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THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE BALKANS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 15, 2011

Serial No. 112–112

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Phil Gordon, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and 

Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State ...................................................... 9

The Honorable Kurt Volker, managing director—International Group, BGR 

Group, senior fellow and managing director, Center for Transatlantic Relations, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University . 38

Gerard M. Gallucci, Ph.D., former U.N. Regional Representative in Mitrovica, 

Kosovo ................................................................................................................... 48

Mr. Ivan Vejvoda, vice president, Programs, The German Marshall Fund 

of the United States ............................................................................................. 54

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 4

The Honorable Phil Gordon: Prepared statement ................................................. 14

The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York: Prepared statement ............................................................ 25

The Honorable Kurt Volker: Prepared statement ................................................. 41

Gerard M. Gallucci, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................... 51

Mr. Ivan Vejvoda: Prepared statement .................................................................. 57

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 74

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 75

The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia: Material 

submitted for the record ...................................................................................... 76

(1)

THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE BALKANS 

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:06 a.m., in room 

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dan Burton (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. BURTON. Good morning. The Subcommittee on Europe and 

Eurasia will come to order. Our topic today is the State of Affairs 

in the Balkans. And it is extremely timely, given the recent events 

in the region. 

Last week, along with Congressman Poe and Congressman Rohrabacher, I visited Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

On this visit, we were able to see and hear many of the recent successes and ongoing issues in the region firsthand. While we were, 

unfortunately, unable to visit Montenegro last month, I had the 

privilege of meeting with the country’s Prime Minister Igor Luksic 

on the day that the European Council announced its recommendation that Montenegro begin its secession talks. I would like to congratulate Montenegro on this achievement. I would also like to congratulate Croatia on completing its own EU secession talks earlier 

this year. It now looks more likely that Croatia will join the EU 

probably within the next 2 years. 

Serbia, too, deserves recognition for the progress that it has 

made over the last decade. Let us be clear, the Serbia of Milosevic 

is dead. Modern Serbia is a democratic country firmly on the path 

to European integration, and is an important U.S. partner in the 

Balkans. The Government of Serbia is committed to joining the EU 

and the larger transatlantic community. This commitment is visible in the Serbian Armed Forces, which has fully adopted NATO 

protocols and compatibility, an amazing achievement for a country 

that felt the full brunt of NATO airpower just over a decade ago. 

However, despite these achievements, the relationship between 

Serbia and Kosovo remains dangerously unresolved, while Bosnia 

has been unable to form a government over a year after its elections. The United States and her European allies must continue to 

work with all parties involved to solve these and other ongoing 

issues in the region. However, such engagement, whether it comes 

bilaterally or through our Embassies, or multilaterally through institutions such as KFOR and NATO or the other organizations over 

there, OHR, or the Office of High Representative in Bosnia, can 

only play a supporting role. A lasting peace in the Balkans cannot 

2

be imposed by the international community. It must come from 

within. And that is one of the reasons why initially I was very concerned, among some of my other colleagues, that we were recognizing Kosovo before talks were completed between Serbia and 

Kosovo. It bothered me, since I have been on Foreign Affairs for 

some time, that we have not been able to solve the problems between Israel and the Palestinians and we have been trying to get 

them together for a long, long time, and yet we unilaterally made 

the decision to recognize Kosovo. And I think that kind of exacerbated some of the problems that they have over there right now. 

And I know the administration has a different position, but that is 

just my view. 

Serbs and Kosovars from Belgrade, Pristina, and Mitrovica must 

sit down as equals, as must Serbs, Croatians, and Bosniaks in Bosnia. During our recent visit, the leaders in Belgrade, Pristina, and 

Sarajevo spoke clearly and in agreement. When the international 

community appears to support one community over another, that 

community loses all incentive to compromise, believing falsely that 

it can dig in and wait for support from above. 

The similarity between the international community’s decision to 

recognize Kosovo over Serbian opposition and Palestinian efforts to 

gain U.N. Recognition outside of a dialogue with Israel cannot be 

denied. The international community must mediate between Israel 

and Palestine, as well as between Serbia and Kosovo, while recognizing that in either case it cannot impose a solution. In both cases, 

we must work to support dialogue that leads to a common understanding. 

In addition, the EU cannot allow the status of Kosovo to dominate the discussion regarding Serbia’s accession, to overshadow 

Serbia’s strengths or shortcomings regarding economic and political 

development. The Kosovo issue should be solved as a part of the 

accession process and not as a prerequisite for that process to 

begin. 

The role of the international community should also include 

working with local leaders to stamp out corruption and to hold 

those responsible for atrocities accountable. I am very troubled by 

the findings—and we read this report last week—I am very troubled by the findings of the report authored by the Swiss politician 

and human rights activist Dick Marty regarding inhumane treatment and harvesting of organs in Kosovo. I urge the international 

community to work with the current Government of Kosovo to fully 

investigate these findings. I talked with the Kosovars and their 

leadership and they firmly denied that this did occur. Nevertheless, 

I think that an investigation should continue. 

This report and a subsequent investigation should not be viewed 

as an attack on Kosovo, but as an effort to help the government 

in Pristina to continue to develop. They seem to be sincere that 

they want to go ahead and work out the problems in the northern 

part of Kosovo with the Serbs. But these other issues should be 

looked into and investigated thoroughly. 

I look forward to hearing what the administration is doing to 

support Ambassador Williamson, the former U.S. Ambassador-atLarge for War Crimes Issues, who is currently heading the investigations as an EU Special Prosecutor. 

3

Significant economic concerns lurk behind and contribute to the 

ongoing political issues in the region. Across the southeastern European area, unemployment is high and taxes are even higher. Despite their progress toward EU membership, unemployment hovers 

around 15 percent in Croatia and Montenegro and reaches above 

20 percent in Serbia. This figure is at least twice as high in Kosovo 

and Bosnia. In Croatia, we also heard that for all the country’s 

progress, signs of the ‘‘Yugoslav hangover’’ remain present, with a 

23 percent value added tax, high corporate taxes and burdensome 

parafiscal taxes, including historic building fees, forestry fees, and 

mandatory membership in business associations. 

These are difficult problems to solve. We have them here in the 

United States as well. But we have to continue to work with them 

to solve these problems and to try to bring them together to solve 

these problems. If you don’t have economic viability and growth, 

you are going to continue to have problems in these areas. 

Continued economic and political development is the only way to 

ensure that the peace is preserved and strengthened. As the violence in northern Kosovo and the attack on our Embassy in Sarajevo show, a sense of political disenfranchisement, combined with 

high unemployment, creates fertile ground for nationalist and religious extremism. 

My colleague is still not here, but before I recognize him—and I 

will recognize him when he comes in—I would like to acknowledge 

that our Embassy staff in Sarajevo, including the local security 

team and the Marine Guard, I want to thank them for their bravery and the presence of mind that they showed in protecting the 

Embassy and assisting local police during the recent attack. The 

people of Sarajevo made it clear during our visit that this was not 

only an attack on the United States, but an attack on the peace 

that so many have worked so hard and given so much to create. 

In the spirit of building on this progress, I look forward to a productive discussion this morning and continuing to support those 

working to move the region forward. And I want to thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burton follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Since my colleague is not here, does anybody have 

an opening statement? 

Do you have an opening statement? 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing 

today to evaluate the state of affairs in the Balkans. Since the mid1990s, the region has undergone a great transformation as the 

wars have ended and political and economic reforms have set in. 

The region has also progressed toward greater integration with Europeans and the transatlantic institutions. 

While great improvements have been made in the Balkans, various challenges still remain, including dealing with the impact of 

Kosovo’s independence and the ongoing fight against organized 

crime and corruption in the region. As our priorities have shifted 

over the past decade toward the war on terrorism and the Middle 

East, it is critical that we continue our commitment to stabilize the 

Balkans in a way that is self-sustaining and does not require direct 

intervention by international forces. A secure and prosperous Balkans is in the best interest of the United States and our transatlantic allies. 

I look forward to hearing from our esteemed witness today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much. 

Mrs. Schmidt. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First off, I want to 

recognize I have had the chance this year to have had two Hope 

Fellows shadow me for the day, and Mimoza Ahmetaj from Kosovo 

is here. I just want to welcome her back. 

Mr. Chairman, generally speaking, much progress has been 

made in the Balkans in the last several years. As mentioned, Albania, Croatia, and Slovenia have joined NATO. And Croatia will be 

soon joining the EU. To a great extent, tragedy and conflict are giving way to political and economic stability, but there are still problems in the region. My concern lies with Serbia and the problems 

that I believe they are creating for Kosovo. Having declared its 

independence in February 2008, Kosovo is now recognized by 86 

countries, including 24 NATO members and 22 EU members. All 

of Kosovo’s neighbors have recognized its independent status, with 

the exception of Serbia. 

In 2010 the International Court of Justice even released an advisory opinion affirming that Kosovo’s declaration of independence 

did not violate international law. Unfortunately, Serbia and the 

Serbian community in the northern Kosovo area, refuses to accept 

the Ahtisaari Settlement and continues to challenge Kosovo’s right 

to govern its sovereign territory, often with tragic consequences. I 

am sure we are all aware of the Kosovo Serbs’ recent illegal actions 

in which they took control of several custom checkpoints in northern Kosovo, killing a Kosovar police officer in the process. With the 

help of the KFOR peacekeepers and the EULEX police, order was 

restored and it appears that an agreement on joint customs management at border crossings in northern Kosovo has been reached. 

Still, I think this incident and a series of incidents by Kosovo 

Serbs is a great illustration as to why we need to keep the KFOR 

troops, including the contingent of American troops, in Kosovo. 

Further, we need to stand firm with perhaps our best friends in the 

8

region, the Kosovars, and refuse to give credence to the idea that 

some are trying to advance—the moving of borders in northern 

Kosovo. I just don’t think that is an option. 

Further, given Serbia’s refusal to accept Kosovo’s right to govern 

its sovereign territory, along with Serbia’s illegal actions, such as 

the takeover of the customs checkpoint, I do not believe that Serbia 

should be permitted into the EU at this point. I hope the EU member nations will think long and hard before allowing Serbia to join 

without a full investigation into their actions. 

Kosovo is a free, independent, and democratic state. I want to 

thank my friend Eliot Engel for providing me the information on 

Kosovo so many years ago when I first got here. He has been an 

ardent advocate for Kosovo’s right to exist along with the other 

Balkan nations. I believe that every nation has the right to chart 

its own destiny, including Kosovo. 

I yield back my time. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Marino. 

Mr. MARINO. No opening statement. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Poe, did you have an opening statement? 

Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. First of all, I would like to thank the chairman for his leadership on this issue. The fact is, he led a codel, 

which I was part of, to the Balkans just a few days ago. He demonstrated during that trip leadership and also reaffirmed to the 

people there on all sides that the United States and the U.S. Congress has not forgotten them but has a keen interest in what happens there. So I would like to thank the chairman for his leadership not only on this hearing but his willingness to go and check 

it out firsthand. 

I have been involved with this area for many, many years, and 

I really felt the trip was worthwhile because I have come to some 

new understandings about the various people who are running 

these countries and the challenges that we face. I would just suggest that we do have a new government in Serbia that realizes that 

there were problems and crimes that were committed in the past 

and that they have nothing to do with those crimes. They are trying to leave that past behind. I was very impressed with the sincerity of the Serbian Government to try to find some solutions and 

to try to calm things down at this point with the Kosovars. 

There are, however, some very serious problems that remain that 

were not taken care of by the fundamental agreement years ago. 

What we have—and we have seen this happen in other countries 

as well—for example, India, where the people of Kashmir were 

never given a right to decide whether they were going to be part 

of India or going to be part of Pakistan—where there is continuing 

violence simmering right below the surface. And sometimes in 

Kashmir and northern Kosovo things come to the surface and the 

risk of bloodshed and extended conflict remains. 

I have presented to both the Kosovars and the Serbian Governments a plan that would be a delineation of the border, a very simple delineation of the border, which would say that in that northern part of Kosovo, where 90 percent of the people, if not more, are 

Serbian, that they be permitted to become part of Serbia. While 

there is a valley coming out of Kosovo into Serbia where 90 percent 

9

of them are Kosovars, almost an equal amount of territory and an 

equal amount of population, just redesignate the border. That, I believe, would calm the situation down dramatically. 

Now, I have found—let me put it this way, not an agreement, but 

a deep interest on the part of some of the government officials in 

that region to this plan. I would suggest that one of the main problems of taking such an action would be—is the fact that our Government believes—obviously believes—that any change of territory 

would result in a domino effect that would create havoc throughout 

the world, not just the Balkans, but the whole world. 

I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that such an action, if we could 

have an agreement between Kosovo and Serbia on something like 

that, it would be a dramatic first step and something that would 

be very symbolic of two sides being able to work together to try to 

make the situation better. There will be no prosperity in that region and there will be no steps forward for either country until all 

the issues are settled. And this would be a first big step. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to make that opening statement and also for allowing me to have the discussion on 

that issue during the codel with the various top leaders of the various countries that we visited. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

As you can see, Secretary Gordon, there are divergent views on 

this whole issue. 

Dr. Philip Gordon, our first witness, was nominated as Assistant 

Secretary on March 6, 2009, and took the oath of office on May 15, 

2009. As Assistant Secretary, he is responsible for 50 countries in 

Europe and Eurasia, as well as NATO, the EU, and the OSCE. Dr. 

Gordon has previously served as a senior fellow at the Brookings 

Institute in Washington, DC; director for European Affairs at the 

National Security Council under President Bill Clinton; and a senior fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies, in London. 

He has a Ph.D. and an M.A. from Johns Hopkins University of Advanced International Studies and a B.A. from Ohio University. 

Dr. Gordon, we welcome you and appreciate you being here, and 

we look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PHIL GORDON, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. GORDON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for inviting 

me and thanks to you and your colleagues for holding this important hearing. With your permission, I would like to submit my 

written testimony for the record. 

Mr. BURTON. Without objection. 

Mr. GORDON. Thank you. I will just summarize some critical 

points here. 

While the dramatic events of the Arab Spring may dominate 

press headlines, the Obama administration remains as committed 

as ever to helping the Western Balkans on their path to European 

integration. I was most recently there myself in June, following a 

number of previous trips. 

10

Then-Under Secretary Burns was in the region in July; Deputy 

Assistant Secretary Phil Reeker, who is here today, has been in the 

region on a very regular basis and remains in continuous contact 

with European partners. We also welcome congressional visits and 

interests in the region, including the delegation that the chairman 

recently led. 

The Western Balkans is a critical part of Europe—historically, 

geographically, and culturally. For us, it is impossible to speak 

about a Europe that is whole, free, democratic, and at peace, without including the Balkans. Our clear policy goal is the integration 

of all of the countries in this region into Euro-Atlantic institutions. 

As we have seen in the rest of Europe, this is the best means of 

ensuring long-term peace, stability, and prosperity. Their success 

remains vital to U.S. national security interests, as a return to conflict would destabilize the region, hinder economic growth, and distract from the global challenges, such as Afghanistan, that we are 

addressing together with the European partners, including our 

friends in the Balkans. 

While there are many challenges in the region, it is worth pausing to review the progress made in the last few years with sustained American engagement and assistance. NATO’s military 

presence has decreased significantly as a result of greater regional 

stability. Meaningful reforms have been made in the rule of law, 

market economics, and democratic governance. Slovenia joined the 

EU in 2004. Albania and Croatia joined NATO in 2009. As was 

pointed out, Croatia was recently invited to join the European 

Union. The North Atlantic Council said that Macedonia will receive 

an invitation to join NATO as soon as the name dispute is resolved. 

Kosovo is nearing the fourth anniversary of its independence and 

continues to make progress as a multiethnic democracy. Montenegro, only 5 years after it obtained independence, already has EU 

candidacy status and is a full participant in NATO’s Membership 

Action Plan. Serbia has a stabilization and association agreement 

with the EU and has taken some notable steps toward achieving 

candidacy status, including the arrest of Ratko Mladic and Goran 

Hadzic. In September, a small group of Adriatic-5 country trainers 

deployed together to Afghanistan, exhibiting a degree of militaryto-military cooperation in the region that would have been unimaginable a decade ago. Just last week, the foreign ministers of 

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia signed a 

joint declaration announcing their countries’ commitment to resolving the longstanding issue of refugees and displaced persons in the 

Balkans. 

So while clearly there are challenges, I do think it is important 

to note the continued progress of a number of these countries. Obviously, all of these countries have further work to do. My written 

statement discusses each in turn. So if I might, I would like to just 

focus some remarks here on Serbia, Kosovo, and BosniaHerzogovina. 

In Serbia, the United States has welcomed the progress that Serbia has made this year on internal reforms needed for EU accession, especially its effort to reform the judiciary. With the extradition of Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic to The Hague, Serbia has 

demonstrated its commitment to justice and met its key obligations 

11

to the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia. In 

recognition of these measures, the European Commission made a 

conditional recommendation that Serbia be granted EU candidate 

status. The progress report, however, that was issued last month 

also made the recommendation ‘‘on the understanding that Serbia 

re-engages in the dialogue with Kosovo and is moving swiftly to the 

implementation in good faith of agreements reached to date.’’ The 

United States welcomes the Commission’s recommendation because 

we strongly support Serbia’s EU aspirations. However, we also 

agree with our European partners that Serbia must come to terms 

with the reality of an independent multiethnic Kosovo within its 

current borders. 

In March of this year, Serbia and Kosovo began an EU-facilitated 

dialogue process. These talks are explicitly not about reopening the 

issue of Kosovo’s status, which we believe is entirely resolved; rather, both sides indicated their willingness to discuss practical solutions that could improve the lives of people in both Serbia and 

Kosovo. 

The United States has backed the efforts of Robert Cooper, High 

Representative Ashton’s appointed mediator, and has participated 

as an observer in every session of the dialogue. While the dialogue 

has resulted in improved technical cooperation, significant issues 

remain unresolved and Serbia’s implementation has been lagging. 

The United States remains concerned about the tense situation 

in northern Kosovo, particularly the roadblocks that were erected 

this summer by local Serbs in an attempt to prevent freedom of 

movement. We have been clear that there must be a safe and secure environment and unconditional freedom of movement throughout Kosovo. We look to the Serbian Government to cooperate fully 

with KFOR and EULEX in both the immediate removal of the 

roadblocks and ensuring proper controls at the border. 

Let me be clear on a final point. There is no way for borders in 

this region to be redrawn along ethnically clean lines. Partition and 

land swaps are unacceptable solutions. If any such process is set 

in motion, there is no way that it can be confined to a single boundary line or that it can end peacefully. Any rhetoric calling for the 

partition of Kosovo and questioning the ability of people of different 

ethnicities to live together is harmful to regional reconciliation and 

contrary to the international community’s decade-long effort to 

move the region beyond the brutal ethnic conflicts of the 1990s. 

Turning to Kosovo. This country has made remarkable progress 

in the last 3 years by strengthening its political institutions and 

fulfilling most of the obligations under the Comprehensive Status 

Proposal. Kosovo needs to continue the hard work of building a cohesive state and strengthening its multiethnic, democratic institutions. The United States has been clear that a vital part of this 

process includes ensuring respect for the rights of all of Kosovo 

communities, including Kosovo Serbs, and the preservation of their 

cultural and religious heritage. As EU Representative Ashton has 

said, ‘‘The future of Kosovo lies in the European Union.’’ The 

United States strongly agrees. Like other countries that have been 

motivated by the prospect of the EU integration, we believe Kosovo 

needs to see concrete steps toward its European perspective. We 

welcomed the EU’s announcement that it will open a dialogue with 

12

Kosovo this year. We hope Kosovo soon receives European Council 

backing for concluding contractual relations in the form of a trade 

agreement or even a Stabilization and Association Agreement. 

The United States supports Kosovo’s efforts to take its place in 

regional and global institutions. There are currently 84 countries 

that have recognized Kosovo, including NATO and the European 

Union. We believe that even more countries will recognize Kosovo 

and back Pristina’s efforts to secure wider recognition. 

Finally, let me say a word about Bosnia and Herzegovina. This 

country has made significant progress since the horrors of the 

1990s, which is apparent when looking at its constructive contributions toward international peace and stability. Bosnia and 

Herzegovina is nearing the end of its 2-year rotation on the U.N. 

Security Council, where it has provided consistent support for U.S. 

priorities and its mission in Afghanistan. 

Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a steadfast partner against 

international terrorism. We saw this firsthand on October 28, when 

the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo was attacked by a gunman on the 

Embassy compound. We appreciate the excellent cooperation from 

Bosnian authorities in response to this attack, as well as counterterrorism issues more generally. In recent years, Bosnia and 

Herzegovina has investigated and closed down numerous terrorismfinancing NGOs and deported extremists who illegally entered the 

country. Given the need for constant vigilance, we are continuing 

to work closely with Bosnian authorities to strengthen their law 

enforcement and counterterrorism capabilities. 

Notwithstanding these successes, the country has not moved in 

the right direction over the past 5 years. We have witnessed a dangerous rise in nationalist rhetoric as well as brazen challenges to 

state institutions and the Dayton settlement. In addition, the reform process needed for NATO and EU accession has stalled. Bosnia’s political leaders have been too willing to stoke ethnic fears 

and to place their personal political interests over the needs of the 

people they are supposed to represent. In order for Bosnia and 

Herzegovina to keep pace with progress elsewhere in the region, it 

must be able to function as a state that can deliver results for all 

of its citizens, regardless of their ethnicity. 

We have been urging—and I urged this on my last visit to Sarajevo, both publicly and privately—urging progress in three critical 

areas: Creating functioning political institutions, demonstrating 

commitment to the Dayton framework, and introducing governmental reforms necessary for Euro-Atlantic integration. 

The United States is working in very close coordination with the 

European Union on these priorities, and we continue to urge Bosnia’s leaders to form a new government and address these issues 

in parallel. We welcomed the arrival in September of new Special 

Representative Peter Sorsenson, whom we strongly support to lead 

an enhanced EU presence dedicated to guiding Bosnia and and 

Herzegovina toward its European future. 

Finally, if I might, let me say a word about U.S. assistance to 

the region, which I know is of great interest to this committee. 

Since the breakup of Yugoslavia, the United States has remained 

deeply committed to helping integrate the Western Balkans into 

the Euro-Atlantic community. In the current climate of budget conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:36 Mar 06, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EE\111511\71261 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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straints and competing priorities, we recognize that our resources 

are finite and cannot cover all of the region’s needs. Our foreign assistance is focused on the core remaining challenges in Albania, 

Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, while addressing more fundamental issues of democratic reform and economic modernization in 

Kosovo and Bosnia. 

With an eye to resource scarcity, we have begun to leverage our 

assistance to attract funding from Central and East European governments as well as the European Union. Our long-term goal is to 

find ways to share assistance efforts with our new allies in the region. 

While the United States and European Union have important 

roles in completing unfinished business in the Western Balkans, 

the main responsibility falls on the citizens and leaders of the regions. Local political leaders must be willing to move past divisions 

and personal interests to focus on delivering genuine reforms and 

making necessary compromises as demanded by their citizens. We 

need partners who share this vision, who are prepared to put the 

interests of the people ahead of their own pride, who are willing 

to compromise for the greater good. The international community 

cannot want progress and reform more than local leaders do. 

Thank you very much for your attention. I look forward to your 

comments and questions. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. I am sure you are already aware of this but both 

leaders of both Kosovo and Serbia indicated that there would be 

upcoming talks and they are going to try to continue to work out 

their differences. I think they were both sincere. I think those of 

us on the codel were impressed with the leadership of both Serbia 

and Kosovo, and I think there is a lot of sincerity there in trying 

to solve these problems. 

Let me just ask you a couple of real quick questions. Have you 

seen this report on the tragedies that took place during and shortly 

after the war regarding torture, and also the trafficking of human 

organs? 

Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Where are we on investigating that? Is there any 

investigation going on right now to find out if there is any validity 

to this report? 

Mr. GORDON. Absolutely. Let me first say I agree with your previous comment about the sincerity of the leaders. We have encouraged dialogue between the two sides, and we are encouraged that 

for the first time in the history of this troubled relationship they 

have been willing formally to sit down together. We also believe in 

their sincerity, and that is why we strongly support that process 

and have participated in it. 

On the report that you mentioned from the Council of Europe 

and Swiss Senator Dick Marty alleging serious war crimes and 

organ trafficking, those are charges that we take very seriously. We 

have read the report carefully and we have talked to Senator 

Marty and his colleagues. Alleged crimes of that nature cannot go 

uninvestigated, and, if proven, unpunished. So we have acted rigorously and together with our European colleagues to ensure that appropriate investigations take place. 

You referred, Mr. Chairman, in your opening remarks, to Clint 

Williamson, the American prosecutor that we put forward—experienced prosecutor in war crimes, former Ambassador for War 

Crimes issues for the United States. He seemed to us to be the individual best placed to lead a serious investigation of these allegations. That is why we put his name forward, working closely together with the European Union, and why he will lead this investigation, together with EULEX, the European Rule of Law Commission, which we also find appropriate in that this should be done 

together between the United States and the European Union. 

EULEX is the body to investigate the rule of law. They have 

judges, they have experts. And we are going to work very closely 

together. We are encouraged that all of the parties have pledged 

their full cooperation. I believe that is the message you heard in 

Pristina when you were there. That is what we have heard from 

Kosovars, from their neighbors. 

I think, to conclude, our presentation of the lead prosecutor and 

the fact that we are doing this together with EULEX is a real manifestation of our commitment to a full investigation and our commitment to working together with the European Union on the rule 

of law in the region. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, there are varying views on the investigation. 

This yellow house, where a lot of these atrocities allegedly took 

place, there was a table there. And there was various testimony. 

23

Some people said a child was born on that table. Others said they 

had the dissection of people and their organs sold. And others said 

that it was a place where they killed cattle and other farm animals. So I think it really does need to be thoroughly investigated. 

Serbia has sent their war criminals to The Hague. They are 

going to send those who have not yet been prosecuted, who I am 

sure will be. I think that whoever committed atrocities, on either 

side, should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. I hope there 

is no hesitancy to get to the truth, whatever it takes, because that 

is a horrible, horrible thing that took place. 

Regarding the blockades on the border, we flew over there, Congressman Rohrabacher and I, and the problem with those blockades is the KFOR leaders we talked to said, you remove one, and 

24 hours later there is another one someplace else. So as long as 

the population there is determined to keep setting up these roadblocks, it is virtually impossible to keep them from occurring, because you tear one down, there is another one there 24 hours later. 

It just goes and on and on. 

So can you elaborate just a little bit on who you think is supporting that unrest? Is it criminally or politically supported? Is it 

possible that the people of northern Kosovo just don’t want to be 

a part of Kosovo? What is your analysis—or the State Department’s 

analysis? 

Mr. GORDON. Thank you for flagging that real issue of concern 

to us. It is clearly a challenge to keep—ensure freedom of movement throughout the region, which is what we would want to see. 

And what you describe is accurate. When KFOR acts to take down 

the roadblocks, we see them come back up and appear in a different place. But we cannot accept that individuals, some of which 

are sponsored by Belgrade, others of which are encouraged by——

Mr. BURTON. How do you know that? How do you know individuals that are sponsored by Belgrade are putting up the roadblocks? 

Mr. GORDON. I think we have seen plenty of evidence from Belgrade: Political, rhetorical support; an absence of a willingness to 

take measures and ask them to stand down. I am not talking anybody behind the scenes, but visibly we have encouraged Belgrade 

to join us in supporting freedom of movement and opposing roadblocks, and have been disappointed by the absence of such support. 

I also think—you asked the question about criminal support—I 

do think there are those in the region who benefit from preventing 

open trade and take advantage of the lack of freedom of movement 

and open trade to corner the market on smuggling. And we have 

seen their actions in busing people to——

Mr. BURTON. Let me interrupt you, because I have one more 

question and then I yield to my colleagues. I didn’t get the impression that the people in Serbia were instigating the roadblocks. The 

feeling that I had, I don’t know about my colleagues, I will let them 

speak for themselves, was that there are people there that definitely don’t want to be part of Kosovo, and they are the ones that 

are doing it. So hopefully during the talks that take place, they will 

be able to come to some kind of resolution that will convince those 

people to remove the roadblocks. But I don’t think that the Serbian 

leadership is involved, at least not from my perspective. 

24

I have one more question. When we were in Sarajevo we met 

with the three factions, the leaders. You have got a real Gordian 

knot there. There was just no movement toward agreement. So if 

you can give us an update on that real quickly from the State Department’s perspective on how you are going to get these three factions together to solve these problems a year after the elections, I 

would like to hear that. 

Mr. GORDON. Sure. One final brief word on roadblocks. I wanted 

to say the reason we so seriously object to this is that to allow 

locals, wherever they might be, to interfere with freedom of movement, in part for reasons I say of protecting smuggling routes and 

criminal enterprises, would be a slippery slope that would be dangerous for the whole region if we just stood passively by and said, 

It’s okay, if you don’t want to accept freedom of movement, to close 

down roads. So that is why we take such a firm line on that issue. 

Of course, we agree this needs to be talked through with the locals 

who live there and with the neighbors. 

I can’t disagree with your assessment that political progress in 

Sarajevo is a Gordian knot. We have been disappointed. We waited 

for some time for last October’s elections to take place, hoping that 

those elections would allow the formation of a functioning government which would be in the interest of the people of the country. 

They had the election but the political leaders have failed to reach 

an agreement that allows for them to create a government. Secretary Clinton was there just after the election. It has not been a 

year. And they still have failed——

Mr. BURTON. Let me interrupt because I don’t want to monopolize this. All three suggested that there might be the need for a 

Dayton II Accords. Are you looking into that? 

Mr. GORDON. No. We are looking at the implementation of the 

Dayton Accords that exist. Nobody should think that there is some 

quick fix; that if only somehow there was a different constitutional 

arrangement or institutional structure, this would be any easier 

than it is now. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to submit my 

opening statement for the record. I apologize for being late. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Meeks follows:]

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Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Engel and I were at a very important meeting 

regarding New York State redistricting. I want to thank the chairman because this is a timely hearing on the current state of affairs 

in the Balkans. I know you recently visited there. I wish I was on 

that trip. You have been focused on traveling and taking Members 

so that we can see what is happening on the ground ourselves. I 

just want to say thank you for this hearing. It is very timely. 

I continue to want to work with you. You had this time by yourself. Now we are here to sit back and hear what is really going on. 

Let me say this. I do believe that the United States has a positive role in which we can play in all these endeavors in the Balkans. If we disengage, I think there are others lurking out there 

waiting to fill the void. So it is time—and those that want to fill 

the void don’t necessarily have the best of intentions. And so we 

have got to make sure that those influences who stand ready in the 

wings to stimulate organized crime, encourage radicalism and rekindle violence, while others want to ensure the region’s orientation is not toward Euro-Atlantic integration but, rather, toward 

fears of influence from the East. So the timeliness and the importance of us engaging now I think is important—and not disengaging. 

And I know, Mr. Assistant Secretary and the State Department, 

I compliment you for what you have been doing. I know the Secretary has visited the region, and is doing it on a very urgent matter in trying to keep us together. So I want to compliment you on 

that. 

That being said, let me ask a couple of quick questions. Europe 

and the United States seem to overlap greatly when it comes to 

policy toward the Balkans and the Balkan region. How would you 

evaluate the EU’s ability to affect the region as a result of the newformed policy formed in Lisbon today? 

Mr. GORDON. Thank you very much, Mr. Meeks. Let me just reinforce your first point about disengaging and why that is not in 

the U.S. interest. It is our view to have a stable, democratic, and 

prosperous Balkans. Even when resources are required to promote 

such an outcome in the region, in the long run, just as we have 

seen in Central and Eastern Europe, if we can help produce stable, 

democratic, prosperous trading partners that contribute to our 

global missions in this part of the world, we will be doing ourselves 

a favor. So I thank you for that comment and welcome it. 

On cooperation with the European Union and how that might 

have changed in the wake of the Lisbon Accords, I would suggest 

that our cooperation with the EU on the Balkans is closer and 

more effective than ever. It is no secret that in the past there had 

been differences in approach between the United States and Europe on the region. And I think we have come to the point where 

we really are following the same strategy. 

I mentioned in my opening statement how closely we engage 

with the Europeans, Secretary Clinton and I, Representative Ashton. I am in constant touch with my EU counterparts. Deputy Assistant Secretary Reeker is there on a regular basis. And we are 

pursuing the same strategy. We believe that the most compelling 

incentives, strategic incentives for the countries of the Balkans, is 

to join the European Union. For many of them, joining NATO is 

28

also an important goal, and we have tried to make clear that if 

they do the right things and reform in the right ways, they can join 

NATO as well. But overwhelmingly, it seems that the incentive of 

joining the European Union is a powerful democratizing tool for 

them and we support what Europe is trying to do. 

I quoted the European Commission’s report on Serbia, which was 

very clear. The Commission has been clear with all of the countries 

in the region: Work on rule of law; work on democracy; fight corruption; make peace with your neighbors, and you will move down 

the path to European Union membership, which will have benefits 

for everybody. 

Mr. MEEKS. Given that, how would you say the European economic crisis is affecting it with the high unemployment now that 

is going on and the whole crisis disrupted the region’s economic 

growth? How do you see the European economic crisis affecting the 

situation? 

Mr. GORDON. It is obviously a huge challenge on a number of levels and it is a challenge that affects the enlargement process inevitably. We hope that while resources are scarcer everywhere, it 

won’t divert the European Union from the core belief, which as I 

just said, we share; that keeping its doors open to countries in the 

region is in their interest. And it is in their economic interest as 

well. Again, if their choice is to have stable democratic trading 

partners as opposed to countries that need support from outside 

and military presence, it seems to us obvious what the choice 

should be. And I am fully confident that the European Union 

shares our view on that subject. 

Mr. MEEKS. If you allow me one more question and then I will 

yield back. And maybe if we get a second round, we will. I want 

to ask a question on Bosnia. If we were to place Bosnia on a sliding 

scale between progress achieved because or through full implementation of the Dayton Accords and progress achieved from the EU 

accession, where would you put it on that sliding scale? 

Mr. GORDON. You are putting me back in graduate school and 

draw a diagram of the influence of the two factors. I think they go 

together. It is really not zero sum between the two, it seems to me. 

Dayton is necessary. It is not enough. They need to build on it and 

do more, including have the EU accession process. But it is the absolute minimum. It provides the constitutional structure that can 

allow that country to be a functioning state and join the European 

Union. In the absence of full implementation of Dayton, it just 

won’t happen. 

So I think the two, rather than alternatives, which one is going 

to be the powerful factor, they go together—full implementation of 

Dayton and the incentive of joining the European Union. Ultimately, as I said, we can’t do it for them. We can support the EU 

in making clear what benefits they would get by implementing 

Dayton and meeting the EU’s conditions. But as I also said, the 

leaders need to ultimately put the interests of the country ahead 

of their narrow political or personal interests. And they have in recent years failed to do so. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I really appreciate your 

leadership. 

Mr. BURTON. Mrs. Schmidt. 

29

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, my concern is with the 

Serbian-Croatia issue. And that is where I would really like to 

focus a couple of my questions. The first is that—and I know that 

there are ongoing reports on both sides—but there are reports that 

Serbia has spent between $5.5 billion and $6 billion on parallel institutions in Kosovo. And my concern is what is the intention of 

that money. Is it to help the people of Kosovo or to sow division? 

Is the money going to northern Kosovo undermining a resolution 

to the problems that are there? 

Mr. GORDON. Thank you. First, since you mentioned Croatia, just 

to mention we underscore its importance to the rest of this process, 

because as we talk about how our strategy and policy is to encourage all of the countries to move in the direction of the European 

Union, it is important to note that one of them is doing so as we 

speak. 

I mentioned questioning in Europe, in part due to the financial 

crisis, about the future of the European Union enlargement. It is 

worth noting the lesson from Croatia is if you do the right thing 

and you meet the standards on anticorruption, rule of law, democracy, judiciary, and make peace with your neighbors, you get in. 

And that is why it was hugely positive to see the European Union 

offer membership. Once the ratifications are done, it is going to be 

a great message to the entire region to see that country join the 

European Union. 

That point is related to your question about Serbia and its support for parallel institutions. Our message to Serbia is we are encouraged to see you also making progress on rule of law, democracy, anticorruption, and war criminals. Those are all positive steps 

toward the European Union. But it is hard to imagine a country 

joining the European Union which is actively funding separate institutions in a neighboring state and which has unregulated, uncontrolled borders with that state, and unrecognized. And so that 

is the message that we together with the European Union are trying to convey to Serbia. 

There is a final piece that needs to be managed. And it is fully 

consistent with very significant self-government for the people 

throughout Kosovo, including the ethnic Serbs who live in the 

north. It is entirely consistent with protection of their religious and 

cultural rights, indeed the whole future, the whole notion of the 

European Union, as borders become less important. Just as between France and Germany where it was once critically important 

which side of the border you lived on and what your ethnicity was, 

today in the European Union there is nothing at that border. And 

that is the future that we would like to see for the Balkans as well. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Thank you. Just one more question. My concern 

with Serbia is it seems to be aligning itself with other countries. 

If Serbia wants to be part—to be aligned with the U.S. and NATO 

and the European Union, my concern is their ongoing relationship 

with Russia and China and other countries that have been less 

helpful in the Balkans. Could you elaborate on that, please? 

Mr. GORDON. Sure. Those relationship we watch closely. But I 

would say that we believe Serbia has made a strategic choice for 

Europe and that it wants to be a European country, it wants to be 

a European member. The chairman referred to the Government of 

30

Serbia. They generally have turned the page on the Milosevic era. 

They have a strong relationship with the United States. And we 

want to encourage and support that. So, of course, we watch all 

countries in the region’s relationships with others, but we don’t 

have any doubts that Serbia’s strategic choice is for Europe. And 

we have tried to be clear on what they need to do to see the culmination of that positive process. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Thank you. I yield back my time. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. 

Secretary. Thank you for the great work that you do, that you have 

been doing for many years. We appreciate it. 

Mr. Chairman, I was just following you around the Balkans. I 

just got back from Kosovo yesterday. And as people know, I have 

been a strong supporter of an independent Kosovo for many, many 

years. I know that Mr. Rohrabacher and Mr. Poe and you were 

around the region as well. 

Let me talk about certain observations that I made. First of all, 

I was there in Kosovo to help cut the ribbon on the new road, that 

Prime Minister Thaci Highway which will link Albania with 

Kosovo, and hopefully Serbia one day as well. It seems to me at 

a time when some countries are trying to close borders, Kosovo is 

trying to open its borders. I think that is a positive thing for Europe. 

The Prime Minister of Albania was there, Mr. Sali Berisha was 

there, Mr. Thaci, also the President of Kosovo. I hope one day there 

will be a time when we can have a ceremony like that, that the 

leaders of Serbia will be there as well. I think that their 

rejectionist attitude toward Kosovo is negative—more so negative 

for Serbia than anybody else, unfortunately. I think that Kosovo is 

making great strides. I just wanted to throw that out. 

One of the things that some of my colleagues have mentioned, 

which is very disturbing to me, is the fact of parallel institutions 

that have been set up in north Mitrovica by Serbia. I think that 

is a situation that cannot be sustained. So I want to ask you, is 

there a plan to end the criminality and lawlessness, to restore freedom of movement and establish control over the borders, which is 

provided by KFOR’s mandate? Is EULEX doing enough to bring 

this about? 

What I heard when I was there was there are between 50 and 

200 people, mostly criminals and sponsored by Belgrade, who are 

behind this. It seems to me that the majority of the Serb population there doesn’t support it and wouldn’t support it. These are 

criminals going back and forth. 

I want to also add, which I think is important to point out, is 

that most Serbs in Kosovo lie south of the river, which cuts 

through Metrovica. It is the southern part. Since independence, 

there are six majority Serbian municipalities that have been established in Kosovo, where the Serbs now run their own affairs, including local government, education, road building, and other matters. Most importantly, I think, they are participating in all levels 

of the government in the Republic of Kosovo, from Deputy Prime 

Minister Slobdan Petrovic to local mayors and council members in 

the municipality. 

31

Can you also describe the progress which has come from the plan 

for an independent Kosovo devised by the former President of Finland, Martii Ahtisaari? 

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Engel. First, I appreciate your 

mentioning the new highway and raising the vision of such highways stretching not just between Albania and Kosovo but ideally 

between Belgrade and Pristina. Why not think that way and imagine that you would have transportation routes between Serbia and 

Kosovo; open trade between Serbia and Kosovo; customs being collected not by smugglers or local gangs, but by officials who would 

then take the customs revenues and distribute them to the people 

who live there. That is the vision that we have for the region. And 

it is not an unrealistic one. It requires a modicum of cooperation 

on both sides. We hope the EU dialogue will bring the parties to 

talk about these things. If the leaders are really focused on the 

rights and well-being of the people who live there, that is the vision 

that we should see them trying to implement. 

In the meantime, we are doing all we can through KFOR and 

EULEX to provide for that opening and to fight against the corruption and the closed borders that we see. That is why we believe we 

need to continue to support KFOR and EULEX, because, alas, in 

their absence we would see the closed borders and the corruption 

under issue. KFOR is a mandate to provide a safe and secure environment and to ensure freedom of movement. That is why we 

strongly back what KFOR and EULEX are together trying to do. 

You are absolutely right to mention the ethnic Serbs who live in 

Kosovo but not in the north, for a number of reasons. One is that 

they have shown that it is possible to be an ethnic Serb in Kosovo 

but also to have a very significant degree of self-government and 

democracy. 

You mentioned the Serb majority municipalities. They have elected their mayors. Their democracy is functioning. I have visited 

with the Serb mayors. Secretary Clinton visited with them when 

she was there. It is a model for how you can have this confident 

degree of self-government while being in the borders of a democratic, multiethnic Kosovo. 

These sorts of arrangements were provided for in the Comprehensive Status Plan, which also, by the way, provides for a voice 

from Belgrade. It is not as if neighbors can have no interests or say 

in developments in the region. If the concern is that locals have a 

significant degree of say over their hospitals and their schools and 

their police, that can be provided for within the context of a democratic, multiethnic Kosovo. 

So we hope that is a vision that ethnic Serbs of Kosovo, that the 

neighbors, Belgrade, come to share, because moving down that 

path would really be the recipe for the well-being of the people who 

live there and the success of both countries. 

Mr. ENGEL. What about the fact that essentially north Mitrovica 

has been blocked by the Government of Kosovo from being able to 

control it? It is part of Kosovo. The Ahtisaari plan clearly said that 

what is happening now should be allowed to happen. I believe if 

we keep kicking the can down the road, whether it is KFOR or 

whomever, it is going to be much worse, much more difficult to resolve as the years go by. We should not allow this lawlessness to 

32

just continue because if we do, we are first of all not really implementing the Ahtisaari, which was adopted. Secondly, it is only 

going to flare up and be worse down the road. So I would wonder 

if you could comment on that. 

The last thing I want to throw in is that I am for Kosovo and 

Serbia being part of the European Union. But I don’t think Serbia 

can get in before Kosovo because Serbia would then block Kosovo 

the way it has blocked Kosovo from getting into the United Nations. So I think it is important. I think it is important that both 

countries join the EU because I think that the EU borders aren’t 

that important because there is flexibility of travel among all 

places and borders. But I don’t think Serbia should be admitted before Kosovo. 

So I wonder if you can mention about the lawlessness in north 

Metrovica and the fact that we just can’t keep kicking the can 

down the road. 

Mr. GORDON. On lawlessness, we remain strongly committed to 

backing KFOR and EULEX politically and with the resources they 

need to combat that lawlessness. We will stay engaged as long as 

we need to until that situation is dealt with. We reinforce it because there is only so much we can do with the presence on the 

ground, with the strategy of making clear to Serbia that it is path 

to European Union membership requires dealing in an appropriate 

way with that situation. 

I talked a bit about what that appropriate way might be. We 

share the view that both countries should enter the European 

Union. If they did, the borders would be far less significant and 

both countries would clearly benefit. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Poe. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Having been to the region, 

Mr. Secretary, there is no place on Earth like the Balkans. You 

couldn’t write a story and come up with all the different dynamics 

that are taking place. I have never seen such a thing. 

I will correct you on one thing. Kosovo recognizes them as neighbors. But Serbia doesn’t recognize Kosovo. So, with that correction. 

I have several questions and try to be brief in your answers, if 

you will. The issue I will call, for lack of better phrase, the Marty 

report and the Del Ponte memoirs, you have read it, I have read 

it. We heard accusations—tremendous accusations—while we were 

there about what took place. But we also met with our Ambassador 

to Kosovo, Mr. Dell. He basically took the position that it was all 

a bunch of nonsense. There is no such thing. Couldn’t happen. 

Wouldn’t happen. A little disturbing in that he didn’t seem to be 

open-minded to trying to find a conclusion. 

I think the allegations of people being killed for their organs anywhere in the world is about as bad as it gets. I would hope we get 

to the bottom of it and resolve it one way or another. So are we 

going to do that or are we just going to hope time passes by and 

we never get a resolution? Because people of all different ethnic 

groups that we met with really want an answer to that question. 

So is the U.S. going to push that, Secretary Gordon? 

Mr. GORDON. Absolutely. As I said, these are very serious 

charges. We have looked at them carefully and came to the view 

33

that they deserved, indeed required, serious investigation. To underscore our commitment on this, I think it really—that is why we 

found and identified and put forward the best possible candidate. 

That is the opposite of sweeping this under the carpet. There are 

plenty of ways you can bury a report or have someone else deal 

with it. And I think we did the opposite of that. We said it needs 

to be investigated. We weren’t convinced that—there aren’t a whole 

lot of experienced war crimes prosecutors out there who are available and ready and prepared to take on this responsibility. And so 

I want to tip my hat to Ambassador Williamson for being willing 

to do it. We said it needs to be a serious, credible person. We will 

put him forward. And I think that is really a sign of the degree 

to which we agree with you that we need to get to the bottom of 

this. It is serious. 

Mr. POE. The second was about the people who have been murdered on both sides during all this conflict. There would be mass 

graves—or graves—and people in this grave would be transported 

to another grave and then be moved to another grave to try to prevent anybody from finding out where they are. You have got mixed 

remains in three different graves. 

Are we proceeding sufficiently enough so people in the entire region are going to get some satisfaction about their family members, 

wherever they were killed? 

Mr. GORDON. It is another hugely important issue. It is part of 

the dialogue. There has been real progress. There is no doubt a lot 

of work needs to be done still in terms of refugees and displaced 

people and missing persons. But we believe that all of the countries 

of the region are committed to tackling these problems, and even 

in recent months there has been important progress. 

Mr. POE. The KFOR operation, Camp Bondsteel, I was there in 

2008. It is winding down. We would fly over the area where the 

roadblocks—we saw a lot of roadblocks. We saw a lot of Serbian 

flags; big flags at the roadblocks. You are aware of all of that. How 

long are we going to be in Kosovo? How long is the United States 

going to be in Kosovo because of that issue of protecting that border area? 

Mr. GORDON. No longer than necessary. 

Mr. POE. That may be a long time. The impression I got, it is 

going to be a long time. 

Mr. GORDON. Here is what I would say to put it in context. I 

have made the case already and really defended, that without us 

it wouldn’t be in our interest to let this go and to let locals put up 

roadblocks and do nothing about it. I would remind us all that our 

initial deployment to Kosovo was more than 40,000. And so it has 

dramatically come down from when we went to Kosovo in the first 

place, and steadily, to the point I think the American deployment 

today is around 700 troops, which is a small proportion of the overall NATO commitment there. Germany has twice as many troops—

you saw this for yourself—as we do. 

So our contribution is important, but it is appropriate and limited and has been steadily coming down. We would like to get to 

the point where it wasn’t necessary at all, but we need to make political progress before it is possible to entirely eliminate the military contribution that we are making. 

34

Mr. POE. I think the presence of the United States has made a 

difference—will make a difference there, just based on my observation. 

The last question. We have heard a lot and we discussed a lot 

here in this committee on northern Kosovo, the borders being 

drawn really by Tito years ago. For some odd reason we took Tito’s 

borders and we made it the rule of law. The whole idea of the 

Serbs in the north of Kosovo—we are a Nation I think that believes 

in self-determination. But if the Serbs in northern Kosovo—just assume with me in a hypothetical, they want to be part of Serbia, 

why do we say you can’t be part of Serbia, you have got to be part 

of Kosovo, even though you don’t want to be? Assume my hypothetical is correct first, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. GORDON. Going back to your first comment about there is 

nothing like the Balkans, I assume part of the reason you said that 

is the complexity of the region. We have the phrase ‘‘Balkanization’’ 

is a reflection of that complexity. There are so many different ethnic groups throughout that region, which makes it in some ways 

a wonderful place. It makes it also a complicated place. 

The reason we can’t simply say if certain people of one ethnic 

group living in one place want to be part of another country, that 

they should be allowed to, as that would literally open a Pandora’s 

Box that could never be closed. So if you said that Serbs—if you 

took your stipulation that Serbs in northern Kosovo should be able 

to choose to be part of Serbia, well, why not Serbs in Bosnia? So 

then some Serbs in Bosnia become part of Serbia. What about Albanians in Serbia? Do they then choose a different country? At 

what point do you stop? What about the Serbs in the southern part 

of Kosovo? Do they get to be part of Serbia? You could go on and 

on in describing all of the different Macedonians, Albanians. 

Mr. POE. Excuse me for interrupting, Mr. Secretary, because I 

have only got 1 minute left. I am just talking about the Serbs in 

northern Kosovo, of course, seems to be the conflict. The people in 

Serbia, many of them, think their families should be able to be part 

of their country. The Serbs in northern Kosovo, seem to me, they 

don’t want to be part of Kosovo. And there are some leaders really 

in both countries who think we have got to figure out a partition 

or something to help the folks in northern Kosovo because that is 

where the problem is. That is why KFOR is over there, is because 

of that issue in northern Kosovo, in my opinion. 

So is there anything that is going to help, or are we going to say 

you’re stuck with the country you’re in and that’s going to be the 

U.S. position indefinitely? Is that kind of our position? 

Mr. GORDON. It is our assessment that there is no way to start 

redrawing borders that stops in a stable place, and that you would 

actually open it up for much more conflict and complication than 

we have at present. Where we want to get, frankly, is the point 

that borders are less important. Where you have European Union 

members that trade with each other, that there is not even a post 

there because it doesn’t matter. That is, frankly, where the European Union has gotten to, especially in the Shengen arrangement 

on immigration. You just don’t have presences at the border. That 

is the way to tackle the complicated ethnic makeup of the Balkans, 

ultimately. 

35

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time. 

Mr. BURTON. Ambassador, we appreciate your testimony. It was 

very enlightening. 

Oh, Mr. Rohrabacher, I am sorry. Forgive me. I was recognizing 

you at the end because you aren’t a member of the subcommittee. 

I apologize. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Back to the point that was just made. Basically, I have been a 

supporter from the very beginning. I was, along with Eliot, we are 

very involved in this over the last 20 years. It was always based 

on self-determination; on the concept that people have a right to 

determine their own destiny, which is part of our Declaration of 

Independence, our statement of nationhood. But yet it seems to me 

that if we believed in that, we should be supporting these people 

in the northern tier that is next to Serbia who want to be part of 

Serbia. They have a right to self-determination. 

Why is it if we accept your logic and our country’s position now, 

we should have sided with Serbia to prevent the Kosovars from becoming independent in the first place? No, the Kosovars had a 

right to be independent, and so do some of those Serbs in the 

northern part of that country. Now you say there is too much of 

a risk of having the mushroom and the dominoes fall and everybody declares their independence? Well, there is a difference. This 

difference is we are talking about an agreement between two countries now—between Kosovo and Serbia. You see, there can be no 

agreements between these various countries to delineate their borders. It is up to us as, the grand poombas of the whole globe, to 

determine these people cannot make agreements with each other 

as to where their border is? 

Let me remind you, Mr. Secretary, the United States’ borders 

were changed into the time when we became a country. Remember 

the motto: 54/40 or fight? What was that all about? That was about 

us saying we were going to fight unless we had the 54/40 parallel 

up there with Canada, which would have given us a huge chunk 

of Canada. But guess what? The people up there didn’t want to be 

part of the United States. They wanted to be part of Canada, even 

though we were revolutionary. And we were the ones who were for 

self-determination. Our Government in 1846 agreed to delineating 

our border with Great Britain beneath Canada in 1846 not to 54/

40 but to the 49th parallel. 

I would suggest you are correct that once we get to the point 

where these countries in the Balkans are independent and part of 

the EU, these borders become less important and thus the friction 

there and the potential of war is decreased dramatically. How do 

we get to that point, is the question. And you get to that point by 

trying to find agreements between these countries. And I would 

suggest an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo on redesignating 

their borders so more Serbs are in Serbia and more Kosovars are 

in Kosovo would be a dramatic step forward and symbolic of the 

cooperation that would lead to that very point that would permit 

the EU to eliminate the importance of borders. 

Here is the question for you: Are we then superimposing our will 

on the Governments of Serbia and Kosovo that they cannot make 

36

such an agreement to redelineate their border so that more Serbs 

are in Serbia and more Kosovars are in Kosovo? 

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. When you referred to 

the potential deal between the two to change their borders, I know 

of no agreement between the two countries to change their borders 

along those lines. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is not the question. What would our position be? 

Mr. GORDON. No one talks about such an arrangement, nor do 

I know of any conceivable arrangement that actually both could 

agree with, that wouldn’t cause real problems for the entire nation. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me note that I do. Let me note that I do 

know of those things, and you don’t seem to and our Government 

doesn’t seem to. But I am not asking whether you know about it 

or not. I am asking you whether or not, with an honest discussion 

between the Kosovars and the Serbians, and if they decide to make 

sure there are more Serbians in Serbia and more Kosovars in 

Kosovo, what would our Government’s position be? 

Mr. GORDON. You are asking a hypothetical question. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. A principle question. Whether or not, in principle, that is what we would agree to. These are independent countries. Do they have a right to make agreements to delineate their 

borders as we made with Great Britain in 1846? 

Mr. GORDON. For reasons I have given, I really don’t think it is 

in our interest to speculate about border swaps in the region, because once you start going down that path, you really run the risk 

that you would be opening up that question in all of the neighboring countries. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right now you are leaving them with the 

idea that no, you are sovereign countries, but the United States is 

never going to go along with any agreement between you two. You 

have to prove to us first before we can approve of anything like 

that. 

Mr. GORDON. I think changing borders in a volatile region is a 

very significant matter of international concern. If and when, to 

take your hypothetical, it can be done in a way that everybody 

agrees with, without negative repercussions——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me suggest where we are really lucky, 

that back in the early days of our country, number one, that we 

believed in the right to self-determination as expressed in our Declaration of Independence. But number two, that we didn’t have 

some huge global power suggesting to us that we couldn’t make an 

agreement with Great Britain over what the delineation of our territory would be. Because instead of 54/40 or fight, we would have 

had a fight. 

It is when you calm tensions by allowing two groups of people 

to make—have an agreement, a mutual understanding, that you 

calm things down, not exacerbate them, especially if it leads to a 

point where the borders become less important. 

So I would suggest that maybe, just maybe, we should be rethinking our basic strategy at least between allowing the Kosovars 

and the Serbs to try to reach some understandings on their own 

rather than having us—we are the big guy on the block—to come 

down and tell people what agreements they can or cannot make. 

37

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Ambassador. I am sure you are happy 

to leave on that note. I got a little history lesson there. 

It is a very difficult issue, the whole Balkan situation, and we 

appreciate the tough work you have to face. We appreciate you 

being with us today. 

Mr. Meeks, the ranking member, had to run to another meeting 

but he will be back. 

Former Ambassador Kurt Volker is going to be with us. He is a 

Senior Fellow and Managing Director of the Center of Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He is also a senior adviser at the Atlantic Council of the United States and a member of its Strategic 

Advisory Group. He is also managing director of the BGR Group. 

Ambassador Volker was previously a career member of the United 

States Senior Foreign Service, with over 23 years of experience 

working on political and security issues under five U.S. administrations. He served as Ambassador and the 19th U.S. Permanent Representative on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from July 2, 2008, until May 2009, leading the 156-

person-strong U.S. mission to NATO. 

My colleague Mr. Meeks will be returning and Mr. Rohrabacher 

as well. 

Mr. Gerard Gallucci served with the United Nations Department 

of Peacekeeping Operations as the U.N. Regional Representative in 

Metrovica, Kosovo, from June 2005, to October 2008, and thereafter 

in the U.N. Mission to East Timor as the chief of staff until June, 

2010. He has served over 25 years with the U.S. State Department 

and retired from the Senior Foreign Service in June 2005. Since his 

retirement he has taught peacekeeping as an adjunct professor at 

several universities, including the University of Pittsburgh and 

George Washington University. He received his Ph.D. from the 

University of Pittsburgh in Political Science in 1978 and a B.A. 

from Rutgers University in 1973. 

Ivan Vejvoda is currently vice president of programs at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. From 2003 to 2010, he 

served as executive director of the Balkan Trust for Democracy, a 

project of the German Marshall Fund dedicated to strengthening 

democratic institutions in southeastern Europe. Mr. Vejvoda came 

to GMF in 2003 from a distinguished career in the Serbian Government as a senior adviser on foreign policy and European integration to Prime Ministers Zoran Djindjic and Zoran Zivkovic. Mr. 

Vejvoda was a key figure in the democratic opposition movement 

in Yugoslavia through the 1990s and is widely published on the 

subject of democratic transition, totalitarianism, and postwar reconstruction in the Balkans. 

Mr. Volker, we will start with you. If you could keep your remarks as close to 5 minutes as possible, we won’t cut you off. 

38

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE KURT VOLKER, MANAGING 

DIRECTOR—INTERNATIONAL GROUP, BGR GROUP, SENIOR 

FELLOW AND MANAGING DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY 

Mr. VOLKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to be here. I do have a written statement that I have 

submitted for the record and I will just try to summarize some 

thoughts orally. I appreciate the opportunity to testify at this hearing because it gave me a chance to think again—a bit of fresh 

thinking—about the Balkan region, something that I think maybe 

is worthwhile. 

I would like to start my testimony with a thought that I think 

should drive some of our policy thinking looking ahead. The 

thought is this: For the past 15 years, U.S. policy has been based 

on the premise that bringing the countries of the region into the 

EU and NATO—so, integration in European institutions—provides 

such a powerful incentive for reform that it is going to drive change 

in the region, and they will overcome their differences, much as 

Western Europe successfully did at the end of World War II, getting beyond the wars of the 20th century. 

I would suggest that if you take a look around Europe right now, 

that vision is not credible in the short term. If you look at the EU, 

it is dealing with a massive debt and deficit crisis. They are talking 

about whether they can keep the Euro Zone together; about whether Greece remains in the Euro Zone; what to do with Italy. They 

are not talking about which new countries to bring in. 

Likewise, NATO has slowed down on its movement toward enlargement of NATO as well. Probably it is because candidates are 

weaker, but probably also the engine and the consensus within 

NATO to bring in new members has gone down. You hear Germany 

in the political commentary in Germany talking, for example, about 

the EU; maybe it wasn’t even a good idea to let in Greece. 

So the notion that politically we are going to see this move into 

the European mainstream, and in a near-term period of time, just 

doesn’t really ring true to me. And as a result, I am not sure it is 

providing the incentives in the region that need to be provided to 

drive that continued positive change. 

As a result of that, I think that if we are basing our presence, 

the troop presence that we have, the troop presence the EU has, 

the financial support, on the notion that change is going to come 

from inside the region, powered by the drive to get into the EU, 

I think we have to look at ourselves and say, Well, it is really not 

working very well right now; we have seen stagnation, if not backsliding, in the last few years. 

I had a chance to testify before a Senate Subcommittee on Europe in April 2010. I went back and reread my testimony in preparing this one, and I was struck at how little had changed. As a 

result, it makes me think if little has changed in that long a period 

of time, where are we going from here? 

So I would like to suggest that we should take a fresh look. But 

before giving you my thoughts on maybe some ideas we could do, 

I do want to put down a marker that the U.S. should not think, 

Well, if it is not going anywhere, we should withdraw, that we 

39

should pull out of the Balkans because it is not working; because 

I think that would have grave and negative consequences. We got 

into the Balkans because of the negative effect that region and the 

conflicts there were having on Europe. And as we see in the financial crisis every day, Europe does matter to the United States. And 

likewise, security in Europe matters to the United States. 

And we are there with relatively a modest investment compared 

to where we have been: Less than 700 troops in Kosovo, I think 

less than 30 in Bosnia for the United States. The EU is there in 

a larger number in Bosnia. So we are not making a massive investment. But it is a good insurance policy against the degradation of 

security in the region. But if all it is an insurance policy, and we 

are treading water, that is not good enough. I do think, therefore, 

we should be ramping up our diplomatic and political efforts to try 

to resolve some of these lingering problems. 

Let me put it this way. If the thought was that EU integration 

was going to be the driver to fix the problems, and that is not happening, maybe the way to look at it instead is to drive hard to fix 

the problems to increase the prospect that EU membership is a realistic possibility. 

In that, let me mention three particular things. This came up in 

the question-and-answer earlier, one of them on Bosnia. I think the 

Dayton Accord is an essential foundation in Bosnia, but it has stagnated. I do think that we need a renewed political push to resolve 

those issues that were never resolved at the time of Dayton. I 

would call for a Dayton II. I would put it this way: It has to be 

driven by people in the region. We can’t make the decisions for 

them. But we can provide a lot of international pressure and international support for genuine new agreements to go beyond where 

we have gotten with Dayton thus far. 

The second one, and it has been a topic of a lot of the discussion 

here, is Mitrovica. There has been an effort to stimulate dialogue 

between Serbia and Kosovo over the situation in the north. As 

some of the other Congressmen pointed out, that is the festering 

issue there. I don’t believe territorial swaps can solve the problem, 

but I do believe agreement between the two sides needs to solve 

the problem. And I think that we should again increase the engagement of the U.S. and the EU in pressing both sides to come to 

those resolutions. 

I also mention a third issue, it hasn’t been brought up yet today, 

which is the Macedonian name issue. I think it is a terrible shame 

that a country in the Balkans that was ready for NATO membership in 2008 has been held back because of the lack of agreement 

over the name. I think that all the elements have been on the table 

in the past. They can be brought back on the table. It serves no 

one’s interest—not Greece’s, not Macedonia’s, not the people in the 

Balkans, not the EU, not NATO, not the United States—to see 

Macedonia held back and contribute to continued dysfunctionality 

in the region. So, again, this is a third one. I would like to see a 

greater U.S. and EU coordinated push with both parties to try to 

bring that to resolution. 

A final point, and then I will stop, is all of this fits in the context 

of the big goal. The big goal is a Europe whole, free, and at peace. 

You don’t hear a lot of people talk about that these days because 

40

it is so hard to imagine with all the difficulties we with have the 

EU, with our own budget and domestic challenges here at home, 

but ultimately what we need is for Europe—all of Europe, all the 

people of Europe—to be in free societies, market economies, to have 

stable societies, and to be secure. Until that happens, there will always be some latent risk. And that is a risk that affects the United 

States as well, because of our need for a stable and secure Europe. 

So we have got to reemphasize the big goal and in that context 

keep pushing very hard on these specific issues. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Ambassador. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Volker follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Dr. Gallucci. 

STATEMENT OF GERARD M. GALLUCCI, PH.D., FORMER U.N. 

REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE IN MITROVICA, KOSOVO 

Mr. GALLUCCI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Griffin. Through 

my 30 years career, including the State Department and the 

United Nations, I have never had a chance to appear in such a capacity in front of the U.S. Congress. Thank you for the honor. I 

deeply appreciate it. 

Events over the last 4 months in northern Kosovo are unfortunate reminders of the potential for things to spiral out of control 

there with consequences that could be felt throughout the Balkans. 

On July 25, units of the Kosovo Special Police, sent from Pristina, 

attempted to seize control of the two northern crossing points with 

Serbia that, until then, had been manned by local Kosovo police 

and members of EULEX. In the next days, NATO troops, KFOR 

and EULEX, both in Kosovo under a U.N. Peacekeeping mandate, 

sought to support the action by transporting Kosovo police and customs officials from Pristina to the two northern gates. The local 

Kosovo Serbs saw this as an effort to subject them to Kosovo-Albanian control and to cut them off from Serbia. They responded by 

peacefully resisting and raising barricades to block further such efforts by the Kosovo authorities or the international forces. 

KFOR and EULEX reacted by confronting peaceful protests with 

armed force, using live fire on September 27, and repeatedly seeking to remove barricades and close off alternative roads using tear 

gas, pepper spray, and heavy machinery. U.S. personnel have been 

on the front line of these efforts, stepping outside their U.N. Mandate without any apparent recognition by the administration of 

their new role. 

Let me be clear about three things. One, the NATO troops and 

EU police have been acting outside their U.N. Peacekeeping mandate by trying to impose Kosovo customs in the north without any 

prior political agreement. They are there to keep the peace while 

others seek to resolve the political differences. Their actions have 

damaged international credibility and increased tensions dangerously. 

Number two, the great majority of the local Kosovo Serbs in 

peaceful protest and on the barricades are not criminals or being 

forced to be there against their will. They see the actions by Kosovo 

authorities and KFOR and EULEX as an attack upon their lives 

and community. 

Third, nothing can be gained by the effort by the Quint countries—the U.S., U.K., Germany, France, and Italy—to impose 

Pristina’s authority through force. The Serbs rebuild their barricades and use other means to get supplies. The actions by NATO 

and the EU have only hardened their rejection of Pristina and 

made compromise more difficult. 

I note that last week, one person, a Kosovo Serb, was killed and 

several others injured, including a local policeman, by gunfire in a 

sensitive area of north Metrovica. Accounts differ as to what happened, but it seems the gunfire came from Kosovo Albanians. 

After 12 years of frozen conflict, it has become clear that an effort to find practical accommodation for the north, while Kosovo’s 

49

status remains unresolved, is long overdue. The local Kosovo Serbs 

have prevented through peaceful means what they see as an effort 

to impose on them Kosovo institutions that they reject. The International 

Peacekeepers have reached the limits of their ability to project 

political solutions that do not have the support of the local community in the north. It may therefore be a good time for all parties—

Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, Pristina and Belgrade, and 

the internationals, including the EU and the United States—to 

look for alternatives. 

TransConflict, an NGO in Belgrade that occasionally publishes 

my analysis on their site, has posted a paper that looks at such a 

possible alternative: Status-neutral implementation of the 

Ahtisaari Plan for Kosovo, the Ahtisaari Plan, developed at the request of the U.N. Secretary General in 2007. It derives from an understanding that nothing positive can emerge as long as the two 

sides continue to see the situation in zero-sum terms; that for them 

to win, the other side must lose. Rather, to avoid further conflict 

and open the door to focusing on achieving economic progress, each 

side must be willing to compromise and consider outcomes that recognize the fundamental interests of the other side as well as their 

own. Simply put, for the northern Serbs to be allowed to live in 

their own communities without political interference in local matters from Kosovo’s central institutions and with continued linkages 

to Serbia. For the Kosovo Albanians, that the north remain part of 

Kosovo and function in significant ways as part of the Kosovo system. 

The paper which I wish to enter as an annex to my testimony 

provides a series of detailed recommendations for the courts, the 

police, municipal competencies, finance, inter-municipal cooperation, cooperation with Serbia, and extended competencies for north 

Mitrovica that could facilitate implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan 

in north Kosovo. But without outside help, Kosovo Serbs and Albanians are unlikely to be able to rise above their history and achieve 

compromise. The northern Serbs prefer outright partition and remaining part of Serbia. The Albanians would prefer not to have a 

Serbian majority in the north. 

Unfortunately, the responsible internationals, the Quint, and 

most especially the United States, still support imposition of 

Pristina authority and institutions in the north. Reportedly, U.S. 

elements of KFOR are even now seeking to close all alternative 

roads along the boundary to force the northern Serbs to capitulate 

to Kosovo customs in the official crossing points. The rest of KFOR 

and EULEX appears to be simply waiting for the Serbs to abandon 

their barricades in the coming cold. They refused a Serb offer to 

allow them through the barricades if they do not use this access 

to impose Kosovo customs officials on the boundary. 

The illegal and counterproductive efforts of KFOR and EULEX 

seek to force the northern Kosovo Serbs to surrender have only increased distrust and strengthened the local resistance to any compromise. The Serbs show no sign of being ready to take down their 

barricades. 

Since 2008, Quint policy, strongly encouraged by the United 

States, has been to bully and threaten Serbia and the Kosovo Serbs 

50

to accept the loss of Kosovo and to abandon the north to Pristina. 

Some view this as one more bit of ‘‘punishment’’ for Serbia, despite 

its new reality of democracy and eagerness to become fully part of 

Europe. But pressure and use of force has not worked. No Serbian 

leader, despite EU threats to deny the country EU membership unless they cooperate, can simply surrender Kosovo or end support for 

the north. The northern Serbs see no alternative but to continue 

to resist. The Kosovo Albanians see no reason to compromise when 

they have U.S. support to continue demanding everything. 

This leaves the alternatives for the north the same as they have 

always been—continued frozen conflict or partition, both of which 

might lead to further ethnic conflict and/or fight, or some compromise solution. As things now stand, north Kosovo may have to 

see more conflict before everyone looks to compromise. It is a good 

time to look for other approaches to Kosovo than trying to force one 

side to lose everything. If the United States cannot support an effort to achieve real compromise, then it should get out of the way 

and bring our soldiers home before we get involved in one more 

conflict far from home. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallucci follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Mr. Vejvoda. 

STATEMENT OF MR. IVAN VEJVODA, VICE PRESIDENT, PROGRAMS, THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED 

STATES 

Mr. VEJVODA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for giving 

me the honor to speak before you today about these important matters as the region moves away from the conflicts of the nineties. 

History is humbling. I come from the region. I was born into the 

former Yugoslavia. That country disappeared before my eyes. As a 

social scientist, I didn’t see it coming. That is why it has been humbling. 

Some talked about the unfinished business of Versailles. The two 

countries that were made there, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, 

disappeared. Unfortunately, we did not have the fortune of dismembering peacefully, as the Slovaks did, but it was in blood and 

war and hell. And I think saying that, that no one wishes to go 

back there, neither the people nor their elected officials. I think it 

is loose talk when people say that Bosnia is prone maybe to go into 

new conflicts. It would be like saying after the U.S. Civil War, 11 

years after that war, that America would go back into a new civil 

war. 

We need to give peace a chance. And I think that being someone 

of the glass-is-half-full approach, I think that the region has made 

enormous strides. As you yourself said, as Assistant Secretary Gordon said, one needs to take a look at the longer view here and get 

out of the weeds, not neglecting in any way the huge challenges 

that have been exposed here throughout the debate this morning. 

I was at the same hearing as Ambassador Volker in April 2010 

in front of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. I would say that 

there has been progress made since then. I also reread what I had 

written. Serbia arrested the two outstanding war criminals. Many 

were saying Serbia would never do that; that Mladic would somehow disappear. That is sustaining the rule of law. 

Serbia, Belgrade, and Pristina have begun a dialogue 3 years 

after the declaration of independence of Kosovo. This is a quintessential European story. There is nothing totally specific, although everything is specific in history. And I will not talk about 

the U.S.-Canada border. I will talk about Northern Ireland. Let me 

just remind you that it took close to 10 years after the Good Friday 

Agreement in April 1998, for Andy Pasley and Martin McGuinness 

to sit down and create this transitional government, without shaking hands, if you remember. 

So that is why I say, Give these people a chance. I think that 

beyond the rhetoric that we hear from both sides, and normally 

politicians, and especially in pre-electoral periods, have to do what 

they do best. But I would say if one takes the deeper view of 

things, I think there is a clear political determination on both 

sides, whether it is in Belgrade or Pristina, and a willingness to 

resolve this. We all need to, wherever we are working, facilitate, 

create that space which allows for them, facilitate or not, through 

back channels or not, to find that comfort zone where they will be 

able to live with an agreed solution. There is no ideal solution to 

this. No one will get what they want. This is the lesson from KashVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:36 Mar 06, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EE\111511\71261 HFA PsN: SHIRL
55

mir, from Northern Ireland, from Schleswig Holstein, South Tyrol. 

You take any of these examples and they are important because 

they have produced tools that are on the shelf that we can all use 

here. Of course, it will be a combination of those tools. How do you 

allow people to feel comfortable in something that is the least bad 

solution? I think that is what the two sides are grappling with. 

My hope, as with others, is that they go back to the table as 

quickly as possible to continue that. I would not be surprised that 

we see forward movement that is maybe more accelerated than we 

would expect this morning here in Washington. And that is because 

the realities are trenchant. It is clear that we will not move to 

Mars and they will not move wherever else. We are bound together 

by history. We will have to live as neighbors. And we are already 

living as neighbors. And I would say that regional cooperation is 

in fact the unsung song of this region. 

You noted the military cooperation that all of these countries 

have with the United States. What clearer sign is there about the 

inclinations of all of these governments, the number of regional 

meetings that occur? In my written testimony, which I am submitting, I just mention two of the most recent ones. 

The intelligence chiefs of all of these countries met for the third 

time. The ministers of defense meet; the cooperation in the Danube 

Valley, in the Sava River Valley; the fact that the railway companies of Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia have realized that they have 

to join together if they want to be competitive in this market; the 

economic crisis which has led everyone to see transparently how 

dependent each of these small countries that are in the region depend on each other for economic survival. This is a micro-region of 

the world. Twenty million people. 

Prime Minister Djindjic, for whom I worked and had the honor 

of being his senior foreign policy adviser, used to say we are only 

relevant as a region of 50 million people. He was including Romania and Bulgaria then. 

Everybody knows with common sense that we are looking at each 

other, that our hands are tied in the best way, and that we have 

to find that path that will allow us in this world of global economic 

crisis. Just yesterday, Chancellor Merkel told us all that this is 

probably the greatest crisis Europe has confronted since World War 

II. That is the state of affairs of Europe in which the state of affairs the Balkans are conducting their path forward. 

I would like to say that the European Union still is a very potent 

magnet. Yes, it has a lot of problems everyone sees in the region 

itself. There are some declining public opinion polls. But still we 

find clear majorities to join the European Union and NATO, except 

in Serbia as regards NATO, but Serbia is a member of Partnership 

for Peace and I think it was mentioned it is conforming to NATO 

standards. 

So it is very important that on the date of 9th of December, when 

the European Prime Ministers and Presidents meet for their Council, to uphold the suggestion and the opinion that the European 

Commission has made in October that Serbia get candidacy; that 

Montenegro get a date for beginning of talks. And, of course, we all 

applaud the huge success of Croatia in becoming a member in July 

2013. 

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If I can put it very colloquially, we need to keep the train moving 

here. Otherwise, that will help the nay-sayers, the nationalists—

the rabid nationalists—who say Europe doesn’t want us and they 

are being upheld by the U.S. trying to keep us out. No. We need 

a strong leadership gesture which is fully merit-based. This is not 

anything for free. I say that because of the progress that hasn’t 

been made in the region. So I think we will all be following, whether we are here or over there in Europe, what the leaders of Europe 

decide on December 9th. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Vejvoda follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. I think I will yield to my colleague, who has been 

very patient, Vice Chairman Griffin. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to hear 

from you, Mr. Ambassador, on the status of our trade relationship 

with the Balkans. I know that the Balkans are in need of increased 

trade and foreign direct investment. As some of the shine of Europe 

maybe rubs off a little bit, I am interested to know whether we 

here in the United States are taking advantage of potential trade 

opportunities, export opportunities in particular, and what you 

think about the general status of trade with the United States. If 

anyone else from the panel wants to comment on that, that would 

be great. 

Mr. VOLKER. Thank you. I will offer a couple of brief comments. 

I am not sure I have enough depth to answer all of the questions 

that you put on the table. But let me give you these couple of 

points. One of them is that geographically the Balkans region is 

much closer to Europe. It has agriculture and small industry, and, 

as a result, it is naturally going to have a larger trade relationship 

with the EU than it is going to have with the United States. That 

is just the geography of it. 

Secondly, when we talk about progress toward the EU and integration, one of the elements of that that people talk about is business climate. Do the countries of the region create a good, healthy 

business climate, a fair marketplace, the ability of businesses to 

run themselves, to get clear title to hire and fire and not be tied 

up in regulations to have a clear tax policy? They need to do more 

themselves on the business climate. 

And then thirdly, I want to just endorse where I think your question is coming from. I would very much like to see the U.S. be a 

stimulus to pushing those kinds of reforms internally, including by 

paving the way for greater direct U.S. trade with the region and 

greater U.S. investment in the region. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Private sector investment as opposed——

Mr. VOLKER. Exactly. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. You probably heard that we are out of money. 

What is the role—anybody that wants to comment, that would be 

great—of corruption in the region in terms of attracting economic 

growth and how corruption there compares to other European 

countries? 

Mr. VOLKER. I will start, but I don’t want to dominate the panel 

here. I think corruption is a serious problem and I don’t think it 

has gotten meaningfully better in places. A couple cases would be 

Croatia, which has really stepped toward EU membership, and 

Montenegro, which has made a lot of progress as well. When you 

look at the conflict zones in particular—I want to agree with much 

of what Ivan Vejvoda has said. And I also think we face a dilemma. 

Yes, the people of the region want integration into Europe. But the 

leaders in the region continue to hold the region back by failing to 

settle a lot of these issues, and in many ways, because they profit 

from it, because they have created mechanisms that reinforce the 

status quo and hold back the region as a whole. I do think that is 

a serious problem. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Correct me if I am wrong, but fuller integration, or 

integration into Europe, would bring great changes for the leading 

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class and would, as a result of the requirements they would have 

to meet, may put significant pressure on the way they do business. 

Mr. VOLKER. Absolutely. That is part of the premise for preparing for EU membership is that you strengthen your own economic management institutions, rule of law, the ethics. All of those 

things. That is part of the premise of joining the EU. So it would 

be necessary for them to do that. That is a short-term downside for 

those people who profit in other ways today. But there is also a 

long-term benefit—that they are bringing their countries forward 

and they will be leaders in those countries. 

Mr. VEJVODA. Congressman, I would like to add a few words, if 

I may. Thank you for bringing up that issue because it is of extreme relevance. First of all, to the livelihood of people in these 

countries and then for EU accession, because it is a key condition 

to move forward. Again, here the picture is gray in the best sense 

of the word. There are still outstanding problems, but I think much 

has been done. In fact, I am glad Assistant Secretary Gordon mentioned the huge work that has been done in judicial reform, for example, in Serbia. But Croatia would not have gotten its accession 

without having arrested its former Prime Minister. This is huge. A 

former leader of a country that led the country to NATO is in jail 

today for abuse of power and corruption. Montenegro has done substantial work. And so has Serbia. 

What I would like to underline here is that this fight is across 

borders. It is the fight against organized crime that is linked to corruption, that is linked to money laundering, and then investment 

of that money into real estate and other places. I would like to commend the huge collaboration that has occurred with, for example, 

the DEA here in the U.S. or the British Serious Organized Crime 

Agency and huge heists of tons of drugs have been made in Latin 

America, thanks to the joint work of Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, 

Bosnia, the DEA, and the SOCA. I think that is a testimony to the 

willingness, again, and the determination to overcome the scourge 

that is organized crime, and then corruption. 

In all of these countries—and I come from Serbia, and I know 

more—there are judges from the high court who are in jail. There 

are a number of various mafias that they call the highway mafia, 

those who are taking toll-road money and siphoning it off through 

very clever computer programs. The hacking business is intense. 

Sports. Soccer in all of these countries, the fixing of matches. These 

are some of the variety. One could spend the whole afternoon here 

describing how this is being addressed. 

More needs to be done, there is no doubt. And there is huge public grievance about the fact this is not moving as fast as it can. But 

that is, again, where we come to the EU’s framework, which is one 

that enables this movement forward. Just on the trade issue and 

U.S. investments, U.S. Steel was the biggest exporter company 

from Serbia, worth 12 percent of all Serbian exports, just before we 

went down into the 2008 crisis. 

Mr. GALLUCCI. I just wanted to note that open borders between 

the Balkans and Europe also means open borders for movements 

of people and organized crime. I think that complicates the European view of how to handle places like Kosovo. 

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Mr. GRIFFIN. Do I have a few more seconds? I wanted to follow 

up on that and ask, if you are looking at the organized crime activities and movements, are they tied to, for example, Russian organized crime or are they pretty much limited to the Balkans? The 

reason I ask that is there is a real problem with intellectual property and rule of law and acknowledging intellectual property laws 

here in the United States. I call that theft. It is a big, big problem. 

A lot of it is driven by Russia—folks in Russia—and some of it has 

to do with a failure to enforce and respect the rule of law even by 

the governmental authorities, not just organized crime. 

China is the other big perpetrator with regard to intellectual 

property violations. I would be interested to know if you have 

heard or know of any specific problems with intellectual property 

and piracy in the region. 

Mr. VEJVODA. This is also an issue that is being addressed and 

is still outstanding. To answer your question simply, it is homegrown. We half jokingly, half seriously, say that the best regional 

cooperation is between the criminalized groups. There is no ethnic 

problem between Serbs, Albanians, Croats, Montenegrins, Slovenians, Bulgarians, or Romanians. Their interest is profit. And they 

will do everything to maintain those good ‘‘relations’’ that they 

have. 

But it is just, as I mentioned, the coordinated effort of the police 

forces, of the intelligence services, that are now literally working 

in real time, with video conferencing every day between all of 

them. That is the only way to get at those who are violating, for 

example, intellectual property. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. Did you have a comment? 

Mr. VOLKER. Just very briefly. I don’t believe that intellectual 

property is the biggest organized crime challenge that we face in 

the Balkans. I think that some of the bigger ones are in the area 

of just simple extortion. Money laundering and trafficking in persons are the ones I am most concerned about. 

I would also say that while it is true there is home-grown organized crime, there is also evidence of Russian organized crime in 

the Balkans as well. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, let me just end up by saying one of the things 

that has not been discussed today by the Secretary are the political 

problems. You have very vividly pointed out some of the problems 

from the Serbs’ point of view on the border there, and the customs 

problem, and how they have been importing police from the middle 

of Kosovo. The Ambassador pointed out some of the other problems. 

The one thing that I have noticed in all the testimony today, and 

when I was over there, is there is a big political problem that everybody faces. The people in Serbia, the leaders in Serbia, I think 

they have an election coming up here pretty quickly. If they throw 

up their hands and say, ‘‘Okay, we are going to accept everything 

that has been decided,’’ then politically they are going to get killed. 

There is just no question about it. Conversely, in Kosovo, if it looks 

like they are acceding any of the decisions that have already been 

made to the people on the Serbian side in northern Kosovo, then 

they have a political problem. 

72

So the only thing that I can see is that there have been some 

very wrong things happening. I am not sure they are going to be 

solved overnight. But the one thing that I think is extremely important is that the United States use whatever leverage we have 

to get everybody to the conference table and to have them sit down. 

We had the privilege to talk to the leaders, once again, of Serbia. 

I have high regard for those folks and I think that that should have 

been resolved in a different way, as I said to the Ambassador. I 

think we should have done like we do in other parts of the world—

get them together and try to keep them at the conference table 

until they hammer out a decision that they can live with, instead 

of trying to focus some kind of—force some kind of decision from 

the outside, which many times doesn’t lead to a real solution but 

only to more problems. 

But the one thing I think is absolutely imperative is that the 

leaders in Serbia and the leaders in Kosovo continue to talk. Because if they will get together and talk, I am sure that these problems can be resolved without further conflict. And nobody wants 

another civil war. Nobody wants to see a lot of people get killed. 

We want to see a resolution of the problem. 

So with that, I want to thank you and you and you for being here 

today. I appreciate you being so patient and waiting so long while 

we questioned the Ambassador at length. But thank you very 

much. We will use everything at our disposal to try to make sure 

we get everybody together to solve this problem. 

We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:06 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA


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gional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo, entitled ‘‘The Ahtisaari Plan and North 

[NOTE: Additional material submitted by Gerard M. Gallucci, Ph.D., former U.N. Ref Kosovo,’’ is not reprinted here but is available in committee records.]

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