J-A09038-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

ESTATE OF: MARY G. H. DAVIS, 

DECEASED

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

APPEAL OF: SUSAN P. TREADWAY, 

BETSEY W. DAVIS, MARY G. COOKE AND 

JAMES C. TREADWAY

No. 2551 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree dated July 18, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Orphans' Court at No: 1990-X1644

BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE, and STABILE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 11, 2015

This appeal involves a dispute over the estate of Mary G. H. Davis 

(“Decedent”). In this regard, her daughters Betsey W. Davis, Mary G. Cooke 

and Susan P. Treadway, and her son-in-law and Susan’s husband James C. 

Treadway (individually “Betsey,” “Mary,” “Susan,” and “James,” and 

collectively “Appellants”) appeal from the July 18, 2014 decree entered by 

the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Orphans’ Court Division 

(“orphans’ court”). The orphans’ court, inter alia, granted Decedent’s son’s, 

E. Morris Davis, IV (“Appellee” or “Morris”), summary judgment motion titled 

“Motion for Return of Property No Longer in Dispute,” and dismissed 

Appellants’ objections to accounting. Upon review, we affirm.
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The orphans’ court summarized the facts and procedural history of this 

case as follows. 

[Decedent] died on May 26, 1990, leaving a will dated 

September 14, 1989, in which she appointed her son, [Morris], 

and her son-in-law, [James], as co-executors. Letters 

testamentary were granted by the Montgomery County Register 

of Wills on June 1, 1990. The [e]xecutors filed an [i]nventory 

dated June 19, 1990 and filed a Pennsylvania [i]nheritance tax 

return, as well as a copy of the [f]ederal [e]state [t]ax return in 

1991. The [i]nventory incorporated an appraisal of tangible 

personal property that was located in Decedent’s residence at 

her death. The Pennsylvania [i]nheritance tax return and 

[f]ederal [e]state tax return also included an appraisal of 

[D]ecedent’s tangible personal property. Apart from a significant 

parcel of real estate, the majority of the estate assets were 

distributed during the first few years of the administration of the 

estate. 

Following the 1990 and 1991 tax filings, no activity 

occurred in the Register of Wills’ office or in the Clerk of the 

Orphans’ Court division until October 12, 2000, at which time an 

agreement entitled “Receipt, Release, Waiver and Agreement of 

Indemnity” was filed, which had been signed by Mary[.] This 

document in paragraph 4 represents that “the only asset 

remaining in the estate is the Lafayette Road property.” 

This refers to the real property that was the home of [Decedent]. 

Apparently, complications arose regarding the subdivision of the 

real property and the distribution of the property in shares to the 

three daughters of [D]ecedent], resulting in lengthy delay of 

final distribution under the [w]ill. [Mary] acknowledged in this 

[r]eceipt and [r]elease [d]ocument that “the co-executors have 

made distribution to her of all of the balance of the proceeds of 

the estate” and have “delivered to her the amount distributable 

to her”. See Receipt, Release, Waiver and Indemnity Agreement 

dated October 12, 2000. 

Although there were no proceedings in the [o]rphans’ 

[c]ourt during the first ten years following the death of 

[Decedent], there was a dispute litigated in the Civil Division of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County among the 

[e]state and Decedent’s daughters, as plaintiffs, and [Morris] 

and his wife as defendants. This matter was resolved by 

stipulation in open court on February 19, 1991, followed by a 

written stipulation signed by the parties’ attorneys. 

Civil litigation was again commenced in 2010 among 

[Morris] and his sister, Susan [], and his brother-in-law, James 

[], concerning certain disputed articles of personal property and 

certain real estate. The estate of [Decedent] is not party to this 

civil dispute. 
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The dispute in the Civil Division of the Montgomery County 

Court of Common Pleas arose in 2010 and concerns a home in 

which [Morris] and his wife, Bridgitta had been living. Susan 

and James [] changed the locks on the home and took 

possession of certain items of tangible personal property that 

was then within the home. The parties commenced two civil 

disputes in which they advanced claims and counterclaims 

regarding possession and use of the real estate, a claim for rent 

for the real estate, and a vigorous dispute over the ownership of 

the items of tangible personal property (hereinafter, collectively, 

the “Disputed Items”). Upon consideration of preliminary 

objections in this civil action, the claims regarding the tangible 

personal property were transferred to the Orphans’ Court 

division for disposition.[FN1] See Order dated July 7, 2011, 

Docket #2010-15013.

[FN1:] While the Petition to compel the filing of an 

Account was pending but before the Account had 

been filed, the Honorable William Carpenter issued 

an order dated July 7, 2011 in the civil matter listed 

at docket no. 2010-15013, captioned E. Morris 

Davis, IV v. Susan P. Treadway. This order 

granted preliminary objections to certain counts in 

that civil matter, (Count I (Conversion), Count II 

(Fraud), Count V (Accounting), Count VI (Injunctive 

Relief) and Count VII (Replevin) of the Amended 

Complaint of E. Morris Davis), and transferred 

jurisdiction over the disputes regarding ownership of 

certain items of tangible personal property to the 

Orphans’ Court division to be raised in conjunction 

with the proceedings in the Estate of Mary G. H. 

David, docket no. 1990-X1644. 

There are several categories of Disputed Items of tangible 

personal property. The parties do not dispute that the Disputed 

Items originally belonged to [Decedent] and her husband during 

their lives. Nor is there any dispute most of that [sic] the 

Disputed Items were in the possession of [Morris] as of March of 

2010. However, there are certain items that [Morris] claims that 

he never possessed and certain other items that [Morris] 

received but sold. [Morris] claims that the remaining Disputed 

Items belong to him and were received by him as gifts from his 

mother during her lifetime. With respect to most of the Disputed 

Items, [Morris] claims that he received them as gifts from his 

mother decades before her death. [Appellants] claim that the 

Disputed Items belonged to [Decedent] and were property of her 

estate at the time of her death, although they acknowledge that 

many of the Disputed Items were in the possession of [Morris] at 

the time of their mother’s death. 

More than two decades after the death of Decedent, 

following the commencement of the civil litigation, Susan [], 

Betsey [], Mary [] and James [] . . . filed on March 8, 2011, a 

[p]etition for citation to show cause why an [a]ccount should not 
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be filed, seeking to compel [Morris], one of the two co-executors 

to account for the Disputed Items of tangible property that they 

allege he held in his capacity as [e]xecutor of the [e]state of 

[Decedent]. No [a]ccount had previously been filed by the 

[e]xecutors. [Appellants] assert that in 2010 they discovered 

that [Morris] had in his possession certain items of tangible 

personal property that “they recognized as having been in 

[D]ecedent’s possession at or shortly before the time of her 

death.” See Petition for Citation dated March 8, 2011. [Morris] 

asserts in his [a]nswer that the Disputed Items of personal 

property at issue “were not owned at the time of [D]ecedent’s 

death.” To the contrary, [Morris] asserts that most of the items 

of personal property had been given to him by his mother 

decades before her death. 

Thus, this [instant] controversy was initially brought to the 

attention of the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt division by the filing on March 

8, 2011, of a [p]etition to [c]ompel the filing of an [a]ccount. 

Th[e orphans’ court] ordered [Morris] to file an [a]ccount of his 

administration of the [e]state of [Decedent.] After several 

extensions of time, [Morris] filed an [a]ccount on November 30, 

2011. [Morris] filed a [l]imited [a]ccount, limited to jewelry and 

tangible personal property with an aggregate value of

$23,637.50, which he acknowledges were assets of the estate. 

The items listed on this [l]imited [a]ccount were previously 

disclosed on the [i]nventory and [t]ax returns filed by the 

[e]state. [Morris] denie[d] knowledge of the disposition of these 

items and assert[ed] that the disposition of these items [was] 

known only to his co-executor, James[.] On February 3, 2012, 

[o]bjections were filed by [Appellants] . . . to this [a]ccount. 

[Appellants] listed approximately 37 additional items of tangible 

personal property which were not listed in the [l]imited 

[a]ccount filed by [Morris], but which [Appellants] assert[ed] 

actually belonged to Decedent at the time of her death and 

should have been accounted for as part of the [e]state. 

[Morris] has filed in the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt [d]ivision a 

[summary judgment] [m]otion entitled “Motion for Return of 

Property No Longer in Dispute and/or For Which There is Not a 

Substantial Dispute and Overrule All Remaining Objections to the 

Account of E. Morris Davis, IV[.]”[1] A Rule was issued, 

returnable February 5, 2013. No party appeared to show cause 

why the [m]otion should not be granted, and no response to the 

[m]otion was filed by the opposing parties. [Appellants] filed 

voluminous exhibits, a memorandum and two sworn declarations 

on February 11, 2013, immediately before oral argument. 

____________________________________________

1 Appellants point out Morris’s summary judgment motion was unverified. 

We, however, need not address this issue because Appellants did not raise 

it before the orphans’ court. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). 
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The issue in dispute before th[e orphans’ court] with 

respect to this [a]ccount and the [o]bjections, and the [m]otion 

filed by [Morris], is whether the 39 items of tangible personal 

property (plus an automobile) identified by [Appellants] are 

property of Decedent’s estate subject to distribution under her 

[w]ill. [Morris] also seeks to raise a claim to 7 additional items 

of tangible personal property not identified in the [o]bjections. 

Of these 47 items in dispute, [Morris] addresses in his motion 

only 32, although he also takes the position with respect to 11 

items that he does not know their location and that [Appellants] 

should be estopped from asserting a claim with respect to these 

items as well. There are several distinct categories of tangible 

personal property, which the [c]ourt has been at pains to 

categorize, and which are itemized on a [t]able attached hereto 

as Schedule A, with respect to which the parties make slightly 

different claims. The categories of items of tangible personal 

property can be described as follows: 

I. Four Items claimed by [Appellants] to be property of the 

[e]state, in the possession of [Morris] at date of Decedent’s 

death until the present.

II. Fifteen Items claimed by [Appellants] to be property of the 

[e]state, that were in the possession of [Morris], at Decedent’s 

date of death until 2010, but are now in the possession of Susan 

and James Treadway. 

III. Three Items that were in [Morris’s] possession until 2010 are 

now in possession of Susan and James Treadway, but as to 

which [Appellants] assert they were in Decedent’s residence at 

her date of death. 

IV. Four Items claimed by [Appellants] to be property of the 

[e]state, that were in the possession of [Morris] following 

Decedent’s death but were sold following Decedent’s death and 

before 2010. 

V. Eleven Items claimed by [Appellants] to be property of the 

[e]state, as to which [Morris] claims he does not know the 

whereabouts of these items and does not possess them. 

VI. Seven Items claimed by [Morris] to be his property that are 

now in the possession of Susan and James Treadway, but which 

are not specifically identified by [Appellants] on the [o]bjections 

to the [a]ccount as assets of the [e]state (although the 

[o]bjections include a “catch-all” objection number 4, regarding 

other items not specifically identified by [Appellants] but that 

may belong to the [e]state). 

VII. Decedent’s [a]utomobile and two other items to which 

[Morris] does not refer in his motion, but which were listed in the 

[o]bjections to the [a]ccount. 
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Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/18/14, at 1-6 (emphasis added). On July 18, 

2014, the orphans’ court granted Morris’s summary judgment motion and, 

as a result, dismissed Appellants’ objections to the account. In granting the 

summary judgment motion, the orphans’ court principally applied the 

doctrine of laches to conclude Appellants were barred from instituting the 

instant action. Appellants timely appealed to this Court.2 

In arguing the orphans’ court erred in granting Morris’s motion for 

summary judgment, Appellants raise two issues on appeal.3 First, 

Appellants argue the orphans’ court erred in applying the affirmative defense 

____________________________________________

2 The orphans’ court did not order Appellants to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. The court, however, issued a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, incorporating the reasons set forth in its July 18, 

2014 opinion granting Morris’s summary judgment motion. 

3 Although Appellants present us with the following five issues, we have 

consolidated them into two for ease of disposition. 

1. Whether the lower court erred in considering laches as a 

defense to Appellants’ objections to [Morris’s] account as coexecutor of the Estate of Mary G. H. Davis, given [Morris’s] 

failure to plead it in his answers to Appellants’ petition for an 

account and to their objections to his account.

2. Whether the lower court properly formulated and applied the 

“undue delay” element of laches.

3. Whether the lower court erred in holding that the summary 

judgment record demonstrated “undue delay” beyond genuine 

dispute.

4. Whether the lower court properly formulated and applied the 

“prejudice” element of laches.

5. Whether the lower court erred in holding that the summary 

judgment record demonstrated “prejudice” beyond genuine 

dispute.

Appellants’ Brief at 4. 
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of laches sua sponte. Appellants argue Morris failed to raise laches in his 

response to, inter alia, the petition for accounting. Second, and 

alternatively, Appellants argue the orphans’ court erred in determining there 

were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to the “undue delay” 

and “prejudice” elements of laches.

When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we must 

determine whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion or committed an 

error of law.4 See In re Estate of Hooper, 80 A.3d 815, 818 (Pa. Super. 

2013); accord Hovis v. Sunoco, Inc., 64 A.3d 1078, 1081 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (citation omitted); Mee v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 908 A.2d 344, 

347 (Pa. Super. 2006). Our scope of review is plenary. See Sevast v. 

Kakouras, 915 A.2d 1147, 1152 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted); accord 

Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089, 1095 (Pa. 2001). In reviewing an 

orphans’ court’s grant of summary judgment, we apply the same standard 

employed by the orphans’ court, i.e., we review all of the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all doubts as to 

the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party. 

See Erie Ins. Exch. v. Weryha, 931 A.2d 739, 741 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

____________________________________________

4 To the extent Morris argues the orphans’ court did not rule on his summary 

judgment motion, such argument is belied by the record. As noted earlier, 

the orphans’ court expressly granted Morris’s summary judgment motion, 

and in so doing, dismissed Appellants’ objections. 
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“Only when the facts are so clear that reasonable minds could not differ can 

a trial court properly enter summary judgment.” Hovis, 64 A.3d at 1081.

With this standard in mind, we first address Appellants’ argument that 

the orphans’ court erred in applying the doctrine of laches sua sponte. 

The doctrine of laches is an equitable bar to the prosecution of stale 

claims and is the practical application of the maxim: those who sleep on 

their rights must awaken to the consequences that they have disappeared. 

Fulton v. Fulton, 106 A.3d 127, 131 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). Because the application of laches involves a 

question of law, we are not bound by the orphans’ court’s ruling on the 

issue. Id. As we recently explained, the doctrine of laches:

is an equitable doctrine which bars relief when the complaining 

party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to promptly 

institute the action to the prejudice of another. In order to 

prevail on an assertion of laches, respondents must establish: a) 

a delay arising from petitioner’s failure to exercise due diligence; 

and, b) prejudice to the respondents resulting from the delay. 

The question of laches is factual and is determined by examining 

the circumstances of each case. . . . [L]aches is an equitable 

doctrine that should not be applied in favor of a person who has 

failed to take required action on his own.

Vill. of Four Seasons Ass'n, Inc. v. Elk Mountain Ski Resort, Inc., 103 

A.3d 814, 823 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). The party asserting 

laches as a defense must present evidence demonstrating prejudice from the 

lapse of time. Such evidence may include establishing that a witness had 

died or become unavailable, that substantiating records were lost or 

destroyed, or that the defendant has changed his position in anticipation 
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that the opposing party has waived his claims. Fulton, 106 A.3d at 131 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Here, our review of the record reveals the orphans’ court did not raise 

laches sua sponte. On the contrary, Morris raised it in his pleadings. In 

particular, Morris asserted in his pro se response to the petition for 

accounting that Susan “had entered the property numerous times 

previously, and had never made a mention, reference, comment or made 

any other sign of a contest of ownership of the chattels, despite [Morris’s] 

continued and exclusive ownership and customary acts of ownership during 

such visits.” Morris’s Answer to Petition for Accounting, 4/12/11, at ¶ 9. 

Moreover, in his response to Appellants’ objections, Morris argued:

Each of the [Appellants] had personally been in his house and 

seen [Morris’s] in full and outright possession and ownership of 

the majority of the above mentioned items over the last 25+ 

years. Upon his father’s passing, [D]ecedent gifted [Morris] 

many items. At no point was possession or ownership ever 

contested or questioned.

Morris’s Response to Objections, 2/27/12, at ¶ 4. Although we recognize 

Morris did not use the term “laches,” he certainly alleged facts to establish 

laches as a defense to Appellants’ objections. T here is no need to name an 

affirmative defense “if facts sufficient to constitute the defense are pled.” 

Iorfida v. Mary Robert Realty Co., 539 A.2d 383, 397 (Pa. Super. 1988) 

(finding that a single paragraph of defendant’s new matter sufficiently raised 

abandonment as an affirmative defense). Thus, based on the foregoing, we, 

like the orphans’ court, construe Morris’s pleadings to include laches. As a 

result, we cannot conclude the orphans’ court raised laches sua sponte. 
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Having determined laches was properly raised, we now turn to 

Appellants’ alternative argument that the orphans’ court erred in concluding 

Morris satisfied the undue delay and prejudice elements of laches.

As noted earlier, to prevail on an assertion of laches, Morris must 

establish a delay arising from Appellants’ failure to exercise due diligence 

and prejudice to Morris resulting from the delay. See Elk Mountain, 

supra.

With respect to undue delay, Appellants argue the orphans’ court erred 

in concluding they were aware of Morris’s possession of the disputed items 

because evidence of awareness was controverted in the record. In other 

words, Appellants argue the existence of genuine issues of material fact 

relating to their awareness of the disputed items. Appellants, however, fail 

to support their argument with record evidence. They do not cite to the 

record to establish they were unaware of Morris’s possession of the disputed 

items.5 

In the argument section of their brief, Appellants do not even appear 

to challenge knowledge of possession. On the contrary, they argue only that 

“knowledge of possession is NOT necessarily knowledge of an undisclosed 

claim of ownership by gift.” Appellants’ Brief at 20 (emphasis added). Thus, 

____________________________________________

5 Our review of the record does not reveal any evidence to support 

Appellants’ contention that their awareness of Morris’s possession of the 

disputed items was an issue of material fact. 
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Appellants essentially argue Morris failed to provide them notice of his 

ownership of the disputed items.6 We, however, need not decide whether 

disclosure by Morris occurred here. For purposes of establishing undue 

delay under laches, it is sufficient that Appellants were aware of Morris’s 

possession of the disputed items at time of Decedent’s death in 1990. 

Indeed, even if they were unaware of Morris’s possession of the items at the 

time of Decedent’s death, they certainly were put on notice with respect to 

the disputed items when the executors filed the inventory on June 19, 

1990.7 Nonetheless, despite their awareness of Morris’s possession, it was 

not until March 2011, when Appellants petitioned the orphans’ court to order 

Morris to file an account of the estate. 

Here, the orphans’ court recounted the following undisputed facts of 

record:

First, [Appellants] admit in their depositions testimony and 

sworn declarations, that they were aware, both before and after 

Decedent’s death, that [Morris] was in possession of most of the 

Disputed Items. Second, [Morris’s] co-executor, [James], took a 

position as [e]xecutor on [t]ax filings and [i]nventory regarding 

the tangible personal property that was included in the [e]state 

and did not include these Disputed Items. Third, [Appellants] 

never objected to [Morris’s] possession of the Disputed Items 

____________________________________________

6 To buttress this point (lack of disclosure), Appellants refer to Mary’s and 

James’s sworn declarations and Susan’s and James’s depositions.

7

“[A] function and object of an inventory is to fix presumptively the 

existence of property in the fiduciary’s possession, and, while the listing 

therein does not affect true ownership, it is prima facie evidence of 

ownership.’” In re Hendrickson’s Estate, 130 A.2d 143, 146 (Pa. 1957). 

The inventory lists property belonging to the estate that is under the control 

of the executor. 
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until 2010. Fourth, [Appellants] did not demand an accounting 

until nearly twenty-one years after Decedent’s death. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/18/14, at 12. Given these undisputed facts, the 

court reasoned: 

[Appellants] had an affirmative duty to inquire or object if 

they were concerned about the [e]state’s interest in the 

Disputed Items, including making an inquiry regarding any 

missing items, now missing for more than 20 years. [James] in 

particular, as co-executor, had a duty to determine the nature, 

value and disposition of all of the assets of the [e]state, and 

repeatedly identified the assets of the [e]state on an inventory 

and [f]ederal and [s]tate tax returns, always without any 

reference to the Disputed Items. [Appellants] do not allege that 

[Morris] kept secret from them his possession of the assets. 

Indeed, [Mary] admits she knew [Morris] had possession of 

many of these items long before the Decedent’s death.

Id. at 12-13. We, therefore, agree with the orphans’ court’s determination 

that Appellants are guilty of delay in instituting the instant action. 

Appellants next argue the orphans’ court erred in granting Morris’s 

summary judgment motion because there existed issues of material fact 

regarding whether Morris suffered any prejudice because of Appellants’ delay 

in instituting the action. Again, Appellants provide no record support to 

underscore their argument that disputed issues of material fact exist 

regarding whether Morris suffered prejudice because of the undue delay. 

Indeed, our review of the record yields no facts tending to negate the 

orphans’ court’s determination that Morris suffered prejudice as a result of 

Appellants’ delay. Thus, we find no reason to disagree with the court’s 

determination with respect to the prejudice element. As the orphans’ court 

noted: 
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[Appellants’] lengthy delay has inevitably impaired the ability of 

the parties to produce evidence regarding the claims of gifts 

made in the 1970s, the specific location or instructions regarding 

certain items of jewelry as to which none of the parties knows 

where they are or who had them last, and many other facts 

relating to these various items of tangible personal property.

Id. at 13. The orphans’ court also noted that, to dispose of the instant 

matter, Morris relied on a 1991 in-court release,8 which he and Appellants 

had executed with respect to the 1990 civil action. The court further noted 

that the transcript of the release was no longer available. In this regard, the 

orphans’ court determined “[t]he fact that the transcript of the proceedings 

can now no longer be obtained and appears to have been lost or destroyed 

by all of the parties and their counsel, is another confirmation of the 

prejudice caused by the lengthy delay in this case.” Id. at 14. Accordingly, 

given the circumstances here, the orphans’ court did not err in concluding 

Morris suffered prejudice because of Appellants’ delay in bringing this action. 

The court, therefore, did not err in granting Morris’s summary judgment 

motion based on the equitable doctrine of laches.

____________________________________________

8 To memorialize the in-court agreement, the parties executed a written

stipulation releasing Morris “of and from any and all claims arising out of 

[Decedent’s estate] as well as from any and all claims which has been or 

could be brought on behalf of the [e]state for any acts or omissions 

involving [Morris and his wife] during the lifetime of [Decedent].” Orphans’ 

Court Opinion, 7/18/14, at 14 (citing Stipulation and Agreement under 

docket nos. 1990-21209 and 1990-20688). The record also indicates that 

Mary separately executed a release in 2000, wherein she declared that “the 

co-executors have made distribution to her of all of the balance of the 

proceeds of the estate” and have “delivered to her the amount distributable 

to her.” Id. (citing Receipt, Release, Waiver and Indemnity Agreement 

dated October 12, 2000). 
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To the extent Appellants cite In re Estate of Aiello, 993 A.2d 283 

(Pa. Super. 2010), to compel a different outcome, such reliance is 

inapposite. In Aiello, decedent Donald Aiello died testate on March 27,

1977, leaving his entire estate to appellee, his wife. Under his will, he 

named appellee as executrix. Because appellee was not familiar with 

decedent’s financial and business affairs and because English was not her 

native language, she renounced her right to serve as the executrix in favor 

of appellant, her husband’s brother and successor executor under the will. 

In the summer of 2000, upon appellee’s petition, the orphans’ court directed 

appellant to file an accounting of his administration of decedent’s estate. 

Upon the filing of the account, appellee filed objections, raising numerous 

allegations of self-dealing and breach of fiduciary duty on the part of 

appellant. The orphans’ court sustained all but one objection.

On appeal, appellant argued, inter alia, that the orphans’ court erred 

in failing to apply laches. In support of his argument, appellant pointed out 

that the active administration of the estate had ceased many years ago and 

that appellee’s twenty-year delay in petitioning the court for accounting “was 

detrimental to him in that bank records and other records [had] been lost, 

memories [had] faded and his ability to piece together the specifics of his 

administration [had] been generally impeded.” Aiello, 993 A.2d at 287. 

Relying on the orphans’ court’s reasoning, we affirmed its ruling. 

The [orphans’] court concluded that [appellant] failed to 

prove that he had changed his position [to his detriment] as a 

result of the delay. Furthermore, the court found that 

[appellant] continued to actively administer the estate for 
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many years after decedent’s death. For example, in 1997 he 

signed a deed, in his capacity as executor, transferring a parcel 

of property owned by the decedent. He signed liquor license 

renewals for a bar owned by the decedent in his capacity as 

executor until 1999, when the bar was sold. Additionally, there 

are 18 shares of St. Mary’s common stock that continue to be 

held in the name of the estate.

Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, we concluded the orphans’ court did not 

err in determining that laches did not bar appellee’s claims. Id. Moreover, 

this Court observed in passing that the doctrine of unclean hands9also 

would bar laches. We remarked:

[Appellant’s] actions in this case require that he not be allowed 

to benefit from the delay. The evidence shows that [appellee] 

was unsophisticated in financial matters and relied heavily on 

her brother-in-law’s advice, trusting him to act in her best 

interests. However, [appellant] repeatedly breached his 

fiduciary duty as executor, engaging in numerous transactions 

that had the effect of enriching himself to the detriment of the 

estate and, by extension, [appellee], the sole beneficiary of the 

estate.

Aiello, 993 A.3d at 287-88 (noting appellant continued to actively 

administer the estate for many years after decedent’s death). 

Instantly, there is no evidence of record to indicate that Morris actively 

administered the estate long after Decedent’s death in 1990. The record 

reveals Morris’s active administration of the estate essentially terminated in 

1992, when he disposed of the estate’s tax issues. Thereafter, there was a 

____________________________________________

9 The orphans’ court may invoke the doctrine of unclean hands sua sponte.

In re Bosley, 26 A.3d 1104, 1114 (Pa. Super. 2011). The decision to apply 

the unclean hands doctrine against a party is subject to review for abuse of 

discretion. In re Vincent J. Fumo Irrevocable Children’s Trust ex rel. 

Fumo, 104 A.3d 535, 539 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). 
J-A09038-15

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general lull on the docket,10 until Appellants filed the instant action in 2011. 

Thus, unlike the executor in Aiello who actively administered the estate for 

over twenty years, Morris did not actively administer the estate long after 

Decedent’s death. Accordingly, the case sub judice is distinguishable from 

Aiello and, therefore, inapposite.

In sum, the orphans’ court did not err in granting Morris’s motion for 

summary judgment on the basis of laches, because Morris suffered prejudice 

as a result of Appellants’ undue delay in bringing this action.

Decree affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/11/2015

____________________________________________

10 The only notable actively that occurred on the docket was Mary’s release 

dated October 12, 2000.