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ASSESSING THE THREAT TO THE HOMELAND 

FROM AL-QAEDA OPERATIONS IN IRAN AND 

SYRIA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

AND INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 22, 2013 

Serial No. 113–19 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

CHRIS STEWART, Utah 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

VACANCY

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DONDALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

GREG HILL, Chief of Staff 

MICHAEL GEFFROY, Deputy Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

CHRIS STEWART, Utah 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DENNIS TERRY, Subcommittee Clerk 

HOPE GOINS, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence ................................................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism 

and Intelligence: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

WITNESSES

Mr. Seth G. Jones, Ph.D., Associate Director, International Security and 

Defense Policy Center: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 10 

Mr. Robin Simcox, Research Fellow, The Henry Jackson Society: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 16 

Mr. Thomas Joscelyn, Senior Fellow, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 19 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 21 

Mr. Barak Barfi, Research Fellow, New America Foundation: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 29 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 31 

(1) 

ASSESSING THE THREAT TO THE HOMELAND 

FROM AL-QAEDA OPERATIONS IN IRAN AND 

SYRIA 

Wednesday, May 22, 2013 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King [Chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives King, Stewart, and Higgins. 

Also present: Representative Jackson Lee. 

Mr. KING. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland Security 

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism Intelligence will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony examining 

the threat to the homeland for al-Qaeda operatives in Iran and 

Syria, and want to welcome all of the witnesses, say thank you for 

giving us your time, and now I will recognize myself for an opening 

statement. 

Before I make the statement, I would like to comment on the fact 

that we have been advised that there was a shooting in Florida 

today, which seems to have some relationship to the Boston marathon investigation. 

The FBI was, as we have been told, interrogating a Chechen who 

had an involvement—an alleged involvement with the older brother 

and what we are told so far is that the person being questioned actually pulled a knife and stabbed the FBI agent and then the assailant was killed on the spot. 

So again, I think it shows that the tentacles of these terrorist 

connections often go beyond what we first anticipate and also without pre-judging anything makes me wonder again how much information we missed by the interrogation being cut short of the 

younger brother in Boston at the time. 

But I say that only because I think many of us will agree in 

many ways it is a seamless web. There are disconnects but there 

are also a seamless web among various terrorist groups and we 

have to basically, you know, be looking at every possible threat. 

With that, I want to welcome the witnesses today for this hearing, ‘‘Assessing the Threat to the Homeland From al-Qaeda Operations in Iran and Syria.’’ 

This hearing continues the Counterterrorism and Intelligence 

Subcommittee’s plan for the 113th Congress. 
2 

I say at the outset that the Ranking Member, Brian Higgins, and 

I think are on certainly full agreement as to where the subcommittee is going. Whether we agree on everything as we go 

along, who knows, but we certainly have the same intent and the 

same focus and I really look forward to the, you know, this session. 

We will be examining current threats, detecting emerging 

threats, and overseeing intelligence sharing between Federal, 

State, and local governments. 

Today we are examining safe havens in Syria and Iran from 

which al-Qaeda could target the homeland, the relationship between al-Qaeda and Iran, the threat to the United States from foreign jihadis in Syria, and how Syrian instability may impact alQaeda’s capabilities. 

On April 22 the RCMP, the Canadian Mounties, arrested two 

Islamists, Raed Jaser and Chiheb Esseghaier. I am not sure I have 

that exactly right, but you know what we are talking about. 

At the direction of al-Qaeda members in Iran, these men planned 

to derail a passenger train from Toronto, as it passed over Niagara 

Falls en route to New York City. 

I will point out of course they we are talking about Congressman 

Higgins’ district and a district very close to mine in New York, and 

I say that as a preview to what we will say later on about the lack 

of information we were given on this. 

On May 9 American authorities arrested Ahmed Abassi, an associate of these men in the United States, who also supported alQaeda’s Syrian affiliate. 

Now, had their terror plot succeeded, American and Canadian civilian casualties in New York could have been catastrophic. 

Let me say up front as I started to mention before, the Committee on Homeland Security was never briefed, even in classified 

settings, about this year-long investigation of a serious threat 

against the homeland. 

Obviously, a threat against any American is a threat against all 

Americans but I think it was particularly egregious in this case 

that when you have two Members of Congress from New York in 

the area impacted by this that the Department of Homeland Security—nobody in the intelligence committee, the law enforcement 

community, at any time advised me and I don’t think they advised 

Congressman Higgins during the last year about this. To me, that 

is inexcusable. 

It is something which we, as Chairman of the committee and 

now as Chairman of the counterterrorism subcommittee and Ranking Member Higgins, we attend weekly, biweekly briefings from the 

FBI, from the National Counterterrorism Center, from the Department of Homeland Security where we are told and advised of so 

many possible plots, all of the investigations that are going on, and 

yet this one which was so key, we were never told anything about. 

To me, it is just inexcusable and basically I am passing on to 

the—all of those agencies and departments of that this is not going 

to be tolerated. 

It is a—there is no excuse whatsoever for holding back on this 

type of information. Also my understanding is that New York State 

and local police were not briefed about this plot, either. 
3 

Now, we have seen this pattern for years now, most recently in 

the Boston Marathon bombing and the planned follow-up attack on 

Times Square and the Fort Hood and Little Rock shootings. 

The Federal Government identifies potential terrorists or attack 

plans, but does not share the knowledge with State and local police. Again I would say the fact that in Boston where the FBI was 

advised of a possible attack against Time Square and did not notify 

the NYPD and their theory was well the plot was over, the threat 

had ended, the fact is as we saw with the killing in Florida today, 

perhaps that plot was not over and it had not ended. So again, I 

just pass on that to the FBI the importance of information sharing. 

Turf battles should have ended on September 11, 2001. 

This information sharing was urged by the 9/11 Commission and 

ordered by the Homeland Security and Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Acts. 

Now, there is much we don’t know about the relationship between Iran and al-Qaeda. As Churchill described Germany and 

Stalin with their Union in 1939, it is a ‘‘a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.’’ 

The Iranian regime is a state sponsor of terror, and al-Qaeda is 

a terror organization. But Tehran’s ayatollahs are Shi’i Muslims 

and al-Qaeda are Sunni Muslims. 

For this reason Iran and al-Qaeda are enemies under some circumstances. In Syria, Tehran’s proxies, the Assad regime and 

Hezbollah, fight against the Syrian opposition, which unfortunately 

now is a substantial al-Qaeda influence and presence. Iranian terror proxies and al-Qaeda also fight each other in Iraq. 

On the other hand, since 2001 some senior leaders on al-Qaeda’s 

management council have resided in Iran. Al-Qaeda uses Iran as 

facilitation, finance, and transport hub. 

From this sanctuary al-Qaeda ordered attacks against Westerners in Saudi Arabia in 2003. But our Government’s assumption 

was that al-Qaeda would not allow al-Qaeda to plot against America from within Iran. 

This latest al-Qaeda plot against New York, hatched from inside 

Iran, makes us question this assumption. A similar reassessment 

of Iran’s intentions was caused by Iran’s 2011 plot to partner with 

a Mexican drug cartel to assassinate a Saudi ambassador by means 

of a car bomb here in Washington, DC. 

Greatly adding to our concerns are the following facts. Al-Qaeda 

in Syria, also known as the Nusra Front, is an outgrowth of alQaeda’s vicious Iraqi affiliate. It is responsible for the vast majority 

of suicide attacks in Syria. 

Among the several thousand members of the Nusra Front are, 

according to unclassified sources, a large number of foreign jihadis 

with Belgian, Dutch, Danish, Dutch—British, Danish, Dutch, German, Finnish, French, or Swedish citizenship or residency. 

Europeans constitute as much as 10 percent of this al-Qaeda’s affiliate strength. Canadians, Australians, and perhaps even Americans have gone to Syria to fight alongside—or even with—alQaeda. 

These foreign fighters will likely undergo further Islamist 

radicalization as they receive terror training and gain combat experience before returning home to the West. 
4 

The border between Syria and Turkey, a Muslim Brotherhood-led 

country which is itself a cause of growing terror concerns, is porous. It will be difficult for U.S. authorities to determine, going forward, whether a European or British Commonwealth citizen or a 

returning U.S. person may have been inside Syria. 

The Syrian situation is made more dangerous by the availability—and even use—of military-grade chemical weapons. 

If even a fraction of Syria’s vast stockpile of poisonous and toxic 

gases falls into the hands of terrorist groups, these weapons of 

mass destruction will pose a grave threat to homeland security. 

With that want to thank all of the witnesses today; especially 

look forward to any testimony you may have involving bin Laden’s 

son-in-law who was captured and had been spending time in Iran 

and what impact that has. 

But I would think the witnesses. 

Now I am pleased to recognize the Ranking Member, Brian Higgins, for his opening statement. 

Mr. HIGGINS. I would like to thank Chairman Peter King for 

holding this hearing; today’s hearing. 

I would also like to thank the witnesses for their testimony. 

Assessing the threats the United States from al-Qaeda operatives 

in Iran and Syria is uncharted territory for this subcommittee. 

Even though exploring the subject is new to the subcommittee, 

I believe it is our responsibility, and I thank the Chairman for 

agreeing to hold this hearing. 

On April 22, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police announced the 

arrest of two people in connection with plotting a terrorist attack 

on a passenger train that travels from Toronto through Niagara 

Falls into New York City. 

According to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the alleged terrorists were receiving assistance from al-Qaeda elements in Iran. 

The RCMP stated that there was no connection to state sponsorship. 

If these allegations are true, it would mark the first time alQaeda elements in Iran directed a plot at the West. Soon after the 

news of the arrests of the terrorists broke, Iran’s Foreign Ministry 

spokesman stated that there was no firm evidence of any Iranian 

involvement and such groups as al-Qaeda have no compatibility 

with Iran in both political and ideological fields. 

Iran is a Shi’i majority country. Only about 8 to 10 percent of the 

population is Sunni and al-Qaeda is a Sunni organization. Even 

though there are political and ideological differences between Iran 

and al-Qaeda, there is a need to look deeper at their relationships. 

Several al-Qaeda operatives have made Iran their home. In 2001, 

when the United States Government took out the Taliban government, many of bin Laden’s family members and top lieutenants 

self-exiled to Iran. 

In the past, Iran kept a very close eye on all al-Qaeda figures in 

the country. Iranian intelligence services have access to all communications and contacts. 

However, these restrictions have been loosened and this should 

raise questions about whether al-Qaeda operatives in Iran are 

making trips outside the country to make connections with a broader terror network. 
5 

As we evaluate al-Qaeda’s relationship with Iran, we must be 

sure not to look at it in a myopic view. We need to evaluate both 

al-Qaeda and Iran’s relationships with the areas of the Middle 

East; especially areas of conflict. 

Hezbollah, a terrorist organization supported by Iran has a growing and active role in the war in Syria. Hezbollah is an ally of 

President Assad and is aiding government forces in this Syrian 

Civil War. 

Al-Qaeda operatives on the other hand have been traveling to 

Syria to bring down the Syrian regime. As the violence grows in 

Syria it becomes more sectarian bringing Hezbollah and al-Qaeda 

fighting face-to-face with each other. 

Will the conflict between Iranian-backed Hezbollah and al-Qaeda 

elements in Syria have a grave effect on the United States? What 

will this conflict do to al-Qaeda’s relationship with Iran? 

As the recent Canadian plot brings questions about al-Qaeda’s 

role in both Iran and Syria, there are still questions that should 

be raised about al-Qaeda’s effect in the West. 

The plot brings the question of whether al-Qaeda operatives in 

Iran are looking to Canada as their target for terrorist activity and 

recruitment. Canada’s being a target for terrorist activity and recruitment is startling because a successful plot can cause catastrophic loss to the United States. 

In addition to the potential for innocent people in two countries 

being killed or injured, or people from two countries being killed or 

injured, there is a possibility of grave damage to critical infrastructure and the economy of western New York in southern Ontario. 

The Peace Bridge in Buffalo is a busy Northern Border crossing 

for automobiles in the United States. It is a local symbol and architectural icon for the Buffalo Niagara region. It is one of America’s 

busiest corridors for international travel and trade. 

Canada is the United States’ No. 1 trading partner. In 2011, over 

$597 billion of imports and exports were traded with Canada. Over 

$30 billion in annual commerce travels through the Peace Bridge. 

This Western New York region is the first point of entry into the 

United States between Toronto and New York City where the terrorists were attempting to attack. 

The security of our border should be a priority and this means 

that first responders who are familiar with the border in the area 

should be fully funded to prepare and prevent an attack. 

This also means that information that the Federal Government 

has related to a potential attack should be adequately shared with 

State and local partners. Having the information is key to preventing an attack from groups from both foreign and domestic. 

We can expand our knowledge today and I look forward to hearing today’s testimony. 

I yield back. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Higgins follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BRIAN HIGGINS

MAY 22, 2013 

Assessing the threat to the United States from al-Qaeda operatives in Iran and 

Syria is unchartered territory for this subcommittee. Even though exploring this 
6 

subject is new to the subcommittee, I believe it is our responsibility and I thank 

the Chairman for agreeing to hold this hearing. 

On April 22, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police announced an arrest of two people in connection with plotting a terrorist attack on a passenger train that travels 

from Toronto, through Niagara Falls, into New York City. According to the RCMP, 

the alleged terrorists were receiving assistance from al-Qaeda elements in Iran. The 

RCMP stated that there was no connection to state sponsorship. If these allegations 

are true, it would mark the first time al-Qaeda elements in Iran directed a plot at 

the West. 

Soon after the news of the arrests of the terrorists broke, Iran’s Foreign Ministry 

spokesman stated that there is no firm evidence of any Iranian involvement and 

groups such as al-Qaeda have no compatibility with Iran in both political and ideological fields. 

Iran is a Shia majority country, only about 8 to 10 percent of the population is 

Sunni and al-Qaeda is a Sunni organization. Even though there are political and 

ideological differences between Iran and al-Qaeda, there is a need to look deeper at 

their relationships. 

Iran is home to al-Qaeda operatives. In 2001, when United States Government 

took out the Taliban government in Afghanistan, many of Osama bin Laden’s family 

members and top lieutenants self-exiled to Iran. In the past, Iran kept a very close 

eye on all al-Qaeda figures in the country. Iranian intelligence services had access 

to all communications and contacts. 

However, these restrictions have been loosened. This should raise questions about 

whether al-Qaeda operatives in Iran are making trips outside of the country to 

make connections with the broader terror network. 

As we evaluate al-Qaeda’s relationship with Iran, we must be sure not to look at 

it in a myopic view. We need to evaluate both al-Qaeda’s and Iran’s relationships 

with other areas of the Middle East, especially areas of conflict. 

Hezbollah, a terrorist organization supported by Iran, has a growing and active 

role in war-torn Syria. Hezbollah is an ally of President Assad and is aiding government forces in Syria. Al-Qaeda operatives, on the other hand, have been traveling 

to Syria to bring down the Syrian regime. As the violence grows in Syria, it becomes 

more sectarian, bringing Hezbollah and al-Qaeda fighting face-to-face with each 

other. 

Will the conflict between Iranian-backed Hezbollah and al-Qaeda elements in 

Syria have a grave effect on the United States? What will this conflict do to alQaeda’s relationship with Iran? As the recent Canadian plot brings questions about 

al-Qaeda’s role in both Iran and Syria, there are still questions that should be 

raised about al-Qaeda’s effect in the West. The recent plot in Canada also brings 

the question of whether al-Qaeda operatives in Iran have a broader terror network, 

and if Canada serves as their target for terrorist activity and recruitment. 

Canada being a target for terrorist activity and recruitment is startling because 

a successful plot can cause catastrophic loss to the United States. In addition to the 

potential for innocent people from two countries being killed and injured, there is 

a possibility of grave damage to critical infrastructure and the economy. 

The Peace Bridge in Buffalo is the busiest border crossing for automobiles in the 

United States. It is a local symbol and an architectural icon for the Buffalo Niagara 

region. It is one of America’s busiest corridors for international travel and trade. 

Canada is the United States’ No. 1 trading partner. In 2011, over $597.4 billion of 

imports and exports were traded with Canada. Over $30 billion of annual commerce 

travels through the Peace Bridge in Buffalo, Niagara region. This region is the first 

point of entry into the United States between Toronto and New York City, where 

the terrorists were attempting to attack. 

The security of our border should be a priority and this means that first responders should be fully funded to prepare and prevent an attack. This also means that 

information that the Federal Government has related to a potential attack should 

be adequately shared with State and local partners. Having the information is key 

in preventing an attack from groups both foreign and domestic. We can expand our 

knowledge today. 

Mr. KING. I thank the Ranking Member for his opening statement. 

Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 
7 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

MAY 22, 2013 

Today’s hearing is an assessment on the threat from al-Qaeda operatives in the 

Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic. Both Iran and Syria have tense relationships with the United States. The United States does not consider these countries as allies, is a welcome criterion for al-Qaeda to operate and thrive in these two 

regions. 

We know that radicalization by the al-Qaeda extremist ideology and communication with al-Qaeda is widespread and accessible. Vulnerable areas such as Syria, 

which is crippling under a civil war, could potentially be a safe haven for al-Qaeda 

operatives to radicalize and train militants. 

The Republic of Iran has been home to top al-Qaeda operatives for over a decade. 

In the past, the government closely monitored their dealings within the state. However, recent actions by the Iranian government illustrate that their interactions 

with al-Qaeda may have become laxed. However, it is my hope as we evaluate the 

threat from al-Qaeda operatives in these countries, we give a fair, thorough, and 

critical assessment. This evaluation should not only include testimony from today’s 

hearing, but also information that we receive from the State Department and the 

intelligence community. 

On April 22, 2013, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police arrested two individuals 

for plotting a terrorist attack on a passenger rail train that travels from Toronto, 

through the Northern Border at Niagara Falls to New York City. According to authorities, the alleged perpetrators received assistance from al-Qaeda operatives in 

Iran. As of today, the authorities do not see this foiled plot as a link to a plot directed by the Iranian government. The Iranian government also denies any involvement in this plot. Even though there is not evidence that shows that there is a link 

to the Iranian government and these perpetrators, Iran, as a state sponsor of terrorism, and its relationship with al-Qaeda should be evaluated. This thwarted plot 

also gives rise to other issues that should be given another thorough evaluation. 

First, the threat to mass transit is not novel. According to the National CounterTerrorism Center’s Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, from January 2004 to 

July 2008, 530 terrorist attacks were waged worldwide against mass transit and 

passenger rail targets, resulting in over 2,000 deaths and over 9,000 injuries. In the 

United States, a plot to attack the New York City subway system was thwarted in 

September 2009. The convicted conspirators stated they were directed by al-Qaeda. 

Thirty-four million rail and transit passenger trips are taken within the United 

States each weekday. However, the Transportation Security Administration’s budget 

for surface transportation security remains less than 2% of TSA’s budget. 

Another issue that should be evaluated is the Northern Border. To date, over the 

last decade, the Department of Homeland Security, with support from Congress, has 

made unprecedented investments in border security. During my time on this committee, I have consistently advocated for a comprehensive strategy to help guide 

how border security funding is utilized. 

Last week, the Committee passed H.R. 1417, which requires the DHS to develop 

a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan for achieving operational control 

of our borders. The bill sets a goal for the Secretary to certify to Congress that operational control of the border has been achieved in high traffic areas, which includes 

Northern Border areas such as Niagara Falls, within 2 years. 

Another evaluation to consider is the cost of terrorism. Had this plot been successful, it could have affected some of the busiest border crossings in the Nation. The 

border crossings in along the Northern Border between New York and Canada are 

linked to over $200 billion in annual U.S. sales, income, and Federal taxes. We 

know that one of the goals of al-Qaeda is to cause economic disruption. 

The attacks of September 11, 2001 did not just result in the deaths of 2,250 people, it also resulted in nearly $80 billion in economic damage with about $32.5 billion covered by nearly 150 domestic and international insurers and reinsurers. In 

the wake of the attacks, commercial insurance insurers began excluding terrorism 

coverage from policies provided to businesses across the country. 

In response, Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 to increase the availability of terrorism risk insurance to at-risk American businesses by 

guaranteeing that the Government would share some of the losses with private insurers should a terrorist attack occur. Initially authorized for 3 years, the program 

was refined and extended in 2005 and 2007. It is scheduled to sunset in 2014. 

I have introduced the ‘‘Fostering Resilience to Terrorism Act of 2013,’’ which extends the TRIA program 10 years, creating much-needed stability and predictability 

for the business community. Finally, another evaluation should be of community en-
8 

gagement and involvement. Canadian authorities gave credit to the Canadian Muslim community for recognizing and identifying the behavior of the alleged perpetrators and reporting this information to the authorities. 

Last Congress, this committee held a series of hearings that stroked a climate of 

fear and distrust in the Muslim community. Those hearings also served as propaganda for fear and distrust of the Muslim community. In the wake of the Boston 

Marathon bombings, attempts were made to revive this climate of fear and distrust. 

Some said that we must surveil the Muslim community. 

Luckily, this committee served as a platform to counter the arguments that were 

perpetuated last Congress. The Boston Police Chief testified that there is no need 

to live in a surveillance state and a former FBI special agent in charge testified that 

community involvement is what is necessary to recognize the signs of radicalization 

and prevent attacks. These are just a few things that we can evaluate in this hearing and beyond. I look forward to today’s testimony. 

Mr. KING. We are very pleased to have a distinct panel of witnesses for us today, Dr. Seth Jones, Mr. Robin Simcox, Mr. Tom 

Joscelyn, Mr. Barack Barfi. 

Our first witness, Dr. Seth Jones, is the associate director of the 

International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND 

Corporation as well as an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies. 

Previously, Dr. Jones served as the representative for the Commander U.S. Special Operations Command to the Assistant Secretary of Defense of Special Operations. Prior to that position, he 

served as a plans officer and advisor to the Commanding General 

U.S. Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan. 

Dr. Jones specializes in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 

including a focus on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and al-Qaeda. He has 

been a source of information and advice to this committee and we 

are pleased to welcome him back for this session as well. 

Dr. Jones. 

STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES, PH.D., ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER 

Mr. JONES. Thank you very much, Chairman King, Ranking 

Member Higgins, and Members of the subcommittee. Thanks for 

inviting us on this very important subject. 

I am going to focus my remarks predominantly on the Syria front 

because I consider that blinking red right now, though I had written and have a number of comments later on the Iran component. 

In my view with the escalating war in Syria presents a growing 

threat to the United States led by Jabhat al-Nusrah, which is an 

al-Qaeda-affiliated group and we will touch on that shortly. 

Syria is becoming a training ground for foreign fighters. As 

Chairman King mentioned, for the past year, particularly concerning, an increasing number of fighters have traveled to Syria 

from other locations including the West particularly in Europe to 

fight against the Assad regime where some have joined Jabhat alNusrah. 

Most Westerners appear to be Europeans from such countries as 

Belgium, France, and Sweden. There are many others that the 

Chairman mentioned as well. 

Many of these fighters are gaining valuable experience in combat, in bomb making, in propaganda, in counterintelligence. Most 

are expanding their relationships with other jihadist networks op-
9 

erating in other regions and are likely becoming more ideologically 

committed to the cause. 

In addition, this European pipeline is used to transport money, 

material, and other things to the Syrian front. While in my judgment the number of American citizens at the moment traveling to 

Syria appears to be limited at least in comparison to the number 

of Europeans and others, the increase in Europeans with potential 

access to the United States does present a serious counterterrorism 

challenge. 

I would say it is unclear at the moment whether most of these 

fighters will remain in the long run in Syria, whether they will 

move to other war zones, or whether they will return home. 

Even if some return home as we have seen with groups like alShabaab it is uncertain whether they will become involved in plots, 

recruiting, and fundraising, or become disillusioned. 

I would say the trend is fairly straightforward and that is that 

Syria is attracting a growing cadre of foreign fighters including 

from the West who could potentially return home with the capability and the intentions to conduct attacks or be involved in other 

terrorist activity in the United States. 

The rest of my remarks will focus on three issues. The first is 

Jabhat al-Nusrah, the second is its capabilities, and the third is 

what that means for the homeland. 

Let me just briefly mention that it is clear—it is very important 

in my view to recognize that Jabhat al-Nusrah or the al-Nusrah 

front group out of al-Qaeda and Iraq’s logistics and support network in Syria in late 2011. 

When it was created al-Qaeda and Iraq utilized these established 

networks to create Jabhat al-Nusrah has an operational arm. They 

were much more careful than they have been in other places to 

make this not overtly publicized that relationship so in some cases 

created confusion on people covering the Syrian war that maybe 

the connections weren’t as strong. 

I would say at least as I have looked at it, that the organization 

was created out of, generally out of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Its goal fits 

al-Qaeda’s model. It is to establish an emirate in Syria and potentially the broader region. 

I would say one thing very briefly on the trends. After the April 

2013 strain between Jabhat al-Nusrah and al-Qaeda in Iraq what 

appears to be a very concerning development is Jabhat al-Nusrah’s 

increasing close relationship with al-Qaeda’s central leadership in 

Pakistan. 

Meaning that should be a very serious concern for the United 

States if we are seeing a dialogue go back to Ayman al-Zawahiri’s 

central leadership. That has grave implications, I think, for the 

United States. 

I do think, second on the capabilities; again we are seeing a fairly robust command-and-control network. I think it is worth noting 

that al-Nusrah has been involved in over-running multiple bases in 

Syria that are—in gathering extensive firepower including heavy 

artillery, heavy weapons, and aircraft. 

Then finally, on threats to the West, let me just say briefly that 

I would say at the moment, Jabhat al-Nusrah does appear to be 

predominately interested in overthrowing the Assad regime and 
10 

1The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should 

not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This 

product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony 

presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local legislative committees; Governmentappointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions 

that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. 2This testimony is available for free download at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/ 

CT388.html. 

possibly launching attacks against Israel, but it is possible that 

these intentions could change. 

I think it is critical for the United States to keep a very close 

watch with its allies including both in Europe and the region on 

these individuals getting them on a watch list because with potential access to Europe, they have got potential access through the 

visa waiver program to the United States. 

This is a very serious concern. I think in the long run, the threat 

to the United States from Syria will only increase and so we better 

deal with this now, and we can talk again about the substance of 

that later. 

I will conclude my remarks again by thanking you Chairman 

King and Ranking Member Higgins and the rest of the committee 

for this opportunity. I look forward to the questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES 1

MAY 22, 2013 

THE TERRORIST THREAT FROM SYRIA 2

Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for inviting me to appear before you today on this important topic. 

The escalating war in Syria presents a growing threat to the United States. Led 

by Jabhat al-Nusrah (the Victory Front), an al-Qaeda-affiliated group, Syria is becoming a consummate training ground for foreign fighters. Over the past year, an 

increasing number of fighters have traveled to Syria from other areas—including 

the West—to fight against the Assad regime, where some have joined Jabhat alNusrah. Most Westerners appear to be Europeans from such countries as Belgium, 

France, and Sweden. Many of these fighters are gaining valuable experience in combat, bomb making, propaganda, and counterintelligence. Most are also expanding 

their relationships with fighters from other regions—such as the Persian Gulf, 

North Africa, and South Asia—and becoming more ideologically committed. In addition, this European pipeline is used to transport money and material to the Syrian 

front. 

While the number of American citizens traveling to Syria appears to be limited, 

at least at the moment, the increase in Europeans with potential access to the 

United States presents a serious counterterrorism challenge. It is currently unclear 

whether most of these fighters will remain in Syria over the long run, move to other 

war zones such as North Africa, or return home. And even if some return to the 

West, it is uncertain whether these fighters will become involved in terrorist plots, 

focus on recruiting and fundraising, or become disillusioned with terrorism. Still, 

the trend is clear: Syria is attracting a growing cadre of foreign fighters from the 

West, who could potentially return home with the capability to conduct attacks 

against the United States and its allies. 

The information for this testimony was gathered from a range of sources, including jihadist websites and forums, Western websites that publish jihadist videos and 

transcripts (such as SITE Intelligence Group and the Long War Journal), interviews 

with government officials from the West and the Middle East, and secondary 

sources. Yet there are notable gaps in this analysis, as there are in most assessments of the Syrian war. It is uncertain, for instance, how many foreign fighters 

from the West and other areas have traveled to Syria, why and how they have 

radicalized, and what they will do if they leave. Despite these methodological chal-
11 

3 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qaeda’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the 

Sinjar Records (West Point, NY: Harmony Project, Combating Terrorism Center, 2007). 4 Brian Fishman, ed., Bombers, Bank Accounts, and Bleedout: Al-Qaeda’s Road In and Out of 

Iraq (West Point, NY: Harmony Project, Combating Terrorism Center, 2008), pp. 50, 70. 5 Audio Statement by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, SITE Intelligence Group, April 10, 2013. 

6 Author interview with government officials from Europe and the Middle East, April and May 

2013. 7 Video Statement by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, January 24, 2012. 

8Shaykh ul-Islaam Taqi-ud-Deen Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah, The Religious and Moral Doctrine 

of Jihad (Birmingham, England: Maktabah al Ansaar Publications, 2001). 9The author thanks Bruce Hoffman for making these points. 

lenges, there is still sufficient information to assess the threat from Syria with reasonable accuracy. 

This testimony is divided into three sections. The first outlines the origins of 

Jabhat al-Nusrah and its evolution since 2011. The second section assesses Jabhat 

al-Nusrah’s growing capabilities and presence in Syria, as well as briefly describes 

other militant groups operating in Syria. The third examines the threat to the U.S. 

homeland and U.S. allies from Syria. 

THE ORIGINS OF AL-QAEDA IN SYRIA

Jabhat al-Nusrah grew out of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s logistics and support network in 

Syria. Beginning as early as 2003, Syria became a key transit point for foreigners 

that wanted to fight in Iraq. According to documents captured in a raid near Sinjar, 

Iraq, for instance, foreign fighters in Iraq came from such countries as Saudi Arabia, Libya, Yemen, Algeria, and Syria. Most were young, averaging 24 to 25 years 

old. Some had been students, while others held full-time jobs.3 Virtually all of the 

foreign fighters entered Iraq through Syria with the aid of smuggling and criminal 

networks.4 In short, Syria became a significant transit hub for al-Qaeda and other 

terrorist groups. 

As the war in Syria began to intensify in 2011, al-Qaeda in Iraq leaders utilized 

these established networks and created Jabhat al-Nusrah as their operational arm 

in Syria. Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (also known as Abu Du’a) 

explained that ‘‘we laid for them plans, and drew up for them the policy of work, 

and gave them what financial support we could every month, and supplied them 

with men who had known the battlefields of jihad, from the emigrants and the natives.’’5 Al-Qaeda in Iraq officials chose Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, an Iraqi national, as leader (or emir). Jawlani pledged allegiance to Baghdadi before taking 

charge of operations in Syria in late 2011. Al-Qaeda in Iraq then sent small arms 

and light weapons—including rifles, light machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades—to its Syrian contingent. It also sent explosives experts to augment Jabhat 

al-Nusrah’s bomb-making capabilities and deployed fighters to boost its ranks. A 

growing number of donors from the Persian Gulf and Levant began to send financial 

support.6

Jabhat al-Nusrah leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani explained that the group’s 

goal is to bring ‘‘back the rule of God’s law on earth.’’7 It is a Salafi-jihadist group 

committed to establishing an Islamic emirate in Syria and potentially the broader 

region. Its leaders have established a radical interpretation of sharia, or Islamic 

law, in some areas they control in Syria. In an important development, however, alQaeda leaders initially decided not to publicize the group’s links with al Qa’ida in 

Iraq, perhaps out of concern that it would undermine their support in Syria and 

draw unwelcome attention from U.S. and other foreign intelligence agencies. 

Syria has long been important to al-Qaeda for historical, religious, and strategic 

reasons. Known as Bilad al-Sham, or the Land of the Levantine Peoples, Damascus 

was the base for the thirteenth century scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, whose book, The 

Religious and Moral Concept of Jihad, is a pillar of al-Qaeda’s ideology.8 The wider 

Levant region also includes al-Quds, or Jerusalem, Islam’s third-holiest site after 

Mecca and Medina. In addition, Syria is strategically important because it borders 

two of al-Qaeda’s most hated enemies, Israel and Jordan, and the Assad government’s conventional and unconventional weapons caches may become increasingly 

available as the Assad regime loses control of territory.9

By early 2013, however, Jabhat al-Nusrah’s relationship with al-Qaeda in Iraq became strained, pushing Jahbat al-Nusrah closer to al-Qaeda’s senior leadership in 

Pakistan. Jabhat al-Nusrah officials were apparently unhappy when al-Qaeda in 

Iraq announced in April 2013 their intention to merge the al-Qaeda’s affiliates in 

Iraq and Syria under a common name, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. 

As Jabhat al-Nusrah established its own sources of funding, fighters, and material, 

it became increasingly independent from al-Qaeda in Iraq. A formal merger would 
12 

10 Audio Statement by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, SITE Intelligence Group, April 10, 2013. 

On the broader debate, also see Thomas Joscelyn, ‘‘Al Nusrah Front Leader Renews Allegiance 

to al Qaeda, Rejects New Name,’’ Long War Journal, April 10, 2013. 11 U.S. Department of State, Terrorist Designations of the al-Nusrah Front as an Alias for alQa’ida in Iraq (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, December 2012). 12See, for example, Bill Roggio, ‘‘ ‘Islamist’ Factions Seize Syrian Airbase,’’ Long War Journal, 

February 12, 2013. 13 Author interview with government officials from Europe and the Middle East, April and 

May 2013. 

likely have undermined this autonomy. Asserting his independence from al-Qaeda 

in Iraq, Jawlani declared his loyalty directly to al-Qaeda’s central leadership in 

Pakistan. ‘‘This is a pledge of allegiance from the sons of the al Nusrah Front and 

their supervisor general that we renew to the Sheikh of Jihad, Sheikh Ayman alZawahiri, may Allah preserve him,’’ Jawlani announced in April.10 As discussed 

later in the testimony, Jabhat al-Nusrah’s move toward al-Qaeda’s central leadership in Pakistan makes it a more dangerous enemy to the United States. 

Understanding the origins of Jabhat al-Nusrah is important for two reasons. 

First, al-Qaeda in Iraq operatives helped establish the group, directly linking it to 

al-Qaeda. Unlike with other affiliates, such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

(AQAP) in Yemen, Syrian operatives publicly downplayed their ties with al-Qaeda. 

This was an important strategic decision and one that al Qa’ida-linked groups may 

increasingly do in the future to avoid unwanted monitoring from foreign governments. Second, this relationship gave Jabhat al-Nusrah access to money, weapons, 

fighters, and other material from al-Qaeda in Iraq. 

GROWING CAPABILITIES

Since early 2012, Jabhat al-Nusrah has developed a robust command-and-control 

network across Syria, conducted a devastating string of suicide attacks, and orchestrated hundreds of car bombs and assassinations against the Assad regime. Between 

November 2011 and December 2012, for instance, it was involved in nearly 600 attacks in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Idlib, and other locations.11 It has claimed credit 

for many of its attacks in announcements released on jihadist forums and its Twitter site. Indeed, Jabhat al-Nusrah has established an advanced propaganda campaign led by its official media arm, the White Minaret Group. 

To organize its operations, Jabhat al-Nusrah appointed a management council, set 

up a headquarters, and created regional networks with military and religious leaders to run operations, manage cross-border facilitation, and procure weapons and 

other supplies. In addition, it has amassed an impressive arsenal of weapons, making it one of al-Qaeda’s best-armed affiliates in the world. It has participated with 

other groups in seizing control of several Syrian military bases and acquired a vast 

array of armaments to enhance its firepower and endow it with capabilities more 

akin to a small army than a rag-tag group of guerrilla fighters. In February 2013, 

for example, Jabhat al-Nusrah fighters helped seize control of the al-Jarrah airbase 

in Thawra, as well as two dams in Raqqa. In January, Jabhat al-Nusrah and Ahrar 

al-Sham teamed up with the Islamic Vanguard to seize control of Taftanaz, a key 

Syrian air force base in Idlib. In December 2012, Jabhat al-Nusrah and allied 

groups took control of the Sheikh Suleiman base. In October, Jabhat al-Nusrah and 

allied fighters overran a Syrian air defense and Scud missile base in Aleppo.12

As Figure 1 highlights, Jabhat al-Nusrah has been active in several areas of 

Syria. Its most secure sanctuary is likely in the Sunni-dominated Dayr az-Zawr 

province, where al-Qaeda in Iraq’s foreign fighter pipeline operated for nearly a decade. A second area is in northwestern Syria, where Jabhat al-Nusrah has moved 

fighters, explosives, and other material across the Turkish border into its sanctuaries in Halab and Idlib provinces. Reminiscent of groups like Hezbollah, Jabhat 

al-Nusrah has set up some humanitarian relief efforts in these provinces, along with 

religious courts and schools. Jabhat al-Nusrah has also established a sanctuary in 

southwestern Syria in Dar’a province, near the Jordanian border, as well as in Damascus.13
13 

14On Syrian opposition groups see Elizabeth O’Bagy, Jihad in Syria (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, September 2012); Aron Lund, Syrian Jihadism (Uppsala, Sweden: 

Swedish Institute of International Affairs, September 2012). 15 Bill Roggio, ‘‘Al Nusrah Front Poised to Take Over Last Major City on Euphrates River,’’ 

The Long War Journal, March 13, 2013. 

While Jabhat al-Nusrah is one of the most capable extremist groups in Syria, it 

is not the only one. It has conducted joint operations with over a dozen groups, such 

as Ahrar al-Sham, Suqur al-Sham, and Martyrs of Syria. Ahrar al-Sham is perhaps 

the largest Salafi-jihadist group operating in Syria.14 In 2012, Jabhat al-Nusrah cooperated with at least nine other groups to create the Mujahideen Shura Council 

in Dayr az-Zawr. The council was formed to ‘‘unite the ranks of the jihadi brigades 

in the Cause of Allah, organize the efforts and the attacks against the soldiers of 

disbelief and apostasy, and distinguish the ranks of truth from falsehood,’’ according 

a statement released by the group in December 2012. ‘‘We call upon our sincere 

mujahideen brothers all over the strong Levant to unite their ranks in groups, pure 

of the filth of suspicious groups and the infiltration of people who have no qualities 

or faith, in order to clarify their banner and purify their path.’’15 Al-Qaeda in Iraq 

pursued a similar strategy, forming a Mujahideen Shura Council in 2006 to coordinate operations among Sunni militant groups in Iraq. 

THREATS TO THE WEST

At the moment, Jabhat al-Nusrah and its leaders, including Abu Muhammad alJawlani, appear to be most interested in overthrowing the Assad regime and possibly launching attacks against Israel. But it is conceivable that Jawlani’s intentions 

will evolve and Jabhat al-Nusrah or splinter groups could conduct attacks in the 

West after—or even before—the Assad regime falls. Jabhat al-Nusrah’s access to 

foreign fighters, external network in Europe and other areas, and bomb-making expertise suggest that it may have the capability to plan and support attacks against 

the West. 

More broadly, there appears to be a growing contingent of foreign fighters traveling to—and from—Syria to fight in the war. A substantial portion of these fighters 

are coming from the region, including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. But a significant number also appear to be coming from the West, especially from Belgium, 

France, and Sweden. Extremists have traveled to Syria from other European coun-
14 

16 Author interview with government officials from Europe and the Middle East, April and 

May 2013. 17 ‘‘Iraq Says al-Qaeda Flowing Into Syria,’’ Al Jazeera, July 5, 2012. 18 Riyadh made the comments in an undated YouTube video. See, for example, Bill Roggio, 

‘‘Free Syrian Army Commander Praises Al Nusrah Front as ‘Brothers,’ ’’ Long War Journal, 

March 30, 2013. 19 ‘‘Syrian Opposition Urges U.S. to Reconsider Al-Nusrah Move,’’ Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), December 12, 2012. 

tries. According to Spanish officials, for example, a network based in Spain and Morocco sent approximately two dozen fighters to Jabhat al-Nusrah over the past year. 

It is unclear how many of these fighters have returned to the West, but some have 

apparently returned to Germany, Denmark, Spain, and Norway among others. In 

October 2012, authorities in Kosovo arrested the extremist Shurki Aliu, who had 

traveled from Syria to Kosovo and was involved in recruiting and providing material 

to Syrian opposition groups. A small number of Americans—perhaps less than a 

dozen—have apparently traveled to Syria to fight with the Syrian opposition.16

While Turkey is the most common transit country through which extremist foreign fighters travel before entering Syria, some use Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. As 

Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari acknowledged, ‘‘We have solid information 

and intelligence that member of al-Qaeda terrorist networks have gone in the other 

direction, to Syria, to help, to carry out attacks.’’17 There are also indications that 

some al-Qaeda members have left Pakistan and traveled to Syria, including former 

al-Qaeda senior leader Abu Wafa al-Saudi. 

These trends pose a threat to the United States. Syria is attracting a growing 

cadre of foreign fighters from the West, who could potentially return with the capability to conduct attacks against the United States and its allies. Some of these individuals have joined Jabhat al-Nusrah, which has developed a closer relationship 

with al-Qaeda’s senior leaders in Pakistan. Just as concerning, some Free Syrian 

Army leaders have praised Jabhat al-Nusrah. Colonel Riyad al-Assad, a founder of 

the Free Syrian Army, defended Jabhat al-Nusrah as ‘‘our brothers in Islam.’’ He 

continued that they ‘‘might have some ideological thoughts over which we differ, but 

the majority of the people are looking with admiration toward the al Nusrah 

Front.’’18 And Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib, head of the Syrian Opposition Coalition, similarly remarked that the U.S. decision in December 2012 to designate Jahbat alNusrah as a terrorist organization ‘‘must be reexamined’’ since they shared ‘‘the 

same goal: to overthrow the criminal regime’’ of President Bashar al-Assad.19 This 

defense of Jabhat al-Nusrah is a short-term deal with the devil. Al-Qaeda’s longterm vision of establishing a radical Islamic emirate in the Levant—and, indeed further afield wherever it can—is incompatible with the more moderate religious views 

of most Syrians. 

While the number of American citizens traveling to Syria appears to be limited, 

at least at the moment, the increase in Europeans with potential access to the 

United States—including through the Visa Waiver Program—presents a serious 

counterterrorism challenge. It is incumbent on the United States and its European 

allies to continue to identify the names of these foreign fighters (including variations 

in spelling and cover names), share intelligence, ensure they are on appropriate 

watch lists, monitor their activities, and capture them if they return to the West. 

As suggested by the recent Boston bombers and several previous terrorists in the 

United States (such as Faisal Shahzad and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab), not all 

radicalized individuals flying into the United States make it onto watch lists. U.S. 

and European intelligence on Syrian extremists is currently spotty, making it important to increase human and signals intelligence collection capabilities over the 

next year to track individuals traveling into—and out of—Syria. 

In the long run, the threat to the United States from Syria will likely increase. 

Even if the Assad regime is overthrown, the war will almost certainly continue in 

a different form, as sub-state groups like Jabhat al-Nusrah compete for control of 

the state and attempt to spread their ideology across the region. 

Again, thank you for allowing me to appear before you today, and I’d be happy 

to take your questions. 

Mr. KING. Thank you very much, Dr. Jones. 

Mr. Robin Simcox is a research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society in London, a bipartisan British-based think tank. I have had 

up privilege of attending Henry Jackson Society meetings in this 

country and again, an outstanding organization. 
15 

Mr. Simcox’s work focuses on terrorism and National security, 

specifically al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda-inspired affiliates, and terrorism 

trends. He is also the author of ‘‘Al Qaeda in the U.S.: A Complete 

Analysis of Terrorism Offenses’’ and prior to joining the Henry 

Jackson Society, Mr. Simcox was a research fellow at the Center 

for Social Cohesion, a think tank studying extremism and terrorism in the United Kingdom. 

Mr. Simcox we welcome you here today, and look forward to your 

testimony. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF ROBIN SIMCOX, RESEARCH FELLOW, THE 

HENRY JACKSON SOCIETY 

Mr. SIMCOX. Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, Members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for inviting me 

today to discuss this issue, which I think is of extreme relevance. 

The first thing I want to point out is that even though the numbers of Western European fighters currently in Syria may be relatively small, the impact they can have both in the region and on 

the U.S. homeland is significant. 

Now currently, there has not been any successful attacks in the 

United States that have taken place as a result of someone coming 

back from Syria, but there is evidence of plotting in other countries 

that I think should concern us greatly. 

Just last week, the Belgian security services intercepted a telephone call between an extremist based in Syria and one of his contacts back in Belgium which discuss the potential attack on the 

Brussels Palace of Justice. 

Back in October, there was a Jordanian plot that was disrupted 

that would have been potentially catastrophic. Individuals who had 

fought together in Syria and forged ties during that time of fighting 

jihad together in Syria were planning a series of attacks that would 

have included an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Amman. 

These individuals were an affiliate with al-Qaeda in Iraq and I 

believe it is absolutely impossible to understand what is going on 

in Syria and the threat that it poses without understanding alQaeda in Iraq. 

Abu Dua who is the amir of that group is now been suggested 

as even move into northern parts of Syria to solidify al-Qaeda in 

Iraq’s control over operations in Syria itself. 

Obviously, another country which has a significant stake in Syria 

is Iran. The engagement and interaction between themselves and 

al-Qaeda I think is established. All I would say is that I think we 

shouldn’t see it is necessarily a done deal that these two are going 

to work together completely harmoniously in the future. 

I don’t believe they are especially natural allies and this plays 

itself out geopolitically at times. So you have Iran attempting to 

prop up Assad in Syria at the same time as al-Qaeda are trying 

to overthrow him. 

You have al-Qaeda and Iraq who viscerally hate the Shi’i, target 

them consistently in regard the current Iraqi government as almost 

an Iranian branch or defacto Iranian government. 

Zawahiri has spoken on occasion of Iran not as an ally but as a 

potential strategic threat and so while the interaction is there, I 
16 

think there are still opportunities for the United States to be able 

to divide them as well. 

I think in terms of Syrians—the Syrian conflict and members 

coming back to plot attacks in the United States and the West generally, I think we should be absolutely mindful of that. 

But there is one caveat I would like to add in my remarks today. 

My reports recently—I have written three reports on terrorism 

trends in the United Kingdom and the United States and a statistical analysis of the background of all individuals who have either 

been convicted in U.K. or U.S. courts or committed suicide attacks 

here. 

The vast majority of those who plot serious terrorist attacks 

against the West are those that have received training in foreign 

countries in Pakistan, Afghanistan, those sorts of places, but have 

then been dispatched back for a very specific operation in mind. 

Actually those that have combat experience in Kashmir, 

Chechnya, Bosnia, and the sorts of places weren’t always the ones 

that were most likely to then come back and carry out terrorist attacks. Now obviously there is no guarantee that that is going to be 

the case in the future, but I just think it is something that is worth 

bearing in mind. 

I also think it is worth bearing in mind that the U.S.A.’s—the 

intervention or failure to intervene is going to be just as much a 

policy in this as intervention. 

Iraq is sometimes seen for example as having a radicalizing effect on Muslim communities yet Bosnia a war where the United 

States was much more reluctant to be involved was used by 

ideologues as proof that the West didn’t care about the slaughter 

of Muslims taken place, in fact it acquiesced in it. 

So essentially, America is to deal with the fall-out from Syria 

and no matter its policies in the future and no matter how it decides to deal with this problem of Syrian jihadists returning. 

So I will wrap up there. 

Thank you again for hearing my thoughts on this today and I 

will be delighted to answer the questions you have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Simcox follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBIN SIMCOX

22ND MAY 2013 

Chairman King, Members of the subcommittee, my sincere thanks for the opportunity to testify here today on issues which I believe should concern us all more and 

more. That concern should be shared not just by those who live in America, but by 

non-American citizens who care about America’s security. 

SYRIA AND THE REGION

The on-going conflict in Syria is quite rightly of significant concern to the international community. This is not just because tens of thousands have now died—but 

because of the presence of significant amount of jihadist militants, including members of al-Qaeda. 

The al-Qaeda group currently operating in Syria is called Jabhat al-Nusra, which 

controls parts of eastern Syria and has carried out a string of suicide bombings. 

Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani, Jabhat al-Nusra’s leader, last month pledged allegiance to the emir of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri. 

It is estimated that the number of Western fighters operating in Syria is in the 

low- to mid-hundreds. Despite these relatively small numbers, there are a multitude 

of reasons to be concerned about the potential fallout from Syria—not just in the 

region, but how it could impact the U.S. homeland. 
17 

At present there have not been any attempted attacks on the United States by 

those who have fought in Syria. However, there is now evidence of other countries 

being targeted by those who have. 

The first is Belgium. Last week, it was reported that their security services intercepted a call from an extremist based in Syria, who was discussing a potential attack on the Brussels Palace of Justice with a contact in Belgium. 

Going further back, it was reported in October of last year that Jordanian authorities disrupted a significant plot against civilian and government targets, including potentially the U.S. Embassy in Amman. 

The Jordanian cell that connected in Syria was only thought to have been acquaintances prior to their shared experience fighting there. Afterwards, they had access to huge amounts of weaponry and explosives, as well as combat experience and 

a shared ideological inspiration to attack a foreign country. 

The Jordanian individuals in this plot were connected to al-Qaeda’s affiliate in 

Iraq, and I believe it is impossible to consider the threat emanating from this region 

without considering what is happening in Iraq. 

The State Department has now designated Jabhat al-Nusra as an alias for alQaeda in Iraq. Abu Dua, the emir of that group, announced last month that Jabhat 

al-Nusra was simply a ‘‘branch’’ of al-Qaeda in Iraq. It has been reported in recent 

days that Abu Dua has now entered northern Syria in order to get an even stronger 

grip on al-Qaeda’s operations there. 

Al-Qaeda in Iraq provides funding to Jabhat al-Nusra, as well as sharing fighters 

and the joint aspiration to overthrow Bashar al-Assad. However, the relationship between the two groups is not entirely straightforward. Al-Jawlani has distanced himself from Abu Dua’s claim of Jabhat al-Nusra simply being an extension of al-Qaeda 

in Iraq. 

Furthermore, al-Jawlani’s pledge of allegiance to al-Zawahiri does not necessarily 

make Jabhat al-Nusra a formal part of the al-Qaeda network. For example, members of al-Shabaab in Somalia pledged loyalty to al-Qaeda’s emir—at that stage 

Osama bin Laden—21⁄2 years before they were officially accepted by al-Qaeda as a 

formal franchise. 

IRAN

The conflict in Syria contains significant influence from Iran, one of the biggest 

supporters of the Assad regime. 

Iranian links to al-Qaeda have come under review following last month’s foiled 

train attack in Canada, and the suggestion that the two plotters were being guided 

by al-Qaeda elements in Iran. 

It would be surprising if the Canadian plot was Iranian government-sanctioned. 

Al-Qaeda would not be willing to be used as a proxy by the Iranian government in 

the way that, for example, Hizbollah would. There is too much distrust on both 

sides. I believe it is more likely that Iran were either not aware of al-Qaeda’s activities with regards to the Canadian plot, or they were and simply chose to look the 

other way. 

There is some truth in the suggestion that Iran’s connections to al-Qaeda are 

often largely overlooked. The Shia-Sunni sectarian split is seen as making any collaboration between the two a non-starter. However, there is evidence of engagement 

on some level. 

For example, Osama bin Laden met with Imad Mughniyah, a senior member of 

Hizbollah, in the early 1990s. It is thought that al-Qaeda subsequently received explosives training from the group. Furthermore, Iran facilitated al-Qaeda members’ 

travel in and out of Afghanistan prior to 9/11. Senior al-Qaeda leaders close to 

Osama bin Laden fled there after the invasion of Afghanistan, before being placed 

under a form of house arrest by early 2002. 

There is the possibility that Iran envisaged using some of these al-Qaeda 

operatives as a bargaining chip with the United States, or as a deterrent against 

attack on Iranian soil. 

Iran and al-Qaeda do also have shared enemies—the United States, Israel, and 

Saudi Arabia being the obvious ones. Therefore it is at least conceivable that Iran 

would allow al-Qaeda’s operatives limited scope to undertake activities against their 

shared enemies in return for not targeting Iran itself. 

While many of the al-Qaeda operatives in Iran have now been released, it is certain that there is still an al-Qaeda presence there. 

However, I believe this potential for interaction should not distract us from the 

potentially significant differences that do still exist between the two. These differences have on occasion played themselves out geopolitically. 
18 

In Syria, Iran is supporting Assad at a time al-Qaeda are attempting to overthrow 

him. Al-Zawahiri has publicly lambasted Iran’s role in the conflict. The perception 

of an increasingly influential Iran is something that al-Zawahiri has been warning 

of for several years. Al-Zawahiri has also at times portrayed Iran as a strategic 

threat, rather than an ally. 

Al-Qaeda in Iraq has a visceral hatred for Iran, which it regards as being a de 

facto ruler of the current Iraqi government. 

Therefore, despite the interaction that certainly does exist between the two, there 

are still question marks concerning the precise nature of the relationship between 

al-Qaeda and Iran. 

However, there are also differences between franchises within al-Qaeda itself. 

The complex dynamics between al-Qaeda in Iraq and Jabhat al-Nusra mirrors a 

wider ambiguity as to the precise dynamics between al-Qaeda’s senior leadership 

and its affiliates. 

For example, in the documentation discovered at Abbottabad, the revulsion that 

members of al-Qaeda’s core feel for their Iraqi franchise is clear, with suggestions 

that there is little operational interaction between the two. 

This is evidence of not only the increased importance of localised autonomy within 

the al-Qaeda movement today, but also the increased decentralisation of its leadership structure. 

CONCLUSION

To conclude, let me address some of what should be key concerns for homeland 

security. In the short term: The impact of Western fighters returning from Syria. 

In the long term: The fallout from a perceived lack of involvement by the West. 

I have in recent years co-authored three reports on terrorism trends from the late 

1990s onwards. This includes two editions of a publication called Islamist Terrorism: 

The British Connections, and most recently a publication called Al-Qaeda in the 

United States: A Complete Analysis of Terrorism Offenses. These reports provide a 

statistical analysis of the background of all individuals who were convicted in the 

United States and United Kingdom for Islamism or al-Qaeda-related offenses, or 

who had committed suicide attacks there. 

As part of this most recent research I studied which of those who had fought in 

conflict zones abroad—for example in Chechnya, Bosnia, or Kashmir—then went on 

to attempt mass casualty terrorist attacks after leaving the battlefield. 

Those that have attacked, or tried to attack, the West tended to be cells who had 

received terrorist training abroad and then returned to their country of origin specifically to carry out an operation. 

In both the United Kingdom and United States, it was extremely rare for those 

with combat experience to try and launch domestic attacks once they returned 

home. 

This may seem like a glimmer of a silver lining, but it is worth stressing that 

there is no guarantee that this will remain the case. 

The war in Syria could have other knock-on effects. For example, as with the 

jihad of the 1980s and 1990s, Syria will give legitimacy to a new generation of fighters. Those who have fought there could go on to become key ideologues, with their 

experiences in Syria serving as an inspiration for future generations of aspiring 

militants. This is precisely what happened with conflicts such as those in Afghanistan and Kashmir, and there is no reason to think Syria will be different. 

Furthermore, it is worth remembering that inaction can have just as much impact 

as intervention. It is often assumed that U.S. intervention in Iraq had a radicalising 

effect on Muslim communities. Yet consider the radicalising impact of a less-discussed war: That in Bosnia. The West had considerably less involvement in Bosnia 

than it did in Iraq and yet, in Europe, ideologues attempted to persuade Muslim 

communities that Western inaction meant Western acquiescence in the slaughter of 

Bosnian Muslims. 

Therefore, there remains a host of things to concern us about the fallout from 

Syria in both the short and long term. Thank you all for listening to my thoughts 

on this today, and I would be delighted to answer any questions you may have. 

Mr. KING. Thank you Mr. Simcox. 

I would just mentioned that Chairman McCaul and I jointly attended in the Henry Jackson Society and both of us were extremely 

impressed by your work. 

The society in general, but your work in particular, particularly 

that volume you put together, which I have to admit, I am still 
19 

working my way through. If anyone wants to see a detailed compilation, well you did it. So, thank you. 

Mr. SIMCOX. Thank you. 

Mr. Tom Joscelyn is a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a nonpartisan institution focused on National 

security and foreign policy, which was founded shortly after the 

September 11, 2011 terrorist attacks. He is also the senior editor 

of the Long War Journal. 

Mr. Joscelyn is a terrorism analyst and writer whose research focuses on how al-Qaeda and its affiliates operate around the world. 

Mr. Joscelyn served as senior terrorism advisor for Mayor 

Giuliani’s 2008 presidential campaign, and in 2006 he was named 

one of Claremont Institute’s Lincoln Fellows. 

He also has been extremely helpful to this committee, has testified before, and Mr. Joscelyn, welcome you back again today. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS JOSCELYN, SENIOR FELLOW, 

FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, thank you for having me back, Congressman King and Ranking Member Higgins and other Members of the 

subcommittee. 

I am going to focus my comments mainly on al-Qaeda and Iran 

because this is really I think a pretty widely misunderstood topic. 

I think both of your comments were right on the money in terms 

of emphasizing that there are numerous areas where they have divergent interests—— 

Mr. KING. If I could interrupt for just one second to say that that 

was certainly the main concern of Ranking Member Higgins when 

he came to me with this whole new element of Iran. So you in particular, we will be looking forward to your testimony. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Sure, sure. Let me give you a little bit of a historical perspective first because I think in order to understand how 

al-Qaeda and Iran collude together despite their differences, you 

have to take a longer view. I am going to get to the more recent 

plots, but you have to take a longer view. 

Going back to the early 1990s, and this is all documented in the 

9/11 Commission report—actually pages 60 to 61, 128, and 240 to 

241—where they discuss in detail how al-Qaeda and Iran actually 

forged an agreement to collude against their common enemies. 

Okay? 

This first agreement was actually forged in late 1992 or 1993 

when al-Qaeda was stationed in the Sudan at the time. It had numerous ramifications for how al-Qaeda evolved. 

In fact, part of the agreement led to senior al-Qaeda operatives 

traveling—this is again, according to the 9/11 Commission—traveling to both Lebanon and Iran to receive explosives training which 

was then used in the 1998 embassy bombings. Okay? So this is a 

matter of historical record. 

I would say in addition to the 9/11 Commission report when I 

look at the long view of the relationship other building blocks I look 

to—towards are actually the trial transcripts that came out of the 

embassy bombing trial in the spring of 2001 in New York, other 

documents were produced in the course of that litigation, I look 
20 

back to the Clinton administration’s original indictment of alQaeda November 4, 1998. 

I look back to the CIA’s documents that have been declassified 

from the 1990s. I look to the FBI’s declassified documents of 1990s. 

In other words what I am trying to say here is for the subcommittee is that there is this voluminous material that you have 

to look at in order to understand the relationship over a longer horizon and that even though they have had diverging interests and 

have actually come into conflict at times there are still numerous 

instances where actually the two have colluded. 

So looking at the current state of al-Qaeda and Iran, this is a 

fascinating part of what we focus on at the Long War Journal is 

a very granule analysis of individual terrorists so we have been 

trying to track who these guys are in Iran, the senior al-Qaeda 

leaders in Iran. 

Actually the Obama administration’s Treasury Department and 

State Department going back to July 2011, has laid out in very 

great detail how this relationship works. 

I think the Treasury Department and the State Department actually deserve a lot of credit for really blazing the trail in terms 

of understanding what is going on inside Iran today. 

In a series of designations the Treasury Department, which is 

subjected to a very rigorous process came to the conclusion in July 

2011, that in fact al-Qaeda and Iran have an agreement, have an 

explicit agreement that allows senior al-Qaeda operatives to operate inside Iran. 

That designation in July 2011 was followed up with a reward by 

the State Department in December 2011 of $10 million for the head 

of that network, Yasin Al Suri. 

It was followed up in February 2012 by designation by the Treasury Department designating Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security for their support to al-Qaeda. Okay, so this is again U.S. 

Government official position at this point. 

Then in October 2012 the Treasury Department came back again 

and designated the new head of al-Qaeda in Iran in that network 

and that the new head of al-Qaeda in Iran right now as we sit here 

is a guy named Muhsin al Fadhli who was a Kuwaiti who actually 

is so trusted within al-Qaeda he was one of the few terrorists that 

actually had foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks. So this is a guy 

who was a big fish in the al-Qaeda world. 

Just quickly going through the plots you will see my testimony 

would try to do is outline for you, I try to connect the dots between 

what the Treasury Department and the State Government said 

about al-Qaeda and Iran is a relationship, the network and how it 

functions, and actual specific plots that have gone beyond Iraq and 

Afghanistan. 

These are plots that have come at the West and one of the first 

things I found was the 2010 plot ordered by Osama bin Laden, 

which was intended to have a Mumbai-style attacks on European 

cities, actually used the facilitation network in Iran and according 

to the New York Times and other credible reporting, Iran actually 

provided safe haven to some of the plotters involved in that attack. 

Okay? 
21 

Going forward to the Canadian plot that you have mentioned and 

expressed concern about—and rightfully so, Congressman—the reporting that has come out says that at least one of those plotters, 

not only did they receive direction and guidance from al-Qaeda 

members in Iran, but at least one of them traveled, according to 

press reporting, to Zahadan, which is in eastern Iran. 

Zahadan is actually a hub for al-Qaeda and Iran, as it long has 

been to al-Qaeda-affiliated groups. It is one of their—basically their 

transportation nodes that they use to shuttle fighters around. So 

that sticks out as a red flag to me. 

The third thing I would like to say is that earlier this month that 

Egyptian interior minister came out with news that broke up an 

al-Qaeda plot against the American Embassy and the French Embassy in Cairo. These embassies in Cairo. 

He didn’t provide many details about what actually happened in 

the plot but he identified that at least one of the plotters had 

trained, received military training in Iran and Pakistan, and he 

also named a key al-Qaeda point of contact for them as a guy 

named Dawud al Asadi. 

Now being the nerd, this actually struck a chord with me when 

I saw this because that actually is the alias for the head of alQaeda in Iran today. Okay. It is actually Muhsin al Fadhli, one of 

his key aliases. 

So what I am saying here is there is a huge Government literature, U.S. Government literature in the Treasury and State Department outlining this network inside Iran and the focus of my 

testimony is to show how that network has actually facilitated 

plots not just in Iraq and Afganistan, but also abroad in the West 

and even in our own hemisphere. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Joscelyn follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS JOSCELYN

MAY 22, 2013 

Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the committee, thank 

you for inviting me here today to discuss the threat posed by al-Qaeda’s operations 

inside Iran and Syria. These are complex topics that require a careful evaluation 

of the facts, and even then there is much we do not know. Yet, it is clear that alQaeda’s networks in Syria and Iran threaten American interests in various ways. 

My testimony can be boiled down to two points. First, al-Qaeda is fighting to establish a safe haven that covers parts of both Iraq and Syria and, if the terror network is successful, it will most likely increase the threat to the U.S. homeland. The 

effects of al-Qaeda’s growth in Syria have already been felt by neighboring countries. And European officials have expressed their concern that al-Qaeda’s network 

inside Syria could be used to launch attacks against their countries. 

Second, while Iran’s proxies and al-Qaeda are at odds inside Syria, the two have 

repeatedly colluded since the early 1990s. Under the Obama administration, the 

Treasury and State Departments have repeatedly highlighted an ‘‘agreement’’ between the Iranian regime and al-Qaeda that allows senior terrorists to operate on 

Iranian soil. 

Al-Qaeda’s Iran-based network has not only facilitated the movement of terrorists 

to the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, but has also been implicated in plots 

against the West and against Western interests elsewhere. In my testimony today, 

I am going to highlight three specific examples: Al-Qaeda’s 2010 Mumbai-style plot 

against European cities, the al-Qaeda plot broken up in Canada in April, and the 

foiled plot against the U.S. and French Embassies in Cairo earlier this month. In 

all three instances, there are reported ties between the plotters and al-Qaeda 

operatives inside Iran. This does not mean that Iranian officials planned these acts 
22 

1 Jason Burke, ‘‘Al-Qaida leader Zawahiri urges Muslim support for Syrian uprising,’’ The 

Guardian, February 12, 2012. See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/12/alqaidazawahiri-support-syrian-uprising. 2State Department Press Statement, ‘‘Terrorist Designations of the al-Nusrah Front as an 

Alias for al-Qa’ida in Iraq,’’ December 11, 2012. See: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/ 

12/201759.htm 3State Department Media Note, ‘‘Terrorist Designation of Al-Nusrah Front Leader Muhammad Al-Jawlani,’’ May 16, 2013. See: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/209499.htm. 

For a discussion of al Julani’s statement, see: Thomas Joscelyn, ‘‘Al Nusrah Front leader renews 

allegiance to al-Qaeda, rejects new name,’’ The Long War Journal, April 10, 2013. See: http:// 

www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/04/allnusrahlfrontllead.php. 4See, for example: Greg Jaffe, ‘‘Iraq attacks raise specter of al-Qaeda’s return,’’ The Washington Post, July 23, 2012. See: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iraqattacks-raise-specter-of-al-qaedas-return/2012/07/23/gJQAVgB74Wlstory.html. 5 Joby Warrick, ‘‘In foiled Jordanian terror plot, officials see hand of resurgent al-Qaeda in 

Iraq,’’ The Washington Post, December 2, 2012. See: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 

national-security/in-jordanian-terror-plot-officials-see-hand-of-resurgent-al-qaeda-in-iraq/2012/ 

12/02/43f1698c-3421-11e2-bb9b-288a310849eelstory.html. 6The Al Nusrah Front is being assisted by Chechens and others, too. There are even credible 

reports of jihadists from China traveling to Syria to fight. 7Matthias Gebauer and Veit Medick, ‘‘Interior Minister: Boston Points to ‘Dangerous Phenomenon’,’’ Spiegel Online, April 25, 2013. See: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/ 

german-minister-says-authorities-concerned-about-lone-wolf-terrorists-a-896493-2.html. 

of terror. But the clear implication is that Iran’s provision of safe haven has allowed 

al-Qaeda terrorists to coordinate plots far beyond the Middle East, including just 

north of our border. 

AL-QAEDA IN SYRIA

Al-Qaeda did not start the Syrian rebellion, which comprises a number of groups. 

My written testimony focuses specifically on al-Qaeda’s activities inside Syria. The 

growth of al-Qaeda’s Syrian wing, the Al Nusrah Front, is alarming. Al-Qaeda has 

clearly capitalized on the violence. Al-Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri has repeatedly 

emphasized the importance of the effort to topple Bashar al Assad’s regime. In February 2012, for instance, Zawahiri urged jihadists to make their way to Syria to 

fight the ‘‘pernicious, cancerous regime.’’1 Just a few months earlier, in late 2011, 

the Al Nusrah Front was established by Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), an al-Qaeda affiliate that has sworn fealty to al-Qaeda’s senior leadership.2 In April of this year, Abu 

Muhammad al Julani, the head of the Al Nusrah Front, also reaffirmed his oath 

of loyalty to Zawahiri in an audio recording.3 Make no mistake about it: The Al 

Nusrah Front is al-Qaeda. 

While the Al Nusrah Front’s resources are largely devoted to the fighting inside 

Syria, we have already witnessed the effects of al-Qaeda’s expansion beyond Syria’s 

borders. As the Al Nusrah Front has ramped up its operations, AQI has also increased its operational tempo inside Iraq.4 In other words, AQI’s operations in Iraq 

have not suffered even as the group has taken on a larger role inside Syria. This 

indicates that al-Qaeda’s overall capacity for violence has greatly increased inside 

both countries since late 2011. 

Other neighboring states are feeling the effects as well. Consider just one example. Late last year, AQI plotted a complex series of attacks inside Jordan, with the 

ultimate target being the U.S. Embassy. According to The Washington Post, the 

plotters had fought inside Syria and carried their ‘‘new skills and a changed perspective toward their native country’’ back home with them.5 AQI’s recruiting and 

facilitation network inside Jordan plays a significant role in the Al Nusrah Front’s 

operations, making it likely that returnees will continue to pose a threat for the 

foreseeable future. The Al Nusrah Front poses security challenges for Syria’s other 

neighbors as well. And the Al Nusrah Front’s tentacles stretch far beyond Syria’s 

immediate neighborhood. The group is pulling in fighters from numerous other 

countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa.6

European officials have sounded the alarm concerning the Al Nusrah Front’s 

Western recruits. In an interview with Spiegel Online in April, German Interior 

Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich said that authorities were aware ‘‘of calls for those 

Europeans who have been trained in battle’’ in Syria ‘‘to return home and pursue 

jihad.’’7 Friedrich added, ‘‘We are following this development with great concern.’’ 

Other European officials have expressed similar concerns. 

Thus, al-Qaeda’s arm in Syria has already impacted the security of neighboring 

countries and added a new threat to European nations. But we’ve been asked to assess the threat to the U.S. homeland. While I am not aware of any specific plots 

against the homeland that have been tied to al-Qaeda’s presence in Syria so far, the 
23 

8 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 365–374. 

9 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 366. 

10 9/11 Commission Report, p. 367. 11This ‘‘over there’’-‘‘over here’’ dynamic was first used in the 9/11 Commission’s final report. 

See p. 362. 12David Samuels, ‘‘The New Mastermind of Jihad,’’ The Wall Street Journal, April 6, 2012. 

See: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303299604577323750859163544.html. 

lessons of the past are plain to see. At least three observations concerning the potential threat emanating from Syria come to mind. 

First, the 9/11 Commission stressed in its final report that sanctuaries are necessary for large-scale terrorist plotting.8 ‘‘Many details... illustrate the direct 

and indirect value of the Afghan sanctuary to al-Qaeda in preparing the 9/11 attack 

and other operations,’’ the commission found.9

It was for this reason that the commission recommended that the U.S. Government craft a strategy for disrupting terrorist sanctuaries. When the commission 

published its final report in 2004, there was a palpable fear that Iraq would become 

the next Afghanistan. ‘‘If, for example, Iraq becomes a failed state, it will go to the 

top of the list of places that are breeding grounds for attacks against Americans at 

home,’’ the commission wrote.10 We could make the same observation about Syria 

(and Iraq) today. Al-Qaeda’s affiliate is attempting to establish a safe haven stretching across both countries. If al-Qaeda is successful, and this is not a certainty at 

this point, then this will almost certainly lead to new plots against the U.S. homeland. 

Second, we have already seen the connection between gains made by al-Qaeda’s 

affiliates on the ground ‘‘over there’’ and the threat to Americans ‘‘over here.’’11 The 

most striking example of this can be found inside Yemen, where al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) made significant advances beginning in 2009. Yet even 

as AQAP rose in prominence, some counterterrorism analysts assumed that the 

threat to American interests was confined to inside Yemen. AQAP’s attempted 

bombing of Flight 253 on Christmas day 2009 changed that thinking. Here is what 

the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found in its analysis of the intelligence 

failures leading up to that attempted attack: ‘‘Prior to the 12/25 plot, counterterrorism analysts at NCTC, CIA, and NSA were focused on the threat of terrorist attacks in Yemen, but were not focused on the possibility of AQAP attacks against 

the U.S. homeland.’’ The 12/25 plot is just one of several by AQAP against the 

homeland. We should not make the same analytic mistake with respect to other alQaeda affiliates, whether they are in Syria, Iraq, or elsewhere. This does not mean 

that these affiliates will immediately devote resources to attacks on the U.S. homeland, but the potential is always there. 

Third, a violent rebellion inside Syria has already been tied to a catastrophic terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland—albeit indirectly. Consider the following history. 

One of the paths to 9/11 began in Syria in the early 1980s, when the Assad family’s 

regime brutally crushed a rebellion launched by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. 

Members of the Brotherhood were forced to flee to neighboring states and Europe. 

Some of them evolved into elite al-Qaeda operatives. 

One such former Syrian Muslim Brother is named Mohammed Zammar, a key recruiter of al-Qaeda’s Hamburg cell, which provided the suicide hijack pilots for the 

9/11 operation. One of Zammar’s fellow Syrian Brothers, Mamoun Darkazanli, has 

been identified as an important backer of the Hamburg cell and served as an imam 

at the mosque where Mohammed Atta and his fellow hijackers regularly met. AlQaeda’s cell in Spain at the time of 9/11 was run by a former Syrian Muslim Brother named Imad Yarkas, who was convicted on terrorism charges. And one of 

Yarkas’s minions, also a former Syrian Muslim Brother, may have performed surveillance on the World Trade Center in 1997 that was used to plot the 9/11 attack. 

Still another former Syrian Brother who rose through al-Qaeda’s ranks is an ideologue named Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (a.k.a. Abu Musab al Suri), who was tied 

to al-Qaeda’s terrorist plotting inside Europe, including the 2004 Madrid train 

bombings and the 2005 attacks in London. Nasar played a prominent role in alQaeda’s operations prior to being detained in 2005 and transferred to Syrian custody. Nasar is a widely influential jihadist thinker and a key advocate of small-scale 

terrorist attacks inside the West. He was reportedly freed by the Assad regime in 

the wake of the current rebellion.12

In sum, the Syrian civil war is likely providing new talent for al-Qaeda’s international operations and has led to established threats like Nasar being freed. We 

cannot know with certainty if or when al-Qaeda operatives inside Syria will attempt 

to launch an attack against the U.S. homeland. And America’s defenses have greatly 

improved since 9/11, making it more difficult for such an attack to succeed. How-
24 

13See U.S. Treasury Department Press Release, ‘‘Treasury Targets Key Al-Qa’ida Funding 

and Support Network Using Iran as a Critical Transit Point,’’ July 28, 2011. The press release 

can be found online at: http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1261.aspx 

(last accessed May 20, 2013). 

ever, we should be mindful that the Syrian conflict opens new possibilities for alQaeda, which is always probing our defenses for a weakness. 

AL-QAEDA’S NETWORK IN IRAN

There is no doubt that Iran and al-Qaeda are on opposite sides of the Syrian war 

today. Iran supports Bashar al Assad’s crumbling regime, while al-Qaeda’s Al 

Nusrah Front is one of the leading insurgency groups opposed to Assad. This obvious conflict of interest must create new tension between al-Qaeda and Iran. It may 

very well lead their relationship in a new direction. However, it would be a mistake 

to assume, absent significant evidence, that the fight in Syria will necessarily end 

the relationship between the Iranian regime and al-Qaeda, which has always simultaneously entailed both mistrust and collusion. 

In fact, al-Qaeda and Iran have frequently worked together even in the face of 

divergent interests. For example, Iran allowed some al-Qaeda leaders to operate on 

its soil following the 9/11 attacks, but placed them under a form of house arrest in 

2003. This reportedly prompted Osama bin Laden to threaten the Iranians with violence if they did not release al-Qaeda leaders and al-Qaeda family members from 

custody. The Iranians did not release all of the al-Qaeda members from house arrest, but the two still found common ground for cooperation. Then, in 2009, alQaeda kidnapped an Iranian diplomat, holding him hostage in order to force the Iranians’ hand in freeing these same al-Qaeda members. This led to a hostage exchange between the two. But despite such antagonistic episodes, Iran and al-Qaeda 

have repeatedly cooperated when it suits their common interests. 

Under the Obama administration, the U.S. Treasury Department has led the way 

in exposing al-Qaeda’s Iran-based network and the agreement that led to its existence. Since July 2011, the Treasury Department has issued three separate designations targeting al-Qaeda’s Iran-based network. It is important to note that this network remains active under an ‘‘agreement’’ between Iran and al-Qaeda, even as the 

two support opposite sides in the Syrian war. In addition, the State Department has 

repeatedly pointed to this same agreement, issuing rewards for al-Qaeda leaders inside Iran. 

The Treasury Department Targets Iran’s ‘‘Secret Deal’’ With al-Qaeda 

On July 28, 2011, the Treasury Department designated six al-Qaeda members 

who formed the core of al-Qaeda’s Iran-based network at the time.13 Some of the 

terrorists are based elsewhere, but work with Iran-based facilitators to move fighters and money. The Treasury Department explained that this al-Qaeda network is 

‘‘headed by Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil, a prominent Iran-based al-Qaeda facilitator, 

operating under an agreement between al-Qaeda and the Iranian government.’’ 

Khalil is otherwise known as Yasin al Suri. 

‘‘Iran is the leading state sponsor of terrorism in the world today,’’ Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen said when announcing this designation. ‘‘By exposing Iran’s secret deal with al-Qaeda allowing it to 

funnel funds and operatives through its territory, we are illuminating yet another 

aspect of Iran’s unmatched support for terrorism,’’ Cohen explained. He continued: 

‘‘Today’s action also seeks to disrupt this key network and deny al-Qaeda’s senior 

leadership much-needed support.’’ 

The Treasury Department described Iran as ‘‘a critical transit point for funding 

to support al-Qaeda’s activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan’’ and noted that ‘‘Iranian authorities maintain a relationship with Khalil and have permitted him to operate within Iran’s borders since 2005.’’ Khalil’s activities included moving ‘‘money 

and recruits from across the Middle East into Iran, then on to Pakistan,’’ where 

they served other senior al-Qaeda leaders. 

The Treasury Department hinted at the game Iranian authorities play in their 

relationship with al-Qaeda. Khalil ‘‘works with the Iranian government to arrange 

releases of al-Qaeda personnel from Iranian prisons.’’ After they are released, ‘‘the 

Iranian government transfers them to Khalil, who then facilitates their travel to 

Pakistan.’’ 

One of the al-Qaeda leaders then working with Khalil and included in the July 

2011 designation was Atiyah Abd al Rahman, who was subsequently killed in a 

drone strike the following month, on August 22, 2011 in North Waziristan, Paki-
25 

14 Bill Roggio, ‘‘Al Qaeda announces death of Atiyah Abd al Rahman,’’ The Long War Journal, 

December 1, 2011. See: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/12/allqaedal- announcesld.php. 15Siobhan Gorman, ‘‘Bin Laden Plotted New Attack,’’ The Wall Street Journal, July 15, 2011. 

See: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304521304576446213098582284.html. 16 U.S. Treasury Department Press Release, ‘‘Treasury Designates Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security for Human Rights Abuses and Support for Terrorism,’’ February 16, 2012. 

See: http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1424.aspx. 17 U.S. Treasury Department Press Release, ‘‘Treasury Further Exposes Iran-Based Al-Qa’ida 

Network,’’ October 18, 2012. See: http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ 

tg1741.aspx 

stan.14 According to the Treasury Department, Rahman was al-Qaeda’s ‘‘overall 

commander in Pakistan’s tribal areas and as of late 2010, the leader of al-Qaeda 

in North and South Waziristan, Pakistan.’’ The Treasury Department added: 

‘‘Rahman was previously appointed by Osama bin Laden to serve as al-Qaeda’s emissary in Iran, a position which allowed him to travel in and out of Iran with the 

permission of Iranian officials.’’ 

A little more than two weeks prior to the Treasury Department’s designation, The 

Wall Street Journal reported that Rahman was al-Qaeda’s ‘‘operations chief’’ and 

was working with bin Laden to assemble a terrorist cell capable of hitting America 

on the tenth anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks.15 According to the newspaper, the intelligence tying Rahman to the plot was found in communications recovered during the May 2011 U.S. raid on bin Laden’s safe house in Abbottabad, 

Pakistan. Anonymous officials told The Wall Street Journal that the ‘‘plans were 

only in the discussion phase’’ and there were no ‘‘signs the nascent plot ever went 

beyond the early planning.’’ 

The Treasury Department Designates Iran’s MOIS for Supporting al-Qaeda, Among 

Other Acts 

On February 16, 2012, the U.S. Treasury Department designated the Iranian 

Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) ‘‘for its support to terrorist groups as 

well as its central role in perpetrating human rights abuses against the citizens of 

Iran and its role in supporting the Syrian regime as it continues to commit human 

rights abuses against the people of Syria.’’16

Al-Qaeda and its affiliate, al-Qaeda in Iraq, are among the terrorist groups supported by the MOIS, which is Iran’s chief intelligence agency. ‘‘Today we have designated the MOIS for abusing the basic human rights of Iranian citizens and exporting its vicious practices to support the Syrian regime’s abhorrent crackdown on its 

own population,’’ Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. 

Cohen explained in a press release. Cohen added: ‘‘In addition, we are designating 

the MOIS for its support to terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in Iraq, 

Hizballah and HAMAS, again exposing the extent of Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism 

as a matter of Iranian state policy.’’ 

The MOIS is assisting al-Qaeda in a variety of ways. The Treasury Department 

revealed that ‘‘MOIS has facilitated the movement of al-Qaeda operatives in Iran 

and provided them with documents, identification cards, and passports.’’ In addition, 

the MOIS has ‘‘provided money and weapons to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)... and 

negotiated prisoner releases of AQI operatives.’’ 

The Treasury Department ‘‘Further Exposes’’ Iran-al-Qaeda Relationship 

On October 18, 2012, the U.S. Treasury Department designated Adel Radi Saqr 

al Wahabi al Harbi, who is ‘‘a key member of an al-Qaeda network operating in Iran 

and led by Iran-based al-Qaeda facilitator Muhsin al Fadhli.’’17 This is the same 

network that was previously headed by Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil (a.k.a. Yasin al 

Suri), as revealed in the Treasury Department’s July 2011 designation discussed 

above. Al Fadhli took over as chief of al-Qaeda’s Iran-based network in late 2011, 

after the U.S. Government openly identified and offered a reward for his predecessor. 

Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen explained that the October 2012 designation built upon the July 2011 designation and 

‘‘further exposes al-Qaeda’s critically important Iran-based funding and facilitation 

network.’’ Cohen added: ‘‘We will continue targeting this crucial source of al-Qaeda’s 

funding and support, as well as highlight Iran’s on-going complicity in this network’s operation.’’ 

Muhsin al Fadhli is a long-time al-Qaeda operative who was previously designated by the U.S. Government in 2005. Al Fadhli is so trusted within al-Qaeda 

that he was one of the few terrorists with foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks. When 

he was first designated in 2005, al Fadhli was ‘‘considered an al-Qaeda leader in 
26 

18This section is based on an article I co-authored for The Weekly Standard. Benjamin 

Weinthal and Thomas Joscelyn, ‘‘Al Qaeda’s Network in Iran,’’ The Weekly Standard, April 2, 

2012. See: http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/al-qaeda-s-network-iranl634428.html 

the Gulf’’ who ‘‘provided support to Iraq-based fighters for attacks against’’ the U.S.- 

led Coalition. Al Fadhli was also a ‘‘major facilitator’’ for deceased AQI [al-Qaeda 

in Iraq] leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi. And prior to his involvement in the Iraqi 

insurgency, al Fadhli ‘‘was involved in several terrorist attacks that took place in 

October 2002 including the attacks on the French ship MV Limburg and against 

U.S. Marines on Faylaka Island in Kuwait.’’ 

Al Fadhli ‘‘began working with al-Qaeda’s Iran-based facilitation network in 2009 

and was later arrested by the Iranians,’’ according to the Treasury Department. Al 

Fadhli ‘‘was subsequently released by the Iranians in 2011 and went on to assume 

the leadership of the facilitation network from Yasin al Suri later that year.’’ Today, 

al Fadhli’s Iran-based network provides ‘‘funding for al-Qaeda activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan’’, and moves ‘‘fighters and money through Turkey to support alQaeda-affiliated elements in Syria.’’ Al Fadhli is also ‘‘leveraging his extensive network of Kuwaiti jihadist donors to send money to Syria via Turkey,’’ according to 

Treasury. 

Al Harbi serves as al Fadhli’s deputy. In that capacity, according to Treasury, al 

Harbi ‘‘facilitates the travel of extremists to Afghanistan or Iraq via Iran on behalf 

of al-Qaeda, and is believed to have sought funds to support al-Qaeda attacks.’’ Al 

Harbi joined al-Qaeda’s network in Iran in 2011, but was previously added to Saudi 

Arabia’s Most Wanted List. The Saudi Ministry of Interior charged al Harbi with 

‘‘traveling to Afghanistan to join al-Qaeda and providing technical support on the 

Internet to the terrorist group.’’ 

Explanation of the ‘‘Agreement’’ Between Iran and al-Qaeda 

The Treasury Department’s October 2012 announcement contained new details 

concerning the ‘‘agreement’’ between Iran and al-Qaeda. ‘‘Under the terms of the 

agreement between al-Qaeda and Iran,’’ Treasury reported, ‘‘al-Qaeda must refrain 

from conducting any operations within Iranian territory and recruiting operatives 

inside Iran while keeping Iranian authorities informed of their activities.’’ 

‘‘In return,’’ Treasury continued, ‘‘the Government of Iran gave the Iran-based alQaeda network freedom of operation and uninhibited ability to travel for extremists 

and their families.’’ If al-Qaeda members ‘‘violate these terms’’ they ‘‘run the risk 

of being detained by Iranian authorities.’’ 

The previous head of the network, Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil (a.k.a. Yasin al Suri), 

‘‘agreed to the terms of this agreement with Iran with the knowledge of now-deceased al-Qaeda leader ’Atiyah ’Abd al Rahman.’’ Rahman, who was killed in a 

drone strike in August 2011, is discussed above. Despite the U.S. Government’s efforts, however, Treasury says that ‘‘Iran continues to allow al-Qaeda to operate a 

core pipeline that moves al-Qaeda money and fighters through Iran to support alQaeda activities in South Asia.’’ And ‘‘this network also sends funding and fighters 

to Syria.’’ 

AL-QAEDA’S NETWORK IN IRAN TIED TO PLOTS AGAINST WESTERN INTERESTS

Under the Obama administration, the Treasury and State Departments have 

made it clear that al-Qaeda’s network inside Iran plays a vital role in shuttling terrorists to and from the Middle East and South Asia. In this section, I am going to 

extend this analysis, pointing to ties between this same network and three plots 

against Western interests outside of war zones. The first plot was in 2010, when 

al-Qaeda sought to launch Mumbai-style attacks against Western cities. The alQaeda operatives selected to take part in the attacks used Iranian soil to transit 

to and from northern Pakistan. After the plot was disrupted, some of them were 

sheltered inside Iran as well. 

The second al-Qaeda plot was foiled by Canadian authorities in April. Canadian 

officials revealed that the plotters received ‘‘direction and guidance’’ from al-Qaeda 

members in Iran. The third al-Qaeda plot was broken up by Egyptian authorities 

earlier this month. The cell responsible reportedly targeted the U.S. and French 

Embassies in Cairo and received assistance from a senior al-Qaeda leader who may 

be the same terrorist who currently heads al-Qaeda’s network in Iran. 

2010 Mumbai-style Plot Against Europe 

In March 2012, an alleged al-Qaeda operative named Ahmad Wali Siddiqui went 

on trial in Koblenz, Germany.18 Siddiqui was reportedly slated to take part in one 

of the final plots ordered by Osama bin Laden, who wanted to launch Mumbai-style 

attacks in European cities. Siddiqui’s testimony, as well as other evidence, dem-
27 

19 Hubert Gude, ‘‘Key Al-Qaida Witness: Hamburg Islamist to Stand Trial in Germany,’’ Spiegel Online, February 28, 2012. See: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/key-al-qaidawitness-hamburg-islamist-to-stand-trial-in-germany-a-817984.html. 20Souad Mekhennet, ‘‘Hiding in Iran, Raising Suspicions in Europe,’’ The New York Times, 

January 10, 2012. See: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/10/world/middleeast/hiding-in-iranraising-suspicions-in-europe.html?lr=0. 

onstrated that this al-Qaeda cell used the very same Iran-based terror network that, 

according to the Treasury Department, operates ‘‘under an agreement between alQaeda and the Iranian government.’’ 

During his testimony, Siddiqui, a dual German and Afghan citizen, discussed the 

time he and his fellow plotters spent at the same mosque attended by al-Qaeda’s 

9/11 Hamburg cell, as well as his own transformation into a violent jihadist. ‘‘We 

wanted to fight... against Americans,’’ Siddiqui told the court. Siddiqui initially 

joined the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a terrorist organization closely 

allied with al-Qaeda, in northern Pakistan. He quickly migrated to al-Qaeda itself. 

According to the German indictment, senior terrorists decided to send Siddiqui back 

to Germany to take part in a potentially devastating attack intended ‘‘to weaken 

Europe’s economy.’’ After Siddiqui was captured in Afghanistan, he revealed the 

nascent plot. 

In testimony before the court, Siddiqui described how he and his co-conspirators 

planned different travel routes in order to avoid suspicion beginning in early 2009. 

But their travels had a common theme: Iran was their principal gateway to jihad. 

According to Siddiqui, two of his co-conspirators—Rami Makanesi and Naamen 

Meziche—traveled from Vienna to Tehran in order ‘‘to not get caught.’’ Their trip 

was booked in a Hamburg travel office by an unknown Iranian. Siddiqui explained 

that the pair could not travel directly to Pakistan because they are Arabs. Pakistani 

authorities would have questioned the duo’s intentions and perhaps detained them, 

but by traveling through Iran they avoided such scrutiny. 

When Makanesi and Meziche arrived in Tehran, Siddiqui explained, they called 

a facilitator known as ‘‘Dr. Mamoud,’’ who works for the IMU. The two were ushered to Zahedan, a city on the eastern border of Iran, close to both Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. There, Siddiqui says, Dr. Mamoud ‘‘welcomed them.’’ 

Zahedan is a well-known hub of al-Qaeda and IMU activity. The IMU has repeatedly used the city’s Makki mosque, the largest Sunni mosque in Iran, to shuttle 

fighters into Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaeda has an established presence there, 

too. For instance, before his May 2011 suicide at Guanta ́namo, an Afghan detainee 

named Inayatullah allegedly admitted to authorities that he was al-Qaeda’s emir of 

Zahedan, from where he delivered recruits to senior al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan. 

Even since Inayatullah’s capture, al-Qaeda fighters have continued to travel 

through Zahedan, as Makanesi and Meziche did. And, as explained below, the alQaeda plot disrupted in Canada in April reportedly involved this very same hub in 

Zahedan. 

Meziche has long been known to European counterterrorism officials. His fatherin-law, Mohamed al-Fazazi, was a radical preacher whose sermons and spiritual advice guided al-Qaeda’s 9/11 Hamburg cell. Meziche was reportedly close to Mohamed 

Atta, the lead hijacker in the 9/11 attacks, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, al-Qaeda’s point 

man for the 9/11 operation. Bin al-Shibh reportedly tried to call Meziche just days 

before the 9/11 attacks. Meziche was later implicated in al-Qaeda in Iraq’s operations after European officials found that he had been recruiting fighters for the organization. 

According to Der Spiegel, senior al-Qaeda terrorists instructed Meziche and another member of the cell, an Iranian national named Shahab Dashti, to travel to 

Iran where ‘‘they would be told where in Europe they were to be deployed to begin 

building structures for bin Laden’s organization.’’19 Once in Iran, Dashti ‘‘was to undergo facial plastic surgery’’ because he had already appeared in a propaganda video 

and was therefore recognizable to European authorities. However, Dashti did not 

get a chance to fool Western intelligence officials, because he was killed in a drone 

strike in northern Pakistan in early October 2010, after the Mumbai-style plot was 

uncovered. 

Initial reports indicated that Meziche was killed in the same drone strike, but he 

survived it and was sheltered by the Iranians before being captured inside Pakistan. 

The New York Times reported in January 2012 that Meziche and several other 

members of the cell are ‘‘waiting in Iran, trying to return to Europe.’’20 European 

authorities were not eager to see them come back, as they posed obvious security 

risks. Anonymous U.S. officials interviewed by the Times described Meziche and one 

of his Iran-based compatriots as ‘‘lower mid-level’’ al-Qaeda operatives. ‘‘These two 

have been involved in al-Qaeda external operations activities for some time now,’’ 
28 

21 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, ‘‘RCMP Arrests Two Individuals for Terrorism-related 

Charges,’’ April 22, 2013. See: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/news-nouvelles/2013/04-22-ns-sneng.htm. 22 CBS News and Associated Press, ‘‘2 arrested in terror plot against Canadian passenger 

train, police say,’’ April 22, 2013. See: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202l162-57580804/2-arrested-in-terror-plot-against-canadian-passenger-train-police-say/. 23 Ibid. 24Mark Hosenball, ‘‘Canada train plot suspect traveled to Iran: U.S. officials,’’ Reuters, April 

25, 2013. See: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/25/us-arrests-iran-idUSBRE93- 

O1D320130425. 

one official said. Citing multiple intelligence sources, The New York Times explained 

that ‘‘Iran appears to be harboring them in hopes that, when and if they leave, they 

will cause trouble in the West.’’ 

Rami Makanesi, who set off for Tehran with Meziche, was arrested in Pakistan 

in 2010 and sentenced to nearly 5 years in prison last year by a Frankfurt court. 

Makanesi has his own ties to Iran-based al-Qaeda operatives. According to Guido 

Steinberg, a researcher in the Middle East and North Africa division of the German 

Institute for International Security Affairs, Makanesi met a top al-Qaeda operative 

known as Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil (a.k.a. Yasin al Suri) in February 2010. Khalil 

is the same al-Qaeda leader who was designated by the Treasury Department in 

July 2011. Steinberg, in his analysis brief for IHS Jane’s, a military and intelligence 

consulting group, explains that Khalil asked Makanesi to ‘‘accompany him to Iran.’’ 

Makanesi said that Khalil ‘‘was responsible for funneling money and recruits via 

Iran and that he was known to cooperate with the Iranian government.’’ 

When the Treasury Department designated Khalil in 2011, it also designated several other members of al-Qaeda who utilize the Iran-based network. As explained 

above, one of them was Atiyah Abd al Rahman, who was subsequently killed in a 

drone strike in northern Pakistan. The Treasury Department explained: ‘‘Rahman 

was previously appointed by Osama bin Laden to serve as al-Qaeda’s emissary in 

Iran, a position which allowed him to travel in and out of Iran with the permission 

of Iranian officials.’’ Makanesi seems to have at least known Rahman. According to 

Steinberg, Makanesi has explained that Rahman ‘‘was known to have lived in Iran 

for many years.’’ 

The evidence in this matter is clear. The al-Qaeda cell that was selected to take 

part in one of Osama bin Laden’s last plots against the West was facilitated by the 

same Iran-based network that the Treasury and State Departments have repeatedly 

pointed to as evidence of collusion between al-Qaeda and the Iranian regime. This 

does not mean that Iranian officials orchestrated the plot or were otherwise directly 

involved. Then again, we cannot rule out the possibility. At a minimum, al-Qaeda’s 

network in Iran played a key role. 

DISRUPTED PLOT AGAINST TRAINS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

On April 22, 2013, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) announced that 

they had disrupted an al-Qaeda plot to derail a passenger train traveling from New 

York to Toronto.21 Canadian officials directly implicated al-Qaeda in the plot. ‘‘This 

is the first known al-Qaeda planned attack that we’ve experienced in Canada,’’ Superintendent Doug Best told reporters.22 ‘‘Had this plot been carried out, it would 

have resulted in innocent people being killed or seriously injured,’’ Assistant RCMP 

Commissioner James Malizia said. RCMP chief superintendent Jennifer Strachan 

explained that the plot ‘‘was definitely in the planning stage but not imminent.’’23

Strachan elaborated: ‘‘We are alleging that these two individuals took steps and conducted activities to initiate a terrorist attack. They watched trains and railways.’’ 

Canadian officials added a key allegation: The plotters received ‘‘direction and 

guidance’’ from al-Qaeda members in Iran. 

According to Reuters, investigators think that one of the suspects ‘‘traveled to Iran 

on a trip that was directly relevant to the investigation of the alleged plot.’’24 Reuters added: ‘‘U.S. national security sources close to the investigation said that was 

a reference to a network of low- to middle-level al-Qaeda fixers and ‘facilitators’ 

based in the town of Zahedan, close to Iran’s borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, that moves money and fighters through Iran to support its activities in South 

Asia.’’ 

This is, once again, the same al-Qaeda network that operates under an ‘‘agreement’’ with the Iranian regime. Canadian officials say they have not find evidence 

implicating Iranian officials in the plot. But Iran’s provision of safe haven to alQaeda is a significant factor by itself. More details about the al-Qaeda’s cells contacts inside Iran will hopefully emerge during the forthcoming court proceedings. 
29 

25 Ben Hubbard, ‘‘3 Arrested in Plot to Bomb Egyptian Cities and Embassy,’’ The New York 

Times, May 11, 2013. See: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/world/middleeast/egypt-arrests-3-in-plot-to-attack-cities-and-an-embassy.html. 6Thomas Joscelyn, ‘‘Egyptian interior minister: Al Qaeda cell plotted suicide attack against 

Western embassy,’’ The Long War Journal, May 11, 2013. See: http://www.longwarjournal.org/ 

archives/2013/05/egyptianlinteriorlmi.php. 27 Ben Hubbard, ‘‘3 Arrested in Plot to Bomb Egyptian Cities and Embassy,’’ The New York 

Times, May 11, 2013. See: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/world/middleeast/egypt-arrests-3-in-plot-to-attack-cities-and-an-embassy.html. 28State Department Rewards for Justice, ‘‘Wanted, Information leading to the location of 

Muhsin al-Fadhli, Up to $7 Million Reward.’’ See: http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/ 

index.cfm?page=fadhli. 

DISRUPTED PLOT AGAINST THE AMERICAN AND FRENCH EMBASSIES IN CAIRO

On May 11, 2013, Egyptian interior minister Mohammed Ibrahim announced that 

an al-Qaeda plot against a Western embassy and other targets had been disrupted. 

The interior minister said that two suspected terrorists are being held for questioning and a third is under house arrest. The Egyptian government did not initially 

say which embassy the three-man cell targeted. The New York Times reported, however, that ‘‘a Western official said the Egyptians had privately identified the embassy as the United States Embassy in Cairo.’’25 Subsequently, the Egyptians identified both the American and French Embassies as targets. 

The Egyptian interior ministry revealed three significant details about the plotters. First, the Egyptians alleged that they had been trained in the north Sinai, 

with the intention of fighting inside Syria. This again demonstrates how the war 

in Syria is having ripple effects throughout the region. Second, Ibrahim said the alQaeda cell was in contact with the so-called ‘‘Nasr City Cell,’’ which has its own ties 

to al-Qaeda. The Nasr City Cell has also been tied to the September 11, 2012 terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya.26 Third, Ibrahim pointed to two ties to al-Qaeda’s 

network inside Iran. 

Ibrahim said that one member of the al-Qaeda cell had received ‘‘military training’’ inside Iran, as well as Pakistan. The interior minister also identified a key 

point of contact for the cell as a senior al-Qaeda terrorist known as Dawud al Asadi, 

who told the trio ‘‘to get in touch with a terrorist cell in the Cairo neighborhood 

of Nasr City.’’27

Ibrahim did not offer many details about al Asadi, other than to describe him as 

‘‘the head of al-Qaeda in some west Asian countries,’’ which is somewhat vague. 

Dawud al Asadi is, in fact, one of the aliases used by Muhsin al Fadhli, the head 

of al-Qaeda’s network in Iran.28 Al Fadhli is described above. He was designated 

as the head of al-Qaeda’s network inside Iran in October 2012. Therefore, if the al 

Asadi mentioned by the Egyptian interior minister is in fact Muhsin al Fadhli, then 

this is yet another indication that al-Qaeda’s leadership inside Iran is projecting terror far beyond the mullahs’ borders. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Joscelyn. 

Our next witness, Mr. Barack Barfi, is a research fellow at the 

New America Foundation and focuses on Arab and Islamic affairs. 

Previously Mr. Barfi was a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha 

Center and prior to that was a producer with ABC News affiliates 

in the Middle East where he reported from countries such as Iraq 

and Lebanon. 

Throughout his academic and media careers, Mr. Barfi has had 

extensive travel and access to local ears in the Middle East, has 

experienced first-hand the dilemmas confronting the region. 

Mr. Barfi, pleased to have you here today. I look forward to your 

testimony. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF BARAK BARFI, RESEARCH FELLOW, NEW 

AMERICA FOUNDATION 

Mr. BARFI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Higgins, 

and Members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify today about al-Qaeda’s operations in Syria. 
30 

I would particularly like to commend Chairman King for the perfect pronunciation of my name, something my teachers could not do 

in school. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. KING. I am good for something, I guess. 

Mr. BARFI. After the organization was stripped of its Afghan 

sanctuary following the 9/11 attacks, and its core leadership decimated in Pakistan, the group decided to embrace a more decentralized model that focused on regional affiliates. 

These branches have succeeded in keeping al-Qaeda relevant 

even as it absorbs lethal hits around the world. 

The Middle East revolutions known as the Arab Spring have 

posed new dilemmas for the organization. As the frustrated youth 

that was to fuel the al-Qaeda revolutions flocked to the streets in 

Egypt and Libya to overthrow long-ruling leaders, the jihadist narrative the organization parroted seemed increasingly irrelevant. 

With dreaded security services neutered, Arabs could control their 

own destinies without resorting to violence. 

But as has consistently happened in the decade since the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda has been able to take advantage of events in the 

Middle East to reassert its importance. 

Today a Syrian civil war that has descended into urban anarchy 

has provided the organization a new theater to stage its operations. 

In a nation where the government controls less than a quarter of 

the country’s territory, internal and external actors have been able 

to carve out spheres of influence. 

Al-Qaeda created the organization The Support Front for the 

People of the Levant, known locally as Jabhat al-Nusra, or JN, to 

front its activities in Syria. 

Despite its recent emergence, JN has a long history. It evolved 

from the networks the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi established when he moved his operations from Afghanistan to Iraq following the American invasion of Kabul. JN emerged in January 

2012 when a suicide bomber targeted Syrian security officials. 

Since then the group has carried out a number of suicide bombings, reaching into the regime’s innermost sanctum. But it also has 

embraced conventional military tactics such as ambushes and assaults. Today, JN is considered one of the most effective rebel fighting forces. 

Al-Qaeda thrives on instability and establishes its presence in 

undergoverned spaces. Such factors have become basic staples in a 

country that inches closer to Somalification with every passing day. 

The government has receded, armed groups control much of the 

countryside, and social welfare no longer exists outside of a handful 

of cities and regions. 

Nevertheless, other indigenous geo-religious factors particular to 

Syria have drawn al-Qaeda there. Syria is ruled by a small Shi’i 

offshoot to which President al-Asad and leaders of the regime belong called Alawis. 

Pre-twentieth century Islamic scholars decree the sect’s members 

heretics. Al-Qaeda’s ideology has historically prioritized fighting 

Shi’i infidels to combatting Jews and Christians. 

Syria is also located at a strategic crossroads to which no other 

Arab state can lay claim. It borders several key countries including 
31 

Israel, jihadists’ arch foe. While other al-Qaeda affiliates are located in remote areas on the periphery of the Middle East, a Levantine branch would have the ability to expand out in several directions. 

While Syria has provided al-Qaeda a new haven, Syrians have 

proved receptive to its message. It should be stressed that much 

like in other havens, it is not the organization’s ideology which is 

drawing it admirers. As the international community has abandoned Syrians to face a regime prepared to use all the weapons in 

its arsenal, they are increasingly willing to accept a lifeline from 

anyone prepared to offer them one. 

For much of the revolution, Syrians believed the Free Syrian 

Army known as the FSA would provide it. But as the armed struggle has stalled, the FSA has stumbled. Its units are making little 

progress on the battlefield. Worse, they have drawn the ire of a 

population exhausted by their abuses. Theft, kidnappings for ransom, and torture have become its motto. 

Everyday JN attracts new supporters dissatisfied with the FSA. 

They are drawn to its discipline, organization, and squeaky-clean 

image. JN’s propensity to assist Syrians solve their problems, 

whether through mediation or aid, have also contributed to its popularity. 

It runs a social welfare division that provides goods and services 

to a war-torn population. These networks are much more efficient 

than ones managed by FSA units. 

The organization’s battlefield successes have won it admiration 

as well. JN is the most effective rebel fighting unit. Its fighters are 

known for their bravery and dedication to the cause. 

During my latest trip to Syria, Syrians beamed about JN’s contribution to the revolution. These factors make JN the most admired rebel unit in the field. As the revolution spirals into a cauldron of chaos, the organization will only win over Syrians to its 

cause. 

Unlike the FSA, JN’s ultimate goal is not the overthrow of the 

Syrian regime. It seeks to carve out a new haven for al-Qaeda 

where the organization can operate in the heart of the Arab world. 

It is also bent on taking the fight to neighboring Israel. 

But any attempt to do so will likely be met by resistance from 

FSA units sensitive to Western appeals. As a result, JN will have 

to combat other FSA units to ensure its freedom of mobility. For 

these reasons, JN does not currently pose a threat to the American 

homeland. The organization needs to focus on consolidating its 

local position before it can focus on the far enemy. 

JN nevertheless poses problems for American interests in the 

Middle East. For Syria is not Las Vegas. What happens in Syria 

will not stay in Syria. The violence there is bound to spill over into 

neighboring countries, some of which are American allies. As such, 

containing JN should be a National interest. 

With that I would be happy to answer any of your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Barfi follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BARAK BARFI

Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify 

today about al-Qaeda’s operations in Syria. After the organization was stripped of 

its Afghan sanctuary following the 9/11 attacks, and its core leadership decimated 
32 

in Pakistan, the group decided to embrace a more decentralized model that focused 

on regional affiliates. These branches have succeeded in keeping al-Qaeda relevant 

even as it absorbs lethal hits around the world. 

The Middle East revolutions known as the Arab Spring have posed new dilemmas 

for the organization. As the frustrated youth that was to fuel the al-Qaeda revolutions flocked to the streets in Egypt and Libya to overthrow long-ruling leaders, the 

jihadist narrative the organization parroted seemed increasingly irrelevant. With 

dreaded security services neutered, Arabs could control their destinies without resorting to violence. 

But as has consistently happened in the decade since it rose to international 

prominence, al-Qaeda has been able to take advantage of events in the Middle East 

to reassert its importance. Today a Syrian civil war that has descended into urban 

anarchy has provided the organization a new theater to stage its operations. In a 

nation where the Government controls less than a quarter of the country’s territory, 

internal and external actors have been able to carve out spheres of influence. 

One of those is al-Qaeda. The organization’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has released several videos offering encouragement for Syria’s revolution, while urging foreign jihadists to fight there. His appeals seem to be working. In March, British Foreign Minister William Hague said that ‘‘Syria today has become the top destination 

for jihadists.’’ 

AL-QAEDA IN SYRIA

Al-Qaeda created the organization The Support Front for the People of the Levant, 

known locally as Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), to front its activities in Syria. The late alQaeda founder Osama bin Laden recommended that the organization establish 

groups that did not bear its name because of the negative connotation associated 

with it in the aftermath of its Iraqi debacle. 

Despite its recent emergence, JN has a long history. It evolved from the networks 

the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi established when he moved his operations 

from Afghanistan to Iraq following the American invasion of Kabul. He established 

cells in Levantine countries to funnel foreigners to Iraq. Following the outbreak of 

the Syrian revolution in March 2011, al-Qaeda’s Iraqi affiliate sent between 150– 

200 operatives to Syria to establish a local infrastructure. 

JN emerged in January 2012 when a suicide bomber targeted Syrian security officials. Since then the group has carried out a number of suicide bombings, reaching 

into the regime’s innermost sanctums. But it also has embraced conventional military tactics such as ambushes and assaults. Today, JN is considered one of the most 

effective rebel fighting forces numbering between 1,500–5,000. Though the group 

has drawn members from Iraq, Jordan, and the Caucus Mountain states, the majority of its foot soldiers are nevertheless Syrians. In April, its leader known as Abu 

Muhammad al-Julani pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, an act which has sown some 

divisions within the organization. 

WHY SYRIA?

Al-Qaeda thrives on instability and establishes its presence in ungoverned spaces. 

Such factors have become basic staples in a country that inches closer to 

Somalification with every passing day. The government has receded, armed groups 

control much of the countryside and social welfare no longer exists outside a handful 

of cities and regions. 

Nevertheless, other indigenous geo-religious factors particular to Syria have 

drawn al-Qaeda there. Syria is ruled by a small Shi’i offshoot known as Alawis to 

which President Bashar al-Asad belongs. Pre-twentieth century Islamic scholars decreed the sect’s members heretics. Al-Qaeda’a ideology has historically prioritized 

fighting Shi’i infidels to combatting Jews and Christians. Moreover, by highlighting 

the sectarian nature of the conflict, JN can depict itself as protecting Sunnis from 

a Shi’i onslaught. 

Syria is located at a strategic crossroads to which no other Arab nation can lay 

claim. It borders several key countries including Saudi Arabia and Israel, jihadists’ 

arch foe. While other al-Qaeda affiliates are located in remote areas on the periphery of the Middle East, a Levantine branch would have the ability to expand out 

in several directions. 

Syria will have no government for years at it increasingly becomes a Middle Eastern Somalia. JN’s successes will allow al-Qaeda to carve out a sphere of influence 

unimpeded by a regime’s attempts to neutralize it. 

Syria has an eschatological significance. Medieval Islamic literature predicts 

many apocalyptic battles will occur there, thus convincing jihadists seeking the ultimate martyrdom to flock to Syria. 
33 

WHY JN APPEALS TO SYRIANS

While Syria has provided al-Qaeda a new haven, Syrians have proved receptive 

to its message. It should be stressed that much like in other theaters, it is not the 

organization’s ideology which is drawing it admirers. As the international community has abandoned Syrians to face a regime prepared to use all the weapons in its 

arsenal, they are increasingly willing to accept a lifeline from anyone willing to offer 

them one. 

For much of the revolution, Syrians believed the rebel-led Free Syrian Army 

(FSA) would provide it. But as the armed struggle has stalled, the largely nationalist FSA has stumbled. Its units are making little progress on the battlefield. 

Worse, they have drawn the ire of a population exhausted by their abuses. Theft, 

kidnappings for ransom, and torture have become their motto. 

Everyday JN attracts new supporters dissatisfied with the FSA. They are drawn 

to its discipline, organization, and squeaky-clean image. JN’s propensity to assist 

Syrians solve their problems, whether through mediation or aid, have also contributed to its popularity. It runs a social welfare division that provides goods and services to a war-torn population. These networks are much more efficient and responsive than ones managed by FSA units. 

The organization’s battlefield successes have won it admiration as well. JN is the 

most effective rebel unit. Its fighters are known for their bravery and dedication to 

the cause. During my latest visit to Syria, Syrians beamed about JN’s contribution 

to the revolution. These factors make JN the most admired rebel unit in the field. 

And as the revolution spirals into a cauldron of chaos, the organization will only 

win over Syrians to its cause. 

MODUS OPERANDI

JN has established a hierarchical organization that comprises military, political, 

and religious committees. It is highly compartmentalized with members often not 

knowing those in other cells. It subjects prospective candidates to a rigorous initiation process, imbuing its members with a sense of duty and belonging. 

JN’s operational influence in Syria is mixed. Though it pioneered the use of suicide bombings, most FSA units have eschewed such attacks. JN has been more successful in persuading rebel groups to embrace improvised explosive devices. 

Though JN has refused to join the FSA or other more Islamist-orientated organizations, it nevertheless cooperates with rebel units. It participates in joint operations and amicably divides the spoils between them. 

Like other FSA units, JN operates in the open, hanging its shingle on the door. 

During a recent visit to Aleppo, I lived in the building next door to the one JN was 

occupying. Its fighters buzzed around the complex. Though it maintains operational 

secrecy and largely avoids the international media, it nevertheless maintains an 

open presence throughout Syria. 

TURNING A NEW PAGE

Al-Qaeda’s widespread bloodletting in Iraq tarnished the organization’s image. 

The organization and other jihadists have sought to draw lessons from their failed 

Iraq experience. Their treatises are full of exhortations to avoid killing individuals 

from Syrian minorities allied to the regime. JN has heeded this advice. It has not 

targeted Alawi civilians, instead focusing on those who work for the regime. And 

unlike in Iraq, JN focuses exclusively on military targets, thus minimizing civilian 

casualties. 

The organization’s religio-political program is purposefully vague to avoid alienating certain constituencies. It has not delineated a vision for a post-Asad Syria. In 

contrast, other puritanical groups known as Salafis have been much more explicit 

about the type of state they plan to build on the rubble of the one being destroyed. 

JN has nevertheless employed some vice squads in areas under its control. 

In embracing this middle path, JN seeks to avoid the pitfalls that sank its Iraqi 

sibling. The organization is cognizant that its success depends on ingratiating itself 

with the local population rather than ensuring its grip on society through a reign 

of terror. It remains to be seen if this is a short-term tactical shift or a permanent 

turn. Once JN has accomplished its transitional goal of overthrowing the regime it 

may seek to impose its views on its subjects. 

THE DAY AFTER

Unlike the FSA, JN’s ultimate goal is not the overthrow of the Syrian regime. It 

seeks to carve out a new haven for al-Qaeda where the organization can operate in 

the heart of the Arab world. It is also bent on taking the fight to neighboring Israel. 
34 

But any attempt to do so will likely be met by resistance from FSA units sensitive 

to Western appeals. As a result, JN will have to combat other FSA units to ensure 

its freedom of mobility. For these reasons, JN does not currently pose a threat to 

the American homeland. The organization needs to focus on consolidating its local 

position before it can focus on the far enemy. 

JN nevertheless poses problems for American interests in the Middle East. For 

Syria is not Las Vegas. What happens in Syria will not stay in Syria. The violence 

there is bound to spill over into neighboring countries, some of which are American 

allies. As such, containing JN should be a national interest. 

Mr. KING. We thank, thank all of you for your testimony. 

I will begin the questioning. 

First on Syria, on the issue of foreign fighters, and with the porous borders particularly through Turkey, and with the threat of 

these foreign fighters returning to Europe and then coming to the 

United States with British passports, EU passports, visa waiver 

policies. 

What more do you think we should be doing? Do you believe that 

the European countries are as concerned about this as they should 

be? What do you see as the level of cooperation between Europe 

and the United States particularly regarding these, you know, the 

foreign fighters? 

To start we can go down, Dr. Jones, Mr. Simcox, Mr. Joscelyn, 

Mr. Barfi. If anyone cares to comment. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, very briefly, I think in my conversations with several European ambassadors including from this town 

and then other government officials from Europe, I think they are 

extremely concerned about the both departure and then the inflow 

of foreign fighters coming to their countries from Europe. I do not 

believe however that they have in all cases a good reign on who 

they are and the total number of individuals coming in and coming 

out. 

Once they leave German soil or Swedish soil they may not have 

a particularly good insight about what is happening inside of Syria. 

So I think in this case, it is contingent on the United States to get 

information from sources on the ground in Syria. That does include 

any covert units from other countries whether they are from Jordan or from Saudi Arabia or from Turkey or from the United Arab 

Emirates that are actually on the ground in Syria. 

I think this is the biggest black hole for fighters going into and 

out of Syria is what are they doing and who are they talking to and 

what are their intentions based on what they are doing in Syria. 

I think that is where we have our biggest vagaries on what is 

going on and so in that sense I think probably not enough is being 

done in country to collect on and patch information on what is 

going on in Syria and the United States has very little eyes on in 

country. 

Again, I think that is a very big weakness of the United States— 

its inability to understand what is going on at Syria. 

Mr. KING. Before we go on to the witnesses on this question, I 

make the maybe overly-generalized statement but my experience 

has been I know in our negotiations with Europeans often our European partners think we are too concerned about terror watch list, 

too concerned about who is coming over on planes to the United 

States. 
35 

Is that diminished at all, and how is that going to affect something which is even more vague right now: Who is coming from 

Syria and who is not? I will ask if all of you can address that. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, again I can only tell you what I have 

heard from several European ambassadors who are concerned 

about those numbers. 

Still, I think their external agencies and their external agency’s 

presence in Syria in some cases especially with some of Nordic 

countries is not that good. 

So they may be concerned about individuals that they have a 

sense of, but they don’t know the specifics in general what they are 

doing, which is why they come to people like me. 

Do you have any sense of what they are doing when they get to 

Syria? If they are asking me that question, they don’t know. 

Mr. KING. Well, we are asking you too, so—— 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. Simcox. 

Mr. SIMCOX. First of all, you mentioned that the Europeans believe that the Americans are too worried about—Europeans aren’t 

worried enough would be the way I look at it. 

We have no reason to be complacent in Europe about terrorism 

taking place within the European borders and we have no reason 

to be complacent about terrorism from Europe being exported to 

the States. 

European security agencies are extremely concerned though 

about what will happen to these fighters when they return. The 

other thing I think that is a big concern for them is what—how 

does this end in Syria and how does it impact in Europe in the long 

run? In terms of if there is a series of mini fiefdoms in the eastern 

parts of Syria, the al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups control 

is that then a new safe haven that Europeans are going to be able 

to go and train in—obviously via Turkey, ideally giving them access 

to training camps in a way that hasn’t been possible probably since 

prior to 9/11. 

My sense is that unfortunately we are truly in guesswork when 

it comes to how many people are there from Europe and what they 

are doing and their intentions are when they get back. I think we 

are flying blind on that. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Joscelyn, I know you are focused on Iran, going 

to come back to that in my second round if you want to—— 

Mr. Barfi. 

I am sorry—you want to—— 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Actually I would, if I could, just something I—— 

Mr. KING. Absolutely. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. I totally agree with what Seth and Robin were 

saying about the potential for new talent going to Syria. I think 

they are right on the money in what they say. 

I want to highlight something from my testimony too, which is 

what I call the return of old talent to the battlefield because of one 

of my concerns in all of this is there is credible threat reporting, 

credible press reporting, I am sorry, about a guy named Abu 

Musab al Suri, is his nom de guerre, otherwise known as Mustafa 

Setmariam Nasar, who is a chief al-Qaeda ideologue. 
36 

He is known in al-Qaeda circles and in jihadist circles as one of 

the preeminent thinkers for how to come after the West. He was 

imprisoned in Syria before the rebellion there. 

I actually don’t agree with the decision to send him to Syria for 

imprisonment and for reasons just like this, and there is credible 

reporting that he has been freed. 

This is the type of guy who I would be very concerned about if 

I were on your committee because he is a guy who has written at 

great length about creative ways to attack the West. 

There is all sorts of reporting that he was deeply involved with 

al-Qaeda in Europe prior to him being detained in 2005. There is 

a lot of credible reporting that he was involved in the Madrid train 

bombings in 2004, also the attacks in July 2005 in London. 

So this is the return of what I will call old talent to the game 

for as a consequence of what is happening inside Syria. Another 

name I just want to throw out there, and this has not appeared 

anywhere publicly and this is just my own sort of nerdism, I guess, 

is a guy named Mohammad Zammar was a key recruiter for the 

Hamburg cell for 9/11. 

He was detained and shipped off to Syria and imprisoned by the 

Assad regime. I would take a keen interest in trying to find out if 

I were sitting in your shoes where he is today and if there is any 

classified information which I am not privy to about where he is 

and where he is going because Zummar was directly involved in 

9/11, he was imprisoned in Syria, and I would take a deep concern 

about where he is today. 

Mr. KING. Thank you. 

Mr. Barfi. 

Mr. BARFI. The problem with Europeans going to Syria is we just 

can’t get a handle on it. Once they leave their home countries they 

are pretty much going to fall off the radar. If you go to Turkey it 

is not like traveling to Pakistan. I mean it doesn’t raise red flags, 

why are you going to Turkey? I want to see Europe or I want to 

go check out some nice islands, check out some ruins. 

Another problem is once they go to Turkey, you don’t even know 

how they are going to cross. Are they going to cross using the official crossings or they going to cross orchard groves and across orchard groves and fields, which is a lot of people do that. 

I crossed legally on a trip to Syria. Some of the Syrians that I 

was with that took me in some parts of their family did not have 

passports so they could not leave the country officially from Syria 

to Turkey so they crossed through the fields and they came back 

through the fields when I went in. I crossed legally and they went 

to the fields. 

This is a phenomenon you will see all the time so you won’t even 

see these people with any stamps and their passports that they 

have even been to Syria. So they are going to fall off the radar. 

I personally have not met any of these Europeans but I know a 

lot of people who have. You show up in these towns in these border 

towns in Turkey—I have a good friend to the taxi driver he said, 

‘‘Yes, I took a few French guys across the border the other day.’’ 

It is a big problem. We are not going to be able to find out what 

they are doing, what units they are hooking up with. All we are 

going to find out is a martyrdom notice on a jihadist website; XX 
37 

so-and-so died fighting in so-and-so battle and he was from France 

or he was from Belgium. 

So it is a big problem. What are they doing there? What is going 

to happen when they come back? Are they going to radicalize others in the West? Are they going to bring back bomb-making training or whatnot and this is something we are going to have to understand when the blowback comes back, not when they are inside 

because it is just too hard to find out answers to those questions 

at this point in time. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Barfi, in your testimony you say that you don’t see 

any direct threat from JN to the United States. I would ask if the 

others if that is their consensus and is the main threat from foreign fighters and also are any of you aware of any support or any 

elements of this country who would support a Syrian al-Qaeda 

movement? 

Is there anything, any community in this country or any elements of support, for Syria al-Qaeda or JN in particular other than 

people just maybe radicalized generally, any particular support in 

this country for JN? 

Mr. BARFI. We haven’t seen any incidences of this in the Muslim 

communities in America. As you know, most almost if not all the 

community here is moderate. 

We have not had the same radicalization problems as you have 

in Britain and to a lesser extent France and in the period since 

9/11, you have seen several attacks in—you have seen the bombing, 

the London bombings, the Madrid bombings and then I think your 

last year we had this lone wolf in France. 

We haven’t had that other than the Boston bombing and these 

were guys who were lone wolf. They were not radicalized in a 

mosque and this is very important. They didn’t go to a mosque. 

They didn’t hear a preacher. There was no networks that followed 

them to certain places. 

They did this all on their own. So there was not a community 

to give them an infrastructure and the network. That is what is 

very important about the Boston bombings that we have to take 

away, sir. 

Mr. KING. The main threat then you see from Syria would be the 

foreign fighters coming back through Europe and the United 

States, primarily, that should be our main homeland security focus 

right now. Do you agree with that?. 

Mr. BARFI. The problem—I am sorry, did you want to—— 

Mr. KING. Actually, the whole panel and I will end on that and 

I will go to the—— 

Mr. BARFI. Then I will let the others handle it. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, if I could just come in on this. I heard 

from reliable sources, although I take this with a grain of salt, 

probably no more than a dozen or so Americans have gone to Syria 

to fight possibly some with Jabhat al-Nusrah. 

That is concerning. The fact that we have had some is of concern. 

I think especially as the war continues as the Assad regime falls 

I would expect those numbers to go up rather than down. 

It is unclear what they will do when they leave, whether they 

will come back, whether they will go to North Africa, whether they 

will die in country, but I think the fact that we do have some 
38 

Americans and we don’t know the percentage. We know roughly a 

dozen out of 17, is it a dozen out of 50? 

We don’t know the percentage of the total mass of fighters that 

have left the United States. But I would still say the fact that we 

have some of the facts, that that is probably going to increase because that has been the trend. It’s because the war is likely to get 

worse before it gets better. It is a troubling trend and I don’t believe we have the coverage over that as well as we should. 

Mr. SIMCOX. In regard to whether Jabhat al-Nusrah would look 

to attack the United States or members of that group coming back, 

I mean of course it would be—you could never dismiss it. It is an 

entirely rational and logical thing to fear. 

All I would say is that of the plots that have been against the 

United States and the United Kingdom and I have looked at them 

all in my research, the people who have attempted to attack the 

homeland have actually been those who didn’t fight but trained in 

these areas and were then sent back with a very specific operation 

in mind. 

I think there is a couple of reasons why that may be. I think first 

of all may be in terms of those that are aspiring to attack the 

homeland now al-Qaeda has more—it doesn’t have interest in using 

them as cannon fodder in local conflicts. 

The individuals that can travel back to the homeland and carry 

out operations are perhaps are of greater value to them than they 

were before. Maybe some of the individuals who fight in places like 

Syria but then don’t go on to try and attack the homeland, maybe 

they feel they have done their stint that the time they fight, spend 

fighting jihadist abroad was their contribution to the overall effort 

and they don’t have the same interest in attacking the homeland. 

I mean that is speculation and I think it is worth bearing in 

mind that we haven’t seen a huge amount of people who fought 

abroad carry out attacks in the homeland. 

Briefly on the subject of radicalization in the United States, I 

mean it is true, there is no doubt about it, that Britain and Western Europe generally has had much greater problem with 

radicalization, our integration strategy to be frank just doesn’t 

work as well as the American one. 

I don’t think there is much doubt about that but at the same 

time in the research that I did recently, 54 percent of individuals 

who have been convicted in the United States or carried out suicide 

attacks were American citizens. 

So I would encourage that there is not complacency about this 

issue because even though there aren’t the same networks as there 

are in Europe, there is still problems of radicalization in this country and I think it is one that we should always be wary of. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Just on the question of the potential threat of the 

Nusrah front to the homeland, I just want to interject a couple 

quick points, which I think it is right as Barak says here that basically most of the Nusrah Front is concentrated on fighting locally 

in the insurgency right now trying to consolidate its hold in inside 

Syria. 

My one interjection to that is to always be careful that al-Qaeda 

routinely uses these local insurgencies, these local fights, and then 

basically coalesces them into their global jihad. That is part of their 
39 

strategy and given the head of all al-Nusrah front’s ties to the head 

of al-Qaeda, I mean, al-Zawahiri’s allegiance to them and various 

other indications, you can never downplay the possibility that some 

portion of their assets even it is small compared to the overall effort will be used against us. 

I just want to interject one further thought along those lines. We 

have seen as you have talked about many times, Congressman, 

about the threat from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen 

against the homeland. 

Well, prior to the Christmas day bomb plot in of December 2009, 

there was a widespread assumption and I produced it in my testimony here for you, amongst the—in the intelligence community 

from the NCTC, CIA, NSA, and others of that the AQAP was going 

to be focused on—they were focused on the threat of terrorist sects 

in Yemen but were not focused on the possibility of AQAP attacks 

against the U.S. homeland. 

Well, AQAP was waging a local insurgency there in Yemen, still 

is, trying to consolidate its hold over territory and trying to come 

back from its getting knocked down and yet during all of that it 

still managed to come after us. 

So I don’t know of any specific threats against U.S. homeland 

right now from the Nusrah front, I am just saying that we 

shouldn’t assume that—including—when you have guys like I mentioned before senior al-Qaeda talent now back in the game in Syria, 

we shouldn’t assume that they won’t think about that at some 

point in time. 

Mr. KING. I have gone way over. We are coming back for a second round. 

I would just say, Mr. Barfi, I am not certain yet on the Boston 

attack. That is still open on whether or not there was any 

radicalization within Boston. We don’t know. We have gotten some 

other reports, but again, it is too preliminary. I wouldn’t rule it out, 

that is all I am saying at this stage. 

With that, I would recognize the very patient Ranking Member, 

Mr. Higgins, for as much time as he wants. 

Mr. HIGGINS. No, I enjoyed it. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent for the 

gentlelady from Texas to sit for the purpose of questioning and receiving testimony. 

Mr. KING. Without objection. 

Mr. HIGGINS. We know from the 9/11 report that senior al-Qaeda 

figures maintain close ties to Iranian security officials and had frequently traveled across Iran’s border. 

At least 8 of the 14 Saudi operatives selected for 9/11 operations 

traveled through Iran in the months before the attack. In recent 

years, Iran’s ties to al-Qaeda has increased. In 2010, Iran reportedly began releasing detained al-Qaeda operatives. 

Furthermore, as many as 20 members of the bin Laden family 

have lived in the compound in Iran since September 11, 2001, 

while bin Laden’s son and high-ranking advisors to his father have 

been able to easily slip in and out of the country. 

When the terrorists’ train plot was thwarted before it was executed in Canada, Iran’s foreign minister spokesman stated that 

there was no firm evidence of any Iranian involvement and groups 
40 

such as al-Qaeda have no compatibility with Iran in both political 

and ideological fields. 

Well, I don’t believe the foreign minister spokesperson. I don’t believe the foreign minister. I don’t believe the Iranian president, 

Ahmadinejad because they have a mutual enemy and it is us and 

Westerners. 

We need just to look at 9/11 and the death and destruction that 

was exacted on the United States in New York City, the murder 

of John Granville, a United States Agency for International Development Diplomat, in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum in 2009. He 

was targeted for one reason because he was an American and he 

was a Westerner. The thwarted a New York City subway plot in 

2009 and most recently the Canadian train plot. 

You know, we are asking the question rhetorically in this committee as to whether or not al-Qaeda operatives pose any threat to 

the United States. I think we should get beyond the question and 

just insert the way it should be. The answer is yes. 

The question is: How imminent is that threat? In previous hearings—we had a hearing here about the Hezbollah presence which 

you know, acts as a proxy for Iran, Syria, and Venezuela, a violent 

jihadist group had a presence in Latin America. 

But in the hearing, it was disclosed that they also have a presence in 15 American cities and four major cities in Canada. We 

were told that we shouldn’t be too concerned because that terrorist 

activity was limited to fundraising. 

Well, if you are a terrorist organization bent on destruction of 

Israel and the West and you are raising money, I don’t see the distinction between raising money and actual terrorist plots because 

that money presumably is used to finance the terrorist plots that 

are directed at us. 

So I would just like to try to again, get beyond the pleasantries 

and the, you know, the subtleties of, you know, of whether or not 

al-Qaeda poses any threat and that is just to accept that they do 

and let’s talk honestly and directly about how imminent that threat 

is. 

See, al-Qaeda is an organization much like Nazi Germany. You 

know, Nazis swore a personal oath to Adolf Hitler and it was 

thought that when he died that it ended. Same is true with alQaeda, but the problem is this: The post-bin Laden al-Qaeda is 

younger, more tech-savvy, more aggressive, and found in places 

where we previously never thought they were. 

Like we found in the investigation regarding the Boston Marathon bombers. So I just like to get beyond, you know, the niceties 

and let’s deal with the black and white, and I would start with Dr. 

Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Very good points, Mr. Higgins. 

Briefly I would make two comments. One is, my personal assessment is when one looks at the al-Qaeda threat to the U.S. homeland the most severe threats today are coming from Pakistan, 

Yemen, and a few other locations. 

Not Iran, but on your question about whether the threat is imminent, I have looked carefully over the last several years and written on it, I do think the Iran contingent is significant to monitor. 
41 

I would say it is not as imminent as it appears in several other 

places but I wanted to say a few other things. 

One is the fact that they have got Yasin Al Suri in Iranian territory is of concern. He has been involved in al-Qaeda plotting. He 

is a member of bin Laden’s inner Shi’I; he is is still there. Yasin 

Al Suri, Muhsin al Fadhli, and a range of others, these are core alQaeda operatives in Iran that does present a threat. 

What is in it for Iran? I think the most dangerous prospect 

frankly from al-Qaeda’s contingent in Iran is if there were to be a 

U.S. or Israeli strike against Iranian interests, that would probably 

increase my assessment of Iran’s interest in using and encouraging 

Iranian al-Qaeda—proxies in Iran to attack. 

My sense is that they have been pretty cautious on this about 

getting involved, getting al-Qaeda involved in an attack for that 

very reason, not to encourage—increase the impetus for U.S. or 

Israeli strike. I think that would be one key issue to watch. A 

strike or greater tension might trigger Iran to even close its relationship with them. 

Just one last point. Again, I do think it is worth noting that 

there has been some tension between al-Qaeda and Iran on alQaeda and Iraq targeting of Shi’i which has been consistent and on 

the Jabhat al-Nusrah’s attacks against Hezbollah and Iranians in 

Syria. 

So there have been tensions. The situation is complex. On your 

question about whether it is imminent, I would say no, not compared to other cases right now, but situations could change including elevation of the Israeli/U.S. and Iranian conflict which would 

make it more imminent in my view. 

Mr. SIMCOX. I would echo some of—much of Dr. Jones’ comments 

and I think that the severe imminent threats do come from Yemen 

and Pakistan. 

What concerns me though about Iran in comparison to those 

countries is that we have a good working relationship with the 

Yemeni government in terms of intelligence sharing and those we 

target. 

Similarly in Pakistan the drone strikes have has helped degrade 

al-Qaeda’s operations there. The problem is we don’t have that 

with Iran and we don’t—there is too much we don’t know I feel 

about what is going on in Iran to be able to make a completely 

thorough assessment of how imminent the threat is. 

Now I would suggest that the main threat is still from Pakistan 

and Yemen but I wouldn’t say that that is gonna be necessarily the 

case for the next 5 to 10 years because we know so little about 

their involvement in Iran, because obviously the relations between 

the United States and Iran are what they are. 

One other thing I would suggest is the interaction between alQaeda and Iran is also not—it doesn’t necessarily have to be this 

way. There are opportunities I believe for the West to sow division 

and Dr. Jones mentioned the al-Qaeda and Iraq and Iranian hatred 

and I do believe it is a visceral hatred and the fact that in Syria 

at the moment obviously they are on competing sites. 

So extremely complex and not an easy one for the United States 

to figure out an effective response to, but I think there are both 

great threats but also potential opportunities. 
42 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, I come after it from a little bit of a different 

perspective in that there absolutely are numerous areas where the 

two are at loggerheads especially in Syria today, Iran and al-Qaeda 

and elsewhere. 

But I think again if you look back at the historical record what 

comes out over and over again since the early 1990s that these 

these two have been able to come to agreement on areas they can 

collude. 

That is the official position of the Obama administration, which 

as I said has really paved the way through the Treasury Department and the State Department to expose the current agreement 

which allows yes, you know, Syrians and others to operate inside 

Iran. 

I just want to read for the record what the Treasury Department 

said in its October 2012 announcement that says, ‘‘Under the terms 

of the agreements between al-Qaeda and Iran, al-Qaeda must refrain from conducting any operations within Iranian territory and 

recruiting operatives inside Iran while keeping Iranian authorities 

informed of their activities. In return—’’ this is what the Treasury 

Department said, ‘‘The government of Iran gave the Iran-based alQaeda network freedom of operation and the uninhibited ability to 

travel for extremists in their family. 

The threat to the al-Qaeda members there because Iran doesn’t 

want to allow them to do whatever they want to do, they want to 

have some say in how this all goes is that if al-Qaeda members violate these terms they then run the risk of being detained by Iranian authorities. 

So again, this is part of the official U.S. Government record now 

directly contradicting exactly all of those quotes of the Congressman Higgins read off from the senior Iranian officials. 

Just pointing out that the Treasury Department, State Department, the Obama administration have already come out and said 

what they are saying, the Iranian officials are saying that this is 

wrong. 

One other quick note about al-Qaeda and Iraq, this is where this 

gets really so complicated. One of the things in all of this is yet absolutely true that Iran and and al-Qaeda were on the opposite sides 

in terms of the killings of Shiites within Iraq and that there is animosity there absolutely. 

But look back to February 2012 when the Treasury Department 

released its second designation of the Iran al-Qaeda relationship. 

The Treasury Department came out and said specifically that 

Iran’s ministry of intelligence and security actually provided assistance not just for al-Qaeda but also members of al-Qaeda in Iraq. 

So they are a very duplicitous bunch who play double games in 

all these areas and you can’t just assume away that differences of 

opinion are going to prevent collusion. 

Mr. BARFI. When we first heard reports that al-Qaeda operatives 

had moved to Iran, we were basically—analysts were basically puzzled because of the ideological constraints between the two sides. 

Al-Qaeda is very Shi’i and the Shi’i grows out of Salafi/Wahhabi 

theology. The Iranian regime is a Shi’i theocracy, but over time, we 

have seen that Iran has used al-Qaeda as a tool and we don’t know 
43 

how far it will go to extend the use of that tool, and will it use it 

to bleed the West and particularly the United States? 

We have seen not only al-Qaeda core operatives active in Iran 

but we have also had reports that al-Qaeda affiliates have had relations with the Iranians, specifically AQAP. Specifically, a defector 

said that there was a lot of activity going back and forth between 

Iran and the organization. 

Again we see an ideological problem because we have now reports that the Iranian government is funding the Houthi rebellion 

in northern Yemen that has led by a Shi’i offshoot. That is much 

closer to Sunniism than the Shi’i who rule Iran. 

So we see ideological problems but we do also see pragmatic understandings or cooperation between the organizations and we will 

probably see that in the time to come also because there is a lot 

of senior operatives in al-Qaeda and remember the al-Qaeda core 

has been decimated in Pakistan but those people in Iran, there is 

no drones flying over there, so they are not being killed. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Just a final thought. On April 22, 1 month ago, the 

Royal Canadian Mounted Police announced the arrest of two people 

in connection with plotting a terrorist attack on a passenger train, 

high-impact target, it travels from Toronto, 90 miles from Buffalo 

through Niagara Falls, 20 miles from Buffalo, and into New York 

City, a place that has known the cruel fate of a terrorist attack. 

According to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the alleged terrorists were receiving assistance from al-Qaeda elements in Iran. 

With all due respect, gentlemen, that to me, is an imminent 

threat. 

I will yield back. 

Mr. KING. Oh, I am sorry. Yield back? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes. 

Mr. KING. I now recognize the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Stewart, who as a new Member of the committee has really shown extreme interest in this issue and I commend him for that and I now 

recognize him for his questioning. 

Mr. STEWART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I speak for many 

when we recognize that you have been a National leader on this 

for many years and we appreciate that. 

To the witnesses, thank you for being with us today. Thanks for 

the sacrifice in being here and what you have told us and the expertise that you hold is important and so we appreciate an opportunity to spend a few minutes with you. 

Although I have to say it frustrates me just a little bit and I will 

explain what I mean by that and I don’t mean it in a negative way 

but it illustrates that we live in a complicated world and this is a 

very complicated part of the world. 

It is dangerous, it is unpredictable, and it is frankly hard to sort 

out the good guys from the bad which is I think you have illustrated and talked about that today. You have JN, FSA, al-Qaeda, 

you talked about now Westerners who have gone in and joined the 

fight and that is even more complicated and more difficult when 

you try to predict the future because the reality is a very dynamic 

part of the world and that allegiances and loyalties can change and 

shift quickly and you may not know what the lay of the land is 
44 

going to look like tomorrow even let alone a year or several years 

down the road. 

I was a pilot in the Air Force for 14 years. I have I think a general sense of the situation there but not any specific sense and so 

I want to ask you just very simply are there any rebel groups in 

Syria right now that you would recommend that we could trust, 

that we could you know in in any fashion consider an ally to us 

and sharing values or someone we could have a strategic alliance 

with, with any degree of comfort? 

Mr. BARFI. I was hoping you would ask that question. I spent a 

lot of time with Lewa Al-Tawhid, it is the biggest rebel group fighting in the province of Aleppo. 

I have spent time with the foot soldiers from the villages, I spent 

time with the leadership. These people are thoroughly nationalists. 

They are not secular. We have to take the difference between what 

it means to be secular, nationalist, and jihadist. 

These people believe in the Syrian state. They want to fight for 

an independent Syrian state where they have the freedoms that 

they want. They don’t want to take the fight anywhere else. They 

don’t believe in global jihad. They don’t want to fight the Israelis. 

They just want the regime to leave them alone and have a chance 

to succeed. 

These guys do not speak of radicalism. They are not calling the 

Alawis heretics. They are trying to build a democratic state where 

everybody has the freedom and you respect the minorities and 

these are the types of groups that our intelligence communities 

needed to vet and get the training and get the arms through because they are the best opportunity to overthrow the regime to 

strengthen the nationalists at the expense of the jihadists and to 

instill confidence in the Syrians that the western nations in the 

international community is doing something for them and that they 

do not have to turn to the jihadists and Islamists who are the best 

fighters on the battlefields, sir. 

Mr. STEWART. I appreciate you sharing that with us. Let me 

challenge you just a little if I could and I am not disagreeing with 

you like just sincerely want to know. We said the same thing about 

some of the participants in Libya for example or in Egypt and it 

turned out that they weren’t nearly as democratic nor as friendly 

to the Western ideals as we thought they were at one time. Do you 

think that might be the case here as well? 

Mr. BARFI. Basically the problem you had in Egypt was there 

was no fighting in Egypt and you moved very quickly. There was 

no transition. You deposed Hosni Mubarak who was a secular authoritarian leader. He was president for 30 years. 

There was not a lot of democracy in Egypt. Elections were rigged. 

There was a tolerated opposition but they could do nothing. They 

had no freedoms. So once you had the fall of the regime and the 

quick elections who could benefit? 

Only the Islamists because you can organize in the mosque but 

you cannot organize in the streets so they had some type of organization. So they were able to win and as we see the problems of 

Muslim brotherhood. 

What happened in Libya is we did not directly arm the militias. 

What we did is we subcontracted it to the Qataries. The Qataries 
45 

had different—and I spent 6 months in Libya during the revolution 

so I was able to meet with the leaders—the politicians and the 

military leaders. 

What happened is the Qataries did not choose—they don’t have 

the same ideals and ideology as we do. They are playing also to 

their own domestic constituencies and a lot of their domestic constituencies espouse what we would consider intolerant ideas and 

intolerant groups, so they funded those militias during the campaigns specifically February 17 brigade which was an Islamic brigade. 

We did not work with the defectors, the army defectors who had 

an army units specifically Asayahiah, which were the special forces 

under Abdul Fatah Younis who was the interior—he was the interior minister under Kadafi. He participated in the 1969 revolution. 

He moved up to military ranks. 

He knew what a military organization was, and he was assassinated by the Islamists. We never helped them or his people. We 

never funded them. So we subcontracted. That was the problem 

there. 

If we work directly here in Syria and we are doing the same 

thing. We are subcontracting with the Qataries and the Saudi’s 

again in Syria. If we deal directly. If we vet directly. If we used 

our intelligence agencies directly, if they go on the field and see: 

(A) The capability of these people and (B), what their ideology is 

we won’t have those problems, Mr. Congressman. 

Mr. STEWART. Mr. Chairman, do we have some latitude with 

time then? Yes? 

I have a second question I think it will be a little easier to answer but before I do, from other witnesses, do you—is there a consensus among you that this is a group that we can form an alliance 

with or do you have some hesitation in that? 

Mr. JONES. I have some hesitation. I have some hesitation because I think polling done before the war did show that most Syrians do not support al-Qaeda’s ideology. That there appears to be 

pretty good data on that. 

But, the one concern I have is hearing from some senior free Syrian army officials that the United States putting Jabhat al-Nusrah 

on the foreign terrorist organization list was unhelpful and that 

they actually were playing a role in the opposition was a concerning remark. 

Because in that sense that is a very—I see that is a very shortterm comment where they can be helpful in overthrowing the regime but again my biggest concern though is Jabhat al-Nusrah is 

getting stronger and it has a some support from the opposition 

leadership. That is where I would pause. 

Mr. STEWART. Okay. I am going to move on but before you let 

me just make a quick comment regarding this if I could I mean 

American—— 

Mr. KING. I would just say to the gentleman, and don’t worry 

about time. Just ask your questions. Don’t worry about it. 

Mr. STEWART. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The American people, by nature, we want to help. When you see, 

you know, the death among civilians particularly in Syria and I 
46 

spent a couple of nights ago with some officials from Tunisia and 

Egypt and Morocco and Libya, and it was encouraging for me to 

hear them talk about their revolution. 

This wasn’t just a change in government. They viewed this as 

our revolution just like we viewed 1776 as our revolution and that 

was, I said, encouraging to me, but again I am extraordinarily cautious in forming alliances there or supposing that we can form alliances that it is going to have significant outcome and then wonder 

what happens in the future, but having said that, let me move on 

if I could. 

Mr. Joscelyn, you have talked, to steal your phrase, you mentioned ‘‘creative ways to attack’’ and I would like to look at that, 

if we could, you know as devastating as a conventional attack is 

it certainly a tragedy and it is one that we have to be aware of and 

guard against in every way, but reality is is that there are much 

more destructive outcomes that could potentially happen to us. 

Pakistan has obviously a large number of nuclear weapons. 

Syria, Iran, and Iraq have possession of, or groups there have perhaps access, to you know other weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical weapons. I just wondered how you view that 

threat, the threat of an attack with weapons of mass destruction. 

Does it appear to be something that they are aggressively moving 

towards or is it not—is that too big of an apple for them? Is this 

something they don’t really want to undertake at this time? If you 

could just share your feelings on, you know, that threat because if 

that happens of course that is a world-changing event. Any 

thoughts on that from many of the panel? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, I will say this: I don’t think, you know, I 

don’t know of any detail or intelligence that they are currently in 

possession of any kind of weapons like that, but I think you need 

to take it very seriously the long-standing rhetoric to come out 

of—— 

Mr. STEWART. Well, could I interrupt just to clarify. I mean when 

you say they, you mean some of the rebel groups or terrorists? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Yes, exactly. You were mentioning to me new talk 

about there is a friend in Syria who clearly has an interest in obtaining the chemical weapons and other weapons there; has already been receiving higher—more heavy armaments from captured bases and the like. 

You talk about in Pakistan there is this elaborate game in Pakistan, which is really worth a whole ’nother hearing about how alQaeda and its affiliated groups have even attacked nuclear installations as part of their elaborate game to try and sort of free up 

the security around those arms. 

What I would say is I don’t know of any intelligence right now 

that these groups have these weapons. What I would say that I am 

concerned about is that it is something they talked about now for 

well more than a decade, that they want to get these weapons. 

You talk about—Chairman King mentioned Abu Ghaith earlier 

who was previously in Iran and then you know was arrested and 

detained after he left Iran. 

One of the things that Abu Ghaith actually spoke about, he was 

a close spokesman for Osama bin Laden after 9/11, and inside Iran 

in 2002 he actually spoke openly about the necessity of acquiring 
47 

these weapons, and he is only one of many of these al-Qaeda 

ideologues who talk along these lines. 

So part of the downside I would say of taking a hands-off approach for example to Syria or something along those lines is we 

are not being proactive in trying to figure out a way to prevent 

them from achieving that goal. 

I think Mr. Barfi here said it far better than I could, that basically subcontracting out to others to do this type of work runs all 

sorts of risks in and of itself. 

Mr. STEWART. Yes, anyone else? 

Mr. Simcox. 

Mr. SIMCOX. Sure, yes. I think that if they—I don’t know if 

they—I mean—I don’t believe at the moment I have not seen anything to suggest they do have weapons, al-Qaeda or these affiliated 

groups, but if they got them, I believe they would use them without 

a shadow of a doubt. 

I mean let’s—it is different personalities but the same group: 

9/11 killed 3,000. If it was 30, great, from our point of view. I don’t 

see any evidence to suggest that they would hold back. 

In terms of and the Syrian question, it is extremely difficult. I 

guess I would just always return to the point that America’s involvement or its lack of it—it won’t be thanked either way. 

I think America wants to help. It tries to do good. It gets involved in Iraq. It is—by many it is hated for it. It doesn’t get involved in Bosnia; by many, it is hated for it. Syria, I think it is 

going to be the same. 

Mr. STEWART. Yes, I would agree with that. Maybe I will just 

close with this comment. 

It is clearly their objective. They would clearly look to have access to those, any weapons of mass destruction, whatever they 

might be. As that area becomes less and less stable and less and 

less predictable, I don’t think we can imagine what the command 

and control of those weapons might eventually in whose hands they 

might reside including Pakistan with their nuclear warheads and 

one day an event in Pakistan could shift the world as far as how 

we view that threat. 

So with that, Mr. Chairman I back and thank you. 

Mr. KING. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee is recognized. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the Chairman of the committee 

and the Ranking Member and also thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for what have been a series of very instructive and 

very important hearings on this issue. 

Allow me to apologize for not being here at the beginning as we 

were laying a wreath at the women’s war memorial as we approach 

Memorial Day, which reminds us of the sacrifice of many of the 

men and women of the United States military in battles of yesteryear and battles of today. 

I wanted to ask both Dr. Jones and Dr. Barfi, as I have listened—and Mr. Barfi—as I have listened to the testimony just this 

question: What preparation should the United States be engaged in 

on the basis of what we are listening to in terms of what the world 

is today? Whether we speak of al-Qaeda, whether we speak of others, what should the United States be doing? 
48 

Dr. Jones and Mr. Barfi. 

Mr. JONES. Very briefly, I think we: (A) Must recognize that 

there is in my view a growing threat from Salafi jihadist groups 

that has existed in North Africa and the Levant areas we have 

talked about through Persia, Iran, and down into South Asia and 

potentially other areas. 

I think as we have seen in a few places like Iraq, large numbers 

of American forces are probably not the answer. So I think what 

we are looking at is clandestine units from the Central Intelligence 

Agency and other U.S. intelligence organizations, U.S. special operations forces that need to be able to do to things as we just talked 

about on the chemical side, if it becomes clear that Jabhat alNusrah has access to chemical weapons. 

We need organizations like Delta to be able to go in and seize 

control over those kinds of materials before or after, ideally before, 

somebody gets their hands—but I think this is the kind of struggle 

that we are talking about. 

I do think the biggest weakness that we have along these lines 

is our cutting and funding for a number of years and actually 

eliminating the U.S. Information Agency which was so effective in 

combating the Soviet Union’s ideology during the Cold War. 

I don’t think our inner agencies’ coordination on pushing back 

against this ideology is what it should be. I don’t think it is funded 

as well as it should be, and again I don’t think it is as coordinated 

as well as it should be. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I think that has been very constructive. 

Mr. Barfi. Yes, thank you. 

Mr. BARFI. The biggest problem, Congresswoman, is that we 

have a new frontier, a new front in the Arab world, after these 

Arab Springs. We used to have—we had a long-term working relationships with intelligence agencies in the Middle East specifically 

with the Egyptians. 

We had redlines to Omar Souleyman who headed the intelligence 

agencies and a great friend of the United States. He was a righthand man of Mubarak. We no longer have those access and those 

channels and those lines open. 

We need to develop new relationships. In Libya we had a man 

named, Musa Kusa that we worked with. He defected. He is now 

sitting in Qatar; hangs out in hotels all day. He is no longer giving 

us any more information. 

So we had to figure out how to get this information. Who is going 

to tell us what these guys are doing on the ground? There are several ways you can do that. You can either: (A) Develop your own 

intelligence sources and own contacts on the ground, or you develop 

new relationships with the organizations. 

In Egypt, it is going to be specifically difficult because we have 

a new front. That is another problem that we have in the Arab 

Spring. We have these new fronts. We saw what happened in 

Benghazi. Sinai, Congresswoman, is a big problem. We have seen 

jihadists gather there not only from Egypt but from other countries. They have already attacked Egyptian soldiers in the desert. 

They have already had cross-border raids into Israel and they 

are using sophisticated weapons. We are not just seeing small 
49 

arms. We are seeing surface-to-air missiles that have been smuggled in. These are big problems. 

So we need to develop these new relationships with these people. 

Also, and the problem that with Egypt is: What are you going to 

do? The Egyptian forces do not have the counterterrorism training. 

There is an organization called the Central Security Forces that 

works in the, in the Sinai Peninsula after the Camp David Accords, 

these are rejects. These are military rejects. In Egypt you need to 

have conscription. 

These are people that are largely illiterate. They couldn’t get into 

the Armed Forces so they have this outlet into Central Security 

Forces. So we need to figure out what are we going to do. Are we 

going to train these guys? Are we going to try to train some new 

counterterrorism people? Those are the big problems that we have 

moving forward. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

That is expansive—let me raise the question on the role of the 

Canadian Mounted Police April 22 and these proposed efforts by individuals that would attack a train that was leaving Toronto going 

into New York. 

Again, obviously as my Chairman has often said, one of the targets that they believe draws the most international attention. I 

have two questions that I would like to pose to Mr. Simcox and Dr. 

Jones. 

Do you think al-Qaeda is operating in Iran as they turn their 

head without governmental intervention or support? Do you believe 

that—in the instance of the April 22 incident that the Iranian government may have known about the incident, proposed incident, 

and chose to look the other way? 

Is this not disturbing, given our relationship with Iran? I think 

it builds on what Mr. Barfi has indicated about getting new sources 

and that certainly concerns me, and again, what do you suggest 

that the United States do in focusing on this relationship with Iran 

knowing that these operatives are living there but in particular, 

did they turn their heads and is al-Qaeda living there with complete protection, if you will, because the government looks the other 

way? 

Dr. Jones. And Mr. Simcox. 

Mr. JONES. Very good questions. If I understood your two questions correctly, in my assessment in looking at this issue to some 

degree, the Iranian government is aware of al-Qaeda’s role there. 

It has been aware from the beginning. It had conversations in Afghanistan before they left in 2001. So yes, they are aware. Yes, 

they have provided support. 

My understanding is they have been a little bit cautious on encouraging external attacks outside of Iran against Western countries. 

I was actually suspicious at first of that, there was a connection 

with this particular Canadian plot that went back to al-Qaeda in 

Iran. I was wrong. I went back and looked more carefully at this 

particular situation and there does appear to have been al-Qaeda 

in Iran involvement in the plot in several respects including 

operatives along the Iranian Afghanistan border where, it is worth 
50 

noting, the United States is downsizing if not withdrawing entirely 

from Afghanistan. 

I have seen no evidence that the Iranian government was involved or aware. It is possible. I have seen in talking extensively 

with a range of peoples who should know. I have seen no evidence 

that they were aware. I would be surprised if the Iranian government was involved in the attack. 

Again, I don’t know whether they were aware—they are monitoring these people very closely. It is certainly possible that they 

saw something along these lines. Again, they are monitoring them. 

I think in terms of what to do—look, I think the Iranian government needs to be pressured to get rid of these guys; return them 

to their home countries. 

They do appear—and they don’t like a public discussion along 

these lines. I think the more we talk about this in forums like this, 

the more pressure it puts them on because I think most Shi’i are 

not going to be happy with an al-Qaeda Sunni presence in Iran— 

in Iran, not something I think they are going to want more talk 

about publicly. So I encourage her questions along these lines because I do think it makes them uncomfortable. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Simcox. 

Mr. SIMCOX. I certainly believe that al-Qaeda is operating in 

Iran. I think Iran certainly knows the whereabouts of these individuals. I think there is a support that is going on between the 

two. 

It has been a—Iran has been a safe haven almost for some of 

these individuals that went there after the fall of the Taliban in 

the immediate post-9/11 world. 

My sense is that the Iranian government—I also haven’t seen 

evidence to suggest the Iranian government was involved in the 

Canadian plot. I would also suggest that they would have to be— 

to get involved in that kind of planning and the attention it would 

bring would be a grave strategic mistake on their part. 

Now that doesn’t mean they haven’t made a grave strategic mistake, it is entirely possible. But I would be a little bit skeptical to 

suggest they knew about it. It is possible they didn’t look the other 

way, but in terms of actual operational involvement, I am a little 

more skeptical. 

I would suggest that if they did know, it was more about letting 

it happen as opposed to actively forcing it. In terms of the United 

States—what the United States can do with Iran, I don’t see a 

whole host of great options here, because the United States has 

reached out to Iran very, very publicly under the Obama administration especially after he had just been elected, this hasn’t been 

reciprocated in any way shape or form as far as I can tell by the 

Iranian government. 

My sense is that they—the presence of al-Qaeda operatives on 

their soil is something they see as a potentially useful bargaining 

chip down the line in terms of any negotiations that may be going 

on with, for example, the Iranian nuclear program. 

So that is essentially how I see it but I certainly think there is 

going to be—there is no reason at the moment for Iran to rein in 

the activities of al-Qaeda and that seems to me to be quite a big 

problem. 
51 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. If the Chairman would allow me one last 

question, I would appreciate it. Thank you very much. 

I will pose it to Dr. Jones and Mr. Barfi if some others want to 

comment. Does Syria have—let me ask the obvious—chemical warfare capacity? But will Dr. Assad use it and what other elements 

in Syria might use or might have access to these chemical weapons? 

Dr. Jones, and if someone else wants to comment. 

Thank you very much. I will just conclude as I am listening to 

your answer is that sometimes people would argue that information is a negative element. 

I frankly believe that we are now poised with what is happened 

at the Boston Marathon to not turn any moment to get information 

and to act and react, or to act proactively than right now, and so 

I thank the Chairman for this hearing. 

But would you please—— 

Mr. JONES. Yes. I think the answer to your question is the Syrian government does have access, does have stockpiles of especially 

chemical materials. It has likely used to them in some capacity and 

I suspect as long as it stays a danger, will have an impetus to potentially use them. 

I think if one looks at the involvement of Jabhat al-Nusrah and 

other organizations in seizing control of the al-Jara airbase, of dam 

facilities, of an Air Force base in Iblib, and a number of other locations, assuming the Syrian regime does collapse eventually, I think 

there is a decent likelihood that this material will not be secured 

and organizations that are in the opposition may have the ability 

to control it. 

So I think there is a very serious danger of this material getting 

outside of the government’s hands and potentially outside of other 

states-in-the-regions’ hands. This I would say is a very serious—I 

have already heard some potential indications of some opposition 

groups essentially getting their hands on small amounts of chemical material, which is a very disturbing. 

Mr. BARFI. So the problem with Syria is it has, I think, the third 

or fourth largest arsenal of chemical weapons in the world. Basically, the president’s father, Bashar’s father, Hafez, created this as 

a turn against an Israeli first strike. It was not supposed to be 

used in offensive capacity. 

Now that the regime is under is under threat and may lose 

power, we have seen the regime and resort to small uses of it as 

it increases its use of its weapons of its arsenal, it has gotten to 

the point where it has used its most lethal ones, chemical weapons, 

in very small amounts. 

I think we will see it because if there is no response to an international community, there is no reason to believe that the regime 

will not increase its use of the weapons on more wide-scale levels 

that will result in higher levels of civilian casualties. 

The problem with the weapons falling outside the control of the 

regime is it is a very hard if you don’t have expertise in these 

weapons to use them. It is not like MacGyver, the A Team, you mix 

a couple of substances and you are going to be able to use it. 

The problem is: How are you going to deliver it? What are you 

going to put it on? These people cannot put these weapons on a 
52 

rocket. You need very sophisticated people and it is not something 

that you can learn on the internet like the Boston bombers how to 

build a bomb in the kitchen of your mom. 

You need experts in that and we don’t see that these people have 

those experts at this time. They would love to get their hands on 

these weapons but they would—even if they did, they wouldn’t 

know how to use them and they would see casualties on their own 

side before they were even able to to put these into play. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank all the witnesses. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. KING. The gentlelady yields back. 

I just have a few follow-up questions. 

Mr. Joscelyn, to give bipartisan credit, throughout your statement you seem to give the Obama administration credit for both 

the State Department and the Treasury Department for recognizing and focusing in on the threat of al-Qaeda and Iran. Is there 

anything else you think the administration should be doing that it 

is not regarding the al-Qaeda elements in Iran? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. You know, it is tough to say. Seth here mentioned 

that sunlight in asking these questions plays a big role and I totally agree with that. 

As a result of the Treasury Department designating Yasin Al 

Suri as the head of al-Qaeda’s network in Iran, he was basically 

sidelined and what they did was they allowed Muhsin al Fadhli 

who was the current head of al-Qaeda and Iran to come out of prison to take over the network. 

So that sunlight I think that Seth is mentioning has direct effects on their behavior. So the more you expose the facts of what 

is going on, the better it is. 

I just want to interject one quick thing on the idea of the Canada 

plots and whether or not Iranian officials were involved. Like the 

other witnesses, I haven’t seen any specific evidence saying that 

any Iranian officials were involved. 

My only hesitation is I don’t think we really know one way or 

another and part of the reason for that is the way the Treasury Department has described the agreement between Iran and al-Qaeda, 

it says explicitly that al-Qaeda must keep Iranian authorities informed of their activities otherwise if they violate these terms they 

run the risk of being detained by Iranian authorities. 

I don’t know the answer to this question, in the wake of the Canada plots, I don’t know of any al-Qaeda operatives inside Iran who 

were detained or arrested. Maybe some were, I don’t know of any 

and I think that would be indicative one way or another of either 

tacitly turning a blind eye and approving of something like that or 

possibly just, you know, basically looking the other way as the Congresswoman asked. 

The other thing I would say about that is that where one of these 

platters went for training and to meet in Zahadan Eastern Iran is 

also a major hub for the Iranian Quds Force. The RGC Quds Force. 

They traffic drugs through there. They traffic arms through there 

illicitly. It is basically crawling with Quds Force operatives who report right up to the regime. 

It is one of those towns—Zahadan is one of those towns where 

the collusion between these various parties is quite evident. So I 
53 

don’t know the answer to that question whether Iranian authorities 

were involved in the Canada plots either, I just say that there are 

good reasons to actually keep pressing the inquiry. 

Mr. KING. With the apprehension of bin Laden’s son-in-law, I 

know the questioning was stopped after I think 22 hours, but what 

is the potential do you see from him from obtaining information 

about the al-Qaeda presence in Iran? 

How close was he once he was in Iran? How much access do you 

think he would have had to knowledge as to what the true relationship is? The complexity of the relationship? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. I think it is a good question. I think you can have 

quite a bit. 

I mean, here is the complexity of all of this, right? What happens 

after 9/11 is that Abu Ghaith turns into this chief spokesman for 

bin Laden. He sitting next to him within days of the plot on a 

video, right? Days of the 9/11 attack on a video. 

He then, some time in early 2002 according to press reporting, 

flees into Iran. Now I have previously reported and I have put together a string of facts of what he did inside of Iran in 2002 including threatening the United States, including a cell that he was tied 

to in an attack on U.S. Marines in the Failaka Islands off of Kuwait. 

There is a whole string of things that were tied to him basically 

as he is on Iranian soil in 2002. Then in 2003 he is placed under 

house arrest. Basically I think the Iranians were spooked by a 

number of things; one were these international plots were tied to 

al-Qaeda’s Iranian presence where there were complaints from the 

Saudi’s and U.S. Government, back to Seth’s point, the transparency and sunshine does have an effect on their behavior. 

So he and others are put under house arrest. Now here is where 

this just turns again is that we know from the Treasury Department that by 2005 the Iranians had now cut a deal with other alQaeda operatives to allow them to freely operate inside Iran and 

some of those operatives include guys who were tied to Abu Ghaith. 

So I would say the unpacking all of this in figuring out what he 

knows about all of this is crucial for kind of understanding—he is 

one of few eyewitnesses that we would have in custody that actually could tell us how all of this unfolded and sort of the double 

game and the sort of inconsistent behaviors people have seen of the 

Iranian regime toward all of this. 

Mr. KING. Dr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, if I could just make one remark. My 

understanding of the lay down in Iran is that there is some 

compartmentalization of individuals that have been under house 

arrest so I do think the interrogation can be quite useful. 

It won’t give a big—a complete picture of the relationship with 

Iran because I do think it is somewhat compartmentalized, but it 

will give a portion. 

You know, there are other places where there would be useful access to information. The bin Laden documents I understand that 

have still not been released have plenty of information about alQaeda’s involvement in Iran and vice versa. Whether that gets released or not is obviously administration decision. 
54 

Mr. JOSCELYN. I totally agree with that. I would urge transparency as much as possible with the bin Laden documents. As I 

have reported, hundreds of thousands of documents and files were 

recovered during the May 2011 raid in Abbattabad. 

The administration has released a grand total of 17 of them out 

of hundreds of thousands. This was announced in a speech at the 

Wilson Center by current CIA director John Brennan. Ironically 

enough, he was promoting transparency on behalf of the Obama 

administration and government. 

I think we can hold them to that and say if you really want to 

be transparent, you should release as many of these documents as 

possible including all documents, not just some, all documents dealing with Iran’s collusion with al-Qaeda. 

Mr. KING. Thank you. 

Mr. Barfi, this will be my final question and Mr. Barfi and any 

of you can comment on it. 

Assuming we can’t find a group in Syria that can be trusted that 

we feel is no jihadist threat, and we supply them with weapons, 

and Assad is overthrown, at the end of the day, is JN though the 

one best place to take over that movement in order to have a successful revolution, have elements at least reasonably favorable to 

the West, bring that about, but then have JN take over the revolution? 

Mr. BARFI. The problem there, Congressman, is that JN has a 

strategic vision of not what it wants to do right now in the revolution, but it wants to do in the day after. 

It knows that the big fight is not now against Assad, it is what 

the future of Syria is. So what are they doing? They are taking 

over infrastructure. 

They have taken over the grains, the granaries. So they have 

grain supply so they can bring the bread to win over the confidence 

of the people; the hearts and the minds. 

They control strategic roads and access points in Syria that link 

certain very important areas when you need to bring final fighters 

and you need to bring final provisions in. 

You take control of the oil installation in the northeast. They are 

controlling all of this infrastructure, and they can squeeze people 

for things that they want later on. 

What will likely happen after the fall of the regime is we will see 

local warlords pop up in certain regions. It will be very cantanized 

in Syria; focused on cities. There will be five brigades fighting for 

al-Ethel. Another six fighting for Hama and Homs. This is the way 

the revolution will play out, these warlords will fight each other. 

What needs to be done is that JN cannot sit on the sidelines, 

hide the weapons—this is another problem is JN—and this is, I 

know from talking to people who have raided bases with them. 

They are very good—they are put in charge sometimes in dividing 

the spoils. 

So they get the first choice of what they want when they take 

a base and they get the weaponry. So they have all these things. 

So the problem is the day after. What does JN do? 

Does JN sit on the sidelines and watch these nationalist brigades 

fight amongst themselves while it strengthens itself, it strengthens 
55 

its ties to the community?—and you have to understand, Congressman, JN is very, very popular. 

I was in Zelepos when they were designated terrorist organization in the front of al-Qaeda in Iran, and a lot of people asked me 

why did America do this? Why does America hate JN so much? You 

have to understand their popularity is very high and it is not because people like al-Qaeda. 

They are not talking about other ideology. They are talking about 

what they do for society. Every day people line up at the entrance 

to JN’s headquarters and ask them for help in solving problems 

and they do it in an organized way. So that is something we have 

to worry about. 

So, the day after these brigades are going to fight amongst themselves. What is JN going to do? Are they going to stand on the sidelines? Is it going to throw its weight with certain brigades? 

What needs to be done and what we need to encourage is the day 

after these brigades turn on JN first and then they solve their 

problems. They weaken JN before they weaken themselves and 

that is what we need to focus on. 

Mr. KING. Would they be willing to consolidate their position 

against JN or would each be like an individual warlord unwilling 

to share? In other words, can there be that sense of coordination 

among the other elements? 

Mr. BARFI. You need to use your leverage. If you are funding certain brigades, if you are the United States and you are funneling 

aid in weapons to certain brigades, you then have influence over 

them and you can use that influence to achieve your goals. 

If you are not playing the game with people, there is no reason 

for them to help you. So if we can fund the strike brigades and we 

tell them we want X, Y, and Z and you take a hands-off approach 

and see—we don’t get involved too many cooks in the broth there— 

you can get the goals that you want. You can achieve that saying 

hey, the day after this is what you should do to worry about what 

you need. 

Mr. KING. I have to watch what I say, but let me ask you. Do 

you think we are asserting that now? Are we paving the way to assert that or are we just dealing through subcontractors? We can’t 

do it through Qatar. 

Mr. BARFI. Yes, I think that we need to get more directly involved at this point in time. Look, nobody wants to send our boys 

overseas to put them in harm’s way. We want to focus on rebuilding the homeland after all these years where our forces have been 

away, but we need to deny al-Qaeda a new safe haven. 

They are on the run in Pakistan. They are on the run in Yemen. 

Why give them a new opportunity in the heart of the Arab world? 

You have got to keep them on the run and we need to deny them 

that. That is why we need to get more involved at this point in 

time, and if we don’t, we will have this haven and we will have 

other actors that aren’t our friends being involved funneling aid to 

the wrong organizations. 

Mr. KING. I think we are on the same page. 

Anybody else want to comment on that? 

Okay. 
56 

Well, let me thank all of the witnesses. This has really been a 

very illuminating hearing. I want to thank all of you for your expertise over the years and for sharing it with us today. 

Members of the committee may have some additional questions 

for you and we will ask you to respond to these in writing and 

probably the only negative part of this is because you have always 

performed so well, we may ask you back again and tie up some 

more of your time, but thank you very much. 

And without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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