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S. HRG. 113–89 

CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY 

THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

TUESDAY, MARCH 12, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 
(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

ANGUS KING, Maine 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

DANIEL COATS, Indiana 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio 

JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma, Ex Officio 

DAVID GRANNIS, Staff Director 

MARTHA SCOTT POINDEXTER, Minority Staff Director 

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk 
(III) 

CONTENTS 

MARCH 12, 2013 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California .................. 1 

Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Georgia .............. 3 

WITNESS 

Clapper, Hon. James R., Director of National Intelligence, Accompanied by: 

Mueller, Hon. Robert, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Brennan, 

John O., Director, Central Intelligence Agency; Goldberg, Hon. Philip, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research; Olsen, Matthew, 

Director, National Counterterrorism Center; and Flynn, Lt. Gen. Michael 

T., Director, Defense Intelligence Agency .......................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment 

of the U.S. Intelligence Community by James R. Clapper ........................ 13 

(1) 

CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL 

SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES 

TUESDAY, MARCH 12, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Chambliss, 

Rockefeller, Wyden, Mikulski, Udall (of Colorado), Heinrich, King, 

Coats, Rubio, and Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. The Committee will come to order. We 

meet today in open session, as we’ve done since 1994, actually, to 

hear an unclassified briefing from our intelligence leaders on the 

threats that face our nation; hence the title—the ‘‘World Threat 

Hearing.’’ 

As Members know, we will immediately follow this session with 

a closed one, and I’ll ask that Members refrain from asking questions here that have classified answers. This hearing is really a 

unique opportunity to inform the American public, to the extent we 

can, about the threats we face as a nation and worldwide. 

Let me begin by welcoming our witnesses and thanking them for 

being here. They are: The Director of National Intelligence, Jim 

Clapper, who will provide the opening statement on behalf of the 

Intelligence Community; the Director of the CIA, new to the job, 

John Brennan—actually, it’s his fifth full day; the Director of the 

FBI, Bob Mueller, now nearly twelve years on the job, and who, 

barring another unforeseen intervention by the Congress, is appearing in his last Worldwide Threat Hearing before this Committee—but Bob, you never know; the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael Flynn; the Director of 

the National Counterterrorism Center, Matt Olsen; and the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, Ambassador 

Phil Goldberg. 

So welcome, all of you. 

DNI Clapper, thank you for your Statement for the Record, 

which I have read. It’s submitted in both classified and unclassified 

form, and we very much appreciate it. 

It is clear that the threats to the United States are many. They 

are diffused, and they are complex. We face a continuing threat at 
2 

home from terrorist attack, most notably from al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, which we call AQAP, but also from home grown extremists, such as Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter; Najibullah 

Zazi, who attempted to blow up the New York subway; and Faisal 

Shahzad, the attempted Times Square bomber. 

It’s notable that the Statement for the Record includes the assessment that, due to recent losses, the core of al-Qa’ida in Pakistan—and I quote—‘‘is probably unable to carry out large, complex 

attacks in the West,’’ end quote, although its desire to do so hasn’t 

changed. This appears to be a stronger statement than in the past 

about the effect of counterterrorism operations against al-Qa’ida. 

Since last year’s threat hearing, our staff has been keeping a 

tally of terrorism-related arrests in the United States. With the arrest on March 5th of Riaz Khan, for conspiring to provide material 

support to terrorists in connection with the suicide bombing of ISI 

headquarters in Pakistan, there have now been 105 terrorism-related arrests in the United States in the past four years. We have 

actually listed these, and that’s the number: 105 arrests in the last 

four years. In our federal criminal court system, those arrests will 

most likely lead to a conviction or a guilty plea. If those arrests 

have not resulted in convictions or guilty pleas, it is only because 

the case is still ongoing. 

Another indicator of the success of our criminal justice system in 

prosecuting terrorists is, in 2011, the Department of Justice released a list of terrorism trials conducted since 2001 and reported 

a total of 438 convictions from September 11, 2001 to December 31, 

2010; so in those nine years, 438 convictions in federal courts. 

We have also been briefed recently on the detention and arrest 

of Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, Osama bin Laden’s son-in-law and alQa’ida spokesman. And I’d like to commend the witnesses for your 

agencies’ work in bringing him to the United States to be prosecuted in the federal criminal court, where he faces a life sentence. 

Of course, as the terrorist threat has receded, the threat from 

cyber attack and cyber espionage has grown. We have seen largescale denial-of-service attacks against United States banks, and recent public reports, including by the computer security firm 

Mandiant, about massive cyber penetrations and loss of intellectual 

property from United States businesses. 

I am very concerned, also, about the instability that seems to be 

festering across Northern Africa—from Mali to Egypt to Libya and 

beyond, breeding and harboring a new generation of extremists. 

Some of the governments in the region are unable or unwilling to 

take action against these terrorist groups, meaning that the rest of 

the world will need to focus energy and attention to preventing a 

safe haven and launching pad for future attacks. 

In Syria, there is a massive and still-growing humanitarian disaster under way, with no end in sight, as the regime and the opposition appear nearly at a stalemate. This Committee has been very 

concerned about the possibility that President Bashar Assad would 

become sufficiently desperate to use its chemical weapons stockpile. 

And I note that the DNI’s statement includes exactly that warning. 

I know the President has expressed that the use of chemical 

weapons would be a redline for the United States, and I would pre-
3 

dict that the United States Senate would demand a strong and 

swift response should the use of such weapons occur. 

Of course, Syria is not the only WMD state to be making headlines. North Korea has claimed a third nuclear weapons test, has 

displayed a road-mobile ballistic missile, and demonstrated the capability of its Taepodong-2 missile. The regime is now disavowing 

the 1953 armistice with the South. There’s perhaps nowhere else 

on Earth where the capacity to wreak enormous damage is 

matched by the possibility of North Korea using their nuclear 

weapons. 

Both the Syrian and North Korean examples demonstrate the 

need to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, yet its work 

at Natanz and Fordow continue, and Revolutionary Guard and 

Hezbollah proxies are growing bolder and more capable of their terrorist attack plotting around the world. 

So these, and many other threats and challenges, face the Intelligence Community and play a very critical role in providing warning to United States policymakers, and to providing insight to 

shape their policy decisions. Unfortunately, the IC is being asked 

to do this work under the self-inflicted damage of sequestration. 

I know, Director Clapper, that you have been planning for sequestration and would like to speak to its effects. I have an amendment to the appropriations legislation currently on the Senate 

Floor that will provide the Community with as much flexibility as 

possible to implement the cuts made by sequestration, in the same 

way as the rest of the Department of Defense, to make sure that 

intelligence efforts, and therefore our national security, can proceed 

as much the same as possible. 

Let me now turn to the distinguished Vice Chairman, Saxby 

Chambliss, for his opening remarks. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SAXBY CHAMBLISS, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Well thanks, Madam Chair, and I 

join in welcoming Director Clapper, as well as all of our other witnesses today, and particularly Mr. Brennan, as his first testimony 

as the Director of CIA—Mr. Director, congratulations; and to Bob 

Mueller—I had a conversation with Bob when his last term was 

ending, and implored him to think about staying. 

I will expect to have that conversation again with you, Director 

Mueller; we may not be successful this time. But you have provided 

great leadership at a great agency, and all of America is safer because of the kind of leadership that you have provided. We’ll have 

many more opportunities, I hope, to say thanks, but we don’t want 

to miss any of those opportunities. 

I particularly appreciate all of you being here today to talk about 

the threats that face our nation. These threats come in all forms— 

terrorism, espionage, cyber, and good old fashioned counterintelligence—and from all corners of the globe. Today, the American 

people have the chance to hear first-hand from those on the front 

lines what these threats mean to the security of our nation. 

Let me just start out by noting that today’s hearing follows a 

lively discussion over the past month about the potential for the 

domestic use of drones. While the administration has put many 
4 

fears to rest over the last few days, this debate brought new attention to the difficulty Congress often faces in getting information 

from the executive branch. 

The Intelligence Community is obligated, under the National Security Act, to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully 

and currently informed of its intelligence activities, including covert action. We cannot do the oversight the American people expect 

of us if every request for information becomes a protracted battle. 

As a group, our witnesses represent the entire Intelligence Community, and each of you has made a commitment to this Committee to provide information when we request it. We understand 

there may be rare exceptions to this rule, but we are now operating 

in an environment in which the exception has become the rule, and 

this simply has to stop. 

Let me now turn to the threats facing our nation. We’ve heard 

it said over the past year that core al-Qa’ida has been decimated 

and is on the run. Its Pakistan-based leadership is crumbling 

under the pressure of U.S. and allied counterterrorism efforts. 

But new threats, posed by al-Qa’ida affiliates and other similar 

organizations, are emerging—and possibly expanding—in places 

like Yemen, North Africa, and Mali. The past six months alone 

have brought the terrorist attacks in Benghazi and Algeria that 

claimed innocent American lives. Clearly, these attacks show that 

radical and extreme ideologies are not going away anytime soon. 

Instead, these terrorist organizations are regrouping and gathering 

strength. 

When we entered Afghanistan in October 2001, our goal was to 

put the al-Qa’ida terrorist training camps and military installations 

of the Taliban regime out of business. Now, as we prepare to leave 

Afghanistan nearly twelve years later, the Taliban, the Haqqani 

Network, and similar groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan seem to 

have mostly survived years of counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations. This raises the inevitable question of whether 

these groups will be able to create a sanctuary, like we saw before 

9/11, once the U.S. coalition withdraws in 2014. 

As we face new threats from al-Qa’ida affiliates, we are badly 

overdue for a long-term detention policy that allows us to fully and 

effectively interrogate terrorist detainees. Last week, Osama bin 

Laden’s son-in-law was indicted in federal court in New York after 

being captured overseas. While Sulaiman Abu Ghaith is finally facing justice for his long affiliation with bin Laden and al-Qa’ida, I 

firmly believe this administration’s refusal to place new detainees 

at Guantanamo Bay is hurting our ability to collect intelligence. 

It seems as though we now either just kill terrorists or give them 

Miranda warnings. Dead terrorists don’t talk. And when we 

Mirandize the ones we do capture, after just 50 minutes, or 90 minutes, we aren’t likely to get the timely intelligence we need. Three 

years ago, we had the same conversation, following the failed 

Christmas Day Bombing, and I’m disappointed that this scenario 

seems to be repeating itself. 

Whether Abu Ghaith is ultimately tried in federal court or a 

military commission is not the primary question; it is whether we 

maximize our opportunity to gather good intelligence up front. 

Waiting for a potential plea deal before getting access again, as we 
5 

saw with the Christmas Day Bomber, is, I believe, simply the 

wrong approach. 

I’m very concerned that we have returned to the dangerous pre9/11 reactive mindset, where international terrorists were treated 

as ordinary criminals. This is a mistake we should not repeat. The 

administration’s handling of Abu Ghaith also seems to directly contradict the National Defense Authorization Act, which specifically 

called for individuals like him to be held in military custody. 

Now, I understand that the administration adopted procedures 

that effectively undermined the spirit of this military custody requirement. And what I believe is an abuse of the NDAA’s waiver 

provision, the administration created broad, accepted categories 

under which they can continue to avoid placing terrorists in military custody. I would simply ask—if someone like Abu Ghaith will 

not be held in military custody for interrogation purposes, then 

who will be? 

Of course, terrorism is not our only threat. The possibility of Iran 

acquiring nuclear weapons, and North Korea’s nuclear test, and 

other provocations, merit our close attention, as does the increasing 

conflict in Syria. It is critical that we ensure the Intelligence Community can give us a clear reading into these ‘‘hot spots’’ and to 

what may lie over the horizon. 

At the same time, cyber espionage and intrusions are growing 

every day, and if we are going to prevent the siphoning off of our 

intellectual property to hackers and nation-states alike, then Congress must work with the private sector in a truly cooperative way. 

We must pass voluntary information sharing legislation that completely protects companies from the threat of lawsuits. The government must put its own cyber house in order, and we must make 

sure that our criminal penalties are sufficient to punish and deter 

cyber intruders. 

Gentlemen, today is your opportunity to give the country a real 

glimpse of what it means to be on the front lines of the Intelligence 

Community. There is no doubt that today’s slimming budgets, combined with increasing and diverse threats, clearly present a challenge to the entire Intelligence Community. 

Your task is not an easy one. But I am confident that the men 

and women of the Intelligence Community, who work so hard every 

day in defense of this nation, will rise to this challenge and not 

only get the job done, but, under your leadership, they will do it 

well. 

Madam Chair, I thank you and look forward to a discussion with 

our witnesses. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much for those comments. 

We will now proceed. Director Clapper, you have the floor, and it’s 

my understanding you’re going to make the comments on behalf of 

everyone? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And then we will be able to ask questions. 

The rounds will be five minutes because we have a classified hearing, and we will go according to seniority, alternating sides. 

Please proceed, Director Clapper. 
6 

STATEMENT OF JAMES R. CLAPPER, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 

INTELLIGENCE ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 

Director CLAPPER. Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman 

Chambliss, and distinguished Members of the Committee, as you 

indicated, we’re here to present the 2013 Worldwide Threat Assessment. You already introduced my colleagues, but I do want to 

speak very briefly about, sort of, the alpha and omega of tenure in 

the Intelligence Community. 

Bob Mueller, approaching now twelve years in office, is a very 

distinguished director of the FBI, and a tremendous colleague for 

me—in this job and in previous ones I’ve held. 

And of course, I could not be more delighted and more proud to 

have John Brennan confirmed and installed as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. It’s my view that John will go down as 

one of the distinguished directors of CIA. 

These remarks and our two Statements for the Record—one unclassified, and then a much more detailed classified one—reflect 

the collective judgments of the extraordinary men and women of 

the United States Intelligence Community. And it’s our privilege— 

those of us who are here and those who aren’t—a privilege and 

honor to serve in these positions to lead them, and now, as I will 

discuss shortly, our solemn duty to try to protect them. 

As you know, Madam Chairman, I have serious reservations 

about conducting open hearings on the worldwide threat, especially 

the question and answer sessions. While I believe it’s important to 

keep the American public informed about the threats that our nation faces, I believe that can be done through unclassified opening 

statements and statements for the record. As you also know, we’re 

ready to answer any and all of your questions in closed session, but 

an open hearing on intelligence matters is something of a contradiction in terms. 

While our statements for the record and your opening statements 

can be reviewed in advance for classification issues, our answers to 

your questions cannot. And our attempts to avoid revealing classified information sometimes leads to misinterpretation, or accusations that we’re being circumspect for improper reasons. It’s a hazard we have encountered when publicly discussing sensitive details 

of national security matters. 

So, when we ask to discuss certain matters in the closed session, 

it’s not to evade, but rather to protect our intelligence sources and 

methods and, if I might add, to be sensitive to the often delicate 

relations we have with our allies and partners. They, too, all carefully listen to and watch these hearings, as I have learned the hard 

way. 

The topic that you both alluded to—the topic that is foremost on 

our minds this year—is, of course, sequestration. You haven’t seen 

much public discourse on the impact of these indiscriminate cuts 

on intelligence. We haven’t been on the talk shows, and you don’t 

read much about it in the printed media. So, let me now be blunt— 

for you, and for the American people: sequestration forces the Intelligence Community to reduce all intelligence activities and functions without regard to impact our mission. 
7 

In my considered judgment as the nation’s senior intelligence officer, sequestration jeopardizes our nation’s safety and security, 

and this jeopardy will increase over time. The National Intelligence 

Program, or NIP, as it’s called, which I manage, is spread across 

six cabinet departments and two independent agencies. Much of it 

is included in the DoD budget. 

For that portion of the NIP, the Congress directed that the National Intelligence Program use an even more onerous set of rules 

to carry out these cuts than that imposed on the Defense Department. This restrictive Program, Project, and Activity—or PPA 

structure, as it’s known—compounds the damage because it restricts our ability to manage where to take deductions in a balanced and rational way. Accordingly, the sheer size of the budget cut—well over $4 billion, or about 7 percent of the NIP—will directly compel us to do 

less with less. I’ll give you some examples—and I’ll have to be circumspect here in an open, unclassified setting, but we’re prepared 

to speak more specifically in a classified setting—of the impacts of 

sequestration. 

We’ll reduce HUMINT, technical, and counterintelligence operations, resulting in fewer collection opportunities while increasing 

the risk of strategic surprise. This includes, for example, possibly 

furloughing thousands of FBI employees funded in the National Intelligence Program. 

Our cyber efforts will be impacted. This is an area where, as you 

all know, we need to keep ahead of rapid technology advances to 

maintain and increase access to adversaries as well as provide 

warning of a cyber attack against the U.S. 

Critical analysis and tools will be cut back. So, we’ll reduce global coverage, and may risk missing the early signs of a threat. Our 

response to customers will suffer, as well. 

We’ll let go over five thousand contractors—and that number 

may grow—who are an integral part of the Intelligence Community. And this is on top of the thousands of contractors we’ve let 

go in previous years. 

We’ll delay major systems acquisitions, and we’ll decommission 

older, but still productive, overhead reconnaissance capabilities, 

thus reducing coverage. Virtually all of the 39 major systems acquisitions across the Intelligence Community would be wounded. 

We’ll have to re-negotiate contracts, and slip schedules to the 

right, which, in the long run, will cost us more. And we’ll scale 

back cutting-edge research that helps us maintain a strategic advantage. 

Since we’re already halfway through the fiscal year, the mandate 

of across-the-board cuts is equivalent to 13 percent, because we’ll 

be forced to take them in just seven months. These condensed 

timelines magnify the impact these cuts will have on the IC. 

So, in response, our approach starts with the premise that mission comes first. Therefore, our two highest priorities are, one, to 

protect our most valuable resource—our civilian workforce—so we 

can focus on the threats we face; and two, to support overseas operations. 

Our civilian workforce works 24/7 around the world, and is crucial to performing that mission. It is our civilian professionals who 
8 

will provide the resilience and ingenuity to help compensate for the 

other cuts we’ll incur. I am resolutely committed to minimizing the 

number and lengths of furloughs that would be required, not only 

because of the direct impact on our mission, but because of the severe impact on the morale of the people who do it. I plan to follow 

Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter’s sterling example and 

have my pay reduced, as well, in solidarity with any IC employees 

that have to be furloughed. 

Now, let me emphasize here that we are not arguing against taking our share of the budget reductions. What I am saying is that 

we must manage this budget crisis and continue our vital missions. 

And, in so doing, we’ll minimize the impact on our nation and on 

our employees. Therefore, I plan to submit a reprogramming action 

that mitigates some of the most egregious cuts to help us cut in a 

more rational, mission-focused manner. And in this, I’m asking for 

your support, and the other intelligence oversight committees, for 

expedited management and consideration. 

And Madam Chairman, I want to, on behalf of the entire Intelligence Community, thank you for your leadership and your care 

for the mission of the Intelligence Community and for introducing 

a bill that would give us that flexibility. 

Now, I must tell you that, unfortunately, I’ve seen this movie before. Twenty years ago, I served as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency—the job that Lieutenant General Mike Flynn has 

now. We were then enjoying reaping the peace dividend occasioned 

by the end of the Cold War. 

We reduced the Intelligence Community by 23 percent. During 

the mid to late 1990s, we closed many CIA stations, reduced 

HUMINT collectors, cut analysts, allowed our overhead architecture to atrophy, and we neglected basic infrastructure needs, such 

as power, space, and cooling, and we let our facilities decay. And 

most damaging, most devastatingly, we badly distorted the workforce. 

All of that, of course, was reversed in the wake of 9/11. And 

thanks to the support of the Congress over the last decade, we rebuilt the Intelligence Community into the premier of such capability on the planet. And now, if we’re not careful, we risk another 

damaging downward spiral. So I’m going to do all I can to prevent 

history from repeating that cycle. 

But, to be clear, the scope and magnitude of the cuts already 

under way will be long lasting. Unlike more directly-observable sequestration impacts, like shorter hours of public parks, or longer 

security lines at airports, the degradation to intelligence will be insidious. It will be gradual and almost invisible—unless and until, 

of course, we have an intelligence failure. 

With that preface as a backdrop, let me turn now to a brief 

wave-top review of global threat trends and challenges; although, 

Madam Chairman, you and the Vice Chair have, I think, done an 

admirable job of that already. 

I will say that in my almost fifty years of intelligence, I do not 

recall a period in which we’ve confronted a more diverse array of 

threats, crises, and challenges around the world, which you both 

described. To me, this makes sequestration even more incongruous. 
9 

This year’s threat assessment illustrates how dramatically the 

world and our threat environment are changing. 

Threats are growing more interconnected and viral. Events that 

at first seem local and irrelevant can quickly set off transnational 

disruptions that affect U.S. national interests. It’s a world in which 

our definition of war now includes a soft version. We can add cyber 

and financial to the list of weapons being used against us. And 

such attacks can be deniable and non-attributable. 

So, when it comes to the distinct threat areas, our statement this 

year leads with cyber. And it’s hard to overemphasize its significance. 

Increasingly, state and non-state actors are gaining and using 

cyber expertise. They apply cyber techniques and capabilities to 

achieve strategic objectives, by gathering sensitive information 

from public and private sector entities, controlling the content and 

flow of information, and challenging perceived adversaries of cyber 

space. 

These capabilities put all sectors of our country at risk—from 

government and private networks to critical infrastructures. We 

see indications that some terrorist organizations are interested in 

developing offensive cyber capabilities, and that cyber criminals are 

using a growing black market to sell cyber tools that fall into the 

hands of both state and non-state actors. 

This year, we include natural resources as a factor affecting national security because shifts in human geography, climate, disease, and competition for natural resources have national security 

implications. Many countries that are extremely important to U.S. 

interests that sit in already-volatile areas of the world are living 

with extreme water and food stress that can destabilize governments. This includes Afghanistan and Pakistan in South Asia, 

Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya in the Arab world, and many 

other nation-states across Africa and in our own hemisphere. 

Water challenges include not only problems with quality and 

quantity, but with flooding. Some countries will almost certainly 

exert leverage over their neighbors to preserve their own water interests, and water infrastructure can be considered a viable target 

for terrorists. 

In the United States, Germany, and Japan, less than 15 percent 

of household expenditures are for food. In India and China, that 

figure climbs to more than 20 percent. In Egypt, Vietnam, and Nigeria, it rises to greater than 35 percent. And in Algeria, Pakistan, 

and Azerbaijan, more than 45 percent of household expenses are 

just for food. 

Terrorists, militants, and international crime groups are certain 

to use declining local food security to gain legitimacy and undermine government authority. Intentional introduction of a livestock 

or plant disease could be a greater threat to the United States and 

the global food system than a direct attack on food supplies intended to kill humans. 

So there will most assuredly be security concerns with respect to 

health and pandemics, energy, and climate change. Environmental 

stressors are not just humanitarian issues; they legitimately 

threaten regional stability. 
10 

On the issue of terrorism, the threat from core al-Qa’ida and the 

potential for a massive coordinated attack on the United States is 

diminished, but the global jihadist movement is a more diversified, 

decentralized, and persistent threat. Lone wolves, domestic extremists, and jihadist-inspired groups remain determined to attack 

Western interests, as they have done most recently in Libya and 

Algeria. 

The turmoil in the Arab world has brought a spike in threats to 

U.S. interests. The rise of new governments in Egypt, Tunisia, 

Yemen, and Libya, along with ongoing unrest in Syria and Mali, 

provide openings for opportunistic individuals and groups. In these 

and other regions of the world, extremists can take advantage of 

diminished counterterrorism capabilities, porous borders, and internal stressors; most especially, a high proportion of unemployed 

young males. 

Development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is 

another major threat to U.S. interests. North Korea has already 

demonstrated capabilities that threaten the United States and the 

security environment in East Asia. 

It announced last month that it concluded its third nuclear test, 

and last April, it displayed what appears to be a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. We believe North Korea has already 

taken initial steps towards fielding this system, although it remains untested. It also used its Taepdong-2 launch vehicle to put 

a satellite in orbit in December, thus demonstrating its long-range 

missile technology. These developments have been accompanied 

with extremely aggressive public rhetoric towards the United 

States and the Republic of Korea. 

Iran continues to develop technical expertise in a number of 

areas, including uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors, and ballistic missiles, from which it could draw it if decided to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons. These technical advancements 

strengthen our assessment that Tehran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons. This 

makes the central issue its political will to do so. Such a decision 

will reside with the supreme leader, and at this point, we don’t 

know if he’ll eventually decide to build nuclear weapons. 

The United States and our allies are tracking Syria’s munitions 

stockpiles, particularly its chemical and biological warfare agents, 

which are all part of a large, complex, and geographically dispersed 

program. Its advanced chemical weapons program has the potential 

to inflict mass casualties. 

This adds to our concern that the increasingly beleaguered regime, having found its escalation of violence through conventional 

means inadequate, might be preparing to use chemical weapons 

against the Syrian people. And besides the regime’s use, non-governmental groups or individuals in Syria could gain access to such 

materials. 

Let me now briefly address regional threats around the world. 

Some nations in the Middle East and North Africa are making 

progress toward Democratic rule, but most are experiencing levels 

of violence and political backsliding. Islamic actors have been the 

chief beneficiaries of the political openings, and extremist parties 
11 

in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco will probably solidify their influence this year. 

After almost two years of conflict in Syria, the erosion of the regime’s capabilities is accelerating. We see this in its territorial 

losses, military manpower, and logistic shortages. The regime’s aggressive violence and the deteriorating security conditions have led 

to increased civilian casualties. 

This sort of violence too often accompanies major political upheaval, being perpetuated by elites trying to assert or retain control. This violence and economic dislocation has led to more than 

two million Syrians being displaced, both internally and externally. 

In Iran, leaders are exploiting the unrest in the Arab world to 

try to spread influence abroad and undermine the United States 

and our allies. However, Tehran faces a worsening financial outlook since sanctions were implemented in 2012 on its oil exports 

and central bank. 

Iran continues to be a destabilizing force in the region, providing 

weapons and training to Syrian forces, and standing up a militia 

force there to fight the Syrian opposition. Iran’s efforts to secure regional dominance, however, achieve limited results, and the fall of 

the Assad regime in Syria would be a major strategic loss for 

Tehran. 

In Iraq, sectarian tensions are rising between the majority Shi’a 

and minority Sunni. Last year, we saw a rise in vehicle and suicide 

bombings by al-Qa’ida in Iraq. However, AQI almost certainly lacks 

the strength to overwhelm Iraqi security forces, and Iraq is producing and exporting oil at its highest levels in two decades. 

Moving to South Asia, the Taliban-led insurgency has diminished 

in some areas of Afghanistan, but remains resilient and capable of 

challenging U.S. and international goals. The coalition drawdown 

will have an impact on Afghanistan’s economy, which is likely to 

decline after 2014. 

In Pakistan, the government made no concerted effort to institute much-needed policy and tax reforms, and the country faces extremely challenging prospects for sustainable economic growth. On 

a more positive note, this past year, the Pakistani armed forces 

continued their operations in the Federally Administered Tribal 

Areas, or FATA, which have been safe havens for al-Qa’ida and the 

Taliban. Pakistan also saw fewer domestic attacks from the militant group of TTP. 

Across Africa, violence, corruption, and extremism will threaten 

U.S. interests this year. We’ve seen strides in development in some 

areas—Ghana here, is noteworthy. And international efforts have 

combined with domestic support to bring more stability to Somalia. 

But we still see unresolved conflict between Sudan and South 

Sudan, extremist attacks in Nigeria, the collapse of governance in 

Northern Mali, and persistent conflict in Central Africa, especially 

in the great lakes region. 

China is supplementing its more advanced military capabilities 

by bolstering maritime law enforcement to support its claims in the 

South and East China Seas. It continues its military buildup and 

its aggressive information-stealing campaigns. 
12 

Russia will continue to resist putting more international pressure on Syria or Iran, and will continue to display its great sensitivity to missile defense. 

Closer to home, despite positive trends toward democracy and 

economic development, Latin America and the Caribbean contend 

with weak institutions, slow recovery from devastating natural disasters, and drug-related violence and trafficking, which, of course, 

is a major threat to the United States. 

On another aspect of transnational organized crime, roughly 20 

million human beings are being trafficked around the world, an 

issue on which we’ve increased our efforts to support law enforcement. Virtually every country on the face of the Earth is a source, 

a transit point, or a destination for human trafficking, and some 

fall in more than one category. 

In sum, given the magnitude and complexity of our global responsibilities, our strong, persistent, and reliable intelligence capabilities have never been more important or urgent, and I have trouble reconciling this imperative with sequestration. 

With that, I thank you for your attention, and we are ready to 

address your questions. 

[The Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, prepared by Director 

Clapper, follows:] 
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Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Director Clapper, 

and thank you for the written comments, as well—I think they’re 

excellent. 

Director Mueller, in a quick question, I mentioned the 100 terrorist-related arrests in the United States since January of 2009, 

and the number of convictions since 2011 at over 400. 

Let me ask you this question: Has the FBI been impeded in its 

ability to conduct investigations or collect intelligence from terrorist suspects because of the need to read Miranda rights or 

present a suspect to a court? 

Director MUELLER. It’s hard to respond specifically, because there 

may be an occasion where it was an issue in an investigation, but 

for the most part, the answer is no. If you talk to agents who do 

this for a living, I think they would tell you that it is their ability 

to elicit information by developing rapport with individuals that is 

a prime mover, in terms of providing the appropriate intelligence. 

And let me, if I could, put in context what I think is the underselling, or the underestimating, the ability of the criminal justice 

system to produce intelligence. I, for one, understand that if there 

is a terrorist attack, it is going to be on us. I, for one, am very concerned about maximizing the access to intelligence. One of the 

things I do think is underestimated is the ability of the criminal 

justice system to do just that. 

There has not been—well, there are very, very few cases, of the 

numbers that you mentioned, where we have not ultimately obtained the cooperation of the individual, albeit going through—as 

the Senator points out—going through the criminal justice system. 

But we have a number of cases where we have convicted persons, 

and because of our plea bargaining in our system, we have gotten 

the cooperation we need. And that cooperation has led to our testifying in cases in the UK and elsewhere because we had intelligence, from our system, that they did not have. 

If you look at three of the cases that were prominent in terms 

of providing intelligence—you start with David Headley, out of Chicago, who opened the door to us in terms of the Mumbai attacks; 

if you look at Najibullah Zazi in the plot to bomb the New York 

City subway, that case couldn’t have proceeded without his full cooperation; and then another individual by the name of Bryant Neal 

Vinas. 

In every case, we try to look at the best option. And I’m not saying that—in certain cases, the military tribunal option is not the 

best option to go. But I do think that the ability of the criminal justice system to produce intelligence is often overlooked. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

For either Director Clapper or Mr. Brennan: In light of recent 

warnings by North Korea, including the renunciation of the 

ceasefire with South Korea after six decades, does the IC assess 

that they could actually take provocative action that could lead to 

a renewal of active hostilities with the South? 

Director CLAPPER. Let me start, and then John can jump in. 

Absolutely. I, personally, having followed Korea ever since I 

served there in the mid 1980s as the Director of Intelligence for 

U.S. Forces Korea, am very concerned about the actions of the new 
48 

young leader—very belligerent—and the rhetoric that has been 

emanating from the North Korean regime. 

The rhetoric, while it is propaganda-laced, is also an indicator of 

their attitude, and perhaps their intent. So, for my part, I am very 

concerned about what they might do, and they certainly, if they so 

choose, could initiate a provocative action against the South. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Director Brennan, would you like to add to 

that? 

Director BRENNAN. I would agree with Director Clapper. This is 

a very dynamic time right now, with the new leader. I think it also 

just underscores the importance of making sure that our analytic 

capabilities, as well as our collection capabilities, are as strong as 

possible, because what we’re talking about are developments that 

have strategic importance and potential consequence for U.S. interests, not just in northeast Asia, but also globally. 

So I think this is one of the areas that we, as the Intelligence 

Community, and certainly the CIA, need to pay particularly close 

attention to. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thanks, Madam Chair. 

Director Clapper, let me just address for one second your comments relative to sequestration, and just initially say that we are 

spending too much money in Washington. I don’t think there’s any 

disagreement about that. And actually, the reduction in $1.2 billion 

in spending is not a bad idea. 

But your reference to the way in which we’re doing it is exactly 

right. It’s a foolish way to reduce spending—to tell every aspect of 

the federal government, ‘‘You don’t have a choice. You’re mandated 

to reduce spending across the board by whatever the dollar amount 

is in your specific agency, or your office.’’ 

Let me just give you the assurance, and everybody here at the 

table, the assurance that the Chairman, myself, and every Member 

of this Committee is committed to ensuring that the Intelligence 

Community does not suffer from the lack of resources. One thing 

the Constitution is very clear about is that it is the role of Congress to provide for the national security of Americans. And we intend to honor our obligation. 

You, and the men and women that work under you, are very professional, and you’re doing your job. You’re doing exactly what we 

ask you to do. So we want you to know that we’re committing to 

do everything within our power to ensure that the resources are 

there to allow you to continue to do what you’re asked to do every 

single day. 

Director CLAPPER. Senator Chambliss, first, I very much appreciate that. I think, on behalf of the men and women in the entire 

Intelligence Community, now, more than ever, we are dependent 

on, particularly, our two oversight committees—this one and the 

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence—to be our 

stewards and our advocates. 

That said, let me stress that I am not, and none of us are, suggesting that we won’t take our fair share of the cuts. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Sure. 
49 

Director CLAPPER. All we’re asking for is the latitude on how to 

take them, to minimize the damage. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. And I know you mean it exactly that 

way, and we’re going to have your back on this as we go through 

this. It’s not going to be easy, but we’re going to work hard to do 

it right. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Mr. Vice Chairman, a point of personal privilege—I have to go to the Floor on the continuing resolution. May 

I respond to your comments, the Chair and General Clapper, in 

terms of the state of play? 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Sure. 

Senator MIKULSKI. We have a continuing resolution on the Floor. 

This does not deal with the sequester—that’s being negotiated by 

the higher powers, whether it’s a charm offensive or whether it’s 

an offensive. My job, along with Senator Shelby’s, is to move the 

continuing resolution. We are working steadily, on a bipartisan 

basis, to do that. 

But the money is spartan, and it is frugal. And in terms of the 

flexibility that you’ve just asked for, that the Chair has spoken 

pretty firmly with me about, along with other Members, we will not 

have that in our bill. We were told that was a poison pill. And I’m 

not just saying that to you, Mr. Clapper, but to our colleagues. And 

I would like that as we go through the rest of the day, we could 

talk to see if we could have an amendment that would accomplish 

that. 

But we were told, by both the House and by others, that this was 

a poison pill. I’d like to do everything I can to not only get you the 

money, but the administrative framework for you to properly do 

the money. 

So if we could work together, if I could have your help, but I 

can’t deal—first of all, I can say nothing but positive things about 

Senator Shelby; we’ve worked very well, we’ve co-sponsored our 

bill. But if we can do what you want us to do, we need help. And 

if we could do that, we would. We do want to work with you. We 

so admire you. 

And I’m going to my other duty station. 

Director CLAPPER. Senator Mikulski, if I may just—again, in the 

complex arcana of PPAs, all we’re asking for is to be treated identically as the Department of Defense. And the same PPA arrangement as the larger Department gets, so would we. But we have 

been singled out for very small exacting PPAs, which greatly restricts the latitude to move money around to mitigate the damage. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And Director, as the Senator knows, the 

only thing that this amendment would do that’s being introduced 

today—and I will give this to the Chairman—is essentially to give 

you that authority. You would be treated as defense units are 

treated. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Madam Chair, I welcome you giving me this 

amendment. I’d also like you to give it to Senators Reid and 

McConnell, Boehner, and the House Democratic leadership, as well. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Will do. 

Senator MIKULSKI. You know, again, I always hoped that a higher power would be on my side. The Pope, they meet for—we will 

have a new Pope, and I’d like you to have new flexibility. Okay? 
50 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Okay. 

Senator MIKULSKI. But it’s going to take higher power, and this 

is what you need to show them. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. We will—today. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Thank you. Because it’s not Shelby-Mikulski 

here. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Shall we continue? 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Let me direct this to both Director 

Clapper and Director Mueller: Obviously, we’re still in the stage of 

remorse, relative to the death of four brave Americans in Benghazi. 

The American people have demanded answers, and frankly, we 

have not been able to provide them the types of answers that they 

have asked to this point because we haven’t been given all of the 

answers. 

I realize we’re in an open hearing, but what I would like to ask 

Director Clapper and Director Mueller is to tell the American people—number one, Director Clapper, what are our lessons learned 

here, as we move forward? We know we have a lot of other vulnerable spots around the world. 

Director Mueller, what can you, in an open hearing, tell us about 

the progress towards bringing these murderers to justice? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, first of all, Senator Chambliss, I think 

one lesson in this is a greater emphasis on the Intelligence Community on force protection for our diplomat facilities. And I can, in 

a closed context, go into specifically what I mean by that. And that 

clearly was, I think, a shortfall for us, having a better appreciation 

of the tactical situation at a diplomatic facility. 

I guess the other lesson learned is—don’t do talking points, unclassified talking points. That’s the other lesson I learned. 

Director MUELLER. With regard to the investigation, Senator, a 

couple of points: Since this occurred, we’ve had teams on the 

ground in Tripoli, and elsewhere around the world, conducting the 

investigation. 

With regard to the cooperation of the Libyan authorities, there 

is a willingness exhibited by their actions to cooperate. However, 

it is exceptionally difficult, particularly in eastern Libya, in 

Benghazi. And that has been a hurdle that we have not seen elsewhere where we’ve had similar incidents. 

Nonetheless, we have received the cooperation from the Libyan 

authorities. I traveled there in January to continue to coordinate 

with them. And I will say that the investigation has not been stymied. There are hurdles that we’ve had to overcome, but it’s ongoing, and I believe it will only prove to be fruitful. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thanks very much, gentlemen. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

I’ll give the next four and see what happens in terms of arrival: 

Rockefeller, Burr, Wyden, and Udall. 

Senator Rockefeller. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I cannot help, Director Clapper and John Brennan, but bring up 

the subject that Saxby did in his opening comments, because to me 

talk was just given about a good relationship between the Intelligence Community and Congress. What happened over the last 
51 

couple of weeks is a threat; is a threat to trust—between us and 

you, us towards you, you towards us. And I’m going to ask for comments just from the director, and from Director Brennan. 

What basically happened was we were given certain things that 

we requested, primarily because you, sir, were up for confirmation. 

And had we not been given some of those things which we requested, the confirmation would not have had the votes, and it 

wouldn’t have mattered who had been put up. 

It’s a terrible situation. And I think you’re absolutely superb, absolutely superb. I’ve been through every—for the last almost thirty 

years, I’ve been through every CIA director, and I think you’re the 

best. And I mean that. 

But the irony was that we were given certain things to look at, 

and then we were told, as we did that, when we finally got our 

staff to be allowed to participate—this goes all the way back to 

2001. Then ‘‘minders’’—as I sat with my intelligence expert in a 

room to read these opinions, there was a Department of Justice 

‘‘minder’’ who was sent in to watch us. I was not aware that that 

person was going to have to be there. That was an insult to me, 

and I kicked the person out. She said, ‘‘My orders are I have to be 

here.’’ And then I said something else—I told her to leave. 

We have to find a way for us to trust each other. And I don’t 

think that we’ve—maybe, mutually—but in any event, we haven’t 

figured it out. Things, after the confirmation, went directly back to 

the way they were from 2001/2002 to 2007. We had a classified 

briefing, and all of our staff was kicked out. All of our staff was 

kicked out, with one exception—two exceptions. I was outraged. 

And you can talk about worldwide threats, but unless we have 

our common purpose together, like it was after 9/11, where everybody was on the same team. Everybody was fighting for the same 

thing. Everybody was working with everybody else. That was the 

deal. We were eager to do it. The first bill that passed after 9/11 

was allowing the FBI and the CIA to talk to each other. Maybe we 

need another bill allowing the Intelligence Community to talk to us 

openly—more openly than they have. It’s a real problem. 

John Brennan, you have—I don’t think this is your instinct— 

through your four-hour grilling, and I thought you were superb. 

And on the questions that you had to deflect just a bit, I thought 

you should have deflected, and I respected that. 

But we cannot be told that documents that could be in our purview to look at, which, in fact, have nothing in them that would 

make our review of them a threat to anybody at all, that we can’t 

have them, or that our staff cannot be in attendance. 

What would happen if we had you here, and all the folks behind 

you had to stay out of the room—all of you? That’s the comparable 

situation. I’m not a lawyer. I’m not an intelligence analyst or specialist. I need advice. I need counsel. I need staff. I have a superb 

one, as we all do. 

Is there a way, in your mind, that we can somehow come to an 

understanding that makes this program, or problem, work the way 

it should, to work it out the way it should, so that we’re comfortable with each other; that you protect yourself when you absolutely have to, but you don’t protect yourself beyond where you ab-
52 

solutely have to, so that we can trust each other, and really concentrate on worldwide threats, sir? 

Director CLAPPER. Senator Rockefeller, let me start. And then I 

know John has views on this, having experienced the process that 

I won’t ever go through again—confirmation; I’ve done it three 

times, and that’s more than anybody should stand. And what I’ll 

say probably won’t be entirely satisfactory to you. 

I think all of us—and I think I speak for all my colleagues in the 

Intelligence Community who are here and those who aren’t—that 

trust is fundamental to the relationship between the Intelligence 

Community and our oversight committees. The oversight committees have a unique responsibility, unlike others, because so much 

of what we do is classified, it’s secret. 

So we recognize the doubly-important responsibility that you 

have on behalf of the American public, since not everything we do 

can be revealed. As a general rule, that which is under our control, 

and activities that we manage and oversee, I think our record has 

been pretty good, pretty consistent in sharing that with you, because, again, we depend so heavily on you for your support. 

When there are documents that are elsewhere in the executive 

branch—OLC opinions, just to name one example—or when we are 

attempting to abide by a longstanding practice of executive privilege, which has been practiced by both Republican and Democratic 

administrations, I think that’s where we begin to have problems. 

But I will tell you, for that which is fully under our control and 

for which we manage, I think I can pledge to you that we will endeavor to earn your trust. 

John. 

Director BRENNAN. Senator, like most hostages, I was excluded 

from the ransom negotiations during my confirmation process. But 

one of the things that I have committed to myself is to familiarize 

myself intimately with the rules and procedures that govern the 

interaction with this Committee and other oversight committees for 

programs and activities that fall under my purview. 

And what I want to be able to do is to speak with the Chairman 

and the Vice Chairman about this, because I don’t know what 

those procedures have been heretofore. I’ll pick up on Jim’s point— 

Director Clapper’s point—about some things that are beyond the 

purview of the Intelligence Community or the CIA to make some 

decisions on. But what I really want to do is to have as much dialogue as possible with you so that that trust can be built up, so 

that we are able to address these issues earlier. 

As I think the Vice Chairman was pointing out, on some of the 

matters related to—like the Benghazi talking points and other 

things, what we need to do is address it as early on as possible, 

because, like an angle, the lines of an angle get further apart the 

further out they go. And I really do believe that what we can do 

is, up front, have a clear understanding of what your interests are, 

what your requirements are, and then I think what we need to do 

is to do what we can in order to give you what you need to fulfill 

your statutory responsibilities of oversight. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Either I or others, in the second round, 

will continue this. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator Rockefeller. 
53 

I just want to add one quick thing right here. The OLC opinions, 

in particular, particularly with our obligation, which is robust oversight, you cannot know whether something is carried out by the executive branch within the law unless you see those opinions, which 

phrase the law. And I think that’s the problem—it’s very difficult 

not to look at them, and to make judgments without understanding. I’ll just leave you with that. 

Senator Coats. 

Senator COATS. Madam Chairman, thank you. 

Director Clapper, I note that of all the topics that you chose to 

talk about, you put cyber right at the very top. And I think I understand why—you state that we are undergoing a major transformation intertwined with digital technologies and the internet 

that has profound implications for U.S. economic and national security. 

I was very disappointed that we were not able to put a legislative 

package together in the last Congress—it failed in the waning days 

of the Congress. The President followed up with an Executive 

Order. I know, Director Brennan, you were part of putting that Executive Order together. It’s limited in terms of what it can do, so 

I’m hoping we can work together to fashion a proper legislative 

proposal that will enhance our ability to better understand, and 

better deal with, this ever-growing critical threat to our economy 

and to our national security. 

In that regard, I noted that the Executive Order from the President indicated a strong willingness to share information from the 

government with private industry. But the hang-up here is that the 

reverse—information from private industry shared with the government—hit some road blocks. And we need some incentives to provide private industry to feel secure, in terms of their sharing of 

propriety information, and the impact on its competitiveness with 

others, and so forth. 

Providing such things as liability, coverage, and so forth, and assuring that the standards that are set are compatible with industry 

standards, I think, are critical issues there. So I think I’m making 

a statement in that regard that hopefully we can address that, and 

keep that at the level of priority where you have put it. I know the 

majority leader has said we need to take that up; unfortunately, 

we’re all caught up in debate in issues relative to the fiscal situation—sequester, as you’ve talked about. But this is a serious subject, and we need to get on it sooner rather than later. 

I want to just briefly flip to a question on Iran and ask maybe 

both you, and Director Brennan, just to—if you have anything to 

say about the cyber, that’s fine, but also, just to put this into one 

question: 

We have ever-ratcheting sanctions against Iran, in terms of its 

pursuit of nuclear weapon capability, development: a) Have you 

seen any glimpse of possible change in the decision-making and 

will of the leadership, which will decide whether or not they will 

comply in any sense at all with the requests being made by the 

global community relative to their pursuit? 

And, b) Are there concerns, and maybe you want to save this for 

the closed session, but are there concerns relative to the cooperation agreement signed between North Korea and Iran relative to 
54 

ballistic missile technology and other aspects that might modify the 

timetable in which you assess Iran’s ability to get this capability? 

Director CLAPPER. Let me just start on the first part of your 

question. The second one—the potential relationship between 

North Korea and Iran—might be better addressed in the closed session. 

Clearly, the sanctions have had profound impact on Iran’s economy—by any measure, whether it’s inflation, unemployment, the 

availability of commodities, et cetera—and that situation is getting 

worse. 

At the same time, at least publicly, overtly, that has not prompted a change in the Iranian leadership, specifically the supreme 

leader’s approach. 

We can go into perhaps a more detailed discussion in a closed 

setting about some indications that I think would be of interest to 

you. And I probably ought to let it go at that. 

Senator COATS. Fair enough. 

Director Brennan. 

Director BRENNAN. Senator, the only thing I would add is that 

on your first point related to cyber, the seriousness and the diversity of the threats that this country faces in the cyber domain are 

increasing on a daily basis. And from my perspective, I think this 

is one of the real significant national security challenges we face. 

And the threat is going to continue, and it’s going to grow. 

What we need to do, as a country, is reduce the vulnerabilities 

and take the mitigation steps. So, again, from a national security 

perspective, I very much hope that the Congress will move forward 

with legislation, and the issues that you raise, on terms of information sharing and liability, are the key ones. And hopefully, that legislation will get through. 

Director CLAPPER. If I could tag onto what John just said, I think 

your brief discussion really highlighted the, sort of, what I call ‘‘organizing principles,’’ those tenets that would have to be covered. 

And I think the standards that need to be applied would apply both 

to the government and the private sector. 

And the other thing I would want to mention is the due consideration for civil liberties and privacy in whatever legislation that 

eventually is enacted. 

Senator COATS. I assume both of you would acknowledge that 

time is of the essence here? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes, sir. 

Senator COATS. The sooner we get this done, the better. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Udall. Excuse me—Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Director Brennan, first of all—congratulations. I appreciated the 

chance to talk about a number of issues with you previously, and 

I’m going to be asking you some additional questions about drones 

and targeted killings in the days ahead, but for today, my congratulations. 

Director Clapper, I want to ask you what I asked you about a 

year ago, and that was the matter of surveillance—particularly, 

what the rules are that an intelligence agency would have to follow 
55 

in order to electronically track the movements and locations of an 

American inside the United States. And I asked you about this a 

year ago, and you said that your lawyers were studying this, and 

I hope that since a year has passed, we can get some answers to 

these questions. 

So first, let me ask the question: If an intelligence agency wants 

to electronically track the movements and whereabouts of an American inside the United States, how much evidence do they need? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, first of all, let me just say, sir, that particularly in the case of NSA and CIA, there are strictures against 

tracking American citizens in the United States for foreign intelligence purposes. And that’s what those agencies are set up to do. 

I think, though, when—I might ask Director Mueller to speak to 

this because what you’re referring to, I think, devolves into the law 

enforcement/criminal area, so—— 

Senator WYDEN. Let me—and I do want to hear from Director 

Mueller, but I’m trying to get some general principles out with respect to intelligence. And you’ve cited, certainly, some areas that 

are relevant, but what I’m really trying to do is get an unclassified 

answer to a question about what the law authorizes. 

Director CLAPPER. The law, of course, as you know, is embedded 

in the Foreign Surveillance Intelligence Act, the amendment to 

which was recently extended for five years, and it places very strict 

strictures on the Intelligence Community’s tracking of U.S. persons 

where there is a terrorism nexus. And that is overseen, very strictly, by both the FISA Court as well as within the executive branch, 

both by my office and the attorney general. So there are very strict 

rules about that, as you know, as we’ve discussed. 

Senator WYDEN. But, as you know, there are some fundamental 

questions about the balance between security and liberty that transcend just the FISA question. So, what I would like to do is see if 

we can get a direct answer to the question about when the Intel 

Community needs to get a warrant, for example, when a lesser 

amount of evidence would do; and second, the circumstances when 

no specific evidence is needed at all. 

And the FISA law does not specify whether a warrant is required, so that’s the reason that I’m asking the question. I asked 

it a year ago—— 

Director CLAPPER. I’d like to ask Director Mueller to help me 

with that question. 

Senator WYDEN. And Mr. Director, I’m anxious to hear from Director Mueller, who I greatly respect, but I also need to hear from 

you with respect to the Intelligence Community. That’s why I 

asked it a year ago, and—— 

Director CLAPPER. As I said, Senator Wyden, in the case of CIA 

and NSA, who are engaged in foreign intelligence collection, that’s 

a practice that they do not engage in. 

Senator WYDEN. Director Mueller. 

Director MUELLER. Well, Senator, let me start by saying that 

there’s no real distinction in what we do between the criminal and 

the national security—if we require it in the criminal side, we require it in national security. We treat them the same; there is no 

distinction between our intelligence cases in terms of undertaking 

the activity you suggest, and our criminal cases. 
56 

That being said, in the wake of the Jones decision, which I’m 

sure you’re familiar with—that has put some things in an area 

where we’re waiting to see where the courts go. But obviously, as 

I said, if you were going to trespass to install a device, then that 

requires a warrant, and the standard on that warrant is still up 

in the air. 

And consequently, to give you a more precise answer to a particular question on a particular monitoring, I would have to be 

more factually based and then apply the law to that particular set 

of facts. 

Senator WYDEN. Director Mueller, you have identified the exact 

reason why I’m trying to get an answer from Director Clapper, because there’s no question we are going to watch what the courts 

do in the days ahead. The question is what will be the rights of 

Americans while that is still being fleshed out? And the fact is 

FISA does not specify whether a warrant is required. 

I know I’m out of time for this round, but I just want you to 

know, Director Clapper, respectfully, I will be asking this question 

of you—just like we did with respect to the legal documents for targeted killings, which we finally got after seven requests over a twoyear period—until we get an answer, because I think Americans 

are entitled to a direct answer to that question. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Would you like Director Mueller to respond? I think it would be helpful. 

Senator WYDEN. Madam Chair, I think the director did, and he 

gave a very thoughtful answer, which is that the courts are still 

wrestling with the various interpretations of it. I think that is a 

correct answer by Director Mueller, but we still have the question 

remaining—what are the rights of Americans, as of today, while 

the courts are wrestling with this? And that is the matter we have 

not gotten an answer to. And I will follow it up again on my second 

round. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, would you like to respond to that? I’ll 

give you the opportunity. 

Director MUELLER. The only thing I would add, Senator, is that 

with the law—disarray is probably too strong, but not having been 

totally identified, we take the most conservative approach—— 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Fair enough. 

Director MUELLER [continuing]. To ensure that the evidence that 

is captured will pass scrutiny, regardless of how the court may 

come down. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Next is Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I guess we can start with you, General Clapper, but then everyone can weigh in if they have an opinion. I want to talk about 

Egypt for a moment. 

First of all, I want to have a clear understanding about their security apparatus, and in particular, their military, that, for a long 

time, has been seen as a professional organization, which was committed to upholding its international obligations and with which we 

had a good working relationship. 
57 

What is the status of that relationship now? How heavily influenced have they become with recent political changes—in particular, with the election of President Morsi, and the coming to 

power of the Muslim Brotherhood? Has that changed the nature, 

or is it changing the nature, of those organizations? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, I think the military, as an institution in 

Egypt, has attempted to sustain its status and its stature as a professional military organization, and not, wherever it can be avoided, be drawn into the internal political upheavals that are going on 

in Egypt. 

Senator RUBIO. In terms of the upheaval that they’re facing, 

what, in your judgment, or in the judgment of any of the panelists, 

are the most significant security risks that they face? And I’ll tell 

you the context of how I’m asking this question: We have recently 

seen sales of jet planes or—you know, these other existing contracts, and tanks, and so forth—but it strikes me that the real security concerns increasingly should be towards security in the 

Sinai, upholding their peace treaty with their neighbors, providing 

for improved law enforcement in the streets there, where we’ve 

seen a rise in criminality. 

Can anyone comment on what the real security risks are? Again, 

it strikes me that Egypt is not at risk of being invaded by some 

foreign army anytime soon. So, shouldn’t the weapons systems 

they’re acquiring and so forth kind of reflect their real security 

needs? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, that’s kind of up to—— 

Senator RUBIO. I know that’s a policy decision. 

Director CLAPPER. That’s their policy decision. But I think you’ve 

highlighted, though, what the challenges are in Egypt, particularly 

with respect to security of the Sinai, which I believe they recognize 

they have a challenge there, and I think their intent is to—they 

may attempt to modify it—but I think, by and large, they wish to 

support the peace treaty. 

To me, the fundamental challenges that face Egypt have to do 

with its economy. And it’s kind of a spiral—one of the impacts on 

their economy has been a decline in tourism, and that’s related to 

the security situation. I think they recognize that. So, they clearly—I mean, they know they have internal challenges that they 

have to deal with. 

Senator RUBIO. So their real security challenges are internal; in 

essence, street crime, which—my understanding is it’s gotten pretty dangerous, particularly in Cairo, but in some of the other tourist 

areas. And also, there are security obligations vis-a`-vis the peace 

treaty, and Sinai, and so forth. 

I think that the other question is broader, and again, any input 

from anyone is welcome on this, and that’s the general direction 

that they are headed governmentally. And obviously, you know, 

there was an election, and there are questions about reforms to the 

constitution in Egypt. 

But where is, in your judgment, Egypt headed? In essence, where 

is the Muslim Brotherhood or President Morsi, to the extent he’s 

heavily influenced by them, headed in the long term? Is it a real 

commitment to a democratic transition? Is it a real commitment toward a more Islamist type state? Or is it still in flux, and they’re 
58 

kind of trying to figure out how they can grow their economy and 

at the same time bring about these changes that the Muslim 

Brotherhood base of President Morsi is asking for? 

Director CLAPPER. I think the latter, the third condition—it’s still 

in flux. I think the leadership of Egypt, when they’re in charge, is 

influenced heavily by pragmatic aspects and challenges, like the 

state of the economy, and security in the streets. 

However, at the same time, I think their ideology is clearly influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood. That’s evident in some of the 

constitutional provisions, particularly having to do with the rights 

of women. 

Senator RUBIO. And in that vein, U.S. policy, particularly U.S. 

aid policy towards Egypt, would probably weigh heavily on the 

pragmatic side of the equation for these leaders—in particular, 

their ability to receive the financing they need to stabilize their 

economy, and also to provide the gear they need to provide the security so people feel safe in Egypt again. 

Director CLAPPER. Yes, sir, but not at any price. I think they’re 

very—understandably—very sensitive about their sovereignty and 

the extent to which we or anyone else can dictate to them what 

their behavior is. And, of course, that’s not just the United States; 

it’s the International Monetary Fund, and others, that ascribe conditions for financial aid. And that’s an issue for the Egyptian policy 

apparatus to decide. 

Senator RUBIO. All right. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Rubio. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Director Clapper, I want to also associate myself with Senator 

Feinstein’s remarks on the threat assessment documents; very 

readable, very helpful. I’m not sure you’d read it if you wanted a 

good night’s sleep, but thank you for the work your team has done. 

Let me turn to the 6,000-page report that this Committee produced on the CIA’s detention and interrogation program. I stated 

at Director Brennan’s confirmation hearing that I was very concerned that inaccurate information on the management, operation, 

and effectiveness of the CIA’s detention and interrogation program 

was provided by the CIA to the White House, the DOJ, Congress, 

and the public. 

As you know, Director Brennan expressed shock at the report’s 

contents. And I understand that you had a similar personal reaction to the report; is that accurate? Were you also taken aback by 

the report’s contents? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes, I was taken aback, by its length and 

breadth and all that, but I also think that I would counsel hearing 

from the Agency and its response to the RDI. I might ask John to 

comment on that. 

Senator UDALL. Yeah, well, if I might, General, I’m going to do 

that. I want to get the director to comment, as well. But let me 

turn to Director Mueller. 

In an interview in Vanity Fair, Director, in December 2008, you 

were asked about terrorist attacks and whether they were disrupted thanks to intelligence obtained through the use of the CIA’s 

enhanced interrogation techniques. And you responded, without 
59 

elaborating, ‘‘I don’t believe that’s been the case.’’ And then months 

later, in April 2009, your spokesperson, John Miller, confirmed that 

your quote in the Vanity Fair article was accurate. 

Director, have you seen any information since April 2009 to 

change your views on this topic? 

Director MUELLER. What I was trying to express is that I was 

really not in a position to see, because I was not aware of either 

the practices or the facts. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you for that. And I do want to follow up 

with you later in that regard, as well. 

I would like to turn now to Director Brennan. ‘‘Director Brennan’’—it’s nice to be able to say that. Congratulations on your confirmation. I appreciate your comment on being the hostage, and the 

hostage not being involved in the negotiations. I really look forward 

to working with you in your new role. 

As you remember, in the confirmation hearing, we discussed the 

Committee’s study and the importance of putting reforms in place 

to prevent past mistakes from happening again. And I also pushed 

for declassification of the Committee’s report. At that hearing, I 

pointed out that misinformation about the CIA’s detention and interrogation program is, quote, ‘‘regularly and publicly repeated 

today by former CIA officials, either knowingly or unknowingly.’’ 

And then last week, before you were even on the job for your first 

day, a newspaper story was published quoting a senior intelligence 

official who claimed that, quote, ‘‘The CIA is objecting to a majority 

of the 6,000-page report,’’ which, I should note, has 35,000 footnotes directly sourced to CIA documents. 

And this newspaper article included numerous inaccurate statements about the Committee’s report, including that it has 20 recommendations, which it does not. 

While it appears that the unnamed intelligence officials quoted 

in the paper were unfamiliar with the Committee’s report, I’m concerned that, despite the Chairman going out of her way to make 

sure that only the specifically-named individuals at the CIA have 

access to the report, CIA personnel are leaking what may or may 

not be the CIA’s official response to the report. 

And it seems that unnamed CIA officials are putting you in a 

particularly awkward position by making public their disagreement 

with the report’s conclusions, even before you have a chance to 

weigh in as the new CIA director. 

So, I have three questions concerning the leak, and I want to run 

through them and then give you time to respond: One, do you believe that this is a leak of the CIA’s views, despite the fact that 

these officials seem unfamiliar with the report? Two, do you anticipate looking into the leak? And three, as far as I’m aware, there’s 

no new deadline for the CIA to provide comments on the Committee’s report to this Committee. 

In my view, it’s in no one’s interest to delay the process. Can you 

give the Committee a sense as to when we can expect the CIA’s 

comments? 

Director BRENNAN. Thank you, Senator. First of all, I’m not going 

to speculate on who might have been responsible for the information that appeared in the newspaper. I know that people are looking into that right now to see whether or not there was any disclo-
60 

sure of classified information, but there is a real interest on the 

part of CIA to be as responsive as possible to this Committee and 

on that report. 

And I’ve had a number of discussions with Deputy Director Michael Morell and other Members of the leadership team, and the 

response and comments on that report will be coming back to this 

Committee. I’d like to be able to say that it will be done within a 

month’s time; hopefully before then. But I know that there have 

been a number of conversations with Members of this Committee 

on that, and it is my firm resolve to look at what the CIA has 

pulled together in response to that report and get back to this 

Committee on it. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. I look forward to your firm resolve 

resulting in an as-soon-as-possible response to this seminal and important report from which we really need to learn the lessons so 

that we don’t repeat the mistakes that were made. Thanks again, 

and congratulations, Director Brennan. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Udall. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Director Clapper, in your opening statement, you certainly painted a bleak, dark picture of a very dangerous world. And I share 

your concern about the impact of sequestration on the Intelligence 

Community. 

Senator Udall and I have introduced what I believe to be the 

only bipartisan flexibility bill that would give, essentially, agencies 

the ability to set priorities; submit their plans to the Appropriations Committee the way you do with reprogramming requests 

now. It’s sort of an enhanced reprogramming authority. 

I talked to Senator Mikulski about it. She has a similar vision 

in mind. I know the Chairman also has an amendment dealing just 

with the IC. And I just want to encourage you to make the disastrous consequences of sequestration known to the Senate leaders 

and the House leaders, because that’s really where the decision is 

being made. And I think it’s critical that they hear from you, and 

indeed from all Members of this panel, about what the consequences would be, particularly in light of the dire threat situation that we face. 

I want to turn now to Iran. During a Senate Armed Services 

Committee hearing last week, the Commander of U.S. Central 

Command testified that the current diplomatic and economic efforts to stop Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability are 

not working. Do you agree with that assessment? 

Director CLAPPER. Not completely. I think, as I indicated earlier, 

the sanctions are having a huge impact on Iran. And I think clearly that that is going to have an influence on their decision-making 

calculus, and we see indications of that. 

But where I do agree, at least to this point, is that the sanctions 

thus far have not induced a change in Iranian government policy. 

Senator COLLINS. Well, I think the fact that they haven’t produced a change suggests that General Mattis is correct in saying 

that they’re not working. 

But let me follow up with Mr. Goldberg with a second question. 

The President has exempted nine countries from fully complying 
61 

with the sanctions on Iran because they have demonstrated a significant reduction in the purchase of Iranian petroleum-based products. These nine countries, however, include some of Iran’s biggest 

trading partners, including China, India, and Turkey. And Turkey 

was granted an exemption, even after it conceded that it had 

helped Iran conduct energy exports through the acquisition of billions of dollars of gold. 

What is your assessment of what would happen to Iran’s fiscal 

and economic situation if these nine countries were not exempt 

from the U.S. sanctions policy? 

Mr. GOLDBERG. What I can tell you, Senator Collins, is that the 

overall amount of Iranian oil that is being exported is down considerably; that there were workarounds and exemptions made for 

those who reduced over time. And that’s a constant evaluation and 

consideration. 

But the actual amount of Iranian oil being exported is down. And 

it’s probably—well, I think maybe I’d reserve on the exact quantity 

for a closed session. 

Senator COLLINS. I would suggest—and maybe we’ll get into this 

in the closed session—there needs to be much more transparency 

in order for us to make a judgment on whether or not doing such 

sweeping exemptions is wise policy. 

I just want to quickly touch on cyber security, Director Brennan, 

since you and I worked extremely closely on that issue last year 

when Senator Lieberman and I repeatedly tried to get our comprehensive bill through. And we also worked very closely with General Alexander. 

As you know, I had real reservations about the President issuing 

an Executive Order because I believe it sends the wrong signal that 

this issue can be taken care of through an Executive Order. So I 

just want to get you on the record this morning that you do not 

believe that the Executive Order is a substitute for legislation, and 

that only legislation can take further actions, such as conferring a 

grant of immunity on private sector companies that comply with 

standards. Is that an accurate assessment? 

Director BRENNAN. Senator, I’m no longer part of the Policy Community; I’m part of the Intelligence Community now. And what I 

will just say is that based upon the nature, scope, and diversity of 

the cyber threat that is out there, I think that we need to do more 

as a country to address the vulnerabilities that we have and take 

the steps that we need to in order to protect our infrastructure, our 

networks, from these types of cyber attacks. 

And I do believe that there are enhancements in legislation that 

can be made, and that need to be made, in order to help us as a 

country protect our systems, our networks, our infrastructure from 

those types of attacks. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Heinrich. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Director Clapper, this Committee spent an awful lot of time examining the process that resulted in the unclassified Benghazi 

talking points. And you’ve touched on that a little bit this morning. 
62 

I just have one simple question around that that I want to ask 

you: In your professional view of that process, was it in any way 

unduly politicized? 

Director CLAPPER. Absolutely not. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you for a very simple answer. We don’t 

get those very often, so I want to say I really appreciate it. 

I want to move on to Syria for a few minutes. And just to, sort 

of, set the table, I wanted to ask how you would describe the current state of the opposition in Syria? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, the opposition is gaining in strength. It 

is increasingly gaining territory. At the same time, the regime is— 

as I indicated in my statement—is experiencing shortages in manpower and logistics. 

That said, the opposition is still fragmented. There are literally 

hundreds of these opposition battalions of varying strengths and 

cuts, and there are attempts being made by the opposition to bring 

some overarching command and control to that. 

The bad news in all this, I believe, with respect to the opposition 

of course, is the increasing prevalence of the al-Nusra Front, which 

is the al-Qa’ida in Iraq offshoot that has gained strength, both numerically and otherwise, in Syria. And they’ve been pretty astute 

about this, and they are, where they can, providing more and more 

municipal services in what is a very terrible situation from a humanitarian standpoint. 

As well, there has been a growing infusion of foreign fighters 

that have been attracted to the conflict in Syria, who have joined 

the opposition. And so the opposition, in my view, and the al-Nusra 

Front specifically, has been very astute about that. 

The question, of course, comes up—how long will Assad last? And 

our standard answer is his days are numbered; we just don’t know 

the number. I think our assessment is he is very committed to 

hanging in there and sustaining his control of the regime. 

Senator HEINRICH. How would you assess Iran’s overall—the role 

that they’re playing in Syria today? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, increasingly, they’re being drawn into 

Syria, both in terms of providing material aid and, as well, advice, 

to the extent of organizing militias, and that sort of thing. So Iran, 

together with their surrogate, the Hezbollah, has a huge stake in 

keeping Syria under control of the regime. It would be a tremendous loss—strategic loss—for the Iranians, if the regime falls. 

Senator HEINRICH. You mentioned that Assad’s days are numbered; how do you think Iran is going to, or will react to, a postAssad Syria? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, I think they will try to—that’s one of the 

reasons they’re investing, both materially and with advisors and 

some fighters, is to maintain their interest and their physical presence there, so whatever form some successor regime takes, or if 

there’s fragmentation, that they would at least have a foothold in 

Syria. I’m saying that, so we really don’t know what their strategy 

is. 

Senator HEINRICH. I’ll leave you with one last question, and then 

I’ll give back my time. 

On Egypt, how capable do you think that the current Egyptian 

government is in handling the unrest that we’re seeing currently? 
63 

Director CLAPPER. The unrest, you say? 

Senator HEINRICH. Yes. 

Director CLAPPER. Well, they were able to suppress the violence 

in Port Said that was occasioned by the trials of the so-called ‘‘soccer hooligans.’’ So I think they have the capability, and when they 

put their minds to it, they can maintain order. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you. 

Madam Chair, I yield back. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator King. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Clapper, I want to call upon your long years of experience. 

We put a lot of stock in sanctions and have over the years, and 

we’re putting a lot of stock in sanctions right now in Iran. My concern is that we as Americans tend to think that other countries will 

think and act and react the way we do, when, in reality, their systems just are very different than ours. 

My question on Iran is—is there a sufficient middle class who 

has the political power to have any influence on the regime’s decisions, based upon the squeeze applied by the sanctions? In other 

words, does the supreme ayatollah care that his economy is going 

down? 

Director CLAPPER. Excellent question, sir. And yes, he does. He 

does care. And it does concern him about the deterioration in the 

economy because of the prospect for promoting unrest among the 

citizenry of Iran. And we are seeing more signs of that. 

At the same time, though, I think the supreme leader’s standard 

is a level of privation that Iran suffered during the Iran-Iraq War. 

And he doesn’t believe they’ve reached that point yet. 

And of course, as the supreme leader looks westward, or looks at 

us, he can argue that, you know, we’re on the decline; our influence 

is declining, particularly in that part of the world. And so, you 

know, his view of the world may not be necessarily fact-based, particularly when it comes to internal conditions in his country. 

Senator KING. Thank you. Turning again to another longstanding 

part of U.S. policy, which is nuclear deterrence, which has been our 

policy since the late 1940s, does deterrence work with a country 

like North Korea, or Iran? 

And sort of the same question—do they care? Mutually assured 

destruction—are they responsive to that kind of rational thinking 

that guided U.S. policy for fifty years; are these countries like the 

Soviet Union—that we can have some confidence that they’re going 

to make a rational decision, knowing that if they do something 

crazy, they’re going to be wiped out? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, I do think they both understand that. 

I’m not sure about deterrence for North Korea, where they would 

expect us to use a nuclear weapon. But they certainly respect the 

capability of our military. They’ve gone to school on what we’ve 

done, starting with Desert Storm. I know that for a fact. 

So I think deterrence, in this broadest context, does work, and 

does have impact on the decision-making calculus of these two 

countries. 
64 

Senator KING. Mr. Brennan, you had a brief colloquy with Senator Collins on last year’s cyber bill. That bill did not get through. 

There were objections, I understand, from business interests. 

I know you’re not on the policy side anymore, but are there 

things we can do to get that bill through? There’s a certain urgency 

here, and I believe it went twice before the Senate—it didn’t go 

through either time. What’s happening to get that done? 

Director BRENNAN. I’m sure there are things that the Congress 

can do to push this forward. There were differences of view last 

year on the legislation. Again, I would just underscore the importance of being able to come up with some legislation that’s going 

to be addressed, some of the vulnerabilities that our adversaries 

are taking advantage of, whether they be states, whether they be 

activists or organized criminal groups; vulnerabilities exist that we 

need to be able to address. 

Senator KING. Would you characterize the cyber threat as accelerating? 

Director BRENNAN. Absolutely. 

Senator KING. Madam Chairman, that’s all I have. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Just on cyber, the Vice Chairman and I have resolved to try to 

work together and see if we can’t get a bill that we can agree to 

move through the Committee on the information sharing part of it. 

That might be of help to you. So we will begin that effort shortly. 

We will have one other quick round. I have a question on 

Hezbollah, and this is it, Director: Does the IC assess that 

Hezbollah and the Iranian Qods Force will continue to conduct terrorist attacks against Israelis and Americans, as Hezbollah has recently done in other places? 

That’s a yes or no question, I think. 

Director CLAPPER. Yes. I think they clearly have the intent to do 

that, when they can. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Okay. How does Hezbollah’s capacity compare with that of al-Qa’ida at this time? 

Director CLAPPER. I don’t think they reach that level of alQa’ida—core al-Qa’ida at its height. I don’t believe that’s the case. 

I might ask Matt Olsen if he’d like to comment on that. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Good. 

Mr. Olsen. 

Director OLSEN. Thank you very much, Chairman. 

I would agree with Director Clapper. To be specific, I wouldn’t— 

compared to core al-Qa’ida ten years ago, Hezbollah is not at that 

level. Hezbollah does have a presence that extends to many countries around the world. We’ve seen plots and activity from 

Hezbollah across the globe, but we haven’t seen anything like the 

capability or activity that we’ve seen from al-Qa’ida over the last 

ten years. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Director Olsen, you are the guy who 

is responsible for gathering all of the information from the Intelligence Community, sifting through it, and making some critical decisions, not only about who gets what, but where the danger is. 
65 

This is a public hearing. Tell the American public what keeps 

Matt Olsen awake at night. 

Director OLSEN. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

I would say that there are a number of things that we’re particularly concerned about. From an overseas perspective, it is the decentralized nature of the threat from al-Qa’ida. As we’ve talked 

about this morning, the threat from core al-Qa’ida is greatly diminished. It is nowhere near where it was ten years ago. But we have 

seen that threat become geographically dispersed, as affiliated 

groups, and groups sympathetic to al-Qa’ida and al-Qa’ida’s message, have grown in areas—for example, in North Africa. 

Probably the most significant of those affiliated groups, from our 

perspective, is al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula. We’ve seen 

AQAP seek to carry out attacks against aviation targets three 

times over the last several years. So I would put AQAP at the top 

of the list, from an overseas perspective. 

Looking closer to home and the Homeland, the number one concern for an attack, albeit a small-scale, unsophisticated attack, likely comes from home grown extremists who may well be inspired or 

radicalized by the message that al-Qa’ida sends. But it would be 

more likely a person more likely to act alone or in a very small 

group to carry out an unsophisticated attack, and that’s very difficult for us, from an intelligence perspective, to see in advance and 

therefore, to be able to disrupt. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Is there an aggressive effort on the 

part of al-Qa’ida, as well as other affiliated groups, or other terrorist groups, for that matter, to develop American home grown 

terrorists? 

Director OLSEN. Sir, we definitely have seen—from both al-Qa’ida 

core in Pakistan, as well as AQAP in Yemen—an effort to reach out 

beyond those regions into the United States to radicalize individuals who are here who may be susceptible to that kind of a message. They may be simply wayward knuckleheads, but they may 

well be inspired by that message, and seek to carry out an attack. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Now, let me address that to you also, 

Director Mueller, since the FBI has jurisdiction over domestic 

criminal and terrorist activity, and I’d like your comments on what 

you see taking place, from the standpoint of home grown terrorists. 

Director MUELLER. Let me start by saying that the threat from 

AQAP, particularly with airliners, has not dissipated over the 

years. There’s still that threat out there. The individuals who were 

responsible for the previous attempts are still there. So I join him 

with identifying that as a principal concern overseas. 

More directly at home, it is the radicalization of individuals on 

the Internet, who develop the desire and the will to undertake attacks. They’re finding it very difficult to find co-conspirators, others 

that would join in. But then again, the Internet can facilitate that 

kind of a meeting/coming together for an attack. And it is the lone 

wolves that we are principally concerned about. 

The other point I would put in terms of keeping me awake is 

cyber, and the fact that what is happening in the cyber arena cuts 

across any of our disciplines, whether it be counterintelligence or 

counterterrorism, as well as criminal. And the various objectives, 

goals, of discrete individuals utilizing the cyber arena, whether it 
66 

be for criminal purposes or for terrorist purposes, has grown to be 

right up there with AQAP, home grown terrorists, and cyber 

attackers. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thanks, Madam. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thanks, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Senator Rockefeller, are you okay? No, you’re not okay? 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. No, I am—I think I’m okay. I’ve got a 

couple of questions I’d like to ask, but I’d rather get to the closed 

hearing. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Okay. 

I know, Senator Wyden, you have a question you’d like to ask. 

Senator WYDEN. Just one, Madam Chair, and I thank you. 

And this is for you, Director Clapper—again, on the surveillance 

front. And I hope we can do this in just a yes or no answer, because 

I know Senator Feinstein wants to move on. 

Last summer, the NSA director was at a conference and he was 

asked a question about the NSA surveillance of Americans. He replied, and I quote here, ‘‘The story that we have millions, or hundreds of millions, of dossiers on people is completely false.’’ 

The reason I’m asking the question is, having served on the Committee now for a dozen years, I don’t really know what a dossier 

is in this context. So, what I wanted to see is if you could give me 

a yes or no answer to the question—does the NSA collect any type 

of data at all on millions, or hundreds of millions, of Americans? 

Director CLAPPER. No, sir. 

Senator WYDEN. It does not? 

Director CLAPPER. Not wittingly. There are cases where they 

could inadvertently, perhaps, collect, but not wittingly. 

Senator WYDEN. All right. Thank you. I’ll have additional questions to give you in writing on that point, but I thank you for the 

answer. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Wyden. 

Senator King. 

Senator KING. Just a follow-up on Senator Chambliss’ questions—my concern is we keep talking about al-Qa’ida, but my impression, and Mr. Olsen, perhaps I’ll direct this to you—we have 

to realize that it only takes four or five people these days to mount 

some kind of threat. 

Is there a danger that we are so focused on al-Qa’ida that we’re 

going to miss the second cousin of al-Qa’ida that arises in Brazil 

or someplace, that constitutes a serious threat? 

Director OLSEN. Well, I don’t think so. I think that’s reflected on 

this panel. Director Brennan, Director Mueller, Director Clapper— 

all of us work very closely together to look forward to determine 

where that next threat is coming from. We’re very focused on, for 

example, the activities of groups in North Africa that may simply 

be sympathetic to al-Qa’ida, but certainly haven’t reached the level 

of being affiliated officially with al-Qa’ida. 

And so, all of our organizations—and I certainly know I can 

speak on behalf of the people working at the National Counterterrorism Center—are laser-focused on trying to identify that next 

threat. Are we going to be perfect every time? The answer to that 

is no, but we are very, very focused on trying to look forward to 
67 

see that next threat, and that’s something that we’re doing together as a Community. 

Senator KING. Mr. Mueller. 

Director MUELLER. If I might add, we have threats across the 

board—domestic threats. We have not forgotten the bombing of the 

Oklahoma City federal building in 1995. And while, yes, we look 

at threats from outside that can be ultimately undertaken within 

the United States and look at home grown terrorists, we look 

across the board and try to anticipate, not only with international 

terrorists affiliated in some way or shape with al-Qa’ida, but with 

others that are affiliated with more extremist, radicalized groups 

domestically. 

Senator KING. Are you seeing any increase in the number of 

those groups not related to Islamic extremists, but more home 

grown? 

Director MUELLER. I would say, to a certain extent, it’s cyclical. 

If there are groups who may lose their leaders—either they were 

incarcerated or have passed—then the capabilities of that group to 

undertake an attack would be diminished. And we’ve seen that off 

and on. 

We also see that many of the more radical groups or extremist 

groups do not want to be associated with the lone wolves and will 

push them out, which is a problem, because if you have surveillance or you can understand what’s happening in a substantial extremist group, to have somebody with the intent to undertake attack with nobody around them, that presents a separate special 

challenge. 

Director CLAPPER. We are seeing Northern Africa’s, as Matt alluded to, a proliferation of Ansar al-Sharia chapters—Tunisia and 

Libya, to name two cases—which seem focused much more on local, 

regional issues, Western interests only as they are present in those 

particular countries, and less inclined—at least at this point—to 

promote attacks elsewhere, although that’s always a possibility. 

So we watch these groups as they evolve in their objectives. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Let me thank you, everyone, first of all, on behalf of this Committee, for your service to the country, for your presence here 

today, for your testimony—and to those of you that didn’t have a 

chance to respond, we look forward to seeing you in the Committee 

on some of these issues. 

We will recess and reconvene directly to our SCIF right down the 

hall, at the call of the Chair. 

So thank you, and this hearing is recessed. 

[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the Committee recessed briefly to reconvene in a closed session.] 

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