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ASSURING THE SAFETY OF DOMESTIC 

ENERGY PRODUCTION: LESSONS LEARNED 

FROM THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 

(112–58) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

NOVEMBER 2, 2011 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ 

committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington 

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana, 

Vice Chair 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida (Ex Officio) 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

(Ex Officio) 

(III) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... iv 

TESTIMONY 

Caldwell, Stephen L., Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 6 

Rufe, Vice Admiral Roger, Jr., (Retired), Chair, Incident Specific Preparedness Review, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, United States Coast Guard ......... 6 

Rusco, Frank, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 6 

Zukunft, Rear Admiral Paul F., Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, 

Security, and Stewardship, United States Coast Guard .................................. 6 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Caldwell, Stephen L., and Rusco, Frank, joint statement .................................... 53 

Rufe, Vice Admiral Roger, Jr., (Retired) ................................................................ 75 

Zukunft, Rear Admiral Paul F. .............................................................................. 78 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

United States Coast Guard: 

Response to recommendations from five reports regarding the Deepwater 

Horizon oil spill ............................................................................................. 12 

Response to request for information from Hon. Frank A. LoBiondo, a 

Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey ....................... 38 

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(1) 

ASSURING THE SAFETY OF DOMESTIC 

ENERGY PRODUCTION: LESSONS 

LEARNED FROM THE DEEPWATER 

HORIZON OIL SPILL 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 2011 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND

MARITIME TRANSPORTATION, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:59 a.m. in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Frank LoBiondo 

(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Good morning. The subcommittee will come to 

order. The subcommittee is meeting this morning to examine the 

lessons learned in the wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, 

review the latest investigations into the causes of the spill, and the 

Coast Guard response to it, hear recommendations of those involved in investigations, and find out what actions the Service has 

taken or will take in response to those recommendations. 

The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill was an unprecedented tragedy. The explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon tragically 

claimed the lives of 11 individuals and left a tremendous—almost 

unparalleled—natural and economic disaster in its wake. The 

Coast Guard mobilized over 7,500 personnel, and 150 assets from 

throughout the country to respond to the spill. While I am extremely proud of how the Coast Guard handled this incident, it is 

important that we review what went well and what we could do 

better in any future type event. 

As such, today we will hear testimony on the Joint Investigation 

Team Report, the incident-specific preparedness report, and the 

Federal On-Scene Coordinator report. These reports each contain 

valuable insight into what caused the oil spill, and how the Federal 

Government responded to it. 

Among the many findings and recommendations, a few stand out 

because they appear in nearly every report. Nearly all of the reports noted that the area contingency plans were not adequate for 

a spill of this magnitude, and that they must be updated to incorporate protocols for using dispersants and other response technologies, as well as the latest information on environmentally sensitive areas. They must also do a better job of involving State and 

local officials in the planning process. I hope the Coast Guard has 

2 

made some progress on this issue, and look forward to hearing 

when we can expect all ACPs will be revised. 

I am also concerned with findings indicating the Coast Guard’s 

oil spill response and Marine environmental protection mission has 

withered over the last decade, as a result of emphasis on homeland 

security missions. This is in line with the findings of the inspector 

general and others, which indicate that funding and resource hours 

dedicated to non-homeland security missions, as well as the oil spill 

response, research, and development activities have shrunk considerably over the last decade. 

Finally, I am very concerned with the findings that officials at 

all levels of Government were unfamiliar with the national contingency plan, our Nation’s 42-year-old blueprint on how to respond 

to oil spills. But I am particularly alarmed that senior leaders of 

the Department of Homeland Security were either unaware or simply misunderstood how the plan functions. 

But these concerns speak to a larger issue this subcommittee has 

been concerned with since the Coast Guard was transferred to the 

Department of Homeland Security, and that is the Department 

does not understand nor appreciate the traditional missions of the 

Coast Guard. We talked about this extensively over the years, that 

when the Coast Guard has been asked to do so very much—and 

homeland security is a very critical mission—that the traditional 

missions cannot be overlooked. 

And while critically important, port security accounts for only 20 

percent of what the Coast Guard does on a daily basis. The remaining 80 percent are traditional missions like oil spill response. These 

missions require the Department’s leadership to understand that 

they need to commit adequate resources and attention, as well as 

participate fully in training and preparedness activities. 

MODUs like the Deepwater Horizon continue to operate in our 

waters, and will soon begin operations in Cuban waters. Each of 

these operations, if not properly regulated by the Coast Guard with 

the support of the Department, could potentially cause another catastrophic spill. As such, we cannot afford to sit back and take our 

time in implementing the lessons learned. 

I look forward to hearing what the Coast Guard has done to date 

to implement the recommendations of these reports, and when they 

will complete action on the remaining recommendations. 

With that, I would like to yield to Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for scheduling today’s hearing to continue the subcommittee’s oversight concerning the circumstances contributing to the Deepwater Horizon 

oil spill, and to hear recommendations to improve our energy development activities on the intercontinental shelf of the United States. 

We learned a lot earlier this year, when members from the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling in February provided us with their recommendations. I expect that this morning’s witnesses will provide additional 

insights and new motivation for the Congress to take purposeful 

action. 

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was a major human and environmental disaster of potentially unprecedented proportions. The message today is the same as it was when we heard from the National 

3 

Commission 8 months ago. Undertaking deep water drilling requires a fuller understanding of the risks that accompany the clear 

benefits. It is great news that we now have a much more full understanding. 

Several common themes run through the findings and recommendations contained in the various reports that we will review 

today, and many of these seem parallel—themes parallel the findings and recommendations contained in the National Commission’s 

report. 

For example, the Federal Government’s regulation of offshore oil 

and gas drilling and of foreign-flagged MODUs was too lax. Also, 

Federal oversight of foreign-flagged registries and reliance on certifications of compliance issued by such registries deserves greater 

scrutiny. 

Additionally, as reported in the Joint Investigation Team analysis, failures and deficiencies in the safety management system 

aboard the Deepwater Horizon and the dual command structure 

that existed prior to its demise each contributed to the disaster. 

The need for greater integration and outreach on the State and 

local levels during the development of area contingency plans—or 

ACPs—also was emphasized in these reports. Moreover, efforts to 

better articulate the institutional and operational differences between Federal response efforts under the Oil Pollution Act and the 

Stafford Act are needed to improve coordination between Federal 

responders and their State and local partners. 

Additionally, we learned that our limited tool box of response capabilities exposed a legitimate need for a new emphasis and resources to bolster research and development of new oil spill response technologies. 

And, once again, these reports reaffirmed that the Jones Act, the 

law which protects and supports our domestic maritime industry, 

was absolutely no hindrance to the Federal Government’s response 

to this environmental calamity. These reports also make clear that 

we need to provide Federal agencies with adequate resources to 

minimize the odds of another tragedy from happening again, and 

respond efficiently and effectively, should we have to. 

The public depends on Federal agencies to ensure the safety of 

deep water drilling, and the safety of the men and women who 

work on those platforms. Diminishing this capacity through budget 

cuts is irresponsible, especially considering the call for increased 

investment borne out by these reports. As much as we may want 

the Coast Guard to do more with less, what this means in reality 

are fewer inspectors, less inspections, and less certainty for safe operations. And, as we have learned tragically, this has real consequences, in terms of loss of life and economic disruption. 

Now that we have these recommendations in hand, Congress 

should act sensibly where it must to ensure that our policies for offshore drilling are rigorous, that they safeguard workers, that they 

benefit the economy, and protect the environment. Too many lives 

are at stake and too many jobs are at risk for Congress to remain 

complacent. If we cannot demonstrate that we can utilize our offshore resources in a way that protects lives and the environment, 

we stand to further lose our credibility and trust of the American 

people. 

4 

And that result could be devastating to the maritime industry, 

and the jobs that support our economy as a whole, including the 

ship builders, welders, and pipe fitters who work at places like Dakota Creek Industries, located in my district, who actually do work 

to develop and build supply vessels that support the energy industry in the gulf. No one is suggesting that we eliminate deep water 

drilling off our coasts. In fact, the record says just the opposite. 

According to information provided by the Bureau of Safety and 

Environmental Enforcement, perhaps not all, but many of the drilling activities that were suspended as a result of this disaster have 

resumed operations. Moreover, 97.7 percent of the 1,413 requests 

to extend deep water oil and gas leases have been granted, and 

close to 300 new well permit applications have been approved since 

June 8, 2010. 

But given what we now know about the risks of deep water drilling and the exposed deficiencies, we should put the pieces in place 

to ensure the highest level of safety and reliability. When the 

Exxon Valdez ran aground in Bligh Reef in Alaska in 1989, Congress responded with the passage of the Oil Pollution Act. And fortunately, over the past 22 years, the act has served its intended 

purpose, and greatly reduced the frequency and severity of oil spills 

in the navigable waters of the United States. 

Nonetheless, the Deepwater Horizon disaster demonstrated a 

need to amend and strengthen the act to ensure that contemporary 

offshore drilling can be done safely, efficiently, and with minimal 

harm to the environment. 

Last Congress, the House passed comprehensive legislation to reform and improve the Federal Government’s oversight of energy development on the intercontinental shelf. The Senate did not act. 

Nevertheless, comparable legislation has been reintroduced this 

Congress, and that bill, H.R. 501, provides an appropriate starting 

point for discussions. 

I suggest it is time for these discussions to begin in earnest, and 

I stand ready to work with Chairman LoBiondo and other members 

of this committee to shape legislation to meet this challenge. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the chance to provide an opening statement, and I yield back. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. Mr. Mica, chairman of the full committee, would you like to make any opening remarks? 

Mr. MICA. Well, just a comment, first, to thank you all for conducting this hearing. And it is important that our subcommittees 

conduct appropriate oversight, particularly of something so significant, so impacting on the Nation as the oil spill, the Deepwater Horizon incident, in which we lost lives and did damage to the environment of the gulf, and affected many of the surrounding States. 

I hope from this hearing and from previous reports that we can 

also adopt measures and look at any changes in law or policy that 

can make certain that we have a better response when we do have 

an incident. 

I am anxious to hear some of what will be the testimony given 

today in regard to progress of the Coast Guard and its ability to 

respond adequately and make certain that we give them the tools 

to—and again, any changes in Federal law that we need to make, 

5 

or in their response pattern, so that again they can do the job necessary. 

I was concerned about several things I have heard lately. One 

is—will affect pending legislation to divide some proceeds from a 

legal settlement between the States and the Federal Government. 

And I think it is important that at some point the subcommittee 

ascertain who has been adequately compensated for their losses, 

and try to come up with some fair and balanced approach to make 

certain that people are made as whole as possible. 

Congress will have to divide that compensation that the courts 

may soon decide upon, and we want it done fairly. I have told some 

of the participants that I our responsibility in Congress is representing the American people and the taxpayer, who did expend 

a considerable amount of resources and effort. And I thank the 

Coast Guard for their great job in helping direct the cleanup, and 

Admiral Allen’s incredible work at a difficult time. 

I was disappointed by some of the interagency problems that we 

experienced, particularly with EPA. It is making decisions that— 

on some of the chemicals and other treatment that was used back 

and forth, leaving the response in the lurch, so to speak, probably 

causing some delays and also uncertainty in what should move forward. 

I think, finally, that it is nice to have the Federal Government 

prepared, and we have learned some lessons from this. A delayed 

response by the Federal Government, but finally getting in there. 

Part of that was based on inadequate flow information, and that 

can be corrected, and we will probably hear more about that today. 

But I think, in the long term, the private sector has to be held 

responsible. They also need to be developing technologies or means 

to cap a spill like this as the disaster progresses. Some of those 

mechanisms, the technologies, equipment need to be in place. I understand they have taken some initiatives. I don’t know how adequate they are, in case we ever experience something like this 

again. 

And finally, that BP or anyone who was involved in and held responsible for this makes certain that folks are adequately compensated. I understand what initially started out as an adequate 

response to those affected has now experienced some problems, and 

people have not been adequately, again, assisted. And I think we 

have got to find out how we move that process forward and hold 

the private sector, as well as the Government’s feet to the fire. 

I thank you again for conducting this hearing. I hope some answers can evolve that will help us do our job better. And I yield 

back the balance of my time. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Mica. We now welcome our panel 

of witnesses. We thank you very much for being here today. 

Our panel includes Admiral Zukunft—I hope that is pronouncing 

it correctly. If it is OK with you, we will go with Admiral Z the rest 

of the way. The rear admiral is the assistant commandant for marine safety, security, and stewardship. 

We also have retired Coast Guard Vice Admiral Roger Rufe, 

chairman of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill incident specific preparedness review, Mr. Steve Caldwell, director of the Government 

Accountability Office of homeland security and justice team, and 

6 

Mr. Caldwell is accompanied by Mr. Frank Rusco, director of 

GAO’s National Resources and Environment Team. 

I thank you all again for participating. Admiral Z, you are up. 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL PAUL F. ZUKUNFT, ASSISTANT 

COMMANDANT FOR MARINE SAFETY, SECURITY, AND STEWARDSHIP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD; VICE ADMIRAL 

ROGER RUFE, JR., (RETIRED), CHAIR, INCIDENT SPECIFIC 

PREPAREDNESS REVIEW, DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL, 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD; STEPHEN L. CALDWELL, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; AND FRANK RUSCO, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Good morning, Chairman LoBiondo, Ranking 

Member Larsen, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

I am honored to appear before you today to testify about the Coast 

Guard’s status in regard to the 2010 Macondo 252 spill of national 

significance that resulted in a tragic explosion, loss of 11 lives, and 

sinking of the MODU Deepwater Horizon. I served as the Federal 

On-Scene Coordinator for over 6 months, leading more than 47,000 

Federal, State, local, tribal, and private responders in the expansive response operation. 

In the aftermath of the spill, the Coast Guard conducted a comprehensive review of several Deepwater Horizon after-action reports, including the incident-specific preparedness review, or ISPR, 

the Federal On-Scene Coordinator report, that I signed, the National Incident Commander’s report, and the Joint Investigation 

Team Report. These reports provide a valuable body of lessons 

learned, perspectives, and opinions the Coast Guard is now using 

to spur initiatives that will ensure we are well prepared to respond 

to future spills of national significance. 

While there are many areas for improvement that we are addressing through countless initiatives, we have concluded the overall response framework and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the 

national oil and hazardous substance pollution contingency plan, or 

the NCP, is sound and effective. 

The NCP established and organized a command and control 

structure that allowed the National Incident Commander and the 

Federal On-Scene Coordinator to effectively cooperate with one another while directly coordinating with other Federal, State, local, 

tribal, and private stakeholders to address the most critical needs. 

Additionally, the NCP provided the necessary discretion and 

flexibility to address the very unique circumstances of the Deepwater Horizon response. Since the Deepwater Horizon spill, the 

Coast Guard and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, or BSEE, have forged an interagency partnership focused on 

improving compliance standards, oil spill response and preparedness efforts, and regulation of drilling activities on the outer continental shelf. 

The director of BSEE and the Coast Guard deputy commandant 

for operations meet on a quarterly basis—and they are actually testifying together today—to discuss OCS activities. They have established working groups that are actively engaged on a wide range 

7 

of issues, including oil spill response planning, exercises, joint inspections, and of significant note, a comprehensive analysis of regional and area contingency plans. This effort includes a worst-case 

discharge gap analysis to identify the most accurate up-to-date information for offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico, Alaska, and 

Pacific regions. 

One of the key lessons learned—one of our key lessons learned 

was that, although we planned with State officials, as prescribed 

in the national contingency plan, we need to drive the same effort 

down to the county, parish, local, and tribal levels. Accordingly, the 

Coast Guard has re-emphasized existing guidance to our district 

and sector commanders to develop an aggressive outreach program 

with local municipalities to facilitate a true whole-of-government 

approach under the NCP and future response efforts. 

The various after-action reports highlighted 51 recommendations 

and areas for improvement. In response, the Coast Guard is reviewing each item and establishing goals, objectives, courses of action, and a timeline, as a followup. Our significant initiatives that 

are currently in progress include developing an on-scene Federal officer coordinating course, which has already been launched. 

We have requested additional personnel in the President’s budget for fiscal year 2012 to establish a national incident management 

assistance team that will provide immediate deployable incident 

management surge capability. We are working with DHS and the 

interagency to update documents and protocols, and we have also 

promulgated a National Incident Commander spill of national significance internal instruction that codifies a number of the lessons 

learned during the Deepwater Horizon response. 

We are also implementing senior-level Coast Guard liaisons to 

State, local, and tribal levels during a future response. We have engaged with EPA and FEMA to develop improvements for whole-ofgovernment responses under the national response framework and 

the national contingency plan, and we are also working closely with 

the national response teams, EPA and NOAA, to review and update guidelines for dispersant use and in situ burning, two tools 

that were critical in the Deepwater Horizon response. 

The Coast Guard is aggressively pursuing updates to regulations 

governing activities on the outer continental shelf. These updates 

will identify safety gaps for critical equipment, as identified in the 

Deepwater Horizon reports, and reflect standards for new and 

emerging technological advancements within the industry. 

On July 7, 2011, we announced policy in the Federal Register detailing a new risk-based oversight program that will target the 

highest risk foreign-flagged MODUs operating in the U.S. EEZ. 

The Coast Guard is also addressing funding concerns with both 

the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and the research and development. To improve our response capability we need to modify current authorities to increase per-incident cap under the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund permit multiple advancements from the fund to 

underwrite Federal emergency response activities, and provide access to funds for administration of claims. 

There is also an urgent need to further invest in oil spill research 

and development funding. Fiscal year 2011 appropriations included 

$4 million for oil spill response and development, and the PresiVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:56 Feb 29, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG\11-2-1~1\71098.TXT JEAN
8 

dent’s fiscal year 2012 budget request includes R&D funding for 

spill response in the Arctic, Deepwater subsidy response, and for 

a full-time executive director on the interagency coordinating council on oil pollution response. 

In conclusion, although we faced early challenges, particularly 

the technological challenges of oil recovery in sub-sea containment 

at a depth of 5,000 feet, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response 

met its objectives through the prudent application of the national 

contingency plan, and unity of effort—of all efforts of Government 

and the private sector. 

Gaps that are not addressed in the national contingency plan 

were implemented as best practices in the midst of this unprecedented response, and we continue to enact oil spill prevention and 

response initiatives with a focus on outer continental shelf activities. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today, and 

I will be pleased to answer your questions. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Admiral, very much. 

Admiral Rufe? 

Admiral RUFE. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

committee, Ranking Member Larsen. I appreciate the opportunity 

to appear before you today to testify on the incident-specific preparedness review, which I chaired for the Coast Guard. My name 

is Roger Rufe. I am a retired Coast Guard vice admiral. 

Our team was chartered by the commandant of the Coast Guard 

on the 14th of June—— 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Excuse me, Admiral, can you pull the microphone 

a little closer? 

Admiral RUFE. Our team was chartered on 14 June 2010 by the 

commandant of the Coast Guard to assess the implementation and 

effectiveness of preparedness and response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Our team was composed of 14 spill response experts 

from Federal agencies, State governments, industry, and a representative of the environmental advocacy NGO community. 

It is important to note that we were focused solely on the oil spill 

itself, not on the fire and explosion, and that we were completely 

independent of the Coast Guard or any other oversight from the 

administration. We conducted 92 interviews, all of which were not 

for attribution, unlike some of the other investigations. Our members all signed nondisclosure statements and confidentiality agreements. 

We are integrated fully with the President’s National Commission, which was mentioned earlier. Their staff members participated fully in all of our interviews. And, in fact, chapter 5 of their 

report is based largely on the information gleaned during the process. 

While the findings and recommendations of our report are all important, I would like to highlight a few and, at risk of being redundant, certainly some of them were mentioned already by the chairman and others, as well as by Admiral Z. 

The ACPs are of uneven quality, especially with respect to identifying and prioritizing environmentally sensitive areas, and laying 

out detailed strategies for protecting them. It is also important that 

9 

they identify the resources that are necessary for responding to a 

worst-case discharge. 

There is a need for the incident commander to quickly attain information dominance, and maintain it throughout the incident. A 

single source of authoritative information is critical to public confidence in the Government’s response. It is also very difficult to 

achieve in our 24/7 cable news cycle, and in an era of social networking where it is so pervasive. 

As already mentioned, there has been insufficient inclusion of 

local officials in the contingency planning or exercise process. That 

needs to be improved. And Admiral Z has already spoken to the 

fact that it is under scrutiny right now. 

But the inadequacy of local involvement relates to my next point 

already mentioned, that it was unfamiliarity at all levels of Government on the national contingency plan, which led to what Admiral Allen described as the social and political nullification of the 

NCP. 

State and local officials are much more comfortable with and familiar with the NRF model, which allows for the Stafford Act to 

support State and local officials with funding and resources, but 

the local officials are in charge. Obviously, that is different than 

the national contingency plan. And, as Admiral Z has already mentioned, our report indicates that we feel the national contingency 

plan is the right model for oil spill response, and there needs to be 

a better process of educating State and local officials in that process early in the game. 

One thing not mentioned earlier is—and a central part of our report was—a failure of crisis leadership at virtually every level of 

response, from industry to Government, from Federal to local. 

Among the indications of this failure was the decisions being made 

on response tactics at political levels, rather than at the level of the 

response experts, which led to response tactics being implemented 

which were known to be inadequate at the outset and delayed, in 

many cases, an adequate response. 

And finally, I want to emphasize the issue of funding. It was 

clear to our team that the support of the Coast Guard’s oil spill 

preparedness program following the Exxon Valdez spill had atrophied over time. This was partly due to the preventative program’s 

doing so well in lowering the number of major oil spills. But it also 

resulted from diversion of funding to critical homeland security responsibilities. 

This is not an either/or proposition. The Coast Guard and the administration need to propose, and the Congress needs to provide, 

adequate funding to the Coast Guard for all of their critical missions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to answer your questions. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. Caldwell. 

Mr. CALDWELL. Good morning, Chairman LoBiondo and Ranking 

Member Larsen, other members of the committee. I am pleased to 

be here to discuss the oversight of offshore facilities, based on some 

of the work GAO has done recently. As noted, I am accompanied 

10 

by Frank Rusco here, who is a director in our Natural Resources 

and Environment Team. 

GAO has done a variety of work related to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. We have reviewed the management of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. My team has done work on protection efforts 

by the Coast Guard to secure these facilities from terrorist attacks. 

And Mr. Rusco’s team has done work on Department of the Interior 

and their oversight of offshore facilities. 

Today my testimony will focus on inspections of offshore facilities. It summarizes work we have done at both the Coast Guard 

and Department of the Interior. Such inspections are meant to ensure compliance with a variety of regulations, but particularly 

those related to security, safety, and production. One of the key 

purposes of these inspections is to prevent the type of incident that 

happened with the Deepwater Horizon. Regarding the Coast Guard, we found that the Coast Guard had 

taken a number of steps, which are detailed in our recent report, 

to secure offshore facilities. However, one of the key components of 

the Coast Guard regime for security, the inspections, had not been 

done for the majority of the offshore facilities. Of the approximately 

50 offshore facilities, the Coast Guard had only conducted 13 percent to 45 percent of the required inspections, depending on the 

year. 

The reasons for not conducting these inspections varied. Some of 

this was confusion over which Coast Guard unit should conduct inspections and confusion over which types of facilities should be inspected. Some Coast Guard units were not tracking which inspections were coming up. And finally, there was reliance on owners 

and operators to tell Coast Guard when they needed inspections. 

In addition, the Coast Guard’s database for planning, conducting, 

and evaluating such inspections had a number of limitations, in 

terms of consistency, accuracy, and duplication of the data. 

Regarding the Department of the Interior, we also found that the 

agency was not conducting all of the inspections required to fulfill 

its regulatory role. The Coast Guard delegates certain safety inspections to the Department of the Interior. And according to Interior officials, they met their internal targets for safety inspections, 

but those internal targets were only set at 10 percent of facilities 

within a given year. Interior has not met its internal targets for 

regulatory inspections to measure the production of oil and gas. 

These production inspections are important because they determine 

how much revenue is due the U.S. Government, as well as which 

facilities the Coast Guard then puts under its security regime. 

We found that Interior had met its target for production inspections in only 1 of the 4 years we reviewed. We found Interior was 

not able to meet these inspections for reasons generally related to 

personnel, such as hiring, training, and retaining inspectors. More 

recently, we are concerned that Interior’s reorganization of its bureau and its processes will further reduce the number of inspections being conducted. 

Our written statement also goes into detail on the Coast Guard’s 

security authorities over MODUs such as the Deepwater Horizon. 

And these authorities, in some ways, are more limited than they 

are for some of the other types of offshore facilities. 

11 

In summary, our work has shown deficiencies in both the Coast 

Guard and Department of the Interior regimes for doing these inspections. These deficiencies ultimately hinder these agencies’ ability to ensure that the regulatory requirements are met for security, 

safety, and production. We have recommendations to the Department of the Interior, as well as the Coast Guard. I am glad to say 

the agencies both have steps underway to take corrective action. 

And hopefully, our collective activities of the agencies of GAO 

and the Congress will help prevent another disaster like the Deepwater Horizon. In closing, thank you very much. Mr. Rusco and I would be 

happy to answer any questions. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. OK, thank you, Mr. Caldwell, very much. 

Admiral Z, this is for you. Over the last year, five reports or investigations have come back on the causes of the spill and the 

Coast Guard response to it. These investigations and reports include several hundred recommendations for the Coast Guard to review and to implement to improve the safety of the offshore energy 

industry prevention of oil spills, and the Service’s response to the 

spills. 

With the exception of the Joint Investigation Team Report, we do 

not know whether the Coast Guard is currently taking action on 

any of these recommendations, and which they will take action on 

in the future. Can the Coast Guard provide this subcommittee with 

a list of the recommendations that the Coast Guard is taking action on, and which ones they intend to take action on for each of 

the five reports? 

[The information follows:] 

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Admiral ZUKUNFT. Chairman, I would be delighted to provide 

you a brief on that. What you will find is that there is commonality 

across a number of the five reports. I highlighted six of those key 

objectives, as we talk about whether it is research and technology 

for response, or measures to prevent a spill of national significance, 

our involvement with—at the very local level, with our ACPs. 

But just to walk you through each one of these very briefly, the 

incident-specific preparedness report provided us a third-party assessment that characterized our efforts to respond to this spill. 

We have since created a national incident command spill of national significance instruction that identifies gaps that aren’t addressed in the national contingency plan to better prepare us for 

a response. This is everything from seafood safety, behavioral 

health, assigning liaison officers to every parish president, county 

official, and Governor throughout the affected area. So, we have 

taken a number of those and have already put those in place so 

that we can then act for prevention and response. 

At the same time, with the FOSC report, that is a report that 

I am required to provide to the national response team that provides a chronology and a summary of response actions and interventions that were taken, which is fairly expansive, but is really 

directed at the response itself. And that would be to better inform 

and better prepare our Nation, should we see a similar event transpire on the outer continental shelf. 

And I say that because, as we look at where is oil and gas being 

exploited, it is now in more remote areas. Not only in deep water 

in the Gulf of Mexico, but we are also using these lessons learned, 

as we look at initiatives going forward, to drill in the Arctic region. 

So again, we are applying these best practices that were learned 

during this particular response. 

But I can brief you on each and every one of these reports, but 

the—really directs, you know, what can we do to prevent these activities. The ISPR and the FOSC report are really focused on how 

to improve our response protocols, including research and development. And all of these are in progress. And again, I would be 

pleased to provide you a summary of all those activities. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. We would like that, Admiral. We would like the 

subcommittee to have a list of the recommendations of what you 

have done and what you will do, and each of the five reports. And 

can you suggest to us when we can expect to receive that list? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. A lot of this we are working across the interagency, so it would be circumspect on my part to—as we work with 

NOAA, EPA on, you know, whether it is research and development, 

dispersants, we are working closely with BSEE. But I would need 

some time to look at that. We have some—— 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Well, let’s—excuse me—let’s put it this way. Recognizing that it is a work in progress, there is some that is already 

decided, and maybe we will have to do this in bites. So can we say 

that within a month that we will have your list up to this point 

in time, and then we can see what that includes, and then go from 

there? Is that reasonable, from your perspective? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Yes, we would be able to provide that. Yes, 

Chairman. 

37 

Mr. LOBIONDO. OK. Also, the Coast Guard has requested Congress to make changes to the way the Oil Spill Liability Trust 

Fund functions under current law. The Service has not requested 

any changes to current law governing oil spill prevention and response, or in response to any of the recommendations of the various reports. 

Can you tell us, will the Coast Guard be requesting any changes 

to current law to improve prevention and response, or to implement 

a recommendation? Or does the Service feel they have sufficient 

authority to make these changes, administratively? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. That is one area where we will seek a regulatory change. For any spill out of the Oil Spill Liability Trust 

Fund there is an initial $50 million funding appropriation, followed 

by a $100 million emergency response. It then requires congressional approval to get subsequent installments of $100 million. 

To put that in perspective, at the peak of this spill—and again, 

this was being funded by BP—we were expending upwards of $70 

million per day at the peak of this response. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Yes. Excuse me, I apologize if I was unclear. We 

understand about this funding scenario, but I am interested in 

changes to current law, as it results in response and implementation or recommendations for the Service. 

Can you do this administratively, or changes to current law of 

how you respond? Does it have to come through legislation? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Chairman, right now we are doing that 

through policy, and so we are able to invoke many of these measures through policy and not regulation. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. OK. And, Admiral Z one last question for you. In 

the wake of the disaster that we had with this oil spill, several responders to the spill and manufacturers of dispersants and other 

technologies who were following the request, or the requirements 

the Coast Guard laid down for them to deal with the spill, have 

been sued for the actions they took at the direction of the Government during the response of the spill. 

So, the Government tells them what to do, tells them what they 

need, and then, you know, in the height of all the confusion and 

the run-up to getting this done right. And now, because they did 

what they were told, they are being sued. 

Has the Coast Guard heard from the responders or dispersant 

manufacturers regarding the issues? And has the Coast Guard 

taken a position on these lawsuits? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. We have not taken a position. But in the urgency of a response, there needs to be a provision for indemnification of these oil spill response organizations that are responding in 

accordance with our interagency action plans. So that would be a 

needed change if, in fact, these responsible organizations are being 

held liable. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Well, I would like to suggest in very strong terms 

that the Coast Guard consider either sending up legislation or taking a very strong position on this. I don’t see how, when we have 

a disaster like this, we can expect people to respond and follow 

what we are requesting them to do, and let them swing in the wind 

when the dust starts to settle. 

38 

And I can only think of a future situation where there is an 

emergency and a disaster, and especially if it is involving some of 

these same groups, if it is an offshore disaster like this. If I were 

one of them, I think I would be pretty slow to respond. So I would 

urge you to figure out how the Coast Guard can minimally weigh 

in on this, and ideally become proactive in how we can resolve this 

problem. 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. I agree completely. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. OK. Also, I would like you to report back to us 

how you are making out with that. 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. I have that for action. 

[The information follows:] 

The Coast Guard interprets this question as pertaining to 

conferral of responder immunity, rather than indemnity. 

The Coast Guard has met with certain Oil Spill Response 

Organizations (OSROs) to discuss their concerns with respect to litigation claims against them for personal injury 

and death alleged to be from the use of dispersants during 

the Deepwater Horizon spill of national significance. By 

statute, OSROs already enjoy immunity for response activities under the Clean Water Act as amended by OPA 90, 

33 U.S.C. 1321(c)(4). The statute essentially exempts responders from liability for actions taken consistent with 

the NCP relating to a discharge or substantial threat of a 

discharge. However, this exemption does not apply with respect to personal injury or death, or if the responder is 

grossly negligent or engages in willful misconduct. OSROs 

have asked that the U.S. Government’s sovereign immunity under 33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(8) be extended to them: ‘‘The 

United States Government is not liable for any damages 

arising from its actions or omissions relating to any response plan required by this section.’’ The Coast Guard is 

in the process of carefully considering the various legal, 

policy and operational implications of addressing the 

OSROs’ concerns through any procedural vehicle(s) that 

may be available. The Coast Guard will coordinate conclusions and actions with the Environmental Protection Agency and Department of Justice. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. OK. Because we will revisit it if the answer is 

not correct. 

I have some additional questions, but I am going to turn to Mr. 

Larsen now. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to start 

with Mr. Caldwell with regards to the Oil Spill Liability Trust 

Fund, and actually the financial risks which you just briefly mentioned in your testimony. 

But it is my understanding that, as cleanup costs continue to 

mount, the GAO has estimated there is a reasonable chance that 

expenditures from the trust fund will exceed the $1 billion total expenditure per incident cap, and that funds will no longer be available to reimburse the Federal agency costs associated with the incident. Does that—is that correct? 

39 

Mr. CALDWELL. Yes, sir. We don’t have a specific time when that 

is going to be. But right now we are at 62 percent of the cap. So, 

given the uncertainty of the cost, and the long-term nature of restoration, it could certainly go over that cap. 

Mr. LARSEN. And so, the influence on the timeframe is sort of 

getting some harder costs about the longer term cost of restoration, 

as an example? What other factors would be involved in getting 

that other—— 

Mr. CALDWELL. I think just the lag, in terms of when costs are 

incurred and when they are reimbursed, as well as the uncertainty 

of some of those restoration costs going forward. Restoration is 

more of an art than a science. 

Mr. LARSEN. Sure. 

Mr. CALDWELL. We know about such lags from the Exxon Valdez. 

It took 10 years to clean up some of the damage. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. Well, it has an implication, I guess, for us 

then, as well. Because to alleviate the strain on the trust fund, 

GAO has again recommended that Congress consider setting a new 

incident fund cap based on net expenditures, rather than total expenditures. Would that change provide an immediate improvement 

in the financial status of the trust fund? And is there any downside 

to doing that? 

Mr. CALDWELL. It would have no immediate impact on the fund. 

What it would do is reduce the uncertainty that you have. And if 

you make those changes in advance, you will increase the chances 

that those reimbursements would continue unabated. 

As I said, some of the restoration work can take years. Obviously, there is a lot of other funding options Congress does have. 

But having one that is directly linked to the fund is obviously useful, since the fund pays for these. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. In terms of the downside to a change like that? 

Mr. CALDWELL. I don’t really see one right now. The advantage 

we had in this case, in this horrible incident we did have, is that 

the responsible party had deep pockets. BP upfront said, ‘‘We are 

going to pay for these costs.’’ So we didn’t have the problem of either a small player that created large damage, or a company that 

then went bankrupt and couldn’t fund any of the cleanup. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. Would the—but the cumulative impact, say, of 

several incidents—one big incident could blow the fund up. Unfortunate choice of words, I guess, sorry about that, but it still would. 

And you would have perhaps smaller, unrelated incidents elsewhere in the country who then potentially get squeezed out of access to the trust fund, unless there was something done with it. 

Mr. CALDWELL. That is correct. If you had multiple incidents, you 

would be more likely to draw down the fund quickly. Perhaps you 

could have a natural disaster but that would be different, that 

would be funded under the Stafford Act. 

But you could have multiple accidents within a year or two. You 

could have an accident like the Deepwater Horizon, which was now 

more than a year ago, but if you have another large incident, you 

may be still drawing down from the first one and then you have 

got costs from the second one, as well, which could put a large 

strain on the fund. 

40 

Mr. LARSEN. Right, right. Well, the GAO has expressed concern 

that the per-barrel tax, the primary source of revenue, is due to expire at the end of 2017. And they estimate the fund balance will 

likely decrease over time and raise the risk that the fund would not 

be adequately equipped to deal with future spills—we sort of discussed that—particularly another spill like Deepwater Horizon. 

Based on that uncertainty of future costs associated with this incident, I know GAO isn’t in the direct business of providing direct 

recommendations to Congress about what we should do or 

shouldn’t do, but rather, what you see. Is it better for Congress to 

reauthorize the per-barrel tax sooner, or wait to see if the—wait 4 

or 5 years, when the tax is scheduled to expire, to see what happens with the trust fund? 

Mr. CALDWELL. You reduce the risk of uncertainty if you take 

these steps in advance. We do have 5 years here, but there was 

other periods where the tax expired. What I don’t have in front of 

me is whether during those certain years—I think there is a 12- 

year hiatus where the barrel tax expired—what happened to the financial health of the fund during that period. 

But if you have this established in advance, you have less uncertainty. There is a lot going on in Congress, and some things don’t 

get reauthorized or don’t get passed. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. There is always a lot going on in Congress. 

And my personal view, it is never an excuse not to do something. 

So, Admiral Z, the GAO has recommendations on inspections as 

they relate to Coast Guard. Hearing your testimony and hearing 

GAO’s testimony—I am just trying to get my head wrapped around 

where they connect and where they disconnect—can you, from your 

point of view, discuss the recommendations, a few of the recommendations from the GAO specifically, and how the Coast 

Guard is addressing those? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Yes. We recognize we do have shortcomings in 

our tracking of security inspections on the outer continental shelf, 

whether they are fixed platforms or mobile offshore drilling units, 

which are technically vessels. And so we are working to correct 

those inadequacies. But the points they make are being taken for 

action, so we can better track those particular events. 

On the safety side, those inspections have not languished. Some 

of those are actually carried out on our behalf either by Department of the Interior or, in some cases, by other recognized organizations. But there is a distinction between safety and security inspections. And we do have room for improvement on our enactment 

of security inspections on the outer continental shelf. 

Mr. LARSEN. I have got one more question for Admiral Z, and 

then a second round I have some questions for Admiral Rufe—I 

don’t want you to feel ignored—actually some ones about ACP. So 

if you—think through that. 

But just finally for Admiral Z, on this determining what is a 

high-risk MODU for inspection from your policy letter of 11/2006, 

you talk about 2 things: how to determine what is high risk; and 

second, the JIT said inspections were so routine that, essentially, 

complacency got set in. So you could still focus on high-risk 

MODUs, but that could still become routine, and it could still introVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:56 Feb 29, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG\11-2-1~1\71098.TXT JEAN
41 

duce a measure of complacency into even those inspections of high 

risk. 

So talk about what a high-risk MODU is, and then talk about 

what you would do to prevent that complacency that the JIT report 

found on inspections. 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Yes. For the—this really applies to foreignflagged MODUs. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. And where we depend on the flag state, and 

often under the auspices of a recognized organization, to follow 

through on IMO-accepted codes. But when we have foreign-flagged 

vessels operating in the U.S. EEZ, we do need to be more stringent, 

and ensure that these also comply with U.S. standards. 

And so, it is possible to look at a MODU’s history, you know, if 

they have had oil spills in the past, to then target that as a highrisk mobile offshore drilling unit. It does one of two things. One, 

it rewards the good actors, and at the same time it holds those that 

may not be in full compliance to not just international, but also 

U.S. standards. And so, that is the process that we use in assessing 

those high-risk MODUs. 

Mr. LARSEN. And the issue of complacency, though? You could 

still have that level of inspection, but again, we had levels of inspection before, and things got routine, and people got complacent. 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Yes. No, I could not attest to that, you know, 

complacency has set in. This was an issue with foreign-flag, you 

know, operating in the EEZ, that we were not as strident as we 

would, had that been a U.S.-flagged vessel operating in the EEZ. 

So it is that issue of, you know, how strident were we with a foreign flag, but not an issue of complacency. But it was a dependency, if you will, on the foreign-flagged state, and a number of recognized organizations such as DNV or ABS to provide that level of 

oversight. But we will provide that measure, as well, for foreign 

flag in our EEZ. 

Mr. LARSEN. All right, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Admiral Rufe, the incident-specific preparedness 

review is a third-party report that is chartered by the Coast Guard 

and compiled by a team of industry and oil spill experts. The ISPR 

noted that the Coast Guard’s environmental response capabilities 

have atrophied. Can you share with us what your thoughts may be 

of why that has happened, and any suggestions that could be made 

to restore those capabilities? 

Admiral RUFE. Well, I think two things, Mr. Chairman, contributed to that. One is that over time, because of the infrequency of 

large spills, I think the Nation became complacent—not just the 

Coast Guard, we all became complacent—that perhaps we had gotten past the concern about oil spills. And so the shift away from 

the oil spill response capability in the Coast Guard was probably 

a factor of that. 

But it was also a factor of increasing responsibilities of the Coast 

Guard that caused attention to be shifted to homeland security 

missions and other high-priority missions. I think the Congress and 

the administration were equally at fault for not ensuring that the 

Coast Guard, as the Coast Guard overseers, made sure that they 

continued to be fully funded and adequately funded, and that the 

42 

emphasis did not drift away from inadequate oil spill response capability. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. And also, let me thank you for your service and 

your willingness to return back to the public side of things to share 

with us your expertise. It is very much appreciated. 

The incident-specific review, the review notes that the area contingency plans were ineffective, and that the national contingency 

plan was not well understood by State, local, and even some Federal officials. Would strengthening and improving the ACPs to 

make them more effective help Government officials to understand 

what the Coast Guard is doing, and make us more effective here? 

Do you have any ideas or thoughts in this area? 

Admiral RUFE. Yes, sir. Well, I think underway already, according to Admiral Z, is more inclusion of the local officials in that contingency planning process. And we think that is vital. 

But I will say that it is much easier for these State and local officials to get up on their high horse and get excited about the fact 

they weren’t included when there is a spill underway. It is another 

thing to have them sit through these long, laborious, really difficult 

meetings, where they have to sit down and decide what are the priorities. When everything is a priority, nothing is a priority. So to 

sit down and say, ‘‘This marsh is more important than this beach, 

and when it comes to protecting them, I am willing to have oil 

come up on this beach, as opposed to the marsh,’’ it is an important 

consideration that they be able to sit down and hammer out at the 

contingency planning process. 

So, including them certainly is important. They have to be willing to come to the meetings, to participate, and then to be part of 

the team that says, ‘‘This is the way we are going to handle this 

when the spill occurs,’’ and I think then you will have less of the 

political influence over decisions being made about response strategies during an incident. They will feel part of the process. They will 

understand, as you point out, the national contingency planning 

process, as contrasted with the NRF. And we will have a much better process. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. All we have to do is figure out how to force them 

to do that. 

Admiral RUFE. That is right. Some funding for—they are always 

looking for funding. I don’t know if that is a possibility. But, it is 

expensive for them to participate in the process. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Right. 

Admiral RUFE. It takes them away from other things they are 

doing. And that is the case at every level. You know, the Secretary 

of Homeland Security only has so much bandwidth. And for her to 

go to an exercise—or him, whoever the secretary is—to learn more 

about the national contingency plan takes him or her away from 

something else that is on their plate. 

So, I don’t want to be critical, but it is important that these officials become engaged when you are not in the middle of a crisis, 

so they can understand what the process is, they can understand 

how the system works and be part of it, right from the get-go, rather than being in the learning process when the spill is ongoing. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. Master Chief Coble. 

43 

Mr. COBLE. I thought you had forgotten me, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Never. 

Mr. COBLE. Good to have you all with us, gentlemen. Admiral Z, 

I was going to ask you about the administrative authority, or lack 

of it. But I think you and the chairman pretty well detailed that, 

so I won’t revisit it. 

Admiral Rufe, good to have you back on the Hill, as the chairman said. The incident-specific preparedness review is a thirdparty report chartered by the Coast Guard and compiled by a team 

of industry and oil spill experts. The ISPR noted that the Coast 

Guard’s environmental response capabilities have atrophied, or 

lapsed. What can be done to restore these capabilities if, in fact, 

you agree that they did lapse? 

Admiral RUFE. Yes, sir. I certainly agree they did lapse. I think 

the Coast Guard is already underway in bringing their response capability up to the level that it should be, based on our report and 

based on the other reports, to the extent that they can do that internally. 

However, it is going to require funding. And that is, I think, 

where the Congress comes in, where the President comes in. It is 

important that the President support a strong budget for the Coast 

Guard. Admiral Z can’t say this, but I can, I am retired now, that 

the President support a strong budget for the Coast Guard that 

doesn’t compromise one critical mission for another, and that the 

Congress support a strong funding for the Coast Guard so they can 

do the R&D that is necessary, and can restore the capability that 

it needs to respond to these spills. 

And, you know, the fact that we are drilling further and further 

offshore in deeper and deeper water, I think we are being less than 

honest with the American public to say that that is a free lunch. 

You know, we need the oil, but it comes with great risk. And we 

need to minimize that risk, and be sure that we are doing it as 

safely as possible. But it is not a zero-risk industry. So, when these 

incidents occur, as infrequently as they may, we have to be prepared to respond to them adequately. 

Mr. COBLE. I concur. Thank you, Admiral. Mr. Caldwell or Mr. 

Rusco, since the oil spill there has been much discussion about the 

regulatory oversight of MODU—that is, offshore drilling units—especially those that are foreign-flagged. Was the Coast Guard adequately inspecting MODUs prior to the Deepwater Horizon incident, in your opinion? 

Mr. CALDWELL. We put a chart in our report, and we tried to get 

color copies to committee members, as well, to show it is really 

complex. This chart shows which MODUs fell under which categories. The inspections that were conducted by the Coast Guard 

would differ from a normal offshore facility. 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Chairman? 

Is that the chart on page 15 of your report? 

Mr. CALDWELL. Correct. 

Mr. LARSEN. OK, thank you. 

Mr. COBLE. Well, was there a gap between the Coast Guard and 

BOEM inspections prior to the incident? And if so, what was being 

overlooked, or missed? 

44 

Mr. CALDWELL. We didn’t find that Coast Guard wasn’t doing inspections of MODUs. What we saw was that the kinds of inspections Coast Guard was doing on a MODU were generally different 

than they do on a larger offshore production unit. 

Mr. COBLE. OK. 

Mr. CALDWELL. Because MODUs rarely meet the production 

thresholds to bring in section 106 of the Maritime Transportation 

Security Act, which would require that they have a security plan, 

the Coast Guard does not do annual security inspections. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you, sir. And just for the record, Mr. Chairman, for the benefit of the uninformed, the chairman has affectionately promoted me to master chief status. I am not a master chief, 

and I am not qualified to be one. But I thank you for that, Mr. 

Chairman, and I yield back. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Well, in this committee you are a master chief, 

and you are qualified to be one. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you, sir. I appreciate that. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. The gentleman from Minnesota. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the 

great panel being here today. Thank you for the United States 

Coast Guard for doing what you do on a daily basis that so many 

people don’t even realize what you do. So thank you for keeping us 

safe. 

A couple of questions I did have is for Mr. Rusco, if I could, sir. 

Is it safer to drill in deeper water or more shallow water? Or is it 

the same? 

Mr. RUSCO. There are different risks associated with both. So I 

am not sure I can answer which is safer. But what we can say is, 

looking at processes for managing offshore drilling, that it is clear 

that the regulator needs to understand more clearly what all those 

risks are, and build that into the planning and permitting process. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. OK. If an incident such as Deepwater Horizon occurred in more shallow water, would it have been easier to respond 

to? 

Mr. RUSCO. Yes. I am certain that that is correct, that Deepwater, in the specific incident that occurred, did create its own 

unique difficulties, in terms of response. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. In your opinion, can you tell me why we were 

drilling in such deep water, versus in more shallow water? 

Mr. RUSCO. The progress of drilling in the gulf has taken place 

as a result of following the resources where they are, but also taking advantage of new technologies that have allowed drilling in 

deeper and deeper waters. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. OK. So there is—the reason why we were drilling 

in deeper and deeper water is only—was because of the resources 

that were available out there, versus, for example, drilling in more 

shallow water? 

Mr. RUSCO. I think we started in shallow waters because that is 

what we could do, technologically, way back at the beginning. The 

technology improved, both in terms of exploration and discovery of 

resources. And we discovered that there were vast resources further and further offshore, and the technologies enabled the companies to go there. 

45 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Do you think we are prepared now for another 

Deepwater Horizon, if that would occur? I know there were some 

unique, you know, incidents that occurred. But do you think we 

would be able to do it again, but respond in a better manner? 

Mr. RUSCO. Obviously, a lot of lessons have been learned. But I 

think those lessons need to be codified into regulation and rules, 

and that process is ongoing. At GAO we currently have ongoing 

work looking at response technologies, and also looking at the permitting and planning process that BOEM is using, and inspection 

regulations and rules that BSEE is adopting. We will be reporting 

out on that towards the end of the year and the beginning of the 

next year, and we should have a lot more to say about that. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. OK. Thank you, sir. Admiral Rufe, would you 

agree with that, or—since you are not wearing the stripes any 

more, you can let her rip. 

Admiral RUFE. Yes, yes, generally speaking. Now, we did not 

look at the drilling operation itself. We were strictly limited—our 

team was strictly limited to the response to the spill. So we didn’t 

have any role in assessing blame or looking at the technology to— 

the drilling technology. 

But I will say, in terms of responding to a spill, yes, I think there 

were a lot of lessons learned about how to cap a well that we didn’t 

know before this came. There were things developed—to BP’s credit, there were things developed on the fly that should have been in 

place earlier, weren’t, but they developed them pretty quickly. And 

I think, were it to occur again we would be better prepared. 

I wouldn’t say we are not going to end up with oil on the beach. 

I think history tells us if you have oil in the water, it is going to 

end up on the beach, and people have to accept that is a risk. That 

is one of the risks of production. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Right. 

Admiral RUFE. That is one of the costs of production, and people 

have to accept that. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Right. OK. Great. Thank you, sir. Appreciate it. 

Mr. Caldwell, in your recent findings you noted that the former 

MMS was not adequately staffed for inspecting offshore facilities. 

Under the MOU with the Coast Guard, the MMS was responsible 

for ensuring the safety compliance for all offshore oil platforms. Is 

there a cause to believe that the safety systems for the platforms 

were not being inspected prior to the Deepwater Horizon? And I understand that there has been some—you are up to a certain percentage, but you are not quite there yet. 

Can you kind of expand upon that, and what we are trying to— 

making sure that you have the resources that you need to make 

sure it occurs? 

Mr. CALDWELL. I will ask Mr. Rusco to answer on those—— 

Mr. CRAVAACK. OK. 

Mr. CALDWELL [continuing]. Issues. 

Mr. RUSCO. Yes. So we have found for a number of years that 

Interior—and this is not just offshore, it is also onshore, but obviously this is about offshore—have not met all of their internal and 

regulatory requirements for inspections. And the key reason for 

that is that they have had trouble attracting, training, and retaining staff that are qualified to do that. 

46 

These inspectors go out and they are inspecting for a lot of things 

having to do with production verification. Also, in the same inspection, they will look for safety violations or environmental issues. 

And so these inspections are all together typically done by the 

same staff. They have been hard pressed to maintain a level of 

trained staff to meet all those needs. And Interior has requested 

funding for additional staff, but to my knowledge they are working 

on developing that. But they are not there yet. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. OK. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, my time has 

expired. I yield back. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Gentleman from the 27th District of Texas? Is 

that correct? 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. You are now recognized. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We— 

there has been a lot of talk today about inspections. And I guess 

we will ask—or I will ask—Admiral Z and Mr. Rusco. Had the 

Deepwater Horizon been inspected the day before the blowout, 

would you all have—do you think you all would have caught something that would have stopped it? 

You know, my reading of the reports were there were a series of 

bad events that happened and bad decisions that were made and 

troubles associated with setting cement that deep under water. 

Had all the inspections in the world been conducted, do you think 

the result would have been different, and there wouldn’t have been 

the blowout? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. One area of particular concern was the gas 

detection system had been muted, which would not have provided 

maybe perhaps adequate warning that there had been a release of 

gas to perhaps earlier attention to shut that well in. But that 

would have been detected during an inspection. 

Some of the other—the electrical systems, the life-saving systems 

that we would check would not have had any impact on the outcome of this. But some of the inherent—especially these remote 

sensors that would detect a presence of gas, you know—— 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. It might have given us a little more time? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. That may have provided us a little bit more 

window of time. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Mr. Rusco, do you have anything to add? 

Mr. RUSCO. I think that I can’t say that it could have been prevented, had there been an inspection the day before. But what I 

can say is that Interior recognizes that its inspection process needs 

to be improved, both in terms of applying risk-based standards for 

when and how to inspect. And they are working to change their inspection process. We are in the process of evaluating that, and we 

can report out on that. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you. And there is—the United States is 

not the only country developing oil and gas in the Gulf of Mexico. 

You are seeing an increase in Mexico, and now Cuba is starting to 

be involved in that. 

How—the way the currents work in the Gulf of Mexico—I represent the gulf coast, you know, from Corpus Christi, Texas, to 

Brownsville—that stuff tends to—the currents tend to take it our 

way. And we suffered for years from a blowout in Mexico. How is 

47 

the Coast Guard prepared, if at all, to deal with a spill taking place 

in waters of another country, and in a completely foreign-controlled 

situation? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. We are working multilaterally, as we speak, 

to address concerns that we have with offshore drilling in Cuba 

and the Bahamas. Those currents, while not of concern to Texas, 

is of great concern to southern Florida and our eastern seaboard, 

and perhaps would make impact within 5 to 10 days of a catastrophic event. So we are already working on our area contingency 

plans. 

More importantly, you know, what our response posture—there 

are some legal gaps, in terms of what we would call a responsible 

party when, in a foreign EEZ, there is a release of oil that impacts 

the U.S. Clearly, we have our Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. But 

certainly there are constraints there. 

And so, working with that other foreign country—Cuba, in particular, is—will be a challenge, but we are working very closely at 

the interagency level to address that particular concern, because 

that drilling effort will commence in January. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Now, under existing law we have got technology that we couldn’t share with a country like Cuba, is that correct? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Again, we are working with other governmental agencies. What we did learn from Deepwater Horizon—the 

capping stack did not exist on April 20th, on the day of that blowout. That was designed, literally, on the fly, as was the top hat and 

other intervention methods. Helix, a U.S. company, now has dynamically positioned vessels and that technology literally on the 

shelf. So what we need to—you know, our concern is we want to 

contain that before that oil comes ashore and causes environmental 

and economic damage to the United States. 

So, that information, we do want to be able to share that to protect U.S. interests. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. And finally, there was a lot of talk in the 

media as this was going on that there were various offers of assistance from foreign governments and foreign assets that could have 

been brought to bear in responding, and those were either not used 

or turned down for a variety of reasons. 

How has that been addressed? Can we, in the future, find a way 

to deal with the foreign companies that want to help, or are we 

adequately situated to do it entirely ourselves with no help? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. We address this in our instruction. Again, this 

was a lesson we learned on the fly, and we stood up what we called 

an interagency technological assistance program that assessed 

every foreign offer of assistance, and whether it would immediately 

alleviate some of the impact that we were seeing. 

We actually flew equipment from the Netherlands to the Gulf of 

Mexico. We didn’t send the vessels, because it would take them a 

month to get there, but we entertained over 67 foreign offers of assistance, and we did receive assistance from 22 countries across the 

globe. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. So you think you may have been treated unfairly with the media on that one? 

48 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Yes. Well, I think the other part is, you know, 

you do not want to be doing research and development in the midst 

of a spill of national significance. So having that available on the 

shelf would have been much more helpful for us to implement—— 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Well, I see my time has expired. Thank you 

very much for your answers, and I will yield back. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. The gentleman from coastal Louisiana. 

Mr. LANDRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Rear Admiral, Vice Admiral, for your service, and the panel, for being here 

today. This question is actually for both Admiral Z and Vice Admiral Rufe. 

Do you agree with conclusion O of the JIT report which says that 

the proximity and operational capabilities of the offshore supply 

vessel Damon B. Bankston were critical to the successful evacuation of 115 survivors of this casualty? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Congressman, absolutely. Although the 

Damon B. Bankston was not a standby vessel, she was in that immediate proximity. And the outcome could have been much different for those 115 survivors. 

Mr. LANDRY. And she was an EEP vessel, classified vessel, 

though, right? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. That is correct. 

Mr. LANDRY. You know, because one of my biggest concerns—certainly, you know, I always believe that the greatest natural resource we have in the Gulf of Mexico is actually the men and 

women who ply that dangerous trade. And I want to learn from 

this accident, and I want to take it as a learning experience, and 

make sure that we implement ways to make sure that those people 

get back home if we ever have another accident like that. 

We heard from the panel that this action was mostly caused by 

human error, communication problems. Those things can happen 

again even under the most perfect system, any time you insert the 

human element in it. 

And so, you know, and one of the things that I find amazing is 

that, by having the Damon B. Bankston there, the Coast Guard 

lowered a rescue swimmer down from the chopper that arrived at 

the scene about an hour-and-a-half or so later. And that swimmer 

conducted triage, and ensured that the most severely injured individuals were evacuated first. 

Absent the presence of that vessel, of the motor vessel Damon B. 

Bankston, where would this triage have occurred on these 110 people? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Yes. Again, had it not been for the Damon B. 

Bankston, you know, I think the outcome for some of those survivors would have been much different. She was very critical to the 

immediate rescue and survival of some of the more critically injured. 

Mr. LANDRY. So—and so I guess you would agree with the witness statement that was found in the JIT report which says that 

if the Damon B. Bankston wouldn’t have had a fast rescue craft, 

there may have been 10 more lives lost? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. That was a very likely outcome. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LANDRY. And so, again—because it is hard for people who 

have never been out in the Gulf of Mexico, who can’t understand 

49 

the environment that these men and women are dealing with, and 

how vast that gulf is, that—and the amount of people. I think it 

is hard for people to even understand how many people were actually on that particular rig. 

That again, if you have everyone evacuating off that rig, and this 

rig being totally taken out of service in a manner that no one can 

stay on it, if we don’t have a place where those people can—where 

we can bring everyone to a central location in an effort to allow the 

Coast Guard—because only the fastest manner that you all have 

for getting out there at that distance would be a helicopter, is that 

correct? 

And so, again, to triage those personnel, and ensure that we provide and administer first aid and get those who are critically 

wounded helo’d out, we need a stable platform by which to do that. 

Would you not agree? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. I have been in that business for over 34 years, 

Congressman, and I do agree. 

Mr. LANDRY. And lastly, again—I mean I hate to continue to beat 

this dead horse—so you would agree with the safety recommendations which state: ‘‘It is recommended that the commandant revise 

33 CFR subchapter N to establish designated standby vessels for 

MODUs engaging in oil and gas drilling activities in the outer continental shelf’’? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Yes. We have not pursued that. We are currently working with our Federal advisory committees to first work 

through that process. But certainly we, in the context of Deepwater 

Horizon, fully appreciate the safety of life factor that is involved 

with this. 

But we are going through, as we would any regulatory process, 

going through that outreach process first. 

Mr. LANDRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Larsen? 

Mr. LARSEN. Admiral Rufe, I said I would get back to you, and 

then you ended up answering all the questions I had. And I had— 

a lot with the ACPs and what we can do about those, but there are 

a few more questions. 

Your report generally speaks positively concerning the use of alternative response technologies, specifically the use of dispersants 

and in situ burning. Your report does recommend, however, that 

more work needs to be done to evaluate those technologies and assess their overall impact on the marine environment, and establish 

protocols and procedures for when they might be safely used. 

Which Federal agency should lead that assessment? Should it be 

conducted by a nongovernmental entity? Is there a role for industry? If there is, what role would that be for industry, in order to 

accomplish what you have recommended? 

Admiral RUFE. Well, first of all, yes. This was an unusual spill, 

and dispersants we used at a level never before seen and never before contemplated, including inserting large amounts of dispersants 

at the well head. So the long-term impacts on the environment are 

still out there. There should be studies done, and there are studies 

being done to see what, if any, negative long-term impacts there 

might have been by that extensive use of dispersants. 

50 

I think EPA should lead that, and they are qualified to do it. 

That is their wheelhouse for that kind of work. I think industry 

has a large role to play in that, because there is a lot of expertise 

in industry, both in the manufacturing and producing of 

dispersants, as well as the application of them. Certainly the Coast 

Guard ought to be involved in it, because the Coast Guard does 

have a role in the authorization in the use of dispersants, although 

EPA is the lead. 

So, I think—EPA ought to be the lead for it, but certainly with 

input from a number of Federal agencies. NOAA probably has a 

large role in being part of that investigation, because they have the 

scientific capability to assess best how that impacts the environment. 

Mr. LARSEN. On the ACPs, if I could—just yes or no, or you can 

expand a little bit—I just want to make sure I understand your 

point about the involvement of local communities, what a State, 

what this parish, what this county level, city level—— 

Admiral RUFE. Right. 

Mr. LARSEN [continuing]. That your point is that if we are going 

to use the NCP, which you state is the appropriate framework to 

use in these kinds of incidents, that it is going to take much more 

education and training of these communities about what the NCP 

is, and how they fit into it, than has currently been done. And, as 

a result, it will take more resources to do that, resources that currently, you know, either exist in the budget, would need to be 

moved from some other place in the budget, or don’t exist in the 

budget and need to be added to the budget in order to get the magnitude of the training done. 

Admiral RUFE. Yes. I think so, because I think, up until recently, 

the Coast Guard has had a good relationship with the State authorities who are involved in the spill response—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, right. 

Admiral RUFE [continuing]. And they have been fully involved in 

the contingency planning process. 

I think the Coast Guard relied—overly relied on the State to 

bring in the local folks. And that hasn’t happened, either because 

of funding considerations, because they weren’t invited, because it 

was too complicated. Just don’t know. And that hasn’t been the 

case everywhere. As I said, it is uneven. Some places there has 

been better outreach to the locals. 

But they need to be included. And if there are incentives that 

need to be put in place to get them included, that is very important, because we can’t have this confusion and discord in the middle of a spill, where the local officials are recommending that we 

power-wash marshes, when that has been a known inappropriate 

response technology for years and years, and should have been 

worked out in the contingency planning process well in advance, so 

that you know that when oil gets into the marsh you leave it alone, 

you don’t power-wash it out of there and do more damage than just 

by leaving it alone. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, right. Admiral Z, I want to talk a little—just 

a question about RMI. The JIT report concludes the Republic of the 

Marshall Islands, the flag state registry failed to meet its responsibilities to ensure the safety of Deepwater Horizon, and also failed 

51 

to properly monitor the two recognized organizations that it contracted with for verifying the compliance with ISM codes. 

Admiral Papp, in his final action memo in response to the JIT 

report, however, finds that more fault lies with the IMO guidelines, 

rather than RMI’s Government or the recognized organizations. 

That being the case, what specific changes does the Coast Guard 

intend to pursue within the IMO’s flag state implementation subcommittee to, for lack of a better term, tighten the IMO guidelines 

to ensure proper vigilance by the flag administrations and by recognized organizations? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. We have since met with RMI and with DNV 

and ABS, one the flag state and two of the recognized organizations 

that were cited in the JIT report. 

Mr. LARSEN. Just—Det Norske Veritas and American Bureau of 

Shipping. 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. And American Bureau of Shipping. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. As a follow-on, you know, that impelled us to 

invoke this high-risk MODU program. Now, would Deepwater Horizon have been identified as a high-risk MODU at the—you know, 

prior to this event? In all likelihood, probably not. But at least it 

does provide us a better targeting approach of foreign activity within our EEZ that not just meets the IMO code, but also meets U.S. 

standards, as well. So that was really the impetus behind us invoking that high-risk MODU program. 

Mr. LARSEN. Can I ask you to clarify for me? Would this—identifying the high-risk MODUs, is that—would that be an additional 

set of steps, or would that be a replacement? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. That would be in addition to. And this is a 

policy, not a regulation. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, good. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Admiral Z, you stated we don’t want to do research and development in the midst of a response, which I think 

we certainly understand your point and agree. But in the 20-year 

lull between the Exxon Valdez and this Deepwater Horizon, very 

little, I think, oil prevention research and development was done. 

Now that the response phase is over to this particular disaster, 

do you have any idea, or can you tell us what research and development is being done, so that we don’t find ourselves in the year 

2030 and we’re going to have to learn on the job again? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Clearly, we need not look any further than 

dispersants. And what is—especially the impact of sub-sea application of dispersants on the ecosystem. I will say that that did launch 

a—the most expansive—the sub-sea monitoring program that I 

worked with NOAA to implement, to determine if there was any 

recoverable oil anywhere on the sea floor throughout the Gulf of 

Mexico, an armada of ships out there doing sampling on the sea 

floor and in the water columns. So—but we didn’t have good technical awareness of what the impact of all of that dispersant applied 

at 5,000 feet would be. 

There will always be challenges in mechanical removal of oil. 

During this oil spill we had 17 consecutive days where wind and 

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52 

ing because of the sea state. And so when you lose that mechanical 

ability, what other tools do you have? And it really comes down to, 

you know, chemical dispersant, and to be able to mitigate that before that oil works its way into these very sensitive wetlands. 

But that would be one of the key areas is, you know, one, what 

is the baseline within the Gulf of Mexico of the ecosystem, recognizing there are natural seepages that take place, the microbial activity, because we had an oil budget, and that at the end of that 

there is a certain amount of oil remaining, but we don’t have a 

good model to predict, you know, what the degradation rate of that 

remaining oil would be, and at what point does it no longer cause 

harm to the environment. 

So, those are some of the, entering into a spill, information that 

I could have benefitted from, as we looked at the day-to-day decisions over dispersants, and what the long-term impact of that 

might be. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Rick, do you have anything else? 

Mr. LARSEN. No. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. OK. I would like to thank the panel very much 

for being here today, for your work on this issue. 

Admiral Z, we will look forward to your responses to those several areas we asked about. 

I thank the Members for their participation, and the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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