that will be used for this European Infrastructure Consolidation and indicate how this diminished force structure will provide you sufficient forces to meet your Phase 0, peacetime stability operations? I 

would particularly like to understand the risks associated with this diminished force 

structure. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The Secretary of Defense directed the European Infrastructure Consolidation analysis to provide a basis for reducing long-term expenses 

through footprint consolidation. The consolidation of our footprint in Europe will 

take into account DOD’s strategic guidance for a shift in strategic focus to the Pacific, the planned inactivation of the two Brigade Combat Teams and associated support forces, reductions in Air Force units, and decreasing requirements for support 

to Afghanistan. This rebalancing also includes the addition of four ballistic missile 

defense capable destroyers, a CV–22 squadron, a small aviation detachment to Poland, potentially more special operations forces in Germany, and anticipated support 

to USAFRICOM for crisis response to meet the new challenges in their AOR. Because the European Infrastructure Consolidation analysis is ongoing, we cannot anticipate what impact it will have on our future force structure and assigned personnel. We also cannot anticipate what impact it will have, if any, to our Phase 0 

steady state tasks. 

Mr. WITTMAN. From an Army perspective, what will be the primary purpose of 

U.S. troops based in Europe once the regular deployments to Afghanistan are done? 

What kind of threats will they be responding to? Why should the U.S. continue to 

forward deploy our troops to Europe? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Army forces provide a diverse crisis response capability for 

the uncertain security environment to include the Levant and NATO contingency 

plans; they serve as a demonstration of U.S. commitment and deterrence, they underpin our NATO Article 5 commitment, and are key to sustaining interoperability 

among Allies and partner nations. As I told the Committee, our European bases are 

the forward operating bases for 21st century security. 
132 

Their primary purpose of our forces is to provide immediate response to the full 

spectrum of operations including global contingencies, peacekeeping, noncombatant 

evacuations, humanitarian assistance and more. They support seven combatant 

commanders and NATO with strategic reach into three continents, capitalizing on 

the existing European infrastructure. 

The threats these forces may respond to include the continued political unrest in 

the Middle East, European based terrorism, ballistic missile threats, and the frozen 

conflicts in the Caucasus and Balkans. Land forces in Europe contribute to maneuver and enabler force capabilities to support a full range of military operations, 

while meeting a wide array of engagements to build partner capacity and meet 

interoperability objectives. The return on investment of U.S work with our European partners is enormous, with more than 90% of our coalition partners in Afghanistan coming from Europe. That equates to 40,000 personnel actively shouldering a 

common burden in our global defense. All those nations train with and have close 

long-term relationships with European assigned Army units from the strategic to 

the tactical level. They also remain a visible symbol of U.S. commitment to European security and the NATO Alliance. 

Mr. WITTMAN. The Army has announced the reduction of 2,500 ‘‘enablers’’ as part 

of our force structure footprint reduction in EUCOM. During my recent visit to 

EUCOM, several unit commanders expressed concerns about the number of enablers 

being tied to force structure reductions rather than COCOM missions or crisis response. Do you share those concerns? Why or why not? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. No. Our posture in Europe, and these attendant changes, reflects our recent strategy guidance and budget decisions and are sufficient to meet 

our current assigned missions. Consistent with DOD’s Strategic Guidance and 

NATO’s Strategic Concept, we continue to adapt our posture in Europe to meet new 

threats while maintaining the forces necessary to fulfill our Article 5 commitments 

and strengthen Allied and partner capabilities. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Earlier this year, the Department provided us notice about the intent to expand airbase operations in Djibouti at a nearby airfield in Chabelley. Can 

you explain the current state of aviation operations at Djibouti and ensure our committee that additional measures are in place to preserve this critical mission? 

General HAM. Currently, civilian and military aviation operations continue normally at Djibouti’s international commercial airport while talks continue to work out 

technical arrangements for operations at Chabelley. We will continue to work with 

the Department of State as they complete necessary agreements with the Government of Djibouti for aviation operations at Chabelley. 

We appreciate the reauthorization of the temporary, limited authority to use operations and maintenance funding for military construction in support of contingency 

operations in our area of responsibility which will permit us to complete necessary 

construction at Chabelley. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

Mr. COFFMAN. Admiral, I understand we are reducing our military footprint in the 

European theater. What is the current force lay-down for the United States military 

in Europe? Provide details on the number, type, and location of all our troops in 

Europe. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. There are approximately 64,000 military personnel authorized 

for the support of U.S. European Command and our Service component commands. 

Additionally, there are approximately 10,000 additional U.S. personnel supporting 

U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Transportation Command, NATO, and other U.S. Government and Department of Defense activities in Europe. 

2013 Navy/Marines Force Lay Down 

Unit Approx. 

# Location(s) Comments 

NAVEUR HQ 600 Naples, Italy Includes NAVAF and 

6th Fleet 

MARFOREUR/MARFORAF 170 Stuttgart, Germany 

NSWU–2 60 Stuttgart, Germany 

NSWU–10 25 Stuttgart, Germany 

EOD Mobile Unit 8 160 Rota, Spain 
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2013 Navy/Marines Force Lay Down—Continued 

Unit Approx. 

# Location(s) Comments 

Rota Security Forces 125 Rota, Spain 

Commander Task Force 67 160 Sigonella, Italy 

Other Navy/Marine Forces 5,700 Various locations (primarily Rota, Spain; Naples 

and Sigonella, Italy; and 

Souda Bay, Greece) 

Includes Navy personnel for EUCOM, 

AFRICOM, NATO 

billets, etc. 

Total Navy/Marines 7,000

2013 Air Force Lay Down 

Unit Approx. 

# Location(s) Comments 

USAFE HQ 1,100 Ramstein, Germany Includes support to 

AFRICOM 

3rd Air Force 500 Ramstein, Germany 

31st Fighter Wing 3,800 Aviano, Italy Includes 2 F–16 

Sqdns and an Air 

Control Sqdn which 

inactivates in FY13 

48th Fighter Wing 4,600 Lakenheath, UK Includes 3 F–15 

Sqdns 

52nd Fighter Wing 3,600 Spangdahlem, Germany Includes F–16 Sqdn 

and an A–10 Sqdns 

which inactivates in 

FY13 

39th Air Base Wing 1,200 Incirlik, Turkey 

MUNSS Units 550 Various Locations 

65th Air Base Wing 600 Lajes, Portugal 

86th Airlift Wing 5,000 Ramstein, Germany 

100th Air Refueling Wing 1,800 Mildenhall, UK 

435th Air Ground Ops Wing 1,300 Ramstein, Germany 

603rd Air and Space Ops 

Center 

450 Ramstein, Germany 

MUNSS Units 540 Various locations 

501st Combat Support Wing 800 Various locations in UK 

352nd Special Ops Group 900 Mildenhall, UK 

521st Air Mobility Ops Wing 1,000 Ramstein, Germany 

Other Air Mobility Forces 400 Various locations 

Other Air Forces 3,360 Various locations throughout Europe Includes Air Force 

personnel for 

EUCOM, AFRICOM, 

NATO billets, etc. 

Total Air Force 31,500
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2013 Army Force Lay Down 

Unit Approx. 

# Location(s) Comments 

USAREUR HQ 700 Heidelberg/Wiesbaden, 

Germany 

V Corps 775 Wiesbaden, Germany Inactivates in FY13 

JMTC 1,500 Grafenwoehr, Germany 

173rd IBCT (A) 3,500 Bamberg/Schweinfurt, 

Germany and Vicenza, 

Italy 

2nd CR 4,000 Vilseck, Germany 

172nd Inf Bde 4,000 Schweinfurt/Grafenwoehr, 

Germany 

Currently Inactivating 

12th Combat Avn Bde 2,700 Ansbach, Germany 

Theater Spt Avn 570 Mannheim/Stuttgart, Germany and Chievres, Belgium 

10th Air Missile Defense 

Detachment 

150 Kaiserslautern, Germany 

5–7 Air Defense Bn 575 Kaiserslautern, Germany 

21st Theater Sustainment 

Command 

3,000 Various locations throughout Europe (HQs in 

Kaiserslautern) 

Includes 16th 

Sustainment Bde 

18th Engineer Bde 1,300 Various locations in Germany (HQs in 

Schweinfurt) 

Includes 2 Eng Bns 

18th MP Bde 1,800 Various locations throughout Europe (HQs in 

Sembach, Germany) 

Includes 2 MP Bns 

66th MI Bde 1,000 Wiesbaden/Hohenfels, Germany 

5th Signal Command 1,800 Various locations throughout Europe (HQs in Wiesbaden) Includes 2 Signal 

Bdes 

Medical Command 2,800 Various locations throughout Europe (HQs in Heidelberg) Includes Landstuhl 

Regional Med Ctr 

IMCOM-Europe 400 Various locations throughout Europe (HQs in Heidelberg) 

1–10 Special Forces BN 450 Stuttgart, Germany 

Other Army 3,980 Various locations throughout Europe Includes Army personnel for EUCOM, 

AFRICOM, NATO 

billets, etc. 

Total Army 35,000

Mr. COFFMAN. Admiral, how many of our troops in Europe are combat element 

troops? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Although there is no doctrinal definition of a ‘‘combat element’’ force, EUCOM does have several assigned units that exercise and employ a 

direct combat mission. Those units are listed below. The combined total FY13 military authorizations for these units are approximately 27,000 personnel; however, 

several of these units are deactivating as noted. 
135 

Unit Service 

Approx. 

# Location(s) Comments 

Naval Special Warfare 

Unit–2 

USN 60 Stuttgart, Germany 

Naval Special Warfare 

Unit–10 

USN 25 Stuttgart, Germany 

31st Fighter Wing USAF 3,800 Aviano, Italy Includes 2 F–16 

Sqdns and an Air 

Control Sqdn which 

inactivates in FY13 

48th Fighter Wing USAF 4,600 Lakenheath, UK Includes 3 F–15 

Sqdns 

52nd Fighter Wing USAF 3,600 Spangdahlem, Germany Includes F–16 Sqdn 

and an A–10 Sqdns 

which inactivates in 

FY13 

352nd Special Ops 

Group 

USAF 900 Mildenhall, UK 

1–10 Special Forces BN USA 450 Stuttgart, Germany 

173rd IBCT (A) USA 3,500 Bamberg/Schweinfurt, 

Germany and Vicenza, 

Italy 

2nd Cavalry Regiment USA 4,000 Vilseck, Germany 

172nd Inf Bde USA 4,000 Schweinfurt/Grafenwoehr, Germany Currently Inactivating 

12th Combat Avn Bde USA 2,700 Ansbach, Germany 

Mr. COFFMAN. Admiral, how many of our troops in Europe are there to support 

ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. U.S. troops are stationed in Europe to enable ongoing operations in Afghanistan as well as other global missions. First, just like CONUS based 

forces, U.S. forces in Europe deploy worldwide. In the case of Afghanistan, U.S. 

Army Europe deployed on average approximately 20% of its forces (roughly 7,400 

personnel) to ISAF and U.S. Central Command in 2012. This included the 173rd 

Airborne BCT, 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, and V Corps. Currently, we have approximately 3,500 personnel deployed in support of operations in Afghanistan. Second, U.S. troops in Europe provide critical logistical support to global operations. 

With regard to Afghanistan, this includes Ramstein AB airmen conducting airlift 

operations, the movement of cargo along the Northern Distribution Network, and 

life-saving urgent care for wounded warriors at the Landstuhl Regional Medical 

Center. Third, our European assigned forces enable Allies and partner nations to 

deploy forces in support of U.S. operations. For example, U.S. Army Europe personnel at the Joint Multinational Training Command in Grafenwoehr and 

Hohenfels, Germany conduct pre-deployment training for Ally/partner nation forces 

deploying to Afghanistan. U.S. forces in Europe have provided these same types of 

support to operations in Iraq and Libya, and will be required to do so in future global operations. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. VEASEY 

Mr. VEASEY. I know you have worked to foster and maintain great relationships 

with our NATO allies. And you have encouraged our partners to build their capabilities as we face challenges across the globe. Thank you for your efforts. I know that 

in 2011, you wrote to the Senate Appropriations Committee in support of the Medium Extended Air Defense System—MEADS—the next generation Air and Missile 

Defense system we are developing in partnership with Germany and Italy. How important is it, in your view, that we complete our financial commitment and develop 

missile defense capabilities for the U.S. and our partner nations? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It is very important, and we are grateful that the Congress 

passed H.R. 933 (now Public Law 113–6), which provides that crucial funding. Completion of MEADS development will reassure our allies by avoiding a situation 
136 

where the U.S. could have been viewed as an unreliable partner. Further, this 

comes at an exceptionally crucial point in time where EUCOM is working with 

NATO and multiple nations to build missile defense capabilities and capacity to 

allow European nations to bear more of the load for the defense of Europe. 

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