BIOLOGICAL RESPONSE AND RECOVERY

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

ROADMAP

Executive Office of the President

National Science and Technology Council

OCTOBER 2013
BIOLOGICAL RESPONSE AND RECOVERY

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

ROADMAP
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20502

October 25, 2013

Dear Colleague:

I am pleased to transmit the enclosed Biological Response and Recovery Science and Technology 

Roadmap, produced under the auspices of the Committee on Homeland and National Security of 

the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). 

The report categorizes key scientific knowledge gaps, identifies technology solutions, and 

prioritizes research areas to enable government, at all levels, to make decisions more effectively 

during the response to and recovery from a biological incident—whether naturally occurring or 

intentional.

A catastrophic biological incident could threaten the Nation’s human, animal, plant, 

environmental, and economic health, as well as America’s national security. Such an event 

would demand a rapid and effective response in order to: (1) minimize loss of life and other 

adverse consequences associated with the incident and (2) thwart ongoing threats and follow-on 

attacks in the case of suspected criminal activity or terrorism.

This report builds on the National Biosurveillance Science and Technology Roadmap, which was 

released by the NSTC in June 2013, and focused on how to better monitor and track events that 

could lead to a biological incident. 

The new roadmap sets near-term objectives and long-term goals for coordinated research and 

development (R&D) activities among Federal agencies to strengthen evidence-based decision 

making and response and recovery efforts during a biological incident or after one occurs. 

Thank you for your interest in Federal R&D efforts to ensure the United States is fully able to 

mount an effective response to and recovery from a catastrophic biological incident. This work is 

critically important to the health, safety, and security of our Nation.

Sincerely, 

John P. Holdren

Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

Director, Office of Science & Technology Policy
About the National Science and Technology Council

The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) is the principal means by which the 

Executive Branch coordinates science and technology policy across the diverse entities that make 

up the Federal research and development enterprise. A primary objective of the NSTC is 

establishing clear national goals for Federal science and technology investments. The NSTC 

prepares research and development strategies that are coordinated across Federal departments 

and agencies to form investment packages aimed at accomplishing multiple national goals. The 

work of the NSTC is organized under five committees: Environment, Natural Resources and 

Sustainability; Homeland and National Security; Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math 

(STEM) Education; Science; and Technology. Each of these committees oversees subcommittees

and working groups focused on different aspects of science and technology. More information is 

available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/nstc.

About the Office of Science and Technology Policy

The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) was established by the National Science 

and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976. OSTP’s responsibilities 

include advising the President in policy formulation and budget development on questions in 

which science and technology are important elements; articulating the President’s science and 

technology policy and programs; and fostering strong partnerships among Federal, state, and 

local governments, and the scientific communities in industry and academia. The Director of 

OSTP also serves as Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and manages the 

NSTC. More information is available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp.

About the Subcommittee on Biological Defense Research and Development (BDRD)

The purpose of the BDRD is to provide all relevant Federal agencies a focused forum for 

coordinating and collaborating on defensive research, development, testing, and evaluation 

addressing biological threats to national security, including known biological threats 

(bacteria/viruses/fungi/toxins) and emerging infectious disease agents that have the potential to 

significantly affect the environment, plants, animals, and humans both within the United States 

and throughout the globe. The BDRD has five working groups, including biosurveillance, 

biological response and recovery, foreign animal diseases, microbial forensics, and biorisk 

management. This document was developed by the Biological Response and Recovery Science 

and Technology Working Group (BRRST WG).

Federal Copyright Information

This document is a work of the United States Government and is in the public domain (see 17 

U.S.C. §105). Subject to the stipulations below, it may be distributed and copied with 

acknowledgment to OSTP. Copyrights to graphics included in this document are reserved by the 

original copyright holders or their assignees and are used here under the government’s license 

and by permission. Requests to use any images must be made to the provider identified in the 

image credits or to OSTP if no provider is identified. 
Report prepared by

NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND AND NATIONAL SECURITY (CHNS)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 

(BDRD)

BIOLOGICAL RESPONSE AND RECOVERY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

WORKING GROUP (BRRST WG)

National Science and Technology Council

Chair Staff

John P. Holdren Pedro I. Espina (through May 31, 2013)

Assistant to the President for Science and Executive Director

Technology and Director, Jayne B. Morrow (beginning June 1, 2013)

Office of Science and Technology Policy Executive Director

Committee on Homeland and National Security

Chairs

Patricia Falcone Tara O’Toole

Associate Director for National Security Undersecretary of Homeland Security for 

and International Affairs Science and Technology 

Office of Science and Technology Policy Department of Homeland Security

Alan R. Shaffer Staff

Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Susan Law

for Research and Engineering Executive Secretary

Department of Defense Department of Homeland Security

Subcommittee on Biological Defense Research and Development

Chair Staff

Franca Jones Jayne B. Morrow (through May 31, 2013)

Office of Science and Technology Policy Executive Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Department of Commerce
Biological Response and Recovery Science and Technology Working Group

Co-Chair Co-Chair

Jayne B. Morrow John F. Koerner

National Institute of Standards and Technology Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and

(through May 31, 2013) Response

Department of Commerce Department of Health and Human Services

Staff

Brooke Pearson

Executive Secretary

Members

Dave Adams Department of Homeland Security–Office of Health Affairs

Matthew Arduino Department of Health and Human Services–Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention

Mark Beall Department of Defense–Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense 

Erica Canzler Environmental Protection Agency–Office of Emergency Management

Lisa Delaney Department of Health and Human Services–Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention

Aaron Firoved Department of Homeland Security–Office of Health Affairs

Sonia Hunt Department of Justice–Federal Bureau of Investigation

George Korch Department of Health and Human Services–Office of the Assistant 

Secretary for Preparedness and Response 

James Lawler Department of Health and Human Services–National Institutes of Health

Helen Lawrence Department of Justice–Federal Bureau of Investigation

Ryan Madden Department of Defense–Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Tyler McAlpin U.S. Department of Agriculture–Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service

Lori Miller Department of Homeland Security–Science and Technology

Stephen Morse Department of Health and Human Services–Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention

Shawn Ryan Environmental Protection Agency–National Homeland Security 

Research Center

Jill Sheets Department of Justice–Federal Bureau of Investigation

Lynn Slepski Department of Transportation

Theresa Smith Executive Office of the President–National Security Staff

Margaret Sobey Department of Defense–Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical 

and Biological Defense 

Angela Weber Department of Health and Human Services–Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention
Abbreviations and Acronyms List

AAP American Academy of Pediatrics

ASDWA Association of State Drinking Water Administrators 

ASPR Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response

ASTHO Association of State and Territorial Health Officials 

BDRD Biological Defense Research and Development

BOTE Bio-response Operational Testing and Evaluation 

BRRST WG Biological Response and Recovery Science and Technology Working Group

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CHNS Committee on Homeland and National Security

DeconST Decontamination Decision Support Tool

DFoS Decontamination Family of Systems

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOD Department of Defense

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

EM2P Emergency Management Modernization Program 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FDA Food and Drug Administration

FERN Food Emergency Response Network 

GIS Geographic Information Systems

HHS Health and Human Services

HRDS Human Remains Decontamination System

ICLN Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks

JPEO-CBD Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

LRN Laboratory Response Network

MCM Medical Countermeasures

NACCHO National Association of County and City Health Officials 

NASGLP North American Soil Geochemical Landscapes Project 

NEHA National Environmental Health Association

NHSRC National Homeland Security Research Center

NSTC National Science and Technology Council

OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy

PHEMCE Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise

RV-PCR Rapid Viability Polymerase Chain Reaction 

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

SPORE Scientific Program on Reaerosolization and Exposure 

S&T Science and technology

STEM Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math 

TaCBRD Transatlantic Collaborative Biological Resiliency Demonstration 

USDA United States Department of Agriculture

USGS U.S. Geological Survey

Vet-LIRN Veterinary Laboratory Investigation and Response Network

WARRP Wide Area Recovery and Resiliency Program 

WG Working Group
Table of Contents

Executive Summary......................................................................................................................................1

Chapter 1.......................................................................................................................................................2

Introduction...................................................................................................................................................2

Background...........................................................................................................................................2

Overview of the Response and Recovery Process................................................................................3

Capability Gaps.....................................................................................................................................4

Roadmap Development Process............................................................................................................4

Purpose and Scope ................................................................................................................................5

Chapter 2.......................................................................................................................................................7

Capability Goals to Support Critical Response and Recovery Decisions ....................................................7

Goal 1: Characterize the extent of the incident to reduce exposure and save lives. .............................7

Goal 2: Effectively communicate to reduce the impacts of a biological incident.................................9

Goal 3: Accurately assess risk of exposure and risk of infection........................................................12

Goal 4: Reduce the risk of exposure and/or infection.........................................................................13

Goal 5: Manage biological waste following a catastrophic incident. .................................................15

Conclusions.................................................................................................................................................18

Appendix I: Definitions ..............................................................................................................................19
1

Executive Summary

A catastrophic biological incident could threaten the Nation’s human, animal, plant, 

environmental, and economic health, as well as America’s national security. Such an event 

would demand a quick and effective response in order to minimize loss of life and other adverse 

consequences and, in the case of suspected criminal activity or terrorism, to thwart ongoing 

activity and prevent follow-on attacks. But response and recovery from a catastrophic biological 

incident is not a simple, formulaic process. Rather, it is a continuous process of data and 

information collection, evidence-based review, and decision making, all leading to an informed 

and constantly evolving series of critical and coordinated actions. Moreover, the response and 

recovery process involves the integration and coordination of data and capabilities from many 

different sectors, including public health, law enforcement, waste management, infrastructure 

management, and transportation. Strategic science and technology (S&T) investments are 

essential to provide the information that can support evidence-based operational decisions and 

strengthen response-and-recovery efforts. This report categorizes key scientific knowledge gaps, 

identifies technology solutions to these gaps, and prioritizes research areas that will enable 

government at all levels to make decisions more effectively during the response to, and 

recovery from, biological incidents.

The prioritized, near-term objectives and broader, long-term goals presented in this report 

constitute a roadmap for use by Federal departments and agencies to coordinate their research 

and development (R&D) activities. The primary near-term objectives whose timely achievement 

this roadmap aims to facilitate are:

 Establish the location(s) of the confirmed biological agent in the environment;

 Develop reliable estimates of risk of exposure for a multitude of environments, matrices, 

and conditions associated with wide-area release scenarios;

 Develop reliable estimates of risk to humans, animals, and plants through various exposure 

and transmission routes;

 Develop risk reduction strategies, including decontamination, waste management, 

contaminant control, and reaerosolization control, for a variety of biological threats and 

scenarios;

 Evaluate population infection prevention measures (e.g., quarantine, isolation, and social 

distancing) used to reduce incident impact and develop a strong scientific basis for 

recommending these measures; and

 Use risk communication research to guide development of appropriate messages and 

dissemination means to stakeholders, including decision makers, first responders, the 

public, and the media.

Coordination of R&D agendas among Federal departments and agencies will reduce duplication 

of effort and enhance efficiencies as the Nation enhances its capacity to prevent, protect against, 

mitigate, respond to, and recover from catastrophic biological incidents.
2

Chapter 1

Introduction

“Just as we step up our ability to prevent an attack, we must also bolster our capacity to protect against 

— and respond to — the threats that may come. When it comes to bioterror, this can mean the 

difference between a contained incident and a catastrophe. That's why we need to invest in new 

vaccines, to reduce the risk posed by those who would use disease as a weapon. That's why we must 

develop the technology to detect attacks and to trace them to their origin, so that we can react in a 

timely fashion. And to care for our citizens who are infected, we must provide our public health system 

across the country with the surge capacity to confront a crisis. Making these changes will do more than 

help us tackle bioterror — it will create new jobs, support a healthier population, and improve America's 

capability to respond to any major disaster.”

—President Barack Obama (July 16, 2008)

Background

A biological incident may be caused by a naturally-occurring outbreak with a human, plant, or 

animal pathogen, such as the 2009 H1N1 pandemic; the deliberate dissemination of pathogens, 

such as the 2001 U.S. anthrax attacks; or the accidental release of biological agents, such as the 

2007 release of foot-and-mouth disease virus from a laboratory in the United Kingdom. Such 

events can have devastating impacts on public, animal, or plant health, the economy, critical 

infrastructure, military readiness, and public confidence. Effective response to and recovery from 

a catastrophic biological incident can mitigate all those risks, but will depend upon rapid, sound 

decisions being made by response personnel and government officials.

In working toward that goal, the Secretaries of the U.S. Departments of Health and Human 

Services, Agriculture, Interior, Defense, Commerce, and Homeland Security, as well as the 

Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Attorney General, with the 

support of other Federal partners, are guided by the National Response Framework1and specific 

Presidential Policy Directive-8

2

frameworks to support local authorities in making critical 

decisions to enable effective response and recovery from a biological incident. 

To ensure the United States is fully able to mount an effective response to and recovery from a 

catastrophic biological incident, the Subcommittee on Biological Defense Research and 

Development (BDRD), under the Committee on Homeland and National Security of the National 

Science and Technology Council, chartered the Biological Response and Recovery Science and 

Technology (BRRST) Working Group (WG) to assess biological incident response and recovery 

capabilities and recommend a way forward towards addressing scientific knowledge or 

technological gaps to improve decision making.

 

1

Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Framework, Second Edition, Department of 

Homeland Security, May, 2013.

2

Presidential Policy Directive / PPD-8: National Preparedness March 30, 2011.
3

Overview of the Response and Recovery Process

Response to and recovery from a catastrophic biological incident requires a continuous and 

coordinated process of data and information collection, review, and decision making that results 

in a series of critical and coordinated actions (Figure 1). Science and technology (S&T) provide 

the knowledge and tools for effective response and recovery operations. Throughout the response 

and recovery process, decisions depend on what is known about the agent’s transmission 

dynamics, chain of infection, and other data that may change or evolve as the incident matures 

and the response unfolds. Response includes those capabilities necessary to save and sustain 

lives; mitigate human, environmental, plant, and animal health impacts; stabilize the incident;

protect property and the environment; meet basic human needs after an incident has occurred;

and, in the case of suspected Federal crimes or terrorism, thwart continued activity and prevent 

follow-on attacks. The ability to make sound decisions in the first minutes, hours, and days 

following an incident can make a significant difference in lives saved, extent of the spread of 

disease, and duration of the overall recovery. 

Key elements of an effective biological response and recovery are described in the 2009 Draft 

document, “Planning Guidance for Recovery Following Biological Incidents”3. Briefly, the first 

phase of activities includes detection and confirmation of a biological incident, followed by

notification/early warning and first response. Decisions to begin notification procedures and 

initiate communications regarding an incident require confidence in the identification and 

confirmation process, as well as guidance on operational coordination and communications 

strategies for disseminating information about the incident to appropriate authorities and the 

public. 

Notification/early warning procedures provide situational awareness by confirming for proper 

authorities and the public that a biological incident has occurred. First response is a series of 

decisions and actions immediately following notification that aim to effectively control, contain, 

investigate, and mitigate the effects of a biological incident. First response may include initial 

site containment, environmental sampling and analysis, and public health activities such as 

treatment of potentially exposed persons and industry engagement. It may also include a law 

enforcement response, tactical and technical operations, designation of crime scenes, and related 

activities. 

Restoring basic services and supporting the transition to recovery are also critical elements of a 

timely response to a biological incident. Restoration and recovery encompass the process of

returning a community to a state of normality after a disastrous biological incident and requires, 

among other elements, ongoing characterization of the environment to determine health risks. 

Efforts to support restoration and, as appropriate, re-occupancy following a biological incident 

include elements of communicating the risk associated with returning an area to normal use and 

how best to reduce risk of infection or exposure through remediation processes. Federal, state, or 

local public health officials, government departments and agencies, and/or property owners 

(depending on site-specific jurisdictional authorities) make final decisions on clearance. 

 

3

Subcommittee on Decontamination Standards and Technology Committee on Homeland and National Security,

Draft Planning Guidance for Recovery Following Biological Incidents, National Science and Technology Council, May 

2009.
4

Environmental stability of biological pathogens varies greatly among various organisms, and 

restoration, clearance, and re-occupancy can range from relatively uncomplicated processes to 

large-scale decontamination processes.

Capability Gaps

While substantial progress has been made to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from 

natural, accidental, and intentional outbreaks, additional focused S&T efforts that leverage 

investments by Federal departments and agencies and integrate knowledge from advancements 

in the biological sciences are required to fill critical capability gaps that currently hamper

decision makers. Among the numerous factors that can undermine an effective response to an 

incident are the lag between the incident occurrence and its detection and/or confirmation; lack 

of understanding of agent spread, transport, and persistence in the environment; lack of clarity 

about the actual impacted or contaminated area; and uncertainty due to technical limitations and 

gaps in knowledge and information to drive decision making. Additionally, biological 

contamination with certain agents presents unique remediation challenges because of the ability 

of the agent to infect and replicate in a host and/or persist or propagate and thrive in the 

environment. For example, periodic natural outbreaks of anthrax in animals throughout the world 

demonstrate the persistence and transport of the organism in the environment. Likewise, seasonal 

outbreaks of influenza show a persistence of the causative virus in human and animal reservoirs.

Biological structure, metabolic characteristics, and natural history of biological agents in 

conjunction with the physical and climatic conditions in the surrounding environment define the 

survival rate and hence the fate of the agent outside of its host or hosts. Changing conditions 

affect the presence and persistence of an agent in the environment, which influences the risk

posed and drives the choice of risk-reduction strategies. Therefore, response and recovery 

processes, including a variety of risk-reduction strategies, are dependent upon a comprehensive 

understanding of the agent and the human and environmental contexts in which it exists. 

Roadmap Development Process

To define the path forward outlined in this Roadmap, the BRRST WG developed a working 

document that described the decisions that first responders or government officials would need to 

make following a biological incident, what questions the decision maker might ask, and, of those 

questions, which could be addressed with scientific information or technological capabilities. 

While the framework established in the draft “Planning Guidance for Recovery Following 

Biological Incidents” focuses only on remediation/cleanup recovery operations after 

contamination with Bacillus anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax, that framework serves as a 

starting point for describing the decisions that need to be made in response to biological 

incidents in general. Based on the phases and activities outlined in that framework, the BRRST 

WG developed a list of major (high-impact) decisions that would need to be made during each 

phase of response and recovery (Figure 1). (The decisions and activities presented in Figure 1 are 

nominally categorized according to their relative timing within the response and recovery 

timeline but the timing of their implementation can vary—e.g., some limited decontamination 

operations and waste generation may begin with the first response activities and implementing 

public messaging generally occurs throughout the entire process). 

The resultant working document was used to guide discussions and to collect Federal department 

and agency information on current and planned programmatic activity with the potential to
5

address the questions answerable by S&T. Review of submitted information on Federal activities 

drove the development of S&T capability goals and objectives. Those goals and objectives 

constitute the heart of this Roadmap and comprise a guide for future Federal, academic, and 

industrial S&T efforts and for international collaborations. Sidebars highlighting some successful 

S&T programs have been included in this report as well, to demonstrate where current programs 

are working to address some of the gaps identified and where expansion of ongoing activities 

would be beneficial. While the intent was to create a Roadmap that applies to a variety of 

biological agents, it should be noted that many components and highlighted programs in this 

Roadmap apply in particular to agents that pose the difficult challenge of persisting in the 

environment (e.g., Bacillus anthracis).

Purpose and Scope

The strategic goals and objectives presented in this Roadmap aim to focus Federal S&T efforts 

with the goal of enhancing operational decisions at various phases of the response and recovery 

process. This Roadmap complements, but does not duplicate, ongoing S&T collaboration in the 

area of Biosurveillance and Medical Countermeasures (MCM) that address S&T needs for 

protection against the occurrence of a biological incident; initial detection, diagnosis, or 

confirmation of a biological agent; prediction of the occurrence of or forecasting the impact of a 

biological incident or the development and use of MCM.
6

Response and Recovery

Crisis Management Consequence Management

Notification First Response

Remediation/Cleanup Restoration/

Re-occupancy Characterization Decontamination Clearance

Initiate first 

response 

activities,

including 

notification 

of proper 

authorities

Develop a 

publicengagement

campaign

Evaluate 

Threat 

Credibility

Operational Coordination

Law enforcement, intelligence, 

and investigative response

When and how to distribute 

medical countermeasures

Recommend staying-in-place or 

evacuation

Recommend 

quarantine/isolation/social 

distancing

Implement transportation 

restrictions

Provide safety and health guidance 

and protections to impacted first 

responders and citizens

Issue guidance on personal 

hygiene or decontamination

Provide support for mass casualty

Establish mass medical treatment 

facilities

Implement modified standards of 

care

Develop/ implement 

strategies for 

characterization in 

facilities and the 

outdoors

Implement strategies 

and procedures to 

identify, stabilize, and 

maintain infrastructure 

and property

Determine 

requirements and 

methods to protect 

natural and cultural 

resources

Implement strategies 

and means to contain 

and mitigate the spread 

of contamination and 

eliminate sources of 

further distribution 

(e.g., insecticides for 

flies)

Decontaminate 

outdoor areas and/or 

buildings

Decontaminate 

wide areas

Implement required 

capabilities for 

sustained 

environmental 

decontamination 

operations

Implement 

decontamination 

waste handling 

requirements

Decontaminate 

critical 

infrastructure

Provide guidance 

for determination 

of effectiveness of 

decontamination

Provide guidance for 

re-occupancy and reuse 

criteria and goals

Provide guidance for 

controls to implement, 

reduce, mitigate any 

potential exposures or 

future incidents after 

re-occupancy

Implement public 

messaging to instill 

confidence in the public 

and workforce that reoccupancy is safe

Implement measures to 

retain, maintain and 

improve the economic 

vitality of a region

Implement long term 

health treatment, 

intervention and 

surveillance strategy

Figure 1. Key Response and Recovery Decisions
7

Chapter 2

Capability Goals to Support Critical Response and Recovery Decisions

This Roadmap presents the S&T needs to support the following critical operational decisions that 

may be required at various phases of response and recovery following confirmation of a 

biological incident:

 Develop/implement strategies for characterization both indoors and outdoors

 Determine when and how to distribute medical countermeasures4

 Recommend staying-in-place or evacuation

 Recommend quarantine, isolation, or social distancing

 Implement transportation restrictions

 Provide safety and health guidance and protections to impacted first responders and the 

public

 Implement strategies and methods to contain and mitigate the spread of contamination

 Provide guidance for determination of effectiveness of decontamination

 Provide guidance for re-occupancy and reuse criteria and goals

 Decontaminate outdoor areas and/or buildings

 Implement decontamination and waste handling requirements

 Provide guidance for controls to implement, reduce, mitigate any potential exposures or 

future incidents after re-occupancy

The high-level goals below describe relative end-states that will enable decision making, while 

the objectives and accompanying sub-objectives identify scientific knowledge and technological 

needs to achieve those end states.

Goal 1: Characterize the extent of the incident to reduce exposure and save lives.

Biological incidents must be adequately characterized in order to enable effective decision 

making. Validated methods for environmental analysis can inform decision makers of the extent 

of an incident and guide actions such as recommending evacuation or staying-in-place or 

determining the extent to which MCMs are needed. This capacity requires high-throughput 

methods to support surge capacity for wide-area and large-scale incident characterization; 

coordinated sample-collection and analysis capability to support multiple agencies during 

response and recovery operations; and real-time modeling tools to support biosurveillance 

operations, including a capacity to incorporate post-incident characterization data to identify 

potentially contaminated areas and guide response and recovery operations. 

 

4

The following link provides the most current FDA information on drug therapy and vaccines to prepare our 

country for possible bioterrorism attacks: 

http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/EmergencyPreparedness/BioterrorismandDrugPreparedness/default.htm
8

Objectives to achieve characterization of the extent of the incident and to reduce exposure 

include: 

1. Establish the location(s) of the confirmed biological agent in the environment.

a. Identify and verify performance for environmental sample collection, preservation, 

transport, preparation technologies, and protocols for high priority agents that can be 

rapidly adapted for a large-scale incident;

b. Establish appropriate test and evaluation capability for rapid environmental 

contamination detection technologies to ensure reliable and consistent performance 

across the response and recovery operations; and

c. Develop integrated sampling strategies, guidance, and training to support capabilities for 

environmental sampling and analysis.

2. Integrate incident characterization data into biosurveillance situational awareness modeling 

tools.

a. Develop protocols and technologies to rapidly assess agent critical characteristics, spread 

potential (including secondary aerosolization), and environmental persistence; 

b. Develop capability to integrate rapid field-to-lab and lab-to-field data and results 

interpretation into biosurveillance modeling tools; and

Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN)

The ICLN is a multiagency effort chaired by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to bring together information, 

operations, and strategies from different laboratory systems for timely response to major incidents; participating 

networks include the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Laboratory Response Network (LRN), the 

National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN), the National Plant Diagnostic Network, the Food Emergency 

Response Network (FERN), the Environmental Response Laboratory Network, the Veterinary Laboratory Investigation 

and Response Network (Vet-LIRN) and the Department of Defense (DOD) Laboratory Network. The ICLN is a forum to 

facilitate communication and collaboration to build relationships and tools to support a more effective integrated 

laboratory response during emergencies (e.g., terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and disease outbreaks). ICLN activities 

include work to harmonize rapid-screening protocols for a pathogen outbreak, develop assay-sharing and testing

reciprocity policies, enable transfer of laboratory data between networks, promote network 

compatibility/interoperability, and develop information-sharing policies for surge-capacity demands.

Rapid Viability Polymerase Chain Reaction (RV-PCR)

The RV-PCR method was developed for detection of live B. anthracis spores in surface wipe, air filter, and water samples. 

It has been optimized to achieve a limit of detection of 10 to 99 B. anthracis spores per sample. The method is most 

useful during the recovery phase of the response because it allows for rapid and high-throughput sample analysis to 

determine presence or absence of viable (live) B. anthracis spores (in the presence of a large number of inactivated/dead 

spores). The method supports rapid response and recovery following a B. anthracis contamination incident. Products 

from the research efforts can be accessed at www.epa.gov/sam/BAPROTOCOL.pdf and www.epa.gov/sam/.

Protocol for Detection of B. anthracis in Environmental Samples During the Remediation Phase of an Anthrax Event

This step-by-step protocol (http://cfpub.epa.gov/si/si_public_record_report.cfm?dirEntryId=247752) was developed for 

EPA’s Environmental Response Laboratory Network and Water Laboratory Alliance to support remediation decisions. The 

broad promulgation of this protocol has effectively increased laboratory capacity to analyze anthrax samples during a 

wide-area event. The protocol includes adaptation of many procedures of the CDC’s LRN protocols which will lead to 

increased confidence in sample analyses. 
9

c. Ensure that biosurveillance situational awareness modeling tools provide capability to 

rapidly forecast incident physical perimeters, estimate risk of environmental exposure, 

translate and integrate analytical, intelligence, and clinical surveillance data.

Goal 2: Effectively communicate to reduce the impacts of a biological incident.

Effective response and recovery operations require Federal, state, and local leaders to have the 

tools and messages they need to rapidly and effectively communicate with each other, the public, 

the media, and the response community during a biological incident. Effective communication is 

critical to quickly and accurately convey information that can mitigate the consequences of an

incident; provide consistent guidance to the public on what immediate actions they should take to 

protect themselves; and provide guidance to the public as to when it is safe to return to affected 

areas. Because information travels quickly through social media, leaders at all levels of 

government need to be aware of the challenges and opportunities that the modern media 

landscape may present during an incident. For example, quick communication of an incident 

through social media might require rapid, high-consequence decisions (such as ordering 

evacuations, quarantines, release of MCM stockpiles) early on and in the face of high 

uncertainty. However, effective risk communication plans using social media and traditional 

media (e.g., radio and TV) can be prepared before an incident, pulled “off the shelf,” adapted to 

fit the specifics of an incident, and used to quickly disseminate life-saving information to the 

public. This information can be tailored and delivered to targeted audiences based on their 

locations and circumstances. Additionally, decision makers can use social media to obtain

feedback from people in the affected areas, which may be useful to assess and improve response 

and recovery operations.

Risk communication during an incident requires previously verified communication systems, 

interoperability, and focus-group or other testing of message content. Questions arise around 

how best to distribute information and what types of information to distribute, and how that 

information will be received. Building a foundation in the social science of effective 

communication is critical to creating effective media communication mechanisms and leveraging 

existing social media networks. Regardless of the type of information, science-based knowledge 

products and improved technologies to assess consequences and impacts of interventions will 

support the implementation of informed, coordinated, public messaging campaigns. 
10

Objectives to improve communication throughout all phases of response and recovery include: 

1. Enhance response communications through leveraging existing or developing new technology. 

a. Characterize the performance of existing technologies and develop innovative uses and 

applications that address recognized challenges in disaster communications;

b. Develop geo-targeting technologies to support customized, response critical information 

dissemination based on location of recipient;

c. Develop geo-targeting forms of communication to improve efficacy and timeliness of 

delivering messages to responders, the public, the media, and decision makers; and

d. Ensure communication system interoperability.

Generation of Risk Communication Best Practices

The EPA, in conjunction with county governments and academic institutions, is conducting multi-year studies of riskcommunication best practices and is eliciting stakeholder and public input to determine risk communication needs and test 

pre-scripted messages. To date, the best practices for risk communication themes that emerged from this research are 

being used to create pre-scripted messages based on a water contamination event to be used during listening sessions with 

public consumers. Project outcomes will help develop risk-communication guidelines for post-incident decontamination and 

clearance activities following an intentional biological environmental contamination.

The EPA, in conjunction with the Pueblo City/County Health Department of Colorado, is conducting a three-year study of 

effective risk-communication practices during the remediation phase of a biological contamination event. The objective of 

this research effort is to determine the preferred mechanism of message delivery that makes it more likely that risk 

communications will be trusted and understood by target audiences, as well as examine risk tolerance, risk perception, and 

the use of social media.

Anticipating the Public's Questions during a Water Emergency 

The EPA has conducted research to identify information the public will most need during a major intentional watercontamination incident. The study involved collecting information from both utility professionals and members of the 

public in four large metropolitan areas across the United States. The combined list of 400 questions identified during the 

study can be sorted into five overall question categories including (1) details about the incident and who is affected, (2) 

issues regarding exposure to the contaminant, (3) actions people can take to protect themselves and others, (4) acceptable 

uses of water and availability of alternative water supplies, and (5) response and recovery. Findings are presented in a 

report entitled Need to Know: Anticipating the Public’s Questions during a Water Emergency (EPA/600/R-12/020).

Communicating Effectively with the Public during an Anthrax Emergency

Surveys, focus groups, and expert panels have guided the development of materials that could be used to communicate 

with the public during an anthrax emergency. These activities are the result of partnerships involving a host of partners,

including CDC, Food and Drug Administration (FDA), EPA, Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO), 

National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO), National Environmental Health Association (NEHA), 

Association of State Drinking Water Administrators (ASDWA), and American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), as well as state 

and local health agencies. CDC has used this feedback to create fact sheets, videos, social media, and web pages that aim to 

answer questions that members of the public would likely ask during an emergency and advise them on what they need to 

do to protect themselves and loved ones.

Emergency Management Modernization Program (EM2P)

The Joint Project Manager-Guardian is one of the 6 Joint Project Management Offices under the Joint Program Executive 

Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD) is undertaking an effort to design, procure, field, train and sustain 

an emergency management capability for Army installations and assigned personnel. The system will provide an 

integrated, all-hazards Emergency Management system and enable a common operating picture, mass warning and 

notification, and communication with Enhanced 911.
11

2. Use risk communication research to develop appropriate messages and means of 

dissemination to all stakeholders (domestic and foreign), including decision makers, first 

responders, the public, and the media. 

a. Conduct risk communication and risk perception research to develop public engagement 

campaigns that effectively address the uncertainties of public health threats;

b. Develop a fundamental understanding of what sources and forms of information are most 

trusted and well-received by the public, and what their expectations for information are;

c. Develop messages that incorporate findings from risk communication research, including 

through the use of comprehensive websites, booklets, or videos, to engage the public in 

educational activities related specifically to biological response and recovery preincident;

d. Develop message dissemination means that take into account diverse populations,

including those with special needs, during an incident;

e. Develop a medical provider messaging campaign, and networks for sharing information,

for patient decontamination, triage, treatment, and management; and

f. Develop methods to counteract the dissemination of erroneous information by unofficial 

sources.

3. Develop methods and algorithms to determine public understanding and response actions 

based on public messaging.

a. Conduct basic R&D on public understanding of messaging and develop methods to

assess a person’s understanding of message content;

b. Gather data to forecast and model how information is disseminated after a person 

receives a mobile alert;

c. Design tabletop exercises to evaluate the effectiveness of messages and strategies to 

disseminate messages;

g. Develop methods to gauge information dissemination efficacy to affected populations,

including improved speed, accuracy, and overall response, due to message content and 

mechanism of communication; and

h. Develop metrics to evaluate public messaging effectiveness. 

4. Develop the social science approaches to understand and interpret response outcomes and 

amend messaging campaigns.

a. Conduct studies to evaluate public confidence in messages and predict anticipated 

response to messages based on various trust levels;

b. Identify and understand mechanisms to reduce the potential for failure in public health 

and safety response as a result of messaging; and

c. Conduct studies to understand social outcomes of risk communication and messaging 

campaigns, including social vulnerability, response, and resilience to catastrophic 

biological incidents.
12

Goal 3: Accurately assess risk of exposure and risk of infection.

Risk assessment can be used to determine the association between the hazardous characteristics 

of a known infectious or potentially infectious agent or material with the activities that can result 

in an individual’s exposure to that agent or material. Risk assessment also evaluates the 

likelihood that such exposure will cause an infection, the outcomes associated with an infection, 

and the likely impact of MCM. There is a need for more reliable information on the fate and 

transport of microorganisms in the multitude of environmental matrices, including food, and 

conditions encountered in both indoor and outdoor settings. A solid understanding of the factors 

that influence the persistence and abundance of microorganisms and their dissemination, and the 

impact of potential mitigation methods (e.g., insecticidal treatments to prevent the redistribution 

of vector-borne pathogens such as Japanese encephalitis virus spread by mosquitoes or enteric 

bacteria spread by flies) is needed. 

The following objectives provide the foundation from which to build a robust, quantitative risk 

assessment capability to enhance response and recovery:

1. Develop approaches and algorithms to assess risk of infection from environmental exposure, 

including food and water, to biological agents.

a. Generate accepted methods to establish estimates of agent infectious dose as well as 

critical toxic levels that correlate to a clinical outcome;

b. Develop knowledge of exposure pathways that account for incident scenario and unique 

properties of the agent;

c. Generate plant and animal models to understand and forecast clinical outcome as a 

function of exposure routes and concentrations; and

d. Integrate exposure research results with existing data on industry and consumer practices 

into MCM selection and distribution efforts; 

Scientific Program on Reaerosolization and Exposure (SPORE)

The Scientific Program on Reaerosolization and Exposure (SPORE) is an interagency collaboration between DHS S&T, DOD 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Assistant Secretary for 

Preparedness and Response (ASPR), CDC Anthrax Management Team, and the EPA National Homeland Security Research 

Center (NHSRC, which serves as the interagency lead). The purpose of the program is to understand reaerosolization to 

inform response decisions. Initial projects are providing empirical data on the forces required to initiate reaerosolization 

from selected urban surfaces, evaluation of parameters that influence reaerosolization (surface roughness, humidity, spore 

preparation, etc.), and comparison of surrogates (both biological and inert) to B. anthracis. Interagency SPORE partners are 

planning and reviewing future proposals among partner agencies to ensure a focused and unified research approach.

Leveraging the North American Soil Geochemical Landscapes Project (NASGLP)

Through the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) NASGLP, over 4,800 soil samples were collected across 48 states and uniformly 

analyzed for more than 40 major and trace elements. EPA and USGS teamed up to expand the project to examine the 

presence of naturally occurring high-priority pathogens. Presence/absence data will be mapped using geographic 

information systems (GIS) linking location to geochemical properties of the soil, ambient meteorological conditions, soil 

moisture content, and land use. A graphical representation of areas within the United States that may have high probability 

of naturally occurring biothreat agents is critical to decision-makers in determining if a detected constituent is part of the 

naturally occurring environment or a contaminant associated with an accidental or intentional release.
13

2. Develop reliable estimates of risk of environmental exposure for a multitude of environments, 

matrices, and conditions associated with wide area release scenarios.

a. Establish key scenarios to guide fate and transport research investment, including the 

impact of fluids (air and water) on the spread of contaminants;

b. Conduct research to assess microbial organism’s fate, transport, and temporal natural 

occurrence (background soil, water, food, and aerosol levels) and geographic distribution

of biological agents;

c. Develop tools to monitor changes in agent fate and transport over spatial and temporal 

variation;

d. Develop degradation algorithms to predict persistence and examine fate during mitigation 

and recovery procedures (e.g., food, water and wastewater distribution and collection 

systems);

e. Determine the risk of exposure to residual contamination as a function of environmental 

conditions and types of contaminated materials/surfaces to inform recovery decisions;

f. Evaluate the behavior of biological contaminants in fatality management operations (e.g., 

burial, cremation) and potential environmental release as a result of those fatality 

management operations; and

g. Utilize exposure research results to develop consensus methodology to determine when 

areas should be repopulated.

3. Develop reliable estimates of risk to humans, animals, and plants through various exposure 

and transmission routes.

a. Establish key scenarios to guide research investment on the routes of transmission for 

emerging and ill characterized zoonotic, non-zoonotic, and foreign plant and animal 

disease pathogens; 

b. Conduct research to assess transmission mechanisms; and 

c. Apply established models for contaminant distribution in water, in potential edible 

products, and on insects, to make quantitative estimates of risk and characterize the 

certainty of those risk estimates.

Goal 4: Reduce the risk of exposure and/or infection. 

Methods to reduce the risk of exposure or infection are essential for rapid recovery from a 

catastrophic biological incident. Risk-reduction strategies include actions such as quarantine, 

transportation control, social distancing, evacuation, distribution of MCMs, mitigation of the

spread of contamination (e.g., removing contaminated water, insecticidal treatment of vector 

insects, or elimination of an infected flock or herd), and decontamination. An assessment that 

provides quantitative estimates of risk and characterizes the certainty of those risk estimates will 

inform decision as to which risk-reduction strategies will be most effective. For example, current 

guidance on the use and application of existing decontamination methods and strategies is 

limited in application and may not be appropriate for all potential biological agents. 

Development and integration of new decontamination methods and technologies requires 

standardized approaches to demonstrating safety and efficacy. 
14

Objectives to achieve risk reduction include:

1. Ensure effective risk reduction strategies, including decontamination, waste management, 

contaminant control, and reaerosolization control, for a variety of biological threats and 

scenarios.

a. Generate response plan guidance, including decision support tools and methodologies, 

that reduces risk by accounting for scenario and agent characteristics;

b. Conduct research to assess the impact of existing mitigation technologies and protocols;

c. Develop technologies and guidance for mass human, animal (including household pets), 

and plant decontamination or destruction;

d. Conduct research on social and economic variables that promote or impede compliance 

capacity based on risk perception;

e. Identify consistent and efficient risk reduction methods that are readily available, 

inexpensive, compatible with sensitive surfaces and materials, and environmentally 

friendly;

f. Develop new approaches to decontamination and evaluate efficacy for new and existing 

decontamination approaches and procedures;

Decontamination Family of Systems (DFoS)

The Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD), Joint Project Manager Protection, at 

the Department of Defense has established programs under the DFoS umbrella that will improve decontamination 

processes by developing, maturing, and fielding materiel solutions to mitigate the hazards associated with chemical, 

biological, and non-traditional warfare agents and radiological contamination on personnel, equipment, fixed facilities, 

terrain, vehicles, ships, and aircraft. Programs currently within the DFoS include: Joint Sensitive Equipment Wipe, General 

Purpose Decontaminants, and Contamination Indicator Decontamination Assurance System.

Advances in Decontamination for Biological Agents

The Bio-response Operational Testing and Evaluation (BOTE) Project was a multi-agency effort designed to operationally 

test and evaluate response to a biological incident (release of B. anthracis spores) from initial public health and law 

enforcement response through environmental remediation. The effort was led by the EPA, DHS S&T, and CDC and 

included participation by the DOD, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and the Department of Energy National 

Laboratories. The two-phase effort was designed to operationally assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and cost 

implications of decontamination approaches that advanced the cleanups following the 2001 anthrax incidents or that 

have been developed since that time. The coordinated response, including implementation of site remediation activities, 

was conducted and assessed during the second phase. 

The EPA’s Homeland Security Research Program and the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Consequence Management Advisory Team continue to partner to advance remediation capabilities to promote 

community resilience after a biological incident of significance. Products from the research efforts can be accessed at 

www.epa.gov/nhsrc. 

Under the DHS S&T Wide Area Recovery and Resiliency Program (WARRP), the EPA and Sandia National Laboratories 

have partnered to develop a decontamination decision-support tool (DeconST) to aid in the assessment of remediation 

strategy options. DeconST incorporates a systems-thinking perspective on decontamination, considering the relationship 

between sampling, decontamination, and waste-management capabilities. The tool enables the use of the latest 

decontamination-related research and capability advances to be used to support decision making, aiding the transfer of 

information to decision makers. From WARRP, DeconST is being transitioned to the EPA for maintenance and further 

development; the tool is also to be incorporated as part of the digital dashboard tool set (TaCBoaRD) that is being 

developed under the DTRA’s Transatlantic Collaborative Biological Resiliency Demonstration (TaCBRD).
15

g. Develop methods to determine efficacy of risk reduction activities on the risk of exposure 

as a result of wide area incidents that result in a loss of property and infrastructure due to 

denial of use;

h. Develop outdoor (including surface waters), indoor, and water-distribution and sewagewaste-water-system risk-reduction strategies to reduce impacts and protect environmental 

and public health following a biological incident;

i. Develop science to support ventilation designs, including transport vehicle protective 

ventilation designs that provide for expedient and cost-effective isolation and negative 

pressure isolation rooms for use during emergencies;

j. Enhance individual survival by reducing the physical burden of personal protective 

equipment, integrate this capability into the responder’s ensemble and use dynamic 

multifunctional materials that respond to threats and continually optimize between 

protection and burden;

k. Develop cost-effective designs to mitigate the potential occupational hazards involving 

airborne, vector-borne, direct contact transmission, and droplet-disseminated infectious 

diseases, including technologies to provide exposure protection for emergency medical 

professionals from airborne and surface contamination during response; and

l. Develop cost-effective and easily applied fixatives that effectively mitigate contaminant 

spread depending on incident scenario.

2. Develop a strong scientific basis for recommending population infection prevention measures 

(quarantine, isolation, and social distancing)

a. Perform studies to ascertain the risk associated with population movements during and 

after multiple disasters;

b. Develop alternative refuge options that enable access to clean air, food, and water while 

reducing the risk of continued exposure;

c. Develop expedient isolation methods and improved isolation capabilities to reduce 

exposure; and

d. Conduct systems-based analysis and develop evidence-based, optimized MCM 

distribution constructs, such as User-Managed Inventory (UMI), to supplement or 

enhance existing distribution mechanisms (e.g. stockpiles and points-of-distribution). 

3. Implement risk reduction strategies to mitigate exposure from known routes of transmission,

including reaerosolization

a. Conduct research and develop technologies to mitigate transmission of emerging and ill 

characterized zoonotic and foreign plant and animal disease pathogens;

b. Develop technologies to mitigate secondary reaerosolization of agents (i.e., containment 

of contamination) and reduce contamination spread following an initial release; and

c. Develop protocols and implementation guidelines to reduce the transport of agents by 

contact with surfaces, including fomites, and by transmission from insect vectors. 

Goal 5: Manage biological waste following a catastrophic incident.

A key component of the response and recovery process is the proper management of wastes 

generated as a result of the initial contamination incident, initial response activities, natural 

processes that occur in the aftermath of the incident (e.g., precipitation), and the mitigation and 
16

decontamination operations that occur in the medium- and long-term phases of the response and 

recovery. Waste management includes methods and protocols for reduction, treatment, and 

disposal of agent-contaminated waste, and must be done in coordination with the law 

enforcement, intelligence collection, and investigative responses. Many of the knowledge gaps 

in the waste management area involve uncertainties associated with application of existing wellestablished technologies (e.g., waste segregation, recycling, landfilling, incineration, 

composting) to wastes that may have trace levels of unconventional contaminants (e.g., B. 

anthracis bound in building materials). At times these unconventional wastes may be generated 

in exceedingly large quantities (e.g., animal carcasses from a foreign animal disease outbreak or 

plants from contaminated nurseries or forests). There is a need to fill knowledge gaps relating to 

the remediation and cleanup of water distribution systems and wastewater that may be generated 

as a result of cleanup activities, run-off, or other incident-specific actions. Furthermore, more 

needs to be known about the agent-specific behavior and environmental release of biological 

contaminants –including, for example, spore-forming bacteria or soil-tolerant viruses—in fatality 

management operations, including burial and cremation. There is also a need to develop 

innovative approaches to minimize contaminated waste (by, for example, vaccinating animals in 

an outbreak so they don’t need to be euthanized) and to enhance erosion control and water 

treatment methods to reduce the spread of pathogens by surface-water transport.

Objectives to meet waste management goals include:

1. Manage and minimize the amount of waste generated from responding to all-hazards 

incidents.

a. Develop tools to manage wastes as part of an integrated response and recovery operation, 

including prioritization of infrastructure cleanup, waste segregation, recycling, staging,

storage, treatment, transportation, disposal of wastes, and assessing the impact of 

decontamination decisions on waste management practices;

b. Adapt existing waste management (e.g., treatment) technologies in a mobile deployment 

setting to minimize contaminant spread and to reduce transportation and disposal costs 

(overall waste management costs);

The Human Remains Decontamination System (HRDS) family of systems 

The HRDS family of systems will provide the capability to protect personnel handling and processing human remains 

associated with a CBRN event. The HRDS will contain CBRN-contaminated remains from the point of fatality to the 

Mortuary Affairs Contaminated Remains Mitigation Site, reduce the hazard/eliminate the hazard from contaminated 

remains, and contain remains during storage and transportation via military airlift and/or commercial aircraft. HRDS 

consists of three major systems: the Contaminated Human Remains Pouch, the Contaminated Human Remains Transfer 

Case, and the Remains Decontamination System.

I-WASTE 

The EPA, with financial support from the DHS and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), developed the I-WASTE Tool over 

the past several years. The I-WASTE Tool contains estimators for various types and volumes of waste. The tool also provides 

location and contact information for treatment/disposal facilities, and health and safety information to ensure public and 

worker safety during the removal, transport, treatment, and disposal of contaminated waste and debris. 

The I-WASTE Tool is available at www2.ergweb.com/bdrtool/login.asp.
17

c. Develop methods to determine the level of contamination present in medical waste and 

hospital consumables to guide disposal and/or recycle, reuse of materials; and

d. Develop guidance for agent and scenario specific concerns regarding the handling of 

decontamination wastewater and wastewater arising from normally occurring activities. 

2. Develop methods and criteria for selecting waste management approaches for agentcontaminated waste.

a. Evaluate human and environmental health risks associated with use of different waste 

management methods to inform incident-specific decisions;

b. Develop scientific knowledge to assess cost/benefit analysis of waste management 

technologies, including long-term human and environmental health impacts;

c. Research social acceptance and develop conflict resolution processes for gaining 

acceptance of waste management decisions from the public; 

d. Develop knowledge and performance evaluation measures of existing waste management 

(e.g., treatment and disposal) technologies for known and emerging biological agents for 

ease of technology selection for use in an incident;

e. Generate mitigation strategies for wastewater collection and treatment, as well as 

prevention of drinking water system contamination during waste management actions, to 

support environmental decision making for sustained operations;

f. Develop strategies and methods to mitigate the potential release of biological agents 

during all waste handling operations (e.g., effective containment during operations such 

as removal of materials from sites, temporary storage, transport, treatment, and disposal);

g. Develop design criteria for constructing new treatment/disposal facilities; and

h. Develop sampling strategies for minimizing the number of environmental samples for 

characterizing wastes prior to transportation.

3. Develop methods and criteria for evaluating and determining appropriate disposal of 

contaminated human and animal remains, and infested plants.

a. Develop scientific knowledge to compare human and environmental health risks 

associated with treatment and disposal methods for human and animal remains and 

infested plants;

b. Develop science to support long-term environmental and human health impacts of 

disposal methods; and

c. Develop environmental criteria (e.g., soil type, depth to ground water, and distance to 

surface water) for onsite burial of animal carcasses.
18

Conclusions

A catastrophic biological incident would force leadership at all levels of government to make 

rapid, high-consequence decisions in the face of numerous uncertainties. This Roadmap

identifies knowledge and technology gaps that currently impede the ability of relevant officials 

to act quickly and decisively on the basis of sound science and reliable evidence, and presents 

goals and objectives to speed the filling of those gaps. Although progress is already being made

in these important domains, continued progress will require focused investments and 

coordination among Federal departments and agencies, academia, industry, and international 

partners as recommended in this roadmap.
19

Appendix I: Definitions

 aerosolization, n—the process of generating an aerosol; a process that generates small 

particles that can be carried in the air.

 biological incident, n—a natural or human-caused incident involving microbiological 

organisms (bacteria, fungi, and viruses) or biologically-derived toxins that pose a hazard 

to humans, animals, or plants (Draft Planning Guidance for Recovery Following 

Biological Incidents).

 biosurveillance, n—the process of gathering, integrating, interpreting, and 

communicating essential information related to all-hazards threats or disease activity 

affecting human, animal, or plant health to achieve early detection and warning, 

contribute to overall situational awareness of the health aspects of an incident, and to 

enable better decision making at all levels (The National Strategy for Biosurveillance).

 biothreat agent, n—any microorganism, virus, infectious substance, or biological product 

that may be engineered as a result of biotechnology, or any naturally occurring or 

bioengineered component of any such microorganism, virus, infectious substance, or 

biological product, capable of causing: (1) death, disease or other biological malfunction 

in a human, an animal, a plant, or another living organism; (2) deterioration of food, 

water, equipment, supplies, or material of any kind; (3) or, deleterious alteration of the 

environment (18 USC 175). 

 catastrophic biological incident, n—a natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, 

involving microbiological organisms (bacteria, fungi, and viruses) or biologically-derived 

toxins that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties or disruption severely 

affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale and/or 

government functions.

 catastrophic incident, n—any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that 

results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage or disruption severely affecting 

the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale and/or government 

functions (NIMS).

 characterization, n—the process of obtaining specific information about a biological 

agent, such as its identity, genetic composition, formulation, physical properties, 

toxicological properties, ability to aerosolize, and persistence, and about the nature and 

extent of contamination of the agent, such as locations or items contaminated and the 

amount of contamination (Draft Planning Guidance for Recovery Following Biological 

Incidents). 

 cleanup, n—the process of characterizing, decontaminating, and clearing a contaminated 

site or items, including disposal of wastes. Cleanup is a synonym for Remediation. 

Generally occurs after Characterization and before Clearance (Draft Planning Guidance 

for Recovery Following Biological Incidents). 

 clearance, n—the process of determining that a cleanup goal has been met for a specific 

contaminant in or on a specific site or item. Generally occurs after Decontamination and 

before Re-occupancy (Draft Planning Guidance for Recovery Following Biological 

Incidents).

 community resilience, n—the ability of a network of individuals and families, businesses, 

governmental and nongovernmental organizations and other civic organizations to adapt 
20

to changing conditions and withstand and rapidly recover from disruption due to 

emergencies.

 consequence management, n—actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and 

manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including 

natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. Also called CM. Includes Remediation/Cleanup 

(i.e., Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance) and Restoration/Re-occupancy 

activities.

 contamination, n—the process of making a material or surface unclean or unsuited for its 

intended purpose usually by the addition or attachment of undesirable foreign substances.

Used in this document to describe building, water, and outdoor exposure and external 

human, animal, and plant contamination.

 crisis management, n—measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources 

needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or an act of terrorism. It is 

predominantly a law enforcement response, normally executed under Federal law. Also 

called CrM. Includes Notification and First Response activities.

 critical infrastructure, n—systems, assets and networks, whether physical or virtual, so 

vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets 

would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public 

health or safety or any combination of those matters.

 decontamination, n—decontamination is a process that makes an item, instrument or 

device safe to handle and can be accomplished by cleaning with detergent and water, or 

cleaning in combination with disinfection or sterilization.

 emergency responder, n—includes Federal, state, local, and tribal emergency public 

safety, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical, including hospital 

emergency facilities, and related personnel, agencies, and authorities. See Section 2 (6), 

Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). Also known as 

Emergency Response Provider (NIMS).

 emergency response, n—the performance of actions to mitigate the consequences of an 

emergency for human health and safety, quality of life, the environment and property. It 

may also provide a basis for the resumption of normal social and economic activity. 

 exposure risk, n—the probability of being exposed to an infectious agent, chemical 

intoxicant, or radioactive substance resulting in a degradation of health.

 evacuation, n—organized, phased, and supervised withdrawal, dispersal, or removal of 

civilians from dangerous or potentially dangerous areas, and their reception and care in 

safe areas (NIMS).

 evidence-based, adj—medicine, pertaining to the conscientious, explicit, and judicious 

use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients. 

 first response, n—actions taken immediately following notification of a biological 

incident or release. In addition to search and rescue, scene control, and law enforcement 

activities, first response includes initial site containment, environmental sampling and 

analysis, and public health activities, such as treatment of potentially exposed persons 

(Draft Planning Guidance for Recovery Following Biological Incidents).

 hazard, n—something that is potentially dangerous or harmful, often the root cause of an 

unwanted outcome; a danger or peril (NIMS). 

 high consequence decision, n—a decision that could result in major disruption or has 

important health or economic risks. Examples of high consequence decisions in the 
21

context of this Roadmap include: ordering evacuations, quarantines, and release of MCM 

stockpiles.

 infection risk, n—the risk to an individual of developing an infection following exposure 

to a pathogenic organism (Virus, Bacteria, Fungi, etc.).

 intervention, v—to involve oneself in a situation so as to alter or hinder an action or 

development.

 jurisdiction, n—a range or sphere of authority. Public agencies have jurisdiction at an 

incident within their area of responsibility. Jurisdictional authority at an incident can be 

political, geographic (for example, city, county, tribal, state, or Federal boundary lines) or 

functional (for example, law enforcement, and public health) (NIMS).

 notification, n—the process of communicating the occurrence or potential occurrence of a 

biological incident through and to designated authorities who initiate First Response 

actions. Generally occurs as the first step in a response to a suspected or actual biological 

incident (Draft Planning Guidance for Recovery Following Biological Incidents).

 persistence, adj—the ability of an agent to live or endure outside of the host and remain

infectious.

 reaerosolization, v—when particles collected on surfaces are re-entrained into the air 

stream.

 recovery, n—the development, coordination, and execution of service- and siterestoration plans; the reconstitution of government operations and services; individual, 

private-sector, nongovernmental, and public assistance programs to provide housing and 

to promote restoration; long-term care and treatment of affected persons; additional 

measures for social, political, environmental, and economic restoration; evaluation of the 

incident to identify lessons learned; post incident reporting; and development of 

initiatives to mitigate the effects of future incidents (NIMS).

 remediation, n—the processes of characterizing, decontaminating, and clearing a 

contaminated site or items, including disposal of wastes. Cleanup (Draft Planning 

Guidance for Recovery Following Biological Incidents).

 re-occupancy, n—the process of renovating a facility, monitoring the workers performing 

the renovation, and deciding when to permit re-occupation. Generally occurs after a 

facility has been cleared but before occupants are allowed to return (Draft Planning 

Guidance for Recovery Following Biological Incidents).

 response, n—activities that address the short-term, direct effects of an incident. Response 

includes immediate actions to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs. 

Response also includes the execution of emergency operations plans and of mitigation 

activities designed to limit the loss of life, personal injury, property damage, and other 

unfavorable outcomes. As indicated by the situation, response activities include applying 

intelligence and other information to lessen the effects or consequences of an incident; 

increased security operations; continuing investigations into nature and source of the 

threat; ongoing public health and agricultural surveillance and testing processes; 

immunizations, isolation, or quarantine; and specific law enforcement operations aimed 

at preempting, interdicting, or disrupting illegal activity, and apprehending actual 

perpetrators and bringing them to justice (NIMS).

 restoration, n—the process of renovating or refurbishing a facility; bringing it to an 

acceptable condition using the optimization process to determine the appropriate use and 

associated clearance level at which occupants may return. Generally occurs after the 
22

Clearance Phase but before occupants are allowed to return (Draft Planning Guidance for 

Recovery Following Biological Incidents).

 risk, n—the probability that a substance or situation will produce harm under specified 

conditions. Risk is a combination of two factors: (1) the probability that an adverse event 

will occur (such as a specific disease or type of injury), and (2) the consequences of the 

adverse event (Presidential and Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk 

Management, 1997).

 risk assessment, n—gathering and analyzing information on what potential harm a 

situation poses and the likelihood that people or the environment will be harmed. [The 

Presidential and Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management, 

1997] A methodological approach to estimate the potential human or environmental risk 

of a substance that uses hazard identification, dose–response, exposure assessment, and 

risk characterization.

 staying-in-place, v—the act of remaining in a designated location in order to avoid further 

danger elsewhere and/or to limit negative impacts in the area of the emergency. Stayingin-place is often recommended in order to facilitate the distribution of MCM or aid to 

individuals. This is in contrast to "shelter-in-place" which means to take immediate 

shelter where you are—at home, work, school, or in between.

 surge capacity, n—a system's ability to rapidly mobilize to meet an increased demand, to 

rapidly expand beyond normal service levels to meet the increased demand in the event 

of large-scale disasters or public health emergencies.

 transport, v—the movement of contaminants through environmental media (e.g., air, soil, 

water, groundwater).

 threat, n—an indication of possible violence, harm, or danger and may include an 

indication of intent and capability (NIMS).