OVERSTAY 

ENFORCEMENT

Additional Actions 

Needed to Assess 

DHS’s Data and 

Improve Planning for 

a Biometric Air Exit 

Program

Report to Congressional Requesters

July 2013

GAO-13-683

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-683, a report to 

congressional requesters

July 2013

OVERSTAY ENFORCEMENT

Additional Actions Needed to Assess DHS’s Data and 

Improve Planning for a Biometric Air Exit Program

Why GAO Did This Study

Each year, millions of visitors come to 

the United States legally on a 

temporary basis either with or without a 

visa. Overstays are individuals who 

were admitted legally on a temporary 

basis but then overstayed their 

authorized periods of admission. DHS 

has primary responsibility for 

identifying and taking enforcement 

action to address overstays. In April 

2011, GAO reported on DHS’s actions 

to identify and address overstays and 

made recommendations to strengthen 

these processes. DHS concurred and 

has taken or is taking steps to address 

them. DHS has also reported taking 

further actions to address overstays. 

GAO was asked to review DHS’s 

progress since April 2011. This report 

addresses (1) DHS’s efforts to review 

its records to identify potential 

overstays, (2) the extent to which 

DHS’s changes in its systems or 

processes have improved data on 

potential overstays and DHS’s ability to 

report overstay rates, and (3) the 

extent to which DHS has made 

progress toward establishing a 

biometric exit system. GAO analyzed 

DHS overstay data and documents—

such as those related to the overstay 

identification processes and biometric 

exit plans—and interviewed relevant 

DHS officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DHS assess 

and document the reliability of its data, 

and establish time frames and 

milestones for a biometric air exit 

evaluation framework. DHS concurred 

with the recommendations.

What GAO Found

Since April 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken action 

to address a backlog of potential overstay records that GAO previously identified. 

Specifically, DHS reviewed such records to identify national security and public 

safety threats, but unmatched arrival records—those without corresponding 

departure records—remain in DHS’s system. GAO had previously reported that, 

as of January 2011, DHS had a backlog of 1.6 million unmatched arrival records 

that had not been reviewed through automated or manual processes. DHS tracks 

arrivals and departures and closes records for individuals with matching arrival 

and departure records. Unmatched arrival records indicate that the individual is a 

potential overstay. In 2011, DHS reviewed this backlog of 1.6 million records, 

closed about 863,000 records, and removed them from the backlog. As new 

unmatched arrival records have accrued, DHS has continued to review all of 

these new records for national security and public safety concerns. As of June

2013, DHS’s unmatched arrival records totaled more than 1 million. 

DHS has actions completed and under way to improve data on potential 

overstays and report overstay rates, but the effect of these improvements is not 

yet known. Further, DHS continues to face challenges in reporting reliable 

overstay rates. DHS has streamlined connections among databases used to 

identify potential overstays. However, these improvements do not address some 

underlying data quality issues, such as missing land departure data. Federal law 

requires DHS to report overstay estimates, but DHS or its predecessor has not 

regularly done so since 1994. In April 2011, GAO reported that DHS officials said 

that they have not reported overstay rates because DHS has not had sufficient 

confidence in the quality of its overstay data. In February 2013, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security testified that DHS plans to report overstay rates by December 

2013. However, DHS has not assessed or documented improvements in the 

reliability of data used to develop overstay estimates, in accordance with federal 

internal control standards. Without such a documented assessment to ensure the 

reliability of these data, decision makers would not have the information needed 

to use these data for policy-making purposes.

Developing and implementing a biometric exit capability to collect biometric data, 

such as fingerprints, which is required by federal law, has been a long-standing 

challenge for DHS. In May 2012, DHS internally reported recommendations to 

support the planning for a biometric exit capability at airports—DHS’s priority for 

biometric exit capabilities—that could also be implemented at seaports in the 

future; however, as of June 2013, DHS's planning did not address a biometric 

exit capability at land ports of entry. DHS officials stated that the department’s 

goal is to develop information and report to Congress about the benefits and 

costs of biometric air exit options before the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle. 

Standard practices for project management state that time frames should be 

documented as part of the planning process; however, DHS has a high-level plan 

for a biometric air exit capability, and it does not clearly define the steps, time 

frames, and milestones needed to develop and implement an evaluation 

framework, as recommended in DHS’s May 2012 report. Without robust planning 

that includes time frames and milestones, DHS does not have reasonable 

assurance that it will meet its time frame for developing and implementing an 

evaluation framework.

View GAO-13-683. For more information, 

contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 

or gamblerr@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Letter 1 

Background 5

DHS Continually Reviews Records of Potential Overstays, but a 

Significant Number of Unmatched Arrival Records Remain 12

DHS Has Actions Completed and Under Way to Improve Data to 

Identify Potential Overstays, but the Effect of These 

Improvements Is Not Yet Known 20

DHS Faces Long-standing Challenges and Uncertain Time Frames 

in Planning for a Biometric Exit System at Airports 27

Conclusions 34

Recommendations for Executive Action 35

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 35

Appendix I U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Overstay 

Enforcement Actions 37

Appendix II Timeline of Events Related to Biometric Entry and

Exit System 41

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 44

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 46

Tables

Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities for Addressing Overstays 7

Table 2: Key Federal Databases Used for Identifying Overstays 9

Table 3: Results of DHS’s Summer 2011 Review of Nonpriority 

Records of Potential Overstays Identified as National 

Security and Public Safety Threats, as of March 2013 14

Table 4: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) 

Processing of Records of Potential In-Country Overstays 

from Fiscal Years 2004 to 2012 (Rounded to the Nearest 

Hundred) 38

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Table 5: Timeline of Events Related to Biometric Entry and Exit 

System 41

Figures

Figure 1: Analysis of Unmatched Arrival Records by Admission 

Class, as of November 2012 17

Figure 2: Analysis of Unmatched Arrival Records by Transportation 

Mode, as of November 2012 18

Figure 3: Amount of Time Elapsed since Travelers Were Expected 

to Depart the United States, as of November 2012, Based 

on Analysis of Unmatched Arrival Records 19

Figure 4: Timeline of Events Related to Biometric Entry and Exit 

System 30

Figure 5: Outcomes of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit 

(CTCEU) Overstay Investigations Not Resulting in Arrest, 

Fiscal Years 2004-2012 39

Figure 6: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 

Reported Percentage of Homeland Security Investigations 

Field Office Investigative Hours Dedicated to Overstay 

Investigations, Fiscal Years 2005-2012 40
Page iii GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Abbreviations

ADIS Arrival and Departure Information System

ATS Automated Targeting System

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection

CLAIMS Computer-Linked Application Information Management 

System 3 

CTCEU Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit

DHS Department of Homeland Security

ERO Enforcement and Removal Operations

HSI Homeland Security Investigations

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

IDENT Automated Biometric Identification System

OAU Overstay Analysis Unit

OBIM Office of Biometric Identity Management

S&T Science and Technology Directorate

SEVIS Student and Exchange Visitor Information System

US-VISIT U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 

Technology Program

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Page 1 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

July 30, 2013

The Honorable Tom Coburn, M.D.

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Candice S. Miller

Chairman

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Susan Collins

United States Senate

The Honorable Henry Cuellar

House of Representatives

Each year, millions of visitors come to the United States legally on a 

temporary basis either with a visa or, in some cases, as visitors who were 

allowed to enter without a visa.1 Overstays are individuals who were 

admitted into the country legally on a temporary basis but then 

overstayed their authorized periods of admission.2

 

1

Visitors who are allowed to seek admission without a visa include citizens of Canada and 

the British Overseas Territory of Bermuda (and certain residents of other adjacent islands, 

such as the Bahamas) under certain circumstances, as well as Visa Waiver Program 

participants. This program allows nationals from certain countries to apply for admission to 

the United States as temporary visitors for business or pleasure without first obtaining a 

visa from a U.S. consulate abroad. Currently, there are 37 participants in the program.

We have previously 

reported that most overstays are likely motivated by economic 

opportunities to stay in the United States beyond their authorized periods 

2

In this report, we include out-of-status students—student visa holders who fail to meet 

certain requirements, such as enrolling in a qualified education program—in our definition 

of overstays. In general, foreign students remain in status and therefore eligible to stay in 

the United States under their student visas as long as they are enrolled in and attending a 

qualified education program or engaging in authorized practical training following 

completion of studies.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

of admission.3

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has primary responsibility 

for identifying and taking enforcement action to address overstays. Within 

DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is tasked with, among 

other duties, inspecting all people applying for entry to the United States 

to determine their admissibility to the country and screening Visa Waiver 

Program applicants to determine their eligibility to travel to the United 

States under the program. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE) is the lead agency for enforcing immigration law in the interior of the 

United States and is primarily responsible for overstay enforcement. 

Within ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) directorate, the 

Overstay Analysis Unit is responsible for reviewing records of potential 

overstays and providing the results of these reviews to ICE’s 

Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU), which is 

responsible for initiating overstay investigations. Since 2004, DHS has 

collected biometric data, such as fingerprints, from travelers as part of an 

effort to comply with legislative requirements to track nonimmigrants’ 

entry into and exit from the United States.

However, overstays could pose homeland security 

concerns—for example, 5 of the 19 September 11, 2001, hijackers were 

overstays.

4 To do so, the Office of 

Biometric Identity Management (OBIM), within DHS’s National Protection 

and Programs Directorate, manages the Arrival and Departure 

Information System (ADIS), which tracks and matches arrival and 

departure records for the purpose of identifying potential overstays, and 

the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), which maintains 

biometric information that DHS collects from nonimmigrants upon their 

entry into the United States.5

 

3

GAO, Visa Waiver Program: Limitations with Department of Homeland Security’s Plan to 

Verify Departure of Foreign Nationals, GAO-08-458T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2008). 

4

See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1365a, 1365b.

5

IDENT also contains fingerprints collected by the Department of State to establish and 

verify the identities of visa applicants. Both the Overstay Analysis Unit and OBIM were 

formerly part of the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program 

(US-VISIT) within DHS’s National Protection and Programs Directorate. DHS initiated 

US-VISIT in 2003 to develop a comprehensive entry and exit system to collect biometric 

data from aliens traveling through U.S. ports of entry. Pursuant to the fiscal year 2013 

DHS appropriations act and its accompanying explanatory statement, DHS realigned 

US-VISIT’s overstay analysis function into ICE and created OBIM effective March 27, 

2013. 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

In April 2011, we reported on DHS’s actions to identify and take actions to 

address overstays and made recommendations to the department to 

strengthen those efforts.6 DHS concurred with our recommendations and 

has taken or is taking steps to address them, as discussed later in this 

report. In addition, we have issued a number of reports since 2004 on 

DHS’s collection of biometric data from nonimmigrants upon their entry 

into the United States, as well as the department’s efforts to collect 

biometric data to track their exit from the country. Relying on some of this 

work conducted from 2007 through 2010, we made recommendations to 

DHS to improve planning for and implementation of a biometric exit 

system.7 DHS generally concurred with our recommendations in these 

reports and has taken action to address a number of them, as also 

discussed later in this report. In addition to taking actions in response to 

the recommendations we have made, since April 2011, DHS has reported 

taking other actions to strengthen its processes for identifying and taking 

enforcement action against overstays, such as enhancing its use of 

biographic data to identify overstays and developing plans to capture 

biometric data as part of departure records to comply with federal law.8

You asked us to review actions taken by DHS to identify and address 

potential overstays since our April 2011 report. This report addresses 

(1) DHS’s efforts to review records that are maintained in its databases to 

identify potential overstays, (2) the extent to which DHS’s changes in its 

systems or processes have improved data on potential overstays and 

DHS’s ability to report overstay rates, and (3) the extent to which DHS 

has made progress in developing and implementing a biometric exit 

system. 

To address the first objective, we analyzed documentation on DHS’s 

processes to review records of potential overstays and improve overstay

identification, such as ICE’s standard operating procedures for reviewing 

 

6

GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for Collecting, Assessing, and 

Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS’s Efforts but Would Have Costs, GAO-11-411

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2011).

7

GAO, Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited Understanding of Air 

Exit Options, GAO-10-860 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 10, 2010), and Homeland Security: 

U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Program’s Long-standing Lack of Strategic Direction 

and Management Controls Needs to Be Addressed, GAO-07-1065 (Washington, D.C.: 

Aug. 31, 2007).

8

8 U.S.C. § 1365b(d).
 

Page 4 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

records of potential overstays. Specifically, we analyzed the results of 

DHS’s 2011 review of a backlog of records of potential overstays that we 

identified and reported on in April 2011. We also analyzed the 1.2 million 

records from ADIS, as of November 2012, that represent data on 

individuals for whom ADIS has a record of arrival but for whom DHS has 

no record of departure (unmatched arrival records) at that time.9

To address the second objective, we analyzed documentation on 

changes to DHS component agency systems, such as ADIS, to enhance 

the use of biographic information to identify overstays, and we 

interviewed DHS officials to discuss the expected results of these 

changes. We also analyzed agreements between the United States and 

Canada to exchange entry and exit data as part of the Beyond the Border 

initiative, through which entry into one country is treated as exit from the 

other, and interviewed DHS and Canada Border Services Agency officials 

responsible for overseeing the initiative. We also collected all available 

data on the results of the Beyond the Border pilot phase, which occurred 

from September 30, 2012, through January 15, 2013. To analyze the 

reliability of these data, we reviewed documentation related to the 

exchange of these data and interviewed OBIM, CBP, and DHS Office of 

Policy officials familiar with the data. We determined that the data were 

sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also conducted interviews with 

ICE and DHS Office of Policy officials regarding the department’s plans to 

calculate and report overstay rates using the data available in its 

component agency systems and evaluated those plans based on 

statutory requirements and standards for internal control.

This was 

the most recent date for which DHS had compiled these records at the 

time we began our review. To analyze the reliability of these data on the 

prior backlog, as well as DHS’s unmatched arrival records as of 

November 2012, we reviewed documentation regarding the databases 

used to collect these data and interviewed DHS officials familiar with the 

data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes.

10

 

9

Through ADIS, DHS has identified these records as potential overstays, but as of 

November 2012, DHS had not conducted manual searches through DHS and other 

databases to determine whether there might be evidence of departure or change of status 

in other databases. DHS’s processes for reviewing records of potential overstays are 

discussed in more detail later in this report and in 

We also 

GAO-11-411. 

10GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
 

Page 5 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

evaluated those plans against guidance for designing evaluations and 

assessing the reliability of computer-processed data.11

To address the third objective, we reviewed statutory requirements for a 

biometric exit system and analyzed DHS documents, including a May 

2012 report on the status of efforts to implement biometric exit capabilities 

at airports that was based on analysis that DHS’s Science and 

Technology Directorate (S&T) conducted. We compared the status of 

DHS’s efforts against statutory requirements and standard practices for 

project management.12

We conducted this performance audit from November 2012 to July 2013 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

We also interviewed DHS Office of Policy and 

S&T officials regarding DHS’s plans for addressing recommendations in 

the department’s May 2012 report and other ongoing efforts to develop a 

biometric exit system.

Each year, millions of visitors come to the United States legally on a 

temporary basis.13

 

11GAO, Designing Evaluations: 2012 Revision, 

Generally, nonimmigrants wishing to visit the United 

States gain permission to apply for admission to the country through one 

of two ways. First, those eligible for the Visa Waiver Program apply online 

to establish eligibility to travel under the program prior to departing for the 

GAO-12-208G (Washington, D.C.: January 

2012), and Assessing the Reliability of Computer Processed Data, GAO-09-680G

(Washington, D.C.: July 2009).

12Project Management Institute, A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge 

(PMBOK® Guide), Fifth Edition, (Newton Square, PA: 2013).

13Temporary visitors to the United States generally are referred to as nonimmigrants. For 

a listing and descriptions of nonimmigrant categories, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15); see 

also 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(a)(1)-(2).

Background 

Process for Gaining 

Admission to the 

United States
 

Page 6 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

United States.14 Second, those not eligible for the Visa Waiver Program 

and not otherwise exempt from the visa requirement must obtain a visa 

from a U.S. consular office overseas.15

An overstay is a nonimmigrant who is legally admitted to the United 

States for an authorized period but remains in the country illegally after 

that period expired without obtaining an extension of stay or a change of 

status or meeting other specific conditions, such as claiming asylum.

Upon arriving at a port of entry, 

nonimmigrants must undergo inspection by CBP officers, who determine 

whether or not they may be admitted into the United States. If CBP 

determines a nonimmigrant is admissible, he or she is granted an 

authorized period of admission. This period may be for a specific length of 

time, which CBP designates by assigning a specific “admit until” date, or 

for as long as the nonimmigrant maintains a particular status. For 

example, in general, foreign students are eligible to remain in the United 

States for “duration of status,” meaning as long as they are enrolled in 

and attending a qualified education program or engaging in authorized 

practical training following completion of studies.

16

 

14Nonimmigrants eligible for the Visa Waiver Program who seek admission to the United 

States at a land port of entry do not apply online to establish eligibility.

This includes a nonimmigrant admitted for duration of status who fails to 

maintain that status, such as a student who is no longer pursuing a full 

course of study at an approved educational institution or engaging in 

authorized practical training following completion of studies. In-country 

overstays refer to nonimmigrants who have exceeded their authorized 

periods of admission and remain in the United States without lawful 

status, while out-of-country overstays refer to individuals who have 

departed the United States but who, on the basis of arrival and departure 

information, stayed beyond their authorized periods of admission. Federal 

15In certain circumstances, citizens of Canada and the British Overseas Territory of 

Bermuda (and certain residents of other adjacent islands, such as the Bahamas) traveling 

to the United States as nonimmigrants do not require a visa. See 22 C.F.R. § 41.2(a)-(f). 

16Although overstays are sometimes referred to as visa overstays, we do not use that 

term in this report for two reasons. First, many nonimmigrants, such as those who enter 

using the Visa Waiver Program, are allowed admission into the United States for a specific 

period of time without visas and may overstay their authorized period of admission. 

Second, nonimmigrants can overstay an authorized period of admission set by a CBP 

officer at the border without necessarily overstaying the period of their visas because their 

authorized period of admission may be shorter than the period of their visas. 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

law establishes consequences for foreign nationals who overstay their 

authorized periods of admission.17

Three DHS components and offices—CBP, ICE, and OBIM—are primarily 

responsible for taking action to identify and address overstays, as shown 

in table 1. In addition, the Department of State is responsible for ensuring 

that individuals who have previously overstayed and are ineligible for a 

visa do not receive one when applying for a visa to the United States at 

consular offices overseas.

Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities for Addressing Overstays

Federal agency Overall role Overstay responsibilities

U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) 

Executes policies and procedures 

at ports of entry for the screening 

of travelers and merchandise 

entering the United States.

Determines nonimmigrant admissibility based in part on previous 

overstay violations and provides an admit until date, by which time 

the individual must leave the country to avoid overstaying, or 

admits an individual for duration of status.

Collects biographic and biometric information to document 

nonimmigrant entry into the country and biographic information to 

document nonimmigrant exit from the country.

Responsible for implementing a biometric exit program. 

 

17Nonimmigrants who overstay their authorized periods of admission are subject to 

removal from the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B)-(C). Federal law provides 

additional sanctions against those who overstay their lawful period of admission, including 

a temporary or permanent bar on readmission to the country, depending on the length of 

overstay, and ineligibility for future admission under the Visa Waiver Program. See 8 

U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(B)-(C), 1187(a)(7). The visas of nonimmigrants who overstay 

become void after the conclusion of their authorized period of stay, and the State 

Department will not issue them a new visa if they are subject to a statutory bar on 

readmission, unless DHS grants a waiver; if the length of overstay is not sufficient to 

trigger one of the bars on readmission and they are not otherwise ineligible for a visa, they 

may be able to obtain a new visa and CBP may readmit them to the country, if they are 

not otherwise inadmissible at the time they apply for readmission at a port of entry. See 8 

U.S.C. §§ 1202(g), 1201, 1182(a), 1225(b); 6 U.S.C. § 236(b)-(c). 

Federal Agencies’ Roles 

and Responsibilities 

Related to Overstay 

Identification and 

Enforcement 
 

Page 8 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Federal agency Overall role Overstay responsibilities

U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) 

Homeland Security 

Investigations (HSI)

Overstay Analysis 

Unit (OAU)

Counterterrorism and 

Criminal Exploitation 

Unit (CTCEU)

HSI field offices

HSI: Investigate a range of 

domestic and international 

activities arising from the illegal 

movement of people and goods 

into, within, and out of the United 

States.

OAU: Identifies overstays by matching arrival and departure data 

and performing overstay analysis previously performed by the 

United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 

(US-VISIT) program.a

CTCEU: Identifies overstays, including potential national security 

risks and out of status students, and then assigns leads for further 

investigation by field offices.

HSI field offices: Investigate overstay cases and determine 

appropriate action to be taken, including initiating administrative 

procedures to remove an individual from the country, if appropriate.

ICE Enforcement and 

Removal Operations (ERO) 

ERO: Identifies and apprehends 

aliens who are subject to removal 

from the country, detains these 

individuals when necessary, and 

removes them from the United 

States.

ERO: Contributes indirectly to overstay efforts through various 

programs, such as the Criminal Alien Program and the Fugitive 

Operations Support Center.b Responsible for the removal of 

deportable aliens from the United States.

National Protection and 

Programs Directorate-Office 

of Biometric Identity 

Management

Stores biometric identities and 

matches them against derogatory 

information.

Manages the Automated Biometric Identification System and the 

Arrival and Departure Information System as previously performed 

by US-VISIT. 

Conducts recurrent matching against derogatory information and 

provides other biometric expertise and services. 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS information.

a

DHS initiated US-VISIT in 2003 to develop a comprehensive entry and exit system to collect 

biometric data from aliens traveling through U.S. ports of entry. In March 2013, DHS realigned 

US-VISIT’s overstay analysis function into ICE.

b

The Criminal Alien Program identifies, processes, and removes criminal aliens incarcerated 

throughout the United States, focusing on those that pose a risk to public safety. The Fugitive 

Operations Support Center operates under the National Fugitive Operations Program and reviews 

certain records of potential overstays generated by CTCEU to determine if any pertain to individuals 

that meet ERO’s enforcement priorities.

Federal agencies use various databases to determine whether 

nonimmigrants have potentially overstayed their authorized periods of 

admission to the United States. As shown in table 2, several databases, 

in particular, provide key information on foreign nationals’ arrival in and 

departure from the United States, foreign nationals’ applications to 

change status once in the United States, and the status of foreign 

students.
 

Page 9 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Table 2: Key Federal Databases Used for Identifying Overstays

Database 

Agency responsible for managing 

the database

Information maintained in the database related 

to overstays

Arrival and Departure Information 

System

Office of Biometric Identity 

Management 

Nonimmigrant arrival and departure information, the 

date until which an individual may remain in the 

United States, and various other information (e.g., 

the address where the individual will reside in the 

United States)

Automated Biometric Identification 

System

Office of Biometric Identity 

Management

Biometric information collected from nonimmigrants 

upon their entry into the United States (i.e., 

fingerprints and photographs)

Student and Exchange Visitor 

Information System

U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement

Information about nonimmigrant foreign students 

and their programs of study and exchange visitors in 

the United States

Computer-Linked Application

Information Management System 3 

(CLAIMS) 

Electronic Immigration System (ELIS)

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services 

Status of foreign nationals’ petitions for extensions 

of stay or changes of immigration status (e.g., to 

convert from a tourist to a student). CLAIMS and 

ELIS both maintain data on applications to extend or 

change nonimmigrant status, and CLAIMS also 

maintains data on applications for work authorization 

or for lawful permanent resident status.

Source: GAO analysis of DHS information.

Note: In addition to the systems mentioned in this table, which we discuss later in this report, CBP’s 

TECS system is used at ports of entry to verify traveler information and contains lookouts—electronic 

alerts—for certain individuals (e.g., overstays). TECS also interfaces with other agencies’ databases 

to share this information.

ICE primarily analyzes biographic entry and exit data collected at land, 

air, and sea ports of entry to identify potential overstays. ICE identifies 

both in-country and out-of-country overstays by analyzing and comparing 

biographic data maintained in ADIS against information in other 

databases to find matches that demonstrate that a nonimmigrant may 

have, for instance, departed the country or filed an application to change 

status and thus is not an overstay. In particular, ICE analysts use ADIS to 

identify arrival records for which the subject’s admit until date has passed 

and for whom DHS does not have a corresponding departure record 

(unmatched arrival records), which may indicate that the subject of the 

record is an in-country overstay.18

 

18ADIS may not record arrivals for travelers from Canada or Mexico who present certain 

documents upon arrival—for example, travelers with a Canadian legal permanent resident 

card—and therefore, these individuals may not be identified through the process 

described here for identifying potential overstays.

For these records of potential 

Process for Identifying 

Overstays
 

Page 10 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

overstays, ICE analysts conduct automated searches, such as searching 

for immigration benefit application information through U.S. Citizenship 

and Immigration Services. ICE analysts also determine whether the 

subject of the record meets ICE’s overstay enforcement priorities based 

on national security and public safety criteria. ICE prioritizes investigation 

of overstay leads based on the perceived risk each lead is likely to pose 

to national security and public safety as determined by threat analysis. In 

order to prioritize investigation of overstay leads, ICE uses an automated 

system to assign each overstay lead a priority ranking based on threat 

intelligence information. For the records that meet ICE’s overstay 

enforcement priorities, ICE analysts then conduct manual searches of 

other databases to determine, for example, if the individual applied for 

refugee or asylum status. For these priority records, if ICE analysts are

unable to identify evidence of a departure or a change in status, they 

search for the nonimmigrant’s current U.S. address, and if they are able 

to identify an address, they send the lead to the relevant ICE HSI field 

office for investigation.

For cases in which ICE’s analysis shows that a nonimmigrant visa holder 

departed the United States after the admit until date—an out-of-country 

overstay—and the departure was more than 90 days after the 

nonimmigrant’s authorized period of admission expired, ICE creates a 

lookout that CBP officers at ports of entry and State Department officials 

at overseas consulates can access to determine whether that 

nonimmigrant is eligible for readmission at ports of entry or can receive a 

new visa upon application at a U.S. consulate.

Beginning in 1996, federal law has required the implementation of an 

integrated entry and exit data system for foreign nationals.19 Additionally, 

the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management 

Improvement Act of 2000 required implementation of an integrated entry 

and exit data system for foreign nationals that would provide access to 

and integrate foreign national arrival and departure data that are 

authorized or required to be created or collected under law and are in an 

electronic format in certain databases, such as those used at ports of 

entry and consular offices.20

 

19Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 110, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-558 to 59.

In 2003, DHS initiated the US-VISIT program 

208 U.S.C. § 1365a(b)(1).

Comprehensive Biometric 

Entry and Exit System
 

Page 11 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

to develop a comprehensive entry and exit system to collect biometric 

data from aliens traveling through United States ports of entry. In 2004, 

US-VISIT initiated the first step of this program by collecting biometric 

data on aliens entering the United States at 115 airports and 14 sea 

ports. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 

required the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a plan to 

accelerate full implementation of an automated biometric entry and exit 

data system that matches available information provided by foreign 

nationals upon their arrival in and departure from the United States.21

Since 2004, we have issued a number of reports on DHS’s efforts to 

implement a biometric entry and exit system. For example, in February 

and August 2007, we found that DHS had not adequately defined and 

justified its proposed expenditures for exit pilots and demonstration 

projects and that it had not developed a complete schedule for biometric 

exit implementation.22 In September 2008, we further reported that DHS 

was unlikely to meet its timeline for implementing an air exit system with 

biometric indicators, such as fingerprints, by July 1, 2009, because of 

several unresolved issues, such as opposition to the department’s 

published plan by the airline industry.23 In November 2009, we found that 

DHS had not adopted an integrated approach to scheduling, executing, 

and tracking the work that needed to be accomplished to deliver a 

comprehensive exit solution.24

 

218 U.S.C. § 1365b.

In our prior reports, we have made 

recommendations intended to help ensure that biometric exit was 

planned, designed, developed, and implemented in an effective and 

efficient manner. DHS generally agreed with our recommendations. DHS 

has implemented or taken actions to implement some of these 

22In February 2007 and August 2007, among other things, we found that DHS had 

proposed spending millions of dollars on continuing operations that had known limitations 

and that the investments were disproportionately directed toward management-related 

activities. See GAO, Homeland Security: Planned Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and 

Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Adequately Defined and Justified, GAO-07-278, 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2007) and GAO-07-1065. 

23GAO, Visa Waiver Program: Actions Are Needed to Improve Management of the 

Expansion Process, and to Assess and Mitigate Program Risks, GAO-08-967

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2008).

24GAO, Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of Completion, 

but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed, GAO-10-13 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 

2009).
 

Page 12 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

recommendations; however, DHS has not addressed others. For 

example, in March 2012, DHS reported that the US-VISIT office was 

adopting procedures to comply with the nine scheduling practices we 

recommended in our November 2009 report and has conducted training 

on our scheduling methodology. However, DHS did not implement our 

February 2007 recommendations to (1) report to Congress on US-VISIT 

program risks associated with not fully satisfying legislative conditions, 

such as compliance with Office of Management and Budget capital 

planning and investment control guidance, and (2) limit planned 

expenditures for program management-related activities until such 

investments are economically justified and have well-defined plans.25

DHS reviewed a backlog of records of potential overstays that we 

previously identified in April 2011.26

 

25In response to our recommendation that DHS report to Congress on US-VISIT program 

risks, DHS did not provide us with evidence that it had reported this information to 

Congress. Regarding our recommendation that DHS limit planned expenditures for 

US-VISIT management-related activities, DHS did not complete an economic justification 

of its program management investments or define a detailed set of actions, milestones, 

and measures that would link its program management activities to program outcomes.

DHS uses ADIS to match departure 

records to arrival records and subsequently close records for individuals 

with matching arrival and departure records because either (1) the 

individual departed prior to the end of his or her authorized period of 

admission and is therefore not an overstay, or (2) the individual departed 

after the end of his or her authorized period of admission and is therefore 

an out-of-country overstay. Unmatched arrival records—those records in 

26GAO-11-411. 

DHS Continually 

Reviews Records of 

Potential Overstays, 

but a Significant 

Number of 

Unmatched Arrival 

Records Remain

DHS Reviewed a Backlog 

of 1.6 Million Records 

of Potential Overstays 

in 2011
 

Page 13 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

ADIS that do not have corresponding departure records—remain open 

and indicate that those individuals are potential in-country overstays.27 In 

April 2011, we reported that, as of January 2011, ADIS contained a 

backlog of 1.6 million unmatched arrival records that DHS had not 

reviewed through automated or manual processes. This backlog included 

prior nonpriority overstay leads that had not been reviewed, nonpriority 

leads that continued to accrue on a daily basis, and leads generated in 

error as a result of CBP system changes.28

In the summer of 2011, DHS completed a review of these 1.6 million 

records against various national security and law enforcement databases 

to determine if the subjects of these records had already left the United 

States and to help identify if the subjects posed any potential national 

security or public safety threats. As a result, DHS closed approximately 

863,000 records for individuals who had departed, were in status, or had 

adjusted status, and removed them from the backlog by conducting 

additional automated checks. Second, DHS reviewed the remaining 

757,000 records against national security and law enforcement databases 

to identify potential national security or public safety threats. As part of 

this national security and public safety review, DHS also reviewed 

approximately 82,000 additional records identified by CTCEU that were 

unresolved or had not yet undergone full review because they did not 

meet ICE’s enforcement priorities (a total of approximately 839,000 

combined records). As a result of these reviews, DHS reprioritized 1,901 

of the 839,000 records because the subjects of the records could pose 

national security or public safety concerns and provided them to CTCEU 

for further review and consideration for enforcement action. Table 3 

describes how CTCEU resolved these leads.

DHS officials attributed this 

backlog to resource constraints and US-VISIT’s focus on reviewing leads 

that met ICE’s priorities.

 

27Enforcement actions for in-country and out-of-country overstays differ in that the focus of 

enforcement against in-country overstays is to remove them from the country if they pose 

a threat, whereas enforcement against out-of-country overstays is to prevent possible 

readmission to the United States.

28ICE prioritizes potential overstay leads for possible investigation. The specific criteria 

ICE uses to rank the priority level of overstay leads are determined triannually based on 

current threat information by the Compliance Enforcement Advisory Panel, an interagency 

panel of intelligence experts assembled by ICE for the purpose of determining these 

criteria. CBP system changes had resulted in multiple arrival and departure records being 

inadvertently created for a single individual.
 

Page 14 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Table 3: Results of DHS’s Summer 2011 Review of Nonpriority Records of Potential Overstays Identified as National Security 

and Public Safety Threats, as of March 2013

Outcome Number of records (percentage of total)

Individual had departed the United States 711 records (37.4 percent)

Records forwarded to ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) 

as potential public safety threatsa 481 records (25.3 percent)

Individual was in status (e.g., the subject filed a timely application to change 

his or her status or extend his or her authorized period of admission in the 

United States)

302 records (15.9 percent)

Individual could not be locatedb 266 records (14.0 percent)

Individual was arrested 9 records (0.5 percent)

Otherc 132 records (6.9 percent)

Total 1,901 records (100 percent)

Source: ICE CTCEU.

a

CTCEU refers information on nonpriority potential overstays to ICE’s ERO, which is responsible for 

identifying and apprehending aliens who are subject to removal from the country, detaining these 

individuals when necessary, and removing aliens subject to removal from the United States. ERO 

personnel may encounter overstays in the course of their work but they do not directly focus on 

overstay enforcement.

b

An ICE contractor’s system automatically queries these records against various databases on a 

weekly basis for new information relating to the location of the suspected overstay. If such information 

is identified, CTCEU will reopen the investigation.

c

Other includes the following outcomes: (1) ICE determined that information indicating a possible 

national security or public safety threat was false (73 leads, 3.8 percent); (2) the subject of the lead 

was in removal proceedings, previously arrested, or the subject of an investigation (43 leads, 2.3 

percent); (3) the lead is open for continuous review (13 leads, 0.7 percent); and (4) the subject of the 

lead is the subject of an ongoing investigation at an ICE Homeland Security Investigations field office 

(3 leads, 0.2 percent).

According to our analysis of DHS documentation, since completing this 

review of the backlog of records of potential overstays in the summer of 

2011, as new records have accrued, DHS has continued to review all 

records of potential overstays through national security and law 

enforcement databases to identify potential threats, regardless of whether 

the subjects of the records meet ICE’s priorities for enforcement action. 

DHS also regularly rereviews these records using various national 

security and law enforcement databases to identify new information on 

individuals who were not previously identified as threats.

ICE’s continual review of records of potential overstays enables it to 

prioritize and investigate individuals who pose a potential national security 

or public safety threat; however, most records of potential overstays do 

not result in enforcement action because they do not meet HSI’s overstay 

enforcement priorities. CTCEU provides those records that do not meet 
 

Page 15 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

HSI’s overstay enforcement priorities for possible investigation to ICE’s 

ERO for review to determine if the subjects of these records could be 

within the scope of one of ERO’s programs. For example, ERO oversees 

the Criminal Alien Program, which seeks to identify, arrest, and remove 

priority aliens who are incarcerated within federal, state, and local prisons 

and jails. According to ERO officials, upon receiving records from 

CTCEU, ERO may also determine through this program that the subject 

of the record has committed a crime and is incarcerated or at large. In 

fiscal years 2011 and 2012, the number of nonpriority records of potential 

overstays sent to ERO (more than 420,000) was almost three times the 

number of priority records that CTCEU reviewed for potential homeland 

security investigations (about 147,000) (see app. I for additional data on 

ICE’s enforcement actions). According to ERO officials, ERO does not 

initiate investigations of records of potential overstays it receives unless 

there is evidence at the time ERO receives the record that the subject 

meets ERO’s priorities.29

In April 2011, we found that ICE was assessing funding and resources 

needed to shift more overstay enforcement responsibilities to ERO, but 

ICE had not established a time frame for completing that assessment. We 

recommended that ICE establish a target time frame for completing the 

assessment and use the results to inform its decision on whether to 

assign ERO additional responsibility for overstay enforcement. DHS 

concurred with our recommendation and took action to address it. In June 

2011, ICE conducted a pilot study and completed its assessment later 

that year in which it concluded that significant resources would be 

required to establish ERO teams dedicated to enforcement against 

overstays. As a result, ICE did not change ERO’s overstay enforcement 

responsibilities.

ERO officials stated that few records of potential 

overstays have met ERO’s priorities.

 

29ERO prioritizes the apprehension, arrest, and removal of convicted criminals; those who 

pose a threat to national security; fugitives; and recent border entrants.
 

Page 16 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Since DHS conducted its review of the previous backlog in 2011, 

additional unmatched arrival records have accrued, and as of June 2013, 

DHS has more than 1 million unmatched arrival records in ADIS (that is, 

arrival records for which ADIS does not have a record of departure or 

status change), which do not meet ICE’s enforcement priorities. Some of 

these individuals are overstays, while others have either departed or 

changed immigration status without an ADIS record of their departure or 

status change. For example, the individual may have departed via a land 

port of entry without providing a record of departure or the individual may 

have applied for immigration benefits using a different name that does not 

match the ADIS arrival record. DHS conducts ongoing automated reviews 

of these records to rule out potential national security or public safety 

threats should updated information become available. In certain 

circumstances, such as when a record of a potential overstay meets one 

of ICE’s enforcement priorities, DHS also manually searches additional 

databases to locate evidence of a departure or change of status. 

However, DHS’s automated reviews have not produced evidence that the 

subjects of these 1 million unmatched arrival records meet its 

enforcement priorities. Thus, DHS has not manually reviewed them and 

does not plan to take enforcement action against these individuals. Until 

such evidence becomes available, DHS will continue to maintain this set 

of unmatched records.

In November 2012, DHS’s set of unmatched arrival records not manually 

reviewed totaled approximately 1.2 million records, and we analyzed data 

on these records to assess trends by admission class (e.g., tourist or 

temporary agricultural worker), mode of travel (i.e., air, land, or sea), and 

time elapsed since the travelers were expected to leave the country.30

 

30Travelers from Canada or Mexico who present certain documents upon arrival may not 

be included in this data set because their arrivals may not be recorded in ADIS. For 

example, the arrivals of Canadian legal permanent residents who travel with a Canadian 

legal permanent resident card are not recorded in ADIS. Additionally, this set of 

unmatched arrival records does not include individuals admitted for duration of status, 

such as students. 

Our analysis of the records by admission class shows that 44 percent of 

the unmatched arrival records were nonimmigrants who traveled to the 

United States on a tourist visa, while 43 percent were tourists admitted to 

the country under the Visa Waiver Program. Figure 1 presents our 

analysis of unmatched arrival records by admission class.

DHS Has More than 

1 Million Unmatched 

Arrival Records That 

Do Not Meet Enforcement 

Priorities
 

Page 17 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Figure 1: Analysis of Unmatched Arrival Records by Admission Class, as of 

November 2012

Note: Other includes nonimmigrant visa categories such as temporary workers with specialty 

occupations and spouses and children of temporary workers. The nonimmigrant classes established 

by the Immigration and Nationality Act generally refer to aliens with no intention of abandoning their 

foreign residences, and they are each given specific designations according to regulation. The B-1 

and B-2 designations refer to nonimmigrants who are visiting the United States temporarily for 

business or pleasure, respectively. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B). The H-2B designation refers to 

nonimmigrants who are coming temporarily to the United States to perform temporary, nonagricultural 

service or labor if unemployed persons capable of performing such service or labor cannot be found 

in the United States, and the H-2A designation refers to nonimmigrants who are coming temporarily 

to the United States to perform agricultural labor or services of a temporary or seasonal nature. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a)-(b). For a listing and descriptions of all nonimmigrant classes, see 8 

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15); see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(a)(1)-(2) for the corresponding designations. These 

data do not include records of nonimmigrants who are admitted for duration of status, such as 

students.

With regard to mode of travel, our analysis of the 1.2 million unmatched 

arrival records from November 2012 indicates that most of the records 

were for air arrivals (64 percent), and roughly one-third were for land 

arrivals (32 percent). The remaining 4 percent of the records were for 

arrivals by sea. Figure 2 presents the results of this analysis. DHS has 

reported a similar distribution for modes of travel for nonimmigrants 
 

Page 18 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

arriving in fiscal years 2010 and 2011—roughly one-third by land and twothirds by other modes, which would include air and sea arrivals.31

Figure 2: Analysis of Unmatched Arrival Records by Transportation Mode, as of 

November 2012

We also analyzed the records to assess the amount of time that has 

elapsed since travelers were expected to depart the country, based on 

travelers’ admit until date. Figure 3 presents our analysis of the amount of 

time elapsed, as of November 2012, since the admit until date. The 

average amount of time elapsed for the unmatched arrival records we 

analyzed was 2.7 years. Our analysis indicates that the majority of 

unmatched arrival records correspond to travelers who were expected to 

depart within the past 2 years. According to DHS officials, this may reflect 

that overstays are more likely to depart the United States as time 

 

31DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, Nonimmigrant Admissions to the United States: 

2011, (Washington, D.C.: July 2012). These data are limited to nonimmigrants for whom 

CBP maintains arrival/departure forms (I-94/I-94W). Mexican nationals with border 

crossing cards (when traveling within the border zone for a limited duration) and tourists 

and business travelers from Canada are generally not required to provide arrival/departure 

forms to CBP.
 

Page 19 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

proceeds. For example, the overstays may choose to return to their 

countries of origin.

Figure 3: Amount of Time Elapsed since Travelers Were Expected to Depart the 

United States, as of November 2012, Based on Analysis of Unmatched Arrival 

Records
 

Page 20 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Since April 2011, DHS has taken various actions to improve its data on 

potential overstays. In April 2011, we found that DHS’s efforts to identify 

and report on overstays were hindered by unreliable data, and we 

identified various challenges to DHS’s efforts to identify potential 

overstays, including the incomplete collection of departure data from 

nonimmigrants at ports of entry, particularly land ports of entry, and the 

lack of mechanisms for assessing the quality of leads sent to HSI field 

offices for investigation.32

First, DHS has taken steps to improve connections among its component 

agencies’ databases used to identify potential overstays and reduce the 

need for manual exchanges of data. For example:

Since that time, DHS has taken action to 

strengthen its processes for reviewing records to identify potential 

overstays, including (1) streamlining connections among DHS databases 

used to identify potential overstays and (2) collecting information from the 

Canadian government about those exiting the United States and entering 

Canada through northern land ports of entry.

• In August 2012, DHS enhanced data sharing between ADIS and a 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services database, the ComputerLinked Application Information Management System 3 (CLAIMS), to 

enable automatic transfers of immigration status or benefits 

information from CLAIMS to ADIS. For example, this enhancement 

has enabled CLAIMS to automatically provide data to ADIS when an 

 

32GAO-11-411. 

DHS Has Actions 

Completed and Under 

Way to Improve Data 

to Identify Potential 

Overstays, but the 

Effect of These 

Improvements Is Not 

Yet Known

DHS Has Begun Collecting 

Additional Data and 

Improved Sharing of Data 

among Its Databases to 

Help Identify Potential 

Overstays
 

Page 21 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

individual files a work authorization application form with U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services, and CLAIMS also provides data 

to ADIS daily on whether an application is pending, approved, or 

denied.

• In August 2012, DHS enhanced data sharing between ADIS and 

IDENT. This improved connection provides additional data to ADIS to 

improve the matching process based on fingerprint identification. For 

example, when an individual provides a fingerprint as part of an 

application for immigration benefits from U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services or a visa from the State Department, or when 

apprehended by law enforcement, IDENT now sends identity 

information, including a fingerprint identification number, for that 

individual to ADIS. This additional source of data is intended to help 

allow ADIS to more effectively match the individual’s entry record with 

a change of status, thereby closing out more unmatched arrival 

records.

• Beginning in April 2013, ICE’s Student and Exchange Visitor 

Information System (SEVIS) began automatically sending data to 

ADIS on a daily basis, allowing ADIS to review SEVIS records against 

departure records and determine whether student visa holders who 

have ended their course of study departed in accordance with the 

terms of their stay.33

• Also in April 2013, DHS automated the exchange of records of 

potential overstays between ADIS and CBP’s Automated Targeting 

System (ATS), a CBP system used to improve the collection, use, 

analysis, and dissemination of information on terrorism and other 

violations of United States laws. This exchange is intended to allow 

DHS to more efficiently (1) transfer data between the systems for the 

purpose of identifying national security and public safety concerns, 

and (2) use matching algorithms in ATS that differ from those in ADIS 

to close additional records for individuals who departed.

Prior to this date, DHS manually transferred data 

from SEVIS to ADIS on a weekly basis. According to DHS officials, 

these exchanges were unreliable because they did not consistently 

include all SEVIS data—particularly data on “no show” students who 

failed to begin their approved course of study within 30 days of being 

admitted into the United States.

 

33SEVIS contains biographical and other information for nonimmigrant foreign students 

and exchange visitors.
 

Page 22 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Second, DHS is implementing the Beyond the Border initiative to collect 

additional data to strengthen the identification of potential overstays. In 

October 2012, DHS and the Canada Border Services Agency began 

exchanging entry data on travelers crossing the border at selected land 

ports of entry. Because an entry into Canada constitutes a departure from 

the United States, DHS will be able to use Canadian entry data as proxies 

for U.S. departure records. We found in April 2011 that DHS faced 

challenges in its ability to identify overstays because of unreliable 

collection of departure data at land ports of entry.34 The Beyond the 

Border Initiative would help address those challenges by providing a new 

source of data on travelers departing the United States at land ports on 

the northern border. In the pilot phase, DHS exchanged data with the 

Canada Border Services Agency on third-country nationals at four of the 

five largest ports of entry on the northern border.35

DHS plans to expand this effort to collect data from additional ports of 

entry and to share data on additional types of travelers. Specifically, 

according to DHS officials, as of June 30, 2013, DHS began exchanging 

data for third-country nationals at all automated ports of entry along the 

These data covered 

entries from September 30, 2012, through January 15, 2013. DHS’s 

analysis of the 413,222 records received through the pilot showed that 

DHS was able to match 97.4 percent of Canadian entry records to a U.S. 

entry record in ADIS. DHS was able to use Canadian entry records to 

verify the departure of approximately 11,400 subjects prior to the end of 

their authorized period of admission who would otherwise have been 

thought to be potential overstays. DHS determined that roughly 4,300 

subjects with indeterminate status (meaning that DHS lacked exit records 

for those individuals) had left the United States after their authorized 

period of admission, meaning that they had overstayed while in the 

United States and are now considered out-of-country overstays.

 

34GAO-11-411. 

35These ports were Pacific Highway (Blaine, Washington), Peace Arch (Blaine, 

Washington), Lewiston-Queenston Bridge (Lewiston, New York), and Rainbow Bridge 

(Niagara Falls, New York). For the purposes of this pilot, third-country nationals are 

individuals who are not citizens of Canada or citizens or nationals of the United States. 

The pilot phase included the exchange of biographic data on permanent residents of 

Canada and lawful permanent residents of the United States. 
 

Page 23 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

northern border.36 During this phase of the initiative, in accordance with 

the agreement between the United States and Canada, DHS also plans 

to begin using these data for operational purposes (e.g., taking 

enforcement action against overstays, such as working with the State 

Department to have their visas revoked or imposing bars on readmission 

to the country based on the length of time they remained in the country 

unlawfully).37

The Beyond the Border initiative provides DHS with additional data that 

should enable it to close out potential overstay leads for individuals who 

depart across the northern border; however, according to DHS and CBP 

officials, the southern land border poses unique challenges that make an 

approach similar to Beyond the Border difficult to implement there. 

Mexican entry procedures differ from those in Canada. For example, 

according to DHS officials, at some border crossings, Mexican officials 

may not collect entry data until travelers reach a station located miles 

past the border. Therefore, Mexican border authorities may not collect 

information on every traveler entering Mexico. In addition, according to 

DHS officials, Mexican information technology systems may be less 

compatible with U.S. systems than are the Canadian systems. DHS is 

conducting informal outreach to the Mexican government regarding the 

potential to share entry data in the future, but according to DHS officials, 

such a program would be years away.

After June 30, 2014, DHS plans to exchange data on all 

travelers, including U.S. and Canadian citizens, at all automated ports of 

entry along the northern border. Both DHS and Canadian officials with 

whom we spoke stated that the initiative is proceeding on schedule.

 

36For the purposes of the Beyond the Border initiative, an automated port of entry refers to 

a port of entry on the shared Canada-U.S. land border with a primary processing capacity 

to capture traveler (land, ferry, and pedestrian) passage as an electronic record. This does 

not include large cruise vessels deemed to be sea crossings under the laws of Canada 

and the United States.

37Since these data include only individuals who have departed the United States, all of the 

overstays identified would be out-of-country overstays.
 

Page 24 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Since 1994, neither DHS nor its predecessor has regularly reported 

annual overstay rates to Congress because of concerns about the 

reliability of the department’s overstay data. According to statute, DHS is 

to submit an annual report to Congress providing numerical estimates of 

the number of aliens from each country in each nonimmigrant 

classification who overstayed an authorized period of admission that 

expired during the fiscal year prior to the year for which the report is 

made.38 Overstay rates are among the statutory criteria that determine a 

participant’s termination from the Visa Waiver Program.39 Therefore, we 

have previously concluded that reliable and valid estimates of the number 

of overstays are important to manage the program.40 In April 2011, we 

reported that DHS officials stated that the department had not reported 

overstay estimates because it had not had sufficient confidence in the 

quality of its overstay data. DHS officials stated at the time that, as a 

result, the department could not reliably report overstay estimates in 

accordance with the statute.41

In February 2013, the Secretary of Homeland Security testified that DHS 

plans to report overstay estimates by December 2013.42

 

388 U.S.C. § 1376(b).

However, as of 

June 2013, DHS has not made a final determination for how it plans to 

calculate, report, and characterize the limitations of these data. For 

example, according to officials from ICE and DHS’s Office of Policy, the 

department has calculated preliminary overstay estimates for fiscal year 

39See 8 U.S.C. § 1187(f). A country must be terminated from the Visa Waiver Program if 

that country’s disqualification rate for the most recent fiscal year for which data are 

available was more than 3.5 percent. The disqualification rate is the total for a given fiscal 

year of (1) those nationals of the country who were admitted as nonimmigrant visitors and 

violated the terms of their admission—this would include overstays—and (2) the number 

of foreign nationals who were denied admission upon arrival in the United States, as it 

compares with the total number of nationals of that country who applied for admission as 

nonimmigrant visitors during the same time period. According to the statute, the country 

must be terminated at the beginning of the second fiscal year following the fiscal year in 

which the determination of the disqualification rate was made. 

40GAO, Illegal Immigration: INS Overstay Estimation Methods Need Improvement, 

GAO/PEMD-95-20 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 1995).

41GAO-11-411. 

42See testimony of Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, before 

the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Washington, D.C.: February 13, 

2013.

DHS Continues to 

Face Limitations in 

Reporting Reliable 

Overstay Rates and 

Has Not Assessed 

and Documented 

Improvements in 

Reliability
 

Page 25 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

2012 and the first half of fiscal year 2013 for all travelers and classes of 

admission at all air, land and sea ports of entry. DHS has also calculated 

overstay rates by country for these time periods by determining the 

number of overstays (in-country plus out-of-country) divided by the total 

number of confirmed nonimmigrants arrivals (who were expected to 

depart during the identified period). However, the department is still in the 

process of determining what methodology it will use to generate the data 

it plans to report by the end of the year. In addition, DHS officials stated 

that the department has not yet determined whether to report data from 

fiscal year 2012 or fiscal year 2013, and whether to report certain 

overstay data publicly.

Moreover, DHS continues to face challenges in ensuring the reliability of 

its overstay data. In September 2008, we reported on limitations in 

overstay data that affect the reliability of overstay rates, such as 

weaknesses in departure data. We recommended that the Secretary of 

Homeland Security explore cost-effective actions necessary to further 

improve, validate, and test the reliability of overstay data.43

Further, inaccuracies in passenger data provided by air carriers may lead 

to incorrect records of potential overstays if passengers’ departures are 

not accurately recorded. For example, according to CBP officials, CBP 

DHS 

concurred with this recommendation and has explored actions to improve 

overstay data, as discussed above, but has not yet validated or tested 

their reliability. According to DHS Office of Policy officials, the department 

is better positioned than in the past to describe the limitations in the 

overstay data. However, challenges to reporting reliable overstay 

estimates remain. Although DHS has improved connections among its 

various databases used to help identify potential overstays, these 

improvements do not address some of the underlying data quality and 

reliability issues we previously identified. For example, in April 2011, we 

found that DHS faced challenges in collecting accurate and complete 

information from nonimmigrants departing the United States through land 

ports of entry. The Beyond the Border initiative is intended to help 

address this issue by collecting proxy data on individuals exiting from the 

United States at northern border ports of entry; however, DHS has not yet 

identified mechanisms for collecting data on individuals exiting through 

southern border ports of entry.

 

43GAO-08-967. 
 

Page 26 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

learned in early 2011 that some carriers were inadvertently transmitting 

passenger data without properly recording the passengers’ departure 

after DHS noticed an increase in the number of potential overstays. 

According to these officials, the issue was resolved in April 2011, but 

because of the errors in the data, an unknown number of those 

passengers were incorrectly identified as potential overstays. Moreover, 

DHS Office of Policy and ICE officials stated that, prior to the April 2013 

improvements between ADIS and SEVIS, ADIS was receiving limited 

information on foreign students; therefore, the overstay estimates prior to 

April 2013 do not fully account for the extent to which foreign students in 

the United States were in legal status in the country. These limitations in 

overstay data may affect DHS’s ability to report reliable overstay 

estimates unless resolved. Estimates of in-country overstays are based 

on ADIS’s identification of unmatched arrival records for individuals who 

were expected to depart during a given year. As discussed earlier in this 

report, DHS does not manually review all unmatched arrival records in 

ADIS because many do not meet ICE’s enforcement priorities. Therefore, 

the reliability of data in ADIS may affect the accuracy of year-end 

overstay statistics.

DHS has documented the results of receiving new departure data in the 

pilot phase of the Beyond the Border initiative to demonstrate how DHS 

may be able to close out more records of potential overstays in the future. 

However, DHS has not assessed and documented how its changes to 

database connections have improved the reliability of its data for the 

purposes of reporting overstay rate calculations and has not analyzed the 

incremental improvements that database changes have made in data 

quality. According to DHS Office of Policy and ICE officials, DHS has not 

conducted such an analysis because it is difficult to pull such data from 

ADIS. DHS has not maintained a separate, mirrored system of ADIS and 

must therefore pull data directly from the live ADIS system—a resourceintensive process that can take several months. However, there may be 

other cost-effective ways to assess data improvements, such as 

conducting quantitative analyses of the number of records closed as a 

result of the improvements in connections among databases.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that 

program managers need operational data to determine whether they are 

meeting their goals for accountability for effective and efficient use of 

resources. The standards also require that all transactions be clearly 
 

Page 27 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

documented in a manner that is complete and accurate in order to be 

useful for managers and others involved in evaluating operations.44

Additionally, GAO’s methodology transfer paper on the logic of program 

evaluation designs, which describes key issues in evaluating federal 

programs, states that the basic components of an evaluation design 

include identifying information sources and measures, data collection 

methods, and an assessment of study limitations, among other things.45

Moreover, GAO’s standards for assessing computer-processed data, 

which can provide a framework for assessing DHS’s computer-processed 

overstay data, states that care should be taken to ensure that collected 

data are sufficient and appropriate. Data may not be sufficiently reliable if 

(1) significant errors or incompleteness exists in some of or all the key 

data elements, and (2) using the data would probably lead to an incorrect 

or unintentional message.46 Without an assessment and documentation 

of improvements in the reliability of the data used to develop overstay 

estimates and any remaining limitations in how the data can be used, 

decision makers will not have the information needed to use these data 

for policy-making purposes.

DHS has not yet fulfilled the 2004 statutory requirement to implement a 

biometric exit capability, but has planning efforts under way to report to 

Congress in time for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle on the costs and 

benefits of such a capability at airports and seaports. In 2004, the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act required DHS to 

develop a plan to accelerate full implementation of an automated 

biometric entry and exit system at air, sea, and land ports of entry. 

However, development and implementation of a biometric exit capability 

has been a long-standing challenge for DHS. With regard to an exit 

capability at airports, in an October 2010 memo, DHS identified three 

primary reasons why it has been unable to determine how and when to 

implement a biometric solution: (1) the methods of collecting biometric 

data could disrupt the flow of travelers through air terminals; (2) air 

carriers and airport authorities had not allowed DHS to examine 

mechanisms through which DHS could incorporate biometric data 

 

44GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

45GAO-12-208G. 

46GAO-09-680G. 

DHS Faces Longstanding Challenges 

and Uncertain Time 

Frames in Planning 

for a Biometric Exit 

System at Airports
 

Page 28 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

collection into passenger processing at the departure gate; and (3) 

challenges existed in capturing biometric data at the point of departure, 

including determining what personnel should be responsible for the 

capture of biometric information at airports. With regard to an exit 

capability at land ports of entry, in 2006, we reported that according to 

DHS officials, for various reasons, a biometric exit capability could not be 

implemented without incurring a major impact on land facilities.47

According to DHS officials, the challenges DHS identified in October 2010 

continue to affect the department’s ability to implement a biometric air exit 

system. For example, in 2009, DHS conducted pilot programs for 

biometric air exit capabilities in airport scenarios.

As a 

result, as of April 2013, according to DHS officials, the department’s 

planning efforts focus on developing a biometric exit capability for 

airports, with the potential for a similar solution to be implemented at 

seaports, and DHS’s planning documents, as of June 2013, do not 

address plans for a biometric exit capability at land ports of entry.

48 In August 2010, we 

found that there were limitations with the pilot programs—for example, the 

pilot programs did not operationally test about 30 percent of the air exit 

requirements identified in the evaluation plan for the pilot programs—that 

hindered DHS’s ability to inform decision making for a long-term air exit 

solution and pointed to the need for additional sources of information on 

air exit’s operational impacts.49

 

47GAO, Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces, Strategic, Operational, and 

Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, 

According to DHS officials, the 

GAO-07-248 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 

2006).

48In April 2008, DHS announced its intention to implement biometric exit verification at air 

and sea ports of entry in a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (73 Fed. Reg. 22065 (Apr. 24, 

2008)). Under this notice, commercial air and sea carriers would be responsible for 

developing and deploying the capability to collect the biometrics from departing travelers 

and transmit them to DHS. Subsequent to the rule making notice, on September 30, 2008, 

the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, 

was enacted, which directed DHS to test two scenarios for an air exit solution. (Pub. L. 

No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574, 3668-70 (2008).) The act prohibited DHS from obligating any 

US-VISIT funds provided in the act for the implementation of an air exit solution until the 

department provided a report to the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations on 

pilot tests for the solution that addressed two scenarios: CBP collects biometric exit data 

at airport departure gates; and airlines collect and transmit such data. DHS submitted its 

Air Exit Pilots Evaluation Report to the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security in October 2009.

49GAO, Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited Understanding of Air 

Exit Options, GAO-10-860 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 10, 2010).
 

Page 29 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

department’s approach to planning for biometric air exit since that time 

has been partly in response to our recommendation that DHS identify 

additional sources for the operational impacts of air exit not addressed in 

the pilot programs’ evaluation and to incorporate these sources into its air 

exit decision making and planning. Figure 4 depicts a timeline of DHS’s 

efforts to develop a biometric exit capability and key findings from our 

prior reports.
Page 30 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Source: GAO.

1996 2000 2004 2008 2012

June 2003

GAO issued a report 

entitled Information 

Technology: 

Homeland Security 

Needs to Improve 

Entry Exit System 

Expenditure Planning.

August 2007

GAO issued a report 

entitled Homeland 

Security: U.S. Visitor 

and Immigrant Status 

Program's Longstanding Lack of 

Strategic Direction 

and Management 

Controls Need to Be 

Addressed.

February 2005

GAO issued a report 

entitled Homeland 

Security: Some 

Progress Made, but 

Many Challenges 

Remain on U.S. 

Visitor and Immigrant 

Status Indicator 

Technology Program.

November 2009

GAO issued a report 

entitled Homeland 

Security: Key USVISIT Components at 

Varying Stages of 

Completion, but 

Integrated and 

Reliable Schedule 

Needed.

August 2010

GAO issued a report 

entitled Homeland 

Security: US-VISIT 

Pilot Evaluations Offer 

Limited 

Understanding of Air 

Exit Options.

September 1996

The Illegal Immigration 

Reform and Immigrant 

Responsibility Act of 1996 

required an automated 

system to record and then 

match the departure of every 

foreign national from the 

United States to the 

individual’s arrival record.

June 2000

The Immigration and 

Naturalization Service 

Data Management 

Improvement Act of 

2000 required 

implementation of an 

integrated entry and 

exit data system for 

foreign nationals.

April 2003

The Department of 

Homeland Security 

(DHS) initiated the 

United States Visitor 

and Immigrant Status 

Indicator Technology 

(US-VISIT) program 

to develop a 

comprehensive 

biometric entry and 

exit system. 

January 2004

US-VISIT began 

collecting biometric 

data on aliens 

entering the United 

States at 115 air and 

14 sea ports of entry.

December 2004

The Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 

2004 required a plan 

to accelerate full 

implementation of an 

automated biometric 

entry and exit system.

October 2005

US-VISIT began 

collecting biometric 

data on aliens 

entering the United 

States at all ports of 

entry.

2011

DHS directed its 

Science and 

Technology 

Directorate (S&T), in 

coordination with 

other DHS component 

agencies, to research 

long-term options for 

biometric exit.

May 2012

DHS reported 

internally on the 

results of S&T’s 

analysis and made 

recommendations to 

support the planning 

and development of a 

biometric air exit 

capability.

2009

DHS operated two 

biometric air exit pilots 

from May 2009 until 

July 2009, and DHS 

submitted its 

evaluation report for 

these pilots to 

Congress in October 

2009.

Interactive graphic Figure 4: Timeline of Events Related to Biometric Entry and Exit System

Move mouse over the blue shaded text boxes to get more information on GAO’s findings and recommendation, click on text box to open the 

referenced GAO report. For an accessible and printable version of this graphic please see appendix II.
 

Page 31 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

In 2011, DHS directed S&T, in coordination with other DHS component 

agencies, to research long-term options for biometric air exit.50 In May 

2012, DHS reported internally on the results of S&T’s analysis of previous 

air exit pilot programs and assessment of available technologies, and the 

report made recommendations to support the planning and development 

of a biometric air exit capability.51

 

50In our previous reviews of DHS’s efforts to pursue biometric exit capabilities, DHS’s 

plans have approached development of a biometric exit system through a phased 

approach that involved conducting pilots to inform eventual planning for long-term 

solutions. Different pilots were created to inform solutions at air/seaports and land ports. 

See 

In that report, DHS concluded that the 

building blocks to implement an effective biometric air exit system were 

available. In addition, DHS’s report stated that new traveler facilitation 

tools and technologies—for example, online check-in, self-service, and 

paperless technology—could support more cost-effective ways to screen 

travelers, and that these improvements should be leveraged when 

developing plans for biometric air exit. However, DHS officials stated that 

there may be challenges to leveraging new technologies to the extent that 

U.S. airports and airlines rely on older, proprietary systems that may be 

difficult to update to incorporate new technologies. Furthermore, DHS 

reported in May 2012 that significant questions remained regarding (1) 

the effectiveness of current biographic air exit processes and the error 

rates in collecting or matching data, (2) methods of cost-effectively 

integrating biometrics into the air departure processes (e.g., collecting 

biometric scans as passengers enter the jetway to board a plane), (3) the 

additional value biometric air exit would provide compared with the 

current biographic air exit process, and (4) the overall value and cost of a 

biometric air exit capability. The report included nine recommendations to 

help inform DHS’s planning for biometric air exit, such as directing DHS to 

develop explicit goals and objectives for biometric air exit and an 

evaluation framework that would, among other things, assess the value of 

GAO-10-13. As of April 2013, the department’s planning efforts are focused on 

developing a biometric exit system for airports, with the potential for a similar solution to 

be rolled out at seaports, according to DHS officials.

51DHS, DHS Biometric Air Exit: Analysis, Recommendations and Next Steps, 

(Washington, D.C.: May 2012).
 

Page 32 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

collecting biometric data in addition to biographic data and determine 

whether biometric air exit is economically justified.52

DHS reported in May 2012 that it planned to take steps to address these 

recommendations by May 2014; however, according to DHS Office of 

Policy and S&T officials, the department does not expect to fully address 

these recommendations by then. In particular, DHS officials stated that it 

has been difficult coordinating with airlines and airports, which have 

expressed reluctance about biometric air exit because of concerns over 

its effect on operations and potential costs. To address these concerns, 

DHS is conducting outreach and soliciting information from airlines and 

airports regarding their operations. In addition, DHS officials stated that 

the department’s efforts to date have been hindered by insufficient 

funding. However, in fiscal year 2012, DHS requested that Congress 

release funds allocated to the biometric exit program and funds being 

withheld pending the full implementation of a biometric exit system so that 

these funds could be applied to DHS’s efforts to enhance the biographic 

exit system. In its fiscal year 2014 budget request for S&T, DHS 

requested funding for a joint S&T-CBP Air Entry/Exit Re-Engineering 

Apex project. Apex projects are crosscutting, multidisciplinary efforts 

requested by DHS components that are high-priority projects intended to 

solve problems of strategic operational importance. According to DHS’s 

fiscal year 2014 budget justification, the Air Entry/Exit Re-Engineering 

Apex project will develop tools to model and simulate air entry and exit 

operational processes. Using these tools, DHS intends to develop, test, 

pilot, and evaluate candidate solutions. As of April 2013, DHS Policy and 

S&T officials stated that they expect to finalize goals and objectives for a 

biometric air exit system in the near future and are making plans for future 

scenario-based testing.

 

52The report recommended that DHS take the following actions: (1) develop explicit goals 

and objectives for biometric air exit, (2) leverage improvements in passenger facilitation 

and biometric technology to support a concept of operations, (3) use developmental 

scenario testing instead of pilot programs to validate a concept of operations, (4) establish 

collaborative relationships with airports and airlines, (5) use operational tests to validate 

performance and cost estimates, (6) develop an evaluation framework for biometric air 

exit, (7) employ a holistic approach to assess the costs and benefits of comprehensive 

biometric entry and exit processes, (8) determine whether biometric air exit is 

economically justified, and (9) incrementally deploy biometric air exit to airports where it is 

cost-effective to do so.
 

Page 33 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Although DHS’s May 2012 report stated that DHS would take steps to 

address the report’s recommendations by May 2014, DHS officials told us 

that the department’s current goal is to develop information about options 

for biometric air exit and to report to Congress in time for the fiscal year 

2016 budget cycle regarding (1) the additional benefits that a biometric air 

exit system provides beyond an enhanced biographic exit system and 

(2) costs associated with biometric air exit. However, DHS has not yet 

developed an evaluation framework, as recommended in its May 2012 

report, to determine how the department will evaluate the benefits and 

costs of a biometric air exit system and compare it with a biographic exit 

system. According to DHS officials, the department needs to finalize 

goals and objectives for biometric air exit before it can develop such a 

framework, and in April 2013 these officials told us that the department 

plans to finalize these elements in the near future. However, DHS does 

not have time frames for when it will subsequently be able to develop and 

implement an evaluation framework to support the assessment it plans to 

provide to Congress.

According to A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge, 

which provides standards for project managers, specific goals and 

objectives should be conceptualized, defined, and documented in the 

planning process, along with the appropriate steps, time frames, and 

milestones needed to achieve those results.53

 

53Project Management Institute, A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge 

(PMBOK® Guide), Fifth Edition, (Newton Square, PA: 2013). We have used A Guide to 

the Project Management Body of Knowledge to provide criteria in previous reports, 

including GAO, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund: State Should Better Assure the 

Effective Use of Program Authorities, 

In fall 2012, DHS 

developed a high-level plan for its biometric air exit efforts, which it 

updated in May 2013, but this plan does not clearly identify the tasks 

needed to develop and implement an evaluation framework. For example, 

the plan does not include a step for developing the methodology for 

comparing the costs and benefits of biometric data against those for 

collecting biographic data, as recommended in DHS’s May 2012 report. 

Furthermore, the time frames in this plan are not accurate as of June 

2013 because DHS is behind schedule on some of the tasks and has not 

updated the time frames in the plan accordingly. For example, DHS had 

planned to begin scenario-based testing for biometric air exit options in 

August 2013; however, according to DHS officials, the department now 

plans to begin such testing in early 2014. A senior official from DHS’s 

GAO-13-83 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2012).
 

Page 34 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Office of Policy told us that DHS has not kept the plan up to date because 

of the transition of responsibilities within DHS; specifically, in March 2013, 

pursuant to the explanatory statement for DHS’s 2013 appropriation, DHS 

established an office within CBP that is responsible for coordinating 

DHS’s entry and exit policies and operations.54

DHS Policy and S&T officials agreed that setting time frames and 

milestones is important to ensure timely development and implementation 

of the evaluation framework in accordance with DHS’s May 2012 

recommendations. According to DHS officials, implementation of a 

biometric air exit system will depend on the results of discussions 

between the department and Congress after the department provides this 

assessment of options for biometric air exit. Any delays in providing the 

assessment to Congress could further affect implementation of a 

biometric air exit system, and without reasonable assurance when DHS 

will be able to provide this assessment to Congress, it remains unclear 

when DHS will make progress toward addressing the statutory 

requirements for a biometric exit system.

This transition was in 

process as of June 2013, and CBP plans to establish an integrated 

project team in July 2013 that will be responsible for more detailed 

planning for the department’s biometric air exit efforts. Without robust 

planning that includes up-to-date time frames and milestones to develop 

and implement an evaluation framework for its assessment of biometric 

air exit benefits and costs, DHS does not have reasonable assurance that 

it will be able to provide this assessment to Congress as planned for the 

fiscal year 2016 budget cycle.

Addressing the large number of foreign visitors who have entered the 

United States legally but then overstayed has been a long-standing 

challenge. Given the government’s finite resources for addressing 

overstays, and competing priorities, reliable data and analysis are of 

particular importance to both DHS and Congress. Without clear 

assessment and reporting of the extent to which the reliability of the data 

used to develop overstay estimates has improved and any remaining 

limitations in how the data can be used, decision makers may not have 

complete information needed to use these data for policy-making 

 

54See Explanatory Statement, Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 

2013, 159 Cong. Rec. S1287, S1550 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 2013).

Conclusions 
 

Page 35 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

purposes. Furthermore, DHS has faced long-standing challenges in 

making progress toward meeting the statutory requirement for biometric 

exit capabilities since 2004. DHS plans to provide Congress with an 

assessment of the benefits and costs of various options for pursuing a 

biometric exit system at airports, but without robust planning that includes 

time frames and milestones to develop and implement an evaluation 

framework for this assessment, DHS lacks reasonable assurance that it 

will be able to provide this assessment to Congress for the fiscal year 

2016 budget cycle as planned. Furthermore, any delays in providing this 

information to Congress could further affect possible implementation of a 

biometric exit system to address statutory requirements.

To help improve confidence in the quality of overstay data that DHS plans 

to report in December 2013 in accordance with statutory reporting 

requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security 

direct relevant DHS components to assess and document the extent to 

which the reliability of the data used to develop any overstay estimates 

has improved and any remaining limitations in how the data can be used.

To provide reasonable assurance of when DHS will be able provide an 

assessment of the benefits and costs of biometric air exit options to 

Congress, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security 

establish time frames and milestones for developing and implementing an 

evaluation framework to be used in conducting the department’s 

assessment of biometric air exit options.

We provided a draft of this report to DHS and the Department of State for 

their review and comment. DHS provided written comments, which are 

summarized below and reproduced in full in appendix III. DHS concurred 

with our two recommendations and described actions under way or 

planned to address them. Regarding our first recommendation, that DHS 

assess and document the extent to which the reliability of the data used 

to develop any overstay estimates has improved and any remaining 

limitations in how the data can be used, DHS indicated that it is 

establishing a working group that will include representation from DHS 

component agencies with responsibility for collecting, recording, and 

analyzing entry and exit data and that this working group will be functional 

by January 31, 2014. According to DHS, the component agencies that 

oversee information systems used to identify overstays will be 

responsible for the data captured in their respective systems, and the 

working group will be responsible for aggregating information across 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 36 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

components regarding the validity of the data and defining any limitations 

to the use of the data. DHS estimated that completion of an initial 

evaluation of the data would occur by July 31, 2014. To fully address our 

recommendation, DHS should assess the reliability of, and document any 

remaining limitations in, any overstay data that the department may 

report. Regarding our second recommendation, that DHS establish time 

frames and milestones for developing and implementing an evaluation 

framework to be used in conducting the department’s assessment of 

biometric air exit options, DHS indicated that CBP and S&T will finalize 

the goals and objectives for biometric air exit by January 31, 2014, and 

that these goals and objectives will be used in the development of an 

evaluation framework that DHS expects to have completed by June 30, 

2014. These actions, when fully implemented, should help address the 

intent of our recommendations. DHS also provided technical comments, 

which we incorporated as appropriate.

The Department of State did not have formal comments on our draft 

report, but provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 

appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, the Secretary of State, appropriate congressional committees, 

and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no 

charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have questions on matters discussed in this report, 

please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Rebecca Gambler

Director

Homeland Security and Justice
Appendix I: U.S. Immigration and

Customs Enforcement’s Overstay Enforcement 

Actions

Page 37 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

In April 2011, we reported that U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), a component within the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), takes actions to address a small portion of the estimated 

overstay population because of, among other things, competing priorities. 

In particular, ICE’s Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit 

(CTCEU), within the Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) directorate, 

prioritizes in-country overstay leads based on various factors that 

consider the potential risks overstays may pose to national security and 

public safety, and HSI field offices investigate those leads that CTCEU 

identifies as priorities. 

As it reviews leads for potential overstays, CTCEU closes records for 

nonimmigrants that have either left the country or changed their status, 

identifies nonpriority records for processing by ICE Enforcement and 

Removal Operations, and sends records that do not have a viable 

address to contractors to continually monitor for new address information. 

CTCEU assigns valid, high-priority overstay leads to HSI field office 

agents within their respective geographical areas of responsibility for 

mandatory investigation. From fiscal years 2004 through 2012, CTCEU 

processed over 2.2 million records of potential overstays and sent about 

44,500 leads to HSI field offices for investigation. Table 4 provides 

information related to the records of potential overstays that CTCEU has 

processed from fiscal years 2004 through 2012 (our April 2011 report 

included the data from fiscal years 2004 through 2010). Out of the 

approximately 44,500 leads sent to HSI field offices over this period of 

time, approximately 9,000 (about 20 percent) resulted in arrests.

Appendix I: U.S. Immigration and

Customs Enforcement’s Overstay

Enforcement Actions
Appendix I: U.S. Immigration and

Customs Enforcement’s Overstay Enforcement 

Actions

Page 38 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Table 4: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) Processing of 

Records of Potential In-Country Overstays from Fiscal Years 2004 to 2012 (Rounded to the Nearest Hundred)

Status of leads 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total

Records imported 261,600 198,600 168,500 197,300 155,600 198,300 193,300 390,200 497,500 2,260,900

Closed records 239,500 180,900 148,200 166,400 104,600 101,100 103,900 169,000 233,400 1,447,000

Nonpriority records of 

potential overstays sent 

to Enforcement and 

Removal Operations

13,900 13,000 15,800 25,100 46,000 85,600 79,700 199,200 221,900 700, 200

Viable leads assigned 

to Homeland Security 

Investigations field 

offices for investigation

7,600 4,600 4,300 5,700 5,000 6,100 5,400 3,000 2,800 44,500

Nonviable leads sent to 

contractor for continual 

monitoring

700 300 300 200 100 6,000 4,900 3,000 4,400 19,900

Source: CTCEU LeadTrac data on overstay leads.

In April 2011, we reported that overstay investigations that do not lead to 

an arrest result in one of three outcomes: (1) evidence is uncovered 

indicating that the suspected overstay departed the United States, 

(2) evidence is uncovered indicating that the subject of the investigation is 

in-status (e.g., the subject filed a timely application with DHS’s U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services to change his or her status or 

extend his or her authorized period of admission in the United States), or 

(3) investigators exhaust all investigative leads and cannot locate the 

suspected overstay. If the evidence of departure shows that the individual 

departed after his or her authorized admit until date (i.e., the individual is 

an out-of-country overstay), the individual could be subject to 

administrative enforcement actions including restrictions on readmission 

to the United States. Figure 5 shows the outcomes of CTCEU 

investigations from fiscal years 2004 through 2012 that did not result in 

arrest (our April 2011 report included the data from fiscal years 2004 

through 2010).
Appendix I: U.S. Immigration and

Customs Enforcement’s Overstay Enforcement 

Actions

Page 39 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Figure 5: Outcomes of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) Overstay Investigations 

Not Resulting in Arrest, Fiscal Years 2004-2012

Note: Data presented in this table include outcomes of CTCEU investigations of suspected visa 

overstays, Visa Waiver Program overstays, National Security Entry-Exit Registration System 

overstays, and out-of-status students. The National Security Entry-Exit Registration System was a 

program that required certain visitors or nonimmigrants to register with DHS for national security 

reasons. DHS ended this program on April 27, 2011.

As we reported in April 2011, ICE has reported allocating a small 

percentage of its resources in terms of investigative work hours to 

overstay investigations. For this report, we found that, from fiscal years 

2005 through 2012, ICE reported devoting from 1.8 to 3.4 percent of its 

total HSI field office investigative hours to CTCEU overstay investigations, 

as shown in figure 6 (our April 2011 report included the data from fiscal 

years 2006 through 2010).
Appendix I: U.S. Immigration and

Customs Enforcement’s Overstay Enforcement 

Actions

Page 40 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Figure 6: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Reported Percentage of 

Homeland Security Investigations Field Office Investigative Hours Dedicated to 

Overstay Investigations, Fiscal Years 2005-2012

Note: Data in this figure do not account for all categories of investigations that may result in 

enforcement actions against overstays. For example, these data do not include document or benefit 

fraud investigations, which include school fraud investigations that may identify out-of-status students.
Appendix II: Timeline of Events Related

to Biometric Entry and Exit System

Page 41 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Table 5 lists events in DHS’s efforts to develop a biometric exit capability 

and key findings from our prior reports (see interactive fig. 4) and includes 

the figure’s rollover information.

Table 5: Timeline of Events Related to Biometric Entry and Exit System

Date Event

September 1996 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 required an automated system to 

record and then match the departure of every foreign national from the United States to the individual’s arrival 

record. 

June 2000 The Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 required 

implementation of an integrated entry and exit data system for foreign nationals.

April 2003 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 

Technology (US-VISIT) program to develop a comprehensive biometric entry and exit system.

June 2003 GAO issued a report entitled Information Technology: Homeland Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit System 

Expenditure Planning.

GAO findings

GAO reported that DHS’s initial plan for an entry-exit system did not provide sufficient information about 

specific system capabilities, benefits, and costs.

Recommendation

GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security ensure that future expenditure plans fully 

disclose what entry-exit system capabilities and benefits are to be delivered, by when, and at what cost, and 

how the department intends to manage the acquisition to provide reasonable assurance that these system 

capability, benefit, schedule, and cost commitments will be met.

Status

Closed–implemented

The fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan disclosed planned system capabilities, expected benefits, and estimated 

schedules and costs. More specifically, the expenditure plan identified capabilities for various US-VISIT 

projects, such as the capability to receive and store 10-print finger scans captured by U.S. consulates. 

Additionally, the expenditure plan identified benefits, such as reduced information gaps and enhanced 

immigration and border enforcement. Furthermore, the expenditure plan provided time frames, such as the 

deployment of the 10-print pilot to 10 air locations in late 2007. Moreover, the expenditure plan provided 

meaningful cost information for some of its projects.

GAO citation

GAO, Information Technology: Homeland Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit System Expenditure Planning, 

GAO-03-563 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2003).

January 2004 US-VISIT began collecting biometric data on aliens entering the United States at 115 air and 14 sea ports of 

entry.

December 2004 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required a plan to accelerate full 

implementation of an automated biometric entry and exit system.

Appendix II: Timeline of Events Related

to Biometric Entry and Exit System
Appendix II: Timeline of Events Related

to Biometric Entry and Exit System

Page 42 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Date Event

February 2005 GAO issued a report entitled Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain on U.S. 

Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program.

GAO findings

GAO reported that changing facts and circumstances introduced additional risk to US-VISIT’s delivery of 

promised capabilities and benefits on time and within budget.

Recommendation

GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary for Border and 

Transportation Security to ensure that the US-VISIT program director reassesses plans for deploying an exit 

capability to ensure that the scope of the exit pilot program provides for adequate evaluation of alternative 

solutions and better ensures that the exit solution selected is in the best interest of the program.

Status

Closed–implemented

The fiscal year 2008 expenditure plan stated that DHS reassessed its exit plans, described a new strategy for 

deploying biometric exit capabilities at air and sea ports of entry, and noted the absence of near-term biometric 

options for land ports of entry. DHS also shut down the exit pilots (and demonstration projects) that this 

recommendation was intended to address.

GAO citation

GAO, Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain on U.S. Visitor and Immigrant 

Status Indicator Technology Program, GAO-05-202 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2005).

October 2005 US-VISIT began collecting biometric data on aliens entering the United States at all ports of entry.

August 2007 GAO issued a report entitled Homeland Security: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Program’s Long-standing 

Lack of Strategic Direction and Management Controls Need to Be Addressed. 

GAO findings

GAO reported that DHS continued to propose spending tens of millions of dollars on US-VISIT exit projects 

that were not well defined, planned, or justified on the basis of costs, benefits, and risks.

Recommendation

In this report, GAO reiterated prior recommendations regarding the US-VISIT program and further 

recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security report to the department’s authorization and 

appropriations committees on its reasons for not fully addressing its expenditure plan legislative conditions and 

our prior recommendations.

Status

Closed–not implemented

US-VISIT program officials told GAO that they had periodically briefed their authorization and appropriation 

committees on program-related issues, including reasons for not having fully satisfied all expenditure plan 

legislative conditions and GAO’s prior recommendations. However, documentation of these congressional 

briefings provided by US-VISIT does not indicate that the program’s reasons for not fully addressing 

expenditure plan legislative conditions or our open recommendations were discussed. As of August 2011, 

DHS officials had yet to provide evidence of discussions with the congressional committees regarding the 

topics of this recommendation, and GAO closed the recommendation as not implemented.

GAO citation

GAO, Homeland Security: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Program’s Long-standing Lack of Strategic 

Direction and Management Controls Need to be Addressed, GAO-07-1065 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2007).

2009 DHS operated two biometric air exit pilots from May 2009 until July 2009, and DHS submitted its evaluation 

report for these pilots to Congress in October 2009.
Appendix II: Timeline of Events Related

to Biometric Entry and Exit System

Page 43 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Date Event

November 2009 GAO issued a report entitled Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of 

Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed.

GAO findings

GAO reported that the US-VISIT program office had not adopted an integrated approach to scheduling, 

executing, and tracking work toward a comprehensive exit solution.

Recommendation

GAO recommended that the US-VISIT program director develop and maintain an integrated master schedule 

for the exit system project in accordance with nine scheduling practices discussed in the report.

Status

Open

In March 2012, DHS reported that the US-VISIT office was adopting procedures to comply with the nine 

scheduling practices GAO recommended and has conducted training on our scheduling methodology.

GAO citation

GAO, Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of Completion, but Integrated and 

Reliable Schedule Needed, GAO-10-13 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2009).

August 2010 GAO issued a report entitled Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited Understanding of 

Air Exit Options.

GAO findings

GAO reported that DHS would need to leverage other sources of information to develop a biometric air exit 

solution given limitations in DHS’s biometric air exit pilot programs.

Recommendation

GAO recommend that the US-VISIT program director identify additional sources for the operational impacts of 

air exit not addressed in the pilots’ evaluation and to incorporate these sources into its air exit decision making 

and planning.

Status

Open

In May 2012, DHS reported internally on the results of the DHS Science and Technology Directorate’s (S&T) 

analysis of previous US-VISIT air exit pilot programs and assessment of available biometric technologies. The 

report also discussed DHS’s plans to take steps that have the potential to result in additional information 

sources to assess the operational impacts of a biometric air exit capability. However, the report also cited 

significant remaining questions, such as those regarding the comparative value of adding a biometric 

capability to the existing air exit process and the overall value and cost of a biometric air exit capability. As of 

April 2013, officials from DHS’s Office of Policy and S&T stated that they are making plans for future scenariobased testing and are conducting outreach and soliciting information from airlines and airports regarding their 

operations.

GAO citation

GAO, Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited Understanding of Air Exit Options,

GAO-10-860 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 10, 2010).

2011 DHS directed S&T, in coordination with other DHS component agencies, to research long-term options for 

biometric exit.

May 2012 DHS reported internally on the results of S&T’s analysis and made recommendations to support the planning 

and development of a biometric air exit capability.

Source: GAO.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 44 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 45 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 46 GAO-13-683 Overstay Enforcement

Rebecca Gambler, (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. 

In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet (Assistant 

Director), Susan Baker, Frances A. Cook, Alana Finley, Eric Hauswirth, 

Richard Hung, Lara Miklozek, Amanda Miller, Anthony Moran, Karl 

Seifert, and Ashley D. Vaughan made significant contributions to this 

report.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(441119)
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