In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided March 1, 2021

S20A1245. JONES v. THE STATE.

 LAGRUA, Justice.

Delaljujuan1 Jones was tried by a Grady County jury and 

convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with a shooting 

that killed Stanley Hill and wounded three others. Jones appeals, 

contending that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient

to sustain three of his convictions, that the trial court erred when it 

denied his request to charge the jury on the defense of justification,

and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his 

trial counsel failed to present evidence that Hill and others at the 

 1 Though Jones’s first name is spelled “Delajujuwan” in the notice of 

appeal and some of the briefing in this Court, we use the spelling used in the 

indictment, Final Disposition, and trial transcript.
2

scene of the shooting were members of a gang.2 Having identified no 

reversible error, we affirm.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the 

evidence presented at trial shows the following. On January 17, 

2015, Jones and his stepbrother, Alvin Price, along with several 

others, drove from Havana, Florida to Cairo, Georgia to attend a car 

show. After the car show, a crowd of attendees gathered in the 

parking lot of the Cairo Mart gas station to continue the festivities. 

As one witness described it, “[t]here was a lot of music, dancing, 

drinking, [and] people showing off their cars.” 

 2 Hill was killed on January 17, 2015. On March 23, 2015, a Grady 

County grand jury indicted Jones, charging him with malice murder, murder

in the commission of a felony (aggravated assault), aggravated assault of Hill, 

aggravated assault of Kentrail Brown, aggravated assault of Shontarius 

Brown, and aggravated assault of Martravione Moore. Jones was tried in 

September 2015, and the jury found him guilty on all counts. The trial court 

sentenced Jones to life in prison without parole for malice murder and three 

consecutive 20-year terms of imprisonment for the aggravated assaults of the 

three surviving victims. The other counts merged or were vacated by operation 

of law. Jones filed a timely motion for new trial in October 2015, and he 

amended the motion in July 2019. After a hearing, the trial court denied his 

motion for new trial in January 2020. Jones timely appealed, and this case was 

docketed to the August 2020 term of this Court and orally argued in September 

2020.

 
3

At one point that evening, an argument broke out among some 

of the people gathered next to the gas pumps, including Price. Some 

evidence suggests that this argument arose because Price had been 

throwing money into the crowd, angering some of the local residents. 

During the ensuing tension, Hill punched Price, and Jones 

immediately pulled out a gun and fired several shots in Hill’s 

direction. A bystander video-recorded most of the incident on his cell 

phone, and this video was played at trial. 

The video shows a crowd gathered at the gas pumps, with 

some people arguing, but without much animosity. Less than 30 

seconds before the shooting, Price is seen standing in the middle of 

the crowd, smiling and holding a beer, while engaging in a low-key 

argument with someone. Jones also appears in the video, standing 

near Price in a calm manner, not saying anything. As the argument 

with Price appears to intensify, Hill suddenly comes from the side 

and punches or shoves Price, who falls back toward Jones. 

Immediately, Jones pulls out a gun and starts firing at Hill. The 

camera moves away from the scene as soon as the first shot is fired, 
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but a total of seven shots, in quick succession, are heard on the video.

An autopsy revealed that Hill was hit twice. One bullet struck him 

in the arm, and the other entered his lower abdomen, causing a 

massive hemorrhage and resulting in his death. 

The three other victims — Kentrail Brown, his brother 

Shontarius Brown, and Martravione Moore — were not involved in 

the altercation but were struck by stray bullets, and each of them

testified at trial. Kentrail testified that he was sitting on the roof of 

his car, parked next to the Cairo Mart, when he was shot in the 

thigh. Before the shooting, Kentrail said, he saw a “little” 

commotion, but “nothing major at the time.” Kentrail testified that 

the shots were coming from the gas pump area.

Shontarius testified that he was standing by Kentrail’s car

when he was shot in the right foot. Prior to the shooting, Shontarius 

said, he saw some people arguing, and he specifically noticed Jones 

because “everybody else was arguing and he was the only one that 

was calm.” Shontarius testified that he did not see Hill or anyone

else with a gun that night. 
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Moore testified that he was standing right beside the gas 

pumps when he was shot in the thigh. He did not see who shot him, 

as the whole event happened “so fast.” Moore started running as 

soon as he heard gunshots, but then he collapsed from the gunshot 

wound. As he lay on the ground, he heard another series of gunshots, 

which occurred about 15 minutes after the first.

One of the bystanders, Lakeisha Cooper, also heard two 

distinct rounds of gunshots. She testified that she was leaning 

against Kentrail’s car when she heard several gunshots, and about 

two minutes later, she heard more gunshots—“some other dudes 

[were] shooting in the air.” According to Cooper, the second round of 

gunshots occurred after Hill, Kentrail, and Shontarius had been 

shot. Cooper also testified that Hill did not have a firearm that 

night. Another bystander, Nicholas Harden, identified Jones in 

court as the person who shot Hill and testified that he did not see 

anyone with a gun that night other than Jones. Crime scene 

investigators found two bullet fragments near the Cairo Mart store 

and six shell casings scattered near the gas pumps. All six shell 
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casings were of the same brand and caliber, and no other shell 

casings were found at the crime scene. 

1. Jones first contends that the evidence was insufficient as a 

matter of Georgia statutory law to sustain his aggravated assault 

convictions for the shootings of Kentrail, Shontarius, and Moore. 

Jones argues that those convictions were based on circumstantial 

evidence and that the State failed to exclude the reasonable 

hypothesis that other shooters were involved. See OCGA § 24-14-6 

(“To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved 

facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but 

shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the 

guilt of the accused.”). We disagree.

Although some evidence suggests that someone other than 

Jones may have been responsible for the second round of gunfire 

that occurred minutes after the first, testimony from the three 

aggravated assault victims, as well as other evidence, indicates that 

they were shot during the initial round of gunfire and that Jones 

was solely responsible for that initial round. Among other things, 
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the video reflects that Jones fired the first shot and that six more 

shots followed in quick succession. All of the shell casings found in

the area where Jones was standing were of the same caliber and

from the same manufacturer, and there was no evidence indicating 

that anyone else fired a gun at the same time as Jones. So the jury 

was free to reject as unreasonable the hypothesis that Kentrail, 

Shontarius, and Moore were shot by some person other than Jones. 

See Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 781, 783 (1) (822 SE2d 203) (2018) (“[I]t 

is principally for the jury to determine whether an alternative 

hypothesis is reasonable.”). See also Graham v. State, 301 Ga. 675, 

677 (1) (804 SE2d 113) (2017) (“[I]t is the role of the jury to resolve 

conflicts in the evidence and to determine the credibility of 

witnesses, and the resolution of such conflicts adversely to the 

defendant does not render the evidence insufficient.” (Citation and 

punctuation omitted.)). Thus, we conclude that the evidence 

supporting Jones’s aggravated assault convictions was sufficient as 

a matter of Georgia statutory law. And, though Jones does not 

assert insufficiency of the evidence as a matter of constitutional due 
8

process, we also conclude that the evidence presented at trial was 

sufficient for purposes of constitutional due process to authorize a 

rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones

was guilty of all the crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) 

(1979).3

2. Jones next contends that the trial court erred when it denied 

his request to instruct the jury on the defense of justification. Jones 

specifically identifies three instructions that, he argues, the trial 

court erroneously failed to provide: that a person may be justified in 

using force to defend himself or a third person if he reasonably 

believes such force is necessary; that the State must disprove a 

justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt; and that a person 

who is not the aggressor is not required to retreat before using force 

in self-defense. We need not decide, however, whether the trial court 

 3 We remind litigants that, beginning with cases docketed to the term of 

this Court that begins in December 2020, we will end our practice of 

considering sufficiency sua sponte in non-death penalty cases. See Davenport 

v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 399 (4) (b) (846 SE2d 83) (2020). This Court began 

assigning cases to the December Term on August 3, 2020.
9

erred when it refused to provide these requested instructions, 

because any such error was harmless. See McClain v. State, 303 Ga. 

6, 9 (2) (810 SE2d 77) (2018) (“[T]he failure to give a requested 

charge which is authorized by the evidence can be harmless error.” 

(Citation and punctuation omitted.)). “The test for determining 

whether a nonconstitutional instructional error was harmless is 

whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the 

verdict.” Hatney v. State, 308 Ga. 438, 441 (2) (841 SE2d 702) (2020) 

(citation and punctuation omitted). 

Here, to the extent there was any evidence supporting a charge 

on defense of self or a third person, it was meager at best. Our law 

makes clear that the use of deadly force to defend oneself or another 

person is justified only if a person “reasonably believes that such 

force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury . . . or to 

prevent the commission of a forcible felony.” OCGA § 16-3-21 (a). 

The jury here saw the video recording depicting Jones opening fire, 

amidst a crowd of people talking, dancing, and mingling, the 

moment after Price was shoved or punched. Nothing in the video
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suggests that either Price or Jones was in such danger that Jones 

“reasonably” believed it was necessary to immediately fire his gun 

at Hill, much less to fire it in such a manner as to injure multiple 

bystanders. And while Jones argues that there was an air of tension 

between the Florida men and the local residents and that there was 

some evidence of gang affiliations among members of the crowd, he 

offers no evidence that he himself observed or perceived any threat, 

gang-related or otherwise, that would have justified the use of 

deadly force. Accordingly, it is highly probable that the jury’s verdict 

was unaffected by any error in the trial court’s refusal to give all of 

Jones’s requested instructions. See Calmer v. State, 309 Ga. 368, 

372-373 (2) (c) (846 SE2d 40) (2020) (any error in the trial court’s 

failure to give jury instructions on self-defense and no duty to retreat 

was harmless where the evidence supporting these instructions was 

weak); Hatney, 308 Ga. at 442 (any error in failure to give requested 

instruction was harmless where, weighing the evidence as 

reasonable jurors would, it was highly probable jury would have 

rejected defense’s theory). Accordingly, this claim fails.
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3. Lastly, Jones contends that he was denied the effective 

assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to discover and 

present evidence that Hill and other individuals were gang 

members. To obtain relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a defendant generally must show both that his counsel’s 

performance was deficient and that this deficient performance 

prejudiced his defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). An attorney performs 

deficiently under Strickland if he discharges his responsibilities at 

trial in an “objectively unreasonable way considering all the 

circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” 

Thomas v. State, 303 Ga. 700, 702 (2) (814 SE2d 692) (2018) (citation 

and punctuation omitted). “A strong presumption exists that 

counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of professional 

conduct.” Lopez v. State, __ Ga. __ (3) (852 SE2d 547) (2020) (citation 

and punctuation omitted). Prejudice is shown by demonstrating “a 

reasonable probability[,] sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome[,] that, but for counsel’s alleged unprofessional errors, the 
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result of the proceeding would have been different.” Miller v. State, 

285 Ga. 285, 286 (676 SE2d 173) (2009) (citation and punctuation 

omitted). “If either Strickland prong is not met, this Court need not 

examine the other prong.” Palmer v. State, 303 Ga. 810, 816 (IV) 

(814 SE2d 718) (2018).

At trial, in her opening and closing remarks, Jones’s counsel

argued that several people seen in the video standing at the 

periphery of the crowd and wearing red hoodies were members of 

the Bloods gang, which presented a threat to Jones and his group. 

But, aside from testimony that some people at the gathering were 

flashing gang signals, the defense presented no evidence that any of 

the attendees was a gang member. In addition, the State countered 

the defense’s argument with evidence that the red clothing merely 

represented the colors of Cairo High School. 

At the motion for new trial hearing, Jones (through new 

counsel) presented the testimony of a private investigator who was 

retained after trial by Jones’s mother. The investigator testified that 

she discovered a number of photographs on social media showing 
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Hill posing with other people, wearing red clothes or red bandanas,

and making certain hand signs. These photos (16 in total) were 

introduced into evidence at the hearing. Jones also presented the 

testimony of a crime intelligence analyst, who was tendered without 

objection as an expert on gangs. This witness testified that the red 

clothing and bandanas and the hand signs seen in the photos showed 

an association with the Bloods gang; that, in gang culture, if anyone 

shows disrespect to even a single gang member, the entire gang will 

“respond in force”; and that a gang member’s failure to respond to 

disrespect, especially in public, will be perceived as a weakness that 

warrants punishment. On cross-examination, the expert

acknowledged that his opinion about Hill’s gang affiliation was 

formed solely from the social media photos and that he had never 

talked to Jones nor seen the video or any other evidence in the case.

Jones argues that the photographic evidence of Hill’s gang 

membership was necessary to support his defense of justification —

to give the jury a full picture of the threat Jones and his associates

faced from the crowd gathered at the Cairo Mart and to counter the 
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State’s argument that the red clothing seen in the video merely 

represented the colors of the local high school. However, the mere 

fact that this evidence might have been marginally helpful in 

establishing facts that the defense elicited other evidence to 

establish is not sufficient to render trial counsel’s performance in 

this regard deficient. “[D]eficiency cannot be demonstrated by 

merely arguing that there is another, or even a better, way for 

counsel to have performed.” Davis v. State, 306 Ga. 140, 144 (3) (829 

SE2d 321) (2019).

This is particularly true given that the evidence Jones now 

claims counsel should have discovered would have offered only 

minimal additional support for his self-defense theory. No evidence

was presented at trial or the motion for new trial hearing that Jones 

knew Hill or believed that he was a gang member, and there was no 

evidence showing that any of the people depicted in the photos with 

Hill were present at the scene of the shooting, that those people were 

the same individuals seen in the video wearing red clothing, or that 

the red clothing seen in the video was in fact associated with the 
15

Bloods gang. Thus, given the marginal probative value of the photos, 

trial counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to discover them.4

For the same reasons, it is highly unlikely that the evidence in 

question, even if admitted, would have persuaded the jury that 

Jones was justified in shooting Hill, and thus Jones has failed to 

show prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (III) (B). This 

enumeration is thus without merit.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

 4 Indeed, it is not clear whether Jones’s trial counsel, had she discovered 

the photos and obtained the expert’s opinion, would even have sought to 

introduce this evidence, or whether, even if she had, the trial court would have 

admitted it. See, e.g., Walton v. State, 303 Ga. 11, 15 (3) (810 SE2d 134) (2018) 

(trial court did not plainly err in excluding evidence that victim was gang 

member because “any such affiliation was irrelevant and had no connection to 

the shooting”).