U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

80–292 2013

DOE MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF ITS 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX: LESSONS OF 

THE Y–12 SECURITY FAILURE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 13, 2013 

Serial No. 113–13 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

energycommerce.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

Chairman 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

Chairman Emeritus 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

Vice Chairman 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey 

BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

DAVID B. MCKINLEY, West Virginia 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

MIKE POMPEO, Kansas 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

BILL JOHNSON, Missouri 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

RENEE L. ELLMERS, North Carolina 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

Ranking Member 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

Chairman Emeritus 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

JOHN BARROW, Georgia 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin Islands 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

(III) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

Chairman 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

Vice Chairman 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

RENEE L. ELLMERS, North Carolina 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

FRED UPTON, Michigan (ex officio) 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

Ranking Member 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California (ex officio) 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. Tim Murphy, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth 

of Pennsylvania, opening statement ................................................................... 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3 

Hon. Diana DeGette, a Representative in Congress from the state of Colorado, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 4 

Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the state of Michigan, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Hon. Michael C. Burgess, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas, opening statement .................................................................................... 7 

Hon. Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

California, opening statement ............................................................................. 8 

WITNESSES

Sandra E. Finan, Brigadier General, USAF, Commander, Air Force Nuclear 

Weapons Center and Former Acting Chairman of Defense Nuclear Security, 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) .......................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11 

Daniel B. Poneman, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy, Accompanied by Neile L. Miller, Acting Undersecretary for Nuclear Security and 

Acting Administrator, NNSA .............................................................................. 27 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 181 

Richard A. Meserve, President, Carnegie Institution for Science ....................... 56 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 58 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 191 

C. Donald Alston, Major General, USAF (Retired) ............................................... 57 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 58 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 191 

David C. Trimble, Director, Natural Resources and Environment Team, Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 83 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 85 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 193 

SUBMITTED MATERIAL

Document binder ...................................................................................................... 116 

(1) 

DOE MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF ITS 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX: LESSONS OF 

THE Y–12 SECURITY FAILURE 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 2013 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in room 

2322 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tim Murphy 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Murphy, Burgess, Harper, 

Gardner, Johnson, Barton, Upton (ex officio), DeGette, Braley, 

Luja ́n, Tonko, Green, and Waxman (ex officio). 

Staff present: Carl Anderson, Counsel, Oversight; Charlotte 

Baker, Press Secretary; Mike Bloomquist, General Counsel; Annie 

Caputo, Professional Staff Member; Karen Christian, Counsel, 

Oversight; Andy Duberstein, Deputy Press Secretary; Kirby Howard, Legislative Clerk; Peter Kielty, Deputy General Counsel; Peter 

Spencer, Professional Staff Member, Oversight; Tiffany Benjamin, 

Democratic Senior Counsel; Brian Cohen, Democratic Staff Director, Oversight and Investigations, and Senior Policy Advisor; Elizabeth Letter, Democratic Assistant Press Secretary; and Stephen 

Salsbury, Democratic Special Assistant. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TIM MURPHY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Mr. MURPHY. Good morning. We convene this hearing to continue 

the committee’s examination of Department of Energy’s management and oversight of its nuclear weapons complex, three national 

weapons laboratories and five production and testing facilities. 

These eight sites are responsible for the stewardship of our Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile. 

DOE, through its National Nuclear Security Administration, or 

NNSA, spends billions of dollars each year performing hazardous 

operations to maintain and secure nuclear weapons and weapons 

materials. This work is performed by contractors at the Department’s nuclear weapons sites under the supervision of federal officials and requires strict adherence to strong safety standards. The 

supremely sensitive nature of the materials and technologies also 

requires the Department to ensure an extraordinary level of security to safeguard these nuclear sites and operations. 

2 

Our attention today will focus mainly on the lessons for the Department from the security and oversight failures that occurred 

last summer at the Y–12 National Security Complex, in Oak Ridge, 

Tennessee, and what DOE is doing to address these lessons. 

At its hearing this past September, this subcommittee began to 

examine preliminary information about the failures at Y–12. We 

learned how these failures allowed three protestors at around 4:20 

a.m. one morning last July to penetrate security fences and detection systems and deface the walls of the facility storing highly enriched uranium. We learned about inexcusable maintenance problems and compensatory security measures to work around broken 

equipment and chronic false alarms. We learned about the inadequate response by the protective guard force. And most to the 

point of our hearing today, we learned about the failure of contractor governance and federal oversight to identify and correct the 

multiple early indicators of Y–12’s security, maintenance, and communications systems breakdowns. 

The DOE Inspector General’s testimony at that hearing revealed 

that federal site officials did not do anything to address security 

maintenance backlogs because NNSA’s contractor governance system meant ‘‘they could no longer intervene.’’ This perhaps is the 

most incomprehensible aspect of this troubling situation. It appears 

that, due to a ‘‘hands off’’ federal contracting policy, we had ineffective federal security oversight at Y–12, and potentially at other 

sites around the complex. 

Information produced since September confirms that a strong 

oversight approach to security has not been paramount at DOE, 

particularly since the Department instituted certain reforms to its 

oversight in 2009 and 2010. The stated purpose of these reforms 

was to give contractors flexibility to tailor and implement safety 

and security programs ‘‘without excessive federal oversight or overly prescriptive departmental requirements.’’ Whatever the intent, 

the reforms in practice were interpreted by federal site officials to 

mean they couldn’t intervene when security problems arose. 

We will discuss today the findings of a revealing Task Force assessment, which was commissioned in response to Y–12 and released to the administrator in November. Led by Air Force Brigadier General Sandra Finan, who will testify on the first panel this 

morning, the Task Force found that issues at Y–12 were part of a 

larger pattern of deficiencies in NNSA’s security-related functions 

and activities across board. Notably, the Task Force found no clear 

lines of accountability at NNSA, and broken security policy process, 

an ‘‘eyes on, hands off’’ governance approach that weakened federal 

oversight, and a federal organization ‘‘incapable of performing effective security performance assessment’’ of the contractors operating 

the sites. 

We will hear testimony from GAO on our second panel that 

many of these deficiencies are identical to those identified at NNSA 

10 years ago. It appears the Department instituted reforms that actually may have exacerbated the deficiencies, turning ‘‘eyes on, 

hands off’’ into eyes closed, hands off. 

Deputy Secretary Poneman and acting NNSA Administrator Miller I trust will explain to us today how and when the agency will 

implement the Task Force’s recommendations and exactly how they 

3 

will communicate clear and appropriate priorities for safety and security in their governance of the sites. Let me welcome you both, 

and General Finan. 

Our second panel provides broader perspective on security culture at the Department. Along with GAO, we will hear from General Donald Alston and former NRC Chairman Richard Meserve, 

two of three contributors to an analysis requested by the Secretary 

of Energy about the physical security structure at the DOE. 

The experience and perspective of these witnesses should help us 

to put the security deficiencies in the broader context of the oversight and management challenges confronting DOE. In the end we 

should identify a path forward for the Department to ensure strong 

oversight and zero tolerance for failures. The risks to millions of 

people, and indeed geopolitics are too important for anything less. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TIM MURPHY

Good Morning. We convene this hearing to continue the Committee’s examination 

of the Department of Energy’s management and oversight of its nuclear weapons 

complex—three national weapons laboratories and five production and testing facilities. These eight sites are responsible for the stewardship of our nation’s nuclear 

weapons stockpile. 

DOE, through its National Nuclear Security Administration (or NNSA), spends 

billions of dollars each year performing hazardous operations to maintain and secure nuclear weapons and weapons materials. This work is performed by contractors 

at the Department’s nuclear weapons sites under the supervision of federal officials 

and requires strict adherence to strong safety standards. The supremely sensitive 

nature of the materials and technologies also requires the Department to ensure an 

extraordinary level of security to safeguard these nuclear sites and operations. 

Our attention today will focus mainly on the lessons for the Department from the 

security and oversight failures that occurred last summer at the Y–12 National Security Complex, in Oak Ridge Tennessee—and what DOE is doing to address these 

lessons. 

At its hearing this past September, this Subcommittee began to examine preliminary information about the failures at Y–12. We learned how these failures allowed 

three protestors at around 4:20 a.m. one morning last July to penetrate security 

fences and detection systems and deface the walls of the facility storing highly enriched uranium. 

We learned about inexcusable maintenance problems and ‘‘compensatory’’ security 

measures to work around broken equipment and chronic false alarms. We learned 

about the inadequate response by the protective guard force. 

And most to the point of our hearing today, we learned about the failure of contractor governance and Federal oversight to identify and correct the multiple early 

indicators of Y–12’s security, maintenance, and communications systems breakdowns. 

The DOE Inspector General’s testimony at that hearing revealed that federal site 

officials did not do anything to address security maintenance backlogs because 

NNSA’s contractor governance system meant ‘‘they could no longer intervene.’’ This 

perhaps is the most incomprehensible aspect of this troubling situation. It appears 

that, due to a ‘‘hands off’’ federal contracting policy, we had ineffective federal security oversight at Y–12—and potentially at other sites around the complex. 

Information produced since September confirms that a strong oversight approach 

to security has not been paramount at DOE, particularly since the Department instituted certain reforms to its oversight in 2009 and 2010. The stated purpose of 

these reforms was to give contractors flexibility to tailor and implement safety and 

security programs ‘‘without excessive federal oversight or overly prescriptive departmental requirements.’’ Whatever the intent, the reforms in practice were interpreted 

by federal site officials to mean they couldn’t intervene when security problems 

arose. 

We will discuss today the findings of a revealing Task Force assessment, which 

was commissioned in response to Y–12 and released to the Administrator in November. Led by Air Force Brigadier General Sandra Finan, who will testify on the first 

panel this morning, the Task Force found that issues at Y–12 were part of a larger 

4 

pattern of deficiencies in NNSA’s security-related functions and activities across 

board. 

Notably, the Task Force found no clear lines of accountability at NNSA, a broken 

security policy process, an ‘‘eyes on, hands off’’ governance approach that weakened 

Federal oversight, and a federal organization ‘‘incapable of performing effective security performance assessment’’ of the contractors operating the sites. 

We will hear testimony from GAO on our second panel that many of these deficiencies are identical to those identified at NNSA ten years ago. It appears the Department instituted reforms that actually may have exacerbated the deficiencies— 

turning ‘‘eyes on, hands off’’ into eyes closed, hands off. 

Deputy Secretary Poneman and acting NNSA Administrator Miller I trust will explain to us today how and when the agency will implement the Task Force’s recommendations and exactly how they will communicate clear and appropriate priorities for safety and security in their governance of the sites. Let me welcome you 

both, and General Finan. 

Our second panel provides broader perspective on security culture at the Department. Along with GAO, we will hear from General Donald Alston and former NRC 

Chairman Richard Meserve, two of three contributors to an analysis requested by 

the Secretary of Energy about the physical security structure at the DOE. 

The experience and perspective of these witnesses should help us to put the security deficiencies in the broader context of the oversight and management challenges 

confronting DOE. In the end we should identify a path forward for the Department 

to ensure strong oversight and zero tolerance for failures. The risks to millions of 

people, and indeed geopolitics are too important for anything less. 

# # # 

Mr. MURPHY. I would now like to recognize Ranking Member 

Diana DeGette for her opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANA DEGETTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, as you said, a little over 7 months ago, an 82- 

year-old nun and two middle age men breached the security perimeter surrounding the highly-enriched uranium facility at the Y–12 

National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. In the wake 

of that incident, this committee had a hearing toward exactly how 

such an absurd and dangerous breach of security could happen. 

Today, I want to thank you for having this follow-up hearing to 

learn what has happened to address the security breakdowns that 

resulted in the breach, and to make sure that something like that 

never happens again. 

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for continuing our longstanding bipartisan interest in this subcommittee in ensuring that 

our nuclear facilities are safe and secure. 

Our past oversight over the nuclear complex has made a significant difference, raising standards for worker safety, ensuring lab 

safety, ensuring security standards remain accountable to those 

who work within the labs and who live nearby, and forcing NNSA 

to make significant changes when things go awry. But I got to tell 

you, as I have told you before, both on and off the record, every few 

years we go through this same thing. There is an incident, there 

is an aggressive response from NNSA, time passes without an incident, and everybody begins to relax. Labs start to complain about 

overly burdensome paperwork and oversight. In response, expectations and rules are relaxed, and then, of course, without fail, another incident occurs. I am tired of this pattern and we should all 

5 

be tired of this pattern, because it really does affect our national 

security. 

Today, I am hoping to hear how NNSA and DOE have responded 

to last year’s call to action, not just at Y–12, but across the NNSA 

complex. But more importantly, I want to hear what they are doing 

to ensure that we don’t have to have any more hearings about security breaches or safety incidents at these sites. I guess my view 

is, it is time to break this pattern. 

I want to commend the agencies for acting promptly to address 

the issues exposed at Y–12 in the wake of the July 28 breach. However, I continue to be deeply concerned about oversight within 

NNSA. Last month, GAO again released its high risk list, identifying agencies and program areas that are at high risk due their 

vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Just as 

it has been since 1990, contract management at NNSA is on this 

list. Assessments conducted after last year’s security breach show 

that NNSA dubious honor is well-deserved. A February, 2013, DOE 

Inspector General report described a ‘‘eyes on, hands off’’ approach 

to contractor oversight, meaning federal employees felt they could 

monitor but not intervene in contractor activities, even if they suspected an issue. Recent assessments conducted by DOE’s Office of 

Health, Safety, and Security showed contractor communication 

problems, both between different contractors at the Y–12 site, and 

between the contractor and federal employees at Y–12, and other 

independent experts observed a Y–12 culture that completely failed 

to adequately focus on security. 

As terror effects become more real, and as our enemies become 

more sophisticated, we just can’t afford to take this ‘‘eyes on, hands 

off’’ approach to security. Tens of thousands of people work at these 

labs and facilities, and we owe it to them and to the communities 

around the facilities and the American people to ensure that they 

are safe and secure. To do that, we have got to closely examine and 

monitor the nuclear complex, promote transparency when it comes 

to how DOE and NNSA are using their resources, and demand accountability from everybody involved. We have to insist that standards are simply never relaxed because people don’t like filling out 

paperwork. In short, we have to demand more. 

There has been no shortage of assessments of what should be 

done for the complex, and in the coming months, I am sure we can 

expect more of these. As we move forward, we have to continue to 

make sure that DOE and NNSA are keeping nuclear safe sites safe 

and adapting and responding to the ever-changing security challenges at the nuclear complex. 

So Mr. Chairman, I am happy that you are continuing the grant 

tradition of this subcommittee in oversight of DOE and NNSA, and 

I look forward to working with you as we move along in the future. 

I yield back. 

Mr. MURPHY. I thank the Congresswoman from Colorado. 

I now recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Upton, 

for an opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 

Mr. UPTON. Well thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

6 

Today’s hearing represents another important step in this committee’s ongoing oversight to ensure that the Department of Energy’s management of nuclear security enterprise can successfully 

protect taxpayer dollars, ensure public health and worker safety, 

and in fact, safeguard our national security assets. We know from 

our past work, as well as from the recent and very troubling security failures at Y–12, that management reform is necessary to ensure safe and secure operations. The challenge has been learning 

the right lesson from past failures, and then successfully implementing the right fixes. 

Time and again over the last 14 years, we have witnessed dramatic failures in safety and security, as well as taxpayer waste 

across the nuclear complex. Despite that poor track record, in ’09 

DOE proposed increased economy and less oversight as the appropriate corrective actions. We know, though, from past experiences 

and the Y–12 breach that strong and consistent federal management bolstered by truly independent oversight is, in fact, necessary. DOE leadership must be clear that safety and security 

come first. They go hand in hand. This is the lesson that we have 

learned from the civilian nuclear industry. As safety improves, so 

does performance. Absent an imbedded safety culture, there is erosion of safety practices, leading to outages, delays, and other operational impacts. The same is true for security. 

The Y–12 security breach demonstrated not only a failure at the 

site, but also a failure of DOE and NNSA management. We can 

trace some of that failure to the initiative launched by DOE leadership 3 to 4 years ago to rely more on contractor’s self-assessments 

and define success as productivity gained. Secretary Chu himself 

wanted DOE to be viewed as a ‘‘partner and asset,’’ his words for 

the contractors, sending the signal that oversight of these contractors would not be a priority. Members on this committee warned 

the Secretary in 2010 that such initiatives, however well-intentioned, were misinterpreting the lessons and the past and could, in 

fact, backfire, and that track record speaks for itself. 

As this committee, with oversight responsibility for DOE, we 

must ensure that current and future DOE leadership learns the 

right lessons. That starts today when we hear about the plans to 

fix and sustain improvements in safety and security oversight. 

I yield the balance of my time to Dr. Burgess. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Upton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHAIRMAN FRED UPTON

Today’s hearing represents another important step in this committee’s ongoing 

oversight to ensure the Department of Energy’s management of the nuclear security 

enterprise can successfully protect taxpayer dollars, ensure public health and worker safety, and safeguard our national security assets. 

We know from both our past work, as well as from the recent and very troubling 

security failures at Y–12, that management reform is necessary to ensure safe and 

secure operations. The challenge has been learning the right lessons from past failures and then successfully implementing the right fixes. 

Time and again over the past 14 years, we have witnessed dramatic failures in 

safety, security, and taxpayer waste across the nuclear complex. Despite this poor 

track record, in 2009 DOE proposed increased autonomy and less oversight as the 

appropriate corrective actions. 

7 

We know, though, from past experience and the Y–12 breach that strong and consistent federal management, bolstered by truly independent oversight, is necessary. 

DOE leadership must be clear that safety and security come first. 

Safety and performance go hand-in-hand. This is the lesson we’ve learned from 

the civilian nuclear industry. As safety improves, so does performance. Absent an 

embedded safety culture, there is erosion of safety practices, leading to outages, 

delays, and other operational impacts. The same is true for security. 

The Y–12 security breach demonstrated not only a failure at the site, but also a 

failure of DOE and NNSA management. We can trace some of this failure to the 

initiatives launched by DOE leadership three and four years ago to rely more on 

contractor self-assessments, to reduce ‘‘burdensome’’ oversight, and to define success 

as productivity gains. Secretary Chu himself wanted DOE to be viewed as a ‘‘partner and asset’’ for the contractors, sending a signal that oversight of these contractors would not be a priority. 

Members on this committee warned the Secretary in 2010 that such initiatives— 

however well-intentioned—were misinterpreting the lessons of the past and could 

backfire. DOE’s track record speaks for itself. 

As the committee with oversight responsibility for DOE, we must ensure that current and future DOE leadership learn the right lessons. This will start today, when 

DOE/NNSA explains that it has serious plans for fixing and sustaining improvemes 

in safety and security oversight. 

# # # 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL C. BURGESS, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Mr. BURGESS. I thank the chairman of the full committee—chairman of the subcommittee for calling this important hearing. This 

is an important follow-up on the committee’s work in the last Congress into the astonishing security lapses that occurred at one of 

our most important, and purportedly most secure nuclear weapons 

facilities in the country. 

You know, you look at the continuum, the range of failure and 

it goes from totally unacceptable to an abject failure, and this is 

at one of our country’s most important facilities that stores highly 

enriched uranium for our defenses and for our national security. At 

last September’s hearing, I voiced my concern over the lack of accountability. We need to know who at Department of Energy was 

held accountable. Who lost their job? Who lost their job because of 

this epic failure of security and oversight? 

Now, General Finan’s task force, I think, has put it very succinctly that there is a pervasive culture of tolerating the intolerable 

and accepting the unacceptable. I fear that statement has really become the operational motto of the Executive Branch, where failure 

after failure is met with a shrug and not much more. Had this incident been perpetrated by someone with more sinister motives, the 

break-in could have had catastrophic results for that region and for 

our Nation. So I continue to be concerned that our security at our 

Nation’s most critical facilities is not being given the priority that 

it deserves. 

Chairman Murphy and I met with General Finan, and I thank 

you, General, for taking the time for that meeting—this was a 

month ago—to discuss some of the observations that her task force 

has made in the security lapses and the oversight failures at 

NNSA. So certainly, we look forward to hearing from you this 

morning as to where the NNSA stands in its oversight of these facilities. 

8 

This investigation is a prime example of the good work that this 

committee can do when it works in a bipartisan manner. The security of our Nation’s weapons facilities is not an issue that divides 

or should divide along party lines. We are all in favor of safe, secure areas where our nuclear stockpiles can be held, ready to protect our Nation, and safe from predators. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank the gentleman. I will now recognize for 5 

minutes the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Waxman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for recognizing me and 

for holding this hearing. 

The Y–12 incident was embarrassing for DOE and NNSA, the 

National Nuclear Security Administration. It exposed serious 

issues within the security organization at NNSA. I appreciate our 

witnesses being here today, and I hope they will help us identify 

and address these concerns. 

The security concerns we will hear about today must be addressed. We cannot let our nuclear facilities become targets for our 

foreign enemies and terrorists. We need to invest in the safety and 

security of these facilities, both financially and by ensuring they 

have a culture that is focused on keeping our nuclear legacy materials and the people who work with them safe and secure. 

I appreciate DOE’s actions in the wake of the Y–12 incident. The 

Department has taken this incident seriously and developed a 

thoughtful approach to addressing concerns that have been identified, but there is still more work left to be done. DOE needs to ensure that it exercises strong oversight over both its contractors and 

its federal employees at NNSA sites, and as noted by General 

Finan today, DOE needs to ensure that there is a clear line of authority from the Secretary down to the contractor, security guards 

at every site. 

Over the years, many people have advocated many different 

structures for NNSA, but the assessments made after the Y–12 incident show that the problem is not too much DOE efforts oversight, it is too little. The problem is that contractors didn’t take 

their responsibilities to the government or their workers seriously. 

The federal employees failed to exercise appropriate authority over 

the contractor counterparts, and that NNSA’s culture didn’t adequately focus on security. 

These problems can be resolved by effective oversight by DOE by 

requiring that contractors become accountable and transparent, 

and by ensuring that the federal officials who oversee these contractors take a hands on approach to oversight. 

In the past year, some have suggested that NNSA needs more 

autonomy. In fact, last year’s House-passed National Defense Authorization Act included language stripping DOE’s authority over 

some NNSA sites. Given what we have seen in the last 7 months, 

that approach makes absolutely no sense. The Y–12 breach made 

it abundantly clear that NNSA is not doing enough on its own. All 

the findings and recommendations that have come from indeVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:16 Aug 22, 2013 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\MY DOCS\HEARINGS 113\113-13 CHRIS
9 

pendent evaluators of the Y–12 breach, including NNSA’s own task 

force, show that NNSA needs more oversight, not less. NNSA sites 

house some of our most dangerous nuclear assets. We need vigorous oversight by DOE to ensure that these nuclear materials are 

appropriately protected. 

Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for holding this hearing. I look 

forward to more opportunities to check in on NNSA’s progress. I 

yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. MURPHY. The vice chairman yields back, and now we will go 

over our witnesses today. 

With us today is Brigadier General, United States Air Force, 

Sandra Finan. I hope I am pronouncing that right. I believe I am, 

right? Thank you for being here. She is the Commander of the Air 

Force Nuclear Weapons Center and former Acting Chief of Defense 

Nuclear Security, National Nuclear Security Administration. 

Also joining her is Daniel B. Poneman, Deputy Secretary, U.S. 

Department of Energy. Thank you so much for being with us today, 

sir, and also accompanied by Neile Miller, the Acting Administrator 

of NNSA. I hope I have all the title correct. 

As you know, the testimony you are about to give is subject to 

Title XVIII, Section 1001 of the United States Code. When holding 

an investigative hearing, this committee has a practice of taking 

testimony under oath. Do you have any objections to testifying 

under oath? 

The chair then advises you that under the rules of the House and 

rules of the committee, you are entitled to be advised by counsel, 

if you desire to be advised by counsel during your testimony today. 

OK, they all say no. 

Then in that case, if you would please rise and raise your right 

hand, and I will swear you in. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. Noting for the record that all the witnesses responded in the affirmative, I now call upon each of them 

to give a 5-minute summary and their written statement. 

Starting off with you, General Finan, thank you for being here 

today. 

TESTIMONY OF SANDRA E. FINAN, BRIGADIER GENERAL, 

USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CENTER AND FORMER ACTING CHAIRMAN OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR SECURITY, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (NNSA); AND DANIEL B. PONEMAN, DEPUTY SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ACCOMPANIED BY 

NEILE L. MILLER, ACTING UNDERSECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR 

SECURITY AND ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, NNSA 

TESTIMONY OF SANDRA E. FINAN 

General FINAN. Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member DeGette, 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the study I conducted on the National Nuclear Security Administration’s federal security organization—— 

Mr. MURPHY. Could you pull your mike closer to yourself there, 

if it is on, too? 

General FINAN. Is that better? 

10 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, much better. Thank you. 

General FINAN. OK. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the study I conducted 

on the National Nuclear Security Administration’s federal security 

organization and assessment model. Although I am no longer assigned to the NNSA, I am pleased to share our observations based 

on our 90-day study. 

In the aftermath of the July 28, 2012, security incident at the 

National Nuclear Security Administration’s Y–12 National Security 

Complex, the leadership of the NNSA and the Department of Energy took action to address the security failures at Y–12. The initial information gathered revealed that the issues at Y–12 were 

part of a larger pattern of security program management deficiencies within NNSA. These security issues prompted the NNSA 

administrator to commission a task force to analyze the current 

federal NNSA security organizational structure and security oversight model and recommend possible improvements. The NNSA Administrator directed the Task Force to analyze the current NNSA 

security organizational structure and recommend possible improvements, and to analyze the current NNSA security oversight model 

and mechanisms to determine what seams existed and what structures could be implemented to better ensure that the issues are 

found and fixed before they become problems. 

While other reviews were aimed at diagnosing the root causes of 

the Y–12 event, the NNSA administrator’s direction called for this 

Task Force to focus on the a path forward within the federal NNSA 

organization. Under my leadership, the task force consisting of 

NNSA, DOE, and military specialists conducted extensive document reviews and interviewed federal managers and staff as well 

as a selection of contractor security managers and others across the 

NNSA security organization. The task force collected and analyzed 

information, identified issues, and suggested a revised organizational structure and assessment model. 

While we highlighted negative aspects of the NNSA security organization and assessment model, the task force found many great 

people on the NNSA security staffs. They are clearly dedicated, 

skilled, and hard-working and want to get the security mission 

done right. Unfortunately, NNSA security personnel have seen 

themselves thwarted by lack of management support and feel obstructed by some of their peers. Their difficulties were compounded 

by the absence of a workforce strategy to recruit, retain, and develop a cadre of talented, knowledgeable and experienced security 

professionals. Thus, it is all the more encouraging that these personnel, almost without exception, genuinely care about doing good 

work. Their continued strong desire to build a successful security 

organization is a hopeful sign for the future. 

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I will submit the remainder of my testimony for the record. It contains the findings of the 

task force. 

[The prepared statement of General Finan follows:] 

11 


80292.001

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENT A TIVES 

PRESENTATION TO THE 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SUBJECT: DOE Management and Oversight ofIts Nuclear Weapons Complex: Lessons of the 

Y -12 Security Failure 

STATEMENT OF: Brigadier General Sandra E. Finan 

Commander, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center 

Based on Previous Position as 

Acting Chief of Defense Nuclear Security, NNSA 

March 13,2013 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
12 


80292.002

Introduction 

Chainnan Murphy, Ranking Member Degette, distinguished Members of the Committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to discuss the study I conducted on the National Nuclear Security 

Administration's (NNSA) federal security organization and assessment model. Although I am 

no longer assigned to the NNSA, I am pleased to share our observations based on our 90 day 

study. 

2 

In the aftennath of the July 28,2012 security incident at the National Nuclear Security 

Administration's Y-12 National Security Complex, the leadership of the NNSA and the 

Department of Energy (DOE) took action to address the security failures at Y -12. The initial 

infonnation gathered revealed that issues at Y -12 were part of a larger pattern of security 

program management deficiencies within the NNSA. These security issues prompted the NNSA 

Administrator to commission a Task Force to analyze the current Federal NNSA security 

organizational structure and security oversight model and recommend possible improvements. 

The NNSA Administrator directed the Task Force to: 

• Analyze current NNSA security organizational structure and recommend possible 

improvements that would improve operational focus, oversight, and culture sustainment. 

• Analyze current NNSA security oversight model and mechanisms to detennine what 

seams exist and what structures could be implemented to better ensure that the issues are 

found and fixed before they become problems. 

While other reviews were aimed at diagnosing the root causes of the Y -12 event, the NNSA 

Administrator's direction called for this Task Force to focus on the "path forward" within the 

Federal NNSA organization. Under my leadership, the Task Force consisting ofNNSA, DOE, 
13 


80292.003

and military specialists conducted extensive document reviews and interviewed Federal 

managers and staff as well as a selection of contractor security managers and others across the 

NNSA security organization. The Task Force collected and analyzed information, identified 

issues, and suggested a revised organizational structure and assessment model. 

3 

While we highlighted negative aspects of the NNSA security organization and assessment 

model, the Task Force found many great people on the NNSA security staffs. They are clearly 

dedicated, skilled, and hard-working and want to get the security mission done right. 

Unfortunately, NNSA security personnel have seen themselves thwarted by lack of management 

support and feel obstructed by some of their peers. Their difficulties were compounded by the 

absence ofa workforce strategy to recruit, retain, and develop a cadre of talented, knowledgeable 

and experienced security professionals. Thus, it is all the more encouraging that these personnel, 

almost without exception, genuinely care about doing good work. Their continued strong desire 

to build a successful security organization is a hopeful sign for the future. 

Summary Findings 

The Task Force noted significant deficiencies in security organization, oversight, and culture 

sustainment throughout the NNSA security organizations. In the NNSA security organizations, 

line management authority was ill-defined and claimed by multiple Federal NNSA organizations. 

On the one hand, the "Federal field organizations" (federal site offices and the nuclear 

production office which oversees the management and operating contracts) exercised line 

management authority over the site security contractors via the contract management structure. 

On the other hand, the NNSA Headquarters security organization asserted that it also had such 

authority. Absent clearly defined lines of authority, many individuals asserted authority, while 

correspondingly few have assigned responsibility. This lack of clear lines of authority 
14 


80292.004

contributed to a widespread practice of decision-making by consensus. When consensus failed, 

organizational elements acted independently or not at all, which undermined effective 

implementation of the security program. 

4 

The Task Force further noted a significant gap in the current NNSA security organizational 

structure. At the strategic level the NNSA Headquarters organization had been ineffective and 

had intervened in field tactical execution. The Federal field organizations had been ineffective in 

performing their tactical responsibilities for executing the security program and had intervened in 

strategic matters. Additionally, there had not been a clearly identified operationally-focused 

organization that bridged the gap between strategic and tactical responsibilities and addressed 

standardization, field execution, and multi-site analysis. 

The Task Force found a weak security performance assessment model. It found that NNSA 

relied overwhelmingly upon Federal staff simply reviewing contractor-provided data, rather than 

effectively assessing performance itself. At the same time, misinterpretation of the DOE Safety 

and Security Reform Plan resulted in less stringent independent oversight of security operations. 

As a result of numerous interviews, the Task Force also observed that potentially critical 

management information was not being reported clearly to the appropriate decision makers. 

As concerning as these structural and assessment issues might be, the most striking result of this 

review falls in the area of culture sustainment. It quickly became evident that the Task Force 

findings closely resembled those presented in numerous prior reports. While NNSA has 

attempted to correct some identified issues over the years, it has not adequately emphasized 

effective security mission performance. In recent years, NNSA security leaders have chosen to 

emphasize security cost containment to the detriment of security program execution. The idea 

that the requirements for security performance effectiveness are subordinated to cost concerns 
15 


80292.005

5 

had become a prevailing concept in the NNSA security community. This emphasis had become 

endemic throughout the NNSA security culture, so much so that fundamental facility protection 

issues such as the protection of operational capabilities came to be regarded as too expensive and 

therefore "out of bounds" for analysis. The NNSA security culture had focused on fiscal 

limitations over effective performance. This resulted in an environment in which deficiencies 

were worked at the margins rather than management addressing core issues. 

These issues underscored the critical role of effective leaders. While outside the charter of this 

Task Force, it must be acknowledged that leadership plays the key role in mission 

accomplishment. The Task Force recognized that effective leadership may compensate for 

structural deficiencies within an organization; however, restructuring alone cannot overcome 

leadership shortcomings. The best assessment model is useless if leaders fail to effectively 

implement it. Additionally, the assessment model will not be effective unless leaders 

consistently demand comprehensive, unbiased information. NNSA must take ownership of its 

history of security failures. Leadership must take bold and enduring actions if this pattern is to 

be broken. 

NNSA Organizational Model 

The existing NNSA security organizational structure was convoluted and ineffective. The Task 

Force observed that lines of authority in virtually every organizational function were divided. 

The NNSA security function was not well organized or effectively staffed and the NA-70 policy 

development and implementation process was sub-standard. While the Chief of Defense Nuclear 

Security is the Cognizant Security Authority (CSA), this responsibility has been unevenly 

delegated and was open to inconsistent interpretation. Security staffs were responsible to 

multiple lines of authority and for some functions may not be responsible to anyone. The most 
16 


80292.006

6 

fundamental issues arose from the relationship between NA-70 and the Federal field 

organizations. NA-70 believed that it had line management authority over the security elements 

within the Federal field organizations. However, the managers of these field organizations had 

been formally assigned line management authority. The NNSA Act states that the Chief of 

Defense Nuclear Security role includes "the development and implementation of security 

programs". The current interpretation of this provision has been a source of ambiguity due to the 

mixing of line and staff responsibilities. 

Roles and responsibilities were either undefined or not followed. The Task Force identified 

numerous occasions across the NNSA security organizations where individuals were not allowed 

to perform assigned duties or assumed roles and responsibilities nominally assigned to others. 

The confusion of roles and responsibilities was evident in NA-70, within field organizations, and 

between NA-70 and the field. For example, the approved mission and function statements for 

the two major divisions within NA-70 have little apparent relationship to the way these offices 

operated and how they interacted with each other or with the NA-70. Within field organizations, 

the Task Force noted a number of instances where management precluded staff from performing 

the assigned roles of their position and/or assigned personnel to unrelated duties. At times, NA70 acted as a formal line management organization, and asserted responsibilities that were 

formally assigned to the Federal field security organizations. NA-70 personnel were frequently 

frustrated by site-level resistance to the programmatic direction they provided and Federal field 

security managers were often similarly frustrated when NA -70 used its budget authority, its 

control over the policy process, and other activities to inject itself into what the sites regard as 

their line management decision-making process. 
17 


80292.007

7 

There were no clear lines of authority. There were overlapping lines of authority and mixed 

staff and line functions. The CSA function flowed from the NNSA Administrator through the 

Chief of Defense Nuclear Security to the Federal field organizations. Line management 

authority went from the NNSA Administrator through the Associate Administrator for 

Infrastructure and Operations (NA- 00), to the field. However, NA-70 attempted to exert line 

management authority and provided programmatic guidance directly to the Federal field security 

managers. While Federal field organizations administer the contracts governing the actual 

performance of the security mission, NA-70 routinely interacted with the security contractors. 

Furthermore, NA-70, not the line managers, was the primary executer ofthe NNSA security 

budget. 

The security policy process was sub-standard. The Task Force identified that there was no 

clearly articulated or consistently implemented NNSA security policy process. A major concern 

was the supplanting of DOE Security Orders with generic and less restrictive NNSA policies 

(NAPs). This appeared to be based on a desire to reduce funding demands through a reduction 

of requirements. Additionally, the Task Force noted a desire on the part of some NA-70 senior 

manag~rs to maximize separation from DOE HSS policies and activities. Within NA-70, policy 

and guidance were issued through a variety of formal and informal mechanisms with erratic 

distribution. The Task Force identified that some Federal field organizations were inconsistent 

in their acceptance and application ofNA-70 issued policies. Finally, NA-70 policy and 

guidance tended to be vague resulting in widely differing interpretations by field personnel. 

The NNSA Federal security organization was not effectively structured or staffed. While 

there were clearly strategic (Headquarters) and tactical (Federal field organizations and 

contractors) levels, there was little indication of an effective operational element with 
18 


80292.008

responsibility for security program functions such as site assistance and standardization of 

program execution. The Task Force also noted that the Federal field organizations structured 

their security functions substantially differently. This resulted in a lack of standardization of 

both organization and execution of the security program. At some sites there was weakening of 

the security function and reduced senior management attention. There were a number of 

personnel issues associated with the security professional staff including the lack of a human 

capital development plan, no career path, and limited mobility. Additionally, the Task Force 

noted an overreliance on support service contractors who primarily assisted the NA-70 

organization. 

Federal Assessment Model 

The Task Force expended considerable effort attempting to describe, understand and analyze the 

current assessment model and mechanisms. 

The failure to adequately assess security system performance and to clearly and unequivocally 

report deficiencies to the appropriate senior managers has been identified as a significant 

contributing cause to the Y-12 security incident. The Task Force focused upon the performance 

assessment process as implemented by Federal field and Headquarters organizations within 

NNSA. Although contractor self-assessments were the first-line elements in the security 

performance assessment process, these were outside the direct scope of the review. 

Strengthening the contractor self-assessment process is an important objective, but cannot 

replace a rigorous Federal assessment process. 

NNSA did not have an adequate security performance assessment process or capability. 

The performance assessment capabilities of Federal security organizations within NNSA were 

8 
19 


80292.009

9 

virtually non-existent. Essentially all responsibility for performance assessment was delegated to 

the Federal field organizations. The current Federal field organizations were typically limited to 

"shadowing" contractor self-assessments and/or reviewing the reports these self-assessments 

generated. Moreover, there was a tendency on the part of some field Federal staff to adopt the 

role of defending "their" contractors rather than attempting to objectively assess contractor 

performance. At the Headquarters level, the NA-70 performance assessment function had only 

three full-time Federal staff members. The Task Force noted that the NA-70 assessment process 

was largely confined to the review of submitted paperwork. The result was that there was no 

NNSA Federal organization capable of performing effective security performance assessment. 

The "systems-based" assessment model as implemented was ineffective for security. 

Misinterpretation, and/or misapplication of the DOE Safety and Security Reform Plan, dated 

March 16, 20 I 0, resulted in a weakened Federal security assessment program. In particular, this 

document stated: "Security Performance: Contractors are provided the flexibility to tailor and 

implement security programs in light of their situation and to develop corresponding risk- and 

performance-based protection strategies without excessive Federal oversight or overlyprescriptive Departmental requirements." This guidance was further expanded upon and 

eventually articulated in NAP-21, Transformation Governance and Oversight Initiative. The 

belief arose that' eyes on, hands off precluded Federal security staff from conducting 

performance-based assessments of contractors. As a result, most Federal assessment was based 

on paperwork generated by the contractor. This paper-based system of assessment, without 

sufficient performance verification, was inadequate for effective evaluation of security 

operations. 
20 


80292.010

10 

NNSA had no clear and consistent performance baseline for secnrity program 

implementation. A perfonnance baseline, set forth in detailed standards and criteria, is the 

keystone of an effective security program. Precisely articulated standards and criteria further 

provide an objective foundation for performance assessment. NNSA did not have the standards 

or criteria necessary to effectively measure security program perfonnance. The absence of such 

standards and criteria diminished the ability to identity potentially significant perfonnance 

deficiencies. The Task Force noted that the lack of standards and criteria had been coupled with 

the widespread notion that contractors must only be told "what" the mission is, not "how" the 

mission is to be accomplished. While this approach may be appropriate in other areas, it was 

ineffective as applied to security programs. Therefore, security tasks were not necessarily 

performed in a manner consistent with NNSA security requirements. 

The curreut assessment process was biased against criticism. The Task Force noted a distinct 

bias against finding and stating perfonnance criticisms. The NNSA Federal assessment relies 

heavily on contractor self-assessment. While an important and useful tool, contractor selfassessments tend to be insufficiently objective. The primary Federal assessment role was 

perfonned by field staff. Long-term geographic proximity to site contractors can compromise 

the objectivity of these Federal assessors. Moreover, the intermingling of management and 

assessment roles within Federal field organizations can also contribute to less objective 

assessment. The NA -70 Headquarters perfonnance assessment process, being paper-based, 

could not validate the information submitted. Information provided to the Task Force suggested 

that in some instances infonnation considered to be unfavorable was being "watered down" or 

obscured. Furthennore, information was presented that indicate differing opinions were being 
21 


80292.011

II 

suppressed by some senior managers in the field and at Headquarters. As a result, NNSA senior 

leadership may not have received all information needed to make quality decisions. 

Recommended Organizational Structure 

Recommend an organizational structure that separates the line function for executing the security 

mission from the Headquarters staff function. Additionally, create an operational-level 

organization that focuses on security implementation and standardization. Distinct roles and 

responsibilities should be associated with tactical, operational, and strategic-level security 

functions. Tactical execution of contract administration occurs at the Federal field organizations. 

Operational implementation and standardization of operations across the security program occurs 

at the NA-OO level. Strategic-level policy guidance, requirements determination, and 

performance assessment occur in Headquarters NNSA, NA-70. 

In order to clarify the line of authority, CSA must flow from the NNSA Administrator, through 

the head of the NA-OO, to the Federal field managers, and finally to the designated CSA at field 

sites, with no re-delegations authorized to non-Federal individuals. This authority should follow 

the same path as the line authority. The asserted security line management tie between the Chief 

of Defense Nuclear Security and the security managers in the field should be terminated in order 

to ensure a single, clear line of authority. 

In terms of clarifying line and staff functions, the current NA-70 organization needs to be 

restructured so that it serves solely as a staff organization at the strategic level. Specific 

alignment within the divisions can be varied. The most important change in NA-70 is the standup of the Performance Assessment Division -- a new function responsible for assessment of 
22 


80292.012

12 

contractor and Federal field organization performance. This is the entity that the Chief of 

Defense Nuclear Security would use to verify that security programs are properly implemented. 

A new security operations organizational level needs to be stood up within the NA-OO structure. 

The responsibilities of this office are to ensure that the policies and guidance provided by the 

NA-70 staff are executed in the field. It will also ensure standardization of security procedures 

across the field locations as well as provide field assistance, and a conduit for field concerns to 

be surfaced to the NA-70 staff. 

Resource planning and budgeting, and project management responsibilities will be realigned 

from NA-70 to the new operational-level organization. This establishes a clear linkage between 

budget formulation and mission execution and establishes an equally clear boundary between 

budget considerations and the formulation of requirements. An expanded 

intelligence/counterintelligence liaison is intended to ensure that Federal security managers get 

needed information and have appropriate ties to law enforcement and intelligence-related 

agencies. 

At the tactical level in the field, the multiple lines of authority are eliminated and direction will 

come from a single line of authority. All authorities will run through the Federal field 

organization manager to the appropriate security manager. The Federal field organization scope 

of duties will include primary contract administrative functions--including reviews of contractor 

reports, analysis, security plans, and other required documentation; partnering with the executing 

contractor; remaining knowledgeable and up-to-date on the content, operations, and effectiveness 

of the contractor's security implementation; alerting management of all concerns related to 

contractor execution of the security mission. 
23 


80292.013

13 

This organizational structure will help define and clarify roles and responsibilities and facilitate a 

strong mission focus. It divides resourcing from requirements determination in order to ensure 

that requirements are appropriately stated, weighed against budget resources and decisions made 

on accepting risks at the appropriate level. It provides a single line of authority to those 

operating in the field and maintains an appropriate span of control. 

Recommended Assessment Model 

Recommend a three-tiered assessment process that strengthens the role of Federal security 

assessment within NNSA without diminishing the legitimate need for contractors to maintain 

their own self-assessment capabilities. 

The contractor self-assessment process continues as a first tier in the overall assessment process. 

The primary audience for the contractor self-assessments should be the contractor security 

managers themselves. However, the self-assessments should follow a consistent, program-wide 

format, and be made available for review at all higher levels of management. Contractors should 

be required to identify, report, and resolve security issues--sanctions should come when a higher 

level assessment uncovers problems that the contractor self-assessments fail to identify or 

properly address. Even when an issue is readily resolved and corrective actions are immediate, a 

finding should be issued and the corrective action recorded. Failure to do so inevitably hides 

potential negative trends. Contractor self-assessments should involve active performance testing 

rather than simply relying on work observation and document review--effective security 

performance can only be evaluated through testing. 

The fundamental purpose of Federal security performance assessment is to ensure that 

requirements are properly implemented. Therefore, the primary Federal assessment organization 
24 


80292.014

14 

should ultimately report to the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security, who is responsible for 

requirements. This provides independence not only from the contractors, but also from the 

tactical-level Federal field staff whose necessary day-to-day interaction with contractor managers 

and staff risks loss of objectivity. This enables the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security to better 

ensure effective implementation ofNNSA security programs. Additionally, it provides feedback 

on performance to the operational and tactical levels. 

These Federal security assessments should include performance testing of all critical elements. 

The assessors should issue clear findings which are to be tracked and closed in a program-wide 

corrective action management system. Federal assessors should also look closely at the 

contractor self-assessment process; "failures to identifY" by the contractor self-assessment 

element should automatically rise to the level of significant findings. 

The final tier of the assessment model should explicitly rely upon the services ofthe independent 

security oversight function currently provided by HSS. NNSA should arrange for a regular 

process of comprehensive inspections. The oversight function should be encouraged to issue 

strong findings for matters of potential concern to the NNSA Administrator and the Secretary of 

Energy, and should routinely evaluate the performance of contractor self-assessments and the 

Federal assessment program. 

This performance assessment model assumes a common requirements base that is employed at 

all levels and across the NNSA security program. While some allowance may be made for sitespecific issues, the fundamental elements of this requirements base should be an appropriately 

integrated system of DOE policies, NNSA implementation directives, and field operational 

guidance. The requirements base should be reflected in approved documents such as site 

Safeguards and Security Plans. Specific performance requirements should be articulated in 
25 


80292.015

detailed perfonnance standards and criteria supported by a commonly understood and utilized 

perfonnance testing process. 

Closing 

15 

Over the years, there has been tension between implementation of security and conduct of 

operations. Whenever there have been significant incidents of security concern, there have been 

corresponding swings of the pendulum towards a more rigorous security program. Security 

program emphasis has increased after espionage cases, internal security lapses, and external 

events such as the September 11, 200 I attacks. However, over time, the general trend has been 

to accept more risk and to reduce the perceived burden and cost of the security mission. 

Furthennore, the trend has been to remove security from an integral mission role, adversely 

affecting the NNSA security program. The events at Y -12 illustrate how far the pendulum has 

swung in the wrong direction. 

The Secretary of Energy characterized the Y -12 events as "unacceptable" and clearly stated that 

security is the highest organizational priority. The NNSA Administrator has been equally 

emphatic in numerous public statements since the incident. The evidence from Y-12 and from 

prior security incidents points to a culture of compromises. Moving forward, NNSA must 

establish and sustain an effective security program. NNSA must address the significant flaws in 

the current organizational structure for security and the associated assessment model. NNSA 

must clearly and consistently emphasize the importance of security. Ensuring that the right 

leadership is in the right position is absolutely critical to success. The daunting prospect-and 

the one that will require the consistent emphasis of current and future Secretaries of Energy and 

future Administrators of the NNSA-will be to insti11 a culture that embraces security as a 
26 


80292.016

16 

fundamental and essential element ofthe NNSA mission. IfNNSA fails in this, then senior 

leaders will again find themselves answering to the American people for the failures of security. 

Sooner or later, the perpetrator will not be peacefully-minded. 
27 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Poneman? 

TESTIMONY OF DANIEL B. PONEMAN 

Mr. PONEMAN. Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member DeGette, 

and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to 

appear before you today to provide the subcommittee details on the 

actions the Department has taken or will take to strengthen the security of the Nuclear Weapons Complex in the wake of the July, 

2012, Y–12 incident. We appreciate the interest and engagement of 

this committee and recognize the important oversight role that you 

fulfill. The Secretary and I recognize the severity of the problem 

that led us to this point, and we have acted swiftly to identify and 

address the issues it revealed. 

Since the Y–12 incursion, several major actions have taken place 

to improve security immediately and for the long term. Let me tell 

you about a few of them. 

We restructured the contracts at Y–12 to integrate security into 

the line of command at the M&O contractor. The protective force 

contractor was terminated, and a new M&O contractor has been selected to manage the Y–12 site, providing an opportunity for new 

leadership and to improve the Y–12 security culture. We held accountable both the senior federal and contractor management personnel at headquarters and the site, removing them from their positions. The Department’s Chief of Health, Safety, and Security 

conducted an independent security inspection of Y–12 security operations, which include rigorous force-on-force performance testing, 

as well as no notice and short notice limited scope performance 

testing activities as directed by the Secretary. HSS will be conducting a follow-up review in April to examine the status of the implementation of corrective actions. The Secretary also directed HSS 

to conduct immediate extent of condition assessments of all sites in 

Category I nuclear materials across the DOE complex, to identify 

any immediate security issues and to follow up with a full security 

inspection, including force-on-force exercises to assure effective security measures are being implemented at those sites. 

NNSA conducted an immediate after-action report to identify 

causes, issues to be addressed and recommended action, and you 

just heard very eloquently summarized the findings of those reports. 

In order to address these institutional problems that have been 

revealed, we are continuing to embrace and implement the findings 

of General Finan’s report, which you just heard her describe. 

Because we believe that we need fresh perspectives from disinterested parties to consider broader and long-term responses to this 

incident, Secretary Chu requested three independent experts in 

this area to conduct a strategic review of the entire DOE security 

architecture, with a particular emphasis on Y–12, and I see that 

you are joined by two of the three of these eminent experts here 

today. Each of them provided thoughtful advice on the DOE’s nuclear security structure, specifically, all Category I nuclear facilities. We are now reviewing and discussing their advice on how to 

improve security at Y–12, and across the nuclear enterprise. 

28 

The series of personnel and management changes I have described today were made to provide effective security at the Y–12 

site, and across the DOE complex. We are also working to carry out 

the structural and cultural changes required to secure all Category 

I nuclear materials at this and all other DOE and NNSA facilities, 

and in this respect, I welcome the comments of—in your opening 

remarks from members of this subcommittee about the need to introduce cultural changes so that we are not back in the same situation again. That is absolutely critical, and I think as we get into 

the discussion, what you hear in terms of what we are implementing from General Finan’s report will put us in the right direction in that respect. 

Our management principles hold that our mission is vital and urgent. Nowhere is that more true than here. The security of our Nation’s nuclear material and technology is a core responsibility of the 

Department, in support of the President and in defense of the Nation. The incident at Y–12 was unacceptable and served as an important wakeup call for our entire complex. The Department is taking aggressive actions to ensure the reliability of our nuclear security programs across the entire DOE enterprise and will continue 

to do so. 

In that effort, the Department looks forward to working with this 

subcommittee to ensure the security of the Nation’s nuclear materials. I would be pleased, of course, to answer any questions from 

members of this subcommittee, and request the balance of my 

statement be submitted for the record. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Poneman follows:] 

29 


80292.017

Statement of 

Hon. Daniel B. Poneman 

Deputy Secretary 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Before the 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

Energy and Commerce Committee 

U.S. House of Representatives 

March 13, 2013 

Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member DeGette, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you 

for the invitation to appear before you today to provide the subcommittee details on the 

actions the Department has taken or will take to strengthen management, oversight, and 

security of the nuclear weapons complex in the wake of the July 2012 Y-12 incident. We 

appreciate the interest and engagement of this Committee and recognize the important 

oversight role that you fulfill. We also share the Committee's commitment to assure that all of 

our offices and operations are delivering on our mission safely and securely- from 

Washington, DC, to California, from every naval reactor to every warhead, from production to 

clean-up, from deterrence to nonproliferation. 

Introduction 

Since its creation in 1999, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has served as a 

separately-organized entity within the u.s. Department of Energy, entrusted with the execution 

of our national nuclear security missions. living up to the challenging demands of executing 

our mission safely, securely, and in a fiscally responsible manner requires daily management 

through strong, effective, and efficient relationships with our Management and Operating 

(M&O) contractors. 

The protection of all Department of Energy (DOE) people and assets - our federal and 

contractor employees, technology, and physical assets, including both nuclear and non-nuclear 

facilities and other resources - is of integral importance to our mission. The Secretary and I 

know that, and understand our responsibilities to that mission, in its entirety. Indeed, we have 

reflected our commitment through our Management Principles, which provide that: 

• We will treat our people as our greatest asset; 

• We will pursue our mission in a manner that is safe, secure, legally and ethically sound, 

and fiscally responsible; and 

• We will succeed only through teamwork and continuous improvement. 

1 
30 


80292.018

The Secretary has expressed a consistent, unwavering commitment to maintain safe and secure 

work environments for all Federal and contractor employees. In that spirit, we are determined 

to assure that the Department's and contractors' operations do not adversely affect the health, 

safety, or security of workers, the surrounding communities, or the Nation. 

DOE's mission includes diverse operations, involving a variety of nuclear materials and 

processes. We recognize our unique obligations as a self-regulated agency to establish and 

meet exacting standards for nuclear safety and security, to maintain robust nuclear safety 

performance, and to provide rigorous and trustworthy oversight and enforcement of those 

nuclear safety and security standards. We must also maintain a safety and security culture that 

values and supports those standards, and assures that individuals can freely step forward to 

voice their concerns related to our safe execution of our mission. Indeed, we encourage them 

to do so. Only through these actions can we provide adequate protection of our workers, the 

public, and the environment, while sustaining the public trust and confidence crucial to our 

ability to fulfill the mission. 

To achieve our mission, DOE must strive to excel simultaneously as a self-regulator, as an 

owner, and as an operator of the facilities in our national security complex. Each of these roles 

is vital and must be executed with integrity. The July 2012 incident at Y-12, as the Secretary 

and I have repeatedly emphasized, was unacceptable, and we have taken and will continue to 

take steps not only to identify and correct issues at that site, but across the DOE complex. I wilt 

address the Department's response to the incident in more detail later in this testimony. 

Roles and Responsibilities for Nuclear Security within DOE 

The Secretary and I bear ultimate responsibility for nuclear safety and security at DOE facilities. 

Under our direction, line managers have the authority and the responsibility for establishing, 

achieving, and maintaining stringent performance expectations and requirements among all 

Federal and contractor employees, at DOE labs and other facilities. 

The Department's Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), in consultation with line 

management, is responsible for the development of DOE nuclear safety and security policy, 

Federal Rules, Orders, and the associated standards and guidance, as well as for reviewing 

safety and security issues complex-wide. HSS also conducts independent oversight and 

regulatory enforcement that is independent from line management. HSS oversight has 

expanded the scope and variety of performance testing methods utilized to assess the 

readiness of DOE and NNSA site protection systems against a defined spectrum of threats and 

adversary capabilities Performance testing methodologies include no-notice and limited notice 

inspections to obtain a more realistic assessment of site response capabilities and readiness 

performance. 

The Department's approach to nuclear safety and security is founded on a demanding set of 

standards that capture knowledge and experience in designing, constructing, operating, 

2 
31 


80292.019

deactivating, decommissioning, and overseeing nuclear facilities and operations. DOE applies 

validated national and international standards to the maximum extent possible, because these 

standards reflect broad input from a large and diverse group of experts. As our management 

principles state: "We will apply validated standards and rigorous peer review." 

Our management principles also require that we "manage risk in fulfilling our mission." This is 

essential to a robust safety and security culture, as demonstrated by the 2010 Deepwater 

Horizon oil spill, which vividly demonstrated the inadequacy of a mere "check-the-box" 

mentality by regulated entities when it comes to smart decision-making in a complex and 

hazardous operational environment. Since DOE expects scrupulous compliance with its 

requirements, managers and workers must recognize and embrace their personal 

accountability to meet safety standards, while avoiding a tendency for rote compliance with 

requirements. In some cases, it may be necessary to raise a hand and ask if another approach 

could offer a smarter way to assure safety. This questioning attitude must be encouraged. 

Finally, the Secretary and I are also dedicated to strengthening contract and project 

management. Indeed, we cannot succeed in advancing our goals for the Department if we fall 

short in this effort. And, as we all know, safety and security are integral to effective contract 

management. Indeed, safety and security are key performance standards and elements of 

every contract, and extensive oversight is required to ensure stewardship as well as legal and 

regulatory requirements are met. When we have a safety or security problem, we must fix it, 

which may lead to increased costs and delays. So building safety and security into the fabric of 

our programs and our projects from the start and continuously monitoring adherence to safety 

standards is not just the right thing to do from a moral perspective, and not just the necessary 

thing to according to our governing laws and regulations, but it is also the smart thing to do, as 

stewards of our responsibilities to the Nation and its taxpayers. 

Response to Y-12 Incursion Incident 

On Saturday, July 28,2012, at 4:30AM three individuals trespassed onto the Y-12 National 

Security Complex and defaced a building at NNSA's Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak 

Ridge, Tennessee. 

This incursion and inadequate response to it demonstrated a deeply flawed security culture and 

equally flawed execution of security procedures at Y-12. In response to the incident, we acted 

swiftly to identify and address the problems it revealed. 

Since the Y-12 incursion, several major actions have taken place to improve security: 

Federal and Contractor Management Changes 

New senior Federal and contractor management personnel were brought in to take charge of 

Site and Headquarters organizations, to transform our approach to security. Of the Federal 

personnel, a highly-experienced individual was appointed to serve as the new Chief of Defense 

3 
32 


80292.020

Nuclear Security and to develop overall policy; two Federal office directors experienced in 

security matters were appointed to implement the new policies. Of the contractor 

management personnel, a new M&O Site Manager and the top security official were appointed 

by the contractor to implement the vital security transformation. 

IG Inquiry into Y-12 Security Breach 

The Department and NNSA have been working diligently to implement the recommendations of 

the August 2012 IG report, including verifications that all critical security equipment at Y-12 has 

been repaired and is operational. 

Protective Force Contract Terminated, New M&O Contractor Selected 

WSI's protective force contract was terminated and a new M&O contactor has been selected to 

manage the Y-12 site, providing an opportunity for new leadership and to improve Y-12's 

security culture and management. The award is currently under an automatic stay while being 

protested_at the GAO. Combining contracts and site offices will allow us to improve 

performance and operate as an integrated enterprise. 

HSS Y-12 Security Inspection 

HSS conducted an independent security inspection ofY-12 security operations, which included 

rigorous force-on-force performance testing as well as no-notice and short-notice limited scope 

performance testing activities as directed by the Secretary. The final report of inspection 

results was completed and briefed to senior management on September 28. The Y-12 

inspection results were also briefed to Congressional staff. HSS will be conducting a follow-up 

review in April to examine the status of implementation of corrective actions. 

Extent of Condition Reviews 

At the direction of the Secretary, the Department's Chief of Health, Safety and Security also 

conducted extent of condition reviews at all of the DOE and NNSA Category I Special Nuclear 

Material (SNM) sites in collaboration with DOE and NNSA Program Offices. These reviews 

assessed the current security posture, specifically to determine whether the systemic issues 

identified at Y-12 were present at other Sites, so that any necessary steps could be taken to 

cure any such defects. HSS completed its review in December 2012. The results were briefed to 

DOE leadership and Congressional staff. 

Comprehensive Independent Oversight Security Inspections of all Category I Sites 

The Secretary also directed HSS to conduct assessments of all Category I sites across the DOE 

complex, to identify any systemic security issues. These deep dives are being conducted by the 

HSS Independent Oversight organization, and include the HSS enhanced program of 

performance testing program, evaluation of force-on-force exercises, no-notice security testing, 

4 
33 


80292.021

and comprehensive security inspections at all Category I sites by October 2013. HSS has 

completed security inspections at Y-12, Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Hanford Site. 

Results of these inspections have been briefed to DOE leadership and Congressional staff. The 

remaining security Inspections will include the Savannah River Site (field work completed 

February 21), Pantex Plant, Idaho National Laboratory, Office of Secure Transportation, the 

Nevada National Security Site, and Los Alamos National Laboratory. 

independent Expert Review ofY-12 

Secretary Chu requested three former senior executives from Federal agencies and the private 

sector to conduct a strategic review of the entire DOE security architecture with a particular 

emphasis on Y-12. These executives included President ofthe Carnegie Foundation and former 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Richard Meserve, former Lockheed Martin CEO 

Norman Augustine, and retired Air Force Major General Donald Alston. Each one provided 

thoughtful advice on the DOE's nuclear security structure, specifically all Category I nuclear 

facilities. Their words of advice and ideas are current being considered to improve security at Y12 and across the nuclear enterprise. 

Brigadier General Sandra Finan's Review 

On August 14, 2012, then NNSA Administrator Tom 0' Agostino commissioned a Security Task 

Force led by Brigadier General Sandra Finan to analyze the then-current federal NNSA security 

organizational structure and security oversight model, and to recommend possible 

improvements. 

Over the course of several months, Gen Finan and the members of the Task Force conducted a 

thorough review of NNSA security operations at headquarters and in the field. 

Organizational Improvements 

Prior to the Y-12 incursion, the Headquarters NNSA security organization, the Office of Defense 

Nuclear Security (NA-70), served as a "Functional Manager" for the security mission, while the 

line authority flowed from the Secretary to other NNSA Administrators and other organizations. 

General Finan recommended for strategic-level policy guidance, requirements determination, 

and performance assessment to be under the jurisdiction of the Chief, Defense Nuclear Security 

(NA-70). NNSA's Office of the Associate Administrator for Infrastructure and Operations (NA-OO) 

would provide the operational accountability for NNSA's security organization. Operational 

implementation and standardization of operations across the security program occurs at the 

NA-OO level. 

The existence of a single point through which the field reports and is held accountable is the 

way the NNSA will assure the consistent and effective implementation of security policy. This is 

5 
34 


80292.022

a change from the approach the NNSA has taken-where each field office had greater latitude 

in implementing policies and requirements for its site. 

Additionally, Gen. Finan made recommendations to eliminate the conflict between DOE 

Security Orders and NNSA NAPs. Specifically, NNSA should use DOE Security Orders. DOE has a 

specialized security policy function that produces its orders. Rather than attempt to duplicate 

this function, DOE orders would provide direction while the NAP process would provide 

guidance and clarify information in the orders as appropriate, but not reduce requirements. 

Changing the Assessment Model 

Regarding NNSA's security oversight model, Gen. Finan found that at the time of the Y-12 

incursion NNSA did not have an adequate security performance assessment process or 

capability. The systems-based assessment model that was employed was ineffective for 

security. NNSA lacked a clear and consistent performance baseline for security program 

implementation and the assessment model was biased against criticism. 

To directly address problems with the assessment model, NNSA has set about implementing a 

three-tiered approach to assessing security throughout the NNSA. This approach includes: 1) 

an initial assessment performed by the contractor at the site, 2) an assessment of the 

contractor's performance carried out by the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security at DOE 

Headquarters (NA-70), and 3) independent oversight by the Office of Health, Safety and 

Security. And, of course, apart from this three-tiered assessment and inspection regimen, we 

expect Federal site personnel to perform quality assurance activities on a routine basis as an 

integral part of their line management responsibilities. 

The Secretary and I are pleased that the NNSA has responded to Gen Finan's recommendations 

seriously and is on a course to implement effective security improvements. 

The series of personnel and management changes I have described today were made to provide 

effective security at the site and across the DOE complex. We are also working to carry out the 

structural and cultural changes required to secure all CAT 0/1 nuclear materials at this and all 

other DOE and NNSA facilities. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, the security of our Nation's nuclear material and technology is a central 

responsibility of the Department, in support of the President and in defense of the Nation. We 

must remain vigilant against error and complacency and have zero tolerance for security 

breaches at our Nation's most sensitive nuclear facilities. The incident at Y-12 was 

unacceptable, and it served as an important wake-up call for our entire complex. As a result, 

the Department is carefully reviewing security at all of our NNSA sites - as well as all of the 

recommendations of the HSS security review teams, Brigadier General Finan, DOE IG, and 

independent reviews provided by distinguished military and private sector experts - with a 

6 
35 


80292.023

view to taking all those steps that are needed to protect this Nation's most sensitive materials 

and technologies. The Department is taking aggressive actions to ensure the reliability of our 

nuclear security programs across the entire DOE enterprise, and will continue to do so. 

We accept the responsibility that we have inherited from the generations of Americans going 

back to the Manhattan Project to assure the safe and secure stewardship of our nuclear 

enterprise in order to deter aggression, defend our freedom, and support our allies. 

In that effort, the Department looks forward to working with the Committee to ensure the 

security of the nation's nuclear materials. I would be pleased to answer any questions from 

members of the Subcommittee. 

7 
36 

Mr. MURPHY. And so will the balance of your statement will be 

submitted for the record. 

We understand, Ms. Miller, you do not have an opening statement, so we will go right into some questions. I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

First of all, let me just say that I appreciate your candor. Nothing is better for leaders than to step forward and say mistakes 

have been made, taking full responsibility, and taking definitive action. I thank you for that. We are certainly hoping this never happens again, and we hope that the report and recommendations are 

going to be fully implemented and continue to be reviewed. 

So let me start with you, General Finan. Your task force identified the serious weaknesses in the federal capability to evaluate 

contractor performance at the Nuclear Weapons Complex. The 

NNSA administrator commissioned your report. I am correct in 

that? 

General FINAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MURPHY. It is also correct that the recommendations are directed at the administrator, not the Secretary of Energy, am I correct? 

General FINAN. That is correct. It was all NNSA-focused. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. I just want to make sure we are following the right chain here. 

Mr. Poneman, as Deputy Secretary of Energy, you and the Secretary set high level policy direction and safety and security standards for NNSA’s mission, but it is the responsibility of the NNSA 

to arrange a structure to accomplish these goals. That is up to the 

administrator, am I correct? 

Mr. PONEMAN. It is up to the administrator, of course, subject to, 

as you just said, the leadership of the Secretary and the Deputy 

Secretary. 

Mr. MURPHY. And something you will continue to monitor as 

well? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. 

Ms. Miller, you are now the NNSA Acting Administrator. 

Ms. MILLER. That is right. 

Mr. MURPHY. Is it correct that you were Principal Deputy Administrator at NNSA as it implemented its safety and security reform efforts in 2010? 

Ms. MILLER. I became the Principal Deputy Administrator in August of 2010. 

Mr. MURPHY. OK. Do you agree with the findings of General 

Finan’s report? 

Ms. MILLER. I completely agree with them. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. 

General Finan states that NNSA must clearly and consistently 

emphasize the importance of security. Do you agree with her statement? 

Ms. MILLER. I absolutely agree with them. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. 

Do you believe that NNSA’s leadership has been inconsistent in 

the message it sends to the field about security emphasis? 

37 

Ms. MILLER. I believe it has been inconsistently communicated, 

yes. Absolutely. 

Mr. MURPHY. Were you aware of the inconsistent messages on 

security prior to Y–12? 

Ms. MILLER. I would say that I was aware that because the chief 

of Defense Nuclear Security, as well as the chief of Defense Nuclear Safety reported directly to the administrator and not to me. 

I would say I was aware of the difficulty and the inconsistencies 

in communicating policy and decisions for security and many other 

areas from the headquarters organization to the field offices. 

Mr. MURPHY. Well yes, and since part of the purpose of this 

Committee on Oversight is to make sure that we are understanding lessons learned, but what you don’t measure, you can’t 

manage. What you don’t admit, you can’t act on. Were there some 

lessons you learned from this, some things that you should do differently in terms of the process as we move forward? 

Ms. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, I would say two things. First of all, 

there were lessons I had been learning prior to this incident that 

caused us to announce a few weeks before this incident, the end 

of July, that we were changing the way we governed our sites. And 

that is to say, we took the sites from within defense programs, our 

large weapons program, where they had been reporting for a number of years and had them now directly report to the administrator 

through an associate administrator peer level, the senior management, so that we could start to drive accountability and consistency 

across our sites. So that was a measure that I had come to the conclusion that organization absolutely had to make to address what 

I said before, which was concern about inconsistencies all over the 

place. 

With regard to post-Y–12 incident, in particular with security, I 

was fortunate to be able to draw upon General Finan’s recommendations and work with her, as she was part of the organization at the time, and others to change the way we operate security, 

both at headquarters and in the field. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. 

Last month on February 5 at NNSA, associate administrator for 

management and budget disputed the Inspector General’s report 

that Y–12 oversight was ineffective because of the ‘‘eyes on, hands 

off’’ oversight approach. The officials said that the ‘‘eyes on, hands 

off’’ policy never applied to security matters and that this was a 

misperception by some federal officials. Ms. Miller, why is an 

NNSA senior official continuing to dispute the impact of the ‘‘eyes 

on, hands off’’ policy? 

Ms. MILLER. I think the issue is not to dispute the impact. I 

think the point is that we certainly did not set out—and again, this 

predates me, but no one set out to say that oversight should not 

be conducted, that your proper role is not to be overseeing all aspects of the contractor’s performance. What I would say is that, as 

you yourself mentioned, driving that message through a very large 

organization from the administrator through every individual in 

every layer at every site is the big challenge. It is the challenge in 

security, it is the challenge all over the place. It is not a new issue. 

As the ranking member mentioned, we need to break the pattern, 

and that is definitely what the organization is about right now. 

38 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. Hopefully you will communicate that 

through solidly, because of the extreme concerns about what happened. 

I recognize each member for 5 minutes as we go through. Next 

is Ms. DeGette. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Poneman, I was intrigued when—first of all, let me 

say, I am impressed and encouraged by the commitment the agency has made to not having to come back here next year or the year 

after with some new crisis. I am, both in these hearings and some 

of our off—our side conversations, I do believe you have that commitment. 

Secretary Poneman, I wanted to ask you, because you just said 

in your testimony that you are committed to implementing some of 

the aspects of the General’s report to make sure that we are not 

back here in a year or two. I wonder if you could briefly tell us— 

if you could give us the highlights of what those things are? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Gladly, Congresswoman DeGette. 

The critical, I think, finding that General Finan’s report showed 

was that we had a lack of clarity of line of management control and 

accountability. So what we have done is, under her recommendation implemented by Acting Administrator Miller and fortunately, 

before General Finan left us, she was the acting head of defense 

nuclear security, to get this started. We have now made sure that 

under this organization that Ms. Miller just introduced of the operations and infrastructure that the responsibility to direct security 

at the site flows down from the administrator through that office 

to the site. The other office that had been doing security policy, socalled NA–70, had been actually exercising some apparent line 

management authority, which was creating confusion. That function has been stripped away. Any line authority has been stripped 

away from NA–70. 

Ms. DEGETTE. So you think that is the key, having a clear chain 

of—that is the number one? What else? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Number two is the staff function that that new 

organization—that NA–70 must perform, they need to promulgate 

the policies and perform independent evaluations so it is not just 

the site checking itself. 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK, independent evaluations. Those are the two 

key things. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, oversight and a line management. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Now, another issue—I don’t have—we might do 

another round, but—so I want to just go into this other issue that 

I care a lot about, which complaints that the committee has heard 

about overly burdensome oversight stifling the work being done at 

NNSA labs and sites. And what we think—I was talking to the 

chairman about this—is that federal officials need to conduct strict 

oversight of the contractors, or serious security problems can fall 

through the cracks. 

So what I wanted to ask you, General Finan, in your review, did 

you find that the problems you saw within NNSA were caused by 

overly burdensome congressional oversight? 

39 

General FINAN. The issues that I found were not caused at all 

by oversight. It was actually caused by lack of oversight, and I 

mean oversight at every level. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Right, right. So what was the—— 

General FINAN. It was impacting everything. 

Ms. DEGETTE. We need to have clear oversight from the top 

down, and as Mr. Poneman says, independent oversight, right? 

General FINAN. The burden was actually—when you—we created 

a system that required a whole bunch of paperwork, and the paperwork is burdensome, but what we lost in security was the ability 

to see security performance. It was paperwork. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Yes, there was a bunch of paperwork, but it was 

irrelevant to the core task, right? 

General FINAN. Correct. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Mr. Poneman, do you want to comment on that? 

Mr. PONEMAN. I thought it was a very apt finding, and the misinterpretation of that 2010 reform is exactly on this point. We were 

trying to strip away the excessive paperwork and get to the performance testing. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Right, but did any of the auditor’s assessments 

conducted in the wake of the Y–12 incident find that it was caused 

by too much congressional oversight of the Y–12 contractors? 

Mr. PONEMAN. No, ma’am. 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. The reason I bring this up is because some 

people try to say oh, we have too much oversight. It seems to me 

when we have these problems over and over again, the problem is 

not too much oversight. The problem is too little effective oversight 

and accountability. Ms. Miller, you are nodding your head. Would 

you agree with that? 

Ms. MILLER. Yes, I would definitely agree. It is about effectiveness. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Now, let’s see. 

General Finan, can you tell us about the findings of the task 

force with respect to improved oversight of NNSA security contractors? You touched on it just very briefly. 

General FINAN. Right. The recommendation we are making is 

that we create an NNSA oversight function, because right now, in 

the system as I looked at it a couple of months ago, NNSA did not 

have any oversight capability. They depended on onsite federal personnel to analyze contractor performance. But again, they were applying the ‘‘eyes on, hands off’’ concept and so that was varied from 

site to site. And what happened is that you lacked—there was no 

sense of criticism in this assessment, right? 

Ms. DEGETTE. Right. 

General FINAN. You had onsite people who were your really only 

federal ability to look at contractor performance. Well, those folks 

onsite grew up there, they lived there, you know, they spent their 

whole time. They identified with the mission and they were really 

not a very good source of independent oversight as to contractor 

performance. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you. 

Mr. Poneman and Ms. Miller, do you agree with that? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Absolutely—— 

Ms. MILLER. Yes. 

40 

Mr. PONEMAN [continuing]. And the reforms we described I think 

reflect that finding. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you. 

Ms. Miller, do you agree with that? 

Ms. MILLER. I do. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. Gentlelady yields back. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Johnson, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Poneman, in her testimony, General Finan states that NNSA 

must clearly and consistently emphasize the importance of security. 

Unfortunately, here is the consistent message that the DOE, NNSA 

organizations, and contractors were hearing. In March of 2010, Secretary Chu stated his vision that he wanted DOE to be viewed as 

a valued partner and asset to contractors. He went on to suggest 

that safety could be ensured with a skeleton crew of health and 

safety experts. Also in March of 2010, Mr. Poneman, you wrote in 

the Department’s safety and security reform plan that success will 

be measured through near-term relief from specific low-value burdensome requirements, as well as longer term streamlining of requirements that will lead to measurable productivity improvements. I note that safety and security did not factor into this definition of success. Would you agree that statements like these send 

mixed signals about the Department’s commitment to safety? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Congressman, the portion of the document read 

from my document, the genesis of that was to set out a set of safety 

and security objectives, so in fact, that particular sentence is out 

of documents that are precisely intended to maximize safety and 

security. What is unfortunate, what has happened is the misinterpretation of that. What we were trying to do, sir, is to get rid of 

the checkbox mentality, just looking at paperwork and creating paperwork, get back to performance testing, so we could be better, 

safer, and more secure. That is absolutely our objective. 

Mr. JOHNSON. What are you doing today to ensure consistent and 

clear emphasis on safety importance from the headquarters on 

down? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Number one, we are, on both safety and security, 

assimilating all of the learnings from reports such as General 

Finan’s. Number two, because we have found safety culture issues 

as well as security culture issues, we have regular meetings where 

we assemble the top leadership in the Department to check on a 

continuing basis that this is being messaged consistently throughout the complex. One of the major challenges, Congressman, that 

we have found is—as you heard with this talk about ‘‘eyes on, 

hands off’’—is the misinterpretation, like a kid’s game of Telephone, is a terrible problem. So it is not enough to promulgate a 

good policy. You have got to continually stay on it, message it, and 

work with your leadership and work with the people in the field. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK, thank you. 

Ms. Miller, a week or so before the Y–12 incident in July of 2012, 

Mr. Don Cook, NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, 

made the following remarks, and I quote, ‘‘With regard to the relationship that we have and where we are between NNSA and its 

41 

labs and plants—I didn’t say my labs and plants, but you can tell 

I feel that way—getting to the point where we have oversight on 

these, which is eyes on, hands off oversight, has been my aspiration 

for several years and it remains so. It was my aspiration when I 

worked on the lab side for many years. General Finan completed 

that ensuring that the right leadership is in the right position is 

absolutely critical to success.’’ What are you going to do to make 

that happen, ensure that leadership is sending the right message 

about the importance of safety and security? 

Ms. MILLER. Mr. Johnson, sending the right message, in my view 

and after many years of looking at the NNSA mostly from outside 

of it, is a challenge that is not achieved just by making sure that 

people at the top level know what the message means. But it is difficult to make sure that every single person in the 10,000 people 

at a given lab or 30,000 throughout our complex understand what 

we are talking about. If we—what we are doing at NNSA is working to be able to communicate and train and talk to people at every 

single level to make sure it is not going to be misunderstood. We 

recently changed all of our M&O contracts. The performance measures in those contracts are all now connected to safety and security 

so that it is not possible to believe that you have performed according to the terms of a contract in an area like nuclear weapons if 

you have not also met the performance plans for safety and security. It just isn’t going to happen. 

So this is a step-by-step throughout the organization. It is not 

just at the top level. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK, good. 

One final question, General Finan. First of all, as a 261⁄2 year 

veteran of the Air Force myself, thank you for your service and 

what you have done here. 

A troubling finding in your report is that potentially critical management information is not being reported clearly to the appropriate decision makers. Would you elaborate on what you mean by 

this? 

General FINAN. Yes, sir. As we interviewed people and took a 

look at what was happening, we found out at the lower levels, 

there were people who knew what issues existed out there and 

knew the significance of those issues. But as they attempted to rise 

those issues up to senior levels, they were being suppressed. Management at mid levels would suppress it, and so in many cases, 

critical decision information was not making its way to the top of 

the organization. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK, thank you for that, and with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. MURPHY. OK, gentleman’s time is expired, and I will now 

recognize Mr. Tonko for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

General Finan, you state in your testimony that the findings of 

this task force were very similar to those numerous prior reports 

by other review teams, so my question is, what happened to the 

recommendations of the prior review teams? Were they ever implemented? Was the implementation insufficient, or is there a larger 

problem that still needs to be identified? 

42 

General FINAN. There is a cultural issue. Those findings, as you 

look at them, you go back to see what people did, you will find that 

there are some actions that were put in place, but there was a 

check the box mentality that said we want to get rid of the findings 

as fast as we can. So they do whatever they could to say yes, I have 

responded to this finding and it is gone. And so the things that 

they changed didn’t stick. It was just a matter of taking action, 

checking the box, closing the finding, and going on to the next 

thing. And so what needs to happen is all those things need to be 

taken in aggregate, we need to create a roadmap, and then we need 

to change the culture so that we continuously evaluate those things 

and go back and make sure that we don’t, year after year, make 

the same mistake and that we are not interested in checking the 

box off, we are interested in changing the way we do business so 

we do it the right way. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you. There seems to be a theme that runs 

through a number of the task force’s observations that cost control 

was a bigger concern for many of the people managing the program, the security program, than performance of the security mission. This implies there is a real or perceived lack of resources to 

support the security mission fully. Which is it, real or perceived? 

General FINAN. It is a combination of both. What happened was 

that management had overwhelmingly started to figure out—they 

wanted to reduce the cost of security, and so in doing that, what 

they did is they lost sight of the requirements of security, and because the two were mixed together, the people who determined requirements and the budget were the same people. What happened 

was that they were no longer looking at the actual requirements 

for security. They lost sight of what was required in order to adequately secure these materials and these sites, and moreover, they 

lost visibility on the important aspect of protecting our operational 

capability and our people. And those items actually got no visibility 

at all and were completely ignored. They thought that if they could 

do the big war, if they could fight the terrorists, they could do all 

the lesser includeds, therefore, they never needed to look at lesser 

includeds. Well, lesser included happened to be a protest event, 

and Y–12 proved that lesser includeds do not—you cannot do lesser 

includeds just because you can fight the larger issues. So it was a 

combination of wanting to reduce the budget, which is a good thing. 

We ought to always be efficient, but when you lose sight of the requirements, what happened is senior leaders at NNSA did not get 

to make the decision. Do I want to fund that requirement or do I 

want to take the risk? The risk was being assumed at lower levels 

by default rather than being made at the senior decision maker 

level at NNSA. 

Mr. TONKO. Deputy Secretary Poneman—and I thank you for 

that answer—but Deputy Secretary, how much of DOE’s budget is 

spent on contractors, your area of the budget? 

Mr. PONEMAN. The vast majority. I think it is well over 80 percent, and we can get you a precise number. I think it is on the 

order of 85 percent. 

Mr. TONKO. With that amount, the agency then, is it fair to say, 

is relying on private contractors to implement many key security 

and safety goals? 

43 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, Congressman, going back to the origins of 

the Department, back to shortly after World War II, Atomic Energy 

Commission, this whole model of the so-called management and operating contractor, the M&O contractor model puts most of the programmatic and security burdens in the hands of contractors who 

were exercising that authority under federal oversight. 

Mr. TONKO. So do the contractors then have a conflicting bid of 

incentives here when carrying out their duties? 

Mr. PONEMAN. There is a risk, Congressman, and in that respect, 

again, one of the many fine findings of General Finan’s report, I 

think, shows the way we need to address that is the contractor 

must own and take responsibility for security, and in the first instance, must evaluate that under their own self-analysis, but that 

then needs to have a double check, first from the headquarters so 

there is not the onsite cozy relationship, so there is some difference 

and the federal oversight is effective, and secondly, from an independent organization, the HSS organization, to effectively ensure 

you have a disinterested third party look to make sure that that 

security is being well executed and there are not conflicts of interest, and to hold the contractor accountable if they do not self-disclose problems in security that they, in fact, find in their own 

forces. 

Mr. TONKO. General Finan, is it possible that contractor concerns 

over cutting costs could have been one of the causes of the Y–12 

incident at Oak Ridge? 

General FINAN. It could have been, and it may have been that 

they had cut back some of their maintenance personnel in order to 

cut costs, and therefore had misprioritized actions, so it could be 

a contributing factor. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you. With that, I yield back. 

Mr. MURPHY. Gentleman’s—thank you very much. 

The chair recognizes the chairman emeritus of the committee 

from Texas, Mr. Barton, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, and I appreciate the courtesy of letting 

me ask questions out of order, since I wasn’t here at the beginning. 

I appreciate that of my junior members. 

I want to refresh the subcommittee’s memory a little bit. We 

have had repeated security incidences at the weapons complexes in 

the national laboratories over the last 20 years. We have had tapes 

lost, we have had materials lost. This latest incident, which has 

been sanitized to call the Y–12 incident, three nuns, I think, one 

fairly elderly, penetrated to the deepest security of our weapons 

complex. A nun, oK, nuns. They showed up at one of our hearings 

and they were in the audience, and these were not ninja warrior, 

flat belly, skulking people. These were just ordinary folks who wandered in, so to speak. So we have, once again, another task force 

that is going to try to rectify the problems. 

Now, I want to get the players straight. General Finan, you are 

not in the normal chain of command at the Department of Energy, 

is that correct? 

General FINAN. I am no longer assigned to the Department of 

Energy. I am back in the Air Force. I was always in the Air Force, 

but—— 

44 

Mr. BARTON. This report that you have helped to prepare was 

done at the request of DOE, at the request of the then administrator, but you were kind of an outside, fresh look person, is that 

correct? 

General FINAN. Well, I guess I would call myself an inside outsider. By that time, I had been assigned to NNSA for 18 months, 

but I was always an Air Force asset. My reporting chain runs 

through the Air Force. I was always an Air Force member, but I 

was assigned to NNSA for 2 years. 

Mr. BARTON. OK, now the report that you testified on has been 

presented to the Department of Energy, is that correct? 

General FINAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARTON. Now I want to go to Deputy Secretary Poneman. It 

used to be the Deputy Secretary is the number two person at DOE. 

Is that still the case? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARTON. Are you the chief operational officer at DOE? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARTON. OK. So you have read the report—— 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARTON [continuing]. That has been prepared? I have read 

a summary of it. It is fairly damning, but it is pretty clear cut in 

its recommendations. So the bottom line question is what are you 

going to do about it? Are you going to accept the recommendations 

and act on them, or are we going to pontificate and fiddle faddle 

around and not do anything? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, sir, it is a fine report. It is excellent. It is insightful. We embrace it and not only have we already accepted and 

put into practice the recommendations, but while we still had the 

benefit of General Finan’s service in the Department, we made her 

Acting Chief of Defense Nuclear Security to oversee the beginnings 

of the implementations. 

Mr. BARTON. So she gets to implement the recommendations? 

Mr. PONEMAN. She had that started, and as she just indicated, 

been reassigned and we are carrying forward from that. 

Mr. BARTON. One of the recommendations is that you eliminate 

this multiple diverse authority. Is that going to be done, centralizing the one line of authority? That is one of the primary—— 

Mr. PONEMAN. That, sir, already has been done and the further 

clarification of the role of the other security organizations is also 

underway. We are, as was indicated, also taking into account more 

widely the recommendations from what we call the Three Wise Experts about—from whom you will hear directly, but the parts that 

you have heard from General Finan, we are already putting into 

effect. 

Mr. BARTON. OK. Now this concept of ‘‘eyes on, hands off’’ oversight, there seems to be some misunderstanding about that. I don’t 

see how that would work anyway. 

Mr. PONEMAN. I don’t either, and I think it is a terrible thing 

that anyone ever thought that that made sense or was the policy 

of the Department. It is absolutely the wrong way to think about 

it. 

45 

Mr. BARTON. So we can assume, since you are the number two 

person, that whatever that concept was, it is no longer in use? It 

is gone? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, we have tried and we will continue, because 

you can’t repeat these messages often enough, to be very, very clear 

that the federal oversight is critical and it needs to be active and 

performance-based, and it cannot be ‘‘eyes on, hands off.’’ That 

would never work. 

Mr. BARTON. OK, now my final question, can we be—can you assure the committee that the actual security of the weapons complex 

is a first-degree, primary function and it is not subject to cost 

issues? I mean, we want these facilities and materials and the people that are operating within those facilities to be secure, period, 

and not secondary to the cost of maintaining the security. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Let me be very clear, Congressman. There is 

nothing more important than the safety and the security of the 

complex. That is our top priority. We will always, as you would expect, make sure that we are good stewards of the taxpayer resources and not waste money. I don’t think that is the implication 

of your question, but we will always make sure that we never compromise security for any other derivative objective, and the security 

of that material is paramount. 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman and the 

other members. I yield back. 

I would love to have a hearing within the next year or two where 

we can pat these people on the back and say you have actually 

done what you said. Things are working. There are improvements. 

Now, I am a skeptic. I doubt we will have that hearing, but I certainly hope that we can and I especially want to commend Congresswoman DeGette. She has been fighting these fights almost as 

long as I have, and with the same degree of fervor and intensity, 

and I am sure that with Dr. Murphy’s added vigilance, we might 

actually get something done. Thank you. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. We all share sentiments. Gentleman 

yields back. 

Now recognize the gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Luja ́n, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Poneman and Ms. Miller, before I ask some questions on Y– 

12, I want to speak about something that is very important in New 

Mexico. With the concerns in Washington State where tanks at 

Hanford are leaking radioactive and hazardous waste, I understand 

the Department is considering sending millions of gallons of highly 

radioactive waste to New Mexico to be stored at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, or WIPP. I would like to get your commitment 

here today that you will work closely with the New Mexico delegation, state and local officials, and concerned citizens, as you explore 

whether such a transfer will take place and under what conditions? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Congressman, I can assure you, A, that we always 

take all critical health, safety, environmental issues into account, 

certainly with respect to the 54 million gallons and their disposition at Hanford, and we will gladly continue to work very closely 

with this committee and with other members of the Congress to 

make sure what we do is in full consultation with you. 

46 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. So Mr. Poneman, that is a commitment to work with 

the New Mexico delegation on this issue? 

Mr. PONEMAN. We will work with this committee and with all 

members of Congress, and any affected state—— 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. I will interpret that as a yes. I appreciate that, sir. 

Has there been discussions that have begun with the State of 

New Mexico on this issue? 

Mr. PONEMAN. I will defer to Ms. Miller. 

Ms. MILLER. The acting Assistant Secretary for Environmental 

Management, Dave Huizenga, has ongoing discussions with representatives from the State of New Mexico. I recently met with a 

number of representatives from the State of New Mexico, local representatives as well as the governor. We did not discuss this issue 

because this is a pretty new development, as you know, but we are 

in good, close contact with the delegation, both locally and certainly 

as Deputy Secretary Poneman said, very willing to work and look 

forward to working with you and the other members of the congressional delegation. 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. I appreciate that, Ms. Miller. I am one of the representatives as well that represents New Mexico, and so I would 

appreciate that very much. I appreciate that. 

And finally, I hope that this will not happen at the expense of 

cleaning up existing sites in New Mexico. I don’t want to see a 

slowing down or a decrease in funding in environmental management funding. If anything, it should be increased to allow more 

rapid cleanup, especially in Los Alamos. And you know, with the 

true waste issue in New Mexico, it is ready to be cleaned up and 

ready to go, and I hope that we can work with you and get a commitment to see what we can do to plus up those accounts. I know 

sequestration is hitting us, but it is something that is very important to us. 

Mr. PONEMAN. Congressman, sequestration is a huge challenge 

for all of us. We have legal, contractual, and moral obligations to 

the state. We take them very, very seriously. I have been there several times myself. We will continue to take that seriously. 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. I appreciate your commitment, Mr. Poneman. 

Mr. Poneman, isn’t your head of Health, Safety, and Security, or 

HSS, the person you and the Secretary rely on for developing and 

coordinating security policy and providing independent oversight 

and enforcement? 

Mr. PONEMAN. That is true. 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. Wasn’t this a colossal failure as a part of HSS in failing to identify and correct the specific security weaknesses that 

were obviously present at Y–12? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Sir, there were a number of failures. There was 

a January, 2009, report from HSS which, in fact, identified some 

of the deficiencies which you have heard later described which, in 

fact, facilitated this terrible episode on July 28. There should have 

been, as HSS has acknowledged, more rigorous, vigorous, and repeated follow-up from those findings, and they have—in the consequences in terms of lessons learned from this episode, redoubled 

their commitment under the direction of the Secretary to make 

sure that they follow up on all such findings in future. So when 

they do identify a problem, they stick with it until it is resolved. 

47 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. With that being said, Mr. Poneman, aren’t those on 

the second panel, including reviewers like General Finan, who are 

identifying systemic security problems and recommending improvements, doing the job that HSS was supposed to have done? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Well, it is always good after an episode like this 

to get fresh eyes, and General Finan, because she had this unique 

perspective of being in the system but somewhat apart from these 

specific events, had a unique and invaluable perspective. In fact, 

her own report recommends that in this three-layer oversight review, that the HSS is, in fact, that third layer of disinterested third 

party oversight. We will hopefully continue to benefit from outside 

expertise of this character, but also make sure we maintain some 

independence within the Department to ensure you don’t have conflict of interest in overseeing security. 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Poneman, in your earlier comments made before similar 

hearings, you stated that no federal employees have been terminated as a result of the Y–12 breach, that such terminations are 

subject to due process. Since there were contract employees that 

were terminated for cause, the response seems to suggest that contract employees don’t have the same due process protection under 

the law. Is there any truth to that? 

Mr. PONEMAN. This is—I am glad you asked this question, Congressman. Let me clarify this. There was accountability on both the 

federal and the contractor’s side. On the federal side—and we had 

to act swiftly and effectively to remove anybody who had an involvement in this episode from the chain of command. On the federal side, the top three nuclear security officials in headquarters 

were removed from those responsibilities. In addition, three members at the site from the federal team were either reassigned or removed from their positions. And then on the contractor’s side, we 

held accountable by making clear to the contractor that they had 

lost our confidence. The three senior—three of the senior people on 

the protective force subcontract and three of the senior people on 

the M&O contractor, we then folded the subcontract for security 

under the M&O contract, made it clear we lost confidence in the 

contractor, and that contractor was terminated full stop. 

Now there are additional actions that can be taken with respect 

to individuals that are disciplinary in nature. Our first responsibility, as the chairman and ranking member have emphasized, is 

to protect the material, so the first thing we did is get anybody who 

had anything to do with this out of the way of possibly protecting 

material that we now needed to make sure we had new people and 

new processes to effectuate. Other disciplinary processes have been 

underway. Some are still continuing, and those are the processes, 

sir, that I was referring to where the due process protections apply 

to these individuals who, like any American, are entitled to due 

process when it comes to termination. 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, as I yield back, I know 

time is expired, but I appreciate the concerns and the statements 

associated with new culture and leadership and changes, and what 

that means coming forward as we look at the future. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

48 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Luja ́n. I let that go on because it 

was a particularly important answer, too. We thank you for that 

answer. 

Now recognize the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Harper, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. HARPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to each of 

you on what is a very important topic, not only to you, but to everyone in Congress. We appreciate the look you are taking at this, and 

of course, how do you convey that security is everybody’s concern, 

and always in that situation where you are looking, it seems that 

it was somebody else’s responsibility, so you have to create that 

culture that everyone is responsible, regardless of their position, 

and do you feel like you are moving things in that direction with 

NNSA? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, sir, and your comment, I think, ties in well 

with when the chairman said at the beginning, if you don’t measure it, you don’t manage it. What we have done since the Y–12 episode is to make sure that in the performance evaluation plans for 

all contracts that safety and security is made a constituent part of 

every programmatic deliverable. So you are not actually performing 

the job if you do it, but you don’t do it safely or you don’t do it securely. So that is how we measure and hold people accountable, 

and so not only are we trying to do this through all the cultural 

teaching that we are telling you about, but we are trying to build 

into the structure of the contracts. That is how we hope to avoid 

keep coming back, as Ms. DeGette has suggested, by really building 

it into our system. 

Mr. HARPER. And I guess one of the issues would be how do you 

make these security changes or improvements, how do you sustain 

those? You know, I will go back, DOE did a major—a comprehensive study back in 2008, and it looked like that was great. If those 

things had perhaps really been sustained, maybe we wouldn’t have 

had the Y–12 incident. So I guess what confidence should we have 

and do you have that these changes, as a result of this very extensive 90-day evaluation and study, will be sustained? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Congressman, as General Finan’s report makes 

clear, even if we have put all the structures in place to be successful in a way that we have not succeeded so far, absent leadership, 

it is not going to succeed. So the first way to sustain it, sir, is by 

sustained leadership attention, and I can commit to you that that 

is what we are providing. 

The second thing I would say is, it is not enough simply to promulgate this and announce it. We have to continue to work with 

people in the complex at the sites and have a continuous flow of 

information back and forth. 

And the third thing is, people have to feel comfortable throughout the site. If they actually have concerns, they have to feel free 

to step forward without any fear of retribution. 

Mr. HARPER. Thank you. 

Do either of the other witnesses have anything that you care to 

add? General, anything that you see of how this study—how you 

believe it would be sustained in the future? It looks great today, 

and we believe we have done that, but do you see anything else, 

49 

other than what Mr. Poneman has added, that you believe would 

show that we could sustain it? 

General FINAN. The key is the leadership, just the Deputy Secretary stated, and a culture. Everyone in the organization has to 

understand that each and every one of them are a part of security, 

and that security is a part of the NNSA mission. It is not a support 

item, it is essential to the mission. So it is culture and leadership. 

Mr. HARPER. Mr. Poneman, the safety and security reform plan, 

if I could read this, stated that the Department’s contractors maintain an assurance system that provides reliable measurement of 

the effectiveness of their safety management systems and facilitates timely corrective actions to systems or performance weaknesses. And the same direction was given for security systems. The 

task force found that NNSA relied overwhelmingly upon contractorprovided data rather than effectively reviewing performance itself. 

Given the broken equipment, security cameras, excessive false 

alarms at Y–12, clearly the contractor did not correct performance 

weaknesses in a timely fashion. And I know you have gone over 

this, but I want to make sure, you believe that relying on contractors to provide measurements of their effectiveness is still a sound 

approach? 

Mr. PONEMAN. I think the system must start because they have 

the line management responsibility with contractor reporting and 

self correcting, but it then needs exactly the oversight that General 

Finan recommended, number one, from the nuclear security operation inside NNSA, which is not at the site and therefore it is not 

prone to the coziness that has been a source of some concern, and 

then secondly, with a third party independent oversight from the 

HSS organization. 

Mr. HARPER. Each of you, do you believe that today would such 

a breach at Y–12 that occurred in July of 2012, do you believe that 

would occur today? 

Mr. PONEMAN. No, sir, I do not, and one thing that we did immediately, the Secretary directed an extent of condition review to be 

done very quickly to ensure that no similar problems existed at any 

of the other sites that have Category I nuclear material in the complex. 

Mr. HARPER. I yield back. 

Mr. MURPHY. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURPHY. The gentleman Mr. Green from Texas is recognized. 

Mr. GREEN. Different member from Texas. 

I know there was some contract restructuring in 2007, and I 

guess what got my attention on Y–12 and also the Pantex site, 

since that is in north Texas, was that contract restructuring ever 

completed to have one contractor for both sites? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, sir, we have finished the contract consolidation. There is another piece that is optional with respect to folding 

the tridium operations at Savannah River, but that part has 

not—— 

Mr. GREEN. I know on a regular occasion, Pantex—there are protesters up there, but it is a long way to get there from most urban 

50 

areas in north Texas, but there has never been any similar incidents like at Y–12 at Pantex, has it? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Not that I am aware of, sir, and in fact, we were 

impressed when we looked after the Y–12 incident at, frankly, the 

contrast and we brought some expertise from Pantex to Y–12 to 

help instill some best practices. For example, the practice of repairing cameras very quickly, that was already institutionalized at 

Pantex, and now I am happy to say, all the cameras are fixed and 

our average time to repair cameras now at Y–12 is 6.5 hours. So 

there were some best practices that we ported over from Pantex. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. I worry about impacts on NNSA due to the sequester. Deputy Secretary Poneman, can you talk about the impacts that sequestration may have on federal and contractor personnel at NNSA? 

Mr. PONEMAN. Yes, I will let Acting Administrator Miller offer 

more detail, but top line is it is a significant effect involving personnel and operations as well, but I can assure you, Congressman, 

is that the directive from the President is to do everything that we 

can and must do to protect our core functions. But I will ask Ms. 

Miller if she has got elaboration. 

Ms. MILLER. I would just add to that. It starts with of course, 

we will protect the material, of course, we will do things safely. As 

long as we are allowed to operate, that is exactly how we will run 

things. Having said that, I think people have a tendency to look at 

sequestration in terms of numbers of people who might be furloughed or dollar numbers that might be missing. It is—what is a 

deeper concern at this point is the ongoing disruption to activities 

that will take projects and programs and make them difficult, if 

not impossible, to actually execute anywhere near to the plan and 

to the price and the need that has already been described. It is that 

ongoing uncertainty disruption, and then lack of ability to plan. 

Mr. GREEN. And I know that is impacting your agency, but it is 

also impacting—— 

Ms. MILLER. Everybody. 

Mr. GREEN [continuing]. Everybody. 

Have you already notified employees or contractors on they could 

face personnel actions? 

Ms. MILLER. Contractors, their own organizations are responsible 

for talking directly to their employees, because they operate in general off of the money they are getting for us. We have, of course, 

worked with them to try to plan and program dollars so that they 

have some sense of what it is going to look like going forward 

month by month, and they are making plans and doing notifications accordingly, and I know our contractors have done that. 

As far as the federal workers are concerned, I sent a note out to 

our federal workers 2 weeks ago, almost 2 weeks ago, to let them 

know that we will do everything we can, but I cannot guarantee 

that it is not going to affect them either. 

Mr. PONEMAN. And I would only add, Congressman, that I have 

notified all the affected governors, and we will also work with the 

states in the same vein. 

Mr. GREEN. OK, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BRALEY. Would the Texas gentleman yield? 

Mr. GREEN. Sure. 

51 

Mr. BRALEY. Mr. Chairman, Ms. Miller, a number of reports observed a culture within NNSA of prioritizing costs, cutting costs 

above the needs of security. As a follow-up to the question Mr. Barton asked, have M&O contractors throughout the complex been told 

to cut their security costs? 

Ms. MILLER. They certainly have not been told to cut their security costs as any means of a policy, but I would say there is definitely messages that get communicated that when money is tight, 

people are looking for ways to cut costs and within an individual 

organization, a contractor organization are working with federal 

people, they may, as General Finan said, start to make decisions 

at very low levels on what their interpretation is of the need to cut 

costs. 

Mr. BRALEY. So it sounds like they could have been cut, so as a 

follow-up, have security funding allocations been reduced in recent 

years before the incident? 

Ms. MILLER. Security allocations have come down over the last 

several years, that is right. 

Mr. BRALEY. Mr. Chairman, this is a concern I think that we 

had. Mr. Barton asked a similar question, and hopefully it is something that we can pursue. You know, I would be interested if security funding has been increased after the incident as well, but I 

think we will find that out later. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GARDNER [presiding]. Thank you. Gentleman yields back. 

Gentleman from Texas, Dr. Burgess, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well on the GAO report that was supplied for this 

hearing, there is a table, table one on page nine of the report, and 

you know, it is interesting in light of the last question that was 

just asked about the funding levels. I mean, this is a comparison 

of a GAO study done in May of 2003 and then the security task 

force in February, 2013, so essentially a decade worth of NNSA 

oversight. And you look at the various things that are listed there, 

the last one being allocating staff. In 2003, the GAO found NNSA 

had shortfalls in its site offices in number and expertise of staff, 

which could make it more difficult for site offices to effectively oversee security activities. OK, that sounds like a real problem identified by the GAO. So what did General Finan find 10 years later? 

The NNSA security function is not properly organized or staffed. It 

sounds like the same problem to me, stated another way. 

So you know, as interesting as this chart is, it really shows that 

the General Accountability Office’s review of the NNSA security organization, when you look at it and go down the list and see the 

problems with defining clear roles and responsibilities, assessing 

site security activities, overseeing contractor activities, allocating 

staff in each and every case. 

So General Finan, you know, it begs the question, it is almost 

every problem that was identified 10 years ago, you encountered on 

your task force 10 years later. So what do you think? Are these 

longstanding cultural problems that are ingrained in the organization, or are these things that can be corrected? 

General FINAN. Clearly they are long-term cultural basic issues 

that need to be fixed. And what happens over the years, as we 

looked at each one of those, reports would come out and people 

52 

would check the box and say yes, I took care of the findings. What 

happened was people were nibbling around the edges, you know, 

they would put a body or two—oK, you have a shortage, so a body 

or two would change. You know, that would just create a shortage 

someplace else. They didn’t ever stop and take a look at the overall 

system. How are we going to fix this long term? So by nibbling 

around the edges, instead of getting at the core issues, they just 

perpetuated the issues for a decade, and probably even longer than 

that, but every report that we looked at had striking similarities 

to what we found. 

Mr. BURGESS. So let me just ask you this. This is a basic question. How is putting more money into a structurally deficient system, how is it going to make it better? I mean any amount of 

money—I agree that, you know, it is reasonable to look the funding 

levels, but for crying out loud, we have known about this stuff for 

10 years and you haven’t fixed it. 

General FINAN. And fundamentally, you know, that is why I propose a change in the organization and change in the assessment 

model. Now I think that there are minor increases in budget that 

might be required, but we are not talking about, you know, hey, 

let’s add a billion dollars to the security budget, because the issues 

that surfaced at Y–12 were structural within the organization and 

structural within the assessment model. Now there are other technical aspects of why the guard didn’t respond properly, a whole 

bunch of things like that that are training related and things like 

that, but we are—when we are talking about the organizational 

structure, we are talking about some bodies. Yes, there is a shortage of security professionals, so you are talking a small number of 

additional bodies, and with the assessment model, you are talking 

about beefing up and changing the assessment model, but you are 

not talking about a massive influx of dollars. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, Chairman Upton in his opening statement 

said we need to learn the right lessons from past mistakes. I now 

certainly thank you for the effort that you have put into this. I just 

pray that 10 years from now another Congress is not having another hearing over the same sorts of failures. 

So Secretary Poneman, let me ask you. Back in 2010, Chairman 

Emeritus Barton was ranking member. He and I wrote to the Secretary expressing our concerns that the safety and security reform 

initiative would weaken outsource by outsourcing safety and security. We requested the General Accountability Office to evaluate— 

actually Chairman Waxman, who was chairman at the time and 

Ranking Member DeGette did join in that letter, so given the troubled history of safety and security in the complex, NNSA’s problems of implementing its own security program, what was the Department’s justification for embarking on this project? 

Mr. PONEMAN. It was clear at the time, Congressman, that we 

needed to focus, and you know the old saying, ‘‘If you don’t know 

where you’re going, any road will take you there.’’ So when I arrived at the Department, there were many people saying many different things. We said let’s sit down and figure out what are we 

doing to be safe, what are we doing to be secure? That was the genesis of that reform. Our management principles say we will only 

succeed by continuous improvement. This was part of that process 

53 

so it wouldn’t just be mindlessly continuing to check the box, but 

being vigorous and aggressive and saying how do we be safe? I 

couldn’t agree more with you, Congressman, in your premise that 

it ain’t just throwing dollars at it, it is a deeply cultural thing, and 

that reform, which I know people have had some concerns about, 

was intended to be exactly part of the process that you are advocating in terms of a self-vigorous analytical process to get safe and 

to make people wake up, think, and be active about it. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have got additional questions. I will submit those in writing. I thank you for the indulgence, and I will yield back. 

Mr. GARDNER. Thank you. Gentleman yields back and the chair 

recognizes himself now for 5 minutes. 

General Finan, a question to you. In your testimony, you write 

that the NNSA is structurally inadequate to address security 

needs. You have made your recommendations. What percentage of 

those recommendations have either been implemented or on their 

way to implementation? Just give me a number, if you could. 

General FINAN. At the time I left the organization, all of the recommendations were in process of being implemented. 

Mr. GARDNER. Thank you. 

Additional questions to Ms. Miller, and this question was referenced earlier. The statement that Mr. Don Cook, NNSA Deputy 

Administrator for Defense Programs had made earlier, he said with 

regard to the relationship that we have and where we are between 

NNSA and its labs and plants, the statement was made ‘‘eyes on, 

hands off.’’ And I think one of the concerns that we have is this 

isn’t just about management; this is about leadership, a culture of 

safety and security. And I am very concerned when it comes to the 

approach that NNSA, when they talk about ‘‘eyes on, hands off,’’ 

that this is actually a management style that is failing to provide 

the kind of leadership we need in safety and security. Would you 

agree or disagree with that? 

Ms. MILLER. I think what is failing and what has failed is something I spoke a little bit about earlier, and that is it is one thing 

for people at a very senior level to talk at a very senior level and 

come out with phrases that they perfectly understand and they 

may be able to explain to the seven or eight people they talk to all 

the time about it. That is a very different thing if you are the person six, seven, eight layers down to understand what does that 

mean for the job you do every day? 

Mr. GARDNER. And so you can see how that kind of creates a culture, though, that doesn’t focus—that focuses more on management 

and less on leadership of a culture that is truly about safety and 

security. 

Ms. MILLER. I think what happens is it leads everybody to focus 

whatever way they can to cope with what they think the person at 

the top is trying to tell them. 

Mr. GARDNER. So what are you going to do to make that that is 

different? 

Ms. MILLER. So as you know, right now I am acting administrator. What we have already begun in NNSA is a change in both 

the way we talk to staff and our contractors from the lower levels 

all the way up through the very top levels to be able to allow peoVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:16 Aug 22, 2013 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\MY DOCS\HEARINGS 113\113-13 CHRIS
54 

ple to understand how they do—how they are meant to do what 

they do in a safe and secure way, and to understand that safety 

and security is not the job of the people—it is not just the job of 

the people in the uniforms or the guys who can discuss criticality 

safety in depth, it is everybody’s job. It is what you do every day 

as part of what else you do every day. 

Mr. GARDNER. Recognize it is about the leadership, not just management. 

Ms. MILLER. Absolutely. 

Mr. GARDNER. General Finan, in your testimony, you talked 

about tension between security and the conduct of operations, stating that the events at Y–12 illustrate how far the pendulum has 

swung too far in the wrong direction, and that NNSA must clearly 

and consistently emphasize the importance of security. Do you believe the tension between security and operations is inescapable, or 

do you think that strong safety and security culture can facilitate 

improved operations performance, given committed leadership? 

General FINAN. I absolutely believe that safety and security can 

make operations better, and depending on how they are integrated, 

you will have a better operation. But it is a cultural change and 

it is a difficult cultural change. 

Mr. GARDNER. Is the agency right now on the way to that cultural change? 

General FINAN. They are trying to make that cultural change. 

Again, it is a long term. It will take years and constant pressure, 

constant attention. 

Mr. GARDNER. Adequate progress, in your mind? 

General FINAN. They are making early steps. Early steps. It is 

going to take a long time. 

Mr. GARDNER. But adequate process not quite ready to say that? 

General FINAN. I am not quite ready to say that. 

Mr. GARDNER. Ms. Miller, do you agree with General Finan that 

there has been a culture of compromise at NNSA? 

Ms. MILLER. Yes. 

Mr. GARDNER. And what are you doing to eliminate that culture? 

Ms. MILLER. That is a culture that I think not intentionally, but 

definitely effectively, has permeated both the contractor and the 

federal side of it, and that is a question of leadership making clear 

what the expectations are for all concerned. 

Mr. GARDNER. And you believe you have taken the sufficient 

steps so that your senior managers understand that there must be 

consistent messaging on security? 

Ms. MILLER. I think through a number of actions that have been 

taken, including the shakeup in management of security, that message has been very clearly communicated as to what is expected of 

everyone. 

Mr. GARDNER. And can you tell the committee today, all of us on 

the committee, that the head of defense programs, the head of the 

budget, the federal site managers, your managers, all are now singing from the same hymnal, so to speak? 

Ms. MILLER. I can tell you that they know they better be. I can’t 

swear for another person, but I believe it to be the case. 

Mr. GARDNER. And have you committed—this information that 

you are talking about now, you have communicated it simply—supVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:16 Aug 22, 2013 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\MY DOCS\HEARINGS 113\113-13 CHRIS
55 

ply the committee with memoranda or other communications instituting your policy for emphasizing that security? 

Ms. MILLER. Yes. 

Mr. GARDNER. Thank you. I appreciate your time, and with that, 

I don’t see any other witnesses, so I will give the gavel back to the 

chairman. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. 

We are going to dismiss this panel and move on to the next one. 

I do want to thank you all for your candid and thorough response, 

and this is extremely important to see leadership being honest with 

us. So we look forward to working with you more and talking with 

you more, and General, a special thanks to you for your report. 

Good luck over there, keep that Air Force in line. Thank you, 

ma’am. 

We will wait for the next panel to come forward. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Chairman, maybe we can just put her in charge 

of everything. 

Mr. MURPHY. Well ma’am, I am Navy so we will have to discuss 

that. 

Well, while this next panel is getting ready, I will start off by introducing them in the interest of time as we move forward. We 

have with us Mr. C. Donald Alston, Major General, United States 

Air Force (retired), and former commander of the 20th Air Force 

Global Strike Command, and Commander Task Force 214 U.S. 

Strategic Command, Francis E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. We also have Mr. Richard Meserve—am I pronouncing that 

right, sir? 

Mr. MESERVE. Meserve. 

Mr. MURPHY. Meserve, thank you, President of the Carnegie Institution for Science, and former Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission from 1999 to 2003. We also have Mr. David 

Trimble, the Director of Natural Resources and Environment 

Team, Government Accountability Office. Welcome here today. 

As you know, the testimony you are about to give is subject to 

Title XVIII Section 1001 of the United States Code. When holding 

an investigative hearing, this committee has a practice of taking 

testimony under oath. Do you have any objection to testifying 

under oath? 

They all agree to testify. The chair then advises you that under 

the rules of the House and rules of the committee, you are entitled 

to be advised by counsel. Do you desire to be advised by counsel 

during your testimony today? 

They all decline counsel. 

In that case, if you would please rise, raise your right hand, and 

I will swear you in. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. I note for the record all the witnesses 

have answered in the affirmative. 

You can now give a 5-minute summary of your written statement. We will start with you, Dr. Meserve. 

56 

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD A. MESERVE, PRESIDENT, CARNEGIE 

INSTITUTION FOR SCIENCE; C. DONALD ALSTON, MAJOR 

GENERAL, USAF (RETIRED); AND DAVID C. TRIMBLE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT TEAM, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD A. MESERVE 

Mr. MESERVE. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member DeGette, and 

members of the subcommittee, I am very pleased to appear before 

you this morning to testify of the security at DOE complex. 

My involvement with this issue, and I believe General Alston’s 

as well, arose as the result of a request that was made by Secretary Chu that we, as well as Dr. Norm Augustine, undertake an 

evaluation of basically the structure for the management of security at DOE. We undertook a study that involved visiting sites, reviewing documents, interviewing people, and as a result of all of 

that effort, we submitted three separate letters to the Secretary on 

December 6 of 2012, and we have submitted copies of those letters 

for the record as our testimony. 

We did not purport to investigate the factual circumstances surrounding the Y–12 institute. Our reports focused on managementrelated issues, and I hasten to add that our report was a snapshot 

in time. I was learning a lot about what has happened at DOE 

since we conducted our interview from the very informative testimony that we have all benefitted from earlier this morning. 

There are a couple of points from my letter that I think I would 

like to emphasize that I see as clear issues that DOE should confront. I believed that on December 6, and I believe they are confronting them. One, and I think a critical one, is to make sure you 

have a management structure in place that assigns clear authority 

and responsibility for security. One of the underlying factors at the 

Y–12 incident is there was a division of responsibility and without 

anyone being truly in charge until you had a situation with a contractor responsible for the guards and a different contractor responsible for the security-related equipment and the cameras, and they 

weren’t communicating well and a lot of the equipment was out of 

service and each could point at the other. 

I also came to the conclusion—and I will let General Alston 

speak for himself—that the federal oversight needed to be improved. It was—serious security issues existed before this episode 

and no one at DOE that we saw was really on top of detecting 

them and correcting them. 

There was issues associated with the protective force, ensuring 

appropriate training. There was an issue associated with the, obviously, the behavior of the first responder. There were many issues 

associated with the protective force that need to be addressed. We 

need to find a clear trajectory for these people. We need to make 

sure that they have a sense that they are an important part of the 

team and integrated with the team. 

I think that all of us came to the view—and this has been emphasized this morning—that one of the things needs to change is 

the culture. There has to be a security culture that places both 

safety and security as highest priorities, and that management by 

its word and deed reinforces that, and that everyone at the site reVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:16 Aug 22, 2013 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\MY DOCS\HEARINGS 113\113-13 CHRIS
57 

alizes that it is their individual responsibility to assure security, 

and that clearly is something that has been failing. 

And finally, I think what I would add is a need for balance. 

Clearly, this episode reflected issues associated with physical security, but there are other security issues that confront the Department, and in order to recognize, you need a balance. There are 

cybersecurity issues, there are personnel security issues, all of 

which need to be functioning, and one ought to not, because it was 

an episode of physical security, focus solely on that. 

My views are explained more fully in the letter that was submitted as part of the record, and I welcome the opportunity to talk 

to you this morning. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. General, I promised you I would have 

you go first. I apologize for the confusion there, but you are recognized now for your opening statement. 

TESTIMONY OF C. DONALD ALSTON 

General ALSTON. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member DeGette, 

members of the subcommittee, I would only briefly amplify what 

my colleague has so well described as Mr. Augustine’s, Dr. 

Meserve’s, and my efforts on behalf of Dr. Chu and the Department 

of Energy. I would only amplify one particular point, and that 

would be the culture piece. 

We have talked this morning—the first panel engaged you in 

conversation using some of the expressions that we found to be of 

concern, ‘‘eyes on, hands off’’ for example, and that expression is 

something that came out of just the last couple years of policy 

changes. But as has been reinforced over and over again, the recurring challenges, the similar recurring challenges, go beyond the 

‘‘eyes on, hands off’’ policy emphasis that had occurred over the last 

years, and I think that at the center of the challenge for the Department is the cultural change. And one aspect of the cultural 

change that is—that feeds the cultural challenges is the distributed 

management, the way the Department distributes its management 

across its labs, and the labs prefer and are very successful in their 

pursuit of the distance between the headquarters and the labs 

themselves, and the freedom of movement that they have, and this 

has great value, I would concede, on the science piece, but I think 

that that contributes—the security, in fact, needs to have more central—management central emphasis, common standards, and what 

I have observed is that you see people talk about mission, which 

I read as science. People talk about safety, and there is more of a 

pervasive safety culture, if you will. But security is not everybody’s 

responsibility, and it is as if mission, safety, and security are in a 

trade space where when there is an emphasis on security because 

of an episodic failure, the other elements of mission and safety see 

the focus on safety as to be marginally at the expense of the other 

parts of the mission, as opposed to looking at it as an enterprise 

challenge, and that, in fact, they don’t share trade space with each 

other, but in fact, are all essential every day to mission success. 

And with that, I thank the committee for the opportunity to have 

dialogue this morning. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Alston and Mr. 

Meserve follows:] 

58 


80292.024

Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Energy and 

Commerce 

Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations 

Hearing on 

DOE Management and Oversight of 

Its Nuclear Weapons Complex: 

Lessons of the Y -12 Security Failure 

Joint Statement 

by 

C. Donald Alston 

Major General, USAF (retired) 

and 

Richard A. Meserve 

President, Carnegie Institution 

for Science 

March 13, 2013 

Rayburn House Office Building Room 2322 
59 


80292.025

Mr. Chainnan, Ranking Member Diana DeGette, and members of the subcommittee, we 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

With the subcommittee's pennission, we would like to submit as our statement three separate 

letters authored by Mr. Nonnan Augustine and ourselves. These letters were submitted to 

Secretary of Energy Stephen Chu concerning the management of physical security at the 

Department of Energy Category 1 nuclear facilities. In October 2012, Secretary Chu asked the 

three of us to consider a variety of management models and to provide separate, individual 

observations regarding management structures that might be appropriate for application across 

Department of Energy and, specifically, National Nuclear Security Administration sites. We 

provided our respective letters to Secretary Chu on December 6

th of last year. 

We would like to provide some context about our assessments. While Secretary Chu did not 

ask us to investigate the Y 12 security breach, we used that incident and resulting investigations 

as an entry point into a larger examination of the management system. Additionally, we were 

exposed to draft corrective actions resulting from those investigations, but we did not evaluate 

these measures or their implementation across Department of Energy and the National Nuclear 

Security Administration. Finally, our written assessments were infonned by our direct 

engagement during a brief seven-week period last fall, culminating in early December. We are 

not up to date with regard to any changes that have been introduced. Nonetheless, we hope that 

our observations are helpful to you. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today before the subcommittee, and we welcome your 

comments and questions. 
60 


80292.026

C. Donald Alston 

ISIS North Star Loop 

Cheyenne, WY 82009 

December 6,2012 

The Honorable Steven Chu 

Secretary of Energy 

U.S Department of Energy 

1000 Independence Avenue, SW 

Washington, DC 20585 

Dear Secretary Chu: 

In light of the perimeter security breach at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in July 

2012, you asked me to examine a variety of organizational constructs for physical security and to provide 

you with observations on the value oftransitioning to a common model. 

My observations have been informed by reviewing the considerable body of work that has been 

done on this subject over the past decades; through interviews and discussions with current and former 

DOE leaders, as wel1 as experienced leaders outside of DOE; and by a number of site visits. I was able to 

visit DOE headquarters (HQ), Y-12, Pantex Plant, Sandia National Laboratories, Los Alamos National 

Laboratory, Savannah River Site, and the Calvert Cliffs commercial nuclear power plant in Lusby, MD. 

The site visits enabled discussion with maintenance and operations (M&O) contractors, DOE overseers, 

and protective force management and members, including union leaders. A very candid exchange at all 

levels with dedicated, experienced professionals greatly aided the effort. 

Four physical security organizational models were reviewed: I) a proprietary protective force 

organic to the M&O contractor responsible for site operation; 2) a protective force subcontracted to the 

M&O contractor; 3) a federalized protective force; and 4) U.S. military forces. Three of these four 

models are currently functioning within DOElNational Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA); 

however, none of the four emerges as attractive long term, department-wide option without addressing 

systemic impediments that preclude effective change. 

On the grandest scale, there were indications that security was viewed as the responsibility of the 

protective forces alone rather than as the responsibility of each member of the work force. While this 

culture may not be widespread throughout the DOE complex, it is clear that leadership could further 

emphasize the need to view security of our nation"s sensitive nuclear materials as a shared commitment 

across the work force. The Department of Energy is responsible for America"s nuclear enterprise, and 

enterprise credibility is derived from the trust and confidence our citizens, national leadership, friends, 

and allies have in the Department's ability to maintain a safe, secure and effective U.S. nuclear weapons 

complex. Importantly, this credibility factors into the daily calculus of potential adversaries and 

contributes directly to achieving an effective deterrent posture, a commodity re-earned every single day. 

A pervasive culture in which each member of the nation"s nuclear weapons complex recognizes the vital 

role he/she plays in assuring both security and safety contributes directly to maintaining that credibility. 

As currently structured, no recognizable critical path exists between DOE HQ and the site 

security organizations to ensure daily security success. Study of a variety of DOE and NNSA 

This updated version (dated December 10th) of the original letter contains minor clarifying edits. 
61 


80292.027

organizational charts could not demystifY where authority lies. The Department struggled to articulate 

how information flows - both up and down - between the sites and DOE HQ and could not easily provide 

a depiction of that process. I think this environment contributes to the reality that nuclear material at 

Savarmah River Site - which falls under OOE"s Environmental Management (EM) office - can be 

secured with different standards and policies than those required at NNSA sites. The category of material 

should drive security requirements, not the organizational chart. 

Distance has been growing between the headquarters and the sites, a trend that follows a OOE 

legacy of decentralized management across its facilities. While this traditional arrangement may pay 

dividends for the department in many respects, security is not one ofthem. Recent efforts to revise 

OOE"s safety and security directives and modifY the department"s oversight approach to provide 

contractors with the flexibility to tailor and implement safety and security programs without excessive 

federal oversight or overly prescriptive departmental requirements, as well as NNSA"s "governance 

transformation" that increased reliance on contractor"s self-oversight through its contractor assurance 

systems, have fortified sites" sense of independence and distance from the HQ. Sites leverage their 

unique missions and geography to justifY a preferred "alone and unafraid" mantra, and the HQ has 

employed a largely "hands off' response. 

Mutual distrust is bred as HQ personnel in key security roles are viewed as inexperienced 

regarding security matters and too far removed from the site to understand the uniqueness oflocal 

challenges. Key leaders must have credible security experience -- especially since there is little to no 

assignment circulation of security personnel to and from the HQ; no missionaries emerge to bridge the 

gaps in trust. 

What little leverage the HQ has comes in the form of additional inspections and assessments -

"black hat" interactions that further contribute to adversarial relationships. Inspection is an absolutely 

essential tool to validate compliance and operational readiness. However, it should be one dimension of a 

composite assessment process. Depending too much on snapshot assessments and not developing the 

right metrics to measure daily readiness would provide leadership little satisfaction regarding the true 

state of security preparedness and program execution. 

Further, there is a perception that corporate security policy is being written from inspection 

results. If true, the Department risks dri fting from measuring original standards to an environment where 

sites lack confidence in the integrity of the inspection process as they perceive they are chasing the latest 

inspection results. In the OOEINNSA HQ construct, a dynamic or volatile policy environment led by 

OOE"s Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) risks marginalizing NNSA security responsibilities. 

Of course, even if these site perceptions are inaccurate, leadership needs to be sensitive to these 

atmospherics. 

Communication is an area ripe with opportunity. Given today"s environment where sites seem to 

prefer to operate independently, where there is no effective best practice/lessons learned dialogue between 

sites, no program for security information exchange with the Department of Defense (DoD) or 

commercial nuclear activities, it is not surprising that site facility staffs can and do conceive, design, 

develop, test and deploy modifications to security systems. To better understand and share risks 

associated with changes to security systems there could be a normalized process over watched by DOE 

HQ, leveraging a revitalized Sandia expert review, with hard requirements for developmental and 

This updated version (dated December 10th) of the original letter contains minor clarifYing edits. 2 
62 


80292.028

operational testing and red teaming that could methodically deliver security modifications ready on day 

one. 

In my final analysis, the NNSA Administrator must always be able to answer the following 

questions: 

How ready are we today and how do we know? 

How ready will we be in 6 months and how do we know? 

A variety of sources produce the set of ingredients that create the mosaic of indicators conveying 

the current and future state of the security program. Timely, balanced reporting, where good news travels 

fast and bad news faster, not only provides content, but also serves as a barometer for the quality of the 

self-critical culture. Quality metrics that provide both tactical and operational level content, deliver 

today"s picture and, measured over time, expose trends and opportunities for course corrections. 

Collaboratively developed metrics, together with processes that actively seek input where appropriate on 

policies and standards also builds trust. Checks and balances in development of new or improved security 

capabilities, to include external review processes, provide corporate-wide awareness and ensures sites 

have support during transitions. A comprehensive human capital development program creates career 

paths at all levels and could provide for circulation up and down the chain, all the while driving greater 

security competency across the enterprise. 

Based on discussions over the past two months, the attributes of the objective security 

organizational construct should include: 

1) A force with a mission focus that understands the vital interdependencies and coordination 

required at all times with the M&O contractor; 

2) A well-trained, disciplined force whose professional conduct during routine operations is 

dependable and above reproach and one that is prepared to use lethal force if required during 

emergency operations; 

3) A force conditioned and incentivized by leaders at all levels to provide timely reporting; 

4) A force that would help drive crosstalk across DOE sites, outside the department such as 

with the DoD, and with commercial nuclear businesses to benefit from others" lessons 

learned; 

5) A force with an absolute intolerance for compensating for shortfalls/deficiencies/outages 

one minute longer than necessary; 

6) A force that knows - based on facts -- how ready it is today and leaders who know how 

ready it will be 6 months from now; 

7) A force not remotely prone to work stoppage as a job action; and 

8) A force that understands the merits of centralized control and decentralized execution of 

security responsibilities. 

This updated version (dated December lOth) ofthe original letter contains minor clarifYing edits. 3 
63 


80292.029

Of all the candidate security organizational models I examined, the military model is the least 

attractive to me to meet DOEfNNSA needs. The advantages include a dependable, high-quality, rotating 

force that would routinely be refreshed to meet mission demands of a typically non-dynamic 

environment. However, the lack of continuity would produce a force less familiar with the site than other 

models, and transitory leadership will have to adapt to a relatively unfamiliar mission (enriching uranium, 

for example). The most significant disadvantage is the division of unity of command by the introduction 

of a substantial command and control seam between protective forces and site operations with the arrival 

of Department of Defense onto the DOEfNNSA playing field. Would there be any risk that geostrategic 

instabilities might make these war fighting forces the first to be redeployed abroad, driving challenging 

domestic security contingency plans? I do not see an effective role for a DOEfNNSA representative in 

this model. 

The proprietary guard force, which has security personnel organic to the M&O contractor 

operating the site, provides the cleanest unity of command option. The risk of security work stoppage 

seems less likely in this model than other contractor options. Poor performers can be removed with ease. 

The drawback to this option is the uncertain security competencies of potential M&O contractors. This 

model is a variation on the status quo where a DOEfNNSA security representative provides oversight of 

the security elements of the M&O contract. 

The model in which the protective forces are part of a company subcontracted to the M&O 

contractor has a mixed record. There is a history of work stoppage. There is a manageable seam as far as 

unity of command is concerned. History shows this model can provide a disciplined, professional force 

with valuable continuity and familiarity with the site. (I would note here that military experience probably 

makes up between 50 and 75% of the force, though most of those veterans have no nuclear security 

experience upon arrival. Good orientation and training programs make up for this significant deficiency 

and ensure those with and without military experience are prepared to provide effective security.) At Y12, the maintenance function was not owned by the protective force which may have contributed to 

improperly prioritized maintenance of security gear, which ultimately resulted in failure. Overcome this 

specific contract deficiency and this model will present less risk than it currently does. This model is a 

variation on the status quo where a DOEfNNSA security representative provides oversight of contract 

execution by the sub-contractor. 

The model I find the most attractive is the federal model. It is proven, working effectively in the 

DOEINNSA transportation business providing for a disciplined professional force. It precludes work 

stoppage risk. True, adverse actions are less swift than the contractor models and this approach does 

introduce a seam with the M&O contractor. However, this model is a substantial departure from the 

status quo and what you trade in local unity of command you gain in more effective corporate oversight 

of security operations. I see the role of the DOEfNNSA security representative as the leader of the site 

security forces and the key integrator with the M&O leadership. The long term culture shift this model 

could drive should be weighed positively in an organizational change decision. 

For your consideration, Admiral Mies oversaw an in-depth study of DOE security in April 2005, 

"NNSA Security: An Independent Review." I think a hard-hitting, "show me" re-assessment of the 

status of his recommendations would benchmark the state of your self-critical culture and prove very 

helpful to the Department. 

This updated version (dated December lOth) of the original letter contains minor clarifying edits. 4 
64 


80292.030

All members of your Department rapidly responded to requests for information and made time for 

discussions at my convenience. Everyone I met, both the contractors and Department personnel, were 

forthright, professional, and dedicated to mission success. 

I am honored you asked me to support this important project. Thank you. It was a great 

experience working with the men and women of your Department. And thank you for providing the 

support of the talented members of Center for Strategic and International Studies. I could not have 

produced this work without their tireless support. 

With great respect, 

C. DONALD ALSTON 

This updated version (dated December 10th) ofthe original letter contains minor clarifYing edits. 5 
65 


80292.031

NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE 

6801 Rockledge Drive 

Bethesda, MD 20817 

Tel. 301-897-6185 Fax 301-897-6028 

norm.aUl:ustine@!mco.com 

December 6, 2012 

The Honorable Steven Chu 

Secretary of Energy 

U.S. Department of Energy 

1000 Independence Avenue, SW 

Washington, DC 20585 

Dear Mr. Secretary: 

This letter responds to your request that I assess certain physical security shortcomings 

experienced by the Department of Energy (DoE), most prominently at the Y-12 National 

Security Complex (Y-12), and provide observations, findings and recommendations. 

Given the relative short amount of time available for this review, my recommendations are 

more in the form of suggestions; however, they are based on over a half-century of 

managing at all levels in large organizations. I have drawn upon lessons gained during the 

ten years I devoted to government service, including several years as Under Secretary of 

the Army, and a number of years as CEO of an organization with over 180,000 employees, 

many working on sensitive national security systems. Further, in keeping with your 

request, I have been extremely candid in my assessments, which in no way suggests any 

diminishment in my overall respect for the people who are charged with such enormous 

responsibilities as are those in your Department. 

Although this letter is no doubt considerably longer than you intended, the matter at hand 

is in many respects a complex one, and its importance obviously merits careful 

consideration. This document has been prepared at the unclassified level for your 

convenience; however, I would be pleased to provide further substantiation and 

clarification of various issues at a higher level of security, should you wish. 

I would note at the outset that I am highly indebted to the people working in the 

Department of Energy, who were generous with their time and expertise and were 

extremely forthcoming, even welcoming, in sharing their views on what are often 

controversial issues. A particular debt of gratitude is owed to the staff of CSIS that 

supported us; they are a group of professionals. 

This updated version (dated December 10th) of the original letter contains minor clarifying edits. 
66 


80292.032

The Honorable Steven Chu 

December 6,2012 

Page 2 

APPROACH 

In conducting this review, I have read on the order of 1,000 pages of documents, some at 

classified levels, and held discussions with literally dozens of individuals, both 

management and non-management-the latter in some cases without management 

present. I visited Y -12, Pantex Plant, Sandia National Laboratories, Savannah River Site, 

DoE headquarters, and the Calvert Cliffs nuclear power generation plant. (The reason for 

conducting the field visits was to benefit first-hand from examining the different 

management models they embrace; to search for systemic problems; and to assure the 

degree of thoroughness that the task you assigned deserves.) 

The mindset you will hopefully find reflected in this letter is one commensurate with DoE's 

extraordinary responsibility of, among other things, providing for the security of sensitive 

nuclear materials and weapons. Failures in this arena can, as you know so well, directly 

impact the lives of millions of people as well as reshape the world's geopolitical landscape 

virtually overnight. Under such circumstances, there can be zero margin for error, and that 

is the attitude that has been adopted in conducting this review. 

OVERALL FINDINGS 

"Unacceptable and inexcusable" were the words aptly used by the Administrator of the 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) testifying before the Congress with 

regard to the events of July 28 at Oak Ridge; as you know, three individuals, one an 82-

year-old nun, penetrated four fences and several clear-zones during the night, and when 

finally confronted, these individuals faced a trained security officer who acted principally 

as a spectator. Disconcertingly, I can see little reason why, under the specific prevailing 

circumstances, the intruding group could not have included, in addition to the three 

persons actually participating in the incursion, a well-armed follow-up group. I must 

disclose that I have been involved in dozens of failure analyses of a variety of types during 

my career, and none has been more difficult for me to comprehend than this one. 

Many security professionals with whom we spoke reacted to the Y-12 incident with extreme 

embarrassment and, as in my own case, perplexity. The overwhelming majority of these 

individuals are very proud of the work they perform and are generally aware of the 

importance of their mission ... which makes the cascade of failures that led to the events of 

July 28 all the more enigmatic. 

You asked that 1 address the pros and cons of various management structures that would 

better serve the Department in providing physical security, and I have done so. While this is 

important indeed,l conclude that, rather convincingly, the management structure was an 

abetting, not a root cause, of the problems encountered on July 28. The fundamental 

This updated version (dated December 10th) of the original letter contains minor clarifYing edits. 
67 


80292.033

The Honorable Steven Chu 

December 6, 2012 

Page 3 

problem was one of culture: a pervasive culture of tolerating the intolerable and accepting 

the unacceptable. 

As examples of this culture, a false alarm rate surpassing by orders of magnitude anything 

that I have ever encountered before was accepted as a fact oflife. When full-time 

surveillance cameras failed, a "compensatory measure" was introduced that consisted of 

(relatively infrequent) periodic patrols. Word of no-notice tests was leaked to those 

security forces being tested. Failed security systems went unrepaired for months (yet were 

repaired within days after the Y-12 incursion when attention was focused upon the issue). 

There was cheating on proficiency exams. "Tune-up" firing was permitted prior to 

marksmanship qualification tests. Worthiness tests of hardware were delayed until the 

hardware was in working condition on the grounds that there is no sense testing hardware 

that isn't working. Strikes of the guard force were largely dismissed as being readily offset 

by substitute guards (even though we were told that as many as three sites have entered 

union negotiations at about the same time, which could limit the availability of such 

substitutes). 

The demands of securing nuclear materials, components, and devices are perhaps of 

unmatched unforgiveness-yet in general it is an endeavor of chilling monotony. 

Individual security personnel can (hopefully) expect that they will never confront a true 

threat during their entire career. Add to this the hundreds of false and nuisance alarms 

that occurred (and occur) each month-and then working 12-hour shifts (albeit some 

involving rotation)-and one has a mind-numbing challenge even for the most dedicated 

professional. (Regarding the length of shifts, as explained in one DoE report, the workforce 

likes the overtime pay and days off.) 

The various corrective action plans and numerous security reviews (going back to 1986) 

reveal a pattern of inverted priorities, to wit, from highest to lowest: 

1. Accommodate the workforce. 

2. Reduce costs. 

3. Secure nuclear materials, components and devices. 

In summary, the problem the Department faces within the context of this review is a 

culture of permissiveness, amplified by the absence of day-to-day accountability and 

exacerbated, in the case ofY-12, by an ineffectual governance structure. 

As will be discussed later, I favor the Federalized Force model for a number of reasons. 

However, if this cannot, for various reasons, be implemented, I believe that the singlecontract ("new" Y-12) model can be made to work ... as could another alternative I will offer. 

This updated version (dated December 10th) of the original letter contains minor clarifying edits. 
68 


80292.034

The Honorable Steven Chu 

December 6, 2012 

Page 4 

Unfortunately, one of the most difficult things to change is a failed culture. My observations 

over the years have, however, convinced me that change can be introduced and that there 

are at least seven ingredients to successfully do so: 

1. Make sweeping changes ... begin with a "clean sheet of paper" -simply "trying 

harder" to do what you have been trying to do all along is a formula for failure. 

2. Make leadership changes wherever doubts exist as to its effectiveness. 

3. Devote a great deal of effort to communicating the new culture. 

4. Be intolerant of even the slightest reversions to the old culture. 

5. Lead by example-demand that all in leadership positions "walk the talk." 

6. Execute change fast ... prolonging change so that everyone can get used to the new 

system is self-defeating. 

7. Weed out individuals who cannot accept the new culture (Vince Lombardi: "If you 

are not fired with enthusiasm you will be fired with enthusiasm!") 

CAUSAL FACTORS (V-12) 

The following six factors seemed to predominate as triggers for the V -12 incident of July 28 

(note: one earlier assessment identified 26 specific factors that contributed to the security 

failures): 

Failure of Early Warning System. Numerous reviews of Y -12 physical security have been 

conducted over the years; however, none-including one by NNSA not long before the July 

28 incident-expressed extraordinary concerns, although several cited troublesome 

indicators. In the case of the line-management system, the headquarters relied upon the 

site management; the site management relied upon the two primary contractors; and one 

of the two primary contractors was facing a competition and the union was concerned with 

an upcoming contract negotiation. In short, bad news did not flow upward, having been 

underappreciated or filtered at every level. The speed of light exceeds the speed of dark! 

Lack of Systems Approach. Razor (or concertina) wire was in place around part ofthe Y12 perimeter ... but not all. There was no evidence of a disciplined analysis of single-point 

or even multi-point failure modes. DoE sites, for example, have far fewer cameras than does 

the Calvert Cliffs power plant. It was reported that sixty compensatory measures were in 

place at Y-12 to "offset" malfunctions, but from a systems standpoint many of them were 

not truly compensatory. When the necessary funding to implement the ARGUS security 

system was not forthcoming (by nearly a factor of four), ARGUS was mated to elements of 

the existing system without adequate systems testing-and then rushed into 

This updated version (dated December 10th) of the original letter contains minor clarifying edits. 
69 


80292.035

The Honorable Steven Chu 

December 6, 2012 

Page 5 

operation-apparently without objection by the Site Office. The result was that the 

"system upgrade" actually deteriorated system performance. 

Split Responsibilities. Wackenhut Services, Inc. (WSI) was responsible for the security 

force but the management and operations (M&O) contractor was responsible for the 

sensing, analysis, and display equipment. The Site Office appears to have withdrawn from 

its oversight responsibilities, having misinterpreted headquarters instructions as to its 

role. The role of a Site Office (or headquarters) with regard to contracted activities is not to 

manage those activities but rather to ensure that those activities are managed. At 

Savannah River Site, physical control of category 1 materials located at two proximate sites 

is currently overseen via two different chains of command emanating from DoE 

headquarters. 

Focus oflnspection/Testing on Compliance. In general, inspections and testing have 

focused on verifying that contract terms are satisfied or that the Design Basis Threat (DBT) 

has been countered. Immense volumes of documentation containing innumerable checklists have been produced-little of which addresses what the Department of Defense would 

consider Operational Testing (as opposed to Developmental Testing). Stated differently, 

tests have too often addressed the question, "Does the hardware or practice meet the 

design criteria rather than is it operationally effective?" Standards are often procedural 

rather than performance-oriented, and stress testing has been lacking. What is needed is 

not more inspections but better inspections. 

Compartmentalization of Responsibility. During the review team's visit to the Calvert 

Cliffs nuclear power plant it was emphasized that if, for example, a member of the security 

force noticed that a production machine sounded differently from whatthey normally 

heard they would view it as their responsibility to report this observation. Further, it was 

the clear responsibility of management to run the apparent anomaly to ground and to 

report their overall findings to the security officer initially reporting the issues. This is in 

stark contrast to what occurred at Y-12. 

The fact that certain sensors at Y -12 had been designated as priority 2 for repair should not 

have been an excuse for a very large number of sensors remaining inoperable for months, 

particularly when the problem was not elevated within the management structure, 

particularly including the Site Office, for resolution. 

During visits to the previously listed sites, one heard complaints about persistent 

escapements (deficiencies) that were known and accepted because "That belongs to the 

M&O contractor," "It is part of the union agreement," "It is required by the contract," "The 

FAA wouldn't like it," "You can't cut down trees," etc. It is critically important that all 

escapements be identified and reported, resolution responsibility assigned, root causes 

found, corrections introduced and tested, and open-items formally closed. (In this regard, 

This updated version (dated December 10th) of the original letter contains minor clarifying edits. 
70 


80292.036

The Honorable Steven Chu 

December 6,2012 

Page 6 

NASA and its contractors have evolved highly effective systems in support of the human 

spaceflight program that might be conceptually helpful to the DoE.) 

Lack oflndependent Verification. Testing and auditing ultimately requires 

independence from those responsible for what is being examined. At some point these two 

functions obviously must come together in the chain of command; however, in general, the 

higher that coincidence takes place, the better. This is particularly true of operational 

(performance) testing that may involve off-nominal conditions. 

The key individuals involved in such independent oversight need to be rotated periodically, 

much as audit firms are required to rotate account managers or the NRC rotates its field 

personnel. Absent this, the site offices can become relatively passive and increasingly 

insular. Site managers must be granted significant authority (and accountability) over 

work performed by contractors-not to give detailed instructions regarding work 

execution but rather to assure that contractor responsibilities are being met. Similarly, 

headquarters personnel should not seek to involve themselves in the actual execution of 

routine work, but should use their full authority to ensure that Significant work is in fact 

properly executed. In short, micromanagement on the one hand and passivity on the other 

are not the only options. 

MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES 

The suggestions that follow are driven by twelve management principles that I have 

discerned over my career (some the hard way!). These are as follows: 

1. Recognize that management is all about people. Selfless, competent, committed. 

ethicalleadership-by-example is the coin of the realm. 

2. Focus on the primacy of mission. 

3. Communicate expectations and listen to concerns. Establish a single chain of 

responsibility and provide commensurate authority and resources. 

4. Maintain clear-and minimal-interfaces (both technical and organizational). 

5. Assure accountability and enforce consequences. 

6. Disproportionately reward significant contributors and do not endure undercontributors. 

7. Analyze every escapement-no matter how trivial-to determine root cause, 

introduce appropriate corrections, and conduct confirmatory tests. ("There is no 

such thing as a random failure.") 

8. Provide independent checks and balances. 

This updated version (dated December 10th) of the original letter contains minor clarifying edits. 
71 


80292.037

The Honorable Steven Chu 

December 6, 2012 

Page 7 

9. Maintain parallel channels for surfacing bad news (line management, auditors, 

ethics officers, suggestion boxes, etc.). 

10. Culture can be an asset but it can never be an excuse. 

11. Treat all persons with respect 

12. Operate ethically at all times. 

Quality personnel can make up for an inadequate organizational structure, but a quality 

organizational structure can never make up for inadequate personnel. 

ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES 

The myriad possible governance and management structures can conveniently be grouped 

into five basic models or hybrids thereof. Each has its advantages and disadvantages and, 

interestingly, three of the five are currently in use by the DoE, thereby offering first-hand 

experiential prototypes. These models are (a) Dedicated Physical Security-Military; (b) 

Dedicated Physical Security-Civilian; (c) Separate Operations and Physical Security; (d) 

Separate Operations and Full-Service Security; and (e) Integrated Operations and Physical 

Security. 

(a) Dedicated Physical Security-Military (Department of Defense (DoD)) 

This model has the advantage of resolving protective force career issues, promoting 

strong discipline and providing a single, established chain of command. It suffers 

from coordination issues that may arise between two major government 

departments (DoE/DoD), rapid turnover of personnel, and a visibly expanded 

operational role of the uniformed military within the United States. Furthermore, 

assigning such a mission to DoD, even given its importance, would inevitably be 

viewed as a distraction from the Department's primary mission-a mission that is 

already extremely strained due to growing resource limitations. 

(b) Dedicated Physical Security-Civilian (DoE Office of Secure Transportation - OST) The 

option of a federalized physical security force would virtually eliminate concerns 

over work stoppages, increase continuity, and offer a clear and highly focused chain 

of command. It also recognizes the paramilitary-as opposed to civilian-nature of 

defending nuclear assets. However, it poses career management challenges for the 

members of the force as they age, and it has been asserted that it could be more 

costly than some other options. This approach represents a transformational change 

that should promote creating a new culture; however, it would be very difficult to 

"unwind" if it should later be desired to do so. (Under this model it is important that 

the Dedicated Physical Security Force have an integral capability to install and 

maintain all security systems as well as to access 

This updated version (dated December 10th) of the original letter contains minor clarifying edits. 
72 


80292.038

The Honorable Steven Chu 

December 6,2012 

Page 8 

organizations capable of developing such systems so that interface issues similar to 

those encountered at Y-12 are to be precluded.) 

(c) Separate Operations and Physical Security ("old" Y-12)) 

This model can produce significant potential interface challenges (between the M&O 

contractor and the security contractor) because of split responsibilities and 

reporting chains. It is also subject to work stoppages. On the other hand, it offers 

the advantage of a direct relationship between the Site Office and the critically 

important physical security contractor and greatly eases the problem of removing 

non-performing individuals and organizations. 

(d) Separate Operations and Full-Service Physical Security (new model) 

The primary failing of the Separate Operations and Physical Security model that was 

previously in place at Y-12 is its split of responsibility between two contractors for 

the performance of the physical security function. A workable excursion from this 

model that would maintain the needed emphasis on physical security professionals 

who are directly aligned with the Site Office would be to have separate M&O and 

physical security contractors but with the latter having a 'full-service" responsibility. 

That is, the security contractor would be responsible not only for providing the ProForce but also for acquiring, installing and maintaining all security systems and other 

necessary equipment-directly overseen by the Site Office. In other words, rather 

than moving the Pro-Force to the M&O contractor, move that part of the M&O 

contract related to physical security to the security contractor. This would likely 

exacerbate relationships between operating employees and security employees but 

would provide a strong physical security capability and would remove physical 

security responsibilities from the M&O contractor that is more likely to be familiar 

with science or operations than physical security. 

(e) Integrated Operations and Physical Security ("new" Y-12, Pantex) 

At the M&O leveL this model unifies responsibilities for security and operations and 

provides the site office with a single point of contact It also permits rapid 

resolution of personnel and major contractor issues. It suffers from the possibility 

of work stoppages and demands that the M&O organization and its senior members 

assume a breadth of responsibility that spans from plant operations to maintenance 

to cyber security to physical security and much more. Most potential M&O 

contractors will not be versed in the demands of providing physical security. The 

formation of joint ventures alleviates this problem but does not eliminate it. In the 

case of sites focused on research and development it confronts the challenge of 

integrating the open culture of science with the closed culture of security. 

Particularly in time of crisis the M&O contractor, security contractor and Site Office 

will need to maintain close coordination; however, this is not unique to this 

This updated version (dated December 10th) of the original letter contains minor clarifying edits. 
73 


80292.039

The Honorable Steven Chu 

December 6,2012 

Page 9 

particular model since in all cases under such circumstances operational command 

shifts to the Pro-Force, with other organizations assuming a supporting role. 

SUGGESTIONS 

Given that no single model seems to offer a perfect solution, I would rank the five principal 

options, from best to worst, as follows, with the fourth of these being undesirable and the 

fifth being unacceptable (note that the second and third of these options would be 

considerably more attractive were it possible to obtain a federal ruling/law that precluded 

strikes by employees of commercial firms charged with securing Category 1 sites): 

• Dedicated Physical Security-Civilian ("Federalized") 

• Separate Operations and Full-Service Physical Security ("New Model") 

• Integrated Operations and Physical Security ("Proprietary"-"New" Y-12) 

• Separate Operations and Physical Security ("Old" Y-12) 

• Dedicated Physical Security-Military (000) 

The above ranking is, curiously, somewhat contrary to my confessed personal prejudicesthat is, believing that the Free Enterprise System does work and that government should 

perform only those functions that the private sector cannot, or will not, perform (there are 

of course a number of such functions). However, in the case at hand, an overriding 

consideration is that the DoE is concerned with one of the most consequential missions in 

the world; furthermore, it is a paramilitary mission potentially entailing the use of deadly 

force. Such a mission is best executed with a singular focus and with the greatest possible 

authority. 

The notion that individuals under some other models, many of whom have served our 

country in combat, would abandon their posts in a work stoppage while protecting a 

Category-1 site is, frankly, incomprehensible to me. Whatever the case, the federalized 

model largely negates that happenstance. I discount the rather widely-held view that such 

eventualities are readily handled through backup plans, and do so in part because of the 

possibility that (as has recently occurred) mUltiple union contracts could expire at about 

the same time. (Note that work stoppages become a possibility even when union contracts 

contain no-strike provisions if that contract is no longer operative due to its expiration.) 

It is again emphasized that the Dedicated Physical Security-Civilian model must be a 

"total package" solution and include an integral capability to obtain and maintain all 

necessary physical security devices and equipment. 

There are at least two major disadvantages to this overall approach. First, it poses nontrivial challenges in workforce career management. Second, any attempt to implement it is 

likely to confront enormous opposition. With regard to the former, it is noted that there 

This updated version (dated December 10th) of the original letter contains minor clarifying edits. 
74 


80292.040

The Honorable Steven Chu 

December 6, 2012 

Page 10 

are many government jobs (as well as M&O contractor jobs) that security force members 

can fill when they are no longer capable of meeting the high physical standards demanded 

when assuring nuclear security. Further, during the review, few if any instances were 

found where such problems have been significant (under any of the models in use). With 

regard to the latter concern, it is simply noted that the issue at hand has to do with the 

security of nuclear materials and weapons. Enough said! 

If, however, for any reason it is not practicable to implement the Dedicated Physical 

Security-Civilian model, the Separate Operations and Full-Service Physical Security model 

or the Integrated Operations and Physical Security model, the latter as used at Pantex and 

has been introduced at Y-12 following the July 28 event, should be workable. The 

Integrated Operations and Physical Security model could involve either a single contractor 

or a joint venture. Both options offer the distinct advantage of making necessary corrective 

actions regarding personnel far more expedient than the preferred approach cited above. 

(In my experience, I have found the government personnel system to be far more tolerant 

of [the relatively rare cases of] clearly substandard individual performance than the civilian 

sector.) 

The DoE is currently in the rather awkward situation of having (appropriately) abandoned 

as unworkable the Separate Operations and Physical Security model at Y-12, yet continuing 

to preserve that same model at the Savannah River Site (SRS)-with exactly the same 

security contractor! In discussions with the leadership of SRS it was dear that they are 

uniformly confident of the suitability and effectiveness of the eXisting situation. Based 

upon a one-day visit I would be hesitant to question that judgment since, as repeatedly 

observed herein, given capable people almost any model can be made to work. However, I 

would strongly emphasize that some models are markedly more vulnerable to problems 

than others. It is my view that the Separate Operating and Physical Security structure is 

such a model. 

Other related actions that I would commend for your consideration are: 

• Establish a separate, dedicated organization responsible for conducting physical 

security (only) inspections and audits that reports directly to the Secretary of 

Energy (or, alternatively, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission). Field Sites 

would be responsible for periodically reporting status of all security elements to 

this organization. 

• Reinforce the authority ofField Sites and Field Offices-nonetheless making 

clear that during actual physical security incidents the chain of command is 

entirely within the physical security management structure and that Site office 

responsibility is not to manage work but to assure that work is managed. If the 

Site Offices are present merely to observe, then it is not apparent why they are 

present. 

This updated version (dated December 10th) of the original letter contains minor clarifying edits. 
75 


80292.041

The Honorable Steven Chu 

December 6, 2012 

Page 11 

• Rotate select individuals between Headquarters and field sites in order to 

enhance understanding of the distinct roles, challenges and responsibilities 

faced by these two institutions (as is commonplace in industry) and thereby 

increase overall effectiveness. This will require revisions to the existing DoE 

policies for reimbursing the cost of employee moves. 

• Place security forces on eight-hour shifts. This would have the secondary benefit 

of producing a larger Pro-Force pool. (This is undoubtedly a strike issue.) 

• Create a single office (at Sandia or Livermore) to develop standards and 

procurement guidance along with advanced equipment for security systems 

(biometrics, high resolution displays, animal-discriminating sensors, etc.). These 

standardized systems can then be tailored, by exception, to the particular local 

conditions of individual sites. (It is noteworthy that not all such solutions need 

to be high-tech. For example, Savannah River Site has implemented what 

appears to be a very effective rip-rap barrier, yet it is not in evidence elsewhere 

(excluding the Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant where it is fully embraced). 

The use of dogs is another such example. 

• Review the current threat model (which is said to be five years old). Involve 

outside organizations from both the intelligence community and the special ops 

community to participate in this effort. 

• Re-balance responsibilities among NNSA and other DoE headquarters entities to 

assure that field elements operating under similar circumstances are provided 

with a single, consistent chain of command and set of procedures. The creation 

of the reporting relationship of the Field Sites to NA-OO seems appropriate for 

clarity of command but will require careful implementation to avoid the 

evolution of "stovepipes." 

• Reevaluate current training practices with the assistance of outside 

organizations (military special operations forces (SOF)). Possibilities range from 

such simple actions as increasing the number of allotted training rounds to 

enhancing force-on-force testing methodology. (I am aware that many of the 

DoE security personnel have had earlier experience with the above 

organizations!) 

• Change the culture! This can be facilitated by adopting the previously mentioned 

practices. It is emphasized that a primary benefit of the "Federalized Force" 

model is that it does provide a fresh start-a "clean sheet of paper." 

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) included the following 

comment in its 1999 report regarding DoE: "A departmen; saturated with cynicism, an 

This updated version (dated December 10th) of the original letter contains minor clarifying edits. 
76 


80292.042

The Honorable Steven Chu 

December 6, 2012 

Page 12 

arrogant disregard for authority, and a staggering pattern of denial." While I observed 

nothing approaching the former two criticisms, the third does have resonance, at least with 

operations at Y-12. The pervasiveness of this sense of denial throughout DoE's physical 

security system was not determinable in the time available for this review. Nonetheless, 

there is ample reason to thoroughly reassess the activities at other sites in search of 

patterns of behavior that may also require corrective action. 

No matter what management model is adopted, the same individuals are likely to populate 

it-with the exception of a few senior managers. Fortunately, the people we met during 

our assessment appeared to be individually highly capable and clearly dedicated, but often 

overwhelmed by a culture of accommodation and passiveness when in the presence of subpar performance. Somehow, at least at Y-12, a culture of tolerance overcame a culture of 

performance. And while one could never, ever condone the actions of the trespassers on 

July 28, they inadvertently provided a much needed wakeup-call to those responsible for 

physical security at the nation's nuclear facilities. And while the Y-12 trespassers could 

not, in retrospect, pose a meaningful threat even given the extent of access they achieved, 

the magnitude of the failure of the security system was extraordinary. Strikingly, there 

have been incidents in earlier years at Savannah River and Rocky Flats that point to much 

the same cultural shortcomings as have been allowed to persist at Y -12. Change is 

needed ... and needed quickly. 

I would note that a great deal of additional information resides at CSIS, and I believe it 

would be a sound investment for it to be compiled and provided to the DoE. 

Finally, I am honored that you requested that I participate in such an important 

undertaking and pleased that you encouraged me to be forthright in my assessment. I hope 

that my comments will be viewed as constructively offered and that they might assist you 

and the members of your team in addressing the challenges the nation confronts in 

securing nuclear assets. 

Norman R. Augustine 

This updated version (dated December 10th) of the original letter contains minor claritying edits. 
77 


80292.043

Secretary Steven Chu 

U.S. Department of Energy 

1000 Independence Ave S W 

Washington, DC 20585 

Dear Steve: 

December 6, 2012 

I am writing in response to your request for advice on the management 

of physical security at the facilities with Category I material under DOE control. 

You have explained that this request arose as a result ofthe event at the Y -12 

Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility in July in which three people, 

including an elderly nun, were able to penetrate the security fences and to 

deface the exterior ofthe building before being apprehended. In addition to this 

troubling breach, the first responder's casual behavior upon encountering the 

intruders was completely inappropriate given the nature of the site. 

The security challenge confronting the Department is a complicated one 

for a variety of reasons. The DOE approach to security has evolved since 9111 

from something that is akin to industrial security to a system involving an elite 

paramilitary force that can defend against a sophisticated terrorist attack. This 

has been a challenge both because ofthe need to enhance the capabilities of the 

protective forces and because the change has entailed significant expense to 

strengthen security structures and systems at facilities that were not initially 

designed with this type of security in mind. These changes had to be 

undertaken within budgetary limitations at a time when the Department needed 

to pursue many other important (and expensive) programs. The changing 

demands on the weapons complex over the years have added yet another layer 

of complexity. And any change in security had to be accomplished within a 

legal and administrative structure for the Department that is extraordinarily 

complicated. 

The Department has not lacked for an abundance ofthoughtful studies 

on the security issue over the years. Considerable change has been introduced 

as a result, but the Y-12 episode reveals that problems remain. Although my 

examination of the security issues confronting the Department has necessarily 

been limited, I am satisfied that the Y -12 episode has been taken very seriously 

and considerable effort has been made to ensure that security is strong 

throughout the complex. I have thus focused on your request to consider 

whether there are issues relating to the management structure for physical 

security. I know that you seek confidence that the security obligation will be 

fulfilled in an effective way for the long term. 
78 


80292.044

Secretary Steven Chu 

December 5, 2012 

Page 2 

You specifically asked whether the wholesale modification of the 

management structure for physical security is appropriate. As you know, the 

current system relies on contractors to provide security. (The details ofthis 

approach are discussed further below.) The obvious altemative would be to 

federalize the protective force (partially or completely) so that the security 

officers become DOE employees. Federalization could shorten chains of 

command between federal policymakers and the implementers of security, 

would encourage consistent application of policies and procedures across sites, 

would reflect the reality that security is a central federal function at these sites, 

and perhaps most importantly, would eliminate the potential for strikes by the 

protective force. Moreover, I understand that the unions at one time advocated 

such a change in order to deal with retirement and long-term disability concerns 

of the security officers. 

An evaluation by DOE in 2009 concluded that the merits of 

federalization turned on three factors: implementation of elite force concepts in 

a cost-effective manner, determination of practical avenues to address 

retirement and disability concerns, and identification of methods to address 

potential protective force work stoppages. Memorandum to the Acting Deputy 

Secretary from T.P. D'Agostino and G.S. Podonsky (Jan. 13,2009). The 

review found that the cost issue was the most important factor that should guide 

a decision and concluded that federalization would result in increased costs 

without commensurate benefits, particularly given the progress that had been 

made in implementing the elite force approach using contractors. The review 

also concluded that federalization did not offer a viable approach to address the 

union concerns because ofthe difficulties and complexities of a transition of 

guards from private-sector employment to federal employment. And, although 

it acknowledged that the most compelling reason to pursue federalization was to 

prevent work stoppages by unionized protective force members, it concluded 

that this risk could be managed by the execution of contingency protective force 

operations in such a situation, an approach that DOE has had to take in 

connection with a strike at Pantex. Although to my mind the issue is a close 

one, I have no informed basis to challenge this recent evaluation. 

One additional factor in favor of federalization is that a dramatic change 

of this nature could facilitate the introduction of a new security culture. In a 

sense, such a step would serve to wipe the slate clean and demonstrate that very 

different performance is expected going forward. The Office of Secure 

Transport uses federal employees and has satisfactorily fulfilled its functions, 

which serves to show that federalization can work. But no doubt a wholesale 

change in management structure would be very expensive to accomplish. And, 

if the protective force were federal employees, the imposition of discipline 

would be more difficult and in the end federalization could reduce flexibility. 

A variant is limited federalization. For example, one might federalize 

the armed component ofthe protective forces, while relying on a contractor for 

the remaining services. This presumably would reduce the cost of the transition 
79 


80292.045

Secretary Steven Chu 

December 5,2012 

Page 3 

and would recognize the unique federal role of those who are authorized to use 

deadly force. Since federal employees cannot strike, this approach would 

facilitate the ability to respond to a work stoppage. But this approach would 

then complicate the chains of command within the protective forces. And it 

would make even more difficult the challenge of providing a career path for 

those in the armed component of the protective forces. (This issue is discussed 

below.) 

I conclude that a decision to federalize all or a part of the protective 

force would be difficult, would be expensive to accomplish, and would create 

some new challenges. In the absence of compelling benefits, it is probably not 

warranted. But it is an approach that may be worthy of consideration if efforts 

to make the necessary changes cannot be accomplished by a less drastic 

approach. 

A variant to the federalization of the protective force as DOE employees 

is to engage another federal agency, such as the Department of Defense or the 

Department of Homeland Security, to provide security. Engagement of another 

agency to provide security would serve to complicate chains of command and 

would likely create confusion as to who was in charge at the sites. The 

interfaces between the DOE and the management and operations ("M&O") 

contractors would become even more complicated and confusing. Even if DOE 

were to engage another agency to provide security, the Department would still 

be accountable for the security posture. And, although I have not pursued the 

point, I am doubtful that another agency would be willing take on the task. I 

conclude that such an approach is not suitable. 

I thus conclude that it is reasonable to continue to rely on private 

contractors to provide security. I hasten to add, however, that there are 

opportunities to improve the management of security. Some of my suggestions 

follow: 

1. Align authority and responsibility. At Y -12, there was a division of 

responsibility for physical protection between the contractor responsible 

for the protective officers and the M&O contractor responsible for the 

fences, various sensors and other equipment that are part of the physical 

protection system. The result was a fractured management structure. 

The interface between the contractors was clearly not functioning: their 

priorities were not aligned. Cameras in the affected area were out of 

service and had been for a considerable time and the system of detectors, 

which had recently been significantly upgraded, was plagued by 

frequent false alarms. This resulted in a situation in July in which the 

protective force did not appreciate that the alarms associated with the 

breach of the fences were "real" and the absence of functioning cameras 

did not enable the appropriate immediate surveillance of the situation. 

Although no doubt a system involving multiple contractors could be 

made to work, a simplified structure in which one contractor is 
80 


80292.046

Secretary Steven Chu 

December 5,2012 

Page 4 

responsible for all elements of security would provide greater assurance 

that the security approach is integrated and that issues that otherwise 

would cross lines between contractors are addressed. 

Although a compelling case can be made for assuring that all security 

functions are the responsibility of a single contractor, there is a 

subsidiary question whether security should be the subject of a separate 

contract from that with the M&O contractor. The advantage of 

separation is that the security responsibility could be allocated to an 

entity with strong skills in that one area, whereas the M&O contractor 

presumably must be selected based on a balancing of a variety of 

capabilities. But, again, separating the security function from the overall 

site responsibility will require a complicated interface between 

contractors, with opportunities for miscommunication and misalignment 

of priorities: security should be an integral part of site operations, not an 

add-on. Indeed, a single chain of command will be mandatory during a 

security event. As a result, the favored course, it seems to me, is to 

require the M&O contractor to fulfill the security function and to ensure, 

through proper controls, that it meets its responsibilities. 

2. Improve federal oversight. It was apparent that the department's system 

of oversight did not detect and correct the security problems that the Y12 incident revealed. The large number of false alarms was tolerated, 

raising questions about the acceptance testing, readiness, and 

maintenance of the ARGUS system. The cameras were not viewed as 

critical security equipment, with the result that a significant number 

were inappropriately allowed to remain out of service for an extended 

period. There were significant departures from expected procedures by 

the first responder, as well as significant communication deficiencies. 

The DOE oversight "system" was seemingly unaware ofthese problems 

and, in fact, the evaluations ofthe security at Y-12 had received 

consistently high marks in the period before the incident. The overall 

situation reveals significant failings in oversight by DOE. I appreciate 

that the approach to oversight does implicate broader issues within the 

Department as to the degree of freedom and flexibility that should be 

provided to its contractors. 

Part ofthe challenge in providing proper oversight may relate to the 

extraordinarily complicated administrative structure within DOE, with 

security responsibilities spread across several offices at headquarters and 

between headquarters and the DOE field offices. Indeed, we have had 

some difficulty in obtaining a clear organization chart that defines the 

structure for security oversight within DOE. I understand that issues 

associated with diffuse management are subject to study within the 

National Nuclear Security Administration ("NNSA") in an effort that is 

being led by Brigadier General Sandra Finan. A broader examination of 

DOE's internal management of security should be undertaken in order to 
81 


80292.047

Secretary Steven Chu 

December 5, 2012 

Page 5 

streamline and simplify the structure. The aim should be to establish 

clear authority and responsibility and to assure that the responsible staff 

has the right training and experience. Although I appreciate that 

different approaches to security may well be appropriate as a result of 

differing circumstances at the various DOE sites, I question whether 

different standards can be justified as a result of DOE's organizational 

structure. Efforts to achieve consistency and uniformity would be 

appropriate. 

3. Enhancement of the Protective Force. Perhaps the most puzzling aspect 

ofthe Y -12 incident is the behavior ofthe first responder. He had 

evidently received the appropriate training, but decided to ignore it. He 

seems to have immediately concluded that the three intruders were not a 

threat and, as a result, he treated them as such. Although his assessment 

proved to be correct, attackers might seek cover for a serious assault by 

mimicking the appearances that evidently were so reassuring to the first 

responder. The episode reveals the importance of training and drills to 

reinforce appropriate actions by the protective force. 

There are challenges associated with the maintenance of an appropriately 

trained protective force. DOE has enhanced the capabilities ofits 

protective forces significantly with the aim of a establishing an elite 

paramilitary capability that can respond to a very capable and 

sophisticated adversary. The physical qualifications and capabilities of 

many members of the force must be maintained at a high level, which 

creates a challenge in establishing a career trajectory for the protective 

officers. Having a force that maintains its "edge" is difficult, given that 

actual attacks have not occurred. Indeed, overcoming boredom among 

the members ofthe protective force is difficult. The commercial nuclear 

industry has confronted many of these same challenges and has sought to 

establish and maintain an esprit among the protective force. It 

encourages attentiveness by frequent force-on-force drills, regular 

transitions among posts, and allowing other activities, 

such as access to the web while on post, in appropriate circumstances. It 

has sought to respond to the demanding physical challenges that may 

become more difficult as the security officers age by enabling and 

encouraging them to migrate to other jobs at the site. In short, it has 

sought to establish and reinforce that the protective force is an important 

part of the team that operates the plant and that its members have career 

opportunities. Some of these lessons may be relevant to the DOE sites. 

4. Security Culture. The commercial nuclear industry has learned that the 

essential ingredient for assuring safe operations is the establishment of a 

culture in which safety is the highest priority. Management has the 

obligation to establish such a culture by its words and deeds, including 

the allocation of resources. Each plant worker has an individual 

responsibility to assure that any safety issue that a worker observes is 
82 


80292.048

Secretary Steven Chu 

December 5,2012 

Page 6 

addressed even it is not within the worker's responsibilities; if a 

supervisor fails to respond, the worker is obligated to raise the issue to a 

higher level and severe sanctions are imposed if any retaliation against 

such a worker occurs. Given the critical importance of security at the 

Category I sites, I believe that an analogous security culture needs to be 

established at the DOE sites. That is, everyone on the site should 

understand that security is his or her responsibility. Establishing such a 

culture will be difficult in a system in which individuals are otherwise 

encouraged to focus on individual responsibilities, but truly effective 

security requires such a change. 

5. Balance. The Y-12 episode has appropriately caused a heightened 

awareness ofthe importance of physical security. This focus should not 

be allowed to unduly distort DOE's efforts. The aim should be to 

evaluate security using a systems approach that integrates physical, 

cyber, -and personnel security in order to reduce aggregate 

vulnerabilities. Balance should be maintained. 

* * * 

In developing my thinking on the charge that you presented, I have had 

the benefit of interactions with Norm Augustine and Don Alston, as well as 

substantial assistance from the Center for Strategic and International Studies 

("CSIS"). I was aided by extensive materials assembled by CSIS with DOE 

assistance concerning the various security reviews undertaken over the years, by 

site visits, by discussions with DOE and contractor staff, and by interviews with 

knowledgeable individuals. (Some of these interviews were undertaken by 

CSIS staff.) I very much appreciate this assistance. Nonetheless, this letter 

reflects my perspective. My comments should not be attributed to the various 

individuals who have helped to shape my judgments. 

I hope this letter is helpful. Please feel free to contact me if you have 

any questions. 

Best regards. 

Very truly yours, 

if'-

Richard A. Meserve 
83 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Trimble, you have a chance for an opening statement. 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID C. TRIMBLE 

Mr. TRIMBLE. Thank you, Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member 

DeGette, members of the subcommittee. My testimony today discusses DOE’s and NNSA’s management of the nuclear security enterprise, and will focus on security, safety, and project and contract 

management. 

Multiple investigations into the security breach at Y–12 identified significant deficiencies in NNSA’s security organization, oversight, and culture. In response to the Y–12 security incident and 

the findings of these reports, DOE and NNSA have taken a number 

of actions, including repairing security equipment, reassigning key 

security personnel, and firing the Y–12 protective force contractor. 

More recently, DOE and NNSA’s leadership committed to additional actions, such as revamping the security oversight model. We 

have not evaluated these recent actions but will examine them as 

part of our ongoing review on security reform for this committee. 

The key question underlying this work will be whether DOE’s actions to address the security breakdowns at Y–12 will produce sustained improvements in security across the nuclear security enterprise. 

DOE has a long history of security breakdowns and an equally 

long history of instituting responses and remedies to fix these problems. The recent testimony the leader of the NNSA security task 

force examining the Y–12 incident identified problems at NNSA’s 

federal security organization, including poorly defined roles and responsibilities for its headquarters and field staff, inadequate oversight and assessments of secured activities, problems ensuring that 

security improvements are implemented, and failing to ensure adequate staffing. Notably, in 2003, we reported on these same problems, problems which have persisted or resurfaced, notwithstanding numerous DOE initiatives to fix or address them. 

In examining the security incident at Y–12, it is also important 

to remember that NNSA’s security problems have not been limited 

to Y–12. In March of 2009, we reported on numerous and wideranging security deficiencies at Livermore, particularly in the ability of Livermore’s protective forces to ensure the protection of special nuclear material and the laboratory’s protection control of classified material. We also identified Livermore’s physical security 

systems, such as alarms and sensors, and its security assurance activities as areas needing improvement. Weaknesses in Livermore’s 

contractor self-assessment program and the Livermore site office’s 

oversight of the contractor contributed to these security deficiencies 

at the laboratory. 

Los Alamos experienced a number of high profile security incidents in the ’90s that were subject to numerous congressional hearings, including some held by this committee. Subsequently, security 

evaluations through 2007 identified other persistent systemic security problems, including weaknesses in controlling protecting classified resources, inadequate controls over special nuclear matter, inadequate self-assessment activities, and weaknesses in the process 

Los Alamos uses to ensure that corrects identified security defiVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:16 Aug 22, 2013 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\MY DOCS\HEARINGS 113\113-13 CHRIS
84 

ciencies. In October of 2009, we found weaknesses at Los Alamos 

in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information stored on and transmitted over its classified computer network. 

Regarding safety, in September of 2012, we testified before this 

subcommittee, noting that DOE’s recent safety reforms may have 

actually weakened independent oversight. Notably, since this recent testimony, reports by DOE and the safety board have continued to identify safety concerns at Y–12, Pantex, and Los Alamos. 

Regarding project management, DOE has made progress in managing the costs and scheduled non-major projects, those costing less 

than $750 million, and in recognition of this progress, GAO has 

narrowed the focus of our high risk designation to major contracts 

and projects. Major projects, however, continue to pose a challenge 

for DOE and NNSA. In December of 2012, we reported that the estimated cost to construct the waste treatment and immobilization 

plant in Hanford, Washington, had tripled to $12.3 billion since its 

inception in 2000, and the scheduled completion date had slipped 

nearly a decade to 2019. Moreover, we found that DOE had prematurely rewarded the contractor for resolving technical issues and 

completing work. We have reported on similar problems with the 

CMR facility at Los Alamos, the EPF project at Y–12, and the 

MOX project at Savannah River. 

In conclusion, over a decade after NNSA was created to address 

security issues, the Y–12 security incident has raised concern that 

NNSA has still not embraced security as an essential element of 

its mission. The numerous actions that DOE and NNSA are taking 

to address its security problems will require effective implementation across the complex. Without this and strong and sustained 

leadership, these recent reforms, like past efforts, may not have a 

lasting impact on the security, performance, or culture of the agency. 

Thank you. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Trimble follows:] 

85 


80292.049

GAO 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10 a.m. EDT Wednesday, March 13, 2013 

GAO-13-482T 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations, Committee on 

Energy and Commerce, House of 

Representatives 

MODERNIZING THE 

NUCLEAR SECURITY 

ENTERPRISE 

Observations on DOE's and 

NNSA's Efforts to Enhance 

Oversight of Security, 

Safety, and Project and 

Contract Management 

Statement of David C. Trimble, Director 

Natural Resources and Environment 

GAO 

Accountability * Integrity * Reliability 
86 


80292.050

WhyGAQ mQ'l'his~tudy 

OO~~~d NNSA~~h,sponSfble!or 

:: ",':,,:'~':', ;\,~< 

.Tnl$ t~l!~m.ony.,.dd~ssesDQE'$ and f.iN$A~~bW1llghtQf{l) ~ty 

performance, (21 ""fety):i!!rfQrmance, 

andX3) P~a!)d"l')ltract 

l11anae"lri~nt.ilj4he'nucle"r,securilY 

~n!"rj:lriSe:l! is.1>l!Sed 01) 1'rior GAQ 

rep"~I~su"d'f'1lmAU9U$1 goon to 

December 2012. . 

tlor::andNN~~'¢Ontil\ueto act on In" 

num"ro\.{s nlC:Qmm'elidaliqns .GAO has 

r\I~~ t<ljl1li!l:o~.I11"na9ement of !he 

nucl\\'¥ security enl$'l>rls,,; GAG will . 

continue ~. mQnlt<lr.DOE'san<i.NNSA's 

.ll\:IPtemen!a~cin of thes\> 

reCOfl1tn",!4<!tipns. 

MODERNIZING THE NUCLEAR SECURITY 

ENTERPRISE 

Observations on DOE's and NNSA's Efforts to 

Enhance Oversight of Security, Safety, and Project 

and Contract Management 

What GAO Found 

The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nudear Security 

Administration (NNSA), a separalely organized agency within DOE, continue to 

face challenges in ensuring that oversight of security activitieS is effective. For 

example, in July 2012, after three trespassers gained atcess to the protected 

security area directly adjacent to one of the nation's most critically important 

nuclear weapon-related facilities, the Y-12 National Security Complex, DOE and 

NNSA took a number of immediate actions. These actions included repairing 

security equipment, reassigning key security personnel, and firing the Y-12 

protective force contractor. As GAO and others have reported, DOE has a long 

history of security breakdowns and an equally long history of instituting remedies 

to fix these problems. For example, 10 years ago, GAO reported on 

inconsistencies among NNSA sites on how they assess contractors' security 

activities and, since that time, DOE has undertaken security initiatives to address 

these issues. GAO is currently evaluating these security reform initiatives. 

DOE and NNSA continue to face challenges in ensuring that oversight of safety 

performance activities is effective. DOE and NNSA have experienced significant 

safety problems at their sites, and recent efforts to reform safety protocols and 

processes have not demonstrated sustained improvements. Long-standing DOE 

and NNSA management weaknesses have contributed to persistent safety 

problems at NNSA's national laboratories. For example, in October 2007, GAO 

reported that nearly 60 serious accidents or near misses had occurred at NNSA's 

national laboratories since 2000. DOE has undertaken a number of reforms to 

address persistent safety concerns. For example, in March 2010, the Deputy 

Secretary of Energy announced a reform effort to revise DOE's safety and 

security directives, However, GAO reported in September 2012 that DOE's 

safety reforms did not fully address continuing safety concerns that GAO and 

others identified in the areas of quality assurance, safety culture, and federal 

oversight and, in fact, may have actually weakened independent oversight. 

DOE and NNSA have made progress but need to make further improvements to 

their contract and project management efforts. DOE has made progress in 

managing nonmajor projects-those costing less than $750 million-and in 

recognition of this progress, GAO narrowed the focus of its high-risk designation 

of DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM) and NNSA to major 

contracts and projects. Specifically, as GAO noted in its December 2012 report 

on 71 DOE EM and NNSA nonmajor projects, GAO found the use of some sound 

management practices that were helping ensure successful project completion. 

However, major projects continue to pose a challenge for DOE and NNSA For 

example, in December 2012, GAO reported that the estimated cost to construct 

the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant in Washington State had tripled to 

$12.3 billion since its inception in 2000, and the scheduled completion date had 

slipped by nearly a decade to 2019. Also, in March 2012, GAO reported that a 

now-deferred NNSA project to construct a new plutonium facility in Los Alamos, 

New Mexico, could cost as much as $5,8 billion, a nearty six-fold cost increase. 

_____________ United States Government Accountability OffIce 
87 


80292.051

United States Government Acconntability Office 

Washington, DC 20548 

Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member DeGette, and Members of the 

Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on the security, safety, 

and project management issues related to the nation's nuclear security 

enterprise. As you know, the National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy 

(DOE), is responsible for managing nuclear weapon- and 

nonproliferation-related missions in research and development 

laboratories, production plants, and other facilities-known collectively as 

the nuclear security enterprise. 1 NNSA directs these national security 

missions, but work activities are largely carried out by management and 

operating (M&O) contractors at each site within the nuclear security 

enterprise. Working under M&O contracts, NNSA contractors apply their 

scientific, technical, and management expertise at NNSA's governmentowned, contractor-operated sites} 

As we testified before this Subcommittee in September 2012,3 questions 

have been raised about DOE's and NNSA's oversight of security, safety, 

and project and contract management for the nuclear security enterprise. 

For example, we first designated DOE's management of its contracts as 

an area at high risk offraud, waste. abuse, and mismanagement in 1990 

because of the department's record of inadequate management and 

oversight of its contractors. During the late 1990s, DOE experienced 

security problems at the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories and 

1 Specifically, NNSA manages three naUonal nuclear weapon design laboratoriesLawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, Los Alamos National Laboratory in 

New Mexico, and Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico and Caiifornia. It also 

manages four nuclear weapon production plants-the Pantex Plant in Texas, the Y ~ 12 

Nationa! Security Complex in Tennessee, the Kansas City Plant in Missouri, and the 

Tritium Extraction Facility at DOE's Savannah River Site in South Carolina. NNSA also 

manages the Nevada National Security Site, formerly known as the Nevada Test Site. 

2M&O contracts are agreements under which the federal government contracts for the 

operation, maintenance, or support, on its behalf, of a govemment-owned or -controlled 

research, development, special production, or testing establishment wholly or principally 

devoted to one or more of the major programs of the contracting federal agency. Federal 

Acquisition Regulation. 48 C.F.R. § 17.601 (2012). 

3GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Observations on the National Nuclear 

Security Administration's Oversight of Safety, Security, and Project Management, 

GAO-12-912T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2012). 

Page 1 GAO-13482T 
88 


80292.052

significant cost overruns on major projects (Le., $750 million or more). 

According to a June 1999 report by the President's Foreign Intelligence 

Advisory Board, DOE's management of the nuclear weapons 

laboratories, while representing "science at its best: also embodied 

"security at its worst" because of "organizational disarray, managerial 

neglect, and a culture of arrogance." The advisory board urged Congress 

to create a new organization that, whether established as an independent 

agency or a semiautonomous agency within DOE, would have a clear 

mission, streamlined bureaucracy, and drastically simplified lines of 

authority and accountability. Responding to the advisory board's 

recommendations, Congress created NNSA under Title 32 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000-the NNSA Act. 4 The 

NNSA Act established NNSA as a "separately organized agency" within 

DOE. The act established the position of DOE Under Secretary for 

Nuclear Security, who was also designated as the Administrator of NNSA. 

The Secretary of Energy and the Deputy Secretary of Energy were 

allowed to establish policy for NNSA and to give direction to NNSA 

through the Administrator; however, other DOE employees were 

prohibited from directing the activities of individual NNSA employees. 

DOE directives remain the primary means to establish, communicate, and 

institutionalize policies, requirements, responsibilities, and procedures for 

multiple departmental elements, including NNSA, but the act gives the 

NNSA Administrator the authority to establish NNSA-specific policies, 

unless disapproved by the Secretary of Energy. NNSA does this through 

the issuance of Policy Letters. 5 

NNSA's creation, however, has not yet had the desired effect of fully 

resolving long-standing management problems. For example, NNSA and 

DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM) remain on our high-risk 

liste Furthermore, we have frequently reported on security incidents and 

safety issues that have contributed to the temporary shutdown of 

facilities, such as at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National 

L. No. 106-65, 113 Stat. 512, 953 (1999). 

5NNSA, Policy Letters: NNSA Policies, Supplemental Directives, and Business Operating 

Procedures, NA SO 251.1 (Washington, D.C.: July 5, 2011). 

"GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-13-283 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2013). We 

have shifted our focus concerning the hlgh~risk area to major DOE-EM and NNSA major 

projects (Le., those $750 million or more). 

Page 2 GAO-13-4B2T 
89 


80292.053

Laboratones in 2004 and 2005,7 as well as the safety and security 

initiatives that contractors at these laboratories put in place to help ensure 

improvement More recently, at the Y-12 National Security Complex, in 

July 2012, three trespassers gained access to the protected security area 

directly adjacent to one of the nation's most critically important nuclear 

weapon-related facilities without being interrupted by the security 

measures in place. According to DOE's Inspector General, this security 

incident was unprecedented and represented multiple system failures 

including failures to maintain critical security equipment, respond properly 

to alarms, and understand security protocols.8 Furthermore, the Inspector 

General found that contractor governance and federal oversight did not 

identify and correct early indications of these multiple system 

breakdowns. 

DOE's management approach to security over the years has shifted in 

part due to concerns raised by some national laboratory, DOE, and NNSA 

officials. These officials believed that DOE's and NNSA's oversight of the 

laboratories' activities had become excessive and that the safety and 

security requirements for the laboratories are overly prescriptive and 

burdensome, which had resulted in a negative effect on the quality of 

science performed at these laboratories. Partly in response to these 

concerns, DOE and NNSA embarked on reforms in 2010 and 2011 that 

sought to streamline requirements and institute what has been called by 

the National Research Council, the DOE Inspector General, the DOE 

Office of Health and Safety Performance, and the Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board (Safety Board) a "hands-off, eyes-on" role for 

federal oversight This approach placed more reliance on contractors' 

self-oversight through its contractor assurance systems to ensure such 

things as effective safety and security performance. 9 Building on this 

theme, in February 2012, the National Research Council found that 

7For additional information on the 2004 temporary shutdown of facilities at Los Alamos, 

see GAO, Stand-Down of Los A/amos National Laboratory: Total Costs Uncertain; Almost 

All Mission-Critical Programs Were Affected but Have Recovered. GAO-06-83 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 18, 2005). 

BOOE Office of Inspector General, Inquiry into the Security Breach at the National Nuclear 

Security Administration's Y-12 National Security Complex. DOElIG-0868 (August 2012). 

9These systems include management controls that help ensure the department's program 

missjons and actlvities are executed in an effective, efficient, and safe manner. We are 

currently evaluating the implementation of contractor assurance systems at NNSA sites 

and NNSA's oversight of these systems. 

Page 3 GAO-13-482T 
90 


80292.054

"safety and security systems at the [NNSA] Laboratories have been 

strengthened to the point where they no longer need special attention."'o 

In this context, there have been calls to enhance NNSA's ability to 

operate independenijy of DOE. For example, the Defense Science Board 

proposed in 2006 that a completely independent nuclear weapons agency 

be created. 11 In January 2007, we reported that former senior DOE and 

NNSA officials with whom we spoke generally did not favor removing 

NNSA from DOE.'2 Furthermore, in a June 2012 report, we concluded 

that such a drastic change was unnecessary to produce an effective 

organization, 13 and we generally hold this view today. However, in the 

wake of the Y -12 security incident and persistent problems with major 

projects, there have been renewed calls to reexamine NNSA's 

organization. Most recently, the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense 

Authorization Act created the Congressional Advisory Panel on the 

Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise to examine options and 

make recommendations for revising the governance structure, mission, 

and management of the nuclear security enterprise. 

My testimony today discusses DOE's and NNSA's management of the 

nuclear security enterprise. It focuses on our reports issued from August 

2000 to December 2012 on oversight of (1) security performance, (2) 

safety performance, and (3) project and contract management in the 

nuclear security enterprise. Detailed information about the scope and 

methodology can be found in our previously issued reports. We 

conducted the performance audit work that supports this statement in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

lONational Research Council, Managing for High-Quality Science and Engineering at the 

NNSA National Security Laboratories, (Washington. D.C.: Feb. 15, 2012). 

11 The Defense Science Board provides the Department of Defense with independent 

advice and recommendations on matters relating to the department's scientific and 

technical enterprise. See Defense Science Board Task Force, Nuclear Capabilities 

(Washington. D.C.: Dec. 2006). 

12GAO, National Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve 

Management of the Nation's Nuclear Programs, GAO-07 -36 (Washington, D.C.: Jan.19, 

2007). 

13GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Observations on the Organization 

and Man~gement of the National Nuclear Security Administration, GAO-12-867T 

(Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2012). 

Page 4 GAO-13-482T 
91 


80292.055

Background 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

DOE is responsible for a diverse set of missions, including nuclear 

security, energy research, and environmental cleanup. These missions 

are managed by organizations within DOE and largely carried out by 

M&O contractors at various DOE sites. According to federal budget data, 

NNSA is one of the largest organizations in DOE, overseeing nuclear 

weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactors missions at its 

sites. With an $11 billion budget in fiscal year 2012-nearly 40 percent of 

DOE's total budget-NNSA is responsible for providing the United States 

with safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons in the absence of 

underground nuclear testing and maintaining core competencies in 

nuclear weapons science, technology, and engineering. Ensuring a safe 

and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile is an extraordinarily complicated 

task and requires state-of-the-art experimental and computing facilities, 

as well as the skills of top scientists in the field. To its credit, NNSA 

consistently accomplishes this task, as evidenced by the successful 

assessment of the safety, reliability, and performance of each weapon 

type in the nuclear stockpile since its creation. To support these 

capabilities into the future, in 2011, the administration announced plans to 

request $88 billion from Congress over the next decade to operate and 

modernize the nuclear security enterprise. 

As discussed earlier, wonk activities to support NNSA's national security 

missions are largely carried out by M&O contractors. This arrangement 

has historical roots. Since the Manhattan Project produced the first atomic 

bomb during World War II, NNSA, DOE, and predecessor agencies have 

depended on the expertise of private firms, universities, and others to 

carry out research and development work and efficiently operate the 

facilities necessary for the nation's nuclear defense. Currently, DOE 

spends 90 percent of its annual budget on M&O contracts, making it the 

largest non-Department of Defense contracting agency in the 

government. 

DOE generally regulates the safety of its own nuclear facilities and 

operations at its sites. In contrast, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Page 5 GAO-13-482T 
92 


80292.056

(NRC) generally regulates commercial nuclear facilities, and the 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) generally 

regulates worker safety at commercial industrial facilities. \4 However, 

because of the dangerous nature of work conducted at many sites within 

the nuclear security enterprise-handling nuclear material such as 

plutonium, manufacturing high explosives, and various industrial 

operations that use hazardous chemicals-oversight of the nuclear 

security enterprise is multifaceted. First, DOE policy states that its M&O 

contractors are expected to develop and implement an assurance 

system, or system of management controls, that helps ensure the 

department's program missions and activities are executed in an 

effective, efficient, and safe manner. 15 Through these assurance systems, 

contractors are required to perform self-assessments as well as identity 

and correct negative performance trends. Second, NNSA site offices, 

which are collocated with NNSA sites, oversee the performance of M&O 

contractors. Site office oversight includes communicating performance 

expectations to the contractor, reviewing the contractor's assurance 

system, and conducting contractor performance evaluations. Third, 

DOE's Office of Health, Safety, and Security-especially its Office of 

Independent Oversight-conducts periodic appraisals to determine if 

NNSA officials and contractors are complying with safety and security 

requirements. '• Fourth, NNSA receives safety assessments and 

recommendations from other organizations, most prominently the Safety 

Board-an independent executive branch agency created by Congress to 

assess safety conditions and operations at DOE's defense nuclear 

facilities." To address public health and safety issues, the Safety Board 

is authorized to make recommendations to the Secretary of Energy, who 

1400E regulates the safety of most of its own sites wIth nuclear operations; NRC 

regulates several DOE nuclear facilities, and OSHA regulates occupational safety at DOE 

sites that have no nuclear function. 

15DOE, Department of Energy Oversight Policy, DOE P 226.1 B (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 

25,2011). Contractor assurance systems are to cover the following operational aspects: 

(1) environment. safety, and hea~h; (2) safeguards and security; (3) emergency 

management; and (4) cyber security. 

1·DOE reorganized offices wtthin its Office of Health, Safety, and Security. The Office of 

Independent Oversight merged with the Office of Enforcement and was renamed the 

Office of Enforcement and Oversight. For the purposes of this report, we refer to it as the 

Office of Independent Oversight. 

"The Safety Board provides oversight for all NNSA sites except the Kansas City Plant, 

which manufactures non-nuclear components. 

PageS GAO-13-482T 
93 


80292.057

DOE's and NNSA's 

Oversight of Security 

Perfonnance 

Continues to Face 

Challenges 

may then accept or reject, in whole or in part, the recommendations. If the 

Secretary of Energy accepts the recommendations, the Secretary must 

prepare an implementation plan. 

DOE and some of its contractors have viewed this multifaceted oversight 

to be overly burdensome. To address this issue, in March 2010 the 

Deputy Secretary of Energy announced a reform effort to revise DOE's 

safety and security directives and modify the department's oversight 

approach to "provide contractors with the flexibility to tailor and implement 

safety and security programs without excessive federal oversight or 

overly prescriptive departmental requirements." In the memorandum 

announcing this effort, the Deputy Secretary noted that burdensome 

safety requirements were affecting the productivity of work at DOE's sites 

and that reducing this burden on contractors would lead to measurable 

productivity improvement. The Deputy Secretary noted that DOE's Office 

of Health, Safety and Security in 2009 had begun reforming its approach 

to enforcement and oversight. Similar to, but independent of DOE's safety 

and security reform effort, in February 2011, NNSA initiated its 

"governance transformation" project, which involved revising the agency's 

business model to, among other things, place more reliance on 

contractors' self-oversight through its contractor aSSlJrance system to 

ensure such things as effective safety and security performance. NNSA's 

non-nuclear Kansas City Plant completed implementation of this new 

business model, and other NNSA sites-such as the Nevada National 

Security Site and the Y-12 National Security Complex-were in the 

process of implementing it, too, when the Y-12 security incident occurred. 

In response to the Y-12 security breach, multiple investigations and 

reviews of the incident were performed by NNSA, the DOE Office of 

Inspector General, and the DOE Office of Independent Oversight These 

reviews identified numerous problems with NNSA's and its contractors' 

performance, including: physical security systems, such as alarms; 

protective force (i.e., NNSA's heavily armed, contractor guard forces) 

training and response; failures to correct numerous known problems; and 

weaknesses in contract and resource management. In addition, at the 

request of the Secretary of Energy, an independent panel, composed of 

three former executives from Federal agencies and the private sector, 

and a NNSA Security Task Force found broader and systemic security 

issues across the nuclear security enterprise. The Secretary's panel in 

December 2012 analyzed various models for providing security at DOE 

and NNSA sites but generally found that improvements to the security 

culture, management, and oversight were necessary, in addition to having 

Page 7 GAO-13-482T 
94 


80292.058

an effective organizational structure. In addition, the leader of the NNSA 

Security Task Force testified before the House Armed Services 

Committee in February 2013 about significant deficiencies in NNSA's 

entire security organization, oversight, and culture. 

In response to the Y-12 security incident and these findings, DOE and 

NNSA took a number of immediate actions, including repairing security 

equipment, reassigning key security personnel, and firing the Y-12 

protective force contractor. In February 2013, the Acting NNSA 

Administrator committed to implementing a three-tiered oversight process 

involving contractor self-assessment, NNSA evaluation of site 

performance, and independent oversight by DOE's Office of Independent 

Oversight. The Acting Administrator testified before the House Armed 

Services Committee that she believed that such actions will help instill a 

culture that embraces security as an essential element of NNSA's 

missions. 

In assessing DOE's actions to address the security breakdowns at Y-12, 

a central question will be whether these latest actions taken will produce 

sustained improvements in security at Y-12 and across the nuclear 

security enterprise. As we and others have reported, DOE has a long 

history of security breakdowns and an equally long history of instituting 

responses and remedies to "fix" these problems. For example, in 

examining the Y -12 security incident, NNSA's former Acting Chief of 

Defense Nuclear Security and the leader of the NNSA's Security Task 

Force testified in February 2013 about problems with NNSA's federal 

security organization including poorly defined roles and responsibilities for 

its headquarters and field security organizations, inadequate oversight 

and assessments of site security activities, and issues with overseeing 

contractor actions and implementing improvements. As noted in table 1, 

10 years ago we reported on very similar problems, and since that time 

DOE has undertaken numerous security initiatives to address them. We 

have not evaluated these recent initiatives but we have ongoing work to 

evaluate them as part of our review on security reform for the 

Subcommittee, which we will complete later this year. 

PageS GAO-13-482T 
95 


80292.059

Table 1: Comparison of GAO 2003 Findings Regarding NNSA's Federal Security Organization wllh NNSA Security Task 

Force's February 2013 Findings 

Defining clear roles and 

responsibilities 

Assessing sites' security 

activities 

OVerseeing contractors' 

actions and implementing 

long-term improvements 

Allocating staff 

GAO May 2003 Findings 

NNSA has not fully defined clear roles and 

responsibilities for its headquarters and site 

operations. 

There are inconsistencies among NNSA sites on 

how they assess contractors' security activities. 

Consequentty, NNSA cannot be assured that all 

facilities are subject to comprehensive annual 

assessments as required by DOE policy. 

NNSA contractors do not consistently conduct 

required analyses in preparing security corrective 

program action plans. Security performance at 

sites may not be maximized because corrective 

security program actions are developed without 

fully considering root causes, risks posed, or costs 

and benefits of taking corrective action. 

NNSA has shortfalls at its site offices in number 

and expertise of staff, which could make it more 

difficult for site offices to effectively oversee 

security activities. 

NNSA Security Task Force February 2013 

Findings 

NNSA security line management authority is HIdefined. There are overlapping lines of authority 

and a mixing of staff and line functions. 

NNSA does not have an adequate security 

performance assessment process or capability. 

NNSA has come to rely overwhelmingly on federal 

staff reviewing contractor-provided data, rather 

than effectively assessing performance itself. 

NNSA has attempted to correct some identified 

issues over the years. but it has not adequately 

emphasized security mission performance. Recent 

DOE and NNSA reforms have deemphasjzed 

performance verification by federal staff, resulting 

in a weakened federal security assessment 

program. 

The NNSA federal security function is not properly 

organized or staffed. 

SOl!l'CeS: GAO. NUClear Security: NNSA Needs to BatterManage Its Safaguards and Secunly Program. GAO·03-471 (Washington. 

D.C.: May 30, 2003); and Hearing on Nuclaar Security. Ac:tiO!ls. Accountability. and Reform, Before tha Subcommittea on StrategiC 

Forces. House Armed Services Committee. 113th Congo (Feb. 28. 2013) (Slateml)!1\ of Brigadier General Sandra E. Firl/m. 

Commander. Air Foree NuClearWeapons Center. Testimony based on Previous Position as Acting Chief of Defel'lse Nuclear Securlty, 

NNSA). 

It is also important to note that NNSA's long-standing security problems 

are not limited to Y-12. DOE's and NNSA's work with nuclear materials 

such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium, nuclear weapons and 

their components, and large amounts of classified data require extremely 

high security, however, as we and DOE have reported, NNSA and DOE 

have a long history of poor security performance across the nuclear 

security enterprise, most notably at Los Alamos and Livermore national 

laboratories, as well as ongoing struggles to sustain security 

improvements, including information security. 18 

18 We note that over the past decade, the DOE Inspector General and Office of 

Independent Oversight periodically identified serious security issues at almost all of 

NNSA's sites, including Sandia National laboratories; the Nevada Nationa! Security Site, 

Pantex, and prior to the July 2012 security incident, the Y-12 National Security Complex. 

Page 9 GAO-13-482T 
96 


80292.060

Los Alamos National 

Laboratory 

Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory 

As we noted in our September 2012 testimony, 19 Los Alamos National 

Laboratory (Los Alamos) experienced a number of high-profile security 

incidents in the previous decade that were subject to congressional 

hearings, including some held by this Subcommittee. Many of these 

incidents focused on Los Alamos's inability to account for and control its 

classified resources. These incidents include the transfer or removal of 

classified information from authorized work areas or the laboratory itself, 

the temporary loss of two hard drives containing nuclear weapon design 

information, and difficulties in accounting for classified removable 

electronic media. In addition to these well-publicized incidents, security 

evaluations through 2007 identified other persistent, systemic security 

problems at Los Alamos. These problems included weaknesses in 

controlling and protecting classified resources, inadequate controls over 

special nuclear material, inadequate self-assessment activities, and 

weaknesses in the process that Los Alamos uses to ensure it corrects 

identified security deficiencies. Partly as a result of these findings, as we 

reported in 2008,20 Los Alamos underwent a 10 month shut-down of 

operations in 2004 and experienced a change in contractors in 2005. 

Moreover, the Secretary of Energy issued a compliance order in 2007 

requiring Los Alamos to implement specific corrective actions to, among 

other things, address long-standing deficiencies in its classified 

information programs. We reported in January 2008 and testified before 

this Subcommittee in September 2008 that Los Alamos had experienced 

a period of improved security performance but that it was too early to 

determine whether NNSA and Los Alamos could sustain this level of 

improvement. 21 

In March 2009, we reported on numerous and wide-ranging security 

deficiencies at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Livermore), 

particularly in the ability of Livermore's protective forces to ensure the 

20GAO. Los Alamos National Laboratory: Long-Term Strategies Needed to Improve 

Security and Management Oversight. GAO-08-694 (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2008). 

21 GAO, Los Alamos National Laboratory: Information on Security of Classified Data, 

Nuc/ear Material Controls, Nuclear and Worker Safety, and Project Management 

Weaknesses, GAO-08-173R (Washington D.C.: Jan. 10.2008), and GAO, Nuclear 

Security: Los Alamos National Laboratory Faces Challenges in Sustaining Physical and 

Cyber Security Improvements, GAO-08-1180T (Washington, D.C.: Sep. 25, 2008). 

Page 10 GAO-13482T 
97 


80292.061

Information Security 

protection of special nuclear material and the laboratory's protection and 

control of classified matter.22 We also identified Livermore's physical 

security systems, such as alarms and sensors, and its security program 

planning and assurance activities, as areas needing improvement. 

Weaknesses in Livermore's contractor self-assessment program and the 

Livermore Site Office's oversight of the contractor contributed to these 

security deficiencies at the laboratory. According to one DOE Office of 

Independent Oversight official, both programs were 'broken" and missed 

even the 'low-hanging fruit." The laboratory took corrective action to 

address these deficiencies, but we noted that better oversight was 

needed to ensure that security improvements were fully implemented and 

sustained. In September 2012, NNSA and Livermore completed efforts to 

move the site's most sensitive nuclear material to other sites, thereby 

easing the site's security requirements. 

We also have reported extensively on NNSA's challenges in maintaining 

effective and secure information security systems, particularly at Los 

Alamos. For example, in June 2008, we reported that significant 

information security problems at Los Alamos had received insufficient 

attention. 23 The laboratory had over two dozen initiatives under way that 

were principally aimed at reducing, consolidating, and better protecting 

classified resources. However, the laboratory had not implemented 

complete security solutions to address either the problems of classified 

parts storage in unapproved storage containers or weaknesses in its 

process for ensuring that actions taken to correct security deficiencies 

were completed. In addition, in October 2009 we reported that Los 

Alamos needed to better protect its classified network,24 Specifically, we 

found significant weaknesses remained in protecting the confidentiality, 

integrity, and availability of information stored on and transmitted over its 

classified computer network. Moreover, we found the laboratory's 

22GAO, Nuclear Security: Better Oversight Needed to Ensure That Security Improvements 

at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Are Fully Implemented and Sustained, 

GAO-09-321 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2009). 

23GAO, Los Alamos National Laboratory: Long-Term Strategies Needed to Improve 

Security and Management Oversight, GAO-08-694 (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2008). 

24GAO, Information Security: Actions Needed to Better Manage, Protect, and Sustain 

Improvements to Los Alamos National Laboratory's Classified Computer Network, 

GAO-l0·28 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 14, 2009). 

Page 11 GAO·13-482T 
98 


80292.062

DOE and NNSA's 

Oversight of Safety 

Perfonnance 

Continues to Face 

Challenges 

decentralized approach to information security program management has 

led to inconsistent implementation of policy. 

DOE and NNSA have experienced significant safety problems at their 

sites, and recent efforts to reform safety protocols and processes have 

not demonstrated sustained improvements. As we testified in September 

2012 before this Subcommittee, 25 long-standing DOE and NNSA 

management weaknesses have contributed to persistent safety problems 

at NNSA's national laboratories. For example, in October 2007, we 

reported that nearly 60 serious accidents or near misses had occurred at 

NNSA's national laboratories since 2000. 26 These accidents included 

worker exposure to radiation, inhalation of toxic vapors, and electrical 

shocks. Although no one was killed, many of these accidents caused 

serious harm to workers or damage to facilities. As we also reported, at 

Los Alamos in July 2004, an undergraduate student who was not wearing 

required eye protection was partially blinded in a laser accident. Our 

review of nearly 100 safety studies-including accident investigations and 

independent assessments by the Safety Board and others issued since 

2000-found that the contributing factors to these safety problems 

generally fell into three key categories: (1) relatively lax laboratory 

attitudes toward safety procedures, (2) laboratory inadequacies in 

identifying and addressing safety problems with appropriate corrective 

actions, and (3) inadequate oversight by NNSA site offices27 DOE's 

Office of Inspector General has also raised concems about safety 

oversight by NNSA's site offices. Specifically, the Inspector General 

reported in June 2011 that NNSA's Livermore Site Office was not 

sufficiently overseeing its contractor to ensure that corrective actions 

were fully and effectively implemented for a program designed to limit 

worker exposure to beryllium, a hazardous metal essential for nuclear 

operations. 28 

25GAO-12-912T. 

26GAO, Nuclear and Worker Safety: Actions Needed to Determine the Effectweness of 

Safety Improvement Efforts at NNSA's Weapons Laboratories, GAO-08-73 (Washington, 

D.C.: Oct 31, 2007). 

27 GAO-08-73. 

2800E Office of Inspector General, Implementation of Beryllium Controls at Lawrence 

Uvermore Na.onal Laboratory, DOEIIG-0851 (Washington, D. C.: June 17, 2011). 

Page 12 GAO-13-482T 
99 


80292.063

DOE has undertaken a number of reforms to address persistent safety 

concems. In March 2010, the Deputy Secretary of Energy announced a 

reform effort to revise DOE's safety and security directives. The reform 

effort was aimed at modifying the department's oversight approach to 

"provide contractors with the flexibility to tailor and implement safety and 

security programs without excessive federal oversight or overly 

prescriptive departmental requirements." As we reported to this 

Subcommittee in April 2012,29 this reform effort reduced the number of 

safety related directives from 80 to 42 by eliminating or combining 

requirements the department determined were unclear, duplicative, or too 

prescriptive and by encouraging the use of industry standards. However, 

as we noted in September 2012 before this Subcommittee, DOE's safety 

reforms did not fully address safety concerns that we, as well as others, 

have identified in the areas of quality assurance, safety culture, and 

federal oversight and, in fact, these reforms may have actually weakened 

independent oversight. We stated, for example, that while DOE policy 

notes that independent oversight is integral to help ensure the 

effectiveness of safety performance, DOE's Office of Independent 

Oversight staff must now coordinate their assessment activities with 

NNSA site office management to maximize the use of resources. This 

arrangement raised our concern about whether Office of Independent 

Oversight staff would be sufficiently independent from site office 

management. In our April 2012 report, we recommended, among other 

things, that DOE develop a detailed reform plan and clearly define the 

oversight roles and responsibilities of DOE's Office of Independent 

Oversight staff to ensure that their work is sufficiently independent from 

the activities of DOE site office and contractor staff. DOE has taken steps 

to respond to these recommendations, including developing a plan aimed 

at improving safety management and drafting a memo from the Secretary 

of Energy reconfirming the department's commitment to independent 

oversight of safety and security. 

However, since our September 2012 testimony,3O concems continue to be 

raised about safety performance and oversight at several NNSA sites, 

which indicate DOE's safety reforms have not brought about a sustained 

change in safety practices. The following are examples: 

29GAO, Nuclear Safety: DOE Needs to Determine the Costs and Benefits of Its Safety 

Reform Effort, GAO-12-347 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2012). 

30GAO-12-912T. 

Page 13 GAO-13-4ll2T 
100 


80292.064

DOE and NNSA Have 

Made Progress but 

Further 

Improvements 

Needed on Project 

and Contract 

Management 

A November 2012 report by DOE's Office of Independent Oversight 

raised concerns about safety culture issues at NNSA's Pantex Plant. 

Among the concerns were reluctance by workers to raise safety 

problems for fear of retaliation and a perception that cost took priority 

over safety. 

At an October 2012 public hearing in Knoxville, Tennessee, the Safety 

Board noted that safety controls to prevent or mitigate consequences 

from accidents had not been fully incorporated into the design of a 

new uranium processing facility at Y-12. The Safety Board noted the 

facility's safety basis-a technical analysis that identifies potential 

accidents and hazards associated with a facility's operations and 

outlines controls to mitigate or prevent their impact on workers and 

the public-did not adequately address controls to protect workers or 

the public in the case of an earthquake or small fires, and did not 

adequately calculate reasonably conservative radiation exposure 

consequences that could lead to putting greater safety into the 

facility's design. The Safety Board further noted that these 

deficiencies raise the potential for significant impacts on public and 

worker safety. 

A January 2013 Office of Independent Oversight report reviewing the 

Los Alamos Site Office assessment of the contractor corrective action 

system found that the contractor had not implemented effective 

corrective actions for identified safety system problems. This report 

noted that the site office concluded that more than half of the 62 

safety system items needing corrective action had been closed 

without adequate action or sufficient documentation. Moreover, in 

October 2012, NNSA issued a Preliminary Notice of Violation to a Los 

Alamos contractor for repeated electrical safety problems. NNSA's 

notice stated that insufficient oversight of subcontractor work by the 

contractor safety staff was among the contributing factors. NNSA 

fined the contractor $262,500. 

A basic tenet of effective management is the ability to complete projects 

on time and within budget. DOE has taken a number of actions to 

improve management of projects, including those overseen by NNSA. For 

example, DOE has updated project and contract management policies 

and guidance in an effort to improve the reliability of project cost 

estimates, better assess project risks, and better ensure project reviews 

that are timely and useful and identify problems early. In addition, in 

December 2010, the Deputy Secretary of Energy convened a DOE 

Contract and Project Management Summit to discuss strategies for 

additional improvement in contract and project management. The 

participants identified barriers to improved performance and reported in 

Page 14 GAO·13-482T 
101 


80292.065

April 2012 on the status of initiatives to address these barriers. DOE has 

continued to release guides for implementing its revised order for 

Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets 

(DOE 0 413.3B), such as for cost estimating, using earned value 

management, and forming project teams. Further, DOE has taken steps 

to enhance project management and oversight by requiring peer reviews 

and independent cost estimates for projects with values of more than 

$100 million and by improving the accuracy and consistency of data in its 

central repository for project data. 

DOE has made progress in managing nonmajor projects-those costing 

less than $750-million and in recognition of this progress, we narrowed 

the focus of our high-risk designation to major contracts and projects. 

Specifically, as we noted in our October 2012 report on DOE's EM 

cleanup projects funded by the American Recovery and Reinvestment 

Act, at the time of our analysis, 78 of 112 projects had been completed. 31 

Of those completed projects, 92 percent met the performance standard of 

completing project work scope without exceeding the cost target by more 

than 10 percent, according to EM data. However, we made four 

recommendations to DOE in this report aimed at improving how EM 

manages and documents projects, particularly with respect to establishing 

key performance parameters such as project scope targets and baselines 

for cost and schedule. DOE concurred with all of our recommendations, 

recognizing that improvements could be made and that lessons learned 

from these projects can be applied to EM's broader portfolio of projects 

and activities. In addition, in December 2012, we reported that EM and 

NNSA were making some progress in managing the 71 nonmajor 

construction and cleanup projects that we reviewed and are expected to 

cost an estimated $10.1 billion in total. 32 For example, we identified some 

NNSA and EM nonmajor projects that used sound project management 

practices, such as the application of effective acquisition strategies. to 

help ensure the successful completion of these projects. We also 

recommended that NNSA and EM clearly define, document, and track the 

scope, cost, and completion date targets for each of their non major 

"GAO, Recovery Act: Most DOE Projects Are Complete, but Project Management 

Guidance Could Be Strengthened, GAO-13-23 (Washington D.C.: Oct. 15,2012). 

32GAO, Department of Energy: Better Information Needed to Determine If Nonmajor 

Projects Meet Performance Targets, GAO-13-129 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19,2012). 

Page 15 GAO-13482T 
102 


80292.066

projects and that EM clearly identify critical occupations and skills in its 

workforce plans. NNSA and EM agreed with these recommendations. 

Notwithstanding these positive developments for non major projects, 

major projects (i.e., those $750 million or more) continue to pose a 

challenge for DOE and NNSA. Since 1990 when we placed contract and 

project management on the high-risk list, we have reported on problems 

that principally involve ineffective oversight and poor management of 

contractors. Our recent work, as well as reporting by DOE, indicates that 

these problems continue. Examples are as follows: 

In December 2012, we reported that the estimated cost to construct 

the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant in Washington State 

had almost tripled to $12.3 billion since the project's inception in 2000, 

and the scheduled completion date had slipped by nearly a decade to 

2019." Moreover, we found that DOE's incentives and management 

controls were inadequate for ensuring effective project management 

and we also found instances where DOE prematurely rewarded the 

contractor for resolving technical issues and completing work. 

In March 2012, we reported that NNSA's project to construct a new 

plutonium facility, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 

Replacement Nuclear Facility, at Los Alamos could cost as much as 

$5.8 billion, a nearly six-fold increase from its original estimate. 34 

While the facility may be large enough to support nuclear weapon 

stockpile requirements, our March 2012 report found that it is unclear 

if the facility will be large enough to accommodate DOE's non-weapon 

activities that involve plutonium-such as nonproliferation, nuclear 

forensics, and nuclear counterterrorism programs-because the 

department has not comprehensively studied its long-term research 

and storage needs. 

In November 2010, we reported that NNSA's plans to construct a 

modern Uranium Processing Facility at its Y -12 National Security 

Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, had experienced significant cost 

33GAO, Hanford Waste Treatment Plant: DOE Needs to Take Action to Resolve Technical 

and Management Challenges. GAO-13-38 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19,2012). 

34GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: New Plutonium Research Facility at 

Los Alamos May Not Meet All Mission Needs, GAO-12-337 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 

2012). 

Page 16 GAO·13-482T 
103 


80292.067

increases. 35 More recently, in September 2011, NNSA estimated that 

the facility would cost from $4.2 billion to $6.5 billion to construct-a 

nearly seven-fold cost increase from the original estimate. 

In April 2010, we reported that weak management by DOE and NNSA 

had allowed the cost, schedule, and scope of ignition-related activities 

at the National Ignition Facility to increase substantially.36 We 

reported that, since 2005, ignition-related costs have increased by 

around 25 percent-from $1.6 billion in 2005 to over $2 billion in 

2010-and that the planned completion date for these activities had 

slipped from the end of fiscal year 2011 to the end of fiscal year 2012 

or beyond. Ten years earlier, in August 2000, we had reported that 

poor management and oversight of the National Ignition Facility 

construction project at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory had 

increased the facility's cost by $1 billion and delayed its scheduled 

completion date by 6 years. 37 

In March 2010, we reported that NNSA's Mixed-Oxide Fuel 

Fabrication Facility currently being constructed at DOE's Savannah 

River Site in South Carolina had experienced delays, but project 

officials said that they expected to recover from these delays by the 

end of 2010 and planned for the start of operations on schedule in 

2016. In addition, after spending about $730 million on design, NNSA 

has cancelled the pit disassembly and conversion facility and is now 

planning to use existing facilities at DOE's Savannah River and Los 

Alamos sites and will add equipment to the mixed oxide facility. 

NNSA is working on a cost and schedule estimate for the use of these 

existing facilities and for adding the additional equipment. 

We have also issued several reports on the technical issues, cost 

increases, and schedule delays associated with NNSA's efforts to extend, 

through refurbishment, the operational lives of nuclear weapons in the 

35GAO, Nuclear Weapons: National Nuclear Security Administration's Plans for Its 

Uranium Processing Facility Should Better Reflect Funding Estimates and Technology 

Readiness, GAO-11-103 (Washington. D.C.: Nov. 19, 2010). 

36!gnition~related activitles consist of the efforts separate from the facility's construction 

that have been undertaken to prepare for the first attempt at ignition-the extremely 

intense pressures and temperatures that simulate on a small scale the thermonuclear 

conditions created in nuclear explosions. See GAO, Nuc/ear Weapons: Actions Needed to 

Address Scientific and Technical Challenges and Management Weaknesses at the 

National Ignition Facility, GA0-10-488 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2010). 

37GAO, Nationa/lgnition Facility: Management and Oversight Failures Caused Major Cost 

Overruns and Schedule Delays. GAO/RCED-00-271 (Washington. D.C.: Aug. 8, 2000). 

Page 11 GAO~13482T 
104 


80292.068

stockpile. For example, in March 2009, we reported that NNSA and the 

Department of Defense had not effectively managed cost, schedule, and 

technical risks for the 861 nuclear bomb and the W76 nuclear warhead 

refurbishments. 38 For the 861 life extension program, NNSA was only 

able to stay on schedule by Significantly reducing the number of weapons 

undergoing refurbishment and abandoning some refurbishment 

objectives. Earlier, in December 2000, we similarly had reported that 

refurbishment of the W87 strategic warhead had experienced significant 

design and production problems that increased its refurbishment costs by 

over $300 million and caused schedule delays of about 2 years. 39 

In conclusion, the actions that DOE and NNSA have taken to address 

weaknesses in oversight of security, safety, and contract and project 

management are very important, but problems persist. While we have 

noted progress in the area of project management, we also observe that 

NNSA and DOE EM have not begun a new major project since taking 

these actions. The Y -12 security incident was an unprecedented event for 

the nuclear security enterprise and perhaps indicates that NNSA's 

organizational culture, over a decade after the agency was created to 

address security issues, still has not embraced security as an essential 

element of its missions. In terms of safety, DOE has recently taken the 

initiative to examine the safety culture at its sites. We believe, as do other 

organizations, including the DOE Inspector General and Safety Board, 

that a "hands off, eyes on" oversight approach for security, safety and 

contract and project management is insufficient and unwarranted until the 

department can demonstrate sustained improvement in all three areas. 

We will continue to monitor DOE's and NNSA's implementation of actions 

to resolve its safety, security, and contract and project management 

difficulties and to assess the impact of these actions. 

Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member DeGette, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be 

pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time. 

38GAO, Nuclear Weapons: NNSA and DOD Need to Mora EffecUvely Manage the 

Stockpile Life Extension Program, GAO-09-385 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009). 

39GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Improved Management Needed to Imp/ement Stockpile 

Stewardship Program Effectively, GAO-OI-48 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 2000). 

Page 18 GAO·13-4S2T 
105 


80292.069

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(361476) 

If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please 

contact me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions 

to this testimony are Allison Bawden, Jonathan Gill, and Kiki 

Theodoropoulos, Assistant Directors; and Nancy Kintner-Meyer, Michelle 

Munn, and Jeff Rueckhaus, Senior Analysts. 

Page 19 GAO·13482T 
106 


80292.070

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other materia!, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 
107 


80292.071

GAO.s Mission 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Phone 

Connect with GAO 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO's website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday 

afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, 

and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted 

products, go to http://www.gao.gov and select "E-mail Updates." 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO's actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO's website, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information. 

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube. 

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts. 

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov. 

Contact: 

Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnetlfraudnet.htm 

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov 

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngcl@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548 

.... 

..... Please Print on Recycled Paper. 
108 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. We will go through these quickly. 

I want to start off. Dr. Meserve, one of the messages from your 

work and General Alston’s work is the lack of an embedded security culture from DOE headquarters on down through the various 

nuclear weapons complex facilities. As a former chairman of the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, you have experience with embedded safety culture. Am I correct on that? 

Mr. MESERVE. That is correct. 

Mr. MURPHY. And the lessons—what lessons, from your experience of NRC regulation of the civilian nuclear industry can apply 

to establishing strong security culture at DOE’s facilities and operations? Can you give us an example? 

Mr. MESERVE. Well, let me say that I think that perspective of 

the NRC has been that a safety culture is the critical foundation 

for ensuring the safe operations of the plants. That without that 

commitment, you have a problem that in regardless of how detailed 

the requirements are, ultimately you have to demand the people 

fulfill their obligations and take responsibility, and the safety culture, which is something that affects everyone in the plant, is the 

foundation. 

So I came to this project with that perspective, and I think that, 

as has been mentioned, and General Alston emphasized this in his 

remarks, is that culture is the critical ingredient, and that is something that has to change to have something that will be sustained 

over time. People see this as responsible as their clear responsibility at every level at the facility and at headquarters. 

Mr. MURPHY. And that is the same as sustained training for security personnel, I am assuming? 

Mr. MESERVE. It means sustained training. It means a responsibility of everyone in the plant, when they see a problem, to raise 

that issue up. If their immediate supervisor doesn’t take it up, it 

means going above that person. It means having a system in place 

so that no one is—faces any discipline or discrimination as a result 

of the fact that they have raised an issue like that. It is people to 

be rewarded if they take initiative to respond. And that is the sort 

of thing you need in the security area as well. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. 

General Alston, you stated in your report that nuclear weapons 

sites leverage their unique missions and geography to justify a preferred, what you called ‘‘alone and unafraid’’ mantra, and that DOE 

and NNSA headquarters has employed a largely hands off response. What do you mean by ‘‘alone and unafraid?’’ 

General ALSTON. Mr. Chairman, at Y–12 specifically, earlier in 

the year, earlier in calendar year 2012, the site security apparatus 

had upgraded their security system, and they—there was a multi- 

$100 million option, and this was still a very expensive option of, 

I can’t remember, $60 to $70 million. And so they went forward 

with this $60 to $70 million modification to their overall security 

capability at the site, but when they deployed that capability early 

in the year, it had flaws that needed to be worked out, and that 

was widely known, but they operated anyway, generated hundreds 

of alarms, false alarms or nuisance alarms a month, conditioned 

the force, I would argue, to not respond with urgency because they 

were being conditioned that the alarms are systemic shortcomings. 

109 

There was—they moved towards the accounting for the alarms and 

less running to the sounds of the guns, which I think was manifested on the morning of July 28, because of the delayed response, 

because it was another false or nuisance alarm, if you will. And in 

that whole effort, though, was—from my perspective—was Y–12 

saw a way to improve its security, and in my view, I saw evidence 

they conceived, designed, developed, and deployed this capability at 

Y–12, defending their unique geographical challenges to secure 

that facility, and in making their, if you will, one off approach to 

this, to be dominant between the relationship between Y–12 and 

the headquarters. And so there was not evidence of a strong, disciplined, central management of security modifications so that the 

field can, soup to nuts, take a look at what they determined to be 

shortcomings, and then worked the solution set on their own without what I think is more appropriate, a good operational test evaluation program where someone is accountable in the headquarters 

for the next gate you go, and that nobody lives with a sub-optimized system that is not operating perfectly on day one. 

Mr. MURPHY. Is this systemic across NNSA? 

General ALSTON. Well, we found a different approach at Pantex. 

I can’t tell you the current state of this, so maybe Dr. Meserve can 

amplify this, but the ARGOS system, and I can’t tell you what the 

acronym stands for, but it is a comprehensive security approach 

that is present at all of their sites. But depending on how you manipulate part of the overall ARGOS architecture at your particular 

site, they may not be precisely identical at each one of the facilities. So as these folks were trying to integrate the changes to their 

security apparatus and blend in to this ARGOS concept, there is 

so much freedom of movement at each one of the sites that I think 

there is great opportunity being missed trying to centralize common standards and force a common approach and making the sites 

defend being different than the common approach, as apposed to 

right now, which is give them the benefit of the doubt that they 

need to support the one off approach and that the common standards get subordinated to the unique approach. I don’t know if I said 

that right. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. That helps a lot, but as this goes 

through, I can’t help, as I am hearing these stories about security 

issues, too, of the people watching the radar on Pearl Harbor on 

December 7 said oh, pay no attention to those blips, that is just 

probably our planes coming over, or on 9/11. These things continue 

on, and hope that the security force is not going to just look past 

these things. I mean, to recognize a situation like this, as Mr. 

Meserve, you put in your letter that sometimes training of terrorists is to look nonthreatening, and you have to be ready for deadly 

force, and this could have ended up in a deadly situation, and we 

are hoping these things are avoided in the future. 

I am out of time. I am going to go Ms. DeGette now from Colorado. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Trimble, when you were reciting the whole litany of problems that we have had with the various labs, it was like I was reliving my congressional career. So I want to ask you, have you read 

General Finan’s report? 

110 

Mr. TRIMBLE. Yes, I have. 

Ms. DEGETTE. And what is your opinion of her recommendations? 

Mr. TRIMBLE. You know, all the recommendations sound sound. 

We have not done a full evaluation or anything of that nature. I 

think our reaction to the reports, as well as the actions DOE has 

already taken is sort of the proof is in the pudding. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Yes, so you think it is a good direction, but you 

want to make sure it gets implemented? 

Mr. TRIMBLE. Yes, and I think even more than that, it would be 

where is the implementation plan? 

Ms. DEGETTE. Right. 

Mr. TRIMBLE. So we have got a lot of oK, we are going to do this, 

we are going to do that, but where is the DOE summary of all of 

these efforts saying hey, this is our assessment of all this good 

work these people have done, and here is our plan with metrics 

and dates and who is accountable going forward. 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. And General, have you read General Finan’s 

report? 

General ALSTON. No, ma’am, I have not. 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. 

General ALSTON. Her report was in draft while we were essentially commissioned by Secretary Chu. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Are you familiar with her recommendations? 

General ALSTON. I am familiar with a lot of them. I couldn’t recite them for you. 

Ms. DEGETTE. I am not asking you to. Good news, I only have 

5 minutes. 

So my question, though, is do you think she is going in the right 

direction with her recommendations, based on your assessments? 

General ALSTON. I do. Where I was encouraged particularly by 

her approach was trying to certainly recognize the field shortcomings, but the headquarters chain—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. Right. 

General ALSTON [continuing]. Needs to be fixed, and it needs a 

solid focus on it. 

Ms. DEGETTE. It needs to be clarified, right? 

General ALSTON. Absolutely. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Yes, what about you, Dr. Meserve? 

Mr. MESERVE. My response would be the same. 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. Now every few years—I alluded to this in my 

previous questioning. Every few years, some in Congress suggest 

that NNSA should be autonomous. From oversight last year, the 

House passed the National Defense Authorization Act that included a provision providing additional autonomy from oversight by 

this committee, for example, for NNSA. Luckily, this language was 

not in the final law and part of our job is to make sure that we 

have adequate oversight, so we are glad it wasn’t in the final law. 

I think, and all of us on this committee think, the Y–12 security 

breach shows that the NNSA is simply not ready for that level of 

autonomy that the National Defense Authorization Act contemplated. 

So General, I want to ask you and Mr. Meserve, were any of the 

issues you identified caused by a lack of autonomy for contractors 

111 

and those who worked for Y–12? Were they caused by a lack of autonomy? 

General ALSTON. I would say that the consequence of the relationship between the semi-autonomous nature of NNSA and the 

Department of Energy did cause a conflict in ambiguity for policy, 

and so, the NNSA was dependent upon Department of Energy apparatus for independent inspection by HSS and the Inspector General properly so. 

Ms. DEGETTE. So what you are saying is the autonomy that they 

had actually caused some of the problems? 

General ALSTON. That they didn’t have sufficient autonomy for 

them to be exclusively accountable for the failure. 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK, and that was because they were partially reporting to DOE? 

General ALSTON. Because the field would look up the chain of 

command, and there were limits to how beholden they were to the 

NNSA because certain policy elements were the purview and domain of organizations in the headquarters that were outside 

the—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. So it was because it wasn’t fish or fowl, they were 

semi-autonomous, right? 

General ALSTON. Yes, ma’am, and Dr. Meserve may have a better way to say this from our perspective. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Dr. Meserve? 

Mr. MESERVE. I think that part of the problem was not the autonomy of NNSA but the fact that there is a very confusing structure. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Within the agency. 

Mr. MESERVE. If something was simplified and then clear lines 

of authority and responsibility is what is necessary. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Right. 

Mr. MESERVE. That could be done with an autonomous NNSA. It 

could be done with the current structure, but having clear guidelines of who is in charge of what. 

Ms. DEGETTE. The problem wasn’t—yes, I got you. The problem 

wasn’t whether it was autonomous or not, the problem was there 

wasn’t a chain of command. 

I want to ask you very quickly, Mr. Trimble, do you think that— 

does the GAO believe that NNSA’s issues can be solved through a 

simple structural change? 

Mr. TRIMBLE. We have previously testified that we do not. We 

think the issues that need to be addressed can be done with the 

current structure, and again, it is cultural changes, sustained effort. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you. 

Mr. MURPHY. The gentlelady yields back. 

Now recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Johnson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, thank 

you for being with us today. 

Dr. Meserve, if the Department of Energy office responsible for 

independent oversight is subjected to political retaliation for conducting that oversight, how would that impact their ability to remain objective and independent, in your view? 

112 

Mr. MESERVE. Well I mean, the obvious danger is that if they are 

being criticized for doing their job that they will then back off doing 

what they are supposed to be doing. And so I think that that would 

be unfortunate, that if they didn’t have a clear view of what their 

obligations were and their mission is. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK. General Alston, what is your view of the importance of independent oversight? 

General ALSTON. I think that it is appropriately integrated in a 

mosaic of sensors and indicators to tell you how sturdy your readiness, or in this case, the quality of the security. I think that if you 

move too much towards depending on independent inspection and 

evaluation, you are missing great opportunity to have—to defend 

yourself against crisis. You are focused on defending against crisis 

and ultimate failure, but you are not taking advantage of building 

routine relationships and seeing whether or not your organization 

has the capacity to recognize failure when the conditions begin to 

present themselves. If you need someone outside to tell you how 

ready you are, you may not have the skill yourself to know yourself. So I believe it needs to be a mosaic of inputs that are converging at the right level to give the leadership at the local, intermediate, and the higher levels the competency and the confidence 

in just what the quality of the performance of the unit is. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I couldn’t agree with you more, and it is analogous 

to—I know in my 261⁄2 year career in the Air Force, you have your 

unit mission, you have standards and evaluation who are the internal looks, eyes, and ears to make sure that you are following those 

rules, but you also have the Inspector General who takes a look 

from the outside, and both are very, very important. 

Back to the issue, though, of political retaliation. To both of you, 

what impact would political retaliation have on safety and security, 

the culture of safety and security? You mentioned, Dr. Meserve, 

that people would just stop. 

Mr. MESERVE. Well, you need to have a system that reinforces 

the priority that is to be given for safety and security, and that 

anything that interferes with the capacity for people to have a willingness to confront those issues honestly and to address them thoroughly is a detriment to achievement of safety and security. And 

that could be through political process, through fear of retaliation 

by a superior, there is any number of things that could affect it, 

but the point here is to keep your eye on the ball and anything that 

distracts you from that is a negative factor. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Sure. 

Mr. MESERVE. And I couldn’t agree more with General Alston is 

that one ought not to anticipate that you are counting on oversight 

function as your primary means to prevent shortfalls. That responsibility has to be in the line organization that is responsible for the 

job, and they should be held accountable for it. The oversight is a 

protective mechanism to make sure that they are fulfilling their 

function adequately and appropriately. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Absolutely. 

General ALSTON. And sir, I would add just one point, and that 

is if you don’t have at a grass roots level the kind of environment 

where the folks will come forward to expose weakness and challenge, you are not going to get to the self-critical culture—the level 

113 

of self-critical culture that you really need in this business where 

the stakes are so high. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I couldn’t agree with you more. 

General, given the site’s, I quote, ‘‘alone and unafraid’’ posture, 

how important, in your opinion, are standardization, 

benchmarking, and best practices to achieving and sustaining high 

security levels? 

General ALSTON. Sir, clearly they feed every day. When you can, 

on a routine level, have the lines of communication sufficiently 

open where there is collaborative process, and standards don’t have 

to be issued from above, there can be collaboration. It builds trust, 

it builds flow of information up and down the chain. Myself and 

Mr. Augustine came to the conclusion that the federalization of the 

correct protective force should be given serious consideration, and 

the reason—I am a unity of command guy, and that creates a seam 

with the operator, who is enriching uranium or whatever the other 

part of the mission would be, and so it is a little odd for me to have 

come down on this side. But for precisely the reasons of standardization and more centralized control and impact that I felt that 

that would be one means by which that could be achieved. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well thank you. Mr. Chairman, I actually do have 

one more question, if it would please the chair that I could ask it, 

otherwise I will yield back. 

Mr. MURPHY. We will give you an additional minute. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK. 

General Alston, one final question. General Finan’s task force 

noted a distinct bias against finding and stating performance criticisms. You stated your belief that one of the attributes of a security 

organization is, and I quote, ‘‘an absolute intolerance for shortfalls, 

deficiencies, outages 1 minute longer than necessary.’’ What must 

happen for NNSA to transition from General Finan’s assessment to 

the attribute that you describe? 

General ALSTON. I played an active role as the Air Force was recovering from its epic failures. I was required to produce a road 

map, and there were a lot—obviously we were on fire, and there 

were a lot of activities that had to go on there. But one of the 

things that we instituted was to find structural mechanisms to 

prove leadership commitment, and so the Chief and Secretary created a nuclear oversight board that met quarterly, and it was a 

forum where everyone with nuclear equities at the senior level 

would meet. But it was a forum where you could expose whatever 

level of detail that you wanted to expose, and in the case of the 

failure that we saw at Y–12, it wouldn’t require so much the senior 

levels at NNSA, but there needs to be a process where the connection is reinforced so that you are tracking outages to the right 

level, and for example—or equipment shortages, and that there is 

a recurring forum so that routine interaction can fortify commitment to the security part of the enterprise. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. MURPHY. All right, now recognize the gentleman from New 

York, Mr. Tonko, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

114 

The obvious major part of NNSA’s work is security, but equally 

important is providing their employees with a safe working environment. The consequences of safety failures are serious and for 

example, in October of ’07, GAO reported that nearly 60 serious accidents or near-misses had occurred at NNSA’s national labs since 

2000. Just to give one example, GAO described a 2004 accident 

where a student working at the NNSA facility at Los Alamos was 

blinded in a laser accident. 

Mr. Trimble, you had indicated in your testimony that GAO has 

been conducting assessments of safety at NNSA for quite some 

time, and while I heard some of the results being mentioned here, 

I am more—I would like to know, more importantly, how the agency is fairing. Are they getting better at addressing safety concerns? 

Mr. TRIMBLE. I would like to say yes, but as of now, I can’t say 

that our work is showing that. I think one of the things that is relevant to the discussion today that ties into the safety and security 

reform initiatives from 2010 is we have previously reported that 

those initiatives did not address our concerns previously expressed 

regarding the safety culture at NNSA and specifically, we noted 

that some of those reforms we viewed weakened federal independent oversight by making HSS’s role sort of more of a ‘‘Mother, 

may I’’ in terms of being able to come in and inspect facilities. And 

I think in our testimony as well, we note since our last testimony 

on these matters in the fall, there have been numerous other safety 

incidents that have been reported. So our concerns necessarily continue. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you. You also made mention, and I will quote, 

that ‘‘they have not demonstrated sustained improvements in 

terms of their safety reforms.’’ Can you tell us about NNSA’s recent 

efforts to reform those measures in terms of safety protocols? 

Mr. TRIMBLE. I don’t know about protocols, per se. I think the 

2010 safety initiative, the reform initiative, you did a lot to—there 

is a lot of good in there in terms of consolidating or rationalizing 

directives, et cetera. Again, as I noted, we saw problems with it, 

but as with security, the issue is one of sustainment. You go 

through these same periods of an accident happens, it gets attention, you have remedial measures, and then attention wanes and 

you go through the same cycle once again. 

Mr. TONKO. So then what should the agency do or be doing to 

promote or improve worker’s safety? 

Mr. TRIMBLE. Well, I think again it is—one, it is a continued and 

sustained effort in addressing sort of a cultural issues that have 

crept in. I think you see, just as in security where you have the 

divide between headquarters and the field units, there is a divide 

there in terms of the importance and differing perceptions, perhaps, of the level of importance this sort of mission holds. 

Mr. TONKO. And in terms of any oversight protections? 

Mr. TRIMBLE. In terms of oversight? Well, independent—clearly, 

we haven’t been on the record in terms of having robust independent oversight, much like in the security realm, so bolstering 

the role of HSS in that regard I think is essential. 

Mr. TONKO. OK. I will yield back, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank the gentleman, and I want to say that for 

all the panelists, I thank you today, both panels. I also want to 

115 

note that certainly at times like this when we have hearings about 

security issues, security breaches, there are those who want to see 

where weaknesses are. They certainly take note of the comments 

made, and we recognize a lot of the things are being done for security remain certainly in the classified levels. But in a situation like 

this, I think it gives the ranking member and I and members of 

both sides of the Aisle confidence to know that actions are being 

taken, because in a world where terrorists on any level may take 

action against our interests at site such as this or other ones, that 

our Nation will be strong and stand up and prevent problems in 

the future with this. And so we thank you for your comments and 

good Americans to help us with that security. 

I ask unanimous consent that the contents of the document binder and all the Majority memos be introduced into the record, and 

authorize staff to make appropriate redactions. Without objection, 

the documents will be entered into the record with any redactions 

the staff determines appropriate. 

[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.] 

Mr. MURPHY. And in conclusion, again, thank you to all the witnesses. I remind members they have 10 business days to submit 

questions for the record, and I ask all the witnesses agree to respond promptly to the questions. 

This committee is now adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:] 

116 


80292.088

The Secretary of Energy 

Washington. D.C. 20585 

The Honorable Joe Barton 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

u.s. House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

Dear Congressman Barton: 

May 5,2010 

Thank you for your March 30,2010, letter regarding the Department of Energy's (DOE) 

Safety and Security Reform Plan. First, let me assure you that we are committed to 

maintaining the highest standards of safety and security at our sites. DOE has conducted 

its nuclear operations for decades without a major accident and has long maintained 

worker injury and illness rates that are significantly below comparable industry standards. 

DOE also maintains a robust security protection posture for oUr nuclear sites, which has 

been rigorously tested to verify the capability to withstand the full range of postulated 

terrorist threats. Our management and operating contractors are responsible for safety and 

security performance, and we will continue to hold them directly accountable for 

achieving the safety and security requirements in their contracts. 

The goal of our reform efforts is to fulfill our mission objectives more effectively and 

more efficiently. We view safety and security to be integral to those mission objectives. 

To that end, we are undertaking efforts to improve our safety and security directives and 

internal oversight processes. In our review of the Department's safety and security 

directives, we plan to maintain an appropriately robust set of regulatory-based and 

contractoa1ly applicable requirements, while eliminating redundant requirements. Further, 

we are refocusing our Federal oversight and enforcement efforts to more specifically 

target areas of greatest risk. 

DOE's oversight of safety and security performance has not and will not diminish. The 

Office ofIndependent Oversight, within the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), 

has undertaken numerous new activities that have actually increased its field presence and 

knowledge concerning site safety and security program performance. With respect to 

security, HSS will conduct an assessment at all facilities with Category 1 special nuclear 

material before the end of the calendar year. 

As stated in the Reform Plan, the only oversight activities that have been suspended are 

those associated with lower risk standard industrial operations. Similarly, these are the 

only activities affected by the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) sixmonth moratorium on internally-driven assessments. Activities will continue to be 

subjected to local monitoring by DOE and NNSA site offices on an as-needed basis and 

®printedw;thSO'finkOnreeye!edPII~r 
117 


80292.089

will be subjected to independent oversight when site performance requires increased 

attention (e.g., for-cause reviews and regulatory enforcement actions). 

Shifting independent oversight resources previously devoted to these activities has 

increased the resources available to assist line managers in tackling difficult challenges 

and solving problems that have remained unresolved by layers of duplicative oversight in 

the past. For NNSA, shifting its resources will allow DOE to develop an integrated and 

comprehensive oversight approach and devote needed resources to ensuring that 

contractors are implementing effective assurance systems. Our efforts have already 

resulted in significantly increased communication and cooperation among all departmental 

elements. 

We are currently conducting a series of congressional committee briefings on our reform 

goals and activities. Glenn Podonsky, the Department's Chief Health, Safety and Security 

Officer, is working to schedule a briefing with the Energy and Commerce Committee's 

minority staifto provide additional information on implementation of the Department's 

Reform Plan. 

If you have any questions, please have your staff contact Betty A. Nolan, Senior Advisor, 

Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs, at (202) 586-5450. 

Sincerely, 

StevenChu 

cc: The Honorable Michael C. Burgess 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

U.S. House of Representatives 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman 

Chairman 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

U.S. House of Representatives 

The Honorable Bart Stupak 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

U.S. House of Representatives 
118 


80292.090

Nutional 

Dc~ 13 2012 ACT·NA·72·12·12·2012·484945 

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION 

THRU: MICHAEL K. LEMPKE i J.(o 

ASSOCIATE ADM~M.+dR' FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS . 

FROM: SANDRA E. FINAN, BRIG GEN, USAF <::~),:l!z:~:~ ACTfNG ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR 

FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR SECURITY 

SUBJECT: Directive Rescission and Impact Assessment 

This memorandum rescinds direction and suspends actions being taken in 

response to the attached memorandum dated August 31, 2011, Direclionfor 

Recenl(), Issued Departmental Orders for Certain Safeguards and Security 

Program Areas. We intend to execute a deliberate process to restore the 

Department of Energy (DOE) directives as the baseline safeguards and security 

policy for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and this is an 

important first step. This direction applies to all NNSA contracts to include 

contracts managed through the Office of Acquisition and Supply Management, 

but docs not apply to NNSA Headquarters (Le., District of Columbia and 

Germantown). The directives that are currently on the contracts will remain until 

the Office of Associate Administration for Management and Budget provides a 

formal notification. 

Executing this transition effectively will require collaboration among the 

Headquarters, Federal Site Offices, and the contractor community. As we 

implement this initiative, we need to fully understand the impact on our partners 

across the nuclear security enterprise before modifying any contracts. We request 

that you conduct an impact assessment and repOlt your results, 

Please identify issues that will have a measurable cost or significant operational 

impact on your implementation of the following DOE Orders: 

CA) 470.4B, SCifegliards and Security Program, July 21, 2011; 

(B) 473.3, Protection Program Operations, June 27,2011 (Attachments 1 

and 2, Federal and Contractor Protective Force); and 

(C) 474.2, Nuclear Material Control and Accoul1fability, June 27, 2011. 
119 


80292.091

Your impact responses should address the following two elements: 

(1) Describe any significant issues that would result from implementing 

the cutTen! DOE directives, including cost impacts. Identify specific 

areas where implementation of cmrent DOE directives wi!! require an 

implementation plan beyond a six·month implementation. Please 

include page, section, and paragraph llumber cross·references for the 

current DOE Orders alld existing contract directives that supp0l1 your 

issues. 

(2) Describe your proposed resolutioll to address any sigllificant issues 

caused by implementing the CutTen! DOE Orders, including potential 

use of equivalencies and exemptions processed in accordance with 

DOE 0 251.1 C, Depal'tmcl1fal Dil'eclil'e Program January 15, 2009. 

By January 31, 2013, please report your assessment orllle costs and schedule for 

implementing the DOE Orders to DNSCorrespondcnce@mlsa.doe.gov. Inquiries 

regarding this direction should be refetTcd to Mr. Larry Small, Office ofField 

Support, at (202) 586-1412. 

Attachment 

Distribution: Jeffery HatTel!, NA·lS 

Douglas Ash, NA-74 

Mark Holecek, KCSO 

Kevin Smith, LASO 

Kimberly Davis, LSO 

Steven Erhan, NPO·] 

Stephen Mellington, NSO 

Douglas Dearolph, SRSO 

Geoffrey Beausoleil, SSO 

cc: Neile Miller, NA-2 

James McCollllell, NA·OO 

Joseph Waddell, NA·APM-lO 

DOll Cook, NA·IO 

Catherine Tullis, NA·MB-20 

Frank Lowery, NA-70 

Catherine McCulloch, NA· 70.1 

Paul Saunders, NA-71 

Donald Stout, NA-72 

Robert Osborn II, NA-IM-I 

Wayne Jones, NA·JM·l 

Laurel Hautala, KCSO 

Michael Duvall, LASO 
120 


80292.092

Duane Gordon, LSO 

Gary Wisdom, NPO·20 

Raeford Phifer, Jr., NSO 

Roxanne Jump, SRSO 

Eileen Johnston, SSO 
121 


80292.093

ACHM T 
122 


80292.094

MEMORANDUM 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

Department of Energy 

National Nuclear Security AdminIstration 

Washington. DC 20585 

August 31, 2011 

__ ~r.:l~T~~ 

, DEFENSE NUCLEAR SECURITY 

Direction for Recently Issued Departmental Orders for Certain 

Safeguards and Security Program Areas 

Recently, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued several new Orders pertaining to the 

Safeguards and Security Program, specifically DOE Order (0) 470.4B, Sajegu(lrds and 

Security Program, dated July 21.2011; DOE 0 474,2, Nuclear Material Control and 

Accountability, dated June 27, 2011; DOE Standard 11942011 for Nuclear Material 

Control and Accountability, dated June 2011; and DOE 0 473.3, Protection Program 

Operations, dated June 27, 2011. As with all new directives, sites have six months to 

either meet all new requirements or develop and approve implementation plans toward 

that end. 

Subject matter experts from the nuclear security enterprise (NSE) have been working 

together to develop and promUlgate specific National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) security policies. The NNSA Policy Letters (NAPs) which correspond with the 

above referenced Departmental Orders are near completion and should be ready in the 

near future. Therefore, NNSA sites should not take action to conduct an impacts 

assessment of the new Orders or place them on the site contracts. The existing Ordcrs 

should remain on the site contracts until the respective NAP is issued by the 

Administrator and placed on the site contracts. TIlls direction also extends to Federal 

entities located outside of the Washington D.C. metro area and possessing and nonpossessing contractors managed out of the Office of Acquisition and Supply 

Management. 

The draft NNSA Program Planning and Management NAP is in the review process 

within NNSA at this time and we anticipate it to be published within the next few 

months. We are currently working on the draft Protection Program Administration NAP, 

which is also expected to be issued ill the near future. Both of these NAPs will replace 

DOE 0 470.4B. Likewise, the draft NAP for Nuclear Material Control and 

Accountability is in the final coordination process and is also expected to be promulgated 

before the end of the year, and will replace DOE 0 474.2. 

The new DOE 0 473.3 establishes requirements for three separate topical areas: Physical 

Protection, Contractor Protective Force, and Federal Protective Force. The Physical 
123 


80292.095

2 

Protection requirements in DOE 0 473.3 were replaced by NAP 70.2, Physical 

Protection, in June 2010. The draft NAP for Protective Force, which provides 

requirements for contractor protective forces, is in the final stages of development and 

will replace DOE 0 473.3, Attachment 2, Contractor Protection Force. Due to the 

complexity of the revision to 10 Code ofFedcral Regulations (CFR) 1046, wecaunot 

guarantee that this NAP will be promulgated this year. We expect the draft 10 CFR 1046 

will undergo the rulemaking process shortly and anticipate its completion in the near 

future allowing us to finalize the NNSA Protective Force NAP. Therefore, 

DOE 0 413.3, Attachment 2, should not be implemented at this time. If the rulemaking 

process takes longer than anticipated, our office will reevaluate. Finally, our office does 

not have responsibility for Federal Protective Forces and we will therefore not be 

addressing those requirements in DOE 0 473.3. 

As we continue our efforts to develop additional NNSA policies for the other security 

topical areas, there will be more opportunities to tailor and streamline the Defense 

Nuclear Security requirements progrant to our mission and operations. I appreciate your 

continued support through this process to ensure that we achieve the greatest benefits in 

terms of cost savings and increased operational efficiencies from this effort while 

maintaining an effective security program. 

If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter further. please call 

Mr. Kevin Leifheit, Director, Office ofField Support (NA-72), at (202) 586-4400, or 

Mr. Michael Bodin (NA-72) at (202) 586-7610. 

Distribution: Joseph Waddell, NA-APM-lO 

Mark Holecek. KCSO 

Alice Williams, LSO 

Kevin Smith, LASO 

Stephen Mellington, NSO 

MITey Harrell. OST 

Steve Erhart, PXSO 

Douglas Dearolph, SRSO 

Patty Wagner, SSO 

Theodore Sherry, YSO 

cc: Donald Cook, NA-IO 

Kevin Leifheit, NA-72 

Larry Wilcher, HS-50 

Laurel Hautala, KCSO 

Dawle Gordon, LSO 

Pamela Valdez, LASO 

Raeford Phifer Jr., NSO 

Mark Jackson, OST 

Gary Wisdom, PXSO 

Carroll McFall, SRSO 

Roxarme Jump, SRSO 

Eileen Johnson, SSO 

Donat St. Pierre, YSO 
124 


80292.096

The Deputy Secretary of Energy 

Washington, DC 20585 

March 16,2010 

MEMORANDUM FOR KRISTINA M. JOHNSON, UNDER SECRETARY OF ENERGY 

STEVEN E. KOONIN, UNDER SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE 

TIIOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO, UNDER SECRETARY FOR 

NUCLEAR SECURITY 

GLENN S. PODONSKY, CHIEF HEALTII, SAFETY AND 

SECURITY OFFICER 

INGRID A. C. KOLB, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT 

SCOTTBLAKEHA~~LCOUNSEL _ 

FROM: DANIELB. PONEMA~ 

SUBJECT: Department of Energy 2010 Safety and Security Reform Plan 

The Department has recently developed the attached end-state vision for safety and security 

reform, which will guide our efforts to enhance productivity and achieve the Department's 

mission goals while maintaining the highest standards of safe and secure operations at 

Department of Energy facilities. It is imperative. that we initiate the necessary actions quickly to 

attain this end state in 2010. 

In 2009, the Office of Health, Safety and Security eHSS) began reforming its approach to 

enforcement and oversight by recognizing line management's resp,unsibility for safety and 

security, reviewing opportunities for streamlining requirements, and eliminating directives that 

do not add value to safety and security. 1 have tasked HSS to continue this reform path, hut they 

will need your input, cooperation and support. Therefore, please IlSsure that senior managers and 

key staff from your Headquarters and field organizations are working closely with HSS to 

achieve our common goals. 

The attached Plan outlines actions and milestones that require your attention. I recognize that 

this is a major effort and will involve the timely commitment ofvaJuahle resources, but your 

support, as well as input from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and our stakeholders, 

is vital to our success. 

Success will be measured through near-term relief from specific low-value burdensome 

requirements as well as longer-term streamlining of requirements that will lead to measurable 

productivity improvements. Please keep me informed of our progress and to alert me in a timely 

manner of any impasse that needs my attention. 

Attachments 
125 


80292.097

cc: Ines Triay, EM-! 

William Brinkman, SC-! 

Pete MiIler. NE-! 

James Markowsky, FE-! 

Cathy Zoi, EE-l 

David Geiser. LM-l 

Mike Weis, PNSO, FMC Chair 

Jeff Smith, ORNL, Deputy Director 

Al Romig, SNL, Deputy Director 

Adam Cohen, PPPL, NLDC Executive Secretary 
126 


80292.098

Attachment 1 

End-State Vision for Safety Reform 

To enhance productivity and achievement of mission goals, while maintaining the highest 

standards of safe operations at DOE facilities through the development, implementation, and 

assurance of effective, streamlined, and efficient safety policies and programs. 

Safety Performance: Contractors are provided the flexibility to tailor and implement safety 

programs in light of their situation without excessive Federal oversight or overly prescriptive 

Departmental requirements. 

Safety Responsibilities: To facilitate effective mission accomplishment, decision-makhlg 

authorities are pushed to the lowest appropriate level of contractor and Federal management, 

considering hazards, risks, and perfonnance history. Authority and accountability for safety 

rests with line management, including responsibility for and oversight. 

Safety Requirements: DOE worker safety requirements are based upon existing national 

standards, with internally-derived requirements developed to address unique DOE conditions. 

DOE's regulatory requirements for occupational safety and health are founded on regulations 

promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), invoke current 

national standards to address outdated aspects of OSHA regulations, and establish or invoke 

requirements to address unique DOE workplace hazards. The Department's corporate approach 

for maintaining the highest standards of safe operations is promoted through its Integrated Safety 

Management Policy, DOE P 450.4, Safety Management System Policy, and implemented by 

contractors through Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation Clause 970.5223-1, 

Integration of Environment, Safety and Health into Work Planning and Execution. 

Safety Assurance: The Department's contractors maintain an assurance system that provides 

reliable measurement of the effectiveness of their safety management systems and facilitates 

timely corrective actions to system or perfomlance weaknesses. 

Regulatory Oversight and Enforcement: HSS's approach to safety regulatory oversight and 

enforcement supports line management's efforts to affect the conduct and priorities of their 

contractors. Oversight is focused on safety performance. Oversight inspections and enforcement 

actions are prioritized for contractors with poor safety records and serious or recurring violations, 

and are consistent with approaches and penalties employed by OSHA and the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission. 
127 


80292.099

Attachment 2 

End·State Vision for Security Reform 

To enhance productivity and achievement of mission goals, while protecting sensitive 

information, technologies, and materials through the development, implementation. and 

assurance of effective, streamlined. and efficient security policies and programs. 

Security Performance: Contractors are provided the flexibility to tailor and implement security 

programs in light of their situation and to develop corresponding risk- and performance-based 

protection strategies without excessive Federal oversight or overly-prescriptive Departmental 

requirements. 

Security Responsibilities: To facilitate effective mission accomplishment, decision-making 

authorities are pushed to the lowest appropriate level of contractor and Federal management, 

considering vulnerabilities, risks, and performance history. Authority and accountability for 

security rests with line management, including responsibility for oversight 

Security Requirements: DOE security strategies are based upon legally mandated 

requirements, national standards developed by peer agencies, a rational threat assessment, and 

internally derived requirements developed to address unique DOE security risks. DOE-unique 

security requirements are streamlined, non-redundant, focused on desired performance outcomes, 

and tailored to specific mission and site risks. DOE security requirements are standardized 

where necessary to support interoperability and cost savings. 

Security Assurance: The Department's contractors maintain an assurance system that provides 

reliable measurement of the effectiveness of their security programs and facilitates timely 

corrective actions to system or performance weaknesses. 

Regulatory Oversight and Enforcement: HSS's approach to independent oversight and 

regulatory enforcement supports line management's efforts to affect the conduct and priorities of 

their contractors. Oversight is focused on security performance. Oversight inspections and 

enforcement actions are prioritized for contractors with serious or recurring violations of security 

requirements, with penalties commensurate with potential harm to national security and with 

those imposed by peer agencies. 
128 


80292.100

Attac.bment 3 

DOE 2010 SAFETY AND SECURITY REFORM PLAN 

Background 

In 2009, the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) began working to refonn its 

enforcement and oversight approach, recognizing line management's significant 

responsibility for safety and security. To date, this approach has resulted in (l) increased 

coordination of enforcement actions with Hne management, (2) working with the Field 

Management Council (FMC) to understand where refonn in its oversight and 

enforcement practices is needed, (3) suspending independent oversight of low-hazard 

operations and lower-value security assets, except for those cases where site perfonnance 

requires increased attention, and (4) maintaining rigorous and infonned oversight of highhazard operations or high-value security assets. 

In November 2009, following the safety and security refonn studies directed by the 

Deputy Secretary, HSS began a disciplined review of all HSS directives, including a 

systematic review oftne Department of Energy safety and security regulatory model 

(which includes both DOE directives and regulations). As a result, HSS identified 24 

directives for potential cancellation (subject to consultation with the Program Offices, 

including the Central Technical Authorities). HSS has also developed approaches fo!' 

safety and security disciplines that are expected to result in more than a 50 percent 

reduction in the number of existing safety and security directives for which HSS is the 

Office of Primary Interest. 

Priority Actions and Milestones 

The Department is setting the following safety and security reform goals and target 

milestones. The Department leadership team expects senior managers of Headquarters 

and field organizations actively to support these challenging efforts. Specifically, 

leadership of each Headquarters and field organization will need to ensure the timely and 

efficient engagement of appropriate managers and staff at all levels of the organization as 

needed to support HSS in achieving the actions listed below. 

Action Milestones 

Process: Initiate directives process changes to support the pace of this March 2010 

refonn effort and require a rapid (3-day) escalation for impasse (veto) 

resolution. 

Outreach: Develop an outreach plan that will engage, infonn and enlist March 2010 

the support of DOE internal and external stakeholders, (including the 

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board) throughout tlris refonn effort to 

achieve our end-state vision. Outreach includes a roundtable discussion 

with the Deputy Secretary, Under Secretaries. and various worker unions 

in March. 

Security Near-term: Provide relief from specific burdensome security March 2010 
129 


80292.101

RlqUiraJlODti by: 1) fiulizi .. ap !!II mised!UDcJ~ 

Ccmko.Iled NueJearlnformatioo fjjjina.' poJioymaporand\Jm 

on Foreign VIIi .. 1IId Aaipment. aufmit~ a roviIDrl ' 

Accountable CllSIriJiecl Removable EtC01loOle M.u..<A.CRl3M) policy 

for ~_ cnlaJ review. 

N ..... ttnn ................ : lDitiatc the .bi.U'IIta1~CIW}iOoeIa to Man:h 2010 

cucci the unnaedeel directiws with tl!8 _.Pfaomptitins tho 

CIIlCCIIlatIODI in '1. 

Oventabt .... d Bllf'orce...m Redefine tho HSS I~cnt ovai&bt May2010 

and repJatoly entbrc:emoat filnctiona to 1IChie:ve the ~ vision to 

JncIude suhmittillg a revision of DOE ~or 470.28, Ind' '.' 

and Perfimulllce Aaauranco PfO .~ , review, 

Wedcet S.fety: StroamJine the D~ W01'Icei heaUh" safety, May 2010 

Jntepted Safccy Manapment, and OvaSipt ctiroctlws tbr'8Ubmittal for 

Departmlnml nwiBW. PutI\IO fiIrther identlficatloJl 0f~ssuos with 1be 

DcpIl'tmcnt'. worker safety ~ations. 10 CPR 85 I (dlit will then be 

evaluated tbrou the rille maki fOCeIIS • 

a...lftcalioD: StreIrnUne the Departmenr.. CI~_ and MIlescones 

j iDfonnIlion COIIbOI dircctivc:a within 90 'dayi:lbUowiq the ~Jicadon of based OIl the 

I the pending executive order OLO.) for~led 1Jnclusifiecf issuaneo of 

.Inform,rion and tho PreSident's Jn1bnliatJoo Security Q.verailht omce the B.o. 

(lSOO) bnp1ementingdiRlCtives for B.O. 13S26. Claiiifiod·National 

• 1nfbrmati0l1. 

QuaI'Y Auanuace: Strclmlil18 the DeparUncat" Quality Assurance 

dltectiws for lubmiHal for nMow. 

Opentlal Es)ltl'l.elaGr. Streuallne the .Dcpaztmenr~ ~emti_ 

experience and r.lbaok dinlctives into an intopted ~onal 

aw_ ancI rille management approach for aubulittlll tor DepartmeIItal 

review. 

J\)ly2010 

Ausust20IO 

N ....... Sa1at)': R.eaopizins tho ianPorcmoo oftha :Depadment', Sept=bct 

nuolcar safety regulations aad direoIivea, a review Wl1J.be ~ to 2010, with 

clarify the exilfinl nrlalionnp betwcan regulation- "i'I~YHriWill interim 

nrqvin:mcata, addrea any identifted .. In zeqaitementt, and!Cduce miI.tones in 

VIIIlfCIIIIIIl')' bvnJerJ where there is:no ~ gJ:ty benefit Tho May u 

review will he completed and the nMsed ~v. wili be lubmitted 1br spcdfiecl 

ental. miow b bel'. "I" ~thia !'1Ji;;;;;m.=tho==Defi=IIIIIC=---' ____ --' 
130 


80292.102

I NaoiOer , ... lIly SdI¥ - wUII",ciOiiiDIiiiL AIIo, due .. ""'-

acbiwW ftom. Departmental review alreld.yconductcd, camplete the 

nwiaioD IIJd itsuaDce oflhl four __ aafeIy onIca,GUmllitly in 

Dcpnmcntal nwi"" (DOH 0 42S.ID •. DOB~O 433.18. DOB 0 422.X, 

_DOE o 426.Y) a BCbeduled ill May. ------,--1-----1 

SI_Ity: SlraImJine the DepartInent's safesdmfs and sec:urity diroctivea October 

by leveraginalho Nal10Dll Hoo1car Security Admiaillmtion Zero-Based 2010, with 

Security RlIYiew (ZHS.R) to update all roIated D~ directives, by intaim 

October, including submiUlng a reviled Safesuardl am,I Security policy milestones jn 

fbr Dcpll1mental review in March and ,thoupdaled Safepards and Man;h and 

Security Program order for Departmental nMew in J\If1II. June as 

S1JOOificd 
131 


80292.103

The Honorable Steven Chu 

Secretary 

U.s. Department of Energy 

1000 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20585 

Dear Secretary Chu: 

March 30, 2010 

We are writing with regard to a "Department of Energy 2010 Safety and Security Plan" 

recently reported in the press and described in a March 16, 2010, memorandum sent from the 

Department of Energy (DOE) Deputy Secretary Daniel Poneman to DOE senior management. 

According to Deputy Secretary Poneman, since 2009 the Department's Office of Health, Safety 

and Security has been taking steps to reform its approach to enforcement and oversight of safety 

and security at DOE facilities. The objective of the plan appears to be to provide contractors 

with the flexibility to tailor and implement safety and security programs without excessive 

federal oversight or overly prescriptive Departmental requirements. 

As you are aware, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has conducted extensive 

reviews in the past relating to safety and security compliance at DOE sites. As GAO has 

documented in numerous reports and testimony before the House Energy and Commerce 

Committee, DOE has experienced significant challenges in the past managing effectively the 

many billions of dollars appropriated to the agency and the multiple projects which DOE is 

directed to carry out in both the civilian and defense areas. These challenges include 

documented concerns that DOE federal site offices, responsible for the day-to-day oversight of 

DOE contractors, may not have sufficient personnel with the necessary skills to manage and 

oversee effectively the work being performed by contractors at their sites. At the same time, 

contractor self-assurance and assessment systems may also be inadequate and/or not yet well 

developed to meet many of the Department's tasks. 

Post 9/11 reforms and a series of incidents the Committee investigated over the past 

decade at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and 
132 


80292.104

Letter to the Honorable Steven Chu 

Page 2 

elsewhere focused needed attention on and prompted improvements in safety and security during 

the past Administration. Given the long history of DOE's management challenges and the grave 

safety and security risks within the nuclear weapons complex, it is imperative that DOE ensure 

safety and security-related improvements that are currently in place can continue and be 

sustained and that DOE be cognizant of lessons from past incidents and management failures. In 

light of this, we have concerns particularly about whether, and the extent to which, DOE should 

be taking steps now to outsource safety and security measures to contractors without strong 

federal oversight. 

To address our concerns, we sent the attached request to GAO today to ask for its 

assistance in evaluating the Department's ongoing reform plan and related activities. In addition, 

we request that the Department (i) provide our Minority Committee staff with a briefing on the 

"Department of Energy 2010 Safety and Security Plan" and all related activities; and (ii) provide 

a written response with full information regarding any enforcement or oversight activities 

relating to safety and security that have been suspended during the past year, and assurances that 

suspension of those activities does not raise any security-related concerns. 

Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. If you have any questions related to 

this request, please contact Mr. Alan Slobodin of Minority Committee staff at (202) 225-3641. 

Attachment 

Sincerely, 

ichael C. Burgess 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 
133 


80292.105

Mr. Gene L. Dodaro 

Acting Comptroller General 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Dear Mr. Dodaro: 

March 30, 2010 

Over the past year, Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary Steven Chu has initiated or 

supported a number of significant changes in the priorities, management and direction of the 

Department, including initiatives that relate to agency oversight at some of the nation's most 

sensitive national security facilities. In connection with these efforts, on March 16,2010, 

Deputy Secretary Daniel Poneman issued a memorandum to DOE senior management describing 

initiatives the Department has taken to reform its approach to enforcement and oversight of 

safety and security, including at National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) facilities 

within the nuclear weapons complex. 

The memorandum describes a "Department of Energy 2010 Safety and Security Reform 

Plan" and provides an "end-state vision" for such reforms and a schedule for plan 

implementation to be completed this year (see Attachment). The objective of the plan, as 

reflected in the end-state vision, appears to be to provide contractors with the flexibility to tailor 

and implement safety and security programs without excessive federal oversight or overly 

prescriptive Departmental requirements. 

We write to request your assistance in evaluating DOE's ongoing safety and security 

reform plan and related activities. We have received reports that during the past year as part of 

its reform initiative: 

• DOE's Office of Health, Safety and Security has suspended some independent 

inspections of DOE and NNSA facilities within the nuclear weapons complex; 

• NNSA has suspended dozens ofinterna1 reviews and assessments; and 
134 


80292.106

Letter to Mr. Gene L. Dodaro 

Page 2 

• NNSA and the Office of Science are implementing an oversight model at some of 

their sites that relies less on direct federal oversight and more on contractor selfassessment. 

DOE carries out many of the nation's most critical national security-related missions, 

including stewardship of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and the environmental 

remediation of the Cold War era nuclear weapons complex. As the Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) has docnmented in numerous reports and testimony before the House Energy and 

Commerce Committee, DOE has experienced significant challenges over the years in managing 

effectively the many billions of dollars appropriated to the agency and implementing all of the 

multiple projects which DOE is directed to carry out in both the civilian and defense areas. 

These challenges include documented conceros that DOE federal site offices, responsible for the 

day-to-day oversight of DOE contractors, may not have sufficient persounel with the necessary 

skills to manage and oversee effectively the work being performed by contractors at their sites. 

At the same time, contractor self-assurance and assessment systems may also be inadequate 

and/or not yet well developed to meet many of the Department's tasks. 

Post 9/11 reforms and a series of incidents the Committee investigated over the past 

decade at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,-and 

elsewhere focused needed attention on and prompted improvements in safety and security during 

the past Administration. Given the long history of DOE's management challenges and the grave 

safety and security risks within the nuclear weapons complex, it is imperative that DOE ensure 

safety and security-related improvements that are currently in place can continue and be 

sustained and that DOE be cognizant of lessons from past incidents and management failures. In 

light of this, we have concerns particularly about whether, and the extent to which, DOE should 

take steps now to outsource safety and security measures to contractors without strong federal 

oversight. Accordingly, we request that GAO undertake a review of these reform initiatives with 

a focus on the following questions: 

1. What is the factual justification and basis for embarking on these reforms and the 

management model or approach DOE senior management relies upon to drive these highlevel initiatives? 

2. What types of efforts have NNSA and DOE program and oversight offices launched in 

response to the Department's ongoing safety and security reform initiatives, and what is 

their implementation status? 

3. What independent oversight activities relating to safety and security have been suspended 

as DOE has pursued its safety and security reform initiatives, and does the suspension 

raise any safety or security concerns? 

4. Based on current progress and on the large body of work compiled by GAO, the DOE 

Inspector General, and a variety of DOE- and Congressionally-appointed commissions, 

what is the likelihood of success for the Department's current safety and security reform 

initiatives, and where might the Congress most usefully direct its oversight resources? 

We request that GAO focus its efforts on NNSA because of its extensive contracting and 

project management activities and critical national security role and functions. In addition, we 

also request that GAO focus on DOE's Office of Health, Safety and Security, because we have 
135 


80292.107

Letter to Mr. Gene L. Dodaro 

Page 3 

particular concerns about the implementation of the Secretary's initiatives in that office, which 

plays a key role in overseeing security and safety of ODE and NNSA operations. 

Thank you for your assistance with this matter. If you have any questions, please contact 

Mr. Alan Slobodin with the Committee Minority staff at (202) 225-3641. 

I C. Burgess 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

cc: The Honorable Henry A. Waxman, Chairman 

The Honorable Bart Stupak, Chairman 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

Attachment 
136 


80292.153

s 

• I 

OFfICIAL USE ONLY 

PRIl·DECISIONAL DIlLIBERA Tl1lE 

n 

• rl ti 

National Nuc/ear Security Administration 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE·DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 
137 


80292.154

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE·DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Department of Energy 

National Nuclear Security Administration 

Washington, DC 20585 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADMINISTRATOR 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

SANDRA E. FINAN, BRIG GEN, USAF 

SECURITY TASK FORCE LEAD 

Transmittal of Task Force Report on the Assessment of NNSA 

Federal Organization and Oversight of Security Operations 

Following the July 28, 2012, security Incident at the National Nudear Security 

Administration's (NNSA) Y·12 National Security Complex, a Task Force was 

commissioned on August 14, 2012, to analyze the current federal NNSA security 

organizational structure and security oversight model and recommend possible 

improvements. I was appointed to lead this Task Force. The Task Force was directed to: 

• Analyze current NNSA security organizational structure and recommend possible 

improvements that would Improve operational focus, oversight, and culture 

sustainment. 

• Analyze current NNSA security oversight model and mechanisms to determine 

what seams eldst and what structures could be Implemented to better ensure 

that the Issues are found and flxed before they become problems. 

The attached report documents the results of our analysis and our recommendations. It 

Is important to note two key points: 

• The items documented In this report are remarkably similar to those 

documented In previous reports. NNSA has been resistant to the kind of 

organizational, cultural, and operational changes that would put security on a 

sustain ably sound footing. 

• Although outside the charter of the Task Force, the role of leadership Is crucial 

and must be taken Into account when considering the report findings. 

While the report hIghlights negative aspects of the NNSA security organization and 

assessment model, the Task Force found many great people on the NNSA security staffs . 

. They are dearly dedicated, skilled, and hard·worklng and want to get the security 

mission done right. Unfortunately, NNSA security personnel see themselves thwarted 

by lack of management support and feel obstructed by some of their peers. Their 

difficulties are compounded by the absence of a workforce strategy to recruit, retain, 

* Primed with ea'/ Ink on nteyded paper 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE·DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 
138 


80292.155

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DEUBERATIVE 

and develop a cadre of talented, knowledgeable and experienced security professionals. 

Th us, It Is all the more encouraging that these personnel, almost without exception, 

genuinely care about doing good work. Their continuing strong desire to build a 

successful security organization Is a hopeful sign for the future. 

Attachment 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 
139 


80292.156

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBEIIA TIVE 

Table of Contents 

1. INTRODUCTION •••••••••••••.•.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••...•••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••• 2 

1.1 Task Force Mission ........................................................................................................... 2 

1.2 Major Results ................................................................................................................... 3 

2. ORGANIZATION .............................................................................................................. 5 

2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 5 

2.2 Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 8 

2.3 Findings ............................................................................................................................ 9 

3. ASSESSMENT ................................................................................................................ 14 

3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 14 

3.2 Discussion ....................................................................................................................... 14 

3.3 Findings .......................................................................................................................... 16 

4. RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................... 19 

4.1 Overarching .................................................................................................................... 19 

4.2 Organization ................................................................................................................... 20 

4.3 Assessment ..................................................................................................................... 22 

5. PROPOSED ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ................................................................... 23 

6. PROPOSED ASSESSMENT MODEL .................................................................................. 26 

7. ClOSiNG ....................................................................................................................... 28 

APPENDICES: 

A. Task Force Charter 

B. Task Force Team Composition 

C. Task Force Methodology 

D. Alternative Organizational Structures 

E. Other Observations 

F. Selected Bibliography 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 
140 


80292.157

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE Page 12 

1. INTRODUCTION 

1.1 TASK FORCE MISSION 

In the aftermath of the July 28, 2012 security incident at the National Nuclear Security 

Administration's (NNSA) Y-12 National Security Complex, the leadership of the NNSA and 

the Department of Energy (DOE) took action to address the security failures at Y-12. The 

initial information gathered revealed that issues at Y-12 were part of a larger pattern of 

security program management deficiencies.1 These security issues prompted the NNSA 

Administrator to commission2 a Task Force to analyze the current Federal NNSA security 

organizational structure and security oversight model and recommend possible 

improvements.3 The NNSA Administrator directed the Task Force to: 

• Analyze current NNSA security organizational structure and recommend possible 

improvements that would improve operational focus, oversight, and culture 

sustainment. 

• Analyze current NNSA security oversight model and mechanisms to determine what 

seams exist and what structures could be implemented to better ensure that the issues 

are found and fixed before they become problems.' 

While other reviews were aimed at diagnosing the root causes of the Y-12 event, the NNSA 

Administrator's direction called for this Task Force to focus on the "path forward" within 

the Federal NNSA organization. Under the leadership of Brigadier General Sandra Finan, 

USAF, the Task Force consisting of NNSA, DOE, and military specialists conducted extensive 

document reviews and interviewed Federal managers and staff as well as a selection of 

contractor security managers and others across the NNSA security organization.5 The Task 

Force collected and analyzed information, identified issues, and herein proposes solutions. 

Sections 2 and 3 of this Report present and discuss the findings under the headings of 

Organization and Assessment.6 Section 4 presents recommendations based on the 

findings. Section 5 presents a proposed approach to an NNSA security organizational 

structure that addresses operational focus, oversight, and culture sustainment. Section 6 

presents a proposed approach to an NNSA security oversight model to better ensure that 

issues are found and addressed before they become problems. Section 7 presents the Task 

Force's closing. Supporting information is presented in the appendices. 

1) In the context of the Task. Force Report the phrase "security program- encompasses security·related functions and activities 

acl'Oss the NNSA in additlon to budget line fundlng. 

2) NNSA Ch.rter, Assessment of NNSA Federal OrB.niz.tion and Oversight of Security Operations, Thoma. P. D'Agostlno, NNSA 

Administrator, August 14, 2012. (Appendix A) 

3) The actual delivery of secur~y and other serviCes In NNSA is performed by contractors. The Federal security organization 

manages the work of these contractors and assesses their performance. 

4) The term ·seam" in the Charter IS understood to include gaps, overlaps, and organizational friction points. 

5) The Task Force team composfilon Is provided in Appendix 8. The data collection methodOlogy is detailed in Appendix C. 

6) The term 'oversight" in DOE and NNSA usage has both the usual, generic meaning and a speCific reference to the "independent 

oversight" role of the DOE Office of Health, Safety, and security (HSS). The term "assessment" is more commonly used to describe 

such programs within NNSA. To avoid confUSion. the Report therefore generally uses the term "assessment" to refer to NNSAspecific programs, and "oversight" to refer to the HSS programs. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE·DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 
141 


80292.158

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

1.2 MAJOR RESULTS 

The Task Force noted significant deficiencies in security organization, oversight, and culture 

sustainment throughout the NNSA security organizations. In the NNSA security 

organizations, line management authority is ill-defined and claimed by multiple Federal 

organizations. The term "line management authority" as used in this Report, is the "ability 

to direct others to execute elements of the security mission." It does not refer to typical 

staff fu nctions such as the development of requirements and promulgation of policy. On 

the one hand, the "Federal field organizations" exercise line management authority over 

the site security contractors via the contract management structure.7 On the other hand, 

the NA-70 asserts that it also has such authority. Absent dearly defined lines of authority, 

many individuals assert authority, while correspondingly few have been assigned 

responsibility. This lack of dear lines of authority contributes to a widespread practice of 

decision-making by consensus. When consensus fails, organizational elements can act 

independently or not at ali, which undermines effective implementation of the security 

program. Conflicting interpretations of the NNSA Act itself add to the confusion.8 

The Task Force further noted a significant gap in the current NNSA security organizational 

structure. At the strategic level the Headquarters organization has been ineffective and 

has intervened in field tactical execution.9 The Federal field organizations have been 

ineffective in performing their tactical responsibilities for executing the security program 

and have intervened in strategic matters. Additionally, there is no clearly identified 

operationally-focused organization that bridges the gap between strategic and tactical 

responsibilities and addresses standardization, field execution, and multi-site analysis. 

The Task Force found a broken security performance assessment model. It also found that 

NA-70 came to rely overwhelmingly upon Federal staff simply reviewing contractorprovided data, ratherthan effectively assessing performance itself. At the same time the 

DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), which is responsible for independent 

oversight, had been directed as part of governance reform, to reduce the frequency and 

rigor of its reviews of NNSA. Of particular concern is the observation that potentially 

critical management information is not being reported clearly to the appropriate deCision 

makers. 

As concerning as these structural and assessment issues might be, the most striking result 

of this review falls in the area of culture sustainment. It quickly became evident that the 

Task Force findings closely resemble those presented in numerous prior reports such as the 

7t The term '"Federal field organization," as used fn this report, refers primarily to the NNSA Site offices, but also includes the 

recently created Nudear Production Office which functions as ill consolidated Site office for the Y-12 and Paotex sites as they move 

toward a single consolidated contract structure. 

8) NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURI1Y ADMINISTRATION ACT [As Amended Through P.L. 111-383, Enacted January 7. 2011) 

9} As referenced in this Report, the "strategic" level develops long range pJanning and goalS to ensure proper execution for achieving 

end results. the "operational" level implements the overall strategy by giving direction to tactical elements and prOViding support to 

reach mission objectives, and the "'tactical" level performs day-to-day operations and oversight to ensure that duties and tasks are 

being completed, 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 13 
142 


80292.159

OFFICIAL USE ONLY· PRE·DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

2005 Mies Report and the 2004 Chiles Report.'o While NNSA has attempted to correct 

some identified issues over the years, it has not adequately emphasized effective security 

mission performance. In recent years, NNSA security leaders have chosen to emphasize 

security cost containment to the detriment of security program execution. The idea that 

the requirements for security performance effectiveness are subordinated to cost concerns 

has become a prevailing concept in the NNSA security community. This emphasis has 

become endemic throughout the NNSA security culture, so much that fundamental facility 

protection issues such as the protection of ongoing operatipns came to be regarded as too 

expensive and therefore "out of bounds· for analysis." The NNSA security culture has 

focused on fisca/limitations over effective performance. This has resulted in an 

environment in which deficiencies are worked at the margins rather than management 

addreSSing core issues. 

These issues underscore the critical role of effective leaders. While outside the charter of 

this Task Force, it must be acknowledged that leadership plays the key role in mission 

accomplishment. The Task Force recognized that effective leadership may compensate for 

structural deficiencies within an organization; however, restructuring alone cannot 

overcome leadership shortcomings. The best assessment model is useless if leaders fail to 

effectively implement it. Additionally, the assessment model will not be effective unless 

leaders consistently demand comprehensive, unbiased information. NNSA must take 

ownership of its history of security failures. Leadership must take bold and enduring 

actions if this pattern is to be broken. 

10) See Appendix F, Selected Bibliographyfor the full citation of these reports and other related materials. 

11) For example, highly enri<:hed uranium operations at Y~12 were suspended for 18 days following the security breach. The Task 

Force found that continuity of operations was not a significant factor in the planning and execution of the site security program. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE·DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 14 
143 


80292.160

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Z. ORGANIZATION 

2.1 INTRODUCTION 

The current NNSA security organizational structure is confusing in terms of the 

relationships between the NNSA Administrator, Office of Information Management 

(NA-IM), the newly established Office of the Associate Administrator for Infrastructure and 

Operations (NA-OO), Office of Defense Nuclear Security (NA-70l and the Federal field 

organizations. There is an intermingling of statutory, programmatic, line, and staff 

functions within the NNSA security organization. 

The primary NNSA Headquarters security organization is the Office of Defense Nuclear 

Security (NA-70), which reports directly to the NNSA Principal Deputy Administrator. The 

NA-70 Director is also the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security (CONS). The Chief of Defense 

Nuclear Security position is established in the NNSA Act and has a reporting line to both the 

NNSA Administrator and the Secretary of Energy. The authoritv to appoint the Chief of 

Defense Nuclear Security resides with the Secretary of Energy, and is exercised with input 

from the NNSAAdministrator. The NA-70 Director reports to the NNSA Principal Deputy 

Administrator, and as the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security has direct access to the 

Secretary of Energy--this creates two lines of communication. 

Separate from the formal mission and functions of NA-70, the Chief of Defense Nuclear 

Security position is also designated by the Secretary of Energy and NNSA Administrator as 

the Cognizant Security Authority (CSA) for NNSA. This authority can be further delegated. 

Federal officials that are delegated CSA authority can commit security resources or direct 

the allocation of security personnel or approve security implementation plans and 

procedures in the accomplishment of specific work activities. 

NA-70 has four offices. Security Operations and Performance Assessment (NA-71), Field 

Support (NA-72), Nuclear Materials Integration (NA-73), and Personnel and Facility 

Clearances {NA-74}. Additionally, NA-70 has a Resource Management staff (NA-70.1) and 

an Intelligence and Counterintelligence liaison function (NA-70.2). See Figure 1. 

Federal field organizations are structured for execution of the NNSA security program in 

many different ways. Some security organizations report to the senior field manager, while 

others do not. Some organizations are singularly focused on the security mission while 

others are part of a more diverse portfolio that could include business operations, project 

management, etc. The diversity of organizational structures has the effect of working 

against the initiative to achieve NNSA-wide consistency, standardization of policy, training, 

and program implementation. This blurs roles, responsibilities, and line management 

authority. 

line management authority runs from the NNSA Administrator through NA-OO to the 

Federal field organization managers and their security staffs, and finally to the contractor 

who executes the mission. CSA flows from the NNSA Administrator to the Chief of Defense 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 15 
144 


80292.161

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Nuclear Security directly to the Federal field organization leadership and currently may be 

further delegated. The Chief of Defense Nuclear Security exercises security line 

management authority to direct Federal security staff and extends this to the contractors. 

Thus, the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security and Federal field management concurrently 

exercise line management authority, causing conflict and confusion. While the CSA is a line 

management authority, it does not follow the same delegation path as other line 

management authorities, compounding this confusion. 

The Task Force noted a significant organizational weakness that is due to a gap in the NNSA 

security structure. The Headquarters security function is basically strategic, providing 

policy, guidance, and requirements. The Federal field organization role is fundamentally 

tactical, executing the day-to-day security program. The NNSA lacks an operational level to 

communicate strategic policy and requirements as guidance that supports NNSA-wide 

standardization, to provide technical assistance to individual field organizations, and to 

perform other functions that are field-oriented and multi-site in character and application. 

This shortcoming contributes to Headquarters becoming involved In tactical-level line 

management decisions, and for tactical-level managers to assert a strategic role. 

Noticeably absent from the above discussion are the NNSA Program Offices. Until 

recently, the Federal field organizations reported to the Deputy Administratorfor Defense 

Programs (NA-IOJ. This has changed so that they now report to the Associate 

Administrator for infrastructure and Operations (NA-oO). Neither organization has any 

formal role in the development and implementation of the NNSA security program, 

although each "owns" the security staffs at the Federal field organizations, budgeting for 

their salaries and benefits and assuming responSibility for their professional development 

and training. 

HSS also plays a role in the NNSA security program. In addition to being the office of 

primary interest for DOE Security Orders, it performs Independent oversight of NNSA 

Headquarters and field locations. HSS is also responsible for providing basic corporate 

security education and professional development through the National Training Center. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 16 
145 


80292.162

OFFICIAL USE ONLY· PRE·OECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Figure 1 

Current NNSA Security Organizational Structure 

Assoclafl! Admlnislrator fOr 

Infrastructure and Operations ( 

Administrator (!'1M) 

Principal DepUIy Administrator (NA-2) 

Federal 

Field 

Managers 

Federal Field 

Seturity 

Olll·nlza!lons 

Chief of Defense Nuclear Securily 

Deputy Chief of Defense Nuclear 

Securily (NA-70) 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE·DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

NNSACIO 

INA·IM) 

Rtsourte 

Management 
146 


80292.163

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

2.2 DISCUSSION 

The existing NNSA security organizational structure is convoluted and ineffective. The Task 

Force observed that lines of authority in virtually every organizational function are divided. 

The NNSA security function is not well organized or effectively staffed and the NA-70 policy 

development and implementation process is broken. While the Chief of Defense Nuclear 

security is the Cognizant Security Authority (CSA), this responsibility has been unevenly 

delegated and is open to inconsistent interpretation. Security staffs are responsible to 

multiple lines of authority and for some functions may not be responsible to anyone. The 

most fundamental issues arise from the relationship between NA-70 and the Federal field 

organizations. NA-70 believes that it has fine management authority over the security 

elements within the Federal field organizations. However, the managers of these field 

organizations have been formally assigned line management authority. The NNSA Act 

states that the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security role includes "the development and 

implementation of security programs". The current interpretation ofthis provision nas 

been a source of ambiguity due to the mixing of line and staff responsibilities in a single 

organization. 

Roles and responsibilities are either undefined or not followed. The Task Force identified 

numerous occasions across the NNSA security organizations where indiViduals are not 

allowed to perform assigned duties or assume roles and responsibilities nominally assigned 

to others. The confusion of roles and responsibilities is evident in NA-70, within field 

organizations, and between NA-70 and the field. For example, the approved mission and 

function statements for NA·71 and NA-72 have little apparent relationship to the way these 

offices operate and how they interact with each other or with the NA-70 "front office." 

Within field organizations, the Task Force noted a number of instances where management 

precludes staff from performing the assigned roles of their position and/or assigns 

personnel to unrelated duties. At times, NA-70 acts as a formal line management 

organization, and asserts responsibilities that are formally assigned to the Federal field 

security organizations. NA-7D personnel are frequently frustrated by site-level resistance 

to the programmatic direction they provide and Federal field security managers are often 

similarly frustrated when NA-70 uses its budget authority, its control over the policy 

process, and other activities to inject itself into what the sites regard as their line 

management decision-making process. 

There are no clear lines of authority. There are overlapping lines of authority and a mixing 

of staff and line functions. The CSA function flows from the NNSA Administrator through 

the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security to the Federal field organizations. Line management 

authority goes from the NNSA Administrator through the Associate Administrator for 

Infrastructure and Operations INA- 00), to the field. However, NA-70 attempts to exert line 

management authority and provides programmatic guidance directly to the Federal field 

security managers. While Federal field organizations administer the contracts governing 

the actual performance of the security mission, NA-70 routinelv interacts with the security 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 18 
147 


80292.164

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

contractors. Furthermore, NA-70, not the line managers, is the primary executer of the 

NNSA security budget. 

The security policy process is broken. The Task Force identified that there is no clearly 

articulated or consistently implemented NNSA secu rlty policy process. A major concern is 

the supplanting of DOE Security Orders with generic and less restrictive NNSA policies 

(NAPs). This appears to be based on a desire to reduce funding demands through a 

reduction of requirements. Additionally, the Task Force noted a desire on the part of some 

NA-70 senior managers to maximize separation from DOE HSS poliCies and activities. 

Within NA-70, policy and guidance are issued through a variety of formal and informal 

mechanisms with erratic distribution. The Task Force identified that some Federal field 

organizations are inconsistent in their acceptance and application of NA-70 issued policies. 

Finally, NA-70 policy and guidance tend to be vague resulting in widely differing 

interpretations by field personnel. 

The NNSA Federal security organization Is not effectively structured or staffed. While 

there are clearly strategic (Headquarters) and tactical (Federal field organizations and 

contractors) levels, there is little indication of an effective operational element with 

responsibility for security program functions such as site assistance and standardization of 

program execution. The Task Force also noted that the Federal field organizations 

structure their security functions substantially differently. This results in a lack of 

standardization of both organization and execution of the secu rity program. At some sites 

there is weakening of the security function and reduced senior management attention. 

There are a number of personnel issues associated with the security professional staff, 

including the lack of a human capital development plan, no career path, and limited 

mobility. Additionally, the Task Force noted an overreliance on support service contractors 

who primarily assist the NA-70 organization. 12 

Z.3 FINDINGS 

2.3.1 Roles and responsibilities are either undefined or not followed. 

2.3.1.1 Within NA·70 there is a lack of clearly defined and understood functions 

and missions. Despite approved mission and function statements within 

NA-70, there is uncertainty, inconsistency, and conflict between the NA-70 

"front office", NA-71 and NA-72. The placement of NA-73 in the 

organization seems an anomaly that can divert senior management 

attention from the core security mission. 

12) These support service' contractors are distinct from security contractors who perform program functions such as protective 

forces. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 19 
148 


80292.165

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

2.3.1.2 NA-70 has failed to implement a requirements-driven budget formulation 

process. There is no clear delineation of responsibilities within the NA-70 

organization between the requirements process and the budgeting 

process. Tnere has been an overwhelming tendency, especially at 

Headquarters, for security requirements to be downwardly adjusted. The 

NA-70 leadership chose to lessen requirements rather than seek 

appropriate funding levels necessary for effective program execution. This 

has led to a wholly budget-oriented focus rather than a balanced approach 

in which requirements drive the process and senior management directs 

the balance between program execution and risk acceptance. 

2.3.1.3 The relationship between NA-70 and Federal field security staff is 

dysfunctional. The roles and responsibilities for Federal staff are not 

clearly defined, understood, or consistently applied. The distinction 

between line management responsibility and Headquarters staff 

responsibility is blurred and negatively impacts the relationship between 

Headquarters and the field. This lack of clear roles and responsibilities has 

led to conflict between some Federal field secu rity personnel and NA-70 

(and sometimes a three-cornered conflict involving contractor security 

staff). There is also a cultural issue between some Federal field 

organizations and NA-70 in which communication with NA-70 security 

subject matter experts (SMEs) is actively discouraged and impeded by 

Federal field management. Some Federal field organizations assert that 

they "do not work" for NA-70. There are disagreements over who has 

responSibility, authority and accountability. As a result, Federal security 

organizations act to Hprotect turf" and are biased against sharing 

information. This has reduced the effectiveness of the NNSA security 

program. 

2.3.2 No clear line of authority within the NNSA security organization. 

2.3.2.1 There is no clear line of authority. There is no documented or consistent 

implementation of security responsibility and authority. The formal line 

management authority for executing security programs in the field does 

not include NA-70, the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security. However, the 

Federal field security managers have an informal 'dashed line' relationship 

to NA-70. This relationship intermingles line and staff functions, which has 

adversely impacted the communications between the Contracting Officer 

and the security contractor. The confusion has contributed to a 

degradation of mission performance, a lack of standardization in program 

implementation, inconsistent performance assessment, and has diluted 

senior management awareness of security operations, issues and risks. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 110 
149 


80292.166

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

2.3.2.2 Delegation ofCSA is iII-defined and inconsistent. There is no clear policy 

guidance on what can be delegated or how the delegations are to be 

implemented. NAP- 70.2, Physical Protection, has allowed for varied 

interpretations of what can and cannot be delegated. There is no 

standardized process for the delegation of CSA from the Chief of Defense 

Nuclear Security to the Federal security managers. Further delegation of 

CSA to the security contractor is inconsistently exercised and in some cases 

inappropriate. As a result, the contractor is sometimes allowed to approve 

security plans and procedures without effective Federal oversight or 

approval. 

2.3.3 NNSA security pOlicy process is broken. 

2.3.3.1 NA-70 has assumed responsibility for generating security policy without 

allocating adequate resources to ensure effective policy formulation. 

N NSA generated security NAPs as an alternative to following DOE security 

policy. NA-70 staffed its policy process by borrowing resources from other 

NNSA security functions, usually at the cost of disrupting the orderly 

performance ofthose other functions. The result has been that NNSA 

security policy fonnulation and issuance is incomplete, ad hoc, inconsistent 

with DOE security policy, and imperfectly communicated to the line 

organizations. 

2.3.3.2. NA·70 has not clearly defined the necessary security program 

performance baseline. There is no dearly established requirements.driven 

baseline to govern the implementation of the NNSA security program and 

against which the program is assessed. Rather, the NA-70 approach 

deliberately departed from key DOE Security Orders and established a less 

restrictive security policy framework through the NAPs without resolving 

the different performance measurement expectations between the two 

poliCies. The lack of clearly defined performance requirements results in 

inconsistent and incomplete security program implementation. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE·DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 111 
150 


80292.167

OFFICIAL USE ONLY· PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

2.3.4 NSA Federal security function is not properly organized or staffed. 

2.3.4.1 There is no standard or consistent organizational structure for security 

functions at the Federal field organizations. The Federal field 

organizations carryout their security functions in different ways. While one 

size does not fit all, effective security organizations should have a set of 

core functions common across the security program. Currently, there is a 

lack of standardization and an uneven implementation of the Federal 

security program requirements. In some cases security functions are 

combined with other, non-security functions, taking management focus off 

of security program execution. 

2.3.4.2 The NNSA security organization has no operational-level element. NA-70 

primarily focuses on the strategic level of security, while the Federal field 

organization focuses on the tactical level. This leaves a gap at the 

operational level; there is no effective capability to provide 

implementation guidance or standardization and no one above the tactical 

level is appropriately focused on field operations. Without this operational 

focus each Federal field organization and each contractor is allowed to 

develop its own procedures for organizing and conducting security. The 

result is a fragmented and inconsistent execution of the NNSA security 

mission. 

2.3.4.3 The NNSA security functions are not staffed effectively and there is no 

human capital strategic plan. While there is a technical qualification 

program for some security professionals, there is no formal strategy for the 

recruitment, retention, and appropriate progression of Federal security 

professionals. Current practice relies heavily on Headquarters' use of a 

cadre of support service contractors, in lieu of developing Federal security 

professionals with multi-site and/or multi-security diSCipline experience. 

The result is that Federal security staff may have limited opportunity for 

professional growth and often feel they are in a 'dead end' job. 

2.3.4.4 The NA·70 leadership overly relies upon support service contractors. The 

senior NA-70 leadership has relied excessively upon contractors to provide 

core expertise. For example, the Security Operations Division's on-site 

workforce is two-thirds support service contractors. The other divisions' 

on-site workforce consists of an average of about 50% support service 

contractors. In addition, there is a very large number of other support 

service contractors used for field assistance activities. This overreliance on 

contractors, combined with the underutilization of the Federal work force, 

has contributed to the lack of an effective and sustained career path for 

Federal security professionals. Demoralization and feelings of 

disenfranchisement are evident in the Federal security workforce. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page i12 
151 


80292.168

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

2.3.4.5 NA-70 has not developed a program to integrate both local and national 

intelligence into daily operations at each of the specific sites. There are 

no clear and effective organizational relationships with the Intelligence and 

counterintelligence communities that provide consistent access at each 

organizational level to security threat and risk-relevant information. As a 

result, NA·70 and most Federal field organizations do not have effective 

intelligence support. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE·DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

p age 113 
152 


80292.169

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

3. ASSESSMENT 

3.1 INTRODUCTION 

The Task Force expended considerable effort attempting to describe, understand and 

analyze the current assessment model and mechanisms. Currently, the NNSA security 

assessment model consists of three levels: 1) contractor self-assessments against policy, 

program and contractual requirements, 2) Federal field organization shadowing and 

evaluation of specific performance testing and program activities and also evaluation of the 

overall effectiveness of the contractor's self-assessment system, and 3) NA-7D evaluation 

of both the contractor's self-assessments and the effectiveness of the Federal field 

organizations' oversight activities. Additionally, periodic independent comprehensive 

security inspections of NNSA sites are perfonmed by HSS. 

There are issues with the implementation oftne assessment activities at each ofthese 

levels. Some portions ofthe assessment process are not fully documented, some portions 

are not always followed, and other assessment activities appear to be locally improvised. 

To the extent that there is a security program baseline, it is derived from DOE Security 

Orders and NNSA security NAPs. However, there are significant unresolVed inconsistencies 

between DOE Security Orders, NNSA NAPs, and a variety of narrowly focused locai criteria. 

The NNSA NAP approach in security has been less specific and less defined than the 

approach specified in DOE Security Orders. NAP-21, Transformation Governance and 

Oversight Initiative, as interpreted by the NNSA security organizations, has enabled the 

contractors to determine how security programs are to be implemented and assessed. 

This extends to a belief that Federal oversight should be non-intrusive. There are no clearly 

established comprehenSive performance standards or measurement criteria for the 

security program. NA-70 has not clearly communicated program guidance and 

performance expectations regarding NAP implementation. There is insuffiCient and 

incomplete training in the assessment process. Finally, constraints at both the field and 

NA-70 levels push Federal assessment activities firmly in the direction of mere paperwork 

reviews. 

The Task Force recognized there are some aspects of the current assessment process, 

which should be fundamental to any assessment process with a large portion of the 

concerns focus on assessment program execution rather than on assessment program 

design. Additionally, there are structural aspects of the program that are causes for 

concern. The Task Force observed an endemic culture that accepts the current abdication 

of effective Federal program assessment as a given. 

3.2 DISCUSSION 

The failure to adequately assess security system performance and to clearly and 

unequivocally report defiCiencies to the appropriate senior managers has been identified as 

a significant contributing cause to the Y-lZ security incident The Task Force focused upon 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 114 
153 


80292.170

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

the performance assessment process as implemented by Federal field and Headquarters 

organizations within NNSA. Although contractor self-assessments are the first-line 

elements in the security performance assessment process, these were outside the direct 

scope of the review. Strengthening the contractor self-assessment process is an important 

objective, but cannot replace a rigorous Federal assessment process. 

NNSA does not have an adequate security performance assessment process or capability. 

The performance assessment capabilities of Federal security organizations within NNSA are 

virtually non-existent. Essentially all responsibility for performance assessment is 

delegated to the Federal field organizations. The current Federal field organizations are 

typically limited to "shadowing" contractor self-assessments and/or reviewing the reports 

these self-assessments generate. Moreover, there is a tendency on the part of some field 

Federal staff to adopt the role of defending "their" contractors rather than attempting to 

objectively assess contractor performance. At the Headquarters level, the NA-70 

performance assessment function has only three full-time Federal staff members. The Task 

Force noted that the current NA-70 assessment process is largely confined to the review of 

submitted paperwork. The result is that there is no NNSA Federal organization that is 

capable of performing effective security performance assessment. 

The Usystems-based" assessment model as Implemented is ineffective for security. 

Misinterpretation, and/or misapplication of the DOE Safety and Security Reform Plan, 

dated March 16, 2010, resulted in a weakened Federal security assessment program. In 

particular, this document stated: "Security Performance: Contractors are provided the 

flexibility to tailor and implement security programs in light of their situation and to 

develop corresponding risk- and performance- based protection strategies without 

excessive Federal oversight or overly-prescriptive Departmental requirements." This 

guidance was further expanded upon and eventually articulated in NAP-21, Trans/ormation 

Governance and Oversight Initiative." The belief arose that "eyes on, hands off" precluded 

Federal security staff from conducting performance-based assessments of contractors. As 

a result, most Federal assessment is based on paperwork generated by the contractor. This 

paper-based system of assessment, without sufficient performance verification, is 

inadequate for effective evaluation of security operations. 

NNSA has no clear and consistent performance baseline for security program 

Implementation. A performance baseline, set forth in detailed standards and criteria, is 

the keystone of an effective security program. Precisely articulated standards and criteria 

further provide an objective foundation for performance assessment. Currently, NNSA 

does not have the standards or criteria necessary to effectively measure security program 

performance. The absence of such standards and criteria diminishes the ability to identify 

potentially significant performance deficiencies. The Task Force noted that the lack of 

13} NAP 21, Chapter 8 states, "Une oversight activities are !argely systems-based in functional areas of lower risk and where the 

contractor has demonstrated good performance ... " Security programs at sites with sp!Cial nuclear material, critical Infrastructure, 

and/or other high value assets and activities are by definition of higher risk and therefore NAP 21 systems-based approach should 

not be applicable. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 115 
154 


80292.171

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

standards and criteria has been coupled with the widespread notion that contractors must 

only be told "what" the mission is, not "how" the mission is to be accomplished. While this 

approach may be appropriate in other areas, it is ineffective as applied to security 

programs. Therefore, security tasks are not necessarily performed in a manner consistent 

with NNSA security requirements. 

The current assessment process is biased against criticism_ The Task Force noted a 

distinct bias against finding and stating performance criticisms. HSS was asked to reduce 

the rigor and frequency of NNSA oversight. The NNSA Federal assessment relies heavily on 

contractor self-assessment. While an important tool, contractor self-assessments tend to 

be insufficiently objective. The primary Federal assessment role is performed by field staff. 

long-term geographic proximity to site contractors can compromise the objectivity of 

these Federal assessors. Moreover, the intermingling of management and assessment 

roles within Federal field organizations can also contribute to less objective assessment. 

The NA70 Headquarters performance assessment process, being paper-based, cannot 

validate the information submitted. Information provided to the Task Force suggests that 

in some instances information conSidered to be unfavorable is being "watered down" or 

obscured. Furthermore, information was presented that indicate differing opinions are 

being suppressed by some senior managers in the field and at Headquarters. As a result, 

NNSA senior leadership may not receive all information needed to make quality decisions. 

3.3 FINDINGS 

3.3.1 NNSA does not have an adequate security performance assessment capability. 

3.3.1.1 NA-70 does not have an effective security assessment capability. The 

current paper-based assessment process is heavily dependent on field offICe 

and contractor reporting and does not include independent observation or 

validation of site security implementation. As a result, NA-70 is unable to 

validate the implementation of security policies or contractor performance 

of assigned missions. 

3.3.1.2 NNSA Federal field organizations do not have consistently effective 

security assessment processes. The current process of reviewing 

contractor self-assessments and operational awareness activities does not 

provide adequate insight into contractor performance. In some cases 

Federal security staff has been limited to reviewing only contractorprovided paperwork. Consequently, Federal field organizations have 

become overly reliant on contractor-generated data in asseSSing contractor 

performance. Objective assessment of contractor performance can be 

compromised by day-to-day interactions. As a result, Federal field 

organizations cannot a Iways validate contractor performance. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 116 
155 


80292.172

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

3.3.1.3 NA-70 has virtually abdicated all responsibility for security assessment to 

the field organizations. NA-70 leadership has provided little unifying 

direction to Federal field security staff. This has allowed for widely varied 

implementation of security assessment requirements. As a result, 

consistently effective security assessments are lacking, cross-site trends are 

not appropriately identified, and NNSA leadership is deprived of an 

appropriate program-wide understanding of the security program 

implementation. 

3.3.1.4 NA-70 has moved away from performance-based Federal security 

assessment. The Federal security staff has only limited capability to do onsite assessments and has increased its reliance on contractor-provided data. 

NA-70 receives extensive paperwork, which is prepared by the contractors 

and transmitted by the Federal field organizations with their input. The 

excessive quantity of paperwork and questionable quality of the data, 

coupled with the Headquarters' inability to assess actual performance. 

precludes validating the information in the documents. This reliance on a 

paper-based approach has taken Federal security managers out of an active 

role in assessing actual security performance. 

3.3.2 The systems-based assessment model as implemented is ineffective for 

security. 

3.3.2.1 The current implementation of systems-based assessments fails to 

uncover problems. The current systems-based approach unduly 

emphasizes the contractor assurance process rather than actual 

performance results. This has largely replaced previous performance-based 

(transactional) evaluation. The Federal staff at Headquarters does not 

conduct any performance testing. While some Federal field organizations 

conduct performance testing on a limited basis, the current assessment 

approach discourages active Federal performance testing. As a whole, 

performance testing in the field has been of questionable effectiveness. 

Therefore, NNSA does not have an effective Federal capability to identify 

issues, and may be unaware of significant problems prior to their 

realization. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 117 
156 


80292.173

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

3.3.3 There Is no dear and consistent performance baseline for program 

implementation. 

3.3.3.1 NA-70 wrote and implemented policy documents, which were less 

restrictive than DOE policy and were subject to excessive interpretation. 

NA-70 produced NAPs, and other policy direction, that reduced security 

requirements and did not provide implementation guidance to clarify or 

build upon DOE security requirements. While the NAPs have allowed sites 

the freedom to tailor security programs to their speCific needs, these NAPs 

also led to an absence of standardization and/or consistent implementation 

of security requirements. This lack of a standard baseline has the potential 

to place assets at risk. It also makes implementation of an integrated NNSA 

security program very difficult. 

3.3.3.2 NA-70 did not establish standards and criteria that define expectations for 

security operations within NNSA. There is no comprehensive definition of 

security performance requirements. Consequently, there are no standards 

and Criteria against which to measure the performance of NNSA security 

program execution at individual field locations or for the overall security 

program. The employment of such standards and criteria increases the 

ability to identify potentially significant performance deficiencies. 

:1.3.4 Current assessment process is biased against criticism. 

3.3.4.1 Contractor self-assessments are insufficientlv critical. The Task Force 

noted an unwillingness to report deficiencies through the contractor selfassessment process. The assessment process as currently applied avoids 

probing areas of potential weakness. The current NNSA contracting model 

insufficiently addresses critical self-assessment as an effective part offee 

determination. 

3.3.4.2 Federal field assessments are insufficiently critical. long-term geographic 

proximity to site contractors can compromise the objectivity of the Federal 

assessors. Similarly, Federal field level involvement in local operational 

deciSions can also limit objectivity. At some field locations management 

impedes the ability of Federal staff to effectively or thoroughly review 

contractor performance. 

3.3.4.3 NA-70 does not have mechanisms to correct biases in assessment 

information. Information considered to be unfavorable is being "watered 

down" or obscured at NA-70 a nd lower levels. As a result, NNSA senior 

leadership may not be getting the information necessary for quality 

decision-making. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 118 
157 


80292.174

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

4. RECOMMENDATIONS 

The following recommendations address findings noted In this Report. The Task Force 

identifies the first three recommendations as overarching, and believes these should 

receive priority attention. Specific organizational and assessment recommendations then 

follow. 

4.1 OVERARCHING 

4.1.1 Build and execute an NNSA Security Road Map that consolidates 

recommendations, articulates a clear vision of where the security program is 

gOing, and charts a path forward. 

4.1.1.1 Evaluate this Report, and other security reports, in building a sustainable 

path to success. Document the path in a roadmap that is signed by the 

NNSA Administrator and follow up with action plans that have clear 

ownership, and status updates. Make the solutions enduring so that they 

are not again written up in the next report. 

4.1.2 Restate and stress the role of security within NNSA to emphasize a stronger 

security focus and culture that embraces security as integral to the overall 

mission. 

4.1.2.1 leadership must emphasize the importance of the security mission in 

strategic plans, mi"ion statements, policy documents, and other 

expressions of management intent. Security must be clearly integrated with 

other mission elements and appropriately recognized as essential to overall 

NNSA mission success. 

4.1.3 NA-70 senior leaders must focus on the primary responsibl!lty of developing 

an effective security program for the NNSA. 

4.1.3.1 NA-70 needs to concentrate on its primary mission of producing a current 

and comprehensive NNSA security program. The security program scope 

must reflect the balance between requirements and fiscal realities. Ensure 

that budget constraints do not inappropriately influence the establishment 

of program requirements. 

4.1.3.2 An effective security program for the NNSA must not only address the 

protection of special nuclear material and classified matter, but must also 

address other considerations such as continuity of operations and a broader 

spectrum of threats. NA-70 must clearly define the requirements that will 

serve as a basis for risk acceptance deCisions by line management. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE· DECISIONAL DEUBERATlVE 

Page 119 
158 


80292.175

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

4.2 ORGANIZATION 

4.2.1 Clearly define and document the roles and responsibilities across NNSA. 

security functions. 

4.2.1.1 Each organization needs to have clearly defined responsibilities. With each 

ofthese responsibilities the appropriate authority must be accorded. With 

responsibility and authority in alignment, individual and organizational 

accountability is established. 

4.2.1.2 Propose a clarification to the NNSA Act that more effectively addresses clear 

roles and responsibilities for the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security and the 

security line management responsible for executing the NNSA security 

program. 

4.2.2 Establish a clear Security line of authority. 

4.2.2.1 Eliminate the bifurcation of the security line of authority for implementing 

security programs. The Chief of Defense Nuclear Security should develop 

appropriate policy gUidance, but allow the CSA to flow from the NNSA 

Administrator through the NA·OO function to the Federal field organization 

managers. Create a clear distinction between line and staff functions. 

4.2.3 Retain the CSA. authority at the Federal level. 

4.2.3.1 Clarify CSA delegation of authority and its limitation, so that it cannot be redelegated to contractors. 

4.2.4 Create an operational-level security organization that is responsible for the 

Implementation and standardization of security operations in the field. 

4.2.4.1 The operational·level organization should focus on standardizing security 

operations, ensuring that the security program is effectively executed, 

addressing NNSA-wide trends and issues, and ensuring that the 

requirements, budget and policy guidance appropriately meet the security 

needs of the field elements. 

4.2.5 Establish an assessment capability that evaluates implementation of security 

programs across NNSA. 

4.2.5.1 In order to ensure the security program is appropriately implemented 

across NNSA, this capability must include the abilitv to assess the 

performance of the Federal field security organization as well as that of the 

contractor. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE·DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

P age 120 
159 


80292.176

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

4.2.6 Establish an appropriate Headquarters-level security policy capability. 

4.2.6.1 Policy development and implementation is a Headquarters core function 

that requires a dedicated professional policy staff to execute. Whether 

writing stand-alone policy or articulating implementation instructions for 

higher level policy, this function is essential for security program execution. 

4.2.7 Ensure that NA-70 security personnel have the appropriate level of security 

background, experience, and skill to properly carry out the NNSA security 

mission. 

4.2.7.1 NNSA needs the right security professionals in the right places. Individual 

leaders and collectively the entire staff must possess an appropriate skill 

and experience base to provide effective security program execution. With 

the right team in place. Federal security leaders and staff can set a path to 

success. 

4.2.8 Develop and execute a comprehensive human capital management program 

for Federal security professionals. 

4.2.8.1 NA-70 leadership must take responsibility to create a comprehensive 

personnel management plan that develops current security professionals, 

prepares them for pOSitions of broader scope or greater responsibility and 

recruits, and retains security talent needed to sustain the Federal security 

capability. 

4.2.9 Reduce reliance on support service contractor personnel. 

4.2.9.1 Support service contractors should be used to provide discrete products and 

services as defined in the statements of work. They should not be used as 

an alternative for appropriately skilled and experienced Federal staff. 

4.2.10 Eliminate the conflict between DOE Security Orders and NNSA NAPs. 

4.2.10.1 NNSA should use the DOE Security Orders. DOE has a specialized security 

policy function that produces its orders. Rather than attempt to duplicate 

this function. use the orders for direction and the NAP process to provide 

guidance and clarify information in the orders as appropriate, but not 

reduce requirements. 

4.2.11 Implement a requirements-driven security budget formulation process. 

4.2.11.1 Develop a structured planning, programming, budgeting, and execution 

process that ensure requirements are adequately stated and riSks 

appropriately accepted. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

P age 121 
160 


80292.177

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

4.3 AsSESSMENT 

4.3.1 Implement a comprehensive, multi-tiered, performance-based security 

assessment process. 

4.3.1.1 Implement an objective system in which performance information is 

identified, documented, and communicated. as appropriate. 

4.3.1.2 Establish an effective Federal performance testing element in the security 

program assessment process. 

4.3.1.3 The assessment program should include a comprehensive look at all 

security topical areas on a regular basis. 

4.3.2 Establish clear security performance expectations (standards and criteria) and 

performance measures. 

4.3.2.1 Develop and issue specific standards against which security operations are 

to perform and the criteria by which they will be evaluated. Consider 

inclusion of periodic and end of year performance evaluation 

requirements, fee strategy, and fee recommendations for security 

contractors. 

4.3.2.2 Revisit governance reform as it applies to the security program. Ensure 

that appropriately stringent standards and criteria for performance are 

articulated in policy and program direction. 

4.3.3 Revalidate and update the security performance requirements to ensure all 

levels of the threat spectrum are addressed. 

4.3.3.1 Greater consideration of lower-level and non-traditional threats such as 

active shooters and protesters must be appropriately incorporated into 

performance requirements. 

4.3.4 Create a culture of critical self-assessment and candid communication. 

4.3.4.1 Instill a commitment to effective self-assessment throughout the security 

program. Encourage presentation of areas of concern before they become 

problems. 

4.3.4.2 Create an environment in which all personnel are empowered and 

expected to appropriately communicate information in a clear, concise and 

accurate manner. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

P age 122 
161 


80292.178

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

S. PROPOSED ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 

The proposed organizational structure, Figure 2, separates the line function for executing the 

security mission from the Headquarters staff function. It establishes an operational-level 

organization that focuses on security implementation and standardization. Distinct roles and 

responsibilities are associated with tactical, operational, and strategic-level security functions. 

Tactical execution of contract administration occurs at the Federal field organizations. 

OperatiOnal implementation and standardization of operations across the security program 

occurs at the NA-OO level. Strategic· level policy guidance, requirements detennination, and 

performance assessment occur in NA-70. 

In order to clarify the line of authority, the CSA flows from the NNSA Administrator, through 

CONS to the head of the NA-OO, to the Federal field managers, and finally to the designated CSA 

at field sites, with no re-delegations authorized to non-Federal individuals. This authority 

follows the same path as the line authority from NA-OO downward. The asserted security line 

management tie between the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security and the security managers in 

the field is also terminated, in order to ensure a single, clear line of authority. 

In tenns of clarifying line and staff functions, the current NA-70 organization is restructured so 

that it serves solely as a staff organization at the strategiC level. The four security offices under 

the current structure will be realigned into divisions with One additional division being stood up. 

The five divisions are Performance Assessment, Strategic Requirements (I.e., policy 

development, planning and requirements, and training and career development), Nuclear 

Materials Integration, Personnel and Facility Clearances, and Business OperatiOns (I.e., Resource 

Management, Headquarters security operations, classification and controlled information, and 

human capital).l' 

The Performance Assessment Division is a new function responsible for assessment of 

contractor and Federal field organization performance, including no-notice and/or short notice 

assessments. This diviSion will also evaluate training effectiveness, policy implementation, and 

vulnerability assessments. This is the entity that the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security would 

use to verify that security programs are properly implemented. 

The Strategic Requirements Division is responsible for security requirement determination and 

the NNSA security policy process (whether that is to write new policy or interpret and amplify 

existing DOE policies). This division will also be responsible for establishing training 

requirements and developing standards and criteria for security programs. A new function of 

training policy and career development planning is being stood up to support Federal security 

professional development. 

The Business Operations Division retains the existing NA-70 functions of Headquarters security 

operations administration and classified and controlled information. The division will be 

14) The divisions of Personnel and Fadlity Clearances and Nuclear Materials Inttgration wm not be addressed In thIS model as It dOes 

not affect the execution of the Headquarters securlty program function. However, an evaluation should be conducted to determine 

if a possible transfer of the Office of Nuclear Materials Integration i$ warranted. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

PagelZ3 
162 


80292.179

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

responsible for implementation of certain activities within the NNSA security program, including 

the protection and control of classified information, and the physical security for NNSA 

Headquarters facilities and other security programs. Additionally, this division will manage the 

NA-70 program direction budget, establish internal controls, design and implement office 

protocols, and oversee records management. 

A new security operations organizational level will be stood up within the NA-oD structure. The 

responsibilities of this office are to ensure that the policies and guidance provided by the NA-70 

staff are executed in the field. It will also ensure standardization of security procedures across 

the field locations as well as provide field assistance, and a conduit for field concerns to be 

surfaced to the NA-70 staff. It will execute the NA-70 scope and security training requirements. 

An expanded intelligence/counterintelligence liaison is intended to ensure that Federal security 

managers get needed information and have appropriate ties to law enforcement and 

intelligence-related agencies. 

At the tactical level in the field, the multiple lines of authority are eliminated and direction will 

come from a single line of authority. All authorities will run through the Federal field 

organization manager to the appropriate security manager. The Federal field organization scope 

of duties will include primary contract administrative functions--including reviews of contractor 

reports, analysis, security plans, and other required documentation; partnering with the 

executing contractor; remaining knowledgeable and up-ta-date on the content, operations, and 

effectiveness ofthe contractor's security implementation; alerting management of all concerns 

related to contractor execution of the security mission. Federal field security organizations will 

fulfill their contract management role. 

This organizational structure will define and clarify roles and responsibilities and facilitate a 

strong mission focus. It divides resourcing from requirements determination in order to ensure 

that requirements are appropriately stated, weighed against budget resources and decisions 

made on accepting risks at the appropriate level. it provides a single line of authority to those 

operating In the field and maintains an appropriate span of controi. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Pagel24 
163 


80292.180

OfFICIAL USE ONLY· PRE· DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Figure 2 

Proposed NNSA Security Organizational Structure 

Administrator (11M) 

Principal Deputy Administrator (NM) 

Associate Administrator for ,.------1: Infrastructure and Oparations (NA-OO) 

Chief of Defen •• Nuclear Security 

Deputy Chief of Defen •• Nucle.r 

Security iNA.70) 

Resource Security 

Management Operations 

F-ederalfie!(i 

Managers 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE· DECISIONAL DELIBERA TlVE 

i 25 
164 


80292.181

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

6. PROPOSED ASSESSMENT MODEL 

The Task Force proposes a new approach to ensuring an effective security performance 

assessment system, one designed to address deficiencies in the current model. While retaining 

the three-tiered concept, it differs from the current model in several structural details and in the 

performance expectations established for each tier and for the system as a whole. The Task 

Force proposal strengthens the role of Federal security assessment within NNSA without 

diminishing the legitimate need for contractors to maintain their own self-assessment 

capabilities. 

The contractor self-assessment process continues as a first tier in the overall assessment 

process. The primary audience for the contractor self-assessments should be the contractor 

security managers themselves, but the self-assessments should follow a consistent, programwide format, and be made available for review at all higher levels of management. Contractors 

should be required to identify, report, and resolve security issues--sanctions should come when 

a higher level assessment uncovers problems that the contractor self-assessments fail to identify 

or properiy address. Even when an Issue Is readily resolved and corrective actions are 

immediate, a finding should be issued and the corrective action recorded. Failure to do so 

inevitably hides potential negative trends_ Contractor self-assessments should involve active 

performance testing rather than simply relying on work observation and document review--

effective secu rity performance can only be evaluated through testing. 

The fundamental purpose of Federal security performance assessment is to ensure that 

requirements are properly implemented. Therefore, the primary Federal assessment 

organization should ultimately report to the Chief of Oefense Nuclear Security, who is 

responsible for requirements. This provides independence not only from the contractors, but 

also from the tactical-level Federal field staff whose necessary day-to-day interaction with 

contractor managers and staff risks loss of objectivity. This enables the Chief of Defense Nuclear 

Security to better ensure effective implementation of NNSA security programs. Additionally, it 

provides feedback on performance to the operational and tacticalievels. 

These Federal security assessments should include performance testing of all critical elements. 

The assessors should issue ciear findings, which are to be tracked and closed in a program-wide 

corrective action management system. Federal assessors should also look closely at the 

contractor self-assessment process; "failures to identify" by the contractor self-assessment 

element should automatically rise to the level of significant findings. 15 

The final tier of the assessment model should explicitly rely upon the services of an independent 

security oversight function, currently provided by HSS_ NNSA should arrange for a regular 

process of comprehensive inspections. The oversight function should be encouraged to issue 

strong findings for matters of potential concern to the NNSA Administrator and the Secretary of 

IS} This model does not preclude operational and tactical level Federal managers from actively assessing contractor performance as 

part ofthelr hoe management responsibilities. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

P age 126 
165 


80292.182

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Energy, and should routinely evaluate the performance ofcantractar self-assessments and the 

Federal assessment program. 

This performance assessment model assumes a cammon requirements base that is employed at 

all levels and acrass the NNSA security program. While some allowance may be made for sitespecific issues, the fundamental elements of this requirements base should be an appropriately 

integrated system of DOE policies, NNSA implementation directives, and field operational 

guidance. The requirements base should be reflected in approved documents such as site 

Safeguards and Security Plans. Specific performance requirements should be articulated in 

detailed performance standards and criteria supported by a commonly understood and utilized 

performance testing process. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Pa g e 127 
166 


80292.183

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

7. CLOSING 

Over the years, there has been tension between implementation of security and ccnduct of 

operations. Whenever t~ere have been significant incidents of security concern, t~ere have 

been corresponding swings of the pendulum towards a more rigorous security program. 

Security program emphasis has increased after espionage cases, internal security lapses, and 

external events such as the September 11, 2001 attacks. However, over time, the general trend 

has been for lower management levels to accept more risk in order to reduce the perceived 

burden and cost of the security mission. Furthermore, the trend has been to remove security 

from an integral mission role, adversely affecting the NNSA security program. The events at Y12 illustrate how far the pendulum has swung in the wrong direction. , The Secretary of Energy characterized the V-12 events as "unacceptable" and clearly stated that 

security is the highest organizational priority. The NNSA Administrator has been equally 

emphatic in numerous public statements since the incident. The evidence from Y-12 and from 

prior security incidents points to a culture of compromises. Moving forward, NNSA must 

establish and sustain an effective security program. NNSA must address the significant flaws in 

the current organizational structure for security and the associated assessment model. NNSA 

must clearly and consistently emphasize the importance of security. Ensuring that the right 

leadership is in the right position is absolutely critical to success. The daunting prospect--and 

the one that will require the consistent emphasis of current and future Secretaries of Energy 

and Administrators of the NNSA--will be to instill a culture that embraces security as a 

fundamental and essential element ofthe NNSA mission. If NNSA fails in this, then senior 

leaders will again find themselves answering to the American people for the failures of security. 

Sooner or later, the perpetrator will not be peacefully·minded. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

P age 128 
167 


80292.184

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DEUBERATIVE 

APPENDICES 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 129 
168 


80292.185

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Appendix A 

/IV It..~ SIIJ.. MItIwNI~~AlllltltWInItIorr 

CHARTER 

ASSESSMENT OF NNSA FEDERAL ORGANIZATION AND OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY OPERATIONS 

1. Authorization 

This Charter authorf2:es and dIrects 8rlgsdier General Sandra Finan. united States Air Force" Princlpal 

Assts;tant Oeputv Administrator for Military Application. National Nuclear SecurIty Administration 

(NNSA), to conduct an Independent critical assessment of NNSA federal organization and oversight of 

security operations. 

%. Background 

Three Individuals trespassed and defaced a building at the NllSA's Y·12 National Securltv COmplex early 

on July 28, 2012. As a result, NNSA Is looking at aU aspects of what occurred to determine both the root 

cause{s) of the Incfdcmt and any contributing factors. This charter Is focused on the path forward within 

the federal NNSA orsonl.aHan. 

a. Purpose 

The focus will be on the following two areas: 

• Analyze current NNSA security organizational structure and recommend possible Improvements 

that would facilitate ImprOVEd opetatlonal focus, oversight. and culture sustainment. 

• Analyze current NNSA security oversight model and mechanisms to detennJne what .seam$ exist 

and what structures could be Implemented to better ensure that Issues are found and flxed 

before they become problems. 

AddItIonally, if other areas requiring further evaluatIon are noted, the charter may be amended to 

provide additional assessment. 

4. Deliverables 

No later than 90 days from the date of th1s charter, deliver to the NNSA Administrator a report and 

briefing describing the analysisl findIngs, and recommendations. WIthin 45 days deliver an update with 

Interim findings. 

s. Membership 

Membership will focus on individuals with a high degree of independence. expertise, and pragmatism 

and wJII be supported by NNSA. For NNSA team members, thiS 1$ to be a full time detail. Team 

members from outside NNSA may be used to the maximum extent allowed by their host orpnilBtlons. 

Thomas P. 0' Agostino, Administrator 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE·DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Date 

Pagel30 
169 


80292.186

OFFICIAL USE ONLY· PRE·DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Appendix B 

Task Force Team Composition 

.:. Brigadier General Sandra Finan, USAF* 

.:. Mr. Roger Lewis, NNSA 

.:- Dr. James McGee, DOE 

.) Lieutenant Colonel Rasheem Wright, USAF* 

.:. Major David Coy, USA* 

.:. Major Daniel Voorhies, USAF* 

Security Liaison 

Mr. Norbert Marcelle, NNSA 

Technical Editor 

Ms. Kimberly Hayes, Contractor 

*Currently assigned to NNSA Military Element 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE·DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 131 
170 


80292.187

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

AppendixC 

Task Force Methodology 

The Task Force used the following methodology in accomplishing its assignment: 

1. Assembled a small group with appropriate expertise that could participate on a fully 

dedicated basis forthe planned period ofthe review. This group included Individuals 

knowledgeable and experienced in organizational analysis; security program 

management; security operations; performance management and performance 

assessment; NNSA Federal field organizations; government-owned, contractor-operated 

facilities; contractor performance management; M&O contracts; inspections and 

surveys; and human capital management and training. 

2. Obtained a thorough understanding of the July 28, 2012, Y-12 security breach, initial 

assessments and succeeding actions. This understanding was obtained through review 

of draft and final reports, security video footage, briefings; and discussions with 

individuals, who participated in subsequent documentation and evaluation of what 

occurred. The Task Force focus was not on the incursion's root cause analYSis or 

appropriate responses, but this baseline understanding was considered necessary and 

informative in addressing the task of analyzing the NNSA security organizational 

structure and the current security oversight model and mechanisms. 

3. Reviewed a significant number of past reports, most notably the security assessments 

commonly referred to as the Chiles and Mies Reports; as well as NA-70 documents, 

Federal field organization documents; HSS, IG, and GAO Reports, and previously-used 

Standards and Criteria for evaluating DOE security program effectiveness. A selected 

bibliography is presented in Appendix F. 

4. Reviewed written responses to a set of questions, which were answered by selected 

Headquarters and field organizations. 

5. Conducted approximately three dozen interviews with senior Federal security managers 

and senior security staff (in Washington and from across the Federal field organizations) 

and senior contractor security representatives. This information was supplemented by 

discussions (not formal interviews) with others from both management and practitioner 

levels that the Task Force felt could be of assistance. 

6. The Task Force members carefully analyzed, consistent with the terms of its charter, the 

information that was derived and developed. Key observations were discussed, which 

drove the development of findings and recommendations. After the basic conclusions 

and implications were formulated, the Task Force drafted this Report and reviewed the 

conclUSions. 

7. As a final quality step, before formal presentation of results to the NNSA Administrator, 

the "final draft" Report was further reviewed by a "Red Team" composed of 

experienced and qualified independent experts. The Report was finalized giving due 

consideration to the inputs from the Red Team. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 132 
171 


80292.188

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Appendix D 

Alternative Organizational Structures 

The Task Force considered two additional organizational structures. While not recommended 

by the Task Force, the basic structural concepts are presented below. 

Alternative A 

Centralization of the NNSA Security Function within NA-70 

This structure would achieve a unified security line of authority by realigning the security 

organizations at each NNSA Federal field organization within Defense Nuclear Security (NA-70). 

At present, most senior security managers report directly to the Federal field organization 

manager, who provides site security guidance and direction. Currently, the Chief of Defense 

Nuclear Security has a dotted line to the Federal field secu rity managers with one Specific 

Performance Objective into their Performance Evaluation Plan. These relationships would be 

fundamentally changed ifthe senior security managers are integrated into the NA-70 

organization. The intent of this centralization option is to improve communications among 

Headquarters, Federal field organizations, and contractors. It could also enable NNSA to 

address security issues and concerns from a program-wide perspective. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Pagel33 
172 


80292.189

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Alternative A 

Centralization of the NNSA Security Function within NA-70 

Associate Administrator lor 

Infrastructure and Operations (NA-OO) 

Federal Field 

Managers 

Offleeof 

Pef'$onne! and 

Facility 

Clearances 

Administrator (NM) 

Principal Deputy Administrator (NA-21 

ome •• fFieki 

Support 

Officeof 

Security 

Operations 

& Performance: 

Assurance 

Officoof 

Nuclear 

Materials 

Integration 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELlBERA riVE 

NNSACIO 

INA-1M) 

-UneAuthority 

-- StaffAuthori~ 

... ,. Cyber Securi~ ProgramAulhoriy 
173 


80292.190

OFFICIAL USE ONLY· PRE·DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Alternative B 

Centralization of the NNSA Security Function within NA-OO 

This structure would achieve a unified security line of authority by realigning the Office of 

Defense Nuclear Security directly into the Associate Administratorfor Infrastructure and 

Operations (NA-OO) organization. The statutory responsibility for the designation of the Chief 

Defense Nuclear Security and provision for direct access to the NNSA Administrator and the 

Secretary of Energy could be maintained via a separate direct communication channel. 

Additionally, the NA-OO would need to establish an internal organizational element focused on 

operational aspects of the NNSA security program. The security professionals within the Federal 

field organizations would have formally described relationships with both the operational 

element and the Office of Defense Nuclear Security while ensuring that there remains an 

effective communication and organizational relationship with the Federal field organizations. 

Current organizational relationships, including the placement of the security function in the 

NNSA organization, would be fundamentally changed if the Chief of Defense Nuclear 

Security/NA-70 is integrated into the NA-OO organization. The intent of this centralization 

option is to improve communications among Headquarters, federal field organizations, and 

contractors. It could also enable NNSA to address security issues and concerns from a programwide perspective. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 135 
174 


80292.191

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIllERATlVE 

Alternative B 

Centralization of the NNSA. Security Function within NA-OO 

Fede,* Field 

Managm 

Fod.,..IFleki 

Olganlzatkm 

Administrator (NM) 

Principal Deputy Admlnistrato' (NA-2) 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

NNSACIO 

INA-1M} 

:36 

Resouree 

Management 
175 


80292.192

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Appendix E 

Other Observations 

In the course of its activities, the Task Force identifled a variety of items that, while not rising to 

the level of findings in terms of the Task Force charter, were deemed worthy of inclusion in the 

permanent record of this review. 

1. Peer reviews are not used to help ensure effective security im plementation. The peer 

review process does not appear to be understood within the security organizations. 

Virtually all sites believe that an HSS assessment or an NNSA Headquarters visit constitutes 

adequate peer review of their operations. As a result, little data is shared between sites and 

the practice of evaluating security eight separate ways, without regard for how other sites 

operate, is perpetuated. Recommend that an effective peer review process be 

implemented. 

2. Cyber Security responsibility as set forth in the NNSA Act is invested in the Chief of Defense 

Nuclear Security. Cyber Security has been delegated to NA-IM. This delegation assigns 

responsibility without sufficiently addressing authority and accountability. This is further 

complicated in that the Federal field organizations' Cyber Security function is not always 

integrated into the overall security program. Recommend the basis for this bifurcation be 

revisited. 

3. A number of issues have been identified with contractor self-assessment. Critical selfassessment is not routinely accomplished and NNSA requirements are not always 

sufficiently tested or otherwise assessed. The current fee process as applied to security is 

biased toward documenting success as opposed to reality. The NNSA Acquisition Executive 

should evaluate options for addressing these issues in the basic contract and in the 

contractor performance evaluation plan. 

4. There does not appear to be a correlation between issues identified and status listed in 

some Safeguards and Security Management Systems Assurance Program reports. In one 

instance, a flag was identified as "Significant Weakness" or "Unsatisfactory" performance; 

however, the area was identified as "Green" or "Satisfactory." Additionally, the description 

of the flagged item stated that "The project is and has been out of schedule". The area, 

however, was rated as "Green" for the first three-quarters of the year. Recommend a 

review of how items are reported in order to ensure the reports appropriately highlight 

performance. 

5. The practice of using "Areas for Improvement" rather than "Findings" in assessment reports 

has caused follow-up actions to be weakened. "Findings· generally require a response with 

tracked follow-up activity. This process helps ensure that issues are appropriately 

corrected. "Areas for Improvement" do not require a response or follow-up. This lack of 

emphasis has resulted in a less stringent process to fix issues found in the assessment 

process and has permeated into the assessment model used by NNSA Federal staff. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 137 
176 


80292.193

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

6. Safeguards and Security Management Systems Assurance Program Reports are not 

standardized in format and content. The varied formats made analysis of the data and trend 

determination extremely difficult. Recommend NA-70 require all sites to submit repOrts in a 

standardized format. 

7. Evaluate the role of the National Training Center (NTC) in providing professional training to 

the NNSA staff as part of implementing the overall recommendation for establishing an 

NNSA Federal security career path. 

8. Consider moving the Office of Nuclear Material Integration out of NA-70. This function is 

not aligned well with the security mission. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 138 
177 


80292.194

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Appendix F 

Selected Bibliography 

Public Law: 

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION ACT [As Amended Through P.l. 111-383, 

Enacted January 7,2011] 

DOE Orders/NAPs: 

u.s. Department of Energy. Information Security. Ord. no. DOE 0 471.6. June 2011. 

U.S. Department of Energy. Protection Program Operations. Ord. no. DOE 0 473.3. June 2011. 

U.S. Department of Energy. Safeguards and Security Program. Ord. no. DOE 0 470.4B. July 2011. 

U.S. Department of Energy. National Nuclear Security Administration. Information Security. By 

Office of Defense Nuclear Security. Vol. NAP 70.4. July 2010. NNSA Policy Letter. 

U.S. Department of Energy. National Nuclear Security Administration. Physical Protection. By 

Office of Defense Nuclear Security. Vol. NAP 70.2. July 2010. NNSA Policy Letter. 

U.S. Department of Energy. National Nuclear Security Administration. Transformational 

Governance and Oversight. By Office of the Administrator. Vol. NAP-21. February 2012. 

NNSA Policy letter. 

Memorandums: 

Fremont, Douglas E., Chief, Defense Nuclear Security. "Direction for Recently Issued 

Departmental Orders for Certain Safeguards and Security Program Areas." 

Memorandum. 31 Aug. 2011. MS. Washington, DC. 

Poneman, Daniel B., The Deputy Secretary of Energy. "Department of Energy 2010 Safety and 

Security Reform Plan." Memorandum. 16 Mar. 2010. MS. Washington, DC. 

D'Agostino, Thomas P., NNSA Administrator. "SiX-Month Moratorium on NNSA Initiated 

Assessments." Memorandum to National Nuclear Security Administration. 18 Dec. 2009. 

MS. Washington, DC. 

Abraham, Spencer, Secretary of Energy. "Delegation Order NO. 00-003.00." Memorandum to 

the Under Secretary For Nuclear Security. 6 Dec. 2001. MS. U.S. Department of Energy. 

Badolato, E.V., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security Affairs Defense Programs. "Direction for 

Safeguards and Security." Memorandum to Michael B. Seaton, DP-31. 6 Jan. 1986. MS. 

U.S. Department of Energy. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 139 
178 


80292.195

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Internal Reports: 

International Safeguards and Physical Protection. Operation Cerberus. Rep. U.S. Department of 

Energy, September 1986. 

National Nuclear Security Administration. lOCAS Affirmation Review for the V-12 Site Office and 

B&W V-12 at the V-12 National Security Complex. Rep. U.S. Department of Energy, June 

2011. 

Office of Inspector General. Management Challenges at the Department of Energy. Rep. no. 

DOE/IG-0858. U.S. Department of Energy, November 2011. 

Office of Inspector General. Inquiry into the Security Breach at the National Nuclear Security 

Administration's V-12 National Security Complex. Rep. no. DOE/IG-OS6S. U.S. 

Department of Energy, August 2012. 

Office of the Inspector General. Inquiry into the Security Breach at the National Nuclear Security 

Administration's Y-12 National Security Complex. Rep. no. DOE!IG-0868. U.S. 

Department of Energy, August 2012. 

Office of Defense Nuclear Security Office of Program Evaluation. NNSA Administrator's Special 

Focus Area 111 Oversight of Physical Security. Rep. U.S. Department of Energy, October 

2007. 

Office of Health, Safety and Security. Force-on-Force Performance Tests. Rep. U.S. Department 

of Energy, July 2012. 

Office of Health, Safety and Security. Independent Oversight Safeguards and Security Inspection 

of the National Nuclear Security Administration's V -12 National Security Complex. Rep. 

no. 05-5-12-00100. U.S. Department of Energy, September 2012. 

Secretary of Energy Advisory Board. Alternative Futures for the Department of Energy National 

laboratories. Rep. U.S. Department of Energy, February 1995. 

External Reports: 

Baker, Howard H., Jr., and lee H. Hamilton. Science and Security in the Service of the Nation: A 

Review of the Security Incident Involving Classified Hard Drives at los Alamos National 

laboratory. Rep. U.S. Department of Energy, September 2000. 

Chiles, Henry G., Jr. Strengthening NNSA Security Expertise An Independent Analysis. Contract 

Number DE-AD26-02NT41465. U.S. Department of Energy, March 2004. 

The Commission on Science and Security. Science and Security in the 21st Century: A Report for 

the Secretary of Energy on the Department of Energy laboratories. Rep. 2002. 

Mies, Richard W., ADM USN (Retired). NNSA Security An Independent Review. Contract Number 

DE-AMS2-04NA9960S. U.S. Department of Energy, April 2005. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 140 
179 


80292.196

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

A Special Investigative Panel President' Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Science at Its Best 

Security at Its Worst: A Report on Security Problems at the U.S. Depa rtment of Energy. 

Rep. June 1999. 

United States Government Accountability Office. Modernizing The Nuclear Security Enterprise 

Observations on the Organization and Management of the National Nuclear Security 

Administration. Rep. no. GAO-12-867T. GAO, June 2012. 

United States Government Accountability Office. National Nuclear Security Administration 

Observations on NNSA's Management and Oversight of the Nuclear Security Enterprise. 

Rep. no. GAO-12-473T. GAO, February 2012. 

United States Government Accountability Office. Nuclear Security DOE Needs to Fully Address 

Issues Affecting Protective Forces' Personnel Systems. Rep. no. GAO-l0-485T. GAO, 

March 2010. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

PRE-DECISIONAL DELIBERATIVE 

Page 141 
180 


80292.072

Til..: Honorable Tim :VlurplJy 

Chainmm 

July 9, 2013 

Suhcommitlee on O\'(.~rsight and Tlwestigatiol1s 

Committee 011 Energy and Commerce 

C. S. House of Representativcs 

Washington. DC ::0515 

Dear NIr. Chainnan: 

On ~\'!arch D. :WI3. DepUly Se.:r~lary Danlc" R Pone man. tc;aiiicd regarding 

"DOE IIfanagcment aml Oversight ()flts :\m:lcar W,'apo!ls Complex: Lessons ofthc 

Y-12 Security Failur..:." 

Encloscd arc the answers \(l six questions Ihal were submitted by Rej1r..:scntativ(:s 

Michael C. Burgess. Ben Ray l.ujan and YllU to complete the hearing record. 

Ifw..: can be of further assistnnce. pleas\.' ha\'c >'our stHf!' comae\ \lur 

Congressional II caring Coordinator. Lillian Owcn. at P(2) 586-2031. 

Enclosure:; 

Sincerely. 

Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for C('l1gressional A frairs 

Congrcssi<)!1:1i and Il1lergovemmcmal Affairs 

cc: The Honorable Diana DeGcttc. Ranking :-'kl1lhl'r 
181 


80292.073

QUESTION FROM CHAIRMAN TIM MURPHY 

Q1. Please describe Department of Energy (DOE) and National Nuclear Security 

Administration's (NNSA) implementation plans developed in response to the 

recommendations provided in the Assessment of NNSA Federal Organization and 

Oversight of Security Operations prepared by the task force led by General Sandra E. 

Finan. Include in this description the specific timetables developed and funding 

estimates for implementing the recommendations fully. 

AI. In response to the recommendations provided in the report prepared by the task force, we 

have focused on their observation that lines of authority and responsibility were not 

clearly delineated and that contractor performance was not effectively assessed. To 

correct those problems, we have consolidated line management authority within the 

Office ofInftastmcture and Operations (NA-OO) and refocused the Office of Defense 

Nuclear Security'S (NA-70) mission on the development of strategic requirements and 

the conduct of operational secUrity assessments. NA-70 now establishes the safeguards 

and security requirements and conducts field assessments to validate operational 

performance against those requirements. The remainder of fiscal year (FY) 2013 will be 

a transition period with full re-alignment and execution occurring in FY 2014. 

NA-70 formed a transition team to develop and implement the realignment plan. The 

transition team has developed guidance in the form of a project management plan (PMP) 

. and schedule which identifies the programs, activities, and actions necessary to support 

the implementation and sustainability of this organization. 
182 


80292.074

The PMP activities began in February 2013 with a planned completion date of July 2014. 

NA-70 leadership is fully engaged in the activities and is briefed on a regular basis by the 

transition team lead. Ongoing communication activities are conducted to ensure NA-70 

staff and NNSA leadership are kept informed of the progress as well. The increase in 

Federal FTEs in NA-70 will be offset by a $6M reduction in the support service 

contractor level of effort in NA-70. 

NA-OO has developed and is implementing a subordinate Office of Security Operations 

(NA-00-30) to provide management and operational direction of the physical security 

program at NNSA facilities. Functions include management related to the protection 

program, physical security systems, information security, personnel security, material 

control and accountability, protective forces, technical security programs, and liaison 

with DOE's Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. NA-OO-30 will serve as the 

NA-OO operational element responsible for evaluations and analyses that inform security 

strategies, performance objectives, and the allocation ofField Security (FS)-20 resources 

to meet all requirements. Consistent with the Office of Infrastructure and Operation's 

line management authorities, NA-OO-30 will establish a self-evaluation capability aimed 

at ensuring the iterative improvement ofNNSA security operations. In addition, NA-OO30 will participate in external reviews (e.g., DOE's Health Safety and Security, NA-70) 

ofNNSA security operations as necessary and lead NA-OO efforts to identify security 

system needs, support field security activities. and share lessons leamed that improve the 

overall security program. 

2 
183 


80292.075

NA-OO will assign program management support of the FS-20 budget activity to the 

Office of Infrastructure Resource Management (NA-OO-50), to direct and oversee the 

Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation (PPBE) processes. This role includes 

budget fonnulation and programming activities regarding operational security. The 

proposed name change reflects the growth in scope of the office. 

The security changes being effected within NNSA will require close coordination 

between NA-70 and NA-OO to ensure that focus is maintained on the execution of the 

security mission in the field while these transitions are taking place at the Headquarters. 

We are committed to close teamwork while establishing these new roles and 

responsibilities. 

3 
184 


80292.076

QUESTION FROM CHAIRMAN TIM MURPHY 

Q2. Please describe DOE's plans for developing a response to the advice and observations 

relating to DOE's security shortcomings provided to you by Dr. Norman R. Augustine, Dr. 

Richard A. Meserve, and General C. Donald Alston. 

A2. Following the Y -12 security breach, Secretary Chu solicited the advice and 

recommendations of Dr. Augustine, Dr. Meserve and General Alston to gain an informed 

external perspective as it related to DOE security infrastructure. The external security 

experts conducted a strategic review of the areas that included, but were not restricted to: 

contract structure, leadership, security culture, line and independent oversight strategies, 

and federal versus contractor security forces. The lessons learned are being applied across 

the DOEINNSA enterprise and shared with the broader nuclear security community. A 

review of these - and other security reviews - is underway by DOE headquarters to 

determine whether any policy or organizational changes that should be on the enterprisewide level. 

4 
185 


80292.077

QUESTION FROM REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL C. BURGESS 

Q I. The Secretary asked three eminent individuals to evaluate DOE culture and physical 

security. Their leiter reports were released to the Secretary this past December, and are 

part of the hearing record. 

QI(a) Do you plan to produce any formal evaluation of their recommendations? 

QI(b) To their observations abou~ security culture, what have you directed the agency to do to 

institute mechanisms and communications necessary to ensure a strong security culture? 

Al(a) Following the Y-12 security breach, Secretary Chu solicited the advice and 

recommendations of Dr. Augustine, Dr. Meserve and General Alston to gain an informed 

external perspective as it related to DOE security infrastructure. The external security 

experts conducted a strategic review of the areas that included, but were not restricted to: 

contract structure, leadership, security culture, line and independent oversight strategies, 

and federal versus contractor security forces. The lessons learned are being applied across 

the DOEINNSA enterprise and shared with the broader nuclear security community. A 

review of these - and other security reviews - is underway by DOE headquarters to 

determine whether any policy or organizational changes that should be on the enterprisewide level. 

AI(b) We believe that it is imperative for the Department to improve its culture so that 

employees feel that they can raise issues or problems to management without fear of 

reprisal, and know that they will be part of the process for developing effective solutions. 

We have found through a series ofindependent assessments that the Department has 

work to do to improve our existing culture, and this is true in both the safety and security 

arenas. This is a very high priority for the Department's leadership team. 

5 
186 


80292.078

QUESTION FROM REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL C. BURGESS 

Q2 In response to questioning during the hearing about terminating federal employees 

as a result of the Y -12 incident, you explained that disciplinary actions such as 

terminations are subject to due process protections. In carrying out his 

responsibilities, does the Secretary have sufficient statutory authority to effectuate 

appropriate and timely disciplinary actions relating to personnel responsible for 

nuclear security? And, if not, please explain what additional statutory authority 

may help to ensure appropriate and timely actions may be taken. 

A2 With respect to initiating and effectuating disciplinary action, the Secretary has 

the same statutory authority afforded to heads of all other federal agencies, which 

is spelled out in the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1918, Pub. L. No. 95-

454,92 Stat. 1111 (1918) (codified as amended at scattered sections of5 U.S.C.) 

The current statutory scheme provides sufficient authority to effectuate 

appropriate and timely disciplinary actions within the Department. 

6 
187 


80292.079

QUESTION FROM REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL C. BURGESS 

Q3. According to budget data supplied to the Committee, security budgets at Y-12 carried over 

substantial sums from prior years that had not been expended, including approximately $55 

million in fiscal Year (FY) 2011 and $36 million in FY 2012. What was communicated from 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to Management and Operating (M&O) 

contractors or the sites to spend less than the budget authority, and what was the basis for any 

such directions? 

A3. The Office of Defense Nuclear Security did not direct the NNSA Field Offices, or the 

M&O contractor, to spend less than the budget authority. 

7 
188 


80292.080

Ouestion for Neille Miller 

QUESTION FROM REPRESENTATIVE BEN RAY LUJAN 

Security Funding 

Q. A number of the reports observed a culture within the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA) of prioritizing cuning costs above the needs of security. Have 

Management and Operating (M&O) contractors throughout the complex been told to cut 

their security costs? Have security funding allocations been reduced in recent years before 

this incident? Has security funding been increased after the incident? 

A. No, the M&O's have not been told to cut their security costs. 

Security funding at some sites has been either reduced or increased depending upon 

operational requirements. These requirements are determined through Defense Nuclear 

Security's Planning Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation (PPBE) process. The PPBE 

process is a formal, structured development of integrated, prioritized site security funding 

requirements that is validated by Defense Nuclear Security. Site security funding levels are 

determined based on historical cost date, current mission requirements, and any external 

factors that may drive funding requirements. 

Following the Y-12 incident, all sites conducted assessments of their security posture, to 

identity any immediate funding needs for security upgrades. Some sites identified one-time 

costs for upgrades to specific systems. In addition, at Y -12, a shi ft in the protective force 

services from a direct contract to being provided under the M&O contractor has resulted in 

an increase of approximately $48 million in overhead costs applied to the Defense Nuclear 

8 
189 


80292.081

Security program. The cost model changes, however, should result in commensurate 

decreases to other Y -12 program customers. This cost increase associated with the contract 

structure change is included in outyear funding requirements at Y -12. 

9 
190 


80292.082

Major General C. Donald Alston 

Retired 

United States Air Force 

1515 North Star Loop 

Cheyenne, WY 82009 

Dear General Alston, 

April]2,20]3 

Thank you for appearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on Wednesday, 

March 13.2013 to testify at the hearing entitled "DOE Management and Oversight of Its Nuclear Weapons 

Complex: Lessons of the Y -12 Security Failure." 

Pursuant to the Rules cfthe Committee on Energy and Commerce, the hearing record remains open 

for ten business days to permit Members to submit additional questions to witnesses, which are attached. 

The fOlmat of your responses to these questions should be as follows: (I) the name of the Member whose 

question you are addressing, (2) the complete text of the question you are addressing in bold, and then (3) 

your answer to that question in plain text. 

To facilitate the printing of the hearing record, please respond to these questions by mail by the 

close of business on Friday, April, 26, 2013. Please also e-mail your responses to the Legislative Clerk in 

Word format at Kirby.Howard@mail.house.gov. 

Thank you again for your time and effort preparing and delivering testimony before the 

Subcommittee. 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

cc: The Honorable Diana DeGene, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

Attachments 
191 


80292.083

OFRs submitted by the Honorable Ben Ray Luian 

Subcommittee on Energy and Commerce 

DOE Management and Oversight of its Nuclear Weapons Complex: 

Lessons of the Y -12 Security Failure 

1. I have some questions related to Mr. Augustine's report that I hope the two of you 

might address given that his report was entered as part of your testimony and that your 

own investigations may have led you to have some opinions on these topics. Mr. 

Augustine wrote that "What is needed is not more inspections but better inspections." 

And that "Site office responsibility is not to manage work but to assure that work is 

managed." And finally that "headquarters personnel shonld not seek to involve 

themselves iu the actual execution of routine work, but should use their full 

authority to ensure the significant work is in fact properly executed." It seems to me 

Mr. Augustine was concerned about different levels of oversight not having clearly 

defined roles. Did you see evidence for this and do you agree that what is needed is not 

more oversight but more effective oversight? 

We are not in a position to speak for Mr. Augustine, but we concur in your interpretation of the 

thrust of Mr. Augustine's letter. We agree that an improvement of the inspection process is 

appropriate and that the differing responsibilities of the site offices and the headquarters need to 

be clearly defined. We also urge that the security capabilities of both the headquarters and field 

offices should be upgraded and that both offices should complement each other's activities. 

2, Not all aspects of what was found at Y-12 will generalize and be applicable to all 

NNSA sites, In particular, production facilities are very different from the design and 

engineering labs. Which of the lessons from Y-12 in your opinion are readily 

generalized across all sites and which ones will require adjustment to meet the unique 

aspects or mission needs of each lab? 

The focus of our inquiry was on the structure for the management of security. We believe that 

our suggestions for clarification of authority and responsibility, for the encouragement of an 

appropriate security culture, and for improvement of federal oversight are widely applicable 

across the weapons complex. The details of the security plan may well be very different from 

site to site in light of the varying circumstances (e.g., geography, defensive strategy), the different 

types of work that are conducted, the different masses and types of materials, different 

vulnerabilities, and the like. 
192 


80292.084

Mr, David C. Trimble 

Director 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Dear Director Trimble, 

April 12, 2013 

Thank you for appealing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on Wednesday, 

March 13,2013 to testify at the hearing entitled "DOE Management and Oversight of Jts Nuclear Weapons 

Complex: Lessons of the Y-12 Security Failure." 

Pursuant to the Rules of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the hearing record remains open 

for ten business days to permit Members to submit additional questions to witnesses, which are attached. 

The format of your responses to these questions should be as follows: (l) the name of the Member whose 

question you are addressing, (2) the complete text oflhe question you are addressing in bold, and then (3) 

your answer to that question in plain text. 

To facilitate the printing of the hearing record, please respond to these questions by mail by the 

close of business on Friday, April, 26, 2013. Please also e-mail your responses to the Legislative Clerk in 

Word fonnat at Kirbv.HowardCalmail.house.gov. 

Thank you again for your time and effort preparing and delivering testimony before the 

Subcommittee. 

Tim Murphy 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

cc: The Honorable Diana DeGetle, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

Attachment 
193 


80292.085

Additional Ouestions for the Record, House Committee 

on Energy and Commerce, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Chairman Murphy 

The Honorable Tim Murphy 

1. In its September 12 testimony. GA 0 credited NNSA with having an effective headquarters 

security organization that had been able to conduct security reviews, develop security 

performance measures and institute a security lessons-learned center. Can you explain why 

and how your view has changed? We noted progress between our 2003 and 2007 reviews 

ofNNSA's headquarters security organization. For example, our May 2003 report 

found that NNSA had not been fully effective in managing its safeguards and security 

program in a number of areas including defining roles and responsibilities and 

allocating staff.1 In January 2007, although we noted some similar weaknesses, we also 

found that NNSA had begun to build an effective security organization.2 Between 2007 

and 2012 we continued, through recommendation follow-up and other interactions, to 

witness positive trends in the management ofNNSA security. These views are reflected 

in our September 2012 testimony.3 As our March 2013 testimony notes, however, some 

of the reviews conducted in the wake of the Y-12 incident uncovered negative and 

apparently unresolved aspects ofNNSA's security organization such as confused lines 

of authority and lack of site assessment capability. 4 NNSA recently announced plans to 

address these problems and we plan to examine them closely in our ongoing review of 

NNSA security reform for the Subcommittee. This review will be complete later this 

year. 

I Government Accountability Office (GAO), Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its Safeguards and 

Security Program, GAO-03-471 (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003) 

2 GAO, Notional Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management of the 

Nation's Nuclear Programs, GAO-07-36 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007). 

3 GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Observations on the National Nuclear Security 

Administration's OverSight of Safety, Security. and Project Management, GAO-12-912T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 

12,2012). 

4 GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Observations on DOE's and NNSA's Efforts to Enhance 

Oversight of Security, Safety, and Project and Contract Management, GAO-13-482T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 

2013). 
194 


80292.086

Additional Questions for the Record 

2. In response to other witness testimony. wouldfederalizing NNSA security organization, to 

include securityforces. change the agency's security culture? We generally agree with the 

findings of the Secretary of Energy's 2012 panel which found, among other things, that 

NNSA needed to improve its security culture. The members of the panel believed that 

federalization could serve as a catalyst for cultural change. While this is possible, our 

January 2010 report on DOE and NNSA protective forces found that federalization of 

these forces may be difficult to implement.s For example, current contractor protective 

forces might face a loss of payor even a loss of their jobs as these forces would have to 

compete with other applicants for the newly created federal jobs. In addition, 

according to Office of Personnel Management officials, federal retirement benefits 

would not be granted, under existing laws, for previous years of contractor service. 

Nevertheless, if DOE and NNSA cannot enact cultural change themselves, far-reaching 

and fundamental reforms such as federalization may need to be considered. 

3. How did DOE respond to your GAO work on its safety reform efforts? We made a number 

of recommendations in our April 2012 report on safety reform.6 In February 2013, 

DOE reported to us that it is developing action plans or tracking mechanisms in 

response to our recommendations. Specifically: 

• GAO Recommendation: Provide DOE sites and contractors with a plan on 

implementing the Safety Riform effort that includes results-oriented outcome 

measures. DOE reports that it is developing a comprehensive training matrix for all 

new directives and requirements, and is monitoring the implementation of all new 

directives. 

5 GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Address Protective Forces' Personnel System Issues, GAO-10-275 

(Washington, D.C.: January 29,2010). 

6 GAO, Nuclear Safety: DOE Needs to Determine the Costs and Benefits of Its Sqfety Reform Effort, GAO-12-347 

(Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2012). 
195 

Æ 


80292.087

Additional Questions for the Record 

• GAO Recommendation: Ensure that the plan developed for sites and contractors 

details how the reform effort (revised directives) will help address past safety problems. 

DOE reports that it: (1) has developed a report that details activities and plans for 

implementing effective quality assurance requirements; (2) is developing a plan to 

identify activities for effective implementation of Safety Management; and, (3) is 

developing a plan to identify activities for implementing effective federal oversight. 

• GAO Recommendation: Clearly define and implement independent oversight roles. 

DOE reports that HSS is developing a memo for the Secretary to re-affirm the 

Department's commitment to independent oversight of safety and security. 

We are currently monitoring DOE's implementation of these activities.