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 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD

 

 Workshop Regarding Surveillance Programs

 Operated Pursuant to Section 215 of the USA 

 PATRIOT Act and Section 702 of the Foreign 

 Intelligence Surveillance Act

 

 July 9, 2013

 

 

The workshop was held at the Renaissance Mayflower 

Hotel, 1127 Connecticut Avenue NW, Washington, 

D.C. 20036 commencing at 9:30 a.m.

 

 

 

Reported by: Lynne Livingston
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1 BOARD MEMBERS

2

3 David Medine, Chairman

4 Rachel Brand

5 Patricia Wald

6 James Dempsey

7 Elizabeth Collins Cook

8

9 PANEL I

10 Legal/Constitutional Perspective

11 Steven Bradbury, formerly DOJ Office of Legal 

12 Counsel

13 Jameel Jaffer, ACLU

14 Kate Martin, Center for National Security Studies

15 Hon. James Robertson, Ret., formerly District 

16 Court and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

17 Kenneth Wainstein, formerly DOJ National Security 

18 Division/White House Homeland Security Advisor

19

20 

21 

22 
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1 PANEL II

2 Role of Technology

3 Steven Bellovin, Columbia University Computer 

4 Science Department

5 Marc Rotenberg, Electronic Privacy Information 

6 Center

7 Ashkan Soltani, Independent Researcher and 

8 Consultant

9 Daniel Weitzner, MIT Computer Science and 

10 Artificial Intelligence Lab

11

12 PANEL III

13 Policy Perspective

14 James Baker, Formerly DOJ Office of Intelligence 

15 and Policy Review

16 Michael Davidson, Formerly Senate Legal Counsel

17 Sharon Bradford Franklin, The Constitution Project

18 Elizabeth Goitein, Brennan Center for Justice

19 Greg Nojeim, Center for Democracy and Technology

20 Nathan Sales, George Mason School of Law

21

22 
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1 PROCEEDINGS

2 MR. MEDINE: Good morning, and welcome to 

3 the third public meeting held by the Privacy and 

4 Civil Liberties Oversight Board.

5 I want to first introduce my fellow board 

6 members Rachel Brand, Pat Wald, Beth Cook and Jim 

7 Dempsey. 

8 PCLOB, as we are often known, is an 

9 independent bipartisan agency within the Executive 

10 Branch. We were recommended by the 9/11 

11 Commission and created by Congress. 

12 The board's primary missions are to 

13 review and analyze actions by the Executive Branch 

14 to protect the nation from terrorism and ensuring 

15 the need for such actions is balanced with the 

16 need to protect privacy and civil liberties and to 

17 ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately 

18 considered in the development and implementation 

19 of laws, regulation and policies related to 

20 protect the nation from terrorism.

21 Essentially PCLOB is both an advisory and 

22 it has an advisory and oversight role with respect 
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1 to our country's counterterrorism efforts.

2 I wanted to thank our many panelists 

3 throughout the day for agreeing to participate in 

4 this workshop and share their views about these 

5 important programs with the board. 

6 I also wanted to thank Sue Reingold, the 

7 board's chief administrative officer and Diane 

8 Janosek, our chief legal officer for their 

9 tireless efforts in making this event possible.

10 Our focus today will be two federal 

11 counterterrorism programs, the Section 215 program 

12 under the USA PATRIOT Act and the Section 702 

13 program under the FISA Amendments Act. 

14 The purpose of the workshop is to foster 

15 a public discussion of legal, constitutional and 

16 policy issues relating to these programs. PCLOB 

17 has agreed to provide the President and Congress a 

18 public report on these two programs, along with 

19 any recommendations it may have. 

20 A few ground rules for today's workshop, 

21 we expect that the discussion will be based on 

22 unclassified or declassified information. 
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1 However, some of the discussion will inevitably 

2 touch on leaked classified documents or media 

3 reports of classified information.

4 In order to promote a robust discussion 

5 speakers may choose to reference these classified 

6 documents or information but they should keep in 

7 mind that in some cases these documents still 

8 remain classified, therefore while discussing them 

9 speakers in a position to do so are urged to avoid 

10 confirming the validity of the documents or 

11 information.

12 There will be three panels today. The 

13 first will focus on legal issues, the second on 

14 technical aspects, and the third on policy. 

15 After the first panel we will be taking a 

16 lunch break. Two board members will moderate each 

17 panel and will pose questions and additional board 

18 members may have follow-up questions. 

19 Panelists are urged to keep their 

20 responses brief to permit the greatest possible 

21 exchange of views. 

22 At the end of the day there will be some 
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1 time for members of the audience to make 

2 statements about these two programs. 

3 This workshop is being recorded and a 

4 transcript will be posted on what we hope will be 

5 PCLOB's website active this evening, and as well 

6 as on regulations.gov.

7 Those who wish to submit written comments 

8 about these issues are welcome to do so, and 

9 comments may be submitted at regulations.gov or by 

10 mail until August 1st. 

11 I want to start by level setting the 

12 discussion. My description that follows of the 

13 two programs is based on information that's been 

14 publicly disclosed by the federal government. It 

15 should not be interpreted as saying new about 

16 these programs. It's merely a summary of the 

17 unclassified remarks by federal government 

18 officials.

19 PCLOB has not come to any conclusions 

20 regarding the accuracy or completeness of this 

21 information or the two programs' legal 

22 justification.
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1 There are a couple of things in common 

2 between the two programs. Both are designed, 

3 among other things, to identify terrorists and if 

4 possible prevent terrorist plots. Both require 

5 orders from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

6 Court, but the criteria for such orders may differ 

7 for each program. 

8 In both it's possible that even with the 

9 best intentions the government may end up 

10 collecting or accessing information beyond what 

11 was authorized leading to questions about how such 

12 information should be handled. 

13 And of course both programs have been the 

14 subject of leaks by Mr. Snowden. 

15 In terms of the specific programs, the 

16 first is based on Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT 

17 Act, which was reauthorized by Congress in 2011. 

18 Sometimes this is referred to as the 215 Business 

19 Records Collection Program. 

20 One of the things the government collects 

21 under 215 is telephone metadata pursuant to court 

22 order authorized by the Foreign Intelligence 
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1 Surveillance Act under a provision that allows the 

2 government to obtain business records for 

3 intelligence and counterterrorism purposes. 

4 The government's argued that the 

5 collection of this information must be broad in 

6 scope because more narrow collection would limit 

7 the government's ability to screen for a identify 

8 terrorism-related communications. 

9 The metadata that's been collected 

10 describes telephone calls such as the telephone 

11 number making the call, the telephone number 

12 dialed, the date and time the call was made and 

13 the length of the call.

14 The government takes the position that 

15 these are considered business records of the 

16 telephone companies. 

17 This program does not collect the 

18 contents of any communications, nor the identity 

19 of the persons involved with the communication. 

20 Intelligence community representatives have stated 

21 that cell phone location information is not 

22 collected, such as GPS or cell tower information.
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1 In approving the program, the FISA Court 

2 has issued two orders. One order, which is the 

3 type of order that was leaked, is an order to the 

4 telephone providers directing them to turn 

5 information over to the government. 

6 It's been asserted that the other order 

7 spells out the limitations what the government can 

8 do with the information after it's been collected, 

9 who has access to it and for what purpose it can 

10 be accessed and how long it can be retained.

11 Court orders must be issued every 90 days 

12 for the program to continue. 

13 Concerns have been raised that once large 

14 quantities of metadata about telephone calls have 

15 been collected it could be subjected to 

16 sophisticated analysis to drive information that 

17 could not otherwise be determined. 

18 This type of analysis is not permitted 

19 under this program. Instead the metadata can only 

20 be queried when there is a reasonable suspicion 

21 that a particular telephone number is associated 

22 with specified foreign terrorist organizations. 
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1 Even then the only purpose for which the data can 

2 be queried is to identify contacts.

3 In other words, the input and output of 

4 this program is limited to metadata. In practice 

5 only a small portion of the data that's collected 

6 is actually ever reviewed because the vast 

7 majority of data is never going to be responsive 

8 to terrorism-related queries. 

9 For example, in 2012 fewer than 300 

10 identifiers were approved for searching this data. 

11 The rationale for this program is that 

12 because all the metadata is collected because if 

13 you want to find the needle in the haystack you 

14 need to have the haystack.

15 Follow-up investigations that result from 

16 the analysis of metadata such as electronic 

17 surveillance of particular U.S. telephone numbers 

18 requires a court order based on probable cause. 

19 I'm turning now to the second program 

20 under Section 702. It involves the government's 

21 collection of foreign intelligence information 

22 from electronic communication service providers 
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1 under court supervision pursuant to Section 702 of 

2 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. It's 

3 been referred to as PRISM, which is a misnomer. 

4 PRISM does not refer to a data collection program, 

5 it's instead the name of a government database.

6 Under Section 702, which was reauthorized 

7 by Congress in December 2012, information is 

8 obtained with FISA Court approval with the 

9 knowledge of the provider, and based on a written 

10 directive from the Attorney General and the 

11 Director of National Intelligence to acquire 

12 foreign intelligence information.

13 The law permits the government to target 

14 a non-U.S. person, that is somebody who is not a 

15 citizen or a permanent resident alien, located 

16 outside the United States for foreign intelligence 

17 purposes without obtaining a specific warrant for 

18 each target. 

19 The law prohibits targeting somebody 

20 outside of the United States in order to obtain 

21 information about somebody in the United States. 

22 In other words, Section 702 prohibits reverse 
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1 targeting of U.S. persons.

2 The law also does not permit 

3 intentionally targeting any U.S. citizen or other 

4 U.S. person, or intentionally target any person 

5 known to be in the United States. 

6 In order to obtain FISA Court approval 

7 there must be first an identification of the 

8 foreign intelligence purposes for the collection, 

9 such as for prevention of terrorism, hostile cyber 

10 activities or nuclear proliferation, and 

11 procedures for ensuring individuals targeted for 

12 collection are reasonably believed to be U.S. 

13 persons located outside of the United States. 

14 There must be also approval of the 

15 government's procedures for what it will do with 

16 the information about a U.S. person or someone in 

17 the United States if it gets that information 

18 through this collection. 

19 Court approved minimization procedures, 

20 which have also been the subject of a leak, 

21 determine what can be kept and what can be 

22 disseminated to other government agencies. 
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1 Dissemination of information about U.S. 

2 persons is expressly prohibited unless the 

3 information is necessary to understand foreign 

4 intelligence, assess its importance, is evidence 

5 of a crime, or indicates an imminent threat of 

6 death or serious bodily harm.

7 The intelligence community asserts the 

8 communications collected under this program have 

9 provided insight into terrorist networks and 

10 plans, including information on terrorist 

11 organizations strategic planning efforts, 

12 contributing to impeding the proliferation of 

13 weapons of mass destruction and related 

14 technologies and successful efforts to mitigate 

15 cyber threats.

16 We will turn now to our first panel which 

17 will focus on legal and constitutional 

18 perspectives on the two programs. Board members 

19 Rachel Brand and Pat Wald will moderate the panel.

20 MS. BRAND: All right, thank you, David. 

21 Good morning, everyone, thank you for coming. 

22 I'm Rachel Brand, one of the members of 
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1 the board. My colleague Patricia Wald and I are 

2 moderating the first panel which is focusing on 

3 the legality of the two types of surveillance that 

4 David described. The policy implications of those 

5 types of surveillance will be discussed at a later 

6 panel.

7 We have a panel of five distinguished 

8 experts to give us their views on these issues. 

9 I'll introduce them in a moment. Each of them 

10 will have up to five minutes to give opening 

11 remarks. 

12 Our general counsel Diane Janosek is in 

13 the front row with cards, red, green, yellow, so 

14 for your benefit on the panel. 

15 Then each panelist will have up to two 

16 minutes to give responsive remarks, reflections on 

17 what the other panelists have said. Pat and I 

18 will then ask a series of questions to the panel, 

19 and for the last 15 minutes our colleagues on the 

20 board will have a chance to ask questions as well.

21 So our panelists are, in alphabetical 

22 order, Steve Bradbury, who is a partner at a law 
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1 firm here in D.C. and was the head of the Office 

2 of Legal Counsel at the Justice Department from 

3 2005 to 2009. 

4 Jameel Jaffer is the Deputy Legal 

5 Director with the ACLU and is currently involved 

6 in a constitutional challenge in court to one of 

7 the programs we're talking about today.

8 Kate Martin is the Director of the Center 

9 for National Security Studies.

10 James Robertson is a former U.S. District 

11 Judge and also served on the Foreign Intelligence 

12 Surveillance Court.

13 And Ken Wainstein at the end is a partner 

14 at Cadwalader, Wickersham and Taft and served 

15 previously as the Homeland Security Advisor as the 

16 Head of the National Security Division at the 

17 Justice Department and as a U.S. Attorney here in 

18 Washington.

19 So Steve, we'll start with you.

20 MR. BRADBURY: Thanks, Rachel. I 

21 appreciate the opportunity to participate today.

22 I'm going to focus my opening remarks on 
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1 the telephone metadata program. As the government 

2 has stated, and David summarized, this program is 

3 supported by a Section 215 business records order, 

4 which must be reviewed and reapproved by the 

5 federal judges who sit on the FISA Court every 90 

6 days. 

7 And I understand that fourteen different 

8 federal judges have approved this order since 

9 2006. 

10 The metadata acquired consists of the 

11 transactional information that phone companies 

12 retain for billing purposes. It includes only 

13 data fields showing which phone numbers called 

14 which numbers and the time and duration of the 

15 calls. 

16 This order does not give the government 

17 access to any information about the content of 

18 calls or any other subscriber information, and it 

19 doesn't enable the government to listen to 

20 anyone's phone calls.

21 Access to the data is limited under the 

22 terms of the court order. Contrary to some news 
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1 reports, there's no data mining or random sifting 

2 of the data permitted. 

3 The database may only be accessed through 

4 queries of individual phone numbers and only when 

5 the government has reasonable suspicion that the 

6 number is associated with a foreign terrorist 

7 organization. 

8 If it appears to be a U.S. number the 

9 suspicion cannot be based solely on activities 

10 protected by the First Amendment. Any query of 

11 the database requires approval from a small circle 

12 of designated NSA officers.

13 A query will simply return a list of any 

14 numbers the suspicious number has called and any 

15 numbers that have called it, and when those calls 

16 occurred. That's all. 

17 The database includes metadata going back 

18 five years to enable an analysis of historical 

19 connections. 

20 Of course any connections that are found 

21 to numbers inside the United States will be of 

22 most interest because the analysis may suggest the 
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1 presence of a terrorist cell in the U.S. 

2 Based in part on that information the FBI 

3 may seek a separate FISA order for surveillance of 

4 a U.S. number but that surveillance would have to 

5 be supported by individualized probable cause. 

6 The NSA's Deputy Director, as David 

7 mentioned, has testified that in all of 2012 there 

8 were fewer than 300 queries of the database, and 

9 only a tiny fraction of the data has ever been 

10 reviewed by analysts.

11 The database is kept segregated and is 

12 not accessed for any other purpose. And NSA 

13 requires the government -- and FISA, excuse me, 

14 requires the government to follow procedures 

15 overseen by the court to minimize any unnecessary 

16 dissemination of U.S. numbers generated from the 

17 queries.

18 In addition to court approval, the 215 

19 order is also subject to oversight by the 

20 Executive Branch and Congress. FISA mandates 

21 periodic audits by inspectors general and 

22 reporting to the intelligence and judiciary 
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1 committees of Congress.

2 When Section 215 was reauthorized in 2011 

3 I understand the leaders of Congress and members 

4 of these committees were briefed on this program, 

5 and all members of Congress were offered the 

6 opportunity for a similar briefing.

7 Now let me address the statutory and 

8 constitutional standards. Section 215 permits the 

9 acquisition of business records that are, quote, 

10 relevant to an authorized investigation.

11 Here the telephone metadata is relevant 

12 to counterterrorism investigations because the use 

13 of the database is essential to conduct the link 

14 analysis of terrorist phone numbers that I've 

15 described. And this type of analysis is a 

16 critical building block in these investigations.

17 In order to connect the dots we need the 

18 broadest set of telephone metadata we can 

19 assemble, and that's what this program enables.

20 The legal standard of relevance in 

21 Section 215 is the same standard used in other 

22 contexts. It does not require a separate showing 
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1 that every individual record in the database is 

2 relevant to the investigation. 

3 The standard is satisfied if the use of 

4 the database as a whole is relevant. It's 

5 important to remember that the Fourth Amendment 

6 does not require a search warrant or other 

7 individualized court order in this context. 

8 A government request for business records 

9 is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth 

10 Amendment. Government agencies have authority 

11 under many federal statutes to issue 

12 administrative subpoenas without court approval 

13 for documents that are relevant to an authorized 

14 inquiry. 

15 In addition, grand juries have broad 

16 authority to subpoena records potentially relevant 

17 to whether a crime has occurred, and grand jury 

18 subpoenas also don't require court approval.

19 In addition, the Fourth Amendment does 

20 not require a warrant when the government seeks 

21 purely transactional information or metadata, as 

22 distinct from the content of communications.
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1 This information is voluntarily made 

2 available to the phone company to complete the 

3 call and for billing purposes. And courts have 

4 therefore said there's no reasonable expectation 

5 that it's private. 

6 I would stress however that Section 215 

7 is more restrictive than the constitution demands 

8 because it requires the approval of a federal 

9 judge. 

10 And while the 215 order for metadata is 

11 extraordinary in terms of the amount of data 

12 acquired. It's also extraordinarily protective in 

13 terms of the strict limitations placed on 

14 accessing the data.

15 For these reasons I think the program is 

16 entirely lawful and conducted in a manner that 

17 appropriately respects the privacy and civil 

18 liberties of Americans. Thank you.

19 MS. BRAND: Thank you, Steve. Jameel. 

20 MR. JAFFER: Thanks for the invitation to 

21 participate. 

22 Since these programs were disclosed much 
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1 of the public debate has focused on issues of 

2 policy, and I think that's understandable. No 

3 government has ever trained this kind of 

4 surveillance power upon its own citizens. 

5 Until quite recently none had the 

6 technological capacity to do that. We need to 

7 think carefully about how the exploitation of new 

8 technology could affect liberties that generations 

9 of Americans have fought to protect.

10 What I'd like to underscore today is that 

11 the recently disclosed surveillance programs 

12 aren't just unwise, they're unconstitutional as 

13 well. 

14 And I'm going to focus principally on the 

15 215 program with the hope that we'll be able to 

16 return to 702 later on. 

17 Under the 215 program the NSA collects 

18 metadata about every phone call made or received 

19 by a resident of the United States. 

20 Some news reports indicate that the NSA 

21 is collecting Internet metadata as well, making a 

22 note of every website an American visits and every 
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1 email he or she receives. 

2 The program is a massive dragnet, one 

3 that raises many of the concerns associated with 

4 general warrants, that is many of the concerns 

5 that led to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment 

6 in the first place.

7 You might say that these Section 215 

8 orders are general warrants for a digital age. 

9 The President and the DNI has emphasized that the 

10 government is collecting metadata, not content. 

11 But the suggestion that metadata collection is 

12 somehow beyond the reach of the Constitution is 

13 wrong. 

14 For Fourth Amendment purposes the crucial 

15 question isn't whether the government is 

16 collecting metadata or content, but whether it is 

17 invading reasonable expectations of privacy. And 

18 here it clearly is. 

19 The Supreme Court's recent decision in 

20 Jones is instructive. In that case a unanimous 

21 court held that long-term surveillance of an 

22 individual's location constituted a search under 
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1 the Fourth Amendment. 

2 The justices reached that conclusion for 

3 different reasons, but at least five justices were 

4 of the view that the surveillance infringed a 

5 reasonable expectation of privacy. 

6 Justice Sotomayor observed that tracking 

7 an individual's movements over an extended period 

8 allows the government to generate, quote, a 

9 precise comprehensive record that reflects a 

10 wealth of detail about her familial, political, 

11 professional, religious and sexual associations. 

12 The same can be said of the tracking now 

13 taking place under Section 215. Call records can 

14 reveal personal relationships, medical issue, and 

15 political and religious affiliations. Internet 

16 metadata may be even more revealing, allowing the 

17 government to learn which websites a persons 

18 visited, precisely which article she read, whom 

19 she corresponds with, and who those people 

20 correspond with. 

21 The long-term surveillance of metadata 

22 constitutes a search for the same reasons that the 
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1 long-term surveillance of location was found to 

2 constitute a search in Jones.

3 In fact, the surveillance that was found 

4 unconstitutional in Jones was narrower and 

5 shallower than the surveillance now taking place 

6 under Section 215. 

7 The location tracking in Jones was meant 

8 to further a specific criminal investigation into 

9 a specific crime and the government collected 

10 information about one person's location over a 

11 period of less than a month. 

12 What the government has implemented under 

13 Section 215 is an indiscriminate program that has 

14 already swept up the communications of millions of 

15 people over a period of seven years. 

16 Some have argued that Section 215, the 

17 program under Section 215 is lawful under Smith v. 

18 Maryland, which upheld the installation of a pen 

19 register in a criminal investigation. 

20 But the pen register in Smith was very 

21 primitive. It tracked the numbers being dialed 

22 but it didn't indicate which calls were completed, 
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1 let alone the duration of the calls, and the 

2 surveillance was directed at a single criminal 

3 suspect over a period of less than two days. The 

4 police weren't casting a net over the whole 

5 country. 

6 Another argument that's been offered in 

7 defense of the metadata program is that though the 

8 NSA collects an immense amount of information, it 

9 examines only a tiny fraction of it. 

10 But the Fourth Amendment is triggered by 

11 collection of information, not simply by the 

12 querying of it. The same is true of the First 

13 Amendment because the chilling effect of 

14 government surveillance stems from the collection 

15 of information, not merely the analysis of it. 

16 The Constitution isn't indifferent to the 

17 government's accumulation of vast quantities of 

18 sensitive information about American's lives, 

19 neither should the board be. 

20 Indeed it's worth remembering in this 

21 context that other countries have aspired to total 

22 awareness of their citizens' associations, 
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1 movements and beliefs. The experiences of those 

2 countries should serve as a caution to us, not as 

3 a road map.

4 Thank you again for inviting me to 

5 participate, and I look forward to the board's 

6 questions.

7 MS. BRAND: Thank you. Kate.

8 MS. MARTIN: Thank you also for inviting 

9 me and giving me this opportunity to participate 

10 today. 

11 I want to take this opportunity to raise 

12 some overarching concerns which I hope the board 

13 will address before making specific 

14 recommendations about necessary changes to either 

15 Section 702 or 215, and begin by quoting Senator 

16 Sam Ervin, who in 1974 as the author of the 

17 Privacy Act noted that the more the government 

18 knows about us, the more power it has over us. 

19 When the government knows all of our secrets we 

20 stand naked before official power. The Bill of 

21 Rights then becomes just so many words. 

22 I think it is not debatable that secrecy 
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1 increases the danger that the government will 

2 overreach, nor is it debatable that foreign 

3 intelligence activities depend to some degree on 

4 secrecy and that a democracy must continually work 

5 to figure out ways to provide for the national 

6 defense, while respecting civil liberties and 

7 preserving constitutional governments.

8 The increase in technological 

9 surveillance capabilities, global connectedness 

10 and the reliance on electronic communications in 

11 daily life has made doing this more complex and 

12 even more important. 

13 I want to ask however whether or not the 

14 expansion of secret government surveillance and 

15 secret legal authorities, especially in the last 

16 twelve years requires us to ask whether we are 

17 witnessing the serious erosion of our 

18 constitutional system of checks and balances, and 

19 the rise of a system of secret law decreed by 

20 courts, carried out in secret, enabling the 

21 creation of massive secret government databases of 

22 American's personal and political lives.
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1 As you know quite well, the system of 

2 checks and balances relies upon, first, the 

3 existence of a Congress which engages in and is 

4 influenced by a public debate.

5 It relies upon the existence of courts 

6 which hear two sides to a question and know their 

7 opinions are subject to appeal and subject to 

8 public critique. 

9 And finally, an Executive Branch who will 

10 be called to account should they ignore or violate 

11 the law. 

12 And fundamentally all of this depends 

13 upon the existence of an informed and engaged 

14 press and public. 

15 So why does it matter? I think it 

16 matters fundamentally for two reasons. First is 

17 that the system is set up in order to prevent the 

18 government from breaking the law and to ensure 

19 that if it does so that will become known and the 

20 Executive Branch will be held to account for doing 

21 so.

22 Secondly, the system is meant to prevent, 
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1 as Jameel outlined, the government from using its 

2 surveillance capabilities to target its political 

3 opponents, to chill political dissent, and to 

4 limit the political debate and options in this 

5 country. 

6 This is not a theoretical concern. Of 

7 course in my lifetime it has happened many times 

8 already in this country. 

9 Perhaps later on I could detail what I 

10 find to be the shocking revelation of the history 

11 of these programs, beginning in 2001 and resulting 

12 in where we are today, where we only learned 

13 through unauthorized leaks that there is at least 

14 one secret opinion authorizing the massive 

15 collection of telephony metadata. 

16 We still don't know what the secret law 

17 is about the collection of massive amounts of 

18 Internet metadata. Although we know that 

19 presumably this administration has stopped that, 

20 we have no idea whether or not there is law that 

21 would permit that to resume. 

22 I think that the question that we need to 
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1 ask is whether or not the system of checks and 

2 balance needs to be reaffirmed so that it acts as 

3 a safeguard against these two harms. 

4 There is, I think the history of the 

5 debates on these issues over the past few years 

6 demonstrate that the debate has been incomplete. 

7 It has been informed by inaccurate information at 

8 best supplied by the government, if not 

9 deliberately.

10 Finally I just want to note that I've 

11 worked on these FISA issues for almost a quarter 

12 of a century and I think that probably of the many 

13 civil liberties voices that have been raised in 

14 objection to these programs, I am maybe one of the 

15 least likely to be labeled an alarmist.

16 MS. BRAND: Thank you. I know you have 

17 more you wanted to get to, and David may have 

18 mentioned this too, but any of the panelists and 

19 anyone in the public can submit written comments 

20 to the board, so if you have a fuller statement 

21 that you'd like to submit, you're welcome to do 

22 that.
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1 Judge Robertson.

2 MR. ROBERTSON: Thank you. I should 

3 probably first state that I am a member, I am now 

4 and have been a member of the Liberty and Security 

5 Committee of the Constitution Project, which wrote 

6 a report in September of 2012 expressing some 

7 alarm about these programs. And I signed that 

8 report and stand by it, but that's not primarily 

9 what I want to talk about today. 

10 I did sit on the FISA Court for a few 

11 years. I asked to be appointed to the FISA Court, 

12 frankly to see what it was up to. And I came away 

13 from it deeply impressed by the careful, 

14 scrupulous, even fastidious work that the Justice 

15 Department people, and the NSA, and FBI agents 

16 involved with it did. 

17 The FISA Court was not a rubber stamp. 

18 The fact, the numbers that are quoted about how 

19 many reports, how many warrants get approved do 

20 not tell you how many were sent back for more work 

21 before they were approved. 

22 So I know at firsthand, and I wish I 
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1 could assure the American people that the FISA 

2 process has integrity and that the idea of 

3 targeting Americans with surveillance is anathema 

4 to the judges of the FISA Court, which they call 

5 the FISC.

6 But I have a couple of related points to 

7 make. First, the FISA process is ex parte, which 

8 means it's one sided, and that's not a good 

9 thing. 

10 And secondly, under the FISA Amendment 

11 Act, the FISA Court now approves programmatic 

12 surveillance, and that I submit and will discuss 

13 for a few minutes, I do not consider to be a 

14 judicial function. 

15 Now judges are learned in the law and all 

16 that, but anybody who has been a judge will tell 

17 you that a judge needs to hear both sides of a 

18 case before deciding. 

19 It's quite common, in fact it's the norm 

20 to read one side's brief or hear one side's 

21 argument and think, hmm, that sounds right, until 

22 we read the other side.
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1 Judging is choosing between adversaries. 

2 I read the other day that one of my former FISA 

3 Court colleagues resisted the suggestion that the 

4 FISA approval process accommodated the executive, 

5 or maybe the word was cooperated. Not so, the 

6 judge replied. The judge said the process was 

7 adjudicating.

8 I very respectfully take issue with that 

9 use of the word adjudicating. The ex parte FISA 

10 process hears only one side and what the FISA 

11 process does is not adjudication, it is approval. 

12 Which brings me to my second and I think 

13 closely related point. The FISA approval process 

14 works just fine when it deals with individual 

15 applications for surveillance warrants because 

16 approving search warrants and wiretap orders and 

17 trap and trace orders and foreign intelligence 

18 surveillance warrants one at a time is familiar 

19 ground for judges. 

20 And not only that, but at some point a 

21 search warrant or wiretap order, if it leads on to 

22 a prosecution or some other consequence is usually 
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1 reviewable by another court.

2 But what happened about the revelations 

3 in late 2005 about NSA circumventing the FISA 

4 process was that Congress passed the FISA 

5 Amendments Act of 2008 and introduced a new role 

6 for the FISC, which was to approve surveillance 

7 programs.

8 That change, in my view, turned the FISA 

9 Court into something like an administrative agency 

10 which makes and approves rules for others to 

11 follow. 

12 Again, that's not the bailiwick of 

13 judges. Judges don't make policy. They review 

14 policy determinations for compliance with 

15 statutory law but they do so in the context once 

16 again of adversary process.

17 Now the great paradox of this 

18 intelligence surveillance process of course is the 

19 undeniable need for security. Secrecy, especially 

20 to protect what the national security community 

21 calls sources and methods. 

22 That is why the Supreme Court had to 
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1 refuse to hear Clapper versus Amnesty 

2 International. The plaintiffs could not prove 

3 that their communications were likely to be 

4 monitored so they had no standing. That is a 

5 classic catch-22 of Supreme Court jurisprudence. 

6 But I submit that this process needs an 

7 adversary, if it's not the ACLU or Amnesty 

8 International, perhaps the PCLOB itself could have 

9 some role as kind of an institutional adversary to 

10 challenge and take the other side of anything that 

11 is presented to the FISA Court.

12 Thank you.

13 MS. BRAND: Thank you, Judge. Ken. 

14 MR. WAINSTEIN: Okay, good morning, 

15 everybody. I'd like to thank the board for 

16 inviting me here to speak on these very important 

17 issues.

18 I'd like to focus my remarks today on the 

19 FISA Amendments Act and the authority in Section 

20 702. 

21 MS. BRAND: Ken, can you pull the mic 

22 over to you.
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1 MR. WAINSTEIN: I'm sorry. As I said, 

2 I'd like to focus my remarks today on the FISA 

3 Amendments Act and the Section 702 authority that 

4 David has described earlier. 

5 The recent disclosures regarding the 

6 PRISM Program have raised questions in some 

7 quarters about the appropriateness and legality of 

8 the government's collection of Internet 

9 communications traffic, with some expressing 

10 surprise that collection of that type and that 

11 scale is taking place.

12 A review of the text of the FISA 

13 Amendments Act and the historical record reveals 

14 however that that Internet collection appears to 

15 be exactly what was contemplated when Congress 

16 passed that statute in 2008.

17 I'd like to take a moment to remind 

18 ourselves about the FAA, the FISA Amendments Act 

19 and the reason it came into being in the first 

20 place. In 1978 Congress undertook to create a 

21 process by which electronic surveillance of 

22 foreign powers or their agents must first be 
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1 approved by the FISA Court. 

2 In doing so however Congress recognized 

3 it had to balance the need for a judicial review 

4 process for domestic surveillance against the 

5 government's need to freely conduct surveillance 

6 overseas where constitutional protections do not 

7 apply. 

8 It sought to accomplish this objective by 

9 imposing in the FISA statute a court approval 

10 requirement on surveillances directed against 

11 persons within the U.S. and leaving the 

12 intelligence community free to surveil overseas 

13 targets without the undue burden of court 

14 process. 

15 With the change in technology over the 

16 years since FISA was passed however that foreign 

17 domestic distinction started to break down. And 

18 the government found itself expending significant 

19 manpower in generating FISA Court applications for 

20 surveillances against persons outside the United 

21 States, the very category of surveillances that 

22 Congress specifically intended to exclude when it 
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1 imposed the FISA Court approval process 

2 requirement in 1978.

3 As this problem got worse, particularly 

4 after the 9/11 attacks, the government found 

5 itself increasingly unable to cover its 

6 surveillance needs.

7 Congress, to its credit, took up this 

8 issue in the spring of 2007 and over the next 

9 fifteen months or so numerous government 

10 officials, including Steve Bradbury, myself and 

11 others, spent countless hours testifying and 

12 meeting with members and staff up on the hill, and 

13 after thorough analysis and deliberations Congress 

14 ultimately provided relief in the form of the FISA 

15 Amendments Act, which passed in the summer of 

16 2008.

17 Section 702 of the FAA created a new 

18 process, a new process by which categories of 

19 foreign surveillance targets can be approved for 

20 surveillance.

21 Under this process, the Attorney General 

22 and the DNI provide the FISA Court annual 
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1 certifications identifying the target categories 

2 and certifying that all statutory requirements for 

3 surveillance of those targets have been met. 

4 The government in turn designs targeting 

5 procedures which are the operational steps that it 

6 takes to determine whether each individual 

7 surveillance target is outside the United States, 

8 as well as minimization procedures that David 

9 described, that limit the handling and 

10 dissemination of any information relating to U.S. 

11 persons. 

12 The government then submits the 

13 certifications, as well as the targeting and 

14 minimization procedures for review by the FISA 

15 Court and the FISA Court confirms whether all 

16 statutorily required steps have been taken in 

17 compliance with FISA and the Fourth Amendment.

18 Now this process succeeds in bringing the 

19 operation of FISA back in line with its original 

20 intent. It still provides that any surveillance 

21 targeting a U.S. person here or abroad, or 

22 targeting any person believed to be inside the 
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1 United States must be conducted pursuant to an 

2 individualized FISA Court order.

3 However, it allows the government to 

4 conduct surveillance of foreign targets overseas 

5 without the need to secure individualized court 

6 approval. And it does so while at the same time 

7 giving the FISA Court an important role in 

8 ensuring that this authority is used only against 

9 those non-U.S. persons who are reasonably believed 

10 to be located outside the U.S.

11 In addition, the FAA tasks various levels 

12 of government with conducting significant and 

13 meaningful oversight over this authority. 

14 The authority procedures and oversight 

15 prescribed by the FAA have been in place since 

16 2008 and just last year they were reauthorized. 

17 Prior to its reauthorization the 

18 intelligence committees of both houses were 

19 briefed on the classified details of its 

20 implementation, and that same briefing was made 

21 available to all members. 

22 As this history demonstrates the FAA was 
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1 a carefully calibrated piece of legislation that 

2 addressed an urgent operational need while at the 

3 same time maintaining the privacy protections that 

4 the original FISA statute afforded to domestic 

5 communications.

6 With the recent public disclosures about 

7 the PRISM Program we are now seeing the statute in 

8 action. Not surprisingly we're seeing exactly 

9 what was contemplated when Congress carefully 

10 considered and passed the FAA, which is a program 

11 that focuses on the surveillance of foreign 

12 national security targets, which is where the 

13 Executive Branch has its greatest latitude, that 

14 is conducted well within the bounds of the Fourth 

15 Amendment, that is carried out with the knowledge 

16 and engagement of all three branches of government 

17 and that is monitored with multiple levels of 

18 oversight.

19 And that is exactly what Congress and the 

20 American people asked for in the legislative 

21 process that resulted in the passage of the FAA.

22 I appreciate the opportunity to address 
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1 these issues here today and I look forward to any 

2 questions that the board may have.

3 MS. WALD: Thank you. We're now going to 

4 enter into the second phase of our program and 

5 that is, each person on the panel gets two minutes 

6 to respond to any of the comments or to make their 

7 own comments upon what other panelists have said. 

8 So we'll get the going, Steve.

9 MR. BRADBURY: Thank you, Judge Wald. 

10 Just real quick responding to a few points that 

11 Jameel made first. 

12 Jameel said that he thought no other 

13 country conducts surveillance like the NSA. I 

14 don't think anybody here should leave today 

15 assuming that statement is correct. 

16 In terms of the 215 telephone metadata 

17 collection, he described it as a dragnet. I think 

18 of a dragnet as a collection of mass amounts of 

19 content communications, not metadata. I think 

20 there's a critical difference between content and 

21 metadata, and I think the Constitution recognizes 

22 that.
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1 He talked about the Jones case which is 

2 the GPS tracking device that's put on a particular 

3 car for a particular individual. Well that case 

4 involved, as he described it, tracking of an 

5 individual, the government doggedly following 

6 around and tracking a particular individual. 

7 Here in the collection of the metadata 

8 there's no targeting or tracking of an individual 

9 until a suspicious number is put into the 

10 database. 

11 And the targeting under the 702 order is 

12 only focused on non-U.S. persons believed to be 

13 outside the U.S. 

14 He described the Smith versus Maryland 

15 case as simply a case involving a primitive device 

16 and focused on an individual. Well, this case has 

17 been applied by the lower courts more broadly and 

18 also the fact that it was focused on an individual 

19 there I think is more constitutionally significant 

20 than a general collection of metadata. 

21 I want to talk for just a minute about 

22 some of the comments that Kate and Judge Robertson 
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1 made about secrecy and the rise of secret law and 

2 also the role of the court with programmatic 

3 orders, etcetera.

4 I think it's important to understand the 

5 constitutional background. As Ken alluded, before 

6 1978 surveillance for foreign intelligence 

7 purposes was conducted by the president without 

8 court approval. And the courts have consistently 

9 said that the president has authority to undertake 

10 such surveillance without court approval where the 

11 target is a foreign intelligence threat. 

12 And FISA -- that led to abuses, but FISA 

13 was created as a compromise between the branches 

14 to enable that kind of surveillance but to involve 

15 Article III courts in the review and approval, and 

16 Congress in the oversight, creating the 

17 intelligence oversight committee. 

18 MS. WALD: Steve, I'm going to have to be 

19 very tough. You've covered an enormous amount and 

20 I'm sure --

21 MR. BRADBURY: Thank you.

22 MS. WALD: You can pick up in the 
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1 individual questions, which will come about later. 

2 Thank you. Jameel.

3 MR. JAFFER: So let me just start by 

4 expressing a degree of frustration about something 

5 that Mr. Wainstein said. 

6 So when we were before the Supreme Court 

7 in Amnesty v Clapper last year, the government 

8 repeatedly said, and they said this in the lower 

9 courts as well, they repeatedly said that the 

10 assertion that the NSA was engaged in large scale 

11 surveillance of Americans' international 

12 communications under Section 702 was speculative 

13 and even paranoid. 

14 And now the program has been disclosed 

15 and everybody can see that the NSA is engaged in 

16 exactly that. And the intelligence community, and 

17 I would include Mr. Wainstein in that category, 

18 the intelligence community's position now is that, 

19 well, this is what was contemplated by the 

20 statute. Everybody knows that this is what the 

21 statute was all about.

22 And you know, there's a certain 
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1 frustration I feel in this sort of moving target. 

2 You know, a year ago it was speculative and 

3 paranoid and now there's nothing to see here. 

4 And it would trouble me less if it 

5 weren't part of a pattern in which the Executive 

6 Branch officials and members of the larger 

7 intelligence community have repeatedly misled the 

8 public about the scope of these surveillance laws 

9 and the safeguards that are in place or aren't in 

10 place to protect individual's privacy. 

11 And on a related topic I think it's just 

12 very important, Mr. Bradbury points out quite 

13 rightly that under 702 the government can target 

14 only foreign nationals outside the United States 

15 but nobody should take that to mean that 

16 Americans' communications aren't being collected. 

17 In the course of collecting the 

18 communications of people outside the United States 

19 the NSA collects Americans' communications. And 

20 not just their international communications, but 

21 their domestic communications as well.

22 That too, that assertion I just made was 
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1 something characterized by the government in 

2 Amnesty v. Clapper as speculative and paranoid but 

3 the minimization procedures that have been 

4 disclosed over the last few weeks I think make 

5 clear that that's exactly what's taking place.

6 MS. WALD: Kate.

7 MS. MARTIN: So I just want to reiterate 

8 that I think Ken illustrated the importance of the 

9 history in looking at these programs. I would 

10 disagree with his, and Steve's as well, 

11 description of that history. 

12 I think that as Jameel mentioned, the 

13 important question here is not under what 

14 circumstances can the NSA collect and use 

15 communications by foreigners overseas. 

16 The important question that we've always 

17 tried to focus on is under what circumstances is 

18 the NSA going to collect and use in secret 

19 information about Americans usually gathered 

20 inside the United States, including both metadata, 

21 which is extremely revealing of their associations 

22 and private life, and the content of their 
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1 communications, especially communications with 

2 people located overseas. 

3 To repeatedly focus on or to state that 

4 the purpose of this surveillance is about 

5 foreigners overseas I think is confusing at best 

6 about the real issues that face the American 

7 people. 

8 I just, I think the other issue that's 

9 underlying here is that it's not only a question 

10 of collection of course but it's a question of how 

11 the government uses the information. Many of 

12 those regulations are secret about how the NSA or 

13 the FBI is allowed to use them. 

14 To the extent that there are public 

15 regulations they're extremely complex to figure 

16 out which set of regulations applies to which set 

17 of information, and that fundamentally I think 

18 they don't address the problem that the government 

19 is in a position perhaps to use information about 

20 Americans against Americans. And that's the issue 

21 that needs to be addressed.

22 MS. WALD: Jim.
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1 MR. ROBERTSON: Perhaps two quick 

2 points. It is certainly true that a government 

3 request for business records is not a search, but 

4 I think we all need to pay attention to what 

5 Jameel said about this subject and about the Jones 

6 case, because modern technology enables analysis 

7 of metadata that was not possible before. 

8 It reminds me of something that Ben 

9 Bradlee is supposed to have said about Woodward 

10 and Bernstein. He said if you give those guys 

11 enough steel wool they will knit a stove. 

12 Secondly, as to Ken Wainstein's point 

13 that we got exactly what Congress asked for. 

14 That's true, but the brouhaha after the Snowden 

15 leaks, and this meeting indeed establishes what I 

16 think is true that we need to have a more wide 

17 open debate about this in our society and 

18 thankfully we're beginning to have the debate, and 

19 this meeting is part of it.

20 MS. WALD: Ken.

21 MR. WAINSTEIN: Thank you. I'd like to 

22 start off by responding to Jameel's suggestion 
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1 that I or others misled him in any way about the 

2 collection of U.S. person communications. That 

3 contention's flat wrong. 

4 I spent fourteen, fifteen months with 

5 Steve and others up on Capitol Hill explaining the 

6 intricacies of the procedure that ended up being 

7 adopted, or a formula which ended up being adopted 

8 in the FISA Amendments Act. 

9 We answered every conceivable question on 

10 the record and in meetings, in forums like this 

11 with privacy groups about the implications of this 

12 collection, and it was abundantly clear to 

13 everybody, and we said numerous times that this 

14 will be focusing on foreign targets overseas 

15 collecting their communications, whether those 

16 communications were overseas or also if the happen 

17 to come into the United States. 

18 So what he's getting at is the concept of 

19 incidental collection. While you're targeting a 

20 foreign person, a non-U.S. person overseas, you'll 

21 get that person if he and she is talking to 

22 somebody in an overseas country. You'll also get 
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1 that communication if he or she calls somebody in 

2 the United States. 

3 That's authorized collection and the 

4 collection of that U.S. person's communication is 

5 acceptable. That's what happens in any form of 

6 authorized collection. 

7 If you look at Title III, which is the 

8 criminal rule that allows criminal wiretaps, the 

9 same thing happens. If I'm a criminal suspect a 

10 court authorizes a Title III wiretap on me, the 

11 government's also going to get the communications 

12 between me and the pizza delivery man when I call 

13 to get pizza, not only with other criminal 

14 colleagues. 

15 So that incidental collection is a 

16 reality of any kind of surveillance and it's 

17 something that was fully vetted and made clear to 

18 the American people. 

19 And then the second point I'd very 

20 quickly make, which is, you know, Kate talked 

21 about the collection and the use of this 

22 information in secret and the concern about how 
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1 this information is used. 

2 I think one thing that's not touched on 

3 sufficiently is the value of oversight. You can 

4 take a look at the FAA in itself it prescribed 

5 four or five or six different types of oversight. 

6 And all these programs are carefully overseen by 

7 the FISA Court, by Congress and importantly within 

8 the Executive Branch itself and that oversight is 

9 very important and meaningful in terms of 

10 preventing abuses. Thank you.

11 MS. BRAND: Okay, thank you all. Pat and 

12 I will now ask some questions of the panel. We 

13 sort of agreed in a sidebar here that since we 

14 have a bit of time, I think we started a little 

15 early, we can be a little bit more flexible with 

16 the length of your responses to these questions, 

17 but let's try to keep it not beyond three minutes 

18 maybe. But we don't need to be so strict about 

19 it.

20 My first question deals with the 

21 relevance standard in Section 215. I'm 

22 particularly interested in all of your views about 
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1 that. So each of us will throw a question open to 

2 all of you so you can answer in turn, if you 

3 want. If you want to pass on the question, that's 

4 fine too.

5 Section 215 authorizes an order for 

6 tangible things that are relevant to an ongoing 

7 FISA investigation. And I have several sort of 

8 sub-questions related to that.

9 One is whether relevance can attach as 

10 the government seems to be asserting to the entire 

11 set of data or whether relevance needs to attach 

12 to any particular record that's collected. 

13 And relatedly whether Congress, which one 

14 of those things Congress understood itself to be 

15 passing when it enacted Section 215, the kind of 

16 haystack approach or the relevance attaching to a 

17 particular record. 

18 And then relatedly, and some of those of 

19 you with criminal backgrounds, I'd be especially 

20 interested how that compares to the way relevance 

21 is understood in the criminal context or even in 

22 the civil litigating context. Is this 
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1 understanding of relevance broader? Should it be 

2 broader? 

3 So Steve, if you want to start with that.

4 MR. BRADBURY: Thanks, Rachel. Well, I 

5 began to touch on that I think in my opening 

6 remarks. 

7 And of course individual members of 

8 Congress might say, well, I didn't have in mind 

9 this specific concept when I voted for something 

10 that says relevant.

11 But I think in adopting the word relevant 

12 Congress embraced a broader context in which that 

13 word is used embraced frequently and commonly in 

14 other situations, administrative subpoenas, for 

15 example, civil investigative demand by agencies 

16 that regulate industries can be extremely broad in 

17 concept of relevance. 

18 Civil litigation, a lot of folks who are 

19 involved in civil litigation understand that a 

20 party in litigation gets a broad right. For 

21 example, it could encompass an entire database of 

22 information where particular items of data in that 
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1 database may be useful in the litigation and the 

2 parties work out an arrangement that maintains 

3 that database so that it can be searched for 

4 potentially useful documents. That's under a 

5 concept of relevance.

6 Grand juries have an extremely broad 

7 concept of relevance when they can go after any 

8 materials that are potentially relevant. 

9 For example, after the Boston bombing 

10 where if there was a concern about follow-on 

11 attacks or collaborators, a grand jury could 

12 subpoena without court approval all airline 

13 manifests of flights in and out, passengers flying 

14 in and out of Boston in a particular period of 

15 time because one of those people on one of those 

16 flights might have been relevant. Communications 

17 similarly.

18 So I think the concept of what's relevant 

19 to an investigation is naturally understood to be 

20 broad in lots of contexts and I think it's 

21 reasonable that that's what was incorporated in 

22 the statute when Congress adopted it. 
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1 MR. JAFFER: Well, I agree with some of 

2 that, that relevance is, you know, a relatively 

3 broad standard, but there are haystacks and there 

4 are haystacks. 

5 And if you just think about the examples 

6 that Mr. Bradbury just provided, for example, this 

7 hypothetical situation where a grand jury 

8 subpoenas the flight manifests in and out of 

9 Boston for a particular period of time, I mean 

10 that is not anywhere near the scope of the program 

11 we're talking about here.

12 And I think, you know, I can say with 

13 confidence, and I'm sure that everybody on this 

14 panel will agree with me, that there is no 

15 subpoena out there, there's no case out there in 

16 which any court has approved on a relevance 

17 standard surveillance on this scale. 

18 This is, this takes us across a new 

19 frontier, maybe several new frontiers. This is 

20 orders of magnitude broader than any surveillance 

21 that has ever been approved under a civil or a 

22 criminal subpoena.
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1 MS. BRAND: Can I just ask a quick 

2 follow-up to that since this panel is focused on 

3 the legality of the alleged current programs. 

4 Where would you draw the line then if this 

5 haystack is too broad but if your argument is not 

6 that each individual record collected needs to 

7 itself be relevant, what line do I exercise with 

8 the FISC engage in? 

9 MR. JAFFER: Well, I don't think that 

10 it's possible to set out a line with any more 

11 clarity than to refer to relevance.

12 The surprising thing here is not that the 

13 court is applying a relevance standard, but that 

14 it isn't, that in spite of the statute's clear 

15 language that requires it to apply the same 

16 standard that applies with respect to ordinary 

17 subpoenas, the court has approved the government 

18 to collect everything. It has allowed the 

19 government to collect everything.

20 And you know, I think it's fair enough to 

21 say that relevance doesn't require the kind of 

22 specificity that probable cause does. 
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1 But everybody agrees that relevance is 

2 supposed to be a limit, and I think it's quite 

3 obvious that relevance isn't doing that work with 

4 respect to this kind of order.

5 MS. MARTIN: On the question of what did 

6 Congress and the American people understand with 

7 regard to the use of the word relevance, I think 

8 it's pretty clear that until this past month the 

9 American people had no idea that Section 215 

10 relevance was being used to collect all of 

11 telephone metadata on Americans' phone calls, and 

12 I assume that it was also being used to collect 

13 all of the Internet metadata. 

14 And I think the mere fact that, not only 

15 did we not know that, but our assumption during 

16 the debates on the FISA Amendments Act was that 

17 that was not happening, that that had been part of 

18 President Bush's warrantless program, it had been 

19 revealed and that it stopped. 

20 I think a further indication of that is 

21 that in the bible, which I commend to you, on this 

22 statute written by Mr. Chris and Mr. Wilson, their 
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1 description of Section 215 orders during the 

2 relevant time period describes a very limited 

3 number of orders. 

4 And if you were to read that description 

5 you would never suspect that the government was 

6 using 215 orders to collect millions or billions 

7 of records on Americans. 

8 And finally in response to the question, 

9 Rachel, about well, what should be the standard? 

10 Of course 215 is about all different kinds of 

11 records. Some of them are more revealing than 

12 others. Communications metadata, both telephone 

13 and Internet I think are among the most revealing 

14 kinds of records covered by 215. 

15 One possibility is to go back to what was 

16 in the law before 2001 and require a showing that 

17 the collection of communications metadata is 

18 connected to a specific suspect, a specific 

19 incident, a specific plan. That requirement was 

20 deleted. 

21 And finally on the analogy to the 

22 criminal context, I strongly object to that 
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1 analogy. In the criminal subpoena context there 

2 are two key factors that are not present here. 

3 One is that at least after the subpoena 

4 is served and sometimes during the service of the 

5 subpoena, it's public, and that leads to all kinds 

6 of restraints on its use, objections to use, 

7 etcetera.

8 And secondly, there is the possibility of 

9 true adversarial adjudication in the way that 

10 Judge Robertson talked about it in a criminal 

11 subpoena. That does not exist under Section 215 

12 and will not exist even if you allow the recipient 

13 of the 215 order to go to the FISA Court, because 

14 the recipient of the 215 order is not the party 

15 that has the interest in the order. The persons 

16 whose information is being sought are the persons 

17 who need to have that right to show up in court.

18 MS. BRAND: My question about the 

19 criminal context wasn't so much whether it's a 

20 completely apt analogy but whether the relevance 

21 standard is the same. 

22 I mean do you have a view on that, 
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1 whether the word relevant or relevance in 215 and 

2 the concept of relevance in the criminal context 

3 or in a civil litigating context are the same?

4 MS. MARTIN: You know, I don't know, but 

5 I don't think it's a relevant question, with all 

6 due respect. With all due respect.

7 MR. ROBERTSON: Well, I think your 

8 relevance question is a great question and I would 

9 love to know whether the FISA Court ever has 

10 considered the question when it reviewed the 

11 program. 

12 Relevance is usually raised, it usually 

13 comes into question in a legal proceeding if 

14 there's an objection, but there's nobody there to 

15 object. 

16 MR. WAINSTEIN: I'd just like to I guess 

17 make two quick points. One, add to something that 

18 Steve mentioned about you know, the statements 

19 that we've heard from members or former members of 

20 Congress saying, you know, gee, I didn't intend 

21 when I voted to 215 that it would apply in this 

22 way. 
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1 You know, that's just, just to make it 

2 clear, that's not unique to this situation that 

3 former or current members of Congress might now be 

4 voicing some concern that the way a statute is 

5 applied is not exactly as they conceived of it 

6 before passage of that statute. 

7 You saw that with the authorization for 

8 use of military force back in 2001. I've seen it 

9 throughout my career with, for example, statutes 

10 like the Racketeering Influence Corrupt 

11 Organization Act, RICO, which was initially passed 

12 and many members thought it was going to be 

13 focused on primarily, if not exclusively, on 

14 traditional organized crime. 

15 And then it has now been applied to a 

16 much broader swath of criminal activity, with many 

17 people saying, gee, I didn't think when we passed 

18 that statute that that's the way it was going to 

19 be applied. So just to make it clear, this is not 

20 an anomaly, this is a fairly common phenomenon.

21 And then I guess the second point I'd 

22 want to make is as to Kate's point. She argues 
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1 that the criminal grand jury subpoena is different 

2 and you can have more comfort in the government's 

3 use of those subpoenas and their interpretation of 

4 relevance for purposes of using one because these 

5 subpoenas will see the light of day ultimately. 

6 And that's true for some cases, no 

7 question. Those cases where a grand jury subpoena 

8 is issued and that grand jury process ripens into 

9 an indictment which then goes to trial and the 

10 evidence is tested in court, then there's a good 

11 chance those subpoenas are going to be turned over 

12 in discovery and then tested in a suppression 

13 hearing or at trial. 

14 But that's not always the case. There 

15 are a lot of grand jury subpoenas that I've issued 

16 over the years that never see the light of day 

17 because that sequence of events doesn't happen.

18 So just to make clear, that's not sort of 

19 a perfectly distinguishing feature that would 

20 break down the analogy between the grand jury 

21 subpoena and 215 which Steve made. Thanks.

22 MS. WALD: Okay. I'd like to delve a 
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1 little bit into the constitutionality of some of 

2 the facets of constitutional analysis of one or 

3 both programs, which will give you a chance to 

4 elaborate on some things that you may not have 

5 been able to catch up on the earlier segments.

6 We already talked a little bit about U.S. 

7 v Jones and whether some of the opinions of the 

8 Supreme Court justices, and in fact the majority 

9 opinion of the D.C. Circuit, which preceded the 

10 Supreme Court which suggested that in fact when 

11 you have an extensive surveillance of location in 

12 that case, but in a sense kind of metadata over a 

13 long period of time, it reveals enough of a 

14 person's personal life so that it may indeed 

15 constitute a search requiring Fourth Amendment 

16 compliance. 

17 But there are a couple of other aspects 

18 and constitutionality that have been brought up, 

19 if you want to touch on them.

20 One is, I think this was raised by 

21 Senator Feinstein in some of the hearings, and 

22 that is whether or not there are less intrusive 
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1 alternatives. 

2 In other words, it was brought up 

3 specifically with regard to 215 that do you have 

4 to seize, does the government have to, in the 

5 alleged program, seize the data or require that it 

6 have the data? Would it be less intrusive if it 

7 queried the data which was existing in the hands 

8 of the communications providers?

9 And in fact, the Executive Order 12333 

10 which governs intelligence conduct activities 

11 generally, speaks of requiring the least intrusive 

12 collection technique feasible. 

13 Whether or not it specifically applies to 

14 215, we can debate that, but the general principle 

15 why isn't it sufficient that they query the 

16 communications companies which have the data, 

17 rather than requiring that they get all the data. 

18 And indeed there's possible 

19 constitutional question about, and I think Kate 

20 may have raised this, if the alleged program 

21 that's under 215 is okay on telephone metadata 

22 then are there any inherent limits in 215? 
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1 I mean are there other kinds of metadata, 

2 the fact of bank records, the fact of various 

3 other kinds of records, are there inherent limits 

4 there?

5 Now what I have left out but I'm going to 

6 save it for my next question is the whole FISA 

7 Court area and what might possibly, following up 

8 on Jim's analysis, could anything be done? Is it 

9 better that we not have the government, we not 

10 have the court getting into programmatic analysis 

11 at all? If not, where are our protections going 

12 to be? 

13 But that's the question for another day. 

14 In this case I'm giving a lot of grist for your 

15 mill.

16 Steve.

17 MR. BRADBURY: Thanks. Is that last 

18 question for another day or the next question?

19 MS. WALD: No, the FISA question.

20 MR. BRADBURY: I have a lot to say about 

21 that so I hope you do ask that.

22 MS. WALD: Well, I'll ask it now but in 
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1 that case everybody gets six minutes. 

2 MR. BRADBURY: Well, on the Jones case I 

3 already talked about that. 

4 But on your question, Judge Wald, about 

5 the database and would it be less intrusive if the 

6 telephone companies just maintained the database 

7 and what can we get with a business records order, 

8 I don't think it's a question of intrusiveness. 

9 I don't think it would less intrusive. 

10 It would be far less efficient, far more costly, 

11 and perhaps less effective. You'd have to have 

12 multiple databases at the different telephone 

13 companies. 

14 And they don't for business purposes 

15 retain this data for as long as the government 

16 needs it. This is just business record data they 

17 retain for billing purposes. They don't have a 

18 separate national security reason for keeping it. 

19 So we'd have to create a database. They 

20 don't have all the servers and everything. So the 

21 government is going to have to create the 

22 database, which evidently under this alternative 
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1 would be housed with the private company, have to 

2 pay for it. 

3 And of course the government would still 

4 have to control the querying because you're not 

5 going to tell the telephone company what queries 

6 you're going to do to the database. That's 

7 national security investigatory information. They 

8 don't need to know that. 

9 And so it's far more efficient. The 

10 government already has facilities in place and it 

11 can segregate them. It can ensure that all of the 

12 protections are honored and that the data is not 

13 being accessed for other reasons, etcetera. So 

14 it's really an efficiency question.

15 In terms of --

16 MS. WALD: Just one slight follow-up 

17 question, a subordinate question. Is that, are 

18 some of those criteria you talked about, in your 

19 view more sort of convenience kind of things or 

20 are they necessity because when we're talking 

21 about constitutional analysis are they necessary 

22 to the feasibility or purpose for which the 
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1 program is related.

2 I mean the cost and that kind of thing 

3 sound a lot like convenience factors.

4 MR. BRADBURY: Well, I do think there are 

5 very real practical and feasibility requirements. 

6 I don't think the Constitution would see a 

7 difference between the data being housed with the 

8 government or the data being housed elsewhere but 

9 the government controlling it and controlling 

10 access and ensuring it's preserved, etcetera.

11 But 215 is focused on business records so 

12 you have to be talking about the kind of data or 

13 database information that a business is 

14 maintaining for its own business purposes. 

15 So that may be very different with 

16 respect to the email that people have alluded to, 

17 email metadata under 215. Telephone companies 

18 maintain these call detail records for billing 

19 purposes and it may be very different in other 

20 contexts. 

21 So I don't think you can just easily say, 

22 oh, well they must be using this for other things 
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1 too. These are business records that have to be 

2 in existence in a separate business, for separate 

3 business purpose. 

4 Shall I leave the FISA Court questions 

5 for later? 

6 MS. WALD: Let's do everything but FISA 

7 and then come back and do FISA. 

8 MS. BRAND: Let's do constitutional now 

9 and then save FISA for another round.

10 MS WALD: Well, that is part of FISA.

11 MR. JAFFER: So just to point out the 

12 obvious, I think that the least restrictive means 

13 question is an important question and a question 

14 that the board should be asking. 

15 But it assumes that the government has 

16 some overriding national security interest to get 

17 access to the information in the first place, that 

18 this information is somehow crucial to protecting 

19 the national security. 

20 And that is something that I think many 

21 people have been pressing the intelligence 

22 community to corroborate, but thus far nothing 
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1 convincing has been said to establish that this 

2 information is actually crucial. 

3 I understand that at one point the 

4 government pointed to the Zazi case. The Zazi case 

5 turns out not to have turned on that kind of 

6 information at all. 

7 If there is some case out there to which 

8 this information was in fact crucial, I don't 

9 think the government has pointed to it yet. 

10 But, you know, to go back to the 

11 question. If we assume that the information is in 

12 fact crucial then I think it's crucial to ask the 

13 question about the least restrictive means of 

14 getting the information.

15 And on that question I do have a problem 

16 with this centralized database, the creation of 

17 this centralized database in the hands of the 

18 NSA. And here I'll take the opportunity just to 

19 agree with something that Mr. Wainstein said 

20 earlier which is that authorities created for one 

21 purpose, it's not uncommon at all to find out 

22 later that they were used for some other purpose. 
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1 That happens all the time, and the same 

2 thing is likely to happen with this database. 

3 Even if it's true right now that the government 

4 queries it very rarely, that the queries are quite 

5 narrow, and that only 300 queries have been made 

6 thus far, even if all of that is true, and even if 

7 all of that satisfies you about the privacy 

8 safeguards that are in place right now, you don't 

9 know what those privacy safeguards are going to 

10 look like three years from now or five years from 

11 now. 

12 If there is another significant terrorist 

13 attack you can imagine the pressure that members 

14 of Congress will come under to change the 

15 parameters or the intelligence community will come 

16 under to change the parameters that govern access 

17 to the database. 

18 And that massive database of American's 

19 most sensitive information will be forever 

20 available to the intelligence community to access 

21 under whatever standards prevail at that 

22 particular point in time. 
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1 So that's just to say that there are 

2 problems that arise from the existence of this 

3 kind of centralized database.

4 MS. MARTIN: So I think the truth of the 

5 matter is, as you know, that the Supreme Court 

6 hasn't answered these questions, that if you start 

7 from the understanding that in order for the 

8 government to seize or obtain information inside 

9 the United States it needs to meet Fourth 

10 Amendment requirements, then you end up in one 

11 place. 

12 If of course there are many situations in 

13 which the Fourth Amendment has been held not to 

14 apply to government seizures of information. I 

15 think that as Jameel says the ability for the 

16 government to obtain information and create 

17 massive databases raises serious constitutional 

18 issues not yet addressed by the court. 

19 They're not just Fourth Amendment issues, 

20 they are also First Amendment issues about the 

21 impact that that has on people's exercise of their 

22 First Amendment rights. 
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1 I think the other constitutionally 

2 significant fact is that the seizures are being 

3 done in secret. And I know that some of us who 

4 worked on the 1994 amendments to FISA which 

5 allowed secret searches of American's homes and 

6 offices, but in a particularized way with a 

7 particularized warrant objected though to that 

8 authority because it allowed secret searches of 

9 American's homes and offices which would never be 

10 revealed to the people whose homes and offices had 

11 been searched.

12 That 1994 amendment was enacted before 

13 the Supreme Court held in the criminal context 

14 that notice of a search was constitutionally 

15 required and not just required as a matter of the 

16 criminal law.

17 So one of the questions is the 

18 applicability of that basic understanding to this 

19 kind of search and seizure. 

20 And I think on the question of less 

21 intrusive alternatives that Jameel is correct, but 

22 the initial question is what is the purpose? Less 
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1 intrusive than what? 

2 There is no doubt that if the government 

3 is able to create as large a database as possible 

4 and use as sophisticated analytics as possible 

5 that it will be able to generate information that 

6 will be useful from time to time in combating 

7 terrorism. There is no doubt about that. And in 

8 fact, we've seen that in other countries. I don't 

9 think that's the question. 

10 I think it's a much more complex 

11 question. I think it requires looking at the 

12 actual threats that the United States poses, 

13 including the scope of those threats, looking at 

14 the different ways to meet those threats and 

15 looking at the different alternatives that exist 

16 other than creating a database that's always 

17 available to query.

18 MR. ROBERTSON: I don't have I think a 

19 very useful view on least restrictive alternatives 

20 or on permanent databases versus accessing the 

21 databases that are in the hands of the vendors. 

22 But I have to tell you that what keeps 
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1 running through my mind as this conversation is 

2 going on is that this is not only a First 

3 Amendment problem and a Fourth Amendment problem, 

4 but NRA members, a Second Amendment problem. It 

5 is exactly the argument you'll get from the NRA 

6 about permanent records of gun ownership. Think 

7 about that.

8 MS. MARTIN: Which are not permitted of 

9 course.

10 MR. WAINSTEIN: I'm not going to bite on 

11 the Second Amendment issue. I'll leave that one 

12 for another day and another panel.

13 But I do want, you know, Jameel expressed 

14 some agreement with me, and we can't allow too 

15 much agreement between Jameel and me so I'm going 

16 to have to put a stop to that.

17 But he did, he made the point that, yes, 

18 you put legislation in place and it adapts to the 

19 situation and it adapts to the needs at that time. 

20 That's the way legislation is supposed to be 

21 imposed and that's why you have courts to make 

22 sure that any adaptations remain true to the 
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1 original intent of the original legislation. 

2 But I guess what I find concerning is the 

3 notion that if you have a strong but lawful and 

4 appropriate investigative tool in place now, that 

5 you should think twice about maintaining it 

6 because of some speculative concern that down the 

7 road it could be misused. 

8 I think that's a recipe for disaster. I 

9 think if we were to take that approach we'll end 

10 up walking right back into another 9/11. I don't 

11 think that's exactly what was suggesting, but that 

12 is a concern you see in some of the opinions out 

13 there in the real world. 

14 I think what instead we need to do is 

15 exactly what I believe we learned over the last 

16 decade, which is the value of oversight. And 

17 oversight, as a government employee, I'll tell you 

18 it drove me crazy because I spent half my life 

19 running up to Congress answering questions, 

20 talking to the FISA Court about their various 

21 concerns and questions. And I would have much 

22 preferred to stay in my office and work. And many 
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1 of my former colleagues who are here today 

2 probably feel the same way. 

3 But we learned the importance of that 

4 oversight and making sure that these things, these 

5 legislative tools stayed true to the legislation, 

6 true to the Constitution. But also because it 

7 helped to ensure the confidence of the American 

8 people when they knew that that oversight was 

9 effective and strong they had confidence in those 

10 tools. 

11 So instead of taking the approach of 

12 scaling back on the strength of appropriate 

13 investigative tools now out of some speculative 

14 concern of misuse in the future, just make sure 

15 you build in the safeguards and the oversight that 

16 will prevent that kind of misuse.

17 MS. BRAND: Thank you. I'm going to go 

18 back to the statute again, and I apologize if this 

19 seems like a quiz, but I want to get the benefit 

20 of your views, to the extent that you can provide 

21 them.

22 So if you look at section -- my question 
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1 is whether Section 215 can be interpreted to allow 

2 the government to get ongoing production of not 

3 yet created business records? 

4 So the document that purports to be a 

5 leaked 215 order would authorize, would require 

6 the company to provide on a daily basis records at 

7 a future date. So they haven't yet been created. 

8 And the language of Section 215 

9 authorizes that production of any tangible things, 

10 etcetera, even though this doesn't use the term 

11 business records, everyone understands this to be 

12 a business records provision.

13 Later in the section there's a proviso 

14 that it can only require the production of a 

15 tangible thing if such a thing can be obtained 

16 with a subpoena duces tecum, etcetera, grand jury 

17 subpoena. So I'd like your thoughts on that. 

18 And relatedly there is two sections 

19 earlier in FISA, there's a pen trap provision, 

20 right, which also is based on a relevance 

21 standard. Pen traps, as everyone knows, are 

22 inherently sort of ongoing and real time, unlike a 
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1 business records subpoena. 

2 In light of the existence of that 

3 provision and the limitations of the language in 

4 215, do you think that if this leaked order is 

5 actually correct, the language of 215 permits 

6 that? 

7 MR. BRADBURY: Yes, I think it does. I 

8 don't think the statute in talking about tangible 

9 items distinguishes when the tangible item is 

10 created. 

11 I think there are a lot of production 

12 orders under a relevance standard that require 

13 ongoing production of relevant materials. That's 

14 common in litigation. It can be common in 

15 administrative investigation. 

16 The items are created and are records by 

17 the time they're turned over, and the order is 

18 focused on a known existing category of records 

19 that are constantly being refreshed. But they are 

20 tangible, they are in existence. They are 

21 business records when they're obtained under the 

22 order. So I don't think that's a distinction the 
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1 statute requires or points to.

2 In terms of pen registers, trap and trace 

3 devices, that's a different technology. That's 

4 for when communications are occurring you're 

5 picking up the addressing information, the calling 

6 party number, etcetera. So those pen registers 

7 would be somewhere out in the network or on the 

8 switches, etcetera, in real time collecting all of 

9 the calling party number type information when 

10 calls are being placed.

11 And this is a business records order 

12 because it's actually with the telephone company 

13 it's much more efficient to go to their existing 

14 databases where they maintain this, the 

15 information you're looking for, for billing 

16 purposes. 

17 Can I just say one quick thing? Jameel 

18 has used the word surveillance in describing this 

19 215 order. This is not surveillance. 

20 Surveillance is a defined term under FISA. That 

21 includes getting the content of communications 

22 usually when they're being transmitted across a 
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1 wire, for example. 

2 This is not content, this is just 

3 metadata. It is not surveillance and it's not 

4 accurate to use the word surveillance. Thanks.

5 MR. JAFFER: I think that people can 

6 decide for themselves whether it's surveillance or 

7 not, in the same way they can decide for 

8 themselves whether or it's torture or not. You 

9 know, the statutes can define these things but the 

10 terms also have ordinary usage. 

11 You know, I have a different view of how 

12 the statute can be read. I don't think that the 

13 statute was meant to allow the government to 

14 require the production of records on an ongoing 

15 basis. 

16 If you take grand jury subpoenas as the 

17 relevant comparison, I don't think it's typical 

18 for grand jury subpoenas to require ongoing 

19 production in that way. 

20 And if you look at the legislative 

21 history of the statute there is no hint in the 

22 legislative history that anybody considered the 
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1 possibility that this statute could be used for 

2 the purposes it's now being used for. 

3 In fact, there was this testimony that 

4 then Attorney General John Ashcroft gave to 

5 Congress I think way back in 2004. It must have 

6 been 2004. And he was asked about the outer 

7 limits of the Section 215 authority, and at one 

8 point somebody asked, you know, could it even be 

9 used to require the production of DNA? And he 

10 said yes, I suppose it could. And that was sort 

11 of the outer limit.

12 But nobody ever suggested, nobody even 

13 asked the question, you know, could it be used to 

14 require ongoing production of any of these things 

15 you just said it could be used to compel the 

16 production of. Nobody even contemplated that 

17 possibility. 

18 So you know, I don't think that the 

19 statute can be read that way. I don't think that 

20 members of Congress who are advocates of this 

21 particular provision thought it would be read that 

22 way. 
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1 And Representative Sensenbrenner, who is 

2 often thought of as the grandfather or the father 

3 of this provision has spoken out over the last few 

4 weeks saying that it had never occurred to him 

5 that it would be used in this way.

6 So I think that there's really very, very 

7 little to support the proposition that the statute 

8 is now being used for the purposes it was designed 

9 for.

10 MS. MARTIN: It seems pretty clear that 

11 the government has argued that Section 215 can be 

12 read this way and that the FISA Judge has agreed 

13 with that argument. 

14 And I would, in order to evaluate and 

15 respond to that argument, I think it should be 

16 disclosed and then we can have a discussion about 

17 whether or not that interpretation by the 

18 government and the FISA Court is a reasonable or a 

19 correct one, especially given the existence of 

20 overlapping authorities under FISA for pen trap 

21 collection.

22 MR. ROBERTSON: I'll pass to Ken.
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1 MR. WAINSTEIN: I'll just second what 

2 Steve said. 

3 MS. WALD: Okay, back to FISA. This is a 

4 three part question. Maybe we'll open with Jim 

5 and then everybody will get a chance, but since he 

6 covered this in his opening remarks.

7 My initial question is whether or not 

8 judicial, effective judicial review is necessary 

9 to the constitutionality of a program or a 

10 statute. That's a general overview question, as 

11 one of the ingredients. 

12 But Jim, you felt that the court really 

13 had no legitimate role in passing on programmatic 

14 issues, as opposed to the individual 

15 applications. 

16 And so to you, I'm directing the 

17 question, what would you put in their place? If 

18 you took that particular kind of review away from 

19 the FISA Court would you be happy with just 

20 leaving it with congressional oversight and 

21 internal governmental, or what would you do? 

22 And the third question to all of you, 
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1 including Jim, it's been suggested and in some of 

2 the comments today too, that maybe you could beef 

3 up the FISA Court by having some kind of an ex 

4 parte, whether you call it amicus, ex parte, 

5 somebody representing the interests of the people 

6 involved who don't even know that they're the 

7 subject of a FISA Court proceeding, how that would 

8 work.

9 But one other, the other one would be on 

10 appeals. I mean technically the only people that 

11 can appeal a FISA order of this type is the 

12 government, if it doesn't get what it wants, or 

13 the holder of the records, although many of them 

14 complain that they feel that they are hindered 

15 because they don't even have access to the secret 

16 targeted, original targeting record, so that all 

17 they're getting are tasking orders. And so they 

18 don't know. They don't feel that they're equipped 

19 to do that, even if it was in their interest to do 

20 it.

21 But even more specifically the question 

22 has been raised in Congress about, and Kate raises 
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1 it again, is there some way that we can find out 

2 what the FISA Court does, because the majority of 

3 its opinions are secret.

4 I think in the last congressional 

5 reauthorization last December there was a request 

6 made and sort of a promise given that they would 

7 see, the government would see whether or not some 

8 form of redacted order, some form of redacted 

9 orders or opinions could be given, but as yet that 

10 hasn't happened. 

11 The question of whether there's some form 

12 of declassification which would give us the 

13 benefit of what the legal analysis is, especially 

14 when you are dealing with a program of great 

15 magnitude such as the 215, alleged 215 program 

16 appears to be. 

17 Okay, take it away.

18 MR. ROBERTSON: Well, that's about a 

19 quint part question I think. 

20 MS. WALD: I sneaked it in.

21 MR. ROBERTSON: But let me take the last 

22 part of it first. I was frankly stunned when I 
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1 read the other day that Eric Lichtblau story --

2 Sorry. I was stunned when I read Eric 

3 Lichtblau's story about the common law that's 

4 being developed within the FISA Court because I 

5 frankly have no familiarity with that. And 

6 everybody needs to understand that it was eight 

7 years ago that I was on the FISA Court. 

8 But in my experience there weren't any 

9 opinions. You approved a warrant application or 

10 you didn't, period. 

11 I think there was one famous opinion that 

12 was reviewed and reversed by the court of review 

13 back in 1902. But a body of law and a body of 

14 precedent growing up within FISA is not within my 

15 experience. And I don't know what the answer to 

16 that question is, how we get hold of it. 

17 I'm more comfortable dealing with your 

18 question about should there be some sort of an 

19 institutional amicus or opponent that deals with 

20 FISA issues. 

21 And I think I would like to say the 

22 answer is yes. My problem is I don't know what it 
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1 would be or exactly how it would work. 

2 I wasn't kidding when I suggested that 

3 perhaps some tweaking of the statute establishing 

4 the PCLOB might make the PCLOB that institution. 

5 But you're not going to ask for that and I don't 

6 know who it would be. 

7 There is, for example, within the defense 

8 department a group of people who are dedicated to 

9 the defense of detainees at Guantanamo. They are 

10 defense lawyers defending detainees that are being 

11 prosecuted by the other part of the defense 

12 department. 

13 So it is, there is some precedent for 

14 it. Whether there would be some institutional 

15 office adverse to the office that brings these 

16 applications to FISA or not, I don't know but it's 

17 conceivable. 

18 I'm going to pass on your question of the 

19 big constitutionality. I don't think the FISA 

20 Court itself, I'm not even sure they have the 

21 jurisdiction to pass on the constitutionality of 

22 the statute that they're carrying out. But I'm 
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1 not aware of any constitutional challenge to the 

2 FISA statute that's ever been brought before the 

3 FISA Court itself. It's got to be handled I think 

4 by Article III courts. 

5 I don't know if that answers all of your 

6 questions.

7 MS. WALD: Well, it goes part way. Thank 

8 you.

9 MR. ROBERTSON: Part way.

10 MS. WALD: The rest of the panel, 

11 anybody that wants to take a whack at any part of 

12 the quartite question.

13 MR. BRADBURY: Sure, I'll take a whack. 

14 In terms of whether judicial review is required by 

15 the Constitution, well to the extent the Fourth 

16 Amendment in a particular situation requires a 

17 warrant supported by particularized probable cause 

18 approved by a judge, then yes, judicial review is 

19 necessary.

20 And of course in the classic warrant 

21 context it usually is ex parte. The government 

22 comes in with an application with an affidavit and 
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1 a judge signs a warrant without an opinion often, 

2 typically. 

3 And the FISA Court is analogous to that 

4 model. And there are a few very small number of 

5 opinions but as Judge Robertson suggested, most of 

6 the time it's an elaborate application, it goes 

7 back and forth, and then it's finally approved by 

8 the court with the judge's signature. There may 

9 be memos internally at the court analyzing issues. 

10 I do think that Bob Litt, the general 

11 counsel of the DNI said in a congressional hearing 

12 the other day that they're scrambling, and I 

13 imagine they are, to declassify as many 

14 applications and prepare white papers and explain 

15 legal analysis to the extent consistent with 

16 national security. And I think they're doing 

17 that. 

18 In terms of replacing the court 

19 involvement, I think that again we need to 

20 understand the constitutional background is that 

21 foreign intelligence surveillance until 1978 

22 occurred without court involvement. 
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1 It was a unilateral action of the 

2 Executive Branch that led to lots of abuses and 

3 something the authority being used focused on 

4 domestic targets. 

5 FISA was a big compromise between the 

6 branches to bring courts in, and to the extent 

7 feasible and consistent with national security, to 

8 involve a court, like a warrant type situation in 

9 approving surveillance, types of surveillance that 

10 used to happen without any court approval. 

11 And then to create the intelligence 

12 committees on Congress for so Congress could be 

13 briefed in, in secure facilities, etcetera.

14 And that's, it is a very unusual animal 

15 and I agree with Judge Robertson that it raises 

16 some significant questions, for example, with 

17 programmatic approvals under 702. 

18 But prior to 702, the FISA Court was 

19 overwhelmed with individualized orders focused on 

20 foreign targets. It was just the court didn't 

21 understand why it was spending so much time 

22 worrying about non-U.S. persons' privacy outside 
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1 the United States.

2 So the 702 process was intended to make 

3 it easier where it's just focused on foreign 

4 targets to collect those communications in and out 

5 of the United States to those targets. 

6 So it's workable. I think it's a great 

7 story that Congress passed this legislation. And 

8 when Congress did pass it and consider it, all 

9 members of Congress were given the opportunity to 

10 be briefed on all the classified details of these 

11 programs and all the members of the intelligence 

12 committees were briefed.

13 Finally on the amicus participation, I'm 

14 not sure that's feasible because the amicus would 

15 have to know the classified details of the 

16 particular surveillance request and what's up. 

17 I mean the court is witting of all, of 

18 lots of detailed classified information supporting 

19 the probable cause determination or the reasonable 

20 suspicion determination and the context of the 

21 surveillance. The amicus couldn't, there's not a 

22 feasible way for --
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1 MS. WALD: Even with a security 

2 clearance? I mean for instance in the detainee 

3 analogy that somebody raised, I mean the 

4 government has a defense layer, as it were, and 

5 they do have security clearance, I don't know, 

6 that allow them to --

7 MR. BRADBURY: That's right. But number 

8 one, the defense lawyer is only given access to 

9 what the government is going -- is what's relevant 

10 to that particular prosecution. 

11 And the government of course always has 

12 the choice not to prosecute if the disclosure of 

13 some particular information to defense counsel is 

14 too worrisome.

15 In this context we're talking about doing 

16 surveillance of the most sensitive threats based 

17 on the most sensitive national security 

18 information, and the Executive Branch is only 

19 making it available to the court and to the 

20 congressional committees because it's required to 

21 by statute. 

22 And it's so sensitive that you'd need to 
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1 have an amicus that's really a permanent. It 

2 would probably have to be an officer of the 

3 government, whether of the court or of the 

4 Executive Branch that would be fully participating 

5 in the process and cleared into the same things 

6 that the court receives.

7 MS. BRAND: Just to inject one other idea 

8 into your comments perhaps, and this has sort of 

9 been alluded to, but the federal public defender's 

10 office is part of the judiciary essentially, 

11 employees of the judiciary hired to oppose the 

12 government and I wondered if something like, a 

13 model like that would be feasible? 

14 MS. WALD: How about some other panel 

15 members on anything they want.

16 MR. JAFFER: So I think in the usual case 

17 before the FISA Court it would be good to have 

18 somebody with access to classified information who 

19 could play an adversarial role within the process 

20 that already takes place.

21 I'm not convinced that with respect to 

22 broader legal questions like is it consistent with 
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1 the Fourth Amendment for the government to collect 

2 all American's telephony metadata. I'm not 

3 convinced that that kind of question has to be 

4 decided behind closed doors. 

5 I don't see why the court couldn't 

6 articulate that question publicly, notify the 

7 public that it was going to consider the legal 

8 implications of a proposal to collect all 

9 American's telephony metadata, and allow anyone 

10 who wanted to, to file an amicus brief. 

11 I think that Mr. Bradbury starts from, I 

12 think it's clear, a different assumption than I 

13 do. His assumption is that everything that is 

14 classified and that has been classified is 

15 properly classified, and that is not my view. 

16 My view is that a lot of these programs, 

17 well, some of the programs that have been 

18 disclosed over the last few weeks and the last few 

19 years should never have been secret in the first 

20 place. They should have been disclosed to the 

21 public, at least the general parameters of the 

22 program should have been disclosed to the public, 
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1 both because it's important that the political 

2 leaders who put these programs in place be held 

3 accountable, but also so that the judicial process 

4 can actually function in the way that it's 

5 supposed to in an adversarial fashion. 

6 And then you know just to expand on 

7 something that Judge Robertson said earlier, you 

8 know if we're asking the question whether FISA, 

9 whether the oversight of the FISA Court is 

10 sufficient I think it's important to keep in mind 

11 that there are structural limitations on what the 

12 FISA Court can do.

13 So even apart from these questions about, 

14 you know, is it appropriate that the Chief Justice 

15 of the Supreme Court appoints all of the FISA C 

16 judges, even apart from questions like that there 

17 are structural limitations on what the FISA Court 

18 can do. 

19 And some of those have to do with the 

20 court's jurisdiction. The court doesn't have the 

21 jurisdiction to consider First Amendment 

22 implications of the government's proposed 
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1 surveillance. It doesn't have the jurisdiction to 

2 consider the facial validity of a statute like the 

3 FISA Amendments Act. And the court itself has 

4 said that in one of the opinions that was made 

5 public a few years ago. 

6 And the court doesn't have the authority 

7 to consider the constitutionality of the limits 

8 on its own jurisdiction. 

9 One of the arguments we made in Amnesty v 

10 Clapper, which was our constitutional challenge to 

11 the FISA Amendments Act was that the role that the 

12 court was playing with respect to surveillance 

13 under Section 702 was different from the role that 

14 Article III courts are permitted to play under the 

15 Constitution. 

16 They weren't considering individualized 

17 suspicion allegations. They weren't making 

18 determinations of probable cause. The government 

19 wasn't appearing before the court identifying 

20 proposed surveillance targets or proposed 

21 facilities to be targeted.

22 Instead the court was making these, and 
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1 is making these judgments about the 

2 appropriateness of the government's programmatic 

3 procedures relating to targeting and minimization. 

4 And that's something that no Article III court has 

5 ever done in the past and is quite foreign to the 

6 kinds of things that Article III judges are 

7 accustomed to doing. 

8 That argument we made before, initially 

9 before a judge in the Southern District of New 

10 York, but it wasn't heard because our plaintiffs 

11 were found ultimately to lack standing. 

12 But the point, the narrow point I'm 

13 trying to make is just that that is a question 

14 that the FISA Court doesn't even have the 

15 jurisdiction to consider. The fact that other 

16 courts aren't considering it, I think makes it all 

17 even more problematic.

18 MS. MARTIN: So I don't know the answer 

19 to your question, Judge, but I do think it's 

20 important to distinguish and probably limit the 

21 role of the FISA Court. 

22 I think that it was created, as Judge 
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1 Robertson said, to issue warrants in the way that 

2 judges have always issued warrants. 

3 The fact that it is now creating a body 

4 of common law is extraordinary, and I'm not sure 

5 that is an appropriate function of the court. 

6 The fact that that body of common law is 

7 being created in secret of course compounds the 

8 problem of it being created ex parte. 

9 And the fact that the administration, 

10 although I take that their promise to try to 

11 disclose more information is sincere, I wish that 

12 they would work on that before they described to 

13 the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal 

14 legal opinions which are still classified. We 

15 could use the legal opinions themselves. 

16 But fundamentally I think we need some 

17 kind of system where a traditional Article III 

18 court, not the FISA Court, is looking at these 

19 questions that have to do with what does the law 

20 allow and what's constitutional. 

21 And I just in that connection want to 

22 push back on the notion that somehow this might be 
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1 legal even without court involvement because it 

2 was done that way before 1978. I disagree with 

3 that.

4 But I think more importantly is that we 

5 mustn't forget that during the Bush Administration 

6 when the FISA statute was exclusive, it explicitly 

7 said you may not conduct this kind of surveillance 

8 except pursuant to a FISA Court order, and if you 

9 do so it is a crime. 

10 The Bush Administration in secret 

11 violated those provisions and made up a series of 

12 flimsy legal arguments for doing so. But most of 

13 all, forgot to tell the American people that it 

14 was taking the new view that it was no longer 

15 bound by FISA. And we only found that out as a 

16 result of leaks to the press, which is not the way 

17 the system should work, you know. 

18 And similarly, just because Mr. Wainstein 

19 keeps talking about the efficacy of oversight 

20 here. We have a situation during this 

21 administration where two members of the oversight 

22 committees have repeatedly raised questions about 
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1 what was happening. They have been repeatedly 

2 blocked from bringing those questions to the 

3 public. And now here we are as a result of an 

4 unauthorized leak.

5 MS. WALD: Okay, Kate. Ken, you get the 

6 last word, right of reply.

7 MR. WAINSTEIN: Okay, thank you very 

8 much, Judge. I'd like to address the amicus idea, 

9 the idea that there should possibly be some other 

10 party that would take the side of the person who's 

11 to be surveiled in a particular FISA application. 

12 A couple of points to keep in mind. One 

13 is something that Steve mentioned a few moments 

14 ago. Keep in mind that the notion of a judge 

15 receiving and assessing an application for a 

16 search is not new. 

17 As Steve said, this is exactly what we do 

18 in the criminal side. When I go to judges like I 

19 did with Judge Robertson to get a search warrant 

20 as a prosecutor, or to get a Title III wiretap 

21 warrant against somebody, that was done ex parte. 

22 It was the prosecutor, maybe the agent and nobody 
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1 on the other side, nobody representing the person 

2 whose house is to be searched or the person whose 

3 telephone calls were to be listened in to. And 

4 that's the paradigm and I think it's important to 

5 keep that in mind. 

6 You might see, you might be able to sense 

7 a theme of mine, which is that this construct on 

8 the national security side for these investigative 

9 activities all is drawn from parallels and origins 

10 on the criminal side. So this idea of an ex parte 

11 consideration of warrants is not something that's 

12 out of the ordinary. In fact, that is the norm.

13 And the point of that of course is that 

14 we trust judges. We trust the judges to look, you 

15 know, scrutinize the showing, and in the case of a 

16 warrant to make sure that there's probable cause 

17 to support that warrant. 

18 And I can tell you from experience that 

19 judges on the FISA Court, they are Article III 

20 judges they are, you know, contrary to what some 

21 people have suggested not at all in the 

22 government's pocket. They are very independent 
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1 and they put us through our paces to make sure 

2 that what we give them measures up to their 

3 standards and the standards in the law.

4 But keeping those two points in mind, the 

5 idea of some sort of counter-party is an 

6 intriguing one. I think Steve's right that there 

7 are a lot of practical issues with that in terms 

8 of the sensitivity of the information that the 

9 FISA Court judges see. They see the most 

10 sensitive information in the intelligence 

11 community.

12 But to the extent that that would help 

13 establish greater public confidence in the 

14 process, I think is something that the board and 

15 others should look at, whether it's practical or 

16 not, it's hard to say. 

17 In addition, Kate mentioned the concern 

18 about the transparency. You know, same point 

19 there. To the extent that the government can be 

20 more transparent with its legal theories, or if 

21 the FISA Court, and I don't know whether it can 

22 because I haven't seen any of these opinions, but 
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1 if the FISA Court can disclose some sanitized 

2 version of these opinions, it's just good for 

3 public education, but it's good because these 

4 programs only work so long as we have the 

5 confidence in the American public that they're 

6 being conducted honestly and reasonably and 

7 consistent with the Statute.

8 MS. WALD: Thank you.

9 MS. BRAND: Thank you. My clock here 

10 says 11:17. We're scheduled to go to 11:30, I 

11 believe. Do the other members of the panel have 

12 questions?

13 MR. MEDINE: Yeah, I have a question 

14 about the 702 program. Steve and Kate have 

15 touched on it. 

16 Under that program by definition the 

17 target is non-U.S. persons outside the United 

18 States, but of course inevitably some of those 

19 conversations are with U.S. persons in the United 

20 States. 

21 My question is whether that raises a 

22 Fourth Amendment issue by collecting and using 
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1 that information involving U.S. persons, and if 

2 so, are the minimization procedures in place 

3 sufficient to meet Fourth Amendment concerns? 

4 MR. BRADBURY: Well, I guess I'm going to 

5 go back a little bit to history again. There's 

6 been some discussion, Ken mentioned changing 

7 technology, you know prior to 1978 and when FISA 

8 was first enacted almost all international 

9 communications in and out of the United States 

10 were carried by satellite, not even covered by 

11 FISA.

12 Over time that migrated to fiber optic 

13 cables in and out of the U.S. Suddenly if you're 

14 conducting that surveillance on a wire in the 

15 U.S., even though it's international 

16 communication, suddenly it's covered by FISA, 

17 individualized orders required. And that was 

18 okay. It was workable. 

19 But then 9/11 hit, huge problem. We 

20 suddenly needed to know about all suspicious 

21 communications from thousands of potential 

22 terrorist dots outside of the United States. When 
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1 are they communicating in or out of the U.S.

2 Of course that led to the President's 

3 special authority to conduct that surveillance. 

4 Very controversial, the disclosures, the debates.

5 Congress grappled with it, ultimately 

6 resolved on a statutory solution, 702, which again 

7 is targeted at non-U.S. persons reasonably 

8 believed to be outside the United States. 

9 But it is particularly focused on 

10 communications in and out of the United States 

11 because just as it was right after 9/11 when the 

12 President gave that authorization, those are the 

13 most important communications you want to know 

14 about if you're talking about a foreign terrorist 

15 suspect communicating to somebody you don't know 

16 inside the United States, potential planning, 

17 etcetera. 

18 And 702 enables court involvement, 

19 review, approval of procedures to ensure the 

20 targeting is focused outside the United States but 

21 I don't think the Fourth Amendment and the 

22 particularized warrant requirement of the Fourth 
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1 Amendment would apply to those communications if 

2 you're targeting a non-U.S. person reasonably 

3 believed to be outside the United States just 

4 because some of the communications happen to come 

5 in and out of the U.S. if you're not focused on a 

6 U.S. person whose privacy interests you're 

7 attempting to invade. 

8 And whenever you do get into that sphere 

9 FISA specifically requires individualized 

10 surveillance orders that are very much like 

11 warrants, supported by probable cause. 

12 Although I still wouldn't say they're 

13 warrants because it's not probable cause to 

14 believe a crime is being committed or has been 

15 committed. It's focused on use of a facility. 

16 And it's also important to remember that 

17 702 is not limited to terrorism and 

18 counterterrorism. What Congress authorized in 702 

19 is any foreign intelligence gathering purpose, so 

20 it can be much broader. And it's not, it's 

21 actually much broader than the President's special 

22 authorization in that regard.
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1 MR. JAFFER: Well, the government 

2 conceded in Amnesty v Clapper that surveillance 

3 that takes place under 702 implicates the Fourth 

4 Amendment and requires the government to establish 

5 reasonableness. And in fact, they filed a summary 

6 judgement brief in the district court explaining 

7 their view that the statute was reasonable, in 

8 part because of the minimization procedures that 

9 you just referenced. 

10 You know at the time we didn't have the 

11 minimization procedures so it was very difficult 

12 for us to answer that argument. 

13 Now we do have the minimization 

14 procedures, and one thing that's clear from the 

15 minimization procedures is that the use of these 

16 words, incidental and inadvertent is highly 

17 misleading. 

18 The collection of American's 

19 communications under this statute is not 

20 incidental or inadvertent. As Mr. Bradbury just 

21 said, those are the communications that the 

22 government was most interested in. The 
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1 minimization procedures allow the government to 

2 retain all of that information, if it's foreign 

3 intelligence information, forever. Even if it's 

4 not foreign intelligence information for up to 

5 five years. 

6 The procedures allow the government to 

7 collect and retain and disseminate attorney, 

8 client communications. There are some are 

9 restrictions for communications between attorneys 

10 and clients who have been indicted in the United 

11 States, but that's a very narrow category compared 

12 to the larger category of attorney, client 

13 communications more generally.

14 So the statute was designed to allow the 

15 government to access American's communications. 

16 The procedures reflect that design. And the 

17 government has conceded that the Fourth Amendment 

18 is not irrelevant to the question of whether this 

19 statute is lawful or not.

20 So the I think you're asking the right 

21 question. My view is the answer to your question 

22 is the minimization procedures are insufficient, 
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1 insufficient to protect American's privacy.

2 MR. MEDINE: Steve you want a rebuttal?

3 MR. BRADBURY: Can I just say one quick 

4 thing? If I said this I misspoke. I did not mean 

5 to say the Fourth Amendment is irrelevant or does 

6 not apply. 

7 I think what I said, what I meant to say 

8 is the warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment 

9 wouldn't apply. It would still have to be 

10 reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and that's 

11 a special analysis in the foreign intelligence 

12 context.

13 MS. MARTIN: Well, I would agree that the 

14 Fourth Amendment applies and I think there's a 

15 serious question about the applicability of the 

16 warrant requirement when the seizure is taking 

17 place in the United States, the seizure is 

18 deliberately intended to obtain the communications 

19 contents of Americans located in the United 

20 States. 

21 And the argument that was made during 

22 consideration of 702 is that the reason why you 
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1 didn't need a warrant was that an American talking 

2 in the United States to somebody else doesn't know 

3 whether or not their conversation is being 

4 eavesdropped on because that other person could be 

5 the subject of a warrant and could be wiretapped. 

6 But what you do know and what you, I 

7 think, have a right to know is that if you're 

8 communicating inside the United States with 

9 someone, the government's not collecting the 

10 contents unless it has a warrant on you or a 

11 warrant on the person you're talking to. And so 

12 that's not the case under 702. 

13 Then the question becomes, well, what 

14 about the practicalities? How do we do this? And 

15 I would urge the board to look at proposals that 

16 have been talked about by ex-NSA officials which 

17 basically would set up a system where by the 

18 information might be acquired by the computers but 

19 before the government could access the 

20 communications of Americans, it would need to go 

21 back to the FISA Court and make a probable cause 

22 showing and get a FISA warrant.
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1 MR. ROBERTSON: That indeed is one of the 

2 recommendations of the Constitution Project report 

3 that I mentioned when I made my opening remarks. 

4 This concept of minimization, 

5 minimization is one of the great classic 

6 euphemisms of our time. Nobody really knows 

7 exactly what it means and I think the board could 

8 profitably study that subject in great detail and 

9 for weeks.

10 MR. WAINSTEIN: I'd just like to clarify 

11 one point Kate mentioned and I might have the 

12 phrasing a little bit wrong, but you know, some of 

13 these surveillances under 702 could be intended to 

14 collect communications of person in the U.S.

15 Just to make clear, there's actually a 

16 specific provision in 702 that says you cannot do 

17 reverse targeting. I think, David, you mentioned 

18 that. 

19 So that you cannot, the NSA cannot target 

20 somebody who's overseas for the purpose of 

21 collecting a communication within the United 

22 States. What 702 does permit, and this is I think 
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1 Kate and I are on the same page on this, is you 

2 can target somebody who's overseas, knowing that 

3 you're going to collect his or her communications 

4 with other people overseas, but also with 

5 communications that are inside the United States, 

6 which often, as Steve mentioned, are the most 

7 valuable or most concerning communications because 

8 they might indicate the existence of the plot.

9 But just you have to keep in mind that if 

10 you were to try to impose a warrant requirement, 

11 we discussed all this in the lead-up to 702. If 

12 you try to impose a warrant requirement of some 

13 kind to protect the communications of the U.S. 

14 person who might be communicating with someone 

15 who's rightly targeted overseas, then that same 

16 notion would apply to, presumably apply to our 

17 12333 collection around the world. 

18 You know, and FISA was drafted 

19 specifically to work around that collection to 

20 make sure that didn't get hindered by the FISA 

21 order requirement. And obviously the same thing 

22 could to Title III. And so it would be a major 
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1 paradigm shift in our collections.

2 MR. MEDINE: A quick response from Kate.

3 MS. MARTIN: I just want to, I think Ken 

4 and I would agree that the reverse targeting 

5 provision in 702 prevents the government from 

6 using 702 surveillance in order to obtain the 

7 communications of a specific known American. 

8 But if the intent of the government is to 

9 target someone overseas in order to find out and 

10 obtain the communications of people that are in 

11 the United States who are talking to somebody 

12 overseas, that is the purpose of 702. 

13 MS. BRAND: We're almost out of time for 

14 this panel but I know Beth has one question. I 

15 don't know if Jim has a question, but if we can --

16 MR. DEMPSEY: I'll just make a comment 

17 but go ahead.

18 MS. BRAND: Okay, then go ahead. If we 

19 could just make it very, very brief.

20 MS. COLLINS COOK: I was actually at the 

21 risk of assigning homework going to ask that you 

22 all consider my question and if you are so moved 
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1 provide information afterwards to keep us on 

2 track.

3 This is following on some of what we've 

4 been talking about, and Kate, you came close to 

5 what I was thinking about. But looking at what 

6 happened in 2006 with multi-point or roving 

7 surveillance, when there was some uncertainty as 

8 to how an authorization that was granted by the 

9 court would be implemented in a given case, a 

10 return requirement was imposed. 

11 And my question is whether or not when 

12 you're dealing with these more programmatic or 

13 bulk authorizations whether it would be 

14 appropriate to impose a return requirement through 

15 a statutory provision. So whether it's for 702 or 

16 whether it would be for this, to use y'all's 

17 phrase, programmatic collection under 215 of 

18 business records.

19 So I would appreciate your thoughts on 

20 that and I will also pose this to panel three, so 

21 y'all should come back for panel three and 

22 hopefully folks will have some opinions on that.
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1 MR. MEDINE: And just to add to Beth's 

2 point, 702 provides for judicial review of 

3 directives and the question is can the judge's 

4 actually review specific targeting requests or 

5 only just the broad program as well? And if not, 

6 should they be able to under 702?

7 Jim.

8 MR. DEMPSEY: Thank you very much to all 

9 the witnesses. 

10 I have an observation and I have some 

11 homework as well. My observation is up until the 

12 very end we really only heard one concrete 

13 recommendation for what might be changed, which 

14 was Judge Robertson's suggestion which a number of 

15 the witnesses engaged with about creating at least 

16 for some of the activities of the FISA Court some 

17 adversarialness to the process. 

18 I'll just say that I really think it's 

19 incumbent upon the civil liberties community, of 

20 which I consider myself part I guess, but really 

21 incumbent upon the civil liberties community to 

22 develop some concrete recommendations for moving 
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1 forward here. 

2 It might be that your bottom line is the 

3 215 program is inappropriate and should be ended 

4 completely. But I think that whether it's 702 or 

5 215, you really have to get more granular and more 

6 specific in terms of some concrete suggestions.

7 Now at the tail end we started to get to 

8 another one here which was this idea that's 

9 apparently reflected in the Constitution Project 

10 report about acquisition versus then a second 

11 search, a search, the particularized search. 

12 That's another concrete change. 

13 I'll say one thing to Steve and to Ken. 

14 I think it's very important for people like you to 

15 engage in that process as well. And again, Ken 

16 started to at the end in terms of engaging with 

17 the idea about the adversarial process. 

18 The way this was set up it was a little 

19 bit we have two critics of the programs and two 

20 defenders of the programs. I really think that 

21 there's a role for former government officials to 

22 play. It can't be that everything is perfect. It 
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1 can't be that no changes can be made, that no 

2 additional improvements or checks and balances or 

3 controls, etcetera, can be made.

4 And a little bit I know you're put in 

5 this position of somebody says it's terrible and 

6 you've got to say it's great. I really think both 

7 the civil liberties community has to be more 

8 specific in its criticisms and its forward looking 

9 suggestions, and I think former government 

10 officials, including those who helped design these 

11 programs have, I think, a role to play in offering 

12 concrete suggestions for how to improve them. 

13 And then my sort of follow-up, my 

14 homework assignment, I guess to take Beth's term, 

15 I would like to see more specific engagement on 

16 the question of minimization. 

17 Judge Robertson is a hundred percent 

18 correct in terms of the misunderstanding at least, 

19 or the use of that term in a way that it becomes a 

20 mantra and no one really has dug in on that. 

21 There is a document online, whether it's valid or 

22 not, whether it's still right or not, I think 
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1 there's a document online that, assuming that 

2 minimization procedures looked like what is in 

3 that document, what's the reaction to them? How 

4 do they play out here? Is it good, is it bad, is 

5 it indifferent?

6 Secondly, I think there's some follow-up 

7 to be done on the legislative history of Section 

8 215. Everybody talks about relevance. Relevance 

9 didn't come into the statute until 2005. In 2001 

10 the statute said the documents are sought for an 

11 authorized investigation. Relevance came in 

12 2005. 

13 And I think it's worth thinking about 

14 what was the possible intent of Congress in 

15 shifting from sought for an investigation to 

16 specific and articulable facts giving reason to 

17 believe that they are relevant to an 

18 investigation. Did that have any impact? Should 

19 it be viewed as having an impact?

20 And then on the Zazi case I would like to 

21 see some, whatever there is on the public record 

22 in terms of Jameel had mentioned that. I'd like 
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1 to see somebody dig in a little bit and spell that 

2 out for us. 

3 MS. BRAND: Thank you. Thank you, Jim. 

4 We're out of the time, unfortunately. But thank 

5 you to all the panelists for being here. 

6 As I mentioned before, anyone on the 

7 panel or in the audience is welcome to submit 

8 written comments. Diane Janosek or Sue Reingold 

9 can give you the details on how to do that. Thank 

10 you.

11 MR. MEDINE: And thanks. We're going to 

12 take an hour break for lunch and we'll resume at 

13 12:30. 

14 (Off the record)

15 MR. MEDINE: Good afternoon. We're going 

16 to begin the second session of our program today 

17 and this is the section that will focus on 

18 technology issues. 

19 Jim Dempsey and I will be co-moderating 

20 this. And I'll turn it to Jim to make 

21 introductions and kick things off. 

22 MR. DEMPSEY: So good afternoon again 
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1 everybody, and thanks to our afternoon panelists 

2 as well for giving their time to us on this 

3 important set of issues. 

4 Our panelists for the afternoon are four 

5 of the leading experts, and sort of one of the 

6 questions or one of the challenges facing the 

7 PCLOB, which is bridging the gap between 

8 technology and policy.

9 So we have Steve Bellovin, currently a 

10 professor in the computer science department at 

11 Columbia University, many, many years at Bell 

12 Labs, one of the country's leading experts on 

13 computer security issues, as well as other issues 

14 at the intersection of technology and policy.

15 Secondly, is Marc Rotenberg, long time 

16 president and head of the Electronic Privacy 

17 Information Center, and again a nationally and 

18 internationally recognized expert on privacy 

19 issues.

20 Ashkan Soltani is an independent 

21 researcher on privacy and security issues, among 

22 other things was a consultant to the Wall Street 
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1 Journal on its extensive series of articles on 

2 Internet privacy issues. 

3 And finally, Danny Weitzner, currently at 

4 the computer science and artificial lab at MIT, 

5 former White House science and technology policy 

6 advisor, co-founder of the Center for Democracy 

7 and Technology, and again, a long time participant 

8 in these debates. 

9 So again we will adhere to the rules we 

10 established this morning, five minute opening 

11 remarks from each of the panelists, followed by a 

12 two minute response by the panelists to comments 

13 made by their fellow panelists and then questions 

14 by the Chairman David Medine and myself. 

15 And as with this morning and as with 

16 members of the public, the record of this 

17 proceeding will remain open until August 1. 

18 Several of the speakers on the second 

19 panel have already submitted either final or draft 

20 comments, which we're grateful for, but they will 

21 have, like everybody else, until August 1 to, as 

22 they say on Capitol Hill, revise and extend. 
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1 So Steve, please.

2 MR. BELLOVIN: Thanks, Jim. And let me 

3 add a brief disclaimer, I wear many hats in this 

4 town. Today the only one I'm wearing is as a 

5 private citizen, nothing else. 

6 And what I'm going to be saying is based 

7 on my draft remarks. You have copies of them but 

8 for anyone else, they're already on my web page. 

9 You can find it easily with your favorite search 

10 engines. 

11 But these are draft remarks, draft 

12 comments. I need to just make sure I've got the 

13 facts right, let alone my analysis in writing. So 

14 take it with a grain of salt, this is still a 

15 draft.

16 So I'm a computer scientist, not a 

17 lawyer, but it means when I look at a system, I 

18 look at it from a technical perspective. And when 

19 I see a system the first two questions I ask are, 

20 why was it built that way and what else can I do 

21 with it? 

22 And you can say that that's my training 
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1 as a computer scientist, alternatively that's why 

2 I became a computer scientist because that's in my 

3 personality. Gee, shiny, pretty, what can I make 

4 it do?

5 As a privacy scholar and technologist, I 

6 also know that one of the things that's the 

7 biggest problem in privacy is not the primary uses 

8 of data collected for a legitimate reason but the 

9 secondary uses that are often found later on for 

10 some particular database. And that's another part 

11 of the attitude I took towards this. 

12 And so when I look at this large database 

13 of phone records and presumably Internet metadata 

14 as well, my first question is, why does somebody 

15 need to build such a large database of phone 

16 company records when the phone company has these 

17 records? 

18 I could come up with three possible 

19 answers. One is retention. Perhaps the phone 

20 companies do not retain the data for as long as is 

21 necessary. The EU has a data retention law for 

22 about two years covering a wide variety of 
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1 communications metadata. But that in itself is 

2 controversial. 

3 In the U.S. one reason why it will be 

4 controversial is we don't have workshops and 

5 hearings as much on what private companies are 

6 allowed to do with their data, unlike in Europe. 

7 Having a large telephone company maintain 

8 data for longer might be worse for privacy. I 

9 don't know. But it certainly is an issue. A data 

10 retention law is not an automatic answer to a 

11 privacy question.

12 A second possible answer that occurred to 

13 me is the efficiency of search, and in particular 

14 the indices. If you have a large amount of data 

15 it's often organized to make it efficient to 

16 answer the kinds of queries you need to answer for 

17 your business purposes.

18 Arguably the phone companies do not have 

19 the right indices for the kinds of queries that 

20 the intelligence community wants to do and needs 

21 to do. And that's perfectly reasonable for the 

22 phone company not to. They don't have the same 
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1 questions. 

2 It's a little harder to say what should 

3 be done about that other than a copy. Asking a 

4 phone company, could you build this index for me 

5 is revealing of the kinds of questions an 

6 intelligence agent, analyst might want to ask and 

7 that could easily, very plausibly be seen as a 

8 serious security issue.

9 The third answer, and the one to me that 

10 I think poses the most difficult legal and policy 

11 questions is machine learning, data mining, call 

12 it what you will. 

13 If you don't know what it is just think 

14 of the phrase you've all seen in the press, heard 

15 on the radio. I've heard several NPR stories in 

16 the last year on big data. That's what this is, 

17 big data.

18 What can you do with it? What can you 

19 learn from it? It's a powerful technique but it's 

20 also one very susceptible to abuse. Machine 

21 learning finds things out by correlation, not 

22 causality. It can find out very, very surprising 
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1 things. 

2 The best example I can give you, go back 

3 and read last year's New York Times Magazine 

4 article on Target and the kinds of analyses they 

5 were able to do with their customer base. 

6 But the thing that makes it most 

7 relevant, relevant, yes, that's an interesting 

8 word here, isn't it? Machine learning often 

9 requires a very large collection of data that 

10 defines normal, precisely so you can say this is 

11 abnormal because it's different than normal. 

12 This means that by extension everything 

13 is relevant, which makes for an interesting 

14 reading of the law. It's not necessarily wrong 

15 from a technical perspective. 

16 I don't know what it means to do a Fourth 

17 Amendment search which requires particularity when 

18 it's data that's already there. We need to have a 

19 legal understanding of what relevance and 

20 particularity mean in the context of data mining.

21 We're going to have to go short because 

22 I'm running very short on time. Metadata, you can 
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1 consult my written comments. Metadata, I look at 

2 it from a technical perspective, a legal 

3 perspective, third party doctrine, something I'm 

4 giving to somebody else. 

5 Can I look at this from a technical 

6 perspective and say this piece of the technical 

7 data is going to somebody else? It turns out that 

8 it requires a very detailed technical analysis in 

9 order to understand that. It cannot be done 

10 easily. 

11 There's a lot of invisible things that 

12 can change the answer, and it's ridiculous to have 

13 an expectation of privacy that depend on that.

14 How do we enforce the search limits that 

15 the court has supposedly imposed? Can we do it by 

16 technical mechanisms? Can we do it by auditing? 

17 Do we do it on the server side or on the client 

18 side? Both have problems. 

19 Finally, there's the role of the system 

20 administrator. In a recently declassified NSA 

21 publication noted that system administrators, 

22 because they have all privileges, are among the 
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1 very biggest security risks. This was once a 

2 classified statement. I don't know why since any 

3 system administrator knows it, and I've been doing 

4 that for almost fifty years. 

5 But looking at the technical, 

6 organizational roles of the system administrator 

7 is a very important thing that the board needs to 

8 look at to understand the real security of the 

9 system against the privacy against insider misuse.

10 MR. DEMPSEY: Steven, thank you. Marc.

11 MR. ROTENBERG: Thank you very much. I 

12 want to begin by saying following Steve's comments 

13 that I am not now a computer scientist. I was a 

14 computer scientist and decided to go to law school 

15 to help address the lawyer shortage in Washington, 

16 D.C., and you know, I've contributed my time to 

17 solving that problem.

18 In this statement that I've submitted I 

19 outlined some of the steps that EPIC has taken to 

20 date and made some recommendations to the 

21 oversight board. 

22 I do want to say that over the years at 
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1 EPIC I've had the opportunity to work with many 

2 great computer scientists and technical experts. 

3 And the one thing that they have taught me is a 

4 healthy skepticism of technical solutions to what 

5 are ultimately social or policy problems, which is 

6 a point that I'll come back to. 

7 In brief, let me first describe the steps 

8 that we have taken. This may be of interest to 

9 the oversight board. As many of you know, we 

10 filed a mandamus petition with the Supreme Court 

11 this week challenging the legal authority under 

12 which the Verizon order was issued by the Foreign 

13 Intelligence Surveillance Court.

14 This order was based on Section 215 of 

15 the PATRIOT Act and it requires the 

16 telecommunications firm to provide on an ongoing 

17 basis all of the call detail records, that's the 

18 phrase in the order, also described as telephone 

19 metadata, for all Verizon customers on an ongoing 

20 basis. 

21 We looked very closely at that statute. 

22 We read an enormous amount of commentary. We 
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1 simply concluded that the court did not have the 

2 legal authority to issue that order. 

3 We believe that the Supreme Court was the 

4 only court that we could bring this claim to, and 

5 that's a very important part of the analysis I 

6 think. 

7 Even as we talk about changes in the law, 

8 we have to answer the question under current law, 

9 is this surveillance activity lawful? 

10 The second thing that EPIC has done is to 

11 begin the formal petition process to the NSA 

12 Director, General Alexander. 

13 The National Security Agency, like all 

14 federal agencies, is subject to the Administrative 

15 Procedures Act and when it engages in a 

16 substantial change in agency practice, it actually 

17 has an obligation to notify the public of its 

18 determination. 

19 Now of course there are certain rules, 

20 almost unique rules that apply to the NSA, and we 

21 understand that. But that doesn't get the agency 

22 out from under its fundamental responsibility to 
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1 be accountable to the public. 

2 And as we did with the Department of 

3 Homeland Security when they made the decision to 

4 deploy the airport body scanners for primary 

5 screening and that challenge was ultimately 

6 successful in the D.C. Circuit, we think on a 

7 similar basis the National Security Agency should 

8 give the public the opportunity to comment on this 

9 domestic surveillance program. 

10 We have also asked the Federal 

11 Communications Commission to determine whether 

12 Verizon may have violated Section 222 of the 

13 Communications Act when it turned over the 

14 customer records to the National Security Agency. 

15 The FCC plays a critical role in safeguarding the 

16 privacy interests of American telephone consumers.

17 And finally, we've pursued a series of 

18 Freedom of Information Act requests for some of 

19 the key legal documents that have been thus far 

20 kept secret. 

21 If you have suggestions for more things 

22 that we should be doing please send an email 
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1 marc@epic.org. We're very interested.

2 In brief, let me summarize the key points 

3 of my written statement. The first point that I'd 

4 like to make, as I did already, is that we think 

5 the legal authority was exceeded in the Section 

6 215 activity. It's set out in the petition in 

7 considerable detail, summarized in our statement.

8 The second point as to metadata is that 

9 this information is far more detailed and far more 

10 revealing of person activity than typically the 

11 underlying content in a communication. 

12 And in this sense current law, U.S. law 

13 in particular, is almost upside down with respect 

14 to the privacy interest. As many of you know, our 

15 laws have evolved following a paradigm which 

16 basically distinguishes between the content of a 

17 message, what's in the envelope, and the header 

18 information contained on the exterior of the 

19 envelope. And we've carried that forward with the 

20 contents of a telephone communication, as opposed 

21 to the CPNI, the call detail information. 

22 But that analysis, you know, which might 
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1 have worked forty years ago when Smith versus 

2 Maryland was decided, is almost unrelated to 

3 current circumstance because in a digital word, as 

4 opposed to an analog word, it's the digital data, 

5 it's the transactional data that enables the 

6 linking, the chaining, the profiling, the 

7 matching, the assessing, the ranking, the rating. 

8 All the analytic techniques that are 

9 deployed to assess personal information are most 

10 useful as against transactional data. 

11 Underlying communications actually 

12 requires interpretation and assessment, and it's a 

13 slower process. 

14 So the second point is that the metadata 

15 which has been said as something of less privacy 

16 interest than the content, in fact the opposite is 

17 true. And I think that is the view widely held in 

18 the scientific community.

19 The third point to make is that this type 

20 of data, unlike underlying content, generates 

21 additional uses. 

22 I've said in the past that data chases 
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1 applications, which is to say that once you have 

2 information collected and stored in a database, 

3 you will not surprisingly find new uses for it. 

4 In fact, it would be surprising if you didn't find 

5 new uses. 

6 Now you can through law attempt to 

7 restrict and legislate the way in which the data 

8 that you've collected may be used. But over time 

9 almost certainly those boundary points will be 

10 pushed further and further as more applications 

11 for the data are found.

12 And I think the conclusion to draw from 

13 this point is that a threshold is crossed once the 

14 data is gathered because it is at that moment that 

15 you've created the opportunity for future 

16 applications. 

17 Whether you choose at that moment in time 

18 to permit those applications is a safeguard you 

19 can put in place, but there is no guarantee that 

20 that safeguard will remain over time. 

21 The final point that I'll make, coming 

22 back to my original comment is that it's very 
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1 tempting to imagine that there are technological 

2 solutions to privacy problems. And I will say our 

3 organization EPIC has been on the front line since 

4 our founding to promote technologies to protect 

5 privacy. 

6 We were started over the freedom to use 

7 encryption. We've supported de-identification, 

8 anonymization, techniques of minimization. All of 

9 these methods are very important, but there is no 

10 question that at the end of the day the most 

11 effective safeguards are the legal safeguards. 

12 And I just wanted to close by sharing 

13 with you a quote from President Jerome Wiesner, 

14 former president of MIT, was the first science 

15 advisor to President Kennedy. 

16 He was asked to testify before the U.S. 

17 Congress in the early days of the hearings on the 

18 Privacy Act. And he was asked this question, are 

19 there technological solutions to the problems of 

20 privacy. And he said, there are those who hope 

21 new technology can redress these invasions of 

22 privacy that information technology now makes 
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1 possible, but I don't share this hope. To be 

2 sure, it is possible and desirable to provide 

3 technical safeguards against unauthorized access. 

4 It is even conceivable that computers could be 

5 programmed, this is forty years ago by the way, it 

6 is even conceivable that computers could be 

7 programmed to have their memories fade with time 

8 and to eliminate specific identity. Such 

9 safeguards are highly desirable, but the basic 

10 safeguards cannot be provided by new inventions. 

11 They must be provided by the legislative and legal 

12 systems of this country. 

13 We must face the need to provide adequate 

14 guarantees for individual privacy. Thank you.

15 MR. DEMPSEY: Ashkan.

16 MR. SOLTANI: Thanks for having me. And 

17 I want to just echo, before I start, just echo 

18 Marc's points, that I agree wholeheartedly that 

19 the metadata is actually more sensitive at times 

20 than the content, and the retention of this 

21 information exposes, even with policy safeguards, 

22 just the existence of this information collected 
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1 at points it normally wouldn't be collected, 

2 exposes us to great risk from breach, from misuse, 

3 similar to the ways where hanging a piano over my 

4 head might be legal but it exposes me to being 

5 crushed by that piano at some point. 

6 So I'm going to talk today about just 

7 kind of four points, and I've written these in 

8 comments, in draft comments on my blog, which you 

9 guys can refer to and I'll submit them by the 1st. 

10 I'm expecting that there's probably more 

11 revelations that are going to be made and I'd like 

12 to incorporate those before I submit.

13 So the points I want to make is, one, 

14 that traditional ideas about geography and borders 

15 don't really translate onto the Internet. 

16 And that, two, that most of our modern 

17 activities take place in part through some digital 

18 medium. They create data trails about our 

19 activities. 

20 In fact, the NSA itself remarked that in 

21 2002, they remarked that only 1 percent of the 290 

22 gigabytes of traffic, of Internet traffic at that 
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1 time was outside of their reach at the time. 

2 That's in any 2002, right.

3 And two other points, that computer 

4 systems don't inherently understand law. They 

5 don't understand borders. You know, they don't 

6 have the same kind of limitations that we do or 

7 understanding that we do. 

8 And that they work under the guidance of 

9 their operators. And these operators are 

10 empowered under a legal authority which I feel 

11 like might be confused or lack understanding of 

12 the technical capabilities. 

13 One is, for example, the point Marc made 

14 that the metadata has more capabilities, or big 

15 data has more capabilities than one would 

16 naturally logically infer. But just other 

17 understandings of how the technology operates. 

18 And so I'd like to expand on that a bit. 

19 And the one other point of clarification from this 

20 morning's kind of discussion was that there's been 

21 a couple of different kind of very clever 

22 push backs and a couple of different revelations 
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1 we've made. 

2 But the metadata collection wasn't just 

3 business records. It wasn't just the NSA going to 

4 AA&T and saying, show us your call records that 

5 you collected historically. 

6 There was at multiple times equipment 

7 that the NSA had implanted at key Internet 

8 exchanges and key junctions at service providers 

9 in order to themselves create this metadata and 

10 collect it. 

11 And we want to be mindful of that in 

12 particular because it's a very different issue 

13 than just going to Verizon and saying, hey, give 

14 us call records. This is generating call records, 

15 generating IP metadata. 

16 And the process by which that's generated 

17 is problematic because, as I said, computers don't 

18 understand law. They don't understand the 

19 difference between, say -- they do understand the 

20 difference, but it's a very small distinction 

21 between an IP header and the email content itself, 

22 right, and the same equipment is often very easily 
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1 able to capture that same data if it wanted to. 

2 And we have some understanding that they were 

3 actually collecting email content from the wire. 

4 So I'm going to start just to expand on 

5 the first point, which is on a quote that former 

6 NSA Director Hayden himself made in an interview 

7 recently where he said, let's keep in mind that 

8 global telecom infrastructure, geography doesn't 

9 mean what it used to mean. Things of a place may 

10 not be in a place, and things in a place may not 

11 be of a place. The Internet actually lacks 

12 geography.

13 And so this is his statement. It's kind 

14 of telling, the person who kind of spearheaded 

15 these projects himself doesn't believe that 

16 there's an inherent geography to the Internet. 

17 And we kind of need to push on this a bit 

18 because, in fact, we want to understand that the 

19 NSA is collecting information about kind of any 

20 geography and then using, or taking technical 

21 measures to limit the amount of information they 

22 use on Americans. 
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1 And to do this, it's kind of unreliable. 

2 I describe a couple ways where this breaks down in 

3 my comments around things like users using VPNs, 

4 users switching email addresses, who uses, you 

5 know.

6 For example, the NSA maintains a database 

7 of identifiers on U.S. citizens which in itself is 

8 information about Americans, not anonymous 

9 information, but for example, phone numbers, MAC 

10 addresses, Internet IP addresses, those kinds of 

11 things to identify who's an American. And so 

12 that's actually information about Americans. 

13 And oftentimes these things can, to the 

14 degree that they're right, they're problematic, 

15 and to the degree they're wrong, oftentimes it's 

16 problematic because they'll be inadvertently 

17 collecting information.

18 The other thing that kind of complicates 

19 things is that the systems that are in place, you 

20 know, using these identifiers, using these 

21 selectors, right, to discern content can often be 

22 implemented improperly, right. 
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1 So in fact, we know that through contact 

2 chaining targets of interest could be anyone that 

3 has an affiliation or interactions with someone 

4 else of interest, right. So I could be 

5 potentially be a target of interest by my 

6 communication with someone of interest. 

7 But you'll find that most of the modern 

8 Internet systems that we use today, things like 

9 Skype, P-apps like Skype or Spotify, I don't know 

10 if you guys use Spotify to listen to music. These 

11 are P to P apps, right. They connect with anyone 

12 on the Internet for the purpose of providing the 

13 service. 

14 So if I and a member of Al-Qaeda like the 

15 same Britney Spears's song, right, does that 

16 actually put me as a target, right? Does that put 

17 me as a target under this contact chaining? 

18 And so the system would probably say yes 

19 because I have, you know, some sort of 

20 communication with that target, some sort of data 

21 sharing with that target. But we want to be 

22 mindful that these systems are limited in the way 
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1 they understand geography.

2 And then finally I want to make the 

3 point, I make this in my comments as well, that I 

4 feel like most of the, you know, we might look to 

5 Congress and look to policy makers at what, you 

6 know, they've had repeated opportunities to shut 

7 down and push back on these programs and they 

8 haven't. 

9 And we might infer that to mean that they 

10 think these programs are justified or think that 

11 they are effective or they're worth the tradeoff. 

12 But one other explanation I want to kind of 

13 propose is that, again, people don't understand 

14 the technical implications and the raw elements 

15 that go into these systems. 

16 So that in fact, the policy makers don't 

17 actually understand the technical capabilities of 

18 these underlying infrastructures and what data 

19 they ingest and what they're capable of. 

20 And because of that lack of understanding 

21 that it seems generally okay, right. The geeks 

22 have the key to the castle where they'll give you 
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1 an explanation that of course the system won't 

2 collect information. But in fact, if you looked 

3 under the hood, you'd realize that there is 

4 actually quite a bit of domestic surveillance 

5 going on, quite a lot of inadvertent data 

6 collected, quite a lot of misuse from both a 

7 policy and a technical perspective. And I think 

8 that lack of understanding might explain why there 

9 hasn't been kind of tighter controls.

10 MR. DEMPSEY: Okay, thank you, Ashkan. 

11 Danny.

12 MR. WEITZNER: Thanks very much. Thanks 

13 to all of you for having me and congratulations to 

14 us on having you here. 

15 I think that we all know that as this 

16 round of privacy discussions kicked off, the 

17 President said we need a national conversation and 

18 I think you guys are it, and that's great. 

19 Hopefully there's more, too.

20 But you have my written remarks. I want 

21 to just highlight three points from those 

22 remarks. I want to touch on a little bit of a 
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1 what I see as the functional goals of a system 

2 with sound oversight, some of the technical 

3 challenges of getting to that kind of system, and 

4 a new technical approach that we've been 

5 developing at MIT as part of a larger family of 

6 research that's going on around the computer 

7 science world.

8 I see really two functional goals in 

9 thinking about how a combination of law and 

10 technology can shape the system that we're talking 

11 about. And we've concentrated, you've asked us to 

12 concentrate on the 215 and 702 programs. 

13 I will say that I think it's important, 

14 as Ashkan has suggested, to see these programs in 

15 a larger context. They draw on data from a much 

16 larger set of systems out there, and I think the 

17 ability to draw boundaries in those systems is not 

18 nearly as easily as changing section numbers in a 

19 statute. So I think it's useful to look in a 

20 broader context.

21 But I want to suggest that there are two 

22 goals that we ought to pay special attention to. 
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1 First of all, I do think that we should be 

2 thinking about how to enable, within the bounds of 

3 law and under the rule of law, the process of what 

4 Bob Litt has recently called finding a needle in a 

5 haystack without undue privacy risk. That's goal 

6 number one.

7 And goal number two, I think given that 

8 kind of intensive information analytic 

9 environment, to create an environment, as Ken 

10 Wainstein said, where there's genuine public 

11 confidence in the operation of these programs 

12 based on oversight that's effective and a 

13 meaningful sense of transparency. 

14 I do think that if we look over the last 

15 month it's been the lack of public transparency in 

16 these programs and the continued revelations about 

17 more data and more data and more information and 

18 more information that's come out about these 

19 programs that has caused people to feel more and 

20 more uneasy. 

21 I think it's caused American allies 

22 around the world to feel more and more uneasy. I 
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1 think it causes citizens to feel uneasy. I think 

2 it causes companies to feel uneasy.

3 And so I think that having a real sense 

4 of transparency here is quite important. And I 

5 would suggest to you that it's important to think 

6 about transparency in two dimensions here. 

7 The first panel spent a lot of time 

8 talking about the reasonable transparency for 

9 rules and the rule making processes associated 

10 with these programs. But I think the second kind 

11 of transparency that this panel can address 

12 perhaps in a more focused way is transparency of 

13 the actual data usage. How are we going to know 

14 what's actually going on in these systems? 

15 Let me talk for just a minute about what 

16 I see is the technical challenge of having that 

17 kind of transparency. Within certain bounds I 

18 think it's safe to assume that the government is 

19 going to have more and more and more data. 

20 I think the constitutional process, the 

21 legislative process will determine how much more, 

22 but it's going to be more, and that's just because 
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1 of the trends in the world that we live in. 

2 So I see the challenge, again picking up 

3 on Bob Litt's, he's been very eloquent these days, 

4 Bob Litt's statement, he's very up front recently 

5 in a public statement said that we, the 

6 intelligence community, collects all the data 

7 because if you want to find a needle in a 

8 haystack, you have to have the haystack. 

9 Steve addressed some of this question 

10 about whether you actually need all the haystack 

11 all the time, but I think we can see the 

12 development of government programs, the NCTC 

13 programs as an example, are moving towards having 

14 all the data in one place. 

15 And then the challenge, the oversight 

16 challenge for organizations such as the PCLOB, for 

17 the internal oversight functions for the courts, 

18 for the Congress and ultimately for the public is 

19 how to have a sense of confidence that all that 

20 data that's held where again the claim is only a 

21 tiny bit of it is used, that in fact those rules 

22 are being adhered to.
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1 What I think it's very important to 

2 recognize about these rules is that these are 

3 rules that really are governing the usage of 

4 information, not the access to or collection of 

5 information. 

6 Again, in the larger privacy policy 

7 debate I think we can see more and more a 

8 recognition that many of the privacy challenges we 

9 have are going to have to be addressed by usage 

10 limitations, not simply by collection limitations 

11 because to a large extent all the data of interest 

12 has been collected and is sitting somewhere. 

13 Very briefly, I would say that if you 

14 look at the computational techniques available to 

15 address these kinds of challenges, in computer 

16 science we're quite good at access control. We're 

17 quite good at controlling who has what access to 

18 what data at any given moment. We can encrypt it. 

19 We can put it behind firewalls. We can do all 

20 kinds of things. And Steve is one of the world's 

21 experts on all of those sorts of techniques. 

22 But what we're not actually as good at 
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1 until recently is the ability to examine a system 

2 and determine how the information in a system is 

3 actually used and whether its uses are in 

4 accordance with whatever the appropriate rules 

5 are.

6 Several years ago my research group at 

7 MIT took on the challenge of trying to think about 

8 whether there's a way to actually characterize 

9 information usage rules in a formal computational 

10 sense and whether you can then apply those rules 

11 or you can ask whether those rules have been 

12 adhered to in any given information system. 

13 We've developed a number of research 

14 prototypes that enable us to detect violations of 

15 rules such as nondiscrimination rules, law 

16 enforcement information sharing rules, and then 

17 some non-privacy rules such as copyright law. 

18 And you have in my written remarks a 

19 description of this research. And by the way, 

20 there's now a very active community of researchers 

21 around the country and around the world who are 

22 working on systems like this. 
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1 I guess if I could stress one thing about 

2 these systems and the state of their development, 

3 I think we know a fair amount about how to design 

4 these systems. 

5 We know much less about how to deploy 

6 them at large scale. And I don't think we will 

7 know anything about how to deploy them in large 

8 scale until we actually start doing that. And 

9 that won't happen until the entities that hold 

10 information are actually told that they have to be 

11 accountable to these usage rules.

12 What we have now I think, and I think we 

13 can take --

14 MR. DEMPSEY: If you could, can we hold 

15 it right there. 

16 Mr. Weitzner: Yes.

17 MR. DEMPSEY: I was a little generous on 

18 the five minutes on the first round and instead of 

19 having a full two minute round where everybody 

20 feels obliged to say anything, let me simply ask, 

21 is there anybody who feels compelled to say 

22 something at this moment before we get to 
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1 questions?

2 Marc.

3 MR. ROTENBERG: Thanks, Jim. Well, I 

4 actually wanted to follow-up on some of the points 

5 that Danny just made because I'm very troubled by 

6 his description and his proposal. 

7 He seems to be arguing that there's 

8 really no need, purpose, or likelihood of success 

9 for collection limitation rules. 

10 So I mean let me stipulate that for a 

11 moment, but ask you these questions, if that's 

12 true, A, what is the legal authority under which 

13 U.S. agencies are currently allowed to collect all 

14 this data? In other words, what's the basis? 

15 I used to think of that as a search 

16 requiring some legal standard, even a low one. Do 

17 you think there is such a legal standard that 

18 operates as a limit on collection? 

19 And secondly, if you don't, if you don't 

20 think there are any legal standards that prevent 

21 collection, is there any boundary point? 

22 In other words, if the Verizon order, the 
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1 NSA were to go to FISC and say we want all credit 

2 card information, all telephone information, all 

3 web searches, everything you possibly have and 

4 then we will sort out the usage conditions, do you 

5 have any problem with that? 

6 MR. WEITZNER: So let me make sure that 

7 no one misunderstands, I am in no way suggesting 

8 that we should eliminate all collection 

9 limitations. 

10 What I am suggesting is that our current 

11 legal standards appear to allow the collection of 

12 very large amounts of information. And I said 

13 very directly that I think it is for the 

14 legislative process and ultimately for 

15 constitutional determinations to sort out how 

16 broad that is. 

17 But my belief is that agencies have 

18 reasons to have large amounts of information. And 

19 again, I don't know whether it's large or very 

20 large. 

21 I also think that it's quite challenging, 

22 based on some of the comments Steve made, to 
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1 understand where those limits will be. We need 

2 those limits, but what I would suggest is that 

3 some of the protections that we have traditionally 

4 sought from collection limitations, which I would 

5 submit have mostly been practical limitations, 

6 that it's hard. It used to be hard to store data, 

7 it used to be hard to analyze a lot of data, those 

8 practical limitations have fallen away. 

9 And I believe we need to replace them in 

10 many cases with very clear usage rules to prevent 

11 against the misuse of data. 

12 I don't think it's an either or question 

13 in any way, Marc, but I think it's equally 

14 mistaken to assume that you can solve this problem 

15 with collection limits.

16 MR. SOLTANI: Just a quick comment on 

17 that. I think I would agree with both sides here 

18 in the sense that I'm a fan of usage or 

19 audit-type, basically transparency, technical 

20 transparency mechanisms, right. 

21 For an agency that's, you know, whose 

22 bread and butter is kind of data mining and data 
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1 analysis, they should be able to analyze what the 

2 effectiveness and the usage of their information 

3 is, right, that's a no brainer. 

4 They could tell us what percentage of the 

5 information throughout a trail was relevant to an 

6 investigation. 

7 However I want to push back on the use of 

8 technology as a placebo or fix, or sorry, a 

9 panacea of policy limitations, right, because all 

10 that does, all the use of things like encryption, 

11 or firewalls, or access control rules, all that 

12 does is make it more expensive to get at the data, 

13 but rarely does it make it impossible.

14 We've found that with enough resources 

15 and enough effort almost every security 

16 advancement, there's been some vulnerability 

17 found, it just takes -- 

18 MR. DEMPSEY: Although I mean we can talk 

19 about the abuse scenario. Honestly, I would 

20 rather focus on the non-abusive uses.

21 MR. SOLTANI: Absolutely. But let me 

22 give you, so let's say there's a database that's 
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1 encrypted or it has access limitations that has 

2 the subject of a potentially suspected terrorist 

3 and it's our only lead for it. 

4 We know that data exists in a database 

5 but it also contains, you know, millions of 

6 records of individuals, innocent individuals, 

7 Americans. 

8 So not in an abuse scenario but in a 

9 scenario where we know that data exists somewhere, 

10 we have technical limitations, but do you think we 

11 would not as a nation or as a country overcome 

12 those technical limitations if the data exists?

13 MR. DEMPSEY: All right, that's a 

14 different. 

15 Steve, do you want to add anything 

16 quickly here?

17 MR. BELLOVIN: I'll pass for now.

18 MR. DEMPSEY: Okay. For my first 

19 question let me ask the following, which is 

20 geography. A couple of you mentioned geography 

21 and that the Internet lacks geography, quoting 

22 General Alexander or whoever. 
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1 We have a law, 702, which is based upon 

2 the geography of people, persons. And let's 

3 assume for now that persons means an individual. 

4 So an individual only exists in one place at a 

5 time, and we have a system that's based upon 

6 assessing where that individual is, and if they 

7 are outside of the United States and not believed 

8 to be a U.S. person, then they can be subject to 

9 collection under 702. 

10 Now my question is, what are the best and 

11 what are the worst indicators of whether a person 

12 is outside the United States? Steve.

13 MR. BELLOVIN: So there are several 

14 technologies that are commonly used. The most 

15 common one is something called IP geolocation. 

16 There are databases saying where different IP 

17 addresses are, Internet protocol addresses. 

18 If you look at this, this is used by 

19 gambling sites, by major league baseball to see if 

20 you're in the blackout area and so on.

21 MR. DEMPSEY: And by the way, don't 

22 forget the possibility of nontechnological means 
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1 in terms of your --

2 MR. BELLOVIN: Yes, absolutely. It's an 

3 imperfect technology, is probably about 85 percent 

4 accurate, certainly more accurate when we talk 

5 about the country level rather than the city 

6 level.

7 MR. DEMPSEY: Which one are you talking 

8 about now? 

9 MR. BELLOVIN: This IP geolocation. The 

10 NSA actually has a patent on a somewhat more 

11 advanced technique which uses round trip time from 

12 geographically known points. Speed of light is a 

13 limit. I don't know if they're actually using it, 

14 but there is a U.S. patent that they were granted 

15 on this. 

16 The problem is that data doesn't respect 

17 national boundaries and as we see more and more 

18 data moving to the, quote, cloud, unquote, if 

19 you're operating one of these large data 

20 warehouses in the Internet someplace, you want to 

21 disburse geographically for reliability, 

22 redundancy, another northeast blackout or another 
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1 California blackout won't take it out, one of the 

2 migration's going to happen quite transparently 

3 and nobody is controlling where a lot of this 

4 stuff goes. So the geography of the data makes 

5 for a very, very poor analogue --

6 MR. DEMPSEY: Again, we have a law here. 

7 We have a law here that ignores the geography of 

8 the data and focuses on the geography of the 

9 person, and I'm trying to ask -- Ashkan. 

10 Finish up, Steve, and then go to Ashkan.

11 MR. BELLOVIN: There are approaches, 

12 they're not perfect, especially a lot of the 

13 technical mechanisms that business travelers 

14 especially use when they're traveling virtual 

15 private networks makes them appear in the U.S. who 

16 are not in the U.S. depending on what their 

17 country of origin is. 

18 It's not a particularly useful paradigm 

19 today. And there's a lot of stuff that's out 

20 there which is not easily attributable to a 

21 particular person because of twitter handles and 

22 the solution of massive databases has its own 
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1 privacy risks.

2 MR. DEMPSEY: Ashkan, and then I'll go 

3 back to Marc.

4 MR. SOLTANI: I want to echo Steve's 

5 comment. There's actually the third largest ISP 

6 in New Zealand, they have a feature where their IP 

7 addresses become borderless. They can appear to 

8 come from the UK or come to the U.S. so they can 

9 have access to things like Hulu or BBC, right. 

10 So these are like commonly used. VPN 

11 tools are commonly used and they basically render 

12 IP-based geolocations somewhat ineffective. IP 

13 geolocation will tell you the source of the 

14 network equipment but it won't tell you the 

15 location of the individual.

16 But one thing I want to point out is 

17 email addresses don't have the same property. So 

18 an email address doesn't inherently have a 

19 nationality that you can infer from the email 

20 address, right, so perhaps you can look at the 

21 country code or maybe the nationality of the name. 

22 But there's nothing actually inherent to the email 
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1 address.

2 And in fact, we've learned that most 

3 email, so most email between cloud providers, 

4 right, so when you go to Gmail and you send an 

5 email, even though you see a lock icon in your 

6 browser, when Gmail delivers that email to someone 

7 else, it's transmitted through Gmail servers in 

8 the cloud, as Steve described in Cleartext, right, 

9 and so anyone with equipment at large Internet 

10 exchanges can monitor that and scoop that 

11 information up, metadata or content. 

12 And the question is at what point then or 

13 how do they determine whether it's a U.S. citizen 

14 or not? And we understand there's some indication 

15 to show that they have database of U.S. citizens. 

16 There's other indication to show that there is 

17 other data appended to it, right. 

18 And at that point you're actually looking 

19 at the data. You're actually, so if 702 is a 

20 collection limit, you've collected and looked and 

21 processed the data, at which point then you 

22 decide, well, it might be American. 
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1 And the problem with that is it kind of, 

2 it's kind of after the fact, right, you've already 

3 looked and processed that data. 

4 And then we know under section, what is 

5 it, Section 5 that if you actually encounter any 

6 illegal activity in that process you're then able 

7 to hand it over to other law enforcement agencies 

8 for processing, right, under Section 5. So it 

9 renders this problem of email identity somewhat 

10 borderless and somewhat ineffective to try to 

11 differentiate.

12 MR. DEMPSEY: Marc next, Danny and then 

13 I'll come to you. Marc was next.

14 MR. ROTENBERG: Let me see if I can give 

15 you a somewhat more precise answer shaking the 

16 cobwebs of my computer science background. 

17 Now for locating the device the typical 

18 cell phone can be located based on three 

19 techniques. One is the cell service 

20 triangulation. The second is the GPS, which the 

21 devices typically include. And the third is the 

22 Wifi access to the local router. 
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1 But you're talking about the identity of 

2 the individual, you're actually talking about the 

3 individual using the device at a moment in time. 

4 And that's actually a problem in isomorphic 

5 mapping. 

6 In other words, you need a big table of 

7 all U.S. citizens and then you need a unique link 

8 to the user of the device at that moment in time. 

9 Because, by the way, the person who's holding John 

10 Smith's device may not necessarily be John Smith. 

11 So you actually have to authenticate the user to 

12 the device and then determine if that person has 

13 the status that allows them to be a U.S. citizen 

14 for 702 purposes. 

15 Now I actually suspect that the NSA has 

16 given considerable thought to that problem because 

17 they need to address that challenge in satisfying 

18 their 702 requirements. 

19 I also know something about this because 

20 I participated several years ago in a workshop on 

21 something that was called eDNA. And the theory of 

22 eDNA, and this was not long after 9/11 was that it 
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1 would be possible to uniquely link every activity 

2 on the Internet, every key stroke to an 

3 identifiable user. It actually solves the 

4 isomorphic mapping problem because you know 

5 exactly who did what when, right? It's perfect if 

6 you're trying to design something like total 

7 information awareness. 

8 But here's the problem with this 

9 calculus, and I think it's why we've gone too far 

10 down this road of distinguishing between U.S. 

11 citizens and non-U.S. citizens. Our Fourth 

12 Amendment actually doesn't draw that distinction. 

13 Our Fourth Amendment, and almost all 

14 privacy laws but for the FISA, regulate the 

15 conduct of the police in undertaking law 

16 enforcement activity. We certainly recognize the 

17 need for the conduct, but it's the police conduct 

18 that we're regulating. 

19 What FISA introduced was the notion that 

20 in the collection of foreign intelligence we 

21 needed to safeguard the privacy interests of U.S. 

22 citizens, and in that introduction attempted to 
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1 build a barrier against the overreach on the U.S. 

2 side, which was very sensible.

3 MR. DEMPSEY: Marc, if we could, back to 

4 the question of geography. Again, the law focuses 

5 on persons reasonably believed to be outside the 

6 United States. That's the first filter, let's 

7 call it. 

8 And what I'm asking is in terms of how 

9 that assessment is made, is this person or device, 

10 let's assume, because you don't care so much about 

11 the identity of the person, you care about the 

12 location of the person, reasonably believed to be 

13 outside the United States. 

14 My question is, can somebody give me, 

15 give us a list of what are the most reliable 

16 factors, answering just that question, and then 

17 what are the least reliable factors in answering 

18 that question. 

19 I'm going to go Danny and then I'll yield 

20 to David because we've got to move on.

21 But to me, personally, it would be 

22 helpful to have some kind of way to go back to NSA 
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1 and say, how are you making this determination, 

2 what are you looking at, what is technologically 

3 more reliable and technologically less reliable? 

4 So you don't get then to the second question, 

5 which is, oops, we got it, turns out it's a person 

6 inside the United States, or oops, we got it, it 

7 turns out to be a citizen. How do you first make 

8 this judgement of geography? Danny. 

9 MR. WEITZNER: I want to suggest that 

10 perhaps the more reliable, less reliable list may 

11 not be the best way to do it. 

12 What I would say about more and less 

13 reliable is the more contact you have with some 

14 target, the more reliable your determination 

15 should become. 

16 And I think that in these uncertain 

17 cases, let's take Steve's 85 percent accuracy as a 

18 given, and I think we can get, there's known, 

19 there are known reliability levers for different 

20 IP address blocks. We can get you that sort of 

21 information. The NSA obviously knows it. 

22 But I think the real question is, does 
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1 any intelligence agency as they develop more 

2 information about a target, do they act on it? Do 

3 they realize, oh, actually it's now more likely 

4 that this is a U.S. person so we better start 

5 treating them that way? 

6 Or, so the question is, do we have a way 

7 of establishing that dynamic threshold? That is 

8 the way that any web service, any Internet service 

9 functions is it learns over time about who it's 

10 dealing with. And I think it's reasonable to 

11 expect that intelligence agencies should deploy 

12 that kind of technique also and be accountable to 

13 it.

14 So I'm a little nervous about these 

15 bright line rules because I think the hard cases 

16 are going to be the ones that change over time, 

17 and the question is when does that change get 

18 recognized?

19 MR. SOLTANI: And just real quick, 

20 because of the point that I made in my -- the 

21 other assumption is that there isn't a reliable 

22 method, right, that as Steve said and others have 
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1 said, the Internet is without geography and that 

2 you need additional information to prove one way 

3 or the other. Sometimes that requires looking at 

4 the content. 

5 And there's a perverse incentive here, as 

6 we found in the minimization guidelines and the 

7 targeting guidelines whereby the standard is, the 

8 information is basically guilty until proven 

9 innocent, right. So unless you can reliably prove 

10 that it's a U.S. citizen, you are able to hold it 

11 and analyze it and for later analysis. This is 

12 encrypted data. This is data that we don't have 

13 clear understanding of.

14 And so these two things together that the 

15 Internet is inherently without geography and 

16 there's not a reliable way and the standard is 

17 hold the data until you can reliably prove that 

18 it's not U.S., I think causes a --

19 MR. DEMPSEY: Let's move on. We could go 

20 on this forever.

21 MR. MEDINE: Yeah, I want to pull back to 

22 about 5000 feet. One of the board's 
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1 responsibilities is to oversee programs and see if 

2 they strike the right balance between privacy and 

3 civil liberties. 

4 We've heard from panelists about there 

5 are privacy and civil liberties issues with regard 

6 to collection, use, access and disclosure of 

7 information. 

8 I guess my question for each of you is, 

9 if you could guide us in how we should approach 

10 these problems, where can technology address those 

11 concerns? Where does law, where do we have to 

12 rely on law to address those concerns, or how does 

13 technology and law interact together so that we 

14 could address those concerns as a framework for 

15 thinking about these issues going forward?

16 MR. BELLOVIN: Technology at best can 

17 implement a policy. If I'm designing a system I 

18 have to know what, you know, what are the specs, 

19 what are the things I'm trying to do? 

20 And I get, depending on the problem, I 

21 can come closer or not so close from a technical 

22 perspective.
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1 The flip side to that is audit. How do 

2 you verify that people are staying within the 

3 rules? 

4 I'll take a somewhat different 

5 non-national security system, electronic medical 

6 records in hospitals. Anybody who's looked at 

7 these realizes that you can't require really 

8 strong authenticate need to know because someone's 

9 going to walk into the emergency room. So all of 

10 these systems have so-called break the glass 

11 access. In case of emergency, break the glass, 

12 look at the data. 

13 But there's going to be an audit process 

14 after the fact to say was this a reasonable thing 

15 for this doctor, this nurse, whatever, to have 

16 done at that a time? And that's a deterrent. 

17 It's also a way to catch and punish people who are 

18 ignoring the rules. 

19 But what comes first is the policy. 

20 After that I can design a technology and it will, 

21 it has to include an audit function.

22 MR. ROTENBERG: Well, I didn't mean to 
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1 suggest by my earlier comments that technical 

2 solutions aren't appropriate. Obviously they're 

3 necessary, and audit logs are key. 

4 My point is simply that I don't think 

5 that's an ultimate solution, and I think you do 

6 need legal safeguards. And to that issue, you 

7 know, I listened to the panel this morning, which 

8 I thought was absolutely fascinating. All of the 

9 speakers I thought had very interesting things to 

10 say. 

11 But I was particularly struck by 

12 Mr. Wainstein's comments regarding how the FISA 

13 process is similar to the traditional Title III 

14 wiretap process. He said, you know, we have ex 

15 parte access. We don't tell our targets when 

16 we're trying to get information about them in the 

17 course of an investigation. And of course in that 

18 respect he was absolutely right. 

19 But what struck me also, you know having 

20 studied the oversight mechanisms for both of these 

21 frameworks for electronic surveillance in the 

22 United States, is how many other things are in 
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1 place for traditional Title III wiretaps, law 

2 enforcement investigations. 

3 So it's true, you don't notify the target 

4 and you wouldn't, but what do you do? Well, you 

5 know, the courts are have to report on an annual 

6 basis the number of wiretaps that were authorized, 

7 how long they took place, what the outcome was, 

8 what the cost was, what percentage of 

9 non-incriminating information was gathered. 

10 And all of that data, by the way, is made 

11 available to the public, not any investigation12 specific information, but an enormous amount of 

13 information is made available to the public about 

14 the scope, use, purpose, and effectiveness of 

15 those traditional wiretaps. 

16 With respect to FISA, we have almost none 

17 of that information. We have a letter that says 

18 roughly in 2012 there were 1,784 applications 

19 submitted, one was withdrawn and 1,783 were 

20 modified or approved, or actually approved or 

21 approved subject to modification, because they're 

22 ultimately virtually all approved. 
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1 So the key point I'm trying to make with 

2 regard to the legal safeguards is I think there 

3 are necessary and appropriate ways to pursue the 

4 collection of data and to safeguard the nation. 

5 No one is disputing that. But I think there are 

6 many more ways of establishing meaningful 

7 oversight within the FISA that really we haven't 

8 scratched the surface of.

9 MR. MEDINE: Ashkan, law versus 

10 technology.

11 MR. SOLTANI: Yes, so I think there are 

12 some technical ways to do this but you would need 

13 essentially kind of an intelligence agency to 

14 monitor the intelligence agency. 

15 So you would need a set of technically 

16 capable kind of actors, you know, they could be 

17 under PCLOB, they could be under some other 

18 agency, that are building tools, building audit 

19 mechanisms, building security mechanisms to 

20 measure exactly what the agency is doing and the 

21 effectiveness.

22 This could be simply things like, you 
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1 know, the number of email addresses, IP addresses, 

2 U.S. persons, gigabytes, whatever is collected, 

3 how that information relates to investigations, 

4 how effective it's been. And provide kind of a 

5 good, in-depth kind of, you know, red teaming the 

6 NSA essentially, right, having someone from the 

7 outside that's independent of the NSA audit them 

8 and provide intel to you guys to tell you whether 

9 they're doing their job, rather than you relying 

10 on them. And this could be technical.

11 But this isn't things like what Danny and 

12 Steven have described as the NSA implementing 

13 their own audit logs, right, because I think 

14 that's -- they will perhaps not classify an email 

15 address as an individual, whereas you guys might 

16 feel that is an individual. So you would probably 

17 want an independent team doing this, I think.

18 MR. MEDINE: Taking that a step further, 

19 is there also an argument that some of these 

20 programs should be subject to testing and analysis 

21 before they're rolled out on a larger scale? 

22 I mean typically in technology you test 
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1 something and then see if it works and then you 

2 build it out, as opposed to waiting after the fact 

3 and seeing if it ended up working. Is there a 

4 lesson there? 

5 MR. SOLTANI: Absolutely. And fed back 

6 to the judges and the policy makers approving 

7 these programs, right. 

8 So as you give a FISA order for something 

9 like this, do you know the actual number of 

10 individuals affected, the number of records, the 

11 amount of records collected from this, how much 

12 was over-collected, how effective this was? 

13 That is, there's no feedback mechanism to 

14 the FISC or to Congress as to how well. You just 

15 kind of trust the NSA to say, yeah, this 

16 recommendation, this is working great, these 

17 algorithms are on it. And I don't think you guys 

18 have a way to say, actually, you know to call BS 

19 on that.

20 MR. MEDINE: Danny, any thoughts on law 

21 and technology?

22 MR. WEITZNER: So I think that along the 
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1 lines that Ashkan is suggesting, I think we have 

2 21st century intelligence analytic capabilities 

3 and 20th century accountability and enforcement 

4 methods, and we have to get the privacy 

5 enforcement methods up to date. 

6 I don't think it requires creating a 

7 whole other intelligence agency and you probably 

8 were just being flip in saying that. 

9 I do think it requires a much more 

10 intensive approach to auditing and it requires a 

11 way of looking at the results of those audits in a 

12 fashion that can have a certain amount of public 

13 transparency, certainly access for independent 

14 entities. 

15 Maybe there's a role for the PCLOB in 

16 doing but there'd probably have to be more than 

17 just five of you to do it. 

18 So I think we should raise our 

19 expectations of the ability to detect anomalies 

20 and detect misuses in the way these agencies 

21 operate. 

22 I'm a little leery of blending together 
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1 the question of intelligence effectiveness and 

2 privacy rules. I find it to be -- so, yes, I 

3 think certainly if agencies are going to spend 

4 lots of money on new data analytic systems they 

5 should make sure they're effective and they 

6 shouldn't waste their money. 

7 But just because a system is effective 

8 doesn't mean it passes our privacy test. I think 

9 we should make sure to keep those two questions on 

10 separate tracks. 

11 But there is really a lot that can be 

12 done in having better accountability, but it comes 

13 back also to Steve's original point, the rules 

14 really have to be clear and not dependent on 

15 technical accidents such as whether a particular 

16 IP address might be geolocatable or not.

17 MR. DEMPSEY: Steve, did you comment on 

18 this question or did you have anything?

19 MR. BELLOVIN: Well, I started by saying 

20 that policy has to come first, and that's the law.

21 MR. DEMPSEY: Okay. One quick follow-up 

22 for Marc and then one general question.
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1 Marc, you mentioned, you said we've 

2 barely scratched, I think you said we've barely 

3 scratched the surface on approving the FISA 

4 project, there's a lot more to be done there. 

5 Either off the top of your head could you 

6 tick off a couple of items or submit them for the 

7 record please, but anything off the top of your 

8 head that you want to tick off.

9 MR. ROTENBERG: I think we could improve 

10 public reporting through the availability of more 

11 statistical information that doesn't compromise 

12 any particular program or activity of the agency 

13 but would give the public a better picture of how 

14 these programs are used over time. 

15 I mean we found, for example, with 

16 respect to the wiretap data, it's very useful to 

17 see trends. It's very useful to understand, for 

18 example, why narcotics investigations today are 

19 the primary reason we have wiretapping, and 

20 bookmaking was in the 60s and 70s, or regions of 

21 the country.

22 And I think it leads to a more informed 
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1 public debate because people who think these are 

2 necessary tools have the data to support their 

3 points. We're not arguing in the dark.

4 MR. DEMPSEY: Thanks. And anything 

5 further you could submit along those lines would 

6 be very helpful to us, or other witnesses, or 

7 other members of the public. 

8 Content versus non-content. I have to 

9 say personally I'm not yet convinced the 

10 statement, Marc, that you made that the 

11 non-content is as revealing as or more revealing 

12 than the content. 

13 Two reasons. Often of course when the 

14 government collects the content they collect the 

15 associated non-content as well. 

16 But even on sort of the big data basis, I 

17 mean I get it that, you know, I call the cancer 

18 testing clinic, and then ten minutes later I call 

19 the oncology department, and ten minutes later I 

20 call the insurance company, and then I call the 

21 drug store, and then I call the oncology clinic, 

22 you know, every week for three months. So you 
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1 infer that I have cancer. 

2 Well, I may have called and said my 

3 mother is 90 years old, she has cancer, what can 

4 we do about it? Or my child is six years old, she 

5 has cancer, I'm going to be bringing her in every 

6 day.

7 Now it would be far better, far more 

8 revealing it seems to me to have that content than 

9 the unreliable inference. 

10 And I think there's a privacy flaw in 

11 the, there is no distinction, because I actually 

12 think you fall into the argument that the content 

13 is so powerful you actually end up making the 

14 government's argument as to why they need it.

15 I think there's a different argument to 

16 be made, which is actually the metadata can be 

17 highly misleading and you conclude that I have 

18 cancer when in fact it's a relative that has 

19 cancer.

20 MR. WEITZNER: Could I speak in favor of 

21 Marc's proposition, which is that I would just 

22 amend it slightly to say that metadata at scale is 
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1 at least as revealing as content. A single piece 

2 of metadata or even a single set of metadata about 

3 you can very well be misinterpreted. 

4 A few years ago two students of mine did 

5 as a final class project a paper that they called, 

6 Gaydar. They looked at the MIT social network on 

7 Facebook and were able to infer relatively 

8 accurately who in that 25,000 person social 

9 network was gay and who was straight, based on the 

10 strength of the friendship relationships, based on 

11 a link analysis. 

12 So that was information that was actually 

13 not available for the vast majority of the members 

14 of the social network either publicly or 

15 privately. You couldn't get it with a warrant but 

16 you could infer it by looking at the metadata.

17 MR. DEMPSEY: Good point. Marc.

18 MR. ROTENBERG: I mean I agree with Danny 

19 who is agreeing with you that at the micro level 

20 inferences can be wrong, but at the macro level 

21 the amount of useful information you can glean 

22 from the metadata is far more valuable than the 
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1 underlying content. 

2 And the simple way to understand this is 

3 the dramatic paradigm shift from an analog world 

4 to a digital world. Analog information doesn't 

5 lend itself to analysis. 

6 To analyze analog information you need to 

7 transform it into a digital representation, which 

8 by the way, is what's happening with a lot of 

9 telecommunications, because a lot of voice traffic 

10 is now being digitized and transformed so that it 

11 can be analyzed as a digital representation. 

12 But once in digital format you have 

13 unbounded opportunity to examine, compare, rank, 

14 analyze. 

15 And I have to say coming from a bit of a 

16 computer science background, I mean it's 

17 fascinating. It's absolutely fascinating what you 

18 can learn that you didn't even think you would 

19 look for at the outset. 

20 I would be surprised if people at the 

21 National Security Agency aren't uncovering things 

22 they didn't anticipate that they would find.
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1 But you also made a critical point, Jim, 

2 and I agree with this. I think it's the hard 

3 policy problem. It is the value of the digital 

4 data to the NSA that's driving these programs. 

5 It is also the risk to privacy that I 

6 think has raised the need to update our privacy 

7 laws to reflect the underlying interest, the 

8 actual interest in digital data.

9 If I can make one final point. I know 

10 I've talked on a bit but I really don't want to 

11 lose this one. We're thinking a lot about the 

12 communications realm and the linking of identities 

13 through investigations, which is an appropriate 

14 investigative technique, but you should also be 

15 aware that these large data sets are used to 

16 profile individuals, including American travelers 

17 entering the United States, to assign a threat 

18 index to the likelihood that they may commit some 

19 act that poses a risk to the country. 

20 So by taking all of that data, looking at 

21 prior acts, you can assign a score across a large 

22 data set and allocate your resources. That is 
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1 another way in which large data is being used.

2 MR. DEMPSEY: But if the data is so 

3 powerful, isn't that a good thing?

4 MR. MEDINE: And let me just follow-up on 

5 that. That's really the converse of what your 

6 argument is, is if the goal here of these programs 

7 is to find terrorists that the data is very good 

8 at that and shouldn't we be using it, and doesn't 

9 that support the government's argument that we 

10 need to amass all of this data to be as effective 

11 as possible in identifying --

12 MR. WEITZNER: But we're missing, we 

13 missed some steps, because we have answers I think 

14 in consumer privacy law, as you know, David, laws 

15 like the Fair Credit Reporting Act that are good 

16 at managing very large scale analysis of data in a 

17 way that attempts to be fair to individuals, so 

18 that when determinations that could be harmful to 

19 them, like you're not allowed into the country, or 

20 you don't get a loan, are made, that there's a 

21 feedback process, that people have a right to 

22 respond and correct the data.
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1 I think that there are obviously, you 

2 know, there have been calls for that. It seems 

3 like there's been some progress in DHS in doing 

4 that, but I don't think that we've gone far 

5 enough. 

6 When there are real adverse consequences 

7 for individuals, people should have the right to 

8 be able to respond and correct the record, not to 

9 be able to hide from what's true, but to make sure 

10 that in fact the inferences are accurate.

11 MR. BELLOVIN: And let me just clarify a 

12 little bit what Marc just said, it's not digital 

13 data that's helpful, it's structured data. 

14 Anyone who's done one of these voice menu 

15 systems on the phone knows just how bad computers 

16 can be in processing unstructured, just voice, 

17 especially unstructured conversations.

18 Structured data, this is the calling 

19 number, this is the called number, is extremely 

20 valuable. You can process it very efficiently at 

21 scale, gather vast amounts of data. It's much 

22 harder to hide. You can do it retrospectively 
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1 rather than prospectively. 

2 I want to wiretap, I have to go in 

3 advance because the phone company is not recording 

4 all of my target's phone calls, but they are 

5 keeping call detail records. You can go do this 

6 retrospectively. 

7 The intelligence community has known for 

8 more than seventy years that just the metadata is 

9 an exceedingly valuable technique, and it's gotten 

10 more so with modern data processing and data 

11 handling. 

12 Content is great but it's much harder to 

13 get, especially harder to deal with --

14 MR. WEITZNER: Can I just express one 

15 note of caution? I don't think that we should 

16 necessarily make asumptions in an unclassified 

17 environment about what the capabilities are to 

18 analyze very large volumes of digital voice data. 

19 I don't know, but I don't think we should 

20 necessarily assume what the limitations are. 

21 Because there's certainly been a lot of 

22 advances in voice recognition and in processing 
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1 very large streams of digital data of this sort.

2 MR. SOLTANI: I agree with Danny. And 

3 I'd rather propose a different perspective, which 

4 is rather than saying content is gold and metadata 

5 is maybe less, or trying to come up with a formula 

6 where a thousand pieces of metadata equal one 

7 piece of content, we should kind of view this as 

8 information. 

9 And information has kind of confidence 

10 levels, right. So you have certain amounts, like 

11 certain ability that information is accurate. 

12 Oftentimes you'll find content itself, right, 

13 content itself will be unreliable. There will be 

14 lies, or code words, or misleading statements in 

15 the content itself, right. 

16 So, and if there's not a gold standard of 

17 the truth, there's the information reveals certain 

18 characteristics about you, about the individual 

19 and that information has some level of 

20 confidence. 

21 And so oftentimes you'll find that a 

22 statement like, you know, I like puppies is a very 
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1 high confidence interval that I've made, right, or 

2 you could try to infer that based on my, you know, 

3 previous pet activity or previous browsing 

4 activity of puppies.

5 And you have some levels of confidence, 

6 as Jim said, sometimes they're wrong, but as you 

7 tune systems you often find that in a large data 

8 environment you start kind of improving these 

9 algorithms and with enough information you can 

10 make these inferences. 

11 And the question of whether this is 

12 effective or not is definitely one question, 

13 right. We've found in some cases this stuff is 

14 effective or can be effective, right. 

15 There've been examples of calling 

16 patterns. Getting a nation's calling patterns 

17 will reveal, you know, who might be in a drug ring 

18 based on just the fact that people make inbound 

19 calls, right. 

20 So there is effectiveness to that stuff, 

21 but it doesn't alleviate the policy question, 

22 which is that, or I'm sorry, the privacy question 
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1 or the privacy interest, which is that, does this 

2 information reveal sensitive, does metadata reveal 

3 sensitive information? And to some degrees it 

4 does.

5 MR. DEMPSEY: Just one quick observation 

6 and I want to go to other members of the panel if 

7 they have anything.

8 You know we talk about machine learning 

9 and the feedback process and sort of system 

10 learning, and again, thinking about the role of 

11 judges, traditionally the judge issues the search 

12 warrant, he gets a return. But if the search 

13 turned up nothing, it's not like it was a bad 

14 search or a bad warrant. 

15 So in a way we're talking about, as Judge 

16 Robertson said, changing the role of judges in a 

17 way with these programmatic approvals. 

18 Also with this question of what's coming 

19 back. There might be something to be done there 

20 to say, well, it's not that it was a bad search, 

21 but we're just not going to do it again.

22 MR. SOLTANI: Right. If in your example 
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1 if historically you do a thousand of those and you 

2 do intrusive searches and you kind of expend a ton 

3 of resources and they don't come back as hits, at 

4 some point the judge might kind of say, hey, this 

5 is kind of a waste of time, let's not expend 

6 resources on this. We don't have that 

7 accountability in this program, right. 

8 MR. DEMPSEY: Do the other members of the 

9 panel, I am willing to yield if you do, if 

10 something has occurred to you since. 

11 MS. WALD: I've got one.

12 MR. DEMPSEY: Okay, good. So let's go on 

13 down, Judge. 

14 MS. WALD: You talked a lot about, 

15 several of you about the accountability and 

16 enforcement mechanisms being 20th century, whereas 

17 our technology is leaping ahead in the 21st 

18 century. 

19 This morning's panel we talked a little 

20 bit about possibilities on a legal end. I mean 

21 people talked about maybe having not an ex parte 

22 thing before the FISA, but something that the 
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1 other side is represented by. 

2 Now my not being a technological person 

3 at all, but my impression is that right now the 

4 accountability mechanisms are all, well pretty 

5 much all internal within the agencies. I mean 

6 they self-report when something goes wrong. They 

7 do have to report already to some degree, 

8 depending, back to the FISA Court in certain 

9 situations. 

10 But, you know, even then they kind of 

11 decide, and I'm not saying no question of good 

12 faith, but they have the initial option of 

13 deciding, you know, when they will report, what 

14 they will report. 

15 Now do you think there are any, we talked 

16 about like in the FISA Court on the legal end 

17 having somebody presenting the other legal side. 

18 Are there any outside of the agency 

19 itself kind of accountability mechanisms, other 

20 than the one you mentioned about having the FISA 

21 Court say, come back to me and tell me how that 

22 program is working out, hoping the FISA Court is 
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1 more knowledgeable than I would have been in that 

2 situation, that would help to enhance your notion 

3 of accountability? 

4 MR. WEITZNER: Could I suggest, Judge 

5 Wald, that one, I don't actually have an answer 

6 about what outside institutions might be put in 

7 place, but I think that having structured, well 

8 understood audit returns could help a court, could 

9 help an authorizing judge evaluate the authority 

10 that that judge has given to a given agency in a 

11 given situation. 

12 You know, I think that the problem we 

13 have is it seems like on the one hand sometimes 

14 there's a very large volume of data, there's 

15 millions of elements of telephone metadata and 

16 then we hear only 300 of them were used. 

17 And I think that seems to present, or 

18 Jim's example looking at geolocation, maybe if we 

19 follow Steve's numbers, one in five, or one out of 

20 six times you misidentify the location of a 

21 person. 

22 Well, do we have to just accept that as a 
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1 given for all programs and should judges act 

2 accordingly, or could a judge say, well this time 

3 you were accurate five out of six times, I want to 

4 see it better. Come back, you know, fix your 

5 program, come back with 90 percent accuracy. 

6 You know, these are in many cases 

7 challenges that could be met and we can identify 

8 the underlying policy goals, the underlying harms 

9 we're trying to prevent. 

10 So I guess I think that, again, from a 

11 technical perspective we should expect better 

12 analysis of the data that's returned so the judges 

13 can make judicial and policy determinations.

14 MS. WALD: But just to follow-up on that, 

15 as you know the judges, the FISA judges are picked 

16 from the pool of U.S. District Court judges. My 

17 impression, I knew many of them, is that they 

18 didn't come with a great deal of technical 

19 knowledge or with computer science knowledge. I 

20 mean they do their very best. I think they 

21 probably do a good job, but they are not technical 

22 people. 
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1 And when you get a massive operation and 

2 they say, X with the selector or something went 

3 wrong and as a result we got X number of things 

4 that we shouldn't have gotten, blah, blah, blah, 

5 blah. I guess what I'm saying is, do they need or 

6 is it possible that FISA judges need maybe a 

7 technical law clerk, I don't know, somebody who's 

8 outside of the system who can relate to them? 

9 MR. WEITZNER: Certainly. I think 

10 absolutely having technical expertise to evaluate 

11 --

12 MS. WALD: Or not outside the agency to 

13 evaluate the data that comes back on returns.

14 MR. WEITZNER: But I think it's 

15 ultimately up to policy makers. 

16 MS. WALD: Yes, I agree.

17 MR. WEITZNER: To set that expectation, 

18 to say that we actually care about this U.S. 

19 persons question and we want to see accuracy 

20 increase. It seems to me a judge, a court with 

21 technical resources could implement that 

22 determination.
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1 MR. DEMPSEY: Steve and then Beth. Steve 

2 just to follow-up on this answer.

3 MR. BELLOVIN: Yes. I'm not going to 

4 answer who should do the auditing because you 

5 don't want me designing your organizational 

6 structure. Trust me on that.

7 But I can give you a few questions that 

8 need to be asked. The first question, is it 

9 actually effective? Are you actually finding 

10 targets? If it's not finding targets, what's the 

11 point in the system? 

12 Second, how accurate were the 

13 preconditions? The analog through probable cause 

14 saying this is a program that we think will be 

15 good enough or this is why we think this 

16 individual is or is not American. How accurate 

17 was that judgment on later investigation? How 

18 well is it actually working? Are you really 

19 finding the people you want to find? What are the 

20 risks to privacy, both from intrinsic risks, from 

21 later reanalysis, from misbehavior?

22 These are the questions to ask in the 
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1 audit. How often are people actually following 

2 the rules? Rules that are too strict tend to get 

3 evaded, and those are no good either. There's 

4 just pro forma adherence to it. So this is the 

5 kind of question. 

6 But yeah, you want to feed that process 

7 both internal and external. I hope they've done 

8 internal. 

9 There's one NSA whistle blower, I forget 

10 his name, who blew the whistle on some project. 

11 He said it was not working, it was privacy 

12 violating, but most of all it wasn't working and 

13 we're spending a billion dollars on it. What's 

14 the point of doing that? Assuming his claims are 

15 correct, and I do not know.

16 MR. DEMPSEY: Marc had a follow-up on 

17 that one.

18 MR. ROTENBERG: Just very briefly, Judge, 

19 I recommended earlier enhanced public reporting. 

20 I think the question also should be 

21 considered whether the statutory scope of the 

22 court should be limited. It has enlarged over 
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1 time to a significant degree. It was actually in 

2 2003 that the number of FISC orders exceeded the 

3 number of Title III warrants approved in the 

4 United States. And that trend has continued. 

5 And the final point which I thought Judge 

6 Robertson made very eloquently on the earlier 

7 panel today is that the judicial process works 

8 best of course from an adversarial proceeding. 

9 And so even to have a technical expert, 

10 you know, maybe that's helpful, but I think you 

11 really do need to hear both sides of the claim to 

12 make a meaningful determination. Otherwise you 

13 transform the judge into someone who's basically 

14 an agency manager, and that doesn't seem to be the 

15 appropriate role for the court.

16 MR. DEMPSEY: Ashkan, if you could --

17 MR. SOLTANI: Actually just a quick --

18 MR. DEMPSEY: Okay.

19 MR. SOLTANI: There are external actors 

20 or external entities, right. These are the 

21 companies. A lot of these programs couldn't 

22 actually be possible without the assistance of the 
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1 companies, right. 

2 And the companies are currently under gag 

3 to report the number of people that are affected. 

4 We've seen some expansion of that recently. But 

5 you could actually try to get more information 

6 from the companies to actually describe, you know, 

7 what information is revealed, not specific to 

8 targets of course, but kind of trend reports, in 

9 the same way we have transparency reports by a few 

10 companies. You could actually have the agencies 

11 that are working with these companies. 

12 And these, but these companies are 

13 actually dying to tell us, right. They're dying, 

14 their brand and reputation are going down the 

15 drain. So they're dying to reveal that in fact 

16 it's not as bad as it is, or that the NSA is over17 collecting, right. And that's a nice little 

18 external hook you could latch onto.

19 MS. COLLINS-COOK: So thank you guys. 

20 This has been extremely helpful from my 

21 perspective.

22 Danny, I wanted to follow up on one thing 
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1 that you had mentioned which was the gap between 

2 the development of the capacity to do more 

3 substantive and more effective auditing and the 

4 inability to deploy it on larger scales. 

5 And I just wanted to confirm what I got 

6 out of that is that there are potential 

7 operational risks. 

8 For example, if you were to attempt to 

9 deploy some of these more substantive audits on 

10 existing systems or in existing databases, or is 

11 it possible to simultaneously task some of the 

12 programs y'all are developing without risking the 

13 operational efficiency of ongoing programs?

14 MR. WEITZNER: So I think that it is 

15 possible to. These systems all generate logs. 

16 They have logs coming out, you know, logs and 

17 logs. So it's possible to parallelize the 

18 analysis of the logs from the ongoing operation of 

19 the system. I don't think that one needs to 

20 burden the other. 

21 Very often we've seen situations in which 

22 analysts, it's actually helpful for analysts to 
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1 have real time assessment of the policy impact of 

2 a query they're proposing or a conclusion they're 

3 reaching. Can I use that conclusion for a certain 

4 purpose or not? 

5 You know, that's where it's important 

6 that we have adequate computational efficiency to 

7 get that answer in the time that the analyst needs 

8 to make a decision. But I don't think that 

9 there's a reason to worry that one burdens the 

10 other. 

11 I do think it is the case that, and my 

12 guess is the agencies would say, well, they're 

13 going to have to spend money on it, and that's 

14 true.

15 MS. BRAND: Beth started the practice of 

16 giving homework in the last panel, so I know we're 

17 just about out of time here so I don't want to 

18 make all of you go down the line and answer, but I 

19 actually was focused on the same comment, Danny, 

20 that Beth just mentioned.

21 You said something like, we're not very 

22 good at figuring out how information is used and 
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1 whether it's consistent with the rules and we've 

2 started to learn how to design the systems but 

3 haven't figured out how to deploy them on a large 

4 scale. 

5 So you know, you presumably are not privy 

6 to whatever the NSA is doing to audit its own 

7 systems and so there's sort of the front end 

8 restrictions, such as who can access it and what 

9 the supervisory levels of authority are there, and 

10 then after the fact whatever the audit trail is 

11 and, you know, that's not public necessarily. 

12 But it occurred to me that in the current 

13 context with Snowden, his leaks are viewed to be a 

14 national security risk because the things that 

15 he's leaking are more structural in nature. But 

16 you could also imagine a situation where somebody 

17 in a position like his wanted to leak things that 

18 would violate peoples' privacy, so the underlying 

19 data instead of the structural documents. 

20 And so perhaps in your written statements 

21 you can address this. Is there a way to design a 

22 system that would kind of issue a red alert if 
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1 somebody is accessing data in a way that seems to 

2 indicate that they are going to use it for that 

3 kind of purpose, as opposed to violating an 

4 internal rule that might not immediately violate 

5 someone's privacy?

6 That's not a very well-formed question 

7 but -- 

8 MR. SOLTANI: Hospitals have the same 

9 complaints. So hospitals, you know, it's a 

10 commonly known thing that people will leak when a 

11 superstar comes in and they'll leak it to the 

12 press. So there are existing systems in place 

13 that will do anomaly detection for access. 

14 So why are you, if your region is here, 

15 why are you accessing data on people? So it would 

16 be much harder in a global, kind of in a global 

17 operation, but. 

18 MR. ROTENBERG: I just wanted to end with 

19 a cautionary note here. You know when we talk 

20 about audit logs in the 21st century this is not 

21 simply the problem of a person accessing a data 

22 set from a computer terminal. What we realize 
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1 increasingly is the amount of information that a 

2 person can pull down from a system off of a server 

3 and walk out with in something that's, you know, 

4 smaller than a credit card is really remarkable, 

5 right?

6 And I think this belief that through 

7 carefully tailored audit logs we can ensure legal 

8 compliance and prevent misuse has already been 

9 demonstrated many times not to be a reliable 

10 operating principle. So we --

11 MR. WEITZNER: Could I just very quickly 

12 though differentiate between operational security 

13 risks, which are real, and obviously Snowden and 

14 Bradley Manning have demonstrated that there are 

15 very real operational risks, and they can entail 

16 privacy intrusions, as we saw with the WikiLeaks 

17 situation to great harm.

18 But I would distinguish that from policy 

19 compliance problems where in fact the assumption 

20 is that an institution, or at least large parts of 

21 an institution is prepared to be accountable to a 

22 set of rules, but because we don't have fine 
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1 grained enough, precise enough audit mechanisms, 

2 we allow a lot of fuzziness. We allow fuzziness 

3 about who is a U.S. person or not because we can't 

4 determine it. We allow fuzziness about what's a 

5 terrorism investigation use and what isn't. 

6 We can get much more precise and close 

7 these gaps. I agree with Marc that there are, the 

8 rogue insider problem is not one that can be 

9 solved with the kind of information accountability 

10 that we're proposing. 

11 I would suggest that it can be solved by 

12 detecting, as Ashkan suggested, anomalous activity 

13 by someone who's supposed to be infrastructure 

14 analyst but is instead doing something else. 

15 But I think, Marc, you're right to 

16 distinguish the two, but I don't think that the 

17 difficulty of doing one means that the other is 

18 not useful.

19 MR. BELLOVIN: Here's a quote from 

20 Bradley Manning, attributed to Bradley Manning in 

21 the WikiLeaks case, weak servers, weak logging, 

22 weak physical security, weak counterintelligence, 
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1 inattentive signal analysis, a perfect storm. 

2 He was able to get away with downloading 

3 all those documents because no one was paying 

4 attention. The stuff wasn't being logged or no 

5 one was paying attention. Yeah, someone 

6 downloading 250,000 documents that should have 

7 tripped a flag, if there were enough audits and if 

8 people were paying attention. 

9 And that's about, that's an anomaly and 

10 that's about the best you can do there.

11 MR. DEMPSEY: With that, I think we will 

12 bring this to close right at the top of the hour. 

13 Thank you all very much.

14 MR. MEDINE: And we're going to take a 15 

15 minute break and then we'll pick up with the third 

16 panel. Thank you.

17 (Off the record)

18 MR. MEDINE: So welcome to our third 

19 panel on policy issues, and I'll turn it to Beth 

20 Cook to introduce the panel.

21 MS. COLLINS COOK: So thank you all for 

22 joining us for this third panel of the day, that 
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1 certainly for me, and I hope for my colleagues and 

2 for all of you, has been very informative and very 

3 thought provoking.

4 So we turn now to the third panel, where 

5 we are joined by six very distinguished experts in 

6 this field. 

7 And from left to right we have with us 

8 Jim Baker, who is a former Department of Justice 

9 official and lecturer at law at Harvard Law 

10 School.

11 To his left we have Mike Davidson, who 

12 served as both minority counsel and then general 

13 counsel for the Senate Select Committe on 

14 Intelligence. 

15 We then have Sharon Bradford Franklin, 

16 who is senior counsel with The Constitution 

17 Project.

18 Then Liza Goitein, who is the codirector 

19 of the Brennan Center for Justice's Liberty and 

20 National Security Program.

21 Greg Nojeim, who is the director of the 

22 Project on Freedom, Security and Technology at the 
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1 Center for Democracy and Technology.

2 And Nathan Sales, who is a law professor 

3 at George Mason and former Justice Department and 

4 Department of Homeland Security official.

5 So we're going to structure our panel 

6 just a little bit differently than the first two 

7 panels. We're going to start with a question. 

8 And the question, and we will allow each 

9 of the pnaelists five minutes to respond and then 

10 a two minute secondary response, is the following, 

11 we begin by asking whether based on the publically 

12 available information you have any recommendations 

13 for change to the programs or whether you believe 

14 the programs appropriately balance the potentially 

15 competing interests? 

16 And Jim, going alphabetically, I would 

17 invite you to start.

18 MR. BAKER: Well, thank you. Thank you 

19 very much for the invitation to speak before the 

20 board. I appreciate this opportunity. 

21 And I just would say at the outset I'm 

22 speaking just for myself today, not on behalf of 
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1 any current or former employer, employers.

2 And so with respect to thinking about 

3 these issues, I mean I guess if I could just for a 

4 moment take it up a higher level to sort of make 

5 sure that we're thinking about these problems in 

6 the right way.

7 And I guess one of the disadvantages of 

8 going last is that a lot of people have said a lot 

9 of things and you guys have talked a lot about a 

10 lot of things today. But I also get to sort of 

11 react and reflect a little bit on what has been 

12 said. 

13 And so at the outset, you know, I'm 

14 sitting in the back and watching what was going on 

15 and thinking about your banner here and thinking 

16 about the name of the panel and so on, and it was 

17 striking to me that really at the end of this 

18 session, I think some of the fundamental, some 

19 parts of the name of this board, there is still 

20 not agreement on and there was not agreement about 

21 today. And I think that complicates your task.

22 So for example, what does privacy mean? 
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1 I think you saw several different versions or 

2 several different visions of that during the 

3 discussions today. I don't think there is wide 

4 agreement on what that means today. And I think 

5 that's one of the issues that we're confronting. 

6 And let me back up. There may be wide 

7 agreement that there is at least some significant 

8 disagreement, let me put it that way.

9 The same is true with respect to the term 

10 civil liberties. What exactly does that mean? It 

11 ties right into what is privacy and how do people 

12 think about this and how do we think about this in 

13 the current era in terms of the types and the 

14 variety of communication facilities and devices 

15 that people use on a regular basis. 

16 And then how do we think about that with 

17 respect to the changes and the growth in the 

18 government's ability to conduct surveillance and 

19 to store and analyze and understand data.

20 Another thing that was striking to me 

21 obviously with respect to the name is oversight 

22 and what does that mean and how do we think about 
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1 that? 

2 And reflecting upon these programs that 

3 we're talking about today, I guess my question is, 

4 how much more oversight do you want? Because 

5 you've got all three branches of government 

6 involved in these particular activities we're 

7 talking about. You've got the President, you've 

8 got Congress, you've got the courts, you've got 

9 lawyers all over the place running around doing 

10 oversight. And so the question is, you know, how 

11 much more really do you want? 

12 And that, then I was thinking about, 

13 well, okay, so what's going on here? What's 

14 really at issue? And so a couple of different 

15 things. 

16 One is that either people, the people who 

17 are critics of these programs either don't like 

18 the design that exists today, the design that's 

19 come up, that was passed by Congress, signed by 

20 the President and put into place, put into 

21 practice, implemented by the court, either you 

22 don't like the design or you don't like the people 
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1 that are implementing the design. It's one of the 

2 two. I don't know what else there would be.

3 So that is a significant problem. And 

4 it's a significant problem that reflects, I think 

5 even a deeper issue that you have to try to think 

6 about, and I'm not sure how you're going to deal 

7 with this. 

8 I'm not sure that I have, I certainly 

9 don't have the answer, but it's this, at the end 

10 of the day if all three branches are involved 

11 there remains some fundamental distrust of the 

12 government and the structures that the government 

13 has put into place and the people who are 

14 implementing these things.

15 I mean I think that is what is underneath 

16 a lot of the critique and criticism. And I don't 

17 know how you deal with that. So that's point 

18 number one, I guess just in terms of reflection.

19 In addition, in terms of before I talk 

20 about solution, I do want to just mention briefly 

21 that these issues are even more challenging than 

22 we've talked about today. And I'll just briefly 
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1 state we have the cyber threat that we have to 

2 deal with.

3 All of the things we've been talking 

4 about today with respect to terrorism exists even 

5 to a more significant degree with cyber because of 

6 the volume of communications involved, because of 

7 the variety of the different types of 

8 communications involved, and because of the 

9 velocity of the communications. 

10 All of those make all the issues 

11 regarding the collection and the analysis of 

12 metadata and content even more difficult. 

13 So with that said, in terms of trying to 

14 think about structural changes and refinements in 

15 the law and what you can do to move forward, I 

16 don't think that anybody is going to have a 

17 perfect solution to you, to describe to you today. 

18 You can, I think, do some things at the 

19 margins to try to improve these statutes, but you 

20 know, I'm just really not sure what you can do to 

21 have more oversight of these activities that 

22 impact privacy and civil liberties. I think it's 
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1 just a very tough nut to crack.

2 Having said that, let me just make a 

3 comment. One of the things that I recommend that 

4 you think about is to try to simplify the range of 

5 laws that apply in this area. 

6 What we have right now, and others have 

7 made this observation, what we have right now is a 

8 very complex patchwork of statutes that overlap 

9 with each other. 

10 And I can tick them off. It's not only 

11 FISA, it's Title III -- 

12 MS. COLLINS COOK: Actually before you go 

13 through the full list, we have six panelists so 

14 we're unfortunately going to have to be a little 

15 bit stricter on this panel than the last panel. 

16 Simplicity.

17 MR. BAKER: Okay. Simplicity. 

18 And think broadly about the laws that are 

19 applied to the surveillance of content and 

20 metadata.

21 MS. COLLINS COOK: Thank you.

22 MR. DAVIDSON: Is that a color coded --
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1 MS. COLLINS COOK: It is indeed. We have 

2 a very helpful green -- 

3 MR. DAVIDSON: There are not numbers?

4 MS. COLLINS COOK: There are no numbers.

5 MR. DAVIDSON: No numbers?

6 MS. COLLINS COOK: No numbers

7 MR. DAVIDSON: Red means stop.

8 If I could address perhaps a variant of 

9 the question that you asked and address it in 

10 these opening comments, not the specifics about 

11 what might be done with these programs but the 

12 conditions upon which they are discussed in 

13 several important places, one being the judicial, 

14 branch, the second being in the Congress, and then 

15 particularly looking forward to the next set of 

16 sunset debates, and the third more generally in 

17 the public. 

18 With respect to the judicial branch 

19 there's of course been a discussion that's gone on 

20 since, well at least since 2008 about greater 

21 public information about the major decisions of 

22 the FISA Court, its reasoning as it approached 
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1 various segments of FISA. 

2 And nominees have come before Senate 

3 committees and have pledged to proceed on. And 

4 that's been going on since 2008, and maybe we're 

5 on the verge of a breakthrough. 

6 But without even looking to the past as 

7 to what the court has done, bear in mine that in 

8 the public information about business records it 

9 now appears publicly that those orders are 90 day 

10 orders. 

11 And so there's some cycle going on before 

12 the FISA Court, which would mean that in days, or 

13 at least within months there will be an occasion 

14 for the FISA Court's consideration of the extent 

15 of any such orders, the legal basis for them. 

16 And then with respect to the development 

17 of the program under the FISA Amendments Act, 

18 Section 702 of FISA, that's an annual cycle. The 

19 statute doesn't limit the government to any 

20 particular one year order or how it packages what 

21 it does, but it does say that those authorizations 

22 are for no more than a year. 
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1 And each time the FISA Court considers 

2 the government's submissions to authorize another 

3 year's collection, it has the statutory 

4 obligations that it has at the outset. 

5 Central to those is to consider the 

6 compliance that the government system of targeting 

7 and minimization and other aspects of the statute 

8 have with both the terms of the statute and with 

9 the Fourth Amendment. 

10 The statute reiterates the expectation 

11 and the requirement that the court will consider 

12 the Fourth Amendment in approving or not approving 

13 its annual authorizations. 

14 And so within weeks or months, but 

15 certainly within the year, there will be an 

16 occasion before the FISA Court to consider the 

17 basic elements of the authorization that's allowed 

18 under section 702. 

19 I think that this board, given its 

20 charter and its stature, can play a very important 

21 role in helping to improve that process so that 

22 there is a greater confidence that the FISA Court 
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1 in fact is dealing with the basic issues that have 

2 been discussed earlier today, and are being 

3 discussed in the larger society, and that there 

4 are models out there. 

5 So that in 2002, when the FISA Court of 

6 Review considered legal issues relating to the 

7 wall between intelligence and criminal 

8 investigations, the Court of Review had a process 

9 in which outside groups came in, filed amicus 

10 briefs, and the court in its disposition of the 

11 matter addressed issues that had been raised 

12 there.

13 And in 2008, when the Court of Review had 

14 an appeal from the Protect America Act, which had 

15 a resemblance to, but it's far from identical to 

16 the system created by the FISA Amendments in 2008, 

17 it issued a public opinion. It redacted portions 

18 of it, but the public opinion dealt with 

19 substantial legal issues.

20 So finding a way for people outside the 

21 system to bring before the FISA Court important 

22 legal issues and for the FISA Court to then 
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1 communicate to the public at large is something 

2 that's been experienced. 

3 Now the modeling of it could very well be 

4 different and it would take an initiative, I would 

5 believe, by the Department of Justice. 

6 And I do believe that the board in its 

7 communications with the Executive Branch could 

8 help to make the case that we're now at a point in 

9 which there should be that form of public 

10 discussion. 

11 And perhaps it could go to the extent of 

12 helping to identify the questions that should be 

13 considered on a public record. 

14 Now the intelligence community is going 

15 to have some choices to make. It is loathe, and 

16 understandably loathe, when there have been 

17 improper disclosures to acknowledge the validity 

18 of those disclosures. 

19 But there's also a reality out there. In 

20 fact, there appears to be public information about 

21 matters that are at the heart of the annual 

22 approval, of the targeting procedures of the 
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1 government, and the minimization procedures of the 

2 government. 

3 And some way can certainly be found to 

4 now call for a process in which those are 

5 discussed against the requirements of the statute, 

6 which are both statutory and the call for an 

7 annual consideration of Fourth Amendment 

8 compliance.

9 MR. MEDINE: Let me just make also, in 

10 the interest of time and moving on, I think -- 

11 MR. DAVIDSON: You can interpret that as 

12 red?

13 MR. MEDINE: That's our timekeeper. So 

14 if you have additional comments you can make them 

15 in a later round. 

16 MR. DAVIDSON: Sure.

17 MR. MEDINE: We appreciate that. Sharon.

18 MS. BRADFORD FRANKLIN: Thank you very 

19 much for the opportunity to appear here today, and 

20 I have already filed a lengthier statement on 

21 behalf of The Constitution Project so I will be 

22 more brief in my comments.
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1 The short answer to your question is yes, 

2 we do believe that there are changes that should 

3 be made. And I just want to make two quick points 

4 before I get to summarizing what some of those 

5 recommendations are.

6 First, with regard to the PCLOB's role in 

7 assessing counterterrorism programs and whether 

8 the safeguards for privacy and civil liberties are 

9 appropriate, part of that role obviously, and the 

10 discussion at this morning's panel was whether 

11 existing programs comply with existing law 

12 including the Constitution. 

13 And that is a very important assessment 

14 and we have already filed in our prepared comments 

15 our views on some likely legal violations there.

16 But beyond that, the PCLOB's statute 

17 talks about assessing whether the protections are, 

18 quote, appropriate, and, quote, adequate. 

19 The board is not limited to making 

20 recommendations for compliance with the 

21 Constitution and existing law. And so I would 

22 urge you to be forward-leaning in the 
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1 recommendations that you do make.

2 There will be plenty of voices within the 

3 government pushing for strong powers in 

4 counterterrorism. And we know now from the recent 

5 disclosures that the administration, whatever 

6 administration it is, is likely to interpret 

7 existing law aggressively to the maximum extent 

8 that they believe they can justify under the words 

9 of existing statutes.

10 So I urge you to really take seriously 

11 the role to push for adequate and appropriate 

12 safeguards in law to make sure that we're 

13 protecting both our security and our civil 

14 liberties.

15 Second, the PCLOB's statute explicitly 

16 provides a role for informing the public, 

17 including holding forums like today, and in making 

18 sure that you're of course including the reports 

19 to Congress are available to the public to the 

20 greatest extent possible. 

21 And I think that this transparency role 

22 is really a critical one the PCLOB can play, in 
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1 addition to making specific recommendations for a 

2 forum. And there's been a fair amount of 

3 discussion about that in the earlier panels, but I 

4 would urge you to take that role seriously, the 

5 place where you really can make significant change 

6 in pushing for a full disclosure. 

7 The administration so far has been trying 

8 to release some more information in response to 

9 the leaks, but I don't get the sense that we're 

10 getting a full picture. 

11 They are perhaps, you know, 

12 understandably picking the facts to release that 

13 they think will support their case. And you are 

14 authorized to get a full picture and to hopefully 

15 push for more of a full picture to the public.

16 So I'll try to be somewhat brief in 

17 summarizing the recommendations. We did outline 

18 some in fair detail in our written comments. 

19 And I just want to emphasize that a lot 

20 of, most of the recommendations that are included 

21 in our comments are actually ones that come from 

22 The Constitution Project's Liberty and Security 
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1 Committee, which is a bipartisan committee, well 

2 before any of these disclosures. 

3 These were things that our committee felt 

4 were necessary to better protect privacy and civil 

5 liberties, just looking at the statutes before we 

6 knew more details about how they are being used. 

7 And they fall into a couple of categories. 

8 First, tightening the standards for when 

9 the government should be able to collect 

10 information in the first place. Second, 

11 regulating very strictly what uses can be made of 

12 the information once it is collected. And third, 

13 again, on transparency.

14 As far as tightening the standards, it's 

15 very important that we have strict rules to 

16 require a sufficient connection to terrorism 

17 before this information is collected. 

18 The sheer fact that it is useful to the 

19 government for counterterrorism cannot possibly 

20 comply with Fourth Amendment standards and it's 

21 not the kind of society that we live in. 

22 Usefulness is not enough. We need to make sure 
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1 that there's a connection to terrorism. 

2 And frankly, this should help the 

3 efficiency of the programs too. We want the 

4 surveillance to be conducted on the, quote, bad 

5 guys and the people we have reason to believe that 

6 they are a connection to terrorism.

7 In the context of Section 215, although 

8 we do not believe that the existing law does 

9 authorize the bulk collection of the telephone 

10 metadata that has been reported, although I 

11 haven't seen the underlying order, we would urge 

12 that at this point Congress should, you should 

13 recommend that Congress amend the Act to clarify 

14 that that's not permitted under 215 or any other 

15 authority, and specifically recommend tightening 

16 the standard for issuing an order under Section 

17 215 to require a showing to a judge of specific 

18 and articulable facts demonstrating that the 

19 material sought pertains to a suspected agent of 

20 a foreign power or a person in contact with or 

21 directly linked to such an agent. So restoring 

22 some of the earlier standards. 
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1 In the context of Section 702, we have 

2 similar recommendations to restore the requirement 

3 that foreign intelligence be the primary purpose 

4 of the surveillance, and also to require the 

5 government to make a greater showing to the FISA 

6 Court of the actual foreign intelligence purpose, 

7 and more of a showing that it is not likely that 

8 it will be intercepting large quantities of 

9 communications of U.S. persons. 

10 We've heard a fair amount of discussion 

11 this morning about justifying collection where an 

12 American is on the other end, I'll try to be quick 

13 here, when we know it is targeted at a foreigner. 

14 But we need to make sure that the word incidental 

15 has more of its common, everyday meaning in that 

16 targeting.

17 Then there should also be strict limits 

18 on data once it is collected. We had reference, 

19 Judge Robertson mentioned a recommendation that we 

20 made for post-collection warrants in the context 

21 of 702. I'd be happy to discuss that more in the 

22 questioning, if you are going to seek information 
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1 on a specific U.S. person in an existing database.

2 And finally, we have a series of specific 

3 recommendations on transparency, including 

4 releasing significant opinions of the FISA Court 

5 and more details on the extent of interceptions of 

6 U.S. person information that have gone on in the 

7 past. 

8 And I appreciate the opportunity. Thank 

9 you.

10 MR. MEDINE: Thank you.

11 MS. GOITEIN: Thank you very much for the 

12 opportunity to participate. 

13 On this panel, as you said, our task is 

14 to leave aside the question of the program's 

15 legality and focus on whether they strike the 

16 right balance between our security and our 

17 liberties. And I believe that the known threat to 

18 liberty from these programs exceeds any known 

19 benefit.

20 Now in my line of work I often get 

21 accused of invoking phantoms of lost liberty, as 

22 John Ashcroft once said. So let me start by 
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1 saying that I recognize that this is a remarkably 

2 free country. The vast majority of Americans go 

3 about their lives and speak their minds without 

4 fear of persecution. 

5 But that has not always been the case at 

6 periods in this country's history. Throughout 

7 much of the cold war our law enforcement agencies 

8 and our intelligence agencies spied on Americans, 

9 not solely for the purpose of preserving security, 

10 but sometimes for the purpose of impeding social 

11 justice movements or harassing political enemies. 

12 Innocent Americans had their careers and sometimes 

13 their lives ruined. 

14 When these abuses came to light in the 

15 1970s, Congress and executive agencies implemented 

16 a range of laws and policies that establish a kind 

17 of golden rule. And that rule was law enforcement 

18 and intelligence agencies may not collect 

19 information on Americans unless they have some 

20 level of individualized, fact-based suspicion that 

21 the person is involved in some kind of wrongdoing 

22 or is an agent of a foreign power. 
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1 Now the exact level of suspicion would 

2 depend on the kind of information the government 

3 wanted to get and how. This golden rule served us 

4 well for decades. 

5 The 9/11 Commission found fault with a 

6 lot of government practices, but it never said we 

7 need to collect more information about Americans 

8 with less reason for suspicion.

9 Nonetheless, since 9/11 we have seen a 

10 steady and rapid erosion of the level of suspicion 

11 that is required for our law enforcement and 

12 intelligence agencies to collect on Americans. 

13 The FISA Amendments Act, national 

14 security letters, FBI assessments, electronic 

15 border searches, these are all instances in which 

16 the required level of suspicion has been lowered, 

17 in some cases to zero.

18 The programs we're talking about today 

19 fall squarely within this category. Section 215 

20 already weakened preexisting law by allowing the 

21 acquisition of tangible things with a very low 

22 showing of relevance. 
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1 We've now learned that the government and 

2 the FISA Court have interpreted relevance largely 

3 out of existence, so there's no individualized 

4 showing required to get information, American's 

5 information.

6 That means it's up to the Executive 

7 Branch to police itself when it comes to actually 

8 using that information. 

9 Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act on 

10 its face doesn't require any individualized 

11 suspicion. Now it targets foreigners overseas 

12 nominally, but what we've learned is that the 

13 government Section 702 programs tolerate a massive 

14 amount of so-called incidental and inadvertent 

15 collection of American's information. 

16 Again, this incidentally acquired 

17 information is nominally master deleted, but that 

18 relies on self-policing. And also, if you look at 

19 the targeting and minimization procedures, they 

20 tell a much more complex story in which there are 

21 many loopholes for keeping and sharing this kind 

22 of information. 
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1 When you get rid of the requirement of 

2 individualized suspicion for collecting on 

3 Americans, you reopen the door to the kinds of 

4 surveillance abuses we saw in the 40s, 50s, 60s 

5 and 70s. 

6 And when you free government officials 

7 from the requirement of some sort of factual 

8 predicate for investigation, you open the door for 

9 them to fall back on conscious or subconscious 

10 prejudices, whether racial, or religious, or 

11 ethnic, or political. 

12 Now if there were evidence that these 

13 programs were uniquely effective, then we might be 

14 willing to risk these downsides, but the burden 

15 should be very high in terms of the proof we 

16 require. And to date, all the government has told 

17 us is these programs have helped to disrupt 

18 terrorist plots. 

19 That's not even the relevant question. 

20 The question is, have these programs thwarted real 

21 significant terrorist attacks that could not have 

22 been prevented using more narrower methods or more 
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1 narrow methods? 

2 So I'm very much hoping that the PCLOB 

3 will insist on getting the information necessary 

4 to make that assessment. And if it turns out that 

5 these programs are useful and if it turns out that 

6 they comply with the Fourth Amendment, then as a 

7 society we'll have a very difficult choice to 

8 make. 

9 Until then, we are weighing a known and 

10 serious risk to liberty against an unknown and 

11 unproven benefit.

12 MR. NOJEIM: Hi, I'm Greg Nojeim. I'm 

13 with the Center for Democracy and Technology. As 

14 it happens one of the PCLOB members is also 

15 employed by CDT. We have walled off our work from 

16 each other and don't discuss PCLOB issues.

17 I think we've strayed a long way away 

18 from the world that was envisioned in our 

19 Constitution where you don't have to worry about 

20 government surveillance unless there's evidence 

21 that you're up to no good. My gosh, we've moved 

22 so far away from that.
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1 When it comes to these two programs I 

2 don't think that they adequately protect privacy, 

3 and I will focus with respect to the Section 702 

4 program primarily on transparency, where I think 

5 PCLOB can play a huge role. And with respect to 

6 the 215 program -- 

7 MR. MEDINE: Move the mic closer to you.

8 MR. NOJEIM: With respect to the 215 

9 program, I think that one is illegal and that the 

10 PCLOB should make a recommendation that it be 

11 discontinued. 

12 On 702, there are some critical questions 

13 about FISA Amendments Act surveillance that have 

14 never been answered that we would urge you to take 

15 up in your report, or to encourage government 

16 officials to answer.

17 The first is whether the FAA can be and 

18 is being used to do bulk surveillance. That means 

19 surveillance of a large quantity, a large 

20 proportion of the communications between Americans 

21 and people who are abroad. 

22 Because you can target anyone you 
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1 reasonably believe to be abroad, just how much of 

2 that surveillance is going on? 

3 Second, the Washington Post reported that 

4 when it comes to targeting that a 51 percent 

5 likelihood of foreignness was good enough. Well, 

6 it's not good enough for me and I don't think it's 

7 good enough for the American people. That's a 

8 coin flip level of certainty. 

9 I would think that there would be, and 

10 the procedures that have been leaked suggest that 

11 there is, more attention to foreignness than 

12 that. But I think PCLOB could play an important 

13 role in clearing up the 51 percent number. 

14 I also think that when you look at the 

15 purpose for which the surveillance can be 

16 conducted in the 702 program, it's very broad. 

17 And I would think that all of the surveillance 

18 that's authorized under that program is not being 

19 conducted because it wouldn't be useful. 

20 For example, it appears that because 

21 collecting foreign intelligence information is all 

22 the purpose that you have to have, that that would 
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1 cover, for example, collecting up all the email of 

2 people that have protested outside a U.S. base in 

3 Germany. I don't think that the government is 

4 ordering U.S. providers to turn over all the 

5 information because I don't think it's really what 

6 the government is looking for. 

7 What I think is needed for 702, in 

8 addition to more transparency, is more FISA Court 

9 involvement, not less, where the FISA Court 

10 actually authorizes the surveillance, not just 

11 guidelines. 

12 And I think that the PCLOB should give 

13 consideration to the purpose of the FISA 

14 surveillance and whether it could be limited to 18 

15 U.S.C.(e), I'm sorry, I don't have the exact 

16 statutory citation here. But just the first part 

17 of the definition of foreign intelligence 

18 surveillance, which would make it much more 

19 limited. 

20 With respect to Section 215, I think that 

21 that surveillance is unlawful. It's overbroad. 

22 It can't be the case that everyone's telephone 
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1 records are relevant to an investigation because 

2 if that's true, then everyone's records of any 

3 type are relevant to an investigation because they 

4 fit into a mosaic and could be used to engage in 

5 more learning about what might be actually 

6 relevant. 

7 I think the most important change to 

8 Section 215 is the one that Sharon outlined to 

9 require that there be a tie to an agent of a 

10 foreign power, specific and articulable facts 

11 giving reasonable grounds to believe that the 

12 information sought pertains to an agent of a 

13 foreign power or a person in contact with such a 

14 person. 

15 I think also the PCLOB should make it 

16 clear, I think this is already clear in the 

17 statute but apparently not to the NSA, that 

18 Section 215 is not about prospective surveillance, 

19 it's about records already in existence. 

20 Perhaps an exclusive means provision 

21 should be added to the pen trap statute to make 

22 that entirely clear. 
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1 There should be clarity about the 

2 particularity that's required and more work on 

3 transparency with respect to the surveillance.

4 Finally, I will just say this, I don't 

5 think that FISC oversight is serving us adequately 

6 at this point. 

7 It seems to have been the case that one 

8 judge of the FISC issued the orders that 

9 determined that this information about all phone 

10 calls were relevant, and that when those orders 

11 were issued, the other judges on the court didn't 

12 even know. I mean that is not a system that I 

13 think has the oversight that Congress intended. 

14 There ought to be explicit authority to 

15 consider all constitutional claims, and I think 

16 the idea of an ombudsperson is a very good one, 

17 and I'd like to discussed that later.

18 MS. COLLINS COOK: Thank you.

19 MR. SALES: Thank you to the members of 

20 the board and my fellow panelists for asking me to 

21 participate in this important and interesting 

22 conversation.
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1 I'd like to take a step back and look at 

2 the big picture concerning surveillance. It seems 

3 that the programs that have been leaked to the 

4 press are examples more or less of what we might 

5 call programmatic surveillance. Greg called it 

6 bulk data collection. 

7 Programmatic surveillance is something 

8 that's familiar to a lot of intelligence 

9 personnel, but those of us who are lawyers 

10 probably haven't encountered it all that much. 

11 We're more familiar with individualized 

12 surveillance where cops think that Tony Soprano is 

13 up to no good, they therefore ask a court for 

14 permission to wiretap him to come up with evidence 

15 that they can use to prove his guilt.

16 You move, with individualized 

17 surveillance you move from suspicion, to an 

18 individual, to evidence. 

19 Programmatic surveillance is in a sense 

20 the exact opposite of that. We don't have a 

21 particular target in mind. In fact, the whole 

22 point of the surveillance is to develop enough 
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1 information so that we can find the bad guys. 

2 So programmatic surveillance therefore 

3 relies on bulk data collection and screening it 

4 through various algorithms or analytical processes 

5 to identify pieces of information, individual data 

6 points that might be important.

7 Programmatic surveillance, I think what 

8 I'd like to talk about is its potential benefits 

9 and how to do it in a way that respects privacy 

10 values, and rule of law, and civil liberties 

11 values as well.

12 The benefits are fairly straightforward. 

13 Programmatic surveillance is an important tool for 

14 identifying unknown associates of known 

15 terrorists. The process is called, as you know, 

16 link analysis. 

17 We know that Mohamed Atta is up to no 

18 good, let's find out who is in his social network 

19 because they may also be up to no good, and we can 

20 use that to trigger further investigation. 

21 There's a report from 2002 indicating 

22 that a rudimentary form of link analysis actually 
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1 would have enabled investigators to identify all 

2 19 of the 9/11 hijackers. Still, we start with 

3 two hijackers who were known to have attended a 

4 terrorist meeting in Malaysia. Let's look at 

5 their passenger reservation data from their 

6 various airlines travels and find out what we can 

7 learn. 

8 Well, it turns out that a number of 

9 people had used the same frequent flier number as 

10 these two terrorists. It also turns out that 

11 other people had used the same addresses and 

12 credit cards as these terrorists.

13 Building out from the initial two 

14 suspects, it was possible to put together a fairly 

15 detailed portrait of their social network leading 

16 us to all 19 of the 9/11 hijackers. 

17 So programmatic surveillance has the 

18 potential to yield some important national 

19 security gains, not merely hypothetical ones, but 

20 actual concrete national security gains. 

21 The question for me is, how do we do it 

22 in a way that is consistent with our rule of law, 
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1 values, and with our commitment to privacy and 

2 civil liberties.

3 I want to propose a series of principles 

4 that I think can help guide our judgment as to 

5 whether any particular program, including these 

6 programs, live up to our values in addition to 

7 protecting us from national security threats. 

8 There's two basic sets of principles that 

9 I personally would like to see reflected. The 

10 first set has to do with the formation, the 

11 architectural considerations. When building a 

12 system of programmatic surveillance, how should we 

13 design it? 

14 And the second set of considerations 

15 concerns operational features. What sorts of 

16 safeguards should we build into the system so that 

17 when it operates it does so in a privacy and civil 

18 liberties friendly way? 

19 As far as formation goes, one of the most 

20 important principles to me is anti-unilateralism. 

21 The Executive Branch shouldn't be doing 

22 programmatic surveillance on its own. It should 
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1 rather have to obtain authorization, legal 

2 authorization from Congress, perhaps also from the 

3 judiciary. There have been examples of the 

4 judiciary signing off on and approving in bulk 

5 programmatic surveillance programs.

6 I also favor maximum transparency and 

7 public debate. The public should be informed of 

8 the government's plans as much as is possible with 

9 operational security, so that an informed 

10 deliberation in the public can take place and so 

11 Congress's deliberations can thereby be informed.

12 I also want clear legal authorization for 

13 programmatic surveillance. I think it's important 

14 for Congress not to hide elephants in mouse holes. 

15 If we're going to have a system that 

16 authorizes bulk data collection, it should be 

17 approved transparently and expressly, rather than 

18 something that's simply hidden in the penumbral 

19 emanations of various other statutory provisions.

20 I also think it is important to prevent 

21 mission creep. These are important tools to be 

22 used to protect against existential threats and 
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1 mass murderers. I don't think we should be using 

2 these sorts of tools to go after tax cheats. I 

3 want a firewall that prevents those sort of tools 

4 from bleeding over into routine ordinary 

5 investigations where a lot less is at stake.

6 As far as the operational principles are 

7 concerned, the basic idea here I think is to 

8 substitute for restrictions on the collection of 

9 data, restrictions on the use of data. 

10 As the government acquires more and more 

11 information on the front end, it becomes more and 

12 more important to substitute on the tail end 

13 restrictions on who can access it, what can be 

14 done with it and so on.

15 I see I'm nearly out of time so let me 

16 just finish this thought very briefly. There's a 

17 couple different type of checks you could have in 

18 mind, external checks, judicial oversight, ex-ante 

19 approval before you conduct surveillance or access 

20 the data, ex post oversight audits and reviews of 

21 surveillance that has taken place in the past. 

22 Internal checks are also an important 
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1 part of the conversation, inspectors general, the 

2 PCLOB itself, and other forms of internal 

3 Executive Branch oversight can help prevent the 

4 sorts of abuses we saw in the 70s and that nobody 

5 wants to go back to. Thank you.

6 MS. COLLINS COOK: Thank you all. And we 

7 will now ask you to, if you have some thoughts, 

8 two minutes each. 

9 And one thing I did want to mention, and 

10 building on something that Jim had said earlier 

11 was that we're really looking for solutions here. 

12 We're very much looking for recommendations, we're 

13 looking for concrete and specific ideas that can 

14 be discussed, that can be assessed, that can be 

15 analyzed. 

16 And you know, we spent a lot of time 

17 today on the framework of what we're talking 

18 about, and I hope that over the rest of the day 

19 that we can really start exploring some very 

20 specific options for how these programs might be 

21 done differently if necessary.

22 MR. BAKER: Okay. So let me focus on 
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1 that and try to get very, there's a lot of stuff 

2 to talk about. Let me focus on one thing in 

3 particular, transparency.

4 MS. COLLINS COOK: Yes.

5 MR. BAKER: Okay. So back to my earlier 

6 comment in terms of that may be one thing that 

7 would help enhance trust in government, okay.

8 So with the transparency of the FISA 

9 Court orders and FISA Court proceedings, so I've 

10 got just a couple of observations. 

11 And just by way of background, I was in 

12 charge of representing the United States in front 

13 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 

14 from 1998 till 2007. So I dealt a lot with the 

15 court in that time period.

16 Two things. One, this will be easier 

17 going forward than it will going back. So if 

18 Congress were to mandate in legislation that from 

19 here on some type of rulings by the FISA Court 

20 would have to be disclosed, then that's going to 

21 be easier because the judges, I think, will be 

22 able to write opinions knowing that that's the 
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1 case.

2 Going back I think there's two problems. 

3 One is the intertwining, I think this is why it's 

4 taking so long to declassify all this stuff is 

5 that the intertwining of classified facts with 

6 legal analysis as you go through makes it 

7 difficult to extract the two pieces in a way that 

8 will give the American public any real 

9 information, as opposed to just pages and pages of 

10 blacked out stuff, or text with a lot of blacked 

11 out stuff. So going forward I think will be 

12 easier than going back.

13 Secondly, you have to understand that not 

14 everything that the FISA Court does is reflected 

15 in some opinion, I think Judge Robertson was 

16 talking about this before, some opinion that's 

17 what like you're used to seeing in the normal 

18 judicial proceedings with other courts. 

19 A lot of it is based on you submit an 

20 order, the court says, hmm, you want to do X, 

21 well, we think you should have minimization 

22 procedure Y to go along with that. The government 
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1 works that out, okay, fine. Then the next time 

2 you file it, you just have X plus Y is built into 

3 the package. There was never any opinion. There 

4 was never any ruling like that. It's just an 

5 order from the court and that's what you have. 

6 So there's a lot of back and forth that 

7 is not going to be apparent in some kind of big 

8 judicial opinion like people think about.

9 MR. MEDINE: Just to clarify the 

10 recommendation, so would you envision on the going 

11 forward basis that where there are opinions that 

12 there essentially be an unclassified summary or 

13 syllabus of the decision and there be a 

14 classified, more detailed decision addressing the 

15 specific facts of the case or something that they 

16 need to be classified?

17 MR. BAKER: Basically, yes, because that 

18 way if the court is writing the summary, the court 

19 can say what it wants to say knowing whether it 

20 will become public. As opposed to somebody, I 

21 mean I'm sensitive to this, as opposed to somebody 

22 else writing some summary of some decision that 
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1 was written, and whether they get it right or not 

2 is another matter.

3 MS. COLLINS COOK: And Jim, on that 

4 point, I think one of the things we've struggled 

5 with is I think it's too strong to say it's a red 

6 herring, the declassification of previous opinions 

7 issued. 

8 And one thing I would like your opinion 

9 on is whether or not it would be likely a more 

10 efficient course to simply direct a summary of 

11 past opinions, rather than to go through a 

12 declassification process of existing documents.

13 MR. BAKER: It would be more efficient, 

14 the question is would it be accurate and would 

15 people trust it. And would it accurately reflect 

16 what the judge's, or that particular judge who may 

17 not be on the court anymore, actually thought when 

18 he or she wrote that opinion. That's I think the 

19 trouble that you'll have. 

20 So I'm not sure that that -- I'm not sure 

21 it's going to work in terms of summary. 

22 You could, I mean I guess you could have 
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1 some type of analysis, I don't know, by OLC or 

2 something, where you mandate an analysis, 

3 comparison of the body of FISA Court law with the 

4 body of law that's out in the public. I don't 

5 know, you could think about things like that as 

6 well.

7 MR. DAVIDSON: Well, the government has 

8 experience in producing public documents based on 

9 underlying classified documents. 

10 So in January of 2006, the Department of 

11 Justice took a portion of a May 2004 OLC opinion, 

12 a portion that then dealt with the January of 2006 

13 concern, content collection under the President's 

14 surveillance program, and it produced a white 

15 paper. 

16 That white paper was extraordinarily 

17 informative to the debate that then followed in 

18 Congress because it pointed to the fact that the 

19 government had been relying on the authorization 

20 for the use of military force for the content 

21 collection part of the President's surveillance 

22 program, and it elicited a considerable debate and 
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1 ultimately legislation on what it took to convey 

2 that there was some variant to collection under 

3 FISA, to what extent was FISA exclusive in the 

4 face of another statute. 

5 So it has experience doing that. It has 

6 recently produced a white paper on drugs, on 

7 targeted killings. So it has done that. 

8 And that also gets done in any litigation 

9 in which there may be classified information in 

10 which the government works with the court to 

11 produce an unclassified version. 

12 It also need not just be a summary. 

13 There may be entire parts of a relatively small 

14 number of decisions that are in fact unclassified 

15 themselves. 

16 And just do this to imagine it, if it is 

17 significant what the term relevance means. It 

18 wouldn't be surprising to find in a major decision 

19 or two how the government asked the court to draw 

20 from five different opinions of the United States 

21 Supreme Court in order to understand what 

22 relevance may mean in certain situations. 
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1 So just as another example, in the May 

2 2004 OLC opinion, which was then made public in 

3 2011, at least as to those parts that dealt with 

4 content analysis, there's enough of an indication 

5 there that relative to the question of 

6 reasonableness the Department of Justice looked to 

7 border search decisions of the Supreme Court, or 

8 other decisions of the Supreme Court about how 

9 much of some span of collected material needs to 

10 be on point in order for a government search to be 

11 a reasonable search. 

12 So summaries are a possibility, but there 

13 are other mechanisms that are available in order 

14 to get the result of a broader public discussion. 

15 And I think I've used my two minutes.

16 MR. MEDINE: Yeah, why don't we move on 

17 to Sharon. Thank you.

18 MS. BRADFORD FRANKLIN: So two 

19 recommendations on how transparency can improve 

20 oversight. 

21 One is by addressing the problem that 

22 many of us have been talking about in terms of 
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1 secret law. So in the morning panel Ken Wainstein 

2 made a comment that when members of Congress are 

3 expressing, you know, surprise at how a law's been 

4 interpreted, that's not what I thought I was 

5 voting for, that's just like any other law.

6 Well, the difference, unlike the RICO 

7 example he gave, RICO, there are published 

8 opinions on how RICO's being used. You can see 

9 what prosecutors are using that for. 

10 Here it took a leak of a classified order 

11 for us to know how Section 215 was being 

12 interpreted. It shouldn't take a leak for us to 

13 know the legal interpretations that the Executive 

14 Branch and the FISA Court are applying.

15 Now that's different. There are 

16 certainly going to be classified information woven 

17 into those orders. I don't deny that in any way. 

18 But the actual understanding of what the law means 

19 should be public in the first place and that will 

20 facilitate a meaningful public debate over whether 

21 that's an appropriate use of the law in a legal 

22 authority.
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1 The second is greater transparency for 

2 some of the auditing type practices that the 

3 second panel was talking about, to some extent 

4 that review again be classified. Maybe the FISC 

5 can play a greater role, this board can play a 

6 greater role, and Congress. 

7 But in terms of reporting on the extent 

8 to which the minimization procedures are actually 

9 successful, to what extent are they limiting the 

10 collection of American's information, how much of 

11 that is being captured? 

12 But to some extent we can have public 

13 disclosure there as well on statistics that are 

14 anonimized. There can be a much greater level of 

15 public reporting on that as well, and that as well 

16 can affect the public debate and have an informed 

17 consideration over what those authorities should 

18 mean.

19 MS. GOITEIN: Two quick responses to what 

20 other panelists have said and then some 

21 recommendations. 

22 First Jim said that, you know, we have 
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1 all three branches in government engaging in 

2 oversight, what more could we want? I think it's 

3 important to point out that the oversight that we 

4 have right now is a kind of oversight-lite. 

5 Oversight by congressional committees in 

6 skiffs looking at classified information does not 

7 work the same way that regular congressional 

8 oversight does because these are elected 

9 representatives who answer to their constituents 

10 and they answer to their donors. 

11 And if those people aren't on the phone, 

12 you know, Jack Goldsmith said this himself in his 

13 book, Power and Constraint. The institutional 

14 incentives are not there for robust oversight in 

15 the intelligence committees. It's just not the 

16 same as regular oversight in an unclassified 

17 setting.

18 Similarly with the FISA Court, for all 

19 the reasons we've talked about, it does not 

20 operate in the way that a regular court operates. 

21 So this is a slightly different version of 

22 oversight than what we usually mean when we talk 
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1 about checks and balances.

2 On the point that programmatic oversight, 

3 sorry, programmatic surveillance to try to 

4 identify who the terrorists are necessarily means 

5 bulk collection, I think we don't want to conflate 

6 those things. 

7 I agree that contact chaining can be a 

8 very important way to find out who known or 

9 suspected terrorists are talking to. You don't 

10 need my metadata to do that. You don't need 

11 Sharon's to do that. You work from the 

12 information you have and you branch outward. 

13 All of the examples the government has 

14 given thus far, the Zazi example and any of the 

15 other specific examples of how it's used its 

16 authorities are examples that, from at least the 

17 information the government has made public, did 

18 not require bulk collect versus contact chaining 

19 outward. 

20 Finally on specific recommendations, I'm 

21 talking fast, I agree with Sharon and Greg on how 

22 to amend Section 215. I agree with a lot of 
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1 what's been discussed about the FISA Court. 

2 On Section 702, I think it was Ken 

3 Wainstein who said, well, it's not workable to get 

4 individualized orders, and then we had Steve 

5 Bradbury saying this is the way it's been since 

6 1978. 

7 FISA looked very different before 2007, 

8 and it required individualized orders in order to 

9 get any international communications involving 

10 Americans. 

11 Now we heard today that that became 

12 unworkable because the FISA Court couldn't deal 

13 with the number of orders. We heard that, I think 

14 from Steve. I didn't hear Judge Robertson say 

15 that. He seemed to be saying that the FISA Court 

16 actually worked quite well except for the issue of 

17 adversariality. 

18 So my recommendation would be to go back 

19 to the pre-Protect America Act of individualized 

20 orders for any communication involving an 

21 American. And I think that would be more 

22 constitutionally sustainable as well.
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1 MR. NOJEIM: It would be useful if 

2 unclassified summaries of significant FISA Court 

3 opinions were made public. It is important that 

4 if you make that recommendation that you 

5 articulate a standard that the summary must meet. 

6 For example, in the Classified 

7 Information Procedures Act the summary that the 

8 defendant must receive has to provide the 

9 defendant substantially the same opportunity to 

10 defend as would the classified information 

11 itself. That's a useful standard.

12 It's certainly not a standard that would 

13 be appropriate here, maybe something along the 

14 lines of, the summary must inform the public of 

15 the nature of the legal question and how it was 

16 resolved. That might be useful and that might not 

17 even be enough. 

18 How would the summary be prepared? In 

19 the CIPA context the government prepares it and 

20 then there is a fight, a fight about whether the 

21 summary meets the standard. I think that then the 

22 judge resolves that fight. 
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1 I think some fighting is good, and that 

2 maybe there ought to be an ombudsperson who takes 

3 the position that, who tries to take the public's 

4 interests into account in having an adequate 

5 summary. 

6 And one word on programmatic 

7 surveillance. We haven't done that on Americans. 

8 We don't do that on Americans. We don't collect 

9 all records about Americans for the purpose of 

10 watching all of us. 

11 Programmatic surveillance, if it occurs, 

12 is something that's about people who aren't in the 

13 U.S., I think. And if that's not the case, well, 

14 we need to learn a little bit more about exactly 

15 what programmatic surveillance is being conducted.

16 MR. SALES: I think Greg's right but not 

17 for the reason he thinks he is. We don't do 

18 programmatic surveillance on Americans because we 

19 do not in fact look at the data of all Americans. 

20 My understanding of the 215 program is 

21 there's a distinction between the collection of 

22 the data, which then goes into a warehouse like in 
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1 Indiana Jones, right, next to the Ark of the 

2 Covenant. 

3 And then the second stage of the process 

4 is upon a showing of reasonable suspicion, the 

5 individualized determination that we're all 

6 calling for, or that some of us are all calling 

7 for here, that is the moment at which humans 

8 eyeball the data, right. 

9 If you're an American, Google right now 

10 knows an awful lot more about you than the NSA. 

11 And the only circumstances in which the NSA is 

12 going to be looking at the data that has been 

13 collected under 215 is if there's a reasonable 

14 suspicion that the data is relevant to an ongoing 

15 investigation to protect against terrorism or 

16 espionage. 

17 Good, right, if there's relevant data to 

18 a terrorism investigation, I think the feds should 

19 be looking at it.

20 But I think the critical question is how 

21 strong is that firewall that prevents the feds 

22 from looking at that warehouse of data in the 
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1 absence of the necessary predication, 

2 individualized suspicion? And that goes back to 

3 the questions about oversight. 

4 Now as far as specific recommendations 

5 are concerned I have a couple. The first one is, 

6 has to do with minimization. So I'm concerned, 

7 having reviewed the minimization rules that were 

8 leaked recently about mission creep. 

9 I think the standard for the use of data 

10 collected through programmatic surveillance for 

11 other purposes is if we find evidence of federal 

12 criminal, or actually criminal activity. I think 

13 that's far too low a standard. These sorts of 

14 tools are incredibly important for protecting 

15 against terrorism. 

16 The cost benefit analysis looks very 

17 different however when we're talking about running 

18 down a tax cheat who's two years behind on his 

19 1040s, right. I prefer to see a much stricter 

20 standard there. 

21 You can use this information for 

22 investigations of important federal crimes, or 
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1 crimes involving the threat of death or serious 

2 bodily injury, or child exploitation, something 

3 along those lines.

4 Also my second recommendation is to 

5 consider more thoroughly whether Section 215 is 

6 the appropriate vehicle for programmatic 

7 surveillance of business records. 

8 I can see some potential value in 

9 collecting that data, right. In order to do 

10 programmatic surveillance, in order to connect the 

11 dots, you have to have a big data set. It's no 

12 good to say we're only going to collect data on 

13 Mohamed Atta if we don't know who Mohamed Atta is 

14 in the first place. That's the whole point of the 

15 collection is to develop the data field that 

16 allows us to identify the bad guys. So it's no 

17 good to say you can only collect on bad guys. We 

18 don't know who they are. 

19 I'm not sure that 215 is the appropriate 

20 vehicle for donig this. As several other 

21 panelists have said this seems to have been 

22 intended to go for individual records rather than 
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1 bulk records, records already in existence rather 

2 than mandating the creation of a huge data set. 

3 So I think further exploration of whether 

4 Congress should consider additional legislation to 

5 put this on a more solid legal footing would be 

6 appropriate.

7 MR. MEDINE: In the first panel in 

8 particular we heard a lot of questions raised 

9 about the FISA Court and how it could operate in 

10 more of an adversarial way because that's how our 

11 American litigation system works best is when 

12 there are people on different sides. 

13 And many states around the country have 

14 public advocates appear in the utilities context 

15 where a utility seeks a rate increase and 

16 individual consumers don't come in and oppose it, 

17 but there's a governmental entity, a public 

18 advocate who comes in to argue the citizen's side 

19 of that question.

20 Should there be an institutional, in your 

21 view, institutional entity that appears as a 

22 government entity or with appropriate security 
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1 clearances, who appears to oppose FISA Court 

2 orders and have the chance to litigate with the 

3 government, or should there be some other 

4 structure to create more of an adversarial 

5 context? 

6 MR. BAKER: Sure. So this has been 

7 talked about for years number and it's not been 

8 adopted, and I can speculate why. 

9 But so just a couple of quick 

10 observations. So number one is you're trying to 

11 balance, I think, the legitimate need for the 

12 President to obtain timely and accurate foreign 

13 intelligence information with the privacy and 

14 civil liberties of Americans, right. 

15 And so you're trying to do something 

16 quick and well, okay. And so where you have to be 

17 careful, I think in this area, this can be done, I 

18 think you could create such an entity. You can 

19 give, maybe it's a federal employee of some sort 

20 and the person has the right clearances and 

21 they're dropped into the system somehow. I mean 

22 there's probably some way that you could work it 
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1 out. 

2 But there is a lot of process that goes 

3 on already within the agency before the request 

4 comes over to the Justice Department, at the 

5 Justice Department, back and forth with the 

6 agency, with the FISA Court, which has obviously 

7 the judges on it, but it also has a staff of 

8 permanent legal counsel who are senior attorneys, 

9 you know, experienced, who go back and forth with 

10 the government all the time. You know, this is 

11 part of the system now. 

12 So if you now interject yet another 

13 person into the system you have to think about, 

14 okay, what is that going to do to the speed and 

15 agility of this program? I don't have a good 

16 answer for you, but I think that's part of the 

17 reason why it hasn't been adopted before. 

18 We got pounded on all the time because we 

19 were too slow, we demand too much from the 

20 agencies, all kinds of complaints. So that was 

21 what was happening at the Justice Department on a 

22 regular basis. That's what we were hearing.
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1 So if this new person then asks 

2 questions, demands answers, you're going to have 

3 to think about how it's going to impact the 

4 ability of the process to move quickly.

5 MR. DAVIDSON: I think it would be 

6 important to separate a large part of the FISA 

7 Court's work which does involve individual 

8 applications from, let's call it the occasional 

9 task to consider a government application, and a 

10 consequent order that sets in motion a larger 

11 system of collection, whether it be the annual 

12 order under the FISA Amendments Act or 90 day 

13 orders under Title V, Section 215. 

14 You know, in the circumstance of the 

15 daily work, and I shouldn't say too much about 

16 daily work because that was Jim's bread and butter 

17 for many, many years, the system is dealing with 

18 the kind of occasion that's presented when a 

19 United State's attorney seeks a search order in a 

20 particular matter, it's very fact-dependent, 

21 moving very quickly, in contrast to the point in 

22 the process in which there is intended to be 
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1 reflection. 

2 So one aspect of the FISA Amendments Act 

3 is that the government is to make its application 

4 for its annual order thirty days before it seeks 

5 to put that order, you know, into effect, so that 

6 there is a time for process.

7 So then the question would become what 

8 would be the role of the individual within the 

9 system and what could be the role of people 

10 outside of the system if legal issues could be 

11 identified for some kind of public briefing? 

12 And I think the reality is, but others 

13 more involved in the civil liberties community 

14 could comment, that unless they have an 

15 opportunity to articulate those concerns, the 

16 confidence that there's someone from the 

17 government who's doing that in a closed setting 

18 won't be as strong as if it might be articulated 

19 by individuals or groups who take this at heart as 

20 central to their purposes.

21 MR. MEDINE: And Judge Robertson did 

22 suggest that judges are used to dealing with 
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1 search warrant requests ex parte and are quite 

2 comfortable evaluating them, but it was more 

3 problematic to do program approvals.

4 But other thoughts on that? Sharon.

5 MS. BRADFORD FRANKLIN: So I'd just start 

6 out by saying that The Constitution Project hasn't 

7 taken a specific position on this proposal, but 

8 Judge Robertson is a member of our Liberty and 

9 Security Committee and I would encourage you to 

10 take very seriously his proposal. 

11 As he pointed out, it's probably less 

12 necessary when you're looking at a traditional 

13 individualized FISA warrant, which is more 

14 analogous to a traditional warrant in the criminal 

15 context, and much more important when you're 

16 looking at programmatic surveillance or an 

17 argument for a new interpretation of the scope of 

18 Section 702, or Section 215, or any other 

19 applicable authority and building in some kind of 

20 adversariness, particularly in that process I 

21 think would be very important and would help.

22 MS. GOITEIN: And I think relevant to 
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1 that point, I think Ken said that that's what's 

2 happening right now in the Section 702 context is 

3 pretty much exactly analogous to the criminal 

4 context. 

5 And of course the major difference is 

6 that in the criminal context there's an 

7 individualized showing of probable cause to get a 

8 warrant. There's no such thing as, judge, approve 

9 this one year program in which we will get 

10 criminal warrants on the following people, on the 

11 following unnamed people using these, you know, 

12 targeting procedures, could never happen. 

13 So it is very different, the level, you 

14 don't have the level of protection that the law 

15 affords in a criminal context when you're talking 

16 about these orders. 

17 So I do think that it is more important 

18 for that reason to inject some adversariality into 

19 the process. I think the ombudsman idea is a good 

20 idea. 

21 I think the idea of making the court's 

22 role less about programmatic approval and more 
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1 about individualized warrants goes along with what 

2 I was saying before about changes to Section 702.

3 The only other thing I would add is that 

4 I actually think a lot of the functions that the 

5 FISA Court is performing today are functions that 

6 don't have to be in a secret court. These are 

7 functions that could be sort of kicked back to the 

8 regular courts. 

9 I mean if, you know, if the FISA Court is 

10 an Article III Court, I guess, and so if there's a 

11 case for controversy for the FISA Court's 

12 purposes, then there's one for another Article III 

13 Court's purposes as well. I don't understand why 

14 some of these more significant legal questions 

15 can't be brought before a regular court somehow. 

16 MR. NOJEIM: Just a thought, in a regular 

17 criminal case, yeah, there's a magistrate 

18 considers the application of the government for a 

19 search warrant, it's ex parte, but there's often a 

20 check at the end. You know, you get the evidence 

21 and then it's tested, that search is tested in 

22 court. 
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1 We don't have that test in this context. 

2 There's no after the search test about whether it 

3 was constitutional or lawful. So to make up for 

4 that, you could have the process built in up front 

5 and make it adversarial. 

6 I agree with Mike's point that it doesn't 

7 have to be the case that the ombudsman weighs in 

8 on every warrant application, every search 

9 application that comes in front of the court, and 

10 with Jim's point that that could slow it down 

11 unnecessarily. 

12 But I think you have to leave that to the 

13 ombudsperson because to try to articulate, well, 

14 don't weigh in unless it's a really important 

15 question, you know, it might be an important 

16 question that involves one search. And you need 

17 to allow for that ombudsperson to decide when that 

18 question is important.

19 MR. SALES: I think there's a lot of 

20 value to having a devil's advocate, or ombudsman 

21 or, you know, whatever the nom de guerre would be 

22 for this official, especially in requests to 
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1 approve surveillance programs, as opposed to 

2 individual discreet surveillance requests as 

3 individuals.

4 I share the concerns and misgivings about 

5 time being of the essence in certain cases, but I 

6 think there's a way to write the statute in a way 

7 that accommodates those concerns. You know, the 

8 devil's advocate shall have a right to participate 

9 unless the attorney general certifies that blah, 

10 blah, blah. 

11 FISA actually has mechanisms like that 

12 already and you could import that kind of scheme 

13 where the default rule is you have a devil's 

14 advocate performing an adversarial check, but 

15 there's an exception for truly exceptional exigent 

16 circumstances.

17 MS. BRADFORD FRANKLIN: Can I just add to 

18 that, I think you could have a system where if it 

19 is truly an emergency, if it's certified as an 

20 emergency, then the surveillance begins. And at 

21 that point the ombudsman shows up, you have the 

22 proceedings, and if in fact it turns out that it 
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1 wasn't permissible, the surveillance ends and none 

2 of the information that's been gathered can be 

3 used.

4 MS. COLLINS COOK: So I was hoping to 

5 turn to a slightly different topic, and building 

6 on some of the issues that have been raised 

7 earlier about incidental collection, and I think 

8 that's been raised as a concern. 

9 So I was hoping, and actually just to 

10 change things up a little bit, the order, if I 

11 could start with you, Sharon, actually because you 

12 had referenced this, and thinking about addressing 

13 the issue of incidental collection, if it needs to 

14 be addressed whether it should be at the 

15 collection point, the access point, the use point, 

16 and how we should think about it and whether there 

17 are different approaches.

18 MS. BRADFORD FRANKLIN: The answer's all 

19 the above. 

20 On the collection point, the issue goes 

21 to the justification for how this complies with 

22 Fourth Amendment standards. So we've known all 
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1 along, long before these recent disclosures, that 

2 under the FISA Amendments Act it's legal to 

3 collect communications where the target is a 

4 foreigner located abroad, or supposed to be 

5 foreigners, maybe unknown, located abroad, and an 

6 American may be on the other end of the 

7 communication. And that was called incidental 

8 collection.

9 The problem is that the term incidental 

10 suggests de minimis, suggests it doesn't happen 

11 very often, suggests it's not that broad in scope, 

12 all sorts of things which really are very 

13 misleading it appears, in light of recent 

14 revelations.

15 We've had some members of Congress trying 

16 to get a scent of that and what the real scope is 

17 for a long time and haven't still gotten full 

18 information on what the scope is. 

19 But if it turns out that there are a lot 

20 of Americans whose communications are being 

21 intercepted under programmatic surveillance where 

22 you're not making an individualized showing of 
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1 suspicion about anyone, right, because you don't 

2 even have to have an individual target and show 

3 suspicion about Mohamed Atta, or whoever, under 

4 the programmatic surveillance, that starts to 

5 undermine how you can make an argument that Fourth 

6 Amendment rights are being respected for the 

7 American on the other end. 

8 So at the collection point we would want 

9 to make sure you have a much more rigorous showing 

10 to the FISA Court that you have procedures in 

11 place to really make it incidental and limited to 

12 the Americans on the other end. 

13 Or you should turn to the earlier showing 

14 where you had a showing of actual suspicion. So 

15 it's more parallel to the other context where 

16 you're talking to somebody who there's a criminal 

17 warrant against, a Title III warrant or something 

18 against them. 

19 Then as far as once post-collection, 

20 we've made a recommendation to try and build in 

21 safeguards at that point. 

22 So let's say you have this database, you 
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1 know that there are communications where Americans 

2 are on at least one end in that database, if you 

3 want to go through and search through for 

4 information on a specific U.S person with 

5 recognized Fourth Amendment rights, at that point 

6 you should go make your showing of probable cause 

7 to the FISA Court. 

8 And we have some more detailed 

9 recommendations that we spelled out. 

10 MS. COLLINS COOK: Thank you. Did others 

11 want to weigh in on this? Go, to your left.

12 MR. SALES: Briefly let me answer that 

13 question in the context of the 215 program. So 

14 one way to design a program to minimize the 

15 privacy and civil liberties hit is to minimize 

16 the government role with respect to maintaining 

17 the data. 

18 So an alternative way of doing the 215 

19 program would be instead of the government serving 

20 a 215 order on service providers and saying give 

21 us your data, an alternative arrangement would be 

22 a data retention requirement. 
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1 Congress writes a statute that says ISPs 

2 shall keep whatever type of data Congress 

3 specifies for a certain period of time. 

4 And you know what, data storage can be 

5 costly. Much less so than it used to be, but it 

6 still imposes a cost so we're going to provide a 

7 subsidy to Verizon to warehouse all this data for 

8 a period of five, ten years, whatever Congress 

9 thinks is an appropriate amount of time. 

10 And that way the only circumstances in 

11 which the government then gets the data are 

12 circumstances in which there's a demonstration of 

13 whatever the legal standard is, relevance, 

14 reasonable suspicion, probable cause, whatever the 

15 appropriate standard is, that the information is 

16 relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect 

17 against international terrorism or espionage. 

18 So you know, this solves or has the 

19 potential to solve the problem of misuse, right. 

20 There are good reasons why the government might 

21 want to have this information and there are bad 

22 reasons. 
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1 You know, there's a pretty girl in line 

2 at the airport security checkpoint, I want to find 

3 out, you know, what she's all about. That 

4 obviously is a misuse of authority. 

5 Well, if the government doesn't have that 

6 data in the first place, but rather sort of 

7 outsources the responsibility for collecting and 

8 maintianing it to the ISPs themselves, then that 

9 sort of scenario is a lot less likely to 

10 materialize.

11 MS. COLLINS COOK: Aren't there a series 

12 of other scenarios that could arise, so that's 

13 taking as a given that perhaps that data would 

14 only be available through something akin to a FISA 

15 order, but I think that you would have to expect 

16 that were these repositories of information with 

17 the service providers instead, that that would be 

18 available through a wide range of legal 

19 mechanisms, and whether there's a cost to that 

20 that should also be considered.

21 MR. SALES: Absolutely. Yes, so there 

22 are at least two mechanisms I can think of for 
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1 acquiring that data, the FISA pen trap authority 

2 or the 215 authority itself. 

3 Here you're using those authorities to 

4 get individualized data points rather than big 

5 bulk databases, right. 

6 But part of the cost benefit analysis you 

7 have to do is, you know, how nimble is it, how 

8 nimble is the process for getting that data? 

9 Maybe you need it in exigent 

10 circumstances more quickly than upon application 

11 to the FISA Court. So you could build in an 

12 emergency procedures exception to that process 

13 like we have elsewhere in FISA, I think.

14 MR. MEDINE: I wanted to get other 

15 panelists' thoughts. I mean the proposal does 

16 solve one problem, which is the government doesn't 

17 have the data and therefore the potential to 

18 misuse the data, but it also makes the private 

19 sector keep data a lot longer than it might 

20 otherwise have. 

21 And one privacy protection is destruction 

22 of information, and now if information is being 
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1 kept, there's also an incentive for the private 

2 sector once they've got all this data sitting 

3 around that they're paying to keep or being 

4 subsidized to keep, they might as well use it for 

5 other purposes. 

6 And then there's the added complication 

7 that this data may only be valuable if merged with 

8 data from other companies to paint a fuller 

9 picture. 

10 So what's the tradeoff here in terms of 

11 is it better for the government to have the bulk 

12 data under a legal structure with accounting and 

13 audits, or is it better for the private sector to 

14 have it and only have the government access it on 

15 an as-needed basis?

16 Greg.

17 MR. NOJEIM: It's better for the private 

18 sector to have the data that the private sector 

19 needs to engage in its business. I think that a 

20 new data retention requirement imposed by the 

21 government on the private sector creates more 

22 problems than it solves. 
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1 As you said, David, if the data isn't 

2 there, the bad guys can't get it, it can't be 

3 breached, hackers can't get it. If the data isn't 

4 there it can't be turned to other purposes. 

5 You know, if the data, if there's a five 

6 year data retention requirement, imagine all the 

7 entities that are going to want that data. Law 

8 enforcement is going to want it, and they're going 

9 to want it for all kinds of investigations. 

10 And as we know from our work in other 

11 contexts, the standards for getting that data are 

12 way too low. It'll be the first step toward other 

13 data retention requirements. I mean today it's 

14 the phone records, what's it going to be tomorrow, 

15 IP addresses? Is it going to be content? I just 

16 think it's a very dangerous line to cross. 

17 I think Congress considered it and 

18 ultimately decided that it was not the right thing 

19 to do. 

20 Again, the right data retention rule is 

21 that companies should retain the data that they 

22 need for business purposes and they should get rid 
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1 of personally identifiable data as soon as they 

2 can when it does not serve a business purpose.

3 MS. GOITEIN: I just want to agree that I 

4 think that's not the solution. I think that's 

5 equally problematic in its own right to require 

6 the telephone companies and the other companies to 

7 keep this information. 

8 It reminds me a little bit of the Freedom 

9 of Information Act. You have a right to ask the 

10 government for records it already has. You don't 

11 have the right to ask the government to create 

12 records for your use. 

13 I think, you know, the government has a 

14 right under certain circumstances to get, or 

15 statutory rights anyway, to get information about 

16 Americans. But to require us to generate and keep 

17 information about ourselves for the government's 

18 convenience, it's a form of that to say that 

19 companies have to keep this information on us, and 

20 it's a slippery slope.

21 MS. BRADFORD FRANKLIN: And if I could 

22 just quickly push back on the notion that the 
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1 government should ever have access to all this 

2 bulk information without the kind of showing of 

3 suspicion or contact chaining that Liza was 

4 talking about either.

5 Professor Steve Vladeck on a panel once, 

6 I don't even remember what the context was, but 

7 somebody said wouldn't it just be easier if we 

8 could gather all this information. He said, yeah, 

9 it would be easier if the police could go and 

10 break down everybody's door and scoop up 

11 everything in our houses. 

12 And you know, it's an extreme example, 

13 but the Fourth Amendment is there for a reason. 

14 We need to require a sufficient predicate before 

15 the government should be able to get this 

16 information. The fact that it's easier shouldn't 

17 be enough justification. 

18 MS. COLLINS COOK: Jim, I think you --

19 MR. BAKER: Yeah, thank you very much. 

20 Just one quick comment. 

21 I'm not sure where I come out on whether 

22 it's better to have the government have it or the 
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1 private sector and so on. So I'll just put that 

2 aside for one second. 

3 But if, as you're thinking about that if 

4 you decide to recommend that the private sector 

5 maintain the data, keep in mind, I think, I 

6 haven't looked at it in a while, but there are 

7 seven or eight different ways in the Federal Code 

8 to get dialing data, and under a whole bunch of 

9 different types of predications from probable 

10 cause all the way down to relevance and so on, 

11 subpoenas, and orders, and all kinds of different 

12 things. 

13 So if the providers have it and the word 

14 gets out in the law enforcement community, which 

15 obviously it will, there's lots of ways to get 

16 that data that have different levels of oversight 

17 connected to them, and so you want to think about 

18 that as well.

19 MS. COLLINS COOK: I think we sort of 

20 changed the question midstream, but I did want to 

21 invite other panelists to weigh in on the question 

22 of incidental collection.
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1 MR. DAVIDSON: What was the very last 

2 thing you said? 

3 MS. COLLINS COOK: Incidental. And if 

4 anyone else wanted to weigh in on that specific 

5 question.

6 MR. BAKER: I was just going to say I 

7 mean, I think -- go ahead. 

8 Just incidental collection is dealt with 

9 and deemed and thought to be consistent with the 

10 Fourth Amendment because it's reasonable because 

11 in part it's done, it's obtained in connection 

12 with a legitimate government purpose for obtaining 

13 the information, and then there are minimization 

14 procedures connected with the acquisition, 

15 retention and dissemination of that information. 

16 And so the thinking has been for a long 

17 period of time with respect to incidental 

18 collection that it's okay because it's reasonable 

19 for those reasons. 

20 People may disagree. People may not 

21 think that's sufficient and so on, but that 

22 definitely has been the thinking.
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1 MS. GOITEIN: I have one very specific 

2 thing to say on minimization because even if you 

3 go back to an individualized order requirement for 

4 American's international communications, you'll 

5 still have incidental collection so you'll still 

6 need to have minimization procedures. 

7 I do not understand the logic for a rule 

8 that if you don't know where a person are, where a 

9 person is, then you can reasonably assume that 

10 they are a non-U.S. person who is overseas. 

11 To me that is not consistent with the 

12 statute where you have to have a reasonable belief 

13 that the person is a non-U.S. person overseas. 

14 And you know, at a minimum I think that the 

15 default needs to be changed. 

16 If you really have no information, no 

17 knowledge, the Fourth Amendment I think requires 

18 you to assume that it could be a U.S. person and 

19 be more protective, not less. 

20 MR. NOJEIM: I think we have to pay more 

21 attention to the fact that the statute that we 

22 have on the books for FAA surveillance enables the 
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1 government to compel U.S. companies to collect up 

2 communications of people just because they are 

3 abroad.

4 When you look at the limits that are in 

5 the statute, a purpose of the surveillance has to 

6 be to collect foreign intelligence information, 

7 but the foreign intelligence information is very 

8 broadly defined. And it makes sense, I think, to 

9 have a broad definition of FII when you're talking 

10 about surveilling agents of foreign powers, which 

11 is where that comes from, the traditional FISA in 

12 U.S. 

13 But when it's just foreignness and 

14 collecting information about people who are 

15 abroad, I think we might need a more limited 

16 collection regime. 

17 50 U.S.C., I'm sorry, 15 U.S.C Section 

18 1801(e)(1) has the description of what foreign 

19 intelligence information is, and I think that 

20 collecting information about a potential or actual 

21 attack by a foreign power, sabotage or 

22 international terrorism, clandestine intelligence 
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1 activities is already pretty broad and that you 

2 might consider whether it is consistent with 

3 concepts of international human rights and the 

4 necessity that there has to be for collecting 

5 information, whether you could limit the 

6 collection up front about information about people 

7 who are abroad. 

8 We have, we, the United States, has 

9 embarked on an international campaign to promote 

10 Internet freedom around the world. I don't think 

11 that part of that campaign ought to be that mere 

12 foreignness ought to be enough to allow for 

13 surveillance. 

14 I don't think that our government would 

15 say, for example, that the government of Germany 

16 should be able to collect the communications of 

17 people in the United States just because that's 

18 where we are and that we're not Germans. I think 

19 you have to pay some attention to that. 

20 MR. DAVIDSON: Can I suggest a focus for 

21 the board, and that is the Congress will turn to 

22 the many important questions that have been 
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1 discussed through the day when it has to, and it 

2 will have to initially when the sunset for 

3 business records is reached in the middle of 2015.

4 I think, and this is an opinion, I think 

5 unfortunately the sunsets for the FISA Amendments 

6 Act and for business records have not been 

7 aligned. 

8 An alignment would permit looking and 

9 encourage looking at this system in an integrated 

10 way. These are all provisions of FISA. Something 

11 may have come in through the PATRIOT Act, 

12 something may have come in through the FISA 

13 Amendments. They're all provisions of FISA and 

14 they are intended to, or in fact work in an 

15 integrated manner. 

16 So at least by the middle of 2015 the 

17 Congress will be turning to this. It's actually 

18 not too soon to begin to think about what that 

19 sunset debate should be. These sunset debates 

20 just creep up on people. 

21 Important to any debate, which is more 

22 than a debate of should we now extend it another 
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1 four years and get by this temporary crisis and 

2 the possible loss of authority. 

3 But if it is to become an occasion to 

4 think fundamentally about the collection system 

5 that we have, then questions need to be identified 

6 well in advance in order to determine which of 

7 those should be responded to empirically and which 

8 of those are philosophical matters that could be 

9 discussed, you know, at any time. 

10 So for example, you know, questions have 

11 been raised about incidental collection. And 

12 certainly I know within the Senate there are 

13 senators who've articulated the importance of 

14 having some process by which the intelligence 

15 community helps to identify what the actual impact 

16 of its collection system is. 

17 Some of those involve privacy concerns. 

18 So that one of the problems considered in how 

19 deeply one could look at how much incidental 

20 collection involving Americans comes in through a 

21 system that's not focused on them, but focused on 

22 others, is that the process will involve looking 
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1 at the communications of Americans. One might 

2 invade privacy in the course of trying to learn 

3 something about privacy.

4 Well, there's a balance there. And an 

5 entity that is concerned about the overall issue, 

6 you know, of the privacy and civil liberties of 

7 Americans could begin a consideration that I think 

8 would have importance within the intelligence 

9 community and the Congress, which is, how do you 

10 find out how a system is working? What are the 

11 downsides? What are the risks? What are the 

12 benefits? 

13 Sometimes, you know, we have to have some 

14 infringement on privacy to learn what the 

15 infringement on privacy might be. 

16 I'm not suggesting the answer to it, but 

17 trying to identify those questions now in 2013 and 

18 2014, rather than waiting to 2015 might mean 

19 there's a possibility that they'll be considered 

20 factually and deeply at that time.

21 MS. COLLINS COOK: Thank you. We did 

22 want to give an opportunity to the other board 
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1 members to ask a question, if they did have one. 

2 Given the time we have and the number of 

3 panelists I would urge something akin to a speed 

4 round. So if you could go straight to, maybe not 

5 red, but yellow, and let's try to keep our 

6 responses to a minute to the questions. 

7 Or maybe I'm getting ahead of myself, but 

8 I assume you have questions. 

9 MR. DEMPSEY: My question is about 702, 

10 and in part it's directed largely to what I would 

11 consider to be the three civil liberties 

12 representatives in the middle of the table, 

13 although I know you all care deeply about civil 

14 liberties.

15 On 702, I think we have to confront the 

16 fact the a number of witnesses this morning talked 

17 about the sort of historical perspective. To my 

18 mind, what really changed around 2000, 2001, 

19 etcetera, was the fact that a large percentage of 

20 the communications of foreigners passed through or 

21 were available in the United States on U.S. 

22 territory, in the hands of U.S. based service 
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1 providers.

2 Previously when the government wanted to 

3 get the communications of foreigners they had to 

4 go overseas. And if you read the history of NSA 

5 and so on, you find out about all the different 

6 methods that the NSA used overseas to collect the 

7 communications of foreigners with zero oversight. 

8 Zero.

9 Now that comes into the United States and 

10 it's available from U.S. based service providers. 

11 And I do think that there is, you know, 

12 credibility to the argument that 702 is a 

13 tightening of rules as to what previously was the 

14 practice for the government to obtain the 

15 communications of persons reasonably believed to 

16 be abroad. 

17 And I think that even if you have a tight 

18 definition of reasonably believed to be abroad and 

19 a tight definition of foreign intelligence value, 

20 the numbers would still exceed the capability of 

21 any court of any size to do particularized 

22 approvals. 
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1 So I mean I guess my question is, A, are 

2 you prepared to accept that premise, assuming my 

3 premises are correct? 

4 And then if that is the premise, that 

5 what used to be truly, truly bulk when you did it 

6 overseas, now is subject to limitations, yes, you 

7 have the incidental collection problem, but what 

8 is your reaction to my statement of the premise 

9 and the problem and what I see now as the impetus 

10 behind 702? 

11 MS. GOITEIN: I would say that it was 

12 loosened in one way and tightened in another. So 

13 I would say that Section 702 probably did in 

14 practice tighten the standard for pure foreign to 

15 foreign communications. 

16 But for foreign to domestic 

17 communications there had been a requirement, had 

18 always been a requirement since 1978, of course 

19 before then all bets were off, but there had been 

20 a requirement that if an American were a party to 

21 a communication --

22 MR. DEMPSEY: We had, I mean again, this 
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1 is ancient history now. We had huge antennas 

2 aimed at huge parts of the world collecting 

3 everything, including communications from abroad 

4 to the United States.

5 MS. GOITEIN: That you're saying were 

6 outside of FISA, that weren't covered by FISA?

7 MR. DEMPSEY: FISA had no 

8 extraterritorial application.

9 MS. GOITEIN: Right. I mean I think if 

10 you interpret FISA as how Congress wanted to 

11 regulate the protections that it felt were 

12 appropriate for the domestic, I'm sorry, not 

13 domestic, the international communications of 

14 Americans, then I have to say that I think the 

15 government might have found a sort of 

16 technological loophole in its ability to, you 

17 know, go overseas and catch this information that 

18 was falling from satellites, or however it was 

19 getting it. 

20 But it doesn't seem that it was 

21 consistent with the spirit, even if it was 

22 consistent with the letter of FISA, it doesn't 
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1 seem like it was consistent with the spirit 

2 because Congress --

3 MR. DEMPSEY: FISA is explicitly orders 

4 for collection inside the United States. FISA 

5 left totally unregulated, everybody knew that, 

6 there's no doubt that everybody knew that it left 

7 unregulated what was happening outside the United 

8 States.

9 MS. GOITEIN: I understand, that's why I 

10 I'm drawing a distinction between the spirit and 

11 the letter. 

12 And also, I mean I think, the law and our 

13 understanding of the law has to evolve along with 

14 the technology, right?

15 MR. DEMPSEY: Well, but how do we then, 

16 okay, but then technology has changed. What do we 

17 do about it, assuming that now things which 

18 previously were totally unregulated and truly bulk 

19 now fall within some structure of regulation? 

20 Again, I'm just not sure that the 

21 particularized, saying it has to be 

22 particularized, I honestly don't think that 
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1 scales.

2 MS. BRADFORD FRANKLIN: I want to address 

3 that piece and just make clear that actually our 

4 Liberty and Security Committee's recommendations 

5 do not say end programmatic surveillance. 

6 Instead the recommendations are to build 

7 in greater safeguards at the front end to limit 

8 the scope of the programmatic surveillance to make 

9 sure that foreign intelligence is the primary 

10 purpose, and to provide more information to the 

11 FISA Court Judge so that he or she can really 

12 evaluate the targeting and hone it in and make 

13 incidental collection be more like the normal 

14 traditional meaning of incidental.

15 And then post-collection to have more 

16 safeguards in effect for American's rights. So we 

17 have not actually recommended eliminating all 

18 programmatic surveillance.

19 MR. NOJEIM: So I would accept that as a 

20 premise but not the only premise. Another premise 

21 is that there is more of that communication and 

22 more human interaction that is now available 
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1 through surveillance than ever there was before. 

2 And it used to be much less perfect, the 

3 ability of the government to conduct the 

4 surveillance. Now it is approaching a near 

5 certainty level and it seems to me that something 

6 has to substitute for the friction that used to be 

7 in the system because there wasn't an ability to 

8 collect all this information about all human 

9 interaction, or close to all human interaction 

10 that we have now.

11 MR. DEMPSEY: Greg, I thought you were 

12 going on a different point, which I just want to 

13 draw out and then yield to Judge Wald or to 

14 Rachel.

15 But the world, another thing that has 

16 happened in the past fifteen, twenty years is the 

17 world has globalized. I think we now have the 

18 largest percentage of people who are lawfully in 

19 the United States, the largest percentage of U.S. 

20 persons who are foreign-born since maybe the 

21 1890s, right. 

22 So again, when we were outside the United 
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1 States targeting people outside the United States 

2 thirty years ago, it was sort of rare that any of 

3 those would actually be talking to people inside 

4 the United States. 

5 I do think now with globalization there 

6 might be an argument that there's a larger 

7 likelihood of picking up, Jim Baker is nodding his 

8 head, if I can note that, a larger likelihood of 

9 picking up foreign to domestic communications.

10 MR. NOJEIM: I think that's right. And I 

11 think it would be useful to have some reporting 

12 about the extent to which under FAA that is 

13 occurring, FAA, the FISA Amendments Act, that that 

14 is occurring. 

15 And the government hasn't even conceded 

16 that it can make an estimate, that it couldn't 

17 even take a sample of FISA Amendment Act 

18 surveillance to figure this out, and I think it 

19 could. 

20 MS. GOITEIN: And I think to the extent 

21 that what you're saying is that an individualized 

22 court order requirement would be unworkable 
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1 because now today there are so many international 

2 communications that, you know, run through fiber 

3 optics and that involve Americans and people 

4 overseas, I mean to me that just sort of shores up 

5 my point that --

6 MR. DEMPSEY: No, honestly I was making 

7 the argument that a large percentage of purely 

8 foreign to foreign is also -

9 MS. COLLINS COOK: Right, right, and I'm 

10 fine with treating those differently. 

11 I'm just saying that to the extent that, 

12 because when I talked about an individualized 

13 order requirement, I was merely talking 

14 communications for which an American was on one 

15 end of the communication. 

16 And as far as that's concerned, I mean to 

17 the extent that that is such a massive part of the 

18 surveillance that the government is doing that it, 

19 you know, would slow things down too much to get 

20 individualized orders, I mean that just reinforces 

21 my point that we have a massive Fourth Amendment 

22 problem here if the government is collecting that 
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1 much of American's content, communications, 

2 whether those communications are overseas or 

3 otherwise. 

4 And, you know, whether or not the 

5 technology has changed or not, we have to grapple 

6 with that Fourth Amendment problem. I realize 

7 we're the policy panel.

8 MR. BAKER: Just real quick, I don't 

9 necessarily agree with some of the premises of 

10 your analysis, so I just wanted to say that. I 

11 don't really have the time, and this is not really 

12 the place to have a full-blown discussion of that.

13 But let me just say something that I've 

14 said publicly before, which is pre-FAA, 

15 pre-Protect America Act, before all that, my 

16 statement is that FISA worked in wartime. And I 

17 think that's worth a longer discussion with you 

18 all, but I'm just saying that. That was my belief 

19 at the time, that's still me belief today.

20 MR. DEMPSEY: I'm sorry, I didn't hear 

21 that. 

22 MR. BAKER: That FISA worked during 
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1 wartime. 

2 MR. DEMPSEY: Meaning? 

3 MR. BAKER: Meaning FISA, before the FAA, 

4 before the Protect America Act, FISA worked in the 

5 sense that it protected the privacy interests, the 

6 legitimate privacy interests of America, of 

7 Americans, and also protected the national 

8 security.

9 MS. WALD: Okay. This is sort of half a 

10 comment, a question, move on incidental collection 

11 of U.S. persons. 

12 It's been somewhat, I'm reading a lot of 

13 the material that that is out in the public, 

14 that's perhaps one of the key points people worry 

15 about. 

16 And assuming for the moment we're past, 

17 that somehow we get past the individualized 

18 warrant and they are collecting incidental 

19 information on U.S. persons, two things which have 

20 been brought up in your panel and this morning's, 

21 and I just want to underline it if you have any 

22 reaction, and that is a second look at two parts 
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1 of that. 

2 One is the use and dissemination. Now 

3 way back in the December reauthorization, this is 

4 of course on 702 I'm talking about, there was a 

5 debate. Some of the senators were asking, saying, 

6 well, can we get some numbers on how many U.S. 

7 persons are being collected in the course of 

8 this? 

9 My remembrance, I hope it's correct, of 

10 it was that they said, no, we can't. Okay. Which 

11 led me in reading it to wonder what 702(l) in the 

12 actual statute, when it tells the inspector 

13 general what to do, it tells him with respect to 

14 acquisitions authorized under A of that 702, you 

15 should review the number of disseminated 

16 intelligence reports containing a reference to a 

17 U.S. person identity and the number of U.S. 

18 persons' identities subsequently disseminated by 

19 the element concerned in response to request for 

20 identities, and then with respect to acquisitions 

21 authorized, the number of targets later to be 

22 determined to be in the U.S. in the extent 
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1 possible, whether they were reviewable. 

2 Then all that goes to the attorney 

3 general, the DNI, but not to the public. The 

4 thought occurs to me, what great risk would there 

5 be to national security in disseminating that kind 

6 of information if it's already being collected by 

7 the inspector general? 

8 Because like one of the panel members, I 

9 wondered as we went through many, not just these, 

10 but many of the broader contexts of many of the 

11 acts and found out that when people talk about 

12 minimization, as it was brought up in the morning, 

13 it can mean many things.

14 In some contexts it means, for instance, 

15 if they collected it by mistake when they 

16 shouldn't have, it goes out apparently. It's 

17 deleted. Well, it's taken to some cloud that's 

18 not as accessible as other clouds or whatever. 

19 However, if it's incidentally collected 

20 it's kept in there. It may be tagged and there 

21 may be some attempt to protect the specific 

22 identity, but it's kept there and it's used and 
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1 it's available for, and it can be disseminated, as 

2 I understand it, you know, for not just the law 

3 enforcement but to, which I've always wondered 

4 what it really means, if it's necessary to make 

5 foreign intelligence understandable, whatever that 

6 means. 

7 And so it seems to me that that's an area 

8 which I think, or at least initially deserves 

9 more, because my guess is we are going to end up 

10 collecting, however it goes, your premise or not, 

11 a lot of incidental information. 

12 And I think that could help, I think, to 

13 heighten the trust perhaps if Americans get a 

14 better specific notion of both the dimensions and 

15 the actual usages. Because I think it's an area 

16 of total confusion, at least it's still that for 

17 me. 

18 That's more of a comment than a question, 

19 so I'll go on to Richard.

20 MR. SALES: If I could, just a very quick 

21 reaction to that. You may as well put me on red 

22 because I'll be very quick. 
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1 There actually is some precedent for the 

2 disclosure of very high level aggregate data about 

3 national security operations. So the intelligence 

4 budget, the overall sum previously was classified 

5 and now has been declassified. 

6 In the criminal law context, every year 

7 we have a wiretap report that reveals how many 

8 Title III wiretaps were issued. So I think it's 

9 certainly possible to have that kind of 

10 information.

11 MS. WALD: But am I not right that in 

12 Title III, it's been a long time since I've been 

13 in the criminal area, but in Title III 

14 minimization means if you collect information in a 

15 telephone call, you know, about his wife having 

16 problems, that kind of thing, it gets thrown out? 

17 That doesn't happen in many, many of these 

18 programs.

19 MR. SALES: I think that's right. 

20 Minimization looks different in the Title III 

21 programs.

22 MS. WALD: Yeah, it stays. It stays in 
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1 those data banks. It may be restricted, you know, 

2 tagged, but it stays there accessible for 

3 whatever.

4 Rachel, I think was the one --

5 MS. BRAND: It's more of a comment. So 

6 we, the PCLOB, have to look at all aspects of this 

7 issue and our statute specifically mentions the 

8 fact that there's nothing that's more harmful to 

9 security or to civil liberties than insecurity. 

10 So you know, we can't discuss privacy and 

11 civil liberties impact in a vacuum. And the 

12 discussion here has been a little sterile in that 

13 regard. You almost wouldn't know we were talking 

14 about terrorism because we haven't been talking 

15 about it very much, frankly. 

16 So you know, we don't have time to do it 

17 now, and I'm, you know, we don't really have time 

18 for more questions, but to the extent that you are 

19 weighing in with us, providing us advice, it would 

20 be useful to know if the broad kind of collection 

21 reflected in the alleged 215 order is going to 

22 occur, what restrictions or limitations would be 
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1 useful? 

2 So destruction dates, limits on access, 

3 you know, targeting guidelines and those sorts of 

4 things. 

5 You know, just talking about the two 

6 sides of the coin here, the government's talked a 

7 lot about the benefits of these programs in terms 

8 of thwarting plots, and we haven't yet had a 

9 chance to fully get into the extent to which 

10 that's credible. You know, we'll be getting more 

11 information about that from the government as we 

12 go along with our analysis. 

13 But if it turns out that these programs 

14 are unbelievably useful and have thwarted more 

15 plots than you can possibly imagine, and that sort 

16 of the national security imperative means that we 

17 have to keep them, then what?

18 I'm not saying that that's the 

19 conclusion. I'm just, it would be useful for us 

20 to know what your recommendations would be for 

21 cabining the privacy damage that that would cause, 

22 so to speak. So that would be useful to us going 
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1 forward, or to me at least going forward.

2 MR. DAVIDSON: If I could say a word in 

3 relation to that. I'm not sure that the test is 

4 always or necessarily most importantly whether 

5 some particular plot was foiled by the use of a 

6 particular authority. 

7 I do believe there's a way of looking at 

8 metadata collection if everyone would permit, even 

9 in terms of privacy and civil liberties. The more 

10 that is known about who should be looked at more 

11 closely, to narrow down the use of other more 

12 intrusive authorities because there's a means of 

13 identifying those particular individuals who merit 

14 that closer look, that may very well work to 

15 reduce the intrusiveness of more robust forms of 

16 content collection. 

17 And so you wouldn't get out of that 

18 benefit that a particular plot was foiled. You 

19 may get out of that benefit you didn't have to go 

20 out and collect content because you had a way of 

21 being reasonably certain that that individual was 

22 not in communication with others of concern.
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1 So there may be several questions to ask 

2 about the benefit of metadata collection.

3 MR. MEDINE: Okay. With that, that's a 

4 good endpoint for our discussions, so thank you 

5 very much for the panel. 

6 We will take a ten break and then welcome 

7 any members of the audience who's like to make 

8 brief comments on these subjects to come up to a 

9 microphone and make those comments. So we'll be 

10 back in about ten minutes. Thank you.

11 (Off the record)

12 MR. MEDINE: Okay. Thank you. We're 

13 going to resume our final session, which is the 

14 opportunity for members of the public to make 

15 comments. Just in the interests of time, we're 

16 going to limit comments to two minutes. And 

17 Diane, who has been our timekeeper will enforce 

18 that.

19 So one other thing is that the session is 

20 being transcribed and so those who choose to come 

21 up and make a public comment have an option to 

22 preserve their privacy and be anonymous and don't 
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1 identify themselves. 

2 But if you would like to be identified 

3 for the record, we would appreciate it, it's in 

4 your interest to identify yourselves. So it's 

5 really up to the speakers whether you want to be 

6 anonymous or not.

7 AUDIENCE MEMBER: David, thanks. Evan 

8 Hendricks, Privacy Times. Thanks for the day, 

9 thanks for devoting attention to this. 

10 I think when you talk about the 

11 collection of phone records of millions of 

12 Americans that are not suspected of any 

13 wrongdoing, it's an affront to the Fourth 

14 Amendment, which means we're supposed to be secure 

15 in our papers and effects. And the intention 

16 there is our personal information.

17 So I think, to me, the credibility of the 

18 board is going to depend on how strongly and how 

19 effectively will you advocate against the phone 

20 metadata collection program. I think there's no 

21 justification for it under the Fourth Amendment. 

22 And I think one of the defects in the 
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1 process is you are finally the only entity to 

2 address privacy within this administration's 

3 tenure. 

4 There's been no privacy counselor to 

5 address these issues along the way. There's been 

6 no privacy advocate in front of the FISA Court. 

7 There's been no privacy advocate or anyone to 

8 stand up for the American people in front of the 

9 intelligence committees. It's totally been 

10 missing in action, and I think that's a huge 

11 defect. 

12 And on the issue of minimization, I 

13 think, I hope you're familiar with William Denny's 

14 Thin Thread Program, which he developed back in 

15 the early 2000s, which is a way of collecting the 

16 information they need and dropping the information 

17 on Americans that were not legal to collect at 

18 that time.

19 That program, which costs about three 

20 million dollars, and it was rejected, and instead 

21 they've wasted billions and billions of dollars on 

22 dragnet programs that haven't worked.
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1 So I think you should also look at which 

2 tail is wagging the dog, and that's again, the 

3 beneficiaries of all this dragnet surveillance 

4 have been military contractors like SAIC and Booz 

5 Allen Hamilton that have made billions of dollars 

6 and have developed programs that weren't as good 

7 as ones that were developed in-house. Thank you.

8 MR. MEDINE: Thank you for your comment. 

9 Next.

10 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Adam 

11 Marshall. We were talking a lot about metadata 

12 today, and the various privacy implications 

13 associated with it. I just thought I'd bring 

14 something to the attention of the board that might 

15 help you crystallize kind of what metadata can do.

16 So MIT has put out a very interesting 

17 tool called Immersion. You can find it just by 

18 Googling it. And it basically has you log into 

19 your Gmail address and then it scans the metadata 

20 of your Gmail account, so only the two from fields 

21 and the time. And then you can kind of explore 

22 your relationships that your metadata says about 
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1 you.

2 And after you're done kind of poking 

3 around for a while and freaking yourself out, you 

4 are then given the option to either delete your 

5 metadata from the MIT server or to let it remain 

6 of the server. It's, you know, secure and 

7 encrypted and such.

8 So I would encourage the members of the 

9 board, if you have a Gmail account just to try 

10 this out to see what it says about you, and then 

11 see whether you feel like deleting it or not. And 

12 if you do feel like deleting it, just ask what 

13 that says.

14 MR. DEMPSEY: What's the name of the 

15 program again? 

16 AUDIENCE MEMBER: It's called Immersion.

17 MS. BRAND: With an I?

18 AUDIENCE MEMBER: With an I, yes. It's 

19 done by MIT.

20 MR. MEDINE: Thank you for your comment.

21 Is there anyone else who would like to 

22 make a comment? Any board members like to make 
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1 any comments?

2 All right. I wanted to thank everyone 

3 for coming today. I wanted to thank the panelists 

4 for engaging in some excellent discussion. I 

5 wanted to thank the board staff, Sue Reingold and 

6 Diane Janosek for helping make this event flow as 

7 smoothly as it did.

8 These are tough issues. There are strong 

9 interests on both the national security and 

10 privacy and civil liberties side and we appreciate 

11 the chance to have discussions about them.

12 It does just occur to me in a broader 

13 sense, maybe not to lose sight of the fact it's 

14 something we take for granted, we have a federal 

15 agency here who's hosting a public discussion 

16 giving people a chance to critique their 

17 government surveillance programs. 

18 I think that in a way is a testiment to 

19 what a great country we have, that we can have 

20 this kind of discussion and how important it is to 

21 maintain these kinds of values to have an open and 

22 free discussion about them. 
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1 And going forward, the board will take 

2 into account what we've learned today, continue to 

3 look into these matters and eventually prepare a 

4 report for the President and Congress in a public 

5 forum on these two programs.

6 With that, thank you very much for 

7 coming.

8 (Whereupon, at 4:14 p.m., the meeting was 

9 adjourned.)

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 
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1 CERTIFICATION

2

3 I, LYNNE LIVINGSTON, A Notary Public of 

4 the State of Maryland, Baltimore County, do hereby 

5 certify that this is a verbatim transcription of 

6 the proceedings; that this transcript is a correct 

7 and accurate record of the proceedings, to the 

8 best of my knowledge, ability and belief.

9 I further certify that I am not of 

10 counsel to any of the parties, nor in any way 

11 interested in the outcome of this action.

12 AS WITNESS my hand and notarial seal this 

13 _________ day of ___________________ 2013.

14

15 __________________________

16 Lynne Livingston

17 Notary Public

18

19 My Commission Expires December 10th, 2014

20 

21

22
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A

aa 143:4

ability 9:7 75:15

149:17 154:1

180:19 191:11

213:18 268:4

297:16 300:3,7

319:8

able 23:15 66:5

77:3,5 105:6

119:6 130:5

144:1 159:1

166:6 172:10

185:7 189:8,9

209:2 227:9

248:22 285:15

290:16

abnormal

130:11

abroad 41:21

236:21 237:1

276:4,5 289:3

289:15 290:7

295:16,18

297:3

absence 263:1

absolutely

159:21 162:2

175:8,18 179:5

186:17 198:10

280:21

abundantly

52:12

abuse 129:20

159:19 160:8

abuses 46:12

54:10 94:2

231:14 234:4

247:4

accept 196:22

296:2 299:19

acceptable 53:5

access 10:9

17:17,21 71:10

72:17 74:16,20

88:15 96:8

97:18 112:15

114:19 140:3

153:4,16,17

159:11 160:1

164:9 166:22

173:6 174:11

175:15 180:13

205:8 206:13

246:13,19

275:15 282:14

285:1 310:2

accessed 10:10

18:3 19:12

70:13

accessible

306:18 309:2

accessing 8:10

22:14 77:20

206:1,15,21

accidents

181:15

accommodated

35:4

accommodates

274:7

accomplish 39:8

account 30:10

30:20 261:4

315:20 316:9

318:2

accountability

180:3 181:12

194:7,15 195:4

195:19 196:3

208:9

accountable

99:3 135:1

155:11 171:12

207:21

accounting

282:12

accumulation

27:17

accuracy 7:20

170:17 197:5

198:19

accurate 84:4

162:4,4 189:10

191:11 197:3

199:12,16

251:14 266:12

319:7

accurately

185:8 251:15

accused 230:21

accustomed

101:7

acknowledge

222:17

aclu 2:13 16:5

37:7

acquire 12:11

acquired 17:10

22:12 114:18

233:16

acquires 246:10

acquiring 281:1

acquisition 20:9

120:10 232:21

287:14

acquisitions

305:14,20

act 1:7,8 5:12,13

8:17 9:1 12:2

28:17 34:11

36:5 37:19

38:3,13,18

40:15 52:8

60:16 64:11

100:3,11

133:15 134:15

135:13,18

139:18 171:2

187:19 188:15

197:1 219:17

221:14 228:13

232:13 233:9

236:13 259:19

260:7 268:12

269:2 276:2

284:9 291:6,11

301:13,17

303:15 304:4

action 43:8 94:1

314:10 319:11

actions 4:13,15

active 7:5

154:20

activities 13:10

18:9 29:3

67:10 105:9

119:16 141:17

141:19 214:6

216:21 290:1

activity 64:16

134:9 136:6,10

166:6 168:1,16

182:12 192:3,4

208:12 263:12

actors 177:16

201:19

acts 32:2 187:21

306:11

actual 77:12

151:13 179:9

187:8 229:6

243:20 255:18

277:14 289:20

292:15 305:12

307:15

adam 315:10

adaptations

78:22

adapts 78:18,19

add 63:17 119:1

126:3 160:15

272:3 274:17

added 239:21

282:6

addition 19:18

21:15,19 42:11

106:17 215:19

226:1 238:8

244:6

additional 6:17

121:2 137:21

172:2 223:14

265:4

address 20:7

28:13 43:22

50:18 104:8

132:15 151:11

153:15 164:18

164:20 165:1

167:17 170:20

173:10,12,14

178:15 181:16

205:21 218:8,9

299:2 314:2,5

315:19

addressed 43:2

50:21 75:18

152:9 153:9

221:11 275:14

addresses 145:4

145:10,10

161:17,17

164:7,17 178:1

178:1 243:11

283:15

addressing 83:5

250:14 254:21

275:12

adequate 140:13

204:6 224:18

225:11 261:4

adequately

236:2 240:5

adhere 125:9

adhered 152:22

154:12

adherence 200:4

adjourned
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318:9

adjudicating

35:7,9

adjudication

35:11 62:9

administration

31:19 102:9

103:5,10,21

225:5,6 226:7

administrations

314:2

administrative

5:7 21:12 36:9

56:14 82:15

134:14

administrator

131:20 132:3,6

administrators

131:21

adopted 52:7,7

57:22 266:8

267:17

adopting 56:11

adoption 24:5

advance 190:3

292:6

advanced

162:11

advancement

159:16

advances 190:22

adversarial 62:9

97:19 99:5

120:17 201:8

265:10 266:4

273:5 274:14

adversariality

259:17 271:18

adversarialness

119:17

adversaries 35:1

adversariness

270:20

adversary 36:16

37:7,9

adverse 91:15

189:6

advice 309:19

advisor 2:18

16:15 125:6

139:15

advisory 4:21

4:22

advocate 265:18

273:20 274:8

274:14 313:19

314:6,7

advocates 85:20

265:14

affect 23:8

256:16

affidavit 92:22

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affiliations

25:15

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affords 271:15

affront 313:13

afternoon

123:15,22

124:1,4

age 24:8

agencies 13:22

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134:14 156:13

157:17 166:7

171:11 180:20

181:3 195:5

202:10 204:12

231:7,8,15,18

232:12 267:20

agency 4:9 36:9

134:13,16,21

135:7,14

158:21 171:1

177:13,14,18

177:20 180:7

182:12 186:21

195:18 196:10

198:12 201:14

267:3,6 317:15

agent 104:22

129:6 228:19

228:21 231:22

239:9,12

agents 33:15

38:22 289:10

aggregate 308:2

aggressively

225:7

agility 267:15

ago 48:2 90:7

100:5 104:14

137:1 140:5

154:6 167:20

185:4 301:2

agree 58:1,14

73:19 94:15

113:13 117:4

140:18 158:17

185:18 187:2

191:2 198:16

208:7 258:7,21

258:22 273:6

284:3 303:9

agreed 5:17

54:13 86:12

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185:19

agreement

78:14,15

212:20,20

213:4,7

agrees 60:1

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194:17 287:7

294:7

aimed 297:2

airline 57:12

airlines 243:6

airport 135:4

280:2

akin 280:14

294:3

alarm 33:7

alarmist 32:15

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alexander

134:12 160:22

algorithms

179:17 192:9

242:4

alien 12:15

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100:17

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67:5,20 89:15

309:21

allen 315:5

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allies 150:21

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allow 62:12

78:14 81:1

84:13 96:6

98:9 102:20

112:1,6,14

157:11 208:2,2

208:4 211:8

273:17 290:12

allowed 50:13

59:18 76:5,8

128:6 156:13

188:19 220:17

allowing 25:16

232:20

allows 9:1 25:8

42:3 53:8

167:13 264:16

alluded 46:5

71:16 97:9

alphabetical

15:21

alphabetically

211:16

alqaeda 146:14

alternative

69:22 278:18

278:21

alternatively

127:1

alternatives

67:1 76:21

77:15,19

amass 188:10

amend 184:22

228:13 258:22

amendment

18:10 21:5,10

21:19 24:5,14

25:1 27:10,13

34:10 41:17

43:15 66:15

75:10,13,19,20

75:22 76:12

78:3,3,4,11

92:16 98:1

99:21 107:22

108:3 109:21

110:1 111:4

112:17 113:5,8

113:10,14

130:17 168:12

168:13 220:9

220:12 223:7

227:20 235:6

275:22 277:6

278:5 285:13

287:10 288:17

301:17 302:21

303:6 313:14

313:21

amendments

5:13 36:5

37:19 38:3,13

38:18 40:15

52:8 60:16

76:4 100:3,11
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232:13 233:9

236:13 268:12

269:2 276:2

291:5,13

301:13

america 221:14

259:19 303:15

304:4,6

american 23:22

34:1 43:20

50:6 53:18

60:6,9 80:7

103:13 107:5

114:1 117:7

135:16 145:11

150:21 165:22

187:16 199:16

229:12 237:7

249:8 259:21

262:9 265:11

276:6 277:7

296:20 302:14

314:8

americans 22:18

23:9 27:18

29:22 34:3

47:11 48:16,19

49:19 50:20,20

60:11 61:7

74:18 76:5,9

98:2,9 111:18

112:15 113:1

113:19 114:20

144:22 145:8

145:12 160:7

231:2,8,12,19

232:7,12 233:4

233:15 234:3

236:20 256:10

259:10 261:7,8

261:9,18,19

266:14 276:20

277:12 278:1

284:16 288:4

292:20 293:1,7

297:14 299:16

302:3 303:1

304:7 307:13

313:12 314:17

amicus 88:4

90:19 95:13,14

95:21 97:1

98:10 104:8

221:9

amnesty 37:1,7

47:7 49:2

100:9 111:2

amount 22:11

27:8 46:19

128:14 133:22

144:21 155:3

176:12 179:11

180:12 185:21

207:1 226:2

229:10 233:14

279:9

amounts 31:17

44:18 157:12

157:18 189:21

191:10

analog 137:4

186:3,4,6

199:13

analogous 93:3

270:14 271:3

analogue 163:5

analogy 61:21

62:1,20 65:20

96:3

analyses 130:4

analysis 10:16

10:18 11:16

18:18,22 20:14

20:15 27:15

40:13 51:6

66:2 68:8,10

70:21 89:13

93:15 113:11

126:13 131:8

134:5 136:22

159:1 172:11

178:20 185:11

186:5 188:16

197:12 203:18

209:1 216:11

242:16,22

249:6 252:1,2

254:4 263:16

281:6 303:10

310:12

analyst 129:6

204:7 208:14

analysts 19:10

203:22,22

analytic 137:8

150:8 180:2

181:4

analytical 242:4

analytics 77:4

analyze 4:13

158:7 159:1

172:11 186:6

186:14 190:18

213:19

analyzed 186:11

247:15

analyzing 93:9

anathema 34:3

ancient 297:1

animal 94:14

annual 40:22

176:5 219:18

220:13 222:21

223:7 268:11

269:4

anomalies

180:19

anomalous

208:12

anomaly 64:20

206:13 209:9

anonimized

256:14

anonymization

139:8

anonymous

145:8 312:22

313:6

answer 55:2

90:15,22

101:18 111:12

112:21 128:10

128:12,16,16

129:9 131:12

134:8 166:15

196:5 199:2,4

204:7,18 215:9

224:1 236:16

257:9,10

267:16 278:12

293:16

answered 52:9

75:6 236:14

answering

79:19 169:16

169:17

answers 92:5

127:19 188:13

268:2 275:18

antennas 297:1

anticipate

186:22

antiunilateral...

244:20

anybody 34:16

44:14 84:22

92:11 155:21

174:6 216:16

anymore 251:17

anyones 17:20

anyway 284:15

apart 99:13,16

apologize 80:18

apparent 250:7

apparently

120:9 239:17

306:16

appeal 30:7

88:11 221:14

appeals 88:10

appear 157:11

163:15 164:7

223:19 265:14

appearing

100:19

appears 18:8

38:14 89:16

219:9 222:20

237:20 265:21

266:1 276:13

appended

165:17

applicability

76:18 113:15

applicable

270:19

application 90:9

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104:11,15

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272:18 273:8,9

281:10 297:8

applications

35:15 39:19

87:15 91:16

93:14 138:1,10

138:16,18

176:18 268:8

applied 45:17

64:5,15,19

217:19

applies 50:16

59:16 67:13

113:14

apply 39:7

59:15 63:21

75:14 110:1

113:6,9 116:16

116:16 134:20

154:10 217:5
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

4

applying 59:13

255:14

appointed 33:11

appoints 99:15

appreciate

16:21 43:22

118:19 211:20

223:17 230:8

313:3 317:10

approach 55:16

79:9 80:11

149:4 173:9

180:10

approached

218:22

approaches

163:11 275:17

approaching

300:4

appropriate

79:4 80:12

99:14 102:5

118:14 154:4

175:2 177:3

187:13 201:15

224:9,18

225:11 255:21

260:13 264:6

264:19 265:6

265:22 279:9

279:15 297:12

appropriately

4:17 22:17

211:14

appropriaten...

38:7 101:2

approval 12:8

13:6,14 18:11

19:18 21:12,18

22:8 35:4,11

35:13 39:9

40:1 42:6 46:8

46:10,15 57:12

94:10 109:19

222:22 246:19

271:22

approvals 94:17

193:17 270:3

295:22

approve 36:6

271:8 274:1

approved 11:10

13:19 17:8

33:19,21 39:1

40:19 58:16,21

59:17 90:9

92:18 93:7

176:20,20,21

176:22 201:3

245:17

approves 34:11

36:10

approving 10:1

35:16 94:9

179:6 182:3

220:12,12

245:4

apps 146:11

apt 62:20

architectural

244:11

area 68:7

161:20 217:5

266:17 307:7

307:15 308:13

arent 23:12 48:9

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175:2 186:21

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280:11

arguably 128:18

argue 265:18

argued 9:4

26:16 86:11

argues 64:22

arguing 156:7

183:3

argument 27:6

34:21 59:5

78:5 86:13,15

101:8 111:12

113:21 178:19

184:12,14,15

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277:5 295:12

301:6 302:7

arguments

100:9 103:12

ark 262:1

arrangement

57:2 278:21

article 25:18

46:15 92:4

100:14 101:4,6

102:17 105:19

130:4 272:10

272:12

articles 125:1

articulable

122:16 228:18

239:10

articulate 98:6

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273:13

articulated

269:18 292:13

artificial 3:10

125:4

ashcroft 85:4

230:22

ashkan 3:7

124:20 140:15

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163:9,10 164:2

177:9 180:1

201:16 208:12

aside 230:14

286:2

asked 33:11

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85:6,8,13

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199:8 218:9

253:19

asking 72:14

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129:3 169:8

211:11 240:20

305:5

asks 268:1

asneeded 282:15

aspect 269:2

aspects 6:14

66:17 220:7

309:6

aspired 27:21

assemble 20:19

asserted 10:6

asserting 55:10

assertion 47:10

48:22

asserts 14:7

assess 14:4

137:9

assessed 247:14

assessing 104:15

137:7 161:6

224:7,17

assessment

137:12 169:9

204:1 224:13

235:4

assessments

232:14

assign 187:17,21

assigning

117:21

assignment

121:14

assistance

201:22

associated 10:21

18:6 24:3

151:9 183:15

315:13

associates

242:14

associations

25:11 27:22

49:21

assume 60:12

73:11 151:18

158:14 161:3

169:10 190:20

288:9,18 294:8

assumes 72:15

assuming 44:15

122:1 200:14

296:2 298:17

304:16

assumption

60:15 98:12,13

171:21 207:19

assure 34:1

asumptions

190:16

atta 242:17

264:13,13

277:3

attach 55:9,11

attaching 55:16

attack 74:13

289:21

attacks 40:4

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attempt 138:6

203:8 306:21

attempted

168:22

attempting

110:7

attempts 188:17

attended 243:3

attention 51:4

149:22 209:4,5

209:8 237:11

288:21 290:19

313:9 315:14

attitude 127:11
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

5

attorney 12:10

16:17 40:21

85:4 112:7,12

268:19 274:9

306:2

attorneys 112:9

267:8

attributable

163:20

attributed

208:20

audience 7:1

123:7 312:7

313:7 315:10

316:16,18

audit 174:1,13

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177:18 178:7

178:13 196:8

200:1 205:6,10

206:20 207:7

208:1

auditing 131:16

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203:3 256:2

audits 19:21

180:11 203:9

209:7 246:20

282:13

audittype

158:19

august 7:10

125:17,21

authenticate

167:11 174:8

author 28:16

authorities

29:15 73:20

86:20 256:17

258:16 281:3

311:12

authority 21:10

21:16 37:19

38:3 42:8,13

42:14 46:9

76:8 85:7 94:3

100:6 109:3

133:11 134:2

136:5 142:10

156:12 196:9

205:9 228:15

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270:19 280:4

281:1,2 292:2

311:6

authorization

64:7 109:12

110:22 118:8

220:17 245:1,2

245:12 252:19

authorizations

118:13 219:21

220:13

authorize 81:5

220:2 228:9

authorized 8:11

8:22 20:10

21:13 53:3,6

110:18 122:11

176:6 226:14

237:18 305:14

305:21

authorizes

53:10 55:5

81:9 238:10

245:16

authorizing

31:14 196:9

automatic

128:10

availability

182:10

available 22:2

42:21 74:20

77:17 96:19

153:14 176:11

176:13 185:13

211:12 225:19

254:13 280:14

280:18 294:21

295:10 299:22

307:1

avenue 1:16

avoid 6:9

aware 92:1

187:15

awareness 27:22

168:7

awful 262:10

B

back 18:17

33:20 41:19

61:15 64:8

72:7 73:10

79:10 80:12,18

85:5 87:3

90:13 93:7

102:22 108:5

114:21 118:21

130:2 133:6

138:22 147:7

159:7 164:3

169:3,22

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212:14 213:6

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247:5 248:5,17

249:2,12 250:6

259:18 263:2

267:5,9 272:7

284:22 288:3

305:3 312:10

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background

46:5 93:20

166:16 186:16

248:11

backgrounds

55:19

backs 142:22

bad 122:4

189:15 193:13

193:14,20

202:16 228:4

242:1 264:16

264:17 279:21

283:2

bailiwick 36:12

baker 3:14

210:8 211:18

217:17 247:22

248:5 250:17

251:13 266:6

285:19 287:6

301:7 303:8,22

304:3

balance 32:2

39:3 173:2

211:14 230:16

266:11 293:4

balanced 4:15

balances 29:18

30:2 121:2

258:1

baltimore 319:4

bank 68:2

banks 309:1

banner 212:15

barely 182:2,2

barrier 169:1

base 130:5

238:2

baseball 161:19

based 5:21 7:13

8:16 11:18

12:9 18:9 19:2

81:20 96:16

126:6 133:14

150:12 157:22

161:1,5 166:18

185:9,10 192:2

192:18 211:11

249:19 252:8

294:22 295:10

basic 76:18

140:9 220:17

221:1 244:8

246:7

basically 114:17

136:16 158:19

164:11 172:8

201:13 250:17

315:18

basis 81:6 84:15

133:17,20

135:7 156:14

176:6 183:16

213:15 219:15

250:11 267:22

282:15

bbc 164:9

bear 219:7

beef 88:2

began 56:5

beginning 31:11

51:18

begins 274:20

behalf 211:22

223:21

belief 157:17

207:6 288:12

303:18,19

319:8

beliefs 28:1

believe 79:15

107:11 110:14

122:17 134:3

144:15 158:9

211:13 222:5,6

224:2 225:8

228:5,8 230:17

237:1 239:11

311:7

believed 13:12

41:22 42:9

45:12 109:8
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

6

110:3 161:7

169:5,12

295:15,18

bell 124:11

bellovin 3:3

124:9 126:2

160:17 161:13

162:2,9 163:11

173:16 181:19

189:11 199:3

208:19

ben 51:8

beneficiaries

315:3

benefit 15:14

80:19 89:13

230:19 235:11

263:16 281:6

311:18,19

312:2

benefits 242:8

242:12 293:12

310:7

bernstein 51:10

best 8:9 32:8

50:5 130:2

161:10 170:11

173:16 197:20

201:8 209:10

265:11 319:8

beth 4:6 117:14

199:1 204:15

204:20 209:19

beths 119:1

121:14

bets 296:19

better 68:9

171:4 181:12

182:13 184:7

197:4,11 227:4

282:11,13,17

285:22 307:14

beyond 8:10

24:12 54:17

224:16

bible 60:21

big 91:19 94:5

129:16,17

142:14 167:6

183:16 241:2

250:7 264:11

281:4

biggest 127:7

132:1

bill 28:20

billing 17:12

22:3 69:17

71:18 83:15

billion 200:13

billions 61:6

314:21,21

315:5

bipartisan 4:9

227:1

bit 54:14,15

66:1,6 108:5

115:12 120:19

121:4 123:1

142:18 144:17

148:4,22

152:21 186:15

187:10 189:12

194:20 211:6

212:11 217:15

261:14 275:10

284:8

bite 78:10

blacked 249:10

249:10

blackout 161:20

162:22 163:1

blah 198:4,4,4,5

274:9,10,10

bleeding 246:4

blending 180:22

blew 200:10

block 20:16

blocked 104:2

blocks 170:20

blog 141:8

blower 200:9

board 1:3 2:1

4:4,5 5:5 6:16

6:17 14:18

15:1,20 27:19

28:12 32:20

37:15 44:2

72:14 106:14

114:15 115:7

132:7,21 133:9

211:20 212:19

220:19 222:6

224:19 240:20

256:5 290:21

293:22 313:18

315:14 316:9

316:22 317:5

318:1

boards 4:12 5:7

28:5 172:22

bob 93:10 150:4

152:3,4

bodily 14:6

264:2

body 90:13,13

102:3,6 135:4

252:3,4

bombing 57:9

book 257:13

bookmaking

182:20

books 288:22

booz 315:4

border 232:15

254:7

borderless

164:7 166:10

borders 141:14

142:5

boston 57:9,14

58:9

bottom 120:2

bound 103:15

boundaries

149:17 162:17

boundary 138:9

156:21

bounds 43:14

150:2 151:17

bradbury 2:11

15:22 16:20

40:10 44:9

46:21 48:12

56:4 58:6

68:17,20 69:2

71:4 82:7

92:13 96:7

98:11 108:4

111:20 113:3

259:5

bradford 3:17

210:15 223:18

254:18 270:5

274:17 275:18

284:21 299:2

bradlee 51:9

bradley 207:14

208:20,20

brainer 159:3

branch 4:10,13

19:20 30:9,20

43:13 48:6

54:8 94:2

96:18 97:4

218:14,18

222:7 233:7

244:21 247:3

255:14 258:12

branches 43:16

46:13 94:6

214:5 215:10

257:1

brand 2:4 4:6

14:19,20,22

22:19 28:7

32:16 37:13,21

54:11 59:1

62:18 72:8

80:17 97:7

107:9 117:13

117:18 123:3

202:14 204:15

309:5 316:17

breach 141:2

breached 283:3

bread 158:22

268:16

break 6:16

39:17 65:20

123:12 174:10

174:11 209:15

285:10 312:6

breaking 30:18

breaks 145:2

breakthrough

219:5

brennan 3:18

210:19

bridging 124:7

brief 6:20 34:20

98:10 111:6

117:19 126:3

133:7 136:2

223:22 226:16

312:8

briefed 20:4

42:19 94:13

95:10,12

briefing 20:6

42:20 269:11

briefly 153:13

200:18 215:20

215:22 246:16

278:12

briefs 221:10

bright 171:15

bring 94:6 134:4

209:12 221:21

315:13

bringing 41:18
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

7

104:2 184:5

brings 35:12

91:15

britney 146:15

broad 9:5 21:15

56:16,20 57:6

57:20 58:3

59:5 119:5

157:16 237:16

276:11 289:9

290:1 309:20

broader 56:1,2

56:12 58:20

64:16 97:22

110:20,21

149:20 254:14

306:10 317:12

broadest 20:18

broadly 45:17

217:18 289:8

brought 66:18

67:2 92:2

272:15 304:20

306:12

brouhaha 51:14

browser 165:6

browsing 192:3

bs 179:18

budget 308:4

build 80:15

127:15 129:4

169:1 179:2

244:16 277:20

281:11 299:6

building 20:16

177:18,18,19

243:13 244:11

247:10 270:19

275:5

built 126:20

250:2 273:4

bulk 118:13

228:9 236:18

241:6 242:3

245:4,16 258:5

258:18 265:1

281:5 282:11

285:2 296:5

298:18

bunch 286:8

burden 39:13

203:20 234:14

burdens 204:9

bush 103:5,10

bushs 60:18

business 8:18

9:2,15 17:3

20:9 21:8 51:3

69:7,14,16

71:11,13,14

72:1,2,3 81:3

81:11,12 82:1

82:21 83:11

118:18 128:17

143:3 163:13

219:8 264:7

282:19 283:22

284:2 291:3,6

butter 158:22

268:16

C

c 1:17 16:1 66:9

99:15 132:16

135:6 238:15

289:17,17

cabining 310:21

cables 108:13

cadwalader

16:14

calculus 168:9

calibrated 43:1

california 163:1

call 9:11,12,13

22:3 23:18

25:13 34:4

53:12 71:18

88:4 129:11

133:17 136:21

143:4,14,14

169:7 179:18

183:17,18,20

183:20,21

190:5 223:4,6

241:5 268:8

308:15

called 17:13

18:14,15 30:10

150:4 161:15

167:21 184:2

185:5 189:19

241:5 242:15

276:7 315:17

316:16

calling 83:5,9

189:18 192:15

192:16 262:6,6

calls 9:10 10:14

17:15,18,20

18:15 26:22

27:1 36:21

53:1 60:11

83:10 105:3

189:2 190:4

192:19 240:10

campaign 290:9

290:11

cancer 183:17

184:1,3,5,18

184:19

cant 78:14

120:22 121:1

174:7 208:3

238:22 272:15

283:2,2,3,4

305:10 309:10

capabilities 29:9

31:2 142:12,14

142:15 147:17

180:2 190:17

capability

295:20

capable 147:19

177:16

capacity 23:6

203:2

capitol 52:5

125:22

capture 144:1

captured 256:11

car 45:3

card 157:2

207:4

cards 15:13

243:12

care 169:10,11

198:18 294:13

career 64:9

careers 231:12

careful 33:13

266:17

carefully 23:7

43:1,9 54:6

207:7

carried 29:20

43:15 108:10

136:19

carrying 91:22

case 24:20 34:18

45:1,3,15,15

45:16 51:6

58:15 65:14

66:12 68:14

69:1,2 73:4,4,7

97:16 105:15

114:12 118:9

122:20 174:11

204:11 208:21

222:8 226:13

231:5 238:22

240:7 249:1

250:15 261:13

272:11,17

273:7

cases 6:7 65:6,7

158:10 170:17

171:15 192:13

197:6 232:17

274:5

casting 27:4

castle 147:22

catch 66:5

174:17 297:17

catch22 37:5

categories 40:18

41:1 227:7

category 39:21

47:17 82:18

112:11,12

232:19

causality 129:22

cause 11:18 19:5

59:22 92:17

95:19 100:18

105:16 110:11

110:13 114:21

199:13 271:7

278:6 279:14

286:10 310:21

caused 150:19

150:21

causes 151:1,2

172:18

caution 28:2

190:15

cautionary

206:19

cdt 235:15

cell 9:21,22 19:1

166:18,19

center 2:14 3:6

3:18,19 16:8

124:17 125:6

210:19 211:1

235:13

central 220:5

269:20

centralized

73:16,17 75:3

century 32:12
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

8

180:2,3 194:16

194:18 206:20

certain 47:22

134:19 151:17

180:12 191:10

191:11,17

195:8 204:3

253:22 274:5

279:3 284:14

311:21

certainly 51:2

128:9 138:9

162:4 168:16

180:13 181:3

190:21 198:9

210:1 215:8

220:15 223:3

255:16 260:12

292:12 308:9

certainty 237:8

300:5

certification

319:1

certifications

41:1,13

certified 274:19

certifies 274:9

certify 319:5,9

certifying 41:2

chaining 137:6

146:2,17 258:7

258:18 285:3

chairman 2:3

125:14

challenge 16:6

37:10 92:1

100:10 135:5

151:16 152:2

152:15,16

154:7 167:17

challenges 124:6

149:3 153:8,15

197:7

challenging

133:11 157:21

215:21

chance 15:20

65:11 66:3

87:5 266:2

310:9 317:11

317:16

change 36:8

39:15 74:14,16

120:12 131:12

134:16 171:16

171:17 211:13

226:5 239:7

275:10

changed 119:13

286:20 288:15

294:18 298:16

303:5

changes 28:14

121:1 134:7

213:17 216:14

224:2 272:2

changing 108:6

149:18 193:16

characteristics

191:18

characterize

154:8

characterized

49:1

charge 248:12

charter 220:20

chases 137:22

cheat 263:18

cheats 246:2

check 272:20

274:14

checkpoint

280:2

checks 29:18

30:2 32:1

121:2 246:17

246:18,22

258:1

chief 5:7,8 99:14

child 184:4

264:2

chill 31:3

chilling 27:13

choice 96:12

235:7

choices 222:15

choose 6:5

138:17 312:20

choosing 35:1

chris 60:22

cipa 260:19

circle 18:11

circuit 66:9

135:6

circumstance

137:3 268:14

circumstances

49:14,17

262:11 274:16

279:10,12

281:10 284:14

circumventing

36:3

citation 238:16

citizen 12:15

13:3 126:5

165:13 167:13

170:7 172:10

citizens 23:4

27:22 145:7

151:1 165:15

167:7 168:11

168:11,22

265:18

city 162:5

civil 1:3 4:4,16

22:17 29:6

32:13 55:22

56:15,18,19

58:21 63:3

119:19,21

121:7 173:3,5

213:10 216:22

224:8 225:13

227:4 242:10

244:2,17

266:14 269:13

278:15 293:6

294:11,13

309:9,11 311:9

317:10

claim 134:4

152:20 201:11

claims 200:14

240:15

clandestine

289:22

clapper 37:1

47:7 49:2

100:10 111:2

clarification

142:19

clarify 115:10

189:11 228:13

250:9

clarity 59:11

240:1

class 185:5

classic 37:5

92:20 115:5

classified 6:2,3

6:5,8 42:19

95:10,15,18

97:18 98:14,14

98:15 102:14

132:2 249:5

250:14,16

252:9 253:9

255:10,16

256:4 257:6

260:6,10 308:4

classify 178:14

clear 49:5 52:12

53:17 59:14

60:8 64:2,19

65:18 86:10

98:12 111:14

115:15 158:10

172:13 181:14

239:16,16,22

245:12 299:3

clearance 96:2,5

clearances

266:1,20

cleared 97:5

clearing 237:13

clearly 24:18

cleartext 165:8

clerk 198:7

clever 142:21

client 112:8,12

131:17

clients 112:10

clinic 183:18,21

clock 107:9

close 118:4

139:12 173:21

208:6 209:12

300:9

closed 98:4

269:17

closely 35:13

133:21 311:11

closer 173:21

236:7 311:14

cloud 162:18

165:3,8 306:17

clouds 306:18

cobwebs 166:16

code 164:21

191:14 286:7

coded 217:22

codirector

210:18

cofounder 125:6

coin 237:8 310:6

cold 231:7

collaborators

57:11

colleague 15:1
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

9

colleagues 15:19

35:3 53:14

80:1 210:1

collect 9:17

49:14,18 59:18

59:19 60:10,12

61:6 95:4 98:1

98:8 112:7

115:14 116:3

143:10 148:2

156:13 183:14

227:9 231:18

232:7,12

258:18 261:8

264:12,17

276:3 289:1,6

290:16 295:6

300:8 308:14

311:20 314:17

collected 9:9,22

10:8,15 11:5

11:12 14:8

26:9 48:16

55:12 59:6

127:8 138:2,8

140:22 141:1

143:5 148:6

153:12 165:20

178:2 179:11

227:12,17

229:18 254:9

262:13 263:10

305:7 306:6,15

306:19

collecting 8:10

23:21 24:10,16

48:17 52:15

83:8 107:22

114:9 115:21

144:3,19

145:17 202:17

234:2 237:21

238:1 264:9

280:7 289:14

289:20 290:4

297:2 302:22

304:18 307:10

314:15

collection 8:19

9:5,6 11:21

12:4 13:8,12

13:18 24:11

27:11,14 31:15

31:17 38:8,10

38:14 44:17,18

45:7,20 50:10

52:2,12,19

53:3,4,6,15,21

61:17 67:12

86:21 111:18

116:17,19

118:17 130:9

143:2 153:4,10

156:9,18,21

157:8,11 158:4

158:15 161:9

165:20 168:20

173:6 177:4

216:11 220:3

228:9 229:11

233:15 241:6

242:3 245:16

246:8 252:13

252:21 253:2

256:10 258:5

261:21 264:15

268:11 275:7

275:13,15,20

276:8 277:8

286:22 287:8

287:18 288:5

289:16 290:6

292:4,11,16,20

296:7 298:4

299:13 304:10

309:20 311:8

311:16 312:2

313:11,20

collections

117:1

collects 8:20

23:17 27:8

48:19 152:6

183:14

collins 2:7

117:20 209:21

217:12,21

218:1,4,6

240:18 247:6

248:4 251:3

275:4 278:10

280:11 285:18

286:19 287:3

293:21 302:9

collinscook

202:19

color 217:22

columbia 3:3

124:11

combating 77:6

combination

149:9

come 7:19 47:1

52:17 72:7

74:14,15 110:4

118:21 122:9

127:18 133:6

150:18 164:8,8

166:13 173:21

181:20 191:5

194:3 195:21

197:4,5,18

214:19 219:2

226:21 241:14

265:16 285:21

291:11,12

312:8,20

comes 63:13

92:22 174:19

181:12 198:13

206:11 233:7

236:1 237:4

265:18 267:4

273:9 289:11

292:20 295:9

comfort 65:2

comfortable

90:17 270:2

coming 14:21

138:21 186:15

193:18 203:16

317:3 318:7

commencing

1:17

commend 60:21

comment

117:16 135:8

138:22 158:16

164:5 181:17

204:19 217:3

248:6 255:2

269:14 285:20

304:10 307:18

309:5 312:21

315:8 316:20

316:22

commentary

133:22

comments 7:7,9

32:19 44:6,7

45:22 88:2

97:8 123:8

125:12,20

126:12 131:1

132:12 141:8,8

145:3 147:3

157:22 175:1

175:12 218:10

223:14,22

224:14 226:18

226:21 312:8,9

312:15,16

317:1

commission

4:11 135:11

232:5 319:19

commit 187:18

commitment

244:1

committe

210:13

committed

110:14,15

committee 33:5

46:17 227:1,1

227:3 270:9

committees 20:1

20:4 42:18

94:12 95:12

96:20 103:22

219:3 257:5,15

299:4 314:9

common 8:1

34:19 64:20

82:14,14 90:3

102:4,6 161:15

229:15

commonly

56:13 161:14

164:10,11

206:10

communicate

222:1

communicating

109:1,15 114:8

116:14

communication

9:19 11:22

53:1,4 108:16

115:21 136:11

136:20 146:6

146:20 213:14

259:20 276:7

296:21 299:21

302:15 311:22

communicatio...

9:8,18 14:8

21:22 26:14

29:10 37:3

38:9 43:5
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

10

44:19 47:12

48:16,18,19,20

48:21 49:15

50:1,1 52:2,15

52:16 53:11

57:16 61:12,17

67:8,16 83:4

83:21 95:4

108:9,21

109:10,13

110:1,4 111:19

111:21 112:8,9

112:13,15

113:18 114:20

115:14 116:3,5

116:7,13 117:7

117:10 128:1

135:11,13

137:11 187:12

216:6,8,9

222:7 229:9

236:20 259:9

276:3,20 278:1

288:4 289:2

290:16 293:1

294:20 295:3,7

295:15 296:15

296:17 297:3

297:13 301:9

302:2,14 303:1

303:2

community 9:20

14:7 36:20

39:12 47:16

48:7 72:22

74:15,20

106:11 119:19

119:21 121:7

128:20 137:18

152:6 154:20

190:7 222:14

269:13 286:14

292:15 293:9

communitys

47:18

comoderating

123:19

companies 9:16

17:11 67:16

69:6,13 71:17

127:20 128:5

128:18 151:2

201:21 202:1,2

202:6,10,11,12

282:8 283:21

284:6,6,19

289:1

company 22:2

70:1,5 81:6

83:12 127:16

127:16 128:7

128:22 129:4

183:20 190:3

compare 186:13

compared

112:11

compares 55:20

comparison

84:17 252:3

compel 85:15

289:1

compelled

155:21

competing

211:15

complain 88:14

complaints

206:9 267:20

complete 22:2

completed 26:22

completely

62:20 120:4

completeness

7:20

complex 29:11

50:15 77:10

217:8 233:20

compliance

36:14 41:17

66:16 207:8,19

220:6 223:8

224:20

complicates

145:18 212:21

complication

282:6

complies 275:21

comply 224:11

227:20 235:6

compounds

102:7

comprehensive

25:9

compromise

46:13 94:5

182:11

computational

153:14 154:9

204:6

computer 3:3,9

124:10,13

125:4 126:16

127:1,2 132:13

132:14 133:2

142:3 149:6

153:15 166:16

186:16 197:19

206:22

computers

114:18 140:4,6

143:17 189:15

conceded 111:2

112:17 301:15

conceivable

52:9 91:17

140:4,6

conceived 64:5

concentrate

149:12

concentrated

149:11

concept 52:18

56:9,17 57:5,7

57:18 63:2

115:4

concepts 290:3

concern 31:6

53:22 57:10

64:4 79:6,12

80:14 106:17

252:13 275:8

311:22

concerned 246:7

263:5,6 293:5

302:16 305:19

concerning 79:2

116:7 241:2

concerns 4:17

10:13 24:3,4

28:12 79:21

108:3 173:11

173:12,14

244:15 269:15

274:4,7 292:17

conclude 184:17

concluded 134:1

conclusion 25:2

138:12 204:2,3

310:19

conclusions

7:19

concrete 119:12

119:22 120:6

120:12 121:12

243:20 247:13

conditions

157:4 218:12

conduct 20:13

39:5 42:4

67:10 103:7

109:3 168:15

168:17,17

213:18 246:19

300:3

conducted 22:16

42:1 43:14

46:7 107:6

228:4 237:16

237:19 261:15

conducting

42:12 108:14

conducts 44:13

confidence

58:13 80:7,9

106:13 107:5

150:11 152:19

191:9,20 192:1

192:5 220:22

269:16

confirm 203:5

confirming 6:10

confirms 41:15

conflate 258:5

confront 294:15

confronting

213:5

confused 142:11

confusing 50:5

confusion

307:16

congratulations

148:13

congress 4:11

5:17 8:17 12:7

19:20 20:1,3,5

30:3 36:4

38:15,20 39:2

39:22 40:7,13

43:9,19 46:16

51:13 54:7

55:13,14 56:8

56:12 57:22

60:6 63:20

64:3 74:14

79:19 85:5,20

88:22 94:12,12

95:7,8,9 109:5

110:18 122:14

139:17 147:5

152:18 179:14
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

11

214:8,19

218:14 225:19

228:12,13

231:15 240:13

245:2,14

248:18 252:18

255:2 256:6

265:4 276:15

279:1,2,8

283:17 290:21

291:17 293:9

297:10 298:2

318:4

congressional

87:20 89:4

93:11 96:20

257:5,7

congresss

245:11

connect 20:17

146:11 264:10

connected 61:18

286:17 287:14

connectedness

29:9

connecticut 1:16

connection

102:21 227:16

228:1,6 287:11

connections

18:19,20

conscious 234:9

consequence

35:22

consequences

189:6

consequent

268:10

consider 34:13

95:8 98:7

99:21 100:2,7

101:15 117:22

119:20 220:5

220:11,16

240:15 264:5

265:4 268:9

290:2 294:11

considerable

136:7 167:16

252:22

consideration

105:11 113:22

219:14 223:7

238:13 256:17

293:7

considerations

244:11,14

considered 4:18

9:15 43:10

63:10 84:22

200:21 221:6

222:13 280:20

283:17 292:18

293:19

considering

100:16 101:16

considers 220:1

272:18

consistent 93:15

94:7 97:22

107:7 205:1

243:22 287:9

288:11 290:2

297:21,22

298:1

consistently

46:8

consists 17:10

constantly 82:19

constituents

257:9

constitute 26:2

66:15

constituted

24:22

constitutes

25:22

constitution

3:17 22:7

24:12 27:16

33:5 44:21

71:6 80:6

92:15 100:15

115:2 120:9

210:16 223:21

224:12,21

226:22 235:19

270:6

constitutional

2:10 5:15

14:17 16:6

20:8 29:7,18

39:6 46:5 66:2

67:19 70:21

72:8 75:17

92:1 93:20

100:10 102:20

151:20 157:15

240:15 273:3

constitutional...

66:1,18 87:9

91:19,21 100:7

constitutionally

45:19 76:1,14

259:22

constraint

257:13

construct 105:7

consult 131:1

consultant 3:8

124:22

consumer

188:14

consumers

135:16 265:16

contact 146:1,17

170:13 228:20

239:13 258:7

258:18 285:3

contacts 11:2

contained

136:18

containing

305:16

contains 160:5

contemplated

38:15 43:9

47:19 85:16

content 17:17

21:22 24:10,16

44:19,20 49:22

83:21 84:2

136:11,16

137:16,20

140:20 143:21

144:3 145:21

165:11 172:4

183:8,12,14

184:8,12 185:1

186:1 190:12

191:4,7,12,13

191:15 216:12

217:19 252:13

252:20 254:4

283:15 303:1

311:16,20

contentions 52:3

contents 9:18

113:19 114:10

136:20

context 21:7

27:21 36:15

55:21,22 56:12

61:22 62:1,19

63:2,3 76:13

92:21 95:20

96:15 113:12

130:20 149:15

149:20 205:13

228:7 229:1,20

260:19 265:14

266:5 270:15

271:2,4,6,15

273:1 277:15

278:13 285:6

308:6

contexts 20:22

57:20 71:20

283:11 306:10

306:14

continually 29:4

continue 10:12

318:2

continued

150:16 201:4

contractors

315:4

contrary 17:22

105:20

contrast 268:21

contributed

132:16

contributing

14:12

control 70:4

153:16 159:11

controlling 71:9

71:9 153:17

163:3

controls 121:3

148:9

controversial

109:4 128:2,4

controversy

272:11

convenience

70:19 71:3

284:18

conversation

78:1 114:3

148:17 240:22

247:1

conversations

107:19 189:17

converse 188:5

convey 253:1

convinced 97:21

98:3 183:9

convincing 73:1

cook 2:7 4:6
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

12

117:20 209:20

209:21 217:12

217:21 218:1,4

218:6 240:18

247:6 248:4

251:3 275:4

278:10 280:11

285:18 286:19

287:3 293:21

302:9

cooperated 35:5

copies 126:7

cops 241:12

copy 129:3

copyright

154:17

correct 44:15

76:21 82:5

86:19 121:18

188:22 189:8

200:15 296:3

305:9 319:6

correlation

129:21

correspond

25:20

corresponds

25:19

corroborate

72:22

corrupt 64:10

cost 71:2 176:8

263:16 279:6

280:19 281:6

costly 69:10

279:5

costs 314:19

couldnt 95:21

98:5 185:15

201:21 259:12

301:16

counsel 2:12

3:16 15:12

16:2 93:11

96:13 210:12

210:13,16

267:8 319:10

counselor 314:4

counterintelli...

208:22

counterparty

106:5

counterterror...

5:1,11 9:3

20:12 110:18

224:7 225:4

227:19

countless 40:11

countries 27:21

28:2 77:8

country 27:5

31:5,8 44:13

52:22 140:12

154:21 160:11

162:5 163:17

164:21 182:21

187:19 188:19

231:2 265:13

317:19

countrys 5:1

124:12 231:6

county 319:4

couple 8:1 34:6

66:17 104:12

142:21,22

145:2 160:20

182:6 214:14

227:7 246:17

248:10 263:5

266:9

course 8:13

18:20 31:7

36:18 48:17

50:10 56:7

61:10 70:3

75:12 78:9

92:20 96:11

102:7 105:13

107:18 109:2

134:19 148:1

175:17,17

183:13 201:8

202:8 218:19

225:18 251:10

271:5 293:2

296:18 305:4,7

court 2:16,16

8:6,21 10:1,11

11:18 12:1,8

13:6,19 16:6

16:12 17:5,22

19:15,18 21:7

21:12,18 24:21

33:10,11,17

34:4,11 35:3

36:1,9,22 37:5

37:11 39:1,9

39:13,19 40:1

40:22 41:15,15

42:2,5,7 46:2,8

46:10 47:6

53:10 54:7

57:12 58:16

59:13,17 62:13

62:17 63:9

65:10 66:8,10

68:7,10 72:4

75:5,18 76:13

79:20 86:18

87:12,19 88:3

88:7 89:2 90:4

90:7,12 91:20

92:3 93:3,8,9

93:18,22 94:8

94:10,18,20

95:17 96:19

97:3,6,17 98:5

99:9,12,15,17

99:20 100:3,6

100:12,19,22

101:4,14,21

102:5,18,18

103:1,8 105:19

106:9,21 107:1

109:18 111:6

114:21 118:9

119:16 131:15

133:10,13

134:1,3,4

195:8,16,21,22

196:8 197:16

198:20 200:22

201:15 214:21

218:22 219:7

219:12 220:1

220:11,16,22

221:5,8,10,13

221:21,22

229:6 230:4

233:2 238:8,9

240:11 241:13

248:9,9,13,15

248:19 249:14

249:20 250:5

250:18,18

251:17 252:3

253:10,19,21

254:7,8 255:14

257:18,20

259:1,12,15

260:2 265:9

266:1 267:6

272:5,6,9,10

272:15,22

273:9 277:10

278:7 281:11

295:21 299:11

301:22 314:6

courts 22:3

24:19 29:20

30:5 45:17

46:8,15 47:9

78:21 92:4

94:6 99:20

100:14 101:16

152:17 176:5

214:8 219:14

249:18 268:7

271:21 272:8

272:11,13

covenant 262:2

cover 40:5 238:1

covered 46:19

61:14 87:6

108:10,16

297:6

covering 127:22

cpni 136:21

crack 217:1

crazy 79:18

create 38:20

69:19,21 75:16

77:3 94:11

141:18 143:9

150:9 266:4,18

284:11

created 4:11

40:17 46:13

73:20 81:3,7

82:10,16

101:22 102:7,8

138:15 221:16

creates 282:21

creating 46:16

77:16 102:3

119:15 180:6

creation 29:21

73:16 265:2

credibility

295:12 313:17

credible 310:10

credit 40:7

157:1 188:15

207:4 243:12

creep 245:21

263:8 291:20

crime 14:5

21:17 26:9

64:14 103:9

110:14
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

13

crimes 263:22

264:1

criminal 26:8,19

27:2 53:8,8,9

53:13 55:19,21

58:22 61:22

62:1,10,19

63:2 64:16

65:1 76:13,16

104:18 105:10

221:7 263:12

263:12 270:14

271:3,6,10,15

272:17 277:16

308:6,13

crisis 292:1

criteria 8:6

70:18

critical 20:16

44:20 135:15

187:1 225:22

236:12 262:20

criticism 215:16

criticisms 121:8

critics 120:19

214:17

critique 30:8

215:16 317:16

cross 283:16

crossed 138:13

crucial 24:14

72:18 73:2,8

73:12,12

crushed 141:5

crystallize

315:15

current 59:3

64:3 134:8

136:12 137:3

157:10 205:12

212:1 213:13

currently 16:5

124:9 125:3

156:13 202:2

customer 130:5

135:14

customers

133:19

cyber 13:9

14:15 216:1,5

cycle 219:11,18

D

d 1:17 16:1 66:9

132:16 135:6

daily 29:11 81:6

268:15,16

damage 310:21

danger 29:1

dangerous

283:16

daniel 3:9

danny 125:3

148:11 156:5

166:12 169:19

170:8 178:11

179:20 185:18

191:2 202:22

204:19

dark 183:3

data 11:1,5,7,10

12:4 17:13,21

18:1,2 19:9

22:11,14 55:11

56:22 67:5,6,7

67:16,17 69:15

69:16 70:12

71:7,8,12

127:8,20,21

128:6,8,9,14

129:11,16,17

130:9,18,20

131:7 137:4,5

137:10,20,22

138:7,11,14

141:18 142:15

144:1 146:20

147:18 148:5

149:15 150:17

150:17 151:13

151:19 152:6

152:14,20

153:11,18

156:14 158:6,7

158:11,22,22

159:12 160:4,9

160:12 162:16

162:18,19

163:4,8 165:17

165:19,21

166:3 172:12

172:12,17

174:12 176:10

177:4 181:4

182:16 183:2

183:16 187:4,8

187:15,20,22

188:1,2,7,10

188:16,22

189:13,13,18

189:21 190:10

190:10,18

191:1 192:7

196:14 197:12

198:13 205:19

206:1,15,21

213:19 229:18

241:6 242:3,5

243:5 245:16

246:9,9,20

261:19,22

262:8,12,14,17

262:22 263:9

264:9,11,12,15

265:2 278:17

278:21,22

279:2,4,7,11

280:6,13 281:1

281:4,8,17,18

281:19 282:2,7

282:8,12,18,20

283:1,3,5,6,7

283:11,13,20

283:21 284:1

286:5,8,16

308:2 309:1

database 12:5

18:3,11,17

19:8,11 20:13

21:1,4 45:10

56:21 57:1,3

69:5,6,19,22

70:6 71:13

73:16,17 74:2

74:17,18 75:3

77:3,16 127:10

127:12,15

138:2 145:6

159:22 160:4

165:15 230:1

277:22 278:2

databases 29:21

69:12 75:17

77:20,21 83:14

161:16 163:22

203:10 281:5

date 9:12 81:7

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david 2:3 14:20

15:4 17:2 19:6

32:17 38:4

41:8 115:17

125:14 169:20

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313:7

davidson 3:16

210:11 217:22

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287:1 290:20

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day 5:3 6:22

35:2 65:5,16

68:13,18 78:12

90:1 93:12

139:10 184:6

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days 10:11 17:6

27:3 139:17

152:3 219:12

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deals 35:14

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dealt 221:18

248:14 252:12

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death 14:6

264:1

debatable 28:22

29:2

debate 23:1 30:4

31:4 32:6

51:17,18 67:14

153:7 183:1

245:7 252:17

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256:16 291:19

291:21,22

305:5

debates 32:5

60:16 109:4

125:8 218:16

291:19

decade 79:16
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

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decades 232:4

december 12:7

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319:19

decide 84:6,7

165:22 195:11

273:17 286:4

decided 98:4

132:14 137:2

283:18

deciding 34:18

195:13

decision 24:19

135:3 204:8

250:13,14,22

253:18

decisions 218:21

253:14 254:7,8

declassification

89:12 251:6,12

declassified

5:22 131:20

308:5

declassify 93:13

249:4

decreed 29:19

dedicated 91:8

deemed 287:9

deeper 215:5

deeply 33:13

292:19 293:20

294:13

default 274:13

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defect 314:11

defects 313:22

defend 260:10

defendant 260:8

260:9

defenders 97:9

120:20

defending 91:10

defense 27:7

29:6 91:7,9,10

91:11 96:4,8

96:13

define 84:9

defined 83:20

289:8

defines 130:10

definitely

192:12 287:22

definition

107:16 238:17

289:9 295:18

295:19

degree 29:3 47:4

145:14,15

195:7 201:1

216:5

degrees 193:3

deidentification

139:7

delete 316:4

deleted 61:20

233:17 306:17

deleting 316:11

316:12

deliberately

32:9 113:18

deliberation

245:10

deliberations

40:13 245:11

delivers 165:6

delivery 53:12

delve 65:22

demand 56:15

267:19

demands 22:7

268:2

democracy 3:19

29:4 125:6

211:1 235:13

demonstrate

32:6

demonstrated

207:9,14

demonstrates

42:22

demonstrating

228:18

demonstration

279:12

dempsey 2:6 4:7

117:16 119:8

123:19,22

132:10 140:15

148:10 155:14

155:17 159:18

160:13,18

161:21 162:7

163:6 164:2

166:12 169:3

172:19 181:17

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185:17 188:2

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199:1 200:16

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316:14

dennys 314:13

deny 255:17

department 3:4

16:2,17 33:15

91:8,12 124:10

135:2 183:19

210:8 211:3,4

222:5 252:10

254:6 267:4,5

267:21

depend 29:3

131:13 232:2

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181:14

depending

163:16 173:20

195:8

depends 30:12

deploy 135:4

155:5,7 171:11

203:4,9 205:3

deployed 137:9

deputy 16:4

19:6

describe 133:7

145:2 202:6

216:17

described 15:4

20:15 38:4

41:9 44:17

45:4,14 102:12

133:18 165:8

178:12

describes 9:10

61:2

describing

83:18

description 7:12

49:11 61:1,4

154:19 156:6

289:18

deserves 307:8

design 112:16

121:10 155:3

168:6 174:20

205:2,21

214:18,18,22

215:1 244:13

278:14

designated

18:12

designed 8:2

86:8 112:14

designing

173:17 199:5

designs 41:4

desirable 140:2

140:9

destruction

14:13 281:21

310:2

detail 25:10

31:9 71:18

115:8 133:17

136:7,21 190:5

226:18

detailed 95:18

131:8 136:9

243:15 250:14

278:8

details 42:19

95:10,15 123:9

227:6 230:5

detainee 96:2

detainees 91:9

91:10

detect 154:14

180:19,20

detecting 208:12

detection 206:13

determination

95:19,20

134:18 170:1

170:14 198:22

201:12 262:5

determinations

36:14 100:18

157:15 188:18

197:13

determine 13:21

41:6 135:11

151:21 154:2

165:13 167:12

208:4 292:6

determined

10:17 240:9

305:22

deterrent

174:16

develop 119:22

171:1 241:22

264:15

developed 90:4
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

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154:13 314:14

315:6,7

developing

149:5 203:12

development

4:18 152:12

155:2 203:2

219:16

device 45:2,15

166:17 167:3,8

167:10,12

169:9

devices 83:3

166:21 213:14

devils 273:20

274:8,13

devoting 313:9

dhs 189:3

dialed 9:12

26:21

dialing 286:8

diane 5:7 15:12

123:8 312:17

317:6

didnt 26:22 56:8

63:20 64:17

90:10 94:20

111:10 114:1

116:20 122:9

138:4 174:22

186:18,22

197:18 240:11

259:14 303:20

311:19

differ 8:6

difference 44:20

71:7 143:19,20

255:6 271:5

different 17:7

25:3 54:5

61:10 65:1

69:12 71:15,19

77:14,15 83:3

84:11 98:12

100:13 130:11

142:21,22

143:12 160:14

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174:4 184:15

191:3 213:1,2

214:14 216:7

222:4 246:17

253:20 255:15

257:21 259:7

263:17 265:12

271:13 275:5

275:17 286:7,9

286:11,16

295:5 300:12

308:20

differentiate

166:11 207:12

differently

211:6 247:21

302:10

difficult 111:11

129:10 216:12

235:7 249:7

difficulty

208:17

dig 123:1

digital 24:8

137:3,4 141:17

186:4,7,11,12

187:3,8 189:12

190:18 191:1

digitized 186:10

dimensions

151:6 307:14

direct 251:10

directed 27:2

39:10 294:10

directing 10:4

87:16

directive 12:10

directives 119:3

directly 157:13

228:21

director 12:11

16:5,8 19:6

134:12 144:6

210:21

disadvantages

212:7

disagree 49:10

103:2 287:20

disagreement

213:8

disaster 79:8

disburse 162:21

discern 145:21

disclaimer

126:3

disclose 102:11

107:1

disclosed 7:14

22:22 23:11

47:14 49:4

86:16 98:18,20

98:22 248:20

disclosure 96:12

173:6 226:6

256:13 308:2

disclosures 38:5

43:6 109:4

222:17,18

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discontinued

236:11

discovery 65:12

discreet 274:2

discuss 34:12

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discussed 15:5

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221:2,3 223:5

240:17 247:14

259:1 291:1

292:9

discussing 6:8

discussion 5:15

5:21 6:1,4 7:12

86:16 108:6

142:20 218:19

222:10 224:10

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254:14 303:12

303:17 309:12

317:4,15,20,22

discussions

148:16 213:3

312:4 317:11

disposition

221:10

disputing 177:5

disrupt 234:17

disseminate

112:7

disseminated

13:22 305:15

305:18 307:1

disseminating

306:5

dissemination

14:1 19:16

41:10 287:15

305:2

dissent 31:3

distinct 21:22

distinction

39:17 82:22

143:20 168:12

184:11 261:21

298:10

distinguish

101:20 207:18

208:16

distinguished

15:7 210:5

distinguishes

82:9 136:16

distinguishing

65:19 168:10

district 2:15

16:10 101:9

111:6 197:16

distrust 215:11

division 2:18

16:16

dna 85:9

dni 24:9 40:22

93:11 306:3

doctor 174:15

doctrine 131:3

document 81:4

121:21 122:1,3

documents 6:2,6

6:7,10 21:13

57:4 122:10

135:19 205:19

209:3,6 251:12

252:8,9

doesnt 17:19

59:21 65:17

81:10 88:12

99:20 100:1,6

101:14 114:2

134:21 144:8

144:15 162:16

164:18 168:12

181:8 182:11

186:4 188:8

192:21 201:14

219:19 233:10

273:6 276:10

280:5 281:16

297:20,22

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dog 315:2

doggedly 45:5

doing 29:11

30:20 39:2

60:3 93:16

96:15 101:7

103:12 132:3

135:22 155:8

177:20 178:9

178:17 180:16
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

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189:3 200:14

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244:21 253:5

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302:18

doj 2:11,17 3:14

dollars 200:13

314:20,21

315:5

domestic 39:4

39:17 43:4

48:21 94:4

135:9 148:4

296:16 297:12

297:13 301:9

donig 264:20

donors 257:10

dont 21:18

31:16 36:13

44:14 50:18

54:18 59:9

63:4,5 69:8,9

69:14,17,20

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73:8 74:8 77:8

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82:8,22 84:12

84:17 85:18,19

88:6,15,18,18

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96:5 98:5

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258:5,9,10

261:8,8,17

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271:14 272:6

272:13 273:1

273:14 277:1

284:10 285:6

288:8 290:10

290:14 298:22

303:8,11

309:16,17

312:22

door 234:3,8

285:10

doors 98:4

dots 20:17

108:22 264:11

doubt 77:2,7

298:6

downloading

209:2,6

downsides

234:14 293:11

draft 125:19

126:7,11,11,15

141:8

drafted 116:18

dragnet 24:2

44:17,18

314:22 315:3

drain 202:15

dramatic 186:3

draw 59:4

138:12 149:15

149:17 168:12

253:19 300:13

drawing 298:10

drawn 105:9

drive 10:16

driving 187:4

dropped 266:21

dropping

314:16

drove 79:18

drug 183:21

192:17

drugs 253:6

duces 81:16

due 63:6,6

dug 121:20

duration 17:14

27:1

dying 202:13,13

202:15

dynamic 171:7

E

e 238:15 289:18

earlier 38:4 66:5

73:20 81:19

99:7 175:1

200:19 201:6

221:2 226:3

228:22 247:10

248:5 275:7

277:13

early 54:15

139:17 314:15

easier 95:3

248:16,21

249:12 285:7,9

285:16

easily 71:21

126:9 129:7

131:10 143:22

149:18 163:20

eavesdropped

114:4

echo 140:17,17

164:4

edna 167:21,22

education 107:3

effect 27:13

269:5 299:16

effective 69:11

80:9 87:8

139:11 147:11

150:12 178:4

179:12 181:5,7

188:10 192:12

192:14,14

199:9 203:3

234:13

effectively

313:19

effectiveness

159:2 176:14

177:21 181:1

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effects 313:15

efficacy 103:19

efficiency 70:14

128:13 203:13

204:6 228:3

efficient 69:10

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128:15 251:10

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efficiently

189:20

effort 159:15

efforts 5:1,9

14:11,14

eight 90:6 286:7

either 28:14

125:19 158:12

182:5 185:14

200:3 214:16

214:17,21

285:4 316:4

elaborate 66:4

93:6

elected 257:8

electronic 3:5

11:16,22 29:10

38:21 124:16

174:5 175:21

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element 305:19

elements 147:14

196:15 220:17

elephants

245:14

elicited 252:22

eliminate 140:8

157:8

eliminating

299:17

elizabeth 2:7

3:18

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eloquently

201:6

email 24:1 71:16

71:17 135:22

143:21 144:3

145:4 164:17

164:18,19,22

165:3,3,5,6

166:9 178:1,14

238:1

emanations
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

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245:19

embarked 290:9

embraced 56:12

56:13

emergency

174:9,11

274:19,20

281:12

emphasize

226:19

emphasized

24:9

empirically

292:7

employed

235:15

employee 79:17

266:19

employees 97:11

employer 212:1

employers 212:1

empowered

142:10

enable 17:19

18:18 46:14

150:2 154:14

enabled 243:1

enables 20:19

51:6 109:18

137:5 288:22

enabling 29:20

enacted 55:15

76:12 108:8

encompass

56:21

encounter 166:5

encountered

241:10

encourage

236:15 270:9

291:9 316:8

encrypt 153:18

encrypted 160:1

172:12 316:7

encryption

139:7 159:10

ended 52:6,7

120:3 179:3

endpoint 312:4

ends 275:1

enemies 231:11

enforce 131:14

312:17

enforcement

154:16 166:7

168:16 176:2

180:3,5 194:16

231:7,17

232:11 283:8

286:14 307:3

engage 59:8

120:15 239:4

282:19

engaged 30:13

47:10,15

119:15

engagement

43:16 121:15

engages 30:3

134:15

engaging 120:16

257:1 317:4

engines 126:10

enhance 196:2

248:7

enhanced

200:19

enlarged 200:22

enormous 46:19

133:22 176:12

ensure 4:17

30:18 70:11

80:7 109:19

207:7

ensuring 4:14

13:11 42:8

71:10

entail 207:15

enter 44:4

entering 187:17

entire 55:10

56:21 253:13

entirely 22:16

239:22

entities 155:9

180:14 201:20

283:7

entity 265:17,21

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293:5 314:1

envelope 136:17

136:19

environment

150:9,9 190:17

192:8

envision 250:10

envisioned

235:18

epic 132:19

133:1 134:10

136:1 139:3

equal 191:6

equally 158:13

284:5

equipment

143:6,22

164:14 165:9

equipped 88:18

era 213:13

eric 90:1,2

erosion 29:17

232:10

ervin 28:16

especially 29:15

36:19 50:1

55:19 86:19

89:13 163:12

163:14 189:17

190:13 273:22

espionage

262:16 279:17

essence 274:5

essential 20:13

essentially 4:21

97:10 177:13

178:6 250:12

establish 73:1

106:13 111:4

231:16

established

125:10

establishes

51:15

establishing

91:3 171:7

177:6

estimate 301:16

etcetera 46:3

62:7 70:13

71:10 81:10,16

83:6,8 94:13

109:17 121:3

294:19

ethnic 234:11

eu 127:21

euphemisms

115:6

europe 128:6

evaded 200:3

evaluate 86:14

196:9 198:10

198:13 299:12

evaluating

270:2

evan 313:7

evening 7:5

event 5:9 317:6

events 65:17

eventually 318:3

everybody

37:15 47:15,20

52:13 58:13

60:1 69:1 87:5

90:6 122:8

124:1 125:21

155:19 298:5,6

everybodys

285:10

everyday 229:15

everyones

238:22 239:2

evidence 14:4

65:10 234:12

235:20 241:14

241:18 263:11

272:20

evidently 69:22

evolve 298:13

evolved 136:15

ex 34:7 35:9

88:3,4 92:21

102:8 104:21

105:10 175:14

194:21 246:20

270:1 272:19

exact 232:1

238:15 241:20

exactly 38:15

43:8,19 47:16

49:5 51:13

64:5 78:5

79:11,15 91:1

104:17 115:7

168:5 177:20

213:10 261:14

271:3

examine 154:1

186:13

examines 27:9

example 11:9

56:15,21 57:9

58:6 64:9 84:1

91:7 94:16

130:2 142:13

145:6,9 152:13

182:15,18

193:22 196:18

203:8 212:22

237:20 238:1

254:1 255:7
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

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258:14 260:6

285:12 290:15

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examples 58:5

192:15 241:4

245:3 258:13

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exante 246:18

exceed 295:20

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201:2

exceedingly

190:9

exceeds 230:18

excellent 317:4

exception

274:15 281:12

exceptional

274:15

exchange 6:21

exchanges 143:8

165:10

exclude 39:22

exclusive 103:6

239:20 253:3

exclusively

64:13

excuse 19:13

executive 4:9,13

19:20 30:9,20

35:4 43:13

48:5 54:8 67:9

94:2 96:18

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231:15 233:6

244:21 247:3

255:13

exercise 59:7

75:21

exigent 274:15

281:9

exist 62:11,12

77:15

existence 30:3,5

30:13 72:2

75:2 82:2,20

86:19 116:8

140:22 233:3

239:19 265:1

existential

245:22

existing 67:7

82:18 83:13

203:10,10

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225:7,9 228:8

230:1 251:12

exists 160:4,9,12

161:4 214:18

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exnsa 114:16

expand 99:6

142:18 144:4

expansion 29:14

202:4

expect 5:21

171:11 197:11

280:15

expectation 22:4

25:5 131:13

198:17 220:10

expectations

24:17 180:19

expecting

141:10

expend 194:2,5

expending

39:18

expensive

159:12

experience 90:8

90:15 105:18

252:8 253:5

experienced

222:2 267:9

experiences

28:1

expert 124:18

201:9

expertise 198:10

experts 15:8

124:5,12 133:2

153:21 210:5

expires 319:19

explain 93:14

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explaining 52:5

111:6

explanation

147:12 148:1

explicit 240:14

explicitly 103:6

225:15 298:3

exploitation

23:7 264:2

exploration

265:3

explore 315:21

exploring

247:19

exposes 140:21

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express 190:14

expressed 78:13

expressing 33:6

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expressly 14:2

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extend 125:22

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extension

130:12

extensive 66:11

125:1

extent 50:14

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222:11 225:7

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253:3 256:3,7

256:9,12

301:12,20

302:11,17

305:22 309:18

310:9

exterior 136:18

external 200:7

201:19,20

202:18 246:18

extract 249:7

extraordinarily

22:12 252:16

extraordinary

22:11 102:4

extraterritorial

297:8

extreme 285:12

extremely 49:21

50:15 56:16

57:6 189:19

202:20

eyeball 262:8

F

faa 38:18 40:17

42:11,15,22

43:10,21 54:4

236:17 288:22

301:12,13

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face 50:6 140:13

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facebook 185:7

facets 66:2

facial 100:2

facilitate 255:20

facilities 70:10

94:13 100:21

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facility 110:15

facing 124:6

fact 26:3 33:18

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60:14 66:8,10

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77:8 85:3

101:15 102:3,6

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111:5 137:16

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207:19 221:1

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241:21 252:18

253:14 261:19

274:22 285:16

288:21 291:14

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309:8 317:13

factbased

231:20

factdependent

268:20

factors 62:2

71:3 169:16,17

facts 122:16

126:13 226:12

228:18 239:10

249:5 250:15

factual 234:7

factually 293:20

fade 140:7

fair 59:20 155:3

188:15,17

226:2,18

229:10

fairly 64:20

242:12 243:14
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

19

faith 195:12

fall 184:12

227:7 232:19

234:9 298:19

fallen 158:8

falling 297:18

familial 25:10

familiar 35:18

241:8,11

314:13

familiarity 90:5

family 149:5

famous 90:11

fan 158:18

far 69:10,10

70:9 72:22

74:6 135:19

136:9,9 168:9

184:7,7 185:22

189:4 221:15

226:7 227:14

235:22 244:19

246:6 258:14

263:4,13

277:19 302:16

fascinating

175:8 186:17

186:17

fashion 99:5

180:12

fast 258:21

fastidious 33:14

father 86:2

fault 232:5

favor 184:20

245:6

favorite 126:9

fbi 19:2 33:15

50:13 232:14

fcc 135:15

fear 231:4

feasibility 70:22

71:5

feasible 67:12

94:7 95:14,22

97:13

feature 65:19

164:6

features 244:15

fed 179:5

federal 5:10

7:14,17 17:5,8

21:11 22:8

97:9 134:14

135:10 263:11

263:22 266:19

286:7 317:14

feds 262:18,21

feed 200:6

feedback 179:13

188:21 193:9

feel 48:1 80:2

88:14,18

142:10 147:4

150:19,22

151:1,2 178:16

316:11,12

feels 155:20,21

feet 172:22

feinstein 66:21

fellow 4:5

125:13 240:20

felt 87:12 227:3

297:11

fewer 11:9 19:8

fiber 108:12

302:2

field 210:6

264:15

fields 17:13

315:20

fifteen 40:9 52:4

300:16

fifty 132:4

fight 260:20,20

260:22

fighting 261:1

figure 29:5

50:15 301:18

figured 205:3

figuring 204:22

fii 289:9

file 98:10 250:2

filed 111:5

133:10 221:9

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filter 169:6

final 125:19

138:21 185:5

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finally 30:9

32:10 61:8,21

93:7 95:13

125:3 131:19

135:17 147:2

230:2 240:4

258:20 314:1

find 11:13 31:10

73:21 79:2

89:1 117:9

126:9 129:22

138:3,4 146:7

152:7 181:2

186:22 188:7

191:12,21

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242:1,18 243:6

253:18 258:8

263:11 280:2

293:10 295:5

315:17

finding 150:4

199:9,10,19

221:20

finds 129:21

fine 35:14 55:4

207:22 250:1

302:10

finish 163:10

246:16

firewall 246:3

262:21

firewalls 153:19

159:11

firm 16:1

133:16

first 4:5 6:13,15

8:16 13:7

14:16 15:2

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27:12 30:2,16

33:3 34:7

38:19,22 44:11

54:20 72:17

75:20,22 78:2

89:22 98:19

99:21 108:8

126:19 127:14

133:7 136:3

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150:1 151:7

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224:6 227:8,10

236:17 238:16

244:10 255:19

256:22 263:5

264:14 265:7

280:6 283:12

firsthand 33:22

fisa 5:13 10:1

12:8 13:6 17:5

19:3,13,20

32:11 33:10,11

33:17 34:1,4,7

34:10,11 35:2

35:4,9,10,13

36:3,4,8 37:11

37:19 38:2,12

38:18 39:1,9

39:16,19 40:1

40:14,22 41:14

41:15,17,19

42:2,7 43:4

46:12,12 52:8

54:7 55:7

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72:4,6,7,9,10

76:4 79:20

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86:12,18,20

87:3,19 88:3,7

88:11 89:2

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94:18 97:17

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99:17 100:3,11

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229:5 230:4

232:13 233:2,9

236:13 238:8,9

238:13 248:8,9

248:19 249:14

252:3 253:3,3

255:14 257:18
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

20

259:1,7,12,15

260:2 265:9

266:1 267:6

268:6,12 269:2

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272:11 274:11

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314:6

fisc 34:5 36:6

59:8 157:1

179:14 201:2

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fit 239:4

five 15:7,10

18:18 25:3

54:5 74:10

112:5 125:10

155:18 180:17

196:19 197:3

211:9 253:20

279:8 283:5

fix 159:8 197:4

flag 209:7

flat 52:3

flaw 184:10

flexible 54:15

flier 243:9

flight 58:8

flights 57:13,16

flimsy 103:12

flip 174:1 180:8

237:8

flow 317:6

flying 57:13

focus 5:10 6:13

14:17 16:22

23:14 37:18

38:2 49:17

50:3 123:17

159:20 230:15

236:3 247:22

248:2 290:20

focused 23:1

45:12,16,18

59:2 64:13

71:11 82:18

94:3,19 95:3

109:9,20 110:5

110:15 151:12

204:19 292:21

292:21

focuses 43:11

163:8 169:4

focusing 15:2

52:14

foiled 311:5,18

folks 56:18

118:22

follow 19:14

36:11 196:19

202:22

followed 125:11

252:17

following 45:5

68:7 118:3

132:12 136:15

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followon 57:10

follows 7:12

followup 6:18

11:15 59:2

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footing 265:5

force 64:8

252:20

foreign 1:7 2:16

8:5,22 10:22

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35:17 38:22

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52:14,20 93:21

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101:5 109:14

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239:10,13

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302:8,8 307:5

foreignborn

300:20

foreigner

229:13 276:4

foreigners 49:15

50:5 233:11

276:5 294:20

295:3,7

foreignness

237:5,11

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forever 74:19

112:3 172:20

forget 103:5

161:22 200:9

forgot 103:13

form 40:14 53:5

89:8,8,11

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284:18

forma 200:4

formal 134:11

154:9

format 186:12

formation

244:10,19

former 16:10

35:2 63:19

64:3 80:1

120:21 121:9

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144:5 210:8

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formerly 2:11

2:15,17 3:14

3:16

forms 247:2

311:15

formula 52:7

191:5

forth 93:7 250:6

267:5,9

forty 137:1

140:5

forum 226:2

318:5

forums 52:10

225:17

forward 28:5

44:1 120:1

121:8 136:19

173:15 216:15

218:15 248:17

249:11 250:11

311:1,1 318:1

forwardleaning

224:22

foster 5:14

fought 23:9

found 18:20

26:1,3 39:18

40:4 101:11

103:15 127:9

138:11 159:14

159:17 172:6

182:15 192:13

223:3 232:5

297:15 306:11

founding 139:4

four 54:5 124:4

141:7 292:1

fourteen 17:7

52:4

fourth 21:5,9,19

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75:9,13,19

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220:12 223:7

227:20 235:6

275:22 277:5

278:5 285:13

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302:21 303:6

313:13,21

fraction 19:9

27:9

framework

173:14 247:17

frameworks

175:21

franklin 3:17

210:15 223:18

254:18 270:5

274:17 275:18

284:21 299:2

frankly 33:12
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

21

89:22 90:5

228:2 309:15

freaking 316:3

free 39:12 231:2

234:6 317:22

freedom 135:18

139:6 210:22

284:8 290:10

freely 39:5

frequent 243:9

frequently

56:13

friction 300:6

friendly 244:18

friendship

185:10

front 15:13

139:3 152:4

205:7 246:11

248:12 273:4,9

290:6 299:7

314:6,8

frontier 58:19

frontiers 58:19

frustration 47:4

48:1

full 155:19

217:13 226:6

226:10,14,15

276:17

fullblown

303:12

fuller 32:20

282:8

fully 53:17 97:4

310:9

function 34:14

99:4 102:5

174:21

functional 149:1

149:8

functions

152:17 171:9

272:4,5,7

fundamental

134:22 212:18

215:11

fundamentally

30:12,16 50:17

102:16 292:4

further 26:8

60:20 138:10

138:10 178:18

183:5 242:20

265:3 319:9

future 80:14

81:7 138:15

fuzziness 208:2

208:2,4

G

gag 202:2

gains 243:19,20

gambling

161:19

gap 124:7 203:1

gaps 208:7

gather 189:21

285:8

gathered 49:19

138:14 176:9

275:2

gathering

110:19

gay 185:9

gaydar 185:6

gee 63:20 64:17

127:3

geeks 147:21

general 12:10

15:12 19:21

24:4,8 40:21

45:20 67:14

85:4 87:10

93:10 98:21

134:12 160:22

181:22 210:12

247:1 274:9

305:13 306:3,7

generally 67:11

112:13 147:21

218:16

generate 25:8

77:5 203:15

284:16

generated 19:16

143:16

generates

137:20

generating

39:19 143:14

143:15

generations

23:8

generous 155:17

genuine 150:10

geographically

162:12,21

geography

141:14 144:8

144:12,16,20

147:1 160:20

160:20,21

161:2 163:4,7

163:8 169:4

170:8 172:1,15

geolocatable

181:16

geolocation

161:15 162:9

164:13 196:18

geolocations

164:12

george 3:20

211:3

germans 290:18

germany 238:3

290:15

getting 52:18

68:10 73:14

83:21 88:17

149:3 192:16

226:10 235:3

281:8 283:11

294:7 297:19

310:10

gigabytes

141:22 178:2

girl 280:1

give 15:8,10,16

17:16 51:10

66:3 89:12

106:2 123:9

130:2 135:8

143:13 147:22

159:22 166:14

169:14,15

179:8 182:13

199:7 238:12

249:8 266:19

278:20 293:22

given 86:19 89:6

89:9 95:9 96:8

118:9 150:7

153:18 154:12

167:16 170:18

196:10,10,11

197:1 220:19

258:14 280:13

294:2 316:4

giving 28:9 42:7

68:14 122:16

124:2 131:4

204:16 239:11

317:16

glass 174:10,11

glean 185:21

global 29:9

144:8 206:16

206:16

globalization

301:5

globalized

300:17

gmail 165:4,6,7

315:19,20

316:9

go 57:7 61:15

62:13 73:10

80:17 83:13

104:18 107:10

108:5 114:20

117:17,18

130:2,21

132:14 147:15

157:1 163:10

164:2 165:4

169:19,22

172:19 190:2,5

193:6 194:12

204:18 217:12

222:11 231:2

246:2 247:5

249:6,22

251:11 259:18

264:22 267:9

278:3,6,11

285:9 287:7

288:3 294:4

295:4 297:17

307:19 310:12

311:19

goal 150:5,7

188:6

goals 149:1,8,22

197:8

goes 65:9 92:7

93:6 163:4

195:6 244:19

261:22 263:2

267:2 272:1

275:20 306:2

306:16 307:10

going 11:7 16:22

18:17 23:14

44:3,8 46:18

49:18 53:11

64:12,18 65:11

68:5,11 69:21

70:5,6 74:9
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

22

78:2,10,15

80:17 91:5,18

96:9 98:7

108:4 116:3

117:21 123:11

123:15 126:6

130:21 131:7

141:6,11 143:3

143:13 144:4

148:5 149:6

151:13,14,19

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163:2 169:19

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184:5 193:21

199:3 202:14

204:13 206:2

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219:11 222:14

229:22 237:2

245:15 248:17

248:17,20

249:2,11,12

250:7,10

251:21 255:16

262:12 264:12

267:14 268:2,3

279:6 283:7,8

283:8,14,15

287:6 300:12

307:9 309:21

310:22 311:1

312:13,16

313:18 318:1

goitein 3:18

210:18 230:11

256:19 270:22

284:3 288:1

296:11 297:5,9

298:9 301:20

gold 191:4,16

golden 231:17

232:3

goldsmith

257:12

good 4:2 14:21

34:8 37:14

65:10 97:17

107:2,3 122:4

123:15,22

153:16,17,22

178:5 185:17

188:3,7,15

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197:21 199:15

200:3 204:22

235:21 237:5,6

237:7 240:16

241:13 242:18

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264:17 267:15

271:19 279:20

312:4 315:6

google 262:9

googling 315:18

gosh 235:21

gotten 190:9

198:4 276:17

gov 7:6,9

govern 74:16

governing 153:3

government

7:14,17 8:9,20

9:2,14 10:5,7

12:5,13 13:22

17:1,16,19

18:5 19:13,14

21:8,10,20

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39:18 40:4,9

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55:10 59:17,19

61:5 67:4 68:9

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151:18 152:12

183:14 214:5

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223:1,2 225:3

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257:1 258:13

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279:20 280:5

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285:1,15,22

287:12 289:1

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295:2,14

297:15 300:3

301:15 302:18

302:22 310:11

317:17

governmental

87:21 265:17

governments

9:4,7 11:20

13:15 27:17

29:7 38:8 39:5

53:11 65:2

99:22 101:2

105:22 114:9

184:14 188:9

213:18 220:2

245:8 284:17

310:6

governs 67:10

gps 9:22 45:2

166:20

grain 126:14

grained 208:1

grand 21:15,17

57:6,11 58:7

65:1,7,8,15,20

81:16 84:16,18

grandfather

86:2

granted 118:8

162:14 317:14

granular 120:5

grapple 303:5

grappled 109:5

grateful 125:20

great 36:17 63:8

89:14 95:6

115:5,8 121:6

133:2 141:2

148:18 179:16

190:12 197:18

207:17 306:4

317:19

greater 106:13

218:20 220:22

229:5 256:1,5

256:6,14 299:7

greatest 6:20

43:13 225:20

green 15:13

218:2

greg 3:19

210:21 235:12

241:5 258:21

282:16 300:11

gregs 261:16

grist 68:14

ground 5:20

35:19

grounds 239:11

group 91:8

154:6

groups 52:11

221:9 269:19

growing 90:14

growth 213:17

guantanamo

91:9

guarantee

138:19

guarantees

140:14

guerre 273:21

guess 63:16

64:21 79:2

108:4 119:20

121:14 155:1

173:8 197:10
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

23

198:5 204:12

212:3,7 214:3

215:18 251:22

272:10 296:1

307:9

guidance 142:8

guide 173:9

244:4

guidelines 172:6

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310:3

guilt 241:15

guilty 172:8

gun 78:6

guys 51:10

141:9 146:10

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228:5 242:1

264:16,17

283:2

H

hackers 283:3

half 79:18 304:9

hamilton 315:5

hand 166:7

196:13 319:12

handled 8:12

92:3

handles 163:21

handling 41:9

190:11

hands 67:7

73:17 77:21

294:22

hanging 141:3

happen 52:16

65:17 74:2

94:10 110:4

155:9 163:2

271:12 276:10

308:17

happened 31:7

36:2 89:10

118:6 300:16

happening

60:17 104:1

186:8 267:21

271:2 298:7

happens 53:5,9

74:1 235:14

happy 87:19

229:21

harassing

231:11

hard 106:16

158:6,6,7

171:15 187:2

harder 129:2

189:22 190:12

190:13 206:16

harm 14:6

207:17

harmful 188:18

309:8

harms 32:3

197:8

harvard 210:9

hasnt 75:6 89:10

148:9 267:17

270:6 301:15

hats 126:3

havent 81:7

106:22 147:8

177:7 205:3

228:11 241:10

261:7 276:17

286:6 309:14

310:8 314:22

hayden 144:6

haystack 11:13

11:14 55:16

59:5 150:5

152:8,8,10

haystacks 58:3

58:4

head 16:1,16

124:16 141:4

182:5,8 301:8

header 136:17

143:21

healthy 133:4

hear 30:6 34:17

34:20 37:1

196:16 201:11

259:14 303:20

heard 63:19

101:10 119:12

129:14,15

173:4 229:10

259:11,13

265:8

hearing 65:13

93:11 267:22

hearings 66:21

128:5 139:17

hears 35:10

heart 222:21

269:19

heighten 307:13

held 1:15 4:3

24:21 30:20

75:13 76:13

99:2 137:17

152:20

help 106:12

132:15 196:2,8

196:9 222:8

228:2 244:4

247:3 248:7

270:21 307:12

315:15

helped 80:7

121:10 234:17

helpful 169:22

183:6 189:13

201:10 202:20

203:22 218:2

helping 220:21

222:12 317:6

helps 292:15

hendricks 313:8

heres 168:8

208:19

herring 251:6

hes 52:18 152:3

152:4 205:15

hey 143:13

194:4

hi 235:12 315:10

hidden 245:18

hide 189:9,22

245:14

high 192:1

234:15 308:2

higher 212:4

highlight 148:21

highly 111:16

140:9 184:17

hijackers 243:2

243:3,16

hill 40:12 52:5

125:22

hindered 88:14

116:20

hint 84:21

hired 97:11

historical 18:18

38:13 294:17

historically

143:5 194:1

history 31:10

32:4 42:22

49:9,11 84:21

84:22 108:5

122:7 231:6

295:4 297:1

hit 108:19

278:15

hits 194:3

hmm 34:21

249:20

hold 90:16

155:9,14

172:10,17

holder 88:13

holding 167:9

225:17

holes 245:14

homeland 2:18

16:15 135:3

211:4

homes 76:5,9,10

homework

117:21 119:11

121:14 204:16

hon 2:15

hone 299:12

honestly 107:6

159:19 298:22

302:6

honored 70:12

hood 148:3

hook 202:18

hope 7:4 23:15

28:12 68:21

139:20 140:1

200:7 210:1

247:18 305:9

314:13

hopefully

118:22 148:19

226:14

hoping 195:22

235:2 275:4,9

hospitals 174:6

206:8,9

hostile 13:9

hosting 317:15

hotel 1:16

hour 123:12

209:12

hours 40:11

house 2:18

105:2 125:5

housed 70:1

71:7,8

houses 42:18
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

24

285:11

huge 108:19

236:5 265:2

297:1,2 314:10

hulu 164:9

human 290:3

299:22 300:8,9

humans 262:7

hundred 121:17

hypothetical

58:7 243:19

I

icon 165:5

id 23:10 37:15

37:18 38:2,17

51:21 53:19

55:19 63:16

64:21 65:22

81:17 104:8

115:10 122:22

136:3 141:11

142:18 191:3

229:21 240:17

241:1 242:8

270:5 315:13

idea 31:20 34:2

60:9 97:7

104:8,9 105:10

106:5 120:8,17

240:16 246:7

271:19,20,21

ideas 141:14

247:13

identical 221:15

identifiable

168:3 284:1

identification

13:7

identified

269:11 292:5

313:2

identifiers 11:10

145:7,20

identify 8:3 9:7

11:2 145:11

197:7 222:12

242:5 243:1

258:4 264:16

292:15 293:17

313:1,4

identifying 41:1

100:19 188:11

242:14 311:13

identities 187:12

305:18,20

identity 9:18

140:8 166:9

167:1 169:11

305:17 306:22

ignore 30:10

ignores 163:7

ignoring 174:18

ii 3:1

iii 3:12 46:15

53:7,10 92:4

100:14 101:4,6

102:17 104:20

105:19 116:22

175:13 176:1

201:3 217:11

272:10,12

277:17 308:8

308:12,13,20

ill 15:9 68:22

73:18 78:11

79:17 86:22

87:1 92:13

117:16 119:18

120:13 123:20

133:6 138:21

141:9 160:17

164:2 166:13

169:19 174:4

209:19 215:22

226:16 229:12

286:1 307:19

307:22

illegal 166:6

236:9

illustrated 49:8

im 11:19 14:22

16:22 23:14

38:1 46:18,20

53:9 54:21

58:13 68:5,14

78:10,15 80:17

87:16 90:17

91:18,20,22

95:13 97:21

98:2 101:12

102:4 108:4

126:4,6,16

130:22 131:3

141:6,10 144:4

156:5 158:18

163:9 169:8,19

171:14 173:17

173:19 177:1

180:22 183:9

184:5 192:22

195:11 198:5

199:3 211:21

212:13 215:6,8

216:20 235:2

235:12,12

238:15 246:15

250:21 251:20

251:20 258:20

263:6 264:19

285:21 289:17

293:16 294:7

297:12 298:10

298:20 302:9

302:11 303:18

303:20 304:12

305:4 309:17

310:18,19

311:3

imagine 74:13

93:13 139:1

205:16 253:16

283:6 310:15

immediately

206:4

immense 27:8

immersion

315:17 316:16

imminent 14:5

impact 75:21

122:18,19

204:1 216:22

268:3 292:15

309:11

impeding 14:12

231:10

imperative

310:16

imperfect 162:3

impetus 296:9

implanted 143:7

implement

173:17 198:21

implementation

4:18 42:20

implemented

26:12 118:9

145:22 214:21

231:15

implementing

178:12 215:1

215:14

implicates 111:3

implications

15:4 52:11

98:8 99:22

147:14 315:12

import 274:12

importance 14:4

49:8 80:3

292:13 293:8

important 5:5

21:5 29:12

37:16 42:7

46:4 48:12

49:13,16 54:9

72:13 99:1,10

101:20 105:4

109:13 110:16

120:14 124:3

132:7 134:5

139:9 149:13

151:4,5 153:1

204:5 218:13

220:20 221:21

224:13 227:15

237:12 239:7

240:21 242:6

242:13 243:18

244:20 245:13

245:20,21

246:12,22

257:3 258:8

260:3 263:14

263:22 268:6

270:15,21

271:17 273:14

273:15,18

290:22 291:21

317:20

importantly

54:7 103:4

311:4

impose 116:10

116:12 118:14

imposed 40:1

78:21 118:10

131:15 282:20

imposes 279:6

imposing 39:9

impossible

159:13

impressed 33:13

impression

195:3 197:17

improper

222:17

improperly

145:22

improve 121:12
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

25

182:9 216:19

220:21 254:19

improvements

121:2

improving

192:8

inability 203:4

inaccurate 32:7

inadvertent

111:16,20

148:5 233:14

inadvertently

145:16

inappropriate

120:3

inattentive

209:1

inbound 192:18

incentive 172:5

282:1

incentives

257:14

incident 61:19

incidental 52:19

53:15 111:16

111:20 229:14

233:14 275:7

275:13 276:7,9

277:11 286:22

287:3,8,17

288:5 292:11

292:19 296:7

299:13,14

304:10,18

307:11

incidentally

233:16 306:19

include 47:17

166:21 174:21

included 226:20

includes 17:12

18:17 83:21

including 14:10

40:10 49:20

77:13 88:1

121:10 187:16

224:12 225:17

225:18 230:3

244:5 297:3

incomplete 32:6

incorporate

141:12

incorporated

57:21

increase 29:8

198:20 265:15

increases 29:1

increasingly

40:5 207:1

incredibly

263:14

incumbent

119:19,21

independent 3:7

4:9 105:22

124:20 178:7

178:17 180:13

indepth 178:5

index 129:4

187:18

indiana 262:1

indicate 23:20

26:22 116:8

206:2

indicates 14:5

indicating

242:21

indication 60:20

165:14,16

254:4

indicators

161:11

indices 128:14

128:19

indicted 112:10

indictment 65:9

indifferent

27:16 122:5

indiscriminate

26:13

individual 18:4

21:1 35:14

41:6 45:3,5,6,8

45:16,18 47:1

56:7 59:6

87:14 140:14

161:3,4,6

164:15 167:2,3

178:15,16

191:18 199:16

241:18 242:5

264:22 265:16

268:7 269:8

274:2 277:2

311:21

individualized

19:5 21:7 42:2

42:5 94:19

100:16 108:17

110:9 231:20

233:3,10 234:2

241:11,16

259:4,8,19

262:5 263:2

270:13 271:7

272:1 276:22

281:4 288:3

301:21 302:12

302:20 304:17

individuals

13:11 24:22

25:7 48:10

160:6,6 179:10

187:16 188:17

189:7 269:19

274:3 311:13

industries 56:16

ineffective

164:12 166:10

inevitably 6:1

107:18

infer 142:16

147:9 164:19

184:1 185:7,16

192:2

inference 184:9

inferences

185:20 189:10

192:10

influence 64:10

influenced 30:4

inform 260:14

information 3:5

5:22 6:3,6,11

7:13,21 8:10

8:12 9:5,21,22

10:5,8,16

11:21 12:7,12

12:21 13:16,17

14:1,3,10

17:11,17,18

19:2 21:21

22:1 26:10

27:8,11,15,18

32:7 41:10

49:19 50:11,17

50:19 53:22

54:1 56:22

62:16 70:7

71:13 72:17,18

73:2,6,8,11,14

74:19 75:8,14

75:16 77:5

83:5,9,15

95:18 96:13,18

97:18 102:11

106:8,10 108:1

112:2,3,4

114:18 118:1

124:17 135:18

136:9,18,21

137:9 138:2

139:22 140:21

140:22 144:19

144:21 145:8,9

145:12,17

148:2 150:8,17

150:18 153:4,5

154:2,9,12,16

155:10 157:2,2

157:12,18

159:2,5 165:11

168:7 170:21

171:2 172:2,8

173:7 175:16

176:9,12,13,17

178:3 182:11

185:12,21

186:4,6 191:8

191:9,11,17,19

192:9 193:2,3

202:5,7 204:22

207:1 208:9

211:12 218:21

219:8 222:20

226:8 227:10

227:12,17

229:22 230:6

231:19 232:2,7

233:4,5,8,15

233:17,22

235:3 237:21

238:5 239:12

240:9 242:1,5

246:11 249:9

253:9 255:16

256:10 257:6

258:12,17

260:7,10

263:21 266:13

275:2 276:18

278:4 279:15

279:21 280:16

281:22,22

284:7,9,15,17

284:19 285:2,8

285:16 287:13

287:15 288:16

289:6,7,14,19

289:20 290:5,6
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

26

297:17 299:10

300:8 304:19

306:6 307:11

308:10,14

310:11 313:16

314:16,16

informative

210:2 252:17

informed 30:13

32:7 182:22

245:7,9,11

256:16

informing

225:16

infrastructure

144:8 208:13

infrastructures

147:18

infringed 25:4

infringement

293:14,15

ingest 147:19

ingredients

87:11

inherent 67:22

68:3 144:16

164:22

inherently 81:22

142:4 164:18

172:15

inhouse 315:7

initial 76:22

87:7 195:12

243:13

initially 64:11

101:8 291:2

307:8

initiative 222:4

inject 97:7

271:18

injury 264:2

innocent 160:6

172:9 231:12

input 11:3

inquiry 21:14

insecurity 309:9

inside 18:21

41:22 49:20

75:8 109:16

114:8 116:5

170:6 298:4

301:3

insider 132:9

208:8

insight 14:9

insist 235:3

inspector

305:12 306:7

inspectors 19:21

247:1

installation

26:18

instance 96:2

306:14

instances 232:15

institution 91:4

207:20,21

institutional

37:9 90:19

91:14 257:13

265:20,21

institutions

196:6

instructive

24:20

insufficient

112:22 113:1

insurance

183:20

integrated 291:9

291:15

integrity 34:2

intel 178:8

intelligence 1:8

2:16 3:10,14

8:5,22 9:3,20

11:21 12:2,11

12:12,16 13:8

14:4,7 16:11

19:22 29:3

35:17 36:18

39:12 42:18

46:6,11,17

47:16,18 48:7

67:10 72:21

74:15,20 93:21

94:11 95:11

106:10 110:19

112:3,4 113:11

128:20 129:6

133:13 152:6

168:20 171:1

171:11 177:13

177:14 180:2,7

181:1 190:7

210:14 221:7

222:14 229:3,6

231:8,18

232:12 237:21

238:17 241:8

248:13 257:15

266:13 289:6,7

289:19,22

292:14 293:8

295:19 299:9

305:16 307:5

308:3 314:9

intend 63:20

intended 39:22

95:2 113:18

115:13 240:13

264:22 268:22

291:14

intensive 150:8

180:10

intent 41:20

79:1 117:8

122:14

intention 313:15

intentionally

13:3,4

intentions 8:9

interact 173:13

interaction

299:22 300:9,9

interactions

146:3

intercepted

276:21

intercepting

229:8

interceptions

230:5

interest 18:22

62:15 72:16

88:19 133:8

136:14 137:16

146:2,4,5,6

153:11 187:7,8

193:1 223:10

313:4

interested 54:22

55:20 111:22

136:1 319:11

interesting

130:7,13 175:9

240:21 315:16

interests 88:5

110:6 135:16

168:21 211:15

261:4 304:5,6

312:15 317:9

interject 267:12

internal 87:21

152:17 195:5

200:7,8 206:4

246:22 247:2

internally 93:9

international

37:2,8 47:11

48:20 108:8,15

259:9 279:17

288:4 289:22

290:3,9 297:13

302:1

internationally

124:18

internet 23:21

25:15 31:18

38:8,14 60:13

61:13 125:2

127:13 141:15

141:22 143:7

144:11,16

145:10 146:8

146:12 160:21

161:17 162:20

165:9 168:2

171:8 172:1,15

290:10

interpret 223:11

225:6 297:10

interpretation

65:3 86:17

137:12 270:17

interpretations

255:13

interpreted 7:15

81:1 233:2

255:4,12

intersection

124:14

intertwining

249:3,5

interval 192:1

interview 144:6

intricacies 52:6

intriguing 106:6

intrinsic 199:20

introduce 4:5

15:9 209:20

introduced 36:5

168:19

introduction

168:22

introductions

123:21

intrusions

207:16

intrusive 66:22
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

27

67:6,11 69:5,9

76:21 77:1

194:2 311:12

intrusiveness

69:8 311:15

invade 110:7

293:2

invading 24:17

invasions

139:21

inventions

140:10

investigation

20:10 21:2

26:8,19 55:7

57:19 82:15

122:11,15,18

159:6 175:17

176:11 199:17

208:5 234:8

239:1,3 242:20

262:15,18

279:16

investigations

11:15 20:12,16

176:2 178:3

182:18 187:13

221:8 246:5

263:22 283:9

investigative

56:15 79:4

80:13 105:8

187:14

investigators

243:1

investigatory

70:7

invisible 131:11

invitation 22:20

211:19

invite 211:17

286:21

inviting 28:4,8

37:16

invoking 230:21

involve 46:14

94:8 268:7

292:17,22

302:3

involved 9:19

16:5 33:16

45:4 56:19

88:6 214:6

215:10 216:6,8

231:21 269:13

involvement

93:19,22 103:1

109:18 238:9

involves 11:20

273:16

involving 45:15

108:1 259:9,20

264:1 292:20

ip 143:15,21

145:10 161:15

161:16 162:9

164:6,12

170:20 178:1

181:16 283:15

ipbased 164:12

irrelevant

112:18 113:5

isnt 24:15 27:16

59:14 60:3

67:15 130:8

171:21 178:11

188:3 208:5

283:1,3

isomorphic

167:4 168:4

isp 164:5

isps 279:1 280:8

issue 21:11

25:14 35:8

40:8 50:8,20

78:11 102:1

107:22 128:9

129:8 134:2

143:12 175:6

205:22 214:14

215:5 259:16

275:13,20

293:5 309:7

314:12

issued 10:2,11

65:8,15 102:2

133:12 221:17

240:8,11 251:7

308:8

issues 5:16 6:13

7:8 15:8 23:1

32:5,11 37:17

44:1 50:6

75:18,19,20

87:14 90:20

93:9 106:7

123:18 124:3

124:13,13,19

124:21 125:2

173:5,15

193:11 209:19

212:3 213:5

215:21 216:10

221:1,6,11,19

221:22 235:16

269:10 275:6

314:5 317:8

issuing 228:16

item 82:9

items 56:22 82:9

82:16 182:6

itll 283:12

ive 20:14 32:10

64:8 65:15

126:12 129:15

132:3,16,18

133:1 137:22

141:7 187:10

192:1 194:11

248:9 254:15

303:13 307:3

308:12

J

jack 257:12

jaffer 2:13 16:4

22:20 47:3

58:1 59:9

72:11 84:5

97:16 111:1

jameel 2:13 16:4

22:19 31:1

44:11,12 47:2

49:12 51:5

75:15 76:21

78:13,15 83:17

122:22

jameels 51:22

james 2:6,15

3:14 16:10

janosek 5:8

15:12 123:8

317:6

january 252:10

252:12

jerome 139:13

jim 4:6 50:22

87:4,12 88:1

117:15 119:7

123:3,19,20

126:2 156:3

187:1 192:6

210:8 211:16

247:10 251:3

256:22 285:18

301:7

jims 68:8 196:18

268:16 273:10

job 178:9

197:21

john 85:4 167:9

167:10 230:22

joined 210:5

joining 209:22

jones 24:20 26:2

26:4,7 45:1

51:5 66:7 69:2

262:1

journal 102:13

125:1

judge 16:11

22:9 33:1

34:16,17 35:6

35:6 37:13

44:9 45:22

62:10 69:4

86:12 92:18

93:1,5 94:15

99:7 101:9,19

101:22 104:8

104:14,19

119:14 121:17

193:11,15

194:4,13 196:4

196:9,10 197:2

198:20 200:18

201:5,13

228:17 229:19

240:8 249:15

251:16 259:14

260:22 269:21

270:8 271:8

299:11 300:13

judgement

111:6 170:8

judges 17:5,8

34:4,15 35:19

36:13,13 93:8

99:16 101:6

102:2 104:18

105:14,14,19

105:20 106:9

119:3 179:6

193:11,16

197:1,12,15,15

197:16 198:6

240:11 248:21

251:16 267:7

269:22

judging 35:1
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

28

judgment

199:17 244:4

judgments

101:1

judicial 34:14

39:3 87:8,8

92:14,18 99:3

119:2 197:13

201:7 218:13

218:18 246:18

249:18 250:8

judiciary 19:22

97:10,11 245:3

245:4

july 1:10

junctions 143:8

juries 21:15

57:6

jurisdiction

91:21 99:20,21

100:1,8 101:15

jurisprudence

37:5

jury 21:17 57:11

58:7 65:1,7,8

65:15,20 81:16

84:16,18

justice 3:18 16:2

16:17 25:6

33:14 99:14

210:8 211:3

222:5 231:11

252:11 254:6

267:4,5,21

justices 25:2,3

66:8 210:19

justification

7:22 275:21

285:17 313:21

justified 147:10

justify 225:8

justifying

229:11

K

kate 2:14 16:8

28:7 45:22

49:6 53:20

67:19 88:22

104:5 106:17

107:14 115:11

116:1 117:2

118:4

kates 64:22

keep 6:6,19

54:17 99:10

104:12,14

105:5 116:9

118:1 144:7

181:9 279:2

281:19 282:3,4

284:7,16,19

286:5 294:5

310:17

keeping 69:18

106:4 190:5

233:21

keeps 77:22

103:19

ken 16:13 37:13

37:21 46:5

49:8 51:12,20

86:22 104:5

108:6 117:3

120:13,15

150:9 255:1

259:2 271:1

kennedy 139:15

kenneth 2:17

kept 13:21

19:11 135:20

282:1 306:20

306:22

key 62:2 135:19

136:2 143:7,8

147:22 168:2

175:3 177:1

304:14

kick 123:21

kicked 148:16

272:7

kidding 91:2

killings 253:7

kind 23:3 37:9

46:14 53:16

55:15 59:21

60:4 66:12

70:19 71:2,12

73:5 75:3

76:19 80:16

87:18 88:3

98:3 102:17

103:7 116:13

141:7 142:6,20

142:21 144:13

144:14,17,19

145:1,18

147:12 148:9

149:3 150:8

151:10,17

158:22 166:1,2

169:22 171:12

177:13,16

178:4,5 179:15

191:7,9 192:8

194:2,4,5

195:10,19

200:5 202:8

205:22 206:3

206:16 208:9

227:21 231:16

231:21 232:2

233:21 250:7

257:4 268:18

269:11 270:19

274:12 285:2

306:5 308:9,16

309:20 315:15

315:21 316:2

317:20

kinds 61:10,14

62:5 68:1,3

101:6 128:16

128:19 129:5

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knew 80:8

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knit 51:11

know 30:1,6

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33:22 47:22

48:2 53:20

58:2,12 59:20

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63:18,20 64:1

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278:1 279:4,18

280:1,3 281:7

283:5,10

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288:8,14 292:9

292:10,12

293:6,13
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

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294:13 295:11

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302:19 303:4

307:2 308:15

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316:6

knowing 116:2

248:22 250:19

knowledge 12:9

43:15 197:19

197:19 288:17

319:8

knowledgeable

196:1

known 4:8 13:5

30:19 82:18

117:7 162:12

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243:3 258:8

275:22 311:10

knows 28:18,19

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115:6 132:3

170:21 189:15

262:10

L

l 305:11

lab 3:10 125:4

labeled 32:15

labs 124:12

lack 101:11

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lacks 144:11

160:21

language 59:15

81:8 82:3,5

large 10:13

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largely 233:2

294:10

larger 48:6

112:12 149:5

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268:10 301:6,8

largest 164:5

300:18,19

latch 202:18

late 36:3

latitude 43:13

law 3:20 12:13

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61:16 76:16

90:3,13 102:4

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lawful 22:16

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lawfully 300:18

laws 4:19 48:8

136:15 168:14

187:7 188:14

217:5,18

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lawyer 96:8

126:17 132:15

lawyers 91:10

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layer 96:4

lead 160:3

leaders 20:3

99:2

leading 8:11

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243:15

leads 35:21 62:5

182:22

leadup 116:11

league 161:19

leak 13:20 104:4

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leaked 6:2 10:3

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263:8

leaking 205:15

leaks 8:14 31:13

51:15 103:16

205:13 226:9

leaping 194:17

learn 25:17

129:19 186:18

205:2 243:7

261:14 293:2

293:14

learned 31:12

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80:3 165:2

233:1,12 318:2

learning 129:11

129:21 130:8

193:8,10 239:5

learns 171:9

leave 44:14 72:4

78:11 230:14

273:12

leaving 39:11

87:20

lecturer 210:9

led 24:5 46:12

94:2 109:2

305:11

leery 180:22

left 68:5 210:7

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298:5,6

legal 2:10,11

3:16 5:8,15

6:13 7:21

14:17 16:2,4

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63:13 89:13

93:15 97:22

98:7 102:14,15

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255:13,21

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272:14 276:2

279:13 280:18

282:12 314:17

legality 15:3

38:7 59:3

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legislate 138:7

legislation 43:1

78:18,20 79:1

80:5 95:7

248:18 253:1

265:4

legislative 43:20

80:5 84:20,22

122:7 140:11

151:21 157:14

legitimate 87:13

127:8 266:11

287:12 304:6

lend 186:5

length 9:13
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

30

54:16

lengthier 223:20

lesson 179:4

letter 176:17

297:22 298:11

letters 232:14

level 7:11 162:5

162:6 185:19

185:20 191:19

212:4 231:20

232:1,10,16

237:8 256:14

271:13,14

300:5 308:2

levels 42:11

43:17 191:10

192:5 205:9

286:16

levers 170:19

liberties 1:3 4:4

4:16 22:18

23:8 29:6

32:13 119:19

119:21 121:7

173:3,5 213:10

216:22 224:8

225:14 227:5

230:17 242:10

244:2,18

266:14 269:13

278:15 293:6

294:11,14

309:9,11 311:9

317:10

liberty 4:17 33:4

210:19 226:22

230:18,21

235:10 270:8

299:4

lichtblau 90:1

lichtblaus 90:3

lies 191:14

life 29:11 49:22

66:14 79:18

lifetime 31:7

light 65:5,16

82:2 162:12

231:14 276:13

likelihood 156:8

187:18 237:5

301:7,8

limit 9:6 31:4

41:9 60:2

85:11 101:20

144:21 156:18

162:13 165:20

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limitation 156:9

limitations 10:7

22:13 82:3

99:11,17 142:6

153:10,10

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160:1,10,12

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limited 11:4

17:21 61:2

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limiting 256:9

limits 67:22

68:3 85:7

100:7 131:14

158:1,2,15

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310:2

line 41:19 59:4,7

59:10 120:2

139:3 171:15

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lines 180:1

183:5 260:14

264:3

link 20:13 167:7

168:1 185:11

242:16,22

linked 228:21

linking 137:6

187:12

list 18:13 169:15

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listen 17:19

146:10

listened 105:3

175:7

litigate 266:2

litigating 55:22

63:3

litigation 56:18

56:19,20 57:1

82:14 253:8

265:11

litt 93:10 150:4

little 54:14,15

66:1,6 86:7

108:5 115:12

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123:1 129:2

148:22 155:17

171:14 180:22

189:12 194:19

202:17 211:6

212:11 217:14

261:14 275:10

284:8 309:12

litts 152:3,4

live 152:1

227:21 244:6

lives 27:18

29:22 231:3,13

livingston 1:22

319:3,16

liza 210:18

285:3

loan 188:20

loathe 222:15,16

local 166:22

located 12:15

13:13 42:10

50:2 113:19

166:18 276:4,5

locating 166:17

location 9:21

24:22 26:1,7

26:10 66:11

164:15 169:12

196:20

lock 165:5

log 315:18

logged 209:4

logging 208:21

logic 288:7

logically 142:16

logs 175:3

178:13 203:15

203:16,16,17

203:18 206:20

207:7

long 10:10 66:13

69:15 107:4

124:15 125:7

127:20 167:22

176:7 235:17

249:4 276:1,17

287:16 308:12

longer 103:14

128:8 281:19

303:17

longterm 24:21

25:21 26:1

look 28:5 44:1

53:7 54:4

74:10 80:22

84:20 105:14

106:15 114:15

126:17,18

127:12 131:1,5

132:8 147:4,5

149:19 150:14

153:14 161:18

164:20 174:12

186:19 233:18

237:14 241:1

243:4 261:19

289:4 292:19

304:22 309:6

311:14 315:1

318:3

looked 122:2

133:21 148:2

165:20 166:3

174:6 185:6

254:6 259:7

286:6 311:10

looking 49:9

77:11,13,15

83:15 102:18

118:5 121:8

132:5 165:18

170:2 172:3

180:11 185:16

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218:15 219:6

227:5 238:6

247:11,12,13

257:6 262:12

262:19,22

270:12,16

291:8,9 292:22

311:7

looks 263:16

308:20

loophole 297:16

loopholes

233:21

loosened 296:12

lose 187:11

317:13

loss 292:2

lost 230:21

lot 56:18 65:15

68:14,20 71:3

82:11 98:16

106:7 131:11
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

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148:5,6 151:7

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273:19 276:19

280:9 281:19

304:12 307:11

310:7 315:11

lots 57:20 94:2

95:18 181:4

286:15

love 63:9

low 156:16

232:21 263:13

283:12

lower 45:17

47:8

lowered 232:16

lunch 6:16

123:12

lynne 1:22 319:3

319:16

M

m 1:17 318:8

mac 145:9

machine 129:11

129:20 130:8

193:8

macro 185:20

magazine 130:3

magistrate

272:17

magnitude

58:20 89:15

mail 7:10

maintain 71:18

83:14 128:7

286:5 317:21

maintained 69:6

maintaining

43:3 71:14

79:5 278:16

maintains 57:2

145:6

maintianing

280:8

major 116:22

161:19 218:21

253:18 271:5

majority 11:7

66:8 89:2

185:13 231:2

makers 147:5

147:16 179:6

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making 5:9 9:11

23:21 28:13

80:4 96:19

100:17,22

101:1 151:9

170:1 184:13

224:19 225:17

226:1 271:21

276:22 302:6

malaysia 243:4

man 53:12

manager 201:14

managing

188:16

mandamus

133:10

mandate 248:18

252:2

mandates 19:20

mandating

265:2

manifests 57:13

58:8

manner 22:16

291:15

manning 207:14

208:20,20

manpower

39:19

mantra 121:20

map 28:3

mapping 167:5

168:4

marc 3:5 124:15

132:10 136:1

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166:12,13

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182:1 183:10

185:17 189:12

200:16 208:7

208:15

marcs 140:18

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margins 216:19

marshall 315:11

martin 2:14

16:8 28:8 49:7

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maryland 26:18

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massive 24:2

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233:13 302:17

302:21

master 233:17

matching 137:7

material 228:19

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materialize

280:10

materials 57:8

82:13

matter 30:15

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matters 30:16

222:21 292:8

318:3

maximum 225:7

245:6

mayflower 1:15

mean 48:15 58:9

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meaning 21:9

229:15 299:14

304:2,3

meaningful

42:13 54:9

150:13 177:6

201:12 255:20

means 34:8

72:12 73:13

115:7 126:17

130:12,16

161:3,22

208:17 213:4

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236:18 239:20

253:17 255:18

258:4 306:14

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310:16 311:12

313:14

meant 26:7

30:22 84:13

113:7

measure 177:20

measures 106:2

144:21

mechanism

179:13

mechanisms

131:16 158:20

163:13 175:20

177:19,19

194:16 195:4

195:19 208:1

254:13 274:11

280:19,22

media 6:2

medical 25:14

174:5

medine 2:3 4:2

107:13 113:2

117:2 119:1

123:11,15
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

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125:14 172:21

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209:14,18

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medium 141:18

meet 75:9 77:14

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meeting 4:3

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meetings 52:10

meets 260:21

member 33:3,4

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members 2:1

4:6 6:16,18 7:1

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306:8 312:7,14

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memories 140:7

memos 93:9

mention 215:20

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mentioned 19:7

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229:19

mentions 309:7

menu 189:14

mere 60:14

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merely 7:16

27:15 243:19

302:13

merged 282:7

merit 311:13

message 136:17

met 41:3 197:7

metadata 8:21

9:9 10:14,19

11:4,12,16

17:1,10 18:17

20:11,18 21:21

22:10 23:18,21

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51:7 60:11,13

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128:1 130:22

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136:8 137:14

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method 171:22

methods 36:21

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234:22 235:1

295:6

mic 37:21 236:7

michael 3:16

micro 185:19

microphone

312:9

middle 291:3,16

294:12

midstream

286:20

migrated 108:12

migrations

163:2

mike 210:11

mikes 273:6

military 64:8

252:20 315:4

mill 68:15

million 314:20

millions 26:14

61:6 160:5

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mind 6:7 56:8

78:1 99:10

104:12,14

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116:9 144:7

241:21 246:18

286:5 294:18

mindful 143:11

146:22

minds 231:3

mine 105:7

185:4 219:7

minimis 276:10

minimization

13:19 41:8,14

49:3 101:3

108:2 111:8,11

111:13,15

112:1,22 115:4

115:5 121:16

122:2 139:8

172:6 220:7

223:1 233:19

249:21 256:8

263:6,7 287:13

288:2,6 306:12

308:14,20

314:12

minimize 19:15

278:14,15

minimum

288:14

mining 18:1

129:11 130:20

158:22

minority 210:12

minute 45:21

125:10,12

151:15 155:19

209:15 211:10

294:6

minutes 15:10

15:16,19 34:13

44:5 54:17

69:1 155:18

183:18,19

211:9 247:8

254:15 312:10

312:16

misbehavior

199:21

misgivings

274:4

misidentify

196:20

misinterpreted

185:3

misleading

111:17 184:17

191:14 276:13

misled 48:7 52:1

misnomer 12:3

missed 188:13

missing 188:12

314:10

mission 245:21

263:8

missions 4:12

misspoke 113:4

mistake 306:15

mistaken 158:14

misunderstan...

121:18

misunderstands

157:7

misuse 80:14,16

132:9 141:2

148:6 158:11

207:8 279:19

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misused 79:7

misuses 180:20

mit 3:9 125:4

139:14 149:5

154:7 185:6

315:16 316:5

316:19

mitigate 14:14

model 93:4

97:13

modeling 222:3

models 221:4

moderate 6:16

14:19

moderating

15:2

modern 51:6
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

33

141:16 146:7

190:10

modification

176:21

modified 176:20

mohamed

242:17 264:13

264:13 277:3

moment 15:9

38:17 138:14

138:17 153:18

155:22 156:11

167:3,8 212:4

262:7 304:16

moments 104:13

money 181:4,6

204:13

monitor 165:10

177:14

monitored 37:4

43:17

month 26:11

60:8 150:15

months 40:9

52:4 183:22

219:13 220:14

morning 4:2

14:21 37:14

125:10,15

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255:1 294:16

306:12

mornings

142:20 194:19

224:10 304:20

mosaic 239:4

mother 184:3

motion 268:10

mouse 245:14

move 169:20

172:19 216:15

236:7 241:16

241:17 254:16

268:4 304:10

moved 117:22

235:21

movements 25:7

28:1 231:11

moving 48:1

119:22 152:13

162:18 223:10

268:21

multiple 43:17

69:12 143:6

multipoint

118:6

murderers

246:1

music 146:10

mustnt 103:5

N

naked 28:20

name 12:5

164:21 200:10

212:16,19

213:21 315:10

316:14

narcotics 182:18

narrow 9:6 74:5

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narrower 26:4

234:22

nathan 3:20

211:2

nation 4:14,20

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national 2:14,17

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134:13 135:7

135:14 148:17

162:17 186:21

205:14 210:20

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243:20 244:7

304:7 306:5

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317:9

nationality

164:19,21

nationally

124:17

nationals 48:14

nations 192:16

naturally 57:19

142:16

nature 205:15

260:15

nctc 152:12

near 58:10

300:4

nearly 149:18

246:15

necessarily

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necessary 14:3

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necessity 70:20

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need 4:15,16

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needle 11:13

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128:20 132:7

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neither 27:19

nervous 171:14

net 27:4

network 83:7

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243:15

networks 14:9

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never 11:7 61:5

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new 7:15 23:7

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268:1 270:17

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news 17:22

23:20

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nimble 281:7,8

nodding 301:7

nojeim 3:19

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nom 273:21

nominally

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nonabusive

159:20

noncontent

183:8,11,15

nondiscrimin...

154:15

nonincrimina...

176:9

nonnational

174:5

nonprivacy

154:17
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

34

nontechnologi...

161:22

nonu 12:14 42:9

45:12 52:20

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norm 34:19

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notary 319:3,17

note 23:22 32:10

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noted 28:17

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notice 76:14

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notion 79:3

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npr 129:15

nra 78:4,5

nsa 18:12 19:12

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nsas 19:6

nuclear 13:10

number 9:11,11

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83:9 93:4 96:7

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numerous 40:9

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nurse 174:15

nut 217:1

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O

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objected 76:7

objection 32:14

63:14

objections 62:6

objective 39:8

obligation

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obligations

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obliged 155:20

observation

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observations

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observed 25:6

obtain 9:2 12:20

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obtained 12:8

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287:11

obtaining 12:17

287:12

obvious 60:3

72:12

obviously

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occasion 219:13

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292:3

occasional 268:8

occur 309:22

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occurred 18:16

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occurring 83:4

301:13,14

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306:4

offered 20:5

27:6

offering 121:11

office 2:11 3:14

16:1 79:22

91:15,15 97:10

officer 5:7,8

97:2

officers 18:12

offices 76:6,9,10

official 28:20

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273:22

officials 7:18

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oftentimes

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oh 71:22 171:3

okay 37:14

54:11 65:22

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89:17 104:5,7

108:18 117:18

147:21 148:10

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214:13 217:17

247:22 248:5,7

250:1 266:16

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298:16 304:9

305:10 312:3

312:12

olc 252:1,11

254:2

old 184:3,4

ombudsman

271:19 273:7

273:20 274:21

ombudsperson

240:16 261:2

273:13,17

once 10:13

36:15 132:1

138:1,13

186:12 227:12

229:18 230:22

277:19 282:2

285:5

oncology 183:19

183:21

ones 171:16

226:21 243:19

315:7

ongoing 55:6

81:2,22 82:13

84:14,18 85:14

133:16,19

203:13,18

262:14 279:16

online 121:21

122:1

oops 170:5,6

open 51:17 55:1

87:4 125:17

234:8 317:21

opening 15:10

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87:6 115:3

125:10 218:10

operate 180:21

257:20 265:9

operated 1:6

operates 142:17

156:18 244:17

257:20

operating

162:19 207:10

operation 41:19

150:11 198:1

203:18 206:17
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

35

operational 41:5

43:2 203:7,13

207:12,15

244:15 245:9

246:6

operations

308:3

operators 142:9

142:9

opinion 31:14

66:9 90:11

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251:18 252:11

254:2 291:4

opinions 30:7

66:7 79:12

89:3,9 90:9

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102:14,15

106:22 107:2

118:22 230:4

248:22 250:11

251:6,11

253:20 255:8

260:3

opponent 90:19

opponents 31:3

opportunities

147:6

opportunity

16:21 20:6

28:9,11 43:22

73:18 95:9

133:1 135:8

138:15 186:13

211:20 223:19

230:8,12 260:9

269:15 293:22

312:14

oppose 97:11

265:16 266:1

opposed 87:14

136:20 137:4

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249:9 250:20

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opposite 137:16

241:20

optic 108:12

optics 302:3

option 195:12

312:21 316:4

options 31:4

247:20

order 6:4 8:22

10:2,3,3,6

11:18 12:20

13:6 15:22

17:3,8,16,22

19:3,19 20:17

21:7 22:10

30:17 35:21

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62:13,14,15

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264:9,10

268:10,12,19

269:4,5 275:10

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288:3 292:6

301:22 302:13

309:21

ordering 238:4

orders 8:5,6

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35:16,17 46:3

58:20 61:1,3,6

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108:17 110:10

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255:17 259:4,8

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271:16 286:11

298:3 302:20

ordinary 59:16

84:10 105:12

246:4

org 136:1

organization

18:7 64:11

139:3

organizational

132:6 199:5

organizations

10:22 14:11

152:16

organized 64:14

128:15

origin 163:17

original 41:19

43:4 79:1,1

88:16 138:22

181:13

origins 105:9

ought 149:22

240:14 261:2

290:11,12

outcome 176:7

319:11

outer 85:6,11

outline 226:17

outlined 31:1

132:19 239:8

output 11:3

outset 186:19

211:21 212:13

220:4

outside 12:16,20

13:13 39:20

41:7 42:10

45:13 48:14,18

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108:22 109:8

109:20 110:3

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169:5,13 178:7

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269:10 297:6

298:7 300:22

301:1

outsources

280:7

outward 258:12

258:19

overall 293:5

308:4

overarching

28:12

overbroad

238:21

overcollected

179:12

overcome

160:11

overlap 217:8

overlapping

86:20

overreach 29:2

169:1

overriding

72:16

overseas 39:6,12

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50:2,5 52:14

52:16,20,22

115:20 116:2,4

116:15 117:9

117:12 233:11

288:10,13

295:4,6 296:6

297:17 302:4

303:2

oversee 173:1

overseen 19:15

54:6

oversight 1:3

4:4,22 19:19

42:13,14 43:18

46:16,17 54:3

54:5,8 79:16

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80:15 87:20

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213:21 214:4

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240:5,13

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247:3 254:20

257:2,3,5,8,14

257:16,22

258:2 263:3

286:16 295:7

oversightlite

257:4

overview 87:10

overwhelmed

94:19

ownership 78:6

P

p 146:11,11

318:8

paces 106:1
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

36

package 250:3

packages 219:20

page 116:1

126:8

pages 249:9,9

paint 282:8

panacea 159:9

panel 2:9 3:1,12

6:15,17 14:16

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15:14,18 44:5

54:12 58:14

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panelist 15:15

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panels 6:12

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paper 185:5

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papers 93:14

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papps 146:9

paradigm 105:4

117:1 136:15

163:18 186:3

paradox 36:17

parallel 277:15

parallelize

203:17

parallels 105:9

parameters

74:15,16 98:21

paranoid 47:13

48:3 49:2

part 19:2 48:5

51:19 60:17

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parte 34:7 35:9

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participant

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participate 5:3

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participation

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particularity

130:17,20

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particularized

76:6,7 92:17

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particularly

40:3 54:22

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parties 57:2

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partner 15:22

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parts 207:20

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party 56:20

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pass 55:3 86:22

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passage 43:21

64:6

passed 36:4

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passenger 243:5

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57:13

passes 181:8

passing 55:15

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pat 4:6 14:19

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patchwork

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patent 162:10

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patricia 2:5 15:1

patriot 1:7 5:12

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pattern 48:5

patterns 192:16

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pay 51:4 70:2

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paying 209:3,5

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pclob 4:8,21

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pclobs 7:5 224:6

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pen 26:18,20

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penumbral

245:18

people 25:19

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34:1 43:20

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60:6,9 64:17

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251:15 257:11

261:12 265:12

269:9 271:10

271:11 287:20

287:20 289:2

289:14 290:6

290:17 291:20
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

37

300:18 301:1,3

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306:11 314:8

317:16

peoples 75:21

205:18

percent 121:17

141:21 162:3

170:17 197:5

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percentage

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perfect 120:22

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perfectly 65:19

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performing

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period 25:7

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periodic 19:21

periods 231:6

permanent

12:15 77:20

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permissible

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permission

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permit 6:20

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permits 12:13

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persecution

231:4

person 12:14

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personal 25:14

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personality

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personally

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personnel 241:9

persons 9:19

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perspective 2:10

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perspectives

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pertains 228:19

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perverse 172:5

pet 192:3

petition 133:10

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phantoms

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phase 44:4

phenomenon

64:20

philosophical

292:8

phone 9:21

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phrase 118:17

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phrasing 115:12

physical 208:22

piano 141:3,5

pick 46:22

209:15

picked 197:15

picking 83:5

152:2 226:12

301:7,9

picture 182:13

226:10,14,15

241:2 282:9

piece 43:1 131:6

185:1 191:7

299:3

pieces 191:6

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pizza 53:12,13

place 24:6 25:13

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264:14 277:11

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placebo 159:8

placed 22:13

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places 218:13

plaintiffs 37:2

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plan 61:19

planning 14:11

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plans 14:10

245:8

plausibly 129:7

play 97:19

100:14 120:22

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playing 100:12

plays 135:15

please 126:1

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pledged 219:3

plenty 225:2

plot 116:8 311:5

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plots 8:4 234:18

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plus 250:2

pnaelists 211:9

pocket 105:22

point 35:13,20

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73:3 74:22

78:17 85:8

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137:14,19

138:13,21

141:5 142:13

142:19 144:5

147:3 156:21

164:16 165:12

165:18,21

171:20 175:4
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

38

177:1 181:13

185:17 187:1,9

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200:14 201:5

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pointed 73:4,9

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points 34:6

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156:4 162:12

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242:6 281:4

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poking 316:2

police 27:4

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policies 4:19

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policy 3:13,15

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207:18 209:19

303:7

political 25:10

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31:2,3,4 99:1

231:11 234:11

pool 197:16

poor 163:5

portion 11:5

252:11,12

portions 221:17

portrait 243:15

pose 6:17

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poses 77:12

129:10 187:19

position 6:9

9:14 47:18

50:19 121:5

205:17 261:3

270:7

possibilities

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possibility 61:15

62:8 85:1,17

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possible 5:9

6:20 8:4,8 51:7

59:10 67:18

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postcollection

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potential 108:21

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potentially

21:16 57:4,8

146:5 160:2

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pounded 267:18

power 23:4

28:18,20

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239:10,13

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powerful 129:19

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powers 38:22

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practical 71:5

106:7,15 158:5

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practicalities

114:14

practice 11:4

134:16 204:15

214:21 295:14

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practices 232:6

256:2

preceded 66:9

precedent 90:14

91:13 308:1

precise 25:9

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precisely 25:18

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preconditions

199:13

predicate 234:8

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predication

263:1

predications

286:9

preexisting

232:20

prefaa 303:14

prefer 263:19

preferred 79:22

prejudices

234:10

premise 296:2,4

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premises 296:3

303:9

prepare 93:14

318:3

prepared

207:21 224:14

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prepares 260:19

preprotect

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prescribed

42:15 54:4

presence 19:1

present 62:2

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presented 37:11

268:18

presenting

195:17

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preserving 29:7

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president 5:17

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presidents 109:2

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252:21

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presumably

31:19 116:16

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pretty 60:8

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prevail 74:21

prevent 8:4

30:17,22 80:16

156:20 158:10

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prevented

234:22

preventing

54:10

prevention 13:9

prevents 117:5

246:3 262:21

previous 192:3

192:3 251:6

previously

16:15 295:2,13

298:18 308:4

primarily 33:8

64:13 236:4

primary 4:12
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

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127:7 135:4

182:19 229:3

299:9

primitive 26:21

45:15

principally

23:14

principle 67:14

207:10

principles 244:3

244:8,20 246:6

prior 42:17

94:18 108:7

187:21

prism 12:3,4

38:6 43:7

privacy 1:3 3:5

4:3,16 22:17

24:17 25:5

28:17 43:3

48:10 52:11

74:7,9 94:22

110:6 113:1

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125:2 127:5,7

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135:16 136:14

137:15 139:2,5

139:18,20,22

140:14 148:16

150:5 153:6,8

164:1 168:14

168:21 173:2,5

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293:2,3,6,14

293:15 304:5,6

309:10 310:21

311:9 312:22

313:8 314:2,4

314:6,7 315:12

317:10

private 22:5

49:22 70:1

126:5 128:5

163:15 281:18

282:1,13,17,18

282:21 286:1,4

privately 185:15

privileges

131:22

privy 205:5

pro 200:4

probable 11:18

19:5 59:22

92:17 95:19

100:18 105:16

110:11,13

114:21 199:13

271:7 278:6

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probably 32:12

33:3 80:2 97:2

101:20 141:10

146:18 162:3

178:16 180:7

180:16 197:21

241:10 266:22

270:11 296:13

problem 40:3

50:18 73:15

78:3,3,4 90:22

102:8 108:19

127:7 132:17

157:5 158:14

162:16 166:1,9

167:4,16 168:4

168:8 173:20

187:3 196:12

206:21 208:8

215:3,4 254:21

276:9 279:19

281:16 296:7,9

302:22 303:6

problematic

101:17 143:17

145:14,16

270:3 284:5

problems 75:2

131:18 133:5

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173:10 207:19

212:5 249:2

282:22 292:18

308:16

procedure 52:6

249:22

procedures

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19:14 41:5,8

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111:8,11,14,15

112:1,6,16,22

122:2 134:15

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256:8 260:7

271:12 277:10

281:12 287:14

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proceed 219:3

proceeding

63:13 88:7

125:17 201:8

proceedings 4:1

248:9 249:18

274:22 319:6,7

process 34:2,7

35:4,6,10,11

35:13 36:4,16

36:18 37:6

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40:1,18,18,21

41:18 43:21

65:8 95:2 97:5

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processed

165:21 166:3

processes 151:9

242:4

processing

166:8 189:16

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produce 253:11

produced

252:14 253:6

producing

252:8

production 81:2

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85:9,14,16

professional

25:11

professor

124:10 211:2

285:5

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profitably 115:8

program 5:11

5:13 8:7,19

9:17 10:1,12

10:19 11:4,11

11:19 12:4

14:8 17:1,2

20:4,19 22:15

23:15,17 24:2

26:13,17 27:7

38:6 43:7,10

44:4 47:14

58:10 60:18

63:11 67:5,20

71:1 87:9

89:14,15 98:22

107:14,16

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123:16 135:9

182:12 194:7

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programmatic

34:11 46:2

68:10 87:13

94:17 101:2

118:12,17

193:17 241:5,7

241:19 242:2,7

242:13 243:17
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

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244:12,22

245:5,13 258:2

258:3 261:6,11

261:15,18

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programmed

140:5,7

programs 1:5

5:5,11,16,18

7:2,13,16,21

8:2,13,15

14:18 16:7

22:22 23:11

31:11 32:14

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182:14 187:4

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progress 189:3

prohibited 14:2

prohibits 12:19

12:22

project 3:17

33:5 115:2

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223:21 270:6

projects 144:15

226:22

proliferation

13:10 14:12

promise 89:6

102:10

promote 6:4

139:4 290:9

proof 234:15

properly 98:15

property 164:17

proportion

236:20

proposal 98:8

156:6 270:7,10

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proposals

114:15

propose 147:13

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proposed 99:22

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proposing 204:2

208:10

proposition

86:7 184:21

prosecute 96:12

prosecuted

91:11

prosecution

35:22 96:10

prosecutor

104:20,22

prosecutors

255:9

prospective

239:18

prospectively

190:1

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4:20 23:9

36:20 48:10

113:1 116:13

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306:21

protected 18:10

304:5,7

protecting 72:18

225:13 244:7

263:14

protection

271:14 281:21

protections 39:6

43:3 68:11

70:12 158:3

224:17 297:11

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288:19

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154:14

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172:2,9,17

241:15

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provide 5:17

29:5 40:22

80:20 81:6

118:1 133:16

140:2,13 178:4

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279:6 299:10

provided 14:9

40:14 58:6

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providers 10:4

11:22 67:8

143:8 165:3

238:4 278:20

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295:1,10

provides 41:20

119:2 225:16

providing

146:12 309:19

provision 9:1

81:12,19 82:3

85:21 86:3

115:16 117:5

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103:11 245:19

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210:3

public 4:3 5:15

5:18 23:1 30:4

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97:9 98:7,21

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222:1,9,13,20

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256:12,15,16

258:17 260:3

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312:14,21

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publically

211:11

publication

131:21

publicly 7:14

98:6 185:14

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publics 261:3

published 255:7

pull 37:21

172:21 207:2

punish 174:17

puppies 191:22

192:4

pure 296:14

purely 21:21

302:7

purports 81:4

purpose 5:14

10:9 11:1

19:12 50:4

70:22 72:3

73:21,22 76:22

110:19 115:20

117:12 146:12

156:8 176:14

204:4 206:3
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

41

229:3,6 231:9

231:10 237:15

237:22 238:13

261:9 284:2

287:12 289:5

299:10

purposes 9:3

12:17 13:8

17:12 22:3

24:14 46:7

65:4 69:14,17

71:14,19 83:16

85:2 86:8

128:17 167:14

263:11 269:20

272:12,13

282:5 283:4,22

pursuant 1:6

8:21 12:1 42:1

103:8

pursue 177:3

pursued 135:17

push 102:22

142:22 144:17

147:7 159:7

225:11 226:15

284:22

pushed 138:10

pushing 225:3

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put 45:2,9 78:16

78:18 87:17

99:2 106:1

121:4 138:19

146:16,16

153:19 196:6

213:8 214:20

214:20 215:13

243:14 265:5

269:5 286:1

307:21 315:16

Q

quantities 10:14

27:17 229:8

quantity 236:19

quarter 32:11

quarters 38:7

quartite 92:12

queried 10:20

11:2 67:7

queries 11:8

18:4 19:8,17

70:5 74:4,4,5

128:16,19

query 18:10,13

67:15 77:17

204:2

querying 27:12

70:4

question 24:15

30:6 31:22

49:13,16 50:9

50:10 52:9

54:20 55:1,3

60:5 61:8

62:18 63:5,8,8

63:10,13 65:7

67:19 68:6,13

68:18,18,19

69:4,8 70:14

70:17,17 72:13

72:13,13 73:11

73:13,15 76:20

76:22 77:9,11

80:22 85:13

87:4,7,10,17

87:22 88:21

89:11,19 90:16

90:18 91:18

92:12 98:3,6

99:8 101:13,19

107:13,21

112:18,21,21

113:15 114:13

117:14,15,22

118:11 119:3

121:16 127:14

128:11 134:8

139:10,18

152:9 158:12

160:19 161:10

165:12 169:4

169:14,16,18

170:4,22 171:6

171:17 173:8

181:1,18,22

192:11,12,21

192:22 193:18

195:11 198:19

199:8 200:5,20

206:6 211:7,8

214:3,10 218:9

224:1 230:14

234:19,20

243:21 251:14

254:5 260:15

262:20 265:19

269:7 273:15

273:16,18

278:13 286:20

286:21 287:5

294:1,9 296:1

304:10 307:18

questioning

229:22

questions 6:17

6:18 8:11

15:18,20 28:6

38:6 44:2 47:1

54:12,16 72:4

75:6 76:17

79:19,21 92:6

94:16 97:22

99:13,16

102:19 103:22

104:2 107:12

124:6 125:13

126:19 129:1,5

129:11 156:1

156:11 181:9

199:7,22

222:12 236:12

263:3 265:8

268:2 272:14

290:22 292:5

292:10 293:17

294:6,8 309:18

312:1

quick 44:10

51:1 59:1

63:17 83:17

113:3 117:2

158:16 171:19

181:21 193:5

201:17 224:3

229:12 256:19

266:9,16

285:20 303:8

307:20,22

quickly 53:20

160:16 207:11

268:4,21

281:10 284:22

quint 89:19

quite 23:5 30:1

34:19 48:12

60:2 74:4

101:5 148:4,5

148:6 151:4

153:16,17

157:21 163:2

259:16 270:1

quiz 80:19

quote 20:9 25:8

139:13 144:5

162:18 208:19

224:18,18

228:4

quoted 33:18

quoting 28:15

160:21

R

rachel 2:4 4:6

14:19,22 16:20

56:4 61:9

300:14 309:4

racial 234:10

racketeering

64:10

radio 129:15

raise 28:11

180:18

raised 10:13

32:13 38:6

63:12 66:20

67:20 88:22

96:3 103:22

187:6 221:11

265:8 275:6,8

292:11

raises 24:3

75:17 88:22

94:15 107:21

random 18:1

range 217:4

231:16 280:18

rank 186:13

ranking 137:7

rapid 232:10

rare 301:2

rarely 74:4

159:13

rate 265:15

rating 137:7

rationale 11:11

raw 147:14

reach 24:12

142:1

reached 25:2

291:3

reaching 204:3

react 212:11

reaction 122:3

296:8 304:22

307:21

read 25:18

34:20,22 35:2

61:4 84:12
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

42

85:19,21 86:12

90:1,2 130:3

133:22 295:4

reading 130:14

304:12 305:11

reaffirmed 32:2

real 44:10 50:6

71:5 79:13

81:22 83:8

132:8 151:3

170:22 171:19

189:6 204:1

207:13,15

234:20 249:8

276:16 303:8

reality 53:16

222:19 269:12

realize 148:3

171:3 206:22

303:6

realizes 174:7

really 70:14

86:6 87:12

97:1 115:6

119:12,18,20

120:5,20 121:6

121:20 141:15

149:8 153:3

156:8 174:7

177:7 181:11

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188:5 199:18

201:11 207:4

212:17 214:11

214:14 216:20

225:10,22

226:5 238:5

247:11,19

273:14 276:12

277:11 288:16

294:18 299:11

303:11,11

307:4 309:17

313:5

realm 187:12

reanalysis

199:21

reapproved

17:4

reason 38:19

69:18 113:22

122:16 127:8

128:3 182:19

204:9 228:5

232:8 261:17

267:17 271:18

285:13

reasonable

10:20 18:5

22:4 24:17

25:5 57:21

86:18 95:19

111:7 113:10

128:21 151:8

171:10 174:14

239:11 254:11

262:4,13

279:14 287:10

287:18 288:12

reasonableness

111:5 254:6

reasonably

13:12 42:9

107:6 109:7

110:2 169:5,12

237:1 288:9

295:15,18

311:21

reasoning

218:22

reasons 22:15

25:3,22 30:16

70:13 157:18

183:13 257:19

279:20,22

287:19

reauthorization

42:17 89:5

305:3

reauthorized

8:17 12:6 20:2

42:16

rebuttal 113:2

receive 260:8

received 23:18

receives 24:1

97:6

receiving 104:15

recipe 79:8

recipient 62:12

62:14

recognition

153:8 190:22

recognize 153:2

168:16 231:1

recognized 39:2

124:18 171:18

278:5

recognizes

44:21

recommend

217:3 228:13

228:15 286:4

recommendat...

119:13 179:16

229:19 236:10

250:10 259:18

260:4 264:4

277:20

recommendat...

5:19 28:14

115:2 119:22

132:20 211:12

224:5,20 225:1

226:1,17,20

229:2 230:3

247:12 254:19

256:21 258:20

263:4 278:9

299:4,6 310:20

recommended

4:10 200:19

299:17

record 21:1 25:9

38:13 52:10

55:12,17 59:6

69:16 88:16

122:21 123:14

125:16 182:7

189:8 209:17

222:13 312:11

313:3 319:7

recorded 7:3

recording 190:3

records 8:19 9:2

9:15 17:3 20:9

21:8,16 25:13

51:3 61:7,11

61:14 68:2,3

69:7 71:11,18

72:1 78:6 81:3

81:6,11,12

82:1,16,18,21

83:11 84:14

88:13 118:18

127:13,16,17

133:17 135:14

143:3,4,14,14

160:6 174:6

179:10,11

190:5 219:8

239:1,2,19

261:9 264:7,22

265:1,1 283:14

284:10,12

291:3,6 313:11

red 15:13 178:5

205:22 218:7

223:12 251:5

294:5 307:21

redacted 89:8,8

221:17

redress 139:21

reduce 311:15

redundancy

162:22

refer 12:4 59:11

141:9

reference 6:5

229:18 305:16

referenced

111:9 275:12

referred 8:18

12:3

refinements

216:14

reflect 112:16

187:7 212:11

251:15

reflected 120:9

244:9 249:14

309:21

reflecting 214:2

reflection

215:18 269:1

reflections

15:16

reflects 25:9

215:4

refreshed 82:19

refuse 37:1

regard 60:7

67:3 110:22

173:5 177:2

224:6 309:13

regarding 1:5

7:20 38:5

175:12 216:11

regime 289:16

region 206:14

regions 182:20

register 26:19

26:20

registers 83:2,6

regular 213:15

257:7,16,20

267:22 272:8

272:15,16

regulate 56:16

168:14 297:11
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

43

regulating

168:18 227:11

regulation 4:19

298:19

regulations 7:6

7:9 50:12,15

50:16

reinforces

302:20

reingold 5:6

123:8 317:5

reiterate 49:7

reiterates

220:10

rejected 314:20

relate 198:8

related 4:19

14:13 34:6

35:13 48:11

55:8 71:1

relatedly 55:13

55:18 81:18

relates 178:3

relating 5:16

41:10 101:3

221:6

relation 311:3

relationships

25:14 185:10

315:22

relative 184:18

254:5

relatively 58:2

185:7 253:13

release 226:8,12

releasing 230:4

relevance 20:20

54:21 55:9,11

55:16,20 56:1

56:17 57:5,7

58:2,16 59:11

59:13,21 60:1

60:3,7,10

62:20 63:1,2,8

63:12 65:4

81:20 82:12

122:8,8,11

130:19 232:22

233:2 253:17

253:22 279:13

286:10

relevant 20:10

20:11 21:2,4

21:13,16 55:6

56:10,11 57:8

57:16,18 59:7

61:2 63:1,5

82:13 84:17

96:9 122:17

130:7,7,13

159:5 234:19

239:1,3,6

240:10 262:14

262:17 270:22

279:16

reliability

162:21 170:19

reliable 169:15

169:17 170:3,3

170:10,10,13

170:14 171:21

172:16 207:9

reliably 172:9

172:17

reliance 29:10

relief 40:14

relies 30:2,5

233:18 242:3

religious 25:11

25:15 234:10

rely 173:12

relying 178:9

252:19

remain 6:8

78:22 125:17

138:20 316:5

remains 215:11

remarkable

207:4

remarkably

231:1

remarked

141:20,21

remarks 7:17

15:11,16 16:22

37:18 38:2

56:6 87:6

115:3 125:11

126:7,11

148:20,22

154:18

remember 21:5

110:16 285:6

remembering

27:20

remembrance

305:9

remind 38:17

reminds 51:8

284:8

renaissance

1:15

render 164:11

renders 166:9

reopen 234:3

repeated 147:6

repeatedly 47:8

47:9 48:7 50:3

103:22 104:1

replace 158:9

replacing 93:18

replied 35:6

reply 104:6

report 5:18 33:6

33:8 115:2

120:10 176:5

195:7,13,14

202:3 236:15

242:21 308:7

318:4

reported 1:22

228:10 237:3

reporting 19:22

182:10 188:15

200:19 256:7

256:15 301:11

reports 6:3 18:1

23:20 33:19

202:8,9 225:18

305:16

repositories

280:16

representation

186:7,11

representative

86:1

representatives

9:20 257:9

294:12

represented

195:1

representing

88:5 105:1

248:12

reputation

202:14

request 21:8

51:3 89:5

95:16 267:3

305:19

requests 119:4

135:18 270:1

273:22 274:2

require 8:4

20:22 21:6,18

21:20 59:21

61:16 67:5

81:5,14 82:12

84:14,18 85:9

85:14 174:7

227:16 228:17

229:4 233:10

234:16 239:9

258:18 284:5

284:16 285:14

required 41:16

76:15,15 92:14

96:20 108:17

232:11,16

233:4 240:2

259:8

requirement

39:10 40:2

61:19 109:22

113:8,16

116:10,12,21

118:10,14

220:11 229:2

234:1,7 278:22

282:20 283:6

288:3 296:17

296:18,20

301:22 302:13

requirements

41:2 71:5

75:10 167:18

223:5 283:13

requires 11:18

18:11 19:13,14

22:8 29:16

59:15 77:11

83:1 92:16

110:9 111:4

130:9,17 131:8

133:15 137:12

172:3 180:6,9

180:10 288:17

requiring 66:15

67:11,17

156:16

research 149:6

154:6,13,19

researcher 3:7

124:21

researchers

154:20

resemblance

221:15

reservation

243:5
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

44

resident 12:15

23:19

resisted 35:3

resolved 109:6

260:16

resolves 260:22

resources

159:14 187:22

194:3,6 198:21

respect 4:22

59:16 60:4

63:6,6 71:16

97:21 100:12

136:13 162:16

175:18 176:16

182:16 212:2

213:9,17,21

216:4 218:18

219:16 236:3,5

236:8 238:20

240:3 278:16

287:17 305:13

305:20

respected 277:6

respectfully

35:8

respecting 29:6

respects 22:17

242:9

respond 44:6

86:15 188:22

189:8 211:9

responded

292:7

responding

44:10 51:22

response 61:8

117:2 125:12

211:10 226:8

305:19

responses 6:20

54:16 256:19

294:6

responsibilities

173:1

responsibility

134:22 280:7

responsive 11:7

15:16

rest 92:10

247:18

restore 229:2

restoring 228:21

restraints 62:6

restrict 138:7

restricted 309:1

restrictions

112:9 205:8

246:8,9,13

309:22

restrictive 22:7

72:12 73:13

77:19

result 11:15

103:16 104:3

198:3 254:14

resulted 43:21

resulting 31:11

results 180:11

resume 31:21

123:12 312:13

ret 2:15

retain 17:12

69:15,17 112:2

112:7 127:20

283:21

retained 10:10

retention 127:19

127:21 128:10

140:20 278:22

282:20 283:6

283:13,20

287:15

retrospectively

189:22 190:6

return 18:13

23:16 118:10

118:14 193:12

returned 197:12

returns 196:8

198:13

reveal 25:14

192:17 193:2,2

202:15

revealed 60:19

76:10 202:7

revealing 25:16

49:21 61:11,13

129:5 136:10

183:11,11

184:8 185:1

reveals 38:13

66:13 191:17

308:7

revelation 31:10

revelations 36:2

141:11 142:22

150:16 276:14

reverse 12:22

115:17 117:4

reversed 90:12

review 3:15 4:13

36:13 38:12

39:3 41:14

46:15 87:8,18

90:12 92:14,18

109:19 119:2,4

221:6,8,13

256:4 305:15

reviewable 36:1

306:1

reviewed 11:6

17:4 19:10

63:10 90:12

263:7

reviews 246:20

revise 125:22

richard 307:19

rico 64:11 255:6

255:7

ricos 255:8

rid 234:1 283:22

ridiculous

131:12

right 14:20

34:21 56:20

62:17 74:3,8

79:10 81:20

96:7 104:6

106:6 109:11

112:20 114:7

121:22 126:13

128:19 142:2

143:22 145:14

145:21,22

146:4,11,15,16

147:21 155:15

158:20 159:3,9

160:13 164:9

164:20 165:4,8

165:17 166:2,8

168:5 171:22

172:9 173:2

175:18 178:6

178:13 179:7

188:21 189:7

191:10,12,15

192:1,13,14,19

193:22 194:7

195:3 201:20

202:1,13,17

207:5 208:15

209:12 210:7

212:6 213:11

217:6,7 230:16

251:1 257:4

261:16 262:1,8

262:9,17

263:19 264:9

266:14,20

271:2 274:8

277:1 279:19

281:5 283:18

283:20 284:5,9

284:11,14

297:9 298:14

300:21 301:10

302:9,9 308:11

308:19 317:2

rightly 48:13

116:15

rights 28:21

75:22 277:6

278:5 284:15

290:3 299:16

rigorous 277:9

ring 192:17

ripens 65:8

rise 29:19 46:1

risk 117:21

141:2 150:5

187:5,19

205:14 234:14

235:10 306:4

risking 203:12

risks 132:1

164:1 199:20

199:20 203:7

207:13,15

293:11

road 28:3 79:7

168:10

robertson 2:15

16:10 33:1,2

45:22 51:1

62:10 63:7

77:18 86:22

89:18,21 92:9

93:5 94:15

99:7 102:1

104:19 115:1

121:17 193:16

201:6 229:19

249:15 259:14

269:21 270:8

robertsons

119:14

robust 6:4

257:14 311:15

rogue 208:8
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

45

role 3:2 4:22

36:5 37:9 42:7

46:2 87:13

97:19 100:11

100:13 101:21

120:21 121:11

131:19 135:15

180:15 193:10

193:16 201:15

220:21 224:6,9

225:11,16,21

226:4 236:5

237:13 256:5,6

269:8,9 271:22

278:16

roles 132:6

rolled 178:21

room 174:9

rotenberg 3:5

124:15 132:11

156:3 166:14

174:22 182:9

185:18 200:18

206:18

roughly 176:18

round 72:9

148:16 155:18

155:19 162:11

223:15 294:4

router 166:22

routine 246:4

roving 118:6

row 15:13

rubber 33:17

rudimentary

242:22

ruined 231:13

rule 53:8 150:3

151:9 206:4

231:17,17

232:3 242:10

243:22 274:13

283:20 288:7

rules 5:20 36:10

125:9 134:19

134:20 151:9

152:21 153:2,3

154:4,9,10,11

154:15,15,16

154:17 155:11

156:9 158:10

159:11 171:15

174:3,18 181:2

181:13 200:2,2

205:1 207:22

227:15 263:7

295:13

ruling 250:4

rulings 248:19

run 302:2

running 78:1

79:19 130:22

214:9 263:17

S

s 11:17 12:14

13:1,3,4,12,16

14:1 16:10,17

18:8 19:1,4,16

39:11 41:10,21

42:9,10 45:12

45:13 52:2,20

53:4 66:6

94:22 107:17

107:19 108:1

108:13,15

109:1,7 110:2

110:5,6 115:14

116:13 128:3

136:12 139:16

145:7 156:13

161:8 162:14

163:15,16

164:8 165:13

165:15 167:7

167:13 168:10

168:11,21

169:1 171:4

172:10,18

178:2 197:16

198:18 208:3

229:9 230:1,6

238:2,4,15

261:13 278:4

288:10,13,18

289:1,12,17,17

294:21,22

295:10 300:19

304:11,19

305:6,17,17,22

sabotage 289:21

safe 151:18

safeguard 32:3

138:18,20

168:21 177:4

safeguarding

135:15

safeguards 48:9

74:8,9 80:15

139:11,11

140:3,9,10,21

175:6 177:2

224:8 225:12

244:16 277:21

299:7,16

saic 315:4

sales 3:20 211:2

240:19 261:16

273:19 278:12

280:21 307:20

308:19

salt 126:14

sam 28:16

sample 301:17

sanitized 107:1

satellite 108:10

satellites 297:18

satisfied 21:3

satisfies 74:7

satisfying

167:17

save 68:6 72:9

saw 64:7 207:16

213:1 234:4

247:4

saying 7:15

63:20 64:17

86:4 126:6

132:12 143:4

143:13 161:16

180:8 181:19

191:4 195:11

198:5 199:14

231:1 259:5,15

270:6 272:2

278:20 297:5

298:21 301:21

302:11 303:18

305:5 310:18

says 56:10 75:15

107:10 115:16

121:5 176:17

249:20 279:1

315:22 316:10

316:13

scale 38:11

47:10 58:17

155:6,8 178:21

184:22 188:16

189:21 205:4

scales 203:4

299:1

scaling 80:12

scanners 135:4

scans 315:19

scenario 159:19

160:8,9 280:9

scenarios

280:12

scent 276:16

scheduled

107:10

scheme 274:12

scholar 127:5

school 3:20

132:14 210:10

science 3:4,9

124:10 125:4,5

139:14 149:7

153:16 166:16

186:16 197:19

scientific 137:18

scientist 126:16

127:1,2 132:13

132:14

scientists 133:2

scoop 165:10

285:10

scope 9:6 48:8

58:10 77:13

176:14 200:21

270:17 276:11

276:16,18

299:8

score 187:21

scrambling

93:12

scratched 177:8

182:2,3

screen 9:7

screening 135:5

242:3

scrupulous

33:14

scrutinize

105:15

seal 319:12

search 21:6,9

24:22 25:22

26:2 35:16,21

51:3 66:15

76:14,19

104:16,19

120:11,11,11

126:9 128:13

130:17 131:14

156:15 193:11

193:12,14,20

254:7,10,11

268:19 270:1
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

46

272:19,21

273:2,8,16

278:3

searched 57:3

76:11 105:2

searches 76:5,8

157:3 194:2

232:15

searching 11:10

second 6:13

11:19 35:12

44:4 53:19

64:21 78:4,11

87:1 120:10

123:16 125:18

128:12 134:10

136:8 137:14

151:10 166:20

170:4 199:12

218:14 225:15

227:10 237:3

244:14 256:1,3

262:3 264:4

286:2 304:22

secondary 127:9

211:10

secondly 30:22

34:10 51:12

62:8 122:6

124:15 156:19

249:13

secrecy 28:22

29:4 36:19

46:1

secret 29:14,15

29:19,20,21

31:14,16 46:1

49:18 50:12

53:22 76:3,5,8

88:15 89:3

98:19 102:7

103:10 135:20

255:1 272:6

secrets 28:19

section 1:6,7

5:11,12 8:16

11:20 12:1,6

12:22 17:3

20:2,8,21 22:6

24:7 25:13

26:6,13,16,17

28:15 37:19

38:3 40:17

47:12 54:21

55:5,15 60:9

61:1 62:11

80:22 81:1,8

81:13 85:7

86:11 100:13

122:7 123:17

133:14 135:12

136:5 149:18

166:4,5,8

219:18 220:18

228:7,16 229:1

232:19 233:9

233:13 236:3

238:20 239:8

239:18 255:11

258:22 259:2

264:5 268:13

270:18,18

271:2 272:2

289:17 296:13

sections 81:18

sector 281:19

282:2,13,18,18

282:21 286:1,4

secure 42:5

94:13 313:14

316:6

security 2:14,17

2:18 16:9,15

16:16 33:4

36:19,20 43:12

69:18 70:7

72:16,19 93:16

94:7 96:1,5,17

105:8 124:13

124:21 129:8

132:1,8 134:13

135:3,7,14

159:15 174:5

177:19 186:21

205:14 207:12

208:22 210:20

210:22 211:4

225:13 226:22

230:16 231:9

232:14 243:19

243:20 244:7

245:9 265:22

270:9 280:2

299:4 304:8

306:5 308:3

309:9 310:16

317:9

see 33:12 47:15

48:3 65:5,16

71:6 79:12

89:7,7 98:5

105:6 106:9,9

121:15 122:21

123:1 126:19

149:1,8,14

151:16 152:2

152:11 153:7

161:19 162:17

165:5 166:14

173:1 179:1

182:17 197:4

198:19 244:9

246:15 255:8

263:19 264:8

296:9 316:10

316:11

seeing 43:7,8

179:3 249:17

seek 19:3 229:22

seeks 21:20

265:15 268:19

269:4

seen 64:8 77:8

106:22 129:7

129:14 202:4

203:21 228:11

232:9

segments 66:5

219:1

segregate 70:11

segregated

19:11

seize 67:4,5 75:8

seizure 76:19

113:16,17

seizures 75:14

76:2

select 210:13

selector 198:2

selectors 145:21

selfpolicing

233:18

selfreport 195:6

senate 3:16

210:13 219:2

292:12

senator 28:15

66:21

senators 292:13

305:5

send 135:22

165:4

senior 210:16

267:8

sense 66:12

105:6 136:12

150:13 151:3

152:19 154:10

158:18 226:9

241:19 289:8

304:5 317:13

sensenbrenner

86:1

sensible 169:2

sensitive 27:18

74:19 96:16,17

96:22 106:10

140:19 193:2,3

250:21

sensitivity 106:8

sent 33:20

separate 19:3

20:22 69:18

72:2,2 181:10

268:6

september 33:6

sequence 65:17

series 15:18

103:11 125:1

135:17 230:2

244:3 280:11

serious 14:6

29:17 75:17

113:15 129:8

235:10 264:1

seriously 225:10

226:4 270:10

serve 28:2 284:2

served 16:11,14

62:4 210:12

232:3

server 131:17

207:2 316:5,6

servers 69:20

165:7 208:21

service 11:22

62:4 143:8

146:13 166:19

171:8,8 278:20

280:17 294:22

295:10

serving 240:5

278:19

session 123:16

212:18 312:13

312:19

set 20:18 30:17

50:16,16 55:11

59:10 114:17

120:18 124:3
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

47

136:6 149:16

177:15 185:2

187:22 198:17

206:22 207:22

218:15 244:10

244:14 264:11

265:2

sets 187:15

244:8 268:10

setting 7:11

257:17 269:17

seven 26:15

286:7

seventy 190:8

sexual 25:11

shaking 166:15

shallower 26:5

shape 149:10

share 5:4 140:1

274:4

sharing 139:12

146:21 154:16

233:21

sharon 3:17

210:15 223:17

239:8 254:17

258:21 270:4

275:11

sharons 258:11

sheer 227:18

shes 280:3

shift 117:1

186:3

shifting 122:15

shiny 127:3

shocking 31:10

shores 302:4

short 130:21,22

224:1

shortage 132:15

shouldnt 181:6

188:8 198:4

244:21 255:12

268:15 285:16

306:16

show 62:17

143:4 165:15

165:16 277:2

showing 17:13

20:22 61:16

105:15 114:22

228:17 229:5,7

232:22 233:4

262:4 271:7

276:22 277:9

277:13,14

278:6 285:2

shows 274:21

shut 147:6

side 34:22 35:10

37:10 104:10

104:18 105:1,8

105:10 131:17

131:18 169:2

174:1 195:1,17

265:18 317:10

sidebar 54:13

sided 34:8

sides 30:6 34:17

34:20,20

158:17 201:11

265:12 310:6

sifting 18:1

sight 317:13

signal 209:1

signature 93:8

signed 33:7

214:19

significant

39:18 42:12

45:19 74:12

76:2 94:16

201:1 213:7

215:3,4 216:5

226:5 230:4

234:21 253:17

260:2 272:14

signing 245:4

signs 93:1

similar 20:6

135:7 141:3

175:13 229:2

similarly 57:17

103:18 257:18

simple 186:2

simplicity

217:16,17

simplify 217:4

simply 18:13

27:11 45:15

134:1 153:10

155:20 175:4

177:22 206:21

245:18 251:10

simultaneously

203:11

sincere 102:11

single 27:2

185:1,2

sit 17:5 33:10

sites 161:19

sitting 153:12

212:14 282:2

situation 58:7

64:2 78:19

92:16 94:8

103:20 196:2

196:11 205:16

207:17

situations 56:14

75:12 195:9

203:21 253:22

six 54:5 69:1

184:4 196:20

197:3 210:5

217:13

size 295:21

skepticism

133:4

skiffs 257:6

skype 146:9,9

slight 70:16

slightly 184:22

257:21 275:5

slippery 284:20

slope 284:20

slow 267:19

273:10 302:19

slower 137:13

small 11:5 18:11

93:4 143:20

253:13

smaller 207:4

smith 26:17,20

45:14 137:1

167:10

smiths 167:10

smoothly 317:7

sneaked 89:20

snowden 8:14

51:14 205:13

207:13

socalled 174:10

233:14

social 133:5

185:6,8,14

231:10 242:18

243:15

society 51:17

221:3 227:21

235:7

solely 18:9

231:9

solid 265:5

soltani 3:7

124:20 140:16

158:16 159:21

164:4 171:19

177:11 179:5

191:2 193:22

201:17,19

206:8

solution 109:6

163:22 175:5

215:20 216:17

284:4

solutions 133:4

139:2,19 175:2

247:11

solve 158:14

279:19 281:16

solved 208:9,11

solves 168:3

279:18 282:22

solving 132:17

somebody 12:14

12:19,21 52:22

53:1 85:8 88:5

96:3 97:18

104:21 109:15

114:2 115:20

116:2 117:11

121:5 123:1

127:14 131:4,7

169:14 195:17

198:7 205:16

206:1 250:20

250:21 277:16

285:7

someones 174:8

206:5

someplace

162:20

somewhat

162:10 164:12

166:9,10,15

174:4 226:16

304:12

song 146:15

soon 284:1

291:18

sophisticated

10:16 77:4

soprano 241:12

sorry 38:1 90:2

159:8 192:22

238:15 258:3

289:17 297:12

303:20

sort 48:1 54:13
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

48

55:7 65:18

70:19 81:22

85:10 89:6

90:18 97:8

106:5 121:13

124:5 146:19

146:20 157:4

157:15 170:20

183:16 191:1

193:9 205:7

212:4,10 234:7

246:3 266:19

272:7 280:6,9

286:19 294:17

297:15 301:2

302:4 304:9

310:15

sorts 153:21

244:15 246:2

247:4 263:13

276:12 310:3

sotomayor 25:6

sought 39:8

62:16 122:10

122:15 158:4

228:19 239:12

sound 71:3

149:2

sounds 34:21

source 164:13

sources 36:21

southern 101:9

span 254:9

speak 37:16

184:20 211:19

231:3 310:22

speakers 6:5,9

125:18 175:9

313:5

speaking 211:22

speaks 67:11

spearheaded

144:14

spearss 146:15

special 109:3

110:21 113:11

149:22

specific 8:15

12:17 26:8,9

28:13 56:9

61:18,18,19

115:16 117:7

119:4 120:6

121:8,15

122:16 140:8

176:12 202:7

226:1 228:17

230:1,2 239:10

247:13,20

250:15 258:15

258:20 263:4

270:7 278:4

287:4 288:1

306:21 307:14

specifically

39:22 67:3,13

88:21 110:9

116:19 228:15

309:7

specificity 59:22

specifics 218:10

specified 10:22

specifies 279:3

specs 173:18

speculate 266:8

speculative

47:12 48:2

49:2 79:6

80:13

speed 162:12

267:14 294:3

spell 123:1

spelled 278:9

spells 10:7

spend 181:3

204:13

spending 94:21

200:13

spent 40:11 52:4

79:18 151:7

247:16

sphere 110:8

spied 231:8

spirit 297:21

298:1,10

spite 59:14

spoken 86:3

spotify 146:9,10

spring 40:8

squarely 232:19

staff 40:12

267:7 317:5

stage 262:3

stake 246:5

stamp 33:17

stand 28:20 33:8

314:8

standard 20:20

20:21 21:3

54:21 58:3,17

59:13,16 61:9

62:21 81:21

82:12 156:16

156:17 172:7

172:16 191:16

228:16 260:5

260:11,12,21

263:9,13,20

279:13,15

296:14

standards 20:8

74:21 106:3,3

156:20 157:11

227:8,14,20

228:22 275:22

283:11

standing 37:4

101:11

start 7:11 16:19

47:3 51:22

56:3 75:6

140:17 144:4

155:8 171:4

192:8 211:7,17

230:22 243:2

247:19 270:5

275:11

started 39:17

54:14 120:7,16

139:6 181:19

204:15 205:2

starts 98:11

277:4

state 33:3 50:3

155:2 216:1

319:4

stated 9:20 17:2

statement 32:20

44:15 132:2,18

136:3,7 144:13

152:4,5 183:10

191:22 223:20

296:8 303:16

statements 7:2

63:18 191:14

205:20

states 12:16,20

12:21 13:5,13

13:17 18:21

23:19 39:21

41:7 42:1

48:14,18 49:20

52:17 53:2

75:9 77:12

95:1,5 107:18

107:20 108:9

108:22 109:8

109:10,16,20

110:3 112:11

113:17,20

114:2,8 115:22

116:5 117:11

161:7,12 169:6

169:13 170:6

175:22 187:17

201:4 248:12

253:20 265:13

268:19 290:8

290:17 294:21

295:9 297:4

298:4,8 300:19

301:1,1,4

statistical

182:11

statistics 256:13

stature 220:20

status 167:13

statute 38:16

39:9 43:4,7

47:20,21 57:22

60:22 64:4,6

64:18 80:18

82:8 83:1

84:12,13,21

85:1,19 86:7

87:10 91:3,22

92:2 96:21

100:2 103:6

107:7 111:7,19

112:14,19

122:9,10

133:21 149:19

219:19 220:7,8

220:10 223:5

224:16 225:15

239:17,21

253:4 274:6

279:1 288:12

288:21 289:5

305:12 309:7

statutes 21:11

59:14 64:9

84:9 216:19

217:8 225:9

227:5

statutorily

41:16

statutory 20:7

36:15 41:2

109:6 118:15
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

49

200:21 220:3

223:6 238:16

245:19 284:15

stay 79:22

stayed 80:5

staying 174:2

stays 308:22,22

309:2

steady 232:10

steel 51:11

stems 27:14

step 178:18

241:1 283:12

steps 41:5,16

132:19 133:7

188:13

sterile 309:12

steve 15:22

16:19 22:19

40:10 44:8

46:18 52:5

56:3 63:18

65:21 68:16

87:2 104:13,17

107:14 113:2

116:6 120:13

124:9 126:1

152:9 153:20

157:22 160:15

161:12 163:10

165:8 171:22

181:17 199:1,1

259:4,14 285:5

steven 2:11 3:3

132:10 178:12

steves 49:10

106:6 132:12

164:4 170:17

181:13 196:19

stipulate 156:10

stop 78:16 218:7

stopped 31:19

60:19

storage 279:4

store 158:6

183:21 213:19

stored 138:2

stories 129:15

storm 209:1

story 90:1,3

95:7 233:20

stove 51:11

straight 185:9

294:4

straightforward

242:12

strategic 14:11

strayed 235:17

streams 191:1

street 102:13

124:22

strength 80:12

185:10

stress 22:6

155:1

strict 22:13

54:18 200:2

227:15 229:17

stricter 217:15

263:19

strictly 227:11

strike 173:2

230:15

striking 212:17

213:20

stroke 168:2

strong 79:3 80:9

174:8 225:3

251:5 262:21

269:18 317:8

strongly 61:22

313:18

struck 175:11

175:19

structural 99:11

99:17 205:15

205:19 216:14

structure 199:6

211:5 266:4

282:12 298:19

structured

189:13,18

196:7

structures

215:12

struggled 251:4

students 185:4

studied 175:20

studies 2:14

16:9

study 115:8

stuff 163:4,19

192:13,20

209:4 248:1

249:4,10,11

stunned 89:22

90:2

subconscious

234:9

subject 8:14

13:20 19:19

30:7,7 51:5

88:7 114:5

115:8 134:14

160:2 161:8

176:21 178:20

296:6

subjected 10:15

subjects 312:8

submissions

220:2

submit 7:7

32:19,21 34:12

37:6 123:7

141:9,12 158:5

182:6 183:5

249:19

submits 41:12

submitted 7:9

125:19 132:18

176:19

subordinate

70:17

subpoena 21:16

57:12 58:15,22

62:1,3,5,11

65:1,7,21

81:16,17 82:1

subpoenas

21:12,18 56:14

58:8 59:17

65:3,5,11,15

84:16,18

286:11

subquestions

55:8

subscriber

17:18

subsequently

305:18

subsidized

282:4

subsidy 279:7

substantial

134:16 221:19

substantially

260:9

substantive

203:3,9

substitute 246:8

246:12 300:6

succeeds 41:18

success 156:8

successful 14:14

135:6 256:9

suddenly 108:13

108:16,20

sue 5:6 123:8

317:5

sufficient 67:15

99:10 108:3

227:16 285:14

287:21

sufficiently 54:3

suggest 18:22

149:21 151:5

158:2 170:9

175:1 196:4

208:11 237:10

269:22 290:20

suggested 66:10

85:12 88:1

91:2 93:5

105:21 149:14

208:12

suggesting

79:11 157:7,10

180:1 293:16

suggestion

24:11 35:3

51:22 119:14

suggestions

120:6 121:9,12

135:21

suggests 276:10

276:10,11

sum 308:4

summaries

254:12 260:2

summarize

136:2

summarized

17:2 136:7

summarizing

224:4 226:17

summary 7:16

111:5 250:12

250:18,22

251:10,21

253:12 260:5,7

260:14,18,21

261:5

summer 40:15

sunset 218:16

291:2,19,19

sunsets 291:5

superstar

206:11

supervision

12:1
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

50

supervisory

205:9

supplied 32:8

support 86:7

105:17 183:2

188:9 226:13

supported 17:3

19:5 92:17

110:11 139:7

supporting

95:18

suppose 85:10

supposed 51:9

60:2 78:20

99:5 208:13

276:4 313:14

supposedly

131:15

suppression

65:12

supreme 24:19

36:22 37:5

47:6 66:8,10

75:5 76:13

99:15 133:10

134:3 253:21

254:7,8

sure 46:20 58:13

78:22 80:4,14

91:20 92:13

95:14 102:4

105:16 106:1

116:20 126:12

140:2 157:6

181:5,9 189:9

212:5 215:6,8

216:20 223:16

225:12,18

227:22 229:14

251:20,20

264:19 266:6

277:9 285:21

298:20 299:9

311:3

surface 177:8

182:3

surprise 38:10

255:3

surprised

186:20

surprising

59:12 129:22

138:4 253:18

surprisingly

43:8 138:3

surveil 39:12

surveiled 104:11

surveillance 1:5

1:8 2:16 8:5

9:1 11:17 12:2

15:3,5 16:12

19:3,4 23:4,11

24:21 25:4,21

26:1,3,5 27:2

27:14 29:9,14

31:2 34:3,12

35:15,18 36:6

36:18 38:21

39:4,5 40:6,19

40:20 41:3,7

41:20 42:4

43:11 44:13

46:6,10,14

47:11 48:8

50:4 53:16

58:17,20 66:11

83:18,19,20

84:3,4,6 93:21

94:9,9 95:16

95:21 96:16

100:1,12,20

103:7 108:14

109:3 110:10

111:2 117:6

118:7 133:13

134:9 135:9

148:4 175:21

213:18 217:19

228:4 229:4

234:4 235:20

236:13,18,19

237:2,15,17

238:10,14,18

238:21 239:18

240:3 241:2,5

241:7,12,17,19

241:22 242:2,7

242:13 243:17

244:12,22

245:5,13

246:19,21

248:13 252:14

252:21 258:3

261:7,11,15,18

263:10 264:7

264:10 270:16

274:1,2,20

275:1 276:21

277:4 288:22

289:5 290:13

299:5,8,18

300:1,4 301:18

302:18 315:3

317:17

surveillances

39:10,20,21

115:13

surveilling

289:10

susceptible

129:20

suspect 27:3

53:9 61:5,18

109:15 167:15

suspected 160:2

228:19 258:9

313:12

suspects 243:14

suspicion 10:20

18:5,9 95:20

100:17 231:20

232:1,8,10,16

233:11 234:2

241:17 262:4

262:14 263:2

277:1,3,14

279:14 285:3

suspicious 18:14

45:9 108:20

sustainable

259:22

swath 64:16

swept 26:14

switches 83:8

switching 145:4

syllabus 250:13

system 29:18,19

30:1,17,22

32:1 102:17

103:17 114:17

126:17,19

131:19,21

132:3,6,9

146:18 148:1

149:1,3,10

154:1,2,12

161:5 173:17

174:5 181:7

193:9 198:8

199:11 203:19

205:22 207:2

220:6 221:16

221:21 240:12

244:12,16

245:15 265:11

266:21 267:11

267:13 268:11

268:17 269:9

269:10 274:18

291:9 292:4,16

292:21 293:10

300:7

systems 140:12

142:4 145:19

146:8,22

147:15 149:16

149:17 151:14

154:22 155:2,4

174:10 181:4

189:15 192:7

203:10,15

205:2,7 206:12

T

t 143:4

table 167:6

294:12

taft 16:14

tagged 306:20

309:2

tail 120:7

246:12 315:2

tailored 207:7

take 28:11 35:8

37:10 38:17

48:15 54:4

73:18 79:9

84:16 89:17,21

92:11,13

102:10 104:10

121:14 123:12

126:14 141:17

155:13 163:1

170:17 174:4

209:14 212:4

222:4 225:10

226:4 236:14

241:1 245:10

255:12 261:3

269:19 270:10

301:17 312:6

317:14 318:1

taken 41:16

132:19 133:8

246:21 270:7

306:17

takes 9:14 41:6

58:18 97:20

111:3 159:17

261:2
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

51

talk 33:9 45:21

134:7 141:6

151:15 159:18

162:4 193:8

206:19 215:19

242:8 248:2

257:22 306:11

313:10

talked 45:1

53:20 62:10

66:6 69:3

70:18 114:16

187:10 194:14

194:19,21

195:15 212:9

215:22 257:19

266:7 294:16

302:12 310:6

talking 16:7

52:21 58:11

70:20 71:12

79:20 82:8

96:15 103:19

109:14 114:1

114:11 117:11

118:4 149:10

151:8 162:7

167:1,2 193:15

214:3,7 216:3

232:18 247:17

249:16 254:22

256:3 258:9,21

263:17 271:15

277:16 285:4

289:9 301:3

302:13 305:4

309:13,14

310:5 315:11

talks 122:8

224:17

tangible 55:6

81:9,15 82:8,9

82:20 232:21

target 12:13,18

13:4 31:2 41:1

41:7 46:11

48:1,13 107:17

115:19 116:2

117:9 130:4

146:5,16,17,20

146:21 170:14

171:2 176:3

236:22 241:21

276:3 277:2

targeted 13:11

88:16 100:21

109:7 116:15

229:13 253:7

targeting 12:19

13:1,3 34:3

41:4,13,21,22

45:8,11 52:19

88:16 101:3

109:20 110:2

115:17 117:4

119:4 172:7

220:6 222:22

229:16 233:19

237:4 271:12

299:12 301:1

310:3

targets 39:13

40:19 41:3

42:4 43:12

52:14 94:4,20

95:4,5 100:20

146:2 175:15

190:4 199:10

199:10 202:8

233:11 305:21

task 203:11

212:21 230:13

268:9

tasking 88:17

tasks 42:11

taught 133:3

tax 246:2 263:18

team 178:17

teaming 178:5

technical 6:14

126:18 130:15

131:2,5,6,8,16

132:5 133:2,4

140:3 142:12

144:20 147:14

147:17 148:7

149:2,4 151:16

158:19 160:10

160:12 163:13

173:21 175:1

177:12 178:10

181:15 197:11

197:18,21

198:7,10,21

201:9

technically

88:10 177:15

technique 67:12

129:19 162:11

171:12 187:14

190:9

techniques

137:8 139:8

153:14,21

166:19

technological

23:6 29:8

139:1,19 195:2

297:16

technologically

170:2,3

technologies

14:14 139:4

161:14

technologist

127:5

technology 3:2

3:19 23:8

39:15 51:6

83:3 108:7

123:18 124:8

124:14 125:5,7

139:21,22

142:17 149:10

159:8 162:3

173:10,13,16

174:20 177:10

178:22 179:21

194:17 210:22

211:1 235:13

298:14,16

303:5

tecum 81:16

telecom 144:8

telecommunic...

133:16 186:9

telephone 8:21

9:10,10,11,16

10:4,14,21

11:17 17:1

20:11,18 44:16

60:11 61:12

67:21 69:6,12

70:5 71:17

83:12 105:3

128:7 133:18

135:16 136:20

157:2 196:15

228:9 238:22

284:6 308:15

telephony 31:15

98:2,9

tell 33:20 34:16

70:5 77:22

79:17 103:13

105:18 159:4

164:13,14

175:15 178:8

195:21 202:13

233:20

telling 144:14

tells 305:12,13

temporary

292:1

tempting 139:1

ten 183:18,19

279:8 312:6,10

tend 200:2

tenure 314:3

term 81:10

83:20 121:14

121:19 213:9

253:17 276:9

terminal 206:22

terms 8:15

17:22 22:11,13

44:16 54:9

70:15 83:2

84:10 92:14

93:18 106:7

120:6,16

121:18 122:22

162:1 169:8

213:13 215:18

215:19 216:13

220:8 234:15

248:6 251:21

254:22 256:7

282:10 310:7

311:9

terrible 121:5

territory 294:22

terrorism 4:14

4:20 13:9 77:7

110:17 208:5

216:4 227:16

228:1,6 262:15

262:18 263:15

279:17 289:22

309:14

terrorismrelat...

9:8 11:8

terrorist 8:4

10:22 14:9,10

18:6 19:1

20:14 74:12

108:22 109:14

160:2 234:18

234:21 243:4

terrorists 8:3
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

52

188:7 242:15

243:10,12

258:4,9

test 178:22

181:8 273:1,2

311:3

tested 65:10,12

272:21,21

testified 19:7

testify 139:16

testifying 40:11

testiment

317:18

testimony 85:3

testing 178:20

183:18

text 38:12

249:10

thank 5:2,6

14:20,21 22:18

22:19 28:4,7,8

32:16 33:2

37:12,13,15

44:3,9 46:21

47:2 51:21

54:10,11 80:17

92:7 104:7

107:8,9 119:8

123:3,3,4,9

132:10,11

140:14 148:10

202:19 209:13

209:16,21

211:18,18

217:21 223:18

230:8,10,11

240:18,19

247:5,6 254:17

278:10 285:19

293:21 312:4

312:10,12

315:7,8 316:20

317:2,3,5

318:6

thankfully

51:18

thanks 16:20

22:20 56:4

65:21 68:17

84:4 123:11

124:1 126:2

140:16 148:12

148:12 156:3

183:4 313:7,8

313:9

thats 7:13 9:9

11:5 18:16

20:19 23:2

27:6 33:8 34:8

36:12 45:2

49:5 50:8,20

51:14 53:3,5

54:2 55:3,12

57:4,21 64:1,2

64:18 65:6,14

65:18 67:21

68:13 70:6

75:1 77:9,16

78:20,21 79:8

79:11 82:13,22

83:3,3 87:10

89:18 90:3

92:2 94:14

95:14 96:7

97:1 101:4

105:4,11

111:14 112:11

113:10 114:12

120:8,12

126:22 127:1,2

127:6,10

128:21 129:16

130:7,18

133:17 134:5

142:2 143:16

145:12 148:18

149:6 150:5,12

150:18 151:22

152:20 156:11

158:21 159:3

159:22 160:13

161:5 163:19

167:4 169:6

174:16 175:5

178:7,14

181:20 187:4

188:5 189:13

197:12 201:10

202:17 204:5

204:13 205:11

206:6 207:3

209:9,9,10

213:5 214:18

215:17 218:19

219:4,18

220:17 222:2

223:13 228:14

234:19 237:7

237:18 239:2

240:2 241:8

245:18 248:20

248:22 249:16

250:5 251:18

252:4 255:4,5

255:15,21

260:11 261:12

261:13 263:13

264:14 265:10

267:16,22

268:18 271:1

275:2,8 280:12

284:4,4 287:21

290:17 292:21

298:9 301:10

302:16 303:17

303:19 304:14

306:17 307:7

307:18 308:19

309:8 310:10

310:18 312:3

314:10 315:2

theme 105:7

theoretical 31:6

theories 106:20

theory 167:21

thered 180:16

theres 18:1 22:4

44:20 45:8

47:22 48:3

58:15 63:14,14

65:10 67:18

81:13,19 86:6

89:11 95:21

105:16 108:5

113:14 115:15

120:21 122:1,6

131:11,19

141:10 142:20

144:16 148:19

150:10 154:8

154:20 156:7

159:16,22

163:19 164:5

164:22 165:14

165:16 170:18

172:5,16

174:13 179:13

180:15 182:4

184:10,15

188:20 189:3

190:21 191:16

191:17 196:14

196:14 200:3,9

204:9 205:7

218:19 219:11

222:19 226:2

228:1 233:3

235:20 242:21

244:8 246:16

248:1 249:2

250:6 254:4

261:21 262:13

262:17 265:17

266:22 269:16

271:6,8 272:10

272:12,17,19

273:2,19 274:6

274:15 277:16

279:12 280:1

280:19 282:1,6

283:5 286:15

293:4,19 298:6

301:6 309:8

311:7,12

313:20 314:4,5

314:7

thereve 192:15

theyll 145:16

147:22 206:11

293:19

theyre 23:12

50:15 75:19

82:17,21 83:22

88:6,17,18

91:22 93:12,16

107:5 110:12

126:8 145:14

145:14,15

147:11,19

162:13 163:12

163:14 175:2

176:21 178:9

178:21 181:5

192:6 202:13

202:15 204:2,2

204:12 266:21

282:3 283:8

291:13

theyve 147:6

200:7 282:2

314:21

thin 314:14

thing 34:9 53:9

54:2 59:12

71:2 74:2

81:15,15 83:17

111:14 113:4

116:21 120:13

130:6 132:7

133:3 134:10
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

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145:18 155:1

164:16 174:14

188:3 194:22

202:22 206:10

213:20 247:9

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271:8 272:3

283:18 287:2

288:2 300:15

308:16 312:19

things 8:1,3,20

55:6,14 66:4

70:19 71:22

80:4 81:9 84:9

85:14 97:5

101:6 123:21

124:22 127:6

129:21 130:1

131:11 135:21

144:9,10 145:3

145:11,13,19

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159:10 164:9

172:14 173:19

175:9,22

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205:14,17

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216:3,18 217:3

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248:16 251:4

252:5 258:6

275:10 276:12

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302:19 304:19

306:13 310:4

think 22:15 23:2

23:7 28:22

30:15 31:22

32:4,12 34:21

35:12 44:14,17

44:19,21 45:19

46:4 48:11

49:4,8,12 50:5

50:8,17 51:4

51:16 54:2,14

56:5,11 57:18

57:20 58:5,12

59:9,20 60:2,7

60:14,20 61:13

63:5,7 64:17

66:20 67:19

69:8,9 71:4,6

71:21 72:12,20

73:9,12 75:4

75:15 76:1,20

77:9,10,11,18

78:6 79:5,8,9

79:11,14 82:4

82:7,8,11,22

84:5,12,17

85:5,18,19

86:6,15 89:4

89:19 90:11,21

91:19 92:3

93:10,16,19

95:6 97:16

98:11,12 99:10

101:16,19,22

102:16 103:4

105:4 106:6,14

109:21 112:20

113:7,14 114:7

115:7,17,22

117:3 119:18

120:4,14,20

121:6,9,11,22

122:6,13

129:10,13

134:6 135:6

136:4 137:17

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147:10 148:7

148:15,18

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151:1,1,3,5,10

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152:11 153:1,7

154:7 155:3,6

155:12,12

156:15,17,20

157:13,21

158:12,13,17

160:10 168:9

170:16,18,22

171:10,15

172:18 175:4,5

177:2,5,11

178:13,17

179:17,22

180:1,6,9,18

181:3,8 182:2

182:9,22 183:1

184:10,12,15

186:18 187:2,6

188:13 189:1,4

190:15,19

195:15 196:7

196:12,17

197:10,20

198:9,14

199:14,15

200:20 201:10

203:14,19

204:8,11 207:6

208:15,16

209:11 212:18

212:21 213:1,3

213:4,12,12,16

213:22 215:4,5

215:15 216:14

216:16,18,22

217:4,18

220:19 223:10

225:21 226:13

235:17 236:2,4

236:9 237:6,9

237:12,14,17

238:3,5,7,12

238:20 239:7

239:15,16

240:5,13,15

241:12 242:7

244:4 245:13

245:20 246:1,7

248:21 249:2,3

249:11,15,21

250:8 251:4,5

251:18 252:5

254:15 257:2

258:5 259:2,13

259:21 260:21

261:1,13,16

262:18,20

263:9,12 265:3

266:11,17,18

267:13,16

268:3,5 269:12

270:21,22

271:1,17,19,21

272:4 273:12

273:19 274:6

274:18 275:7

275:16 280:15

280:22 281:13

282:19 283:16

283:17 284:4,4

284:13 285:18

286:5,17,19

287:7,21

288:14,17,20

289:8,15,19

290:10,14,18

291:4,4,18

292:4 293:7

294:15 295:11

295:17 297:9

297:14 298:12

298:22 300:17

301:5,10,11,18

301:20 303:17

307:8,12,12,15

308:8,19 309:4

313:10,17,20

313:22 314:10

314:13 315:1

317:18

thinking 118:5

122:13 149:9

150:2 173:15

187:11 193:10

212:2,5,15,15

214:12 275:12

286:3 287:16

287:22

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279:9

third 4:3 6:14

87:22 129:9

131:3 137:19

164:5 166:21

209:15,18,22

210:4 218:16

227:12

thirty 269:4

301:2

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264:5

thought 44:12

64:12 85:21

86:2 167:16

175:8,9 201:5

210:3 246:16

251:17 255:4

272:16 287:9

300:11 306:4

315:13

thoughts 81:17

118:19 179:20

247:7 270:4

281:15

thousand 191:6

194:1

thousands

108:21

thread 314:14
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

54

threat 14:5

46:11 187:17

216:1 230:17

264:1

threats 14:15

77:12,13,14

96:16 244:7

245:22

three 6:12 43:16

54:17 74:10

87:4 118:20,21

127:18 148:21

166:18 183:22

214:5 215:10

257:1 294:11

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threshold

138:13 171:7

throw 55:1

thrown 308:16

thwarted 234:20

310:14

thwarting 310:8

tick 182:6,8

217:10

tie 239:9

ties 213:11

tight 295:17,19

tighten 296:14

tightened

296:12

tightening 227:8

227:14 228:15

295:13

tighter 148:9

till 248:14

time 7:1 9:12

17:14 35:18

42:6 43:3

54:14 57:15

58:9 61:2

66:13 74:1,22

77:6,6 78:19

81:22 82:17

83:8 93:6

94:21 108:12

111:10 115:6

117:13 123:4

124:2,15 125:7

130:22 132:16

138:8,17,20

140:7 142:1,1

151:7 152:11

161:5 162:11

167:3,8 171:9

171:16 174:16

182:14 194:5

197:2 201:1

204:1,7,17

220:1 223:10

246:15 247:16

248:15 250:1

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269:6 274:5

276:17 279:3,9

287:17 292:9

293:20 294:2

303:11,19

308:12 309:16

309:17 312:15

314:18 315:21

timekeeper

223:13 312:17

timely 266:12

times 31:7 52:13

102:13 130:3

140:19 143:6

196:20 197:3

207:9 313:8

tiny 19:9 27:9

152:21

tireless 5:9

title 53:7,10

104:20 116:22

175:13 176:1

201:3 217:11

268:13 277:17

308:8,12,13,20

today 5:10 6:12

16:7,21 23:10

28:10 31:12

33:9 37:18

38:2 44:1,14

80:1 88:2

123:16 126:4

141:6 146:8

163:19 182:18

201:7 211:22

212:10,21

213:3,4 214:3

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216:4,17 221:2

223:19 225:17

232:18 247:17

259:11 272:5

283:13 302:1

303:19 315:12

317:3 318:2

todays 5:20

told 155:10

234:16

tolerate 233:13

tomorrow

283:14

ton 194:2

tony 241:12

tool 79:4 242:13

315:17

tools 80:5,10,13

164:11 177:18

183:2 245:21

246:2,3 263:14

top 182:5,7

209:12

topic 48:11

275:5

torture 84:8

total 27:21

168:6 307:16

totally 298:5,18

314:9

touch 6:2 56:5

66:19 148:22

touched 54:2

107:15

tough 46:19

217:1 317:8

tower 9:22

town 126:4

trace 35:17 83:2

track 118:2

tracked 26:21

tracking 25:6,12

26:7 45:2,4,6,8

tracks 181:10

tradeoff 147:11

282:10

traditional

64:14 102:17

141:14 175:13

176:1,15

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traditionally

158:3 193:11

traffic 38:9

141:22,22

186:9

trail 159:5

205:10

trails 141:18

trained 23:3

training 126:22

transactional

17:11 21:21

137:5,10

transcribed

312:20

transcript 7:4

319:6

transcription

319:5

transform 186:7

201:13

transformed

186:10

translate 141:15

transmitted

83:22 165:7

transparency

106:18 150:13

150:15 151:4,6

151:8,11,12,17

158:19,20

180:13 202:9

225:21 227:13

230:3 236:4

238:8 240:3

245:6 248:3,8

254:19 256:1

transparent

106:20

transparently

163:2 245:17

trap 35:17 81:19

83:2 86:20

239:21 281:1

traps 81:21

travelers 163:13

187:16

traveling 163:14

travels 243:6

treating 171:5

302:10

trend 201:4

202:8

trends 152:1

182:17

trial 65:9,13

triangulation

166:20

tried 49:17

tries 261:3

trigger 242:20

triggered 27:10

trip 162:11

tripped 209:7

trouble 48:4

251:19

troubled 156:5
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

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true 27:12 51:2

51:14,16 62:9

65:6 74:3,6

78:22 80:5,6

137:17 156:12

176:3 189:9

204:14 213:9

239:2

truly 274:15,19

296:5,5 298:18

trust 105:14,14

179:15 199:6

248:7 251:15

307:13

truth 75:4

191:17

try 54:17 102:10

116:10,12

166:10 192:2

202:5 215:5

216:19 217:4

226:16 229:12

248:1 258:3

273:13 277:20

294:5 316:9

trying 101:13

154:7 163:9

168:6 173:19

175:16 177:1

191:5 197:9

216:13 226:7

266:10,15

276:15 293:2

293:17

tune 192:7

turn 10:4 14:16

41:4 55:2

123:20 209:19

210:4 238:4

275:5 277:13

290:21

turned 36:8

65:11 73:5

82:17 135:13

193:13 283:4

turning 11:19

291:17

turns 73:5 131:7

170:5,7 235:4

235:5 243:8,10

274:22 276:19

310:13

tweaking 91:3

twelve 29:16

twenty 300:16

twice 79:5

twitter 163:21

two 5:10,18 6:16

7:2,13,21 8:2

10:2 14:18

15:3,15 27:3

30:6,16 32:3

44:5 51:1 62:2

63:17 81:18

103:21 106:4

120:19,19

125:12 126:19

127:22 141:16

142:3 149:8,21

150:7 151:6

155:19 172:14

181:9 183:13

185:4 208:16

211:6,10 215:2

224:3 236:1

243:3,10,13

244:8 247:8

248:16 249:2,7

253:19 254:15

254:18 256:19

263:18 280:22

304:19,22

310:5 312:16

315:20 318:5

type 10:3,18

20:15 38:10

83:9 88:11

94:8 137:19

239:3 246:17

248:19 252:1

256:2 279:2

types 15:3,5

54:5 94:9

213:13 216:7

286:9

typical 84:17

166:17

typically 93:2

136:10 166:21

178:22

U

u 11:17 13:1,3,4

13:12,16 14:1

16:10,17 18:8

19:1,4,16

39:11 41:10,21

42:10 45:13

52:2 53:4 66:6

107:19 108:1

108:13,15

109:1 110:5,6

115:14 116:13

128:3 136:12

139:16 145:7

156:13 161:8

162:14 163:15

163:16 164:8

165:13,15

167:7,13

168:10,21

169:1 171:4

172:10,18

178:2 197:16

198:18 208:3

229:9 230:1,6

238:2,4,15

261:13 278:4

288:18 289:1

289:12,17,17

294:21,22

295:10 300:19

304:11,19

305:6,17,17,22

uk 164:8

ultimate 175:5

ultimately 40:14

65:5 101:11

109:5 133:5

135:5 152:18

157:14 176:22

198:15 253:1

283:18

unable 40:5

unanimous

24:20

unauthorized

31:13 104:4

140:3

unbelievably

310:14

unbounded

186:13

uncertain

170:16

uncertainty

118:7

unclassified

5:22 7:17

190:16 250:12

253:11,14

257:16 260:2

uncommon

73:21

unconstitutio...

23:12 26:4

uncovering

186:21

undeniable

36:19

underline

304:21

underlying 50:9

136:11 137:11

137:20 147:18

186:1 187:7

197:8,8 205:18

228:11 252:9

undermine

277:5

underneath

215:15

underscore

23:10

understand

14:3 17:7 20:3

46:4 56:19

60:6 73:3 90:6

93:20 94:21

131:9 132:8

134:21 142:4,5

143:18,18,19

144:18 147:1

147:13,17

158:1 165:14

182:17 186:2

213:19 249:13

253:21 272:13

288:7 298:9

307:2

understandable

23:2 307:5

understandably

222:16 226:12

understanding

56:1 75:7

76:18 130:19

142:7,11 144:2

147:20 148:8

172:13 255:18

261:20 298:13

understandings

142:17

understands

81:11

understood

55:14,21 57:19

196:8

undertake 46:9

undertaking
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

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Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

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168:15

undertook

38:20

undue 39:13

150:5

uneasy 150:20

150:22 151:1,2

unfortunately

123:4 217:14

291:5

unilateral 94:1

unique 64:2

134:20 167:7

uniquely 168:1

234:13

united 12:16,20

12:21 13:5,13

13:17 18:21

23:19 39:20

41:7 42:1

48:14,18 49:20

52:17 53:2

75:9 77:12

95:1,5 107:17

107:19 108:9

108:22 109:8

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110:3 112:10

113:17,19

114:2,8 115:21

116:5 117:11

161:7,12 169:6

169:13 170:6

175:22 187:17

201:4 248:12

253:20 268:19

290:8,17

294:21 295:9

297:4 298:4,7

300:19,22

301:1,4

university 3:3

124:11

unknown

235:10 242:14

276:5

unlawful 238:21

unnamed

271:11

unnecessarily

273:11

unnecessary

19:15

unproven

235:11

unquote 162:18

unregulated

298:5,7,18

unrelated 137:2

unreliable 145:1

184:9 191:13

unstructured

189:16,17

unusual 94:14

unwise 23:12

unworkable

259:12 301:22

update 187:6

upheld 26:18

upside 136:13

urge 114:15

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236:14 294:3

urged 6:9,19

urgent 43:2

usa 1:6 5:12

8:16

usage 84:10

151:13 153:3,9

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157:4 158:10

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usages 307:15

use 20:12 21:3

35:9 49:14,18

50:13,19 53:21

60:7 62:6,6

64:8 65:3 77:4

81:10 84:4

102:15 110:15

111:15 118:16

121:19 139:6

144:22 146:8

146:10 159:7

159:10 163:14

173:6 176:14

204:3 206:2

208:5 213:15

241:15 242:20

246:9 252:20

255:21 263:9

263:21 275:15

282:4 284:12

305:2 311:5,11

useful 57:1,4

77:6,19 137:10

149:19 163:18

182:16,17

185:21 208:18

227:18 235:5

237:19 260:1

260:11,16

301:11 309:20

310:1,14,19,22

usefulness

227:22

user 167:8,11

168:3

users 145:3,4

uses 50:11 127:7

127:9 137:21

138:3,5 145:4

154:3 159:20

162:11 227:11

usual 97:16

usually 35:22

49:19 63:12,12

83:22 92:21

257:22

utilities 265:14

utility 265:15

V

v 26:17 47:7

49:2 66:7

100:9 111:2

268:13

vacuum 309:11

valid 121:21

validity 6:10

100:2 222:17

valuable 116:7

185:22 189:20

190:9 282:7

value 54:3 79:16

187:3 264:8

273:20 295:19

values 242:10

242:11 244:1,6

317:21

variant 218:8

253:2

variety 127:22

213:14 216:7

various 42:11

68:2 79:20

219:1 242:4

243:6 245:19

315:12

vast 11:6 27:17

185:13 189:21

231:2

vehicle 264:6,20

velocity 216:9

vendors 77:21

verbatim 319:5

verge 219:5

verify 174:2

verizon 133:12

133:19 135:12

143:13 156:22

279:7

version 107:2

253:11 257:21

versions 213:1

versus 37:1

45:14 77:20

120:10 137:1

177:9 183:8

258:18

vetted 53:17

view 25:4 36:8

62:22 70:19

77:19 84:11

98:15,16

103:14 111:7

112:21 137:17

191:7 265:21

viewed 122:19

205:13

views 5:4 6:21

15:8 54:22

80:20 224:15

violate 30:10

205:18 206:4

violated 103:11

135:12

violating 200:12

206:3

violations

154:14 224:15

virtual 163:14

virtually 176:22

visions 213:2

visited 25:18

visits 23:22

vladeck 285:5

voice 186:9

189:14,16

190:18,22

voices 32:13

225:2

voicing 64:4

volume 196:14

216:6

volumes 190:18

voluntarily 22:1

voted 56:9 63:21

voting 255:5
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

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vpn 164:10

vpns 145:3

vulnerability

159:16

W

wagging 315:2

wainstein 2:17

16:13 37:14

38:1 47:5,17

51:21 63:16

73:19 78:10

87:1 103:18

104:7 115:10

150:10 255:1

259:3

wainsteins

51:12 175:12

waiting 179:2

293:18

wald 2:5 4:6

14:19 15:1

44:3,9 46:18

46:22 49:6

50:22 51:20

65:22 68:19,22

69:4 70:16

72:6,10 87:3

89:20 92:7,10

96:1 97:14

104:5 107:8

194:11,14

196:5 197:14

198:12,16

300:13 304:9

308:11,22

walk 174:9

207:3

walking 79:10

wall 102:13

124:22 221:7

walled 235:15

want 4:5 7:11

11:13 28:11

29:13 32:10

33:9 45:21

49:7 55:3,3

56:3 64:22

66:19 78:13

80:19 97:15

102:21 109:13

113:2 117:3

129:6 132:12

132:22 140:17

141:13 143:11

144:18 146:21

147:2,12

148:20,22

149:21 152:7

157:1 159:7

160:15 162:20

164:4,16 170:9

172:21 178:17

182:8 187:10

190:2 193:6

197:3 198:19

199:5,19 200:6

204:17 214:4

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224:3 226:19

228:3 244:3

245:12 246:3

247:9 249:20

257:2 258:5

277:8 278:3,11

279:21 280:2

283:7,8,9

284:3 286:17

286:20 293:22

299:2 300:12

304:21 313:5

wanted 5:2,6

32:17 98:10

139:12 144:1

156:4 202:22

203:5 205:17

206:18 232:3

281:14 287:4

295:2 297:10

303:10 317:2,3

317:5

wants 88:12

92:11 128:20

247:5 250:19

war 231:7

warehouse

261:22 262:22

279:7

warehouses

162:20

warrant 12:17

21:6,20 35:21

76:7 90:9

92:17,20 93:1

94:8 104:19,21

105:16,17

109:22 113:8

113:16 114:1,5

114:10,11,22

116:10,12

185:15 193:12

193:14 270:1

270:13,14

271:8 272:19

273:8 277:17

277:17 304:18

warrantless

60:18

warrants 24:4,8

33:19 35:15,16

35:18 102:1,2

105:11 110:11

110:13 201:3

229:20 271:10

272:1

wartime 303:16

304:1

washington

1:16 16:18

132:15 237:3

wasnt 62:19

91:2 100:19

101:10 143:2,3

200:12 209:4

275:1 300:7

waste 181:6

194:5

wasted 314:21

watching

212:14 261:10

way 52:1 55:20

62:9 63:22

64:4,18 76:6

78:20 80:2

84:7,19 85:5

85:19,22 86:5

86:12 89:1

92:7,9 95:22

99:4 102:1

103:2,16

120:18 121:19

126:20 138:7

140:5 146:22

151:12 154:8

154:19 157:7

158:13 161:21

167:9 169:22

170:11 171:5,6

171:8 172:2,16

174:17 176:10

179:18 180:11

180:20 186:2,8

188:1,17

193:15,17

202:9 205:21

206:1 212:6

213:8 221:20

223:3 235:17

242:9 243:22

244:18 248:11

249:7 250:18

255:17 257:7

257:20 258:8

259:5 265:10

266:22 274:6,6

278:14,18

279:10 283:12

286:10 291:10

296:12 305:3

311:7,20 314:5

314:15 317:18

319:10

ways 29:5 77:14

141:3 145:2

177:3,6,12

286:7,15

weak 208:21,21

208:22,22

weakened

232:20

wealth 25:10

weapons 14:13

wear 126:3

wearing 126:4

web 126:8 157:3

171:8

website 7:5

23:22

websites 25:17

wed 69:19

week 133:11

183:22

weeks 49:4 86:4

98:18 115:9

220:14

weigh 273:14

278:11 286:21

287:4

weighing 235:9

309:19

weighs 273:7

weitzner 3:9

125:3 148:12

155:16 157:6

170:9 179:22

184:20 188:12

190:14 196:4

198:9,14,17

203:14 207:11

welcome 4:2 7:8
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

58

32:21 123:7

209:18 312:6

wellformed

206:6

went 198:2

306:9

weve 49:16

63:19 77:8

118:3 135:17

136:19 139:7

143:1 149:4,11

154:13 159:14

165:2 168:9

169:20 173:4

182:1,2 189:4

192:13 202:4

203:21 205:1

215:22 216:3

229:10 233:1

233:12 235:17

235:21 251:4

257:19 275:22

276:15 277:20

318:2

whack 92:11,13

whats 49:5

57:18 95:16

96:9 102:20

122:3 136:17

151:14 156:14

186:8 189:9

193:18 199:10

200:13 208:4

214:13,13

259:1 271:1

282:10 283:14

316:14

whistle 200:9,10

white 2:18 93:14

125:5 252:14

252:16 253:6

wholeheartedly

140:18

whos 104:10

115:20 116:2

116:15 145:11

167:9 174:6

189:14 198:7

201:13 208:13

263:18 269:17

312:7 317:15

whove 292:13

wickersham

16:14

wide 51:16

127:22 213:3,6

280:18

widely 137:17

wiesner 139:13

wife 308:15

wifi 166:22

wikileaks

207:16 208:21

william 314:13

willing 194:9

234:14

wilson 60:22

wire 84:1

108:14 144:3

wiretap 35:16

35:21 53:10

104:20 175:14

182:16 190:2

241:14 308:7

wiretapped

114:5

wiretapping

182:19

wiretaps 53:8

176:1,6,15

308:8

wish 7:7 33:22

102:11

withdrawn

176:19

witness 319:12

witnesses 119:9

119:15 183:6

294:16

witnessing

29:17

witting 95:17

wonder 305:11

wondered 97:12

306:9 307:3

wont 148:1

155:9 163:1

164:14 269:18

woodward 51:9

wool 51:11

word 35:5,9

56:11,13 60:7

63:1 83:18

84:4 104:6

130:8 137:3,4

229:14 261:6

286:13 311:2

words 11:3

12:22 28:21

67:2 111:16

156:14,22

167:6 191:14

225:8

work 29:4 33:14

33:20 57:2

60:3 79:22

88:8 91:1

102:12 103:17

107:4 116:19

133:1 142:8

230:20 235:15

240:2 251:21

257:7 258:11

266:22 268:7

268:15,16

283:10 291:14

311:14

workable 95:6

108:18 259:3

worked 32:11

76:4 137:1

259:16 303:16

303:22 304:4

314:22

working 154:22

179:3,16

195:22 199:18

200:11,12

202:11 293:10

works 35:14

179:1 201:7

250:1 253:10

265:11

workshop 1:5

1:15 5:4,14,20

7:3 167:20

workshops

128:4

world 79:13

116:17 149:7

150:22 152:1

154:21 186:3,4

235:18 290:10

297:2 300:15

300:17

worlds 153:20

worrisome

96:14

worry 204:9

235:19 304:14

worrying 94:22

worse 40:3

128:8

worst 161:11

worth 27:20

122:13 147:11

303:17

wouldnt 110:12

113:9 141:1

176:4 237:19

253:18 285:7

309:13 311:17

woven 255:16

write 248:22

274:6

writes 279:1

writing 126:13

250:18,22

written 7:7 12:9

32:19 60:22

123:8 131:1

136:3 141:7

148:20 154:18

205:20 226:18

251:1

wrong 24:13

52:3 115:12

130:14 145:15

185:20 192:6

195:6 198:3

wrongdoing

231:21 313:13

wrote 33:5

251:18

X

x 198:2,3 249:20

250:2

Y

y 249:22 250:2

yall 118:21

203:12

yalls 118:16

yeah 107:13

172:21 179:15

200:6 209:5

254:16 272:17

285:8,19

308:22

year 42:16 47:7

48:2 129:16

219:20,22

220:15 271:9

283:6 308:6

years 18:18

26:15 29:16

32:5 33:11

39:16 65:16

74:10,10 90:7
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

59

98:19 100:5

112:5 124:11

127:22 130:3

132:4,22 137:1

140:5 154:6

167:20 184:3,4

185:4 190:8

220:3 263:18

266:7 268:17

279:8 292:1

300:16 301:2

yellow 15:13

294:5

yield 169:19

194:9 243:18

300:13

york 101:10

102:13 130:3

youd 32:21

69:11 96:22

148:3

youll 52:20,22

78:5 146:7

191:12,21

251:19 288:4,5

youre 32:21

52:19 70:4,6

83:4,15 91:5

108:13 109:14

110:2,5,6

112:20 114:7

114:11 116:3

118:12 121:4

161:20 162:19

165:18,19

166:6 167:1,2

168:6 188:19

208:15 215:6

225:18 235:21

249:17 262:9

266:10,15

268:2 270:12

270:15 271:15

276:22 277:16

281:3 286:3

289:9 297:5

301:21 314:13

316:2

youve 46:19

121:6 129:14

138:8,15

149:11 165:20

166:2 214:5,7

214:7,8,8

Z

zazi 73:4,4

122:20 258:14

zealand 164:6

zero 232:17

295:7,8

0

000 185:8 209:6

1

1 125:17,21

141:21 176:18

176:19 289:18

1040s 263:19

10th 319:19

11 4:10 40:4

79:10 107:10

107:10 108:19

109:11 167:22

232:5,9 243:2

243:16

1127 1:16

12 123:13

12333 67:9

116:17

14 318:8

15 15:19 209:14

289:17

17 107:10

18 238:14

1801 289:18

1890s 300:21

19 243:2,16

1902 90:13

1970s 231:15

1974 28:16

1978 38:20 40:2

46:6 93:21

103:2 108:7

259:6 296:18

1994 76:4,12

1998 248:14

1st 7:10 141:9

2

2000 294:18

2000s 314:15

2001 31:11

61:16 64:8

122:9 294:18

2002 141:21

142:2 221:5

242:21

2003 201:2

20036 1:17

2004 85:5,6

252:11 254:2

2005 16:3 36:3

122:9,12

2006 17:9 118:6

252:10,12

2007 40:8

248:14 259:7

2008 36:5 38:16

40:16 42:16

218:20 219:4

221:13,16

2009 16:3

2011 8:17 20:2

254:3

2012 11:9 12:7

19:7 33:6

176:18

2013 1:10

293:17 319:13

2014 293:18

319:19

2015 291:3,16

293:18

20th 180:3

194:16

215 1:6 5:11

8:16,18,21

17:3 19:18

20:2,8,21 22:6

22:10 23:15,17

24:7 25:13

26:6,13,16,17

28:15 44:16

54:21 55:5,15

60:9 61:1,6,10

61:14 62:11,13

62:14 63:1,21

65:21 67:3,14

67:21,22 71:11

71:17 81:1,5,8

82:4,5 83:19

85:7 86:11

89:15,15

118:17 120:3,5

122:8 133:14

136:6 149:12

228:7,14,17

232:19 236:6,8

238:20 239:8

239:18 255:11

258:22 261:20

262:13 264:5

264:19 268:13

270:18 278:13

278:18,20

281:2 309:21

21st 180:2

194:17 206:20

222 135:12

25 185:8

250 209:6

290 141:21

3

30 1:17 107:10

123:13

300 11:9 19:8

74:5 196:16

4

4 318:8

40s 234:4

5

5 166:5,8

50 289:17

5000 172:22

50s 234:4

51 237:4,13

6

60s 182:20

234:4

7

702 1:7 5:12

11:20 12:1,6

12:22 23:16

28:15 37:20

38:3 40:17

45:11 47:12

48:13 94:17,18

95:2 100:13

107:14 109:6

109:18 110:17

110:18 111:3

113:22 114:12

115:13,16,22

116:11 117:5,6

117:12 118:15

119:2,6 120:4

149:12 161:1,9

165:19 167:14

167:18 219:18

220:18 229:1

229:21 233:9

233:13 236:3

236:12 237:16
Public Workshop July 9, 2013

202-220-4158 www.hendersonlegalservices.com

Henderson Legal Services, Inc.

60

238:7 259:2

270:18 271:2

272:2 294:9,15

295:12 296:10

296:13 305:4

305:11,14

70s 182:20

234:5 247:4

783 176:19

784 176:18

8

85 162:3 170:17

9

9 1:10,17 4:10

40:4 79:10

108:19 109:11

167:22 232:5,9

243:2,16

90 10:11 17:5

184:3 197:5

219:9 268:12