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united states cryptologic history

Operation REGAL:

The Berlin Tunnel (S-COO)

(b) (1)

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

I=IANDLI!! VIA COMINT ("ANNEt! ONLY

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Classified By NSAlCSSM 123-2

Declassify On: Originating Agency's Determination Required

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about reproduction and dissemination should be directed to the Office of Cryptologic

Archives and History, T54.
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TOP "CRET I:JMBM

UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

Special Series

Number 4

Operation Regal:

The Berlin Tunnel (S·CCO)

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

1988

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Foreword

Table ofContents

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v

PreIude ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1

Berlin: Challenge and Opportunity ---------------------------------------------------------------- 2

Just the Right Spot -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3

Masquerade ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 5

Digging In ------------------------------------------------------- u____________________________________ 6

1 1----------------------------------------------------._-._--------------------- 7

Completion . .. the Work Begins -----------------------------------------------------j ~K~L____ 7

Relying on a Rival ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9

Intelligence Production --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10

Some Interesting Sidelights --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11

Strategy ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12

Discovery ------------------------.-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17

A Tunnel Opens to Mixed Reviews ------------------------------------------------------------------ 17

Mole in the Tunnel? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 20

Summing Up: Reassurance... -.-------------------------------------------------------------------- 21

And Misgivings ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22

Crescendo and Decline --------------------------------------------------------------------------------.- 23

Legacy ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 24

Notes -------------------------------------------------------------------------.------------------------------- 26

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Foreword .......................... \,

(U) Operation REGAL is another vOlu1neinih:~:tecIStates Cryptologie ~~tory Special Report Series produced by the NSkHistory and Publications Division. REGAL

was the codename for the Berlin Tunnel, a U.S. intelligence community operatIon

conducted during the mid-1950s \Vhich was designed to intercept Soviet and East Ge~

C01n1nunkatio: . . . \ (U~ IbElgan research on this subject in September 1985 while on an

internship in t e History and Publications Division. Working witb N~ 7val

materials, oral interviews with key individuals, and CIA documents,ll

completed her study in late 1986. Concentrating on NSA involvemen , S e 0 ers a

number ofinteresting observations. She reveals that there was little cooperation initially

between NSA and CIA regarding the Berlin Tunnel. Although the U.S. intelligence

community at first considered REGAL a great success, the Soviets, thanks to George

Blake, certainly knew about the operation early on, but apparently did not inform the

East Germans oftheir discovery. Even the Soviet military may not have known (only the

top officials ofthe KGB), leaving the tapped lines to be accidentally uncovered by the East

Germans. It is an intriguing story, well told. And until the KGB opens its archives,

precisely what the Soviets knew and when they knew it remain a mystery.

Henry F. Schorreck

NSA Historian

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Operation REGAL

T?SCl REGAL was the codename for the Berlin Tunnel, a U.S. intelligence

community operation tUsigned to intercept Soviet and East German communications. It

involued the construction of an elaborate communications intercept center in a tunnel

running beneath West Berlin into East Berlin. The tunnel was operational from 10 May

1955 until 21 April 1956 when the East Germans discovered the operation and closed it

down. Despite its short operational period, REGAL was initially considered a great

intelligence success by U.s. offr.cials because ofthe large volume ofinformation intercepted.

There was also an initial feeling of accomplishment in carrying out such an elaborate

intelligence scheme literally untkrneath the feet ofthe Soviet and East German military.

Later developments led U.S. intelligence community analysts, however, to question the

validity of the intercepted information and its importance relative to the expense

untkrtaken in constructing the tunnel. Considered a mqior Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) operation by the American press, the National Security Agency (NSA) nevertheless

played a vital role in the project. This is a study ofNSA', involvement in REGAL.

Prelude

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Due to the increased us[e=o:f:u:lt:r:a:-h:i:h:::f:re=u=e:n:c::I:in:e:~:o:f-:S:i:h=t=r:a:d:i:oJ communications after World War II, I IleavingBf1.tis and merican 0 ICla s esperate or

information on SOviet intentions. Before the introduction of high frequency, shortwave

communications, airwaves could be monitored at great distances from the actual source

.because long, low frequency waves bend around the earth. However, the transmitting of

large volumes of communications beyond high frequency presented a problem for the

British and American analysts as these waves are basically line-of-sight. Alternate

intercept methods therefore had to be devised to fill the collection void. 3

CUll PIA's Office ofCommunications accidentally opened the way

to new intercept possibilities when he discovered a way to exploit landline messages.

SIGTOT, a Bell System Cipher machine used by the United States in global

communications, had been rejected by the U.S. government for secure communications

during World War II because of its vulnerability to intercept. To their chagrin, Bell

technicians discovered that as SIGTOT electrically encrypted a message, faint "echoes"·

of the plain text were transmitted along the wire simultaneously with the enciphered

message. Refusing to accept Bell's modifications to its 131-B2 mixer, the Army Signal

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peculiarity Corps abandOned faded intoSIGoblivion TOT asuntil a veh.l.·.C rediscover I..e f,.or:(r::e . .n eotyption. 1951. and the machine', 11

(U~ ~uspectedthatSIGTOT's vulnera ilty. w ich enabled him to tap into a

cable CIlJ'l'Yingthe enciphered message and read the plain text wi ..

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L.....r----:.;;;;..,~---.,.,.,,...sc,;;;;o;Jver:;~tte~~g acloseal1y.Jlo\<Veve~.t~~~ritish were not

\ll:Jbjlo.Oo,een y mterested in the intercept possibilities the CIA hoped to us~ innovation to e loit Soviet landlines in East Berlil'l~ m' coincidedf-w"'""i""'th"""""th""e-

~_.....................,.....,........,.....,,......,......""=",...-..,.....,......,...-=,......,----:""""="'"----:,..,....----I Ro'oVlett had joined theCIAas a

Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence.s After five years.with CIA.

Rowlett returned to NSA in 1958.

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BerUn: Challenge and Opportunity

(U) Because oIthe nature of the pre-World War II communications system. Berlin

was the central circuit of East European communications. Any calls originating in

Eastern Europe were channeled through Berlin. including all calls to Moscow.

Monitoring Berlin's communications would greatly increase the U.S. Soviet-Eastern

Europe collection effort. Berlin's telephone and telegraph system resembled a wheel. with

two concentric circles spanning East and West Berlin. Switching stations. placed at

strategic locations around the circle. directed service to each city sector via lines like the

spokes ofa wheel. The occupying officials divided the city after the war and disconnected

the telephone lines from the terminals. To tap into the East Berlin system the CIA

needed to reconnect the lines and monitor the cables.8

""tm.William King Harvey. CIA Bureau Chiefin Berlin. enthusiastically pursued the

idea of exploiting Berlin communications. Under Harvey's direction the CIA attempted

various tapping method n n h

"prime target circuit.,,10

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(U) The CIA realized that Berlin inherently posed more difficulties for the tunnelbuilders than had Vienna. The border area was under constant scrutiny from East

German guards. Without arousing undue suspicion. construction workers would have to

burrow from West Berlin under the heavily guarded border into East Berlin in order to

tap the cables.

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"($.. Never having undertaken such a project, the CIA enlisted British aid in its

development, recognizing British expertise in the "highly specialized art of vertical

tunneling."13 The trick entailed digging through soft soil without collapsing the roof.

Harvey negotiated with the British and devised the following divisions of responsibility.

The CIA was to "(1) procure a site, erect the necessary structures, and drive a tunnel to a

point beneath the target cables; (2) be responsible for the recording ofall signals produced

at·die·poiJit·where·the··'lead-away'.tapping.cableiJ..entere<l.t~e installation; and (3\\-Dlt:QC:WL.,

in 'Ou. •• All nf thp.· • . . • .•from If! "'1

Just the Right Spot

~BeforeHarvey laid out his final plansfor Washington's approval, an appropriate

site had to be selected. The tunnel had to originate in either the U.S. or U.K. zones in

Berlin, with a path in range ofthe targeted cables. The farther from the border the cable

started, the less East German curiosity would be aroused; however, a longer tunnel would

also greatly increase the amount of dirt to be excavated and disposed of. Both the

operators and the equipment required fresh air, which also set a limit on the length ofthe

tunnel because of the maximum capabilities of the air pumps. The small CIA REGAL

planning team finally decided on a spot originating in the U.S. zone where land could be

purchased to build the above-ground compound and from which the tunnel length was

feasible. Collateral information on the site was also available, identifying the target

cable plan, aerial photographs, and utility lines. Geological maps indicated that the area

was predominantly flat, with soft soil but uneven drainage. The permanent water table

was deemed to be 32 feet below ground. Because of the importance of isolating the

electronic equipment from damp areas, the supposedly low water table would aid the

engineers by eliminating requirementsfor watertight construction. 15

"f$. Armed with technical data, William Harvey returned to Washington to obtain

official approval for REGAL. He briefed CIA Director Allen Dulles, Clandestine Services

ChielFrank Wisner, and Deputy Clandestine Services Chief Richard Helms concerning

his meetings with the British and the blueprints for the tunnel's construction and

operations. Dulles approved Harvey's plans, directing, however, that "in the interest of

security as little as possible should be reduced to writing."UI The U.S. side followed

Dulles's stipulation scrupulously, but the British retained extensive notes of the

proceedings. Minutes 01 the initial meeting between Harvey and the British were kept by

an MI-6 agent, George Blake.17 However, CIA officials decided not to inform the rest of

the intelligence community ofthe project, not even NSA.

The tunnel operation got underway in 1954 with the construction of a two-story

warehouse in West Berlin over the area chosen to be one terminus of the tunnel.

Although the construction workers would not comprehend the purpose of a two-story

warehouse with a basement requiring a 12-foot ceiling, its large size was required to hold

the expected 3,000 tons of dirt excavated from 1,476 foot long, 6t foot wide tunnel. The

main floor housed the electronic equipment. 18

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Berlin. the Divided City.

The tunnel lies in the southeast corner orthe U.S. sector.

While the warehouse in West Berlin was under collsttuction, simultaneous

operations were underway in rid Richmond, Virginia. Army engineers led

by Lieutena . . ~Elririf Crops began building a test

tunnel at the 19 The ~ersion was 450

feet long and ug at a ept 0 eet, WIt ee tween the roof and ground surface.

Meanwhile, equipment for the Berlin job was assembled in Richmond. Among the

supplies were 125 tons ofsteel liner plates which when joined created the tunnel's walls.

The plates were specially treated with a protective rubber coat to sup~ress noise during

construction. The gathered supplies then went by ship I

and by train to Berlin and the completed warehouse near Altglienecke.

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The site in enlargement, detaiIJng the West Berlin suburban area from which the tunnel began.

Masquerade

(U) The East German border guards probably felt they harbored few illusions

concerning the U.S. "warehouse." The building was surrounded by two barbed wire

fences, powered by a diesel generator, equipped with a large parabolic antenna, and

staffed by the U.S. Army Signal Corps. For all intents and purposes the area appeared to

be a poorly concealed radar intercept station.

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'tm. The overall CIA concept for the area called for observer confusion. In devising

the engineering plans for the tunnel, the CIA devoted a great deal of thought to an

appropriate "c()ver"for the project. A two-tiered solution was reached. The "warehouse"

itsel1'\1Vas deemed sUfficientlyJlUlocu.0\1s to hide U.S. intentions during construction. To

obfuscateactivitv durinll the tunnel's oDerational oeriod the CIA decided to cover the site

\

(U) Americans and Germans in the western sector were also curious about the area,

and their interest was fed by a series of unusual incidents. A civilian engineer originally

heading the construction project quit after publicly protesting the need for such an

immense basement. Civilians actually constructing the building were required to wear

Army Signal Corps uniforms without explanation.22 Speculation was abundant, but little

ofsubstance was learned as the few actually cognizant of the intricacies of the operation

were not talking.

t$...By 17 August 1954, the German contractors had completed their work, and the

U.S. had possession of the compound. All supplies, shipped under disguise and strict

security, were in Berlin awaiting the start of construction. Simultaneously, a tunnel

group at the CIA's Office of Communications designed the "unique equipment" required

to process the expected telegraphic material. A great deal of care went into the selection

of components for the taps and electrical equipment. All pieces were scrupulously tested

for reliability and constructed ofthe best materials.2S

Digging In

(U) Construction of the tunnel was a laborious, time-consuming task, complicated

by surveillance and security risks. Beginning in the basement's easternmost point, the

engineers

sank a verticalahaft 18 feet in diameter to a depth of20 feet, then drove pilings halfway into the

floor ofthe ahaft. Next, a ateel rin,6tfeet in diameter and fitted with hydraulicjacka around ita

circumference waa lowered into place. Braced a,ainat the n:poaed aection of the pilings, the

rin,. or "ahield," waa fitted flush againat the tunnel'a face.u

is). Three-man shifts using picks and shovels worked on the tunnel's construction 24

hours a day. Gains were small: the team excavated two inches, shoved the shield

forward, and then repeated the process. After they had excavated an entire foot, the

engineers bolted a steel liner plate onto already bolted plates to form the tunnel wall.

They lined the tunnel with steel so that the walls would not implode due to the large

percentage of sand in the soil. 25 The plates each contained small holes which the

engineers unplugged and filled with cement to pack any space left between the dirt and

the wall. After six feet had been completed, the existing wall was secure enough to brace

the jacked-forward shield, and the engineers removed the hydraulic jacks from the

proceu.-

'lSt The tedious process was slowed because ofthe security demands placed upon the

eBlineen. A lookout kept watch around the clock to observe any signs of undue suspicion

Or CUl'6leity on the part ofthe East Germans. Whenever German guards walked over the

waft·....the team halted construction. Building plans called for as quiet an operation

U ltee1 and hydraulic jacks could allow. The U.S. team fmished the tunnel shell on 28

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February 1955, complete with a steel and concrete "anti-personnel" door on the East

Berlin side to prevent East German officialsfrom storming the tunnel upon discovery. 27

Completion••• the Work Begins

1$.The finished tunnel was 1,486 feet long, with the first halfsloping downward and

the second half sloping upward. To keep the equipment and the cables dry, the Army

engineers installed pumps on both sides and panelled the section adjoining the tap

chamber with "marine-type plywood" for insulation.sa

While the engineers completed the tunnel, CIA personnel fabricated a

contingency plan to be effected upon discovery of the tunnel by the East Germans. The

U.S. would publicly deny all knowledge of the tunnel. Secretly, the operatives were to

defend against forced entry, activate the anti-personnel door, and if necessary, demolish

the tunnel with charges mined at the border.se

REGAL became operational on 10 May 1955, and from the beginning

collected a vast amount of information. According to Colonel Russell Horton, an Army

Security Agency officer stationed in Berlin at the time, the collectors were "turning out

that stufTby the car loads."37 Another analyststated that they "used to haul three or four

mailban back from Berlin" to Frankfurt at a time for initial processing.38 I

~----::-:--:-::~--:,_,:",",::,"":"":",,__",,,,,:,," ...JI U.S. personnel monitored the

tunnel inside and out 24 hours a day.

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A Soviet photograph laken from just beyond the chamher where the land line taps were applied. Intercepted

signals were relayed w the U.S. sector through the cables shown at tbe lower right corner oftbe passageway.

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Relying on a Rival

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~ccording to CIA officials interviewed after the termination ofthe operation, the

biggest problem with the tunnel concerned the "quantity and content of the material

available from the target and the manner in which it was to be processed."" CIA officials

kept strict control over who had access to tunnel information, using the same standards as

those for Special Intelligence (SI).45 It was especially difticult to find adequately trained

linguists cleared for SI to process the traffic. The CIA tested all its personnel with any

knowledge of Russian or Getman for possible assignments as translators,4e but CIA

resources were strained to the limit. Onlv then was materiallliven to NSA linllUists

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~8-660) CIA and NSA fought over a great deal of the exehanged materfal.CIA

was reluctant to give up its jurisdiction over the intelligence and refused to release

certain information to NSA due to CIA rules and regulations concerning

compartmentation of information. NSA, on the other hand, wanted to know everything

concerning the CIA o~ration. Nielson recalled that when/he would report back to\NSA,

General Burgess and I t.vould debrief him on everything h, saw at CU\ to

ensure that NSA received all REGAL report. Two for....r NSA anaJYsta~ ~I I eadedthe CIAL Btiildirig operation and these two "smooth num.ers"

were otten '!:;Iow'to 'live" un REGAL intelligence I I

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E'f8e~ On 6 June 1955 the Washington REGAL Center nyRC) issued the first

intelligence report based on the1\. \.IThe WRC aperiodic

reports were classified "TOPSECRET REGAL" and occasionally contained the codeword

"EIDER." The Main Processing Unit in London issued aperiodic intelligence reports

under the title JMTRS. which expanded to Joint Military Translation and Reporting

Service.

The intelligence reports issued by the WRC and the.JMTRS usually contained

several unrelated items in a format similar to a weekly activity summary. Previously

reported items were often referenced as new information became available. Major topics

I I

Some Interesting Sidelights

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(':FS ceo) As stated earlier, most of NSA's involvement in the tunnel operation

occurred after the tunnel was discovered. Only James Nielson and a handful of other

high-level NSA analysts were aware of the existence of the covert CIA operation until it

was exposed. Although the CIA realized that the tunnel would be discovered eventually

and the collection operation shutdown, no one could have foreseen the circumstances that

led to its disclosure.

Discovery

(TS-CCO) On 21 April 1956, eleven months and eleven days after the U.S. first

began monitoring Soviet and East German communications, an East German repair crew

uncovered the tapped cables. Dr. Nielson recalled going to work one morning and being

told "It's all over."99 Several days of heavy rainfall had flooded the low-lying areas, and

while the pumps on the U.S. side ofthe tunnel were powerful enough to keep the electrical

equipment dry, the pumps on the East German side were not strong enough to do so,

resulting in an electrical short.1°O Between 17 and 22 April, all of the cables were

inoperable at some point.101

1St On 22 April, the telephone lines for Marshal Andrei Antonovich Grechko,

Commander, GFSG, and four of his generals, failed. A fault on cable FK150 eliminated

all communications between Moscow and East Germany. Communications for the Soviet

Air Warning Control Center also went down and Soviet Signal Troops and East German

Post and Telegraph technicians were under enormous pressure to repair the damage.

While digging to reach the cable on 22 April, the technicians uncovered the tap chamber

at about 0200 hours. The tap chamber microphone at that time picked up the

conversation and activity going on around it. Unaware of the significance of their

discovery, the technicians continued to dig, finally leaving the site at 0330 to report their

findings. It was not until 0630 that the microphone picked up the announcement that

"the cable is tapped." Soon afterwards, the East German telephone operators refused to

place any outgoing telephone calls, saying that it was against "orders.',102 The intercept

operators realized that the end was imminent.

A Tunnel Opensto Mixed Reviews

The entire chamber was uncovered and entered around 1300, when pictures and

measurements were taken. The East Germans expressed "wonder and admiration" at the

technology and ingenuity involved. The last interesting phone calls were placed in the

0800 hour, and the teletype traffic stopped at 1530 when the tap wires were cut. The

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A dose-up view of the tunnel's receiver bays and watertight casing.

The sandbags along the sides pro,,;ded sound proofing and insulation.

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microphone was dismantled at 1550, and REGAL could no longer intercept intelligence. 103

The monitors immediately halted operations and prepared for the backlash.

The Soviet reaction was totally unexpected. C.S. intelligence experts assumed

that the Soviet Union would not advertise the fact that its communications had been so

totally compromised.104 However, the commandant of the Soviet Berlin Garrison, Major

General losif Leontovich Zarenko, was away from Berlin at the time, and the Acting

Commandant, Colonel Ivan A. Kotsyuba, decided to expose U.S. "perfidy and treachery"

to world opinion. On 23 April Kotsyuba called a press conference to elucidate on U.S. spy

activity. Expressing "righteous indignation,"105 the Soviets apparently hoped to exploit

the situation to their advantage and curtail Allied activities to Berlin. lOe With the U.S.

"warehouse" looming as the obvious endpoint of the tunnel, the Soviets accused the U.S.

of tapping "important underground long-distance telephone" lines linking Berlin with

other nations. 107 They conducted official tours of the tunnel and allowed Western press

members to cross underground into West Berlin. Exploitation of this "iIIegal and

intolerable action"108 led to carnival-like enterprise on the East Berlin side, complete with

snack bar, as about 90,000 East Berlin citizens toured "the capitalist warmongers'

expensive subterranean listening post.,,109

The U.S. and West German reactions to the accusation and notorietv were

subdued and guarded. The U.S. Army denied knowledge of the tunnel but promised to

undertake an immediate investigation. 110 Little doubt existed among the press that it

was a joint U.S.-British operation - the electrical equipment found in the tunnel was

stamped "Made in England," while the tunnel pumps were determined to be of C.S.

manufacture.ll1 However, the operation amused and delighted the general public in the

West. Even Soviet technicians expressed admiration for a tap chamber that resembled

the "communications center of a battleship,',u2 and American journalists considered

ingenious its construction literally underneath the feet of the Soviet and East German

militaries. lls The Western press considered it quite an intelligence coup.

(U) The Soviet propaganda effort, undertaken in satellite countries as well as the

West following the tunnel's discovery,m appeared to backfire, giving the U.S. and the CIA

very favorable publicity. Even the later East German claim that the tunnel idea had been

originated by Eleanor Dulles, sister of the Secretary of State and at the time Special

Assistant to the Director ofthe Department of State's Office of German AtTairs,l15 failed to

elicit sympathy. The press and the general public assumed that Soviet and f~ast German

communications had been compromised for almost a year without detection.

(8 eeO) Although the uncovering of the tunnel had come about sooner than

expected by Western intelligence officials, they considered the East German discovery

"purely fortuitous"u8 and the unpredictable result of poor weather and bad luck. The

failed cable had been known to be in poor condition, and the British had therefore delayed

activating the tap until 2 August 1955, more than two months later than the other two

taps.117 Howe"ero , pinions soon began to emerge as to the reasons behind the

premature demis' '. ···Privately··some··{J;S;··officials··believed··that··orilj"a"senior

official could have e REGAL operation at such an early time. Frank Rowlett

felt that the Soviets "very clumsily put on an act of discovery."ll6 However, no hard

evidence was obtained until the 1961 revelation of the Soviet spy activities of MI-6 agent

George Blake, the very official who had taken such careful notes in the British-American

discussions concerning the tunnel.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)-P.L.86-36

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

19

I'IJdt5L! 'ib\: e6MHi'f €IIArH,FlbS9tlc'!

T9PSECRET
DOCID: 3962741

UNCLASSIFIED

George Blake. a Soviet double agent within British Intelligence (MI·6).

had intimate knowledge orOperation REGAL.

Mole in the Tunnel?

(U) Born the son of an Egyptian Jew in Rotterdam, George Blake escaped from the

Netherlands to Spain on a forged passport during World War II. From Spain he went to

Britain where he joined the British Navy and served heroically with ~aval Intelligence

during the war. Initially recruited by the British Secret Service in 1944, Blake studied

Russian at Cambridge in 1947 and was appointed a Vice-Consul with the British Foreign

Service the following year. Assigned to Seoul in 1948, Blake. along with the other British

Embassy officials. was captured by North Korean Communists in 1950. It may have been

during his three years of incarcerlltion that Blake's political opinions were influenced to

such an extent that he volunteered to work for the Soviets. Released in April 1953, Blake

rejoined British intelligence as an MI-6 secret agent in 1954. 119 The fact that his cousin

Henri Curiel was one of the founding members of the Egyptian Communist Party was

UNCLASSIFIED 20
DOCID: 3962741

"Fep SEERE"F l:JMBRA

apparently not taken into account in his appointment. When arrested in 1961 after being

unmasked by a Polish defector, Blake pled guilty to the espionage charges, saying that

since 1953 he had given every important document with which he came in contact to his

Soviet contact. 120 Charged with "communicating information that might be directly or

indirectly useful to an enemy power"121 and three violations of the Official Secrets Act,122

Blake was sentenced to the maximum 42 years in prison because of his determination "to

wreak maximum vengeance" on Britain and its allies. ::.13

t'fS-OOOl Officially, the U.S. reacted rather calmly to the news of Blake's spy

activities. The Department of State held a press conference to state that Blake had

apparently not compromised any U.S. secrets. L24 t:nofficially, however, there was a great

deal of consternation among the officials involved with the tunnel operation. Frank

Rowlett remembered Blake's presence at a U.S.-British meeting on tunnel details in

Britain in 1951 and believed that Blake ..was..w.....e......ll.•war: OfW:t we w~e doing" and must

have passed the information on to the Soviets.125 I ICIA's Office of

Communications said that Blake "kfl~:wevery detail of t e tunne operation. 1:.16 In

retros ect the CIA realized that Bla.ke had a arentl also reviousl com romised the

American intelligence now had to "----"""'T-:---:"lr--:~--r-~:T"""""'"'---.r"""':"'""'T""""'T"""'T......-T"'9'I"I"l":"'AL to operate for almost a yearl28 in

or er 0 oro ec elr va ua e source 10 rl t 11' 1:.19 IS In e 12'ence.

b)(1 )

b)(3)

GA

CIA

I I

Summing Up: a....urance... ........

I I

(

(

o

b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

21 Tap SECRET UMB~
DOCID: 3962741

) (1)

(3)-50 USC 403

( (3)-18 USC 798

(b) )-P.L. 86-36

.0P S!ERET YMIRA

(b)(1 )

(b){3)

OGA

CIA

(b)(1)

(b)(3)-P.L.86-36

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

Ie. concentrate on spec IC, tec mca I ormahoniJa.lfi~ rom

intercept, REGAL satisfied other obj~ctivesfol"theCIATheCIAcaIJedR..n,r"'lr'T""""::"a-....I

"unique sourceofc\jrrelltinteUigence of a kind and quality which hil9not been available

since 1948;" and the primary source on Soviet intentions in E\lrope.1S6 In the political

sphere, REGAL informed the U.S. and Uk:I.iet de~igrts for Berlin and the "true

story"behiridoffidallyreportedactivityilltefcept also established that the

Soviets were determined to maintain t elr sp ere of influence vis-a-vis the other

occupying powers in Berlin, despite East ~rmanattempts atsovereignty. 137

"i&.. REGAL intercept/aHowed ttieUnited States to notify its representatives at the

1955 Foreign Ministers Conferellce in Geneva that the Soviets had decided to establish an

East German Arllly,andtbeREGAL account of the attempted implementation of the

Soviet 20th Party Congress decisions indicated that dissent among Soviet nuclear

scientists,afous~dbythe denunciation of Stalin and the era of collective leadership, was

being suppressed. The intercept also followed Marshal Georgiy Konstantonovich

Zhtikov"sd w 11 s h at m t r h w r f vi rm F r r i

officers.1SS

... And Misgivings

t'fSC' After George Blake's conviction, the question of the validity of REGAl.

intelligence was combined with doubts concerning its intelligence value. American

intelligence officials could not ignore the possibility of a massive disinformation

campaign mounted by the Soviets. Although they determined that it was highly unlikely

that the Soviets and East Germans had the time, funds, and inclination to undertake such

an immense effort,140 speculation continued on possible precautionary measures the

Soviets may have taken. Because the evidence presented at Blake's trial was never made

public, it is not known when (and/or whether) he actually informed the Soviets about the

tunnel. To protect himself, Blake may have delayed presenting the information, realizing

that he might be suspected if the Soviets "discovered" the tunnel immediately upon its

leI' 'ECREll::lMBRA 22
DOCID: 3962741

'f8P SEERE'f tJM11tA

becoming operational. On the other hand, the Soviets themselves may have deliberately

postponed exposing REGAL in order to protect Blake.

('fS-660~ The cause ofREGAL's exposure has not been, and probably never will be,

ascertained. Frank Rowlett believed that the Soviets deliberately exposed the tunnel on

21 April 1956 for their own unknown reasons. At the time, the CIA determined that it

was the unpredictable result of bad luck. Perhaps only a few Soviet officials and George

Blake ever knew for sure. However, the presence of bad weather, flooded cables, and

electrical shorts are indisputable facts. Despite Soviet knowledge of the intercept

operation and unanswered questions concerning the validity ofthe information, it is very

probable that REGAL's exposure was the unexpected result of poor weather rather than

any deliberate Soviet initiative. To understand possible Soviet motives concerning the

tunnel, the two types of monitored communications - telephone and teleprinter wires -

must be examined se aratel .

Based on the confused GSFG reaction to the tunnel discovery, the CIA concluded

that the East Germans happened upon REGAL by chance. Subsequent revelations about

Blake did not provide sufficient evidence to refute this determination. If Blake did

disclose REGAL, it seems he'd have no problem providing sufficient information for the

Soviets to find the approximate location.

Crescendo and Decline

T e combined U.S.-U.K. effort, when viewed in terms of sheer volume, was a

clear success. TheDJ:Ilo?itored cables "containedDetallic pairs capable of

b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 23 19p '&CAEl YMBAA

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

OGA

CIA
DOCID: 3962741

"'(b)(1)

(b)(3)

OGA

TOP SI!C:RI!T tlMBIb\ CIA

(b)(1:;

(b)(3)

OGA

CIA

transmitting a tot~lofa,pl>~~ximat~lylleolllmunication channels," with up tOn

use ataIlyonetiIIl(!.141On the averag~monitorsrecordec:r--lelegraphic circuits and

r-lvoice cir~uits continuously, resulting in abou~ ~eets'ot magnetic tape totaling ~Ot()ns.142

-tSt- The personnel who processed REGAL material were spread out among several

0.rganiza.tiQlls.....M:f»lJ.in..1.(m9QI'l..Elmploye4:Jpersons,who,transcribe~viet two-

(b)(f)"""""hourY()il:e'r~l1>c()lltain.in~ """ '" """,~conversations;MPUprocessed~~~:~ell (b)(3) German voice reels received, fully transcribingI Iconversations. Many

OGA transcribers remained with the organization after it became the London Processing Group

CIA (LPG), working under James ~ielson when he served as the first U.S. LPG Deputy

Branch Chief. 144

In Washillgton,Deople at~~lJPl"ocessedllsix-hourSoviet teletype

reels~n~1 Isix-ho~r(}erTllanteletypereels. Some~r~els~8.~asTllanyasD ~eparate circllitswhich used tirne-dillisiolllJlllltiplexingtoereate additional circuits. The

~I.t\sta.tion~dasmaHerewoftwo to four persons in Berlin for immediate monitoring of

crucial intelligence and maintaining security. 145 The number of NSA employees included

in the TPli figures has been impossible to ascertain as NSA was not mentioned in the

official CIA history of REGAL. The exact number of NSA analysts, supervisors, and

clerical workers processing REGAL material is also unknown because the numbers

changed monthly due to varying requirements and part-time personnel. GENS-14 kept

thorough records of NSA REGAL personnel in the beginning of the operation, but less

inclusive documentation as time progressed. As of December 1956 REGAL processing

employed aboutr--NSA personnel either at AHS or Fort Meade. 148

Ibl Ii 1

IbI131-P.L. 86-36

Legacy

lQ){ll

Ibl1:31-5QU,';C403

I b 1 131,'1.8 USC 798.

I b 1 I 3 1- p,L 86 - 3 6

lTset-Operation REGAL involved various intelligence community members - CIA,

~SA, Army, and GCHQ - between its planning stage in the early 19508 and the end of

REGAL intercept processing in 1958. Vast amounts of information of varying degrees of

intelligence interest were intercepted. ~umerous engineers, monitors, processors,

analY!3ts, managers. and linguists aided the ostentatious and expensive effort In

retrospect; I I

I I As .1

result - or, perhaps, as a weak justification for an expensive and not overwhelmingly

successful undertaking - the CIA asserts that REGAL's most valuable legacy was not the

intelligence derived, but the morale boost it gave the U.S. intelligence community at the

expense of the Soviet Cnion and the sense of security inherent in the realization that

Europe could not be the subject of a Soviet attack without l".S. foreknowledge.

(tps-oom ~SA's motives for its REGAL participation distinguished it from CIA,

and its goals and expectations were correspondingly distinct. ~SA did not receive

accolades for its part in the operation for several reasons. It was the CIA which

ingeniously engineered and constructed the tunnel and equipment, while NSA officially

24
DOCID: 3962741

TO'SEERET

(b) (1)

(b) (3)

OGA

CIA

included only about a dozen individuals in the actual covert intercept operation. NSA

conducted its endeavors predominantly in the 18 months following the intercept

shutdown, by which time the tunnel's color and appeal had waned. CIA operatives

deserved credit for their glamorous operation, despite REGAL's probable exposure by

Blake. NSA did not want public recognition, but wanted instead what the agency

believed was more valuable - its acceptance by G.S. intelligence community members as a

viable and equal contributor to the intelligence effort. There was a great deal of

competition between the CIA and NSA at the time, and NSA, as the less established ofthe

two, felt compelled to prove its worth. REGAL provided an opportunity CIA, unable to

process REGAL material adequately, reluctantly recruited NSA assistance, thereby

formally reco..~. jzjDg NjA analytic skills. Consequently, in addition to the intelligence it

obtainedfrOin NSA benefited immeasurably from its collaboration on the

REGAL effort with the CIA and GCHQ because of the contacts made, the official

exchanges, and the respect extended by the other collaborators for the NSA effort.

(b) (1)

(b) (3) -50 USC 403

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

25

Ih\NBLI!! YIA €aMmy€UMmPHJ6am::

T9PSEERE'f
DOCID: 3962741

SECRET

SOTES

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b.)(3)-SO USC 403

(b)\(3)-P.L. 86-36

1. I{JJI ~rank Rowlett. "The Berlin Tunnel Operation: 1952-1956," 24 June 1969,

~landestineservices History, Ffo. ISO, CIA. IS)

2 I..U.I David c~rtJn, WilderMIS ofMirrors INew York: Harper and Row, Publishers,1980), p. 73. lUI

3. lUll .JRowlett, "Tunnel."ISI

4. lUi Martin, i derMSs, p. 74. lUI

5. lUi Martin, WilderMSS, p. 74. lUI

6. lUI Martin, Wildernes" p. 74. Il:'

7. lUI Martin, WilderMIS, p. 74. lUI

8. IU) Interview Philip Dibben, 10 May 1985 by Robert D. Farley, OH 09-85, NSA. ITSC SENSlLIMDlS)

9. lUI Martin, WilderMSS, p. 75. (til

10.(1]1 ~wlett, "TunneL" ,SI

11. (l; !Rowlett, "Tunnel." lSI

12. IV> Martin, Wilderne88, p. 76. 'l"l

13. IU) Martin, Wilderness, p. 76. lUI

14;fllj twwlett, "Tunnel." lSI

15. IU1 Jtowlett, "Tunnel." ,SI

16. IU) Martin, WilderfUlss, p. 78. Il:l

17. lUI E. H. Cookridge, The Many Sides of George Blake Esq.: The Complete Dossier (Princeton:

'

B.',ra"ndlDlSvstems prpt,lnc., 19701 p. 158; Martin, p. 100. IU) 18. IU wlett, "Tunnel." ,S)

19.IU wlett, "Tunnel." lSI

2.0. It;') Martin, Wilderness, p. 79. IV>

2LIl"J! Rowlett, "Tunnel."(5)

22. fl")I"WoDderfll! T'\rmel," Time, 17 May 1956)67:42. Ill)

23. lUI JRowlett, "Tunnel." lSI

24. (l:) :B~n :rne18,p.80.1U) 25. unl IRowlett, "Tunnel." IS) ~6;CU) amn, rneB8, p. 80. (\j)

.

2.7. 'till IRowlett, "TunneJ."IS,

28.fU! IRowlett, "Tunnel." (8)

29. CUI Martin, Wilderness, p. 82. Ill)

30.1U) The U.S. intelligence community obtained order of battle information during the tunnel construction

through the close watch kept on the highway: analysts were able to ascertain the relative importance ofvisitors

to East Berlin by the security measures implemented between the airport and the city.

3Ltml IRowlett, "Tunnel."IS)

32. (\j) Marlm, Wdderness, p. 83. lUl

33.IUD'M18,p.83.1U1 34.~U wlett, "Tunnel." (S)

35. III wlett, "Tunnel." IS)

36. IU wlett, "Tunnel." (S)

37. IU) Interview Colonel Russel Horton, 24 March 1982,8 April 1982, 23 Apri11982 by Robert D..Flirley, OH

06-82, NSA. ITSC)

38. IU) Dibben intervil!w, OH 09-85. ITSC SENSlLIMDIS) ,...

39. (0) Interview Dr. James R. Nielson, 21 July 1986 by Robert D. FarleOH. 20-86,

NSA. (TS-CCOI

..... 40. IU~·terview,OH06-82.ITSCI ".

'. '" "'4C(U) ········ ntercept:~eCablesin East Berlin," 1 April 1957,Series VI, 1.3.5, Historical Colletti·on,

NSA. erem r cited as'L-..Jlntercept." ITSC)

4 I M in Wi r 8 . 84.n:1

(b){1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b)(3)-P.L.86-36

CIA

(SICl)

(b) (3)

OGA

CIA

"(il;l)t1 )

(biNI

OGA

"'lll,i~~;~~~~~~~~~;;;;""

(b)(1}

(b)(3)

OGA

CIA

44dU

45;(U~!l:p~ec=:I'='ar-l!"::nT:"l~lg·encerefers to a category of sensitive compartmented information requiring special

controlsfor restricted handling within compartmented intelligence systems and for which compartmentation is

established. Compartmentation is a formal system of restricted acce88 to intelligence activities, such systems

established by and/or managed under the cognizance of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect the

sel1sitive as ect ofsources, methods, and analytical procedures offoreign intelligence programs.

46. (U wlett, "Tunnel." IS)

47. lUI Ie n interview, OH 20-86. ITS-CCO)

SEERET 26

IIANQI>.S VIA E3SMUff Slh\NNBLS SUM"
DOCID: 3962741

SECRET

(b) (1)

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

," (b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

"jb) (1)

0j:J) (3)

O@;A

CIA

48. (U) Nielson interview, OH 20-86.ITS-CCOI

49. CU) Nielson interview. OH 20-86.ITS-CCOI

50. (U) Nielson interview, OH 20-86. CTS-CCOI

51. (UI Nielson interview, OH 20-86. CTS-CCOI

52. <UQWilderM'IJ, p. 84. (UI

53. (U Illtercept." (TSC)

54. (U n rvlewJanel!:~Dunn,29June 1981 by RobertD. FarleY,OH 05-81,NSA. (TSC" I 55~./CU) GENS was one offour major operational divisions of NSA's Production Organization; it combined later

w.ith ADVA(Advanced Soviet) into~ Group.

56. (U) Nielson interview, OH 20-86.lTS-,CCOI

57. (U) Nielson interview, OH 20-86. ITs-ceo I

58. cU) Interview Dr. James R. Nielson, 14 May19~0 by Robert D. Farle)' and Henry Schorreck, OH 18·80.

NSA. CS-CCO)

59. ~X~.D,nDn iDjrVie:,~H 05-81. ITSCI .

~~:~~e:ween~~~e~~~I;~~~(;IA.laUnChed several hundre~~~li\.l.tnbIlJloonsequipped with observation

.cameras for travel over Eastern EuropeandJ;he~vietUnion. Although several balluons produced valuable

information, many more fell or were shot down over the Soyiet l;'nion, triggering official.,rotests to Washington

and alienating President Eisenhower. See Donald E. Welzenbach...Ob!lf!fvatio..n.....B....a...I..I.O.....onsan~~e...c...o...n.naissance

Satellites," Studies in Intelligence cSpring 1986) 30:21-28. IS)

62. (U) Washington REGAL Center Intelligence Report. 28 May 1956. Cryptologic ArchivalHoldingArea,

NSA.ITSC)

~::~~~~:;~:;i.~(~~)86. (TSCI

~~: ~m·Ui6~~~~:~~~~~!85.I~SE~SlLI~~ISI 67. (UI Nielson interview, OH 20-86. (TS-CCOI

68. (UI GENS-I43 Monthly Oijal::a.ti·IlD..SWDDl.a.cr....I.1.L1.f 1956. Accession Number 10243. CryptolC/g"ic Archival

Holding Area. NSA. (TS EIDE

69. (U) GENS-143 Monthly Op:e:!:ra=l::;n:""l:!:u':':m~m=r::::-T':':u=us·t 1956~Accession ~umber 10243, Crypl.ologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA. (TS ElDE

70. (U) GEfliS-143 Monthly O;.jR""e"'r""'u""o""'n.....""um=m""'a=....,.,u""-- 1956, Accessi()nN\lmberl0243.Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA. CTS ElDE ..................................................//

71. (UI GENS-I43 Monthly Operation umma mb r 1956. Accession.Numberl0243~CrYPttl19gjc

Archival Holding Area. NSA. (TSEIDE//''''"(b) (1)

J:~I~Y~~~~;~A~~~rD~~[B~iQnS"mm8ry~!!17rt1956.A.CCE!Sfilio~~~lllberlO~43.CryPtologiC Archival (b) (3) - P . L . 86- 36

73. (UI GENS-14 Monthly Opera 1 n S mm r U tob r 1956.,A.ccessionNumber 10243, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA.ITS EIDE -1i:mi:[sWiiiiiiiiLa:::JJi:liil~ 74. (UI GENS-14 Monthly Ope! r 1956,Acce,9llion Number 10243, Cryptologic Holding

Archival Area, ~SA. (TS EIDE:l1iIi:iiii::siiiiiiiiiiii:6:ii~ 75.lU) GENS-143 Monthly O~ t UJ56,.J\:ccession ~umber 10243, Cryptologir Archival

Holding Area, NSA. (TS EIDE'_-~Wiii:Siiiiiiiiii:ti::1JijWi~ 76. (UI GENS-14 Monthly Oper, er1956,A!=cessionNumber 10243,Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA. (TS EIDE

l~~~~al ~:~~~~r:~~t~~(:;.lTS~p~eE~r~~~~1~~nRf~~um=~m~a--:~,...,.,.-Ptembetll~6.~ccesSion:UrnllE!rl0243,Cryptologic

78. (UI Nielson interview, OH 20-86. ITS:"'CT'C....O")-..~>----... .79. (U) Nielson interview, OH 20-86. cTS-CCQ)

80 (l!) GENS-14 Mo~!t~ OperationSummarv,January 1957. AcCeSSiOnN'UJnberl0243.u(;ryptoIO.J~.i.•.c.•.•.•.Al'ch.i.•. V.~~!'" Holding Area, NSA. rfsq _ J>(b) (1)

81•. CU) Nielson interview, OH20-86. ITS-CCOI (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

82.\(U) GENS-14 Monthl r' n m March 1957. Accession Num!:lerl0243, Cryptglogic Archival

Holding Area, NSA. (

Sa. (tT) GENS-44 Montb'J\pri.U957,Accession :'-iumberl0243~CryptologicArchival

".Old.!~ Ar:NSAdT . 84

85~..(JJ)

(Ul

GE U

lntercep

MonthlyOperational

.//

Summary, April 1957. Acce,9llionNumber 10243, Cryptologic Archival

Hol~.'. Area, NSA.. ;G-ENS-44 ~jhly Operational Summ~r)',MIl:Y1957, Accession Number 10243,Cryptologic

Arcbt::Ji'Area, NSA. (!~ I

86. ( ntercept." (TSC) -------

87. (U Monthly Operational Summary, May 1957, Accession Number 10243. Cryptologic Archival

Holdillg Area, NSA. )

88. CU) vietREGALSummaries~IFebruary1957;ITSCJ

89. (U) wlett. "Tunnel." (S)

90. (U onthly Operational Summary. September 1957, Accession Number 10243. Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, NSA. (TSC)

91. (U) Nielson interview, OH 20-86. (TS-CCOI

27 SECRET
(b) (3) - P . L. 86- 3 6

DOCID:

(blHI

(bl (31

OGA

(bTlH

(b) (3)

OGA

3962741

92. IUl GEl'iS·44 ~onthly OperationaJ Summary, November 1957, ACC8S8ion Number 10243, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, NSA. (TSCI

93. IU) GENS-44 Monthly Operational Summary, December 1957, Accession Number 10243, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, NSA.ITSCI

94. (U) GENS-44 Monthly Operational Summary, January 1958, Accession Number 10243, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, NSA. cTSCI

95. (U) One channel day represented a continuous piece of hard copy containing the traffic transmitted in one

direction on one circuitfor a 24-hour period.

96. (UI GENS-44 Monthly Operational Summary, December 1957, Accession Number 10243, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, NSA. (TSCI

97. lUI GENS-44 Monthly Operational Summary, April 1958, Accession Number 10243, Cryptologic Archival

holding Area, NSA. (TSCI

98. CUI GENS-44 Monthly Operational Summary, June 1958, Accession Number 10243, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA. (TSC)

99. CU) Nielson interview, 01-1 20·86. ITS-CeOI

100.IUID'.' w,OH09-85.ITSCSENSlL1MDlS) 101~CU) wlett, ~Tunnel," Appendix A: Discouery by tM Souiets ofPBJOINTLY. CSI

102. Cm wlett, ~Tunnel," Appendix A. lSI

103. lUI wlett, ~Tunnel," Appendix A. lSI

104. IGI ,artin, I rness, p. 87. cGJ

105. IGI ~Great Berlin Tunnel Mystery," Life,(7 May 19561 40:48. IU)

106. IU) Walter Sullivan, "Russians Say U.S. Taps BerJin Wire: They Show Tunnel Allegedly Dug from Westto

Listen inon Eastern Phones," The New York Times, 124 April 19561 1:5.CU)

107. IU) "East Germans File a Wiretap Protest," The New York Times, 126 April 1956) 1:5.'UJ

108. lUI SuJlivan, "Russians."CUJ

109. tV) Cookridge, Gl'orgeBlake, p. 158.CU)

110. CU) Walter SuJlivan, "u.S. Investigates Wiretap Tunnel: Aides in Berlin Say They Are Looking into Soviet

Charge ofPhone Espionage," The New York Times, (25 April 19561 8:3. ~UJ

111.~ccording to an NSA engineerustationeduinElerlil1uQ.Uhetimel I LSeeulnte.....r.~ie~tumumum 117 JuJy 1986 by Robert D,:~~I~YU~~dUih~III~~JOhn;n,()nl~_lftj, NSA.il I

112. (l;ISuJlivan,"RWIsians." (L"I

113~CUJ Martin, Wilderness, p. 87. lUI

114. cUl "Reds Play t:p Berlin Tunnel," TM New YorkJ'imes;C29 April 19561 29:3.ml

115. m I "Reds Blame DuJles' Sister," Th:e N'ewYotk Times, (11 May 19561 2:6 (UJ

116. cUI Martin. Wilderness,p.S7.CU)

117. CUll ~wlett, "Tunnel."cSJ

118. (ul InterView hank B. Rowlett, 14 May 1985, by Robert D. Farley, Henry Schorreck, and Gerald K.

Haines,OH 10-85, NSA. cS-CCO)

119. (UI Cookridge, George Blaie. CUI

120. 11:1 Seth S. King, "Briton Sentenced as Spy for Soviet," TMNew York Times, 14 May 19611 1:8.IU)

121. cm "Ex·British Aide Held on Security Charge," The New York Times, 119 April 1961 I 16:6. lUI

122. IU) "Briton Accw;ed as Spy," TM New York Times, .25 April 196U3:6.lU)

123. lUI Martin, Wilderness, p. 100. George Blake served time in Wormwood Scrubs Prison. Although

originally pJaced on the escape list and allocated a special security cell, the "model prisoner" was removed from

this list in October 1961. He escaped from prison on 22 October 1966 with the help of fellow prisoner Sean

Alphonsus Bourke ofthe Irish Republican Army. They arri\"ed in Moscow several weeks later, where Blake was

awarded the Order ofl.enin. For more information see Sean Bourke, TM Springing ofGeorge Blake CNew York:

The Viking Press, Inc., 1970', and E, H. Cookridge, The Many Sides of George Blake Esq. CPrinceton:

BrandonJSystems Press, Inc., 1970l.lU'

124. lUI "Spy Had So U.S. Data," The New York Times.c6 M'ay 196U22:6.cUI

125. Cm Rowlettinterview,OH 10-85.18-CCOI

126. (UI Martin, Wilderness, p. 100. According to Sean Bourke, Blake boasted that "the KGB knew about the

tunnel before the first spadeful of earth was dug out ofthe ground. I saw to that." See Bourke, The Springing of

Qeorge Blake, p. 275. This account has not been substantiated. (L')

L~IM='p 101.lLl

ISee nterview,OH 19-86. cTS)

129. (0) Of perhaps minor significance to the compromise of the tunneJ was the presence of Kim Philby who

defected in 1963, confirming his involvement in spy activities first suspected in 1951 with the defe.ctions of

Donald MacJean alld Guy Burgess. Philby had been the ~I-6 representative in Washington in 1949, Serving as a

liaison between the U.S: and U.K,intelligence organizations. Although he remained in British intelligence until

1963, he was under sufficient suspicion tolimitltis...a.....c... c.eC'nsensitive materials. Alth..O....Ugh it is quite probable that he had some knowledge of the existence ia official or unofficial channels, he did not

mention the Berlin tunnel in the autobiography: he later pu IS e from Moscow. (UI

(bl (1 I

(bl (31

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CIA

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(b) (3) -50 USC 403

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DOCID: 3962741

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J iew, 01120-86. as-ceo>

j Rowlett, "Tunnel." IS)

) t.E:"S-143 Munthlv () erAti"nal !':ummApl Oecember 1956, Ac(·p.ssion :'Il"umber 1024~.

I:JO. lUI Dibben interview,OH 09-85. <TSC SENSfI..lMDlS>

13\. I v) Allen Dullt's, The Craft o(lntelligence (New York: Harper and How. Publi~hers, 19631, pp. 206-7. (l'l

132. (V 1 ~ieISl>n intervit'w, on 20-86. ITS·CeO)

133. ct;l Martin.lVilckrness, p. 88. lU>

134. II.:' . terview,OH20-86.ITS-CCOI

13S;tt: ntercepL" (TSC>

136.JU lwlett, "Tunnel," Appendix B: Recapitulatinn Il(the lnteLligence Deriz:ed.ISl

137. IU> uwlett, "Tunnel," ApPl'ndix B: Recapitulation o(the Intelligence DeriL'ed. lSI

138. Ie Ie, I ater obtained additional inlhrmation concerning Zhukov's fall from power frum OleK

I'enko\'skiy. a Soviet defector who had served all a high-ranking member of Soviet military intelligel1t:l". See

OI~g I'enkovskiy. The PenkolJskzy Papers. trans. Peter Deriabin, with an introduction by \>'rank Gibney 1:--;ew

York:.B

139. cV

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29 eONFIBENllAl