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i 

82–460 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–45] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2014 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 

ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES 

AND NUCLEAR FORCES PROGRAMS 

HEARING HELD 

MAY 9, 2013 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DREW WALTER, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

ERIC SMITH, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, May 9, 2013, Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Request for Atomic Energy 

Defense Activities and Nuclear Forces Programs ............................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, May 9, 2013 ............................................................................................ 37 

THURSDAY, MAY 9, 2013 

FISCAL YEAR 2014 BUDGET REQUEST FOR ATOMIC ENERGY 

DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND NUCLEAR FORCES PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Creedon, Hon. Madelyn R., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense ......................................................... 1 

Harvey, Dr. John, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, U.S. Department of Defense .............. 5 

Huizenga, David G., Senior Advisor for Environmental Management, U.S. 

Department of Energy ......................................................................................... 6 

Kehler, Gen C. Robert, USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. 

Air Force ............................................................................................................... 3 

Miller, Hon. Neile L., Acting Administrator and Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration ............................................ 4 

Winokur, Hon. Peter S., Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board ... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Creedon, Hon. Madelyn R. ............................................................................... 43 

Harvey, Dr. John .............................................................................................. 94 

Huizenga, David G. .......................................................................................... 103 

Kehler, Gen C. Robert ...................................................................................... 55 

Miller, Hon. Neile L. ........................................................................................ 78 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 41 

Winokur, Hon. Peter S. .................................................................................... 114 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Dr. Fleming ....................................................................................................... 140 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 139 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 140 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 148 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 153 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 143 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2014 BUDGET REQUEST FOR ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND NUCLEAR FORCES 

PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, May 9, 2013. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:01 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. Good morning. This hearing of the House Armed 

Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces will be called to order. 

I appreciate all the witnesses’ attendance, and your preparation for 

this hearing. I know it takes time and energy, and we do appreciate you doing it. It makes a difference for us. 

Because we have got such a large panel, I and the ranking member have agreed we are going to dispense with our opening statements and submit them for the record and go straight to your 

opening statements. So, if you could summarize your opening statement in about 3 minutes, then that will give us more time for questions. 

So with that, we will start with Ms. Creedon. You are recognized 

for 3 minutes. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELYN R. CREEDON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary CREEDON. Thank you. Good morning and it is nice to 

be back again. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is your microphone on? 

Secretary CREEDON. It is. It says, talk. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay, you need to pull it closer then. 

Secretary CREEDON. Okay. 

Mr. ROGERS. There you go. 

Secretary CREEDON. Okay. Again, thank you and it is good to see 

you all again. My remarks today will highlight a few of the topics 

that are addressed in the written statement, which of course I 

would like to submit for the record. The Global Strategic Affairs 

Office leads the Department of Defense’s efforts to develop the 
2 

strategies and policies to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for the Nation, and for our allies and partners as 

long as nuclear weapons exist, at the same time, moving toward 

the President’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons. 

We continue to work toward this vision, while also supporting 

the many demands of a complex global security environment, and 

assuring our allies and partners. Under the new START [Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty] treaty, the United States and Russia have 

made significant progress. But our two nations still account for the 

vast majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, and for this reason 

our focus for the next stage of arms control remains, bilateral efforts with Russia. Although the timing and framework for the next 

round of these negotiations are not settled, we look forward to discussions with Russia that will address reductions in the number of 

deployed, and nondeployed nuclear weapons, both strategic and 

nonstrategic as directed in the Senate’s resolution of ratification to 

the new START treaty. 

As you know, the Administration has been conducting a nuclear 

posture review implementation study to review our nuclear deterrence requirements, and operational plans to ensure they address 

today’s threats. The analysis is not yet complete, but our preliminary view is that continuing modernization is essential, and that 

further reductions should be possible. While the details of this 

work are highly classified, the Department remains committed to 

sharing relevant aspects of this analysis with the senior leaders of 

the defense committees when the effort is complete. 

The current fiscal situation continues to put pressure on the entire Department of Defense. As sequestration cuts are implemented, and as budgetary uncertainties continue, the Department 

will make difficult decisions, and assume more risks. These risks, 

however, will not alter our prioritization of the nuclear mission. 

The 2010 nuclear posture review concluded that the United States 

will maintain a triad of ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile], 

SLBMs [Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile], and nuclear-capable heavy bombers. And the President’s fiscal year 2014 budget request supports modernization of these nuclear forces. 

As Secretary of Defense Hagel stated, providing the necessary resources for nuclear modernization of the triad should be a national 

priority, and that remains the policy of this Administration. 

And, the last thing I want to touch on right now is that the U.S. 

remains committed to extended deterrence and assurance of our allies and partners, including NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]—the NATO Alliance, Japan and the Republic of Korea. And 

lately, this is particularly true on the Korean Peninsula. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Creedon can be found in 

the Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much, Ms. Creedon. For the record, 

I should have more properly introduced her. She is Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, U.S. Department of 

Defense. 

And next we will recognize General Robert Kehler, Commander, 

U.S. Strategic Command, you are recognized for 3 minutes. 
3 

STATEMENT OF GEN C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER, 

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General KEHLER. Well, Mr. Chairman, thanks for the opportunity to present my views this morning. In today’s uncertain and 

complex world, STRATCOM’s [U.S. Strategic Command] fundamental purpose remains constant. With the other combatant commands, we must deter, detect, and prevent attacks against the 

United States; assure our allies and friends of our security commitments to them; and if directed, employ appropriate force to achieve 

national objectives if deterrence fails. 

Deterrence today is shaped to match the characteristics of specific scenarios and actors and it is pursued with a broader array 

of tools than just nuclear forces. However, as long as nuclear weapons exist, my number one priority will be to deter nuclear attack 

and assure allies and friends with a safe, secure, and effective nuclear force. To do this, my objective remains to field a credible New 

START-compliant triad of survivable ballistic missile submarines, 

responsive intercontinental ballistic missiles, and flexible nuclearcapable heavy bombers that can present any would-be attacker 

with insurmountable problems. 

This force must be supported by a comprehensive warning system, assured command and control, and a highly specialized nuclear weapons complex, all staffed by a dedicated and experienced 

military, civilian, and contractor team. While it is appropriately 

smaller than what we fielded in the Cold War, I can assure you 

that today’s force is safe, secure, and effective. However, it will not 

remain that way unless we keep the nuclear weapons complex, the 

delivery system modernization, and sustainment programs on a 

stable and committed course. 

I believe we have crafted and presented a sound strategy and implementation plan to ensure a continued credible deterrent in fiscal 

year 2014 and beyond, but the plan contains risk. Sequestration 

adds additional risk, as well as the possibility of further budget reductions. 

Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege to lead the outstanding men and 

women of STRATCOM. They are our greatest and most enduring 

strength. All of these amazing professionals will cope in the near 

term. I remain extremely concerned about the longer term impacts 

of fiscal uncertainty on them and their families. 

We face difficult challenges, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward 

to working with you to address them as we go forward. Thank you 

and members of the subcommittee for your support, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in the 

Appendix on page 55.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you General Kehler. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Neile Miller, Acting Administrator and Principal Deputy 

Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration. Ms. Miller, you are recognized for 3 minutes. 
4 

STATEMENT OF HON. NEILE L. MILLER, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR AND PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Ms. MILLER. Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

members of the subcommittee for having me here today to discuss 

the President’s fiscal year 2014 budget request for the Department 

of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. Your ongoing support for the women and men of the NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration] and the work that they do, and your 

bipartisan leadership on some of the most challenging national security issues of our time, has helped keep the American people 

safe, and enhanced global security. The President’s $11.7 billion fiscal year 2014 budget for NNSA 

allows us to continue to implement his nuclear security agenda. As 

you know, we are also deeply engaged in efforts to realize President Obama’s vision for a world without nuclear weapons, free 

from the threat of nuclear terrorism, and united in our approach 

toward shared nuclear security goals. 

Most recently in his 2013 State of the Union Address, the President continued to highlight the importance of his nuclear strategy, 

and pledged to, ‘‘Engage Russia to seek further reductions in our 

nuclear arsenals, and continue leading the global effort to secure 

nuclear materials that could fall into the wrong hands. Because our 

ability to influence others, depends on our willingness to lead and 

meet our obligations.’’ 

His budget for fiscal year 2014, reaffirms his strong support for 

our nuclear security missions. I want to assure you that NNSA is 

being thoughtful, pragmatic, and efficient in how we achieve the 

Nation’s nuclear security objectives, and shape the future of nuclear security. As someone with many years of Federal Government 

experience at the nexus of program and budget, I can tell you that 

while we are challenged to be successful in a time of fiscal austerity and budget uncertainty, we are also dedicating ourselves to 

driving efficiencies into our program so that we can make the best 

use of taxpayer dollars with which we are entrusted. 

And we are holding everyone, from our contractors to our Federal 

employees, accountable. Above all, we are challenging ourselves to 

reject ways of doing business that are holding us back from this, 

but which has survived long into the post-Cold War era, simply because they are the way we have always done it. 

The need to strategically modernize our facilities, infrastructure, 

and weapons systems is urgent, but so is the need to modernize 

how we do what we do. We must, and we are evaluating our programs and challenging the assumptions for everything we do, to 

rethink the underlying premises, and ensure that we are charting 

a path to the future that is well reasoned, responsible, and reflects 

the best way of doing business today. 

As the President has committed, NNSA is working to make sure 

that we have the infrastructure, weapons systems, and supporting 

science to certify the Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile through 

strategic modernization investments, and we are working to implement the most ambitious nuclear nonproliferation agenda in the 

world. Whether or not we were facing this moment’s budget uncertainties and fiscal constraints, we have a responsibility to prioritize 
5 

what we do, and do it in a way that makes sense, not only to us, 

but to you, to our partners at the Department of Defense, our international partners, and above all to the American taxpayers. 

If we want to see the nuclear security agenda move forward, then 

we must ensure that we have essential enabling capabilities, including infrastructure, to support the nuclear navy and strong national laboratories that are the backbone of the nuclear security enterprise. And we must continue to chart the path of nuclear security together. 

We are doing the work the American people need us to do, and 

the President’s budget will allow us to continue doing that work. 

We at the NNSA are working hard to align ourselves for the future, and your continuing support has been a vital part of that. 

I again thank you for having me here today, and I look forward 

to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Miller can be found in the Appendix on page 78.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you, Ms. Miller. 

The Chair now recognizes Dr. John Harvey, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense 

Programs, U.S. Department of Defense. 

Dr. Harvey, you are recognized for 3 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN HARVEY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Dr. HARVEY. Chairman Rogers, Mr. Cooper, members of the committee, I serve as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in DOD’s [Department of Defense’s] acquisition, technology 

and logistics organization, we call it AT&L. AT&L chairs the Nuclear Weapons Council and is the Department’s lead for engaging 

the Department of Energy in all aspects of U.S. nuclear weapons 

programs. 

My written statement outlines the progress we have made to sustain and modernize our nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure, our nuclear delivery platforms, and the nuclear command and control system that links nuclear forces with presidential authority. Congressional support for the President’s fiscal 

year 2014 budget request is essential to continued progress in 

these areas. 

But I want to touch on a couple of other points. The fiscal year 

2014 request also enables progress on a modern nuclear infrastructure that will eventually provide the Nation with capabilities to address technical problems in the stockpile, or respond to future adverse geopolitical challenges, and do so with a smaller stockpile 

than we have today. 

Along these lines, construction of a new facility at Y–12 [National Security Complex] in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, is being aggressively pursued by NNSA to replace the existing aging and 

unsupportable facility currently carrying out HEU, highly enriched 

uranium, operations at Y–12. Budget realities, however, have resulted in deferral of the facility at Los Alamos—we call it CMRR 
6 

[Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility]—that would provide needed plutonium capabilities. 

In light of deferral, we are taking a step back to assess how best 

to achieve the Nation’s plutonium needs, including exploration of a 

modular facility concept, which could provide a more flexible and 

fiscally affordable approach to acquiring needed capabilities. 

To mitigate the risk of deferral, NNSA’s $120 million reprogramming request will help achieve an interim production capacity at 

Los Alamos of 30 pits per year by 2021, sooner than we would have 

achieved with CMRR. We urge your support for this reprogramming request. 

I would like to conclude by noting that the two Departments 

have strengthened their partnership in the Nuclear Weapons Council over the past year in advancing a shared commitment to a safe, 

secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. During the past year, DOD 

and NNSA collaborated on a joint review of DOD’s nuclear warhead requirements and NNSA’s funding options to meet those requirements. NNSA provided unprecedented transparency into its 

program and budgetary processes that support it. 

The comprehensive assessment led to a balanced approach involving some further adjustments to DOD’s modernization schedules and some adjustments to resource allocations within NNSA’s 

program. 

In a separate effort the two Departments are advancing a 25- 

year baseline plan to synchronize schedules for warhead life extension programs, modern delivery platforms that carry those warheads, and initial operations for supporting infrastructure. Further 

work is under way to confirm that this baseline is supportable and 

executable over the long term. 

And let me conclude there. Thanks for the opportunity to speak. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Harvey can be found in the Appendix on page 94.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Dr. Harvey. 

Next, we recognize Mr. David Huizenga, Senior Adviser for Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy. 

Mr. Huizenga, you are recognized for 3 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID G. HUIZENGA, SENIOR ADVISOR FOR 

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member 

Cooper, and other members of the subcommittee. I am honored to 

be here today with my colleagues. I would like to discuss the positive things that the Office of Environmental Management is doing 

for the Nation and address any questions you may have relative to 

our fiscal year 2014 budget request. 

Our request of $5.3 billion for defense-funded activities will enable our office to continue the safe cleanup of the environmental 

legacy brought about from five decades of nuclear weapons development and Government-sponsored nuclear energy research. Our 

cleanup priorities are based on risk and our continued efforts to 

meet our regulatory compliance commitments. Completing cleanup 

enables other crucial DOE [Department of Energy] missions to con-
7 

tinue and ensures the reduction of one of the U.S. Government’s 

largest liabilities. 

The Office of Environmental Management has made significant 

progress in accelerating cleanup across the United States. For example, in 2009 the total footprint of EM’s [Office of Environmental 

Management] cleanup sites was 931 square miles. As of January 

this year, this has been reduced by 74 percent. In 2012, at the Savannah River site in South Carolina, EM achieved a key milestone 

with closing two high-level waste tanks. Also, today EM has sent 

more than 11,000 shipments of transuranic waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico for safe disposal. 

These accomplishments have been possible due to an outstanding 

Federal and contractor workforce. The safety of these workers is a 

core value that is incorporated into every aspect of our program. 

We maintain a strong safety record and continuously strive to an 

accident- and incident-free workplace by aggressively sharing lessons learned across our sites. We are training senior management 

and working to achieve an even stronger safety culture within our 

program and thereby ensure safe construction and operation of our 

facilities. 

In recognition of EM’s improvements in contract and project 

management, earlier this year the GAO [U.S. Government Accountability Office] removed the bulk of EM’s capital asset projects, and 

indeed, all projects with values less than $750 million were removed from the high-risk designation. We are deeply committed to 

excellence in contract and project management, and intend to keep 

these projects off the Government’s GAO high-risk list. 

In fiscal year 2014, we are positioned to continue making 

progress toward our cleanup goals. For example, in the Office of 

River Protection at Hanford, Washington, we will continue construction of the low activity waste facility, complete construction of 

the analytical laboratory, and continue to retrieve the single shell 

tanks in the C tank farm. 

At Savannah River, we will close another two high-level waste 

tanks. In Idaho, we will continue progress in treating the last 

900,000 gallons of liquid waste and ship 4,500 cubic meters of 

transuranic waste to WIPP [Waste Isolation Pilot Plant]. At Los Alamos, EM will complete the processing and removal of 3,700 cubic 

meters of above-ground transuranic waste. 

In closing, we will continue to apply innovative cleanup technologies and strategies so that we can complete our work safely, on 

schedule, and within cost, thereby demonstrating a solid value to 

the American taxpayers. 

The Office of Environmental Management has made steady 

progress and with your help will continue to do so. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Huizenga can be found in the 

Appendix on page 103.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes, Mr. Peter Winokur, Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. You are recognized for 3 

minutes. 
8 

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER S. WINOKUR, CHAIRMAN, 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD 

Dr. WINOKUR. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member 

Cooper, and members of the subcommittee. I have submitted a 

written statement for the record describing the board’s mission and 

highlighting a number of safety issues that are particularly important to ensuring adequate protection of the public and workers at 

DOE’s defense nuclear facilities. 

I am convinced that safety is an enabler to DOE’s mission, a mission that is crucial to the wellbeing of our Nation. I will provide 

a very brief summary of my written testimony for your consideration today. 

The board’s budget is essentially devoted to maintaining and 

supporting an expert staff of engineers and scientists, nearly all of 

whom have technical master’s degrees or doctorates to accomplish 

our highly specialized work. 

The President’s budget request for fiscal year 2014 includes 

$29.915 million in new budget authority for the board. It will support 120 personnel, the target we have been growing toward for 

several years. We believe this level of staffing is needed to provide 

sufficient independent safety oversight of DOE’s defense nuclear 

complex, given the pace and scope of DOE activities. 

DOE and NNSA are designing and building new defense nuclear 

facilities with a total project cost on the order of $25 billion. I cannot overstate the importance of integrating safety into the design 

of these facilities at an early stage. Failing to do this will lead to 

surprises and costly retrofits later in the process. 

The risk posed by the plutonium facility at Los Alamos National 

Laboratory remains among the board’s greatest concerns. An earthquake resulting in collapse of the facility would likely result in very 

high radiological doses to the public in nearby towns. The board 

continues to urge DOE to take meaningful, near-term action to 

mitigate this risk. 

The board is also devoting considerable resources to its oversight 

of the design and construction of the Hanford waste treatment and 

immobilization plant, which is essential to the safe stabilization 

and disposal of 53 million gallons of high-level waste stored in 177 

underground tanks. 

Finally, the need to continually assess and maintain a strong 

safety culture throughout the DOE defense nuclear complex has 

emerged as an imperative for DOE, prompted by board recommendation 2011–1, Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and 

Immobilization Plant. DOE has recently assessed safety culture 

across the complex and determined that much improvement is 

needed. 

Let me add in closing that the bulk of the issues that the board 

has safety concerns about are addressed at the staff level without 

any need for a formal board letter or recommendation. I am confident the board is working with DOE’s liaison to the board to establish an increasingly effective working relationship between the 

board and DOE. 

This concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer any 

questions you have. 
9 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Winokur can be found in the Appendix on page 114.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Dr. Winokur. 

And the Chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes for questions. 

General Kehler, you and I met yesterday and discussed briefly 

the breaking news about the 17 officers who were decertified from 

alert duty at Minot. For the committee, and we are going to reserve 

judgment until the DOD and Air Force has made their findings, 

but could you tell all of us generally what these officers’ responsibilities were and then what happened, to the best of your knowledge? 

General KEHLER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The nuclear-capable units 

have the highest standards and they undergo very, very difficult 

inspections. In those inspections, which are conducted by the Services, the inspectors look at a number of different categories of activities within one of these units. 

One of those categories—and each are graded separately—one of 

those categories is the performance of the missile operations crews. 

These are the crewmembers that man the underground launch control centers, essentially. They are very young. They are typically 

second lieutenants, first lieutenants, captains in some cases. And 

again, their standards are very high. 

During this particular inspection which, again, was an Air Force 

inspection, not a Strategic Command inspection, as I understand it, 

there were some performance issues with that piece of the overall 

inspection that dealt with the missile crewmembers themselves. 

Typically, that is written tests, by the way, or they take them into 

a simulator and they have them perform their paces in a simulator. 

I have taken many of those myself over the years. They are extremely difficult and filled with scenarios that you typically would 

not see in the real world, so to speak. 

This has my personal attention. Because it is a nuclear unit, I 

review the inspection results of all of the nuclear units, both in the 

Air Force and the Navy as they come across my desk. In some 

cases, the Strategic Command inspector general observes those. 

They did not observe this one, but in some cases they do observe 

these. 

And so each of these gets my personal attention. This one in particular has my personal attention. I have spoken with the commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, the parent unit that 

is involved here. I have gone back and I have looked at the inspection results—the nuclear inspection results of this particular unit 

over the last 3 or 4 years, all of which have been satisfactory, by 

the way. 

I have asked the Strategic Command inspector general to go review this specific inspection and the responses to it. I think the 

unit is moving aggressively. I think you saw that in some of the 

press reporting, the very aggressive steps being taken here for decertification of some of the crewmembers, et cetera. 

I believe they are working on getting to root cause. And as I sit 

here today, I don’t see anything that would cause me to lose confidence in that ability’s unit to perform the mission safely and effectively. So, I will continue to watch this very carefully. I know 
10 

the Air Force is digging into this very deliberately. But at this 

point, sir, I remain confident in that unit’s ability to perform its 

mission. 

I do think they reacted very aggressively to the mistakes that 

they saw. They don’t accept those mistakes. And at some level, I 

think what you are seeing here is a product of the increased scrutiny and the increased diligence that is going into these inspections 

and the responses to them. 

So, again, I would prefer to have a little bit more fidelity, I think, 

on what the Air Force will eventually discover here as they continue to dig for root causes. But today, I would be concerned if 

every unit had 100 percent passing. I think that would suggest to 

me that weren’t being tough enough in inspections. 

So, the fact that errors were made in an inspection in and of 

themselves doesn’t trouble me much. It is what are the root causes 

and what are the consequences. And again, sir, to date, I don’t see 

any reason to have less than full confidence in this unit. But we 

are going to continue to work with the Air Force on this, and I 

have in fact asked my inspector general to work with the Air Force 

to make sure that we have a complete picture. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. 

Secretary Creedon, the fiscal year 2014 budget request by the 

President asks for $75 million for the implementation of New 

START. But it is difficult for this committee to evaluate whether 

or not that money is needed, given that we are still waiting on the 

report from the fiscal year 2012 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] on how New START will be implemented. 

An example, some of the funding is for an environmental impact 

study that the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] imposed on 

the Air Force relative to shutting down squadrons or wings of our 

ICBMs. And we don’t really know if we should do that or not in 

the absence of this report. 

Can you give us some idea as to when we get that report? 

Secretary CREEDON. Excuse me, yes, sir. 

As you know, the New START treaty requires compliance with 

essential limits by February of 2018. The Department is on track 

now to ensure that the compliance with the treaty is achieved, and 

at the moment, it looks like compliance can be achieved with about 

a 6-month window to spare. 

So what is going on right now is looking at all of the various alternatives that are available to the Department for the various reductions. And each of the Services is now doing all of the necessary 

preliminary work that they would have to do. So that is where this 

money is going. They are doing engineering studies. They are doing 

the whole range of studies that would allow them to implement the 

various decisions when there is a decision. 

So, what we are doing is we are looking at when compliance has 

to be achieved. We are looking for the various—at the various options in the Services. And right now, the decision on what exactly 

that new force—the New START force structure will look like will 

be made at the end of this calendar year. And at that point, it will 

then be implemented in 2015, and that will then provide enough 

time. 
11 

So, we are trying to fully analyze all the options, provide enough 

flexibility to make sure that we have got the right decision and still 

come into compliance with New START in 2018. So it is not like 

we are doing nothing. There is actually a tremendous amount of 

work going on and preliminary work going on. But it is all preparatory for the actual decision. 

So, each Service is doing what they need to do. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, we appreciate your thoughtful preparation, 

but we want the Administration to understand that your compliance is going to require money. And this committee is not going to 

authorize money until we get the report. So, I would urge you to 

help us get that report so we can have some thoughtful deliberation as to what money we should provide. 

And with that, I will yield to my friend and colleague from Tennessee, the ranking member, Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the witnesses being here, and I appreciate your individual and collective expertise. I hate to ask the painful question 

about how sequestration will affect your work, but I think we need 

to hear from each one of you, assuming Congress doesn’t intervene 

and reduce the cuts, or even give you minimal flexibility, what impact that would have on your work. 

I noted in Dr. Winokur’s testimony, he was very specific, saying 

his travel budget would be cut 29 percent and your advisory and 

contract budget by 76 percent. I know it is hard to be that specific 

probably, but we need to know the impact of Congress on our current course, on your activities. 

So, Ms. Creedon, would you begin? 

Secretary CREEDON. Well, I will take that, sir, from a couple of 

different perspectives. One is just with respect to the Office of Policy, which I know there is usually not much discussion on, but the 

Office of Policy is also suffering dramatically from the sequestration cuts. 

And so initially, the impact to our workforce, which frankly has 

been under a hiring freeze for about 3 years now, and so as people 

leave, the existing workforce just continues to take on more work. 

We are looking at furloughs later this month. The exact number of 

days is still to be determined. 

We are also looking at severely constrained travel budgets, which 

means that the Department is not adequately, in some instances, 

representing itself in various national and international bilateral 

and multilateral dialogues. So, from a policy perspective, this is 

sort of the guts of what we do. And so this is having an impact. 

From the larger strategic perspective, we continue to worry about 

with respect to the implementation of all of the programs under the 

cognizance, particularly of, you know, just for me—for my Office of 

Space, Cyber, Nuclear Missile Defense and Nonproliferation, we 

worry about how the sequestration will impact all of those—from 

modernization to cyber to ensuring that we maintain our space assets in tip-top shape to provide the enablers that our Services need. 

So, we look at it across the board. 

Secretary CREEDON. Thank you. 

Mr. COOPER. General. 
12 

General KEHLER. Sir, in Strategic Command the—sequestration 

really has an impact in two dimensions. There is a human dimension to this, and then there is a readiness dimension to this. 

Let me start with the human dimension. Much like Ms. Creedon, 

our people are concerned about the budget uncertainty. The civilian 

workforce in particular—about 60 percent of my headquarters’ 

workforce is Government civilians. And so, they have been salarycapped, they have had a hiring freeze and now they are facing furloughs—the possibility of furloughs. 

What I have been saying here on Capitol Hill and elsewhere is, 

these are people who are willing to take risks for their country, but 

they are not willing perhaps to take financial risks for their families. And, so I am very concerned that as we go forward here, that 

damage has been done to our workforce in the human dimension 

that they will not forget. 

We have gotten some anecdotal information from some of our 

new hirees who have gone through our intern program, for example, who tell us that they will actively pursue careers elsewhere. 

That is disturbing. I can’t put a quantifiable number on that and 

tell you that the sky is falling as a result, but that troubles me. 

At the other end of the spectrum some of our people are telling 

us that they are—they could retire now, and maybe they will. So 

I—that is very disturbing to me. 

The second thing is readiness. The Services have had to implement drastic measures in their operations and maintenance budgets to get to the sequestration totals, even with the recovery that 

has been allowed in terms of flexibility in the budget for the remainder of this fiscal year, we don’t see that immediately because 

they have worked very hard to try to avoid those strategic force 

issues that STRATCOM deals with. 

But, this is much like an avalanche: Once it starts, it is inevitable that it will continue, and we will see readiness reductions as 

time passes here. You can’t go without flying hours the way the Air 

Force, for example, is having to do and not have that ultimately 

impact readiness, even while they are preserving as best they can, 

the flying hours that apply to STRATCOM’s missions. So we—I 

can’t take you to a unit today, and say, ‘‘That unit can’t perform 

its STRATCOM mission.’’ What I can show you though is that the 

steps that have been taken, the drastic steps by the Services, will 

in fact impact readiness in STRATCOM, we just haven’t seen it developed yet, but we will. 

Mr. COOPER. Ms. Miller. 

Ms. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. 

I of course echo my colleagues’ comments with regard to the 

human cost of this. I would add in two pieces that are particularly 

concerning to us in the NNSA in addition to the toll on our Federal 

workers. That would be people at the laboratories that we depend 

on. 

And I would say that—and here I have to confess as a former 

budget director for DOE, I have to roll the endless continuing resolution uncertainty into the misery of this. When you have people 

who are working and are building a career on expectation of a 

project—whether it is a scientific project, an engineering project, 

whatever the project is—constantly having the rug pulled out from 
13 

under them—as my colleagues say, people look elsewhere for a career. 

Yesterday morning, I—together with my colleague, Mr. 

Huizenga—met with people from one of our communities in one of 

the States. And, I have to say, I think the comments we heard— 

these were business leaders, presidents of chambers of commerce, 

small business owners—were frankly shocking at the effect this is 

already having on individuals who don’t actually work for us, but 

are connected to the community. 

So now having left—putting the people to one side for a moment, 

we have just finished talking about a program of work that we 

have worked diligently with all of us together in the nuclear security community to put us on a healthy path going forward for this 

stockpile, for the infrastructure, for force structure. 

These are projects that are, as everybody notes, very expensive 

projects. And the longer we are put into uncertainty, money is cut, 

the plans that you have laid for a project are completely thrown 

out the window. It should come as certainly no surprise to anyone, 

this will not only undercut the view that the stockpile is healthy 

in the long run, but it will undercut the cost that we are quoting 

today as soon as we say it, it is probably not true anymore, because 

people who have been counting on a certain amount of money just 

don’t have it. So that is of concern in many directions. 

Mr. COOPER. Dr. Harvey. 

Dr. HARVEY. The Nuclear Weapons Council is about to—at the 

request of the Congress—issue a document, a letter reaffirming 

that the Nuclear Weapons Council believes that the President’s 

budget will, if funded, will meet the Department of Defense’s requirements for nuclear—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Harvey will you pull the microphone closer to 

your mouth, please? 

Dr. HARVEY [continuing]. Will reaffirm that the President’s fiscal 

year 2014 request will meet the Department of Defense’s modernization requirements and needs at acceptable risk. 

Sequestration is not factored into that assessment. Any activity 

in sequestration that would delay or slow down a life extension 

program, or that would delay or slow down activities under way to 

restore an infrastructure that will enable—that carries out the 

work on those life extension programs would be of concern and 

would introduce additional risk into our assessment. 

And, that is basically what I would say on that. 

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Huizenga. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Yeah, I would like to echo what Administrator 

Miller said. We have direct impacts on our program. Several thousand of our contractor employees and workforce are currently either being—have been laid off or on furlough. So the—we have 

these direct impacts to those folks and their families, and equally 

importantly we are slowing down our cleanup mission. So it is important for us—and I appreciate the committee approving our reprogramming. We are trying to mitigate the impacts of the sequestration and the continuing resolution through this reprogramming 

effort. But, the bottom line is, things are slowing down. 

Mr. COOPER. Dr. Winokur. 
14 

Dr. WINOKUR. Well, to put this in context to the board, we are 

two-tenths of 1 percent of DOE’s budget in the defense nuclear 

area that we oversee, so obviously these cutbacks are important to 

us. 

You mentioned travel. We are going down by 29 percent. There 

are no defense nuclear facilities in Washington, D.C., so when we 

can’t travel it has an important impact on us. 

In the contract area, I mentioned in my spoken testimony, we 

hired very specialized people to do concrete work, structural work, 

different kinds of analysis for us, and we are not gonna have them, 

but it also represents an opportunity cost for us. Things come up 

all the time. The board, to some extent, is reactive. There may be 

leaking tanks at Hanford where we need to form teams. There may 

be redesigns at the uranium processing facility or the uranium capabilities replacement project where we have to form new teams. 

We found out recently that public hearings have been incredibly 

beneficial to us in terms of focusing issues through the Department, and resolving issues and defining a path forward. So there 

is a lot of opportunity cost we won’t have as our budget is cut, and 

that is gonna make it difficult for us to provide the kind of oversight we would like to provide. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I see that my time has 

expired. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes the 

gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank all of 

you for being here. 

General Kehler, if I could go to you first sir. First let me just 

thank you for your service, the assets and the command that you 

oversee are vital to—not only to deterrence—to capability of this 

country, but it is a stabilizing force in the world, and I am grateful 

that such a profound responsibility rests upon the shoulders of 

someone as committed to human freedom and the cause of America 

in general, as you are, sir. 

Let me, if I could, just suggest that all of us are interested in 

making sure that our network and energy infrastructure is positioned to respond and recover if we are ever faced with an attack 

on our homeland. And in your testimony, you say we must, ‘‘Continue to improve the protection and resilience of our networks.’’ 

And I certainly agree with you completely. 

Can you outline for us the significance of these networks and 

communication systems to the work that you do every day for our 

Nation, and perhaps specifically discuss what improvements you 

think need to happen now and what protections we need in the future to stay ahead of our enemies? 

And please share with us the efforts STRATCOM is making to 

prevent effects of whether it is an enemy intrusion or cascading 

grid collapse or EMP [Electromagnetic Pulse] or GMD [Geomagnetic Disturbance] concerns or just natural disasters in general. 

That is a lot to take in, but just the security of our networks in 

general, and the importance of what they do and what we are 

doing to make them impervious to some of these things. 
15 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. First of all, the network is our central 

nervous system for the entire military establishment. We use our 

military in ways unlike any other military in the world gets used, 

and that is because we are able to network ourselves. We are able 

to surveil parts of the planet from space and network that information back to our forces. We are able to operate in smaller contingents forward that can act like a larger force, because they are 

networked together. So, the networks are critically important to us, 

and really—it is a trite way to say it, but it really enables the 

American way of warfare. 

As a result of that, of course, potential adversaries are looking 

for ways to find vulnerabilities in that network and disrupt our 

ability to do the things with the network that we do today. So, I 

am charged, as part of my responsibilities, along with our sub-unified command, U.S. Cyber Command, to protect all of those networks. Some of them are especially critical to today’s subject, the 

nuclear command and control system for example, which as Dr. 

Harvey described, links the President and his authorities to the nuclear forces. 

So we have undertaken a series of reviews, to take a hard look 

at various parts of our network while we are moving with U.S. 

Cyber Command to put in place better protective measures today. 

We have looked individually at many portions of our networks. We 

have begun a more comprehensive end-to-end review of our networks, and I can tell you that in places where we find 

vulnerabilities, we address those as quickly as we can. I think that 

the nuclear command and control system today, I am very confident that that system is resilient and resistant to the kinds of 

network intrusions that we might see in our administrative networks, for example, where we know that we have some significant 

issues to go address. 

But we are addressing all of these. The network disruptions that 

we might see take a lot of forms as you described. Electromagnetic 

pulse and people view that as a Cold War relic. It is not a Cold 

War relic; it is a potential that we could face in the future. And 

we have got to make sure that in our most critical networks that 

we are capable of operating through them. So this is a combination 

of engineering, it is a combination of information assurance, steps 

that we take for tactics, techniques, and procedures. It is a matter 

of encryption, and encoding. It is a matter of full range that we can 

bring to bear while we continue to dig to make sure with red teams 

and elsewhere, that we understand what our own vulnerabilities 

are. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, General. I am glad you are on the 

job. 

Ms. Miller, I might direct my last question to you. The fiscal year 

2013 enacted levels funded infrastructure, energy, security, and energy restoration programs at approximately $6 million in fiscal 

year 2013. The fiscal year 2014 President’s budget requests $16 

million, and if you can explain to me what this program does—and 

all of us. And why it got this increase in funding, and what that 

is used for? Is that used for any things that the General just described? 
16 

Ms. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Franks. Unfortunately, I believe 

that activity that you are talking about is funded within the greater Department of Energy, that is an energy program. And while I 

might have been able to answer it a few years ago while I was still 

the agency’s budget director, I am afraid it is out of the NNSA, and 

I am not aware of it. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, would there be anyone on the committee that could—or the panel that could answer a question about 

the infrastructure security and energy restoration programs? 

Mr. ROGERS. No. 

Ms. MILLER. No, we can—— 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. 

Ms. MILLER [continuing]. We can certainly send it back to the 

Department and get that answered for you though, for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 139.] 

Mr. FRANKS. That would be great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Veasey, for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to direct my questions to General Kehler and Secretary 

Creedon about START. And does New START remain in U.S. interests? And why, if you could elaborate on that? 

Secretary CREEDON. It does, very much so. We know that Russia 

is modernizing its nuclear forces. And as we look into the future, 

it is very important that we maintain a—very much of a strategic 

balance with Russia. So, what New START does, is New START 

ensures that there is a clear, verifiable, identifiable cap on all of 

the delivery systems, and all of the deployed strategic warheads. 

So as we look into the future, having this cap, having this ability 

to understand through the verification methodologies of the treaty, 

not only what, but how much Russia is doing, is extraordinarily important to maintaining the strategic stability. So it absolutely does 

remain in our interests in the long term. 

Mr. VEASEY. General. 

General KEHLER. And, sir, from my perspective, from a military 

perspective, reducing the potential threat in a way that is 

verifiable and stable is a very good thing from my perspective, and 

is certainly in our national interest. 

Mr. VEASEY. What would be the risk of limiting funding for fiscal 

year 2014? 

Secretary CREEDON. Well, one of the immediate impacts is the 

Services would stop their planning, and their planning efforts now 

are what are going to enable us to come into compliance with the 

treaty. So if we don’t have the planning efforts that set us up for 

the situation of not being in compliance with the treaty, that would 

be frankly a very bad thing. The U.S. has really focused on maintaining its ability to comply with these treaties. 

The flip side is it might do damage to how the Russians feel 

about this as well, and as the committee is very much aware, having the ability and having the verification methodologies and the 

inspection regimes under this treaty is hugely important to our 
17 

knowledge of what the Russian—of what Russia is doing with respect to its strategic modernization program. 

So you know we need to continue to plan. We need to continue 

to shape the environment to allow us to come into compliance, and 

without this money, frankly we have come to a screeching halt. 

Mr. VEASEY. Could further nuclear weapons reductions increase 

U.S. security? 

Secretary CREEDON. That is actually something that we are looking at right now. But it is not an issue that is resolved yet. So it 

depends on what the global strategic environment looks like. It depends on what new guidance is issued. But we believe there is an 

opportunity for future reductions. Exactly the how, and the numbers, and the context, is something that we still need to work on. 

And I—let me just make one clarification of the statement with respect to the funding for New START. 

I mean some of this money also goes to the whole inspection regime. And both sides, both the U.S. and Russia have taken full advantage of their annual inspections. So even funding these inspections is hugely important to our knowledge. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. And I appreciate the fact that things will come to 

a grinding halt if you don’t get the money. So please get us the report so we can try to provide you the money. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. 

Nugent, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And continuing along the New START discussion, and this is directed to General Kehler, you know I have some questions about 

the reduction, the number of nuclear warheads under the New 

START treaty, and potentially the reductions beyond the treaty. 

But which has a bigger impact on our ability to maintain a credible 

deterrence? Reductions in warheads? Or reductions in delivery vehicles? And why? 

General KEHLER. Sir, let me take your question on this way, and 

if I am not on the mark, correct me to 100 percent, please. But let 

me start with, we base our force numbers on a strategy. And so, 

we don’t start with numbers, we start with a strategy. And so 

under the New START ceilings, we are capable of meeting our deterrence needs today, the objectives that are levied on us for deterrence and for objectives if deterrence fails. And so that is a mixture 

of ways we do that. 

One is an overall warhead number, and then there is a question 

about how we would configure our force in order to deliver those 

warheads. What is best for us in terms of the proper blend of survivability, flexibility, and responsiveness. And so, when you say 

what is most important or what is the best way to go forward? 

What I would say is, my contention remains that certainly at the 

New START level, we would want to retain a balanced triad of 

some kind. So that shapes the number of and types of delivery vehicles that we would have. 

Beyond that, in terms of opportunities that might arise in the future for further reductions, I would continue to argue that that 

would be based on a strategy, a strategic approach. And then we 
18 

would have to find the right blend of numbers of warheads and the 

delivery systems that keep that mixture of survivability, flexibility, 

and responsiveness. 

I am not sure I got at your question, though, sir. 

Mr. NUGENT. I think you did partially. It—the question obviously 

was, you know is there a particular—and you—I think you hit on 

it, there is a blend between the number of warheads and the number of delivery vehicles—and I don’t expect you to give me a specific answer at this point in time. But I want to make sure that, 

you know, for our allies, that they perceive that we are also looking 

out for them in regards to how we protect—or project. 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir, I clearly understand what you are saying now. And yeah, I couldn’t agree more. Really, the role of these 

weapons today is deterrence and assurance. We assure our allies 

though our ability to provide extended deterrence. We demonstrated some of that here over the last month, as a matter of 

fact, in our exercises. 

And certainly I can allow Ms. Creedon to step into the policy 

world here, but our responsibility is to be able to provide the President with forces and options that can both deter adversaries and 

assure allies. And that factors into the mixture of forces, the types 

of delivery vehicles, that we would want to retain. 

Mr. NUGENT. And General, you hit on the triad, I think, which 

is an important part of our nuclear deterrence. But last year, there 

was a SLEP [Service Life Extension Program] in the scheduled 

number of Ohio class replacement submarines, that we are only 

going to have 10 of those operational ballistic missile submarines 

for much of the 2030s. Is that number of submarines sufficient to 

keep that triad in place? 

General KEHLER. Sir, I believe that number is certainly sufficient 

to keep the triad in place. I think the ultimate number of submarines that we procure is still an open question. I think you are 

referring to an issue about how do we manage the transition from 

the current Ohio class to the new submarine? And that is a time 

period that we are going to have to watch very carefully, which I 

would suggest argues for why you want to have a viable triad if 

in fact we are going to put fewer submarines at sea, then we would 

like to be able to compensate for that in other ways. 

But we are still in a time period here where that transition we 

are looking at very carefully to see if we can manage that differently. 

Mr. NUGENT. Does that number of submarines meet 

STRATCOM’s need? 

General KEHLER. Well, the need that we put on the table was for 

12. And it remains to be seen—the biggest issue right now, from 

my perspective, is commit to a submarine, a replacement submarine for Ohio. We will get to a date-certain that the current 

class of Ohio submarines, due I am told by the Navy, due to metallurgy issues, we will have to retire them. And so, it is important 

for us to commit to the program. I think you have a lot of time here 

to decide how many submarines we eventually deploy. 

Mr. NUGENT. All right. I appreciate it. And I want to thank this 

panel for being here today to answer our questions. 

And with that, I yield back. 
19 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Carson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Miller, does the NNSA have sufficient funding for weapons activity in fiscal year 2014 in the budget request? 

Ms. MILLER. Yes, Mr. Carson. The President’s budget adequately 

funds all of the activities that we need to fund through the weapons activities account, including defense programs and the programs that we have to meet the requirements for the Department 

of Defense. 

Mr. CARSON. Yes, ma’am. 

General Kehler, many of our most vocal nuclear reduction advocates have essentially argued that we could reduce our nuclear 

stockpile below the level set in the New START Treaty while maintaining a sufficient deterrent. 

How closely aligned do we need to stay with Russian stockpile 

numbers to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent? And how do 

you believe that there is any likelihood that Russia might similarly 

make a unilateral reduction in its stockpile below the level set in 

the New START Treaty? 

General KEHLER. Sir, I will defer the second part of the question 

about the likelihood of Russia to Ms. Creedon, if that is okay with 

you. 

On the former question about how many weapons we think we 

need for deterrence and assurance, again, I would go back to this 

has to do with the strategy. And eventually, a strategy resolves 

itself into a set of military tasks that STRATCOM is asked to perform with those weapons if the need should ever arise. 

That is what drives the size of the force. And today, we can accomplish our objectives with the New START force. We are above 

that level right now. We are on our way down to that level. That 

will take another several years, as you heard just a moment ago. 

But we are on our way to that number. 

Beyond that, I think STRATCOM has been participating in a series of reviews to take a look at what a future arms control structure might look like based upon various strategic approaches. In 

my view, we have had a very successful way to do this in the past. 

It has been—we have done it with the Russians, we have done it 

in a verifiable way, and that has resulted in, I think, increased stability for all of us. 

And because of that, I think, like the nuclear posture review 

said, that it is important for us to not have exact numeric parity 

with the Russians. But I think we need to have relative approximation of that parity with them. Parity is, a lot of different features 

to parity. One is technical capability or capacity as well. But I 

think that like the nuclear posture review suggested, that having 

some rough parity with them, although it doesn’t have to be exact, 

I think that is still a good way to go forward. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Lamborn, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
20 

Secretary Creedon and Dr. Harvey, I understand that DOD’s 

Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office, or CAPE, has 

been tasked with carrying out an assessment of the potential savings, risks, and hedges that would be involved in moving from our 

nuclear triad to a nuclear dyad. Basically, this would be assessing 

the impacts of eliminating one leg of our triad. 

Can you confirm that CAPE has been tasked with conducting 

this analysis? 

Secretary CREEDON. Sir, as both the Secretary and the Deputy 

Secretary have announced, the Department is going through an exercise to look at what the potential effects of further reductions 

would be on the Department. So it is a broad-ranging, far-reaching 

review of any number of different options. 

And so, CAPE has not been tasked to do a specific thing, you 

know, in the sense of reduce here, don’t reduce there. It is more 

of an across-the-board exercise with different teams and different 

categories, looking at a huge variety of different options. 

And so, in any one of these exercises you tend to want to put options on the table that range from little to great big and dramatic. 

And so, in each of these teams, they are putting on the table options that are little to really dramatic. And what the end result of 

this will be is still to be determined. 

And in the end, the Secretary is going to have to make the decision. But this whole exercise is really trying to wrestle with how 

bad would certain levels of cuts impact the Department. So you 

know, this would be something that they would assess in the range 

from little to really substantial. 

Mr. LAMBORN. So that would be one of the options that the team 

is going to look at? Is that what you are confirming to me? 

Secretary CREEDON. No, sir, I am not actually confirming that. 

But what I am trying to say is that wouldn’t be out of the realm 

of possibilities. So I mean if you look at something really little, and 

you look at something really big, reducing one of the legs of the 

triad would be something that would be really big. 

So it would be—I am going to say something that is going to 

sound strange—it would be a reasonable option to look at, even 

though it is completely contrary to the Department’s policy and to 

the NPR [Nuclear Posture Review], which says maintain a triad. 

So when you do one of these exercises, you have to look at ways 

I think that are uncomfortable and that are awkward and that are 

not even consistent with policy. But to really put everything on the 

table, this is the sort of exercise that the Department goes through. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I am concerned that there might be some 

folks who are philosophically in tune with that kind of decision. I 

mean, I am totally opposed to that, and I imagine most of us here 

are. So I don’t even see the value of going into a place that is so 

far removed from what common sense should dictate that we do. 

Secretary CREEDON. And though that is in fact the policy of the 

Department, one of the sad situations now that the Department 

faces with the looming cuts, with sequestration, with possible cuts, 

we are in fact going through an exercise that looks at things that 

nobody wants to do. And that is just the reality of the fiscal constraints that are put on the Department right now. 
21 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I am just going to be on guard for someone 

using the excuse of budget cuts to do things that are really bad policy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Garamendi, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

Perhaps it is opportune that I get to follow my colleague on that 

question. I think the major point is that we ought not be ignorant 

of all of our options, and we ought to be studying do we really need 

a triad for deterrence against whom. 

And so we ought to know those things, and I would encourage 

the Department of Defense to continue to study and to provide the 

Congress with a set of options—full set of options—triad, duad— 

and tell us as best you can what the implications are for a dual 

deterrence rather than a triad—or maybe we do need a triad. 

Let us understand that it is extraordinarily expensive. All of the 

nuclear weapons that are in the current stockpile, the life extension program of all of those, do we need all of those? Do we need— 

what number of each of the various kinds of weapons that are 

available and the delivery systems and, as the general said, the 

strategy or the strategic interests, and then from there comes the 

result. 

But I don’t want to be ignorant. I want to have as much information as I possibly can and to have the wisdom of options that have 

been thought through by the various and the best thinkers that are 

in the military and in the diplomatic arena. So Mr. Lamborn, let 

us have information. 

With regard to specific information, I have some very serious 

questions about the plutonium stockpile that we have and the disposition of the plutonium stockpile. So Ms. Miller, perhaps this is 

in your domain. There is a—in the President’s budget some 

changes as to the disposition of the plutonium stockpile. 

Could you explain the Administration’s position with regard to 

that, and specifically as it relates to the budget proposed by the 

President. 

Ms. MILLER. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi. I think you are 

probably referring to the program to disposition 34 metric tons that 

was declared in 2000 to be excess of our weapons needs. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. That is correct. 

Ms. MILLER. The program of record to disposition that material 

in the United States has been to—this is a program we were involved with in a treaty with Russia. They have declared similar 

amounts. Same amount excess on their side. We all agreed to disposition. 

The program of record in the United States has been to fashion 

that plutonium into mixed oxide fuel to be burned in a nuclear reactor to provide energy. This entails the construction of a couple of 

facilities, the largest of which is the mixed oxide—mixed oxide fuel 

in the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility in Savannah River, South 

Carolina. 

And the budget, as you indicated, does, for 2014, does show a 

strong change in that. That program, as I am sure you are aware, 
22 

is a very costly program and unfortunately has only grown more 

costly over time. And in an echo of everything I think my colleagues and I have been talking about this morning, the budget situation we find ourselves in has required us to take a second look 

at everything that we have got on the table. And that is what the 

budget is doing. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I really need to get into this in great detail. I 

know Mr. Wilson at the other end of this dais is very interested 

in it. Is there a customer for the mixed oxide fuel—for the oxide 

fuel that is supposed to be produced by this facility? 

Ms. MILLER. There are no signed contracts of customers currently. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Are there alternative ways of disposing of the— 

or handling the plutonium stockpile? 

Ms. MILLER. There may be, and that is what the budget declared 

is that we are taking a pause in the construction of that facility 

now that we are facing essentially double the cost of—just for construction—than we had expected. We are going to spend the coming year looking to see whether there are options, what are the options, including the current option, and what makes the best sense 

for the budget and for this program going forward. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So you would be considering options such as 

the—turning the plutonium into a metal fuel? 

Ms. MILLER. I think we are going to keep all options that will 

allow us to both obviously safely and securely disposition that material and, under the terms of the treaty, meet the requirements 

that we have agreed to. We will be looking at all options. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, my time is expired. But much more discussion needs to be spent on this, and I am sure Mr. Wilson would 

agree that we need to really look at this whole thing in great detail. I yield back what is no time left. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes the 

gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Fleming, for 5 minutes. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And General Kehler, great to see you again. Thank you for what 

you are doing for Strategic Command, Air Force, and certainly 

Global Strike Command, which is headquartered in my district. 

I want to revisit a subject that we have talked about before. That 

is weapon storage areas, the WSAs. And I know in last year’s 

NDAA, the committee encouraged a relook into the WSAs with cost 

estimates on recertification. 

You indicated earlier this year that you had recently met with 

General Kowalski, commander of Global Strike, to discuss nuclear 

security and future WSA analyses. When should the committee expect to see a STRATCOM report assessing our Nation’s nuclear 

weapons storage areas with cost estimates for recertification? 

General KEHLER. Sir, I will have to get that for the record. I 

don’t know off the top of my head. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 140.] 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay. The reason why I reflect upon this, of 

course, is from the Schlesinger’s report and other things that have 

followed on, it is important that we at least to some degree decentralize our nuclear weapons that are ready for delivery. And having 
23 

them all in one location as we do with the bomber fleet, obviously 

makes it a little bit easier solution to problems of our potential adversaries. 

But on the other hand, I recognize there is cost to recertifying 

more WSAs. But as I understand it, there may be some better technologies going forward that may make this a less expensive choice. 

So I thank you for that. 

Let’s revisit—this is for General Kehler and also Secretary 

Creedon. Let’s revisit the nuclear triad we were talking just a moment ago. You know, a report just came out that $26 billion was 

spent over the last 4 years or so for green energy. And if you look 

at the yield of jobs, it comes to $11.45 million per green job created. 

To me, that is not a very good investment. On the other hand, 

since 1945, our strategy of peace through strength with nuclear deterrence, nuclear assurance, to me has been the best investment 

that we have ever had. We have prevented another nuclear war, 

another world war, if you will. 

And talk that we are beginning to hear that we may unilaterally 

go down to zero nuclear capability or take a triad down to two legs 

or one leg of the stool I think makes us a little worried. And I have 

spoken to experts in SCIFs [Sensitive Compartmented Information 

Facility] offline about this, and they agree that anything that we 

do to take this from a three-legged stool to a two or a one really 

solves the calculations and the strategy of our potential foes, and 

that it would be a very bad idea to do that. So not only should we 

have a nuclear triad, but we should make sure that all three legs 

are strong. So I would like to hear from both of you where you 

stand on the nuclear triad, its importance. 

We look at some investments in the future. The long-range strike 

bomber, which at its earliest won’t roll off the assembly line for another 12 to 15 years. What is your belief and what is your feeling 

based on your discussions, your research? 

Secretary CREEDON. Let me take this from a policy perspective, 

and then General Kehler—— 

Dr. FLEMING. Could you get a little closer to the mic? 

Secretary CREEDON. Sorry. From a policy perspective, and then 

General Kehler can look at it from an operational implementation. 

So from a policy perspective, I couldn’t agree with you more. 

I mean, a triad is what we absolutely need. It is what the nuclear posture review says, and it is what is fully funded in the 

President’s budget request for fiscal year 2014. 

There are modernization programs in place for every one of the 

delivery platforms that we have right now. The one exception is the 

Minuteman III, under which the Air Force is still looking at an 

analysis of alternatives because that is the one that we have a little bit of luxury of time to when we actually have to have a new 

system in place. But from a policy perspective, that is the policy. 

That is the strategy, is to maintain a triad. And we have not 

changed that. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay. Thank you. 

General KEHLER. And from a military standpoint, Congressman, 

I continue to support a triad. It does in fact provide the best blend 

of survivability and flexibility and responsiveness. Those are mili-
24 

tary attributes that are not only beneficial to us, but typically very 

difficult for an adversary to overcome. 

I would add that we don’t talk about this as much, but it is 

equally important, that is the command and control system that 

links the President to it. There are some deficiencies there as well 

that we are also addressing in the budget. And I would be quick 

to point out that the final piece of this is the work that the Department of Energy and NNSA do for us in the stockpile, which is 

equally critical. 

And so, all of these pieces together I think have come to a place 

where they require investment at a very difficult time for investment. And the program that we have put together, many of us at 

the table have worked pretty hard over the last year to try to come 

up with an implementation plan that goes with the strategy for a 

way forward. And I think that we are laying it here. 

The question will be as we go forward: what will the outcome be? 

And I think that that is a significant question for all of us. But I 

continue to support the triad as a matter of best military advice. 

Dr. FLEMING. Well, I thank you, as I yield back, and just to add 

onto that is simply that in a world in which more nations, not 

fewer, are putting together their nuclear weapons infrastructure, 

and potential foes are modernizing theirs, this is not a time to diminish ours. 

I thank you and yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, 

Mr. Wilson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here. 

And Ms. Miller, Mr. Huizenga, I appreciate you met with representatives, community leaders—and Ms. Miller, you referenced 

it—from North Augusta, from Aiken, from Barnwell, from Augusta, 

Columbia County—really significant community leaders from 

South Carolina and Georgia who felt like it was a very productive 

meeting. So, thank you for that, and staying in touch. 

And Mr. Huizenga, I particularly appreciate your office working 

to get the currently impacted employees at the Savannah River 

Site back to work. I know that you and your staff have been diligent in this endeavor, and I greatly appreciate you addressing the 

20-percent pay reduction, while promoting national security. 

One thing has become very clear during the reprogramming, and 

that is that we need a budget, not another continuing resolution for 

2014. After analyzing the President’s proposed budget, I have a 

couple of questions, Mr. Huizenga, and that is, first, I was pleased 

to see that the site risk reduction and management operations line 

for SRS [Savannah River Site] was increased by approximately $90 

million over last year’s CR [Continuing Resolution]. 

Given the important missions of this line item, such as downblending of highly enriched uranium and preparing plutonium as 

feedstock for the mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility, I believe the 

increase is fully justified. However, I am concerned as to why the 

Department would fund these operations and then reduce the radioactive liquid tank waste stabilization and disposal line item, 
25 

which funds the tanks that receive the canyon’s waste streams, by 

almost $200 million. 

Concerns have been brought to me that the tanks will not have 

adequate funding to receive the waste streams created by the results of the work that will be undertaken at H Canyon and HB 

Line if they are funded at the President’s proposed level. 

Moreover, it is, to the best of my knowledge, that one of the H 

Canyon’s major missions for fiscal year 2014 will be to prepare plutonium for the MOX facility. With the President’s suggestion to 

fund MOX at a lower level for fiscal year 2014 and possibly abandon it altogether in the outyears while new alternatives are being 

studied, I would like to know the rationale behind adequately funding the canyon, then slashing both its waste stream and recipient 

in the program that much of the work would be going toward. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Thank you, Congressman. I can assure you that 

that biomass facility that we commissioned down at the site is still 

efficiently and effectively producing steam and electricity. 

Mr. WILSON. And the world should know about Ameresco and 

that success story, so please let everyone know. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Thank you. 

Relative to the H Canyon and the high-level waste facilities, I 

can tell you I spent a fair amount of time talking with the people 

at the site to try to understand this issue myself. The bottom line 

is the budget caps in the 050 account this year made us have to 

look across the complex and make some tough choices. 

And I think we have come up with a balanced approach at the 

moment which allows us to run the H Canyon, to support the nonproliferation mission of blending down HEU and also supporting 

the MOX feed, and at the same time run the liquid waste campaign. I know that they are looking to provide some additional efficiencies, and I don’t want to deny the fact that there are some challenges there. And over the next few months, we are going to have 

to continue to work with them to make sure that we don’t have, 

you know, one part of the facility operating and the other not being 

able to support it. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, thank you very much. 

Ms. Miller, I enjoy working with Congressman Garamendi on different issues such as SMRs—small modular reactors. I want you 

all to have a good attitude on that. And—but in regard to the 

mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility, this does—it is very important 

for us to comply with the nonproliferation agreement with the Russian Federation, and additionally the environmental significance of 

this. 

And in regard to contracts, in the trade, it is not uncommon for 

contracts not to be signed until late in the process. And there are 

customers for the fuel that I believe should be produced. But I am 

concerned that alternatives—what are the alternatives? And why 

weren’t—and in consideration of other alternatives, why was MOX 

chosen in the first place? 

Ms. MILLER. So, let me, if I can, Congressman, take the second 

part of your question first. 

MOX was chosen as a way to get agreement with the Russians 

when this document or the treaty was originally signed, because at 

the time, the two major pathways for this plutonium, for the dis-
26 

position of it that we looked at, was the creation of MOX, of mixedoxide fuel, or the immobilization of this plutonium in some sort of 

materials—ceramic or glass, but immobilization and then disposal 

in the ground. 

The Russians felt very strongly that the material had an energy 

value to it that they were not willing to just bury. So, that concern 

that we work together with the Russians on the same approach, 

which we thought at the time might be more cost-effective and be 

a better way of going forward, led the United States to go the MOX 

route as well. 

As I think you know, the Russians made some changes in their 

approach over the years. They are still making a mixed oxide fuel, 

but no longer for light water reactors. Our plant and program were 

meant for light water reactors. And of course, we have seen stops 

and starts on the Russian side. 

So, the answer to that second part. 

On the first part of what the alternatives are that are being 

looked at, I think we are talking still in the same general direction, 

in addition to continuing to look at the option that we are pursuing, which is MOX. We will look at other—at ways to immobilize 

the material and disposition it in a way, as I said before, that still 

meets the requirements of the treaty obligation, but if it can be 

done in a less expensive way, we need to understand that. 

Mr. WILSON. And I look forward to working with you on that. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes himself for a second round of questions. 

Oh, Mr. Johnson has come in. I recognize him for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. 

General Kehler, multiple provisions of the House version of last 

year’s National Defense Authorization Act would have constrained 

and even blocked the Pentagon’s ability to implement the reductions required by the New START treaty. What would be the consequences for U.S. national security if the United States’ implementation of the treaty were to cease? And also, how would Russia 

react? 

General KEHLER. Sir, if I could sort of take the military part of 

that first, and then Ms. Creedon might be better able to handle the 

policy part. 

Our belief is that we should continue with our preparatory actions and be allowed to continue with sizing the force to get to the 

New START limits. It is a signed, ratified treaty, and our concern 

is always that we don’t find ourselves in the position where we are 

the reason for why we don’t meet an implementation date that the 

Nation has signed up to. So, in my view, we need to continue to 

go forward. 

Now, all the decisions on force structure and how we are going 

to do that aren’t yet made. And, so as Ms. Creedon described earlier, there are some open questions yet about how we intend to 

structure the force, but preliminary steps are under way by both 

the Air Force and the Navy. There are things that we are doing 

today to get down to the New START Treaty levels, and we intend 
27 

to do that in compliance with what the Congress has told us we 

have to comply with. 

Secretary CREEDON. And from a policy perspective it is—this 

treaty is very important, because among other things it allows us 

to maintain a strategic balance with Russia. So as the policy has 

said, absolute parity is not essential, so 100 and 100 is not necessarily essential, big disparities would have a substantial impact 

on our stability relations with Russia. 

And, right now, between the U.S. and Russia, the two of us still 

have by far and away the bulk of the nuclear weapons in the world. 

So ensuring the transparency, ensuring the bilateral reductions, 

ensuring that we go forward in this together hand in hand is important. This treaty also allows us transparency, verification that 

we wouldn’t have without this treaty, which is hugely important so 

that we understand what Russia’s doing. So there are many aspects of this treaty that really are absolutely essential. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Most experts agree that national defense spending is slated to decrease below the initial $487 billion reduction scheduled to be 

implemented over the next decade with or without sequestration. 

If the Air Force acquires a new ICBM, procurement would likely 

begin in fiscal year 2025, and would overlap—according to current 

plans with the Navy’s SSBN(X) [Ohio class replacement ballisticmissile submarine] program and also the Air Force’s new longrange strike bomber program—is it affordable or desirable to attempt to replace all three legs of the triad at the same time? 

And this would be for any of you who choose to respond. 

Secretary CREEDON. Well, first let me just agree with you that 

this is expensive, but we have a situation where, given the various 

platforms and how they age out, we don’t have much of a choice 

with respect to the metallurgy, the physics, just the natural aging 

of these platforms. 

So they have been—many of them—extended over time, but 

there is a physical factor. On the other hand, it is expensive. Being 

a nuclear power is very expensive. And, you know, at the risk of 

stating the obvious, this is an expensive venture. I mean, being a 

nuclear power is an expensive venture. We are prioritizing as an 

administration, the maintenance, the safety, the security of our nuclear enterprise, but it is expensive. 

Dr. HARVEY. It is clear that we are facing a modernization mountain in the budget in the period of time in the next decade—in the 

mid-part of the next decade. And, we are thinking very hard about 

how to manage that and stay within what we might consider to be 

affordable levels. 

It so happens that the last modernization cycle we did for our 

nuclear platforms was in the 1980s, and those platforms have been 

life extended for significant periods in addition, but it is not surprising that this modernization cusp will be hitting us in the next 

decade. We need to be prepared for it. We need to manage it. And 

it is going to be a major challenge. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes himself for a second round of questions. 
28 

The B61 [tactical thermonuclear gravity bomb] life extension program is very important to this subcommittee, and as you all know, 

it is perhaps the most complex direct work on a U.S. nuclear weapon in over 25 years. But, before approving the B61 life extension 

program to enter engineering development, the Nuclear Weapons 

Council made a decision to forgo an option known as triple-alt that 

would have replaced three components, but left the rest of the 

bomb alone. 

For General Kehler and Dr. Harvey, why did the NWC forgo triple-alt option? 

And would it have met the DOD’s threshold requirements? 

Dr. Harvey first. 

Dr. HARVEY. The triple-alt option would have replaced the—you 

say—three components of the B61, the radar which is a 40- to 45- 

year-old system that still employs vacuum tube technology, the 

neutron generators, and the power supplies for the warhead. One 

of the options considered in our phase II study was the triple-alt. 

And, we decided—we took a considered decision and reviewed that 

decision late in 2011 and decided that it was not prudent to go forward with the triple-alt, because, number one, it did not meet military requirements as established, and there were some other reasons in addition not to go forward. 

It would have foreclosed our ability to manage the size of the 

stockpile and the numbers and types in the stockpile by being able 

to consolidate four weapons types—three nonstrategic and one strategic—into one weapons type, which we are determining the B61– 

12. And, it would have had other impacts in addition. 

Number two, we would have to basically revisit a life extension 

program some time in the next decade, possibly earlier, to basically 

fix the things that we didn’t fix in the triple-alt, which would 

have—doing two things separately is not less expensive than doing 

two things together at the same time. 

One final point is that the B61 current system, the current bomb, 

is not compatible with the joint strike fighter or the upgraded B– 

2 digital interface, and so we would have had to continue to deploy 

this system with existing dual-capable aircraft which would introduce additional costs for extending the life of those aircraft. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Kehler. 

General KEHLER. Sir, I would just add that additional technical 

issues arose after the triple-alt proposal was put on the table, and 

those were hinted at when we discussed the triple-alt, and since 

that time, I think the labs, Sandia in particular, have come back 

with some additional concerns that from an operational requirement standpoint will have to be addressed. 

So triple-alt no longer does what is sufficient to cover basically 

the threshold requirements that we thought we had when triplealt was put together. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay, Administrator Miller, over the long term, 

would triple-alt resolve all reliability concerns in the B61, and is 

there anything in the triple-alt that would not address that would 

present weapon reliability concerns in the 2020s? 

Ms. MILLER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, there are electronic systems in 

the warhead—the details of which are classified—but that are in 

an ongoing way exposed to radiation. And from a material stand-
29 

point, we would have to go back and do a full life extension of the 

weapon, as I think my colleagues have indicated, within 10 years. 

And so that option, frankly, after much discussion in the Nuclear 

Weapons Council where many people were very interesting in a 

less expensive option than the one we ultimately selected, we determined we would be penny-wise and very pound-foolish—not to 

mention the problem with meeting requirements as General Kehler 

has indicated. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Kehler, when you appeared before the full 

committee earlier this year, one of the questions you were asked 

was whether it was your position that any further reductions in 

U.S. nuclear forces take place in a regime that is both bilateral and 

verifiable. 

Is that still your position? 

General KEHLER. Yes, it is. 

Mr. ROGERS. In that hearing a few months ago you were also 

asked if you were aware of any bilateral, verifiable reductions of 

nuclear forces that haven’t occurred through the treaty power or by 

act of Congress as SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] did. 

And, your response was, ‘‘I am not aware of any.’’ 

I believe that is correct, and shows a consistency of bipartisan 

practice that this Administration needs to remember. 

Can you please elaborate on another of your responses regarding 

why it is important to have verifiability which is, as you stated, 

‘‘Guarantees both nations are adhering to the agreement.’’ Why is 

that important? 

General KEHLER. Sir, I think, as Ms. Creedon said earlier, that 

we get a number of benefits out of treaties. One of those is that 

we are able to build transparency, which fosters understanding and 

ultimately I think has to do with stability. 

And so a verification regime that allows us to have confidence in 

the approach that the parties are taking, I think helps us in many, 

many ways. To include, ultimately, it allows us to go forward in a 

way that is stable. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. I want you all to know that the Readiness 

Subcommittee, Chairman Whitman and I are sending a letter to 

the White House informing the President we will not be providing 

any of the New START reduction funding, the $75 million requested in fiscal year 2014 budget submission until we get the plan 

required in the fiscal year 2012 NDAA, and his personal commitment that he will not seek reductions that will circumvent the treaty, or the congressional authorization, process. 

And with that, I will recognize the ranking member for any additional questions he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Creedon, General Kehler, Ms. Miller, both the HASC 

[House Armed Services Committee] and the SASC [Senate Armed 

Services Committee] have withheld approval of the request for 

$120 million in reprogramming for CMRR funds, sought by the Administration last year. If you would like this is your opportunity to 

make the case that reprogramming should still occur? 

Ms. MILLER. Mr. Cooper, since the reprogramming was submitted by my agency, if you don’t mind, I will start. As you know, 

that was a—the decision not to go forward with the plan that was 
30 

on record to build that facility was very deeply considered. And 

threw a lot of things into disarray. It had been on the books for 

many, many years as the program of record to maintain plutonium 

capability. However, budget realities, both in the budget itself, as 

well as what that facility was ultimately going to cost forced us to 

go back to the drawing board, frankly, and rethink. 

That reprogramming that we submitted now reflects our better 

understanding of what our options are, how we can maintain plutonium capability until we do have full replacement of the current 

CMR [Chemistry and Metallurgy Research] capability. And I think 

frankly in the end, it has behooved us to take the time to step back 

and relook at our options. 

So that reprogramming, first of all now is—we are absolutely in 

a position where we must have the ability to fund the program— 

the interim program as we have—as we have described it, to maintain that plutonium capability. But also it has led us to a place to 

understand that the plutonium facility, the so-called PF–4 at Los 

Alamos which is going to need to be replaced, together with the 

chemistry and metallurgy capabilities, is something we need to be 

looking at as one project, or one understanding, or project. 

So, currently we are reviewing a business case for a modular option, as well as several other options. Again not wanting to pin ourselves to one thing to replace one other thing. And we expect to 

have a good sense of what is going to be a prudent path forward 

for all of us, both from a capability, and a funding perspective, by 

about July. We are doing that review with the Department of Defense. The reprogramming itself, however, is absolutely necessary 

if we are going to be able to maintain any capability going forward 

in the interim. 

Mr. COOPER. So it was highly desirable last year, and this year 

it is urgent? 

Ms. MILLER. I would say beyond urgent at this point. 

Mr. COOPER. Beyond urgent? 

Ms. MILLER. Yes. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, hopefully my colleagues will be listening. How 

about resolving the threat of earthquake issue at Los Alamos for 

either CMRR, or the PF–4. Because I know that Dr. Winokur was 

pretty strong in his testimony about that. And yet we have a memo 

from Terry Wallace, principal associate director at Los Alamos, 

kind of downplaying earthquake risk. How do we decide that issue? 

Ms. MILLER. So, we have in fact undertaken an extensive program at PF–4 to address the concerns of the board, and I note Dr. 

Winokur and I have personally spoken, and I have spoken to the 

board about that program to lay out, it has been well laid out for 

their staff, for our staff, and their staff, all of the upgrades that 

have occurred. We have spent a considerable amount of time and 

money upgrading the facility so that the Secretary of Energy, Secretary Chu, sent a letter to the board declaring that he was comfortable with the facility to continue to operate with those upgrades. 

But I would be remiss if I didn’t again say, we do need to look 

at replacing that facility, and that is our plan going forward, to 

look at what makes the most sense to get that facility replaced? 

Mr. COOPER. Does that satisfy you, Dr. Winokur? 
31 

Dr. WINOKUR. Well, Congressman, the board remains concerned 

about this facility because obviously it is susceptible in an earthquake to collapse. And the board has communicated with the Secretary early in the year that the analysis shows it is subject to collapse, and that the off-site dose consequences are very high. There 

are areas of agreement right now. I think the Secretary communicated with the board and said he understood the vulnerability, 

and he understood that the margin between the loss of confinement 

in this facility, and collapse was really too small. 

And the Secretary agreed to additional modeling to understand 

what other modifications need to be performed on the building. And 

NNSA has already performed some modifications to the building. 

The Secretary also agreed that near-term actions will be taken to 

reduce the amount of waste that is in the facility—legacy waste. 

This is plutonium that is not necessary for the mission. That some 

of this dispersible plutonium needs to be containerized, and that 

more focus needs to be provided for emergency response, preparedness, and recovery. 

With that being said, the way the board is looking at this project, 

is simply to understand whether or not NNSA is meeting its requirements. These are NNSA’s requirements, they are not our requirements. We want to understand whether they are meeting 

their requirements for the containment of the material in this 

building, as well as collapse. And the other thing the Secretary 

communicated to us was he felt at this time, that operations in this 

building are safe. This is a risk-based assessment, and the board 

would probably in the future want to have a better understanding 

of how the Secretary performed that assessment and arrived at 

those conclusions. 

So, yes I think there is a lot of agreement here about how important it is to fix this facility. I think it is fixable going forward in 

the future. But the board does remain concerned about it. 

Mr. COOPER. Dr. Harvey, in the limited time remaining, back to 

the B61 modernization issue. I was astonished to learn that there 

are still vacuum tubes used in anything, much less a critical component of our national defense. Are there other instances of vacuum tube use in DOD and critical weapons systems that we need 

to address? 

Dr. HARVEY. Not that I am aware of. 

Mr. COOPER. So the B61 would be unique in that regard? 

Dr. HARVEY. I believe so. 

Mr. COOPER. And there are transistor solid-state substitutes for 

the vacuum tubes? 

Dr. HARVEY. There are. 

Mr. COOPER. That are readily available, and more survivable, 

and more robust? 

Dr. HARVEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COOPER. It is remarkable. I think many people in the younger generation would not even know what a vacuum tube is, much 

less want to trust it for a critical component of national defense. 

Hopefully we can solve this problem. 

General KEHLER. Congressman, if I could add though, while they 

may not exist in the weapons, I know you can find some large floppy-disks still being used in places in our nuclear command and con-
32 

trol system. And so I think that there are some investments here 

that we are going to need to continue with, even though the difficulty that we have with overall investment is upon us. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, General, your statement bears some repeating. Large floppy-disks still exist in components for our nuclear 

command and control? This is almost as astonishing as vacuum 

tubes. Oh my gosh. How could this happen? It is like, PCs [Personal Computer] aren’t that expensive? What is going on here? 

General KEHLER. It isn’t quite that simple, but, sir, I take your 

point. 

Mr. COOPER. Finally back to the sequestration point. This is a little bit of a leading question but, if a foreign power were to hit us 

with something called sequestration that had a similar effect to the 

effect described in each of your Departments, wouldn’t we view 

that as at least an act of provocation? And possibly even an act of 

war? And yet this has been aimed at us by our own Congress? Anybody want to take that bait? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. COOPER. I don’t blame you. 

But thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I don’t argue with the aiming part, but the President came up with the idea. 

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Nugent, is recognized. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

And I know this is a very bright group because you didn’t fall 

for that, but we appreciate it. 

The—as it relates to Yucca Mountain, Mr. Huizenga, President 

Obama has taken actions to terminate the Yucca Mountain project. 

And by law, Yucca Mountain remains designated as the Nation’s 

first repository for high-level radioactive waste. What are the implications of this cancellation on the Yucca Mountain repository and 

the Department of Energy’s ability to manage and consolidate defense waste? And what is the next best option? So it is a two-part. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Thank you, Congressman. Well, we have been 

storing our spent fuel, our defense spent fuel safely for some time. 

And we would intend to continue to do so in either dry storage, or 

we had some still in wet storage that we are moving in—over time 

into dry storage. 

So that would be our intention. And that can be—we are quite 

sure it can be stored safely for several decades relative to—ultimately of course, we want to disposition that fuel. So we would be 

working with the Administration and with Congress ultimately to 

try to find a consensus view of where we should have a repository. 

Mr. NUGENT. So is there a next best on the list, or is Yucca 

Mountain the only thing on the list? 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Well, we are in the middle of—beginning stages 

of trying to answer that question. And I don’t have a specific answer as to what the next best thing is at this moment. 

Mr. NUGENT. Okay. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield the balance of my time to 

Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

Dr. Harvey, I would like to just ask a little bit more about CAPE. 

I mentioned that earlier. What can you tell us about a study that 
33 

either exclusively or among other things would be looking at the 

effects, the impacts of eliminating one leg of a triad? 

Dr. HARVEY. I would—I don’t have much to add beyond what 

Secretary Creedon spoke to. 

But I would address the point that I think these kinds of activities, these types of relooks, these reviews, particularly when we 

have a new Secretary coming on board who wants to basically 

question assumptions and help—and by doing so help him to come 

to understand how we made some of the decisions we have in the 

past is a valuable thing to do. 

Regarding the ongoing activity is something that I believe Deputy Secretary Carter referred to last—in his announcement last 

February that we are going to look at strategic choices within the 

Department. And I really don’t have anything to add beyond what 

Ms. Creedon spoke to—— 

Mr. LAMBORN. Could you provide to the committee the terms of 

reference for the study? 

Dr. HARVEY. I believe I can provide to the committee the public 

announcement that we are going to move forward on this activity. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I would like the terms of reference. 

Dr. HARVEY. Congressman, I will look into that and get back to 

you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 140.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Secretary Creedon, General Kehler, or both, would you be able 

to give us some idea as to how DOD intends to structure its forces 

to comply with the New START treaty? 

Secretary CREEDON. Well, let me—sir, just a little bit. So right 

now, the Department is spending some of this New START implementation money on doing away with systems that had been previously retired but that still counted under the old START treaty. 

So a lot of this money is getting those things actually finally off the 

books. 

So not only are—do we need this—do we need the New START 

money to look for the actual way we structure the 800, 700, 1,550— 

in other words, 800 total systems, 700 deployed strategic delivery 

systems, and 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads—but we 

have to get rid of all these old systems that we refer to as phantoms, so previously retired ICBMs, previously retired bombers. 

So that work is also undergoing and also critical to allowing us 

to implement it. But as we think about from a policy perspective 

how we meet these numbers, we want to do it in a way that allows 

the most flexibility for the longest period of time. 

So what do we think about: we think about what if there were 

some sort of a breakout from a treaty in the future, we want to 

make sure we have sufficient capacity and capability to be able to 

respond to a breakout, we want to make sure that we have enough 

capability across the triad so that if there is an issue with one 
34 

piece of the triad we have the ability to cover for it with other 

pieces of the triad. 

So these are the sorts of things that we are examining and looking at right now as we develop the specifics of—from the DOD perspective, the—specifically the 800 total deployed and nondeployed 

and the 700 deployed. 

General KEHLER. And I would only say, just to add, there is not 

a final decision. There are many ways that we can go forward. And 

that balancing that Ms. Creedon just mentioned is exactly what is 

in the mixture today. So there is some advantage to us doing all 

the preparation work as we go forward, and there is also been some 

advantage to us to keep some flexibility in how we will ultimately 

decide. 

And by the way, the treaty was structured specifically so each 

side can decide on its own how to best structure its forces to be 

within the limits. So there are multiple ways we can go. We are 

looking at the operational benefits to a number of different ways. 

And within that, I would say that in every case we are looking at 

retaining a triad. 

Secretary CREEDON. Can I just add one more thing to that? I 

apologize. There is also a subtlety to this treaty that actually is 

really very interesting, in that there is no such thing, if you would, 

of what the final force structure under this treaty will look like 

until the final day of the treaty because each side has infinite flexibility as to what their force structure looks like on an ongoing 

basis. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So that kind of answers my next question, I suppose, which was at what point must we have a final decision on 

force structure under New START II? 

General KEHLER. What I will say as a practical matter, sir, that 

decisions can’t get executed overnight. And in some cases here, this 

requires a significant amount of work from the Navy and the Air 

Force. And so we think we still have time to make these decisions, 

but there is also a window here that will close over the next year 

or so, perhaps a little longer, which is why we are doing a lot of 

preliminary efforts and a lot of preparation. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Otherwise our operations and maintenance capabilities could be threatened? 

General KEHLER. That is right. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. 

Lamborn, for any additional questions he may have. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I am glad we have a few minutes before we have to go off 

to vote. Administrator Miller, the budget request justification documents show that NNSA is expecting to realize hundreds of millions 

of dollars in efficiencies in fiscal year 2014 to help pay for all the 

work that it wants to do and needs to do. 

The total—these total more than $300 million in fiscal year 2014, 

but the justification documents are very vague on how these are to 

be achieved. Can you give us specificity on how the $300 million 

plus in efficiencies will be achieved? 
35 

Ms. MILLER. Thank you, Congressman. I can tell you the process 

we are going through right now. And I just had a report yesterday 

afternoon in fact on the status of this. 

So the specifics I would like to take for the record because I 

haven’t actually reviewed what has come forward for it. But I will 

tell you the effort that is ongoing right now to identify those efficiencies actually is making very good progress. So we will be able 

to provide you with that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 140.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I look forward to having that provided to 

myself and the committee, but I am concerned that this is still very 

vague. I mean, how can we count on that, and if—let’s say it 

doesn’t materialize. Let’s assume for a moment it does not materialize, that the hopes and expectations are too ambitious. What 

would that do to key programs like the B61 or W76 [submarinelaunched ballistic missile warhead] life extension programs? 

Ms. MILLER. Congressman, if we were unable to realize the—all 

of the efficiencies that we have assumed in the fiscal 2014 5-year 

budget, we definitely would have to, given that the budget right 

now—that the numbers that we are planning to are very fixed and 

quite low, as we have all been discussing, we would have to go back 

and rethink how we are going to execute the programs we have. 

The reason we put the efficiencies into the budget to begin with 

was to try to accommodate this, as I think Dr. Harvey said, this 

vast bow wave of work that is facing us now. So we have the work 

to do and we have very limited budget with which to do it. And the 

only way we are going to get there is if we do it in a more efficient 

way. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Once again, I hope you are right, but I don’t see 

the facts in front of me. I don’t see the efficiency. I would love to 

have a Department say, okay, $300 million, we can come up with 

that. It sounds way too optimistic. I hope I am wrong. 

Ms. MILLER. Right. Well, I hope we are able to achieve it. Faced 

with planning a large program of work and very limited dollars, 

there is nothing that you can do in order to do that, especially 

given the kind of work that we do that has to happen, than to go 

after how we do the work. 

Now, we, of course, as you know, when we formulate the President’s budget, we come to a point at which we realize this is the 

bill we have to pay for the work we have to do, and here is the 

bucket of dollars we have to pay for it. 

At that point, you begin to realize it is going to take you—you 

are going to have to make a major effort to understand how you 

can do this more efficiently, and, yes, you do put a number on it. 

But then you first begin the work at that point. At that point, the 

President’s budget has been formulated and you have got your 

numbers, but that is when the hard work begins on those efficiencies. And that is why we are where we are right now. 

We could not, of course, anticipate or figure out all the efficiencies in advance before we knew the amount we were going to 

have to come up with. So that is where we are in the process. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, it sounds like maybe we need to take some 

of this with a grain of salt and maybe address that with money 
36 

from elsewhere possibly. I am just—that is my personal perspective. You can’t give us any specifics, then, on the proposed efficiencies? 

Ms. MILLER. Well, I would give you—in the general, without attaching dollar amounts to it. We are looking across our complex at 

how we staff the activities that are staffed at each of the field offices, and whether we—whether it is—we have regularly been told 

by our laboratories and our plant partners that for every individual 

that we have working and the kind of oversight that we have been 

performing, they often have many—three, four, five times as many 

people addressing that. 

The question is, can we do this oversight work with them in a 

better way that does not require them to have so many people. 

Their people are by definition always more expensive than our people. And so a lot of the cost, virtually all of the cost that we incur 

in our complex, is a people-based cost. It is not actually for hardware. Most of—70 percent at least of our money is for the people 

involved. 

So if we can work more efficiently, we should be able to realize 

the savings related to that, but it does take examination of all of 

our processes and I—the kinds of things I indicated in my opening 

speech about how we do our business. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Well, I wish you the best. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

Thank you to all the witnesses for your time. We have been 

called for votes. 

I do want to touch on one thing before we leave to vote. This 

committee has been looking actively at the longstanding and welldocumented problems at NNSA and DOE’s governance, management, and oversight of this nuclear enterprise. As you all know, 

Congress has tasked an advisory committee to work on suggestions 

for us as to how this enterprise can be improved. So, all 12 members have been appointed. I would like to ask each of you to affirm 

that you would be willing to cooperate with that advisory committee in its efforts. 

And I will start with you, Secretary Creedon. 

Secretary CREEDON. Yes, sir, very much. As you may know, my 

office, in conjunction with Secretary Weber in AT&L, have been 

working very hard to make sure that the processes are in place to 

get this panel up and running. And so we are absolutely committed 

to this panel. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Kehler. 

General KEHLER. I am committed to it as well. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ms. Miller. 

Ms. MILLER. I am committed as well, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Harvey. 

Dr. HARVEY. Of course, sir. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Huizenga. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Yes, as it is going to affect us, sure. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. 

Dr. Winokur, don’t break the streak. 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. WINOKUR. Yes, we are committed. 
37 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. Thank you all very much. It has been very 

helpful. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:54 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MAY 9, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MAY 9, 2013 

(43) 

Statement of Hon. Mike Rogers 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Request for Atomic Energy Defense 

Activities and Nuclear Forces Programs 

May 9, 2013 

Welcome to the Strategic Forces subcommittee hearing on the 

President’s Fiscal Year 2014 budget request for Atomic Energy Defense Activities and Nuclear Forces Programs. I want to thank our 

witnesses for being here today. We have a crowded witness table 

because we have a lot of ground to cover in this hearing. Our distinguished witnesses are: 

• The Honorable Madelyn R. Creedon, Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, U.S. Department of 

Defense; 

• General C. Robert Kehler, USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; 

• The Honorable Neile L. Miller, Acting Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; 

• Dr. John Harvey, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, U.S. Department of Defense; 

• Mr. David G. Huizenga, Senior Advisor for Environmental 

Management, U.S. Department of Energy; and 

• The Honorable Peter S. Winokur, Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. 

I appreciate you taking the time to prepare for this hearing, and 

we always appreciate the contributions you each make to U.S. national security. 

Turning to the issues, let me start with the good news. First, the 

Department of Defense has made clear that its top two priorities 

to protect from the effects of sequestration—beyond those that are 

exempt by statute or presidential direction—are operations in Afghanistan and operations and sustainment of U.S. nuclear forces. 

These are the correct priorities. 

Second, the budget request would continue the major modernization efforts for the Ohio class replacement submarine and the longrange strike bomber. 

Third, the budget request would provide a significant boost to the 

National Nuclear Security Administration’s nuclear weapons work. 

I commend the Administration for trying to get back on track with 

nuclear modernization at NNSA. 

But I also want to highlight several very serious concerns. For 

starters, the budget request does not account for the effects of se-
44 

questration continuing into FY14—which would gravely endanger 

programs across the DOE and NNSA nuclear enterprise. 

Furthermore, for FY12 through FY14 we still find ourselves a total of around $1.6 billion short of the NNSA funding levels that 

were committed to by the President to win Senate ratification of 

the New START treaty. So while the Administration is trying to 

get back on track with the FY14 request, the nuclear deterrent has 

still been shortchanged the past several years. 

We also find ourselves behind on some key capabilities and programs. The Ohio class replacement program, the B61 life extension 

program, the W78/W88 life extension program, the long-range 

standoff cruise missile—these and others have been significantly 

delayed. Worse, the Administration has effectively and unilaterally 

canceled the plutonium facility at Los Alamos. Reviewing the budget request, we have identified $75 million for 

the Navy and the Air Force for implementing the New START treaty. This is rather strange, because the Administration still has not 

complied with the FY12 defense authorization act, which required 

the Administration to submit a report 18 months ago on how it 

would implement New START. In my view, Congress cannot provide funds to carry out reductions it does not have enough information to understand. 

We also find that the Air Force would use $1.5 million to begin 

an Environmental Impact Study on shutting down one or more 

ICBM wings. We’ve heard no explanation for this study and why 

the Administration thinks it needs to shut down an ICBM wing to 

comply with New START. 

On the policy front, in the next few months the Administration 

is expected to finally complete its long-delayed review of the Nation’s nuclear war plan. Based on press reports, this 18-month-long 

‘‘90-day study’’ is likely to recommend significant further U.S. nuclear force reductions. 

So, while the Administration has not yet decided how to implement the reductions required under New START, it is now pushing 

for even more. Equally concerning are reports that the Administration may seek to avoid Congress and undertake further nuclear reductions outside of the formal treaty process or without affirmative 

approval by Congress. This approach is a nonstarter. 

Let me reiterate something I have said before: As the stockpile 

shrinks in size, we have reached the point where further reductions 

take on immense importance to the Nation’s security and international stability. Avoiding Congress because the President is unwilling to debate the merits of his policy choices is unacceptable 

and should be intolerable to anyone who cares about our system of 

government. Congress must be a full and equal partner for these 

hugely important national security decisions, and I intend to see 

that my colleagues and I fulfill our constitutional role. 

As I said at the outset, we have a lot of ground to cover in this 

hearing. I expect we’ll continue this subcommittee’s discussion of 

management and governance problems at NNSA and DOE. I also 

expect we’ll review the important work of the Defense Environmental Cleanup program. DOE is doing great work in this area, 

but technical and management problems continue at some of their 

biggest and most visible projects. 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MAY 9, 2013 

(141) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Ms. MILLER. a) The Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration (ISER) program in the Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability leads national efforts, in cooperation with public and private sector stakeholders, to enhance the reliability, survivability, and resiliency of the U.S. energy 

infrastructure (electricity, petroleum, natural gas), while also improving national energy security by addressing energy infrastructure interdependencies based on risk 

and consequences. 

ISER’s primary responsibility is to help secure the U.S. energy infrastructure 

against all hazards, whether natural or man-made, physical or cyber. It also develops tools and identifies advanced technology for deployment to enhance the ability 

of the energy sector to be resilient. In addition, ISER partners with state and local 

governments, responding to and recovering from energy disruptions, to ensure seamless collaboration at all levels. These activities place ISER in a unique role to help 

define the technology needs of the energy sector. ISER uses its expertise and partnerships to identify potential technical solutions and suppliers of technology, evaluate risk and cost, and drive innovation by facilitating the seamless integration of 

advanced technologies developed by OE’s research and development programs into 

energy infrastructure. ISER contributes to the Department’s and the energy sector’s 

long-term responsibilities to secure the U.S. energy supply by addressing topics like 

High Impact Low Frequency events such as a geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) 

storms. ISER also mitigates risks posed to global energy infrastructure by assisting 

key energy-producing partners in securing their energy infrastructure, in coordination with the Department of State and on a cost-reimbursable basis. 

b) The ISER program has performed these functions within an approximately $6 

million appropriation. However, as Superstorm Sandy highlighted, the Department 

is currently not fully equipped to respond to new challenges caused by stronger, 

more destructive storms; more sophisticated cyber attacks; potential accidents as a 

result of aging infrastructure or human error; and potential high-impact low frequency threats such as geomagnetic disturbance storms or a catastrophic earthquake. The additional $10 million for the new Operational Energy and Resilience 

(OER) initiative in FY 2014 will lay the foundation to develop an enhanced capability that will enable the Department to better protect against and mitigate threats 

and hazards, with the ultimate goal of quicker recovery by industry and the communities they serve through. OER, in conjunction with continuing ISER activities, will 

enable the Department to meet these challenges. 

c) The FY 2014 request for the OER supports the modification and expansion of 

the Energy Resilience and Operations Center (E–ROC) within the Department of 

Energy’s Washington, D.C. headquarters. E–ROC will be a steady-state operations 

center, where the Department monitors, receives and analyzes real-time threat and 

energy sector status and coordinates and shares this information with all Energy 

Sector stakeholders. During emergencies, it will serve as the collaboration hub between the Department of Energy, other Federal Agencies and Energy Sector partners, including critical infrastructure owners and operators, and will be responsible 

for status and information sharing between DOE and other emergency operation 

centers (Federal and State). A state-of-the-art ‘‘knowledge wall’’ (screen) in the E– 

ROC will be capable of receiving multiple and disparate near real-time data feeds, 

simultaneously visualizing and overlaying over the affected area, so that decision 

makers can appropriately respond. 

The OER subprogram will place DOE Regional Energy Advisors in 10 regional offices (aligned with FEMA’s regions) to implement regionally tailored, energy resilience approaches for facility owners and States (including territories and tribal) to 

mitigate, prepare, prevent, respond and recover from major disasters and events 

that impact energy infrastructure. They will also be able to support response and 

restoration efforts during emergencies. 

d) While the increase for OER requested in FY 2014 does not directly fund GMD 

related work, the request continues efforts to address the threat posed to the electricity infrastructure by geomagnetic disturbances (GMD). For example, in FY 2013, 

ISER completed a study and developed a strategy that led to the deployment of ad-
142 

ditional geomagnetically-induced sensors that provide data that enables utilities to 

better mitigate impacts of GMD events. As a result, the number of sensors installed 

has increased from 10 sensors in one interconnect to 27 sensors (5 funded by DOE 

and the remainder by industry) that cover all three interconnects. [See page 16.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Ms. MILLER. NNSA, with assistance from the Department of Defense and our contractors, envisions achieving efficiencies from management and workforce changes 

consistent with the President’s FY 2014 Budget request and FY 2014 FYNSP. Furthermore, NNSA is undertaking this effort in coordination with other efficiency efforts examining requirements and weapons enterprise capacity. NNSA is approaching achieving the efficiencies from a long-term perspective—the goal is to implement 

changes that are credible, measurable and achievable to the nuclear security complex for both FY 2014 and the outyears. NNSA is now taking a number of actions 

to drive toward solutions: 

• In June, NNSA established the NNSA Operations Council comprised of the 

Chief Operating Officers (COOs) from the NNSA sites and co-chaired by the 

NNSA Associate Principal Deputy Administrator and a NNSA site COO. One 

of the primary goals of the NNSA Operations Council will be to bring together 

senior leaders from NNSA to drive operational efficiencies, Working through the 

Operations Council, NNSA will reduce the ‘‘cost of doing business’’ with minimal impact on NNSA work scope. NNSA believes that working with our M&O 

partners will be the best way to identify where savings can be realized. 

• In early Fall, NNSA will complete a contractor workforce analysis in close coordination with the Labs and Plants to identify workforce prioritizations and 

whether contractor staffing reallocations would impact project scope. As part of 

the efficiencies identified in the President’s Budget request, NNSA committed 

to ‘‘workforce prioritization’’ efficiencies targeted at achieving Life Extension 

Program (LEP) performance targets by reallocating existing staff on non-LEP 

work to LEP work. This efficiencies target arose from a concern about the ability of NNSA sites to staff up to do all the required work. The results of the 

study now under way should provide insights into where efficiencies may be 

found. 

• Finally, NNSA and the Department of Defense are working very closely together to identify both management and workforce efficiencies. This joint effort 

has been helpful in identifying areas to explore for savings. There is a risk that 

if NNSA is unable to realize sufficient savings or to prioritize requirements as 

targeted in the President’s Budget, there could be impacts, such as schedule 

delays, on planned activities. [See page 34.] 

Dr. HARVEY. We have verified that terms of reference for the Strategic Choices 

Management Review do not exist. [See page 33.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. FLEMING 

General KEHLER. USSTRATCOM works with our Service Components to continually assess infrastructure security, capabilities, and capacity in support of all of my 

Unified Command Plan (UCP) mission requirements. 

Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) is developing a proposed schedule and 

cost estimates for recapitalizing nuclear weapons storage and maintenance facilities 

at FE Warren, Malmstrom, Minot, Whiteman, and Barksdale Air Force Bases that 

have degraded due to age and no longer comply with nuclear surety requirements. 

Information will be made available as it becomes available. [See page 22.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MAY 9, 2013 

(145) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. 1) Secretary Creedon, we recently saw senior lawmakers in South 

Korea calling for South Korea to consider developing its own nuclear weapons. A 

recent poll shows that two-thirds of the South Korean public support such a move. 

a) What actions should we be taking to strengthen our nuclear assurances to 

South Korea? And to Japan? 

b) The recent B–2 flights to South Korea seem to have made a profound impact 

on the South Korean government and public—a clear demonstration of U.S. assurances and resolve in the face of nuclear threats. How should we factor this into our 

discussion of the long-range strike bomber that is now under development? Does 

this demonstrate the enduring value of long-range nuclear bombers? 

c) What plans/options exist to relocate B61 gravity bombs and dual-capable aircraft in either country should circumstances warrant that action? 

Secretary CREEDON. The credibility of U.S. extended deterrence is demonstrated 

and strengthened through a variety of actions. The first is transparency: we have 

substantially increased dialogue with both South Korea and Japan regarding extended deterrence, and regularly exchange views concerning strategic issues in the 

region. Our Extended Deterrence Dialogue with Japan and Extended Deterrence 

Policy Committee meetings with South Korea keep our allies informed about 

changes to our nuclear policy and posture, avoiding misperceptions. A second way 

is demonstrating resolve in the face of challenges. Examples include the recent 

bomber missions to the Korean Peninsula, close cooperation with Japan on missile 

defense, and a variety of joint exercises in the region. Furthermore, the President’s 

recent nuclear employment guidance reaffirmed our commitment to our allies and 

partners that the United States will maintain the capability to forward-deploy nuclear weapons with both heavy bombers and Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA). Finally, 

we demonstrate our commitment to extended deterrence by investing in modernization of our nuclear forces, including the weapons, platforms, and infrastructure. It 

is essential that we fully support the President’s plans to replace aging elements 

of our triad, to ensure that our extended deterrence capabilities remain safe, secure, 

and effective. 

In accordance with the Presidents guidance, DOD retains the capability to forward-deploy heavy bombers and DCA with weapons. 

Mr. ROGERS. 2) Secretary Creedon, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has indicated 

that, under sequestration, the Department will prioritize protecting: a) current operations in Afghanistan; and b) nuclear deterrence operations. Please describe why 

this second priority was selected. 

c) If sequestration continues into FY14, will nuclear deterrence operations still be 

protected? How would nuclear force modernization efforts be affected by continuing 

sequestration into FY14? 

Secretary CREEDON. There is widespread agreement on the importance of the nuclear deterrence mission, which protects the United States from nuclear attack and 

coercion from adversaries; contributes to strategic stability with Russia and China; 

and assures U.S. allies and partners in Europe and Asia that might otherwise be 

vulnerable to nuclear threats or prone to consider developing their own nuclear capabilities. The Administration recognizes just how important it is to refurbish and 

upgrade the stockpile so that we can continue to provide a safe, secure, and effective 

deterrent in these uncertain times. 

Sequestration is already having an undesired effect on the modernization of U.S. 

strategic capabilities by delaying slightly the completion of the B61–12 Life Extension Program (LEP). If sequestration continues, we face the very real risk of doing 

serious damage to the U.S. nuclear stockpile, requiring us to delay or extend further 

our refurbishment efforts for weapons that are already serving well beyond their expected service lives. This would create unacceptable risk. That is why it is imperative that a solution be found to this situation before serious damage is done. 
146 

Mr. ROGERS. 3) Secretary Creedon, we understand that you are the U.S. representative to NATO’s High Level Group, which discusses nuclear weapons aspects 

of NATO defense posture. In the past several years, NATO has made a series of 

decisions and declarations regarding its nuclear posture. Please describe these decisions and NATO’s nuclear policy going forward. 

a. Do NATO countries contribute to the cost of the B61 life extension program of 

the B61 and the cost to modify the Air Force tail kit? Would it be appropriate for 

NATO to pay for a portion of the cost of the B61 LEP? 

b. What is NATO’s policy regarding future changes to its nuclear posture, particularly regarding decisions to rebase or change its posture toward forward-deployed 

B61s? 

Secretary CREEDON. Just to be clear, I am the chair of the HLG and DASD Elaine 

Bunn is the U.S. representative. The decision to modernize the B61 bomb is a U.S. 

decision, and the costs for the updated weapon are to be borne by the United States. 

This allows the United States to maintain control of the scope of the life extension 

program (LEP) and meet our nonproliferation commitments. It is also important to 

note that the B61 LEP is required independent of NATO in order to meet U.S. 

strategic requirements and to ensure the long-term viability of the B–2A stealth 

bomber. 

It would not be appropriate to have NATO fund a portion of the B61 LEP. However, NATO members provide considerable funds to the NATO nuclear mission, including mission-related facilities, services, supplies, and other logistical support for 

our units at each NATO storage site; and NATO has funded substantial security enhancements and upgrades, and infrastructure upgrades at the storage sites. 

In May of 2012, the NATO Alliance released its Deterrence and Defense Posture 

Review (DDPR), which states: ‘‘As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain 

a nuclear alliance.’’ Additionally, the Alliance stated that NATO is ‘‘prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for nonstrategic nuclear weapons assigned to 

the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia.’’ 

Mr. ROGERS. 4) Secretary Creedon, do you believe our extended deterrent assurances to allies lose credibility if we continue to slip deadlines for modernizing our 

stockpile, forces, and infrastructure? 

Secretary CREEDON. I do not see an erosion of confidence among our allies with 

respect to the U.S. commitment to our nuclear deterrent. We have extensive consultations with key allies on a regular basis regarding the United States’ extended 

deterrent and our plans for modernization. 

Modernization of our forces, stockpile, and infrastructure is necessary and becomes even more important as the Nation considers potential further reductions. 

Our allies and partners watch the U.S. budget process and can observe that the 

President has significantly increased the funding requested to complete modernization of the stockpile and its accompanying infrastructure. This strengthens the 

credibility of our commitment to modernize and to provide an extended deterrent 

to our allies and partners. Our allies and partners do, however, express concerns 

regarding the effect of continued uncertainty stemming from sequestration and the 

recent inability to appropriate funds in a timely and predictable manner. As we continue to adjust programs in response to budget challenges, each possible slip in 

schedule or combinations of slips must be evaluated and the possible implications 

identified when considering a program adjustments. 

Mr. ROGERS. 5) Secretary Creedon, by law, Congress is supposed to receive the 

annual Report on Stockpile Assessments, which includes the assessments of stockpile health conducted by the laboratory directors and by the commander of U.S. 

Strategic Command, by March 15. Like last year, Congress did not receive this report until months after the statutory deadline. Why is this report always late? Will 

the Administration deliver the report in 2014 by the March 15 deadline? 

Secretary CREEDON. DOD recognizes and understands concerns about late reports. 

The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) always strives to submit this report in a timely manner and will continue to do so in order to meet the March 1, 2014, deadline 

for submission to the President and the March 15, 2014, deadline for submission 

to Congress. The Report on Stockpile Assessments is the result of a rigorous, nearly 

year-long process by three national laboratories to certify that the stockpile remains 

safe, secure, and effective. Additionally, it requires an assessment by the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, of the laboratory certification results. Every year, 

these in-depth assessments culminate in Secretary-level review in both the Department of Defense and Department of Energy. 
147 

This review and discussion of the most serious challenges facing the U.S. nuclear 

deterrent warrant the time and attention to understand and address interagency 

concerns, particularly given that the U.S. nuclear enterprise is aging (e.g., the 

youngest U.S. nuclear warhead is 27 years old), and that it lacks an underground 

testing capability. Further contributing to these challenges is a fiscally constrained 

environment that requires extensive examination of priorities and often difficult 

choices as we highlight issues in the annual assessments for the President. Although we make every effort to address these issues in a timely manner, we often 

experience delays while we work through the process. Nonetheless, our goal is to 

respond in a timely fashion with a report that provides the best assessment 

possible. 

Mr. ROGERS. 6) General Kehler, do you believe our extended deterrent assurances 

to allies lose credibility if we continue to slip deadlines for modernizing our stockpile, forces, and infrastructure? 

General KEHLER. Modernization of our forces, stockpile and infrastructure is necessary and becomes even more important as the Nation considers potential further 

reductions. I believe our allies take into account our commitment to sustaining a 

safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent when they evaluate the value and credibility of our extended deterrence commitments to them. The implications of 

‘‘slipped’’ deadlines fully depend on the programs that are slipped and the overall 

impact on U.S. deterrent capabilities. 

Mr. ROGERS. 7) Ms. Miller, what steps is NNSA taking to realize the ‘‘efficiencies’’ 

described in the FY14 budget request justification documents? What are the impacts 

to the B61 and W76 LEPs, in particular, if these efficiencies are not achieved? 

Ms. MILLER. NNSA, with assistance from the Department of Defense and our contractors, envisions achieving efficiencies from management and workforce changes 

consistent with the President’s FY 2014 Budget request and FY 2014 FYNSP. Furthermore, NNSA is undertaking this effort in coordination with other efficiency efforts examining requirements and weapons enterprise capacity. NNSA is approaching achieving the efficiencies from a long-term perspective—the goal is to implement 

changes that are credible, measurable and achievable to the nuclear security complex for both FY 2014 and the outyears. 

NNSA is now taking a number of actions to drive toward solutions: 

• In June, NNSA established the NNSA Operations Council comprised of the 

Chief Operating Officers (COOs) from the NNSA sites and co-chaired by the 

NNSA Associate Principal Deputy Administrator and a NNSA site COO. One 

of the primary goals of the NNSA Operations Council will be to bring together 

senior leaders from NNSA to drive operational efficiencies. Working through the 

Operations Council, NNSA will strive to reduce the ‘‘cost of doing business’’ 

with minimal impact on NNSA work scope. NNSA believes that working with 

our M&O partners will be the best way to identify where savings can be 

realized. 

• As part of the efficiencies identified in the President’s Budget request, NNSA 

committed to seek ‘‘workforce prioritization’’ efficiencies targeted at achieving 

Life Extension Program (LEP) performance targets by reallocating existing staff 

on non-LEP work to LEP work. This efficiencies target arose from a concern 

raised by some about the ability of NNSA sites to staff up to do all the required 

work. A recently completed independent study evaluated whether the NNSA 

sites could staff up to support a higher level of LEP activity without reducing 

the quality standards for new employees. In early Fall, NNSA, in close coordination with the Labs and Plants, will complete a contractor workforce analysis 

to identify workforce prioritizations and whether contractor staffing reallocations would impact project scope. The results of the study should provide insights into where efficiencies may be found or the impacts due to the realignment of existing weapons activity staff. 

• Finally, NNSA and the Department of Defense are working very closely together to identify both management and workforce efficiencies. This joint effort 

has been helpful in identifying areas to explore for savings. 

• There is a risk that if NNSA is unable to realize sufficient savings or to 

prioritize requirements as targeted in the President’s Budget, there could be impacts, such as schedule delays, on planned activities. The shares of management efficiencies provisionally apportioned to the W76 and B61 LEPs for FY 

2014 were $2.5 M and $5.7 M respectively. The shares of workforce 

prioritization savings provisionally apportioned to the W76 and B61 LEPs for 

FY 2014 were $7.9 M and $17.9 M respectively. At these levels of cuts you could 

expect completion of production for the W76 LEP and achievement of FPU for 
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the B61 LEP to be delayed. If these two efforts were protected from any cuts 

arising from a failure to achieve the targeted savings, the impacts would be to 

scope elsewhere in the program. 

Mr. ROGERS. 8) Ms. Miller, you commented during the hearing on the B61 LEP, 

and why the so-called ‘‘triple-alt’’ option was not acceptable from a cost, requirements, and technical standpoint. Would you please elaborate? What about the socalled ‘‘1–E’’ option—why was it not acceptable from a cost, requirements, and technical standpoint? If the B61 LEP were to pursue the triple-alt or 1–E, what would 

be the cost and schedule impacts? 

Ms. MILLER. The current B61–12 LEP option, Option 3B, is the lowest cost option 

that meets all DOD requirements. Neither the Triple Alt nor the 1E option addresses all aging concerns on the B61 and would each require a second life extension with 

a first production unit (FPU) before 2028. Additionally, until the second life extension necessitated by these options was complete, there would continue to be risk of 

a capability gap to the U.S. extended deterrence mission. The scope of the second 

LEP would include other nonnuclear electronics, such as firing, arming and safety, 

thermal batteries, and use control components that must be replaced due to aging. 

In addition, nuclear components contemplated in the Triple Alt or 1E option would 

need to be refurbished to improve safety and ensure an additional 20-year service 

life. All system qualification and flight testing conducted to certify the Triple Alt 

or 1E option would need to be repeated in the second life extension. Another important consideration is that these options will not consolidate modifications, not allow 

a decrease in bomb quantities and not put us on a path to retire the B83. Pursuit 

of either of these options would greatly increase sustainment costs and require a 

second movement of B61 bombs for the second LEP, which in turn would increase 

DOE transportation risk and costs, as well as DOD costs. 

Mr. ROGERS. 9) Ms. Miller, we have heard a lot of complaints that NNSA and 

DOD have not done any analysis of alternatives for the B61 LEP. Would you please 

describe, in detail, the process that was used to analyze alternatives for the B61 

LEP? Also, please describe the options that were considered and why they were rejected (or in the case of Option 3B, selected). In general, how do NNSA and DOD 

consider alternatives in the 6.X warhead life extension process? 

Ms. MILLER. As discussed in the B61–12 Life Extension Program Interim Report 

on Commencement of Phase 6.3 Activities, July 2012, NNSA and DOD jointly assessed life cycle costs and benefits associated with life extension options during the 

Phase 6.2/2A Study. This assessment was done on seven options as part of Phase 

6.2A, ranging from a full scope LEP with enhanced surety technologies to replacing 

only three aging components [Triple Alteration (Alt)]. After reviewing life cycle costs 

for each of the seven options, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) selected Option 

3B as the most cost effective option that met the minimum DOD military requirements. The option maximizes the reuse of nuclear and nonnuclear components while 

still meeting military requirements for service life extension and consolidation of 

multiple versions of the B61 into the B61–12. The option forgoes the newest surety 

technologies and instead improves security and safety of the bombs using somewhat 

older, but proven, technologies. The option includes mod consolidation using a 

USAF-provided tail kit assembly. Without mod consolidation, NNSA would be required to conduct two separate life extension programs with different scopes to address strategic and extended deterrence requirements. Additionally, mod consolidation will allow for reduced DOD maintenance and logistics activities and enable 

NNSA to maintain a more focused surveillance and assessment program for the single bomb variant than would be necessary if it were maintaining certification for 

two bomb variants. Although two of the other seven options had an initial lower 

cost, their lifecycle cost was higher as a result of not addressing all aging concerns. 

These two options would have necessitated another LEP to address the remaining 

concerns. 

Mr. ROGERS. 10) Administrator Miller, if we have a continuing resolution going 

into FY14, will you recommend to the President that he seek an ‘‘anomaly’’ for 

NNSA—or any individual NNSA programs? 

Ms. MILLER. Later this month, NNSA anticipates that the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) will be issuing additional guidance to Agencies to submit continuing resolution (CR) anomaly requests to OMB for different types of CR scenarios. At that time, NNSA will recommend some anomalies to OMB for OMB’s consideration to transmit to Congress. 

Mr. ROGERS. 11) Administrator Miller, would you consider the governance/management pilot program initiated at the Kansas City Plant in 2006/2007 to be successful? Is it still in place? Approximately how much money has been saved as a 

result of the program? 
149 

Ms. MILLER. The following is from the April 2008 Lessons Learned Report, Implementation of the Kansas City Site Office Oversight Plan at the Kansas City Plant: 

In April 2006, the Kansas City Site Office (KCSO) was directed by the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to develop a plan ‘‘to create a dramatic shift in oversight’’ and implement the 

results by October 2006. The KCSO implemented the required plan, which 

was approved in January 2007. The Oversight Plan, along with the Kansas 

City Responsive Infrastructure, Manufacturing and Sourcing (KCRIMS) 

Project, are expected to enable Honeywell Federal Manufacturing & Technologies, LLC (FM&T) to significantly reduce operating costs, leverage commercial production, and provide a more responsive facility for nonnuclear 

production. 

In 2008, this initiative was validated by several independent assessments, 

which all concluded that it had been successful for Kansas City Plant. A 

third party was contracted to perform an analysis of the benefits of the 

Oversight Plan to contractor operations. The analysis concluded that the 

oversight plan was fully implemented, significant direct and indirect cost 

savings had been achieved, and no significant detrimental impacts were 

identified. Cost reductions for Honeywell FM&T resulted from increased 

use of parent corporation systems, reduced support to KCSO oversight, adjustment of the contract incentive fee structure, elimination of DOE Orders 

and Directives, and the development of a private enterprise like environment where cost control and reduction are important elements in decisions 

involving workforce size. Continued cost reductions for both KCSO and 

Honeywell FM&T resulted from those same Oversight Plan related drivers. 

The KCSO component of cost reduction was estimated to be about $702K. 

For the contractor, cost reductions were validated at $13M for FY07 and 

estimated at $23M per year for FY08–13. By the end of FY 2014, Kansas 

City Plant will have completed a major transformation of operating procedures and facilities that save over $100 Million per year in operating costs. 

Mr. ROGERS. 12) Dr. Harvey, would you please describe, in detail, the process that 

was used to analyze alternatives for the B61 LEP? Also, please describe the options 

that were considered and why they were rejected (or in the case of Option 3B, selected). In general, how do NNSA and DOD consider alternatives in the 6.X warhead life extension process? 

Dr. HARVEY. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) decision to approve Option 3B 

for the B61–12 Life Extension Program was informed by analysis from the B61–12 

Phase 6.2/6.2A, Feasibility Study and Option Down-select/Design Definition and 

Cost Study. During Phase 6.2, the DOD and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) jointly evaluated options to meet military requirements, address component end-of-life/weapon performance drivers and where possible, incorporate improvements in safety and security. Initially, the analysis focused on four design options (Options 2A–2D) that all included a full nuclear and nonnuclear life extension 

coupled with a DOD acquisition program for a tail kit assembly to maintain weapon 

effectiveness. These options differed in the level of enhanced surety they provided 

to the DOD. Due to the high costs associated with Options 2A–2D, as well as the 

risks associated with their potential implementation, the NWC requested additional 

alternatives be assessed. These additional alternatives included a) a minimum refurbishment option that only replaced three components (radar, neutron generator 

and power supply) with documented performance/aging issues (commonly known as 

the ‘‘Triple Alt’’), b) a minimum, credible nonnuclear component refurbishment program (Option 1E), and c) a minimum nuclear and nonnuclear life extension program 

to meet DOD requirements (Option 3B). Although the Triple Alt met immediate 

known aging concerns at a reduced estimated cost, it was considered a ‘‘stop gap’’ 

measure since the B61 would still require a subsequent life extension program in 

the mid-2020s. Likewise, even though Option 1E’s estimated costs were also significantly less than Options 2A–2D, it increased the risk associated with component 

reuse, it did not address nuclear refurbishment and it would require a subsequent 

refurbishment program to sustain a long-term B61 capability. Analysis indicated 

that both the Triple Alt and Option 1E would ultimately be more expensive than 

Option 3B due to successive multiple refurbishment actions required to sustain the 

B61. Based on this analysis, the NWC selected Option 3B because it offered a minimum program to address DOD requirements with a cost-effective, balanced approach to capability, technology risk, and warfighter needs. This option maximized 

component reuse and the use of proven technologies to manage cost and schedule 

risk. Finally, Option 3B will enable the United States to reduce its current nuclear 

stockpile through consolidation of four B61 variants into one B61–12. 
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In general, the process used to down-select the B61–12 Option 3B is used by 

NNSA and DOD to assess LEP alternatives within the Phase 6.X process. Typically, 

the Weapon Design and Cost Report (WDCR), the NNSA product from Phase 6.2A, 

includes all costed design options. The DOD and NNSA, through a weapon system 

Project Officers Group, present these options with a recommended path forward to 

the NWC who in turn, authorizes a warhead LEP. 

Mr. ROGERS. 13) Dr. Harvey, when does our current force of Minuteman III 

ICBMs start aging out? What life extension programs are currently under way for 

the ICBMs? 

a. What assessments or surveillance are we doing related to aging in the ICBM 

force? 

b. What are our plans or programs to replace or extend the life of the Minuteman 

III ICBM force into the 2030s? When must the decision be made on a replacement 

program? 

Dr. HARVEY. The Air Force remains committed to modernizing and sustaining the 

Minuteman III (MM III) through 2030 while evaluating a follow-on Ground Based 

Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) capability. Flight tests and surveillance efforts continue 

for key MM III subsystems, including Solid Rocket Motors (SRM), Guidance and Reentry Vehicles, to provide more accurate estimates for component age-out and system end-of-life timelines. MM III SRM, guidance and fuze replacements are expected to be needed prior to 2030. The ICBM Demonstration Validation program is 

maturing technologies for insertion into future SRM and guidance programs. The 

ICBM Fuze Modernization program is under way and will provide replacement 

fuzes starting in 2020. All of these efforts will be closely coordinated and leveraged 

with efforts to modernize the MM III through 2030. A GBSD Analysis of Alternatives study examining options and required capabilities for a follow-on ICBM system is scheduled to begin in August 2013 and a new ICBM development program 

could begin this decade. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. 14) Has the Administration considered potentially more cost-effective 

alternatives to provide strong and reliable extended deterrence to NATO countries, 

that might be discussed with the Europeans? Why, why not? 

Secretary CREEDON. The United States participated actively in the NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) in 2012. Much like the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, this critical review looked at different options before making final recommendations in the published DDPR. 

In the DDPR, the Alliance decided that: 

Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defence alongside conventional and missile defence forces . . . . As long 

as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the 

Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear 

forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, 

contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies. 

Consistent with NATO’s commitment to remain a nuclear alliance for as long as 

nuclear weapons exist, Allies concur that the North Atlantic Council will direct that 

the appropriate committees develop concepts for how to ensure the broadest possible 

participation of Allies concerned (i.e., all members of the Nuclear Planning Group) 

in their nuclear sharing arrangements, including if NATO were to decide to reduce 

its reliance on nonstrategic nuclear weapons based in Europe. 

Mr. COOPER. 15) Given that the United States plans to spend between $9.6 billion 

$11.7 billion for extending the life of the B61 and a new Air Force tail kit, how 

much do NATO countries contribute to retaining forward-deployed B61s in Europe? 

Secretary CREEDON. Recent NATO contributions toward forward-deployed B61 

warheads in Europe include funding for security enhancements and upgrades, as 

well as infrastructure upgrades (investment) at European weapon storage sites provided through the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP). There have been 

four NATO weapons storage-related upgrades (Capability Package upgrades) since 

the original NATO Capability Package was approved in 2000: 
151 

1 NATO common funding derives from U.S. and other contributions. The U.S. burden-share 

costs are generally 24 percent of the NATO budget. The U.S. burden-share is generally 22–24 

percent of the total NSIP costs. As a result, the NATO funds above include the U.S. contribution 

to NATO. 

Project Total (M) 1

Initial WS3 Installation approx. $215M USD 

Basic Capability Package (Jul 2000) 12.8M EUR 

Addendum 1 (Feb 2005) 17.9M EUR 

Addendum 2 (Apr 2006) 13.0M EUR 

Addendum 3 (Mar 2009) 13.0M EUR 

Addendum 4 (Aug 2011) 108M EUR 

Additionally, bilateral agreements require the host-nation to provide ‘‘mission-related facilities, services, supplies and other logistical support’’ for our units at each 

of the six sites. These may generally be scoped down to facilities and utilities, but 

the type and level of services, as well as funding for services provided, vary at each 

location. 

Mr. COOPER. 16) What is the impact of delayed reprogramming and NDAA FY13 

provisions withholding funds for interim Pu [plutonium] strategy? 

Secretary CREEDON. Delayed reprogramming and National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 provisions are affecting near-term, critical pit production and certification. Additionally, Dr. Charles McMillan, Director of Los Alamos 

National Laboratory, has informed the National Nuclear Security Administration 

that further delay of the reprogramming would harm essential personnel at the lab 

and would create greater difficulty in meeting near-term DOD requirements, i.e., 

producing 10 pits per year by FY 2019, and ramping up to 30 pits per year by FY 

2021. Meeting these requirements is essential to support the W78/88–1 warhead 

Life Extension Program. 

Mr. COOPER. 17) What is the requirement for plutonium pit production and under 

what circumstances might the need be fewer than 80 pits? Is the Administration 

examining this plutonium pit requirement as directed in Sec 3147 of the NDAA FY 

2013? 

Secretary CREEDON. Section 3147 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2013 requires DOD to review its pit production requirement and provide 

analysis for a range of production capacities in a report to Congress. This report is 

currently with the Nuclear Weapons Council members for review and approval. 

DOD maintains its requirement for 50–80 pits per year in order to perform planned 

stockpile work, maintain the highly skilled workforce that performs this work, and 

hedge against technical failure and geopolitical surprise. Because multiple factors 

affect DOD requirements, including stockpile needs and U.S. policy objectives, DOD 

recognizes that at times fewer than 80 pits are required; therefore, DOD allows for 

a range of 50–80 pits per year. We look forward to informing Congress of our analysis more fully. 

Mr. COOPER. 18) Would increasing decision-time for the President by reducing 

alert levels, as Senator Nunn has recommended, provide opportunities for increasing 

stability and reducing the risk of miscalculation? 

Secretary CREEDON. The Nuclear Posture Review follow-on analysis of deterrence 

requirements did look at this issue and did examine postures that involved some 

additional reduction in readiness. We found that additional steps in this regard 

would be difficult to verify on the other side, and more importantly could be destabilizing in a crisis if alert levels were restored. Our conclusion was that modernized 

and improved command and control systems and processes were a better method of 

increasing Presidential decisionmaking time than reducing alert levels. 

Mr. COOPER. 19) What is the impact of delayed reprogramming and NDAA FY13 

provisions withholding funds for interim Pu [plutonium] strategy? 

General KEHLER. NNSA’s reprogramming request provides the initial funding to 

develop an interim plutonium processing capability at Los Alamos National 

Labratory, which is necessary to support the stockpile modernization program. Specifically, the funds will be used to equip the Radiological Laboratory Utility Office 

Building at Los Alamos for higher materials limits, repurpose portions of the Los 
152 

Alamos Plutonium Facility (PF–4), and initiate preconceptual work for establishing 

enduring capabilities. Deferral of the reprogramming approval delays the initial implementation steps of the interim capability and delays the current plan to produce 

30 pits per year by 2021 by at least 2 years. 

Mr. COOPER. 20) What is the requirement for plutonium pit production and under 

what circumstances might the need be fewer than 80 pits? Is the Administration 

examining this plutonium pit requirement as directed in Sec 3147 of the NDAA FY 

2013? 

General KEHLER. The long-term requirement for pit production is 50–80 pits per 

year. NNSA has a plan to build this capacity over time to realize a fully responsive 

infrastructure. The near term life extension program needs can be met with less 

than this capacity by refurbishing and reusing components. As required in Sec. 3147 

of the NDAA FY 2013, the Pit Production Requirements Report will address this 

question further and is in interagency coordination. 

Mr. COOPER. 21) Are you concerned about the risk of unexpected cost and schedule slips for the B61 LEP causing a delay to other LEPs? 

General KEHLER. Yes. As currently planned, the B61 life extension provides an 

opportunity to cost-effectively address known and projected aging and performance 

issues and to enhance the safety and security of the system while aligning the effort 

within the overall capacity of the weapons complex. Slipping the B61 LEP schedule 

out of the narrow window of opportunity will create significant cost growth and impact refurbishments on other systems. 

Mr. COOPER. 22) Does New START remain in U.S. interests? Why? What would 

be the risks of limiting funding for New START implementation in FY14? 

General KEHLER. Yes. New START reduces the potential threat to the American 

people, enhances stability and provides the U.S. with valuable insight into Russian 

strategic nuclear forces. The treaty’s verification regime includes data exchanges, 

on-site inspections, and other measures enabling us to observe and evaluate Russian 

activities, including compliance with treaty obligations. 

Funding limitations in FY14 would introduce significant risk for the U.S. to comply with the treaty’s central limits by February 2018. FY14 funding is necessary to 

continue elimination of deactivated, nondeployed systems and prepare to implement 

additional actions necessary to ensure compliance. 

Mr. COOPER. 23) Could further nuclear weapons reductions increase U.S. security? 

General KEHLER. They could depending on the scale, scope, and nature of the reductions. I believe the negotiated mutual and verifiable reductions the U.S. has implemented with the Russians have definitely increased U.S. security by reducing significantly the number of nuclear weapons Russia could employ against us. 

Mr. COOPER. 24) What part of the nuclear weapons hedge is for technical surprise 

and what part is for guarding against geopolitical surprise? 

General KEHLER. Our nondeployed stockpile addresses both technical and geopolitical uncertainty and risks. There is no specific stockpile distinction. Execution 

of the modernization program for weapons and infrastructure is imperative to ensure appropriate hedge capabilities. 

Mr. COOPER. 25) What is the impact of delayed reprogramming and NDAA FY13 

provisions withholding funds for interim Pu [plutonium] strategy? 

Ms. MILLER. The reprogramming funds initiate the activities associated with getting out of CMR and maintaining capabilities without CMR or CMRR–NF in the 

near term. Additional delays in approval of the reprogramming request slow down 

our efforts to ensure continuity in plutonium operations and will impact mission 

deliverables. The reprogramming request was submitted in September 2012; further 

delays in approval of the reprogramming pose a serious challenge to Los Alamos to 

meet mission requirements and will likely impact our ability to produce war reserve 

pits on the schedule required by the Life Extension Program. These challenges are 

described in the July 1, 2013 letter from LANL Director Charles McMillan to Secretary Moniz. Language in the FY2013 NDAA initially presented a challenge to 

begin execution of some activities associated with the plutonium strategy. Recent 

communication from both the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate 

Armed Services Committee indicates their conditional support for releasing part of 

the reprogramming to begin initial efforts associated with the Pu strategy. Release 

of the remaining funds would be approved after continued communication with both 

committees. 

Mr. COOPER. 26) What is the requirement for plutonium pit production and under 

what circumstances might the need be fewer than 80 pits? Is the Administration 

examining this plutonium pit requirement as directed in Sec 3147 of the NDAA FY 

2013? 
153 

Ms. MILLER. As directed in Section 3147 of the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of Energy 

and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command is preparing a report for Congress 

on pit production capacity requirements. As of late August, the draft report is in 

interagency coordination and should be delivered soon. 

NNSA’s current requirements for pit production are based on the NWC-approved 

plan as described in the classified annex of the FY 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan. The President’s speech given in Berlin on June 19, 2013 announced changes in U.S. nuclear weapon employment guidance. That guidance may 

lead the Department of Defense to implement force structure changes that then may 

create circumstances leading to different pit production capacity requirements than 

we have in our current plans. Due to the anticipated length of time required for the 

Department of Defense to develop nuclear force structure changes, the report responding to section 3147 of the FY 2013 NDAA is based on current requirements. 

In any event, large changes are not expected as a result of any Department of Defense nuclear force structure changes. 

Mr. COOPER. 27) What is NNSA’s plan to reduce cost and schedule risk for performing 4 concurrent LEPs? What is the risk that B61 could delay other LEPs for 

the W78/88 and other life extension programs for militarily necessary weapons? 

Ms. MILLER. NNSA is continuing to work with the Department of Defense to define the anticipated scope, schedule, and costs for all the LEPs. The LEPs are not 

overlapping in a conflicted manner since they are in different phases of the Life Extension process. An example of reducing cost and schedule risk is the recent approval of the B61–12 LEP. Based on a joint assessment of risk and costs, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) selected Option 3B which combines a large amount 

of component reuse and some remanufacture and redesign where needed to minimize costs while meeting military requirements. As part of the decision process, the 

NWC also approved a 2019 First Production Unit (FPU) to reduce overall execution 

risk and better align B61–12 first production with completion of the W76–1 

production. 

Regarding the B61, NNSA acknowledges there are risks to maintaining a B61-12 

FPU in 2019 in part due to sequestration impacts and the expected integration challenges associated with a full life extension program scope. NNSA is aggressively 

working to manage those risks, hold schedule and complete production by the 2024– 

2025 timeframe. As NNSA executes the LEP, we will continue to work with the Department of Defense to balance future LEP requirements to meet cost constraints 

and address the needs of the Department of Defense. 

Mr. COOPER. 28) Why was DNN reduced by $542M, including an 18% cut to Global Threat reduction Initiative? Was this money transferred to weapons activities 

which was increased by $567M? 

Ms. MILLER. In general, the reductions in DOE/NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear 

Nonproliferation (DNN) reflect the successful completion of major program milestones, such as the surge in nuclear removals by the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) in support of the 4-year plans, the planned December 2013 completion 

of the domestic uranium enrichment research, development, and demonstration 

project, and from reassessing the plutonium disposition program. Specifically, the 

reduction in funding for GTRI is not related to the increase in Weapons Activities; 

a significant portion of the Weapons Activities’ increase came from an additional 

transfer of funds from the Department of Defense. Preventing nuclear and radiological terrorism remains one of the highest priorities for the Administration and 

DOE/NNSA, and we are working to address these dangers in the most effective, 

cost-efficient, and timely manner possible. 

Mr. COOPER. 29) Why was GTRI funding reduced while the President was working toward a 4-year goal? How much HEU remains unsecured? 

Ms. MILLER. The top-line reduction in funding for DOE/NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is mainly the result of the successful completion of our 4- 

year effort to secure vulnerable nuclear materials. The reduction is consistent with 

the 4-year plan and reflects increased funding requested in FY 2013 for removal efforts occurring in early FY 2014. Great strides have been made to reduce the prospect of nuclear terrorism in the last 4 years. As of August 6, 2013, GTRI had removed and/or confirmed the disposition of 5,017 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium. GTRI has recently completed a 5-year effort to reconcile the amounts and location of U.S.-origin HEU outside the United States. As 

a result of that effort—as well as efforts to identify additional non-U.S.-origin HEU 

and plutonium that could be eliminated—GTRI has identified up to 3,000 kilograms 

of additional HEU and plutonium that could be targeted for removal or 

downblending beyond the 4-year effort. 
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Mr. COOPER. 30) How much highly Enriched Uranium remains outside the United 

States that could be secured or removed to decrease the risk of nuclear terrorism? 

Ms. MILLER. DOE/NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has recently 

completed a 5-year effort to reconcile the amounts and location of U.S.-origin HEU 

located outside the United States. As a result of that effort—as well as efforts to 

locate additional non-U.S.-origin HEU and plutonium that could be eliminated— 

GTRI has identified up to 3,000 kilograms of additional HEU and plutonium that 

could be targeted for removal or downblending. 

DOE/NNSA’s Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation’s 

(IMPC) immediate priority continues to be increasing the security of buildings and 

facilities in Russia that contain potentially vulnerable weapons-usable nuclear material. To date, the program has completed security upgrades at a cumulative 218 of 

the 229 buildings in Russia and has supported the downblending of over 15 metric 

tons of HEU. 

While considerable security benefits have been gained from these cooperative efforts, much work is left to be done in Russia. Our ongoing nuclear security partnership with Russia will continue to foster improvements in nuclear security best practices in Russia and will facilitate faster and more effective solutions to meeting the 

security challenges that both countries consider critically important. 

Mr. COOPER. 31) What is the impact of delayed reprogramming and NDAA FY13 

provisions withholding funds for interim Pu [plutonium] strategy? 

Dr. HARVEY. According to National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), delayed reprogramming and NDAA FY13 provisions are affecting near-term pit production and certification requirements. Additionally, Dr. Charles McMillan, Director 

of Los Alamos National Laboratory, has informed NNSA that further delay of the 

reprogramming will harm essential workforce at the lab and create even greater difficulty in meeting near-term DOD requirements, i.e., producing 10 pits per year by 

FY 2019 and ramping up to 30 pits per year by FY 2021. Meeting these requirements is essential to support the W78/88–1 Life Extension Program needs. 

Mr. COOPER. 32) What is the requirement for plutonium pit production and under 

what circumstances might the need be fewer than 80 pits? Is the Administration 

examining this plutonium pit requirement as directed in Sec 3147 of the NDAA FY 

2013? 

Dr. HARVEY. The report requirement pursuant to section 3147 of the FY 2013 

NDAA mandates the DOD review its pit production requirement and provide analysis for a range of production capacities. This report is currently with the Nuclear 

Weapons Council Members for review and approval. DOD maintains its requirement 

for 50–80 pits per year in order to perform planned stockpile work, maintain the 

highly skilled workforce that performs this work, and hedge against technical failure and geopolitical surprise. Because multiple factors affect DOD requirements, including stockpile needs and U.S. policy objectives, DOD recognizes that the range 

of 50–80 pits per year must be updated and refined frequently. We look forward to 

more fully informing Congress of our analysis. 

Mr. COOPER. 33) What is the requirement for plutonium pit production and under 

what circumstances might the need be fewer than 80 pits? Is the Administration 

examining this plutonium pit requirement as directed in Sec 3147 of the NDAA FY 

2013? 

Dr. WINOKUR. The Board does not participate in developing the requirements for 

plutonium pit production. Pursuant to Section 3147 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, the responsibility to assess the annual plutonium 

pit production requirement resides with the Secretary of Defense, in coordination 

with the Secretary of Energy and the Commander of the United States Strategic 

Command. 

Mr. COOPER. 34) How has the cost to procure IG services according to the intent 

of the Appropriations and authorization bills affected your budget? 

Dr. WINOKUR. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 

directed the Board to procure Inspector General (IG) services from a Federal Government agency having expertise in the Board’s mission by no later than October 

1, 2013. In so requiring, the NOAA was silent concerning the authorization of funds 

necessary to implement this provision. 

The Board’s budget for FY 2014 is based on the current state of the relevant appropriations bills. Both the House and Senate Appropriations Energy and Water Development Subcommittees have authorized $29.915 million for the Board’s activities. 

Title IV of the House bill, however, further mandates that the Board provide 

$850,000 to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s IG (NRC–IG) for IG services. 

While the Senate bill contains no such language,it must be noted that this bill has 

not yet passed the Senate floor. 
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Consistent with the House bill, the NRC–IG has informed the Board that it will 

not provide IG services to the Board for less than $850,000. The Board believes 

$850,000 is grossly disproportionate to IG appropriations typically imposed on agencies of the Board’s size. Nearly every similarly structured agency the Board examined had IG appropriations ranging from approximately 0.16 percent to 0.85 percent. Conversely, $850,000 would amount to nearly 2.84% of the Board’s total current budget—the equivalent of three to four Board engineers. This reduction in the 

Board’s staffing would necessarily result in less safety oversight of Department of 

Energy defense nuclear facilities. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 35) While the FY 2014 budget request for NNSA weapons activities is more than 7% above last year’s presequester appropriated level, the budget 

request for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative is a reduction of more than 15% 

below the FY 2013 level. Are you concerned that funding for weapons programs is 

crowding out funding for NNSA’s vital nuclear and radiological material security 

programs? 

Ms. MILLER. The funding level for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) 

largely reflects the successful completion of major program milestones. While the 

overall funding for GTRI is less in the FY 2014 request, the FY 2014 request for 

GTRI’s Reactor Conversion program reflects a 16% increase, supporting the acceleration of the establishment of reliable supplies of the medical isotope molybdenum99 (Mo-99) produced without the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU). For GTRI’s 

radiological material protection efforts, there is a partial offset by increases from 

cost sharing with volunteer domestic protection partners that does not appear in the 

GTRI budget. 

Four years of accelerated effort helped DOE/NNSA make a significant contribution to global security, but it is accurately described as ‘‘a sprint in the middle of 

a marathon.’’ More than 100 research reactors and isotope production facilities still 

operate with HEU, significant stockpiles of HEU still exist in too many places, and 

global inventories of plutonium are steadily rising. DOE/NNSA will continue to 

work with international partners to minimize the use of HEU, and eliminate additional stocks of HEU and plutonium after the completion of the 4-year effort. Preventing nuclear and radiological terrorism remains one of the highest priorities for 

the Administration and DOE/NNSA. We are working with our domestic and international partners to secure these dangerous materials in the most effective, efficient, and timely manner possible. 

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