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REVIEWS OF THE BENGHAZI ATTACKS AND 

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 19, 2013 

Serial No. 113–59 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

DOC HASTINGS, Washington 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MATTHEW A. CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

MARK POCAN, Wisconsin 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

TONY CARDENAS, California 

STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

LAWRENCE J. BRADY, Staff Director 

JOHN D. CUADERES, Deputy Staff Director 

STEPHEN CASTOR, General Counsel 

LINDA A. GOOD, Chief Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on September 19, 2013 ..................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, Chairman, Benghazi Accountability Review Board 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 9 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 12 

Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN (Retired), Vice-Chairman, Benghazi Accountability Review Board 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 20 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 23 

Mr. Mark Sullivan, Chairman, Independent Panel on Best Practices, Former 

Director, United States Secret Service 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 26 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 28 

Mr. Todd Keil, Member, Independent Panel on Best Practices, Former Asst. 

Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 32 

Ms. Patricia Smith, Mother of Sean Smith 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 107 

Mr. Charles Woods, Father of Tyrone Woods 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 108 

APPENDIX 

Letter to Chairman Darrell Issa from Kate Doherty Quigley ............................. 122 

Interim Report on the Accountability Review Board ............................................ 126 

Status Update on Investigation of Attacks on U.S. Personnel and Facilities 

in Benghazi ........................................................................................................... 225 

(1) 

REVIEWS OF THE BENGHAZI ATTACKS AND 

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 

Thursday, September 19, 2013 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:40 a.m., in Room 2154, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Darrell E. Issa [chairman of 

the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Issa, Mica, Duncan, McHenry, Jordan, 

Chaffetz, Walberg, Lankford, Amash, Gosar, Meehan, DesJarlais, 

Gowdy, Farenthold, Hastings, Lummis, Woodall, Massie, Collins, 

Meadows, Bentivolio, DeSantis, Cummings, Maloney, Norton, 

Tierney, Clay, Lynch, Connolly, Speier, Cartwright, Pocan, 

Duckworth, Davis, and Grisham. 

Staff Present: Ali Ahmad, Communications Advisor; Brien A. 

Beattie, Professional Staff Member; Molly Boyl, Parliamentarian; 

Lawrence J. Brady, Staff Director; Daniel Bucheli, Assistant Clerk; 

Caitlin Carroll, Deputy Press Secretary; John Cuaderes, Deputy 

Staff Director; Adam P. Fromm, Director of Member Services and 

Committee Operations; Linda Good, Chief Clerk; Frederick Hill, Director of Communications and Senior Policy Advisor; Mitchell S. 

Kominsky, Counsel; Jim Lewis, Senior Policy Advisor; Mark D. 

Marin, Director of Oversight; John Ohly, Professional Staff Member; Ashok M. Pinto, Deputy Chief Counsel, Investigations; Susanne Sachsman Grooms, Minority Chief Counsel; Jennifer Hoffman, Minority Communications Director; Chris Knauer, Minority 

Senior Investigator; Julia Krieger, Minority New Media Press Secretary; Elisa LaNier, Director of Operations; Jason Powell, Minority Senior Counsel; Dave Rapallo, Minority Staff Director; Daniel 

Roberts, Minority Staff Assistant/Legislative Correspondent; and 

Valerie Shen, Minority Counsel. 

Chairman ISSA. The committee will come to order. 

The Oversight Committee exists to secure two fundamental principles. First, Americans have a right to know that the money 

Washington takes from them is well spent. And second, Americans 

deserve an efficient, effective government that works for them. 

Our duty on the Oversight and Government Reform Committee 

is to protect these rights. Our solemn responsibility is to hold government accountable to taxpayers, for what they know is important 

for how they decide. And in fact, our job is to work tirelessly in 

partnership with citizen watchdogs to deliver the facts to the 

American people and bring genuine reform to the Federal bureaucracy. This is our mission. 

2 

I now would ask unanimous consent to read into the record 

statements from two witnesses who will not be available, but family of the victims of the 9/11 attack on Benghazi. 

Without objection so ordered. 

First, a letter from Kate Doherty Quigley. And she says in a letter to the ranking member and myself, thank you for your invitation to participate in the committee’s September 19, 2013, hearing 

concerning the attacks on the U.S. facility on September 11, 2012, 

during which four Americans, including my brother, Glen Doherty, 

was killed. I am unable to do so but submit for the committee’s 

consideration the following questions concerning events that led to 

my brother’s death in particular. I ask that because I am unaware 

of the answers these questions have been provided. First, my understanding is that it took 8 hours for the rescue team from Tripoli 

to travel 200 miles to reach their destination in Benghazi, that 

there were no dedicated transportation assets in place and that the 

team received no help getting through barriers like the Benghazi 

airport and checkpoints in that city. 

If this is correct, why was it so given the urgency of the mission, 

recognizing the difficulty of what ifs, and that is the way it is written, I nevertheless, ask, if those conditions were so, had been different would the outcome have been less tragic? Secondly, Glen 

lived his life to the fullest and took pride in teaching others how 

to be their best. Glen died serving with men he respected protecting the freedoms we enjoy as Americans and doing something 

he loved. 

He is an American hero to those who did not know him, but for 

those of us who did know him, he is a best friend who leaves behind a giant hole in our hearts. My thanks go out to those in Congress and the administration who strive to learn what mistakes 

were made that night so that U.S. personnel can be better protected in the future. And it is signed Kate Doherty Quigley. 

Chairman ISSA. Secondly, a letter that is signed from Chris Stevens’ family. Chris Stevens died in the service of his country. He 

died doing what he loved most, working to build bridges of understanding and mutual respect between the people of the United 

States and the people of the Middle East and North Africa. 

He was loved by many more Libyans than those who hated him 

for being an American. A few dozen fanatics penetrated his compound, but more than 30,000 people in Benghazi demonstrated in 

protest over his death. Chris was successful because he embodied 

the traits that have always endeared Americans to the world, a 

commitment to democratic principles and respect for others regardless of race, religion or culture. 

Chris regarded and liked each person he met as an individual. 

He respected their views whether or not he agreed. One of his 

friends told us a tale that reflects his success on a small scale. Picnicking in the Libyan countryside, they met a local family. Chris 

immediately greeted them and suggested that they be photographed together. The young son of the patriarch of the family suspicious and negative toward Americans, refused to participate. So 

Chris continued chatting with the others. When it was time to 

leave, the initially suspicious son presented Chris with a bouquet 

3 

of flowers. ‘‘This is because you were so respectful to my father,’’ 

he said. 

Chris was not willing to be the kind of diplomat who would strut 

around in fortified compounds. He amazed and impressed Libyans 

by walking the streets with the lightest of escorts, sitting in sidewalk cafes chatting with passersby. There was a risk to being accessible. He knew it, and he accepted it. 

What Chris would never have accepted was the idea that his 

death would be used for political purposes. There was security 

shortcomings no doubt. Both internal and outside investigations 

have identified and publicly disclosed them. Steps are being taken 

to prevent their recurrence. Chris would not have wanted to be remembered as a victim. Chris knew and accepted that he was working under dangerous circumstances. He did so just as so many of 

our diplomats and development professionals do every day. Because 

he believed the work was vitally important, he would have wanted 

the critical work he was doing to build bridges of mutual understanding and respect, the kind of work that made him literally 

thousands of friends and admirers across the broader Middle East 

to continue. 

So rather than engage in endless recrimination, his family is 

working to continue building bridges he so successfully began. One 

year ago this week, in response to tremendous outpouring of support from around the world, we launched the J. Christopher Stevens fund. The mission of the fund is to support activities that 

build bridges between the people of the United States and those of 

the broader Middle East. 

This was the mission to which Chris dedicated his life. We are 

grateful to each contribution received from friends and family, from 

the government of Libya and from people near and far moved by 

Chris and his story. 

In the coming weeks and months, we will launch a number of innovative programs and initiatives. The focus of our activity is on 

young people, both here in America and across the Middle East and 

North Africa. 

Chris served in the Peace Corps in Morocco, and his death was 

felt acutely by the Peace Corps family. Last year in response to numerous queries from returned Peace Corps volunteers during Peace 

Corps Week, we encouraged returned volunteers to fan out across 

America and speak with youth about their experience abroad. We 

are now working with the Peace Corps to expand their reach into 

schools and communities across the country. 

The Center for Middle East Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, where Chris studied as an undergraduate, announced on September 11th, the Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens Memorial Fund for Middle East Studies. Endowed by the J. 

Christopher Stevens Fund, our purpose is to encourage and inspire 

students in Middle Eastern and North African scholarship. 

In Piedmont, California, where Chris spent his teen years, the 

Piedmont unified school district board of education has voted to 

name the Piedmont High School library the Ambassador Christopher Stevens Memorial Library. 

Chris was inspired by Piedmont high school’s motto, ‘‘achieve the 

honorable.’’ 

4 

Later this year, together with a coalition of public and private 

partners, we will launch the J. Christopher Stevens virtual exchange initiative. This initiative will embrace the power of technology to fuel the largest ever increase in people-to-people exchanges between the United States and the broader Middle East, 

vastly increasing the number and diversity of youth who have a 

meaningful cross-cultural experience as part of their formative education and reaching over 1 million youth by 2020. 

Later this year the University of California Hastings College of 

the Law from which Chris graduated in 1989, will host the Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens Symposium. The event will emphasize law and public policy as used in the practice to advance global 

understanding and peace principles to which Chris was committed. 

There have been more awards bestowed and honors given to 

Chris’ memory, than we would ever have thought possible. But as 

we have said before, we have received letters from thousands of 

people all over the world who were touched by Chris’ example. His 

openness touched a cord in their hearts. Chris would have wanted 

to be remembered for that. Thank you. The family of Chris Stevens. 

And without objection, they will both be placed in the Record. 

Chairman ISSA. Briefly in my opening statement, today, we want 

to both do our job as constitutional officers and be very cognizant 

of the wishes of the family. We will hear on the second panel from 

additional family members. Like the first, they both want answers 

to questions, and they want Chris’s memory to be one of his diplomacy and his service. They don’t want this to be a political football. 

The committee’s primary obligation as the Oversight and Reform 

Committee is to do oversight leading to meaningful reform. 

Last week marked the 12th anniversary of the September 11th 

attack on the United States. It marked the 1-year anniversary of 

the terrorist attack on the diplomatic facility in Benghazi. The attack cost Americans their lives, Ambassador Christopher Stevens, 

State Department information officer Sean Smith, and two American security officers, former U.S. Navy SEAL, Tyrone Woods and 

Glen Doherty. 

Today, we honor their memories and the heroic service to our 

Nation. We recognize also the family members of the fallen who are 

with us today are those who truly experience that loss firsthand. 

Last October, Secretary Hillary Clinton convened the Accountability Review Board, or ARB, as required by law to examine the 

facts and circumstances surrounding the hideous attacks and the 

report findings and recommendations. The ARB report was delivered to Congress on December 18, 2012. While the ARB made some 

important findings, it also raised serious additional questions. 

First, the ARBs structure, along with the State Department culture, raises questions about the extent to which it can be independent. Although it is a meaningful document, this committee has 

not been able to receive the background information or were the rerecorded notes sufficient to allow for a true review of the review? 

As we convene this hearing, the committee down the hall, the 

Foreign Affairs Committee, has authored significant reforms in the 

form of legislation. Part of what we will do here today is to continue fueling the discovery process for that purpose. 

5 

In preparation for today’s hearing, the staff has prepared approximately a 100-page report which is entitled ‘‘Benghazi Attacks, 

Investigative Update Interim Report on the Accountability Review 

Board.’’ 

I ask unanimous consent it now be placed in the record. 

It raises important questions on the review board process. Today 

our panel includes distinguished former government officials who 

know firsthand how important this process is, and who dedicated 

their lives to this public service. And we thank you for being here 

today. 

Any criticism of the accountability review process or the law 

passed by Congress in 1986 that created it, should be cast on Congress and the process that they were asked to do and not to the 

individuals who headed this. I believe that to the extent that the 

ARB was currently and traditionally used, it has done its job. Our 

criticism today is was it the appropriate investigation? Was it complete? Did it have the processes necessary to do a thorough review? 

Did it have the authority to go beyond the State Department? Was 

the record such that it could be reviewed and reviewed again as 

many tragic and large investigations will? 

I think we all understand that if the attack 12 years ago on 9/ 

11/2001 had been reviewed through the accountability review process, it would not have been sufficient for the American people. 

Therefore, our investigation today and the subject of this hearing 

is to look at what could be done, what was done, what was learned 

through the ARB. And I want to thank Ambassador Pickering and 

Admiral Mullen personally for their work. They made many reform 

suggestions. My understanding is all of them have been accepted. 

My understanding, further, is acceptance and implementation can 

be different. 

In particular, one of the questions that will not be answered 

today but undoubtedly will be asked is if four individuals were held 

accountable and in testimony, at least one was recommended for 

firing, why is it none lost a day’s pay and all are back on the job? 

That is a question for the current administration and not one for 

this panel. 

Additionally, we are joined by Director Sullivan and Todd Keil. 

Their review is a second review, and it is broader in nature than 

Benghazi. And it is important because one thing that America 

learned from the attacks on 9/11, 2012 is that, in fact, the system 

failed the people who were in that compound in Benghazi. 

Without a doubt, there are problems with in how decisions are 

made for security of our various diplomatic facilities throughout the 

world. I look forward particularly in that Director Sullivan has 

firsthand knowledge of primary protection of an individual, such as 

an Ambassador or the President of the United States, but he also 

understands that compounds and facilities, both preplanned and ad 

hoc such as a hotel the President might be staying in, have to be 

taken as they are but made to work. 

That for me says a lot about the nature of our diplomatic facilities throughout the world. Diplomatic compounds that are Inman 

compliant need not be looked at in any great additional detail. 

They are, in fact, set back, they are, in fact, fortresses. 

6 

The only thing that needs to happen in Inman-compliant facility 

is for the rules and the procedures to be followed for them to be 

extremely secure. But the vast majority of consulates, offices, 

USAID facilities and the like throughout the world are not Inman 

compliant. In fact, our investigation has shown that a great many 

exceptions occur every day, if you will, waivers to what is supposed 

to be. Often this comes in the form of defining a facility in a way 

different than what it actually is. And a multi country office has 

a different standard than a consulate or an embassy, but if, in fact, 

principal officers are there and the risk of attack is high, they must 

be looked at in that sense. 

So I for one believe that this interim report closes—and I hope 

it really will—the chapter on the service of Ambassador Pickering 

and Admiral Mullen because I believe their service, although limited to the rules of the ARB, has been honorable, and they have 

done the best they could under the rules that Congress gave them 

in 1986. 

And with that, I’m going to ask unanimous consent that my entire opening statement be placed in the record since I used so much 

time for the earlier reading. And I yield back and I recognize the 

ranking member for his opening statement. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to begin by recognizing Mrs. Patricia Smith, and Mr. 

Charles Woods who are here to testify about their sons who were 

killed in Benghazi, Sean Smith and Tyrone Woods. 

Nobody can fully comprehend the anguish they are suffering. I 

know from my own experience that losing someone so young and 

so promising is one of the most difficult things we ever experience 

in life. 

Sadly, there are now other mothers and fathers, husbands and 

wives, sisters and brothers who are also grieving after the shootings this week at the Washington Navy Yard less than a mile from 

this very room. Our hearts go out to those families as well. 

In addition, although Ambassador Stevens’ family was not able 

to attend today, and the Doherty—they sent a written statement, 

as did Glen Doherty’s sister, and Mr. Chairman, I’m very, very 

pleased and I thank you for not only reading their statements into 

the record, but making sure that they are part of the record. 

I look forward to hearing that testimony, and I hope we can 

learn more about who these very brave individuals were. I want to 

learn about their hopes and their dreams and their service to our 

country. 

I believe our goal at today’s hearing should be to honor them as 

heroes, because that is exactly what they were. They believed in 

this Nation and they devoted their lives to protecting it. 

There are other ways our Nation should honor these men. First, 

we must hunt down those responsible and bring them to justice. 

Progress on this front may not always be visible to the public, but 

as our Nation demonstrated in the relentless worldwide 10-year 

pursuit of Osama bin Laden, the United States does not forget. We 

never forget. And I believe I speak for the entire committee when 

I say that our commitment to this goal is bipartisan and unwavering. 

7 

Another way to honor their memories is to obtain information 

about what happened in Benghazi. Chairman Issa issued a report 

earlier this week that provided some new information but, unfortunately, he chose not to work with any Democratic committee members. So today I offer him my own report that I would like to provide to the committee and the witnesses. 

As this report explains, our goal was to supply detailed information in response to some of the specific questions that have been 

raised relating to the attack. Our report is based on the review of 

tens of thousands of pages of classified and unclassified documents, 

16 transcribed interviews, and one deposition. 

Our report provides new details about the intense and terrifying 

week last September when events at embassies and consulates 

around the world put U.S. personnel on hair trigger alert for days. 

These included events not only in Benghazi, but also in Khartoum, 

Sana’a, Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad where crowds of thousands 

marched, set fires and breached United States compounds repeatedly. 

Mr. Chairman, I ask that our report be made part of the record. 

Chairman ISSA. Without objection so ordered. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. 

Another critical way we should honor the memories of these heroes is by implementing the recommendations and reforms that 

were put forth to improve the security of our diplomatic and military forces around the world. This is so important. This is the committee on Oversight and Government Reform, reform is so, so vital, 

particularly at this moment. 

I hope we can all agree on a bipartisan basis that we should implement these recommendations as effectively and as efficiently as 

possible. 

On this point, Ambassador Pickering explained to the committee 

during his deposition that because of his own personal and professional bond with Ambassador Stevens, he viewed his service on the 

Accountability Review Board as ‘‘a debt of honor.’’ 

He said, ‘‘Chris gave me two wonderful years of his life in supporting me in very difficult circumstances.’’ He also said, ‘‘I owed 

him his family and the families of the others who died the best possible report we could put together.’’ 

However Ambassador Pickering also said he was deeply concerned that although the previous ARBs were ‘‘excellent in their 

recommendations, the follow-through had dwindled away.’’ 

Ladies and gentlemen, we cannot let that happen under our 

watch. This is our watch. We are in charge now, and we must 

make the, we must never let a report like this sit on some shelves 

collecting dust, and then 10, 12 years from now we are going 

through the same process again. As I have said many times, we are 

better than that. 

I would like to make one final point. And let me go back to Admiral Mullen. I want to thank both of you for your service. The chairman said this is not any kind of an attack on you all, it is concerned about the breadth of the report and things like that. But I 

know that you gave a phenomenal amount of your time and I want 

to thank both of you. But I don’t want to just thank you for today. 

I want to thank you for what you have done for your entire lives, 

8 

for your entire lives, giving your blood, your sweat, your tears to 

make life better for us so that we could sit here and do what we 

do. And I appreciate that. 

Ambassador Pickering, in my 37 years of practicing law, I have 

never heard such compelling testimony. I just so happened to sit 

in at your deposition, and when you told us why you did this, and 

why it was so important that it be excellently done and completely 

done, and I will never forget the things you said. And I really 

thank you for that. 

There have been some extremely serious accusations that the 

ARB was a ‘‘whitewash’’ and a ‘‘coverup.’’ Some said ‘‘it doesn’t answer any real questions.’’ And that is ‘‘the sole function, the sole 

function was to insulate Hillary Clinton.’’ 

When I hear those kinds of statements and then I read the depositions and I listen to you, Ambassador Pickering, you know, I got 

to tell you, those kinds of statements upset me. Because I think 

that they are so unfair. And we are better than that. 

So let me respond as directly as I can. Based on all of the evidence obtained by this committee, this Benghazi review was one of 

the most comprehensive ARB reviews ever conducted. I have seen 

no evidence, none whatsoever, to support these reckless accusations. To the contrary, witness after witness told the committee 

that the ARBs report was ‘‘penetrating, specific, critical, very 

tough, and the opposite of a whitewash.’’ 

Finally, one reason I requested today’s hearing 4 months ago was 

to give Ambassador Pickering and Admiral Mullen an opportunity 

to respond directly to these unsubstantiated accusations. I’m glad 

they are finally being given that opportunity. 

Our Nation owes them and the other board members profound 

thanks for their dedication and for their service. With that, Mr. 

Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

All members will have 7 days to submit opening statements for 

the record, and we will now recognize our first panel. 

As previously noted, Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering served as 

chairman of the U.S. Department of State’s Accountability Review 

Board for Benghazi. Ambassador Pickering has had a long and distinguished career as a diplomat. He has served in an unprecedented number of ambassadorships: Jordan, Nigeria, El Salvador, 

Israel, India, Russia, and the United Nations. 

Not to be any less distinguished, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, 

U.S. Navy retired, served as the vice chairman of the ARB. Admiral Mullen is a retired four-star Navy admiral who served two 

terms as the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the highest rank 

of any officer in the Armed Forces. Mr. Mark Sullivan served as 

chairman of the independent panel on best practices, and is the 

former director of the United States Secret Service, a role in which 

he and I worked together on a number of tough issues, and I respect your participation here today. 

The Honorable Todd M. Keil served as a member of the independent panel on best practices and is the former assistant secretary for infrastructure protection at the United States Department of Homeland Security. 

9 

Welcome all. Pursuant to our rules would you please rise raise 

your right hand to take the oath. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm the testimony you will give 

today will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? 

Please be seated. 

Let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

As I said before, this hearing in our private meeting, this is an 

important hearing and one in which each of your testimonies are 

extremely important. Your entire written statements will be placed 

in the record. Use as close to 5 minutes as you can for your opening. I’m not going to have a heavy gavel if you have additional 

words you have to say, but I would like to allow as much time for 

questions as possible. 

Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR THOMAS R. PICKERING 

Ambassador PICKERING. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much 

and ranking minority member Mr. Cummings, thank you very 

much. It’s an important opportunity to appear before you today for 

this important matter. 

It’s been a special honor for me to work with Admiral Mullen and 

indeed the other members of the Accountability Review Board on 

this very pressing important and significant issue. 

If I may, and I don’t want to extend beyond the limits of my brief 

with you, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that our report will also appear in the record in an appropriate fashion. 

Chairman ISSA. The entire report will be placed in the record. 

Ambassador PICKERING. Thank you, sir. The loss of four brave individuals is devastating to our country and most especially to their 

families. We sympathize with them, with Mrs. Smith and Mr. 

Woods and all of them in their loss. 

The board met pursuant to a statute. The questions the board 

was to respond to under the statute are the extent to which the incident was security related; whether the security systems and security procedures were adequate; whether the security systems and 

security procedures were properly implemented; the impact of intelligence and information availability; such other facts and circumstances which may be relevant to the appropriate security 

management of U.S. missions abroad; and finally, with regard to 

personnel, whenever the board finds reasonable cause to believe 

that an individual has breached the duty of that individual, the 

board should report that finding to appropriate Federal agency or 

instrumentality. 

The board met almost continuously for 2–1/2 months. The group 

worked collegially and intensively and after extensive activities 

outlined in my testimony, reached unanimous conclusions which 

are reflected in the report. The board conducted about 100 interviews beginning with key personnel who were on the ground during the events in Benghazi. It further reviewed many thousands of 

pages of documents and viewed hours of video. It was provided 

with the fullest cooperation by the Department of State and all elements of the U.S. Government. 

The key findings of the board include the following: 

10 

The attacks were security related, involving the use of armed 

force against U.S. personnel at two facilities. Responsibility for the 

loss of life and other damage rests completely with the terrorists 

who carried out the attacks. Systemic failures and leadership and 

management deficiencies at senior levels within two bureaus of the 

Department of State resulted in a security posture at the special 

mission in Benghazi that was inadequate for the mission and 

grossly inadequate to deal with the attacks. 

Notwithstanding the proper implementation of security systems 

and procedures and the remarkable heroism shown by American 

personnel, those systems and the Libyan response fell short in the 

face of the attacks which began with the penetration of the mission 

by dozens of armed attackers. The board found that U.S. intelligence provided no immediate specific tactical warning of the attack. Known gaps existed in the U.S. Intelligence Community’s understanding of the extremist militias in Libya and the potential 

threat that they posed to U.S. interests, although some threats 

were known to exist. 

The board found that certain senior officers within two bureaus 

of the State Department demonstrated a lack of proactive leadership and management ability in their responses to security concerns posed by the Benghazi special mission attack given the deteriorating threat environment and the lack of reliable host country, 

Libyan, protection. The board did not find reasonable cause to determine that any individual U.S. Government employee breached 

his or her duty. 

Recommendations. The Department of State should urgently review the balance between risk and presence. We did not agree that 

no presence was an appropriate answer in most cases. The basis 

for review should include a defined, attainable, priority mission, 

clear-eyed assessment of the risks and costs, commitment of sufficient resources to mitigate risks, and constant attention to changes 

in the situation, including when to leave and perform the mission 

from a distance. 

The Department should reexamine the diplomatic security organization and management. The Department should organize a 

panel of outside independent experts to identify best practices and 

regularly assist the Diplomatic Security Bureau in evaluating U.S. 

security in high risk and high threat posts, and indeed I’m delighted that Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Keil are with us who prepared 

that report. 

The Secretary should require an action plan on dealing with the 

use of fire as a weapon. Recalling the incomplete construction recommendations of the Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam ARB, the Department should work with the Congress to restore the capital cost 

sharing program in its full capacity adjusted for inflation to about 

$2.2 billion for fiscal year 2015 in a 10-year program to address 

outstanding needs in high-risk, high-threat areas. 

While intelligence capabilities have improved post 2001, there is 

no certainty of warning information. More attention needs to be 

given to generally deteriorating threat situations. Key trends need 

to be identified early to sharpen risk calculations. 

The board recognizes that poor performance does not ordinarily 

constitute a breach of duty that would serve as a basis for discipliVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:06 Oct 23, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\85095.TXT APRIL
11 

nary action, but instead needs to be addressed by the performance 

management system of the State Department. However, the board 

is of the view that findings of unsatisfactory leadership performance by senior officials in the case of Benghazi should be a potential basis for discipline recommendations by future ARBs and 

would recommend a revision of Department of State regulations or 

amendment of the relevant statute to this end. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, it was an honor to be called again 

for government service on the Benghazi ARB. Many have said that 

our report would either advocate mere reinforcement of fortress 

embassies or closing down our presence. No conclusion like that 

could be farther from the truth. We recognize that perfection and 

protection is not possible and that fine and good men and women 

will still come forward to serve their country and risk their lives 

on the front-lines of danger. We should continue to do all that we 

can to protect them as they go about such challenging tasks. That 

was the sole purpose of our report, and it was produced with a deep 

sense that we had to get it right, politics, elections, personal controversy and all other external factors aside. 

I am aware that no report will ever be perfect but I am proud 

of this one which has been seen by many as clear, cogent and very 

hard hitting, as it should be. 

New information is always welcome. I feel that this report is still 

on the mark, free of coverup and political tilt and will personally 

welcome anything new which sheds light on what happened and 

that helps us to protect American lives and property in the future. 

Finally, I recognize that we are a government of branches and 

checks and balances. I have always respected the Congress and the 

tasks it must assume to make our Nation great. I appear today 

against the backdrop of those beliefs. We will not always agree. But 

let us always agree that the national interests, the best interests 

and welfare of the American people, are the criteria against which 

we serve. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I very much look forward to your 

questions. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Ambassador Pickering follows:] 

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Chairman ISSA. Admiral Mullen. 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN 

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Cummings, before addressing the subject of this hearing, both my wife Deborah who is 

here with me today, and I want to express our deepest sympathies 

to the families of those killed and the tragedy earlier this week. As 

a Navy family ourselves, those lost were part, were our shipmates 

and family members in the truest sense of the word, and their 

dedication, service to our country and sacrifice will never be forgotten. 

And Chairman Issa and Ranking Member Cummings and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to testify today. And I hope my testimony will be helpful to the 

committee as it investigates the tragic events that occurred in 

Benghazi, Libya on September 11th and 12, 2012. 

Shortly after those events, I was asked by then Secretary of 

State to serve as the vice chair of the Accountability Review Board, 

established to examine the attacks on the special mission compound and annex in Benghazi. The board was ably led by Ambassador Thomas Pickering and included three other highly qualified, 

respected members with expertise in various areas relevant to this 

review. 

The board members took our responsibilities very seriously and 

we worked diligently to fulfill our obligations to determine the facts 

and make recommendations as to how best to avoid similar tragedies in the future. 

From the beginning, the State Department emphasized that it 

wanted full transparency about what happened in Benghazi and 

what led to those events. We had unfettered access to State Department personnel and documents. There were no limitations. We 

received the full cooperation of all witnesses and every State Department office. We interviewed everyone we thought it was necessary to interview. We operated independently, and we were given 

freedom to pursue the investigation as we deemed necessary. 

This independence was particularly important to me. I would not 

have accepted this assignment had I thought that the board’s independence would be compromised in any way. 

The board interviewed more than 100 individuals, reviewed thousands of pages of documents and reviewed hours of video footage. 

We determined, as stated in the Board’s report, ‘‘that responsibility 

for the tragic loss of life, injuries and damage to U.S. facilities and 

property rests solely and completely with the terrorists who perpetrated the attack.’’ The board did find multiple serious State Department shortcomings which exacerbated the impact of the terrorist attack. We also concluded that there was nothing the U.S. 

military could have done to respond to the attack on the compound 

or to deter the subsequent attack on the annex. The actions of our 

military, which moved many assets that night, were fully appropriate and professional. 

In total, the board made 29 recommendations, 24 of which were 

unclassified. I stand by those recommendations. One of the Board’s 

recommendations led to the establishment of the best practices 

21 

panel which Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Keil will detail today. Most of 

the Board’s recommendations were designed to be implemented at 

State Department facilities worldwide in order to keep diplomatic 

personnel safe and secure everywhere they serve, especially in 

areas where they face great personal risk because our Nation needs 

them there. 

The State Department may implement our recommendations as 

it sees fit, and I understand that it has accepted and plans to implement them all. 

The Board’s recommendations with respect to the shortcomings 

of State Department personnel have been given much attention. 

Because of the courageous and ultimate sacrifices made by Ambassador Stevens, Sean Smith, Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods, the 

board meticulously reviewed the conduct of all State Department 

employees with direct responsibilities for security at the Benghazi 

special mission compound. 

We assigned blame at the level where we thought it lay. That is 

what the ARBs statute intended, operational accountability at the 

level of operational responsibility. 

The House report that originally adopted the ARB statute admonished that ‘‘In the past, determining direct programmatic and 

personal accountability for serious security failures had been weak, 

often higher senior officials have ultimately accepted responsibility 

for operational failure in circumstances where they had no direct 

control.’’ 

The ARB statute permits a board only to make findings and recommendations. Any implementation of those recommendations 

must be done by the State Department. It is not an adjudicative 

process or body. 

As to personnel, the statute speaks only to recommendations that 

individuals be disciplined. As set forth by Congress in the ARB 

statute that governed the Board’s deliberations, discipline requires 

a finding that an individual breached his or her duties. The board 

came to understand this as a very high legal standard going well 

beyond negligence that requires affirmative misconduct or willful 

ignorance of responsibilities. 

Furthermore, discipline is a formal term meaning complete removal or demotion, removal from or demotion within, the Federal 

service. Other forms of significant administrative action such as removal from a position or reassignment are not considered formal 

discipline. 

The board has encouraged Congress to consider whether to 

amend the ARB statute so that unsatisfactory leadership performance by senior officials in relation to the security incident under review should be a potential basis for discipline recommendations by 

future ARBs. 

After careful review, the board found that no individual engaged 

in misconduct or willfully ignored his or her responsibilities, and 

thus we did not find reasonable cause to believe that an individual 

breached his or her duty. However the board did find that two individuals demonstrated a lack of proactive leadership and management ability that significantly contributed to the precarious security posture of the Benghazi compound. 

22 

The board recommended that the Secretary of State remove 

those two individuals from their positions. The board also concluded that the performance and leadership of two other individuals fell short of expectations but did not recommend any specific 

personnel action. 

Following our report, all personnel decisions were made by the 

State Department. 

I have the greatest admiration for the service and the and the 

sacrifice of Ambassador Stevens, Sean Smith, Glen Doherty and 

Tyrone Woods. They were patriots and heroes in every sense of the 

word. They died dedicating their lives to our country. I have heartfelt sympathy for the families of these brave men. We should never 

forget their sacrifice. I believe we should honor them by doing everything in our power to ensure that the lessons learned from 

Benghazi never have to be learned again. The board’s report was 

issued in that spirit and with that goal. 

I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you, Admiral. 

[Prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:] 

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Chairman ISSA. Mr. Sullivan. 

STATEMENT OF MARK J. SULLIVAN 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Good morning, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member 

Cummings, and distinguished members of this committee thank 

you for asking Todd Keil and I to appear here today. 

The shootings at the Navy Yard which occurred earlier this week 

in our Nation’s Capital, remind us all of the vulnerabilities and diversified threats we face every day whether in our own backyard 

or on foreign soil. 

My thoughts and prayers are with the victims, their families and 

loved ones. 

In any environment where uncertainty permeates, one certainty 

we share is the necessary collaborative effort that is needed in our 

country to ensure the safety and security of all American lives. It 

is also a necessary certainty that we honor and protect the memories of those citizens who have been lost as a result of violent attacks with dignity and respect. 

As a Federal agent for almost 35 years, my life has been and continues to be dedicated to contributing to improving America’s security. From May 2006 through February, 2013, I had the honor of 

serving as director of the United States Secret Service under both 

Presidents Bush and Obama. 

As director, I learned and understood the importance of having 

clear lines of authority in an organizational structure concerning 

security matters. I have also learned that things don’t also go as 

planned. And when they don’t, it is vital to implement lessons 

learned in an effort to prevent them from happening again. 

Mr. Chairman, I consider it an honor to have served with the 

panel members Todd Keil, Richard Manlove, Raymond Mislock, Jr., 

Timothy Murphy, and staff, Erica Lichliter and Stephanie 

Murdoch. 

Our panel shares a combined experience of almost 170 years of 

security and law enforcement expertise. 

The panel’s report reflects the independent views of the panel 

based upon the members’ best professional judgment, experience 

and analysis of best practices informed by interviews, travel and 

research. 

It was a pleasure to serve with the other panel members, and I 

appreciate their professionalism and hard work. I would also like 

to acknowledge and thank the hundreds of people interviewed in 

the course of drafting this report from the U.S. Government, private sector, international organizations and foreign governments. 

The best practice panel was the result of the Accountability Review Board for Benghazi, which recommended that the Department 

of State establish a panel of outside independent experts with experience in high risk, high threat areas to support the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, identified best practices from other agencies and 

countries and evaluate United States security platforms in highrisk, high-threat posts. 

Our report provides 40 recommendations in 12 different areas. In 

the panel’s opinion, these recommendations, if adopted and implemented, will further strengthen the Department’s ability to protect 

27 

its personnel and work more safely on a global platform to achieve 

American foreign policy goals and objectives. 

The 12 areas of recommendations are organization and management, accountability, risk management, program criticality and acceptable risks, planning and logistics, lessons learned, training and 

human resources, intelligence, threat analysis and security assessments, programs resources and technology, host nations and guard 

forces capability enhancement, regular evaluation, and change 

management, leadership, communications and training. 

The best practices panel looked across a wide spectrum of private 

government and nongovernmental organizations to identify effective measures to enhance the Department’s ability to ensure a safe 

and secure environment for employees and programs. 

Not surprisingly, the panel found that many institutions, including governments, refer to diplomatic security as the gold standard 

for security and seek to model their services after diplomatic security. Nevertheless, any organization must continuously evolve and 

improve to adjust with a fluid and dynamic environment. 

The panel’s view is that its recommendations should be realistic, 

achievable and measurable. 

The findings and the recommendations of the ARB as well as the 

recommendations of other Department of State reports and management studies were reviewed in the context of the panel’s own 

independent assessments and observations of the Department’s security-related operations. Best practices were then identified to address shortcomings and provide mechanisms for further consideration by the Department. 

Among one of the most important of the recommendations is the 

creation of an under secretary For diplomatic security. It should be 

noted that this structural recommendation is not new and was suggested in earlier report 14 years ago following the east Africa embassy bombings. The way forward should be characterized by cooperative efforts that will provide a framework which will enhance 

the Department’s ability to protect Americans. To be effective we 

must be innovative so that we ensure institutions adapt and evolve 

to meet changing security requirements and needs. 

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Department of State in particular, overseas post that hosted panel 

visits and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security For the outstanding 

support provided to the panel during our endeavor. 

Thank you for your time, chairman, ranking member and we look 

forward to any questions you may have. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan follows:] 

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Chairman ISSA. Mr. Keil, I understand you do not have an opening statement. Would you like to say a few words? The gentleman 

is recognized. 

STATEMENT OF TODD KEIL 

Mr. KEIL. Thank you, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member 

Cummings, and distinguished members of the committee for inviting Director Sullivan and me to testify today about our independent panel report on best practices in the aftermath of the tragic events that occurred in Benghazi, Libya. 

Our panel is committed to identifying best practices from 

throughout the U.S. Government, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations and foreign governments which can improve 

the security of U.S. diplomatic facilities abroad and enhance the 

safety of Department of State and foreign affairs agency personnel 

not only in high-risk areas, but globally. We identified 40 recommendations to achieve this goal. 

Importantly, the panel affirmed what we already knew based on 

our professional experience that the men and women of the State 

Department’s diplomatic security service are truly dedicated public 

servants, and amongst the best in service to our great Nation. 

Every day around the world they face extreme challenges, unpredictable risks and unknown events but still provide a safe and secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, and they 

do so with distinction. 

As we stated repeatedly throughout our report, best practices 

will not save lives unless they are resourced, implemented and followed, not just accepted. 

As Director Sullivan stated, almost 14 years ago, a number of 

very similar recommendations were made after systematic failures 

were recognized as a result of the east Africa embassy bombings, 

and little has been accomplished by the Department of State since 

then to improve its approach to security even after approval by 

then-Secretary of State Albright to elevate the Bureau of diplomatic security and make other enhancements. 

Now is the time for the Department of State, with the support 

of Congress, to finally institutionalize some real, meaningful and 

progressive change. The Department of State owes it to those people who have given their lives in service to our country and to 

those employees who continue to serve our country in some very 

dangerous locations around the world. Thank you very much, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

I will now recognize myself and I will go in reverse order. 

Mr. Keil, at the current time, isn’t it true that both the facilities 

sufficiency and the sufficiency of diplomatic security rise to Under 

Secretary Kennedy, effectively he is the Under Secretary for Diplomatic Security at this time under the current structure isn’t that 

true? 

Mr. KEIL. Sir, as we traveled around the world as part of our 

panel research—— 

Chairman ISSA. No. No. Mr. Keil please. I have a very short 

time. You first start by saying yes or no. 

33 

Mr. KEIL. Yes. 

Chairman ISSA. So he is, in fact, in a position where he—the pyramid rises to him, your recommendation and the recommendation 

14 years ago is that he be relieved of diplomatic security, and that 

be placed in the separate Under Secretary position, is that correct? 

Mr. KEIL. Correct. 

Chairman ISSA. Wouldn’t that create, by definition, a situation in 

which somebody would be responsible for the hardware, the facilities, including Inman compliance and somebody else would be responsible for the bodies and the support. 

Have you considered that? And how would we or the Foreign Affairs Committee structure that briefly? 

Mr. KEIL. Yes, we did consider that and, sir, currently there is 

integration between overseas buildings operations and the Bureau 

of Diplomatic Security. 

Chairman ISSA. But they all report to Under Secretary Kennedy? 

Mr. KEIL. They all report to Under Secretary Kennedy. 

Chairman ISSA. And wasn’t the failure in Benghazi both a failure 

to have the facility sufficient and a failure to have sufficient physical security in the way of armed personnel? Weren’t those both 

failures that rose to one under secretary? 

Mr. KEIL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman ISSA. Okay. And that doesn’t mean I disagree with the 

findings now or 14 years ago, but clearly, there was somebody who 

had both halves of it and both failed. 

My ranking member told Politico that we should listen carefully 

to the Ambassador and the Admiral, and I did, and Admiral, I 

think I heard you correctly clearly saying that you had limitations 

in what the ARB mandate was including that your limitations are 

you can’t really, under the ARB, look at policy deficiencies and that 

by definition, you were mandated to look at the lowest level of 

operational failure, not the highest level of policy failure, is that 

true? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think that policy, policy adjustments or policy issues were well within our mandate. What I talked about in 

my opening statement is the constraint was in the discipline—— 

Chairman ISSA. Okay. So finding fault had to go to the lowest 

level, even though you looked at policy failures. 

Admiral MULLEN. Finding fault had to go to the appropriate 

level. 

Chairman ISSA. Okay. Well, the decision to extend the facility for 

another year with limited protection and not meeting Inman or 

close to Inman standards was a decision made by Under Secretary 

Kennedy. So did you consider that policy error, the error to be 

there with insufficient fiscal and human resources, as a policy decision or only that someone lower was responsible? 

Admiral MULLEN. Actually, I think the decision, the memo, I 

think to which you are referring—— 

Chairman ISSA. The August memo. 

Admiral MULLEN. —Mr. Chairman, that Under Secretary Kennedy signed in December of 2011—— 

Chairman ISSA. Yes, December 2011. 

Admiral MULLEN. —was the result of a process inside the State 

Department took everybody into consideration and was approved to 

34 

extend it. And I think that was pretty clear to everybody. It wasn’t 

the establishment of the—of the special mission compound—— 

Chairman ISSA. No. We understand that. We actually had—we 

actually had testimony that there was—there were under consider 

on September 11th of extending it permanently. But the decision 

to keep them there and the reduction in the assets to protect it occurred and was decided on in December 2011. 

Admiral MULLEN. The failure, Mr. Chairman, was not in the establishment or that memo. It was in the execution of what was laid 

out in that memo to include the requisite number of security personnel, which were rarely there over the course of the next year. 

Chairman ISSA. Okay. So whoever is responsible for not having 

enough security personnel is the person who failed. 

Admiral MULLEN. Correct. That is actually where we ended up 

focusing the investigation, the review. 

Chairman ISSA. The final point I want to make sure I get out is 

you had a mandate under of the ARB. You’ve said essentially that 

the changes in what the mandate are welcome and you believe, 

both of you, I understand, believe that some changes to the ARB 

to make it more able to do more will be necessary. I pretty well 

heard that, that what the Foreign Affairs Committee is considering, not the specific legislation, but considering changes is something both of you welcome, having gone through this process. 

Admiral MULLEN. I think it is important. Yes, sir. I think 

where—for the lessons that we learned, absolutely. I think its independence is critical, as well as the anonymity of those who come 

to the table to—to make statements so that those statements are 

made in the spirit of where we’re trying to go, and they don’t feel 

limited. 

Chairman ISSA. And when I heard you, you said that the—both 

of you said that the administration, the Secretary and so on made 

your job easy because you had full access to a hundred witnesses 

and the attempt was to have full transparency. 

Admiral MULLEN. Correct. 

Chairman ISSA. Do you think that Congress should have that 

same option? In other words, since the State Department has not 

made one of those witnesses you interviewed first available, meaning people in Benghazi who are fact witnesses, none have been 

made available. As a matter of fact, even the names have been, to 

the greatest extent possible, withheld from this committee, do you 

believe that is appropriate, or do you believe that we should have 

access to fact witnesses as we review the process? 

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Chairman, I think that is—and I have 

been in government a long time—that is something that historically, certainly in this case, has to be worked out between the Congress and the executive branch. 

Chairman ISSA. Admiral, if something like the Cole attack occurred again today and Congress said we wanted to speak to people 

who were on the deck of that ship today, would you believe that 

we should have a right to speak to those people in order to understand the facts on the ground that day? 

Admiral MULLEN. I don’t—I—I honestly—— 

Chairman ISSA. I am asking from your experience. 

Admiral MULLEN. I understand that. I don’t—— 

35 

Chairman ISSA. And a DOD framework. 

Admiral MULLEN. I don’t know what would limit you to do that, 

quite frankly. 

Chairman ISSA. I am in the process of issuing subpoenas because 

the State Department has not made those people available, has 

played hide and go seek, is now hiding behind a thinly veiled statement that there is a criminal investigation. As you know, there was 

a criminal investigation on the Cole, any time Americans are killed 

abroad. So the answer, quite frankly, is we are not being given the 

same access that you had or Mr. Sullivan and his team had. And 

that is part of the reason that this investigation cannot end until 

the State Department gives us at least the same access that they 

gave your board. 

And, with that, I recognize the ranking member for his questions. 

Wait a second. Just one second. I apologize. I do have to make 

a technical correction, if you don’t mind. It has come to our attention that there is a typo on page 25 of the majority staff report that 

has led to some misunderstanding about what Admiral Mullen told 

the committee about a conversation with Cheryl Mills. We have 

made a technical correction in our report to clarify that portion. 

The report will be—correctly identifies Admiral Mullen’s testimony 

as referring to Charlene Lamb’s interview. The report includes the 

full text of Admiral Mullen’s testimony, and the testimony speaks 

for itself. And the full transcript of the interview will be made 

available on our Web site immediately. And it should be clear that 

the typo was unintentional and has been corrected. 

And I now recognize the ranking member. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. First of all, I want to thank the chairman for addressing the last issue. That fact came out in our memo, by the 

way. And we made it clear that that was not correct. 

Admiral Mullen, as the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, you were the military expert on the ARB. Is that correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. Correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Over and over again, during the past year, Republican Members of Congress, including several members of this 

committee, have impugned the integrity of our military forces and 

their leadership by suggesting that they withheld assistance on the 

night of the attacks for political reasons. 

Admiral Mullen, if you look on page 23 of our report, there is an 

excerpt from your interview with the committee in which you said 

this, and I will quote, quote it for you, it says, ‘‘I personally reviewed, and as the only military member of the ARB, I personally 

reviewed all the military assets that were in theater and available.’’ 

Admiral Mullen, in your review, did you have access to all military information, data, and people necessary to evaluate the military—the military’s response. 

Admiral MULLEN. I did. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And I understand from your interview transcript 

that you conducted this examination not once but twice. Is that correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. First time, Mr. Cummings, was to—actually 

with all members of the ARB, we went to the Pentagon to review 

36 

it in detail. And then the second time, I went back by myself when 

this became an issue that there were certainly questions being 

raised about, I went back again to verify and validate what I had 

done before. And I found nothing different in that the military response, the military did everything they possibly could that night. 

They just couldn’t get there in time. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So, just to be clear, you have 40 years of experience in the military and achieved the highest ranks. You had access to all the information and personnel you thought were necessary to investigate the interagency response on the night of the 

attack and you personally reviewed everything twice. Do I have 

that right? 

Admiral MULLEN. Correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You told the committee during your interview: ‘‘I 

concluded after a detailed understanding of what had happened 

that night that, from outside Libya, that we’d done everything possible that we could.’’ Is that right? 

Admiral MULLEN. Correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Can you explain from your perspective what it 

means for the military to have done: ‘‘everything possible.’’ What 

I am getting at is, did the military really try everything? 

And I ask this for the families who want to know that the country their loved ones served did everything they could do for them. 

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Cummings, I worked for two Presidents. 

The direction you get from a President in a situation like that is 

‘‘Do everything you can.’’ It’s all the guidance that you need. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey both testified to the specifics 

along the lines of—in testimony early February along the lines of 

what I found when I reviewed this on two occasions. It is our—it 

is—it goes to our core, when people are in trouble, to do everything 

we possibly can to help them out. And there were many forces that 

moved that night, including a Special Operations force in Europe 

that ended up on a base in Southern Europe, a large Special Operations force from the United States, which moved under direction 

as soon as—as soon as they were given orders; a group of Marines 

that essentially were sent in from Spain into Tripoli the next day. 

It literally became—this is not something you can just wish to happen instantly. There is a lot of planning, preparation, as rapidly— 

to do it as rapidly as one can do it. 

And, if I may, I will just—there has been great discussion given 

to fast movers: Could you get a jet over Benghazi because there are 

jets in Europe? We have—our readiness condition at that—on that 

particular night, there were no planes sitting at the ready. So it 

is 2:00 in the morning. There are no planes on alert. It is 2 and 

a half to 3 hours to fly there. Tanker support is 4 hours away. You 

need host nation support for where they are to get permission to 

fly, particularly combat-ready jets, out of that country. You have 

got to go get the bomb racks. You have got to stet the munitions 

together. You have got to plan the mission. There are a tremendous 

number of details that have to go on. You have to bring the pilots 

in, pre-brief them, et cetera. Takes hours and hours and hours to 

do if you are not sitting at the ready when this happened. 

What has happened since then that I have been briefed on is the 

Defense Department, the Pentagon has adjusted readiness of forces 

37 

in certain parts of the world to respond. We are not big enough in 

the military to—and—Ambassador Pickering will I am sure echo 

this—we are not big enough in the military to be everywhere 

around the world to respond to where every embassy is that might 

be high risk. We have to take risks and figure that out. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So, Admiral, what do you say in response to 

those members who continue to this day to imply that the military 

somehow fell down on the job? 

Admiral MULLEN. They didn’t fall down on the job, and I just 

completely disagree with that view. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, Ambassador Pickering, I see you shaking 

your head. Would you comment? I have about a minute left. 

Ambassador PICKERING. I think the point that has just been 

made by Admiral Mullen is very important. We have over 270 consulates and embassies around the world in some very isolated and 

strange places. The responsibility for their primary security rests 

with the host country. Where that does not exist, as it did in 

Benghazi, it falls back on us to do it. The report we provided you 

and others provides the recommendations to deal with those particular cases. We are not able to count on the U.S. military, as Admiral Mullen said, always being positioned to come in short notice 

to deal with those issues, so we must do better on the ground. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

Now recognize Mr. Mica for his questions. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And many Americans have been waiting for this hearing. As I go 

back to my district, Admiral and Ambassador and others, I can’t 

tell you how many times people have said, don’t let Benghazi and 

what happened there be swept under the table. 

Unfortunately, the ranking member mentioned this, that in my 

district and the vast majority of Americans feel that your report 

was a whitewash; he said whitewash or cover-up. But that’s what 

people feel. And they feel their government let them down. They 

feel that American public servants were lost there. And now the review is—doesn’t really address anything. Nobody has been fired. 

Nobody has been dismissed. No one has been arrested for the murders. I can’t tell you how frustrating this is. Do you understand 

where the American public is coming from, Admiral Mullen. 

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Mica, I understand what you are saying 

with respect to that. 

Chairman ISSA. Would you please put the mic a little closer, Admiral? 

Admiral MULLEN. Sorry. I understand what you are saying. 

Mr. MICA. I am just tell you how my people feel. So they want 

us to get to this. 

Then you look at who was interviewed, for example, you just got 

through, Admiral Mullen, saying that we seek direction from the 

President. You sought direction, and the President had to do this. 

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Mica, that was what the military—— 

Mr. MICA. I know—— 

Admiral MULLEN. —got from the President in terms of response. 

Mr. MICA. But the military is the one that could have saved the 

day. And the Secretary of State—when you don’t have a—and for 

38 

14 years now haven’t had an under secretary of security, which 

was recommended. So someone was in charge. Mr. Keil said he felt 

Kennedy or someone was in charge. But again, no one held accountable to this date. That is the way Congress feels and the 

American people feel. 

I tend to differ with you—I am not the greatest military strategist, but Mr. Issa and I were, in January, we were at least at one 

post. I know of at least three other posts, we could have launched 

an attack. The attack started at 9:45. We might not have been able 

to save the first two, the ambassador and his colleague, but the 

Seal should never have died. It was 9:45. It was a 5:15 to 5:30 

when they died. You testified a few minutes, 2 and a half to 3 

hours. There is no reason that we couldn’t launch from at least 

three locations I visited and been told that we have in place people 

monitoring the situation, particular and specifically in Africa and 

North Africa. And if we are not, shame on us. 

Admiral MULLEN. What I said was 10 to 20 hours to get there. 

Mr. MICA. That should not be the case. 

Admiral MULLEN. That is the way it was that—— 

Mr. MICA. And I was advised as a Member of Congress, when I 

visited and sat down at one of those locations, that we could launch 

almost immediately to rescue American personnel or American citizens in danger. So there is something wrong there. 

Then, again, investigating people above. It is all below the lower 

level, of which nobody—a couple people temporarily moved, all with 

pay and to other positions. You didn’t interview the Secretary of 

State. She appointed four out of the five members. Is that correct? 

Of the board. 

Admiral MULLEN. She did. 

Mr. MICA. Yes. And it looks like a—sort of an inside job of investigation. The Department of State looking at the Department of 

State. And you had difficulty—again, you testified you didn’t have 

difficulty, Mr.—Admiral Mullen, but two witnesses interviewed by 

the committee testified that ARB member Richard Shennick told 

them that it was difficult process, that the board was having a 

tough time obtaining details or context. Another witness stated, I 

said, ‘‘Dick, how is the ARB going?’’ And Dick said, ‘‘Ray, it is going 

slow; we are not getting any details, we are not getting any context.’’ 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, we got lots of details and lots of context. 

Mr. MICA. Yes. But we are the Congress of the United States, 

and we aren’t getting that. You just heard the chairman, the delay. 

We can’t get access to witnesses. I had somebody come up to me 

another day, I don’t know if it is true, they say they are—they are 

conducting lie detector tests of some of these people to see if they 

have talked to us. This is the stuff that is going on out there that 

American people feel that justice is not prevailing in this case. 

Again, you didn’t—you didn’t investigate—okay. You didn’t go to 

Clinton. How about the Deputy Secretary, William Burns? Was he 

interviewed? 

Ambassador PICKERING. We talked to both Mr. Burns and Mr. 

Nides, both Deputy Secretaries of State. At the time that we got 

to them, as it was with Secretary Clinton, we had very clear evidence, full and complete to our information, that the authority, the 

39 

responsibility, the accountability rested with the people we identified. 

Mr. MICA. They are not on the list, unfortunately, the ARB. 

Finally, when Secretary Clinton testified, she said, I talked to 

the President at the end of the day, but had been in constant communication with the National Security Advisor, I guess it was Tom 

Donilon at the time, the staff told me. Did you interview Tom 

Donilon? 

Ambassador PICKERING. We did not because we saw no evidence 

he made any of the decisions that we and the board were asked by 

the Congress to investigate with respect to the security. And we 

followed the precepts that Admiral Mullen has just outlined for you 

not to go for the people who didn’t make the decisions but to go, 

following the will of Congress, to the people who made the decisions. And indeed, we went to the people who reviewed those decisions. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. MICA. Secretary wasn’t involved. I must be on another planet. Thank you. 

Chairman ISSA. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

We now go to the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, thank all 

of the witnesses, not just for being here today but for your service 

in relation to the panels that you recently filed reports with. 

Look, Admiral, I don’t pretend at least as a member here to 

know better about what could have been done than somebody who 

served in the military with as long and as distinguished a career 

as you did. And no matter how many bases I visit, I don’t think 

I will pretend that I have more knowledge or experience or ability 

than you do. So I am going to accept your word that you reviewed, 

not once but twice, all of the possibilities that were there and finally came to the conclusion that everything that could be done 

would be done. I think it is important for the families to know that. 

We shouldn’t be surprised that some people in the public are confused because there have been misstatements plastered all over the 

place, on TV, and not retracted even when they are shown to be 

absolutely wrong. So there would be some confusion out there on 

that basis. 

But the chairman’s staff report that was released earlier this 

week concluded that the ARBs independence is undermined and 

that board members had actually perceived—put that in quotes— 

‘‘conflicts of interest.’’ 

Admiral Mullen and Ambassador Pickering, that is a very serious charge that challenges the integrity of the unanimous report 

but also challenges fundamentally your own integrity. I want to 

give you each an opportunity to respond to those allegations. But 

first, I want to again acknowledge that you both served our Nation 

for decades in some of the most senior positions in your fields. You 

have served Republican and Democratic Presidents alike, and you 

have won so many awards and promotions, respectively, that if I 

listed them all here, it would eat up the rest of my time. You 

agreed to volunteer months of your time to serve on this ARB. 

So, Admiral Mullen and Ambassador Pickering, can each of you 

explain why you agreed to serve on the board. 

40 

Ambassador PICKERING. As the ranking minority member made 

clear and as my testimony in my deposition, which is available to 

everybody, made clear, I served first because the Secretary of State 

asked me to take on a tough job. And I have been doing that for 

my life, and my sense of service to my country said this is not 

something that I should turn down, anyway, anyhow. 

Secondly, I made it very clear that Chris Stevens gave me 2 

years of help and service as Undersecretary of State. And I had a 

personal debt of honor to Chris to take this on. 

Thirdly, I felt very strongly that we needed quickly to know what 

went wrong and then how to fix it. And that was the function of 

the ARB. And I believe we carried out to the best of our ability that 

particular function. 

Finally, I had no sense anywhere that there was any conflict of 

interest. I have spent 42 years in the State Department. I knew 

many of the officers concerned. I have to tell you full, fair, and free, 

this was not an exercise in any personal sense of debt or obligation 

to any of those people. And I believe that the comments on the report that it was hard-hitting, that it called the shots the way it 

should have, in my view, is the best summation of what we tried 

to do, free of political influence, free of conflict, and I am proud of 

the report, sir. 

Admiral MULLEN. I served, first of all, because I was asked to do 

it, Mr. Tierney. 

Secondly, we lost four great Americans that night. I have certainly in the last 10 years or so been with so many of those in uniform as well as those who serve in the State Department around 

the world in some very, very difficult posts. And I thought I could, 

certainly with my experience, contribute from the professional 

standpoint and particularly from the military perspective on what 

happened that night and wanted to be able to do that. In its—at 

its core, it’s still who I am, which is a servant of this country. And 

when asked to go do that, it was pretty easy to say yes. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. 

You know, the ARB staff comments were made by the Republican staff report they said: ‘‘Under Secretary for Management Patrick Kennedy supervised the selection of the Benghazi ARB staff. 

This placed the staff in a position in which their duties required 

them to evaluate the performance of supervisors, colleagues, and 

friends.’’ 

Ambassador Pickering, how do you respond to the notion that the 

selection of staff created inappropriate conflict of interest? 

Ambassador PICKERING. My understanding of the role of Secretary Kennedy was that he made clear he did not participate. 

That seemed to have been an error somewhere. And that testimony, I think, is now in the minority report. 

I think, secondly, my judgment of the staff performance was that 

I saw no hint of any favoritism or preference. I saw a staff that 

worked many extra hours, that looked very carefully at all the 

issues, that did extraordinary research for us, was highly responsible to us. 

But in every case, Mr. Tierney, we all reviewed the final report 

many times. We each made contributions, and the unanimous view 

41 

of this five-member panel is they took full responsibility and approved every word of that report. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Ambassador, then the chairman’s report also raises 

questions about your recommendation of board member Catherine 

Bertini. Do you in any way believe that your recommendations of 

Catherine Bertini created a conflict of interest, and can you explain 

who she is and why you recommended her as a board member? 

Ambassador PICKERING. No. I was asked in the course of an early 

discussion who I thought might usefully serve on the board from 

outside the State Department. And I gave a list of names to Under 

Secretary Kennedy, who was accumulating those for Secretary 

Clinton. Large number of the people that I put on the list were not 

selected. Catherine Bertini was selected. She had, in my view, an 

outstanding reputation. She ran the World Food Programme, a 

multibillion dollar enterprise of the U.N. She was Under Secretary 

General of the U.N. for Management. She has a distinguished 

record as a professor of public policy. And I knew, in fact, that her 

own political background was on the opposite side to the party in 

power. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, sir. 

Yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. When the staff report talked about conflicts, isn’t 

it true that there were no true outsiders? There were no advocates 

for the families. There were no people whose service outside of government could have caused them to be skeptical. But, in fact, each 

of you—and, Ambassador, you said you had no conflict. Well, at the 

same time, you talked about 42 years in the organization you were 

overseeing. 

If we looked at the bank failures of 2007 and brought Jamie Diamond in to head the board, some might say that there was an inherent conflict because of his experience and life. 

Wouldn’t you agree that, in fact, your makeup was a makeup of 

people like Admiral Mullen, who was responsible for the policy, ultimately, just before he left as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs that 

had no response to this 9/11 attack, and of course, you had years 

of viewing things through an ambassador’s eyes. 

Ambassador PICKERING. Mr. Chairman, with greatest respect, 

this was not a ‘‘gotcha’’ investigative panel. The responsibilities 

were to provide recommendations to see that we do our best never 

to let this happen again. 

Would you choose—put it this way, someone with no experience 

to come in and investigate and carry forward the work? We used 

to, years ago, elect military officers. We stopped that a long time 

ago. I suspect that brain surgery was one of the most early professionalized occupations in the world. Why would you choose a panel 

of people who knew nothing about the responsibilities, nothing 

about how and in what way they were carried out? The value of 

this panel was that three were from outside, and only two of us 

were from inside, hopefully to give precisely the cross current of 

controversy, discussion, questioning, and examination that you 

yourself just expressed the hope that we had. We, sir, had that. 

Chairman ISSA. I appreciate that. 

Obviously, this was not a ‘‘gotcha’’ panel because nobody was 

‘‘gotcha’d,’’ Admiral. 

42 

Ambassador PICKERING. I would with great respect say we gave 

four names to the Secretary of State that we believed were failing 

in their senior leadership and management responsibilities. 

Chairman ISSA. So it is your testimony today that something 

should have happened; they should not be on the job, not having 

lost a day’s pay. 

Ambassador PICKERING. We made recommendations that two of 

those people be removed from their job—— 

Chairman ISSA. So people should have been fired that have not 

been fired. 

Ambassador PICKERING. Fired is a discipline. It is a different set 

of circumstances. I cannot respond for the Secretary of State and 

what he or she is—— 

Chairman ISSA. But wouldn’t you agree, there was no accountability? 

Ambassador PICKERING. No, there was accountability. Of course. 

And we identified it. 

Mr. LYNCH. On a point of order. Are we going to balance out the 

time? 

Chairman ISSA. To be honest, the gentleman went over. I was 

trying to make this quick. 

Mr. Duncan is now recognized. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And earlier, you commended Ambassador Pickering and Admiral 

Mullen. I want to commend you and your staff for the very thorough way that you have attempted to get the full story of this 

Benghazi situation in an instant. 

Let me—let me just mention—say this. Ever since some well 

publicized embassy bombings in 1998 and then again after the 

events of 9/11, the Congress has approved whopping increases, 

many, many billions of extra and additional funding for embassy 

security around the world. Yet the ARB report found that: ‘‘Embassy Tripoli did not demonstrate strong and sustained advocacy 

with Washington for increased security for Special Mission 

Benghazi.’’ 

I would like to ask Ambassador Pickering or Admiral Mullen, 

how did you come to that conclusion? Were there specific documents that led you to that statement or—— 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yes, Mr. Duncan. 

It was a combination of documents and personal interviews with 

the people who made the recommendations. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Admiral Mullen. Okay. 

Admiral MULLEN. I would agree with Ambassador Pickering said. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The—your report says, on page 4, that; ‘‘Systematic 

failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels within two bureaus of the State Department resulted in a special mission security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi and 

grossly inadequate to deal with the attack.’’ 

What—what were the systematic failures and leadership that 

you are talking about in that statement? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Briefly, sir, a constant churn in personnel, including security personnel, with an average stay time in 

Benghazi of 40 days or less, and, as well, differential and uncertain 

43 

and then sometimes negative attitudes towards security physical 

improvements of the post are two examples. 

Admiral MULLEN. I would add to that, sir, that it is—the application of resources over time, whether it was from inside the security 

branch of the State Department or inside the buildings branch. The 

training of personnel before they went for the right kind of highthreat training. The physical upgrades that had been sought. And 

it is because the rotations were occurring, so quickly, the continuity 

of achieving those physical upgrades, the stovepipes that no leader, 

no leader—and we focused on the key leaders in our report—saw 

fit to cross to make things happen from a leadership perspective. 

So there wasn’t active interventionist kind of leadership. And we 

particularly focused on the people with the knowledge in security 

who actually were making the decisions. So it was—as well as 

knowledge in the area, so that would be the NEA bureau as well. 

Mr. DUNCAN. You said not—the knowledge that was available. 

And several people and the chairman just talked about how no one 

has been held accountable in the way that most American people 

would consider accountability in this situation. 

And, Admiral Mullen, in your interview with the committee, you 

were asked about a man named Ray Maxwell. And you said, ‘‘Nobody had the picture like he did.’’ 

Admiral MULLEN. Ray Maxwell was in a position in the—in the 

NEA bureau where his whole portfolio were these four countries in 

the Maghreb, including Libya. As was stated earlier, there was a— 

there was a tremendous amount of instability throughout the Middle East, not just the demonstrations but clearly the evolution of 

what had happened in Egypt and Syria as well. So as you net down 

and you have the Assistant Secretary Jones, who is very focused 

on the whole region, to include those crises, and you come down 

under her, the individual with, from my perspective, the focus, the 

knowledge, the portfolio, the day-to-day focus, was Mr. Maxwell. 

And I was, quite frankly, taken back significantly that he had, 

from my perspective, removed himself from those responsibilities in 

terms of what was going on in Libya. I was shocked, actually, 

based on his interview. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I had to slip out briefly to another committee. 

Maybe you have already answered this. But were you surprised or 

shocked that he or some—or any of these other three people, the 

top four that have been removed, that they—that no one was fired? 

Admiral MULLEN. We have talked about the constraints of the 

law. And that—those are very real constraints. And if I could, oftentimes this gets equated—Chairman, you brought up the Cole. So 

this gets equated to the military. So when we have a military commander that fails we, quote-unquote, ‘‘fire’’ them. What that really 

is in essence is we move him or her out of that job. They are not 

dismissed from the Federal service, unless you get into the criminal—unless they go through the criminal proceedings, and they are 

dismissed as a result of a court-martial. So there is this mismatch 

of the perception of you fire people in the military all the time. 

What you really do is you move them out of a job. They still are 

in the Federal service. 

Mr. DUNCAN. So you don’t fire them in the way they would be 

fired in the private sector. 

44 

Admiral MULLEN. Where they are no longer part of the organization, no, sir. 

Chairman ISSA. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, sir. 

Chairman ISSA. Isn’t it true in the military you would get an adverse OER. You would never be promoted again, in all likelihood, 

and your career would be over. And in an up-or-out basis, you have 

a limited time before you are going to be forced out. And if you are 

a second, first lieutenant, you are going to be forced out before you 

are eligible for retirement. So in the military, isn’t there a level of 

ultimate accountability in which your career is over and you know 

it at that moment? 

Admiral MULLEN. Absolutely. And I would let Ambassador Pickering speak to how that works in the State Department. 

Ambassador PICKERING. I think there is an exact parallel. Exact 

parallel. If you are removed from a job, particularly under the circumstances that have to do with something like Benghazi, your future career is, in my view, finished. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

Mr. Lynch. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and ranking member. I 

want to thank the panelists for helping us with our work. To begin, 

I want to offer my prayers and condolences to the Stevens family, 

the Smith family, the Woods, and Doherty families for their loss. 

I think we can only hope that their grief and the burden that they 

now carry might be lightened a little bit by knowing that it is 

shared by so many across this Nation and perhaps by knowing the 

high regard with which our government holds the breadth of their 

family’s service and the depth of their sacrifice. Also, as has been 

mentioned, I think it is important that we remember these four individuals were among our Nation’s very best, who accepted great 

personal risk to do a very dangerous job. And in that sense, I think 

it somehow diminishes their memory to think of them as victims. 

Far from it. These four men, I think it is better to honor them and 

their memories by recalling that they—they were very dedicated 

patriots. They are American heros. They trained long and hard, 

and they prepared long and hard. And with extreme bravery, they 

went out—they went out to meet the challenges that they—that 

they faced. And they loved doing so on behalf of this country. 

Now, Admiral Mullen, in your interview with the committee, you 

said that during an unfolding crisis like this, the President is likely 

to tell their military leaders to; ‘‘do everything possible to respond.’’ 

And this is—this is basically the direction they need to start moving assets forward and formulating a response. Is that basically 

your testimony? 

Admiral MULLEN. That is my experience with two Presidents. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. Terrific. Did it happen in this case? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Did you find that the Defense Department, the State 

Department, and the intelligence community engaged quickly after 

the President gave them the green light? 

Admiral MULLEN. As rapidly as they possibly could. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. 

45 

Ambassador Pickering, the committee had the opportunity to 

interview—our committee had the opportunity to interview Jake 

Sullivan, the former director of policy, planning, at the State Department. And he told us—this is a rather lengthy quote, but he 

told us that Secretary Clinton and other senior officials were heavily engaged on the night of the attacks. And let me read you what 

he said exactly: ‘‘Secretary Clinton was receiving reports of what 

was happening, and she made a series of phone calls as a result 

of that and gave direction to Pat Kennedy, to Diplomatic Security, 

to Beth Jones, to do everything possible with respect to our own 

resources and with respect to Libyan resources to try respond to 

this situation. She was deeply engaged. She not only was receiving 

regular reports and updates, but she was proactively reaching out. 

She spoke with Director Petraeus. She spoke with the National Security Advisor on more than one occasion. She participated in the 

Secure Video Teleconference System, and she made other phone 

calls that night. And from the time she first learned of it, Secretary 

Clinton was the—this was the only thing that she was focused on.’’ 

So, Ambassador Pickering, are Mr. Sullivan’s statements consistent with what you found regarding interagency response. 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yes, they are consistent with what we 

heard principally from Mrs. Jones and from Undersecretary Kennedy from their perspectives and what we heard and what the committee heard and what the public heard from Gregory Hicks, who 

was in charge of Tripoli after the death of Ambassador Stevens. 

Mr. LYNCH. Very good. And were State Department officials immediately engaged as the attacks unfolded? 

Ambassador PICKERING. They were, sir, in multiple ways and 

through multiple channels. 

Mr. LYNCH. And, in your opinion, did they do everything that 

they could to—they could that night. 

Ambassador PICKERING. I believe they did. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. My time has gone short. But, Admiral Mullen 

and Ambassador Pickering, I have followed both of your careers. 

They are—your reputation is impeccable and your service to this 

country has been in the highest standards of State Department and 

Defense Department. I just want to say I think at times you have 

been treated unfairly and that your body of work and diligence has 

not been appreciated by some. And I just think that you are owed 

a debt of gratitude for your years of public service, number one, 

and also your diligence and your energy and honesty and integrity 

during this whole process. I just want to thank you. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. [presiding.] I thank the gentleman. 

Now recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Jordan, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JORDAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Mullen, in your testimony, your written testimony 

today, you—fourth paragraph, you say, ‘‘We operated independently, were given freedom to pursue the investigation as we 

deemed necessary.’’ 

In your interview with the committee staff, transcribed interview, the committee asked you, ‘‘The ARB is supposed to be set up 

as an independent review board. Did you have any questions about 

46 

the independence of the board?’’ Your response, ‘‘From my perspective, the most important descriptive characteristic of it was that it 

would be independent.’’ Is that all accurate? 

Admiral MULLEN. Correct. 

Mr. JORDAN. Okay. In that same interview with committee staff, 

you were asked, ‘‘Did you update the State Department in the 

course of the ARB?’’ You replied: ‘‘Shortly after we interviewed Ms. 

Lamb, Charlene Lamb, I initiated a call to Ms. Mills to give hear 

heads-up because at this point Ms. Lamb was on the list to come 

over here to testify.’’ 

Now, the ‘‘over here to testify,’’ is that in reference to when Ms. 

Lamb testified in front of this committee? 

Admiral MULLEN. In October. 

Mr. JORDAN. In October. Yes, sir. 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JORDAN. And this Ms. Mills you refer to here, is this the 

same Ms. Mills who is Cheryl Mills, chief of staff and counselor to 

the Secretary of State? 

Admiral MULLEN. It is. 

Mr. JORDAN. All right. And this is the same Ms. Mills that Greg 

Hicks testified when he was in front of the committee last spring 

that, when she calls, you take her call. It is a call you don’t always 

want to get, but it is one you always take. That is the same Cheryl 

Mills we are talking about? 

Admiral MULLEN. I accept that that is what you say—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Okay. Later in that same response to the committee’s question about you updating the State Department in the 

course of the ARB, you said this: ‘‘So, essentially, I gave Ms. Mills, 

Cheryl Mills, chief of staff, counselor to the Secretary of State, a 

heads up. I thought that her appearance, Charlene Lamb, could be 

a very difficult appearance for the State Department.’’ 

Admiral MULLEN. Correct. 

Mr. JORDAN. Now, here is what I am wondering. My guess is a 

lot of people are wondering. If this is so independent, why are you 

giving the State Department a heads up about a witness coming 

in front of this committee? 

Admiral MULLEN. We had just completed—within a day or two 

of that phone call, the—— 

Mr. JORDAN. So you had a phone call with Ms. Mills? Is that 

what we are talking about? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes. I mean, I think that is what my statement said. 

Mr. JORDAN. Okay. 

Admiral MULLEN. But, no, we had just completed the interview 

with Ms. Lamb. And as someone who—— 

Mr. JORDAN. That raises an important question. 

Admiral MULLEN. Could I answer your question? 

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, you can. 

Admiral MULLEN. So my—as someone having run a department 

and spent many, many times trying, as a leader of a department, 

to essentially—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Let me ask—my time is winding down. 

Admiral MULLEN. To—let me answer this, would you, please? 

47 

Mr. JORDAN. Well, let me ask you this, because this is important. 

The ARB was formed on October 3rd; correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. Correct. 

Mr. JORDAN. All right. Charlene Lamb came in front of this committee October 10th. 

Admiral MULLEN. Correct. 

Mr. JORDAN. Seven days later. 

Admiral MULLEN. Right. 

Mr. JORDAN. So why was she one of the first people you interviewed? 

Admiral MULLEN. She was—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Why not—— 

Admiral MULLEN. She was one of the first people interviewed because she was the one in control of Diplomatic Security decisions. 

Mr. JORDAN. Okay. How did you know she was on the list? Who 

told you she was testifying in front of Congress? 

Admiral MULLEN. It was public knowledge that she was—— 

Mr. JORDAN. That is not usually made public until 2 days before. 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, by the time I knew it—— 

Mr. JORDAN. So what day did you interview Charlene Lamb? Do 

you know? 

Admiral MULLEN. Between the 3rd and the 10th. 

Mr. JORDAN. Okay. Then when did you talk to Cheryl Mills? 

Right after that? 

Admiral MULLEN. No, not right after that. I would say within 24 

hours and specifically to give her a heads up that I didn’t think 

that Charlene Lamb would be a witness at that point in time that 

would represent the department well, specifically. And I had run 

a department, worked a lot, worked a lot historically to get the 

best—— 

Mr. JORDAN. But, again, we have been told that this—the ARB 

is an independent review. In fact, you said it. You have said it 

twice. 

Admiral MULLEN. Correct. 

Mr. JORDAN. You said it in front of the committee staff; you said 

it in your statement today. 

Admiral MULLEN. Correct. 

Mr. JORDAN. And yet within a week, within a week, you are giving the counselor to the Secretary of State a heads up about a witness who you think is not going to be good witness when it comes 

in front of the committee investigating. 

You know what else happened between October 3rd and October 

10th? Congressman Chaffetz, sitting in the chair, went to Libya. 

And on that trip, for the first time, under what Greg Hicks testified 

in front of this committee last spring, State Department, Cheryl 

Mills, sent a staff lawyer on that trip. And Greg Hicks testified 

first time in all his years of diplomatic service where that lawyer 

was instructed to be in every single meeting Jason Chaffetz had 

with Greg Hicks. That also happened. Did you and Cheryl Mills 

talk about that? 

Admiral MULLEN. No. 

Mr. JORDAN. That also—and Greg Hicks also testified that when 

there was a meeting at a classified level that this staff lawyer was 

not eligible to attend, he got a phone call quickly thereafter from 

48 

Cheryl Mills saying why in the world did you let this meeting take 

place where this lawyer couldn’t be in that meeting? 

Admiral MULLEN. I had nothing to do with—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Same Cheryl Mills in that same time frame you are 

giving a heads up to, and yet we are supposed to believe this report 

is independent. 

Admiral MULLEN. I actually rest very comfortable that it is independent. 

Mr. JORDAN. Let me ask you one last question because my time 

is out. Did Cheryl Mills—two last questions, if I could, Mr. Chairman. 

Did Cheryl Mills get to see this report before it went public? 

Admiral MULLEN. We had a draft report when it was wrapped 

up. We specifically briefed the Secretary of State for a couple of 

hours and Ms. Mills was in the room. 

Mr. JORDAN. So both Cheryl Mills and Hillary Clinton got to see 

this report before it went public? 

Admiral MULLEN. The report was submitted to her. The Secretary of State made a decision—— 

Mr. JORDAN. So before December 18—— 

Admiral MULLEN. —to release it. 

Mr. JORDAN. —they both got to see it. 

If I could, one last question. Let me just ask this, Admiral 

Mullen. So if an inspector general—if you learned that an inspector 

general in the course of an investigation informed its agency leadership that a witness scheduled to testify before Congress would reflect poorly on the agency, would you have concerns about an inspector general doing the same thing you did? 

Admiral MULLEN. The intent of—— 

Mr. JORDAN. No, that is yes or no. If an inspector general did 

what you guys did, would you have concerns about that? 

Admiral MULLEN. The intent of what I did was to give the leadership in the State Department a heads up with respect to Ms. 

Mills. That was—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman—— 

Mr. JORDAN. —see the final report until it went public. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I would ask that our witness—that Mr. Connally 

be given the same amount of time. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Absolutely. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

And I thank the ranking member. 

I welcome the panel. 

And I do want to say to family members my—I have heartache 

for your loss. I just lost three constituents at the Navy Yard last 

week. I am old enough to remember Lebanon, where our embassy 

was bombed not once, but twice. I lost a good friend in that embassy bombing in the early 1980s. Of course, we also lost our Marine Amphibious Unit. Well over a hundred lives were lost. 

I don’t remember, Mr. Pickering, an ARB at that time. Was there 

an ARB? 

Ambassador PICKERING. No. It was before ARBs became a practice, Mr. Connally. 

49 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. So we lost our embassy, dozens of deaths. 

We lost the MAU at the Beirut airport with over a hundred deaths 

of young Marines. I don’t remember any investigation. I don’t remember any charges. I don’t remember the Democrats exploiting 

Ronald Reagan’s management of that incident. We understood it 

was a national tragedy, and we tried to come together. 

I say to all four of you, I deeply regret the tone of this hearing. 

But it is typical, unfortunately, of all too many of the so-called investigations into Benghazi where apparently there is an agenda. 

And the agenda isn’t getting at the truth; it is getting at somebody. 

In fact, the chairman used the word ‘‘gotcha.’’ Seems to be regret 

there wasn’t enough ‘‘gotcha.’’ So we are going to make up for it 

by getting you and trying to besmirch the reputations, particularly 

the chairman and co-chairman of this ARB who are among the finest civil servants in their respective fields to serve this country in 

a generation. I just say to you, there are many who see through 

that and understand that innuendo and smear and insinuation and 

badgering aren’t going to cloud the truth, that a tragedy occurred, 

and it occurred because terrorists perpetrated terror. 

And we are trying to find out, as you most certainly tried to find 

out in the ARB, how can we learn from that tragedy? How can we 

make sure there aren’t more grieving families before us? How can 

we make sure we are better prepared? And I thank you for the 

courage you have shown, not only in undertaking that investigation 

but in weathering the partisanship that has clouded this investigation. 

Admiral Mullen, speaking of which, in an entirely partisan report leaked to the press, not shared with this side of the committee—which should give you a big, fat hint as to what the intent 

is—you were the subject of an allegation—follow up on the questioning just now—where, quote, ‘‘Mullen put Cheryl Mills on notice 

in advance of her interview that the board’s questions could be difficult for the State Department’’ under the title that you gave Ms. 

Mills an inappropriate heads up prior to her ARB interview. 

I want to give you an opportunity to respond to that allegation. 

Admiral MULLEN. I called, and as I said, I tried to say, I called 

Ms. Mills, having interviewed—actually the ARB had interviewed 

Ms. Lamb very early in the process, prior to the first testimony 

here on the Hill on I think the 10th of October. And I was particularly concerned because I had run a major organization, a couple 

of them and had always worked to provide the best witnesses to 

represent the organization on the Hill. And it was very early in the 

process, as far as what had happened. There were many unknowns. 

I was concerned about her level of experience. And I expressed that 

to Ms. Mills and that was it. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You don’t think that you gave an inappropriate 

heads up to Ms. Mills? 

Admiral MULLEN. No. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Did you give an inappropriate heads up to 

Charlene Lamb? 

Admiral MULLEN. No. No. I am—and in fact, with respect to the 

independence piece, it never had an impact. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Ambassador Pickering, do you want to comment 

on that? 

50 

Ambassador PICKERING. I would. 

I think there are two issues running here. I think Admiral 

Mullen has clearly explained what he did and why. I think it had 

nothing to do with the ARB. 

I do think the Republican text which you cited is an error. It had 

nothing do with testimony by Cheryl Mills before the ARB. 

The third point is that I believed from the beginning of the ARB, 

since we were to report to the Secretary, that it was my obligation 

as Chairman from time to time to talk to the Secretary through the 

chief of staff about our progress, about where we were going, about, 

in fact, the timing of the report, and, in fact, what our expectations 

were with respect to the timing of conclusion, all of which I believed was in full keeping with our obligation to the Secretary to 

give the best possible report. 

There was no direction. There was no feedback. There was no request to do this, that, or the other thing. And that happened every 

couple of weeks. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

I have one more minute, and I want to ask just one more question. 

Admiral Mullen, one of the things that has seemingly been disproved time and time again but it keeps on coming up as recently 

our hearing on Benghazi yesterday at the Foreign Affairs Committee, and that is the canard that there was an order to stand 

down, that somebody gave a command that the military was not to 

respond. Could you put that allegation to rest? Did that, in fact, 

happen, or did it not? 

Admiral MULLEN. An order to stand down was never given. This 

specifically refers to the four special operators that were in Tripoli. 

They had finished at the—at DCM Hicks’ direction, supporting 

movement of American personnel in Tripoli from the embassy compound into a safer place. Having finished that, as every military 

person, active or retired, would want to do, they want to go to the 

fight to try to help. He checked, Lieutenant Colonel Gibson checked 

up his chain of command, which was the Special Operations Command in AFRICOM, and the direction that he got was to hold in 

place. He was re-missioned then to support the security and the 

evacuation. And, in fact, only in hindsight, had they gone—and we 

had a very good understanding of what was going on then with respect to the evacuation—had they actually gotten on an airplane, 

they would have taken medical capability that was needed out of 

Tripoli and most likely crossed in route with the first plane that 

was evacuating Benghazi at the time. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Gentleman’s time has expired. Yields back. 

I now recognize any self for 5 minutes. 

Stevens, Smith, Woods, and Doherty. God bless them. That is 

what this is all about. Admiral Mullen, I would like to direct my 

questions to you. 

Within the Department of Defense, was there an after-action review or report that was done and did you read it? 

51 

Admiral MULLEN. I am—there always is, and I haven’t seen it, 

no. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. My understanding, Chaffetz there isn’t a report. 

And for you to come to the conclusions that you did without reviewing such report, or if there is a review or is such a review or report 

is something the committee wants to further explore. It seems odd 

and mysterious there is no such report and that you would not 

have reviewed it. 

Did you—did the ARB ever talk to Lieutenant Colonel Steven 

Gibson? 

Admiral MULLEN. We did not. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Did you or anybody in the ARB speak with anybody from the Office of Security Cooperation located at the embassy? 

Admiral MULLEN. We were in touch with and spoke with—actually interviewed the defense attache. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. But not within the Office of Security Cooperation. 

What about, who is Colonel George Bristol? 

Admiral MULLEN. I don’t know. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. He is the Commander of Joint Special Operations 

Task Force Trans-Sahara, directly responsible for the Office of Security Cooperation, and was not interviewed by the ARB. 

Did you ever speak with Rear Admiral Richard Landolt, Director 

of Operations for AFRICOM? 

Admiral MULLEN. Not directly, no. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And nobody within the ARB did as well—— 

Admiral MULLEN. No. But actually, we were certainly aware of 

his input, having interviewed—I am sorry—having spoken with the 

Joint Staff and the Director of Operations on the Joint Staff. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. He was the Director of Operations, AFRICOM, 

and was not interviewed by the ARB. 

Admiral MULLEN. That is different from the Joint Staff. That 

is—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Yes. I understand. And he was not interviewed. 

The Rear Admiral Brian Losey, do you know who he is? 

Admiral MULLEN. I do. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. He is the Commander, Special Operations Command at the time of Benghazi attack. Did you or the ARB interview him? 

Admiral MULLEN. We didn’t. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Did you speak with Vice Admiral Charles Joe 

Leidig, Deputy to the Commander For Military Operations there in 

AFRICOM. 

Admiral MULLEN. We spoke to actually General Ham, who is his 

boss. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. But all of these people that I—I named off, directly involved in the operations that night, and one of the concerns is you didn’t read an after-action report or review; we don’t 

even know if there is one that has been done. All these people are 

directly involved; they were not engaged in this. What time did—— 

Admiral MULLEN. I effectively, when I went back, particularly 

the second time, listened to an after-action report with respect to 

what happened that night. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. We all know—— 

52 

Admiral MULLEN. I stand by what they did and what I saw. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. We understand the General Ham was in Washington, D.C. He was not at Stuttgart. He was not in Libya. These 

people were. 

I—what time did the Department of Defense ask Libya for permission for flight clearance? 

Admiral MULLEN. Actually, General Ham was involved throughout. They were able to do that globally—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I understand he was involved, but he was not in 

Stuttgart. He was not in Libya. 

The question is, did the Department of Defense ever ask Libya 

for permission for flight clearance? I believe the answer is no. 

Admiral MULLEN. Which—do I get to answer the questions? 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I am asking if that is—— 

Admiral MULLEN. What kind of flight clearance are you talking 

about? 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So that we could fly our military assets over 

there. We already had permission to fly. The answer is no. Correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. Correct. Actually, I take that back. The—the 

assets that came from Germany, specifically, we received permission to put them—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. That was—let me keep moving. When specifically 

did the United States military reach out to our NATO partners, 

given their close proximity, when did that happen? 

Admiral MULLEN. Actually, I don’t think it did. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And that is one of the concerns. The Italians had 

more than 50 Tornadoes less than 35 minutes away from Benghazi. 

We didn’t even ask them. Never even asked why. You presided—— 

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Chaffetz. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. There is not a question in there. With all due respect, Admiral. 

Next thing. Specifically, when did the United States jets, tankers, whatever you need to do a show of force, when were they called 

up? When were they put on alert? 

Admiral MULLEN. They were specifically looked at as to whether 

or not they could get there in time, and they couldn’t. That was a 

decision that was made. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Here is the problem. 

Admiral MULLEN. Actually, their readiness status was upgraded. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. You said that no planes were at the ready. That 

was your testimony in Cairo, Admiral, with all due respect—— 

Admiral MULLEN. At the time of the attack, Mr. Chaffetz, the 

readiness status there were no strip alert aircraft ready to go. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And that is a fundamental problem and challenge, too, I think we have to look at. In Cairo hours earlier the 

demonstrators had breached a wall, gone over a 12 foot wall, they 

tore down the American flag they put up an al Qaeda-type flag. It 

was Libya after the revolution on 9/11, we had been bombed twice 

prior, the British Ambassador had the assassination attempt and 

nobody is leaning forward? There is nobody that is that’s ready to 

go? Were the closest assets truly in Djibouti? Is that where the 

closest assets were? 

Admiral MULLEN. Physically in Djibouti? I think it was between 

Djibouti and other places in Europe. 

53 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Europe actually had more assets that were closer 

than Djibouti, correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. They were not in a readiness condition to respond. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And that’s what we fundamentally do not understand. Did you talk to anybody who did want to move forward? 

Was there anybody that you came across that did want to engage—— 

Admiral MULLEN. Everybody in the military wanted to move forward. Everybody in the military wanted to do as much they can. 

There were plenty of assets moving. It became a physics problem, 

and it’s a time and distance problem. Certainly that is who we are, 

to try to help when someone is in harm’s way. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And the fundamental problem is they didn’t. They 

didn’t get there in time. I’m telling you if you look at Glen Doherty, 

you look at Lieutenant Tyrone Woods, they ran to the sound of the 

guns. There were other people that wanted to go. Like Lieutenant 

Colonel Gibson I wish you or the ARB had spoken to them, because 

it is an embarrassment to the United States of America that we 

could not get those assets there in time to help those people. We 

didn’t even try, we didn’t ask for permission, we didn’t ask for 

flight clearances, we didn’t even stand up the assets we had in Europe. We didn’t even try. 

Admiral MULLEN. I disagree with what you’re saying, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. You just told me that they did not even get to the 

ready. They were never asked. You presided as the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs when we bombed Libya for months we did so in 

connection with our NATO partners and you never asked those 

NATO partners to help and engage that night. 

Admiral MULLEN. I actually commanded NATO forces, and the 

likelihood that NATO could respond in a situation like that was absolutely zero. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that Ms. Speier be 

given an extra minute and a half so that she can clear up some 

of what you just said which we on this side of the aisle consider 

to be misleading. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I take exception to the last part, but the gentlewoman is recognized. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, I am so outraged by the conduct of this committee 

today. There is 83 years worth of service to this country by these 

two men, and they are being treated shabbily, and I apologize to 

you for what I find to be just totally unnecessary. 

We are trying to get the facts. We are trying to prevent this from 

happening again, and badgering you does not achieve that goal. 

Now let me also point out that there has been a classified briefing, Mr. Chairman, on the whole issue of whether Lieutenant Colonel Gibson was told to stand down. It was an Armed Services Committee subcommittee meeting, I was there at it. There was a press 

release that was put out by the subcommittee after that classified 

briefing. And I want to read to you what was posted. 

During the attack, Colonel Bristol was traveling in Africa, unreliable communications prohibited him from participating in the atVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:06 Oct 23, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\85095.TXT APRIL
54 

tack response beyond an initial conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Gibson and Rear Admiral Losey. Colonel Bristol confirmed to 

committee that in his role, he gave lieutenant Colonel Gibson initial freedom of action to make decisions in response to the unfolding situation in Benghazi. Lieutenant Colonel Gibson previously 

testified to the committee that contrary to some reports, he was at 

no point ordered to stand down but rather to remain in Tripoli to 

defend the American embassy there in anticipation of possible additional attacks and to assist the survivors of the return from 

Benghazi. Colonel Bristol confirmed this account of events. 

When, I ask, will we ever listen to the facts? This came out of 

the subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee chaired by a 

Republican colleague. These are the facts. 

Let me move on and ask Admiral Mullen a question as well. 

Another allegation has been made by many Republicans including that the military should have sent the F–16s or other fighter 

planes to fly over Benghazi. I think that was a series of 

questionings from just prior to mine. Mr. Issa stated on national 

radio you still have to say why weren’t there aircraft and capability 

headed toward them at flank speed, and the next time this happens can we count on this President and Secretary to actually care 

about people in harm’s way as they are being attacked by al Qaeda 

elements? 

There are some things wrong with this statement. And I don’t 

know where to start but how about this. Do you agree the President of the United States and Secretary of State: ‘‘do not care about 

people in harm’s way?’’ 

Admiral MULLEN. I do not agree with that. 

Ms. SPEIER. With respect to flying jets over Benghazi, page 32 of 

our report includes an excerpt from your interview transcript 

where you explain that these planes would have needed refueling 

maybe twice en route, is that correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. That’s correct. 

Ms. SPEIER. That is basically the same thing General Dempsey, 

the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in his testimony 4 months earlier before the Senate Armed Services Committee is that correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. That’s correct. 

Ms. SPEIER. After conducting your own independent review of the 

military assets, did you reach the same conclusion as General 

Dempsey? 

Admiral MULLEN. I did. 

Ms. SPEIER. In fact, on Page 31 of our report, we quote from your 

interview transcript, there’s no one I’ve ever met in military that 

wouldn’t want to get help there instantly. The physics of it, the reality of it, it just wasn’t going to happen for 12 to 20 hours. And 

I validated that in my review when I went to the Pentagon to look 

at every single asset that was postured in theater including those 

jets in Aviano, is that correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. Correct. 

Ms. SPEIER. So Admiral Mullen, both former Secretary Gates and 

former Secretary Panetta raised other risk-based concerns about 

sending aircraft to fly over Benghazi on the night of the attack. Are 

you familiar with their concerns and do you agree with them? 

55 

Admiral MULLEN. I am familiar with their concerns, and you always have to assess the risks in a situation like that. My own experience is that certainly our military is prepared to go into high-risk 

environments if they’re able to do that. There was an awful lot that 

night back to what we’ve talk about, that precluded that. It wasn’t 

for lack of the desire to do that or help someone in harm’s way. 

The other thing I would talk briefly about is the whole issue of 

the situation under, the circumstances in which Tyrone Woods and 

Glen Doherty actually gave their lives and in fact, they were killed 

in a very—they had just relieved two individuals on top of the 

building. Shortly after that, there were three mortar rounds that 

landed very accurately in a very short period of time in the middle 

of the night from a place nobody really knew where that mortar 

fire was coming from. And that is how they lost their lives in the 

end. 

So even the likelihood that we could have provided some kind of 

overflight over a long period of time, the likelihood that that would 

have somehow sorted out that mortar fire is virtually impossible. 

Ms. SPEIER.I thank you gentlemen for your service and to the 

families of those who lost their loved ones. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Would the gentlelady yield 30 seconds? 

Ms. SPEIER. Yes. I yield. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chaffetz asked you about a number of people 

that you said you did an interview. Would either of you comment 

on that? How did you choose who you interviewed? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think we both can quickly. We basically, as 

we started the interview we took, we essentially took the process 

and those we would interview based on the facts as we uncovered 

them over time, and did not feel, I did not feel compelled to interview the chain of command in South Africa. I understand that 

chain of command. I know what happens. I know Losey. I know 

where he was and I know what they were doing that night. I just 

didn’t feel compelled to do that. And I was very comfortable, as I’ve 

said in my opening statement, we interviewed those we thought we 

needed to interview. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The gentlewoman’s time is expired. We’ll now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sullivan, the ARB report discussed stovepipe to discussions 

by the State Department regarding decisions on policy and security. 

My question to you is what can be done to ensure these security 

decisions are not stovepiped and that the individuals making the 

decisions have access to the necessary security information. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Congressman. One of the things that 

we had recommended that I mentioned earlier was to create, to elevate the assistant secretary for diplomatic security to an under secretary level. As I’m sure you know overall, the Secretary is in 

charge of security for the Department, and that authority is delegated down to the Assistant Secretary. What we found is that that 

has led to a little bit of some confusion. When we spoke to people 

in the embassies, to the ambassadors, to the RSOs, to the deputy 

chief of mission, it seems like the lines of communication, the lines 

56 

of authority, accountability are pretty well understood. What we 

found is at the headquarter level that was not as well understood. 

So we believe that by creating this new under secretary, there 

will be clear lines of authority that the under secretary in our view 

would be involved in the policy decisions with the under secretaries 

and we believed that that would go a long way towards creating 

clearer lines of communication. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you. 

Mr. Keil, the best practices panel found that it is common across 

many industries to have a hot wash or after action debriefing of 

key participants in a critical event. 

What is the purpose of a hot wash? 

Mr. KEIL. Sir, I think, and as Admiral Mullen says that typically 

happens at the Department of Defense also. It is to gain critical information as quickly as possible before memories start to fade. 

Mr. WALBERG. Does State Department have a hot wash? 

Mr. KEIL. We did not find any process for after action or hot 

wash at the State Department. 

Mr. WALBERG. So there is no lessons learned process at the Department of State? 

Mr. KEIL. We did not find a lessons learned process no. 

Mr. WALBERG. In your opinion, what should the Department do 

to create an effective lessons learned process? 

Mr. KEIL. I think they need to do a lessons-learned process from 

a tactical and strategic perspective, a lessons-learned process within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and a broader enterprise wide 

lessons learned process for the Department to gather that critical 

information as quickly as possible, wrap it back into operations, 

wrap it back into training. 

Mr. WALBERG. Any indication that that’s being done? 

Mr. KEIL. Not that I know of. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you. Admiral Mullen, again, with all due 

respect, and this is a rhetorical question, you’ve answered it already, but I just wanted to ask this question to bring the context 

back again, and that question is, why should we not conclude that 

a heads up, as you indicated, is not a desire to coach a witness or 

an action, especially in the context of an independent panel such 

as the ARB? 

Admiral MULLEN. The only thing I would say is the intent was 

to get the best possible witness identified for the State Department. 

Mr. WALBERG. Again, with all due respect, again, an independent 

panel coaching a witness, I don’t think we conclude anything else 

from that. 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I didn’t coach—there was no coaching 

that was ever discussed. 

Mr. WALBERG. Ambassador Pickering, why did the board decide 

not to administer oaths to those testifying before the board? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Because no ARB had done that in the 

past, and we had no reason to believe that we would not get truthful testimony. 

Mr. WALBERG. So this was consistent with the practice of previous ARBs? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yes, Mr. Walberg. 

57 

Mr. WALBERG. Why were interviews then not recorded or transcribed? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Interviews were recorded on the basis 

that the, if previous ARBs had followed, in addition, it was a pattern that interestingly enough the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

adopted in its reports as well. We felt it was more than sufficient 

to record the critical and key points that we would have to take 

into account in preparing our report on recommendations—— 

Mr. WALBERG. Could you see a benefit in adopting this practice, 

especially in the context that this panel has found it almost impossible to get full information on making decisions on our own, regardless of what the other side of the dais says. 

Ambassador PICKERING. With deep respect, there is a difference 

between your access to documents and the question of the type of 

documents that should be prepared. 

Mr. WALBERG. What do you mean by that? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I don’t believe that transcribed interviews would have created the kind of attitude and approach of give 

and take which we found with the witnesses, which was particularly useful and relevant. I think that the formal process, in fact, 

of taking a transcription is, in some ways, inhibiting of the kind 

of information we were soliciting, the kind of views we wanted to 

get, and the broad and open character of the kind of approach we 

were taking. 

Mr. WALBERG. Well, I appreciate that, but more importantly, the 

American public and this panel doesn’t feel like we have that access to information necessary to make good decisions about the 

movement forward, and we talk about stovepipes, we talk about 

hot washes, and all of these things that are done at other levels 

of government, other agencies, other industries, and we here have 

information lacking to us because there is not information that we 

can read or bring out to the American public. 

Chairman ISSA. [presiding.] Mr. Walberg, I will assure you that 

this committee will not have chummy discussions that are friendly 

and cordial in lieu of the kind of interviews that we make available 

on the record. We will continue to use our process even if others 

thinks that conversations unrecorded are important and I thank 

the gentleman. 

Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that. I understand 

that you will do that. We needed that from this panel, and the 

American public deserves it, and especially the families sitting in 

this room and not deserve that information. Thank you. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from 

Pennsylvania. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I ask the gentleman be given an extra minute 

and a half. 

Chairman ISSA. The gentleman is recognized. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you Ranking 

Member Cummings, and thank you, Ambassador Pickering and Admiral Mullen for coming back. Both of you testified at prior proceedings, closed-door deposition, recorded interviews. I had the 

privilege of helping conduct some of that questioning, and so we’ve 

spoken quite a bit at length already and I thank you for coming 

back again today on this terribly sad chapter in American history. 

58 

I’m going to start with you, Ambassador Pickering. In your deposition that you had with the committee, you told us that to the best 

of your knowledge ‘‘no other ARB was so extensive and far reaching 

in its findings of personal responsibility or personal accountability, 

or made such far reaching recommendations at such high levels in 

the State Department.’’ 

Now you also told us that in writing this report, you didn’t want 

to ‘‘pull any punches’’ and you felt that ‘‘you had a serious obligation under the law and from the Secretary to do that.’’ But you also 

explained that you were ‘‘deeply concerned’’ that previous ARBs 

‘‘had been excellent in their recommendations, but that through the 

follow-through had dwindled away’’ as you said. 

Ambassador Pickering, my understanding that Secretary Clinton 

immediately adopted all 29 recommendations in the ARB report, 

and that the State Department is making progress on all of them. 

Is that true? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yes, Mr. Cartwright, to the best of my 

knowledge I believe they are. It was testimony I understand yesterday to that effect as well. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. And Ambassador Pickering, I gather you believe that, if implemented, your recommendations will make U.S. 

Facilities abroad and the people that serve in them safer? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yes, we believe that is the case, Mr. 

Cartwright. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Would you take a few moments and explain to 

us how the recommendations will make us safer? 

Ambassador PICKERING. They will in the cases of posts, particularly like Benghazi, stop the personnel churn which allowed such 

deficiencies to develop both in continuity and focus and size of personnel. 

We believe they will provide a better system for the decision 

making with respect to the improvement of physical security by the 

application of higher standards. We believe that the training programs that we recommend will improve the capacity of both security specialists and non-security specialists to know and understand how to, in fact, operate more effectively. We believe that the 

serious discrepancy between fire safety preparations and security 

safe havens illustrated in Benghazi will be ended, and that there 

will be appropriate equipment to deal with fire safety in safe haven 

areas. 

Those are just a few, Mr. Cartwright, of what I think are the 

most salient points. 

If I could ask permission just to make one brief statement, the 

chairman just implied that our interviews and our work was not 

recorded. And the chairman knows and I know that that is not the 

case. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Thank you, Ambassador. And Admiral Mullen, 

I want to give you a chance to weigh in on this question as well. 

Admiral MULLEN. Well the only thing that I would add to that 

is with the immediate establishment inside the NEA bureau, if 

somebody at the senior office—the senior individual with respect to 

diplomatic security with the establishment of a separate the Diplomatic Security Deputy Assistant Secretary specifically focused on 

high threat posts. 

59 

And to Chairman Issa, one of the things that I thought was helpful in your report was this focus on expeditionary diplomacy. And 

if I were to give you an example of expeditionary diplomacy, it 

would be in places like Benghazi and quite frankly, in consulates 

in Iraq and Afghanistan and places like Pakistan that we all need 

to focus on to make sure that we do all the balance, the need to 

be there, and be there in a secure way as absolutely possible. 

So I actually think that the changes that were recommended will 

have a substantial impact on how the State Department moves forward, how we move forward as a country in these very difficult 

times. 

It’s changed since the ARB of 1998 and 1999. The world has 

changed and we need to adapt to that and in many ways, in many 

ways, we have. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Well, I thank you for that gentlemen and I 

yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentlemen. And just to make the 

record clear, Ambassador, we will disagree on what a record is. 

This committee makes an accurate, verbatim record to the greatest 

extent possible just as the transcription is being done today which 

is different than the impressions in a diplomatic note. And I appreciate the fact that the diplomatic service looks at dit notes which 

are impressions of what was said as a record, and I know it is helpful, but it is a very different standard in investigations and one of 

the things that this committee is considering and, Mr. Cartwright, 

I hope that you appreciate it too is that the level of record, of any 

investigation done of any incident no matter what part of government, needs to be considered for how it will be recorded. 

That is not to disparage you or the history of how they’ve been 

done. We appreciate, at least I appreciate, that you recorded as per, 

if you will, your 40-plus years of history and ARBs. What we are 

viewing and Mr. Walberg was viewing is more how we do it. And 

I will assure you that if the FBI were investigating the death of 

four people, they would tend very much to want a very accurate 

record, which is what we are looking for, Ambassador. 

Ambassador PICKERING. Well, they can speak best for themselves 

but our impression has been that the type of recording they provided to us in connection with their investigation of four dead 

Americans was very much along the lines that we were preparing 

for our own use. Admittedly and reasonable people can differ, investigations and reviews sometimes have a different context and a 

different purpose. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you, Ambassador. 

And we now go to the gentleman from Arizona—I’m sorry the 

gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Lankford is there. Mr. Lankford. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Thank you. And thank you to all of you. 

You’ve done a tremendous amount of work and a tremendous 

amount of preparation both for this hearing, but obviously for a lot 

of the reports and everything that you’ve done and the hours that 

you’ve spent for it, I want you know we appreciate that very much, 

and what you’ve taken on, the scope of it. 

My line of questioning is just trying to gather a group of facts 

as we know it at this point, again, to try to zero in on some of the 

60 

things you’re trying to accomplish what do we do to not have this 

repeat again in the days ahead. 

Would you agree we had an overt dependence on Libyan security 

that night and the security team that was local that was not sufficient for the task and that we had an overdependence on them at 

that point? Anyone can answer that. 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yes. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Would you agree we did not have a sufficient 

number of our own armed security forces on the ground? We had 

a larger number before of DOD personnel over there. They were obviously removed, their task as it was done they normalized, as I’ve 

heard several folks say, both Charlene Lamb and Ambassador Kennedy said they wanted it normalized, that we did not have a sufficient number of armed security there that night? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I believe the answer to that is yes, but 

your implication that ‘‘DOD was anywhere around Benghazi at 

that time’’ is a mistake. 

Mr. LANKFORD. No, I’m talking about prior to that, were DOD 

personnel there in August? 

Ambassador PICKERING. DOD personnel served a few short periods in Benghazi, but their assignment was in Tripoli, their work 

was in Tripoli, and their majority was always in Tripoli. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Did they travel with the Ambassador when he 

went to Benghazi or would they have traveled with him? 

Ambassador PICKERING. No. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Because the testimony that we had received is 

that they would have assigned some of those folks to travel with 

the Ambassador—— 

Ambassador PICKERING. The Ambassador took two Benghazi, two 

Department of State security agents with him. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Right, because they didn’t have other folks that 

were there to be able to travel. Those twelve individuals had already left. 

Admiral MULLEN. I think it’s really important, this is the SST, 

I think it’s really important to focus on what the SST’s mission 

was, and over the period of time when they were there for many, 

many months, over that period of time, the vast majority of their 

mission was training. They did take a couple of forays out to 

Benghazi, they did make some security recommendations, and from 

that perspective, they certainly provided some input with respect 

to security. But my own view is, I think it’s a reach to think that 

they would have been there that night. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Fair enough. Did we have adequate diplomatic 

security there that night? 

Ambassador PICKERING. The answer to that I already gave you. 

No. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Thank you for that. The facility, did it meet the 

standards set, the Inman standards after the 98 the facility in 

Benghazi? 

Ambassador PICKERING. No certainly not. It didn’t meet any of 

the standards that were set for Department of State folks. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Do you know how many posts that we had worldwide? At that time? Obviously, that has changed dramatically as 

61 

it should. How many posts did we have worldwide at that time that 

didn’t meet that minimum standard? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I’m only guessing but somewhere between one-third and up. 

Mr. LANKFORD. A third of our posts did not meet the standards 

at that time? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yes. 

Mr. LANKFORD. So 260 or so posts worldwide and you’re saying 

a third of those didn’t meet the standard set in 1999? 

Ambassador PICKERING. That’s my best understanding. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Is there a certain—— 

Ambassador PICKERING. Could I just say, Mr. Lankford, one of 

our principle recommendations was that the Inman building building program recommended in the Nairobi Dar Es Salaam ARB 10 

years before had dwindled away, and that it needed to go back to 

10 a year at a cost beginning in 2015 of $2.2 billion a year, and 

that’s in recognition that probably among those that don’t meet 

standards, there are urgent high threat, high-risk posts perhaps 

that ought to get priority in that program. 

Mr. LANKFORD. What about the high-risk posts? How many posts 

would you consider high risk high threat at that time? 

Ambassador PICKERING. At the time of Benghazi, the Department of State with the Department of Defense had an emergency 

review of 19 posts, including visits to them, which I believe was 

their judgment about what was high risk, high threat at that time. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Is there any special chain of authority to have actual personnel there, any differences in the high risk high threat? 

Who makes the decision putting personnel there and what the security is there? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yes, there is, and the decisions were 

made at the place that we identified, the Deputy Assistant Secretary in Diplomatic Security makes the primary decisions, that 

her bosses are the people who oversee and review that activity. 

Mr. LANKFORD. So that would be Charlene Lamb, Patrick Kennedy, would that go up to the Secretary of State’s Office who would 

have to sign off on that? 

Ambassador PICKERING. No. And they don’t go to the under secretary for management unless there is a dispute and then they do 

go to him for resolution. 

Mr. LANKFORD. You had mentioned before as well that night or 

Admiral Mullen had actually that night there was no one on the 

ready to be able to respond militarily. 

Admiral MULLEN. Correct. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Did you discover if there was a contingency plan? 

Obviously, we are in a high-risk location, Libya is in a civil war 

just coming out of that, did you see if there was a contingency plan 

for a response in case there was an emergency? 

Admiral MULLEN. I’m not aware. I don’t think there was one, and 

I’m not aware if there was. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Is that something that we should recommend in 

the days ahead? 

Admiral MULLEN. It goes back to available assets and what are 

you going to focus on and what the priorities are. 

62 

Mr. LANKFORD. Sure I would say you take high risk locations. 

There’s a relatively small number that are high-risk locations. 

Should those locations have a contingency? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, 19 is not a small number when you start 

talking about forces. So how are you going to make those decisions 

and distribute your forces? It is a worthy discussion, and I know 

that the Pentagon and the administration has recalibrated that as 

a result of Benghazi. But it’s not an infinite resource and so you 

can’t get them everywhere. 

Ambassador PICKERING. If I could just add, Mr. Lankford, the 

first line of defense is the local government. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Right, which was not sufficient. 

Ambassador PICKERING. The second line of defense is our resources in place and those are the things we concentrated our attention on. As you know, the Department of State is assigned an 

additional number of marines and an additional number of security 

officers. They’ve come to you for that support, I hope they get it, 

I believe it is going ahead. 

Mr. LANKFORD. And that was our concern as well that obviously 

the Libyan militia was not sufficient. We know that clearly now. 

We didn’t have a high enough number of diplomatic security personnel. The facility obviously did not meet the minimum standards. 

It was listed as a high-risk facility, and we seem to not have a contingency plan. The difficulty is it appears that the individuals that 

were there were very naked, and we understand our diplomatic 

personnel around the world always take risks on it, but they 

seemed to be particularly exposed in this particular location. 

Admiral MULLEN. The only other thing I would add to that, and 

I mentioned this in my closed statement is that it was the deterioration of the numbers and the upgrades over time, over the course 

of that many months, that essentially did not prepare that 

Benghazi compound from a deterrent standpoint. But it was very 

significant, and had we had two or three times the number of people in place that night from a security standpoint, I’m not sure that 

a mob, a terrorist mob like that that they could have done much, 

but what we also lost by watching the numbers deteriorate and not 

upgrading it, we lost any kind of deterrent capability so that the 

enemy would think twice about whether they would do something 

like that. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman’s time is 

expired. And I thank the Admiral for including the portion of this 

that talks about if you have a strong force, you often don’t get attacked, and that may have been ultimately the greatest benefit of 

additional forces. 

We now go to the gentleman from Wisconsin for 5 minutes. 

Mr. POCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the witnesses. I appreciate you being here today. 

As one of the newer folks around here, I know when I signed up 

for this, even though I served in the legislature for about 14 years, 

I knew it wasn’t exactly going to be Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, 

but I also didn’t expect Groundhog’s Day. And I have to admit I 

feel a little bit like I’m watching another copy of Groundhog’s Day. 

We’ve had I think 12 Congressional hearings on Benghazi, three 

in this committee that I’ve been on. There are three this week 

63 

alone in the House. I know that I sat through part of a closed deposition with Ambassador Pickering, and for several hours where we 

asked some questions. We’ve gone through extensive conversations 

about Benghazi. And I think sometimes in the bubble that’s Washington having just come from outside the bubble, where real people 

were, before I got elected, I think sometimes it’s odd that members, 

we think that we know more by visiting bases than someone who 

has been, perhaps, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs. 

And I guess what my questions specifically are, kind of following 

off Mr. Cartwright, what I’m most concerned about is what we’re 

doing to make sure this never happens again, to make sure that 

we are actually honoring the lives of Sean Smith and Tyrone 

Woods and Glen Doherty and Chris Stevens by making sure that 

their friends and co-workers and the people who work across the 

world for us in those 270-plus locations that we talked about don’t 

have to face another Benghazi, and what we can do to make sure 

of that. 

And I think that is, by far, the most important thing that we can 

do, and I know that Ambassador Pickering you specifically said you 

want to make sure this never happens again. 

And part of what the reports, both reports have outlined there 

are a number of recommendations, I think one of the areas perhaps 

that we’ve been remiss on is Congress, in my opinion, and having 

come from the outside spending more time out there than here is 

that we don’t talk about what Congress has to do. This Congress 

has been pretty much failing to get much of anything done. 

But I think when you look at the recommendations that came in 

your report and most recently in the newest report there are specific things that Congress should be doing to make sure that we 

protect our embassies in other locations across the world, and I 

think we’re remiss in doing that. And I think what our job really 

should be is rather than poking and poking and hoping to get a 

gotcha, which I think sometimes happens too often in Congress, 

let’s figure out what we’re doing to make sure this never, ever happens again and honor the lives of the people who lost their lives. 

So if I can ask specifically, Ambassador Pickering, you talked 

about the fact that State Department immediately accepted those 

recommendations, and in the process of implementing them, how 

about the recommendations you had for Congress recommendation 

Number 10, have we moved at all on the recommendations that 

we’ve had for Congress to make sure that we are protecting our facilities across the world? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I believe that on a couple of the recommendations that were made of an emergency character after the 

visit to the 19 posts I spoke about a minute ago with Mr. Lankford, 

there have been moves by Congress. It has not been, put it this 

way, our brief or our responsibility to do the follow-up to the report. There are a number of our recommendations which have to 

be translated into legislation or legislative proposals. And on that, 

we rely on the State Department and the budget process to proceed 

to you so I think that in effect, the Congress in this case is not 

being asked independently to take initiatives, but hopefully to support the executive branch’s recommendations to take our ideas and 

put them into action. 

64 

Mr. POCAN. So by Congress not moving a budget, kind of living 

on continuing resolutions as we have for the last 4 years, we really 

haven’t had a chance to address the very recommendations that I 

think you have made in this report. 

Ambassador PICKERING. And I don’t know, sir, whether these will 

be sups of 2014, 2015, proposals or not. That really comes beyond 

our responsibility, and I would hesitate at this stage to try to give 

you a thought when I don’t know. 

Mr. POCAN. Thank you. And it’s my hope, Mr. Chairman, that at 

some point as we continue, and I know we will continue to talk 

about what happened in Benghazi and it’s a tragic incident, that 

we will really focus on, I think what Congress can do best, which 

is how do we make sure what do we do to make sure nothing happens like this again. 

So as much as I know we keep looking backwards, I think there 

is a reason why our eyes are in the front of our face and not the 

back of our head, because we actually have to figure what we’re 

doing to make sure that this doesn’t happen to those other 270 facilities, so we honor the lives of the four people who lost their lives, 

and I would hope, and I am hopeful that that’s where we’ll be moving in the future. 

Chairman ISSA. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. POCAN. Sure, I yield. 

Chairman ISSA. I’m sorry you weren’t there on the CODEL in 

January where we actually saw some of the changes that were 

made post 9/11 in Morocco and Algeria. And I’m sorry you didn’t 

get to see the facility in Lebanon which is, of course, is famously 

not Inman compliant, but has several hundred people who guard 

it with armed weapons, including heavy machine guns because 

there’s an awful lot that has to be considered in addition to the 

question of dollars. But if you’re available, along with Ms. 

Duckworth, I would love to have you go on the next trip to the region and we can begin looking at what recommendations we could 

help with. 

Mr. POCAN. Mr. Chairman, I think that is a great suggestion. I 

would love to do that. I just looked at what just happened was we 

looked at what we might do in Syria, and what was one of the first 

things that happened was we were contacting people in embassies 

and countries around it putting out warnings to make sure. 

So we know there still is an imminent threat out there in certain 

regions of the world, but what I don’t see us doing is addressing 

that part of what Congress’ responsibility, what can we do about 

it to make sure it doesn’t happen again rather than continuing to 

look backwards. And I’m really looking forward to the conversations we have that are forward looking to make sure we protect our 

people who work across the world for us. 

Chairman ISSA. And one of the challenges we do have, you mentioned Syria, the Ambassador’s residence in Syria is basically right 

on a street with glass windows, and you look out on people going 

by. And it hasn’t been selected historically for an upgrade for a 

number of reasons, mostly host nation support. 

It’s one of our challenges. And if you’re lucky enough to ever get 

to Dublin which you’ll discover there is that our embassy is on an 

65 

intersection of two streets where the windows can be broken inadvertently by a rock being popped up from a truck going by. 

So we do have a lot of facilities around the world and the complexity of it is important I think today when we look at a situation 

in a country that might have been more similar to Afghanistan or 

Iraq in Benghazi on September 11th, there’s a different consideration, and hopefully that is part of what Foreign Affairs will look 

at in detail. But I look forward to having you on our next trip. 

And with that we go to the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Gosar, 

Dr. Gosar. 

Mr. GOSAR. Thank you. Mr. Sullivan, the best management practice review panel found that many important recommendations 

made in the 1999 ARB convened after the Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam bombings were not, in fact, implemented. In fact, you wrote 

this report was largely ignored by the Department and did not receive wide circulation within either the Department or DS at the 

time. 

Many of the senior officials involved before, during and after the 

Benghazi attacks, including the ARB, held senior positions within 

the Department prior to and after the 1998 attacks. 

At the time, Thomas Pickering was the Under Secretary of Political Affairs, Patrick Kennedy was the Acting Assistant Secretary 

for Diplomatic Security, Susan Rice was the Assistant Secretary for 

the Bureau of African Affairs. 

What did your best management panel recommend to ensure 

that the State Department would actually implement the recommendations set forth in your report by the Benghazi ARB? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. You know, Congressman, what we thought was 

that it’s really important that this be an enterprise-wide initiative, 

that everybody has to be involved in this and everybody has to understand what their roles are. 

We talked about how important accountability is, and we didn’t 

look at accountability as a negative, we looked at accountability as 

a positive as an enabler. 

So we just felt that, with these recommendations, I can’t speak 

to what happened in the past, but we do believe that this is not 

just about the office of diplomatic security but it’s about department-wide and everybody knowing what their responsibilities are 

and what their accountability is, and that everybody work on this 

together. For example, risk management, you know we believed 

that, you know, having a formalized risk management model is 

something that is very important, and again, not just for the Department of Diplomatic Security, but also for the whole enterprise. 

Mr. GOSAR. Mr. Keil, would you agree with that? 

Mr. KEIL. Certainly, Congressman. I think Mr. Sullivan hit on a 

fundamental issue. We were talking previously about the facility in 

Benghazi, how high the walls were, if there was any blast resistance, how many agents were there. Those tactical things are important but the fundamental issue comes down to if the State Department does not have a risk management process to determine and 

make informed decisions, should we be in some of these places with 

a full understanding of the risk? That’s what our panel found. 

Mr. GOSAR. So let’s go back on, so will regular best management 

panel evaluations be conducted to ensure that the recommendation 

66 

set forth in your report and that the ARB recommendations will be 

followed? 

Mr. KEIL. Right. That is part of the ARB recommendation that 

created our panel, it called for regular re-evaluation. 

Mr. GOSAR. And I guess what I’m coming back to is accountability, right? And part of that accountability could be part of Congress’ duty, would it not? 

Mr. KEIL. Definitely. Obviously, some of the recommendations 

are going to take Congressional action. 

Mr. GOSAR. And I’m a private sector guy, so this mortifies me 

what I’ve just seen here because accountability is very implicit, I 

mean, you’re going to have a stack of attorneys, you’re going to 

have depositions, you’re going to have transcripts, and you don’t 

get a go pass go and collect $200 it doesn’t work in the private sector. 

So from the standpoint of the records that we’ve been talking 

about at this ARB, the State Department is withholding those 

interview summaries that have come out because there are no 

transcriptions, but there has been a recorded log. 

In order for Congress to do its job, we should have access to 

those, should we not? 

Mr. KEIL. I think that’s probably a question more for Admiral 

Mullen and Ambassador Pickering. 

Mr. GOSAR. I’m asking you. 

Mr. KEIL. Yes, I believe so. 

Mr. GOSAR. How do you feel about that, Mr. Sullivan? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would agree that if these are documents that 

Congress is entitled to, that they should have them to review as 

well. 

Mr. GOSAR. How about that, Admiral Mullen? 

Admiral MULLEN. Again, I have a longstanding history in terms 

of providing documents when requested, and I think it’s something 

that’s got to be worked out between the Hill, the administration—— 

Mr. GOSAR. No, no, no, no, it doesn’t need to be worked out. It’s 

our due diligence, sir. I mean, accountability, I mean, I’m talking 

to a man who is very accountable, and through his whole lifetime 

has been that way. And the mantra in this place in this Beltway 

needs to change. There needs to be accountability. That is why I 

would hope that you would genuinely come forward and say, absolutely, those records should be turned over. 

Admiral MULLEN. I have lived my life focusing on accountability, 

and I feel very strongly about that. 

Mr. GOSAR. I would expect you to say absolutely yes, that those 

records should be turned over to Congress. I mean, from what I’ve 

ever seen and I’ve ever heard of you, that you would say absolutely, 

accountability and transparency should be there. And I personally, 

you, Admiral Mullen, would see it right to turn those records over. 

Admiral MULLEN. I have, believe me, I’m right where you think 

I am with respect to accountability. The issue of the specifics of 

what’s inside that has to be worked out, specifically, with respect 

to records. I mean, I’ve been in departments that for reasons, whatever the reason is, they don’t provide or take a long time, and I’m 

67 

not privy, quite frankly, to the specifics of why those are not being 

provided right now. 

Mr. GOSAR. So you don’t like the status quo? 

Admiral MULLEN. No, no, I think that what where we were in 

the ARB was to try to get to the best position we could with respect 

to accountability, driven by the law, quite frankly—— 

Mr. GOSAR. I understand but part of that accountability is the 

oversight of Congress, and part of the oversight of Congress for implementation, because we’ve seen this timeline of ineptitude of implementing these, actually these discussions from previous actions. 

And part of that is that we’re not getting part of the records to actually have that oversight, because legislative is not just budgets 

it’s also about this—— 

Chairman ISSA. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Admiral MULLEN. I think oversight to ensure implementation 

and execution in the long term makes a lot of sense. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the Admiral. With that we go to the 

gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ladies and gentlemen, in the Army, our soldiers live by a creed and a warrior ethos 

that begins with, I will always place the mission first, I will never 

accept defeat, I will never quit, and I will never leave a fallen comrade behind. 

I believe that all of our personnel in Benghazi and in Tripoli 

lived, and in the case of our four heroes, laid down their lives as 

warriors on that day. That said, Admiral Mullen, I think the Navy 

has something similar to the warrior ethos, but the Navy’s version 

of it. 

I want to go back over what we’ve talked about today, and ask 

you to just briefly answer my following questions and I’m going to 

give you some time to speak towards the end. 

First as to the allegation that the four-man team in Tripoli was 

ordered to stand down, there was no such order. The team was directed to provide security and medical assistance in Tripoli. Is that 

correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. That’s correct. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. With respect to the allegation that the military 

could have flown aircraft over Benghazi in a matter of hours, in 

fact, they would have needed tankers to refuel them and those 

tankers were many more hours away, is that correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. That’s correct. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. In terms of the allegations by unidentified person who claims to be a special operator that a European Union 

command special forces team could have prevented the attacks in 

Benghazi, that is also incorrect, according to your review and the 

review of General Dempsey? 

Admiral MULLEN. That is incorrect. That is, what you’re saying 

is correct. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. Admiral Mullen, I really don’t understand this because you know it used to be that when our Nation 

came under attack, we would rally together and especially, especially around our men and women in uniform. And the allegations 

that anyone in the military in the uniform on that day would ever 

do anything other than their very best effort to come to the assistVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:06 Oct 23, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\85095.TXT APRIL
68 

ance of the men and women in Benghazi and in Tripoli troubles 

me. 

You yourself have commanded a gasoline tanker, a guided missile destroyer, a guided missile cruiser, you’ve commanded a cruiser destroyer group and the United States Navy Second Fleet. I 

would suspect that if you could have personally done anything to 

get there, you would have yourself based on your extensive military 

experience. 

Admiral MULLEN. I certainly would have. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Admiral, during your interview, you addressed 

this exact line of questioning, on page 32 of our report, you explained how these accusations affect our military service members. 

And this is what you said. ‘‘The line of questioning approached 

here for those of us in the military that we would consider for a 

second not doing anything we possibly could just stirs us to our 

bones because that’s not who we are. We don’t leave anybody behind.’’ Did you say that? 

Admiral MULLEN. I did. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. So Admiral, what do you say to those, such as 

my very passionate colleague from Utah who continue to question 

the integrity, the professionalism and the motives of our military 

commanders and our men and women in uniform? You can take as 

much of my remaining times as you would like. 

Admiral MULLEN. One of the things that has been evident in this 

review and certainly even in Congressional testimony for former 

members of the military and indeed serving foreign service officers 

is the, that you see is the frustration with the inability to deliver 

that night. And I think it’s universal. And I can see it in the, along 

the lines of questioning. And I understand that. 

I led a force for many years. No one I ever knew in that force 

that wouldn’t give their life to try to save those four individuals. 

And including myself. So that every—which is one of the reasons 

I paid so much attention to what could have happened that night 

from a military standpoint and looked at it as I indicated twice. 

There really was a time distance physics problem that would 

have prevented us from getting there for what seems to be an extraordinary amount of time. But as I indicated earlier in particular 

with the F–16s, for example, there are very real requirements in 

order to do that, not even getting to the point of how do you mitigate the risk. And believe me, the military’s willing to go into highrisk places. It just wasn’t going to happen in time. 

What is, to some degree, a little bit ironic in all of this, is at the 

compound, we lost two great heroes and we talked tonight, or today 

about the fact that they weren’t very well armed, that the security 

posture wasn’t there at all, as it should be, and I think rightfully 

so, have criticized that. At the other compound, we actually had a 

compound that was incredibly well armed, incredibly well defended 

and yet somehow back to this mortar fire in the middle of the night 

we lost two people which speaks to the challenge that you have creating security in every circumstance, and those two heroes again 

were individuals had come from a force that I know well. So there 

is no one I know in the military that didn’t do that night all they 

could and wouldn’t do all they could to save those people. 

69 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Admiral, thank you. Can you say that the military has learned some valuable lessons from that day and is doing 

a better job now of considering what we should do in the future in 

terms of our force posture? 

Admiral MULLEN. Again, my—as far as posture is concerned, I 

know that the forces have been repostured, specifically in that part 

of the world, although I don’t know the details and that was a lesson that was learned and put in place immediately after it happened. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you very much. And again, thank you 

for your many decades of service. 

Chairman ISSA. If the gentlelady would allow me a very quick 

follow up on what exactly what you’re doing. 

Admiral, you’re aware of the commandant’s initiative in 

Sigonella and its response capability, are you not? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir, I am. 

Chairman ISSA. And that would be an example of a direct response where the Marines have taken existing assets, repositioned 

them for a very different response. 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, but—not but, to what was discussed earlier, particularly with the CR, I have probably too much expertise 

and history in the budget and programming world that under, 

there are some new initiatives coming, at least recommended, and 

at least as best I can recall, you can’t start new programs under 

a CR. 

So, for instance, the additional force that the Marine Corps is 

asking for to create an expanded security force at embassies 

around the world that has to be funded, and it’s got to be funded 

pretty quickly given the risks that are out there. I don’t know if 

you can do that in a CR, somehow make exception because of the 

priority of that. 

Chairman ISSA. I do know that Chairman McKeon has every intention of trying to make sure there is a regular order where some 

of these things can be done, and I appreciate it Admiral. 

And with that, we go to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Meehan. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Admiral, I want to thank you for your distinguished leadership of our military, and Ambassador Pickering, I want to thank 

you for your long and distinguished career in the best boat and tradition of a Joshua Chamberlain, but I also have responsibility here, 

and it’s in that capacity of oversight that I ask you questions. 

And I’ll begin my questioning with the legal premise that under 

the Inman principles it is such an important idea that any variation from the security requirements under Inman require the direct nondelegable commitment by the Secretary, him or herself before it can be changed. Now I realize we are not in an Inman type 

of circumstance, what we are, in fact, is a different circumstance, 

but your findings, the board that said the key driver behind the 

weak security platform was the decisions to treat the Benghazi as 

a temporary residential facility, even though it was a full-time office facility. Is it not correct that Under Secretary Kennedy made 

that decision? 

70 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yes, he made the decision to continue 

for a year the facility that then existed at Benghazi. I don’t know 

who made any decisions in the course of the transformation between April, 2010 and December, 2012 from a residence to an office 

and residence to another building. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Let me ask at the time that decision was made, 

was it in conformance with what we call the overseas security policy board standards? 

Ambassador PICKERING. It was not. 

Mr. MEEHAN. In fact, your findings were—— 

Ambassador PICKERING. The building did not meet those standards. 

Mr. MEEHAN. That the comprehensive upgrade, the risk mitigation plan did not exist, there wasn’t a comprehensive security review conducted by Washington for Benghazi in 2012, that that decision was a flawed process, the decision did not take security considerations adequately into place. And Ambassador Pickering, did 

you interview Mr. Kennedy? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yes, we interviewed Mr. Kennedy. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Did you interview Mr. Kennedy? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yes, I did. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Did you keep a transcript of that interview? 

Ambassador PICKERING. We have a record of that interview. 

Mr. MEEHAN. You have a record of that interview. What is the 

record of that interview? Is that notes? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I’m sorry? 

Mr. MEEHAN. Is that notes? What is the record of that interview—— 

Ambassador PICKERING. The record of that interview is notes. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Do you expect that that record will be shared with 

Congress? 

Ambassador PICKERING. That’s obviously a question that we’ve 

discussed here many times. In my view, it is a longstanding issue 

between the executive branch and Congress into which I will not 

get. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Now when he—when you asked him questions 

about this, what were his responses when you asked him about the 

failure to have a risk mitigation plan or any comprehensive security views and all of those others things which you identified when 

you asked him those questions what were his responses? 

Ambassador PICKERING. The simple answer was he was making, 

according to his testimony, a decision to continue to occupy the real 

estate. The responsibilities for providing adequate security rested 

with the Bureau of diplomatic security. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Now do you really believe that his responsibility is 

only to make a real estate decision and he is placing this down on 

people below him? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I believe that he believed that’s the decision he—— 

Mr. MEEHAN. Well you’re the person who is asking him the questions. If he believed—I just cited the fact that even the slightest 

change on the Inman principles has a direct turnover, I mean, the 

direct requirement of the Secretary of State herself. 

71 

Ambassador PICKERING. The Under Secretary for Management 

and the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security have different 

roles and missions. The Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security 

is responsible for providing the security. 

Mr. MEEHAN. May I ask, you said that he believed, but do you 

believe that he had a responsibility to look into those factors? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I believe that the Assistant Secretary 

For Diplomatic Security had that responsibility. 

Mr. MEEHAN. What was his responsibility then with respect to 

all of these kinds of shortcomings? 

Ambassador PICKERING. To provide the personnel and the security—— 

Mr. MEEHAN. But the security was not there. It was not being 

provided. 

Ambassador PICKERING. We found that individual at fault for not 

having done so, Mr. Meehan. 

Chairman ISSA. Would the gentleman yield for just a second. To 

make the record clear, the Under Secretary was in place the year 

before and the year before and the year before, so the decision to 

rent that facility in Benghazi was made under the Under Secretary 

and the diplomatic security head held accountable reports to the 

under secretary. So why is this merry-go-round between you and 

the gentleman from Pennsylvania as to whether the Under Secretary had all the authority in front of him, but rather wants to 

blame the diplomatic security head who reports to him? 

Mr. MEEHAN. Well, may I continue? 

Chairman ISSA. Please. 

Mr. MEEHAN. I want to continue my line of questioning here in 

particular, because this is the testimony yesterday of Mr. Kennedy 

before the Foreign Relations Committee. With respect, this is his 

words, every day we review the threat levels at all the posts of the 

world. We reach a point where we believe that the mitigation tools 

that are available to us cannot lower the threat level down, then 

we close the posts. 

He cites an example. We were in Damascus several years ago, 

and I concluded that given the situation on the ground of Damascus we could not longer mitigate the risks sufficiently. I went to the 

Secretary of State, and she instantaneously gave me approval to 

suspend operations in Damascus and pull our people out. 

When you asked him what conversations he had with the Secretary of State with regard to the security at Benghazi, what did 

he tell you? 

Ambassador PICKERING. We did not ask him what conversations 

he had with respect to the Secretary of State—— 

Mr. MEEHAN. Why not? 

Ambassador PICKERING. —in Benghazi. Because we knew and 

understood that the decision making with respect to Benghazi took 

place at the level of the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security—— 

Mr. MEEHAN. But he just said here in Syria in a parallel situation, he consulted with the Secretary of State with regard to this. 

Not only did he make decisions as you said not just about real estate, but this is his testimony yesterday that he was the one that 

was making decisions with regard to the points where we believe 

72 

mitigation tools aren’t effective. And this was, he was assuming 

this responsibly. He was using this as his shield that this was, I 

wanted to demonstrate the things that I have done effectively in 

the past and therefore, don’t hold me accountable. 

So I am asking why he is not being held to the same degree of 

responsibility in a place in which you identify yourself that the security reviews were so deficient in so many ways? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Because again, we believed after looking 

at this, the initial decisions were made in the Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security and reviewed there—— 

Mr. MEEHAN. But he is the one who made the initial decisions. 

It moves up. He is the one that is responsible. He made the decision. 

Ambassador PICKERING. Not if there is not a dispute about providing the resources necessary to do this. 

Mr. MEEHAN. But Ambassador Pickering, you identified 19 separate circumstances of aspects in which there were threats and 

other kinds of very serious things and he said he monitors it every 

day. Now what is the discrepancy? 

Why wouldn’t that be in his attention? Why would this not be 

brought to the attention where he makes a decision or as he says, 

he discusses with the Secretary of State the circumstances of that, 

of Benghazi? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Because we believed that responsibility 

was lodged in the Assistant Secretary For Diplomatic Security. And 

it was very clear that’s where the decisions were made and were 

not made. 

Mr. MEEHAN. But the decision to continue is—I struggle to understand why you’re saying it’s down there when he himself says 

he has these responsibilities and conducts these kinds of things 

every day. 

Ambassador PICKERING. I can only tell you that our full examination of this located the decision making there, under the review of 

the decision making. 

Mr. MEEHAN. I thank you, Ambassador. But I certainly question 

the conclusion. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman for his line of questioning. 

And we now go to the gentlelady from the District of Columbia, Ms. 

Norton. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want 

to apologize I had a markup and was not able to hear all the witness testimony. But I understand the question I have had and I 

think had hung over this entire matter has not been asked, and 

therefore I’d like to use this opportunity to clarify to get you, Admiral Mullen, and Ambassador Pickering to clarify Secretary Clinton’s role. 

You certainly did very extensive interviewing, according to your 

report, over 100 witnesses, thousands of pages, and of course, the 

Secretary was not interviewed, and that is why I think this has to 

be clarified. 

The majority has used, in every way they can, the presence of 

Hillary Clinton to somehow point to an elevator that links up with 

her reading a report? For example, in an earlier hearing, they 

pointed out that she signed the cable. And the truth came out to 

73 

the staff that’s on every cable of the Secretary. So we take everything now with a grain of salt. But this is an opportunity to clarify 

this issue. 

We recognize, or at least I recognize, that not every important 

matter, even one as important as this, will necessarily involve an 

agency head. But again, her name has been raised over and over 

again. 

So I have to ask you, if you received any evidence that led you 

to believe that the Secretary should be interviewed, or what did, 

what is it about your investigation that led you to believe that she 

should not be interviewed although apparently her name does appear in the report a fair number of times? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I think your statement and the question 

is essentially what we found, no evidence to believe that we had 

a need to interview the Secretary of State. 

Ms. NORTON. And why was that? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Because we found, as I just discussed, 

that the decision making with respect to the security issues were 

made at lower levels in which we found responsibility. 

Ms. NORTON. Now are these levels, let me ask Admiral Mullen, 

are these security matters, matters that you would not expect to 

go to the agency head but to be resolved by security? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Maybe since I have experience in the 

State Department, I can answer that question and the answer to 

that question is no, we would not expect those normally to go to 

the agency head. 

Admiral MULLEN. If I could just pick up on this, and maybe it 

is a concern that was expressed over here, for agency heads and 

people that operate at that level, including Mr. Kennedy, quite 

frankly, they have global responsibilities, and so that, first of all, 

what we found in execution was this, the decisions with respect to 

security were delegated. And I think you would, and certainly Secretary Clinton has said she held herself responsible in her own testimony. But when you are running a big organization, you delegate 

that and then you have principals who work for you that you expect to raise issues of concern against whatever the guidance is or 

in accordance with whatever guidance, when something happens. 

And we found that guidance to and expertise and responsibility 

resident in the Assistant Secretary for Security. 

So in my view, it was his responsibility to raise these issues up 

the chain of command. And, in fact, the opposite was going on. 

His immediate deputy, Ms. Lamb, held all these decisions very, 

very closely. And in fact, the, per the direction from the statute 

itself, which directs us at the level decisions were being made, 

that’s where we were. Just to reinforce what Ambassador Pickering 

said, we found no evidence, no lines to Kennedy or above with respect to these decisions that got made with respect to Benghazi 

that resulted in the outcome. 

Ms. NORTON. And you were very critical in the report of how 

these decisions were kept and made? 

Admiral MULLEN. Exactly. 

Ms. NORTON. And I think it is very important. When you call out 

the name of an official simply because she was present, and in this 

case, the head of the agency to lay on the record what evidence 

74 

there was that she knew about this matter, and here we find that 

she not only didn’t know, but there was an effort to make sure that 

these security matters were kept where they were. 

Now, when you consider that you’re dealing with security matters, even if you have very broad experience, that is a sphere unto 

itself, I don’t expect that normally an agency head would secondguess a security official without the same kind of expertise. I do accept your admonition and your criticism of the failure to go up the 

chain of command. I think you were very forthright on that. But 

having found that failure, it does seem to me to be unfair and the 

extremes to, therefore, hold the official who had no knowledge, and 

from whom knowledge was kept, responsible for the tragedy. 

Chairman ISSA. Would the gentlelady yield? 

Ms. NORTON. Always glad to yield to the chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. I think there is a good point. I don’t think you 

were here earlier when we got into this. We had made it clear that 

the ARBs inability to deal with policy decisions and other areas 

outside their jurisdiction, if you will, which include, for example, 

the Secretary of State’s obvious policy decision on normalization, 

policy decision that was in progress, one of the reasons that we had 

heard testimony that the Ambassador was in Benghazi was because of the desire by the Secretary to put a permanent mission 

there. 

Now, we’ve never said and I hope none of our reports will ever 

say that she made a decision to cut security at the consulate. But, 

you know, part of the challenge here today in the earlier testimony 

is that the ARB, as currently structured, has a lot of limitations 

as to what they can do, including the four people they recommended for adverse action, all of whom are back on the job without losing a day’s pay. 

Ms. NORTON. Yeah, but that leaves the Secretary’s name muddied frankly by this committee. And it just seems to me that we 

ought to lay to rest that matter never came to her, should have 

perhaps, don’t know, but certainly never came to her. It’s almost, 

Mr. Chairman, like the, an earlier and terribly great tragedy when 

there was a killing, and of course, the committee sought to go to 

the Attorney General. I do believe in accountability at the top. 

Chairman ISSA. The gentlewoman may remember he was held in 

contempt for withholding information on lying to Congress that occurred under his watch. 

With that, the gentlelady’s time is expired. We go to Mr. Gowdy. 

Ms. NORTON. I do remember that was one of the most controversial, if not the most controversial decision of this committee. 

Chairman ISSA. It wasn’t controversial from this side of the dais. 

Ms. NORTON. That’s right. That’s all that can be said for that. 

Chairman ISSA. Mr. Gowdy. 

Mr. GOWDY. Admiral Mullen, I thank you and the other witnesses for your service. I understand you did an interview of Secretary Clinton. Did you submit written questions to her for her response? 

Admiral MULLEN. We did not. 

Mr. GOWDY. Was Secretary Clinton aware of the attacks on 

Western targets in Benghazi leading up to September 11, 2012? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I believe our information—— 

75 

Mr. GOWDY. I’m asking Admiral Mullen. 

Admiral MULLEN. I think she was. 

Mr. GOWDY. She was aware of the attacks on Western targets? 

Was she aware that the British ambassador was almost assassinated in Benghazi in the weeks and months leading up to September 11, 2012? 

Admiral MULLEN. I can’t be positive but I think she was. 

Mr. GOWDY. Was she aware of the requests for additional security at the Benghazi facility? 

Admiral MULLEN. I would say no. 

Mr. GOWDY. Was she aware of a specific request from the Ambassador himself for improved security at that facility? 

Admiral MULLEN. We never saw any requests from Ambassador 

Stevens to—— 

Mr. GOWDY. That wasn’t my question. Was she aware of it? 

Admiral MULLEN. We never saw anything that indicated Ambassador Stevens asked for significant upgrade at the facility. 

Mr. GOWDY. There has been testimony that he has. My question 

was was she aware of that? Was the Secretary of State aware of 

it? 

Admiral MULLEN. I don’t know the answer to that. 

Mr. GOWDY. And here is what I found confounding about that. 

The 1998 ARB, you start your ARB with a quote from a Spanish 

American philosopher about history and those who don’t study it 

are doomed to repeat it. And I found that interesting because the 

1998 ARB recommended this, the Secretary of State should personally review the security of embassies and other official premises, 

closing those which are highly vulnerable and threatened. 

The Secretary of State, that was the specific recommendation 

from history. So you can understand, with all due respect to my 

colleagues who don’t want to mention the Secretary of State’s 

name, you can understand my question, did she personally review 

the security at Benghazi? 

Admiral MULLEN. I don’t know the—not—all the evidence that 

we saw indicated no, but I don’t know the answer to that. 

Mr. GOWDY. Did she personally consider closing the facility in 

Benghazi, again, given the fact that a panel exactly like the one 

you cochaired recommended, recommended the Secretary of State 

personally review it? My question to you is did she? 

Admiral MULLEN. I’m not aware that she did. 

Mr. GOWDY. So there was no evidence despite a previous recommendation from an ARB just like yours, because what our colleagues on the other side say is let’s don’t study the past, let’s just 

look forward. You’ve made recommendations, all is going to be well 

now, all 30 of them will be implemented, and my point is we had 

this recommendation. We had it in 1998, that the Secretary of 

State herself review the facilities and consider closing them if they 

are not safe. 

Admiral MULLEN. I think one of the, and I think we have pulled 

people out where it wasn’t safe over the course of those years. 

Mr. GOWDY. But my question, Admiral, is you never interviewed 

the Secretary of State about whether she, whether she accepted 

and performed a responsibility given to her by a previous accountability review board. 

76 

Admiral MULLEN. Part of our writ was to look at previous accountability review boards. We certainly commented on that, those 

that had not been implemented. But it was not to test each recommendation against those who were in positions in the current 

administration. 

Mr. GOWDY. I want to read you a quote, and I want to ask you 

if know the author of that quote, okay? ‘‘The independent accountability review board is already hard at work looking at everything, 

not cherry-picking one story here or one document there, but looking at everything.’’ Do you know who the author of that quote was? 

Secretary Clinton. 

How could you look at everything when you don’t even bother to 

interview the person who is ultimately responsible for what happens at the State Department? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think we’ve explained that that we found no 

evidence that she was involved in the decision making and no need, 

therefore, to do that. 

Mr. GOWDY. But I just cited for you it is her responsibility according to an ARB just like yours from 1998, she should personally 

review it. 

Did you ask her whether she was familiar with that previous 

ARB recommendation? 

Admiral MULLEN. We didn’t interview her so obviously we didn’t 

ask her. 

Mr. GOWDY. I will read you another quote. ‘‘Over the last several 

months, there was a review board headed by two distinguished 

Americans, Mike Mullen and Tom Pickering who investigated 

every element of this with this being Benghazi.’’ Do you know the 

author of that quote. 

Admiral MULLEN. No. 

Mr. GOWDY. Barack Obama. Did you interview him and ask 

whether he made any calls to any of our allies in the region and 

said can you help us? Our guys are under attack. 

Admiral MULLEN. We did not. 

Mr. GOWDY. Admiral, my colleague, Jason Chaffetz, asked you 

about Cheryl Mills and a conversation you had with her. And I 

noted two different times you said you wanted to give her a heads 

up. And make no mistake she’s the lawyer for Hillary Clinton. She 

used to counsel for the State Department. You wanted to give her 

a heads up. A heads up about what? 

Admiral MULLEN. I specifically said that having interviewed 

Charlene Lamb and knowing that she was going to appear in Congress that I thought she would not, that she would be a weak witness. 

Mr. GOWDY. Were you concerned that she would tell the truth or 

not tell the truth? When you say not be a good witness, what was 

your concern? 

Admiral MULLEN. I wasn’t concerned about whether she would 

tell the truth or not. That had nothing to do with it. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. [presiding.] The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. GOWDY. I thought there was a practice of going 2 minutes 

over. I don’t know why I possibly could have thought that based 

on being here. 

77 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I would ask that the gentleman be given another 

minute because I would like to get an answer to that question myself. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. Could you answer his question? The 

last question. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Maybe you can repeat the quote. 

Mr. GOWDY. My question was a heads up about what? Were you 

concerned that she would tell the truth or not tell the truth? 

Admiral MULLEN. No. That had nothing to do with it. I would 

never question the integrity of Charlene Lamb. 

Mr. GOWDY. Did you think she was just not going to be an effective witness? 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Would the gentleman just let him answer? 

Mr. GOWDY. I’m trying to help him. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. He’s been around 40 years in the military, so he 

knows how to answer questions. 

Admiral MULLEN. I explained before, Mr. Gowdy, I had run departments, I had dealt with witnesses who came to Congress and 

representing the departments that I was in as best we possibly 

could. The intention of the heads up was to just having sat down 

with Lamb, it was the first time I had met her in our interview, 

that I thought there could be better witnesses to represent the Department. It had nothing to do with the ARB. 

Mr. GOWDY. Better witnesses from what standpoint? 

Admiral MULLEN. At that time and place, with respect to the 

events which had occurred in Benghazi. 

Mr. GOWDY. Admiral, wasn’t she a fact witness? I mean, the facts 

pick the witnesses. I mean the State Department doesn’t pick witnesses. The facts pick the witnesses. She was a fact witness, right? 

Admiral MULLEN. Right. 

Mr. GOWDY. So whether she is good or bad is immaterial. She is 

a fact witness. 

Admiral MULLEN. Again, I approach it from a standpoint of having run a department and many times working to have the Department represented as best as we possibly could. That was it. 

Mr. GOWDY. Well, in conclusion, Admiral, let me just say from 

my previous life, I well understand having bad witnesses. I’ve had 

plenty of cases where I wish I could have picked them, but I 

couldn’t. She was a fact witness. The fact that she was not going 

to be a good fact witness for the State Department to me is immaterial. She’s a fact witness. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Will the gentleman yield 1 minute the time that 

neither one of us have. But just one thing. Will the gentleman yield 

real quick? 

Mr. GOWDY. Sure. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. This is the question, and the reason why I want 

to hear your answer is this, as I listen to you, this has nothing to 

do with honesty and integrity with regard to what the witness was 

saying. 

Admiral MULLEN. No. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Nothing like that. 

Admiral MULLEN. No. 

78 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So what did it have to do with? In other words, 

if somebody, for example, somebody who may not know the facts, 

may not understand? 

Admiral MULLEN. I take Mr. Gowdy’s point. She certainly was a 

fact witness. It was, from my perspective, a judgment that she 

hadn’t done this before. Obviously this was a terribly important 

issue, and to be able to represent that, particularly early in the 

process, I thought was very important and that was the sole reason. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I take it that you wanted the best information 

to come to the ARB? 

Admiral MULLEN. Sure—to the Congress. To the Congress. This 

had nothing to do with the ARB. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. 

Mr. GOWDY. I yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I will now recognize the gentlewoman from New York, Mrs. 

Maloney from New York, for a very generous 5 minutes. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. First of all, I would like to thank the 

chairman and the ranking member for assembling such a distinguished panel. I particularly want to publicly acknowledge the selfless and distinguished careers of Admiral Mullen and Ambassador 

Pickering, both of whom have served Republicans and Democratic 

Presidents and have taken on some of the most challenging and 

difficult problems and obstacles that our country has faced. 

So I want to publicly thank them for their public service and 

their selfless public service. And I respect your work, and I wish 

all of my colleagues would likewise respect everything that you 

have done for our country. 

I must say, as the former chair of the women’s caucus, I’m particularly sensitive of any efforts to roll back gains for women or any 

attacks on women. And I find the attacks unusual and consistent 

against the former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. Although 

the ARB report, which I thought was excellent and there has been 

little mention of the many fine recommendations that you came forward with to improve the safety of our embassies and our people 

overseas, and I thank you for that. I understand the State Department has started to implement many of them. 

But in your statement I believe, Admiral Mullen, you stated, and 

I quote from you, there was no official, including the Secretary of 

State, whose involvement was not reviewed extensively, and do you 

stand by that statement? 

Admiral MULLEN. I do. 

Mrs. MALONEY. And I found the report that was issued this week 

by my colleagues on the other side of the aisle a very partisan staff 

report on its separate investigation of Benghazi, I found it very 

partisan because even though you say she had no participation and 

all evidence shows that, it mentions the former Secretary of State 

25 times, 25 times, and not once does the staff report identify any 

evidence whatsoever to indicate that the former Secretary of State 

played any role in security-related decisions about the Benghazi 

special mission compound. And I compliment you for focusing on 

positives of how we can move forward to make our country safer 

and better in many ways. 

79 

I would like to also point out that there were personal attacks 

on national television stating that the former Secretary of State 

lied under oath when she testified before Congress that she did not 

personally approve of security reductions in Libya. And as proof, 

the Republicans produced a cable that had her stamped signature 

on it. So I would like to ask you, Ambassador Pickering, since you 

have spent a majority of your years in the State Department and 

serving our country many times overseas, do you believe that because the Department stamps the Secretary’s name on this cable 

that she personally approved it? 

Ambassador PICKERING. No. All cables sent out by the State Department are stamped with the Secretary’s name. 

Mrs. MALONEY. And how many cables a year are sent out would 

you say? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I thought the last estimate was 1.4 million. 

Mrs. MALONEY. So that would not say that. And what does the 

State Department manual say about this? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I think it says that all cables should be 

stamped with the Secretary’s name. In the past, they used to 

stamp with the Acting Secretary’s name. That was changed under 

Secretary Powell. Wherever the Secretary is, she is still Secretary 

and her name still goes on the cables. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Could you mention for the panel the four top recommendations, in your opinion, of the ARB to make our personnel 

and our professionals and our public servants safer overseas? 

Ambassador PICKERING. This is hard with 24 in classified and 29 

recommendations. I would center a couple of thoughts on a number 

that I mentioned in my oral testimony a minute ago; one the notion 

that we should carry out the Nairobi Dar El Salaam construction 

program recommended by Admiral Crowe 10, 12 years ago which 

has dwindled away through inflation, through reductions in budgetary support. 

I think those kinds of issues still are very, very important. 

I would like to say as well, that I think among the others, and 

I have highlighted them and if I can, I will just give you a sense 

of what those might be, that we need better risk management assessments and we laid out some criteria, and Mr. Sullivan’s report 

I think produced clear evidence that there were better ways to do 

that in the State Department. 

My sense is that we can improve intelligence performance, and 

we suggested a number of ways that we could do that. And I think 

on the question of personal accountability which has figured here 

very heavily, I believe we made recommendations that were important with regard to that. And my hope is that the State Department will carry those out. There have been discussions here about 

that. They go beyond where the ARB is, but our recommendation, 

as you know, is two be separated from their jobs and two others 

be reviewed for deficiencies and performance. 

Mrs. MALONEY. My time has expired. Thank you. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. We will now recognize the gentleman 

from Kentucky, Mr. Massie, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MASSIE. Thank you, Chairman. I thank the witnesses for 

coming today. 

80 

The brevity as well as the incongruity of statements in the ARBs 

report begs the question, what was Ambassador Stevens doing in 

Benghazi? And I apologize for asking this, but it begs to be asked. 

So let me read a statement from the report. The board found that 

Ambassador Stevens made the decision to travel to Benghazi independently of Washington. 

Now let me read you the testimony of Mr. Hicks when he was 

here in front of this very committee. I asked him, did you tell the 

accountability review board about Secretary Clinton’s interest in 

establishing a permanent presence in Benghazi because ostensibly 

wasn’t that the reason the Ambassador was going to Benghazi? Mr. 

Hicks said this, Yes, I did tell the accountability review board that 

Secretary Clinton wanted the post made permanent. Ambassador 

Pickering looked surprised. He looked both ways to the members 

of the board saying, does the seventh floor know about this? And 

another factor, Hicks went on to say, was our understanding that 

Secretary Clinton intended to visit Tripoli in December. I asked 

him, so Pickering was surprised that this was Ambassador Stevens’ 

mission to establish a permanent facility there. Is that your impression? He said yes. 

Were you surprised by his statement? 

Ambassador PICKERING. No. I was surprised by the fact that this 

was a new item of information to us and I wondered how ramified 

it was understood. Secondly, I made in my deposition a series of 

statements about the numerous reasons why Ambassador Stevens 

went. 

Mr. MASSIE. I’m short on time. So why wasn’t that included in 

the ARB report, that Secretary Clinton had directed him to go 

there? 

Ambassador PICKERING. She had not, to the best of my knowledge, directed him to go there. 

Mr. MASSIE. So you disagree with his testimony in front of your 

board? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I agree that what he had to say was an 

indication of what the Secretary hoped for. 

Mr. MASSIE. Let me go on—— 

Ambassador PICKERING. I don’t think it was a direction from her 

to go to Benghazi. 

Mr. MASSIE. I have very little time. So, I think we all agree that 

any investigation should include a comprehensive list of survivors 

and witnesses. 

Did you or do you, possess a list of survivors and witnesses, 

present or observing during the attack in Benghazi? 

Ambassador PICKERING. It’s in the classified report, all of those 

people we interviewed. 

Mr. MASSIE. Can that report be made available to all the members here? 

Ambassador PICKERING. It is made available to all the members 

here. 

Mr. MASSIE. Are you at liberty to say how many of those witnesses or survivors were CIA operatives? 

Ambassador PICKERING. No. 

Mr. MASSIE. Can you say if any of them were. 

Ambassador PICKERING. No. 

81 

Mr. MASSIE. You said you had unfettered access to State Department employees. Does that also include the CIA employees? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I am not going to go there because that 

gets us into classified issues. 

Mr. MASSIE. Okay. How many people were evacuated from 

Benghazi immediately following the attacks? You mentioned an 

airplane that took people out of there. 

Ambassador PICKERING. There were two aircraft. I think the first 

one evacuated 12, and the remainder, and I think that may have 

been up to another two dozen or so, came on a second aircraft. 

Mr. MASSIE. So maybe 36 people? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Something in that neighborhood, but 

that is just a very rough estimate, Mr. Massie. 

Mr. MASSIE. How many of those were State Department employees, and how many were military? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I can’t tell you that exactly. I can tell 

you that there were, I think, five security officers from the State 

Department who were evacuated. 

Mr. MASSIE. Okay. Do you have a comprehensive inventory of 

U.S. weapons or small arms that were there or at the annex before 

and after the attack? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I do not have such an inventory. 

Mr. MASSIE. Is it true that after the attack, those facilities were 

left unsecured for quite sometime? 

Ambassador PICKERING. They were, but I believe the weapons 

and some or most of the security material from the State Department facility was evacuated. 

Mr. MASSIE. Can you give us a list of what was evacuated? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I can’t, but I am sure the State Department could. 

Mr. MASSIE. Okay. And I have to ask this question because the 

public wants to know this. Are you aware of any arms that, not by 

accident but by intention, were being transferred to Turkey or 

Syria from Libya? 

Ambassador PICKERING. No. 

Mr. MASSIE. Can you give us—can you make any statements or 

give us confidence that that was not occurring? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I am just not aware of it. I think that 

I have to say I looked into it, and I am not aware of it. 

Mr. MASSIE. Okay. Thank you, I yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. 

Now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Woodall, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. WOODALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank everyone on the panel for your service. I am relatively new to the committee, though not as new to public service. 

We have talked a lot about unfettered access. You all had a role 

to play. I know the ARB was able to access folks in 10 weeks that 

this committee hasn’t been able to access in almost a year. So 

much of what we do in public service, for better or for worse, has 

less to do with the facts and more to do with credibility. Folks have 

unanswered questions. I always tell my constituents back home, 

there are more Congressmen in jail for the cover up than there are 

for the crime. It is that undermining of public trust. 

82 

I just want to ask you all because, again, you have all been entrusted with these responsibilities for much longer than I. Understanding a division of government here, executive, legislative, judicial, trying to serve that public trust, Mr. Keil, would you conclude 

that we could serve that public trust best if this committee could 

have access to as much information as possible and then dispose 

of this issue as quickly and thoroughly as possible? 

Mr. KEIL. Yes, I do, sir. 

Mr. WOODALL. Mr. Sullivan? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Again, sir, I think, and I go back to what Admiral 

Mullen said, I think this is something between the committee and 

State Department. I do believe that if these are documents that 

Congress is entitled to get, then they should receive them. Again, 

I think that this is something that should be dealt with between 

the committee and the State Department. 

Mr. WOODALL. And with due respect, and I very much appreciate 

that answer, I actually think it is between the American People 

and the public servants to whom they entrust the future of the republic—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would agree. 

Mr. WOODALL. —and that is a frustration for me, and I understand if you said—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would agree with that, too, sir. 

Mr. WOODALL. Admiral Mullen? 

Admiral MULLEN. We have talked about this several times. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Can you help us with the microphone there, 

please? 

Admiral MULLEN. Sorry. We have talked about this several 

times, and certainly I think the whole issue of how a government 

deals with, you know, this kind of situation I think I told the chairman earlier, I think the oversight is absolutely critical. I have just 

dealt too much, too many times with the tension between agencies 

and Capitol Hill on what should be provided and what isn’t, and 

it’s not for me or us to decide that today or I don’t even think recommend in terms of what is actually going on. I am not even aware 

of the documents specifically of which you speak. 

Mr. WOODALL. It gives me no pleasure to disagree with a public 

servant of your caliber, but I actually—— 

Admiral MULLEN. You wouldn’t be the first. 

Mr. WOODALL. I might not be the first, but candidly, it is less 

your feelings that we ought to be able to resolve these things that 

I was interested in and more the absence of the outrage that we 

can’t deal with these things because this process is going to continue. I asked someone the other day, I said, when do we come to 

an end of this Benghazi investigation? And the answer was, when 

we can finally get the folks who have the answers to speak with 

us. Again, you all were able to do it in 10 weeks by your calculations. 

Ambassador, I talked to every relevant witness within 10 weeks, 

and yet we have not been able to do it in a year. And it is less 

about the powers of this committee. It is more about the duties 

that we owe the folks back home who still have unanswered questions. I will give you an example of one of those questions. In fact, 

the gentleman sat right there in the seat that you are sitting in, 

83 

Admiral Pickering, it was Mr. Mark Thompson. You all may have 

dealt with Mr. Thompson professionally, but he said this when he 

was in that chair, Ambassador. He said, My biography is in the 

record. He said, We live by a code, and that code says you go after 

people when they are in peril when they are in the service of their 

country. We did not have the benefit of hindsight in the early 

hours, and those people who are in peril in the future need to know 

that we will go and get them and we will do everything we can to 

get them out of harm’s way. And he concluded with this; he said, 

That night unfolded in ways that no one could have predicted when 

it first started, and it is my strong belief then as it is now that we 

needed to demonstrate that resolve, even if we still had the same 

outcome. Admiral Mullen, earlier in your testimony, you talked 

about how we were unable to get to Benghazi fast enough. You 

talked about bombs on the racks, munitions on the racks of aircraft 

at the ready. 

Admiral MULLEN. I used that as an example. The aircraft weren’t 

at the ready, and what General Dempsey testified to, and I have 

today certainly and in previous transcription of my statements, we 

just couldn’t get there fast enough. I do resonate completely with 

what Mr. Thompson said, and every military individual to their 

core feels the same way, and that is, to the best of the military’s 

ability that night, that is what happened. I looked at every asset, 

every possibility. It wouldn’t, couldn’t get there in time. 

Mr. WOODALL. In retrospect, it couldn’t get there in time. I think 

the question so many folks back home have on behalf of so many 

families is, ‘‘Can we see the fuel being driven to the runway? Can 

we see the pilots getting out of bed, can we see the teams being 

scrambled?’’ Yes, we have seen some of that, folks arriving the next 

day, but this is every bit as much about what happens in the future as it was what happened in the past, if not more so, and 

again, I thank you all for your great public service. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The gentleman yields back. 

We will now recognize the gentlewoman for 5 minutes. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

And in the spirit of continuing this conversation, I yield back to 

Ranking Member Mr. Cummings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

I just ask, Mr. Chairman, that I be given the extra minute that 

Mr. Woodall also had, please. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ambassador Pickering, sometimes I don’t think 

that the public understands that the State Department is often 

serving in places that don’t offer a lot of options when it comes to 

facilities. Let me read to you what the executive director of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs told the committee in his interview 

about how the United States ultimately selected the special mission compound in Benghazi for use as a military facility. He said 

this: The villas were the only things that were available at the 

time that even met minimal standards. Remember, Chris Stevens 

had just gotten off a ferry with cars. He had gone back into a hotel. 

There had been a bomb that went off. We had to find something 

and something quick, and I mean the Department as a whole had 

to find something. 

84 

Here is the challenge. In the case of Benghazi, you had some 

very smart people, including Ambassador Stevens, advising the 

United States Government that we should be in Benghazi, but it 

sounds like there were not many good options available. Even the 

hotel where they first tried to locate came under risk of being 

bombed. 

Ambassador Pickering, isn’t it the case that, in many parts of the 

world, State Department officials don’t have the best of choices 

from which to operate a diplomatic post? 

Ambassador PICKERING. That is true, Mr. Cummings. On the 

other hand, we are speaking about April 2010 more or less, and the 

problem with Benghazi was that there was time to make change 

and improvements, and we found people at fault for not having 

taken that time to do the job. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And whose responsibility was that? 

Ambassador PICKERING. We believed it was principally in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which is charged with oversight and 

implementation of State Department security. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ambassador Pickering, I am gathering that we 

don’t want to lock up our people in fortresses, and Ambassador Stevens, who was so loved and appreciated by the people, understood 

that. Can you tell us in practical terms how your recommendations 

will help the State Department going forward strike a balance between important policy imperatives and the fact that there are not 

always a lot of good choices from which to operate? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Because, sir, it takes or tries to take 

into account the special disadvantages that you have mentioned in 

location, in changing threat situations, and in risk management, 

and it sees that as a dynamic where not every day can you wander 

the bazaars, but when you can you should know about it and understand the risks that you are taking. It also means that different 

locations in cities have different requirements for security. Cars are 

different than residences, are different than safe havens. And so it 

provides graduated levels, if I could put it this way, of safety and 

security over a period of time to individuals who might be in danger. Hopefully, the situation will be in the main the kind of situation that Chris Stevens really was able in a maximum way to take 

advantage of, but at the same time, it would also be, we hope, the 

kind of situation that would prevent the death of a Chris Stevens 

in times when the threat level had increased and the security 

would be adequate to deal with that, and so it is not all Inman 

buildings, but for most places, it is nice to have those as what I 

would call the security anchor for the worst times. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Sullivan, a key to this seems to be risk mitigation. Can you explain how your best practices panel addressed 

this issue and explain how a department-wide risk management 

model would help? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. What we looked at was risk management, and what we found is that, for the most part, risk is dealt 

with either by experience or intuition, which those two things are 

extremely important. However, what we’re recommending is that 

there be a more—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Did you say ‘‘intuition’’? 

85 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. Experience, intuition, you know, and 

background. What we’re seeing is there needs to be a more formalized system. As things become, you know, more complicated out 

there as the threat becomes, you know, more severe, there needs 

to just be a more formalized risk-management model that would be 

available not just to the department, not just to DS but to the department as a whole, you know, risk management when it comes 

to, you know, medical services, risk management when it comes to 

IT, risk management when it comes to where you’re going to put 

a building, and that would—DS would feed into this risk management model when it comes to, you know, what—how do you mitigate the threat? You know, what is acceptable risk? What is the 

criticality of the program that you are running? How important is 

it for that program to run? You know, all of us know that nothing 

is a hundred percent certain when it comes to eliminating risk. We 

all know that the minute you step out the door, there is going to 

be risk, but what we’re getting at here is that there be a collaborative effort among everybody in the department to come up with 

the best way to manage that risk, to come up with mitigation for 

that risk and make sure we give the safest environment to our diplomats overseas in these high threat areas. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. Thank you. 

Chairman ISSA. [presiding.] We now go to the gentleman from 

North Carolina. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Some have argued today that this hearing is just all about politics, and yet I know that I made a promise to some of the family 

members that are sitting right behind you that I would do everything within my power to make sure that this never happened 

again, and to that end, there is a bill that Chairman Royce, H.R. 

1768 that looks at the ARB and modifying that, of which I with 

some of my colleagues here are a cosponsor of, and so I want to 

specifically look at a couple of things that really hopefully will keep 

us from repeating this tragedy. 

And I want to address what is now known as the Cohen memo 

that was brought forth under Secretary Madeleine Albright. It 

made some recommendations there. It made a recommendation 

that we had an under secretary for Diplomatic Security that reported directly to the Secretary. 

And Ambassador Pickering, I want to address this question to 

you, and if you would put a slide up on the screen so that we can 

know what we are talking about there, if I could ask the committee 

to do that. But in that, you were copied on a memo, that Cohen 

memo, because you were the under secretary for political affairs, 

and it talked about the issue, and I quote, ‘‘The issue of the DS,’’ 

or Diplomatic Security, ‘‘reporting to the Secretary of State was 

controversial with the corporate board.’’ 

What is the corporate board? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I suppose that Under Secretary Cohen 

was referring to the group of people on the seventh floor, under 

secretaries and up, who were close to the Secretary and perhaps 

some of her personal staff, but I cannot but guess. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. Were you a member of that corporate 

board? 

86 

Ambassador PICKERING. From time to time, yes, but not on all 

issues. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. So why was this controversial with that 

corporate board? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I don’t know. I personally had some—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So you would support that? 

Ambassador PICKERING. —reservations about the under secretary 

proposal. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So—because I think the other quote, 

and I want to quote this as well, There are strong feelings that 

there were already enough under secretaries and that the under 

secretary of management should be entrusted to make tradeoff decisions, tradeoff decisions between Diplomatic Security and administrative functions. 

You know, when we are talking about the lives of Americans, 

tradeoff is not a good word. Would you agree with that? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I agree. I believe that there is a natural 

problem in that particular question between the under secretary of 

political affairs and the under secretary for management, between 

the political imperative of staying in a post and the security imperative—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. 

Ambassador PICKERING. —of protecting it or leaving it. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. So let’s look at this. You had an ARB that 

was extensive. So this can be to you, Ambassador, and to you, Admiral Mullen. Why was this particular issue not brought up in the 

ARB when it was clearly recommended when we had a tragedy in 

East Africa before? Why would you not have addressed this as an 

issue? 

Ambassador PICKERING. We did not, in my view, believe that the 

deficiencies that we found would be cured by that problem. That 

was my personal view. 

Secondly, that that cure would not solve all issues. It would bifurcate, in my view, things like the sources of—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So having one person—— 

Ambassador PICKERING. Responsibilities for—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So having one person in control of Diplomatic Security is not a good idea? 

Admiral Mullen, would you agree with that? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I believe that one person in control of 

Diplomatic Security is an excellent idea at the assistant secretary 

level. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. Admiral Mullen? 

Admiral MULLEN. I have seen certainly this brought up today, 

and I’m aware that the panel recommended the same thing. I am 

not as sanguine immediately on doing this because I don’t think 

you fix it by just bureaucratically making the change. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, there may not be one fix, but indeed, it was 

recommended before, and it was thought to be a good idea, and yet 

here we are 15 years later not doing it. 

Admiral MULLEN. Part of the way—part of the way we tried to 

address that was to look at previous recommendations and implementation, and a lot has changed since 1998, so it may be the right 

answer. There are some—there are some bureaucratic issues assoVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:06 Oct 23, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\85095.TXT APRIL
87 

ciated with this that I am not overly excited about. That doesn’t— 

what it can’t do is be put in place and not be integrated in a way 

with the rest of the State Department. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So, for the record, today, each of you, 

are you for this or against it, this recommendation? For the record, 

I want both of you to tell me where you are on the record, and creating an under secretary for Diplomatic Security. 

Ambassador PICKERING. I am inclined against it because I think 

the problems it raises are larger than the problems it solves. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. Admiral Mullen? 

Admiral MULLEN. I am against it until I know a whole lot more 

about it. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. I can see my time is expired, so I will yield 

back. 

Chairman ISSA. Well, before the gentleman yields back, I think 

Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Keil can speak to their view of this, and, you 

know, candidly, I will tell you, Mr. Meadows, I am actually with 

the admiral and the ambassador in that I think Under Secretary 

Kennedy had both parts of this on his watch. And it was an organizational failure to weigh the two. Maybe it didn’t come to his desk, 

but putting a separate under secretary wouldn’t have changed that. 

Mr. Sullivan? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

You know, as the panel looked at this, there were a couple of 

things that just came to mind, and even here there is debate, I believe, as far as who is in charge of security. So, from that perspective, we believe that by having an under secretary for security that 

would, you know, eliminate all debate, confusion about who, in fact, 

was in charge of security. 

When we look at the amount of, the breadth and scope of what 

comes under the under secretary for management, it is just pretty 

vast, and it is pretty, you know, administration, budget, visa, the 

Foreign Service Institute, the comptroller, HR, information resource. We thought that was an awful lot for one secretary. You 

know, I understand the hesitation because of the—this may, you 

know, just create another bureaucratic layer, and one thing I think 

is important to understand is, you know, my background, you 

know, as director, I was a direct report to the Secretary, you know. 

We had a deputy director from the FBI and, you know, and his 

background, the deputy—the Director was a direct report to the Attorney General, and I think when you have that type of direct report and it is made clear to everybody, it just lets your internal, 

and external partners, for that matter, just know the importance 

of security and where security stands within an organization. But, 

again, we also understand that there are a lot of other factors that 

are involved here, and there’s a few things that need to be worked 

out, and I have talked to the current acting assistant secretary, 

Greg Starr, this is something after the report came out, he wanted 

to talk to us about in more detail. 

Chairman ISSA. Mr. Keil, anything briefly? 

Mr. KEIL. Yeah, just quickly. I think when you look at our report, 

all the aspects of our report are interlinked. The under secretary 

is the linchpin. You have to go to a risk management model, program criticality and the other aspects of the report. It is not a 

88 

standalone. You don’t just create an under secretary, and it solves 

it. It is interlinked, as you read our entire report. It is all interlinked. Interestingly, just one last point, the former assistant secretary for Diplomatic Security, Eric Boswell, testified before your 

staff, and it is in your committee report. He says, and it is a quote 

from your committee report, that the under secretary for management was making all the security decisions. That does not integrate well into a risk management model. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. That was our view. 

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Chairman, could I just add one thing? 

Chairman ISSA. Of course, Admiral. 

Admiral MULLEN. With this work, which I just saw recently, the 

intent of what we did in the ARB was to certainly have this but 

hope that this independent group continues over time to evaluate 

this issue so that this isn’t the last word with respect to these 

issues. 

Chairman ISSA. Well, post-9/11, I think we all know that security 

is a daily relook and not a one-time relook. 

Ambassador? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I should just mention because the question of the previous ARB was raised. 

Secretary Albright, as a result of that recommendation, met daily 

with the assistant secretary of state for Diplomatic Security first 

thing in the morning, and that established a nexus, a chain which 

neither her—I think none of her three successors kept. I think that 

may have been an error. I think that in some ways her interest, 

and put it this way, in no more Nairobi’s and no more Dar es Salaams was an important instinct. That wouldn’t be solved necessarily by elevating the rank or denigrating the rank. It was 

solved by a process, and I think that that was a rather good process, and in some ways, I’m sorry it wasn’t repeated, but it wasn’t 

extended at the time we looked at the ARB. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

Mr. Davis. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen. 

Ambassador Pickering, in your deposition you said that no other 

ARB was so extensive and far-reaching in its findings of personal 

responsibility or personal accountability or made such far-reaching 

recommendations at such high levels in the State Department. Is 

that correct? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yes, I believe it is, sir. 

Mr. DAVIS. You further said that you were able to arrive at that 

conclusion because you had your staff review all of the other ARBs 

that were reported on to compare how they did their work and 

what they reported. Is that true? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yes, sir, that’s particularly germane to 

the level and degree of accountability which I believe we assessed. 

Mr. DAVIS. Then can you explain how your review of previous 

ARBs led you to conclude that your ARB was one of the most comprehensive and far-reaching? 

Ambassador PICKERING. We reviewed the level at which they 

fixed responsibility when they did and the degree to which they 

89 

discussed that responsibility and the actions that they did recommend or did not recommend with respect to the people involved 

in those ARBs as a comparator against which to judge what we 

were recommending. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

I also understand that a principal reason for doing the review of 

recommendations is that you felt that previous ARBs had made 

good recommendations but that the State Department sometimes 

fell short in implementing them. Is that correct? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yes, we did, and that is correct. 

Mr. DAVIS. Then could you tell us what steps that you took with 

this ARB to ensure that the 29 recommendations you made would, 

in fact, be implemented? 

Ambassador PICKERING. We re-recommended at least one principal unfilled recommendation of a previous ARB which we felt was 

very germane to our ongoing security posture. That is a construction recommendation involving large amounts of money. We tried 

to carry that message, Mr. Davis, by starting each chapter of the 

ARB with a recollection of past recommendations which we believe 

hadn’t been heeded, needed to be reheeded or needed to be reintroduced. 

Mr. DAVIS. Then have you been able to follow your recommendations and see how they are being implemented, and if so, what 

have you found? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Only in the press, and so far what we 

have seen has shown department action in that regard, but I cannot say that that is a satisfactory method of review. It was not in 

our mandate. 

Mr. DAVIS. One senior State Department official interviewed by 

the committee said that, while serving in Libya, he saw evidence 

that the ARB recommendations were being implemented. He said; 

‘‘when I was charge in Tripoli for 6 months, for example, there was 

a huge number of security upgrades that are underway. Many of 

them, you know, attributable either directly or indirectly to ARB.’’ 

Are you encouraged by this comment? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I saw that in the report. I am encouraged by the comment, but we know that, in fact, the first year after 

the ARB is a time of intense activity, and I worry whether, in fact, 

this is going to be continued, whether some of the heavy lifting between this branch of government and the executive branch for additional money and proposals for additional funding are going to be 

followed through. I hope they are. I can say I remain now skeptically optimistic, but I live in hope. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much. 

And I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

We now go to the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Bentivolio. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much for your distinguished service. 

I certainly appreciate it. I am going to be real quick. I only—I have 

a lot of questions but only 5 minutes to ask them. 

Admiral, I especially took note of your distinguished career and 

that, noticed that you were the captain of several ships or Navy 

vessels, correct? 

90 

Admiral MULLEN. Correct. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. And on those boats, vessels, ships—— 

Admiral MULLEN. Ships. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Ships, thank you. I am an old Army guy. That 

you probably created a culture on that ship that had a high degree 

or those ships that had a high degree of morale, a culture of safety, 

risk management as we were speaking about, and maintaining a 

high state of discipline and readiness; is that correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. Correct. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. You probably wouldn’t have been promoted to 

admiral had you not done that. So, rest assured, I have no doubt 

in my mind that your career is one of the most distinguished I’ve 

ever read about. I’m really impressed. 

But there’s—I want to get back to this risk management. It 

seems to me, from what I’ve been hearing all day, there was a lack 

of it in—well, in the State Department. Did you find that also to 

be true? 

Admiral MULLEN. I’ve sort of a two-level answer for this. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Okay. 

Admiral MULLEN. One of the things that most of us that grew 

up in the military do almost instinctively is risk management, particularly with respect to any kind of combat, and we’ve been in a 

lot of combat in the last dozen years. What I have found, and I 

take, go to my senior position in the Pentagon as the chairman, as 

the head of the Navy, we’re not as good at what I call strategic risk 

management as I would like to be specifically. And I worked on 

that when I was a chairman and when I was the head of the Navy 

in those senior positions. And too often, we’re great tactically and 

not good strategically in many areas. 

What I found when we did our, the ARB is there wasn’t the existence of certainly a system, systematic risk management program. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. So you’re familiar with the military risk management matrix, correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Okay. We start at the very top would be extremely high risk, right? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, yeah. I mean, we would look at a combination of what we call likelihood and danger—— 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Okay. 

Admiral MULLEN. —or most significant outcome. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Well, I’m from the Army and we have low, medium—— 

Admiral MULLEN. Yeah, yeah. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. —high, and extremely high risk, and we evaluate just about every task—— 

Admiral MULLEN. Sure. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. —including when we go into combat. 

Admiral MULLEN. Right. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. We look at all those. And let’s see. Where—the 

part I’m talking about, and I think we touched on this in earlier 

questioning, you developed or the military tries to develop a culture 

around risk management, and I think that’s what you’re trying to 

91 

improve when you talk about discussing this at the Pentagon, 

right? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. But I seem to have found absent in the leadership of the State Department. And I was just reading and just to 

prove your point in how we try to create a culture of safety and 

evaluating risks at all levels, I have a copy from the manual that 

is often used in training our first line of leaders, E–5, sergeants, 

I think. What do you call them in the Navy? E–5s? 

Admiral MULLEN. Petty officers. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Petty officers, thank you. Petty officer. You 

have same, similar classes where they learn leadership skills? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Including risk management analysis, correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, it’s certainly included. We certainly have 

a leadership focus. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Right. Thank you. 

Mr. Keil, Mr. Sullivan, thank you, and you brought up risk management as well. Are you familiar with—well, it says here, let me 

read this, leaders and individuals at all levels are responsible and 

accountable for managing risk. They must ensure that hazards and 

associated risks are identified and controlled during planning, 

preparation, and execution of operations. Are you familiar with 

that? 

Mr. KEIL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Are you familiar with the matrix that I’m talking about, referring to? 

Mr. KEIL. Generally, yes, sir. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Generally, okay. How would you evaluate, if you 

got an intelligence report saying that November 16th that the British intel agency has foiled an attack on the Libya’s National Transition Council and the British ambassador was about to get assassinated or tried to on February 6 in Syria, and in 2012, the U.S. 

closed the embassy in Syria, On June 15, 2012, Tripoli, Libya, reporting a string of attacks on Western diplomats and international 

organizations. If you were going to Libya, how would you evaluate 

or on that matrix, what would be the level of risk? High, extremely 

high, medium or low? 

Mr. KEIL. I would say extremely high, sir. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. An extremely high, would you not try to address 

those things to lower that risk, including worst-case scenarios? 

Mr. KEIL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman ISSA. The gentleman’s time has expired, but you can 

answer. 

Mr. KEIL. Yes, sir, and but it can’t just be addressed strategically. It also has to be addressed tactically. You can’t separate 

those two. Too often people are quick to say, Oh, it was the Bureau 

of Diplomatic Security’s responsibility. It doesn’t stop there. It’s 

more of a strategic question. It’s got to be a whole-of-organization 

approach to risk management. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. A culture within the organizations? 

Mr. KEIL. Yes, sir. 

92 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. And because of that absence of culture, the captain of this ship, so to speak, probably wouldn’t get a very good rating; is that correct? 

Mr. KEIL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. And who was the captain of the Department of 

State at the time? 

Mr. KEIL. Secretary of State. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. And name please? 

Mr. KEIL. At that time it was Secretary Clinton. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

We now go to the gentleman from Missouri, who has been patiently looking in and out, coming in and out for this very opportunity. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for conducting this hearing. 

And thank the witnesses for appearing, and hopefully some of 

our questions are being answered. 

And, Mr. Chairman, at this time, I would like to yield to my 

friend, the husband—— 

Chairman ISSA. Well, thank you. 

Mr. CLAY. The husband of the brilliant Dr. Rockeymoore, Mr. 

Cummings of Maryland. 

Chairman ISSA. Oh, so I was your second choice. 

The gentleman is recognized. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. I’ll tell my wife you said 

that. 

The ARB assigned accountability to three individuals within the 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the deputy assistant secretary responsible for Libya, her boss, the principal deputy assistant secretary, and the assistant secretary. However, the ARB did not find 

specific fault with the under secretary for management, Patrick 

Kennedy, who is the supervisor of the assistant secretary. 

The Republican staff report released on Sunday night stated, 

‘‘The ARB downplayed Kennedy’s role in the decisionmaking that 

led to the inadequate security posture in Benghazi.’’ 

Ambassador Pickering, do you agree that you downplayed Under 

Secretary Kennedy’s role? 

And Admiral Mullen, would you answer the same question? 

Ambassador PICKERING. No. I think that we looked very carefully 

at this. We have had numerous dialogues about this here this 

morning. We did not find the pattern of decisionmaking on the part 

of Secretary Kennedy deficient with respect to security. We did find 

the pattern of decisionmaking at the deputy assistant secretary 

level in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security deficient, and we found 

the review of that pattern by her boss, the assistant secretary, 

lacked, put it this way, sufficient attention to leadership and management, that it was deficient. We’ve talked here about that, and 

I believe that’s the best description I can give you of that interrelationship. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Admiral Mullen? 

Admiral MULLEN. I would only add that, again, we were guided 

by the statute that said, Look at who was making the decisions, 

and that’s—it’s almost hard to overstate the significance and the 

93 

nexus of those decisions being made in the DS Bureau by Lamb 

and fully supported by her boss, Boswell. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. As evidence—— 

Ambassador PICKERING. Not only to reinforce that, we were specifically admonished under the statute not to take as dispositive 

the acceptance of responsibility by senior officers who clearly didn’t 

make decisions and, in some cases, were not informed but took that 

responsibility pro forma as part of their sense of obligation to their 

department. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. As evidence of this allegation, the Republican 

staff report discusses a memorandum that Under Secretary Kennedy approved in December 2011, extending the special mission for 

1 year. The Republican staff report said this; ‘‘The document and 

the testimony show that one of the major contributing factors to 

this deficiency was the temporary nature of the Benghazi compound authorized by Under Secretary Patrick Kennedy.’’ 

Ambassador Pickering, did the Accountability Review Board review the December 2011 memorandum approved by Under Secretary Kennedy? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yes, we did. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ambassador Pickering, can you explain what role 

Under Secretary Kennedy had in that memo and why you did not 

conclude that he was responsible for the specific measures at the 

temporary facility? 

Ambassador PICKERING. He was asked to approve the extension 

by all of the bureaus concerned, including the Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security which had responsibility in carrying out that extension to 

carry out the appropriate security measures. There was not a proposed panoply of security measures which Kennedy was asked to 

approve. It was part of the process that the Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security had that responsibility, would take it and carry it out. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Admiral Mullen, do you agree with that? 

Admiral MULLEN. I do, and one very specific line item in that 

memorandum designated the expected number of ARSO’s, security 

agents or officers in Benghazi, and that gets back to, in implementation, where the decisions were made. The failure and accountability was in not meeting that need. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Then, finally, in fact, that memo was approved 

before it reached the under secretary by both the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Overseas Building Operations, 

both of which were responsible for the security at the post. The Republican staff report also finds fault with Under Secretary Kennedy 

plays a role in approving the decision not to expand—extend the 

SST, a Defense Department team helping with security in Tripoli, 

the report states, and this is—I’ll close with this, ‘‘The decision to 

end the SST mission in Libya in July 2012 was made by Ambassador Kennedy, albeit based upon a recommendation from 

Charlene Lamb.’’ 

Do you all have a comment on that? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yes, I would just comment that to the 

best of our knowledge and belief, the continuation of the SST was 

not also actively supported by Ambassador Stevens, and that 

played a role as well in the decisionmaking. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I’ll yield. 

94 

Chairman ISSA. With that we go—go ahead, Admiral. 

With that, we go to the gentleman from Florida. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Mullen, just to follow up, there was the discussion about 

giving the head’s up to Cheryl Mills, so what was the purpose of 

doing that? 

Admiral MULLEN. The purpose was to—the purpose was to, having sat through an interview with Ms. Lamb, who answered all 

questions very honestly—there’s been an issue raised today about 

whether there was any question about her, and there wasn’t ever, 

about Ms. Lamb and her straightforwardness—but the single purpose was very obviously very early in the overall process postBenghazi, the testimony was having run a large department, I 

spent a lot of time when I was head of the Navy, as well as chairman, and in previous jobs, but really in those head jobs, that the 

senior jobs, looking at who should, who would be best qualified for 

whatever the question was—— 

Mr. DESANTIS. No, I understand that and I understand—— 

Admiral MULLEN. And so testified. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Sorry to interrupt, but I’m limited on time, and 

I understand, as a CNO, and I was in the Navy when you were 

CNO, and I appreciate that, but I guess, you know, you’re on this 

ARB. I just—what is it? Like what interest do you have in who the 

State Department puts up or not? I understand why, given your 

Navy position, how you would have done that with the Defense Department. 

Admiral MULLEN. Actually, it had nothing, it had nothing to do 

with ARB, and it had everything to do with a heads up in order 

to at least give my view that this was going to be a weak witness 

to an agency head who was working through who was going to appear. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Ambassador Pickering, this may, was mentioned 

previously, but this 1998 ARB recommendation about the Secretary 

of State personally reviewing the security situation in these outposts and closing some if there is not adequate security, and this 

was after the East Africa bombings, was that something, because 

I know you were high in the State Department, was that something that you remember, and did you think that that recommendation made sense? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And so the issue with not submitting interrogatories to Secretary Clinton or not interviewing her about, you 

know, what determinations did she make with respect to Benghazi, 

what was the reason for not doing that? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I think that we made it clear that, as I 

said a moment ago, that’s, that particular process, which Secretary 

Albright implemented in her own way of having a daily meeting in 

the morning with the assistant secretary of security, seems to have 

dwindled away. It did not exist, and therefore, there was a weakness, in our view, in perhaps pushing issues up that might have 

attracted the attention of the Secretary, but that was not done. 

But that was not, in our view, a fault with the Secretary. It was 

a fault with the assistant secretary for security, who, if he had that 

view, should have pushed it up. That was, of course, a decisional 

95 

question. We found weaknesses in taking account of a whole series 

of activities in the region that everybody seemed to live with and 

not take as a kind of bell ringing in the night that the situation 

was getting worse and you better take a look at it. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And I understand that. I guess my issue is, is, 

you know, Benghazi and eastern Libya generally, like when I was 

in Iraq in 2007, there were foreign fighters coming into Iraq from 

Libya. And we knew when we were conducting operations against 

Qadhafi that a lot of his opposition was an Islamist opposition. And 

so it just seems to me that that process breaking down, I understand how that, but this particular area on the eve of 9/11, it just 

seems to me that there should have been more alarm bells ringing 

off that would go all the way to the top. And I understand your 

point about the breakdown, but it just seems to me it would have 

been helpful to get the Secretary’s input on what she did or didn’t 

do proactively, understanding that there may be fault beneath because of the critical nature of that, and so I just want—my final 

question would be, you know, as you sit here today, and obviously, 

it would be to both Admiral Mullen and Ambassador Pickering, are 

you satisfied with the United States Government’s response to 

what happened in Benghazi writ large? 

Ambassador PICKERING. No, and I think that our report was designed, sir, to provide a series of recommendations—— 

Mr. DESANTIS. But what I’m saying is—— 

Ambassador PICKERING. —on what to do. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The response, since you’ve done the report, are 

you satisfied with the action that the government’s taken, and 

then, just as somebody, and I know this is outside the purview of 

your report, but just as an American, and certainly Admiral 

Mullen, as a distinguished military officer, you know, are you satisfied with what we’ve done to bring the folks who actually did this 

to justice? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I’m—look, you’ve got a couple questions 

here. What was done to follow up the ARB generally through the 

newspaper reports, I think they are making a serious effort to do 

it, but I would be happier if I sat down and had a full briefing and 

then could give you the kind of judgment that I hope you would 

expect from somebody with experience. 

Chairman ISSA. Heck, we’d be happy to get a briefing, too. 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yeah, I understand. On the FBI’s work, 

I think that’s something you really need to talk to them about. 

There have been complaints that they aren’t moving soon enough, 

but we all know the difficulty of investigative activities in foreign 

countries where, in fact, it requires a huge security presence even 

to go and take a look at the crime scene. And I think there are formidable problems that the FBI faces in being able to provide a 

rapid response. And I think I understand as well as most. I, certainly as a citizen, I would like to see it instantaneously, but as, 

I hope, a rational person, I have some understanding of what it is 

they have to contend with. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

We now go to the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. DesJarlais. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. I know it’s been a long hearing. 

96 

There’s many lingering questions on Benghazi. One I get asked 

quite frequently, and I want to get your perspective, Ambassador 

and Admiral, on this particular issue, and that is the claim by the 

State Department, the Secretary of State, the intelligence community as to the fact that this attack was the result of a YouTube 

video. What is your perspective as to why that was propagated for 

so long? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Look, that all happened after the ARB 

was, in effect, reported. It was not in our line of responsibility, and 

therefore, I think that principally those investigating criminally are 

going to have to look for motive and rationale. And I believe, in 

fact, that, without bucking it too much, that’s where the real decisionmaking on what really was motivating the guys will have to 

take place. 

Put it this way: There was an attack on Egypt apparently more 

directly related to the video that took place on the afternoon before 

the attack on Benghazi. There is some indication that that attack 

stimulated interest in Benghazi, only indication. 

There are some who have said there is testimony that, in fact, 

the video was in people’s minds. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. I mean, I think we can all buy that story, 

sir. 

Ambassador PICKERING. But I can’t give you a conclusive view 

because I haven’t done the work. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Okay, I think we can all buy that. 

You’re an American. You listened to this. You watched the news, 

and you had to have been a little bit ashamed of the fact that this 

was propagated for 2 to 3 weeks. I think this is important because 

we have family that still have not had justice, the justice that 

Obama went on television and promised we would get; we would 

catch these people. It’s a year later; there’s not even been an arrest. And, you know, that’s a problem. 

And so it goes to the credibility, and I just wanted to get your 

perspective. I get your talking points, and I know what happened 

in Egypt, and that story might have held water for, what, maybe 

6 hours, but not 3 weeks. But yet, you know, to the American people the credibility of the administration, the State Department and 

the intelligence community was diminished because they continued 

to propagate that. 

Admiral, do you agree? 

Admiral MULLEN. We made very clear early on, and obviously it 

was almost a month later when—— 

Chairman ISSA. Admiral, if you would take your mic, please. 

Admiral MULLEN. Sorry. We made very clear early on, and obviously, we started a month later, that we thought it was a terrorist 

attack based on, actually not just based on sort of the public discussion but based on the evidence. And certainly I—— 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. What do I tell the folks back home? 

Admiral MULLEN. I guess the way I would answer the question 

is to say I understand the question. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Uh-huh, you understand. 

Admiral MULLEN. But it really was outside our purview to get in. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. A lot of people think it was political. I mean, 

we were 7 weeks from a Presidential election; this was just messy, 

97 

and we didn’t want to deal with it, but what it did create was a 

lack of an investigation taking place immediately. It was delayed 

about 3 weeks, and that’s why I bring it up. 

But let’s get back to something that is more germane to today’s 

hearing. Raymond Maxwell is one of the people selected for accountability. Can you tell me what Raymond Maxwell did to contribute to the inadequate security posture in Benghazi? 

Ambassador PICKERING. He told us that he had made a conscious 

decision not to read the intelligence. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. And did you look at the testimony of his 

supervisor, Beth Jones, where she said it’s been determined that 

there was no intelligence they could have told us that this attack 

was underway; it wasn’t material. 

Ambassador PICKERING. That was all substantive to our discussion. We did interview Ms. Jones. From what I can see, her subsequent testimony to the committee indicated she was not aware of 

the fact that her subordinate was not reading the intelligence. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. But in fact, there was evidence that he had not 

stopped reading all the intelligence. 

Ambassador PICKERING. He made a statement to us that led us 

to believe that he had stopped reading intelligence. 

Admiral MULLEN. And he did not clarify it, as it has been clarified I’ve seen in certain documents. 

Ambassador PICKERING. And in every interview, we gave people 

at the end of the interview the warning and the right, did they 

have anything more to say to explain their testimony to us? 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. So was Maxwell’s finding for accountability directly related to the attack on Benghazi or was the accountability unrelated to the attack? 

Ambassador PICKERING. We believe it was related to the security 

question. If he didn’t know the intelligence, he couldn’t understand 

the security problem in full. 

Admiral MULLEN. And, sir, just very quickly, from my perspective, in that interview. I mean, again, I was stunned and shocked 

when I heard him. What it represented to me was a detachment 

from the responsibilities for Libya and then inside Libya and Tripoli and Benghazi. It was a strong indicator of his detachment, and 

he as a very senior guy in the State Department, responsible with 

everything else that was going on in the world, it sort of lay right 

in front of him. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Okay, so I’ll—— 

Ambassador PICKERING. And, sir, he said he did this because he 

didn’t want to confuse in public speaking classified and unclassified, while at the same time, he was clearly reading all of the State 

Department classified material, so this didn’t seem to us to be a 

responsible position or a reasonable position, and I fully support 

what the admiral said. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Okay, so you think at this point, he still should 

be one of the four individuals based on what you know now? This 

is, of all the things that happened in Benghazi, this is one of the 

guys that should take the heat? 

Ambassador PICKERING. We haven’t changed our view. Certainly, 

I haven’t. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you. 

98 

Chairman ISSA. We go to Mrs. Lummis. 

Mrs. Lummis, would you yield me about 10 seconds. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. I just want to make one thing clear in a question. I’m following up on Dr. DesJarlais. You held him accountable 

because he was derelict in focusing on his responsibility. However, 

people above him and below him were acutely aware that there had 

been a series of attacks, including the two on the British ambassador and the like. So the actual attacks and the actual risk was 

not a question but only the classified information. I just want to 

make sure that’s correct. We’ve had both of you in depositions on 

this. 

Ambassador PICKERING. I think we believed that his responsibility in the bureau extended to everything taking place in Libya. 

Chairman ISSA. So he’s part of the culture of not caring enough 

but, in fact, people above him and below him, including Under Secretary Kennedy, were acutely aware of the growing danger and risk 

actually occurring in Benghazi? 

Ambassador PICKERING. They were not—— 

Chairman ISSA. That’s a yes or no. 

Ambassador PICKERING. They were not required to follow, Mr. 

Chairman, on a daily basis. He had the dot. He made it clear he 

had the dot, and he was—they were not—these—— 

Chairman ISSA. Now, look we’re aware of the—— 

Ambassador PICKERING. —his universe to cover. 

Chairman ISSA. Admiral—or ambassador, we’re not—— 

Ambassador PICKERING. I love the promotion, keep giving it to 

me. 

Chairman ISSA. No, ambassador is forever, we know that. The 

fact is that we are not disagreeing that there was a level, a sequence of responsibility. 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yes. 

Chairman ISSA. So, trust us, we are not saying you were wrong 

in holding certain people accountable. One of the challenges here, 

as Dr. DesJarlais said, is, Look, you had absolutely no mandate to 

deal with the fact that the American people were outright lied to 

as to the cause of the attack and misled for a long period of time, 

including on virtually every Sunday talk show. We understand that 

wasn’t your mandate, but neither was your mandate to look at the 

question of a system, under Under Secretary Kennedy, that did not 

allow anybody to pull the panic button, but rather, it kept looking 

for one person who would decide not to do, not to have Benghazi 

open or to man it with resources they may not have had. Mrs. 

Lummis, I would ask—— 

Ambassador PICKERING. Quite the contrary, Mr. Chairman. One 

of our recommendations was that there ought to be a system, a 

very simple one, where there were differences of view between the 

regional bureau supporting the ambassador in the field and Diplomatic Security, that it ought to be resolved by the two assistant 

secretaries immediately. If it couldn’t go there, it should go to Kennedy and his political opposite number in this point, Wendy Sherman. If they couldn’t solve it right away, the Secretary. So we believed, in fact, that push up was not taking place, and the principal 

responsibility, as Admiral Mullen I think explained a while ago, 

99 

seemed to be at the level of the people who had the responsibility 

to push up, who were in a sense covering their decisions. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

I would ask unanimous consent the gentlelady have the full 5 

minutes. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to follow up on Dr. DesJarlais’s and the chairman’s line 

of questioning. You did, as the Accountability Review Board, admit 

last December that there was no protest prior to the attacks, correct? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Correct. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Is it true that there really were video and audio 

feeds from Benghazi as the attacks unfolded? 

Ambassador PICKERING. No. There were video feeds to the tactical center in Benghazi monitored by a DS agent. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. And did the—— 

Ambassador PICKERING. Who had an opportunity to see certain 

cameras that were put in for precisely that kind of surveillance. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Okay. And so did the DSA agent have an opportunity to communicate what he was seeing on the film to—— 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yes, he was speaking over the telephone 

on a regular basis with the DS operations center at the State Department in Washington. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Okay. So that gets it into the chain of command. 

So that information could have been or should have been available 

to the President, to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 

State; is that correct? 

Ambassador PICKERING. That particular set of information was 

shared in the State Department. I don’t know to what degree it 

went beyond the State Department. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. So we still don’t know why Susan Rice went on 

those Sunday talk shows when they had the information that this 

wasn’t due to a spontaneous protest and instead said it was. 

Ambassador PICKERING. We did not obviously have responsibility 

for investigating that, so I don’t even want to give you an opinion 

on it. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Okay. Was it an organized terrorist group that attacked? 

Ambassador PICKERING. That is something the FBI will have to 

answer. I can say the following: From my observation of the surveillance camera film, which was spotty, not complete, some of the 

invaders showed some modicum of organization for a short period 

of time and some showed a lot of disorganization, but Admiral 

Mullen is the military expert. I don’t know whether he has any 

comment on that or not. 

Admiral MULLEN. I think that’s pretty well said. I would say it 

was a combination. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Okay. Is it true that a former GTMO detainee who 

knew Ambassador Stevens claimed responsibility for the attack 

after it happened? Is that true? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I believe you’re getting into classified intelligence and that we can’t take you there now. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Okay. Is it true—— 

Chairman ISSA. Will the gentlelady suspend? 

100 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Yes. 

Chairman ISSA. That is not true. That is not classified that they 

made an overt claim of responsibility. The gentlelady’s question 

had to do with that a group had claimed it. They made a very public claim. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Okay, thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador PICKERING. Yeah, but—okay. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Is it true that there’s documentation that the Muslim Brotherhood and operatives from Egypt were involved in the 

attack? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Our report indicates that one Egyptian 

organization, which is named in the report, was possibly involved, 

and I’m not sure. I think that that’s in the unclassified. I hope it 

is. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Okay. If we—is it true that they were seeking to 

loot surface-to-air missiles that were gathered up at the annex? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I can’t comment on that. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Okay. Is it possible that they were trying to acquire classified communications codes? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I can’t comment on that. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Okay. Is it true that they were planning to kidnap 

the ambassador and it went wrong? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I can’t comment on that. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Thank you Mr. Chairman I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. Would the gentlelady yield? 

Mrs. LUMMIS. I will. 

Chairman ISSA. Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Keil, I just had one question 

that has come up again and again in your post mortem of problems. I’m a big fan of really great security systems, and my favorite 

one is how they produce high quality automobiles on the Japanese 

assembly lines. They have overhead lines and any production worker—and this has become common in America too—anyone on the 

production line can pull if they see a bad part or a safety hazard 

they can pull a chain and the line shuts down. That’s how they 

make sure they don’t have defects. 

Is one of the problems you’ve observed that whether or not we 

have a growth in the bureaucracy, an Under Secretary of X, Y, and 

Z, who theoretically report directly to the Secretary, isn’t one of the 

problems that the culture doesn’t allow one person who sees a 

problem to simply shut it down? In other words, one group is making the facilities decision as a complete exception to the safety 

standards; another person is held accountable after a decision is 

made to be in a hopelessly worthless building, one whose wall had 

been breached by a very small piece of explosive, and yet that person didn’t have the ability to say, stop, we’re not going to be in 

Benghazi because policy drives whether you are in Benghazi, facilities drives what building you’re in, and then diplomatic security is 

told to make sure that they make it safe. 

Isn’t the functional structure at the Department of State one in 

which instead of having everybody be able to shut something down 

for safety, virtually nobody in some situations can independently 

shut it down other than the Secretary of State herself? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think what we looked at here was enabling people to be able to do that very thing. I think what we saw here, a 

101 

Secretary, there’s a lot of very, very good outstanding people at the 

Department of State. 

Chairman ISSA. Agreed. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Diplomatic security. I think when it comes to risk, 

we, as a country, what I’ve been briefed on, we’ve made a determination that we’re going to go into these high-risk areas. What I 

think is there just needs to be an improvement in how we go about 

doing our risk management and how we come up with the best 

plan to mitigate that risk. 

We’ve seen, we have seen stovepiping, I think that’s an issue, I 

think that’s an issue in any organization. But to me, this is about 

identifying what those problems are and fixing it. And I do see that 

that move is afoot. But I do think when you go into any high-risk 

area, I do think that there is always going to be that threat. We’re 

never going to be able to eliminate all of that risk but we need to 

come to a—I think State Department needs to come to a, arrive at 

a spot where, you know, they look at the criticality of that program 

and they come up with the best mitigation for that threat. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, may I have 30 seconds to just 

sum up? 

Chairman ISSA. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, you said a moment ago you said 

something, and you said that’s not true when you were talking to 

Admiral Pickering. 

Admiral Pickering, I just want you to clear that up the chairman 

said to me he misunderstood, but I want the record clear. 

Chairman ISSA. I was only saying based on her question which 

the Ambassador misunderstood. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Because these records—I don’t want your reputation to be impugned in any way. 

Ambassador PICKERING. I’ve lost part of the conversation. I’d be 

glad to address the question. 

Chairman ISSA. It was simply that what her question was if 

properly understood was about a public report, and it was clear 

that you didn’t understand she was asking about the public report 

which then you both cleared up. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. That is true. 

Ambassador PICKERING. Because I know, I will put it this way, 

unpublic information—— 

Chairman ISSA. We do not want unpublic information here today. 

Ambassador PICKERING. And I would always say, Mr. Chairman, 

just let me say this: Kidnapping seemed to me to be far-fetched because, in effect, in the testimony that was given in the public report, they did not make a serious attempt to go into the closed area 

of the villa. It is not even sure, in my view, they knew the Ambassador was there. 

So I would say while I said I didn’t want to touch that, I would 

say in retrospect, it doesn’t seem highly likely. Could be, but I don’t 

think so. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. We’re now going to recognize that everyone has had a first round. I would like to get this panel out of 

here in less than 10 minutes. So I’m going to look to my left and 

102 

tell the gentlemen that I will waive my time and give you, between 

the two of you, 5 minutes. I will look to my right and give my ranking member 5 minutes, and no one will get a minute more. The 

gentlemen over there may split there time starting now. 

Mr. JORDAN. I thank the chairman for the generosity. 

Admiral Mullen, we learned earlier that in the very first week 

of the ARB being formed, you gave Cheryl Mills a heads up because you felt Charlene Lamb, who was coming to testify in front 

of this committee was quote, and the response to Mr. DeSantis’ 

question, ‘‘a weak witness.’’ 

So my question is real simple. Why should you care? Why does 

it matter? Weak—if she was a weak, strong witness, short witness, 

tall witness, male witness, female witness, why in the heck does it 

matter? Your job is to figure out what took place at the State Department not to decide what kind of representative the State Department sends in front of a Congressional committee. So why in 

the heck did you care? 

Admiral MULLEN. I indicated before that I did that having nothing to do with the ARB, and having everything to do with the fact 

that I’ve run departments, provided witnesses, and as the head of 

a—— 

Mr. JORDAN. If she was a strong witness, if she was going to convey a good light for the State Department, would you have called 

up Cheryl Mills and say hey, Charlene Lamb is going to knock it 

out of the park you know make sure you coach her and get her 

ready and send her in front, she is going to be stellar. Would you 

have called Cheryl Mills then? 

Admiral MULLEN. In my interpretation or judgment at that 

point, she is going to be a strong witness? No. 

Mr. JORDAN. So the only reason you called her is because she 

was going to be a weak witness and convey a bad light on the State 

Department. 

Admiral MULLEN. The only reason I called was to give her a 

heads up that I thought the Department could be better represented at the hearing. 

Mr. JORDAN. Let me walk you one more thing before I yield my 

time to the gentleman from Utah. 

Isn’t it true that you were selected, you were notified by Cheryl 

Mills that you were going to serve on the ARB? 

Admiral MULLEN. Correct. 

Mr. JORDAN. So Cheryl Mills called you up, said, Admiral 

Mullen, I want you to serve on the board. A week into the formation of the board you call her back up and you say, hey, Cheryl 

Mills, the lady who’s about to go in front of the committee that has 

jurisdiction looking into this is going to be a terrible witness. You 

need a heads up on this, and oh, by the way, at the end of the report before it goes public, you give Cheryl Mills and Hillary Clinton 

a chance to look at the report and make edits if they want to, and 

yet, I forget one important point, maybe the most important point. 

In your opening statement you said you operated and the board operated independent. 

Admiral MULLEN. We did operate independent. 

Mr. JORDAN. I just want to make it clear. I yield my time to the 

gentleman from Utah. 

103 

Admiral MULLEN. And the only thing I’d like to comment with 

respect to what you said in the last statement was in the normal 

process, as we report it out, we were done with the report, and we 

went to Secretary Clinton to give her a briefing on the report. It 

was hers to take, that was the tasking, and hers to choose what 

to do with if she chose to sign it out. 

Mr. JORDAN. And Admiral that’s all fine, but don’t convey this as 

independent. If Cheryl Mills picked you, you gave her a heads up 

within days of starting, and you let them look at the report and 

edit the report at the end, that’s all fine if that’s the way the statute reads, but don’t try to tell us that it’s independent. 

Admiral MULLEN. Ms. Mills didn’t pick me. She called me and 

asked me to do this for the Secretary of State. 

Mr. JORDAN. Okay that’s not picking. All right. I got that. 

Chairman ISSA. The gentleman from Utah. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I just have to ask as a follow-up to that. You testified that Charlene Lamb you thought was honest, you’re not questioning her integrity so what made her a weak witness? 

Admiral MULLEN. It was my reaction from having sat down with 

her for a couple of hours at that particular point in time. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So she’s honest, she’s full of integrity but that 

made her a weak witness? 

Admiral MULLEN. My sense was, Mr. Chaffetz, my sense was 

that she had not appeared before, this was not certainly, it certainly wasn’t routine, from that standpoint, and it was not, and I 

just ask you, I have to ask you to believe me, it was not certainly 

intended to never put her in front of the committee, or at least 

speak to that. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. This is the problem. With all due respect, you 

make in your fourth paragraph of your testimony you go to great 

lengths about the unfettered access, the ability to talk to people. 

We didn’t get that same privilege. We don’t have that on the same 

panel. 

The President of the United States said before the American people and said that he would ‘‘I think it is important to find out exactly what happened in Benghazi and I’m happy to cooperate in 

any way that Congress wants.’’ 

That’s never happened. It doesn’t happen in this panel, it doesn’t 

happen from the State Department. That is part of the frustration. 

I don’t mean to single you out at all. I appreciate you being here 

and what you’ve done in your career. We still don’t have answers 

to very basic things. 

The video, or the lack of a video, is kind of an important element 

to what happened or didn’t happen in Benghazi. You didn’t even 

look at that. 

Now I need to ask Mr. Sullivan, because part of the reason that 

you and Mr. Keil are here is because we saw in Al Jazeera of all 

places the independent panel on best practices. You convened this 

panel at the recommendation of the ARB. You started this panel 

back in April, correct? Mr. Sullivan? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. When did you complete your work. 

104 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We completed our work just before the report 

came out which would have been the end of August, beginning of 

September. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Who specifically—I want a name—did you give 

this report to? This report is dated August 29, 2013, this report is 

dated then. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Who did you hand this to? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The report was handed to Greg Stern who is the 

acting—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I’m sorry, who is he? 

Mr. KEIL. We presented actually under the Federal Advisory 

Committee Act, we were legally bound to present the report to the 

Overseas Security Advisory Committee, which is a FACA-exempt 

group, and their executive counsel had to take a look at the report 

before it could officially go to the Department of State. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Has it gone to the Department of State? 

Chairman ISSA. Your time is expired. This will have to be the 

last question. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I don’t know. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I would ask my friend, the ranking member, if he 

would be okay just to finish this line of questioning. Please, if can 

have an additional minute. 

Chairman ISSA. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The Department of State does have the report. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. One of my fundamental challenges and problems 

is the United States Congress doesn’t have this report. It’s been almost a month. We don’t have this report. And yet the first time it 

comes up, to the best of my knowledge, is on Al Jazeera, that’s 

where we’ve got to get this stuff? And so—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Congressman, I think that was really unfortunate—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Do you know how it happened? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I do not. And believe me, that, I believe that’s extremely unfortunate that that report came out that way. The State 

Department, quite frankly, didn’t even have a chance to look at 

that report before it was, before that came out. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So who is going to investigate how Al Jazeera 

gets a copy of it before the State Department or the United States 

Congress gets to it? Where did it go? You used to be the head of 

the Secret Service. You know how this stuff works. How did this 

happen? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, all I know is that we provided this report, as 

Greg said, I was not there that day. I was out of town. But this 

report was provided to the representative of the Overseas Security 

Advisory Committee, and the next thing we knew within 2 days, 

that report had been leaked out. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I do hope for those State Department officials, 

Mr. Chairman, I’m going to wrap up, the State Department officials that are here in this room that are listening to this, to understand this they’ve got to get to the bottom of this, and we still, as 

the United States Congress, have to get a copy of this. For Al 

Jazeera to have it a month almost before us is just not acceptable. 

105 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. We now go to the ranking member. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Admiral Pickering, Admiral Mullen Mr. Sullivan 

and Mr. Keil, many of my comments mainly at Ambassador Pickering and Admiral Mullen, I’m so glad you’re there. I’m glad you 

did what you did. 

There’s a book that I love called The Speed of Trust by Covey. 

At some point, we have to have trust in somebody. When you lose 

trust, what happens is that it’s almost impossible for any relationship to succeed. 

And I know that you come here, and I notice that everybody 

gives you these nice compliments and everything and then all depending on who it is, then you hear a lot of negatives and sometimes positive. But again, I thank you for what you’ve done. 

Let me ask you, Admiral Mullen, there’s been a number of questions about this heads up, and sounds like it was more just general 

advice as to who could best present testimony, but going back to 

the, now back to the ARB, did you all take it easy on Charlene 

Lamb? 

Admiral MULLEN. We did not. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I can’t hear you. 

Admiral MULLEN. We did not. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Did you give her a pass? 

Admiral MULLEN. No, we held her accountable. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Would you agree with that, Admiral Pickering? 

Ambassador. I’m sorry. 

Ambassador PICKERING. Okay. 

Admiral MULLEN. Absolutely. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I apologize. During the transcribed interviews 

with the committee staff, numerous officials described the week of 

the attacks on Benghazi as an intensely dangerous, complex and 

confusing week of protests and other violent episodes at U.S. facilities around the world. For example, Eric Boswell, the Assistant 

Secretary of Diplomatic Security, described a multitude of events 

threatening U.S. posts around the world. 

This is what he told us; ‘‘The state of play was not only in 

Benghazi but in Tripoli, we were very concerned about Tripoli, but 

also things were starting to go haywire in other places. We had an 

attack on our embassy in Sana’a, Yemen, where demonstrators 

penetrated the perimeter, did a great deal of damage, milled 

around inside the compound and in subsequent days, there were 

other such demonstrations, so I had my hands full. We had,’’ and 

this continuing on with the quote, ‘‘we had a mirror innovation of 

a compound in Khartoum, Sudan, where very large thousands of 

demonstrators in each case, there was thousands of demonstrators, 

saw thousands of demonstrators, came up against the wall of this 

brand new mission.’’ 

Continuing; ‘‘There was a similar attack by a mob on our embassy in Tunis, another brand new facility, a large number of demonstrators penetrated into it, into the facility, another round, did 

a lot of damage. It was very alarming at the time.’’ 

Admiral Mullen, I’m trying to put myself in the shoes of our military, diplomatic and intelligence officials who were trying to deal 

with this in very few days. I noted the ARB looked specifically at 

106 

Benghazi, but can you tell us anything about how our military 

would have dealt with this entire week of incidents? 

Admiral MULLEN. You mean in terms of a military response. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes. 

Admiral MULLEN. It would have been obviously posturing forces, 

increasing levels of readiness, moving them as rapidly as we could, 

literally, as you described it, around the world in order to respond. 

And it would pull us away from places like the Persian Gulf where 

we have a lot of forces, even, quite frankly, the Western Pacific we 

started to roll from there, forces that were heavily engaged as well 

in places like—or in Afghanistan. So it wouldn’t have, it wouldn’t 

be for, I’d say, a short period of time, impossible to kind of move 

forces into place, but sustaining them in, lo, these many areas for 

a long period of time, that’s where we don’t have enough forces. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ambassador Pickering, what about the State 

Departments’s global perspective? How do you begin to even process all of this incoming information? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Well, I think that we have a system to 

do it, but the responses to cascades of basically deteriorating events 

are always measured against what are the resources of the State 

Department to mobilize reserves. 

And in truth, Mr. Cummings, there ain’t no reserves. We’re short 

on dough, people are stretched. We have to take away from one set 

of foci where we’re working online, operationally, pull people out 

and put them other places. 

When compounds are under pressure, particularly where there 

are dependents, that raises another very serious question of how do 

we get them out of harm’s way as soon as we can? So there are 

multiple questions. And I can understand that assistant Secretary 

Boswell was literally up to here to have 3, 4 or 5 major attacks if 

you can put it this way on U.S. facilities taking place in the space 

of 3 or 4 days. 

And so that is getting close to exhaustion. And in many ways, 

the ability to ride that out and to see the way through it represents, in my view, an extraordinary devotion to duty. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, I again thank you for bringing 

our witnesses forward. Thank you all very, very much. We really 

appreciate your testimony, all of you. Thank you. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank you. I also thank our witnesses and as 

we close, we thank each of you for your service, both in your roles 

of investigation and for your many years of Federal service. 

We have learned today, I believe, a great deal about how the, 

particularly the Admiral and the Ambassador, view the ARB deficiencies, recommendations. We certainly have a number of statements made that I believe this committee will take note of and reflect on including Admiral Mullen’s statement that, in fact, had 

there been in the neighborhood of 30 defense forces in Benghazi, 

the attack may not have occurred because at that point it would 

have been viewed as a harder target. 

At the same time we contrast that with the two heroes who were 

lost at the annex, a facility that was, by comparison, better fortified 

and better armed. What it means to us is that there is no single 

point of accountability, there is no single fix that will deal with 

this. 

107 

Having been many times in the embassy in Beirut, I know what 

a facility that is heavily guarded costs as compared to one that is 

heavily fortified by design. 

Recognizing that we will always have areas of risk, it is one of 

the challenges of this committee to recommend to the Foreign Affairs Committee and to the Appropriations Committee such funding 

in investments and organization as may allow a better decision 

process to be made. 

One of the challenges I believe this committee and the other committees of jurisdiction will have is if the decision is that we must 

have a diplomatic presence, and then facilities and manpower must 

be procured, it takes away the honest authority of the Congress to 

appropriate such funds as they see fit, and ask the administration 

to live within those funds. 

That struggle does that not occur in this committee. Our recommendations will be based on a process, hopefully leading to better decision processes. 

I want to thank you again. I want to thank the next panel of witnesses for their patience. We will take a very short recess and reconvene. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman ISSA. We now recognize our second panel of witnesses. 

Ms. Patricia Smith is the mother of Sean Smith who lost his life 

in the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi on September 11, 2012. And Mr. Charles Woods is the father of Tyrone 

Woods, who also lost his life that night. 

I want to thank you for your patience. Hopefully you benefited 

as much from the question and answers as the committee did. 

Pursuant to the rules of the committee, could you please rise to 

take the oath. Raise your right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm the testimony you will give 

today will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? 

Please be seated. Let the record indicate both witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

You waited a long time through the first panel, and there were 

a great many questions. There will be many less questions, and I 

would ask that you tell us what you feel what you’ve experienced 

so that we can understand what it’s been like for this slightly more 

than 1 year since the death of your loved ones. Ms. Smith. 

STATEMENT OF PATRICIA SMITH 

Ms. SMITH. I don’t know exactly know what to say. I have been 

ignored by the State Department. I’ve been told I was unimportant, 

and I had to find everything I know by going on the Internet and 

asking questions, because nobody from the government has gotten 

back to me to tell me anything, and I mean that by saying anything. And it’s been, I hate to put in the record, but it has been 

pure hell living through all this and not getting any answers. I 

wanted to be able to put everything beside me and have everything 

go away. But I can’t do that because I don’t have plenty of answers 

that I need. 

One silly question that I had was every time I see this on TV, 

I see these bloody fingerprints crawling down the wall of that 

Benghazi place, and I keep asking everybody, do those belong to 

108 

my son? And nobody has told me anything. One person said, no, 

it’s not them. It’s not him. But that’s just the kind of answers I get. 

Are those his bloody fingerprints? And I know you people can’t answer that now. But this is how it feels, and it feels terrible. I want 

answers. I want to know what happened with my son. And I know 

you can’t tell me anything classified, but tell me something. The 

only thing—wait a minute, I take that back, I apologize, I was told 

a few things and they’re all lies. 

Obama and Hillary and Panetta and Biden and Susan all came 

up to me at the casket ceremony. Every one of them came up to 

me, gave me a big hug and I asked them what happened please tell 

me. And every one of them said, it was the video. And we all know 

that it wasn’t the video, even at that time they knew it wasn’t the 

video. So they all lied to me. 

But what they said was, I will check up on it and get back to 

you for sure. And do you know how many times I heard from them? 

None. I don’t count. People of America don’t count. The only thing 

that counts is their own selves and their own jobs. And the people 

that are involved in this get suspended for a short time, paid the 

whole time, and then rehired or whatever it is that they do. 

I want to know what happened to my son. Why can’t these people tell me this? I’m sorry. I’m ranting. 

That’s it. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

Mr. Woods 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES WOODS 

Mr. WOODS. Thank you, Congressman Issa, for inviting members 

of the family. First of all, I’d just like to say, this tie right here is 

special to me. It was worn at my son’s funeral. And I only wear 

it on special occasions and this right here I trust is something special that is happening. The other thing that is special that is happening is after Ty went home to be with Lord, I really was concerned about his son that was born just, he only saw for a very 

brief time before he left on assignment, how he’d be doing and after 

1 year, we spent a day with him yesterday that was the one ray 

of sunshine through the clouds this week, so a few special things 

have happened here and I thank you for what you’re doing. 

It’s been over a year since four brave Americans were tragically 

killed in Benghazi. And after 1 year, we know very few answers 

that we have been asking for the last year. We don’t know much 

more than we did a year ago. 

Two of my heroes while growing up were John F. Kennedy and 

Martin Luther King. Reverend King made the statement that justice delayed is justice denied. It’s been over a year. We have no justice and we have very few truthful answers that have been provided. 

Public testimony is necessary in front of a committee such as this 

so that the American people can get the truth. So I thank you very 

much for what you’re doing here. Now, voters, they need to know 

the truth about what happened in Benghazi in order to protect 

America’s freedoms. Now a lot of people unfortunately say that we 

can’t tell the people the truth, we have to answer, I can’t answer 

that question. Such as the Ambassador did. There are too many of 

109 

these witnesses that are testifying behind closed doors, and we 

don’t know what they said. We don’t see their faces on TV to tell 

whether or not they’re credible witnesses. We don’t see whether or 

not the right questions were asked to get to the truth or whether 

meaningless questions were asked instead. 

So it’s very important that we have public testimony by credible 

witnesses with firsthand—not hearsay—knowledge of the situation. 

That is why it’s imperative that you call people like General Ham, 

you call people like Ty’s friends who have contacted various committees and wanted to testify through their attorney but have not 

been issued subpoenas. 

There are people out there that have firsthand knowledge, and 

public testimony is necessary. 

The voters need to have the truth about Benghazi so that the 

voters can protect the freedom of America. 

Now after 1 year, there are certain questions that I would like 

to have answered. Recently I sent a letter to the President who offered to reach out for answers some of the questions I asked I 

would like to direct to this body as well. 

I am the father of Ty Woods, who was killed while heroically defending the American consulate in Benghazi. These are some of the 

questions. Who made the decision to stand down and when and 

why was that decision made? 

Now there is some conflict as to whether or not there was an 

order to stand down. There are very credible sources that say that 

Ty and five of his special forces workers were denied three times, 

once they went, were denied. They waited a certain period of time, 

second time they were denied. They waited another period of time. 

Third time, they were denied. They went anyway. 

We need to ask the people that were there, not rely upon hearsay 

evidence as to whether or not there was an order to stand down. 

More importantly, we also need to know find out who it was that 

gave that order to stand down and why that order was given to 

stand down? The former admiral of the Pacific fleet said that in all 

of his decades of service, this has never happened where a rescue 

attempt was not at least attempted immediately, and immediately 

does not mean the next day. Immediately does not mean 8, 9, 10 

hours later. 

When is also important, because Ambassador Stevens was alive 

for a substantial period of time after he made that initial distress 

call. It’s very possible that there would have been no loss of life if 

that first order to stand down had not been given. We need to find 

that out. 

Another question is, is it true that General Ham was relieved 

from duty for refusing to follow the order not to rescue? I have had 

a general tell me that according to his intel, that General Ham was 

relieved of duty because immediately after the distress call was relayed to him, he was told to stand down. And his words, according 

to this general were, I don’t speak like this, screw it, and, within 

moments, General Ham was relieved of his duty by an inferior officer. 

Now the spin that was given by the administration was that this 

was a prescheduled rotation of generals. Well, I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the American community to say that a 

110 

general in the middle of a battle would be relieved because of a 

prescheduled rotation, and especially by an inferior officer. We 

need to have that direct testimony by General Ham, and it needs 

to be public so that the public, so that the voters can view the 

credibility of who is telling the truth, because the ARB contradicts 

that and says that there was not any denial of support by anyone 

from Washington at page 37. 

Finally, this is a very personal question to me, but a very important question, and that is if the President’s child were in Benghazi, 

would the rescue attempt have been more aggressive? There are 

very—there’s very strong evidence of what the answer to that question is, and I will let every American make that decision for themselves. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

I’ll be brief in my questions and first I will start with a comment 

for both of you. We’re essentially the Select Committee on Investigations here in the House, and we have a counterpart in the Senate, and we have a long history of doing investigations and sometimes people talk about us writing subpoenas and demanding people and hauling people before this committee. And we don’t walk 

away from that. Sometimes it’s necessary. 

Today I want you to know that just today, I signed subpoenas 

for Alec Henderson and John Martinek. 

Mr. WOODS. Thank you. 

Chairman ISSA. If there are additional witnesses who have facts 

and were on the ground and want us to issue subpoenas if their 

names could be provided to us we will do so. 

We are issuing the subpoenas for these two individuals because 

the State Department has repeatedly lied in how they reflected 

these people’s availability saying that they were available if they 

wanted to come forward. Well, a spokesperson in the press office 

after repeatedly being asked by press officials, not us, the press officials essentially created the obvious slant which was that these 

individuals were free to come forward, but there was a criminal investigation and they might harm it. 

We finally have reached the end of our rope after repeated requests for these individuals. In fact, their names have never been 

formally given to us, but rather, a large stack of information delivered to us as classified while, in fact, on their face being unclassified is guarded by State Department official and we may not make 

copies of it. 

Instead we were able to find from open source, the names of 

these individuals, and we today subpoenaed them. 

We will not end our investigation until all your questions are answered. 

Mr. WOODS. Thank you. 

Chairman ISSA. One of the questions, Mrs. Smith, that I have is 

how could President Obama tell you that, in fact, this had anything 

to do with a video when he said, quite frankly during a live debate 

in Denver, that the next morning in the Rose Garden he knew it 

was a terrorist attack, and that statement in the Rose Garden obviously occurred prior to your son coming home. So that one I find 

hard to believe. 

111 

Ambassador Rice, on the other hand, continued to be somewhat 

delusional as to the cause of this on five sequential television appearances. Secretary Clinton, I’m not sure what difference it makes 

to her, but I am surprised that she would make a categoric statement of something that her own acting ambassador on the ground 

has said before this committee, under oath, he knew from the moment it happened that it was, in fact, a terrorist attack and more 

importantly the Secretary was well aware that the Ambassador 

went to bed at 9:05 and would never have gone to bed if, in fact, 

there was a large demonstration occurring outside his door. 

For both of you, I really truly regret your loss and I can see the 

pain that you deal with every day. I’m not going to inflict any more 

pain on you here today. 

The promise I make is that as long as I have this gavel, I will 

continue to pursue this. As you go down the dais at least most of 

the dais, you’re going to see people who have worked on this and 

will continue to work on this. And I want you to take particular 

note to Mr. Chaffetz who, on my request, made the first trip to the 

region was with General Ham and if he were sitting next to you, 

the testimony he would give as to what he found out from General 

Ham before the handlers got to him was quite a bit different than 

what was later related. 

So, Mr. Woods, we will work with you, we will work with both 

of you to try to get you the truth. 

The fact is that will not bring your loved ones back. And the only 

thing we can say is that it may save somebody else as a result of 

their efforts. And I also want to reiterate what I think is understood is those who picked up arms to defend the compounds undoubtedly saved the lives of their colleagues. And if reports are correct, there were more than 30 people who are alive today because 

of their heroic efforts. And I want to thank you for that. 

I recognize the ranking member for his question. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. I don’t have any questions. But I do want to thank you all for being here. 

It is so important, and Mr. Woods, the last conversation I had 

with you was a very wonderful conversation and I have actually 

written about, and I remember you asked two things that we find 

out who did this, who is responsible, and do everything in our 

power to bring them to justice. But you also said something else 

and that was to do everything that we could to make sure it doesn’t 

happen to anybody else. I made a commitment to you that day and 

I continue to make a commitment to you today to do just that. 

So Mrs. Smith and Mr. Woods, I join my colleagues in expressing 

our sympathy for your loss, and honoring their memories. It’s 

tough, I know, and very, very difficult. Not all of the heroes who 

were killed in Benghazi have family here today, but I wanted to 

honor those individuals as well as I know you would. 

Mr. Woods, like your son, Glen Doherty was a Navy SEAL who 

spent his life serving our country. He was part of the team that responded to the USS Cole attack and he participated in two tours 

of duty in Iraq. 

I’d like to read some words of kindness that friends of Glen 

Doherty shared at his memorial. Here is what one friend and 

former Navy SEAL said about Glen. 

112 

My friend Glen, he would never pound his chest or tell you how 

great he was. Glen was a great listener and always had experience 

and advice. He was the jack of all trades and the master of all, a 

person that was great at everything he did, a warrior, spirit balanced by kindness of hearts. 

Here is what another friend and former Navy SEAL said about 

him. Glen was, without a doubt, the most liked man I have ever 

met. He was the kind who went through which hundreds of people 

knew one another and kept in touch and up-to-date with each 

other. I can’t remember ever hearing anyone say a bad thing about 

the man, which I found particularly interesting considering he was 

one of the most genuine men I have ever known. 

He was a brother in arms as well as a brother in life. Don’t cry 

for Glen. He would not approve of that. Celebrate a man who lived 

well and died with a gun in his hands fighting for those too weak 

to fight for themselves. 

Another former Navy SEAL described Glen this way. He said 

Glen Doherty was a true American hero in every sense of the word. 

He embodied the selfless spirit, unwavering determination to succeed, and a dedication to our country that sets the standard for 

what every American should strive to be. 

The loss of this incredible warrior is one that will forever hurt 

this Nation’s heart, as Glen was truly a gift to the many people 

that knew him, and even to the ones who didn’t. There is nothing 

he wouldn’t do to help those that were close to him and he never 

met a stranger that he would not befriend. Glen was one of the finest men I have ever had the pleasure of knowing. And the brotherhood that mourns of the loss of one of its very best. 

And I think that we can as a matter of fact, I know we could say 

the same about your sons. They were gifts to us. And guess what? 

You are also gifts to them. And we’re going to do everything in our 

power, as the chairman said, to get to the bottom of this. But we 

thank you so much for being here. 

Ms. SMITH. I do have another question. And it is not really a 

question, but, it is, when I spoke to Obama and Hillary and all the 

rest that I told you about, they all promised me, including Obama, 

that he would get back to me and that it was the fault of the video. 

So don’t tell me that he didn’t know about it. He may have changed 

his mind, but he did tell me that it was the fault of the video. And 

I don’t trust my government anymore because they lie to me. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Again, I want to thank you all both for being 

here. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

Mr. Jordan. 

Mr. JORDAN. Again, I will be brief too. I can’t add to what’s been 

expressed already other than just to say thank you and your family 

for the service to our country for coming here and testifying today. 

God bless you, and I’m committed just like the chairman said to 

getting to the truth, asking every question, getting every witness 

on that witness stand under oath. It’s the way our system works. 

There’s a problem in the executive branch, they have to come here 

in front of Congress under oath and answer questions from the legislative branch. That’s how you have accountability. That’s how you 

have the checks and balances as the Founders wanted. And I’m 

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committed to doing that, but again, I just want to thank you for 

you and your family’s courage and the sacrifice that each of your 

families has made for our country. 

Chairman ISSA. Mr. Chaffetz. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Well, thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman and 

I thank you both for being here. God bless you and your families. 

I just love when Americans, ordinary Americans do extraordinary 

things, and for both of your sons and the others that were involved, 

we can never forget their service, their sacrifice and the millions 

of people, quite frankly, that have gone before them and done as 

well. And I can only hope that my kids will look at what your kids 

did. I just appreciate it. I just want to say thank you. 

As Mr. Jordan said, part of what we do as a Nation which makes 

us different from so many others is we are self-critical, we do look 

hard at these things and that’s why we have this inspired document called the United States Constitution. 

And so you will always have an open door here. We have a duty 

and obligation to find out the truth because you deserve that, our 

country deserves that and we have to make sure that it never ever 

happens again. 

But here is my concern, here is a quote from the President, this 

is November, November 14th, of last year. The President said, ‘‘I 

think that it is important for us to find out exactly what happened 

in Benghazi, and I’m happy to cooperate in any ways that Congress 

wants.’’ 

That has never, ever happened. Not even close. Not even close. 

And it’s sad to me to be 13 months after the fact and look you in 

the eye and tell you, that has never happened. 

This is, again, the President: ‘‘We have provided every bit of information that we have and we will continue to provide information.’’ 

Again, it has never, ever happened. The President continued, and 

we have got a full-blown investigation and all that information will 

be disgorged to Congress. 

Again, I’m here to look you in the eye and tell you that hasn’t 

happened either. They told us today the accountability review 

board didn’t even look at the video they didn’t even look into that, 

they didn’t see if that was one of the factors. 

The President continued, and I don’t think there’s any debate in 

this country that when you have four Americans killed that’s a 

problem, and we’ve got to get to the bottom of this and there needs 

to be accountability. 

Thirteen months later there hasn’t been the accountability. That 

hasn’t happened either. 

Finally, the President said, we’ve got to bring those who carried 

this out to justice. And there won’t be any debate from me on that. 

I can tell you as a Member of Congress spending as much time as 

everybody here who is still sitting here by the way, that hasn’t 

happened either. 

And so I know there are a lot of people who say why are you still 

doing this? Why? It is all politics. We’ve been through this. And 

you’re exactly the reason why. And I think if we just lived up to 

the promise that the President of the United States days after an 

election made to the American people, made to you, that’s fine 

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that’s the standard. I just want to live up to what the President 

said. I just want the President to do what he said he would do. 

Do you have any comments, Mrs. Smith? 

Ms. SMITH. I have many comments, but I can never bring them 

to mind when I want to. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. You’ll think about them tonight, I know that happens to all of us. 

Ms. SMITH. There are just so many, many things that have happened and, I just want my government, I love my country. I love 

my country. But I sure don’t like my government. And if these people are involved in this, why don’t you, why don’t you get them out 

here to tell us their story? Why isn’t Hillary out here telling us? 

It was her department. Why hasn’t she been subpoenaed? Why 

can’t somebody call her get her out here and put her under oath 

and say okay, what did you know? 

Ms. SMITH. And hope that maybe she will tell the truth. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Woods? 

Mr. WOODS. I would like to take this opportunity. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Sorry, your microphone again, sir. 

Mr. WOODS. I would like to take this opportunity to publicly 

honor Congressman Chaffetz. He has lived up to that promise to 

reach out to my family. After this happened, he gave me his personal cell phone number. Once I called him up, he was in the process of taking his children to Disneyland. He took a substantial 

chunk of his family’s time out to talk with me. 

He was so concerned about this that in October, right after it 

happened, when it was still fresh, he went back to Benghazi, a very 

dangerous place, or back to Libya with General Ham. And before 

General Ham was compromised possibly, we don’t know, he asked 

him that very pointed question about whether, you know, there 

were assets and whether there was an order to stand down. 

Now, I’m old school. I keep my brains in my shirt pocket. I’m not 

the sharpest person in the world, so I have to write important 

things down, and this is what General Ham told Jason Chaffetz. 

General Ham told the Joint Chiefs of Staff the forces were available but no order to use them was given. That is in direct conflict 

to page 23 of the ARB report. We need to have public testimony, 

where the public can judge credibility and find out whether one is 

credible or the other. Jason Chaffetz is a man of impeccable credibility. There’s no question. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. You’re very kind, too kind. God bless you both, 

thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, we need to hear from the survivors who were on 

the ground that night. It needs to be in public so the country can 

hear it, so these families can hear it. Those that survived the attacks in Benghazi are the ones that we have to hear from. 

Yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

We now go to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Meehan. 

Mr. MEEHAN. A grateful Nation thanks you for the sacrifice of 

your children, the service of your children, and the sacrifice of your 

families. 

My prayers are with you, and I’ll be inspired by your courage 

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tinue to try to get you answers, and I thank you for your courage 

being here. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. Mr. Gowdy. 

Mr. GOWDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Smith and Mr. Woods, I want to express on a personal level 

my gratitude and my sympathy to you for the loss of your sons and 

to everyone that loved your sons and all of the four victims of 

Benghazi. And when you were testifying, I couldn’t help but think 

of this dichotomy of death that sometimes it walks slowly to the 

front door of your life and it gives you plenty of time to get your 

affairs in order: You’ve had a good life. You have time to say goodbye to the people you love. You have time to offer a prayer for your 

soul. It just walks slowly and knocks gently on the front door. 

And then sometimes it kicks in the front door unexpectedly with 

no notice, and you don’t even have time to offer a prayer. 

The word ‘‘closure’’ is used all the time, and my experience is it’s 

only used by people who have never suffered the loss of a child because there is no closure. I can’t offer you closure. What I hope we 

can offer you is the truth, facts, justice, and let you do with that 

what you need to do as you walk down that road we call grief. 

So we can’t give you closure, just the facts, the truth, and the 

real jury, Mr. Woods and Ms. Smith, is the American people. 

They’re the ones watching this trial unfold, and they will decide. 

They heard this morning a perspective that everything that can be 

investigated has been investigated, everything. That’s one perspective. 

The other perspective is you didn’t even bother to interview some 

of the central key eyewitnesses. And the American people are going 

to have to decide whether or not they would ever tolerate an investigation where you don’t call eyewitnesses and you don’t call the 

people responsible for whatever the duty was. 

But I want to leave you with this, I want you to know this, from 

the upstate of South Carolina, I am asked about Benghazi more 

than any other issue. It has not been forgotten. I suspect you both 

live a long ways from the upstate of South Carolina, but just know, 

Republican, Democrat, independent, don’t know, don’t care, from 

church to the grocery store to Costco, frankly, to the golf course, 

I am asked about Benghazi and, in effect, about your sons more 

than any other issue. So the jury has not forgotten. 

Ms. SMITH. Get answers, please. 

Mr. GOWDY. Yes, ma’am. I will work with Mr. Chaffetz, whom I 

agree with you on your characterization of, and the others, and 

frankly, there are folks on both sides—— 

Mr. WOODS. Right. 

Mr. GOWDY. —who want to find out, and I appreciate the fact 

that Mr. Cummings has been here all day. I can’t give you closure. 

I just want to give you the facts and the truth and justice and let 

you use it however you need to use it. 

Yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

116 

To Ms. Smith and Mr. Woods, we have no idea what you’re going 

through. Even those of us who have lost spouses and endured horrific experiences have no idea, but we are a grateful country for the 

service of your sons, and we want to see that the truth bears out. 

We also want to make sure that this doesn’t ever happen again, 

and we know you’re here in part because you don’t want to see 

anyone else go through this. 

And I think it would be helpful to us to hear about your sons. 

So if you could just take a couple of minutes each and talk about 

how wonderful they were. I mean, Mr. Woods, I believe your son 

was a Navy SEAL and served in some of the most dangerous places 

on the planet to protect our country. Could you just tell us a little 

bit about each of your sons? 

Mr. WOODS. I was told that Ty was a SEAL among SEALs. He 

was an alpha male among alpha males. We sat around when the 

bodies were coming in with several of his SEAL friends, and we 

were exchanging stories like what you’re asking for. They exchanged a story with me that I had never heard before, and one 

was that Ty was two things, a man of incredible physical and 

moral strength. He would not allow what they would refer to or he 

would refer to, he would use the word ‘‘smoke and mirrors.’’ He 

would not allow any breach of integrity. He could bench press over 

500 pounds. You’ve seen a picture of his arms, okay? Obviously, a 

recessive gene. And once someone in authority lied to him, gave 

him smoke and mirrors, he took that strong Navy SEAL arm of his, 

lifted the person up by this part of their body, and said, in Navy 

SEAL language, I’ll paraphrase, ‘‘don’t ever lie to me again. No 

more smoke and mirrors.’’ 

If Ty—and I seriously think there’s a very good chance up in 

heaven he might know more about this hearing than anyone in this 

room knows right now. He might know about the lack of integrity. 

He might take one of those people who, you can kind of paint the 

picture, who has shown smoke and mirrors, and figuratively speaking lifted that person up and said, ‘‘no more lies, no more smoke 

and mirrors.’’ That’s what Ty would want. Thank you. 

Ms. SPEIER. Ms. Smith. 

Ms. SMITH. I keep—I’m not a good button pusher. Sean was married. I didn’t see very much of him toward the end. He was stationed in The Hague. I didn’t know about Benghazi. I didn’t know 

anything about Benghazi. Now I even learned how to spell it, 

which took a little bit, but he said he was always being sent out 

to various different places. And he would call me all the time, and 

I would call him all the time. And we kept in touch that way, 

and—I was 38 before I even had him. I was told I couldn’t have 

kids, but my family called him Patsy’s kid because that was my 

kid, my miracle baby. Well, my miracle baby was abandoned in 

Benghazi that I couldn’t spell before, but I can now, and he was— 

I don’t know what to say about him. He was just a wonderful kid, 

and I loved the hell out of him, and I always will. I don’t know 

what else to say. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

The gentlelady yields back. 

117 

We now go to the gentlelady from Wyoming, Mrs. Lummis. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mrs. Smith, could I ask you to introduce some of your family 

members who are with you here today? 

Ms. SMITH. Okay. This is my friend Don, Don Howard. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Hello, Don. 

Ms. SMITH. And that’s it. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Okay. Well, I’m so pleased that, Don, you’re with 

us as well. 

Ms. SMITH. Don. Don. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Don, yes, thank you so much for being with us. 

And Mr. Woods, could you introduce your family members who 

are with you today? 

Mr. WOODS. Well, I brought two of Ty’s sisters. And one is Joy. 

She’s the oldest. She’s a senior in high school. And Hope, she’s an 

eighth grader. They also have another sister by the name of Faith. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Well, I thank you for introducing your family 

members, and there’s a verse in the Bible that says, Surely goodness and mercy shall follow me all the days of my life. In your case, 

Mr. Woods, surely Hope and Joy will follow you all the days of your 

life and Faith as well. So you can rest assured that your family will 

be enormously supportive of each other as you endure this loss, and 

that you will fill a hole in Ty’s life that their father would deeply 

appreciate, so thank God for family and for you all. 

And Ms. Smith, I want to hope for you that you’ll have the peace 

of God because, like Mr. Gowdy, the people that I represent visit 

about you and your children and what they did for our country 

with me frequently in the great hope that we will continue to 

search for answers. And I want to congratulate the chairman of 

this committee, the chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Chaffetz, 

and all the gentlemen with whom I serve on my side of the aisle 

and all the gentlemen and ladies with whom I serve on the other 

side of the aisle who are in relentless pursuit of the truth. 

I, too, Mrs. Smith, hear from many of my constituents that they 

don’t trust their government anymore. And it’s among the saddest 

things that I hear from my constituents, and it makes me sad to 

hear it from you here today. But that’s why we’re here. That’s why 

we were elected, to restore people’s trust in their own government, 

and on this issue, trust will not be restored until we get to the 

truth, and so we will continue to seek the truth. We appreciate 

your participation, and we wish you God’s good graces as we continue to pursue the truth. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentlelady. 

We now go to the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I guess what I want to say to you two is that as a Member 

from Michigan, a Member who understands my position representing a district, not even a State but a district, but that district 

is made up of people who expect us to stand firmly behind the Constitution, the oath of office we’ve taken, which involves defending 

and protecting our citizens against all enemies, both foreign and 

domestic. 

118 

There are times when a bureaucratic maze sometimes becomes 

the enemy of a good and great country, which is none other than 

a good and great people. Your sons were good and great people. 

Their memories will continue to expand the opportunities for defining what good and great is in the context of America. My sons and 

daughter, my grandsons and granddaughter, when they hear the 

story that I will tell them, regardless of what the history books say 

about the heroes of Benghazi, and I’ve learned to spell it now, too, 

Ms. Smith, with an H in it. 

Ms. SMITH. Yes. 

Mr. WALBERG. They will hear the story of men who rushed in, 

men who stood firm, men who understood the cost and ultimately 

gave the supreme sacrifice, but I hope they also hear the rest of 

the story from me, that I was privileged to serve in a Congress that 

didn’t stop looking for and achieving the truth. 

I’m not looking for a pound of flesh. I’m not looking even for punishment, though I think it ought to be meted out, but I’m looking 

for the truth. Your family members would have done no less, and 

so I can’t ask you any questions, but I can assure you of my commitment to continue the effort toward truth that would honor your 

sons and our great country, and I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

We now go to the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Lankford. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Bless you all for a very long day. I cannot imagine what it was like to start the travel here and to know that the 

destination was going to end up right here where you are right now 

after a very, very long day, so thank you. I am overwhelmed with 

Psalm 34:18, where it says, The Lord is near the brokenhearted, 

and He saves those who are crushed in spirit. And I pray that for 

you and for your family that you will experience the closeness and 

nearness of God and the comfort that only He can provide in this. 

Here’s another city you may not be able to spell, Ms. Smith. Like 

Benghazi, all of us learned how to spell that, Wewoka, Oklahoma. 

Ms. SMITH. What is that? 

Mr. LANKFORD. Wewoka, Oklahoma. 

Ms. SMITH. Wewoka? 

Mr. LANKFORD. Is a tiny little town in my district, and in August, 

I held a town hall meeting in Wewoka, Oklahoma, a town you’ve 

never heard of until just right now. 

Ms. SMITH. That’s right. 

Mr. LANKFORD. And they asked me about Benghazi, and they 

wanted to know in small town Oklahoma what’s being done to get 

the facts out and hold people in Libya that did this to account. 

There are people all over the country that care deeply about this, 

small towns and big towns, and they stand with you. And I thought 

you needed to know that today, that the good folks in Wewoka, 

Oklahoma, care deeply about what’s going on as well as in big 

towns. 

Ms. SMITH. Okay. I’m going to look you up. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Well, you need to look it up, yeah. Go to Oklahoma City and move east, and you’ll find Wewoka out there. 

Ms. SMITH. Okay. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Grateful that you all are here. Thank you for 

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tions that you have. It is important that you receive what you were 

promised, and that’s the facts and the truth, and we want to help 

in that in every way we can. 

With that, I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

We now go to the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Bentivolio. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Smith, Mr. Woods, I would like to echo and reiterate what 

my colleagues have said earlier and their sentiments and know in 

your hearts I grieve with you. I feel your—I share your frustrations 

in finding the truth. I was never a career politician. I served 26 

years part time and full time in the military and served in Vietnam 

and Iraq Freedom. Since I’ve been here in Washington, and I’m 

new, I started January 3rd, and I came to the realization that the 

hardest thing to find here in Washington is the truth. 

Ms. SMITH. True. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. It’s a rare thing. With the verbal two-steps, the 

shuffle, the verbal moonwalk, the dodge, and all of those smoke 

and mirrors, it’s pretty hard to find it. And I feel your frustration 

and understand exactly what you mean when you say, I love my 

country, but my government is a problem. Yep. But I want you to 

know that I’m joining and have joined because one of the reasons 

I came here was to find out what actually happened in Benghazi. 

As a soldier, I always believed in the warrior ethos, never leave one 

of our own behind, and I know in the unit that I came from we 

have, we hold that warrior ethos pretty high, with high regard, and 

the people I served with, well, like your losts, strived valiantly, endured greatly in service to our country. My office is open and at 

your service, whatever you need, don’t hesitate to ask. I’m sure it 

applies to everyone here. 

Thank you, God bless you. 

Ms. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. I yield back my time. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

I guess I’m the last ‘‘thank you.’’ It’s been a long day. It’s been 

a long year, longer for you than for any two people we could possibly conceive of. Both for you and for the other surviving family 

members that are not here today, we thank you for your comments 

and statements, including the written statements you heard me 

read at the beginning. 

I don’t think any words are going to equal what has to be done, 

so I told you a little bit about what this committee is doing. You 

saw people with differing opinions on the dais. The opinion that ultimately matters is the opinion of the Speaker of the House. The 

Speaker of the House has authorized repeatedly the investigation 

to continue, the subpoenas, and all the work that we’re doing. And 

I’m quite sure that as long as John Boehner is Speaker, I will have 

the ability and the authority to continue getting to the bottom of 

this. 

And since we’re all piling on, on Mr. Chaffetz, the fact is that I 

have a team that you saw a great many of today, and they, too, 

will continue to have that ability to go anywhere anytime and get 

to the truth. It takes a long time, and for that, I apologize. But we 

haven’t quit, and we won’t quit. 

120 

Mr. Woods, I can only say that it’s seldom I would note for the 

record that my sister Faith, my sister Hope, and my departed sister Willow would be very proud of the naming practices within 

your family, and with that one light note of the day, we stand adjourned. Thank you. 

Mr. WOODS. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:24 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(121) 

APPENDIX 

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Æ 


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