II 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 3040 

To establish the principle of reciprocity in the relationship between the United 

States and the People’s Republic of China, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 16, 2023 

Mr. SULLIVAN (for himself and Mr. VAN HOLLEN) introduced the following 

bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To establish the principle of reciprocity in the relationship 

between the United States and the People’s Republic 

of China, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘True Reciprocity Act 

5 of 2023’’. 

6 SEC. 2. RECIPROCITY IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 

7 THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE’S RE8 PUBLIC OF CHINA. 

9 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find10 ings: 


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1 (1) In a number of areas, the relationship be2 tween the United States and the People’s Republic 

3 of China is unacceptably nonreciprocal. 

4 (2) The imbalance in the relationship creates 

5 avenues of influence for the People’s Republic of 

6 China and the Chinese Communist Party in the 

7 United States that the United States does not enjoy 

8 in the People’s Republic of China. 

9 (3) Diplomats, Members of Congress, and other 

10 officials of the United States are highly restricted 

11 with respect to where they can travel and with whom 

12 they can meet in the People’s Republic of China. 

13 (4) The Government of the United States re14 quires diplomats of the People’s Republic of China 

15 to notify the Department of State of some travel and 

16 meeting plans, and the Government of the United 

17 States requires such diplomats to obtain approval 

18 from the Department of State for some travel within 

19 the United States. However, when such approval is 

20 required, it is almost always granted expeditiously, 

21 and access and interactions are unimpeded. 

22 (5) Diplomats of the People’s Republic of China 

23 based in the United States generally avail them24 selves of the freedom to travel within the United 

25 States and lobby city councils, mayors, State legislaVerDate Sep 11 2014 02:09 Oct 17, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3040.IS S3040

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1 tors, and Governors to support initiatives of the Peo2 ple’s Republic of China and refrain from passing 

3 resolutions, issuing proclamations, or making state4 ments critical of the Government of the People’s Re5 public of China. 

6 (6) According to the Integrated Country Strat7 egy of the Department of State on the People’s Re8 public of China (approved May 3, 2022, and up9 dated February 2, 2023), ‘‘Local [PRC] law enforce10 ment and security services frequently employ 

11 extrajudicial means against U.S. citizens without re12 gard to international norms, including the Vienna 

13 Convention on Consular Relations and the 1980 

14 U.S.-China Bilateral Consular Convention. These in15 clude broad travel prohibitions, known as ‘exit bans.’ 

16 These are sometimes used to prevent U.S. citizens, 

17 who are not themselves suspected of a crime, from 

18 leaving the PRC to pressure relatives or associates 

19 in the United States who are wanted by PRC law 

20 enforcement to return to the PRC. PRC officials 

21 also arbitrarily detain and interrogate U.S. citizens 

22 for reasons related to ‘state security’ . . . [and] the 

23 PRC criminal justice system often subjects U.S. citi24 zens to overly lengthy pre-trial detention in ex25 tremely difficult conditions while investigations are 


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1 ongoing, and detention facilities arbitrarily prevent/ 

2 limit detainees’ access to lawyers, medical treatment, 

3 and mail.’’ 

4 (7) The People’s Republic of China is consid5 ered one of the least free countries to operate in as 

6 a journalist, ranked 179 out of 180 in the 2023 

7 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters 

8 Without Borders, above only North Korea. The 

9 ranking of the People’s Republic of China stems 

10 from the country’s near complete lack of inde11 pendent journalism. 

12 (8) In 2022, Freedom House’s ‘‘Freedom on 

13 the Net’’ annual report ranked the People’s Republic 

14 of China as the world’s worst abuser of internet 

15 freedom for the eighth consecutive year, with censor16 ship intensifying during the 2022 Beijing Olympics. 

17 (9) According to the Foreign Correspondents’ 

18 Club of China, the Government of the People’s Re19 public of China restricts the activities of journalists 

20 from the United States and journalists representing 

21 United States media outlets by denying entry into 

22 the People’s Republic of China or restricting access 

23 to people and places, attempting to censor their re24 porting, and harassing their colleagues and sources. 


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1 (10) The Government of the United States gen2 erally allows journalists not affiliated with publica3 tions designated as foreign missions under the For4 eign Missions Act (22 U.S.C. 4301 et seq.) and 

5 other citizens of the People’s Republic of China to 

6 travel freely within the United States, including on 

7 college and university campuses and in the halls of 

8 Congress. 

9 (11) The Government of the People’s Republic 

10 of China continues to either directly or indirectly 

11 fund Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms 

12 operated on campuses of institutions of higher edu13 cation in the United States and in K–12 public 

14 school districts, in many cases rebranding them to 

15 avoid recent scrutiny, but similar institutes funded 

16 by the Government of the United States in the Peo17 ple’s Republic of China have been forced to close. 

18 (12) Under the Law of the People’s Republic of 

19 China on the Management of the Activities of Over20 seas Non-Governmental Organizations in Mainland 

21 China, since 2017, foreign nongovernmental organi22 zations operating in mainland China have been re23 quired to submit to supervision by the Government 

24 of the People’s Republic of China. 


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1 (13) Since 2019, the People’s Republic of China 

2 has imposed sanctions on employees of United 

3 States nongovernmental organizations, including the 

4 National Endowment for Democracy, Human Rights 

5 Watch, Freedom House, the National Democratic 

6 Institute, and the International Republican Insti7 tute. 

8 (14) The Government of the People’s Republic 

9 of China has failed to fulfill key commitments to the 

10 World Trade Organization, including with respect to 

11 forced transfers of intellectual property, joint ven12 ture requirements, subsidies, and nontariff barriers, 

13 that would level opportunities for trade, investment, 

14 and United States influence in the People’s Republic 

15 of China. 

16 (15) The Government of the People’s Republic 

17 of China provides massive subsidies for agriculture, 

18 fishery, aluminum and steel, and technology manu19 facturing and services that distort domestic and 

20 global competition in favor of businesses of the Peo21 ple’s Republic of China and at the expense of mar22 ket access for United States companies. These dis23 criminatory and distortionary policies harm United 

24 States security at home and give the Government of 


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1 the People’s Republic of China unfair advantage in 

2 its global competition with the United States. 

3 (16) The Government of the People’s Republic 

4 of China uses multiple policy tools, including caps on 

5 foreign equity ownership, data localization, and 

6 other administrative procedures, to coerce foreign 

7 companies to transfer technology as a precondition 

8 for market access. These policies pose immediate 

9 and far-reaching challenges for United States com10 panies and limit market access for United States 

11 products and services in ways that Chinese counter12 parts do not face in the United States market. 

13 (17) The internet and online restrictions im14 posed by the Government of the People’s Republic of 

15 China hamper the operations of United States busi16 nesses in the People’s Republic of China, and certain 

17 United States technology companies have been 

18 pushed out and effectively banned from doing busi19 ness in the People’s Republic of China. 

20 (18) Businesses of the People’s Republic of 

21 China, both state- and party-owned businesses and 

22 private businesses, are tied to representing state and 

23 party interests, and the access of those businesses to 

24 the United States furthers those interests. 


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1 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

2 United States— 

3 (1) to establish the principle of reciprocity in 

4 the relationship between the United States and the 

5 People’s Republic of China in order to expose the 

6 full range of instruments of influence of the People’s 

7 Republic of China and the Chinese Communist 

8 Party in the United States; 

9 (2) to clearly differentiate, in official state10 ments, media communications, and messaging, be11 tween the people of the People’s Republic of China 

12 and the Chinese Communist Party; 

13 (3) that any negotiations on trade restrictions 

14 or investment with respect to the People’s Republic 

15 of China should be concluded in a manner that ad16 dresses nonreciprocal arrangements between the two 

17 countries; 

18 (4) that any agreements resulting from such 

19 negotiations should, to the extent possible— 

20 (A) ensure that the People’s Republic of 

21 China commits to structural changes in its 

22 trade and economic policies; 

23 (B) ensure that the People’s Republic of 

24 China meets previously made bilateral and mul25 tilateral commitments; 


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1 (C) hold the People’s Republic of China ac2 countable to those commitments; 

3 (D) address national security concerns re4 lated to the targets of Chinese investments in 

5 the United States, United States investments in 

6 the People’s Republic of China, and the export 

7 and import of technology; and 

8 (E) take into account ties of Chinese busi9 nesses to the People’s Republic of China, the 

10 Chinese Communist Party, and the People’s 

11 Liberation Army that enable those businesses to 

12 influence United States business, government, 

13 and society in ways closed to United States 

14 businesses attempting to exercise the same in15 fluence in the People’s Republic of China; 

16 (5) to seek a relationship with the People’s Re17 public of China that is founded on the principles of 

18 basic reciprocity across sectors, including economic, 

19 diplomatic, educational, and communications sectors; 

20 (6) to prioritize the principle of reciprocity in 

21 the relationship between the United States and the 

22 People’s Republic of China as a goal in the Inte23 grated Country Strategy of the Department of State 

24 on the People’s Republic of China; 


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1 (7) to recognize that engagement between the 

2 United States and the People’s Republic of China 

3 and the Chinese Communist Party can be useful, 

4 but only in the context of reciprocity and when the 

5 terms of such engagement advance United States in6 terests; and 

7 (8) to coordinate with allies and partners on 

8 policy approaches to reciprocity in the relationship 

9 between the United States and the People’s Republic 

10 of China and the Chinese Communist Party. 

11 (c) REPORT AND STRATEGY REQUIRED.— 

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

13 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec14 retary of State, in consultation with relevant Federal 

15 departments and agencies, shall submit to the ap16 propriate congressional committees— 

17 (A) a report comparing the manners in 

18 which the United States Government and the 

19 Government of the People’s Republic of China 

20 treat one another’s diplomats and other offi21 cials, journalists, businesses, and nongovern22 mental organizations; and 

23 (B) a strategy for addressing imbalances 

24 in the treatment described in subparagraph (A). 


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1 (2) ELEMENTS OF REPORT.—The report re2 quired by paragraph (1)(A) shall include the fol3 lowing: 

4 (A) A summary of obstacles that United 

5 States diplomats and other officials, journalists, 

6 businesses, and nongovernmental organizations 

7 encounter in carrying out their work in the Peo8 ple’s Republic of China. 

9 (B) A summary of United States Govern10 ment regulations and policies with regard to the 

11 activities of diplomats and other officials, jour12 nalists, businesses, and nongovernmental orga13 nizations of the People’s Republic of China in 

14 the United States. 

15 (C) A description of the efforts that offi16 cials of the United States have made to rectify 

17 any differences in the treatment of diplomats 

18 and other officials, journalists, businesses, and 

19 nongovernmental organizations by the United 

20 States and by the People’s Republic of China, 

21 and the results of those efforts. 

22 (D) An assessment of the adherence of the 

23 Government of the People’s Republic of China, 

24 in its treatment of United States citizens, to 

25 the requirements of— 


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1 (i) the Convention on Consular Rela2 tions, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and 

3 entered into force March 19, 1967 (21 

4 U.S.T. 77); and 

5 (ii) the Consular Convention, signed 

6 at Washington September 17, 1980, and 

7 entered into force February 19, 1982, be8 tween the United States and the People’s 

9 Republic of China. 

10 (E) An assessment of any impacts of the 

11 People’s Republic of China’s internet restric12 tions on reciprocity between the United States 

13 and the People’s Republic of China. 

14 (F) A summary of other notable areas in 

15 which the Government of the People’s Republic 

16 of China or entities affiliated with that Govern17 ment are able to conduct activities or invest18 ments in the United States but that are denied 

19 to United States entities in the People’s Repub20 lic of China. 

21 (G) Recommendations for any changes in 

22 law necessary to improve reciprocity in the rela23 tionship between the United States and the 

24 People’s Republic of China. 

25 (3) FORM OF REPORT; AVAILABILITY.— 


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1 (A) FORM.—The report required by para2 graph (1)(A) shall be submitted in unclassified 

3 form, but may include a classified index. 

4 (B) AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified por5 tion of the report required by paragraph (1)(A) 

6 shall be posted on a publicly available internet 

7 website of the Department of State. 

8 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

9 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT10 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com11 mittees’’ means the Committee on Foreign Relations 

12 of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

13 of the House of Representatives. 

14 (2) RECIPROCITY.—The term ‘‘reciprocity’’ 

15 means the mutual and equitable exchange of privi16 leges between governments, countries, businesses, or 

17 individuals. 

Æ 


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