[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 17-13105

________________________

Agency No. A089-427-907

NIDAL KHALID NASRALLAH, 

 Petitioner,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

 Respondent.

________________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

_______________________

(August 7, 2020)

ON REMAND FROM THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge; TJOFLAT and GILMAN,

* Circuit 

Judges.

GILMAN, Circuit Judge: 

On February 14, 2019, we denied a petition for review from Nidal Khalid 

Nasrallah, a native and citizen of Lebanon. Nasrallah v. United States Attorney

General, 762 F. App’x 638 (11th Cir. 2019), rev’d sub nom. Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 

S. Ct. 1683 (2020). Nasrallah, whom the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 

determined had committed a “crime involving moral turpitude,” sought 

withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture 

(CAT). His petition raised numerous arguments, including that (1) the 

immigration judge (IJ) acted with prejudicial bias, (2) the BIA erred in determining 

that Nasrallah’s conviction constituted a “crime involving moral turpitude,” (3) the 

BIA erred in concluding that Nasrallah committed a “particularly serious crime,” 

and (4) the BIA erred in overturning the IJ’s determination that Nasrallah was 

eligible under the CAT for a deferral of removal. After we denied in part and 

dismissed in part Nasrallah’s petition, the Supreme Court took up only the last of 

these issues. 

In addressing Nasrallah’s CAT claim, we relied on Cole v. United States 

Attorney General, 712 F.3d 517 (11th Cir. 2013), which held that 8 U.S.C. 

* Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by 

designation.

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§§ 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D) preclude judicial review of factual challenges to a CAT 

order in cases where a noncitizen has committed a crime specified in 

§ 1252(a)(2)(C). Because of a circuit split regarding this issue, the Supreme Court 

granted Nasrallah’s petition for certiorari. 

The Supreme Court resolved the issue in favor of Nasrallah. Nasrallah, 140 

S. Ct. at 1694. Most Courts of Appeals had agreed with the holding in Cole, but 

the Seventh and Ninth Circuits held to the contrary. Id. at 1689. The Supreme 

Court determined that the minority’s interpretation was correct because “[a] CAT 

order is distinct from a final order of removal and does not affect the validity of a 

final order of removal,” and because §§ 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D) preclude review of 

factual challenges only to final orders. Id. at 1694. 

Based on the Supreme Court’s ruling, we now need to consider Nasrallah’s 

factual challenge to the CAT order. The remaining issue before us is therefore 

whether substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Nasrallah 

would not likely be singled out for torture if he is removed to Lebanon. For the 

reasons set forth below, we conclude that the BIA’s factual determination is 

adequately supported by the record.

I. BACKGROUND

The overall facts of this case, as stated in Nasrallah, 762 F. App’x at 640–

42, remain the same. Nasrallah was born in Lebanon in 1989. After becoming a

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lawful permanent resident of the United States, he was convicted of receiving 

stolen property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2315. The Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) then initiated removal proceedings against Nasrallah, who 

responded by applying for withholding of removal and CAT protection.

Nasrallah’s application asserted that he feared torture by members of 

Hezbollah and ISIS in Lebanon because he is a member of the Druze religious 

minority and because he now has ties to America. He described one past 

interaction with Hezbollah in support of this claim. Specifically, Nasrallah alleged 

that he and a friend encountered two Hezbollah militants on a mountain in 

Lebanon in 2005. The militants had shot their guns in the air and shouted for 

Nasrallah and his friend to stop. Nasrallah, in fleeing, jumped off a cliff and

severely injured his back. 

Aside from this specific incident, Nasrallah described only a general fear of 

torture upon removal to Lebanon. He asserted that residents and citizens of the 

United States are “often kidnapped and killed” by Hezbollah and that ISIS and 

Hezbollah both posed threats to members of the Druze community. Nasrallah also 

contended that the Lebanese government has little power over Hezbollah and ISIS. 

Reviewing DHS’s appeal from the IJ’s decision granting Nasrallah deferral 

of removal under the CAT, the BIA determined the record did not support a 

finding that Nasrallah would more likely than not be tortured if returned to

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Lebanon. It therefore ordered Nasrallah removed. Nasrallah then filed a timely 

petition for review.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of review

We review administrative factual findings under the deferential substantialevidence standard. Rivera v. United States Attorney General, 487 F.3d 815, 820 

(11th Cir. 2007). Findings of fact may be reversed only if the record compels a 

reversal. Id.

B. Deferral of removal

“An [applicant] is entitled to CAT protection if he is ‘more likely than not to 

be tortured in the country of removal.’” Jean-Pierre v. United States Attorney

General, 500 F.3d 1315, 1323 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4)). 

Torture is defined as:

(1) [A]n act causing severe physical or mental pain or suffering; 

(2) [that is] intentionally inflicted; (3) for a proscribed purpose; (4) by 

or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 

official who has custody or physical control of the victim; and (5) not 

arising from lawful sanctions. 

Matter of V-X-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 147, 153 (BIA 2013) (citing 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.18(a)). 

“[T]he tortuous act ‘must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical 

or mental pain or suffering.’” Jean-Pierre, 500 F.3d at 1320 (quoting 8 C.F.R. 

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§ 1208.18(a)(5)) (emphasis removed). Evidence relevant to the possibility of 

future torture includes, but is not limited to: 

(i) Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant;

(ii) Evidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the 

country of removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured;

(iii) Evidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights 

within the country of removal, where applicable; and

(iv) Other relevant information regarding conditions in the country 

of removal.

8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3).

The BIA determined as a matter of law that Nasrallah’s prior encounter with 

the two Hezbollah militants did not constitute past torture under the CAT due to a 

lack of evidence that the militants specifically intended to inflict severe pain or 

suffering upon him. We agreed with the BIA’s determination in our prior opinion, 

Nasrallah, 762 F. App’x at 644, and we continue to do so here. 

Turning to Nasrallah’s other arguments regarding the likelihood of future 

harm, the BIA acknowledged the evidence of anti-Western terrorist activity and of 

crimes against the Druze community in Hezbollah-controlled areas of Lebanon. 

Nasrallah also identifies religious violence against the Druze in nearby Syria and 

Iraq. We concur with the BIA’s determination, however, that this evidence does 

not support a finding that Nasrallah would likely be singled out for torture in 

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Lebanon. See Jean-Pierre, 500 F.3d at 1324 (explaining that evidence of 

generalized mistreatment is insufficient to show that a petitioner would more likely 

than not be tortured if removed).

Furthermore, Nasrallah returned to Lebanon in 2008 for “a couple of weeks” 

to attend a funeral. That Nasrallah voluntarily returned to Lebanon and was not 

harmed by Hezbollah or other actors strongly undermines his argument that he 

would more likely than not be tortured if removed to that country. See Gomez v. 

United States Attorney General, 447 F. App’x 932, 936 n.2 (11th Cir. 2011) 

(“[T]he fact that [petitioner] returned to Colombia from the United States on two 

occasions after the alleged events took place does not support—indeed, it strongly 

undermines—a conclusion that he had a well-founded fear of future persecution.”). 

We also note that Nasrallah remained in Lebanon without incident for many 

months immediately following his encounter with the two Hezbollah militants. In 

sum, there is substantial evidence that Nasrallah would not likely be tortured upon 

his return to Lebanon.

PETITION DENIED.

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