NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 17

- 3735

_____________ U NITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. ALMAHDEE JEFFERSON , a.k.a Marty, Appellant

____________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

No. 1

- 13

- cr - 00348

- 001 District Judge : Honorable Robert B. Kugler

______________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) June 19, 2018

______________
Before: GREENAWAY , JR. , RESTREPO, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges (Filed: September 24, 2018 )

_____ OPINION *

_____ RESTREPO, Circuit Judge

.

* This disposition is not an O pinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent.2 Almahdee Jefferson appeals the sentence imposed after he ple d guilty to violating two conditions of his supervised release. We will affirm.
I Jefferson was a member of a multifaceted international theft organization that arranged and executed the export of sto len cars to various countries. He contributed to the criminal enterprise in several ways : stealing or carjacking the cars, driving the stolen cars from one location to another to avoid detecti on, and assisting in the sa le of the cars. On May 17, 2013, Jefferson pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to transport stolen vehicles in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Over the course of the next several ye ar s, Jefferson provided assistance to the
governmen t. At his sentencing hearing on February 2, 2017 , District Co urt Judge Robert B. Kugler determined that the Guideline s range for his offense was 110 to 1 3 7 months ’ imprisonment , but that the range was capped by a 60

- mo n th statutory maximum provided in 18 U

. S

. C . § 371

. Jefferson had 20 criminal history point s, establishing a criminal history category of IV

. As a result of Jefferson’s assistance to the government, Judge Kugler d eparted downward from the G uideline s range by 18 levels and imposed a time

served sentence of 5 months ’ and 4 days ’ impriso nment followed by a term of 36 months of supervised release. Jefferson’s term of supervis ed release began the day he w as sentence d

. By November of 2017, Jefferson ’s probation officer had documented seven violations of the

c onditions of his supervision. O n March 21, 2017 , Jefferson was arrested by local police and charged with conspiracy to commit car thef t and theft of movable property. Jefferson3 was arrested a gain on Septembe r 29, 2017 for eluding police. On October 12, 2017, Jefferson’s probati on officer petitioned the D istrict C ourt to issue a summons for technical violations due to Jefferson’s failur e to truthfully answer questions regarding his employment, home detention requirements , and contact with police. The probation officer amended the petition on November 29, 2017 to include Jefferson’s violation for failing to make required restitution paym ents. At his violation hearing before Judge Kugler , Jefferson pled guilty to two technical violations of his supervised release: failure to truthfully answer questions posed by his probation officer and failing to comply with the conditions of his location monitoring. 1 Judge Kugler accepted the plea and turned immediately to sentencing

. Jefferson acknowledged that Application Note 4 of s ection 7(b)1.4 of the Guidelines support ed imposing a sentence above the Guidelines range because he had original ly received a downwar d departure. Judge Kugler, after recognizing that the advisory Guideline s range was 8 to 14 months, sentenced Jefferson to 24 months . In so doing, the
J udge considered Jefferson’s prior criminal record, the nature of his violations, as well as his failure to complete any term of community supervision. Judge Ku gl er found that Jefferson’ s behavior demonstrated a need for specific and general deterrence because he continued to violate the norms of society

.

1 Both violations were Grade C violations , punishable by a term of imprisonment up to 24 months in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)

.4 II On appeal, Jefferson asks us to find that the District Court ’s sentence of 24 months of imprisonment was substantively unreasonable. Specifically, he posits that the Court did not consider mitigating factors and placed undue emphasis on his criminal histo ry and the leniency he received at his original sentencing. We disagree and will a ffirm the sentence imposed

. The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 , and we have juri sdiction on appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We will affirm a procedurally sound sentence “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on tha t particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” United States v. Tomko , 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009 ) ( en banc ). Thus, we are highly deferential when we review for reasonableness and consider “whether the final sentence, wherever it may lie within the permissible statutory range, was premised upon appropriate and judicious consider ation of the relevant factors.” United States v. Clark , 726 F.3d 496, 500 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Doe , 617 F.3d 766, 770 (3d Cir. 2010))

. When a district c ourt imposes a revocation sentence, its primary consideration must be “the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the v iolator.” United States v. Dees , 467 F.3d 847, 853 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting U.S.S.G. ch.7, pt. A, introductory cmt.) . If, as here, an upward departure is imposed, the court “ simply must5 state on the record its general reasons under [the sentencing factors enumerated in] section 3553(a) for rejecting the Chapter 7 policy statements [of the sentencing
G uidelines] and for imposing a more stringent sentence.” United States v. Blackston , 940 F.2d 877, 894 (3d Cir. 1991).
Here , Jefferson acknowledges that the comment accompanying s ection 7B1.4 of the Guidelines allows for a c ourt to impose an upward departure sentence if an original sentence was the r esult of a downward departure. 2 T he Court enunciated its reasons for the upward departure at sentencing , stating that Jefferson’s violation of lying to his probation officer constituted “an extremely serious crime,” that he had “ never . . . successfully completed a term of community supervision ” over the course of his extensive crimin al history, and that he posed a threat to his community because he “continues to violate t he norms of society.” App. 44

- 45. We find that the Court properly considered the relevant factors and exercised its discretion in imposing Jefferson’s
sentence

. Jefferson asserts that , while an upward departure from the Guideline s range was warranted, his sentence was unre asonable because the C o urt devalu ed mitigating factors, such as his familial obligations, while placing undue emphasis on his prior criminal history and original sentence

. We disagree

. The C ourt explicitly recognized Je ff erson’s personal circums tances when imposing the sentence, concluding that his ongoing criminal conduct , despite being given a “tremendous break in the initial sentence , ”

2 Application Note 4 to U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 provides “[w]here the original sentence was the resul t of a downward departure . . . an upward depart ure may be warranted.”6 contributed to his family’ s hardship. App. 44. T hat t he Court did not view the purported mitigating factors through the lens posited by Jefferson does not render his sentence unreasonable. United States v. Lessner , 498 F.3d 185, 204

- 05 ( 3d Cir. 2007); United
States v. Bungar , 478 F.3d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 2007).
III
B ecause the Court reasonably applied the sentencing factors and acted within its discretion in imposing Jefferson’s sentence, the judgment of sentence will be affirmed.