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“As a practical and incremental step, informed by the 

military’s own incentives to 

foster political structures in 

the tribal areas, the new regulation may. . . have value—if 

and only if it has longevity.”

October 15, 2012

Governance Reforms in Pakistan’s 

Tribal Areas: The Long Road to 

Nowhere?

Summary

•	 Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas(FATA) remain mired in an archaic century-old

system of indirect governance that providesspace in which militant movements have thrived.

•	 President Asif Ali Zardari recently announced the FATA Local Governance Regulation 2012,

establishing a system of local councilsin the troubled tribal region.

•	 Although the regulation is disappointingly vague, and retainsthe sweeping prerogatives of

the central government, it appearsto have been driven in part by the army’sinterest in building civilian governance capacity in conflict-torn areas.

•	 The governments of Pakistan and the United States, along with local and internationalstakeholders,should advocate for continuity of implementation, insist on party-based local council

elections, encourage experimentation within the bounds of the regulation, link the new

councilsto existing developmentstructures, pressthe government to articulate a longer-term

political vision for the FATA, and be realistic about the necessity of the army’s active involvement in shaping governance policy in the tribal areas.

Introduction

On August 14, 2012, President Asif Ali Zardari announced with great fanfare the latest in a series of

modest reformsto the country’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas(FATA). The FATA, a century-old

governance anomaly situated on the country’s western border with Afghanistan, hasreceived

critical attention by scholars and policymakers over the last decade as a safe haven for militant

Islamist groups of all kinds, the locus of activity for agitation against the Pakistanistate, and the site

of widespread humanitarian displacements.

Despite the attention devoted to Pakistan’stribal areas, remarkably little has changed over the

last decade with respect to formal FATA governance systems. The FATA isstill administered under

the antiquated Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) of 1901, which established a system of indirect

rule, encouraged consensus-based decision-making through tribal jirgas, permitted collective

punishment, and provided extraordinary discretionary powersto the central government—

today exercised by the governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), acting asthe agent of the president

of Pakistan. The FCR system hasin recent years come under withering criticism by human rights

advocates, jurists and often the residents of FATA themselvesfor violating fundamental principles

of political and human rights.1 Moreover, there is widespread consensusthat the ongoing

Joshua T. White

E-mail: contact@joshuatwhite.net

Shuja Ali Malik

E-mail: shujamalik@gmail.com

PEACEBRIEF135
© USIP 2012 • All rights reserved.

Governance Reforms in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: The Long Road 

to Nowhere? page 2 • PB 135 • October 15, 2012

governance vacuum in the FATA has allowed militancy to fester unchecked, and that reforming the

outdated system is a criticalstep in making the tribal areasless hospitable to militant movements.

Partially in response to such criticism, Islamabad has undertaken severalstructural changes: it

established a FATA Secretariat in Peshawar in 2006 to coordinate development and political management; it extended the Political Parties Act to the FATA in 2011, permitting candidatesto contest

elections on a party basis(though under the FCR they cannot legislate); and it promulgated in

2011 minor revisionsto the FCR, rescinding some of the more egregious provisions. At the same

time, however, the government issued the regressive Action in Aid of Civil Power Regulation 2011,

which gave sweeping powersto security forces operating in the FATA.

These changes have been seen aslargely cosmetic, and have done little to addressthe massive

social disruptions experienced by FATA communities over the last decade of intermittent violence.

Such disruptions—variously attributed to the Pakistan army’s campaigns, the rise of disparate

militant groupsthat targeted pro-government tribal elders and the American policy of drone

attacks—have undermined the government’sfragile system of indirect rule, and have left the FATA

a patchwork of governance dysfunction. In some agencies,such as South Waziristan, government

presence apart from the military is virtually invisible.

Local Governance Regulation 2012: Structure and Substance

The recently- promulgated FATA Local Governance Regulation 2012 (LGR) is a complex regulatory

instrument that, at its core, authorizesthe governor to establish elected local councils at the

municipal level to be given responsibility for matters of local concern. Salient featuresinclude:

•	 Coverage. Unlike previous local government regulations in Pakistan’s so-called“settled”

areas, the LGR limits the establishment of local councils to urban areas, and grants the

governor broad discretion in setting the geographic boundaries of local government

jurisdiction.

•	 Composition. At least three-quarters of the members of the local councils are directly

elected for a four-year term, with up to one-quarter of seats allocated to“special groups”

elected indirectly by the council members. Each council then elects a chairman and vice

chairman.

•	 Staffing. Administrative control over the staff hired by the local councils resides with the

FATA Secretariat in Peshawar, which in turn reports to the governor.

•	 Responsibilities. The “compulsory functions”delegated to local councils include responsibility for sanitation and drainage, water supply, public safety, development and implementation of municipal master plans, building control, streets and traffic management, and

limited cultural activities. The list of“optional functions”is more vague, including“education: As directed or authorized by the governor,” and—listed but left undefined—matters

pertaining to“social welfare.”

•	 Funding. The LGR envisions three major sources of funding for the activities of the local

councils: grants received from the governor, or provided at his direction; profits from property held or managed by the council; and taxes and fees levied by the council on the local

population, final approval of which rests with the governor.

Incrementalism at the Army’s Behest?

At first blush, the motivation behind the LGR seems puzzling. Elected leadersin Islamabad have

few political incentivesto cultivate elitesin the tribal areas, or to bring about an increase in
© USIP 2012 • All rights reserved.

Governance Reforms in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: The Long Road 

to Nowhere? page 3 • PB 135 • October 15, 2012

governmentspending in the region. For his part, President Zardaristandsto receive only modest

reputational gains by promoting political participation in the FATA.

While the civilian leadership may have had only modestincentives, a close reading ofthe regulation, along with interviewsrecently conducted in Islamabad,seem to suggestthatthe army had

strong reasonsto supportthe creation ofthe LGR.The Pakistan military is no strangerto the business

of political devolution; military rulers have a long and often sordid history of crafting local government

systemsto reinforce central power, bypass provincial elites or cultivate local power brokers.

In the case ofthe LGR, however,the military’simpetus was arguably not political manipulation,

but an attemptto deal with the fallout of nearly a decade of intermittent warin the FATA. Following

numerous military campaignsin the tribal areassince 2004,the army findsitself in the awkward position of needing to backfill its operations with local governance infrastructure. By most accounts, it has

no interestin directly serving as a political administration in the FATA (where itis, by many measures,

unpopular) and has every incentive to hand off authoritiesto local elites.With the gradual breakdown

ofthe longstanding system of political agentsreporting to the governor,some kind of a managed

local governmentsystem—one that can be stood up on an ad hoc basis assecurity conditions

permit—is arguably the most amenable governance structure to the military.

Itshould therefore come as no surprise that the LGR bears all the hallmarks of being precisely

such a flexible tool for the military and bureaucratic elite. Consonant with the interests of the army

in promoting post-conflictstabilization in FATA, while also retaining flexibility to adapt ifsecurity

conditions erode, the LGR focuses on urban locales; grantsthe governor high levels of discretion in

terms of the timing of elections and the geographic boundaries of local councils; and enumerates

numeroussources of potential funding, but retains executive control over how taxes are levied.

Moreover, the regulation does not appear to give local councils control over critical development

and infrastructure budgets—which currently reside with the FATA Secretariat—but is also vague

enough that the governor could, at his discretion, choose to progressively delegate such authoritiesto a local council if he so desired.

To those who have advocated for robust FATA reformsthat would substantially bring the tribal

areasinto the governance mainstream, the LGR is clearly a disappointment. Although some of the

governor’s discretionary authorities were rolled back relative to what was contained in the first

public draft of the LGR, the final regulation islimited in the scope, autonomy and responsibilities

granted to local councils.2 Not only are the councilslimited, but they must operate under the

antiquated FCR and submit (in a manner that is pointedly left unspecified) to the oversight of a

powerful and relatively unaccountable political agent.

With so many specificsleft ill-defined, thisregulation has been widely criticized by parties and

civilsociety groups as a half-baked reform effort.3 Cautious, lacking in imagination, and carefully

bounded, it doeslittle to move the tribal areastoward a system of modern governance. It also

seems disconnected from a largerstrategy of FATA integration. Thatsaid, as a practical and incrementalstep, informed by the military’s own incentivesto foster politicalstructuresin the tribal

areas, the regulation may nonetheless have value—if and only if it haslongevity. To the extent that

it allowsthe military and the bureaucracy to gradually build politically-invested local leadership in

those areasin which the security environment is permissive, it hasthe potential to be a worthwhile

firststep in the process of rebuilding local powerstructures.

Policy Recommendations

The governments of Pakistan and the United States, civilsociety groups and internationalstakeholders would be wise to consider the following asthe LGR movestoward implementation:
© USIP 2012 • All rights reserved.

Governance Reforms in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: The Long Road 

to Nowhere? page 4 • PB 135 • October 15, 2012

•	 Pressfor continuity. Longevity is more important than getting the system exactly right.

Former President Pervez Musharraf introduced a local government program in the FATA in

2004, but it was a half-hearted effort, and was soon abandoned. This recent effort runs the

risk that the government will ignore the LGR, fail to fund it, or roll it out in so incremental

a fashion as to signal to tribal communities that it is merely a stopgap measure, bound to

be replaced as conditions evolve on the ground. Outside observers should pressure the

government of Pakistan to establish, bring to scale, and maintain the system outlined in the

LGR, rather than continually rework the structure from scratch every few years.

•	 Insist on party-based elections. If the goals of a local government system in the FATA include

widening political participation, increasing state legitimacy and deepening local ownership

of local issues, the elections should take place on a party basis. Getting political parties

involved allows local constituents to aggregate interests, but also helps to tie FATA into the

national political debate. Islamabad is traditionally wary of party-based local elections, but

ensuring party participation in FATA should be an advocacy priority for civil society groups

and international stakeholders.

•	 Embrace ambiguity. The vague language of the LGR is both a challenge and an opportunity.

At its best, it could provide wide latitude for experimentation, and for gradually pushing

more responsibilities to local councils as the security environment permits. The FATA Secretariat, given its institutional investments, is likely to push back on devolving developmental

authorities, but the LGR will have only minimal impact if the army and bureaucracy insist on

a minimalist reading of the regulation.

•	 Link up existing developmentstructures. The local councils will only gain political traction if

they receive predictable funding. This requires quickly transitioning existing local structures

to the new LGR framework. USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, for example, has supported for several years the FATA Secretariat in establishing dozens of community-driven

development councils; such aid programs should be linked up with LGR local councils to

provide a steady inflow of funds, and give the new structures staying power.

•	 Plan for the future. The LGR does not chart a course for bringing FATA into the governance

mainstream.4 Stakeholders should continue to press the government to articulate a longerterm political vision for the tribal areas. A number of options such as FATA’s full integration

with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, transition to a hybrid Provincially Administered Tribal Areas

(PATA) model, making it a stand-alone province with its own assembly, have previously

been floated. The government should initiate an open debate on FATA’s future so that it

could begin aligning the incentives of the new local council members with a macro-level

strategy for the tribal areas.

•	 Be realistic. Any political endeavor in the FATA today faces an uphill battle. The political class

has been decimated. The security situation is poor. Pakistan’s civilian leadership is wary of

investing time and political capital. The local population is often caught between Taliban

movements and the army, neither of which they welcome. And there is little momentum

for major reforms. Governance change in the FATA, if and when it happens, will be a game

of aligning incentives. If there is any silver lining to the disappointingly narrow and vaguely

written LGR, it is that the army’s incentives for modest reforms appear to be coming into

view. Increasingly wary of“owning”the governance space in the FATA, and taking lessons

from its recent campaign in the Swat Valley, the military is, it seems, beginning to see value

in encouraging locally-owned governance institutions. Not unreasonably, some will see this

development as yet another pernicious example of a hyper-militarized state. But it is, on

balance, a change that should not be dismissed out of hand. Until and unless the army feels
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Governance Reforms in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: The Long Road 

to Nowhere? page 5 • PB 135 • October 15, 2012

compelled by its own incentives to address the governance void in the FATA, even a limited

reform agenda is too much to reasonably expect.

Notes

1.	 See, e.g., Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, Understanding FATA 2011: Attitudes Towards Governance,

Religion and Society in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Volume V (Islamabad: Community

Appraisal and Motivation Programme, 2012), 23.

2.	 In the first public draft, released July 2012, the governor had wider discretion in determining

the size and composition of the councils; was designated asthe“election authority”(instead of the

Election Commission of Pakistan, asin the final regulation); and had nearly unchecked powersto

dismiss councils at his whim.

3.	 See, e.g.,“JI Suggests Changesin Law for Local Govt in Fata,”Frontier Post, August 9, 2012;“Some

Qualms on Proposed Fata LG Law,”Dawn, August 10, 2012; Ayaz Wazir,“Eyewash and Farce,”The

News, August 11, 2012.

4.	 Thisis not to suggest that there is only one possible path toward modernizing governance

structuresin the FATA. See, e.g., Joshua T. White,“The Shape of Frontier Rule: Governance and Transition, from the Raj to the Modern Pakistani Frontier,”Asian Security 4, no. 3 (Autumn 2008); Shinwari,

Understanding FATA 2011, 21ff; Ayaz Wazir,“Which System for Fata?,”The News, June 5, 2012.

About This Brief

Joshua T. White was a 2011–12 

Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar 

at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He 

holds a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins 

University, and conducted a portion of this research in conjunction 

with a generous grant from the 

American Institute of Pakistan 

Studies. Shuja Ali Malik received 

his M.Sc. in International Relations 

from Quaid-e-Azam University, 

and works as a producer at an 

Urdu-language news service in 

Islamabad. The views expressed in 

this brief do not necessarily reflect 

the views of the U.S. Institute of 

Peace, which does not take policy 

positions.