PIN : 073269–000

 Robert M. Mages Daniel K. Elder

Mark F. Gillespie Glen R. Hawkins

Michael B. Kelly Preston E. Pierce

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2013

of the Army

The Sergeants Major
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Mages, Robert M.

 The Sergeants Major of the Army / Robert M. Mages, Daniel K. Elder, Mark F. 

Gillespie, Glen R. Hawkins, Michael B. Kelly, Preston E. Pierce. — Revised edition.

 pages cm

 Includes bibliographical references.

 1. United States. Army—Non-commissioned officers—History. 2. United States. 

Army—Non-commissioned officers—Biography. I. Title. 

 UB408.5.S476 2013

 355.0092'273—dc23

 2013014546

First Printed 1995—CMH Pub 70–63–1
iii

Last year, we said good-bye to William O. 

Wooldridge, our first Sergeant Major of 

the Army (SMA). I think it is fitting 

that, as we write a new chapter in the Office of 

the Sergeant Major of the Army, we celebrate 

those who have come before us. Sergeant Major 

of the Army Wooldridge was a pioneer, blazing 

a trail that thirteen of us have traveled. He was 

instrumental in the creation of this post, and we 

will always remember his sacrifice and his contributions. 

The creation of the Office of the Sergeant 

Major of the Army in July 1966 represented a 

major milestone in the development of the U.S. 

Army. For the first time in history, an enlisted 

soldier assumed the role of adviser to the Chief 

of Staff on all issues pertaining to the enlisted 

force. Even after almost forty years, not much 

has changed. The Sergeant Major of the Army 

continues to advise the Chief of Staff on all 

enlisted matters, including quality of life and 

pay concerns.

The establishment of the SMA position in 

1966 reflected the importance then of soldierrelated issues in the Army, and that emphasis 

continues today. I see myself as a scout for the 

Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army. 

My charge is to share with the enlisted corps 

concerns that are being worked on at the Army 

level and to bring back to the Pentagon matters 

affecting soldiers and their families.

Offices and titles are essential in any large 

institution, but ultimately people are the key to 

an organization’s success; the Office of the 

Sergeant Major of the Army is no exception. The 

noncommissioned officers chosen to be Sergeants 

Major of the Army have been individuals who 

not only have had extraordinary careers, but who 

have demonstrated exceptional dedication to the 

welfare of their fellow soldiers. This commitment 

makes them truly effective advocates and spokesmen on enlisted-related issues. 

The careers and life stories of the men who 

have served as Sergeants Major of the Army are 

both inspirational and instructive because 

through them we gain an appreciation for not 

just the SMAs themselves, but for all the enlisted men and women who over the past two-anda-half centuries have worked, fought, and sacrificed to make the U.S. Army the finest military 

organization in the world. As we continue to 

transform the Army to meet the challenges of 

the next twenty years, it is always appropriate to 

look back and learn from our history.

Foreword

RAYMOND F. CHANDLER III

 Fourteenth Sergeant Major of the Army

v

The Sergeant Major of the Army (SMA) 

is the premier noncommissioned officer (NCO) of the United States Army 

and serves as one of the nation’s senior soldiers. 

The office of Sergeant Major of the Army has 

evolved into a position of great influence and 

responsibility, largely as a result of the hard 

work and exemplary service of the soldiers who 

have occupied the post. 

The Sergeants Major of the Army is an 

important volume in the official history of the 

United States Army. The first part of this 

book describes the origin and growth of the 

Office of the Sergeant Major of the Army. It 

explains why some saw a need for such an 

office and tells who supported it in its infancy, 

who made it work, and why it has succeeded 

as well as it has. 

The second part is a collection of biographical essays that document the personal 

and professional lives of the soldiers who have 

occupied this important post. Through these 

sections, the reader gains insight into the character and motivations of the select group of 

soldiers who became the Sergeants Major of 

the Army. Many SMAs came from humble 

origins, joined the military to serve their country and see the world, and only gradually 

decided to make the Army their career. Some 

fought the Germans in World War II. Others 

saw combat in such diverse locations as Korea, 

Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf. All experienced the joys and heartaches of being an 

ordinary soldier, and over the years all were 

deeply affected by the men and women with 

whom they served. Each has used these lessons 

to help shape the Army.

This essay describes the family life and 

early career of these exceptional soldiers and 

highlights the events that molded their points 

of view and drove their desire to build a better 

Army. With this perspective in mind, the second half of each biographical chapter examines 

the achievements of each Sergeant Major of 

the Army. Lists of duty assignments and decorations are at the end of each chapter. In addition, further readings and an appendix that 

outlines the Presidents, Secretaries of the 

Army, and Chiefs of Staff under whom the 

respective Sergeants Major served provides 

context and framework. 

The history of the Sergeants Major of the 

Army is more than just an account of bureaucratic institutions and the men that led them. 

It is also a story of the NCO Corps as a whole. 

The Army created the Office of the Sergeant 

Major in part because of important shifts in 

the nature, structure, and responsibilities of 

NCOs. During the course of their careers, the 

SMAs experienced these changes firsthand. 

They, in turn, helped shape the future of the 

NCO Corps. 

Finally, the history of the Sergeants Major 

of the Army is a story of the Army itself. The 

Army has experienced extraordinary and 

diverse challenges over the past half-century. 

Interspersed between repeated cycles of war 

and peace, mobilization and downsizing, have 

been such momentous developments as the 

end of the draft, the establishment of the volunteer Army, and the unrelenting advance of 

technology. Each Sergeant Major of the Army 

faced these and other potential barriers, as did 

the dedicated corps of noncommissioned 

Preface
vi

officers that makes the Army work. The cadre’s trials and triumphs underscore those of 

the entire Army. Thus this book gives today’s 

soldiers a useful perspective from which to 

appreciate the past. This past undoubtedly 

will shape the Army’s future, as the Army 

once again endeavors to transform itself into 

an even more effective institution with which 

to serve the American people in both peace 

and war.

ROBERT J. DALESSANDRO

Chief of Military History
vii

This book is the third edition of a U.S. 

Army Center of Military History 

(CMH) publication originally produced in 1995. Each edition adds another 

chapter to the proud history of the Office of 

the Sergeant Major of the Army. Several 

people contributed to the writing of the 1995 

volume. Maj. Glen Hawkins wrote Part I, 

which recounts the history of the office. 

When Hawkins retired, Maj. Michael Kelly 

took on the project, coordinating interviews 

and writing three of the biographical chapters. Upon Major Kelly’s retirement, Maj. 

Preston Pierce, an Individual Mobilization 

Augmentee, authored another three biographies. Finally, Maj. Mark Gillespie wrote two 

sections and guided the project to publication. 

Others outside the Center contributed 

greatly to the first edition. Sgt. Maj. (Ret.) 

Erwin Koehler interviewed seven of the eight 

former Sergeants Major of the Army for the 

book. His questions form the basis of the individual essays. Sergeant Major of the Army 

William O. Wooldridge’s section is a composite of an earlier interview and published 

remarks in various Army journals. Both 

Sergeant Major of the Army Richard A. Kidd 

and Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. 

Sullivan provided wholehearted support for 

this project. Without their generous assistance, 

the first edition of this book could not have 

been published. 

A number of individuals deserve recognition for their important contributions to the 

book’s second edition, published in 2003. 

Command Sergeant Major Daniel K. Elder 

revised and expanded the volume, writing new 

chapters on the men who served as SMAs 

from 1995 to 2002. Dr. Andrew J. Birtle of 

CMH provided valuable advice and assistance 

during the project’s research and writing.

In 2011, I was assigned to revise and expand 

the book, to include writing a new chapter on 

the career of Sergeant Major of the Army 

Kenneth O. Preston. Many people assisted me 

in this endeavor, a few of whom deserve special 

mention. Stephen J. Lofgren, chief of CMH’s 

Historical Support Branch, served as a patient 

adviser and editor. Dr. Robert D. Bouilly, the 

historian for the U.S. Army Sergeants Major 

Academy, provided much-needed research 

material. I am grateful to the Chief of Military 

History, Robert J. Dalessandro; Chief Historian 

Dr. Richard W. Stewart; and Dr. Joel D. 

Meyerson, chief of the Histories Division at the 

time, for entrusting me with this project. Also I 

want to acknowledge the individuals involved in 

the production of this volume: Beth F. 

MacKenzie, chief of CMH’s Historical Products 

Branch; Diane Sedore Arms, editor; and Gene 

Snyder, graphic designer.

Acknowledgments

ROBERT M. MAGES

General Editor
viii

This history of the Sergeants Major of 

the Army fills a long-standing gap in 

the history of the United States Army. 

The Army’s noncommissioned officer corps has 

always stood proudly in the front ranks to serve 

the nation in war and peace, in good times and 

bad. For too long, though, this selfless service 

has passed unnoticed. In one sense the lack of 

recognition of the NCO is a testimony to his or 

her professional dedication and sense of duty. 

The NCO was always there when needed. The 

NCO always did what was needed. And the 

NCO was all too often taken for granted.

The advent of high technology warfare 

placed new demands on all ranks, perhaps none 

more so than NCOs. Not only did they have to 

train soldiers, they had to learn along with their 

squads, platoons, companies, and battalions as 

the U.S. Army adapted its doctrine and warfighting to meet the demands of the twentyfirst century. Yet many of the Sergeants Major 

of the Army cut their teeth during World War 

II. They served in Korea and Vietnam during 

hot wars and everywhere from Germany to 

Indonesia during cold wars.

Their stories are the centerpiece of this 

book. None enlisted or was drafted with the 

promise of becoming a future Sergeant Major of 

the Army. None received special treatment. 

Some left the Army only to reenlist later. 

Others thought about leaving the Army. But 

each one of them made the Army his career and 

reached the top of his profession. Again and 

again they credit an NCO who impressed them 

in basic training and became a role model for 

them. They speak of the bygone massive Army 

of World War II, of the Army at war in frozen 

Korea and sweltering Vietnam, of the all-volunteer Army, of the garrison and post Army, but 

most importantly they speak of, for, and to the 

men and women of the Army.

The first part of this book describes the origin and growth of the Office of the Sergeant 

Major of the Army (OSMA). It explains why 

someone saw a need for such an office and tells 

who supported it, who made it work, and why it 

succeeded so well. Each Sergeant Major of the 

Army made lasting contributions to the office 

during his tenure. The sections on individual 

SMAs uncover their motivations, goals, and 

accomplishments. About half of each section is a 

general account of the respective Sergeant Major’s 

service. The other half focuses on his role as 

Sergeant Major of the Army. The insights and 

perspectives of the Sergeants Major of the Army 

come from years of experience, training, professional development, and individual dedication to 

the Army. At the end of each section is a chronological list of each SMA’s duty assignments. The 

appendix to this book gives a table showing the 

Presidents, Secretaries of the Army, and Chiefs 

of Staff under whom the respective Sergeants 

Major served.

The project was initially beset by changing 

organizational parameters and/or lack of author 

continuity. However, in 1992 Col. Fred Van 

Horn, then commandant of the Sergeants Major 

Academy, approached Brig. Gen. Harold Nelson, 

the chief of military history at that time, about 

reviving the long dormant project. Since then, 

under the direction of professional historians, 

four officers share the credit for compiling and 

writing this volume. Maj. Glen Hawkins began 

the work, organized the concept, and wrote the 

Preface to the First Edition
ix

section on the history of the OSMA. Without 

Major Hawkins’ dedication and hard work, the 

project might again have been delayed. When 

Hawkins retired, Maj. Michael Kelly took over 

the project. Major Kelly worked tirelessly to 

coordinate interviews, administer various details, 

and write three of the essays. When Major Kelly 

retired, Maj. Preston Pierce, an individual mobilization augmentee, assumed the project and 

authored another three sections. Finally, Maj. 

Mark Gillespie completed the book. He wrote 

two sections, interviewed Sgt. Maj. of the Army 

Richard A. Kidd, and saw the work through to 

publication. Each officer deserves much credit—

had any one of them faltered, this book would 

not have been published.

Sgt. Maj. (Ret.) Erwin Koehler interviewed 

seven of the eight former Sergeants Major of 

the Army for this book. His questions form the 

basis of the individual essays. Sergeant Major 

Wooldridge’s section is a composite of an earlier 

interview and published remarks in various 

Army journals. Both Sergeant Major of the 

Army Kidd and the Army Chief of Staff, 

General Gordon R. Sullivan, provided wholehearted support for this project. Without their 

generous assistance, this book could not have 

been published.

A number of individuals at the U.S. Army 

Center of Military History deserve recognition 

for their important contributions to this work. 

Dr. Jeffrey Clarke, chief historian, served as a 

rigorous and exacting reader; John W. Elsberg, 

editor in chief, directed the publication of this 

book; Catherine A. Heerin and Diane M. 

Donovan edited the manuscript into its final 

form; John Birmingham designed and electronically produced the pages; and Dr. Lawrence 

M. Kaplan of the Military Studies Branch 

helped revise a number of draft chapters of the 

manuscript.

This book tells the story of more than the 

Sergeants Major of the Army. It tells about the 

NCO in the Army. It gives today’s soldiers and 

NCOs a perspective from the past on the Army’s 

future path. The views expressed in this publication are those of the respective Sergeants Major 

of the Army and do not reflect the official policy 

or position of the Department of the Army, the 

Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

EDWARD J. DREA

 Chief, Research and 

 Analysis Division

xi

Contents

Page

Part I: The Office of the Sergeant Major of the Army ........... 1

The Sergeant Major ............................................. 4

Sergeant Major of the Army: Origins ................................ 5

The First Sergeant Major of the Army ............................... 7

Confirmation .................................................. 14

Rebuilding a Corps ............................................. 20

Stability and Growth ............................................ 28

Conclusion .................................................... 44

Part II: The Sergeants Major of the Army ...................... 55

William O. Wooldridge .......................................... 57

George W. Dunaway ............................................ 71

Silas L. Copeland ............................................... 85

Leon L. Van Autreve ............................................ 97

William G. Bainbridge ........................................... 111

William A. Connelly ............................................ 123

Glen E. Morrell ................................................ 137

Julius W. Gates ................................................. 151

Richard A. Kidd ................................................ 165

Gene C. McKinney ............................................. 179

Robert E. Hall ................................................. 191

Jack L. Tilley .................................................. 207

Kenneth O. Preston ............................................. 221

Appendix: Chronological List of Presidents, Secretaries of the Army, 

Chiefs of Staff, and Sergeants Major of the Army ...................... 237

Further Readings ............................................... 241

Illustrations

Steuben at Valley Forge ............................................ 2

Office of the Sergeant Major of the Army at the Pentagon ............... 3

General Harold K. Johnson ....................................... 6

General Johnson Administers the Oath to William O. Wooldridge ......... 8
xii

 Page

Badge of the Sergeant Major of the Army ............................ 8

Attendees of the First Command Sergeants Major Conference ............ 12

SMA Wooldridge and CSM Dunaway ............................... 15

Sergeants Major Academy ........................................ 21

General Sullivan Presents SMA Kidd the New SMA Insignia ............. 36

CSM Jerry T. Alley .............................................. 38

CSM James C. McKinney ........................................ 38

General Reimer and SMA Hall with SMA Positional Colors ............. 42

Eight of the Sergeants Major of the Army ............................ 45

Sergeant Major of the Army William O. Wooldridge .................... 56

Private Wooldridge .............................................. 58

First Sergeant Wooldridge Relaxes with Fellow NCOs .................. 59

Wooldridge with Maj. Gen. Jonathan O. Seaman ....................... 62

Wooldridge with General Johnson .................................. 65

Sergeant Major of the Army George W. Dunaway ...................... 70

Dunaway with Troops ........................................... 73

SMA Dunaway with Trainees at Fort Benning, Georgia ................. 78

Dunaway Visits Hospitalized Soldiers ............................... 79

SMA Dunaway and President Richard M. Nixon ....................... 81

Sergeant Major of the Army Silas L. Copeland ........................ 84

Copeland with Troops in Vietnam .................................. 89

SMA Copeland Visits a Young Soldier ............................... 92

Mrs. Ann Copeland Visits an Army Hospital Patient .................... 93

SMA Copeland at His Retirement Ceremony ......................... 94

Sergeant Major of the Army Leon L. Van Autreve ...................... 96

Van Autreve as a Young Soldier .................................... 98

Van Autreve with Vietnamese Children .............................. 102

Van Autreve Takes the Oath as Sergeant Major of the Army .............. 105

SMA Van Autreve at His Retirement Ceremony ....................... 108

Sergeant Major of the Army William G. Bainbridge .................... 110

Bainbridge at Flying School ....................................... 112

Bainbridge as a Prisoner of War .................................... 114

Bainbridge Rides an Elephant in Vietnam ............................ 116

SMA Bainbridge and a Soldier During Exercise REFORGER ............ 118

Sergeant Major of the Army William A. Connelly ...................... 122

Connelly Relaxes with Fellow NCOs ................................ 125

Connelly on Duty in the Dominican Republic ......................... 126

First Sergeant Connelly in Vietnam ................................. 127

SMA Connelly Visits an Infantry Unit in Germany ..................... 130

Sergeant Major of the Army Glen E. Morrell ......................... 136

Morrell as a Young Soldier in Vietnam ............................... 140

Morrell at His Base Camp in Vietnam ............................... 141

SMA Morrell with General John A. Wickham, Jr. ...................... 144

Morrell with Command Sergeants Major ............................. 146

Sergeant Major of the Army Julius W. Gates .......................... 150
xiii

 Page

Gates with His Jump Equipment ................................... 153

CSM Gates in Germany ......................................... 158

SMA Gates and General Carl E. Vuono with Troops in the Field .......... 159

Gates and Vuono with a Soviet Soldier .............................. 161

Sergeant Major of the Army Richard A. Kidd ......................... 164

Kidd in Basic Training ........................................... 166

Kidd with Other Young Soldiers Ready to Jump in Germany .............. 167

Kidd at a Temporary Base Camp in Vietnam .......................... 168

Kidd as a First Sergeant in Korea ................................... 170

Sergeant Major of the Army Gene C. McKinney ....................... 178

Private McKinney in Vietnam ..................................... 180

Sergeant McKinney with Sheridan Tanks ............................. 181

McKinney as 8th Infantry Division Command Sergeant Major ............ 183

SMA McKinney with Soldiers in Macedonia .......................... 185

Sergeant Major of the Army Robert E. Hall .......................... 190

Hall in Korea .................................................. 192

Staff Sergeant Hall .............................................. 194

CSM Hall During Desert Storm ................................. 198

SMA Hall in a Bunker in Bosnia ................................... 202

Sergeant Major of the Army Jack L. Tilley ............................ 206

Private Tilley at Airborne School ................................... 208

Drill Sergeant Tilley. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

CSM Tilley and General William W. Crouch Awarding Medals ........... 212

SMA Tilley in a Fox Vehicle ...................................... 215

Sergeant Major of the Army Kenneth O. Preston ....................... 220

Preston at Basic Training ......................................... 222

Preston Receiving the Army Commendation Medal .................... 224

Preston in the Commander’s Cupola of His M60 Tank .................. 225

SMA Preston Addressing Members of Congress ....................... 230

SMA Preston and Sfc. Dale Green Prepare to Drive an M1A1

 Tank in Kuwait .............................................. 231

SMA Preston and Wife Karen During His Retirement Ceremony ......... 232

Illustrations courtesy of the following sources: p. 2, Pennsylvania Capitol Preservation Committee; pp. 

3, 42, 212, 215, Office of the Sergeant Major of the Army; pp. 6, 58, 62, 65, William O. Wooldridge; 

pp. 8, 38, 178, 220, 230, 231, 232, Department of the Army; p. 12, U.S. Army Photographic Agency; 

p. 21, Michael’s Photography; pp. 208, 209, Jack L. Tilley; pp. 222, 224, 225, Kenneth O. Preston. 

All other illustrations are from the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy.

Part I

The Off ice of the Sergeant Major 

of the Army
Steuben at Valley Forge, Edwin Austin Abbey

The sergeant major, being at the head of the non-commissioned officers, must pay the greatest 

attention to their conduct and behavior....He should be well acquainted with the...discipline of 

the regiment, and...the manner of keeping rosters and forming details. He must always attend the 

parade, be very expert in counting off the battalion and in every other business of the adjutant....

—Friedrich W. A. von Steuben, Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the 

Troops of the United States, 1794
OSMA

One of the most important office locations in our nation’s capital is the 

Pentagon’s “E Ring,” or outer hallway. 

There lie the offices of the most powerful civilian and military leaders in the defense establishment, as well as their key advisers and critical 

subordinates. The Sergeant Major of the Army 

(SMA) occupies Room 3E677, just across the 

hall from the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA). 

Here, the Army’s top noncommissioned officer, 

with the assistance of a small personal staff, performs his duties and fulfills his responsibilities as 

a principal adviser to the CSA.

The SMA is the chief ’s expert in all matters 

concerning the enlisted force. He is not only an 

ombudsman for Army enlisted personnel but, as 

a member of various boards and committees, also 

directly influences policies whose effects ripple 

throughout the Army. The SMA listens to the 

complaints and comments of enlisted men and 

women as someone who has been where they are, 

considers the impact of policy decisions from 

their perspective, carries their views and voices 

their concerns to the decision makers in the 

Pentagon, and focuses solely on their interests 

without being pulled or driven by other staff 

considerations. As such, he serves as a direct and 

personal communication line from the soldiers in 

the field to the CSA and senior staff officers. The 

Sergeant Major of the Army’s job is to comment 

on the enlisted Army, carrying to the chief all the 

news, good and bad, regarding the state of the 

enlisted force based on his experience.

The Off ice of the 

Sergeant Major of the Army

Office of the Sergeant Major of the Army at the Pentagon
4

For the noncommissioned officer corps, the 

Sergeant Major of the Army also serves as a role 

model for the youngest corporal as well as the 

most senior command sergeant major (CSM). 

Providing career inspiration by example, he 

motivates soldiers to professional accomplishments and feats of excellence they might otherwise not achieve. The very existence of the 

Office of the Sergeant Major of the Army 

(OSMA) supports and validates the position of 

the Noncommissioned Officer Corps as professional—worthy of special respect for commitment, expertise, dedication, and sacrifice in service to the nation.

It seems natural, even logical, that we should 

have an Office of the Sergeant Major of the 

Army, as the pinnacle of achievement for a distinguished enlisted career, with a prestigious location 

in the Pentagon and ready access to the senior 

commissioned officer of the Army. After all, this 

position reflects the situation at many lower levels 

of command, beginning with battalions, where 

the sergeant major is the senior enlisted soldier 

who serves and advises the organization commander in the myriad issues affecting enlisted 

soldiers. Before 1966, however, the Army Staff 

had not specifically designated anyone to represent the views of the enlisted Army. There was no 

one to visit soldiers worldwide, listen to what they 

had to say, and take the message back to the highest echelons of the Army Staff. No one directly 

presented the enlisted perspective to the highest 

levels of Army leadership. No one had as his or 

her primary duty the advocacy for the interests 

and concerns of the enlisted ranks. Nor was there 

anyone to act as a distinct, highly visible role 

model to noncommissioned officers Army-wide. 

The establishment of the OSMA is rooted in the 

history of the NCO Corps, the rank of sergeant 

major, and the increasing professionalism within 

the Army over the years.

The Sergeant Major

The title of sergeant major evokes many images: the steady, courageous leader whose very 

presence calms and settles his troops on the 

eve of battle; the articulate, demanding senior 

NCO of the battalion who accepts only the 

highest standards of appearance, performance, 

and training; the experienced senior leader 

who always seems to have the answer or knows 

where to get it; and the ever-present representative of higher-level commanders whose ability to communicate directly with line troops is 

so often taken for granted.

The roots of the sergeant major rank extend 

far back into history. As early as the sixteenth 

century the English Army had sergeants major. 

The title disappeared for a time, but after its 

reintroduction in the eighteenth century the 

rank of sergeant major became associated with 

respect, power, and responsibility. Sergeants 

major directly commanded troops and saw to 

the drill, discipline, and administration of their 

regiments.1 Such individuals usually boasted 

years of experience in service around the world, 

a familiarity with all aspects of Army life, acquisition of command presence, and a demonstrated ability to lead troops in battle. As a 

group, they greatly influenced the lives of the 

enlisted soldiers under them.

The U.S. Army first established the rank of 

sergeant major during the Revolutionary War. 

Baron Frederick William von Steuben, a 

Prussian volunteer, spelled out the duties and 

instructions for the rank in his Regulations for 

the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the 

United States (1779). The regulations, covering 

all aspects of infantry duties and conduct, 

stressed NCO responsibility for care, discipline, 

and training of the troops in garrison and in the 

field. Von Steuben, as the man responsible for 

training the fledgling American Army, placed 

the sergeant major at the head of all NCOs, 

making him responsible for their conduct. 

During the next 150 years the number and 

placement of sergeants major changed, but generally they were authorized in various branches 

at battalion level and above. In June 1920, however, a cost-conscious Congress grouped all 

enlisted soldiers into seven pay grades (E–l 

through E–7) without regard to job or specialty. 

In the process, the position of sergeant major 
5

was eliminated, and master sergeant (“enlisted 

man of the first grade”) became the highest 

NCO rank. For the next thirty-eight years the 

formal rank of sergeant major thus disappeared, 

with the position normally filled by the senior 

master sergeant in the organization. Finally, in 

June 1958 Congress made the first basic change 

to the enlisted grade structure since 1920. It 

authorized two new grades: first sergeant/master sergeant (E–8) and sergeant major (E–9). 

The grade of sergeant major ultimately returned 

as the highest level of enlisted service; in April 

1959 the first NCOs were promoted into the 

newly reestablished rank.2

Sergeant Major of the Army: Origins

American noncommissioned officers have usually thought of themselves as professional soldiers because their skills are not easily acquired, 

and they share a sense of identity as leaders and 

trainers of the enlisted ranks. For a variety of 

reasons, influenced by American military and 

political traditions and the patterns of our 

national history, both the public and the Army 

leadership have been slow to recognize that 

professionalism.

Customarily, at the end of a war Congress 

has cut defense forces to the bone. The late 

nineteenth century and the 1930s were particularly painful examples of this trend. Each time 

this occurred, the NCO Corps suffered: The 

nation dismissed its wartime skills as useless; 

some of its most experienced members left or 

were forced out of the service; its status was 

lowered; and its pay was cut. In addition to 

being ignored during peacetime, the 

Noncommissioned Officer Corps often became 

the repository for excess officers during demobilization. Time and again the NCOs were 

reminded that their status as career soldiers 

meant little.3

Even with the advent of the Cold War 

(1947–1989), the American people were slow to 

recognize the need for a continuing, adequately 

paid force to meet ever-present threats to their 

security. In fact, it was five years after the 

Korean War (1950–1953) that Congress took 

the significant step of passing the Military Pay 

Bill of 1958, which created the E–8 and E–9 

pay grades. Still, the financial and personnel 

pressures of a large standing Army stretched to 

every corner of the globe made it extremely difficult to meet the personal needs and morale 

requirements of the enlisted soldiers. By the late 

1960s, Army leadership was beginning to realize that something beyond traditional methods 

and measures was necessary to bolster troop 

morale and increase the attractiveness of enlisted career opportunities.

In January 1963 Army magazine published 

“Sergeant Major at the Top,” which highlighted 

Sgt. Maj. George E. Loikow, the administrative 

sergeant major for Army Chief of Staff General 

Earle G. Wheeler.4 In the article, Loikow suggested having a sergeant major serve the Chief 

of Staff in a manner “similar to what a unit sergeant major provides his commander.” He 

observed that whenever he accompanied 

Wheeler on visits to Army installations he was 

always warmly received by all ranks as the 

“Army’s Sergeant Major.” Though the title was 

not official, Loikow believed that his presence 

during these trips had a positive effect on 

enlisted pride and morale and enabled him to 

read the “pulse” of the enlisted man.5 Noting the 

creation of the position of sergeant major of the 

Marine Corps in May 1957, Loikow recommended to both Wheeler and his successor, 

General Harold K. Johnson, that the Army formally establish the position of Sergeant Major 

of the Army.6

Loikow’s proposal received a boost during 

the 1964 Personnel Sergeants Major Conference 

when, at the urging of the Sergeant Major of 

the U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), Sgt. Maj. 

Francis J. Bennett, a council of sergeants major 

endorsed the creation of the Sergeant Major of 

the Army.7 Based on this recommendation, the 

Office of Personnel Operations (OPO), Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), began 

to study the idea. Detailed planning began with 

a series of troop studies followed by a gathering 

of sergeants major from throughout the Army. 
6

In October 1965, the Council of Sergeants 

Major, under Bennett’s prompting, once again 

endorsed the proposal. Bennett argued that the 

creation of a Sergeant Major of the Army would 

help senior leaders keep in touch with the cares 

and concerns of the average soldier, promote 

confidence within the enlisted ranks, and 

increase prestige, operating effectiveness, and 

career incentives for senior enlisted personnel. 

The OPO ultimately agreed, and two weeks 

after the 1965 conference it officially recommended establishing the new office.8 Chief of 

Staff Johnson also liked the idea, stating that if 

“we were going to talk about the noncommissioned officers being the backbone of the Army 

there ought to be established a position that 

recognizes that this was in fact the case.”9

There were, however, some issues that needed to be addressed. One of Johnson’s concerns 

was the precise authority to be vested in the 

office. The SMA, as with sergeants major at any 

echelon, would not have any legal responsibilities 

or precisely defined roles. Without legal responsibility, General Johnson observed, you could not 

“provide the position with much authority.” On 

the other hand, a “sort of de facto responsibility” 

would arise from the position, as well as “an 

assumed authority.” This authority derived from 

the nature of the office and from the leadership 

and personality of the man occupying that office. 

Subordinates “would see [in the SMA] someone 

of substantial stature and consequently substantial authority.” In other words, their perceptions 

and expectations provided his authority. This 

meant that the individual who became the 

Army’s top NCO had to be a thoroughly experienced, energetic professional who would tend to 

take action on his own initiative as opportunities 

presented themselves. In this respect, establishing 

a tradition of activist sergeants major would be 

more important than any regulatory authority. 

Their actions and demeanor would enhance the 

office’s authority even more. 

The expected dynamic role of the SMA 

appointees created a second concern. As the 

post would be an advisory position, not an alternate or parallel chain of command, the SMA 

would have to exercise great care to establish 

proper working relationships between his office 

and various Army staffs and agencies such as 

the OPO. In a broader sense, relations with the 

DCSPER, normally a three-star general, were 

even more critical. 

The DCSPER was concerned that the 

SMA’s office might interfere in the assignment 

function by creating an “old boy network” to 

circumvent DCSPER’s decisions by arranging 

assignments and transfers outside of normal 

Army channels. To address this concern, General 

Johnson required every request for transfer 

received by the SMA’s office to be handled only 

through DCSPER rather than, for example, 

through the Chief of Staff ’s office. General 

Johnson intended the Sergeant Major of the 

Army, like the sergeants major in units Armywide, to remain an adviser and not to become an 

operator as many in OPO feared. “We created,” 

General Johnson noted some years later, “what 

might, for want of a better term, be called an 

ombudsman. He was a spokesman at the highest echelons of the uniformed side of the 

Army...to provide a recognition for the enlisted 

ranks of the Army.”10

Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson at His 

Desk at the Pentagon, 1967
7

In 1966, while addressing the first major 

command Sergeants Major Conference in 

Washington, D.C., General Johnson confronted 

the issue of a “dual chain of command,” cautioning the Army’s senior sergeants major against 

such a development. “You have to be careful now,” 

he warned, “that in this sergeants major chain you 

are not establishing some kind of an end run position, because this, if it ever developed and if it 

were then ever identified, would be the very 

quickest way to just torpedo the whole program.”11 Fortunately, it never happened. 

Having decided to create the office, General 

Johnson then had to choose the man who would 

be the first Sergeant Major of the Army. He 

wrote a letter to each of the major commands 

describing his goals for the new office and soliciting suitable nominations for the position. All 

responded, and General Johnson’s personal staff 

placed the names in a matrix of different qualities and characteristics on a large spreadsheet. 

After he reviewed them, his staff went back to 

the commands to obtain further information, to 

make additional checks, or to inquire about certain individuals. Although DCSPER was consulted “a little bit,” as Johnson put it, the Chief 

of Staff and his aides would make the decision. 

“There was,” said Johnson, “a good bit of 

exchange between [members of ] my personal 

staff...people that you call aides normally.”12

Of the twenty-one nominees, only one was 

then serving in Vietnam, the single major command with American soldiers in combat during 

1966. On some of his visits, General Johnson had 

seen Sgt. Maj. William O. Wooldridge of the 1st 

Infantry Division and considered him “a fine 

figure of a man.” Sergeant Major Wooldridge, a 

43-year-old soldier with twenty-five years’ service, had spent sixteen years overseas. A veteran 

of World War II and Vietnam, he had been 

awarded the Silver Star with Oak Leaf Cluster 

and the Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster, 

among others.

Although Wooldridge had had brushes with 

authorities early in his career, the Chief of Staff 

attributed them to the “exuberance of youth” and 

considered them an experience factor not necessarily incompatible with the responsibilities of 

the new position. Also, Johnson firmly believed 

that “once a man had paid the price you don’t 

forever hold him to account...particularly where 

subsequent service has been exceptional in nature 

and so recognized.”13

The decision was made. Wooldridge was 

General Johnson’s man. Still, because of the 

great need that the first Sergeant Major of the 

Army be completely above reproach, the chief 

instructed his staff to make a thorough review 

of Wooldridge’s background. General Johnson 

wanted an individual whom “we can respect 

throughout the entire time he holds the position.”14 The extra efforts produced no new 

information. Although General Johnson later 

learned that there had been some ongoing 

investigations in Europe, the allegations later 

proved groundless.15

The First Sergeant Major of the Army

General Orders No. 29, dated 4 July 1966, officially established the SMA position, with tenure for the office corresponding to the tenure of 

the Chief of Staff he served. That same day 

General Johnson publicly announced the creation of the office.

On 11 July 1966, Johnson administered 

the oath of office, officially making Sergeant 

Major Wooldridge the first Sergeant Major 

of the Army. Since no special rank insignia 

had yet been developed, Johnson and Mrs. 

Wooldridge affixed a specially designed collar 

insignia to the sergeant major’s uniform. This 

new badge of office, improvised by Johnson’s 

special projects officer, Col. Jasper J. Wilson, 

and approved on 4 July 1966, was devised by 

soldering the shield (minus the eagle) from 

the insignia of the aide to the Chief of Staff 

to a standard enlisted brass disk.16 The 

Sergeant Major of the Army was to wear a 

pair of these insignia in place of the branch 

and U.S. insignia normally worn by enlisted 

men. It would not be until the fall of 1978 

that the Army would adopt a distinctive 

insignia of rank for the office.
8

Sergeant Major Wooldridge assumed his 

duties in an environment of upheaval and uncertainty. Little could anyone know that the Army 

was about to face some of the gravest challenges to 

leadership in its entire history. Years later, in 1984, 

renowned historian Russell Weigley would assert 

that “no years since the foundation of the Army 

have matched the turbulence and the uncertainty 

of purpose of the time since 1967.”17 For example, 

in mid-May 1966, just before Wooldridge assumed 

his duties, the draft failed to acquire enough soldiers who met the Army’s physical and mental 

standards. Consequently, Secretary of Defense 

Robert S. McNamara announced Project 100,000, 

allowing inductees with heretofore disqualifying 

Armed Forces Qualification Test scores to enter 

the Army. The decision obviously affected the 

overall quality of the force, necessitating more 

time for recruits to master Army skills and 

increasing the demands on NCO leadership.18

The need to sustain and expand the Army 

without mobilizing a reserve component also put 

a heavy strain on the Noncommissioned Officer 

Corps. In Vietnam and elsewhere, combat casualties and noncombat losses already had begun 

stretching thin the Army’s mid-level NCO officer grades. Promotions to staff sergeant and platoon sergeant came more rapidly than normal, 

resulting in inexperienced and less mature leadership. The problems of inexperience intensified 

in June 1967 when, to meet critical shortages, the 

Army began depending heavily on a wartime 

expedient of hastily trained junior noncommissioned officers, derisively called “shake and bake” 

NCOs, who often lacked the experience and 

judgment gained from the years such men would 

normally spend in the junior enlisted ranks.19

In addition, the Vietnam War grew increasingly unpopular at home and within the Army 

itself. With many Army draftees questioning 

both the purpose and conduct of the conflict, a 

polarization grew between the junior enlisted 

men (E–l to E–5) and the professional noncommissioned officers.20 Even in the latter ranks 

many began to question the need for repeated 

tours in Vietnam and to reflect the frustration 

with the perceived absence of any clear objectives.

While the Vietnam War raged, the U.S. 

armed forces also continued to shoulder the 

major military burdens of the Cold War for the 

entire free world. In the United States and 

Europe, the chronic shortage of experienced 

NCOs soon forced company grade officers to 

deal directly with enlisted men. When the available NCOs were bypassed, their roles as smallGeneral Johnson Administers the Oath to William O. 

Wooldridge on 11 July 1966 on the Pentagon Mall.

Badge Designed 

by Col. Jasper J. Wilson
9

unit leaders eroded. The morale of the 

Noncommissioned Officer Corps plummeted at 

a time when the Army most needed their skills 

and strengths. From 1968 to the mid-1970s, 

junior officer and NCO leadership was a great 

concern to the senior Army leaders. Years later, 

Wooldridge himself generalized that one of the 

greatest challenges facing the Army during his 

tenure was “poor officer and NCO leadership.” 

Both the prestige of the Noncommissioned 

Officer Corps and expectations of what it could 

and should do needed major improvement.

In this environment, Sergeant Major 

Wooldridge energetically assumed his duties. 

As the first person to hold the office, he faced 

the awkward and difficult challenges of establishing ground rules and setting precedents for 

future SMAs. He had no example to look back 

upon for guidance. There was no predecessor 

with whom he could consult. By his own 

account, the greatest challenge that General 

Johnson’s appointment presented him was thus 

the establishment of the position itself.21 In this 

effort, he had only his years of military experience and the personal confidence of General 

Johnson to guide him.

General Johnson’s original letter seeking 

SMA nominations had devoted a full page to 

the duties and functions of the office. But when 

Sergeant Major Wooldridge reported for duty, 

Johnson provided him with no more than an 

informal note card on which the following tasks 

were typed:

Will identify problems affecting enlisted personnel and 

recommend appropriate solutions. He will advise on the 

initiation of and content of plans for the professional education, growth, and advancement of noncommissioned 

officers, individually and collectively. He will advise the 

Chief of Staff on all matters pertaining primarily to enlisted personnel, including but not limited to morale, welfare, 

training, clothing, insignia, equipment, pay and allowances, 

customs and courtesies of the service, enlistment and reenlistment, discipline and promotion policies. He will be 

available to provide advice to any board or commission 

dealing with enlisted personnel matters.

Wooldridge folded the card and carried it in 

his wallet. Those were the only written instructions he received during his tenure.22 With his 

own staff—a Women’s Army Corps secretary 

and a sergeant first class—Wooldridge went to 

work as General Johnson’s senior enlisted adviser and consultant on all matters concerning 

enlisted personnel. When Johnson told him, 

“We’ll give you a couple of weeks for the honors 

and ceremonies and then you can put on your 

fatigues and get to work,” he meant it. In the 

remaining days of July after the swearing-in 

ceremonies, Wooldridge and his staff handled 

about three hundred disparate inquiries as they 

slowly began to define the new post.23

During his first six months Wooldridge had 

an intensive schedule of planned activities, as 

the Army touted and publicized the newly created position, with an emphasis on visits to 

build rapport with troops in the field. He made 

weekly trips to Army posts and hospitals in the 

United States and spent Christmas with Army 

units in Vietnam. At the end of his first year in 

office he had traveled nearly 160,000 miles, 

visited twenty-five continental United States 

(CONUS) installations, and made four trips to 

Vietnam and two to Europe. In the course of 

those trips he also went to Korea, Thailand, and 

Hawaii. He visited with individual soldiers, 

observed their training and combat operations, 

and met with their senior enlisted leaders to 

discuss various areas affecting morale and welfare. Back in his Pentagon office (whenever he 

was there—he was in the field 50 percent of the 

time) he averaged 300 letters, 50 visitors, and 

250 phone calls each month.24

About three months after becoming 

Sergeant Major of the Army, Wooldridge 

began to clarify what he wanted to accomplish. 

One item was not on his list. Echoing the 

admonitions of General Johnson, he was determined to avoid having his position in any way 

become a substitute for the chain of command. 

“I was not brought to Washington as a oneman replacement for the platoon sergeants, 

first sergeants, and unit sergeants major. 

Nothing that the Sergeant Major of the Army 

is slated to do will in any way take the place of 

the traditional responsibilities of these noncommissioned officers as the leaders closest to 
10

the individual soldier and the leaders responsible to unit commanders.”25

His first priority was to develop a more 

regular information-gathering system upon 

which to base future plans and recommendations. As a start, he wanted an annual Command 

Sergeants Major Conference to serve as a 

sounding board for ideas from all elements of 

the Army. In addition, Wooldridge planned to 

meet with noncommissioned officers in other 

forums, such as the annual conference of the 

Association of the United States Army (AUSA), 

and to broaden his contacts among the retired 

and reserve component NCO community. 

Johnson approved both initiatives.

Wooldridge’s second major area of concern 

was the enlisted insignia system. Like everyone 

else, he had developed some pretty clear ideas 

regarding the matter during his years as a soldier. He wanted to combine them with the 

opinions of other enlisted soldiers and make 

some concrete recommendations for change.

Third, Wooldridge wanted to use his office 

to assist soldiers with personal and family 

problems. He intended to establish close contact with service and civilian organizations that 

extended aid to men in need, such as the Army 

Emergency Relief and the American Red 

Cross, as well as with other agencies that 

focused on nonemergency morale support, 

such as the United Services Organization, the 

Army Special Services, and various veterans’ 

organizations. He believed that the conditions 

imposed by the ongoing war in Vietnam made 

such initiatives imperative.

Finally, he intended to participate and 

advise Army boards and commissions that had 

a direct bearing on the enlisted force. To be of 

assistance in this capacity, he planned to reinforce his twenty-five years of experience with 

frequent visits to soldiers in the field during 

which he could focus on the topics under discussion at higher levels.26

Wooldridge often traveled with the Chief of 

Staff. Normally, the new SMA would convey the 

chief ’s greeting to the enlisted personnel of the 

units they visited and sound out noncommissioned officers and enlisted men on matters that 

were troubling them. Johnson observed: “Lots of 

times the problems didn’t make their way up 

[the chain of command] as rapidly or as clearly 

as they might. Sometimes you thought you had 

a problem on your hands and you didn’t, and 

other times you thought everything was fine and 

it wasn’t.”27 The job of the SMA was to cut 

through those types of problems. Wooldridge 

also traveled with President Lyndon B. Johnson, 

both men undoubtedly hoping that the unique 

prestige and prominence of the other’s position 

would reflect on his own. Press relations, or 

“PR,” was important to the new SMA office 

from the beginning.

Very quickly, however, the Chief of Staff 

realized that tying Wooldridge’s travel too 

closely to his own was somewhat self-defeating. 

Since the Sergeant Major of the Army’s office 

was created to provide another avenue of communication with the troops, General Johnson 

deemed it valuable to differentiate their itineraries to the field. The Sergeant Major of the 

Army thus received wide latitude in establishing 

his own travel schedule, with the chief approving where he went on a personal, informal 

basis.28

Soon Sergeant Major Wooldridge had 

blanket travel orders with complete freedom to 

visit where he thought fit without checking 

with anyone. He quickly developed an effective 

routine. After arriving at a base and paying a 

short courtesy call to the commander, he spent 

most of his time visiting mess halls, supply 

rooms, and other areas of the installation 

accompanied by the post sergeant major. Later 

they visited training venues and often had a 

social function in the evening. At training 

posts, the SMA spent the entire day with the 

trainees, eating with them, firing on the range 

with them, or participating in their training. 

Whether at a divisional or a training post, 

whether observing training or attending a 

social function, he talked to the soldiers and 

the noncommissioned officers to find out what 

was on their minds so he could carry the message back to the Army Chief of Staff.29
11

It was not long before the enlisted soldiers 

knew not only that the Sergeant Major of the 

Army existed, but also precisely what he was 

supposed to do. One day Wooldridge received a 

letter from a young private serving in Europe. 

The young man began: “I understand you are 

my representative at the Department of the 

Army. Here is my problem and I want you to 

please do something about it.” Before 

Wooldridge’s staff could get out a reply, he 

received another letter from the same young 

soldier that read, “I wrote to you yesterday about 

my problem and I haven’t heard anything yet. I 

want to know what you are doing about it.”30

Although he could not act as swiftly as the 

impatient soldier in Europe wanted, the 

Sergeant Major of the Army, as the advocate for 

the enlisted soldier with unfettered access to the 

chief, was certainly able to provide previously 

unavailable assistance and service.

Sergeant Major Wooldridge experienced an 

incident that well illustrated another important 

role of the Sergeant Major of the Army. He 

received a call from Florida Congressman 

Charles E. Bennett on 18 December. One of 

the congressman’s constituents had a son serving in the 8th Infantry Division in Europe. 

Although the young man was supposed to be 

home for Christmas, he had been “bumped off ” 

the Military Airlift Command plane at 

Frankfurt by a higher-priority passenger. Was 

there anything Wooldridge could do? 

Wooldridge immediately called Sgt. Maj. Ken 

Koon of U.S. Army, Europe, in Heidelberg, 

Germany, requesting that he pick up the soldier 

and put him on a plane for the United States as 

soon as possible. The next day Sergeant Major 

Koon called from the Frankfurt airport to 

inform Wooldridge that the plane with the soldier on it had just taken off. The soldier made it 

home by Christmas to spend the holiday with 

his family, and the Army had gained the goodwill of all concerned.

When General Johnson learned of the incident, he was pleased. The task of the SMA 

office, he acknowledged, was to take advantage 

of the informal chain of communication that 

sergeants major have at their disposal. 

Wooldridge himself later wryly noted that if 

they had had to rely on the normal bureaucratic 

channels, “that soldier would have been lucky to 

be home by New Year’s.”31

General Orders No. 29, which had established the position of Sergeant Major of the 

Army, set the tenure of the office to correspond 

to that of the Chief of Staff whom he serves. 

When General Johnson relinquished his duties 

on 2 July 1968, after four years as the Army 

Chief of Staff, it was time to find a replacement 

for Wooldridge, even though he had been in the 

position only two years and, in the judgment of 

General Johnson, had done a “splendid job.”32

The new Chief of Staff, General William C. 

Westmoreland, asked Wooldridge to stay on as 

Sergeant Major of the Army. However, because 

of his desire to return to Vietnam and the 

understanding he had with General Johnson 

that they would both depart at the same time, 

Wooldridge declined the offer. He did, however, 

remain in office until August to provide continuity for the incoming Chief of Staff.33

Although he had served as Sergeant Major 

of the Army for just over two years, Wooldridge 

still had made many significant accomplishments. Perhaps his greatest was to fulfill the 

single mission that General Johnson had given 

him: to establish the Office of Sergeant Major 

of the Army. He and General Johnson had laid 

the foundation for how future SMAs would 

work with their Chiefs of Staff. They had 

carved out a highly visible position on the 

chief ’s personal staff with easy, direct access to 

the Army’s top soldier. His presence with the 

chief on inspection trips enhanced the SMA’s 

prestige and signaled the importance the Army 

placed on the senior representative of enlisted 

personnel. By setting his own schedule and 

traveling widely, Wooldridge had provided the 

“eyes and ears,” the informal, direct communication link to the soldiers in the field that General 

Johnson had envisioned. He had established 

invaluable relationships with various staff agencies in the Pentagon to coordinate on matters 

related to enlisted personnel. Just as important, 
12

he had gained the trust and confidence of the 

enlisted ranks. Consequently, most senior noncommissioned officers regarded the creation of 

the Office of Sergeant Major of the Army as 

“one of the finest things that had happened to 

the noncommissioned officer corps in recent 

memory.”34

If establishing the Office of the Sergeant 

Major of the Army was Wooldridge’s premier 

accomplishment, it was not his only one. He 

also established the annual Major Command 

Sergeants Major Conference. Soon after taking office in July 1966, Wooldridge had recommended that sergeants major of the major 

commands accompany their respective commanders to the annual Army Commanders’ 

Conference in Washington, D.C. This would 

give Wooldridge the opportunity to discuss 

matters related to enlisted personnel with the 

sergeants major concurrent with the commanders’ meeting. General Johnson agreed, 

and in November 1966 twenty-one sergeants 

major from commands around the world met 

at the first annual major command Sergeants 

Major Conference. As yet another vehicle for 

soliciting the enlisted viewpoint directly from 

the field, the conference proved extremely useful and has continued to the present.35

From the sergeants major conferences in 

1966 and 1967 came proposals to change virtually every area affecting enlisted soldiers, 

especially specific recommendations to improve 

professionalism and career opportunities within the enlisted force. Among the approved 

recommendations was a centralized system, 

put into effect in 1969, for temporary promotions to the top two NCO grades. The new 

system generally reflected the one used to promote officers to field grade rank: Promotion 

no longer required a position vacancy in an 

individual’s current unit of assignment. The 

result was a more equitable and uniform procedure for selection and promotion to master 

sergeant and sergeant major. Also, for the first 

time in Army history, selections and orders for 

the senior NCOs would be prepared at the 

Department of the Army level. Wooldridge 

considered this reform, along with centralized 

assignments, one of the greatest Army accomplishments during his tenure “because it broke 

up the old unit promotion system, opening up 

vacancies in the Army for all eligible NCOs.”36

Attendees of the First Command Sergeants Major Conference, November 1966
13

It also went far to eliminate the necessity for 

an NCO to be at the right place at the right 

time to be promoted.

The conference recommendations prompted other changes. One was an Army-wide standardized promotion scoring system, which 

allowed competing enlisted personnel to compare their individual standings with those of 

their peers. Another was a standardized enlisted 

insignia of grade as well as an authorized miniature pin-on insignia of rank for fatigues and 

other utility uniforms. The latter, perhaps insignificant to outsiders, eliminated the tedium of 

sewing stripe changes onto multiple uniforms. 

Based on other conference recommendations, 

the Army also upgraded the company clerk 

position from E–4 to E–5, allowing more experienced personnel in the orderly rooms and cutting down on frequent personnel turnovers.

Such reforms succeeded because the 

Sergeant Major of the Army supported them. 

With his higher profile, he articulated the concerns of the enlisted ranks and surfaced the 

issues that the rank and file deemed worthy of 

consideration by various Army staff agencies.37

A third accomplishment during SMA 

Wooldridge’s tenure was the establishment of the 

command sergeant major (CSM) rank, which he 

later called “the single most significant item to 

evolve from my term.”38 The issue had its roots 

in the Army’s longstanding concern about the 

low prestige of its senior noncommissioned officers. The Military Pay Act of 1958 had established the grades of E–8 and E–9, an important 

step in improving the situation. The same concern had led General Johnson to establish the 

Office of Sergeant Major of the Army. Likewise, 

“greater prestige for the senior noncommissioned officer was the basis for...the establishment of the Command Sergeants Major program.”39

The Army took a tentative step toward giving additional recognition to unit sergeants 

major in 1965, when it proposed new insignia to 

better distinguish between sergeants major of a 

command and other E–9s, such as those in staff 

positions. According to the plan developed by 

the chief of Personnel Operations, staff sergeant 

majors would continue to wear the insignia of 

sergeants major but would be redesignated 

“Chief Master Sergeants.” The sergeants major 

of a command, on the other hand, were to 

receive a new insignia with a wreath around the 

star in the center of the sergeants major insignia. 

The plan proved controversial, however, and the 

Army canceled it before its 1 September 1965 

implementation date. The insignia change would 

languish for two more years while the Army 

prepared additional studies.

40

The idea of creating the title of CSM 

originated with Sgt. Maj. John F. Thomas of the 

U.S. Army Air Defense Command in December 

1966. Thomas felt that sergeants major of the 

major commands had little official guidance and 

that their roles and authority frequently changed 

based on “the boss you are currently working 

for.” 41 When Wooldridge first received the suggestion, he did not think a great deal about it. 

He felt that while he was a unit’s sergeant major, 

everybody knew who he was. But the more he 

studied Thomas’ concern, the more he began to 

understand the problem; he eventually backed 

the CSM proposal. 

General Johnson came around to supporting the creation of a CSM program in 1967, in 

part as a result of a records survey of sergeants 

major throughout the Army. The survey found 

that most sergeants major at corps and division 

level had combat arms specialties, outstanding 

commander evaluations, overseas experience in 

long- and short-tour areas, and a sincere desire 

to serve with troops. The profile of sergeants 

major above corps level, however, was “not so 

favorable” in Johnson’s view. There, the survey 

found administrative specialists with limited 

combat and troop experience, many with 

extended overseas service in favorable long-tour 

areas, and “some who [were] motivated more by 

the opportunity to ‘homestead’ in an area of 

their choice than by the challenge of serving 

with troops.” Johnson believed that a strong 

sergeant major chain required individuals in key 

positions who were “vigorous, broadly experienced, and dedicated professionals who are 
14

more at home in the field with troops than at a 

desk in a major headquarters,” rather than “figureheads and administrative specialists.”42

A Command Sergeant Major Program had 

the potential to remedy the situation, and General 

Johnson approved the idea at a late afternoon 

meeting in his office on 13 July 1967. He added 

that since command sergeants major constituted 

the “general officers” of the NCO Corps, they 

would be treated as general officers with 

Headquarters, Department of the Army 

(HQDA), handling their selection, assignment, 

and career management. The program included a 

new title (Command Sergeant Major), insignia 

(the sergeants major insignia embellished by a 

wreath, as proposed in 1965), and a new military 

occupational specialty (MOS) code of 00Z5 for 

command sergeants major. The new command 

sergeants major would fill senior enlisted positions on staffs of commanders from battalion 

level to HQDA. All other sergeants major were 

to be known as staff sergeants major—until the 

word “staff ” was dropped in 1969—and continued to wear their old insignia.

43

After convening a selection board, the 

Department of the Army announced the first 

192 selectees for command sergeant major in 

January 1968. On the list were Sergeant Major 

of the Army Wooldridge and the next four 

incumbents of that office: George W. Dunaway, 

Silas L. Copeland, Leon L. Van Autreve, and 

William G. Bainbridge. In March General 

Johnson presented the first new CSM rank 

insignia to SMA Wooldridge.

Conf irmation

The creation of the new rank and insignia of 

command sergeant major was one of Johnson 

and Woodridge’s last major accomplishments in 

improving the enlisted corps. Four months later, 

in July 1968, General Westmoreland replaced 

Johnson as Chief of Staff of the Army and 

Wooldridge prepared to return to the field. To 

choose his new Sergeant Major of the Army, 

Westmoreland, like Johnson before him, solicited nominations from the field. After narrowing down a final list, he selected George W. 

Dunaway, then serving in Vietnam as command 

sergeant major for the 101st Airborne Division. 

With the choice warmly seconded by 

Wooldridge, the Department of the Army 

announced the appointment on 16 July 1968.44

While Wooldridge reported back to Vietnam as 

the command sergeant major of the Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), 

General Westmoreland swore in the new 

Sergeant Major of the Army, George W. 

Dunaway, on 1 September.45 Although Sergeant 

Major of the Army for only two years, 1968–

1970, Dunaway witnessed pivotal changes in 

the Army. In Vietnam, the Tet offensive in 

February 1968 became a political turning point. 

The surprise Communist offensive shocked the 

American public and America’s political leadership. Militarily the offensive was a failure, but 

psychologically it proved an enemy victory, 

encouraging those opposed to the war and 

demoralizing those who supported it.

Political decisions soon followed, placing the 

United States on a course to end its involvement 

in Southeast Asia. Although the U.S. military 

presence in Vietnam peaked at 550,000 in early 

1969, under the Nixon administration’s 

Vietnamization policy, it decreased to 475,000 by 

year’s end and to 335,000 by the end of 1970.46

Domestic opposition to the Army in general and 

the war in particular peaked in May 1970 when 

Ohio National Guardsmen shot and killed four 

student protesters at Kent State University. 

Antiwar protesters and other groups organized 

a nationwide war demonstration, called the 

moratorium, to march on Washington, D.C., 

in October.

Much of the animosity over the war was 

directed at the military, not surprising since 

U.S. local and national political leaders looked 

to state and federal military forces to contain 

such demonstrations. Within the Army, dissension, opposition, and signs of indiscipline 

increased. Racial antagonisms grew. Drug use 

became rampant. Desertion and absences 

without leave skyrocketed, while respect for 

authority and soldierly deportment declined. 
15

The Army reflected the society it served and 

suffered some of the same illnesses. Moreover, 

serious misdeeds within the Army, such as the 

My Lai massacre in Vietnam and mismanagement of open mess clubs in various locations 

worldwide, required extensive investigations. 

All these incidents received substantial media 

attention. The Army thus found itself a convenient target for the increasing number of 

Americans dissatisfied with the political leadership, the seemingly endless war in Vietnam, 

and the ruinous economic inflation.

An immediate concern for SMA Dunaway 

was to preserve the gains Wooldridge had 

made in establishing the Office of Sergeant 

Major of the Army and to protect it from its 

detractors. From the beginning not everyone 

had accepted the position. General Johnson, in 

a 1972 interview, discreetly talked about “people who resisted the creation of the position.” 

Wooldridge, after his retirement, noted that he 

reported directly to the Chief of Staff and submitted papers and recommendations to him 

directly, “due in some part to the opposition of 

the Vice Chief of Staff and the principal staff 

opposing [ Johnson] on his determination to 

have an SMA position.”47

A seemingly trivial issue, the location of the 

SMA’s office in the Pentagon had stepped on 

toes and made enemies. When General Johnson 

directed the establishment of the position, he 

tasked the DCSPER to make all necessary 

preparations. As the date neared for Wooldridge 

to assume his duties, General Johnson learned 

that the DCSPER had set up an office for the 

SMA within the OPO in the basement of the 

Pentagon.

Johnson quickly understood the implications of a basement office and told the DCSPER 

to put the SMA within the Office of the Chief 

of Staff of the Army (OCSA), where immediate 

access was possible. He viewed the new office as 

similar to the role of a sergeant major at battalion or division level, where the proximity and 

easy access made it possible for the chief to 

quickly consult with his senior enlisted adviser. 

General Johnson made it clear that he wanted 

to see his sergeant major routinely and often.

There was no vacant space in the OCSA 

area of the Pentagon, where space was always 

a premium and vigorously defended commodity. The area selected for the SMA was directly across the hall from the Chief of Staff ’s 

receptionist. Since the space was already occupied, everything on that side of the hall had to 

move left or right and jam in a little tighter to 

make room. According to Dunaway, “virtually 

everyone on that side of the hall in the 600 

block of the ‘E’ ring lost space.” There was a 

noticeable degree of resentment, especially 

among the senior colonels and general officers, who had been battalion, brigade, division, 

and perhaps even corps commanders, and 

understandably resented losing space to an 

enlisted man and his staff. The consequences 

of resentment were compounded when 

General Westmoreland accorded Sergeant 

Major of the Army Dunaway four-star protocol status.

48

SMA Wooldridge Talking with CSM Dunaway 

in Bien Hoc, Vietnam
16

For the first Sergeant Major of the Army, it 

had been an uphill battle, as with any newly 

established agency, but Wooldridge had worked 

hard to establish himself and the office. His 

legacy was a series of excellent working relationships with military and civilian personnel within the various general and special DA staffs. 

Some of Wooldridge’s contacts remained open 

and friendly to Dunaway, while others simply 

vanished as though they had never existed. “The 

resentment [toward the Office of the Sergeant 

Major of the Army] was like a lingering, lowhanging cloud.” Whenever Dunaway or his staff 

had to coordinate official or unofficial matters 

within OCSA, people within offices cooperated, but often with obvious reluctance and footdragging.49

With time, Dunaway and his staff were 

able to reopen many of the doors through personal contacts. But some remained closed and 

only the backing of the Secretary of the 

General Staff (SGS), the Vice Chief of Staff, 

or the Chief of Staff himself could force them 

open. Generally, Brig. Gen. William A. 

Knowlton, the SGS, could provide the requisite muscle, but on several occasions Dunaway 

had to invoke the support of General Bruce 

Palmer, Jr., the Vice Chief of Staff, to budge 

more powerful senior officers. At least twice 

Dunaway had to take delicate matters directly 

to General Westmoreland for resolution.

Within a year of assuming his duties, 

Dunaway made clear his priorities as the 

Sergeant Major of the Army. In an October 

1969 Army magazine article, Dunaway hammered away at the need for renewed professionalism on the part of the NCO Corps. 

Harkening to the time not long before when 

noncommissioned officers were considered on 

duty twenty-four hours a day as the backbone 

of the Army, SMA Dunaway praised the 

NCOs of earlier days who knew every detail of 

their post and made on-the-spot corrections of 

incidents of misconduct and uniform violations on or off post. “The soldier knew that any 

sergeant he encountered would correct him if 

he needed it, and a sergeant didn’t dare let a 

superior catch one of his men in a situation 

which needed correcting.”50 This sort of work 

had once helped make the Army a respected 

institution.

Unfortunately, lamented the new Sergeant 

Major of the Army, by the late 1960s, despite 

“no written directive, which discontinued this 

practice,” it seemed “to have fallen by the wayside.” Dunaway called for the Noncommissioned 

Officer Corps to reestablish the level of discipline and professionalism of previous eras. “A 

disciplined soldier is a well dressed, sharp 

looking soldier, and represents his country in 

the highest tradition. I would like to see a concerted effort, fully supported by all enlisted 

men in the U.S. Army, to return to the true 

meaning of the old saying that ‘NCOs are the 

backbone of the Army.’”51

His concerns meshed well with several 

initiatives of the time. In November 1968 the 

Army had approved a new enlisted personnel 

career program. Awkwardly titled the 

Management of Enlisted Careerists, Centrally 

Administered (MECCA), the program sought 

to provide career management for professional 

enlisted soldiers and to ensure competitive 

individual professional development through 

assignments, education, promotion, classification, evaluation, and quality control. In 1969 

the Army launched the program, which would 

be executed in three phases over several years, 

eventually to include all soldiers in grades E–5 

and above. The first phase, scheduled for early 

1970, initiated career management operations 

for grades E–8 and E–9. The second phase 

included grade E–7, and the final phase would 

incorporate grades E–5 and E–6.

The MECCA attempted to allow each 

career soldier to develop to the highest possible 

level, commensurate with ability and determination. Insofar as possible, the program sought 

to remove chance and favoritism as career 

determinants. Key elements included coordinated programs of progressive assignments, 

selection for schooling, MOS classification, performance evaluation, and selection for promotion. Under its provisions, an Enlisted Personnel 
17

Directorate of the Office of Personnel 

Operations within DCSPER actively managed 

career soldiers by selecting them for schooling 

and assignments, maintaining their DA management files, and advising them of their progress and standing among their peers. The 

underlying philosophy was to assign each individual to positions of increasing responsibility, 

with career patterns guiding the manager in the 

selections, in a manner similar to the officer 

professional development program.52

Centralized promotion to grades E–8 and 

E–9, a key feature of the program, began in 

January 1969. By October the Army Staff was 

also developing a new, more comprehensive, 

and rigorous enlisted evaluation report to support the career management effort. Heretofore 

promotions had been done locally, based on 

locally maintained and updated records. But 

on 1 June 1970, the Department of the Army 

assumed control of selections for promotion to 

grade E–7 as well and chose candidates from 

its first list that October.

The second significant program approved 

during Dunaway’s incumbency as Sergeant 

Major of the Army concerned noncommissioned officer education. In 1969 the Army 

Chief of Staff approved the Noncommissioned 

Officer Education System (NCOES), a graduated system of military education. When completely implemented the program would consist of three levels of formal instruction.

At the first level, the basic noncommissioned officer courses trained selected enlisted 

soldiers in the grade of E–4 and lower for 

assignment, duty, and responsibility as company level NCOs in the grades of E–5 and E–6. 

Instructional materials and facilities already 

existed because the offerings were nearly identical to the then-current Skill Development 

Base (SDB) courses known as the 

Noncommissioned Officers Candidate Course. 

Training was differentiated by MOS and qualified the graduates to lead soldiers in a similar 

MOS or career group. Instruction emphasized 

basic leadership skills, knowledge, and attitudes required to effectively command enlisted 

personnel as fire team leader, squad leader, and 

comparable positions of leadership.

At the next level, advanced noncommissioned officer courses trained selected staff sergeants and sergeants, first class, to perform duties 

in the two highest enlisted grades. This branchoriented training emphasized the philosophy 

underlying Army objectives and systems.

The final level was the senior noncommissioned officer courses, where selected master 

sergeants received training for duty as sergeants 

major of higher headquarters of the Army, or of 

a joint or combined headquarters. Sergeant 

Major of the Army Dunaway helped push 

through the NCOES program, but his successors had to implement it beginning in 1971.53

By 1969 myriad factors such as opposition 

to the war in Vietnam, draft evasion, internal 

Army dissent, and racial issues increasingly 

undermined the Army’s efforts to recruit new 

soldiers, retain those already on active duty, 

and maintain morale and esprit de corps in 

wartime. On 27 March President Richard M. 

Nixon created the Commission on an AllVolunteer Armed Force. In February 1970 the 

commission concluded that an all-volunteer 

force was both feasible and desirable. Two 

months later the president proposed the concept to Congress. Since the Army relied most 

heavily on the draft to meet its manpower 

needs, it immediately created a task group to 

study, develop, coordinate, and monitor actions 

designed to reduce reliance on the draft and 

simultaneously increase the attractiveness of 

military careers.54 To many the task seemed 

doomed to failure, yet by the end of Dunaway’s 

tour in 1970, the Army was taking some tentative steps to develop programs and implement 

changes aimed at having an all-volunteer 

force.55

Although Dunaway had served for thirty 

years in the Army, his retirement came as something of a surprise. The Army originally had 

envisioned the SMA’s serving concurrently with 

his respective Chief of Staff. But Wooldridge’s 

two-year term, which coincided with the last 

two years of Johnson’s tour as Army Chief of 
18

Staff, and Dunaway’s retirement at thirty years’ 

service, appeared to set a de facto limit of two 

years on the SMA’s tenure. Dunaway himself 

thought a two-year tour best, ensuring a continual infusion of fresh ideas and vigor into the 

office. He used this argument to convince 

General Westmoreland to change the assignment length officially. Thus General Orders No. 

34, dated 8 June 1970, limited the SMA’s tenure 

to two years, effective 1 September 1970.

At the same time, Dunaway also recommended that Westmoreland reform the ad hoc 

system of selecting the Sergeant Major of the 

Army. Instead of the chief ’s choosing his SMA 

from a list of names solicited from commanders 

in the field, Dunaway suggested that a selection 

board with a general officer presiding choose 

nominees from which the Chief of Staff could 

select the Army senior enlisted adviser. As the 

slightly more formal process would involve 

more of the Army Staff in the candidate’s selection, broadening his base of support, 

Westmoreland agreed. 

An Army-wide message announced the 

appointment of a selection board composed of 

Brig. Gen. William W. Stone, Jr., as chairman, 

two colonels, and two lieutenant colonels. A 

major served as a recorder, without vote, and 

represented the command sergeants major 

career management section in the OPO. The 

new selection process went according to plan. 

After receiving nominations from the field, the 

board screened the candidates, paying special 

attention to disciplinary records. No candidates with letters of reprimand, Articles 15 

(nonjudicial punishment), or courts-martial 

were to be considered. The board identified 

five superior candidates, and a sixth was later 

added at the request of the SGS.56 Through 

the board’s recommendation, General 

Westmoreland selected Sgt. Maj. Silas L. 

Copeland to succeed Dunaway and become 

the third Sergeant Major of the Army.

A combat veteran of World War II and 

Korea, Copeland had been serving as the command sergeant major of the 4th Infantry 

Division in Vietnam. Like his predecessors, he 

came directly from a combat assignment in 

Vietnam; however, he would be the last. By the 

time he retired from the office on 30 June 1973, 

the United States had withdrawn all its troops 

from South Vietnam and ended its direct 

involvement in the war.

From the perspective of a professional soldier, the state of affairs in the nation and in the 

Army could not have been much grimmer than 

on 1 October 1970, when SMA Copeland sat at 

his new desk for the first time. The trauma of 

pending defeat in Asia reverberated throughout 

the Army. Eventually, the hasty U.S. withdrawal 

from South Vietnam and an inconclusive truce 

underlined failure. The military, already a lightning rod for antiwar and antiestablishment 

sentiments, received more unfavorable press 

from continuing revelations of the My Lai massacre, alleged misconduct of service club operators, and similar affairs. Furthermore, the Army 

was in the throes of its largest demobilization 

since World War II while simultaneously trying 

to implement an all-volunteer force. Stability, 

strength of tradition, and certainty of conviction 

were replaced by institutional turmoil, eroding 

standards, ineffectual leadership at many levels, 

and uncertainty—especially uncertainty.

For Copeland, the fact that he worked for 

three different Army Chiefs of Staff during his 

two years and nine months as SMA only 

increased the turmoil within his own position. 

General Westmoreland retired in July 1972, 

twenty-one months after choosing Copeland 

for SMA. General Palmer served as acting 

Chief of Staff for three and a half months, 

after which General Creighton W. Abrams 

was chief for the final eight months of 

Copeland’s duties.

Although two Sergeants Major of the Army 

had preceded Copeland, he initially did not 

appreciate the potential impact of his new post 

on the Army. Just prior to his formal appointment he had visited troops in Vietnam, and the 

soldiers had given him an overwhelming and 

surprisingly positive reception. There among 

the soldiers at war, even before he officially 

assumed his duties, he began to understand his 
19

role. His experience there convinced him that as 

a personal staff member of the OCSA with 

unhindered access to the chief himself, he could 

really influence critical decisions, challenge 

poorly developed staff policy proposals, and 

provide leadership and professional input to the 

highest levels of the Army to a degree he had 

never before imagined.

Copeland received his marching orders 

from General Westmoreland immediately following the swearing-in ceremony at the 

Pentagon. Once the two of them were alone in 

Westmoreland’s office, the Chief of Staff got 

right to the point. He looked Copeland in the 

eye and said, “You were chosen as Sergeant 

Major of the Army because you are Silas 

Copeland. We have studied you and we know 

everything about you from the word ‘go.’ Now 

don’t you change that!” Westmoreland wanted 

his new enlisted adviser to be himself—to use 

his knowledge, his experience, his personality, 

and the professional conduct he had developed 

over a long, successful military career. In short, 

Westmoreland relied on Copeland’s instincts, 

honed over a career of service, to assist him in 

accomplishing the Army’s goals. Emphasizing 

that Copeland would play an important part in 

the shift from a traditional conscript army to a 

modern all-volunteer force, Westmoreland told 

him to visit as many soldiers as he could and 

talk to them, explaining the Army’s new policies, soliciting their questions and concerns, and 

allaying their fears and uncertainties.57

Copeland faced formidable tasks. The 

unspoken challenge was of course to complete 

the work Wooldridge and Dunaway had begun, 

institutionalizing and strengthening the SMA’s 

office. Despite the hard work of his predecessors, rumors were rampant in senior NCO 

circles that the Army leadership was considering abolishing the office. Many years later even 

Copeland noted that at the beginning of his 

tenure he had “sensed that there were moves by 

certain people to downgrade the office, to 

make it look like a useless establishment...

[which] served no useful purpose and contributed nothing to the Army.”58

The signs of such bureaucratic infighting 

were readily apparent. Early in his tenure, for 

instance, Copeland learned that a colonel would 

rate his performance. Yet lieutenant generals 

and generals rated sergeants major in several 

subordinate commands. In fact, general officers 

had rated Copeland for years.

Positions of greater prestige and authority 

should have higher-ranking raters. Although 

being rated by a colonel would have little effect 

on Copeland’s career, he could not accept the 

diminution in stature to the Office of Sergeant 

Major of the Army that would inevitably result. 

Rather than give in, he preferred reassignment. 

In the end the Army decided that the Sergeant 

Major of the Army would not be rated at all. 

Copeland’s stand increased not only his own 

stature, but also that of the office itself, and 

averted the threat of turning the office into 

some insignificant administrative position that 

would eventually die a natural death.59

Copeland also took other steps to institutionalize the office so it could survive on its own 

merit instead of depending on the strength and 

personality of any one occupant. To project a 

positive image, he made special efforts to win 

the goodwill of commanders and officers in the 

field and show them that the Sergeant Major of 

the Army was a senior noncommissioned officer 

working with, supporting, and assisting other 

noncommissioned officers, not a “whistle blower” or spy from the Pentagon. He wanted both 

officers and enlisted men to understand he was 

there to help in any way he could. At the same 

time he also put in long hours with the Army’s 

public affairs office to help improve the public’s 

impression of the Army.60

SMA Copeland’s willingness to work hard, 

meet people, and discuss issues, together with 

his intuitive good sense, successfully preserved 

the office. Gradually, opponents of the office 

moved to new assignments, retired, or gave up 

their opposition. The office became a normal 

part of the bureaucratic structure as though it 

had always existed. When Copeland retired in 

1973, the constant fight for survival was over. It 

became more a matter of developing the office’s 
20

full potential to advise and counsel the Chief of 

Staff on enlisted matters.

Rebuilding a Corps

In the larger world outside the Pentagon, 

Copeland’s main challenge was to help move 

the Army to an all-volunteer force. When 

President Nixon directed the armed forces to 

become voluntary, the Secretary of Defense set 

1 July 1973 as the “zero-draft” target date. In 

other words, if the Army could not attract sufficient recruits after July 1973, it would endure 

crippling vacancies and reduced efficiency. 

General Westmoreland wanted Copeland to 

work with the noncommissioned officers focusing on enlisted living conditions, career management, and professional development. The 

first task involved modernized family and troop 

housing, improvements in health benefits, and 

increased pay. The second concentrated on more 

attractive enlistment options and the expansion 

of the recruiting service. The third, professionalism, involved improved command stability, 

upgraded leadership instruction, and refined 

personnel management.61

In December 1970 the Chief of Staff 

announced a number of radical policy changes 

regarding the enlisted force. He banned all bed 

checks, eliminated the requirement to sign in 

and out of barracks, and did away with unnecessary formations and details. The Army’s volunteer soldiers would be treated as professionals. 

At the same time, he established a five-day 

workweek as the normal routine whenever possible. Army-hired civilians would henceforth 

perform normal kitchen police (KP) duties, and 

popular short-order food service would be 

phased into mess halls around the world. In the 

barracks, the Army began renovations to provide more privacy and higher living standards 

for the troops. A modern Army had to keep 

pace with a changing society.

The Volunteer Army (VOLAR) tests officially began on 4 January 1971 and eventually 

affected thirteen CONUS and three overseas 

posts. The program provided selected commanders with limited funds to explore new ways 

to attract and retain combat arms volunteers 

and raise living, working, and professional standards in their commands. On 30 June 1972, a 

more centralized experimental program, which 

ended one year later on the day Sergeant Major 

Copeland retired, replaced the VOLAR program. Only after these two critical years of 

experimentation, 1970–1972, did Army leaders 

finally agree to forge ahead with the programs 

and initiatives they felt would make the allvolunteer force a success.

Copeland was there for every agonizing 

minute as the Army tried to find direction in a 

very new world. His role was to help the noncommissioned officer cadre adjust to the tumult 

and change and “convince them that now is the 

time to take a close look at how we handle 

people.”62 Both articles he wrote for the annual 

“Green Book” issue of Army magazine focused 

on leadership. He admonished members of the 

NCO Corps to avoid passing blame or making 

excuses and to improve their leadership skills, 

especially in everyday garrison situations. The 

NCO, he urged, must return to the fundamentals of soldiering: “Know yourself, know your 

job, know your men. These are the basic principles of leadership; not new, but still valid.” 

Copeland demanded more professionalism, 

high ethical standards, and increased communications between enlisted leaders.

Finally, in a concept that would be debated 

by leaders throughout the Army—seen as sacrilege by many—Copeland stressed the need to 

answer the soldiers’ perennial question, “Why?” 

“Whether it be a routine duty or a combat mission, the soldier wants to know why. The answer 

must be a credible one, and providing a credible 

answer is far from impossible. Meeting this 

challenge is one of the greatest needs in developing a professional Army, and is an essential 

for an effective NCO.”63

The post-Vietnam demobilization of the 

Army and the ensuing manpower reductions 

presented Copeland with another major challenge during his tenure, one that was often 

personally painful. Involuntary dismissals from 
21

the service presented a twofold problem for 

leaders like Copeland. Somehow, he had to 

explain why good soldiers with twelve or fourteen years’ service, who had served multiple 

tours in Vietnam and who had “won their battles, got their battle stars, Combat Infantryman’s 

Badge, Combat Medical Badge,” were being 

involuntarily separated from the service. Time 

and again he personally faced soldiers who 

questioned the fairness and reminded him, “I 

have a family, sergeant major.” Often the wives 

would call, hoping to touch the soft part of his 

heart. They did so, more often than they knew, 

but he was powerless to change the situation: “I 

had to try to explain to families, to parents, why, 

after we fought him for three years in Vietnam, 

we’re booting him out.”64

Copeland also had to face enlisted soldiers 

and noncommissioned officers in the field, who 

saw what was happening to their peers and 

understandably questioned their own future in a 

changing Army. After dealing face-to-face in 

his office with the personal hardships resulting 

from the drawdown, Copeland thus found himself often traveling to the field, “ready to take 

some fire” from angry and concerned soldiers 

and NCOs. Both tasks he undoubtedly would 

have preferred to avoid. Maintaining the morale 

of the NCO Corps and explaining the new 

policies were anything but easy during this 

period in the Army’s history.

Still, throughout this darkest time, Army 

leaders were planning a renaissance. During 

Copeland’s tenure the Army emphasized professionalism. Copeland personally stressed it in 

his writing, in his travel, and in his meetings 

with the public. At the Army schools, training 

centers, and major commands, others emphasized professionalism with equal vigor to officers and enlisted alike.

The NCOES, approved during Dunaway’s 

tour, took a more concrete form under 

Copeland. Under the guidance of Copeland 

and other Army leaders, the various schools 

adjusted and improved their basic-level courses. By June 1973 they offered training in fortyone MOSs, each supported by courses of eight 

to twelve weeks in length. Advanced-level 

courses began in the third quarter of Fiscal 

Year (FY) 1972 and were fully implemented 

within the next year, with forty-three courses 

of eight to twelve weeks. During FY 1973 

more than 11,500 students entered basic 

courses and 4,400 attended advanced courses. 

The U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas
22

No one could quantify the contributions being 

made to noncommissioned officer professionalism, but the Army that emerged in the 1980s 

owed much of its excellence to an increasingly 

focused education system.

Most significantly, the Sergeants Major 

Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas, the pinnacle of 

the NCOES, opened its doors to the first 

class on 8 January 1973 with 105 students.65

The academy was the source of special preparation for the Army’s NCO elite. It was even 

more important in its contribution to the 

prestige of the NCO Corps as a whole and in 

its symbolism of the Army’s commitment to 

and emphasis upon NCO professionalism. 

The school’s importance was demonstrated in 

1975 when the academy’s first command sergeant major, William G. Bainbridge, was 

selected to serve as the fifth Sergeant Major 

of the Army.66

The significance of the NCOES, and the 

promise it held for the future professionalism and 

capability of the Noncommissioned Officer 

Corps, is best understood by comparing the new 

system with the old. When the first Sergeant 

Major of the Army, William O. Wooldridge, 

enlisted in 1940, the only schools available for 

NCOs were those set up to meet the requirements of a particular commander’s unit. Formal 

education for NCOs was a hit-or-miss affair. 

Most learned their trade on the job, with all the 

rewards and failures inherent to such an informal 

system. Wooldridge later related:

When Seventh Army commander General Manton S. 

Eddy started a school for the first three graders in Munich, 

Germany [after World War II], I was a platoon sergeant. I 

went to my first sergeant and told him I wanted to attend 

the course. He asked me, “What for?” I told him I intended to stay in the Army and I intended to be something 

more than a rifle platoon sergeant. “But you’re a combat 

veteran. You already know everything.” I told the first sergeant that I knew platoon tactics. “You’re wasting my 

time,” he said.67

With the NCOES, NCOs no longer had to 

do everything by themselves. The institutionalization of noncommissioned officer education 

and training had become a reality.

During Copeland’s time in office other 

changes further increased NCO professionalism. In 1972 the Army started a program to 

enhance the position of first sergeant by upgrading its status and prestige. Key elements of the 

program were stabilization of duty tours for first 

sergeants, priority consideration for family 

housing for the appointees, early attendance at 

advanced NCO schools for potential candidates, a change to the enlisted evaluation report 

to require specific comments on first sergeant 

potential for all staff sergeants through master 

sergeants, and priority consideration by all sergeant major boards for those with first sergeant 

experience.

Elsewhere, the Army changed the Enlisted 

Evaluation System by combining the efficiency 

report with occupational specialty evaluation 

test scores to measure overall performance. It 

also altered the efficiency report by requiring 

annual submissions with rater comments on 

professional development and, as mentioned 

above, first sergeant potential.

By the conclusion of his tenure, SMA 

Copeland could note several major accomplishments, none of which had been easy. He had 

strengthened the Office of Sergeant Major of 

the Army; the Noncommissioned Officer 

Education System was up and running; and the 

first class had graduated from the new Sergeants 

Major Academy. There had also been a steady 

stream of changes in the enlisted acquisition, 

promotion, and training system as the Army 

moved along the road to an all-volunteer force. 

Copeland’s proudest accomplishment, however, 

was “to influence the noncommissioned officer 

corps to alter their method of operating,” persuading “noncommissioned officers to change 

their thinking and leading of troops; [and] to 

treat a human being as a human being, with 

dignity and respect.”68

In September 1972 General Palmer, acting 

as the Army Chief of Staff, extended Copeland’s 

tenure as Sergeant Major of the Army by four 

months to allow him to serve in the office until 

his retirement with thirty years of service.69

That same month, HQDA sent out a message 
23

announcing the formation of a nominating 

board to provide the Chief of Staff a list of 

names from which to choose the new Sergeant 

Major of the Army. The board would consist of 

a lieutenant general as president and four senior 

field grade officers. For the first time the outgoing Sergeant Major of the Army served as a 

member of the nominating board. The zone of 

consideration for nominees included all active 

Army command sergeants major except those 

who had applied for retirement at the time the 

board was to be convened.

In January 1973, one month before 

Copeland was to retire, General Abrams, the 

new Army Chief of Staff, asked him to remain 

in his position as SMA through 30 June 1973, 

saying it was in the best interest of the Army. 

Ever the good soldier, Copeland graciously 

agreed. Finally, on 30 June 1973, after two years 

and nine months as Sergeant Major of the 

Army during a period of great upheaval and 

change, Copeland retired, turning over the reins 

to Leon L. Van Autreve on 1 July 1973.

Leaving his job as command sergeant major 

of U.S. Army, Alaska, Van Autreve became the 

first Sergeant Major of the Army to assume his 

duties from an assignment other than Vietnam, 

although he had previously served there for two 

years. He was also the first engineer selected for 

the job and, at 53 years of age, the oldest. 

Wooldridge had been 43 when he took his oath, 

Dunaway 46, and Copeland 50. Interestingly, 

Van Autreve was also the only foreign-born 

soldier appointed as SMA, his parents having 

immigrated to the United States from Belgium 

when he was a child. In many ways, his career 

represented the American dream: Having come 

to this country not able to speak English, 

through hard work, persistence, and talent, he 

reached the pinnacle of his profession.70

In selecting Van Autreve, General Abrams 

had one additional prerequisite, specifying that 

the new SMA be a married man. Although all 

previous incumbents had in fact been married, 

marriage had not been a formal qualification in 

any way. Abrams, however, thought it essential 

given the important role families played in 

military life. He believed that the SMA’s spouse 

should periodically travel with her husband and 

meet with the wives of enlisted personnel. In 

this way she could provide the Sergeant Major 

of the Army, and by extension the Chief of 

Staff, with insights into the problems and needs 

of enlisted men and their families that might 

not otherwise come to their attention.71

Although a military force, the Army had also 

always been a social institution in which family 

housing, education, health care, and general 

morale had been a communal responsibility.

Although the Army began its return to 

order and relative routine during 1973–1975, it 

remained transitional, with many new ideas and 

programs being tested and implemented. 

Symbolic of the returning calm was the fact that 

Van Autreve’s first year in office, July 1973–June 

1974, was the first full year since 1965 that the 

Army was not at war. It was also the first year 

that the Army relied completely upon an allvolunteer system to procure personnel. When 

the last draftee left the Army on 22 November 

1974, it was a 100 percent all-volunteer force for 

the first time since 1948.

The post-Vietnam Army increasingly 

emphasized the importance and role of its 

reserve components. Although its manpower 

strength was at its lowest since 1950, its global 

responsibilities had not diminished with the 

end of the Vietnam War. Faced with greatly 

reduced budgets and a fixed active duty strength 

of 780,000, the Army leadership had to meet 

the readiness demands with fewer resources. 

One response was to affiliate reserve units with 

active units and, through the affiliation program, forge common bonds among the active, 

reserve, and Guard forces. A primary goal was 

to improve the readiness of those reserve components most likely to be mobilized first in an 

emergency. More efficient organization and 

improved management in this area could provide substantial savings while strengthening the 

Army’s overall fighting potential.72

During this period, the SMA still focused 

on and emphasized people, the “care and cleaning” of the ordinary soldiers. Improved quality in 
24

the Noncommissioned Officer Corps meant 

better implementation of programs affecting 

people. “The quality of the noncommissioned 

officer corps,” Van Autreve wrote, “determines in 

large measure the quality of the Army. Today, 

progress throughout the Army, and most especially in the programs that affect people, reflects 

an upsurge in quality among the noncommissioned officers.” He likened the process to an 

inverted pyramid: the broad base of policies 

instituted at the top, with implementing policies 

and instructions from intervening headquarters 

weighed down on the small, pointed apex representing the unit. The entire weight focused on 

the NCOs in the companies, troops, batteries, 

platoons, squads, and sections that had to make 

the policies work. There, the noncommissioned 

officer played his most important role in the 

development and success of the Army.73

During the two years of SMA Van Autreve’s 

tour, Army-wide efforts thus continued toward 

building an increasingly professional NCO 

Corps with an institutionalized administrative 

base to provide uniform training, continuous 

direction, and progressive growth for every soldier over the course of his career. The departure 

from a draftee-based Army presented several 

challenges to this effort. In moving to a smaller 

force of volunteers, the Army needed more 

broadly qualified soldiers to ease assignment 

and personnel management problems. During 

Van Autreve’s first year in office, Army leaders 

thus decided to decrease the number of MOSs. 

They expected that broadening the remaining 

MOS fields would reduce mismatches between 

the soldier’s designated job and what he was 

actually doing.

Another important development during Van 

Autreve’s watch was the Enlisted Personnel 

Management System (EPMS). A smaller, allvolunteer Army forced the Army Staff to reconsider its heretofore piecemeal personnel management programs. Policies governing promotion, 

MOS classification, testing, and evaluation all 

affected a soldier’s career pattern, advancement, 

and thereby his decision to choose the Army as a 

profession. Yet the various programs were often 

so separate, and sometimes even contradictory, 

that many soldiers were confused and discouraged at the seeming lack of direction in their 

careers. In 1973 General Abrams ordered the 

Military Personnel Center and the Training and 

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to review the 

problems.74

Their recommendations culminated in the 

EPMS, which provided clear patterns of career 

development and promotion potential for any 

length of service. It grouped career management 

fields into related MOSs and redesigned the 

fields to provide a logical, understandable road 

map to guide career-motivated soldiers along 

the most direct route to sergeant major. The 

system eliminated promotion bottlenecks and 

provided everyone a fair opportunity for 

advancement by further centralizing the promotions process. Steps in this direction had already 

been implemented.

The NCOES was one of the earliest programs to be taken over, integrated, and expanded under EPMS. Under the new system, branch 

schools developed training plans for each MOS 

with specific tasks, conditions, and standards. 

Periodically, soldiers were to verify their ability 

to perform MOS-related tasks through skill 

qualification testing (SQT). The entire process 

aimed to help soldiers advance to the next 

higher skill level, where they could be considered for promotion to higher grades.75

Approved in August 1974, the phased 

EPMS implementation began in January 1975 

when the Department of the Army instructed 

field commands to change authorization documents to reclassify and convert personnel in 

certain redesigned career management fields. It 

took two and a half more years for EPMS to be 

in place throughout the Army, but it was conceived, developed, and prepared for implementation with Van Autreve’s strong support.76

SMA Van Autreve also saw the Army take 

the first steps toward what was termed one-station training. To lower costs and reduce turbulence during the training of new enlistees, the 

Army devoted considerable attention to the possibility of conducting all stages of most initial-
25

entry training at a single post. But Van Autreve 

was more concerned about the quality of soldiers 

being sent to the basic NCO courses. Units failed 

to sufficiently emphasize preliminary leadership 

training and there were serious shortfalls in the 

number of students in each NCO class. In visits 

to the field and meetings with senior NCO leadership, he continually emphasized the need to 

send the best soldiers to these courses. Instead of 

holding back good soldiers because they were 

“indispensable” to upcoming unit training or 

activities, he insisted they be allowed to attend 

the classes. Units had to recognize the importance of basic course attendance for the individual soldier and for the Army as a whole.

In his travels and in his day-to-day duties, 

Van Autreve promoted the Army Chief of 

Staff ’s goals of improving the quality of the 

enlisted force, making the best use of limited 

resources, and shaping the Army for the future. 

Since Van Autreve like his predecessors was an 

adviser and counselor, not an action officer or 

initiator of policy, he could not unilaterally initiate or implement specific policies. But as the 

Chief of Staff ’s eyes and ears, he reviewed and 

shaped such policies. Like his predecessors, he 

remained the most visible spokesman for the 

enlisted community and the symbolic leader of 

the noncommissioned officer force.

His peers saw Sergeant Major Van Autreve 

as a “tough task master, a strictly no-nonsense 

type who was trying to revitalize the noncommissioned officer corps and restore the lost faith 

of many noncommissioned officers in the 

Army.” As one contemporary put it, he “took 

the noncommissioned officer corps by the collar 

and shook some sense into [it]...for he has led 

us a mighty long way in the past year and a 

half.”77 Because of his leadership, senior noncommissioned officers requested that Van 

Autreve’s tour be extended. General Frederick 

C. Weyand, who became the new Chief of Staff 

following General Abrams’ untimely death in 

September 1974, declined the requests, deciding to uphold the two-year limitation on the 

SMA’s term of office.78 Weyand agreed, however, as Van Autreve’s tour was ending in the 

spring of 1975, to make him a member of the 

next SMA selection board.

Van Autreve’s successor, Sgt. Maj. William 

G. Bainbridge, also brought a variety of Army 

experiences to the office. As an infantryman 

during World War II with the 106th Infantry 

Division, he had been captured when his unit 

was overrun during the Battle of the Bulge. 

Bainbridge knew the bitter taste of being a prisoner of war until liberated by members of the 

6th Armored Division. Following his return to 

the United States in 1945, he left the Army to 

return to farming but was recalled to active duty 

in 1951 for the Korean War.79 Like others in 

similar circumstances, he then decided to make 

the Army a career. Bainbridge subsequently 

served in a variety of stateside and overseas 

assignments, including combat service in 

Vietnam. In 1972 he became the first command 

sergeant major of the newly formed Sergeants 

Major Academy.

SMA Bainbridge assumed his office on 1 

July 1975; he would ultimately serve longer in 

that capacity than any of his predecessors. Chief 

of Staff General Frederick C. Weyand came to 

believe the two-year tenure for Sergeant Major 

of the Army was “unduly brief ” and took steps 

in June 1976 to extend it to three years.80

General Orders No. 14, dated 16 June 1976, 

officially made the tenure of the Sergeant Major 

of the Army three years, retroactive to 8 June. 

General Orders No. 23, dated 15 November 

1977, reaffirmed three years as “the normal tour 

for the Sergeant Major of the Army.” That same 

month, the new Chief of Staff, General Bernard 

W. Rogers, who had succeeded Weyand in 

October 1977, extended Bainbridge’s tour an 

additional year. Bainbridge had “earned the confidence, respect, and admiration of the Army’s 

leadership as well as its soldiers during service as 

the Army’s senior enlisted member.”81

Practical measures as well as personal reasons extended Bainbridge’s tenure to four years, 

setting an important precedent for the future. 

From the beginning both the tenure of the 

appointment and its timing had been unsettled. 

Of the first five incumbents, two had served 
26

concurrently with the Chiefs of Staff who 

appointed them, but both had served just over 

two years. Two had their tenure set at two years, 

and the fifth lasted three years. These irregularities had somewhat undermined the stature 

of the office.

With Bainbridge, the SMA tour stabilized 

to parallel that of the Chief of Staff. Though the 

tour length for the SMA was established as 

three years, the chief traditionally extended the 

SMA for a fourth year. Thereafter, most 

Sergeants Major of the Army assumed their 

duties on 1 July, served four years with the Chief 

of Staff who appointed them, then retired from 

the office and the service. The original concept 

of having the departing Sergeant Major of the 

Army return to duty elsewhere, as Wooldridge 

had done, was finally laid to rest. The SMA 

assignment would fittingly be a pinnacle of 

achievement before retirement.

During Bainbridge’s tenure, the Army faced 

major financial challenges. The volunteer Army 

proved expensive, and inflation and reduced budgets compounded the problem. Furthermore, the 

Army’s desperate need to modernize its conventional forces also proved costly. During the war in 

Vietnam, the Army had paid for its heavy 

expenses in Southeast Asia in part by putting off 

the development and acquisition of new equipment. The high cost of raising, equipping, and 

maintaining an effective volunteer Army in the 

prevailing economic conditions, given the antimilitary mood of the Congress and the nation, 

presented serious obstacles.

82

At first Army leaders opted to emphasize 

readiness and training. To ease personnel 

shortages, they recruited more women and 

gave them an expanded role in the military. 

Simultaneously, the Army continued to 

improve the quality of service life for the average soldier. Meanwhile, as existing equipment 

was upgraded as inexpensively as possible, the 

Army developed a five-year plan to deploy new 

tank, artillery, cargo helicopter, attack helicopter, and vehicle transport systems to prepare 

the forces for the 1980s. Finally, the Army 

focused on long-term sustainability, that is, 

developing production-planning agreements 

with private industry and maintaining the 

Army’s investment in government-owned production facilities.

Army leaders also continued to emphasize 

what was then called the Total Army, the mixing 

of ready reserve and active component units. The 

Army added three combat divisions during 

1975–1979, without increasing active-force 

manpower, by cutting active duty headquarters 

staffs and transferring many combat support and 

combat service support units to the reserve components. The Army also left some active duty 

divisions with only two of their three authorized 

brigades, supplementing them with reserve component roundout combat brigades and battalions. These roundout units regularly trained 

with their affiliated active-component unit so 

they could fill out the division in time of war.

83

Training emphasized tough, realistic preparation and execution. The Army used the 

opposition-force concept, replicating likely 

enemy forces down to the use of tactics, weapons, and equipment. By 1979 plans were well 

under way for the new National Training Center 

(NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, complete with 

an elite opposition force. Sited in the California 

desert, the NTC would have the task of realistically training heavy combat battalions and brigades. It offered vast maneuver areas for extended periods in near-real battlefield conditions.

Since its inception in 1968 the Command 

Sergeants Major Program had evolved considerably, yet there was still little understanding of 

what was expected of a CSM.84 In 1970 Chief of 

Staff General William C. Westmoreland had 

directed a review of the Command Sergeant 

Major Program after several people at the annual 

commanders conference expressed confusion 

about the role of CSMs. The review attempted to 

delineate specific duties; however, the results were 

not widely circulated throughout the Army.85

Consequently, the confusion continued, and in 

December 1975 the commanding general of 

TRADOC, General William E. DePuy, lamented to his assembled commanders that the command sergeant major “sort of floats around out 
27

there and observes what’s going on with soldiers 

and tells the old man about that. Fine, I think he 

can do that, but that’s a very limited view of what 

a sergeant major is supposed to do.”86

To resolve the situation, General DePuy 

initiated a series of studies that attempted to 

define the skills, knowledge, and attitudes that 

CSMs should possess. The Army then codified 

these in 1977 in Army Regulation 600–20, 

which formalized the CSM position and 

assigned specific duties to Command Sergeants 

Major. It also established the NCO Support 

Channel, a chain of communication and supervision from the command sergeant major to 

first sergeant and then to other NCOs and 

enlisted personnel that paralleled and complemented the chain of command.87

The clarification of the duties of the CSM 

and the creation of the NCO Support Channel 

were part of the spirit of innovative change that 

characterized the Army during the years 1975–

1979. Realistic training incorporated revised 

doctrine, reorganized force development, and 

new equipment. Although the second half of the 

decade seemed dark and foreboding, the Army 

would emerge in the mid-1980s as a first-class, 

professional force, superbly trained and equipped 

with the best weapons in the world, a testimony 

to the hard work and intensive planning of this 

critical period.

Also during this time, the Office of Sergeant 

Major of the Army matured and gained 

increased acceptance and greater responsibility. 

In the final months of SMA Bainbridge’s tenure, he recalled, “I have seen this office move 

from a coordinating office with largely perfunctory and obligatory involvement into an integral 

element of the Army staff.” Bainbridge’s professionalism and vision had helped the process as 

he continually sought more responsibility. In 

response, the Secretary of the Army had made 

the Sergeant Major of the Army a member of 

the Army Policy Council, and the Chief of Staff 

had made him a member of the Army Staff 

Council as well as the General Staff Council. 

The SMA took his rightful place at the table 

with the Army’s other staff principals.88

Added exposure and increased interaction 

within the Army hierarchy increased the credibility and prestige of the office and made the 

Sergeant Major of the Army a sought-after 

person in bureaucratic policy-making decisions. 

The changes reinforced the SMA’s existing 

access to both the Secretary of the Army and 

the Chief of Staff where enlisted matters were 

concerned. Moreover, various staff agencies and 

action officers began to seek him out for input 

and coordination regarding policies affecting 

the welfare of the enlisted force. Indeed, any 

action that would affect enlisted personnel had 

to be coordinated with the SMA, who finally 

emerged as the accepted senior adviser and 

counsel on enlisted matters. His concurrence 

became essential before actions could be sent to 

the Chief of Staff.89

The SMA also gained exposure outside the 

Army. Often he was called upon to testify 

before congressional committees, particularly 

on recruiting, training, retention, and quality of 

life for soldiers and their families. For example, 

Bainbridge testified in 1977 and 1979 on how 

training budget reductions affected the quality 

of personnel and on funding for junior enlisted 

soldiers to move their families overseas. His 

successors would continue the tradition, testifying repeatedly on the recruitment and retention 

of the enlisted force and on the general quality 

of life within the Army.90

In his role as Sergeant Major of the Army, 

Bainbridge personally emphasized increased 

responsibility, authority, and prestige for noncommissioned officers, as well as readiness through 

training, education, and moral discipline. If the 

Army had to do “more with less,” it still had to be 

prepared to fight and win the first battle of the 

next war against a numerically superior opponent. 

In his first Army magazine “status report” 

Bainbridge wrote: “A champion fighter wins 

because he outfights and outsmarts his opponent. 

The champion steels himself with total discipline—physically, mentally, and morally.” He went 

on to emphasize the tough training needed to 

achieve high standards of professionalism and 

fighting skill.
28

While stressing the importance of civilian 

education in addition to the NCOES, Bainbridge 

called upon the NCO Corps to internalize the 

moral discipline that motivates men to do on 

their own what is right and to show “the personal courage to say ‘no’ when the crowd says 

‘yes.’” SMA Bainbridge saw moral courage as 

“an inner critic that refuses to tolerate less than 

your best.” And, finally, as an ominous warning 

for those who chose to ignore his message, he 

reminded the noncommissioned officers that 

promotion boards search for stragglers as well as 

front-runners, and he would not tolerate mediocrity. “Your volunteer Army,” he declared, “is 

not going to become a homestead for mediocre 

performers with mediocre ambitions.”91

Subsequent articles over the next two years 

revisited the theme of preparation through 

training (NCOES, MOS retraining programs, 

and SQTs as part of EPMS) and the noncommissioned officer’s role in this vital function.

During Bainbridge’s watch, the Army 

completed and began fine-tuning the Enlisted 

Personnel Management System. By March 

1978 it had converted all enlisted career management and MOS fields to the new system. In 

the process the Army reduced the 36 enlisted 

career fields and 451 specialties to 30 fields 

and 345 specialties. An important element of 

the system, the skill qualification test, evaluated a soldier’s ability to perform the critical 

tasks required by his specialty at his current 

and the next higher grade. Bainbridge, however, also convinced Army leaders to retain a 

high school education as a criterion for promotion to staff sergeant.92 In addition, 

Bainbridge played a key role in developing the 

basic and primary NCO courses.

93

Perhaps his greatest contribution lay in the 

moral leadership he provided to the NCO 

Corps. His last status report in the 1978 Army 

magazine praised the soldiers of the Army but 

again admonished NCOs for whining about 

officers’ taking away their authority and tying 

their hands. He wrote, “No officer ever took 

anything away from the noncommissioned officer. Rather, it was given away.” He then added, 

“We have worked long and hard at restoring our 

officers’ confidence in the corps of noncommissioned officers. Tomorrow’s Army deserves this 

confidence to be maintained.” He urged NCOs 

to develop personal pride—to be worthy of it, to 

maintain it, and to use it to enhance the prestige 

of the NCO Corps as a whole, which would 

work to the advantage of each and every noncommissioned officer. He expressed his belief 

that the “single greatest contribution to our 

Army’s improved condition can be directly 

traced to greater use of the NCO.”94

The NCO Corps and the Army were on 

the mend and markedly improved from six to 

eight years earlier. Gradually, the Army 

emerged reborn from the chaos of the final 

Vietnam years. Bainbridge’s emphasis and 

efforts during his four-year tenure played a 

major role in revitalizing the backbone of the 

Army, its NCO Corps. General Bernard 

Rogers, General Weyand’s successor in 1976, 

credited Bainbridge with doing more to 

improve the image and prestige of the NCO 

Corps than any other soldier in recent times: 

“As the Army’s senior enlisted man for the past 

four years, he has been the driving force in 

vitalizing and reinforcing the prestige and 

authority of the NCO corps.”95

Stability and Growth

The SMA position was established in 1966 as a 

small but important part of a larger effort to 

professionalize the NCO Corps. By 1979 the 

Office of Sergeant Major of the Army itself 

rested on a secure foundation, and many other 

efforts to professionalize the NCO Corps were 

in motion. The all-volunteer force was established and making the necessary adjustments to 

improve rather than just survive. In the process, 

NCOs had gained more responsibility and prestige. Training had improved. Soldiers had 

improved. The Army itself had improved.

Despite a favorable prognosis, the Army 

still needed plenty of attention before it could 

have a clean bill of health. If the first five SMAs 

had been crucial in reviving the patient, their 
29

successors would have to concentrate on bringing his physical and mental health to a new 

peak. The cessation of war in Vietnam and the 

final fall of Saigon in 1975 had only seemed to 

heighten Cold War tensions, while lesser crises 

in other areas seemed equally menacing.

Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer 

swore in Sergeant Major of the Army William 

A. Connelly on 2 July 1979. The first holder of 

the office to have graduated from the Sergeants 

Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas, Connelly 

was the command sergeant major at U.S. Army 

Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia. 

He was also the first SMA to take office for the 

officially established three-year tenure.

By this point, use of a selection board to 

choose the new SMA was routine. In the case 

of Connelly, the process had begun in 

September 1978, when General Rogers made 

the decision to change certain criteria for eligible candidates. He deleted the MOS test 

score requirement, since the Army had terminated CSM testing in 1975, and increased the 

required minimum enlisted service from 

twenty-four to twenty-six years. Although no 

policy prescribed the position as a terminal 

assignment, it had become one in practice.96

Finally, Rogers specified that SMA recommendations had to come from commanders in 

the grade of colonel or above, instead of lieutenant colonel as previously allowed. 

Considering the prestige of the office, it 

seemed appropriate to have a more experienced commander nominate candidates.97

The Army dispatched messages to the field 

in October 1978, announcing the new criteria 

and soliciting nominations. Five months later, 

in February 1979, a board consisting of a lieutenant general, three major generals, and the 

incumbent SMA selected thirty finalists. Then, 

after gathering further background on the 

selectees and their spouses, the board recommended five finalists. In April, after each had 

been thoroughly checked by investigative agencies, the board ranked them by order of merit 

for the Chief of Staff, who interviewed them 

that same month and announced his decision.

When Connelly took office in July 1979, 

the Army was in the process of several major 

reorganizations. Plans were under way to redesign combat units at division level and higher; 

ideas and concepts were coalescing into the 

dynamic AirLand Battle Doctrine that would 

replace the more passive “active defense.” The 

Army was also moving steadily toward fielding 

exciting and potent new weapons and transportation systems for the mid-1980s. At the same 

time it was implementing revolutionary new 

training systems to enhance the preparedness of 

individual soldiers and their units. Higher standards were demanded Army-wide in virtually 

all areas. In 1979 there were, of course, many 

problems, especially in the areas of personnel 

and recruitment. Nevertheless, the Army was 

moving in the right direction and the problems 

were not so widespread as to be overwhelming. 

For example, the Army had difficulty achieving 

recruiting goals in 1979–1980, and the quality 

of recruits was not always as high as the smallunit leaders would have liked. Yet, this situation 

improved in the next few years as a domestic 

economic downturn made the Army a competitive choice as a profession. By 1983 the active 

Army met both qualitative and quantitative 

recruitment and reenlistment goals.98

In retrospect, as Connelly came on board 

the Army was again changing—this time in a 

more controlled manner, one in which Army 

leaders could provide better direction. It was a 

time of improvement rather than radical restructuring; a time to modernize and move to 

improved readiness and strength. The Army 

now emphasized quality through better training, equipment, and education.

The Chief of Staff gave Connelly a twofold 

mission in rather broad outlines. The first was 

in the tradition of the sergeant major and the 

established pattern of the Sergeant Major of the 

Army: Connelly was to serve as the eyes and 

ears of the Chief of Staff in matters concerning 

the enlisted personnel and “to provide open and 

frank advice and criticism” of what he saw in the 

field. Connelly’s second responsibility, which 

the Chief of Staff gave as a mission-type order, 
30

was “to oversee the continued development of 

the NCO corps.”99

Connelly had clear ideas about what he 

wanted to accomplish. In an interview with the 

Army Times, just three weeks after taking office, 

he said he had “about 10...enlisted matters, 

including several dealing with promotions and 

assignments” that he wanted the Army Staff to 

review. He refused to divulge those matters until 

he had time to coordinate with the various staff 

agencies, but in that same interview he made 

clear one of his two main points of emphasis.

At the time Congress was taking steps to 

reduce the number of military dependents overseas in long-tour areas such as Germany and 

Japan. Connelly strongly opposed such efforts, 

publicly stating that sending the families overseas with the soldiers was “as necessary to 

readiness as spare parts” because of its importance to discipline and morale.100 Taking care of 

soldiers and issues related to soldiers became a 

major focus of Connelly’s tour. Although the 

previous SMAs had similar concerns, they had 

been forced to concentrate on more pressing 

issues, such as establishing the office, downsizing the Army, implementing the All-Volunteer 

Army, and helping set in place programs to professionalize the NCO Corps. Progress in these 

other areas allowed Connelly more time and 

energy to look after the enlisted soldier.

A second concern for Connelly, as highlighted in his Army magazine articles, was training. He wrote about it often and emphasized it 

greatly: “Training is the number-one priority in 

today’s Army.”101 During his second year he 

reemphasized the point: “Our first priority as 

NCOs is to make sure the Army, the whole Army, 

is ready to go to war today, tomorrow or whenever challenged. For us it means leadership and 

hard work and it is spelled T-R-A-I-N-I-N-G.” 

Connelly encouraged the noncommissioned 

officers to train their soldiers to tough, measurable standards; to standardize the practice of 

battle drills; to plan better; to “train smart” and 

share the load; to do a better job of focusing on 

what is important; and to do a better job of 

coaching subordinates when they conduct training.102 The next year he reiterated the same 

challenges. Although the Army had improved, 

he still emphasized the fundamentals of good 

soldiering that needed attention: get tough, take 

charge, and stop making excuses; be positive 

and stop griping; be disciplined and demand it 

from the soldiers. Finally, echoing the ideas 

Dunaway had expressed some years earlier, 

Connelly urged NCOs to show professional 

courage and always correct the soldier who 

needs it.

By Connelly’s last year as Sergeant Major of 

the Army, the new equipment to modernize the 

Army during the 1980s was about to enter the 

units. Connelly insisted on technical competence and the need for NCOs to become personally and closely familiar with the new equipment they were responsible for maintaining. 

They needed to pass on that knowledge, along 

with their tactical and garrison expertise, to the 

soldiers as they trained them.103

Connelly sponsored or encouraged a number of initiatives to improve the life of the soldier and his family. These included improved 

dependent travel entitlements for family members and soldiers during changes of station and 

improved burial entitlements for serving and 

former senior NCOs and other enlisted soldiers. 

Other programs and changes by Congress or 

the Army Staff enhanced the financial rewards 

of a military career: dramatic pay increases, 

improved enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, 

and implementation of the Army College Fund 

(the Veterans Educational Assistance Program, 

a substitute for the old GI Bill). All contributed 

to attracting and retaining high-quality soldiers.104

Connelly also was instrumental in developing the Noncommissioned Officer 

Development Plan (NCODP). This program 

complemented the Enlisted Personnel 

Management System and mandated that commanders at all levels conduct NCO leadership 

training within their units. NCO involvement 

with the execution of this training enabled 

them to put into practical application the 

skills acquired through the EPMS and 
31

NCOES. In 1980 the SMA assumed responsibility for overseeing noncommissioned officer professional development throughout the 

Army’s major commands, the National Guard, 

and the Army Reserve as part of the newly 

established program.

105

SMA Connelly also began the drive that 

eventually led to the elimination of the specialist ranks above E–4. To Connelly, the specialist 

rank served no particular purpose. Moreover, 

the lack of leadership authority associated with 

the ranks above the grade of E–4 diminished 

the respect and prestige of those who held it. 

Calling all soldiers E–5 and above sergeant, 

rather than some sergeants and some specialists, 

eliminated the widespread perception that specialists were mere technical experts with no 

troop responsibility outside of their work area. 

This in turn increased the sense of unity within 

the NCO Corps and encouraged all NCOs to 

accept greater responsibility.

Of all of Connelly’s contributions, however, 

his greatest was in training. At Connelly’s retirement ceremony, General Meyer declared that 

NCO training had improved tremendously over 

the previous four years, mainly due to Connelly’s 

leadership.106 The Sergeant Major’s emphasis 

and efforts, encouraged by his Chief of Staff, had 

changed attitudes, increased expectations, 

expanded responsibility, and raised the level of 

training performance by the NCO Corps in 

units Army-wide. Key to this effort had been the 

steady improvement of NCOES instruction, 

especially in the basic course programs for combat arms, combat support, and combat service 

support. He also contributed to the ongoing 

adoption and adjustment of the SQTs. One of 

many changes implemented in 1982 was the 

initiation of a common-task test administered to 

all soldiers up to the grade of E–4.

Connelly best summed up the focus of his 

tenure and his legacy to the Army himself just 

after his retirement ceremony. He predicted the 

Army would continue to improve only if NCOs 

continued to act like NCOs. Their role was 

critical. He admonished NCOs to never walk 

past a deficiency, always stress physical fitness, 

always look for new training approaches, and 

always stand up and be counted as they promoted the welfare of their troops.107

Selection procedures for the seventh 

Sergeant Major of the Army began in September 

1982 with a decision memorandum to the Chief 

of Staff proposing that the eligibility requirement be raised to twenty-seven years of service. 

Since the tenure of the office was still three 

years, the new requirement would allow the 

selectee to retire at the end of his tour as SMA. 

As in previous cases, the current Sergeant Major 

of the Army agreed to the proposed change 

before it was forwarded to the Chief of Staff for 

approval.108

In May 1983 Chief of Staff General John 

A. Wickham, Jr., announced his selection of 

Glen E. Morrell, then the command sergeant 

major of U.S. Army Forces Command, as 

Connelly’s successor. Morrell became the seventh occupant of that office on 1 July 1983.

Morrell received from his boss possibly the 

most detailed guidance given to any SMA. 

Wickham’s instructions to Morrell completely 

filled three pages with themes, specific SMA 

duties, and instructions to the Army Staff. 

Some of the themes Morrell was expected to 

support included “An Army of Excellence,” “A 

Modern Army,” and “A Total Army.” Wickham 

also instructed Morrell to be the CSA’s primary 

link with the enlisted force and to maintain 

high standards within it.

In a June interview with the Army Times, 

just before assuming office, Morrell outlined 

his priorities. Among his specific objectives 

were extra pay for first sergeants and CSMs 

and the final elimination of the specialist 

ranks: “Nobody relates to it. Everybody knows 

what a sergeant is. But nobody can explain 

what a specialist is. We can’t even explain what 

a specialist does in our talks with our sister 

services.” His broader priorities were to encourage NCOs to place more emphasis on teaching 

basic soldier skills and to “look out for the 

welfare of the soldier.”109

During Morrell’s tour as SMA, stability 

characterized the Army. Although change 
32

occurred as units received new equipment and 

the Army created new types of units, his tenure 

illustrated focus, direction, and continuity. By 

1986 increased funds for recruiting, better 

enlistment bonuses, a new GI Bill, and 

improved quality-of-life programs were 

attracting and keeping good soldiers in the 

Army. As Congress alleviated financial hardships by increasing the household goods weight 

allowance, travel allowances, and temporary 

lodging for dependents of enlisted personnel 

during moves, as well as the annual cost-ofliving pay raises, the Army was able to retain 

more of its best-trained leaders.110

Sergeant Major Morrell focused his attention on training, readiness, and fine-tuning a 

generally sound organization. He criticized the 

Army-wide tendency to send whatever soldiers 

were available to NCOES courses instead of 

choosing only the best. Year after year, Morrell 

reiterated his concern because units selected 

“soldiers for noncommissioned officer development training [who were] available, who [were] 

more easily released from units for weeks at a 

time,” and held that commands were “not selective enough about which soldiers we send to 

school.”111 Morrell also admonished the NCO 

Corps to step forward and accept more responsibility; to focus more on basics and fundamentals; to train for the new equipment and exhibit 

a pride of ownership in its maintenance; and to 

have each noncommissioned officer train his or 

her replacement.

During Morrell’s tenure, the Army 

restructured the NCOES, giving sergeants in 

combat support and combat service support 

branches the same type of professional training, oriented toward leader development, as 

their counterparts in the combat arms branches received. Now all noncommissioned officer 

training followed a common track. The 

Primary Leadership Development Course, 

formed in FY 1985 by merging the primary 

leadership course for combat support and 

combat service support soldiers and the primary NCO course for combat arms soldiers, 

focused on leadership. The second step, the 

Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course, 

contained standard leader training required 

throughout the Army along with branchspecific skill training. The common threads of 

these first two courses bonded the NCOs of 

all branches. Top-performing NCOs of greatest potential then attended the Advanced 

Noncommissioned Officer Course and the 

Sergeants Major Course.112

The Sergeants Major Academy began to 

expand its facilities in 1985. Two years later the 

academy started to provide formal training for 

all first sergeants and command sergeants major. 

It also trained senior NCOs in operations and 

tactical intelligence. The Army’s goal was to 

increase enrollment in the first sergeants course 

from 696 to 1,010 NCOs and the sergeants 

major course from 496 to 624. At the same time, 

the facilities could handle an enrollment of 

about 500 students annually in the new senior 

operations/intelligence NCO course.113

During Morrell’s tour as SMA, the Army 

experienced a major problem with MOS imbalances, that is, inconsistencies between existing 

soldier specializations and those needed or 

authorized. To better balance the MOS structure, in 1983 the Army asked 12,400 soldiers in 

overstrength MOSs to transfer to skill fields 

with shortages. Around 3,500 soldiers accepted 

the offer that year, and 1,200 soldiers volunteered the following year. Nevertheless, in mid1985 the imbalances were still a significant 

problem. To alleviate the situation, the Army 

required soldiers planning to reenlist in overstrength fields to designate a secondary choice 

in a shortage field. At the same time, careerists—

those on other than their first enlistment—in 

overstrength fields were given ninety days to 

begin moving to a shortage MOS or face mandatory reclassification. Such actions, inevitable 

in an ever-changing Army, always prompted the 

attention and review of the SMA.

Morrell’s four-year tour ended on 30 June 

1987. The following day, Julius W. Gates 

assumed office as the eighth Sergeant Major of 

the Army. Gates came to the Pentagon from 

Korea, where he had just completed a two-year 
33

stint as the command sergeant major of U.S. 

Forces Korea/Eighth U.S. Army. The first 

Sergeant Major of the Army to have served in a 

joint command, Gates would put this experience to good use in the Pentagon’s multiservice 

environment.

Although “a lot of high level, high ranking 

officers...still didn’t totally believe the input from 

the Sergeant Major of the Army was all that 

important to the Chief of Staff,” the newly 

appointed Chief of Staff, General Carl E. Vuono, 

did not share that opinion. General Vuono 

reserved his first office visit as Chief of Staff for 

the incoming Sergeant Major of the Army. 

During a three-hour meeting, Vuono told Gates 

that he desired to have “a very close relationship” 

with him, “that his door was always open, and 

that I was to sit to his right...during the General 

Staff ’s weekly meeting.” During these and other 

meetings, Vuono requested that the new SMA 

always be a voice for the common soldier; indeed, 

over the next four years, Vuono would frequently 

rely upon Gates to provide him with advice and 

opinions on matters pertaining to the enlisted 

force. General Vuono also used this initial meeting to impart to Gates his goals, particularly the 

“six imperatives” for building and sustaining the 

Army: quality soldiers; realistic training; dynamic 

doctrine; continuous modernization; a force 

structure properly balanced between heavy, light, 

and special forces; and progressive leadership 

development based upon a combination of institutional training, operational assignments, and 

self-development. With regard to the 

Noncommissioned Officer Corps, Vuono stated 

that he expected NCOs to be the Army’s “standard bearers,” knowing and enforcing the highest 

standards of professional and ethical conduct. 

Toward this end, the Chief of Staff wanted all 

NCOs to be tactically and technically competent, 

rigorous trainers, and good listeners. Both men 

agreed that the best way for NCOs to take care 

of soldiers and their families was to ensure that 

the soldiers were thoroughly trained and ready 

for war. Over the next four years, SMA Gates 

would do his best to ensure that General Vuono’s 

vision became a reality.

Gates’ first major challenge was to educate 

Army leaders on the implementation of the new 

Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Report 

(NCOER), which replaced the old Enlisted 

Evaluation Report (EER). The new rating system was the first of its kind to have been 

designed entirely by noncommissioned officers. 

It employed performance counseling and bullet 

comments to constructively measure specific 

standards and objectives. Based on strong recommendations from Gates and other senior 

noncommissioned officers, General Vuono also 

made the successful completion of an NCOES 

course a requirement for promotion for all 

NCOs. This policy, instituted in 1988, helped 

ensure that the Army identified the best-qualified soldiers and gave them the training they 

needed in a timely manner. 

Despite the increasingly austere budgetary 

climate of the late 1980s and early 1990s, 

Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr., and 

General Vuono were fully committed to advancing the cause of NCO professionalism. Toward 

this end, they endorsed SMA Gates’ suggestion 

that they designate 1989 the “Year of the 

Noncommissioned Officer.” Gates used the 

opportunity to promote approximately fourteen 

NCO-related initiatives during the year. He 

spearheaded the establishment of the Command 

Sergeant Major (Designee) course, designed to 

prepare newly designated command sergeants 

major for their new duties. He also bore a great 

deal of responsibility for the inauguration of the 

NCO Journal, the first official journal written by 

and for noncommissioned officers. He secured 

the publication of The Story of the 

Noncommissioned Officer Corps, the first U.S. 

Army Center of Military History publication 

dedicated to recounting the rich heritage of the 

NCO Corps. The following year Gates, acting 

on the recommendations of noncommissioned 

officers throughout the Army, succeeded in 

replacing the old MOS-based Skill 

Qualifications Test (SQT) with the new SelfDevelopment Test (SDT). The SDT tested 

MOS-specific and more general training and 

leadership skills while encouraging soldiers to 
34

pursue one of General Vuono’s three avenues for 

leadership development: self-improvement. 

Other changes to the NCO education and 

training system during Gates’ tenure included 

the establishment of the Noncommissioned 

Officer Battle Staff Course at the Sergeants 

Major Academy in 1991.

All the attention the Army paid to training 

and professionalism paid off during two major 

combat operations launched during Gates’ tour. 

The first, Operation Just Cause (December 

1989), was a model joint operation that restored 

democratic government to Panama. The second, 

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm

(August 1990–April 1991), was a massive 

undertaking in which U.S. armed forces in conjunction with allied nations decisively defeated 

Iraq in a short but sharp war to liberate Kuwait. 

These operations exorcised any remaining 

ghosts of the Vietnam War that might have still 

haunted the Army and its NCO Corps. 

Gates made two trips to Panama and three 

to Saudi Arabia during these conflicts. During 

these excursions, which he usually made in the 

company of the Secretary of Defense, the 

Secretary of the Army, or the Chief of Staff, 

Gates attempted to boost morale and to identify problems that he could help fix upon 

returning to the United States. When, for 

example, he discovered that soldiers were arriving in Saudi Arabia without all of their nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare 

gear, he took prompt action to correct the 

problem. He also assisted in getting recreational and post exchange facilities out to soldiers in the desert. Everywhere he went in 

Panama and the Middle East, Gates found 

dedicated American service men and women 

performing incredible feats of courage, hard 

work, and self-sacrifice. His most humbling 

and moving experiences, however, occurred 

back in the United States, when he had the 

opportunity to visit wounded soldiers and 

freed prisoners of war from the Panamanian 

and Iraqi conflicts.

Gates took his job of representing soldiers’ 

interests seriously and symbolically demonstrated that commitment by replacing all of the 

office’s elegant chinaware with simple canteen 

cups. The cups were rarely used, however, as 

Gates spent about 70 percent of his time outside the office, visiting units and talking with 

soldiers around the country and the world. The 

trips enabled Gates to explain the Chief of 

Staff ’s philosophy to rank-and-file soldiers. 

More important, it gave him the opportunity to 

listen. From these conversations, Gates was able 

to keep his finger on the collective pulse of the 

Army and to report back to senior leaders how 

Army policies and programs were playing out in 

the field. The information he gathered frequently allowed him to help correct problems 

and to improve soldier-oriented programs. For 

example, although the Army had made great 

strides in providing services to Army families, 

Gates found that family-focused programs like 

the Army Community Family Support Center 

and the annual Army Family Action Plan did 

not take the needs of single soldiers into 

account. Single soldiers who lived in barracks 

also resented the fact that they had less privacy 

and were more subject to inspections and details 

than were married soldiers who lived off base. 

The airing of such grievances led the Army to 

minimize barracks inspections and to seek parity in assignments for married and unmarried 

soldiers. Moreover, the Army introduced a new 

program, Better Opportunities for Single 

Soldiers (BOSS), to meet the needs of single 

soldiers in such areas as morale and welfare services, club operations, self-improvement, and 

coed activities.

Some of the greatest challenges facing the 

Army during the late 1980s and early 1990s 

were those posed by budget and force structure 

reductions. Two forces drove these reductions: 

the government’s desire to reduce the federal 

deficit and the sudden end of the Cold War. 

The latter event began in 1989, as one Eastern 

European nation after another moved out of the 

Soviet orbit and replaced their Communist 

regimes with democratically elected governments. Then, in 1991, the Soviet Union itself 

collapsed, bringing to a stunning conclusion a 
35

major historical era. The removal of America’s 

archrival from the world stage led to calls for a 

“peace dividend” and the transfer of funding 

from military to nonmilitary programs. Gates 

predicted in October 1990: “The shaping of the 

Army over the next five to six years is not going 

to be easy. For the first time we are confronted 

with the difficult task of building a smaller 

Army from an all-volunteer force.”114

Army leaders were determined to carefully 

plan the downsizing process to avoid the hasty 

reductions of past decades that had sometimes 

rendered the Army incapable of fulfilling its 

basic missions. Although the war with Iraq 

temporarily delayed the phasedown, everyone 

understood that this was only an interlude. 

Consequently, Gates spent a considerable 

amount of time working on issues related to the 

projected reductions in Army strength. He 

played an integral role in helping to formulate 

the Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP), 

a program that helped departing soldiers make 

the transition from military to civilian life 

through job fairs, resume development classes, 

and similar activities. Another program that 

received his attention was the Early Out 

Program, which enabled soldiers to electively 

retire after fifteen years of active service with 

reduced benefits. On the other hand, Gates 

actively opposed suggestions that excess officers 

be transferred to the NCO ranks, arguing that 

such an action would be demeaning to the officers and would drastically reduce opportunities 

for promotion among serving noncommissioned officers. 

Although Gates focused his energy squarely on the major challenges facing the Army, he 

also managed to make some minor changes that 

enhanced the ability of the institution of the 

Sergeant Major of the Army to function more 

effectively. One of Gates’ first actions after he 

became SMA was to seek more physical space 

for the Office of the Sergeant Major of the 

Army in the Pentagon—not a small feat in a 

building in which even senior colonels are 

crammed into tiny cubicles. When Gates became 

the Sergeant Major of Army, the office consisted 

of two small rooms directly across the hall from 

the Chief of Staff ’s office. Space was so limited 

that he had to share his personal office with one 

of his three staff members. With the assistance of 

Secretary Marsh, Gates secured nearly double 

the amount of space allocated to his office, thus 

achieving a private office for himself, a small 

conference room, and adequate working conditions for his staff. Then, six months before his 

retirement, Gates’ wife Margaret, with the strong 

support of Chief of Staff Vuono’s wife Patricia, 

succeeded in having the Sergeant Major of the 

Army’s family quarters moved to a larger house 

on Fort Myer, Virginia. The move enhanced the 

ability of future Sergeants Major of the Army to 

host the many social activities incumbent with 

the position.

Sergeant Major of the Army Gates concluded his four-year tour and retired from the 

Army on 30 June 1991. On 2 July, when Richard 

A. Kidd became the ninth Sergeant Major of 

the Army, he, like so many of his predecessors, 

was the top enlisted man of an Army facing an 

uncertain future. Fortunately, Kidd had their 

strong examples to provide some light and 

guidance.

Kidd’s tour focused mainly on ensuring 

that despite severe reductions, the Army 

remained a capable, sustainable force, able to 

fulfill its core mission of fighting and winning 

the nation’s wars. A key challenge for Kidd was 

to make certain that the Army took proper 

care of those enlisted personnel who left the 

service as a result of the drawdown. In response 

to questions relating to the drawdown, Kidd 

was quick to announce that it would be performed in such a way to ensure the readiness of 

the remaining soldiers.115 He also reminded 

audiences that soldiers were not leaving the 

Army cold because, improving on previous 

drawdowns, the Army was working to ease 

their transition into civilian life. In December 

1991 the Army fully implemented the Army 

Career and Alumni Program, developed during Gates’ tenure to assist in marketing soldiers 

to civilian employers. By conducting job counseling and by using an innovative, computer-
36

ized job-bank service, ACAP matched soldiers’ 

skills with the needs of potential employers.116

As the Army’s budget declined in tandem 

with the reduction in manpower, Kidd concentrated on maintaining funding for critical programs such as the NCOES. He successfully 

fought for the opportunity for all promotable 

soldiers to attend the NCOES schools. In addition, Kidd tackled such tough issues as sexual 

orientation and women in combat, making the 

Army’s senior leadership aware of soldiers’ attitudes, perceptions, and concerns. Meanwhile, 

Kidd maintained the tradition of visiting troops 

deployed overseas in the increasing number of 

noncombat operations to new places like 

Somalia, Macedonia, and Haiti.

On 17 October 1994, SMA Kidd introduced 

a redesigned chevron to represent the Sergeant 

Major of the Army. It included the original two 

stars, slightly smaller, flanked by a newly added 

eagle. The eagle symbolized the Sergeant Major’s 

link to the Chief of Staff and was depicted on the 

SMA shield, collar brass, dress uniform buttons, 

and rank of the Army specialist. Since a portion 

of the American eagle is depicted in the rank 

insignia of every senior enlisted service member, 

the change brought the SMA insignia into line 

with that worn by the other services.

117

In January 1995 Kidd convened the first 

meeting of the Council of Command Sergeants 

Major, a new organization intended to discuss 

improvements to NCO professional development programs. One of the council’s key recommendations was that job performance be the 

most important factor in personnel evaluations 

and promotion consideration. Panel members, 

drawn from the major commands and the Army 

Staff, were concerned that soldiers had become 

more focused on other areas, such as attaining 

college credits, rather than job performance.118

A secondary result of the council’s deliberation was a consensus to abolish the Self 

Development Test (SDT). The SDT was the 

1990 replacement for the Skill Qualification 

Test developed during Bainbridge’s tour. It was 

a formally administered, written exam that 

evaluated the soldier’s basic leadership skills and 

knowledge. General William W. Hartzog, the 

TRADOC commander, accepted the council’s 

recommendation and eliminated the test based 

on the opinion that it was redundant to the 

NCOES.119

During Kidd’s tenure the Army finally formalized the tour length of the Sergeant Major 

of the Army to the current four-year term. The 

original General Orders No. 29 that established 

the position had directed that the SMA’s tenure 

correspond to the tenure of the Chief of Staff 

whom he served. Dunaway had recommended 

that the tour length be shortened to two years to 

provide opportunities for other sergeants major 

to serve in this important role. It was while 

Bainbridge was in the office that Chief of Staff 

General Frederick C. Weyand had directed that 

the tour of the SMA be three years, although 

the chiefs thereafter had generally extended 

their SMA’s tour by an additional year. The 

SMA tour length is not governed by law, but by 

Army policy, which states that the sergeant 

major of the Army is appointed by the chief of 

staff of the Army and serves at the discretion of 

the secretary of the Army.120

Surrounded by the soldiers of the 3d U.S. 

Infantry (Old Guard) and The U.S. Army 

Band, “Pershing’s Own,” on Summerall Field at 

Fort Myer, SMA Kidd completed thirty-three 

years of active duty on 16 June 1995. Fourteen 

General Sullivan Presents to SMA Kidd the New 

Sergeant Major of the Army Insignia, 

Which Kidd Designed.
37

days later Florida native Gene C. McKinney 

took his oath as the tenth Sergeant Major of the 

Army. McKinney, who had served as the command sergeant major for U.S. Army, Europe, 

was the first minority service member to hold 

the office of Sergeant Major of the Army. An 

armored cavalryman for over two decades, 

McKinney wanted to ensure that noncommissioned officers were prepared for the quickly 

approaching twenty-first century. He was also a 

staunch believer in the Creed of the 

Noncommissioned Officer, so much so that he 

could recite it in its entirety from memory or 

finish it given a word or two.121

As sergeant major of the Army, McKinney 

saw himself as a “conduit of information” 

between soldiers and Army leaders. Though 

aware that modern weapons and advanced technology might require new approaches to training, 

he recognized that soldier basics would remain 

the same.122 During the 1995 Worldwide 

Noncommissioned Officer Education System 

Conference, McKinney impressed on the delegates the idea that universal standards of training 

must be applied throughout the Army.

123

As the Army continued its post–Cold War 

drawdown, it began to consolidate its extensive 

network of educational and training centers 

under a program called the Total Army School 

System. McKinney asserted that the Army needed to capitalize on the critical methods by which 

NCO leaders were developed.124 Having come 

from U.S. Army, Europe, McKinney had seen 

firsthand the revolution that was occurring in 

improving the quality of life of soldiers and their 

families. His support for single soldier initiatives, 

such as relaxed barracks living standards, was 

based on his belief that young soldiers were smart 

and trustworthy and that leaders needed only to 

give them the respect they deserved.

125

McKinney worked to expand the prestige 

of senior NCOs and to strengthen the command sergeants major program. One of his 

lasting accomplishments was in establishing a 

graduated system of special pay for CSMs 

commensurate with their levels of responsibility. McKinney explained to the Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) that CSMs 

did not receive any pay increases as they progressed through duty positions from battalion 

to major command.126 McKinney observed 

that while an officer who rose from a battalion 

command to become the commanding general 

of a major command received pay increases 

commensurate with his growing responsibilities, a CSM received the same pay regardless of 

whether he was CSM of a battalion or a major 

command. To rectify this situation, McKinney 

proposed instituting tiered special-duty assignment pay (SDAP), the successor to proficiency 

pay, for CSMs assigned to positions where 

their rater, senior rater, and reviewer were all 

general officers. Based on the special qualifications required of CSMs working at senior 

levels, the DCSPER concurred with 

McKinney’s recommendation and the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army approved SDAP for 

select CSMs in October 1996.127

Late in that same year allegations arose 

that drill instructors and other training center 

cadre were sexually abusing female trainees. As 

investigations identified widespread sexual 

misconduct, the Army established a toll free 

hotline and within weeks received almost 

4,500 calls. In November, McKinney held a 

town hall meeting at one of the sites where 

misconduct had occurred, Aberdeen Proving 

Ground, Maryland. There, he spoke with 

almost 1,400 soldiers, trainees, and senior noncommissioned officers. During his two-day 

visit he found that morale for the most part 

was good, but that the soldiers were frustrated 

with the media attention. He noted the soldiers trusted that the Army would do what was 

right in light of the allegations.

128

Determined to evaluate the entire Initial 

Entry Training program, Secretary of the 

Army Togo D. West, Jr., formed an advisory 

panel to review the Army’s policies on sexual 

harassment. As he had done when forming a 

similar panel on extremist activity within the 

Army, West included McKinney in the task 

force. West explained that, “when we need to 

inform ourselves about how our Army is doing 
38

what it is doing, whether it is doing it well and 

what our soldiers think,...we cannot leave out 

the NCO Corps.”129

The task force had been at work for only a 

few months when McKinney himself became a 

target of the probe. In February 1997 a former 

aide accused McKinney of improper conduct, 

and eventually five female service members 

came forward with similar allegations. For the 

first time in history a serving Sergeant Major of 

the Army was suspended from his duties. Under 

growing pressure from Congress, Army Chief of 

Staff General Dennis J. Reimer relieved 

McKinney, stating that “it was a damned difficult decision, probably one of the most difficult 

decisions I’ve ever had to make.”130

The staff in the Office of the Sergeant 

Major of the Army was stunned by the development. Reimer temporarily assigned McKinney 

to the Military District of Washington. 

McKinney vacated his Pentagon office and relocated to Fort Myer, where he devoted much of 

his time to working with his lawyers on his case. 

Meanwhile, the Army asked several senior command sergeants major to fill in for McKinney on 

an ad hoc basis. 

In May command sergeants major at the 

Senior Leadership Conference recommended 

to the Chief of Staff that someone be appointed to the SMA duties on a full-time basis 

until the investigation of McKinney was 

completed.131 Instead, Reimer decided to 

rotate the position between two command 

sergeants major, Jerry T. Alley of Forces 

Command and James C. McKinney of the 

Training and Doctrine Command. ( James 

McKinney was the twin brother of the suspended Sergeant Major of the Army.) Both 

Alley and McKinney were to remain in their 

current positions while sharing the duties of 

SMA. Without forming an opinion regarding 

McKinney’s guilt or innocence, Reimer 

acknowledged that the charges were serious. 

By selecting two men to serve as acting 

Sergeant Major of the Army, he anticipated 

neither would be considered an incumbent 

and receive an advantage should the need 

arise to select a permanent replacement.132

CSM Jerry T. Alley, Interim SMA CSM James C. McKinney, Interim SMA
39

In October 1997 an Article 32 investigation 

referred McKinney’s case for court-martial. 

Reimer immediately reassigned McKinney and 

began the process to select a permanent replacement.133 Having notified the selectee only 

twenty-four hours beforehand, on 13 October 

1997, Reimer went before the AUSA Sergeants 

Major Conference and introduced Robert E. 

Hall as the eleventh Sergeant Major of the 

Army. In the interest of speed, Reimer had 

made the selection without convening a board—

the first time that had happened since the introduction of the board process in 1970. 

Reimer was familiar with Hall. He had 

been one of the five finalists for selection as the 

tenth SMA, and the Chief of Staff had interviewed him at the time.134 While thanking the 

two acting SMAs, Reimer noted, “This is not 

a part time job,” adding that he could not “be 

more pleased by the performance of both 

NCOs.”135

An Air Defense Artilleryman, Hall came to 

the SMA job from the U.S. Central Command. 

Hall commented that he was humbled by the 

selection and pledged not to “forget where he 

had come from.” Reimer’s instructions to Hall 

were to be a forceful advocate for soldiers and to 

keep his eye on the future.136 Hall was the first 

SMA who had not served in Vietnam. He was, 

however, a combat veteran, having served as the 

24th Infantry Division Artillery Command 

Sergeant Major during Operation Desert 

Storm. Cognizant of the damage done by the 

recent scandal, Hall’s first message to nearly 

three hundred NCOs at the October conference 

was “keep faith in the Army.”137

Hall quickly set upon his task and committed 

himself to communicating with soldiers. When 

he assumed his duties, the Office of the Sergeant 

Major of the Army had been vacant for eight 

months. Hall immediately reestablished ties and 

brought the office back to its rightful position. 

Realizing the power of computers and the 

Internet, Hall published his electronic mail 

address in Soldiers magazine and encouraged soldiers to contact him directly. Regularly toting a 

laptop computer on his various trips, Hall was 

able to communicate easily with soldiers of all 

ranks through email.138

Still reeling from the aftershocks of misconduct accusations, the Army’s leadership 

began a concentrated effort to reemphasize the 

core values expected of soldiers. Based on recommendations from the Task Force on Sexual 

Harassment, Hall strove to accentuate the seven 

Army Values: Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless 

Service, Honor, and Personal Courage. Hall 

worked with the sergeant major for the Office 

of the DCSPER to develop a card bearing the 

Soldier’s Code on one side and the Army Values 

on the other that was presented to each soldier 

in the Army.139 Hall believed the card would 

help inculcate dignity and respect for the uniform, for the country, and for the unit. He 

believed that each soldier should sign the card 

in the presence of the unit commander and first 

sergeant in a ceremony designed to signify each 

soldier’s acceptance of the seven values.140

Meanwhile, the Army expanded Basic Combat 

Training so as to integrate the core values into 

its course of instruction.141

During Hall’s tenure the Army struggled to 

meet its recruiting and end-strength goals. 

Surveys indicated that youths between eighteen 

and twenty-five years old had a lower propensity toward military service than in previous 

years, which was obvious when the Army fell 

short of its recruiting mission by 6,290 in 

1999.142 During the same year the attrition rate 

for first-term soldiers was enough to cause Hall 

to voice his concern that “nearly 40 percent of 

our soldiers never make it to ETS (expiration 

term of service).” He committed himself to 

work toward reducing those losses.143 The 

Army instituted and reenergized programs such 

as the Sergeant Major of the Army Recruiting 

Team (Project Smart), Hometown Recruiter 

Assistance Program, GED-Plus (high school 

equivalency diploma test) and the Corporal 

Recruiter Program. Hall stressed his belief that 

the Recruiting Command did not come up 

short, but that the Army did. The Army developed new recruiting ads targeted at the youth of 

the “Info Age.” Later it changed advertising 
40

agencies and scrapped the popular “Be All You 

Can Be” jingle. After Hall’s tour the slogan 

would become “An Army of One.” 

By September 2000, while the Army 

struggled to improve its image among potential recruits, it also faced serious shortages of 

junior noncommissioned officers. In 1995 the 

DCSPER directed personnel proponents to 

conduct a bottom-up review of military occupation specialties, which became known as 

the Change in NCO Structure (CINCOS).144

The Army’s goal was to reduce the size of the 

NCO Corps. As a result of CINCOS, the 

Army downgraded approximately 6,700 

enlisted positions by one grade, cutting the 

NCO Corps from 49.8 percent to 47.6 percent of the enlisted force and returning it to 

its 1989 strength. By mid-1999 the leadership 

decided to “buy back” over 4,600 NCO positions due to leadership shortages and a lack of 

expertise. By October the force felt the effect 

of a shortage of sergeants. Hall challenged 

senior NCOs to take “a risk on young soldiers 

and allow them responsibilities,” thereby giving them a chance to correct their shortcomings and get promoted.145

Interacting with soldiers during his many 

trips throughout the Army, Hall identified four 

top concerns that contributed to dissatisfaction 

among enlisted soldiers: pay and entitlements, 

housing, medical care, and retirement benefits. 

Hall’s reports to Congress emphasized quality 

of life and morale, welfare, and recreation 

issues: “Our nation owes its soldiers a quality of 

life commensurate with that of the private sector and the peace of mind that their families 

will be taken care of when they deploy.” 146

Congress responded to the concerns of Hall 

and other senior leaders by raising military pay, 

increasing retirement benefits, and funding 

major modernization programs for barracks 

and family housing.

147

Although Army regulations stated the tenure of the SMA should be concurrent with that 

of the Chief of Staff who appointed him, 

General Reimer, who was due to retire in June

1999, thought it might be beneficial to have 

Hall stay on as SMA during the transition of 

the chiefs. After consulting with senior leaders, 

Reimer extended Hall’s service commitment for 

an additional year in December 1998. As a 

result, Hall, who had become SMA under 

unusual circumstances midway through Reimer’s 

tour, would eventually serve thirty-two months 

as Sergeant Major of the Army for two Chiefs 

of Staff, Reimer and his successor, General Eric 

K. Shinseki.

In the midsummer of 1999 the Army 

unveiled the Sergeant Major of the Army 

Positional Colors. Never before had an enlisted 

position of any service been recognized with a 

representational flag, historically reserved for 

the Secretary and Under Secretary of the Army, 

Senior Executive Service personnel, and Chiefs 

of Staff and their deputies. The idea for a positional flag had surfaced in 1992 during Kidd’s 

tenure and was seven years in the making.148 A 

representation of the OSMA, it also symbolized the tremendous importance of the NCO 

Corps in the U.S. Army. Designed by the U.S. 

Army Institute of Heraldry, it was taken from 

the insignia created in 1966 to distinguish the 

SMA from all other sergeants major. The flag, 

divided diagonally in scarlet and white and 

fringed with yellow, bore the SMA’s shield 

insignia at its center. 

As the Army began to move into a new 

millennium, technology and modernization 

were changing the way the Army looked at the 

future. The Army took an initial step toward 

transformation by developing two Initial 

Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) at Fort Lewis, 

Washington. The teams were to use off-theshelf technology to achieve an interim capability as the Army headed toward a long-term 

force structure reorganization—a goal termed 

the Objective Force. As part of the transformation the Army needed to produce soldiers 

who were able to shoot, move, and communicate on future battlefields with new and 

advanced equipment, and Hall challenged the 

NCO Corps to train those soldiers and accept 

responsibility and accountability for individual, crew section, and team training.149
41

To chart a course for the NCO Corps of the 

future as part of the transformation initiative, 

the Chief of Staff approved the Future NCO 

Vision, born out of the Future NCO Workshop, 

hosted by the U.S. Army Sergeants Major 

Academy and the RAND Corporation’s Arroyo 

Center. McKinney and the Training and 

Doctrine Command had asked RAND to 

undertake a research project entitled “Future 

Leader Development of Noncommissioned 

Officers.” The project, designed to help formulate a vision to articulate important characteristics of Army NCOs, highlighted the strengths 

and weaknesses the Future NCO Workshop 

had identified. The goal was to develop:

A noncommissioned officer corps, grounded in heritage, 

values, and tradition, [which] embodies the warrior ethos; 

values perpetual learning, and is capable of leading, training, and motivating soldiers. We must always be a noncommissioned officer corps that:

❏ Leads by example

❏ Trains from experience

❏ Enforces and maintains standards

❏ Takes care of soldiers

❏ Adapts to a changing world.150

During his tenure as SMA, Hall traveled 

around the world twelve times, visited more 

than sixty thousand soldiers, and spoke to congressional leaders more than seventeen times. 

Hall’s steady leadership and ceaseless efforts 

helped steer the Army and the NCO Corps 

through difficult periods. Echoing the thoughts 

of his peers, a major command sergeant major 

described Hall as the “right person at the right 

time.” According to Hall, the soldiers themselves guided change.151

On 18 May 2000, the Secretary and Chief 

of Staff of the Army announced the selection of 

Jack L. Tilley as the twelfth Sergeant Major of 

the Army. This nomination was unique in that 

for the first time a female command sergeant 

major was nominated, as well as a full-time 

National Guardsman.152

Tilley hailed from Vancouver, Washington. 

Never expecting to be much more than a good 

specialist, he came up through the ranks as an 

armored cavalryman whose service included a 

combat tour in Vietnam with the 1st Squadron, 

4th Cavalry. He was selected from the U.S. 

Central Command at MacDill Air Force Base, 

Florida.153 Upon arriving at the Pentagon, 

Tilley quickly focused on the top issues of concern to the enlisted force—pay, retirement benefits, quality of life, and health care. A strong 

advocate for the soldier, Tilley’s foundation of 

leadership was built on basic principles: consistent and fair counseling, effective communication, taking care of soldiers and their families, 

maintaining readiness, and ensuring tough, realistic training.154 This first SMA of the new 

millennium consulted with former Sergeants 

Major of the Army. Tilley noticed a common 

theme among them, the conviction that “the 

coming years will be challenging.” He believed 

that soldiers expected him to be honest, fair, and 

to “tell it like it is.”155

Tilley accepted the challenge and quickly 

set upon establishing some “firsts.” In December 

he traveled to Europe for two weeks with the 

sergeants major of the Army Reserves and the 

Army National Guard to exchange information 

with thousands of soldiers and to hear their 

concerns. Tilley, impressed by the soldiers of the 

European Command, pledged to do what he 

could to represent their issues when he returned 

to Washington.156

In January 2001 Tilley held the first-ever 

Sergeant Major of the Army’s Nominative 

Command Sergeant Major Conference, a 

week-long gathering at the U.S. Army 

Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss of the 

most senior noncommissioned officers on 

active duty and in the Guard and Reserve. The 

weeklong conference featured as guest speakers Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera, 

Chief of Staff Shinseki, and numerous subject 

matter experts in fields ranging from medicine, 

finance, logistics, and installation management. The conference identified subject areas 

for the Noncommissioned Officer Corps to 

focus on during the coming year and made 

recommendations to the Chief of Staff on vital 

soldier-related issues.

157
42

Later that same month Tilley 

hosted the first “Sergeants Time 

Training” at the Pentagon.158 At 

Tilley’s invitation General Shinseki 

addressed the assembly. Shinseki 

urged the NCOs to continuously 

hone their leadership skills, since it 

was possible that they might have 

to deploy suddenly in the event of 

a crisis. He also felt that the 

Sergeants Time session would help 

establish special bonds between 

first-line NCOs and junior enlisted personnel—bonds that would 

help soldiers during particularly 

tough missions. Finally, Shinseki 

acknowledged the benefit of giving 

sergeants major the opportunity to 

see all their talented soldiers at one 

time.

As Tilley filled the role of the 

top enlisted soldier, the Army 

transformation initiative began to 

pick up steam. As a symbol of that 

transformation, Shinseki directed 

that the entire Army switch to 

wearing black berets as the standard headgear on the Army’s 225th Birthday, 14 

June 2001. The decision was unpopular with 

some, particularly past and present Rangers who 

had worn the black beret for many years and 

believed it should have remained exclusively 

theirs to wear. Nevertheless, Shinseki believed 

that the beret would become “a symbol of unity, 

a symbol of Army excellence, a symbol of our 

values,” and he directed Tilley to lead the effort 

to implement the change. Tilley acted promptly, 

announcing during his Sergeants Time class 

that “we are going to do some things to change 

our Army. The berets are a part of that.” He 

further noted that “when the chief of staff 

makes a decision, it’s not time to start debating,” 

and he urged the assembled NCOs to get 

behind the effort.159 Though procurement 

problems prevented the distribution of berets to 

all soldiers prior to the implementation date, the 

Army formally transitioned to the beret on its 

226th birthday, an event marked by ceremonies 

across the Army. Meanwhile, the Rangers settled on a tan beret as their distinctive headgear. 

As the Army moved toward the future, 

Tilley foresaw new challenges for the NCO 

Corps. With new technologies, he recognized 

that education was to play an increasingly 

pivotal role in the development of noncommissioned officers.160 Consequently, he wanted the Army to educate soldiers earlier in 

their careers and to break the link between 

education and promotions.161 On the other 

hand, he was sure that the basic responsibilities of leadership would not change. Tilley 

expected that noncommissioned officers 

understand the NCO Vision and know what 

their priorities should be.162

General Reimer and SMA Hall During the Unfurling 

Ceremony for the Sergeant Major of the Army 

Positional Colors
43

Tilley, respected for his lighthearted 

demeanor and down-to-earth personality, 

explained his attitude toward representing the 

entire enlisted force: “I’m just a soldier just like 

you, except I have a different job with different 

responsibilities.”163 After Tilley spoke to one 

unit, one of the soldiers admired “the way he 

addressed issues...it wasn’t like you were looking at his position, but you looked at him [as an] 

NCO that is our voice—the most senior person 

that represents soldiers to the chain of command.”164 Tilley was fond of saying that soldiers 

can tell if you are “live or Memorex.” To the 

soldiers he represented, Tilley was truly “live.”

On 15 January 2004, Kenneth O. Preston 

was sworn in as the thirteenth Sergeant Major 

of the Army. The soft-spoken tanker from the 

mountains of western Maryland took office 

while the Army was fighting two wars and 

undergoing a major transformation in organization, doctrine, and equipment. Preston sought 

to strengthen discipline and morale by emphasizing fitness, the quality of life of soldiers and 

their families, and noncommissioned officer 

education. Preston occupied the office of 

Sergeant Major of the Army for seven years, 

serving two consecutive Chiefs of Staff: General 

Peter J. Schoomaker and General George W. 

Casey, Jr. 

Few understood the relationship between 

retention and the quality of soldier and family 

life better than Preston. The all-volunteer force 

would not survive the unrelenting demands of 

war if the Army did not help sustain healthy 

Army families. This required a commitment to 

properly resource family medical care, child 

support, quality schools, and youth services. 

Together with the Secretary of the Army, the 

Army Staff, and General Casey, Preston helped 

craft the Army Family Covenant, a simple 

pledge of the Army’s commitment to fund these 

priorities. Support for these programs was 

increased from $700 million to $1.4 billion in 

Fiscal Year 2008. From 2005 to 2007 the Army 

built, privatized, and improved eighty thousand 

housing units on thirty-six installations and 

opened over sixty new child care centers.165

Preston was an advocate for the 

Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program. This 

holistic approach to soldier fitness and readiness 

was a collaborative effort between the Army 

and civilian medical researchers and was based 

on evidence collected by the Positive Psychology 

Center at the University of Pennsylvania. The 

purpose was to develop a process for building 

resilience in the minds and bodies of soldiers 

stretched to the limit by the demands of combat 

and the stress of multiple deployments. The 

Army hoped that focusing on a broader spectrum of fitness would also aid suicide prevention efforts and help stop posttraumatic stress 

disorder (PTSD). Preston believed that this 

new approach combined with strong leadership 

would give the Army the capability to produce 

more resilient soldiers.166

Like many of his predecessors, Preston 

worked to reform the Noncommissioned Officer 

Education System. His experiences in Kuwait, 

Kosovo, and Iraq had convinced him that the 

character of warfare had changed. The increased 

dispersion of units and volatility of the modern 

battlefield combined with the expanding spectrum of conflict would require noncommissioned officers to develop a depth of understanding of their mission relative to operational 

and strategic objectives.167

Together with the Training and Doctrine 

Command, Preston devised a new model for 

training soldiers and noncommissioned officers. 

The core courses that made up the NCOES were 

redesigned: the Primary Leader Development 

Course, Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course, 

and Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course 

were changed to the Warrior Leader Course, 

Advanced Leader Course, and the Senior Leader 

Course, respectively. Each curriculum incorporated skills that had formerly been taught in 

higher-level courses.168 The intent was to challenge students and prepare them to step into 

positions of increased responsibility. Distance 

learning and structured self-development were 

integrated into the curricula, maximizing the 

time and resources available for professional education. This method required noncommissioned 
44

officers to shoulder more responsibility for their 

own education and professional improvement. 

The new NCOES courses were built into the 

Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle, 

creating periods for qualified noncommissioned 

officers to leave their units and attend the 

required classes.169

Preston was a valued adviser to both General 

Schoomaker and General Casey for issues 

regarding transformation and soldier discipline. 

His views carried considerable weight across the 

Army.170 As the thirteenth Sergeant Major of 

the Army, he had served the longest term in the 

history of the position. His contribution to Army 

transformation has left an enduring legacy.

Conclusion

Today the Sergeant Major of the Army still 

serves as the senior enlisted adviser and consultant to the Army Chief of Staff. As specified in 

The Army Noncommissioned Officers Guide:

The sergeant major [of the Army] serves as the senior 

enlisted advisor and consultant to the Chief of Staff of the 

Army. The SMA provides information on problems affecting enlisted personnel and proposed solutions to these 

problems; on standards, professional development, growth 

and advancement of NCOs; and on morale, training pay, 

promotions and quality of life for soldiers and family 

members. Using command information channels, the 

SMA keeps soldiers current on important NCO issues, 

and through the public media informs the American 

people on the Army mission, soldier accomplishments and 

future enlisted trends. He directs NCO support channel 

activities through the major commands’ command sergeants major by using written and verbal communications. 

Other functions of this position include: presenting the 

enlisted viewpoint to Congress, DA boards and committees, meeting with military and civilian organizations to 

discuss enlisted affairs, receiving enlisted personnel who 

visit HQDA, and representing all Army enlisted personnel 

at appropriate ceremonies.171

The Sergeant Major of the Army’s views 

have meaning as he serves on a great number of 

boards and committees, including the Army 

Policy Council, the Army Staff Council, and the 

General Staff Council. Protocol confirms the 

prestige and importance of the office by giving 

the SMA positional colors and a protocol status 

just beneath the director of the Army Staff and 

above all other lieutenant generals on staff.

Many aspects of the office have remained 

constant since its inception. The Army’s top 

NCO still spends about half of his time traveling worldwide to visit with soldiers and pass on 

the greetings and policies of the Chief of Staff. 

He still performs the original role as the eyes 

and ears of the Chief of Staff. And even though 

his duties are specified in official Army publications, the duties he performs for the Chief of 

Staff remain flexible. General Johnson’s precedent of instructing Sergeant Major Wooldridge 

in 1966 continues, as each Chief of Staff provides the specific guidance and mission for his 

Sergeant Major of the Army. It may be extensive, detailed guidance, such as that General 

Wickham gave to Sergeant Major Morrell, or it 

may be simple verbal guidance, as General 

Westmoreland gave to Sergeant Major 

Copeland. In any case the guidance has never 

been a restrictive list of “do’s and don’ts” that 

might circumscribe or limit the SMA’s actions. 

The office remains dependent upon the occupant’s initiative to accomplish the mission.

Of course, many things have changed since 

1966. Probably the most important is the ready 

acceptance of the office by the rest of the Army 

Staff. Wooldridge worked endless hours to open 

doors and establish contacts in various offices, 

while Hall had to reoccupy an office that had 

been vacant for eight months. Today, the office 

is now a well-established, accepted member of 

the Army Staff.

The selection process for the Sergeant 

Major of the Army has become more formal. In 

a word, it is now institutionalized. Choosing the 

first two occupants had been simply a matter of 

sending a message to the field soliciting nominees, with the Chief of Staff then using whatever process he desired to make his choice. Now 

the selection process involves a formal zone of 

consideration with a variety of factors considered, including total years of active service, age, 

and service in positions at the general-officer 

level.172 This process can take many months 
45

and involves a prestigious selection board of 

general officers and the incumbent SMA.

The Chief of Staff of the Army continues 

to administer the oath of office to the incoming 

Sergeant Major of the Army, now held in the 

Pentagon’s Hall of Heros. Surrounded by 

friends, family, and colleagues, the SMA 

Designee swears to:

I, [name], having been appointed to the Sergeant Major of 

the Army, do solemnly swear that I will support and defend 

the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, 

foreign and domestic; that I will bear truth faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without 

any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will 

well and faithfully execute the duties of the office which I 

am about to enter, so help me God.173

Tenure for the office has also changed. 

Although the term of the first Sergeant Major of 

the Army was to parallel that of his Chief of 

Staff (roughly four years), the tenure officially 

changed to two years following Wooldridge and 

Dunaway’s two-year terms. In the mid-1970s it 

was officially increased to a three-year tour, but 

subsequent Sergeants Major of the Army—from 

Bainbridge to Kidd—all served four-year tours, 

the same as their respective Chiefs of Staff, 

exactly as General Johnson envisioned in 1966. 

Special circumstances limited McKinney and 

Hall to serve less than four years. Preston served 

seven years due to the requirements of an Army 

at war and the personal trust he established with 

the incoming Chief of Staff.

Finally, the emphasis and focus of the office 

have changed. In the early years, Wooldridge, 

Dunaway, and Copeland were concerned mostly with establishing the office, making it a 

meaningful position, and helping the enlisted 

force as best they could during times of great 

stress and change. Van Autreve and Bainbridge, 

Eight of the Sergeants Major of the Army in the Sergeant Major of the Army Hall, 

U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, 2000
46

transitional figures in a time of increasing stability, moved from reacting to crises and problems to focusing the office on efforts to bring 

steady, planned improvement. Connelly and 

Morrell solidified the gains of their predecessors. By the times in which Gates, Kidd, and 

McKinney served, the senior Army noncommissioned officer could afford to take a broader 

view and emphasize specific adjustments. 

Instead of having the mission to “establish the 

office” as did Wooldridge, or move the NCO 

Corps to an all-volunteer force as Copeland had 

to do, Gates, Kidd, and McKinney could devote 

their energies to specific problems within the 

more general areas of professional development, 

training, and quality of life. 

Hall had to overcome a difficult period for 

the office while the NCO Corps struggled 

from within. Fortunately, the office had gained 

much respect and was an integral part of the 

operation of the Army, and there was little 

concern of abolishing the position of Sergeant 

Major of the Army as during the upheaval of 

Copeland’s tenure. Because of the efforts of 

each of the previous Sergeants Major of the 

Army, the office quickly regained its stature, 

which allowed Tilley to focus early on the 

future and the transformation of the Army for 

the twenty-first century. Preston demonstrated 

the value of the office by effectively assisting the 

Army in meeting the challenges of fighting a 

long, bitter conflict with an all-volunteer force.

The Army created the OSMA in 1966 to 

help professionalize the Noncommissioned 

Officers Corps and thereby improve its performance and responsibility. The new position 

gave symbolic and active support to those 

efforts. The SMA’s office evolved and developed parallel to the professionalization of the 

NCO Corps.

As the Sergeants Major of the Army established the boundaries of their office and institutionalized their position on the Army Staff, the 

Army launched new programs to improve the 

NCO Corps. The Noncommissioned Officer 

Education System, the Enlisted Personnel 

Management System, a redesigned rating system, and the Noncommissioned Officer 

Professional Development Program all emerged 

and prospered simultaneously with the growth 

of the Office of the Sergeant Major of the 

Army. The Sergeants Major of the Army did 

not create these programs, but they and their 

office were symbols of the Army Staff ’s commitment to devote resources, time, and people 

to restructure the NCO Corps.

While the Sergeants Major of the Army 

did not create new enlisted programs, they 

certainly influenced them. The SMAs were 

actively involved in advising, recommending, 

and checking at each step along the way as the 

programs evolved. And as the staff focused 

more effort on NCO and enlisted issues, the 

importance of the SMA as a sounding board 

and point for coordination increased as well. In 

this way, the new programs and the new SMA 

office grew in tandem, creating a synergy that 

allowed those who served to become involved 

in even more programs and policies. 

The SMA also gave prestige to noncommissioned officers. The NCOs now had one of 

their own across the hall from the Army Chief 

of Staff; American enlisted soldiers around the 

globe could be confident that their views could 

and would be represented to the chief. As a 

member of the chief ’s personal staff with 

unobstructed access, the SMA was no mere 

action NCO; the SMA evolved as an individual whose coordination was essential for all 

matters relating to the enlisted force. The 

SMA position also offered all NCOs a career 

goal with greater stature and prestige than had 

ever been available.

It is clear today that the original goals for 

creating the office—fostering direct communication between the enlisted ranks and the 

Chief of Staff, promoting confidence, increasing NCO prestige, and broadening NCO 

career incentives—are being met. The actions 

of those who held the office, through their 

work with the Army Staff and with the units 

and soldiers in the field, have also contributed 

considerably toward the professionalization of 

the NCO Corps.
47

The Sergeant Major of the Army is not a 

policy maker. He neither initiates, coordinates, nor implements staff actions. He has no 

recurring reports to submit, nor does he have 

any specific responsibilities or projects that 

his office must monitor or complete. Instead, 

he works for a policy maker and provides 

information and a point of view to assist the 

number-one Army officer in making decisions. In his capacity as the eyes and ears of 

the Chief of Staff he performs an invaluable 

service, not only by carrying the views of 

enlisted personnel directly to their chief, but 

also by communicating to enlisted people 

Army-wide whatever message the chief wants 

them to be sure to hear. As the senior enlisted 

representative he influences the policies and 

staff actions of the Army Staff whenever they 

affect the enlisted force and thereby ensures 

that their interests are being represented and 

their concerns are being considered.

The Sergeants Major of the Army have 

performed invaluable services for the noncommissioned officers and enlisted soldiers of the 

U.S. Army. They have helped professionalize 

the Noncommissioned Officer Corps; they 

have represented the interests of the enlisted 

force in the highest councils of the Army and 

have helped bring about many positive changes 

in policy; and they have raised the morale of 

soldiers in visits to duty stations around the 

globe. The powers of the office allowed this to 

happen, but the men who held that office during its first quarter-century made it happen 

too. Their strength, their insight, their determination, and their devotion to duty greatly 

contributed to forming the superb Army that 

the United States has today.
48

1. John C. Chapin, Uncommon Men: The 

Sergeants Major of the Marine Corps (Shippensburg, 

Pa.: Beidel Printing House, 1993), pp. 1–2.

2. William K. Emerson, Chevrons: Illustrated 

History and Catalog of U.S. Army Insignia

(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution 

Press, 1983), pp. 183, 195–97.

3. Arnold G. Fisch, Jr., and Robert K. 

Wright, Jr., The Story of the Noncommissioned 

Officer Corps (Washington, D.C.: Center of 

Military History, 1989), pp. 21–23; Interv, 

Erwin H. Koehler with Silas L. Copeland, 

19–21 Oct 93, pp. 247–49, author’s files, U.S. 

Army Center of Military History, Washington, 

D.C. (hereafter cited as CMH).

4. Forrest K. Kleinman, “Sergeant Major at 

the Top,” Army 13 ( January 1963):26–27. Until 

Loikow, the position was filled with a warrant 

officer or higher-ranking person.

5. Ibid.

6. Chapin, Uncommon Men, pp. 6–7, 75–76; 

James M. Carr and William O. Wooldridge, 

Sergeant Major of the United States Army (Fort 

Bliss, Tex.: U.S. Army Museum of the 

Noncommissioned Officer, 1986), p. 16. 

According to Wooldridge, on the day his 

appointment as Sergeant Major of the Army 

was made public, the office of Sergeant Major 

of the Marine Corps Herbert J. Sweet was 

moved upstairs to a location next door to the 

office of the commandant of the Marine Corps. 

Chapin says that after the other services created 

top NCO positions, the position of the Marine 

Corps sergeant major, which had existed since 

1957, was formalized.

7. Memo, Lt Col Fox, DCSPER-CSD, 4 

Nov 65, sub: Department of the Army Sergeant 

Major, author’s files, CMH; “Yes, No and 

Maybe to Top NCO Pleas,” Army Times, 29 Dec 

65, p. 20. Interv, Daniel K. Elder with William 

O. Wooldridge, 7 Feb 01, no. 2, pp. 38–39, 

author’s files, CMH. Sgt. Maj. Francis J. Bennett 

was serving as the U.S. Army Pacific Command 

sergeant major at the time and was later nominated to serve as the first (and subsequent) 

Sergeant Major of the Army. He was never 

selected.

8. Entry of the Office of the Chief of 

Information, Department of the Army, for the 

1967 Silver Anvil Award Competition, Public 

Relations Society of America, author’s files, 

CMH. 

9. Interv, Rupert F. Glover with Harold K. 

Johnson, 22 Jan 73, no. 10, p. 5, U.S. Army 

Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 

(hereafter cited as MHI).

10. Interv, Glover with Johnson, pp. 5–6.

11. Speech, General Harold K. Johnson to 

Sergeants Major Conference, 28 Nov 66, 

Washington, D.C., copy in Harold K. Johnson 

papers, box 64, folder 3, MHI.

12. Ibid., pp. 6–7.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., p. 7.

15. Interv, Glover with Johnson, p. 8. 

According to the 23 May 1973 edition of the 

Army Times, Wooldridge later testified in 1973 

that Army Criminal Investigation Division 

(CID) agents twice came close to finding evidence that he took illegal money in Europe. 

However, Provost Marshall General Maj. Gen. 

Carl Turner managed to cover up the evidence.

16. Memo, Col Harry D. Temple, The 

Institute of Heraldry, for Col McLellan, The 

Notes
49

Adjutant General, 20 Jul 66, sub: Comments on 

the Insignia of the Sergeant Major of the Army, 

author’s files, CMH; Information paper, n.d., 

sub: Insignia of the Sergeant Major of the 

Army, National Archives, College Park, Md.; 

Interv, Elder with Wooldridge, 7 Feb 01, no. 2, 

pp. 46–47. All in author’s files, CMH. The 

original insignia approved by Johnson is on permanent display in the Office of the Sergeant 

Major of the Army.

17. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United 

States Army (Bloomington: Indiana University 

Press, 1984), p. 558.

18. Ibid., p. 570.

19. Interv, Elder with Wooldridge, no. 2, pp. 

103–12. These soldiers were selected from the 

top graduates of their basic combat training and 

given additional training at the newly created 

Noncommissioned Officers Candidate Course. 

The training capitalized on the two-year enlistment of a typical draftee and upon completion, 

each student was awarded the rank of either 

sergeant or staff sergeant and the top graduate 

would be promoted to staff sergeant.

20. Fisch and Wright, Story of the NCO 

Corps, pp. 18–26.

21. William O. Wooldridge, Answers to 

Historical Interview Questions, 1 Jun 91, p. 1, 

Encl to Memo, SAPA-LS, 29 Oct 90, sub: 

Historical Interview Questions, author’s files, 

CMH.

22. Ibid.

23. William O. Wooldridge, “First Look at 

a New Job,” Army 16 (October 1966):43; Bettie 

J. Morden, The Women’s Army Corps, 1945–1978

(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 

1990), p. 393. WACs served in separate units 

under female commanders and were attached to 

the units or offices where they performed their 

duties. They were integrated into the Army on 

20 October 1978, and the Women’s Army 

Corps was dissolved.

24. William O. Wooldridge, “Contact Point 

with the Top for the Soldier in the Field,” Army

17 (October 1967):53.

25. Wooldridge, “First Look,” p. 43.

26. Ibid., p. 84.

27. Interv, Glover with Johnson, p. 10.

28. Ibid.

29. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on 

Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on 

Enlisted Promotion Policy Review, Hearings 

August–November 1967, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 

1967, pp. 7052–53.

30. Interv, Elder with Wooldridge, 7 Feb 01, 

no. 2, pp. 80–81.

31. Wooldridge, Answers, p. 3.

32. Interv, Glover with Johnson, p. 9.

33. Ltr, SMA (Ret) William O. Wooldridge 

to Dr. Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., U.S. Army Center of 

Military History, 6 Jun 82, pp. 2–3; Ltr, 

MACJOO, HQ, USMACV (Col R. H. 

Johnson), to SMA Wooldridge, 10 May 68. 

Both in author’s files, CMH.

34. Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., “The Noncommissioned 

Officer in the U.S. Army, 1775–1975,” pp. 8–9, 

Unpubl Ms, author’s files, CMH.

35. Wooldridge, “First Look,” p. 84; 

Wooldridge, “Contact Point,” p. 53.

36. George W. Dunaway, “New Emphasis 

Aims at Putting More Strength in ‘Backbone of 

the Army,’” Army 19 (October 1969):34; 

Wooldridge, Answers, p. 2. The centralized system for temporary promotions to the top two 

grades was approved on 28 June 1968.

37. George W. Dunaway, “New Voice at the 

Top for the Enlisted Man,” Army 18 (November 

1968):47–48.

38. Wooldridge, Answers, p. 2.

39. Harold K. Johnson, “Challenge,” 1 Jul 

68, p. 438, Unpubl Ms, Harold K. Johnson 

Papers, MHI.

40. Gene Famiglietti, “CSMaj. Chevron 

Wins Approval,” Army Times, 20 May 68, p. 22; 

Robert G. McClintic, “Don’t Tinker with the 

Symbols,” Army 15 (April 1965):28, 30; “No 

Stripe Change for NCO Grades,” Fort Bliss 

News, 14 Aug 65, p. 1.

41. Interv, Elder with Wooldridge, no. 2, pp. 

82–102; Ltr, CSM John F. Thomas to 

Wooldridge, 31 Dec 66. Both in author’s files, 

CMH.

42. Encl to Memo for Record, 17 Jul 67, 

sub: Command Sergeants Major Program, 
50

signed by Col J. A. Leclair, Jr., Chief, Senior 

Enlisted Control Branch, author’s files, 

CMH.

43. Ibid.; Johnson, “Challenge,” p. 438; 

Memo, Cir 611–31, 8 Jan 68, “Command 

Sergeants Major,” p. 1, author’s files, CMH; 

Department of the Army (DA), Army Regulation 

(AR) 600–20, Army Command Policy, Change 2, 3 

Apr 68, p. 1, and Change 5, 4 Nov 69, p. 1.

44. Ltr, Wooldridge to Fisher, 6 Jun 82, pp. 

3–4; News Release 658–68, 16 Jul 68, Office of 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 

Washington, D.C.

45. Interv, Erwin H. Koehler with George 

W. Dunaway, 18–21 Jan 94, p. 84, author’s files, 

CMH.

46. Weigley, History of the United States 

Army, p. 561; Department of the Army 

Historical Summary (DAHSUM), Fiscal Year 

(FY) 1969 (Washington, D.C.: Center of 

Military History, 1973), p. 3; DAHSUM, FY 

1970 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military 

History, 1973), pp. 3, 54. 

47. Interv, Glover with Johnson, p. 5; Wooldridge, 

Answers, p. l.

48. George W. Dunaway, “Random Thoughts 

and Comments Regarding the Office of Sergeant 

Major of the Army,” Apr 93, pp. 1–2, author’s 

files, CMH.

49. Ibid.

50. Dunaway, “New Emphasis,” p. 33.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid., pp. 33–35; DAHSUM, FY 1969, 

pp. 38–39; DAHSUM, FY 1973 (Washington, 

D.C.: Center of Military History, 1977), p. 71.

53. Dunaway, “New Emphasis,” p. 36; NCO 

Education and the Development of NCOES (Fort 

Bliss, Tex.: U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, 

1992), p. 3.

54. DAHSUM, FY 1970, p. 56.

55. George W. Dunaway, ‘“People Benefits’ 

Will Get More Emphasis in ‘70s,” Army 20 

(October 1970):34–35.

56. Office of Personnel Operations (OPO), 

Board Proceedings: Selection of the Third 

Sergeant Major of the Army, tab L, author’s 

files, CMH.

57. “Relationship with the Chief of Staff 

and Major Challenges,” Unpubl Ms, apparently 

from an interview with SMA Copeland, n.d., 

pp. 2–3, author’s files, CMH.

58. Ibid., p. 4.

59. Interv, Erwin H. Koehler with Silas L. 

Copeland, 19–21 Oct 93, pp. 203–07, authors 

files, CMH.

60. Copeland, “Relationship with the Chief 

of Staff,” pp. 3–5.

61. DAHSUM, FY 1972 (Washington, 

D.C.: Center of Military History, 1974), p. 2.

62. Ibid., p. 3.

63. Silas L. Copeland, “The NCO Must Grow 

with Army,” Army 22 (October 1972):24–25; 

“Winding Down of War Calls for Top Leaders,” 

Army 21 (October 1971):26–27.

64. Copeland, “Relationship with the Chief 

of Staff,” pp. 6–7.

65. DAHSUM, FY 1973, p. 34.

66. Ultima Register, 1973–1987 (Fort Bliss, 

Tex.: U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, 

1987), pp. 6–140; William G. Bainbridge, Top 

Sergeant: The Life and Times of SMA William G. 

Bainbridge (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 

1991), p. 157. Sergeants Major Bainbridge and 

Van Autreve were both honorary graduates.

67. “But You’re a Combat Veteran. You...Know 

Everything,” NCO Journal 2 (Fall 1992):15.

68. Copeland, “Relationship with the Chief 

of Staff,” p. 8.

69. Msg, DAPO-EPC-SO, 281440Z Sep 

72, sub: Zone of Consideration for Nomination 

of Command Sergeants Major To Serve as 

Sergeant Major of the Army, author’s files, 

CMH.

70. Ltr, SMA Glen Morrell to SMA (Ret.) 

William O. Wooldridge, 25 Aug 86, with 

attached questionnaire for ex-SMAs, author’s 

files, CMH.

71. Ltr, General C. W. Abrams to General 

B. Rogers, 5 Jan 73; Memo, Col R. L. Adcock, 

Asst Dir, Military Personnel Management, 

for Executive, ADCSPER, sub: Selection of 

New SMA; Interv, Koehler with Copeland, 

19–21 Oct 93, pp. 227–28. All in author’s 

files, CMH.
51

72. DAHSUM, FY 1974 (Washington, 

D.C.: Center of Military History, 1978), p. 158; 

DAHSUM, FY 1975 (Washington, D.C.: 

Center of Military History, 1978).

73. Leon L. Van Autreve, “Where the 

‘People’ Programs Are: The NCO at the Apex,” 

Army 24 (October 1974):17.

74. William A. Patch, “Professional 

Development for Today’s NCO,” Army 24 

(November 1974):15–20.

75. Fisch and Wright, Story of the NCO 

Corps, pp. 28–29.

76. DAHSUM, FY 1975, pp. 30, 43–44.

77. Memo, CSM Johnnie L. Jones, U.S. 

Army Air Defense Center and Fort Bliss, for 

General Fredrick C. Weyand, 18 Oct 74, 

author’s files, CMH. 

78. Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., Guardians of the 

Republic: A History of the Noncommissioned 

Officer Corps of the U.S. Army (Mechanicsburg, 

Pa.: Stackpole Books, 2001), p. 353.

79. Bainbridge, Top Sergeant, pp. 32–44, 52, 

65.

80. Handwritten note, General Fredrick C. 

Weyand to “Dutch,” 3 Jun 76, with handwritten 

note, Vice Chief of Staff to DCSPER, 8 Jun 76. 

Both in author’s files, CMH.

81. Ltr, Gen Bernard W. Rogers to SMA 

William G. Bainbridge, 7 Nov 77, author’s files, 

CMH.

82. DAHSUM, FY 1976 (Washington, 

D.C.: Center of Military History, 1977), pp. 

156–57.

83. DAHSUM, FY 1978 (Washington, 

D.C.: Center of Military History, 1980), pp. 3, 

4, 188.

84. Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, pp. 

319–21.

85. Memo, Col Robert E. Lynch, Office of 

the Adjutant General, for multiple addressees, 

sub: Review of the Command Sergeant Major 

Program, 17 Mar 70, author’s files, CMH.

86. Gen William E. DePuy, Address to 

TRADOC Commanders Conference, 10–11 

Dec 75, as quoted in “The Officer/NCO 

Relationship,” p. 13, Information Management 

Support Center, Washington, D.C., Sep 97.

87. DA, AR 600–20, Army Command Policy, 

15 Aug 99, p. 24.

88. Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, p. 354.

89. Ibid.

90. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on 

Armed Forces, Military Compensation 

Subcommittee, Junior Enlisted Personnel Stationed 

Overseas, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, pp. 123–39; 

Military Personnel Subcommittee, Hearings on 

CHAMPUS, 96th Cong., 2d sess.; Subcommittee 

on Military Construction Appropriations, 

Military Construction Appropriations for 1985, 

98th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 1984, pp. 107–94; 

Military Construction Appropriations for 1986, 

99th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 269–335; Military 

Construction Appropriations for 1988, 100th 

Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1–103; Senate, Subcommittee 

on Manpower and Personnel, Department of 

Defense Authorization for Appropriations for 

FY88–FY89, 100th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1371–80, 

1669–82; House, Committee on Armed Forces, 

Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations, 

Department of Defense Appropriations for 1989, 

100th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 1–79.

91. William G. Bainbridge, “First, and Getting 

Firster,” Army 25 (October 1975):23–24.

92. DAHSUM, FY 1978, pp. 51, 52; Dan Cragg, 

“Where Are They Now? SMA William G. 

Bainbridge,” Army Times, 1 Aug 83, p. 14.

93. Larry Carney, “Bainbridge Hailed as NCO 

Leader,” Army Times, 2 Jul 79, p. 16.

94. William G. Bainbridge, “We Have Met the 

Challenge,” Army 28 (October 1978):26–28.

95. Carney, “Bainbridge Hailed as NCO 

Leader,” p. 16.

96. Memo, DAPE-MPE-PS for Chief of 

Staff, 19 Sep 78, sub: Sergeant Major of the 

Army—DECISION MEMORANDUM with 

CSA Approval, 3 Oct 78, author’s files, CMH.

97. Ibid.

98. DAHSUM, FY 1983 (Washington, 

D.C.: Center of Military History, 1990), p. 211.

99. William A. Connelly, “For NCOs: 

Leadership, Hard Work and TRAINING,” 

Army 30 (October 1980):21.

100. Larry Carney, “New SMA Opposes 

O’sea Kin Cuts,” Army Times, 23 Jul 79, p. 5.
52

101. William A. Connelly, “The Soldier 

Remains Our Ultimate Weapon,” Army 29 

(October 1979):24.

102. Connelly, “For NCOs,” pp. 21–24.

103. William A. Connelly, “Sergeant Major 

of the Army,” Army 32 (October 1982):27–30.

104. Encl to Ltr, Morrell to Wooldridge, 25 

Aug 86, p. 5; DAHSUM, FY 1983, p. 52.

105. Encl to Ltr, Morrell to Wooldridge, 25 

Aug 86, p. 5; Fisch and Wright, Story of the 

NCO Corps, p. 29.

106. Larry Carney, “Our Business Is 

Soldiers, Says Departing SMA,” Army Times, 4 

Jul 83, p. 2.

107. Ibid.

108. Memo, DAPE-MPD-CD, 7 Sep 82, 

sub: Sergeant Major of the Army—DECISION 

MEMORANDUM, author’s files, CMH.

109. Larry Carney, “New SMA Outlines 

Priorities for His Term,” Army Times, 27 Jun 83, 

p. 16.

110. DAHSUM, FY 1986 (Washington, D.C.: 

Center of Military History, 1989), pp. 3, 93.

111. Glen E. Morrell, “What Soldiering Is 

All About,” Army 36 (October 1986):41.

112. DAHSUM, FY 1985 (Washington, 

D.C.: Center of Military History, 1989), p. 28; 

DAHSUM, FY 1986, p. 30.

113. DAHSUM, FY 1985, p. 28.

114. Julius W. Gates, “Bootprints that Will 

Never Fade,” Army 40 (October 1990):35.

115. Rebecca Stark, “Support for Military Is 

Essential, Speaker Says,” Junction City Daily 

Union, Junction City, Kans., 6 May 92, pp. 1, 3.

116. Richard A. Kidd, “The Threshold of a 

New Chapter in Army History,” Army 42 

(October 1992):37–39.

117. Jamie Cavazos, “SMA Kidd Introduces 

New Chevrons at AUSA,” NCO Journal 4 (Winter 

1995):4–5.

118. Bernard Adelsberger, “Focus on Your 

Job for Promotion...” Army Times, 23 Jan 95, p. 

3. The council grew from an NCOES process 

action team recommendation a year earlier to 

form a council of sergeants major that would 

have input to the leadership and developmental 

decision-making network.

119. Bernard Adelsberger, “Major Changes 

for NCOs,” Army Times, 6 Feb 95, p. 3.

120. Memo, DAPE-MPE-PD, 12 Dec 94, 

sub: Sergeant Major of the Army (SMA) Tour 

Extension, author’s files, CMH. General Orders, 

like General Order 29 that established the 

Office of the Sergeant Major of the Army, were 

no longer published, and AR 614–200 is now 

the governing regulation.

121. David Abrams, “SMA McKinney 

Launches Each Day with NCO Creed,” NCO 

Journal 5 (Fall 1995):14–16.

122. Douglas Ide, “New SMA: View from 

the Top,” Soldiers (October 1995):28–29.

123. David Abrams, “NCOES Conferees 

Set Future Course,” NCO Journal 5 (Fall 

1995):18–19.

124. Gene C. McKinney, “Our Army—In 

Touch with America,” Army 45 (October 

1995):32.

125. Ibid., p. 33.

126. Memo, SMA Gene C. McKinney for 

DCSPER, 4 Apr 96, sub: Request for Special 

Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP), author’s files, 

CMH.

127. Ibid.

128. Gerry J. Gilmore, “McKinney Visits 

Aberdeen To Talk to Troops,” Army News 

Service, 21 Nov 96, p. 1.

129. Transcript, Secretary of the Army Togo 

D. West, Jr., with Department of Defense Press 

Corps, 22 Nov 96, p. 3, author’s files, CMH.

130. Memo, DACS-ZAA, 20 Oct 96, sub: 

Media Information on Former SMA 

McKinney, p. 2, author’s files, CMH. During a 

10 February 1997 CBS Evening News piece 

featuring Dan Rather, General Reimer made 

the statement in response to a reporter’s question on how difficult his decision to suspend 

McKinney was.

131. U.S. Army News Release 97–62, 

“Army Names Acting Sergeant Major,” Army 

Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., 13 Jun 97, 

pp. 1–2.

132. Telecon, CSM Daniel K. Elder with 

General (Ret) Dennis J. Reimer, 18 Apr 01, 

author’s files, CMH.
53

133. Jane McHugh, “McKinney Out: 

Search for SMA Starts Immediately,” Army 

Times, 20 Oct 97, p. 3.

134. Jane McHugh, “Robert E. Hall Chosen 

as the Sergeant Major of the Army,” Army 

Times, 27 Oct 97, p. 3.

135. U.S. Army News Service, “CENTCOM’s 

Hall Named Next Sergeant Major of the Army,” 13 

Oct 97.

136. Bill Costlow, Army News Service, 

“New SMA Stresses ‘Keep Faith in Army,’” 

Pentagram, 17 Oct 97, p. 2.

137. Ibid.

138. Phil Prater, “My Message to Soldiers,” 

Soldiers (February1998):3.

139. Interv, Daniel K. Elder with Robert E. 

Hall, 5 Oct 01, p. 144, author’s files, CMH. Sgt. 

Maj. Larry Strickland, one of the victims of the 

attack on the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, 

and CSM (Ret.) Robert Rush assisted Hall in 

developing the Soldiers’ Values Card.

140. Tom Findtner, “SMA Vows To Make 

Army’s Future Better by Taking Care of 

Soldiers,” Northwest Guardian, 17 Apr 98, p. 

A5.

141. Jim Caldwell, “Basic Training Expands 

One Week To Include Values-based Training,” 

Army News Service, 23 Apr 98.

142. Transcript, U.S. Army News Release, 

“Army Recruiting Program Press Briefing,” 

Army Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., 4 Mar 

97, p. 1; U.S. Army News Service, “Recruiting 

Ends Year on Positive Trend,” 5 Oct 99.

143. Gerry J. Gilmore, “Army’s Senior NCO 

Discusses Top Soldier Issues,” Army News 

Service, 16 Apr 99, p. 1.

144. Gerry J. Gilmore, “CINCOS ‘Re-look’ 

To Boost NCO Ranks,” Army News Service, 3 

May 99, p. 1.

145. Connie E. Dickey, “SMA Says Army 

Needs More Junior NCOs,” Army News Service, 

11 Oct 99, pp. 1–2.

146. Jim Garamone, “Top NCOs Push 

Quality of Life Before Congress,” American 

Forces Press Service, 22 Feb 00, p. 2.

147. Ibid., p. 1.

148. Response to Query, Information 

Paper, sub: Positional Flag, Office of the 

Chief of Public Affairs, n.d., p. 1.; U.S. Army 

News Release 99-044, “Army Unveils Sergeant 

Major of the Army Positional Flag,” Army 

Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., 16 Jun 99; 

Memo, DAEC-CA, 22 Mar 99, sub: Sergeant 

Major of the Army (SMA) Flag; Jane 

McHugh, “NCOs Can Hoist their Own,” 

Army Times, 5 Jul 99, p. 2. All in author’s files, 

CMH. Sgt. Maj. Ed Akacki, the NCO in 

charge of protocol for the Army Staff, got the 

idea while arranging the flags of other Army 

leaders and made the recommendation to the 

director of the Army Staff, Lt. Gen. John A. 

Dubia. Chief of Staff General Dennis J. 

Reimer approved the idea.

149. Robert Hall, “The Noncommissioned 

Officer Corps: Meeting the Army’s Challenges,” 

Army 49 (October 1999):36.

150. John D. Winkler et al., Future Leader 

Development of Army Noncommissioned Officers: 

Workshop Results, (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND 

Corporation, 1998), pp. 15–16.

151. Matthew Cox, “Sgt Maj of the Army 

Robert Hall Was ‘Right Person at the Right 

Time,’” Army Times, 3 Jul 00, p. 16.

152. Memo, TAPC-MSB, sub: Results of 

the Sergeant Major of the Army Nominating 

Board,” 3 May 00, author’s files, CMH. Included 

on the initial list of thirteen candidates were 

CSM Cynthia A. Pritchett of the Combined 

Arms Support Command, the first female to be 

nominated, and CSM John J. Leonard, an Army 

National Guardsman who had served as the 

command sergeant major and senior enlisted 

adviser for the U.S. Army National Guard. 

Neither was recommended by the board.

153. Nicole C. Adams, “Taking Care of Soldiers: 

SMA Tilley Shares Holiday with Soldiers,” KORUS 

Magazine (January 2001):20–21.

154. Jack L. Tilley, “The American G.I.—

Person of the Century: ‘Our Heritage and 

Legacy,’” Army 50 (October 2000):34.

155. Ibid., p. 36.

156. Greg Jones, “SMA Begins Two-week 

European Visit,” U.S. Army Europe News Release, 

2 Dec 00, p. 1.
54

157. Donald Sparks, “Conference Concludes 

with One Voice, Direction for NCOs,” U.S. Army 

Sergeants Major Academy web site, n.d., author’s 

files, CMH. 

158. Monica A. Wiley, “Army Launches 

‘Sergeant’s Time’ at Pentagon,” Pentagram, 26 

Jan 01, p. 1. Sergeants Time Training is time set 

aside for first-line NCOs to conduct training on 

critical tasks the unit would be expected to perform in combat.

159. Ibid., pp. 12–13.

160. Donald Sparks, “A Talk with Sergeant 

Major of the Army Jack Tilley,” NCO Journal

(Winter 2000–2001):16.

161. Interv, Daniel K. Elder with Jack L. 

Tilley, 8 Feb 00, no. 2, p. 6, author’s files, CMH.

162. Ibid., p. 9.

163. Sparks, “A Talk,” p. 12.

164. Mike Novogradac, “Down to Earth 

Kind of Guy,” KORUS Magazine ( January 

2001):21.

165. Elizabeth M. Lorge, “Army Leaders 

Sign Covenant with Families,” Army News 

Service, 17 Oct 07, author’s files, CMH.

166. University of Pennsylvania, Positive 

Psychology Center, Comprehensive Soldier 

Fitness: An Overview, author’s files, CMH.

167. Interv, Robert M. Mages with Kenneth 

O. Preston, 14–15 Feb 12, Washington, D.C., 

author’s files, CMH.

168. Ibid.

169. Ibid.

170. General George W. Casey, Jr., “Remarks 

for the Retirement Ceremony of Sergeant 

Major of the Army Ken Preston,” Army News 

Service, 1 Mar 11, author’s files, CMH.

171. DA Training Cir 22–6, The Army 

Noncommissioned Officers Guide, 1990, pp. 

48–49.

172. Information Paper, DAPE-ZAS, 21 

Oct 99, sub: SMA Selection Process, author’s 

files, CMH.

173. Memo (Draft), Linda L. Jacobs, Dir, 

Army Protocol, DASC-DSP, 8 Jun 00, sub: 

Swearing-In Ceremony in Honor of Command 

Sergeant Major Jack L. Tilley as the Sergeant 

Major of the Army, Encl. 3, author’s files, 

CMH.
55

The Sergeants Major of the Army

Part II
56

SMA Wooldridge
William O. Wooldridge, the eighth 

of ten children of William R. 

Wooldridge and Susan A. Gray, was 

born on 12 August 1922 in Shawnee, Oklahoma.1

Five years later, his family left Oklahoma and 

moved to Cross Cut, Texas, where his father 

became a farmer and cattle rancher. Wooldridge 

remembered those early years in rural Texas as 

“hard but satisfying.” The Southwest’s oftenharsh environment and its strong, resolute people 

undoubtedly helped mold his character. 

Wooldridge grew up during hard times, when 

the needs of the family came first; he learned to 

do without.

William first began to have thoughts about 

a military career after his older brother enlisted 

in the Army in 1929. He had two goals in mind: 

to wear a soldier’s uniform and to leave Cross 

Cut, where he saw few prospects for his future. 

Despite being underage, William eventually left 

school to follow in his brother’s footsteps, but 

his parents would not allow him to enlist. Not 

wanting to return to high school, he went to 

California and spent a year harvesting walnuts. 

After turning eighteen, William returned to 

Texas and enlisted on 13 November 1940. The 

Army assigned him to Company F, 23d Infantry, 

at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

Wooldridge recalls that his basic training 

was very different from what recruits experience 

today. In those days, the unit to which a soldier 

was assigned conducted the training. A corporal 

from the 23d Infantry oversaw Wooldridge’s 

initiation into military life. Basic training lasted 

two weeks and was conducted at nearby Dodd 

Field. Wooldridge joined other recruits in learning how to salute, how to march, how to handle 

a rifle, and basic infantry tactics. After this initiation, the recruits returned to their unit and 

received advanced infantry training in the company area by the same corporal. Wooldridge 

particularly valued the tactical sessions in which 

instructors and students gathered around the 

sand tables in the attic of the company headquarters. Two squads up on line, one back: 

“that’s the way I learned,” he recalled, “and the 

war I fought in, we fought the same way.” Upon 

completion of his training, Wooldridge was 

assigned to a regular infantry platoon.

As the specter of war loomed on the horizon, draftees poured into Wooldridge’s unit and 

the tempo of training increased. With little 

transportation available, the infantry walked 

everywhere, regularly marching twenty-five 

miles each way from Fort Sam Houston to 

Camp Bullis, Texas, for field training. They 

would bivouac and run night problems and then 

march back the next day. As the year 1941 progressed, training focused increasingly on tactics 

and weapons qualification.

Unlike many soldiers who decide only 

gradually to make the Army a career, Private 

Wooldridge knew early that he wanted to 

become a professional soldier. Over forty years 

later, he remembered the noncommissioned 

officers (NCOs) in Company F as “true professionals—the company first sergeant, my platoon 

sergeant, and my platoon guide”—who influenced him to become a Regular Army noncommissioned officer. His platoon sergeant, a threestriper named Hull, was a World War I veteran 

and Distinguished Service Cross recipient who 

had served as a private with the same 23d 

Infantry and had “come up from the line.” “I did 

William O. Wooldridge
58

not again, in the U.S. Army, serve under NCOs 

so qualified in their jobs. They were beautifully 

trained and dedicated men.” 

While with the 23d Infantry, Wooldridge 

attended the regiment’s Squad Leader’s Course in 

1941. Once again, Wooldridge’s training differed 

significantly from today’s Noncommissioned 

Officer Education System with its classrooms, 

tables, and chairs. He and several other privates 

sat on the ground listening to a corporal, a sergeant, or the S–3 officer, who primarily taught 

from memory or from charts. The instructors 

did not use reference material and there was no 

obvious lesson plan. The three-week course 

focused entirely on how to be a squad leader.

Wooldridge was quick to follow the example of his sergeants, and he was promoted to 

corporal within six months of arriving in the 

23d Infantry. Wooldridge remembered meeting 

his former Company F first sergeant, then 

retired, shortly after World War II and asking 

him why he had been promoted to corporal in 

such a short time. The first sergeant wryly 

replied, “You weren’t much good as a private so 

I thought I’d try you as a corporal.”

In the fall the 23d Infantry participated in the 

famous Louisiana Maneuvers. To get to the 

maneuver area, the men of Company F had to 

march from Dodd Field to Camp Polk, Louisiana, 

covering about twenty-eight miles a day. 

Wooldridge and his comrades made the march 

wearing the standard high-top brown shoes and 

canvas leggings while carrying combat packs and 

pack rolls.2 Company F arrived five days before 

the maneuvers began, and Wooldridge’s platoon 

immediately initiated map problems and terrain 

familiarization. During the exercise his battalion 

provided security for a horse cavalry unit while it 

conducted a river crossing.

The pay for a private in 1941 was $30 a 

month. By the time a soldier went through the 

“pay line,” however, the $30 would likely end up 

as $20 after money was taken out for canteen 

checks, the Soldiers Home, and the Company 

Fund.3 Soldiers still tried to save part of what 

they earned, and most soldiers sent half home or 

put it in a soldier’s deposit.

While with the 23d Infantry, Wooldridge 

volunteered for overseas duty and had to relinquish his coveted corporal’s stripes to the unit 

first sergeant, thus reverting back to the rank of 

private. As Wooldridge explained, “the stripes 

belonged to the unit, not the soldier. When you 

left the unit, you left your stripes.” In December 

1941 the Army placed Wooldridge on detached 

service with the British forces in Iceland. (The 

British had taken over the defense of the island 

after the Nazi invasion of Denmark in 1940. 

Because of the German threat, Britain turned 

over the defense of Iceland to the United States, 

then still neutral.) The most enduring impression 

of Wooldridge’s tour of duty in Iceland was the 

role of the regimental sergeant major (RSM) in 

the British Army—particularly RSM Tom 

Knight. Unlike his counterpart in the U.S. Army 

at the time, the RSM literally ran the regiment, 

participated in unit training, and “could do anything the troops could do...usually better.” Years 

Private Wooldridge
59

later as a sergeant major, Wooldridge followed 

the examples of those RSMs he had seen in 

Iceland. He also held them as a standard for all 

U.S. Army sergeants major, too many of whom 

he felt spent an excessive amount of time in their 

offices as administrators.

In 1942 Wooldridge returned to duty with 

the U.S. Army and was assigned to the 1st 

Infantry Division in the European Theater of 

Operations. There, he joined Company K, 26th 

Infantry, where he remained until the war’s end. 

The 26th Infantry participated in the invasion 

of North Africa at Oran, fought at the Kasserine 

Pass in Tunisia, and landed at Gela, Sicily, where 

Wooldridge’s platoon received a commendation. 

The regiment invaded Omaha Beach at 

Normandy on D-day and drove across France 

and Belgium. It was among the first units to 

breach the West Wall, to cross the Rhine at 

Remagen, and to advance through Germany to 

the Czechoslovakian border.

Wooldridge distinguished himself for gallantry in action at Aachen, Germany, in October 

1944 and received his first Silver Star. He suffered shrapnel injuries and was evacuated to the 

187th General Hospital in England. Still bandaged and newly promoted, Staff Sergeant 

Wooldridge returned to his unit to participate 

in the vicious winter combat of the Battle of the 

Bulge in December 1944, when Hitler’s army 

made its desperate thrust toward Antwerp in 

hopes of splitting the Allied forces.

During the Battle of the Bulge, Company K 

deployed near a ridgeline close to the Belgian 

village of Bütgenbach. Wooldridge’s understrength 1st Platoon was in reserve, responsible 

for the defense of the company command post. 

The 1st Platoon had received a new second lieutenant two days earlier. On the evening of 19 

December 1944, the command post, which was 

located in the basement of an old farmhouse, 

came under intense tank fire. Wooldridge told 

the lieutenant that he would exit through a hole 

in the basement and go to the squad under fire. 

Unexpectedly, the lieutenant started to climb out 

of the basement. Wooldridge hollered a warning, 

but the lieutenant was mowed down by machinegun fire. After retrieving the dead lieutenant, 

Wooldridge headed for the engaged squad. As 

he ran forward, he heard a loud bang and an 

explosion. The regimental antitank unit had 

knocked out a German tank, the remnants of 

which were now burning brightly in the middle 

of a nearby road.

With the company commander and first sergeant injured and the platoon leader dead, 

Sergeant Wooldridge was the senior man at the 

command post until the battalion S–3 officer 

came forward to take command of Company K. 

Fearing that German reinforcements would run 

down from the ridge and overrun their positions, 

the S–3 directed Wooldridge to retake the ridge 

with the six remaining soldiers he could locate 

from his platoon. Because of the earlier tank fire, 

Wooldridge convinced the officer to detach a 

tank to his platoon. As they approached a house 

near the ridge, Wooldridge told the tank commander that he would put four men on the right 

side of the road, two on the left side, and “we are 

just going to charge. So don’t hesitate to rev it up 

and let it go, because we will be running like hell.” 

As they moved forward the tank shot at the 

house, blowing apart a corner and hitting a 

German tank. Wooldridge and two soldiers 

First Sergeant Wooldridge (far right)

Relaxes with Fellow NCOs.
60

charged toward a nearby barn, kicking open the 

door and shooting three German soldiers, including a lieutenant. As they returned to their vehicle, 

they saw a German tank retreating through the 

snow toward its own lines. For his actions, 

Wooldridge received a second Silver Star.

After the Battle of the Bulge, Wooldridge’s 

regiment reorganized and began its advance 

toward Belgium, meeting only scattered resistance. The 26th Infantry finally halted on the 

Czech border, where Wooldridge remained 

until April 1945. By then the Army had adopted a point system for determining how long a 

soldier should serve overseas. Wooldridge was 

a “high point” man in his company, having 

been overseas since 1941. After processing 

through the replacement company and collecting “a stack” of back pay, Wooldridge caught a 

ride on a boxcar train to Camp Lucky Strike in 

France. The war came to an end while he was 

there, and he steamed back to New York on a 

troop ship.

Following the end of the war in Europe, in 

May 1945 the Army assigned Wooldridge to 

Fort Sam Houston, Texas, where he stayed 

until December 1946. Wooldridge reenlisted 

and spent his time in Texas working guard 

details and miscellaneous duties. He was then 

ordered to go to Japan to join the occupation 

forces, but while he was en route the Army 

diverted him to Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to 

attend the “First Three Graders Course” at the 

Oahu Officer Troop and Staff School.4 Upon 

completing the three-month course in March 

1947, he went to Headquarters, Eighth U.S. 

Army, in Japan. There, he served as an acting 

first sergeant of a Military Police company, 

processing delinquency reports for the Eighth 

Army provost marshal. When his hitch was 

over, Wooldridge, who was not pleased with a 

non-Infantry assignment, flatly refused to 

reenlist and was reassigned to Fort Walton, 

Washington, for separation. After arriving in 

Washington, Wooldridge went to the major in 

charge and said, “I am not going to be discharged, I want to reenlist...to get back to the 

Infantry.” Wooldridge wanted to return to his 

regiment in Europe but was assigned to the 

Infantry demonstration battalion at Fort 

Lawton, Oklahoma.

Soon after Wooldridge arrived in Oklahoma 

in early 1949, he was summoned to the office of 

Maj. Gen. Clifton Andrus, a former 1st Infantry 

Division commander. After swapping war stories, 

Andrus asked Wooldridge what his duties were to 

be. Wooldridge used the opportunity to tell the 

general he wanted to return to the 1st Infantry 

Division. A week later he departed for Germany 

and the Big Red One.

Wooldridge returned as the platoon guide to 

his old wartime outfit, Company K, 26th 

Infantry.5 There, the newly assigned regimental 

commander, Col. Samuel “Hanging Sam” T. 

Williams, set out to instill discipline and enforce 

standards. Together with the old “noncoms” 

Williams began to whip the unit back into 

shape. As part of this effort, Williams selected 

Company K’s first sergeant, Theodore Dobol, to 

serve as the regimental sergeant major. Although 

the Army did not have a rank or grade of sergeant major at that time, Dobol performed functions similar to today’s sergeant major: training 

and enforcing standards and coaching NCOs on 

how to perform their duties.

While he was in Germany, Wooldridge, then 

a platoon sergeant, asked his first sergeant for 

permission to attend the Seventh Army’s NCO 

School in Munich. When asked why, Wooldridge 

responded, “I intend to stay in the Army and...I 

want to be something more than a rifle platoon 

sergeant.” His first sergeant was not persuaded: 

“You’re a combat veteran. You already know 

everything.” When Wooldridge continued to 

press the issue, his sergeant summarily told him, 

“You’re wasting my time” and ordered him “out of 

my orderly room.” In those days, Wooldridge 

explained, a soldier had to provide for his own 

education and training. “I went to night school. 

There were no requirements to attend school if 

you didn’t want to. Now, you must get training or 

you don’t get promoted.”

Wooldridge returned to the United States 

in May 1954 and was assigned as first sergeant 

of Company G, 3d Infantry, Fort McNair, 
61

Washington, D.C. The nature of the 3d Infantry’s 

mission in the nation’s capital was largely ceremonial, and Wooldridge did not regard the 

assignment as exceptionally challenging for an 

Infantry first sergeant. While at McNair, 

Wooldridge testified before the House Armed 

Services Committee. Each of the services was 

sending an enlisted representative to talk about 

military pay, and Wooldridge represented the 

Army. The topic was important, given the growing exodus of armed forces personnel from military service. Congress responded to the concerns 

of Wooldridge and other senior Department of 

Defense personnel by passing the Career 

Incentive Act of 1955, which established 

improved pay and benefits for military personnel. 

After testifying before Congress, Wooldridge 

met with Vice Chief of Staff General Charles L. 

Bolte. Bolte told him that he could have any 

assignment he wanted. Wooldridge replied, “in 

that case sir, I would like to go back to my regiment,” which was then en route from Germany 

to Fort Riley, Kansas. Soon after, Wooldridge 

had orders in hand and reported to the 16th 

Infantry until the 26th arrived. He was then 

assigned as the first sergeant for Company D. 

Wooldridge went on to become the sergeant 

major of the 3d Battalion, 26th Infantry, in 

December 1956. 

In 1957 the Army reorganized into “pentomic” divisions that were supposed to be 

capable of performing both conventional and 

nuclear missions. During the reorganization his 

unit formed the nucleus of the 2d Battle Group, 

28th Infantry. The unit had just won the 

Seventh Army Training Award as the command’s best unit when Wooldridge assumed his 

duties. The following year Congress created two 

new enlisted grades, E–8 and E–9, under the 

Military Pay Bill of 1958, and Wooldridge subsequently was promoted to E–8. 

The following year Wooldridge returned to 

Germany as part of Operation Gyroscope, a 

revolutionary system of troop rotation in which 

entire divisions were exchanged between locations overseas and the United States. During 

Gyroscope, the 2d Battle Group, 28th Infantry, 

became part of the 24th Infantry Division in 

Germany. In the summer of 1959 Wooldridge 

was promoted to the newly created rank of sergeant major. Looking back on his career, 

Wooldridge considered his service as battle 

group sergeant major his most significant in 

terms of professional development and advancement. This assessment was due in part to his 

attendance in 1960 of the Southern Command 

Senior Noncommissioned Officers School at 

McGraw Kaserne, Munich, where he honed his 

professional skills. 

After the Army introduced the triangular 

ROAD (Reorganization Objective Army 

Divisions) in the early 1960s, it inactivated the 

2d Battle Group, 28th Infantry, thus making 

Wooldridge the group’s first and last sergeant 

major. Wooldridge’s hard work and competence 

did not go unnoticed, however, and in March 

1963 he was selected to become the 24th 

Infantry Division’s sergeant major. 

As the division sergeant major, Wooldridge 

expressed his concern about the underutilization of sergeants major. When the 1958 Military 

Pay Bill added the grades of E–8 and E–9, little 

was written on the duties and responsibilities of 

the sergeant major. Wooldridge noted that 

many unit commanders used E–9s as chief 

clerks, rather than as enlisted assistants to the 

commander. In response, the division commander, Maj. Gen. W. A. Cunningham, prepared a paper with Wooldridge’s input, describing the guidelines and duties for unit sergeants 

major and included his expectations that sufficient authority be bestowed on these men to 

perform their duties. At least in the 24th 

Infantry in 1963, the sergeant major finally 

began to serve at the head of noncommissioned 

officers, as von Steuben had envisioned in his 

Blue Book in 1779.6

In January 1965 Wooldridge again returned 

to the 1st Infantry Division as the sergeant 

major of the 1st Brigade. In June he was 

selected to be the division sergeant major and 

went to Vietnam with the division’s advance 

party a few weeks later. After the entire division arrived, his main job was to visit units in 
62

the field and take a close look at how the 

enlisted ranks were faring. Once, he saw a soldier wearing “Ho Chi Minh” sandals, made of 

pieces of automobile tire and leather straps. 

Demanding an explanation from the company 

first sergeant, he was told that no size thirteen 

boots were available and that the battalion 

sergeant major had known about it for the past 

two weeks. Infuriated, Wooldridge had the 

sergeant major of the support command find 

boots of the right size by the next day. He later 

“unloaded on the infantry battalion sergeant 

major,” who quickly lost his job.

Although Wooldridge relished being a 

combat soldier and thrived on the demands of 

the battlefield in Vietnam, he was soon challenged to make his most important contribution to the Army—establishing the Office of 

the Sergeant Major of the Army (OSMA). 

One objective was to boost the morale and 

professionalism of the enlisted force by having 

one of its own become the personal assistant 

to the Chief of Staff of the Army on almost all 

matters relating to enlisted soldiers. The major 

reason was to establish an official channel 

from the enlisted ranks to the highest military 

echelon in the service on such issues as morale, 

welfare, training, pay and allowances, clothing 

and equipment, enlistment and reenlistment, 

discipline, and promotion policies.

In 1966 the Army had over 4,700 sergeants 

major, assigned to twenty-one major commands, 

all of whom were eligible for nomination to the 

new position of Sergeant Major of the Army. 

Major Army commanders throughout the world 

nominated one member each. The final candidates were chosen for their ability as soldiers, 

their military bearing, their personality, and their 

skill in expressing themselves on Army matters. 

Wooldridge, the only finalist then serving in 

Vietnam, was nominated by his former commander, Maj. Gen. Jonathan O. Seaman, then 

the II Field Force Commander, and was endorsed 

by his current commander, Maj. Gen. William 

E. DePuy. Wooldridge was summoned to report 

to the Deputy Commanding General, Vietnam, 

Lt. Gen. Jean E. Engler, for an interview with 

other nominees from U.S. Army, Vietnam. 

When Wooldridge’s turn came he was asked if 

he was aware that the Chief of Staff wanted to 

establish the position of Sergeant Major of the 

Army, to which he responded affirmatively. 

When asked if he was interested in the assignment, Wooldridge replied “no sir.” He was 

thanked and returned to his unit. Wooldridge 

assumed that this new position would be administrative and that an “admin NCO,” not a combat infantryman, would fill the slot. Much to 

Wooldridge’s surprise, Engler nominated him 

and forwarded his name to Chief of Staff 

General Harold K. Johnson.7

Johnson and his staff carefully weighed 

the strengths and weaknesses of each of the 

nominees and eventually selected the combatexperienced Wooldridge. He was on an operation near the Cambodian border when the 1st 

Infantry Division commander flew in by helicopter to notify him of his selection. Expected 

in Washington, D.C., by 5 July, Wooldridge 

departed immediately.

Wooldridge in Vietnam with General Seaman, Who 

Later Nominated Him as the First SMA
63

Wooldridge flew to Washington still in his 

jungle fatigues, with instructions to report 

directly to the Chief of Staff. During a brief 

meeting, Johnson told Wooldridge that he was 

to be sworn in as the Sergeant Major of the 

Army on 11 July and “not to mention it to anybody.” Meanwhile, the Chief of Staff directed 

that Special Orders No. 142 be prepared to 

appoint Wooldridge to the new position.

General Johnson swore in Sergeant Major 

Wooldridge on 11 July 1966 at the Mall 

Entrance of the Pentagon, complete with an 

NCO-led ceremony and a nineteen-gun 

salute. Johnson escorted Wooldridge first 

through an honor cordon of troops and then 

through an inspection of the assembled soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 3d Infantry (Old 

Guard). With the assistance of Wooldridge’s 

wife, Johnson then pinned on the distinctive 

collar insignia for the Sergeant Major of the 

Army. Before the ceremony, the Chief of Staff 

gave Wooldridge this guidance:

You will be a member of my personal staff and will be my 

principal enlisted assistant and advisor on all matters pertaining to enlisted members of the Army. You will report 

directly to me and there will be no one between your desk 

and mine. When you need to see me you will use the private entrance to my office. The only other person who uses 

that entrance is the Secretary of the Army.

Johnson’s instructions laid the foundation 

for the close relationship between all successive 

Chiefs of Staff and their Sergeants Major. 

Johnson wanted the Army’s top NCO to be visible and available to soldiers. “I did not bring 

you here to sit behind a desk,” he told 

Wooldridge. “You will have others for the office 

work who will know something of your habits 

and thinking because they will be your representatives and during your absence must act for 

you.” As his only other formal guidance, he presented Wooldridge with a card outlining the 

duties of the Sergeant Major of the Army:

Will identify problems affecting enlisted personnel and 

recommend appropriate solutions. He will advise on the 

initiation of and content of plans for the professional education, growth, and advancement of noncommissioned 

officers, individually and collectively. He will advise the 

Chief of Staff on all matters pertaining primarily to 

enlisted personnel, including but not limited to morale, 

welfare, training, clothing, insignia, equipment, pay and 

allowances, customs and courtesies of the service, enlistment and reenlistment, discipline and promotion policies. 

He will be available to provide advice to any board or commission dealing with enlisted personnel matters.

Wooldridge’s appointment as the first 

Sergeant Major of the Army also prompted 

action in the other services. After taking office, 

Wooldridge heard from Sergeant Major of the 

Marine Corps Herbert J. Sweet that Sweet had 

previously worked for a colonel in Marine 

Corps Personnel. But the day after the news of 

Wooldridge’s appointment was made public, the 

Marine Corps moved Sweet into an office next 

to the commandant of the Marine Corps. 

Wooldridge had felt that “the Army Chief of 

Staff created the first real and effective top 

enlisted position.” In actuality, he may have created several. Within a year, the other two services followed suit, with Chief Master Sergeant 

of the Air Force Paul W. Airey and Master 

Chief Petty Officer of the Navy Delbert D. 

Black occupying similar positions.

As the first Sergeant Major of the Army, 

Wooldridge faced tough challenges. No precedents existed regarding the scope of his job, 

its focus, or its specific responsibilities. Never 

one to shrink from difficult tasks, Wooldridge 

evaluated the missions General Johnson gave 

him and determined a series of goals that 

would accomplish them. First, to strengthen 

the overall professionalism of the NCO Corps, 

he wanted to improve the education of NCOs. 

Second, Wooldridge resolved to “root out 

NCOs who had ‘homesteaded’ in soft jobs 

such as ROTC (Reserve Officer Training 

Corps), the civil components, West Point, 

other senior schools, and the U.S. Army Rifle 

Team. These units, he noted, “were loaded 

with NCOs holding unauthorized MOSs 

[military occupational specialties] attained for 

promotion purposes,” and Wooldridge wanted 

the Army to require all NCOs serving with 

such organizations to either serve a tour in 
64

Vietnam or retire. Third, he wanted to upgrade 

the key enlisted position of company and battery unit clerks from E–4 to E–5. Finally, he 

set out to see as many of the Army’s troops as 

he could in the continental United States and 

overseas, especially those engaged in combat 

in Southeast Asia, so he could gain an accurate picture of the morale, training, and living 

and working conditions of the Army’s entire 

enlisted force.

Establishing the office would be one of 

Wooldridge’s first priorities. In an interview 

immediately after his swearing-in ceremony, he 

stated that his job would be to act as a consultant 

and adviser to the Chief of Staff of the Army on 

matters pertaining to the morale, training, pay, 

and promotion of the enlisted soldier. He felt 

that to do his job effectively “I want to talk to the 

men and I want them to talk to me.”8

The establishment of the SMA position 

was not popular with everyone. According to 

Wooldridge, Vice Chief of Staff General 

Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., reportedly complained, “that’s all we need, a sergeant telling the 

chief of staff how to run the...Army.” Soon 

after Wooldridge assumed his position, a colonel from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Personnel walked into his office and 

announced, “I think this is the worst thing that 

has ever happened to the Army.” Wooldridge, 

taken aback, offered to escort the colonel to see 

Johnson to discuss the matter. The colonel left 

without another word. 

Some months later, after returning from a 

visit to the field, Wooldridge was summoned 

to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Operations. The deputy proposed that 

Wooldridge report to him instead of the Chief 

of Staff whenever he returned from a trip or 

received a complaint. When Wooldridge asked 

if this had been cleared with the Chief of Staff, 

the deputy replied he would clear it with the 

vice chief. Wooldridge reminded him that he 

did not work for the vice chief and returned to 

his office. Wooldridge never mentioned a word 

of these events to Johnson until the day before 

Johnson left office.

Wooldridge succeeded in achieving most of 

the goals he had intended; improving soldier education proved the most difficult. Although raising 

the consciousness of the Army’s leaders in this 

area, at least enough to see the planning process 

begin, he later admitted that he had not reached 

his target because “the Army’s resources were 

committed to war.” Wooldridge noted that he 

solved the homesteading problem and later elevated the authorized grade for unit clerks. As for 

gaining a reliable understanding of the general 

conditions affecting the enlisted force, Wooldridge 

spent almost half of his tenure on the road to 

attain a sense of “ground truth” that could in turn 

be communicated to the Chief of Staff.

Wooldridge expended a great deal of effort 

in visiting soldiers in Vietnam and in pursuing 

ways to help them through their combat ordeals. 

In his first year alone, he made four trips to 

combat zones in Southeast Asia, always seeking 

out firsthand information on battlefield conditions and then passing on what he learned to 

the Army at large. Soldiers learned what they 

would encounter in an Army Digest article 

entitled “So You’re Headed for Combat: How 

To Get Ready and What To Expect,” published 

in January 1968, the same month as the unexpected Tet offensive by the Viet Cong in which 

dozens of American military installations were 

attacked. Wooldridge presciently advised, “Even 

you men who have jobs ‘behind the lines’ may 

have occasion to fight, if only to defend yourselves. The experience of our troops in Vietnam 

has reemphasized an old lesson—every soldier 

must be able to fight.”9 There were no front 

lines in Southeast Asia. 

Another aspect of Wooldridge’s job as 

Sergeant Major of the Army was to present a 

positive public relations image of the Army’s 

enlisted ranks. He spoke at the Washington 

Press Club and the National Press Club and 

appeared on nationwide television programs 

such as “The Ed Sullivan Show” and “The 

Today Show.” In addition, Life magazine featured him in an article entitled “The Army’s 

Topmost Sarge” in September 1967. Wooldridge 

even accompanied President Lyndon B. Johnson 
65

on a trip to Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The result 

of all this “show biz” work was both critical and 

significant. For the first time it put a major 

spotlight on the enlisted ranks. Gradually, 

Wooldridge demolished the “Sergeant Bilko” 

image of NCOs and gained recognition for 

them as true professionals.

After his tour as Sergeant Major of the 

Army, Wooldridge was asked to comment on the 

major items approved during his tenure that he 

deemed most beneficial to the Army and to 

enlisted soldiers in particular. Wooldridge identified three: the convocation of the first Command 

Sergeants Major Conference in 1966, the establishment of the Command Sergeants Major 

Program in 1967, and the institution of the 

Noncommissioned Officers Candidate course in 

the midst of the Vietnam War.

Wooldridge deemed the 1966 Command 

Sergeants Major Conference “one of the finest 

initiatives approved on behalf of the noncommissioned officer.” For the first time sergeants 

major—enlisted soldiers—had gotten together 

in a forum and reviewed Army policies as they 

related to the enlisted ranks. From the conference flowed “the ideas which would influence 

the advancement of the corps for years to come.” 

Of the twenty-one recommendations proposed 

during the conference, Chief of Staff Johnson 

approved sixteen immediately. Of the five that 

were disapproved, Johnson sat down with 

Wooldridge and explained the reasoning 

behind every decision. When Johnson came to 

the rejected recommendation to upgrade the 

company clerk position from E–4 to E–5, 

Wooldridge pointed out that many units were 

Wooldridge with General Johnson at the Pentagon
66

already using E–5s as clerks—an unhappy 

expedient made possible only by taking an 

E–5 slot away from another portion of the 

company. Johnson finally relented and 

approved the upgrade. 

Wooldridge took equal pride in the creation of the Command Sergeant Major (CSM) 

Program, which he felt correctly highlighted 

the difference between sergeants major in staff 

positions and those who served as senior 

enlisted advisers to commanders above company level. Wooldridge also noted great benefits from the institution of a centralized promotion and assignment system for senior 

NCOs, which “broke up the old unit promotion system, opening up all vacancies in the 

Army to all eligible NCOs.”

The sergeant major of the Army Air 

Defense Command, John F. Thomas, proposed 

the idea of a CSM Program in response to a 

survey Wooldridge initiated. General Johnson 

liked the idea and directed Wooldridge to form 

an ad hoc committee to define what a command 

sergeant major was, what his duties should be, 

and what rank and title he should have.10

Though Wooldridge later admitted to having 

been shortsighted, initially he wanted to limit 

the program to sergeant majors working in 

color-bearing units at the regimental level and 

below. Based on this assumption, the committee, which included future SMA George W. 

Dunaway, estimated that there would be 

between 300–500 sergeants major in the program. Wooldridge felt that the word “command” in the new rank denoted sergeants major 

who “reported to the commander on behalf of 

the...troops” and served as the sergeant major of 

the command.

From the outset there were problems with 

implementing the program. Misunderstandings 

existed over which positions and soldiers qualified for consideration as command sergeant 

major. The Army added to the confusion by not 

publishing clear guidance on the roles and 

responsibilities of the CSM. Wooldridge soon 

received correspondence from sergeants major 

in the field complaining of the process, and he 

brought them to the Chief of Staff ’s attention. 

Though Johnson forwarded these concerns to 

the chief of Personnel, both he and Wooldridge 

were nearing the end of their tours and were 

unable to correct the problems before they left 

office in the summer of 1968.

Wooldridge received the first set of newly 

designed CSM stripes, which featured a wreath 

surrounding the original star in the center of 

three chevrons over three lower arcs, from 

Johnson on 22 March 1968. In the citation, 

Johnson noted that the new rank symbolized 

“the pride, gratitude, and admiration of the 

United States Army for the contribution of the 

Corps of Sergeants Major toward the accomplishment of the mission of the Army.”

Wooldridge considered one of the most 

noteworthy accomplishments of his tenure the 

Noncommissioned Officers Candidate Course 

(NCOCC). During the Vietnam War the turnover of junior NCOs had been extreme, partly 

due to the twelve-month tour limit and high 

casualty rates. Units were forced to select the 

senior soldier, sometimes a private first class, for 

squad leader without the benefit of experience 

or specialized training. The Army instituted the 

NCOCC at Fort Benning, Georgia, to address 

the NCO shortage. The course provided additional combat related training—and promotion 

to sergeant—to the top graduates of basic training, and Wooldridge believed it met an immediate wartime need. SMA Wooldridge believed 

the training program, though not popular, was 

far better than the alternative of allowing 

untrained and inexperienced NCOs to lead 

troops into battle.

When Wooldridge’s two-year tour came to a 

close in the summer of 1968, the new Army Chief 

of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, 

chose a new Sergeant Major of Army. After 

receiving a list of finalists from which to choose, 

Westmoreland asked Wooldridge’s advice. 

Wooldridge highly recommended the final 

choice, George W. Dunaway. As Wooldridge 

turned over the reins to Dunaway, he could be 

proud of much he accomplished during his tenure. Above all, he had met the tough challenge 
67

General Johnson set for him to establish the 

Office of the Sergeant Major of the Army.

Wooldridge bid farewell to Washington in 

September 1968 and assumed his new position 

as the sergeant major of the Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam. He again came to public 

attention in September 1969, when he was 

accused during a congressional inquiry of fraud 

and corruption related to military club systems.11 Notified of the investigation while on 

leave from Vietnam, Wooldridge was assigned 

to White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. 

The accusations resulted in Wooldridge’s being 

tried in the court of public opinion. Media publicity and innuendo pushed presumptions of 

innocence aside and provided fuel for opponents of the Office of the Sergeant Major of the 

Army to level attacks and push for elimination 

of the position.12

After requesting retirement, which the 

Army refused because of the ongoing investigation, Wooldridge was reassigned to Fort 

MacArthur, California. He was never tried in a 

military court, and he retired on 31 January 

1972 after more than thirty-one years of service. 

Still, the accusations lingered; and in 1973 the 

Department of Justice and Wooldridge reached 

an agreement in which Wooldridge pleaded 

guilty to two counts of bribery for accepting 

stock equity and profits from a corporation that 

was engaged in the sale of merchandise to the 

noncommissioned officers’ open mess in 

Vietnam. The government did not find any 

wrongdoing on his part while serving as the 

Sergeant Major of the Army.13 After his many 

years of service to the Army, Wooldridge settled 

in California and later Santa Teresa, New 

Mexico. Although the investigation tarnished 

the final years of Wooldridge’s career, it could 

not diminish his heroic wartime exploits or his 

arduous labors on behalf of enlisted soldiers and 

noncommissioned officers as the first Sergeant 

Major of the Army. On 5 March 2012, William 

O. Wooldridge died at Beaumont Army Medical 

Center, Beaumont, Texas. He is interred at Fort 

Bliss National Cemetery.
68

1. Except as noted, this section is based on 

an interview contained in James M. Carr and 

William O. Wooldridge, The Sergeant Major of 

the Army: The First Twenty Years, 1966–1986

(Fort Bliss, Tex.: U.S. Army Sergeants Major 

Academy, 1986), pp. 13–27; William O. 

Wooldridge, Answers to Historical Interview 

Questions, 1 Jun 91, pp. 1–7, author’s files, U.S. 

Army Center of Military History, Washington, 

D.C. (hereafter cited as CMH); Carl Martin, 

“SGM Wooldridge—Enlisted Advisor, 

Consultant, Spokesman,” Army Digest 21 

(December 1966):49–50; Interv, Daniel K. 

Elder with William O. Wooldridge, Feb 01, 

Santa Teresa, N.M.

2. The combat pack consisted of a change of 

undergarments, toilet articles, and canned 

rations. The pack roll, folded across the top and 

strapped to the sides of the pack, was positioned 

so that it could be discarded easily if the men 

came under fire.

3. Canteen checks were a line of credit used 

for purchasing items at the regimental exchange.

4. The enlisted grade structure was reversed 

during this period, with the senior enlisted 

grade first and the most junior as seventh.

5. The platoon guide was the logistician of 

the platoon, responsible for resupply, ammunition, and water, and worked closely with the 

platoon sergeant.

6. See Friedrich W. L. G. A. von Steuben, 

Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the 

Troops of the United States (Mineola, N.Y.: 

Dover Publications, 1985). 

7. In nominating Wooldridge for the position of Sergeant Major of the Army, Seaman 

wrote, “I strongly recommend whether or not 

Sergeant Major Wooldridge is interested in the 

assignment he should be considered for it.”

8. Carl Martin, “This Is the Man,” Army 

Digest 21 (September 1966):5.

9. William O. Wooldridge, “Headed for 

Combat,” Army Digest 23 ( January 1968):6. 

Wooldridge regularly published articles in the 

Army Digest, usually on topics of concern that 

his visits to various installations had revealed, 

such as the use of reveille, caring, building the 

Army image, and professionalism.

10. Memo, Sgt Maj (Ret) William O. 

Wooldridge to M. Yamamoto, 25 Jan 00, author’s 

files, CMH.

11. For additional details on the investigation and subsequent charges, refer to the Further 

Readings section at the end of this book.

12. Larry Carney, “Reaction of NCOs 

Concerns Dunaway,” Army Times, 24 Oct 69, 

p. 24.

13. Ltr, William O. Wooldridge to Dr. 

Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., in response to Fisher’s 

request to review a portion of a draft publication, “Sergeant Major at the Summit,” 6 Jun 82, 

author’s files, CMH.

Notes
69

Assignments

1940 Enlisted at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, Company F, 23d Infantry,

2d Infantry Division

1941–1942 Detached Service, British Forces–Iceland

1942–1945 Rifleman through Squad Leader, 1st Infantry Division, North 

Africa; Sicily; France; Belgium; Germany

1945–1946 Fort Sam Houston, Texas

1946–1947 Student, 1st Three Grades Course, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii

1947–1949 Platoon Sergeant, Field First Sergeant, Headquarters,

Eighth U.S. Army, Seoul, Korea

1949–1954 First Sergeant, Company K, 26th Infantry,

1st Infantry Division, Germany

1954–1955 First Sergeant, Company G, 3d Infantry (Old Guard),

Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.

1955–1958 First Sergeant, Sergeant Major, 3d Battalion, 26th Infantry,

1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas

1958–1963 Sergeant Major, 2d Battle Group, 28th Infantry,

24th Infantry Division, Germany

1963–1965 Sergeant Major, 24th Infantry Division, Germany

1965–1966 Sergeant Major, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division;

1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley Kansas; Republic of Vietnam

1966–1968 Sergeant Major of the Army

1968–1969 Command Sergeant Major, Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam, Republic of Vietnam

1969–1971 Command Sergeant Major, Sergeant Major, Range Command, 

White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico

1971–1972 Sergeant Major, Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison,

Fort MacArthur, California

Selected Decorations and Awards

Silver Star with One Oak Leaf Cluster

Legion of Merit with One Oak Leaf Cluster

Bronze Star Medal

Purple Heart Medal

Air Medal with Five Oak Leaf Clusters

Army Commendation Medal with One Oak Leaf Cluster

Good Conduct Medal with Ten Oak Leaf Clusters

American Defense Service Medal

European–African–Middle Eastern Campaign Medal

World War II Victory Medal

Army Occupation Medal (Germany)

National Defense Service Medal

Vietnam Service Medal

Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal

Combat Infantry Badge with One Star
SMA Dunaway
I

n January 1940, at the age of seventeen, 

George W. Dunaway enlisted in the Virginia 

National Guard, joining Company A, 176th 

Light Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry 

Division, as a rifleman. Born on 24 July 1922 in 

Richmond, Virginia, he had grown up working 

summers on his grandfather’s farm along with 

his two brothers and three sisters. He attended 

school in Richmond until the tenth grade, when 

he had to leave school and work to help support 

his family. He thought that school “was rewarding and I was lucky to be able to attend school, 

because so many other kids had to work on 

farms and were not able to go to school.” Years 

later as a sergeant first class, Dunaway earned 

his high school equivalency diploma at Fort 

Benning, Georgia.

George Dunaway’s motivation to join the 

National Guard reflected the great strength of 

that institution—unit cohesion. Everyone knew 

each other, lived in the same area, and in some 

cases were childhood friends. “If I hadn’t known 

anybody in the unit, I probably would have felt 

that the military wasn’t for me; but seeing all my 

friends there, my own age. I decided it was OK. 

I still have a soft spot in my heart for the 

National Guard because of those times. We all 

knew each other, and when they put us on the 

train early in the morning to go off for maneuvers, many people would turn out to see us off.”

Dunaway’s company trained every two weeks 

and was divided into ability groups based on each 

soldier’s previous experience. Biweekly drills 

focused on individual, squad, and platoon training: disassembling and cleaning the rifle, wearing 

a uniform properly, and marching. The annual 

company level summer training took place at 

Camp A. P. Hill, Virginia. Dunaway remembers, 

“We did a great job. We even won an exercise 

over the Regular Army...at least that’s what we 

were told. We had great morale and felt that no 

one could touch us.” Company A attacked the 

Regulars, a horse cavalry unit, at dawn while they 

were eating breakfast, and captured the entire 

battalion headquarters. Such success was no 

doubt due to the high morale and the initiative 

that the commanders encouraged in their noncommissioned officers. It certainly was not due to 

excellent equipment. Company A’s mortar platoon used stovepipes to simulate mortars; its 

other elements often fared little better.

Dunaway joined the Regular Army in 

February 1941, when the 29th Division entered 

federal service, and immediately undertook 

eighteen weeks of combat skills training at Fort 

Meade, Maryland. Living and working conditions in the Army of the 1940s were far different than they are today. Dunaway lived in a 

two-story wooden barracks, heated with coal in 

winter and without air-conditioning in summer. 

Each company had its own mess hall, and 

kitchen police (KP) was performed by soldiers 

under the rank of corporal instead of by contracted civilians. An onerous but necessary duty, 

KP entailed “washing trays, pots, and pans, 

scrubbing floors, peeling potatoes by hand, and 

cleaning grease traps.” Only relatively recently 

has this long-time Army fixture disappeared.

Unit leaders, not drill instructors, led 

training. Most of the time, NCOs conducted 

unit training, except for live-fire exercises, 

George W. Dunaway

This section is based on Interv, Erwin H. Koehler with 

George W. Dunaway, Dec 93, Las Vegas, Nev.
72

which required the presence of an officer. 

Instead of bringing in instructors from outside 

the unit to teach specialized subjects, the company NCOs learned those subjects themselves 

and then taught them to their soldiers. This 

approach not only increased their own knowledge, but also enhanced their credibility with 

their soldiers. After all, in the stress of combat 

far away from the training environment, no 

outside instructors would be available for 

guidance. The unit emphasized all aspects of 

military skills. World War II was already in its 

second year of fighting in Europe, and 

Dunaway and his unit had little doubt that the 

war would soon draw in the United States. He 

and thousands of soldiers like him were taught, 

“there were only two kinds of soldiers—the 

quick and the dead.”

Soldiers in Dunaway’s company, as well as 

throughout the Army, underwent frequent 

inspections, “in ranks, standing by our bunk, and 

constantly throughout the day by all superiors.” 

The big inspection came on Saturday. “The 

Saturday morning inspection was where soldiers 

learned the proper way to wear and care for 

their uniforms, awards, and decorations. In 

those days, each soldier knew how to wear properly each and every item of his uniform, and 

NCOs knew how to teach them all.” Only soldiers who had no deficiencies received weekend 

passes. Those who fell short remained in the 

barracks after the inspection and spent the 

weekend correcting their shortcomings.

In February 1943, at Fort Myer, Virginia, 

Dunaway married Mary “Peck” Henry from 

Springfield, Massachusetts. Like thousands of 

other families in the midst of a rapidly expanding Army, the Dunaways found that family 

quarters were almost nonexistent. In August 

they moved to Fort Benning, Georgia, and lived 

in a barn loft, complete with a well and an outhouse. Peck recalled, “We had to go outside and 

use the half-moon latrine and we had to pump 

water from the well and bring it upstairs to cook 

and bathe with. It was uncomfortable with 

almost no privacy, but it was better than being 

back home away from my husband.”

A decision that shaped the rest of George 

Dunaway’s Army career had prompted the 

move to Fort Benning. He volunteered for 

parachute training. When his National Guard 

unit was activated, “two or three of the men 

from my hometown had gone directly to jump 

school when the rest of us went to Fort 

Meade. When they returned to the unit wearing wings and spit-shined jump boots, they 

really looked sharp...they impressed me very 

much, and I decided I’d go airborne as soon as 

I got the chance. Everyone was a volunteer, 

and no one could complain because he didn’t 

have to be there.”

The ensuing weeks of jump school were, 

and still are, tough. For Dunaway, it was 

tougher. During the preparatory week, a physical uncovered a medical problem requiring 

surgery. He was given five weeks to recuperate 

and was assigned as the first sergeant of the 

stockade—“some learning experience.” After 

recovering, he resumed training and went 

through the ground, tower, and jump weeks 

being pushed hard the entire time. NCO trainees attracted more attention from the instructors, because they were expected to meet the 

highest standards. Twice, Dunaway passed out 

when he had done as many pushups as he 

could. “The only time they let you stop was 

when you lost consciousness.” Candidates were 

“put through the mill without mercy, to see if 

they could take the pressure.” In the end, when 

Dunaway pinned on his silver wings after his 

fifth jump, he believed that the agony had been 

worthwhile.

If Dunaway had any complaint about serving in airborne units, it was the disparity in 

jump pay between officers and enlisted men. 

“Enlisted men were paid $55 a month extra for 

jumping, which was a lot of money then, and 

officers were paid $110 a month. It seemed to us 

that there must be two doors on the plane, the 

$55 door and the $110 door. We were always 

looking for the $110 door but never managed to 

get through it.”

After jump school, Dunaway attended 

pathfinder school and glider training. Landing 
73

in a glider was probably more dangerous than 

jumping, but glider soldiers received no extra 

hazard pay. Once released from the towing aircraft, they were on their own in the flimsy 

wooden aircraft. Without power they depended 

on air currents for whatever limited range they 

enjoyed. Pilot skill was critical, and controlling 

the glider was always problematic. Wires or 

trees were considered normal hazards. With 

both jump and glider training, Dunaway could 

be assigned to either a parachute or glider regiment within an airborne division. He spent the 

majority of his career thereafter in airborne 

infantry units—the 501st Airborne Battalion; 

the 187th, 505th, 517th, and 542d Parachute 

Infantry Regiments; the 82d and 101st Airborne 

Divisions; and the Special Forces.

Following a series of airborne courses at Fort 

Benning, Dunaway became an instructor in basic 

airborne training. After accumulating seventyfive training jumps, he attended the eighteenweek Noncommissioned Officers’ Leadership 

Course. At the time World War II was reaching 

its climax, infantry casualties had begun to mount, 

and he expected orders for overseas duty at any 

time. They came toward the end of 1944, assigning him to the 517th Regimental Combat Team 

(RCT) (Airborne), then in France.

Dunaway found that “getting to France was 

just as hectic as being in the war there.” In those 

days, few soldiers were deployed overseas by air. 

Dunaway and others destined for overseas duty 

were trucked from Fort Benning to the troop 

train, which took them to Fort Dix, New Jersey. 

There, they practiced embarkation, debarkation, 

and emergency procedures for three days, all 

followed by a nine-day sea voyage to Liverpool, 

England. Then, after a train ride across England, 

a ship across the English Channel, and a cattlecar ride across France, he arrived at Montage, 

where the 517th, assigned to the Third Army, 

formed part of the Supreme Headquarters, 

Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), strategic 

reserve. As a platoon sergeant in Company H, 

Dunaway fought in Belgium and Germany during the Battle of the Bulge. Morale and discipline in the airborne units were exemplary. The 

NCOs were excellent. These were conditions 

that he found again and again in the elite, volunteer units with which he served throughout 

his career. Dunaway stayed in Europe until 

November 1945, when he was sent back to Fort 

Benning.

With the war over, Sergeant First Class 

Dunaway had no intention of staying in the 

Army. His battalion commander in the 517th 

RCT offered to make him a first sergeant if he 

would reenlist, “but it wasn’t like it had been back 

in my original Guard unit where I had known so 

many guys. Those days were gone and I had to 

make new friends and acquaintances each place I 

went.” The day before he was due to be discharged, he visited his family in Washington, 

D.C. His brother-in-law, just discharged from 

the Air Force, came in from working late on the 

railroad, grimy and covered with soot. He told 

Dunaway that he too would be working for the 

railroad as soon as he was discharged. Dunaway 

“took but a few seconds to decide that was not 

for me. I reenlisted for six years. That turned out 

Dunaway Prepares to Jump with His Troops.
74

to be the smartest thing I ever did.” He immediately returned to Fort Benning as an instructor 

for the Airborne Department.

In March 1948 Dunaway was transferred to 

Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and assigned to the 

505th Parachute Infantry as the regimental 

operations sergeant. In September 1950 he, 

along with selected members of the regiment, 

participated in a nuclear test in Nevada. First 

they observed the detonation from three miles 

away and, after “experts” determined that ground 

zero was clear of radiation, examined ground 

zero. “Two-and-a-half-ton trucks had been 

demolished, buildings with steel frames had 

been ripped to pieces, and some twisted up like 

tangled kite string.” Doctors checked all the 

men for radiation effects.

While in the 505th, Dunaway became a 

first sergeant when he was reassigned to 

Company G. Inexperienced at first, he relied 

on his company commander and the other first 

sergeants for guidance. Platoon sergeants handled discipline problems within the platoon, 

which made Dunaway’s job easier. Only serious cases reached him or the company commander. One of the biggest problems was 

keeping the troops occupied during the duty 

day. Training in garrison was often repetitive 

and boring as the company participated in 

field training exercises (FTXs) only twice a 

year, once for practice and once for grade. 

Usually the platoons conducted the training, 

with the first sergeant responsible for their 

administrative and logistic support. During 

the semiannual FTXs, the company flew to 

another training area or post, conducted a mass 

tactical jump with personnel and equipment, 

and executed all the infantry missions: attack, 

movement to contact, delay, and defense. As in 

his previous units, Dunaway was impressed 

with the leadership qualities of the NCOs 

who, despite the boredom of the garrison routine, managed to maintain such high morale 

that 90 percent of the men in the unit reenlisted. In 1952 Dunaway reached the top after 

only twelve years in the Army, becoming the 

regimental sergeant major of the 505th.

In early 1954 Sergeant Major Dunaway 

began his second overseas tour of duty. Posted 

to the 187th RCT in Japan as the regimental 

sergeant major, he remained with the 

“Rakkasans” for seven years through changes of 

location and unit designation. He had been in 

Japan for only a year when the regiment redeployed to Fort Bragg in July 1955. Later that 

year it moved to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and 

was redesignated the 2d Airborne Battle Group, 

187th Infantry, and assigned to the newly reactivated 101st Airborne Division. This was the 

era of the pentomic Army, which Army planners developed for operations on a nuclear battlefield. The new force structure dictated a battle 

group, an organization between a battalion and 

a regiment in size. Five battle groups constituted a pentomic division, such as the 101st.

As expected, the two moves, not to mention 

the redesignation, were major headaches for 

Sergeant Major Dunaway. Before the reactivation of the 101st, the 11th Airborne Division 

had been the major unit at Fort Campbell. As 

part of Operation Gyroscope, the largest troop 

movement undertaken in peacetime, the 11th 

moved to Europe. But only soldiers with thirtythree months remaining on their enlistments 

deployed with the division. Those who did not 

and were unwilling to reenlist were assigned to 

other units staying at Fort Campbell, including 

the 187th. The apathetic attitudes of these 

“short-timers” soon to leave the Army understandably affected the battle group despite the 

best efforts of the NCOs.

Only after all these personnel had been 

discharged could the sergeant major and his 

NCOs succeed in “molding a well-trained, 

highly motivated, efficient, airborne organization of the highest order.” A decade later, during 

the Vietnam War, similar problems occurred 

Army-wide as returning combat veterans 

entered stateside units with only a few months 

left on their enlistments.

As a restructured unit with many newly 

assigned soldiers, the 187th had to develop a 

sense of unity and teamwork. In Dunaway’s 

words, “One of the major ingredients in a well-
75

rounded organization is teamwork. Troops are 

taught teamwork in their jobs, but it takes more 

than that. There has to be a good sports program and there has to be some social life that 

involves the family. In the 187th and all of the 

organizations where I was the sergeant major, 

we had both.” To do this, Sergeant Major 

Dunaway recommended and supported several 

programs: the Soldier of the Month program, 

unit sports activities (baseball, football, and basketball at the regimental and battle group level), 

and periodic social events. Social gatherings 

were always especially significant events for the 

wives of young soldiers, some of whom “had 

never worn a long dress before.”

During Dunaway’s long tenure at Fort 

Campbell, he became closely involved in community activities. In those seven years he managed a Little League team, taught Sunday 

school, served as president of the PTA, was 

president of the Board of Governors of the 

NCO Club, and supervised the post thrift shop. 

Dunaway later regarded his greatest accomplishment as the 187th sergeant major to be 

simply his longevity in office. “I guess I stayed 

with the 187th about as long as anyone. I 

watched commanders come and go. I watched 

senior NCOs come and go. Some even went on 

overseas tours and came back to the 187th and 

I was still there.” Dunaway and his wife in fact 

supplied much of the continuity and cohesion 

that kept the airborne force a first-class unit. 

One could not mention the 187th in any conversation without bringing up the Dunaways. 

When he left the 101st Airborne Division in 

1961, he never thought that he would return to 

the division for combat in Vietnam.

Sergeant Major Dunaway’s next station was 

in Okinawa as sergeant major of the 1st Special 

Forces Group. The group had troops in Vietnam, 

Laos, Thailand, and Taiwan, so Dunaway traveled 

frequently with the group commander. As at Fort 

Campbell, the Dunaways left their mark, always 

seeking to enhance unit morale and cohesion. 

They hosted several parties to encourage young 

soldiers and their wives to know each other 

socially, and Dunaway personally introduced the 

Special Forces blazer. It became such a soughtafter item that soldiers back at Fort Bragg scheduled for an assignment on Okinawa ordered it 

ahead of time. Another of Dunaway’s measures 

met with less enthusiasm, but in the end was just 

as effective at instilling esprit de corps. “When I 

arrived I noticed in short order that some of the 

men had mustaches, most of them long, shaggy, 

and unkempt, sometimes with food caught in 

them. After getting my commander’s total backing, I announced that the mustaches had to go.” 

Highly unpopular at first, the clean upper lip 

eventually became a mark of pride in serving with 

the 1st Group and Sergeant Major Dunaway.

His frequent travels in Southeast Asia to visit 

the far-flung teams not only kept them informed 

and improved their morale, but also acquainted 

Dunaway with the area, particularly Vietnam, 

where he would serve next. In June 1966 he 

departed Okinawa for Nha Trang, Republic of 

Vietnam, where he was assigned as the sergeant 

major of the 5th Special Forces Group.

Sergeant Major Dunaway spent most of his 

time traveling to the Special Forces A, B, and C 

Teams widely dispersed in South Vietnam’s four 

corps tactical zones. As in previous assignments, 

Dunaway had the fortune to serve with topnotch soldiers. He initiated an on-the-spot promotion and award system to reward deserving 

soldiers immediately without waiting for official 

command visitations. The occasional disciplinary 

problem he reassigned immediately. Such soldiers were told to report to the sergeant major, 

“bag and baggage,” the phrase becoming as well 

known as the “Dunaway blazer” and the nomustache policy. His duties and extensive TDY 

allowed him only one ten-day break to visit his 

family, living in Australia while he was in 

Vietnam. In June 1967, after a year with the 5th 

Special Forces Group, Dunaway received new 

orders reassigning him as the 101st Airborne 

Division sergeant major at Fort Campbell.

His stay at Fort Campbell proved short. 

The airborne unit was then preparing to deploy 

to Vietnam, and he spent most of his time visiting division units as they prepared for the move. 

The 101st had many nondeployable soldiers 
76

and NCOs, either because they had too little 

time left on their enlistments or because they 

had just returned from Vietnam. Dunaway 

redistributed the experienced, deployable NCOs 

throughout the division. The changes ensured 

that every unit had at least some NCOs with 

combat experience.

The 101st Airborne Division deployed to 

South Vietnam in the latter half of 1967. 

Once in Vietnam, Dunaway did everything he 

could to increase morale for the soldiers, especially those serving far from major base camps. 

NCO and enlisted clubs, showers and clean 

clothes, entertainment, Soldier of the Month 

competitions, and promotion selection boards 

helped morale. But often the most effective 

measure was simply the visible presence in the 

field of the division commander and his sergeant major, who arrived by helicopter sometimes through enemy fire.

On one occasion, the commanding general, 

Maj. Gen. Olinto M. Barsanti, was wounded by 

ground fire and collected yet another Purple 

Heart. Dunaway later mused that the general 

might have deliberately guided their helicopter 

into “hot” landing zones for the purpose of adding to his existing collection of Purple Hearts. 

As for Dunaway, “I wasn’t interested in getting 

one...that’s an award they can keep!” But running the risks of enemy fire paid off; often the 

commanding general and his sergeant major 

could decorate soldiers on the spot for heroism 

and see firsthand a unit’s problems and requirements during active combat.

Dunaway did not have to go out into the 

field to seek danger. In January 1968 the Tet 

offensive saw both division and brigade base 

camps hit by enemy attacks. In what he had 

previously considered a safe place, an NCO 

standing two feet from him was shot and killed 

by rifle fire. Dunaway’s role in repelling a twoday North Vietnamese attack on the division 

base camp—evacuating and treating the wounded, manning defensive positions that were short 

of personnel, and redirecting troops as needed 

on the defensive perimeter—earned him the 

Silver Star.

Personnel continuity challenged the sergeants major for all units in Vietnam. Since the 

101st had arrived in Vietnam en masse, most of 

its soldiers would complete their one-year tour at 

the same time. Yet if every soldier departed 

Vietnam at the end of his one-year tour, the division would disappear, or at least new and inexperienced soldiers, officers and enlisted alike, would 

replace almost all of the combat-seasoned veterans. In such a case, unit efficiency and cohesion 

would quickly drop to just about zero. To prevent 

that, Dunaway and the U.S. Army, Vietnam 

(USARV), sergeant major exchanged personnel 

with other divisions to more evenly spread out 

soldiers with the same dates of return to the 

United States. “It bothered me that men who 

volunteered to go back to Vietnam with the 

101st had to be transferred to other divisions 

against their wishes, but it had to be done, and it 

was successful.” In July 1968 Dunaway departed 

Vietnam for an assignment that his division 

commander had foreseen. When the XVIII 

Airborne Corps commander visited Fort 

Campbell in 1967, General Barsanti introduced 

Dunaway as “my Division Sergeant Major, and 

the next Sergeant Major of the Army.” 

Less than a year later the prediction came 

true. In 1966 the Chief of Staff, General Harold 

K. Johnson, had considered Dunaway for his 

SMA, but had chosen another. Two years later, 

General William C. Westmoreland took a 

closer look, challenging him with “some pretty 

tough questions” during a 45-minute interview. 

In July 1968 at Camp Eagle, Vietnam, the 

division chief of staff greeted him with a message 

from Westmoreland: Dunaway had just been 

selected as the new Sergeant Major of the Army. 

Coincidentally, that same day General Barsanti 

turned over command of the 101st to Maj. Gen. 

Melvin Zais, under whom Dunaway had served 

in the 517th RCT during World War II and in 

the 187th at Fort Campbell. After the shock of 

the news wore off, Dunaway “considered declining the appointment in order to stay on with the 

fine men of the 101st. I was proud to be their 

sergeant major and it was great to have General 

Zais as my commander again. But, I decided, I 
77

could contribute much more from the top than I 

could from within.” All of the division’s sergeants 

major and many first sergeants came to Camp 

Eagle to see Dunaway off. “I was proud; I was 

honored; and, let’s face it, I was a little scared 

thinking of what lay ahead.”

Despite the doubts and questions Dunaway 

had on his long flight home, he realized that his 

twenty-eight years of Army experience, sixteen 

as a sergeant major, had prepared him well for 

the top enlisted job in the Army. “I realized that 

I was, in fact, qualified to do this job, and do it 

well. From that point on, all the doubts that had 

plagued me in the beginning suddenly disappeared and I faced each new day with the powerful self-confidence it takes to succeed. The 

most important thing I always remembered was 

where I came from. I was a soldier who had dug 

slit trenches, pulled KP and guard duty, and 

crawled in the mud. It was that soldier that I 

came to represent, and I did my best every day I 

was Sergeant Major of the Army.”

Dunaway had little overlap with the incumbent Sergeant Major of the Army, William 

Wooldridge, who went back to Vietnam to 

serve as the command sergeant major of the 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

(MACV). Wooldridge had made the point that 

the new office had generated some disgruntlement among senior staff officers who “resented 

having an enlisted man accorded more privileges than they.” He had carefully opened channels of communication with each staff section 

and was afraid that they would close once he 

left. Dunaway had to keep those doors open. To 

assist him, Dunaway enlisted the help of several 

staff officers in the Pentagon whom he knew 

personally from previous tours. “Eventually I 

was able to get cooperation wherever and whenever I needed it. Today, more than twenty years 

later, most of those ‘doors’ are permanently open 

to the Sergeant Major of the Army because the 

position has been well established. But the first 

three or four Sergeants Major of the Army had 

to be the pioneers.”

General Westmoreland swore in Sergeant 

Major Dunaway on 1 September 1968 in the 

presence of his family, the 3d Infantry (Old 

Guard), the press, and sergeants major from all 

over the Army. Reviewing the Old Guard with 

General Westmoreland, Dunaway considered 

it “an honor to have the Chief of Staff of the 

Army accord an enlisted man a position of 

such respect.” After the ceremony, when 

Dunaway had his family settled at Fort Myer, 

Westmoreland welcomed him aboard and 

briefed him on his vision of the Army’s goals 

and objectives: Mission, Motivation, 

Modernization, and Management. Rather than 

give him any specific guidelines, the Chief of 

Staff challenged him to represent the entire 

enlisted body of the U.S. Army.

As Sergeant Major of the Army, Dunaway 

had ready access to General Westmoreland. 

When he needed to see him on an issue that 

required his attention, he told Westmoreland’s 

aide and then walked right into the office unless 

the chief was conferring with a major commander or staff officer. Dunaway was careful 

not to abuse this privilege by bothering 

Westmoreland with trivial issues that he could 

solve himself or through other means. The 

Chief of Staff also rated the SMA, and having 

an office directly across the hallway from the 

chief facilitated access. But Dunaway was aware 

that even the location of the SMA’s office 

caused resentment, since senior officers had 

been displaced to make room for the first 

Sergeant Major of the Army.

It took Dunaway a while to get used to his 

access to the Chief of Staff, the SMA’s spacious 

office, and the four-star protocol accorded its 

incumbent. “I had been accustomed to going to 

the office of a full colonel or brigadier general to 

report or coordinate, and it took a while for me 

to get used to them coming to my office.”

Despite the fact that some members of the 

Army Staff still questioned the need for a 

Sergeant Major of the Army, Dunaway had few 

difficulties obtaining any information he needed to carry out his duties. He and his counterparts from the other services periodically 

received briefings from the Department of 

Defense staff and could request specialized 
78

briefings on any subject on an informal basis. 

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Secretary 

of the Army Stanley Resor even stopped by his 

office from time to time to talk to him about 

various Army issues. Besides providing a means 

of exchanging information, visits from highranking officials further enhanced the prestige 

and credibility of the two-year-old office. Such 

visibility also encouraged officers of the Army 

Staff to include the Sergeant Major of the 

Army in policy-making discussions dealing 

with issues affecting enlisted soldiers.

One of the most satisfying aspects of his job 

was the ability to solve problems for soldiers, 

problems that could or would not be solved expeditiously through normal channels. Dunaway 

avoided circumventing normal staff procedures, 

but he found that bringing the attention of the 

appropriate staff section to a soldier’s problem was 

usually all that was needed for a solution. In such 

matters, he worked most often with the Enlisted 

Personnel Directorate (EPD), the Inspector 

General (IG), the Judge Advocate General (JAG), 

and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics 

(DCSLOG). All, he recalled, were “exceptionally 

prompt and courteous with their responses.”

His assistance to one soldier later had a 

direct bearing on the Office of the Sergeant 

Major of the Army. In the late fall of 1968, he 

received a call from the command sergeant 

major of the 20th Engineer Brigade, Leon Van 

Autreve, who was within fifteen days of leaving 

Vietnam and still had no word on his next 

assignment. Although willing to serve anywhere, he opted for Alaska or Fort Gordon if he 

had a choice. Dunaway promptly went to the 

command sergeant major assignment section. 

He learned of several options, including the 

command sergeant major of U.S. Army, Alaska. 

Dunaway accepted it on Van Autreve’s behalf.

Later, however, the position was given to 

another man. Dunaway went to the chief of 

EPD, a brigadier general, to inform him of the 

mix-up. The EPD chief told Dunaway that his 

directorate made assignments of enlisted members and they would not be changed by a sergeant major. Dunaway politely told him, “Sir, I 

did not change the assignment, and I did not 

influence it. I simply asked your people to make 

an assignment they had overlooked. Therefore 

CSM Van Autreve goes to Alaska unless you 

get authority from General Westmoreland to 

change his assignment.” When the general went 

to the Chief of Staff, Westmoreland backed up 

his Sergeant Major.

In retrospect, Van Autreve’s assignment to 

Alaska was critical for his future career. It meant 

that he would be rated by a general officer, one of 

the requirements for consideration for the position of Sergeant Major of the Army. Soon thereafter, at General Westmoreland’s direction, the 

EPD proposed assignments of command sergeants major to major Army commands, but the 

Sergeant Major of the Army approved them.

To meet Westmoreland’s challenge to represent the Army’s enlisted soldiers, Dunaway 

visited the troops in the field, from Europe to 

Korea, from Hawaii to Vietnam: “I did not visit 

all the Army’s installations during my two years, 

but I managed to squeeze in the majority of 

SMA Dunaway Talks with Trainees at Fort Benning, 

Georgia, 1969.
79

them. No doubt I traveled more than was 

expected of me, and it sure gets hectic living out 

of a suitcase and never sleeping in the same 

place two consecutive nights. However, I wanted to be visible and wanted soldiers of all grades 

to know there is someone who could hear their 

problems and go right to the top with problems 

that had merit.” He also wanted soldiers to 

know that they could reach the top if they set 

high goals and worked toward them.

Dunaway also visited National Guard and 

reserve units. Because the reserve components 

usually drilled on weekends, he integrated those 

trips into his schedule for active units. He believed 

that the reservists often felt left out of the Army 

picture and that most people did not know the 

contribution they made to national defense. He 

wanted reservists and Guardsmen to know that 

their efforts were crucial to the war in Vietnam. 

He proudly told them that he “had been a 

National Guard man in the beginning,” and 

related that “I could always tell they were proud of 

me for reaching the top from...[that] beginning.”

To set the example of including one’s family in Army life, Dunaway took his wife, Peck, 

with him as he visited installations around the 

world. Believing that the military wife is an 

important part of the Army, Dunaway could see 

no better way to demonstrate his wife’s importance to him than by having her accompany 

him. At first he paid for her travel out of his 

own pocket, but he soon found the costs prohibitive. Later the comptroller general “scolded” 

him for not coming to him right away with the 

problem; thereafter TDY funds became available for both of them. While Dunaway talked 

with NCOs and junior enlisted soldiers, Peck 

talked with their wives and gained an understanding of the problems they faced, later relaying those concerns to her husband. She also 

accompanied him to ceremonies at the White 

House, such as the presentation of Medals of 

Honor or at receptions President Richard M. 

Nixon gave for the senior enlisted representatives of the armed services, with appropriate 

coverage by television and print media.

During Dunaway’s two-year tenure, he 

continued to institutionalize the office, focusing 

greater attention on the concerns of enlisted 

soldiers. Soon after taking office, he asked the 

Army Staff to inform him of all proposed policies that affected enlisted personnel. Once the 

chief approved the request, Army Staff officers 

became accustomed to seeking his advice and 

including him in the decision-making process 

on issues affecting enlisted soldiers. For example, he secured approval for hospital commanders to promote deserving soldiers who had been 

wounded in Vietnam. Existing policy dropped 

casualties from the unit rolls, so many wounded 

GIs were ineligible for promotion because they 

had been on hospital status. He also started an 

accelerated promotion for pay grades E–6 (staff 

sergeant) and E–7 (sergeant first class) who 

were top NCO Academy graduates.

During Dunaway’s tenure, the Chief of 

Staff approved the Noncommissioned Officer 

Education System (NCOES), a three-tiered 

system that trained NCOs in basic, advanced, 

and senior courses. The capstone was the 

Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas, 

which trained master sergeants for duty as sergeants major at battalion level and above. 

Although the projected Sergeants Major 

Academy did not go into operation until after 

Dunaway retired, he believes that “there can be 

no question that it is one of the best things that 

ever happened to the NCO corps.”

Dunaway Visits Hospitalized Soldiers.
80

To improve morale and enhance public 

perception of the Army, Dunaway changed the 

Army’s uniform policy. His recommendation 

that reserve component soldiers be allowed to 

wear three-year service stripes reinforced the 

“one Army” concept; his recommendation to 

allow soldiers returning from Vietnam to wear 

jungle fatigues rather than their khaki uniforms (which became rumpled after soldiers 

spent hours sitting on an airplane) was equally 

successful. “We were already under attack from 

the civilian sector because of the unpopularity 

of the war...the least we could do was to make 

our veterans look as clean, neat, and well 

dressed as possible.”

He also changed the policy on the wear of 

the Pathfinder Badge. The metal badge, which 

replaced a cloth sleeve insignia, was supposed to 

be worn instead of the parachutist badge, 

because Pathfinders were also airborne qualified, a policy the DCSPER had instituted. But 

this stricture made it impossible for senior and 

master parachutists to display their advanced 

proficiency without the traditional wings. When 

Dunaway brought the situation to General 

Westmoreland’s attention, the chief directed a 

change to allow those qualified to wear both 

badges. Westmoreland also announced that he 

would thereafter personally approve all changes 

to uniform regulations.

Dunaway also refined and improved enlisted assignments. He saw to it, for example, that 

the award of the special qualification identifiers 

(SQI) for open-mess NCOs was limited to 

those who were fully qualified. The change 

gradually improved the open-mess system and 

stopped the loss of mess sergeants from troop 

units. After a hard battle, he also corrected 

another longstanding problem—the lack of 

additional pay for drill instructors. The extra 

hours of duty and the requirements for wellmaintained uniforms merited additional pay to 

attract and retain good NCOs for this critical 

duty. Dunaway’s persistence resulted in additional funding for drill instructor pay.

Dunaway continued Wooldridge’s Command 

Sergeant Major Program. This program essentially differentiated sergeants major who served 

as senior enlisted advisers to commanders, based 

on their own careers of extensive troop leadership experience, from sergeants major who 

advanced to the highest pay grade through 

administrative and technical fields with limited 

troop leadership experience. He also clarified 

the rank structure for senior NCOs. When 

SMA Wooldridge started the Command 

Sergeant Major Program, the titles were confusing and the title of staff sergeant major was not 

well received. Dunaway recommended that the 

titles be restricted to three—Sergeant Major of 

the Army, Command Sergeant Major, and 

Sergeant Major—and that all three be addressed 

as “Sergeant Major.”

Among the other initiatives Dunaway 

pushed was a marked stress on ordinary soldiers’ use of credit unions, making them less apt 

to become victims of loan sharks and analogous 

problems. He also continually emphasized the 

need for soldiers to work in their military occupational specialties (MOSs). Too often soldiers 

were trained and tested in one specialty, only to 

be assigned to another due to unit personnel 

shortages. Incorrect assignments wasted money, 

since a soldier trained in a skill he did not use. 

There was also the issue of fairness, since victims of incorrect assignments were expected to 

perform in a field in which they had no training. On his trips to troop units, Dunaway 

sought out soldiers who were not working in 

their MOS and, if necessary, arranged on-thespot reassignments. As the representative of the 

Army’s enlisted personnel, Sergeant Major 

Dunaway testified before Congress on military 

enlisted matters with his counterparts in the 

other services. He met senators and congressmen in the Secretary of the Army’s office and 

became close with Senator Mendel Rivers, 

Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, 

“the military’s best friend.” His many meetings 

gave congressmen a unique perspective on matters affecting the enlisted ranks and the Army 

in general.

To make the soldier’s voice heard at the 

highest level, the Sergeant Major of the Army 
81

hosted the Major Command (MACOM) 

Command Sergeant Major Conference in conjunction with the Chief of Staff ’s Major 

Commanders’ Conference. Before each conference, sergeants major solicited ideas and recommendations from the enlisted ranks and these 

passed up through the enlisted command channels. At the MACOM level, a panel of command sergeants major examined what had been 

judged the best or most significant ideas and 

recommendations. They forwarded their selections to Dunaway’s conference. 

Before the creation of the Office of the 

Sergeant Major of the Army, the voice of 

enlisted soldiers was often silenced before 

reaching the Army headquarters. Now, at least 

someone heard their ideas and concerns. That 

someone, the SMA, had direct access to the 

Chief of Staff. “In the final analysis,” said 

Dunaway, “we didn’t get everything approved, 

but we got lots of things that never would have 

surfaced through the officers’ chain of command.” After the conference, the SMA sent a 

record of recommendations, approved or not, 

down to all units. This kept commanders, 

NCOs, and soldiers informed of significant 

matters.

By the time Dunaway became Sergeant 

Major of the Army, the term of office was to 

coincide with that of the Chief of Staff, normally four years. Yet after considerable thought 

Dunaway recommended that it be limited to 

two years. This had two benefits. First, it 

allowed the maximum number of command 

sergeants major to hold the job, motivating 

many of them to stay in the service longer in 

hopes of attaining the position. Second, it 

ensured a fresh flow of ideas to the Chiefs of 

Staff and meant that the senior enlisted soldier 

would have recent experience with troops. 

General Westmoreland approved the two-year 

term in June 1970. The benefits of recent troop 

experience also led Dunaway to believe that the 

candidates for the position should come from 

command sergeant major slots at or below division level. This would eliminate the requirement 

that candidates have a general officer as their 

immediate rater. There were too many excellent 

brigade and battalion command sergeants major 

that the existing system had overlooked.

SMA Dunaway (left), with His Counterparts from the Other Services, Visits President Richard M. Nixon.
82

SMA Dunaway retired on 30 September 

1970 after thirty years of service in the Army. In 

a moving ceremony at Fort Myer, he trooped 

the line of the Old Guard with his Chief of 

Staff. “General Westmoreland looked at me and 

said, ‘Sergeant Major, you’re going to miss all of 

this.’ I said, ‘Yes sir, I know.’ Yes. I knew I’d miss 

it, and the tears welled up in my eyes as I 

thought about what it would be like to leave 

behind the only life I had known for the past 

thirty years. But it also felt good to know that I 

had done my job well every day of the thirty 

years I had served.” A few years ago, when 

someone asked Dunaway if he ever had any 

undesirable assignments, the ever no-nonsense 

soldier replied, “A career is a career. Orders are 

orders. Loyalty is loyalty. The oath is the oath.”

When asked about what he considered his 

greatest accomplishment as Sergeant Major of 

the Army, Dunaway humbly pointed out that 

“nothing can be considered permanent, because 

any Chief of Staff can change virtually anything 

he desires. Probably the most permanent 

improvements that I am proud of are initiatives 

that were introduced before my tenure, but 

which materialized or grew during or after my 

tenure.” The two greatest are the Command 

Sergeant Major Program and the Sergeants 

Major Academy. The most rewarding aspect of 

being Sergeant Major of the Army was “being 

in the position to influence Army-wide policies 

pertaining to enlisted personnel, and getting 

top-level attention and focus on matters that 

never got to the top prior to the establishment 

of the Sergeant Major of the Army position.”

Dozens of three- and four-star generals, 

the commandant of the Marine Corps and his 

sergeant major, sergeants major, first sergeants, sergeants first class, and many other 

soldiers attended Dunaway’s retirement ceremony. Afterward, he and Peck toured Fort 

Myer in a horse-drawn carriage, hosted a 

farewell party, and said goodbye to the Army 

they both loved.
83

Assignments

1940–1943 Rifleman through Platoon Sergeant, Company A, 176th Infantry,

29th Infantry Division

1943–1944 Student, Jump School, Pathfinder, Glider, Fort Benning, Georgia

1944 Student, Noncommissioned Officer Leadership Course, Fort Benning, 

 Georgia

1944–1945 Platoon Sergeant, Company H, 517th Regimental Combat Team,

13th Airborne Division, France; Belgium; Germany

1945–1948 First Sergeant, Company A, 501st Parachute Infantry,

Fort Benning, Georgia

1948–1952 Operations Sergeant, First Sergeant, 505th Parachute Infantry,

82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

1952–1954 Sergeant Major, 505th Parachute Infantry, 82d Airborne Division,

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

1954–1956 Sergeant Major, 187th Regimental Combat Team (Abn), Japan;

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

1956–1961 Sergeant Major, 2d Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry,

101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky

1961–1966 Sergeant Major, 1st Special Forces Group, Okinawa, Japan

1966–1967 Sergeant Major, 5th Special Forces Group, Republic of Vietnam

1967–1968 Command Sergeant Major, 101st Airborne Division,

Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Republic of Vietnam

1968–1970 Sergeant Major of the Army

Selected Decorations and Awards

Distinguished Service Medal

Silver Star

Legion of Merit

Bronze Star with V Device

Purple Heart

Air Medal with V Device

Army Commendation Medal with One Oak Leaf Cluster

Good Conduct Medal with Ten Oak Leaf Clusters

American Defense Service Medal

American Campaign Medal

European–African–Middle Eastern Campaign Medal

World War II Victory Medal

National Defense Service Medal

Vietnam Service Medal

Vietnamese Armed Forces Honor Medal, Second Class

Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Silver Star

Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal

Combat Infantryman Badge with Star

Master Parachutist Badge
84

SMA Copeland
Born in Embryfield, Texas, on 2 April 

1920, Silas L. Copeland grew up on a 

cotton farm and was educated in a oneroom schoolhouse from first grade through high 

school. Copeland was inducted into the Army 

on 28 October 1942 in Huntsville, Texas. He 

was twenty-two years old and married with one 

baby daughter. Like most of the new World 

War II draftees, his term of service was for the 

duration of hostilities plus six months. 

Six weeks of basic training in St. Petersburg, 

Florida, made an indelible mark on the new 

recruit. His strongest impression was of his drill 

sergeant: “Here was an individual—from his 

stature, from the long years of service as indicated by those hash marks running down his 

sleeve, the way he spoke, the way he conducted 

himself, the way he moved—here was a person 

that you could look up to. He just carried himself in such a manner, and spoke in such a manner, that you couldn’t help but have a favorable 

impression.”

Drill instructors did not scream at recruits 

in Copeland’s unit. Had they yelled and cursed, 

he believes that his view of the military might 

have been much different. Instead, “all because 

of the first impression that I received at the 

induction station, all the way through my basic 

training, out through my first unit assignment,” he saw the Army as a healthy, positive 

institution.

After basic training, Copeland was assigned 

to the Army Air Corps and began advanced 

training at Biggs Army Airfield, near El Paso, 

Texas. Copeland was assigned to the 538th 

Heavy Bomber Group. Within a few days of his 

arrival, the group departed for England and the 

war, leaving behind the recruits, including 

Copeland, to support base operations at Biggs. 

Initially, Copeland found himself driving an 

eighteen-wheel fuel truck, but he was soon promoted to sergeant and quickly became a refueling specialist, working for another sharp noncommissioned officer (NCO). His new boss, a 

master sergeant, was a veteran of Pearl Harbor 

and was now responsible for the refueling of 

every flight that landed on the airfield. “He was 

an articulate NCO. He was an impressive NCO. 

He’d talk with you, communicate with you. 

Never hollered at you. He treated people well. 

All you had to do was your job.”

By late 1944 heavy fighting in the European 

and Pacific theaters had stretched the U.S. 

Army’s manpower to the limit. The Army’s projected ninety-division force of more than eight 

million soldiers was starving for combat arms 

replacements. To meet that need, thousands of 

soldiers in support jobs like Copeland were 

reassigned, “retreaded,” into combat units almost 

overnight.

Copeland’s civilian experience in heavy 

automotive equipment, road construction, civil 

engineering, and maintenance of equipment in 

general made him a suitable replacement in 

“Hell on Wheels,” the 2d Armored Division. 

He became a tank commander before he rode in 

his first tank, but he recalls his gunner saying, 

“Sergeant, don’t worry. We’ll teach you the fundamentals of tank operations.”

In December 1944 he received orders for 

movement overseas to the 2d Armored Division, 

Silas L. Copeland

This section is based on Interv, Erwin H. Koehler with 

Silas L. Copeland, 19–21 Oct 93, Huntsville, Tex.
86

joining Company E of the veteran 66th Armor, 

near Köln, Germany. The regiment had battle 

scars from North Africa, Sicily, Anzio, France, 

Holland, the Ardennes, and the Rhine River. 

“They had tanks shot out from underneath them, 

would pick up another tank, get their wounds 

dressed, and go back into battle. You were there 

for the duration.” In Company E, Copeland 

began his association with combat-seasoned soldiers and NCOs. “They had to know what they 

were doing or they wouldn’t have survived. They 

were in some real battles.” Again he was told, 

“Don’t worry about it, Sarge, we’ll teach you.” 

Sergeant Copeland fought the closing days of 

World War II in Europe as a member of the 2d 

Armored Division.

By May 1945 the Nazis were finished. In 

September Japan surrendered. Home-front 

public opinion called for rapid demobilization 

of the military and for bringing the boys home 

quickly. Copeland also wanted to get home to 

see his wife and daughter, but he seemed stuck 

with occupation duty in Germany. Then his first 

sergeant gave him some advice. If a draftee 

enlisted in the Regular Army for a three-year 

hitch, he was eligible for ninety days of leave 

and a return ticket to the States and would serve 

with his division upon its return to the States. 

“It wasn’t a career-wise decision that I made. It 

was a ‘get yourself home as quickly as possible’ 

type decision.” Copeland signed up for three 

years and returned to the United States in time 

to celebrate Christmas with his family. In early 

March 1946 he rejoined the 2d Armored 

Division at its new station, Fort Hood, Texas.

He stayed with the 2d Armored Division 

until mid-March 1950, when he was transferred 

to the 1st Cavalry Division, then on occupation 

duty in Japan. There, he became a battalion 

intelligence sergeant. Previously Copeland had 

attended a two-week course of instruction at 

the Fort Hood NCO Academy, as well as a 

twelve-week course at Fort Riley, Kansas. The 

training dealt primarily with operations and 

intelligence, focusing on developing operations 

orders, formulating plans, conducting research, 

publishing orders, interpreting photos and order 

of battle, and collecting, analyzing, and producing combat intelligence. Little did he know that 

within five months he would be applying what 

he had learned in another war.

War in Korea struck suddenly in late June 

1950. Sergeant First Class Copeland was with 

the 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry 

Division, and by mid-July 1950 his unit had 

begun its famous fight to hold the Pusan 

Perimeter in South Korea. “We went over there 

with only 55 to 60 percent strength, and that 

strength was mostly recruits. Consequently we 

used KATUSA [Korean Augmentations to the 

United States Army] to fill out our units.” The 

fighting around Pusan was fierce and continuous, and Copeland’s battalion was in combat for 

ninety-three consecutive days.

In Korea, Copeland initially served in the 

battalion’s intelligence and reconnaissance 

(I&R) platoon as the I&R sergeant. Like most 

of the other experienced NCOs, one of his basic 

responsibilities was to make raw American 

youngsters understand the price of mistakes in 

wartime. “We made a lot of mistakes and we 

corrected a lot of mistakes, but not until lives 

were lost and prices were paid.”

General Douglas MacArthur’s surprise landing at Inch’on in September 1950 cut off the 

North Korean forces fighting along the Pusan 

Perimeter to the south. Then, from 14–19 

September, the 2d Battalion spearheaded the 1st 

Cavalry Division’s breakout from the enclave, 

winning a Distinguished Unit Citation. After a 

month of rapid northward advance, Copeland’s 

division occupied the North Korean capital, and 

the North Korean Army was wiped out. He 

wrote his wife to tell her he would be home by 

Christmas, but the Chinese had other ideas.

At the end of October 1950 the 8th Cavalry 

reached Unsan, North Korea, about fifty-five 

miles from the Chinese border. During the 

night of 1 November Sergeant Copeland heard 

what seemed like hundreds of Chinese bugles 

blowing. They signaled the beginning of an allout offensive, preceded by heavy rocket, artillery, 

and mortar attacks. Once the shelling lifted, 

Chinese cavalry on Mongolian ponies, followed 
87

by waves of infantrymen, charged the unit’s 

positions. The 2d Battalion was quickly engulfed 

and surrounded. Fighting his way through the 

Chinese encirclement with a small group of 

soldiers, Copeland was wounded in the head 

and leg. Nevertheless, after treating a young 

soldier wounded by shell fragments, Copeland 

carried the battalion operations sergeant into 

the safety of the nearby mountains. The next 

day he managed to get his wounded comrade 

aboard a truck and then made his way back to 

U.S. lines. The 8th Cavalry went into reserve 

until replacements and rest reconstituted the 

unit. Then it returned to the fighting, this time 

near Panmunjom.

In late June 1951 Copeland returned home 

from Korea. His next duty station was at the 

Fourth Army headquarters, Fort Sam Houston, 

Texas, but he had no idea what his assignment 

would be. Then fate intervened. His old division 

commander from Korea, Maj. Gen. Hobart R. 

Gay, spotted Copeland’s 1st Cavalry Division 

shoulder patch and asked him into his office. His 

reward for bringing the general up to date on the 

1st Cavalry Division in Korea was an assignment 

to Texas A&M University on ROTC duty.

While at Texas A&M, Copeland successfully completed a precommissioning course but, 

feeling that he was too old, declined the offer of 

a commission. Nevertheless, he learned a great 

deal about the military that helped him throughout his career.

September 1953 found First Sergeant 

Copeland with the 22d Infantry in Kirch 

Goens, Germany. Family quarters in Germany 

were scarce, with sixteen- to eighteen-month 

waiting lists. Such experiences, together with 

his unaccompanied tours and long family separations, finally convinced him to leave the Army 

in 1954. Waiting as a civilian to enroll for the 

spring semester at Texas A&M, Copeland had 

second thoughts. “In those days you could be 

out of the Army up to ninety days and then you 

could come back with your rank, if you could 

find a vacancy with that rank.” Copeland found 

a vacancy with the 4th Tank Battalion at Fort 

Hood and was soon back in the Army.

Resuming his career, Copeland served in 

the 4th Tank Battalion until 1957. He used his 

training and experience in operations and intelligence as the battalion operations sergeant until 

December 1956, when he was assigned as the 

battalion sergeant major. At the time, the battalion sergeant major “handled administration 

for the commander, met with the company first 

sergeants, and checked the police of the area.” It 

was not until later that sergeants major actively 

supervised training and maintenance and “got 

out with the troops.” This change in approach 

to the role of the sergeant major was officially 

recognized when Army Chief of Staff General 

Harold K. Johnson approved the position of 

command sergeant major in 1967.

When Copeland’s unit was moved from Fort 

Hood to Fort Polk, Louisiana, in 1957, Copeland 

decided that he wanted to transfer out of the 

Leesville area. “I [had] never asked for a transfer 

into or out of a unit before, but this was the time 

I could better my family by moving them out of 

the area.” He requested a second assignment to 

ROTC duty, this time at Centenary College in 

Shreveport, Louisiana. Given primarily administrative duties, he soon enrolled in typing classes, 

as well as Mathematics and English. The latter he 

considered helpful, because of his “lack of proficiency and Texas long, drawn-out drawl,” at least 

according to his professor. In addition to the college courses, he furthered his military education 

by completing Unit and Company Commanders 

Extension Courses. In turn, his training in operations was of great value in organizing classroom 

instruction and summer training for the cadets. 

Copeland would derive much satisfaction years 

later when he met many of his former ROTC 

cadets as colonels and generals.

In 1958 the Copelands found themselves 

on their way back to Germany. This time 

Copeland was assigned as the first sergeant of 

Troop B, 8th Cavalry Squadron, 8th Infantry 

Division, in Sandhoffen, Germany. The Army 

had just authorized the new pay grades of E–8 

and E–9, and Copeland was considered for 

promotion to E–8 soon after he arrived in the 

unit. He had one day’s notice for a division 
88

promotion board, and his unit was training in 

the field when he found out about it. Every 

candidate for the one E–8 slot was in a Class 

A uniform except for Copeland, who came 

straight to the promotion board from the field. 

He recalls telling the board president, “It 

wasn’t feasible to change clothes before coming 

here to meet the deadline this morning. I 

chose to appear before the board in field uniform and take my chances.” Copeland 

impressed the board with his knowledge of 

operations and his efforts to continue his education while at Centenary College, particularly 

the precommissioning courses. At the end of 

the interview, he informed the board members 

that they were “facing the best soldier and that 

he should get the promotion.” At the next day’s 

formation, when his company commander 

read his promotion orders, Copeland learned 

that the promotion board had agreed with his 

self-assessment.

The fact that Copeland was working as a 

first sergeant proved a decided advantage. The 

E–8 and E–9 eligibility requirements specified 

that an NCO had to have been in a first sergeant or sergeant major position. But many 

NCOs avoided those jobs, “doing all sorts and 

manner of things to evade troop duty.” By staying with troop units, Copeland gave himself an 

edge over many other candidates. He did not 

keep his first sergeant rank for long, however. 

Within a year his squadron commander selected 

him to be the squadron sergeant major.

Sergeant Major Copeland remained in 

Germany until November 1962, when he was 

assigned as sergeant major of the 2d Battalion, 

37th Armor, 2d Armored Division, at Fort 

Hood, Texas. In June 1963 he became the division sergeant major. As with his promotion to 

E–8, he competed with three other sergeants 

major for the position. As before, Copeland 

was not shy about telling the division commander that he was the best man for the job. 

He also pointed out that he had fought with 

the division in World War II.

Copeland made a significant jump, over the 

combat command (brigade) level and up to the 

division level. As a squadron sergeant major, he 

had worked with five first sergeants, all of the same 

branch; the division had thirty-four sergeants 

major of several branches. As a squadron sergeant 

major, he could escape many administrative duties 

that kept him at his desk and get out to see 

“Private Joe Snuffy” training in the field or performing maintenance in the motor pool. The division job mandated more paperwork. But, just as he 

had done as a first sergeant and platoon sergeant, 

Copeland did not hesitate to learn from others. 

“Going back to my copy-cat days, in the absence 

of any formal schooling in the duties of the sergeant major, I watch a guy who’s been successful. 

I’m going to emulate this guy.” In this case he took 

as a model the sergeant major of the 8th Division, 

who held regular meetings with the sergeants 

major of the divisional units to establish an informal NCO support channel that paralleled and 

complemented the officer chain of command. 

Copeland did the same.

Previously, as a squadron sergeant major, 

Copeland had hoped that he “might make it up 

to brigade or combat command.” As a division 

sergeant major, he never had any desire to be a 

corps sergeant major, because at the division 

level “is where all the action is.” For the next 

seven years he served several times in that position. He worked as the 2d Armored Division 

sergeant major until 1966, then moved back to 

Germany—for the third time—as the sergeant 

major, 2d Brigade, 4th Armored Division, and 

later as the division sergeant major. In 1969 he 

followed his third tour in Germany with his 

third tour in a combat unit, the 1st Infantry 

Division in South Vietnam.

Copeland served one tour in Vietnam, split 

between the Big Red One and the 4th Infantry 

Division. As the division sergeant major of the 

1st Infantry Division beginning in September 

1969, he was the eyes and ears of the commanding general regarding the enlisted troops and 

accompanied the general on inspection trips. 

While the general received his briefings, 

Copeland walked around the firebase, talking 

with the enlisted soldiers and making evaluations: “Are they properly fed? Do they have the 
89

equipment? Do they have ammunition? Do 

they have weapons? Are they operable? How’s 

their morale? How can I support you?”

Having a senior noncommissioned officer 

accompany the young soldier on his mission out 

in the field seemed to boost his morale. So 

Copeland encouraged the sergeants major of the 

division to get out to visit the troops whenever 

possible. “They should let the young soldier 

know that they’re in the area and their primary 

purpose of being there is to support that combat 

soldier and make sure he gets everything that he 

needs to accomplish his mission and [to assure 

him] that he is not the only one directly involved 

in the war.” He stressed that “the sergeant major’s 

primary mission in life” was to ensure that everyone supporting those soldiers in the jungle did 

“everything humanly possible to make the mission as easy and comfortable as possible.”

Copeland found the young soldiers and 

NCOs in Vietnam no different from those of 

World War II or Korea. However, there was a 

difference in the soldiers’ attitude toward the 

war: “I’m the bait. I’m the guy that’s going to 

take the blow in the jungles of Vietnam.” 

Television news and newspapers let them 

know that the entire nation was sharply divided about the war. The divisiveness took a 

heavy toll on the soldiers’ morale. “The big 

challenge for NCOs at all levels, from division 

right on down to fire team leader, is to keep 

the morale of the soldier boosted. If his 

morale is good, his fighting ability is good. If 

his morale is low, you have a problem.” He 

firmly believed that “one way to do that is to 

show him that he is not alone in the jungle 

and although you won’t be at his side day and 

night, you are his prime supporter.”

The 1st Infantry Division phased out of 

Vietnam during the middle of Copeland’s tour. 

He then became the sergeant major of the 4th 

Infantry Division, then operating in Vietnam’s 

Central Highlands. Later in his tour, Copeland 

went into Cambodia with the division.

Copeland (left) with Troops of the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam
90

Before finishing his one-year tour in 

Vietnam, Copeland learned that he was under 

consideration for Sergeant Major of the Army 

(SMA). Having been previously considered for 

the position in 1968 when George Dunaway was 

selected, Copeland felt that the opportunity had 

passed and that he would retire in 1972. There 

were five other sergeants major under consideration, all of whom a general officer had recommended and the chain of command had interviewed. That summer Chief of Staff General 

William C. Westmoreland interviewed the top 

five candidates, including Copeland. As the only 

one then stationed in Vietnam, Copeland was 

asked about conditions in Vietnam and what was 

happening in the 4th Division area of operations. 

For the first time at a promotion board, he did 

not state that he was the best man for the job. He 

knew that all five candidates for such a prestigious position had to be the best or they would 

not have been interviewed. Instead his responses 

were factual and direct. At the conclusion of the 

interview, he left a phone number where he could 

be reached and went home to Huntsville, Texas, 

for a short leave.

He had no sooner arrived home than he 

learned that he had been selected to be the next 

Sergeant Major of the Army. At the time, 

Copeland was instructed to return to Vietnam 

at the end of his leave to complete his tour. 

While there as the SMA designee, he was to 

“visit as many troops as feasible, from the DMZ 

[Demilitarized Zone] to the Mekong Delta.” 

He found the responsibility and the high expectations for him in Vietnam and in Washington 

both humbling and a source of pride.

At his swearing-in ceremony, the entire 

Copeland family, except one, attended—wife 

Ann, daughters Dorothy and Paula, and son 

Russell. He elected not to pull his other son 

Robert out of classes at Sam Houston University, 

a decision he later regretted: “I should have done 

that because there is only one swearing-in ceremony and there’s only one picture of that ceremony.” He told the Secretary of the Army, “Mr. 

Secretary, you all have chosen the proudest soldier in our Army. You may not have chosen the 

best, but you have chosen the proudest, and I 

plan to carry on to the best of my ability.”

Copeland assumed office in October 1970, 

during a turbulent time for the Army. His task 

was to further institutionalize the office he had 

inherited from Wooldridge and Dunaway. 

Although there was little danger of the office’s 

being abolished, Copeland faced attempts to 

erode the influence of the office within the 

Army Staff and to reduce his access to the Chief 

of Staff. Soon after his swearing-in, a colonel 

from the General Staff came into his office and 

announced that he would be Copeland’s rater. 

As a division sergeant major, he had been rated 

by a general officer; to be rated by a colonel 

represented something of a demotion. Copeland, 

considering himself “number one here and not 

working to obtain a rating,” had little personal 

concern over the rating scheme: “Gee, you know 

as far as this soldier is concerned, I don’t care. 

Any officer can rate me.” However, he also knew 

that it would affect the image of the Office of 

the Sergeant Major of the Army, reduce its 

influence within the Army Staff, and reduce his 

access to the Chief of Staff. Sergeants major at 

the division, corps, and major command levels 

were rated by the commanding general for 

whom they directly worked. Copeland felt so 

strongly about the issue that he threatened to 

resign: “I will have no alternative except to go to 

the Chief of Staff and inform him that this old 

sergeant feels that this is not the image he 

would like to create among the NCOs of our 

Army and I would just as soon move on.” In the 

end, the Army decided not to rate the SMA at 

all.

Copeland felt that his performance in the 

new office was being watched very closely and 

that it would have a bearing on the decision to 

continue the office. His professionalism and 

unwillingness to be “political” earned him the 

respect of General Westmoreland, who told his 

major field commanders, “Copeland is the best 

we have and it would behoove you to pay attention to what he has to say.” A young major at 

the Pentagon learned that the hard way. Peter 

Dawkins, part of the Chief of Staff ’s commit-
91

tee on the all-volunteer Army, was tasked to 

develop new haircut standards. At his briefing 

to the Chief of Staff, he realized to his embarrassment that he had not consulted with 

Copeland over this primarily enlisted matter. 

Copeland later related, “Pete didn’t get his way 

because I didn’t agree with him on the haircuts. 

Had we coordinated beforehand, we would 

have come to a determination before the briefing.” The Chief of Staff sided with the SMA 

on the issue, which demonstrated the credibility that Copeland brought to the office. Many 

other officers, both in the field and on the 

Army Staff, soon saw the SMA office as an 

asset once they realized that Copeland “was not 

out there to tattletale, but to assist.”

Although not formally rated, Copeland’s 

performance was nevertheless watched closely 

not only by the Army, but by civilians as well. 

Everything he did, every public appearance, 

seemed to be closely scrutinized, not so much to 

determine the future of his career but the future 

of the SMA’s office. Copeland quickly felt the 

stress as he “tried to overcome and improve the 

image of his office.” One of the things that he 

had to overcome was the adverse publicity created by the open-mess scandal. People who 

knew nothing else about the Office of the 

Sergeant Major of the Army knew about the 

scandal, which was coming to public attention 

during Copeland’s term of office.

Copeland received broad guidance from 

General Westmoreland when he assumed office. 

Perhaps thinking of the damage to the office 

during the open-mess affair, the chief told 

Copeland not to accept gifts of more than 

nominal value from soldiers while visiting units 

in the field. Second, he was not to tread on the 

toes of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel 

(DCSPER). “Oh, by the way,” Westmoreland 

added, “I have a three-star general. His name is 

Lieutenant General Dutch Kerwin. His department handles assignments, transfers, clubs, 

messes, you name it, for the Army. I prefer that 

you do not get involved in that sort of thing.”

Such strictures made life difficult for 

Copeland, as he received many calls from commanders requesting that a certain sergeant 

major be assigned to them or requests from 

sergeants major for assignments to a certain 

unit or area. But in keeping with the chief ’s 

directive, he forwarded such requests to the 

DCSPER and let that staff handle assignments. 

By refusing to interfere with the business of the 

DCSPER, Copeland prevented the “old boy 

network” from conflicting with the formal personnel assignment policy, one of General 

Johnson’s main concerns when he created the 

Office of the Sergeant Major of the Army in 

1966. Yet at the same time, it prevented the 

SMA from playing a role in an area where he 

did have certain natural responsibilities.

The paramount issues in the Army when 

Copeland assumed office were the drawdown 

of the Army in the course of Vietnamization, 

the change from a conscripted Army to an allvolunteer Army, and the need to upgrade the 

Noncommissioned Officer Education System 

(NCOES). As Copeland stated, “One of the 

most gratifying accomplishments during my 

tenure” was the activation of the U.S. Army 

Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas. 

He attended the first graduation and was asked 

if he would like to become commandant after 

leaving the SMA’s office. However, the law 

requiring him to retire at the conclusion of his 

term precluded him from considering the post.

The shift to an all-volunteer Army required 

a change in the way that NCOs dealt with 

soldiers. In the conscript Army, Copeland 

pointed out, “we could fire a soldier, give him 

an undesirable discharge, boot him out of the 

Army, and then all we had to do was ask for a 

replacement. So another one was drafted off 

the street.” Under the all-volunteer Army, 

NCOs had to put themselves into the place of 

young soldiers the Army recruited. How would 

he or she want to be treated? Although more 

was expected of such volunteers, they also merited more respect and consideration for their 

career commitments. Despite the Chief of 

Staff ’s directive to “recruit, train, and retain an 

all-volunteer Army by 30 June 1973,” many 

NCOs resisted the changes needed to carry 
92

out that directive. Although never established 

as policy or even communicated as a veiled 

threat, such attitudes often became discriminators when selecting NCOs for the post-Vietnam reduction in force.

In the effort to recruit and retain an all-volunteer force, Copeland oversaw or was involved 

in several changes to abolish longstanding Army 

traditions. The Army upgraded barracks, virtually ended bed checks, and changed enlistment 

and reenlistment policies and options to attract 

new recruits and induce soldiers to reenlist. 

Civilian contractors took over the onerous chore 

of kitchen police. Copeland, in his travels to 

units, was the point man who carried the message to the soldiers. He knew that “The Army 

Wants to Join You” slogan and philosophy had 

become a lightning rod for NCOs who felt that 

the changes brought about by the all-volunteer 

Army undermined discipline. As Copeland and 

many others saw it, “The Army Wants to Join 

You” meant “We’ve got to be more lenient on the 

style of the haircut, their dress, and—I hate to say 

this—discipline.”

During this period of transition, Congress 

saw Copeland as the soldiers’ representative and 

spokesman. Although he never testified before 

any committee of Congress, he did frequently 

receive calls requesting his opinion on the status 

of the all-volunteer Army: “How is recruiting 

coming along? What do you see in the field? 

What do you think some of the soldiers’ frustrations are? Are you going to be able to obtain an 

all-volunteer force?”

Ironically, at the same time the Army was 

trying to entice young men and women to enlist 

voluntarily, it was forcing other soldiers out of the 

Army as part of the post-Vietnam drawdown. 

Many of those asked to leave were career soldiers 

and NCOs with twelve to fourteen years of service and one or more combat tours in Vietnam. 

Copeland, in the course of briefing Chief of Staff 

General Creighton W. Abrams related to him 

that the reduction in force was one of his most 

frustrating challenges. Unlike officers, NCOs 

were released without the benefit of any separation pay to ease their transition into civilian life.

General Abrams asked Copeland if he had 

any experience dealing with the reductions in 

force after World War II and the Korean War. 

One of the most galling policies after those two 

wars, Copeland noted, was the practice of 

allowing officers to serve in NCO slots at the 

reduced grade so that they could fulfill their 

length of service requirements for full retirement benefits. This forced NCOs out of the 

Army. Worst of all, Copeland felt, was that the 

former officer often only held the NCO slot, 

but did not actually work in it. “Other NCOs 

had to pick up the slack, without the pay or 

promotion that went with it. I cited myself as 

being one of those—the way I put it—victims.” 

General Abrams apparently followed Copeland’s 

advice not to repeat that mistake, because 

“although NCOs were released, it was not because 

a former officer took up his slot.”

SMA Copeland spent at least 50 percent 

of his time in the field, visiting soldiers and 

units, usually accompanying the Chief of Staff. 

If visiting a unit without the chief, he would 

always advise the post commander of his itinerary. Commanders used many of these office 

calls to express their feelings about issues such 

as the all-volunteer Army. Through the SMA, 

SMA Copeland Visits a Young Soldier.
93

commanders could share their feelings with 

the Chief of Staff without their being filtered 

by the intervening channels. The SMA’s direct 

pipeline to the CSA also worked well for the 

soldiers. Complaints or comments on issues 

that normally would never reach the SMA’s 

office reached him directly as he visited soldiers in the field or garrison.

Copeland did not confine his visits to active 

units; General Westmoreland told him not to 

forget National Guard and Army Reserve units. 

As always, visits to reserve units dovetailed with 

those to active units, allowing him to visit an 

active unit during the week and a nearby reserve 

unit on the weekend. Having never worked 

directly with reserve units, Copeland gained an 

appreciation for the role they played in the 

Army. In addition, a visit by the Sergeant Major 

of the Army helped assure reserve component 

soldiers that they were part of the “Total Army.”

Neither General Abrams nor Sergeant Major 

Copeland traveled alone. Like his predecessor, 

the Chief of Staff authorized travel expenses for 

the Sergeant Major of the Army’s wife. To 

encourage voluntary enlistments and reenlistments, it was now even more critical to make 

service life more attractive to spouses and families. Ann Copeland thus paid regular visits to 

wives’ groups and post facilities that served the 

Army families. Copeland later noted that “It was 

from Ann that I was able to learn, firsthand, 

some of the frustrations that were going on 

within families of young soldiers.” Unknown to 

her, these concerns were written into field reports 

submitted to the Chief of Staff, which brought 

about needed changes for an increasingly married Army. The Copelands’ interest in the Army 

family did not stop when he left office in 1973. 

Throughout the next decades, Ann would continue to attend meetings the DCSPER held 

concerning support for family members, especially those of soldiers deployed overseas. During 

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the 

sudden and massive overseas deployments of 

both active and reserve units, as well as the 

increasing number of single-parent and dualservice families, required detailed family support 

plans and organizations. Mrs. Copeland’s experience and advice in this area were understandably 

highly regarded.

Silas Copeland’s tour of duty as the Sergeant 

Major of the Army was due to end in October 

1972, after two years in office. Because of his 

break in service in 1954, this would mean that 

he would be a few months short of thirty years 

for retirement. Acting Chief of Staff General 

Bruce Palmer, Jr., accordingly extended his tour 

until February 1973. Before the end of the year, 

however, General Abrams took over as Chief of 

Staff and asked Copeland to remain in office 

until June 1973, when he would turn over the 

office to Sgt. Maj. Leon Van Autreve.

Silas Copeland had a fulfilling and wellrounded career, spanning three wars, serving on 

three continents, and witnessing vast changes in 

the Army. He served in every leadership level 

available to a noncommissioned officer, from 

tank commander to platoon sergeant, from first 

sergeant to sergeant major. As a sergeant major 

he had worked at the battalion and brigade levels and for four different divisions. In his two 

years and nine months as Sergeant Major of the 

Army, he worked for three Chiefs of Staff and 

oversaw vast changes in the Army as it reduced 

its strength from 1.3 million soldiers in 1970 to 

788,000 in 1973. During this period he helped 

pioneer the improvements in service life needed 

Mrs. Ann Copeland Looks in on a Patient at Irwin Army 

Hospital, Fort Riley, Kansas, 1971.
94

to recruit and retain an all-volunteer Army after 

the draft had ended. His tour saw the first class 

of graduates from the U.S. Army Sergeants 

Major Academy and the strengthening of the 

NCOES. Finally, his actions as SMA institutionalized the office and made it an integral part 

of the decision-making process in the Pentagon. 

After thirty years of service, Copeland and his 

wife returned to Texas, there to reside in 

Huntsville in a well-earned retirement.

On 4 December 2001, after a short illness, Silas L. Copeland passed away in 

Conroe, Texas. Recognizing Copeland as a 

“leader in both peace and war,” Sergeant 

Major of the Army Jack L. Tilley expressed 

the high regard he held for Copeland and 

noted Copeland’s role in helping to implement the NCOES and the transition to an 

all-volunteer force. Army Chief of Staff 

General Eric K. Shinseki lauded him as a 

“highly respected leader, a dignified man and 

a visionary whose positive and very profound 

influence on the character of our noncommissioned officer corps thrives nearly 30 years 

after his retirement. A veteran of three wars, 

his service to our nation represents the best of 

those Americans Tom Brokaw aptly named 

‘the greatest generation.’ He will be missed. 

Anytime a man of his caliber leaves our ranks, 

we all suffer a great loss.”

SMA Copeland “Standing Tall” at His Last Official Army Formation, During His Retirement Ceremony 

at Fort Myer, Virginia, June 1973
95

Assignments

1942 Inducted into service, Huntsville, Texas, and Basic Training,

St. Petersburg, Florida

1942–1945 Refueling specialist, Base Squadron, Biggs Army Airfield, Texas

1945 Tank Commander and Platoon Sergeant, Company E, 66th Armor,

2d Armored Division, Germany

1945–1950 Operations and Intelligence Sergeant, 67th Tank Battalion and 82d 

Reconnaissance Battalion, 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas

1950–1951 Operations Sergeant, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon Sergeant,

2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, Japan; 

Republic of Korea

1951–1953 Assistant Instructor, ROTC, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas

1953–1954 First Sergeant, 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, Germany

1954–1957 Operations Sergeant, Sergeant Major, 4th Tank Battalion,

1st Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas

1957–1958 Instructor, ROTC, Centenary College, Shreveport, Louisiana

1958–1959 First Sergeant, Troop B, 8th Cavalry Squadron,

8th Infantry Division, Germany

1960–1962 Sergeant Major, 8th Cavalry Squadron, 8th Infantry Division, Germany

1962–1963 Sergeant Major, 2d Battalion, 37th Armor, 2d Armored Division,

Fort Hood, Texas

1963–1966 Division Sergeant Major, 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas

1966–1968 Sergeant Major, 2d Brigade, 4th Armored Division, Germany

1968–1969 Command Sergeant Major, 4th Armored Division, Germany

1969–1970 Command Sergeant Major, 1st Infantry Division, Republic of Vietnam

1970 Command Sergeant Major, 4th Infantry Division, Republic of Vietnam

1970–1973 Sergeant Major of the Army

Selected Decorations and Awards

Distinguished Service Medal

Legion of Merit

Distinguished Flying Cross

Bronze Star Medal with V Device and Four Oak Leaf Clusters

Meritorious Service Medal

Air Medal

Army Commendation Medal with One Oak Leaf Cluster

Good Conduct Medal with Ten Oak Leaf Clusters

American Campaign Medal

European Campaign Medal

World War II Victory Medal 

Army of Occupation Medal (Germany)

National Defense Service Medal

Korean Service Medal

Vietnam Service Medal

United Nations Korean Service Medal

Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal

Combat Infantryman Badge
96

SMA Van Aut reve
Leon L. Van Autreve was born in Eeklo, 

Belgium, on 29 January 1920.1 His family moved to the United States when he 

was very young, first settling in Montana and 

then moving to Delphos, Ohio. He attended an 

eight-grade elementary school followed by four 

years at St. John’s Catholic High School in 

Delphos. In the evening, he worked as a projectionist in the local theater. Like many recent 

immigrants, the senior Van Autreves had a special appreciation for their adopted homeland 

and expressed their patriotism by flying the 

American flag every day. The elder Van Autreve 

had been the second most highly decorated 

Belgian Army soldier in World War I. Perhaps 

these two factors motivated his son to enlist in 

the Ohio National Guard in 1938. The need for 

additional income during the Depression was 

certainly another reason.

Private Van Autreve served in Headquarters 

Company, 148th Infantry, in Spencerville, Ohio. 

The first sergeant assigned him as the company 

clerk, because he could “recognize a typewriter 

and was therefore highly qualified.” The Guard 

trained for only two hours per week and consequently, “one almost had to relearn what had 

been learned at each session.” There was no 

educational system and the rate of promotion 

was glacial. “Once you became an NCO [noncommissioned officer], you had to wait until 

someone died to get promoted.” During field 

training, Van Autreve took turns with other 

soldiers hauling around a water-cooled, .30-caliber machine gun mounted on bicycle wheels. 

Training resources were so scarce that no one 

actually got to fire the weapon.

Van Autreve left the 148th Infantry in 1940 

when he landed a job with the Long Island 

Railroad and later with the Baltimore and Ohio 

Railroad in Lima, Ohio. In October he was 

inducted into the Army. Although he was 

unhappy about leaving his girlfriend, his hometown in nearby Delphos was patriotic and supportive. “When you received your draft notice, 

people would clap you on the back and say, ‘Hey, 

man, that’s all right.’” At the time, none of the 

draftees called up with Van Autreve knew what 

the term of service would be. After the Japanese 

attack on Pearl Harbor, “we thought that the 

war was going to last only three or four weeks 

and we would wipe the Japanese off the face of 

the map. We were not aware on the 7th of 

December of the consequences of the Pearl 

Harbor attack. Everybody wanted to go, immediately, to get it over with. Unfortunately it did 

not last three or four weeks.”

After Van Autreve spent several weeks inprocessing, he went to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for 

eight weeks of basic training. Like most other 

trainees, he lived in a two-story wooden barracks that contained rifle racks, bunks, and little 

else. Unlike in today’s barracks with triplelocked arms rooms, recruits then could take out 

their rifle at will to practice the techniques they 

had learned on the range. 

Van Autreve put his marksmanship skills 

into practice soon after Pearl Harbor. When on 

guard duty one night, he and a fellow guard saw 

a car without headlights near their post. 

Thinking that “the Japanese were intruding into 

Leon L. Van Autreve

1 Except as noted, this section is based on Interv, Erwin 

H. Koehler with Leon L. Van Autreve, 3–4 Feb 94, San 

Antonio, Tex.
98

the confines of Fort Belvoir,” they shot at it. 

Fortunately, they missed the two cadre members 

who were trying to sneak back onto post after 

curfew. When brought before their battalion 

commander, they were terrified and thought 

that they “were going to be lined up against the 

wall and shot.” Apparently attributing the incident to the invasion “jitters” prevalent all over 

the country, the colonel did not punish them.

Enlisted soldiers rarely saw officers, because 

NCOs conducted every facet of their training, 

and lived, ate, and slept with them. Van Autreve’s 

incentive to become a noncommissioned officer 

was not monetary, but came from the desire to 

have the comfort and status of his own room at 

the end of the barracks. “Besides the private 

room, I didn’t have to clean latrines. I didn’t 

have to go on KP [kitchen police]. Oh, I was in 

‘hog heaven.’ I’d wear that little corporal stripe 

down there like a wheel.” The NCOs conducted 

excellent hands-on training, taking advantage of 

increased resources available after Pearl Harbor. 

Van Autreve quickly learned engineer tasks that 

he would use in combat: demolitions, bridging, 

and mine clearing. Engineering was not all he 

learned. His platoon sergeant set an example of 

“foot locker counseling,” which Van Autreve 

emulated later in his career. The sergeant made 

himself available to his soldiers at night and on 

weekends in the barracks to answer questions 

and discuss the day’s training. Noticing that Van 

Autreve had “fairly decent possibilities as an 

NCO,” he took the young recruit out to the 

parade field. There, Van Autreve, under the sergeant’s watchful eye, hollered commands across 

the field to strengthen his command voice.

In January 1942 Van Autreve left Fort 

Belvoir for Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where 

he was assigned to the 15th Engineer Battalion, 

9th Infantry Division. His reception at Fort 

Bragg in the middle of the night impressed him. 

The mess hall provided food and hot coffee for 

the half-frozen arriving soldiers. The beds in 

the barracks were already made. How these 

newly arriving soldiers were made to feel part of 

the unit was something he never forgot and 

always emphasized in the future.

The 15th Engineers conducted hard, realistic unit training in preparation for the upcoming invasion of northwest Africa. Van Autreve’s 

company commander promoted him to sergeant and included him in the two squads 

attached to the 60th Infantry Regimental 

Combat Team (RCT) to provide demolition 

support. The 60th moved to Little Creek, 

Virginia, for two months to work in an environment resembling that of its initial objective, 

French Morocco. Sergeant Van Autreve trained 

fourteen to fifteen hours a day, much of it at 

night, learning how to destroy pillboxes with 

pole charges; to sneak up on sentries, using several U.S. and enemy weapons; and to handle 

small boats. The small-boat training later proved 

the most valuable.

Van Autreve and a small demolition group 

shipped out on a destroyer, the USS Dallas. The 

sailors neglected to brief the soldiers about what 

“general quarters” meant until after their first 

terrifying encounter with submarines. The 

chance of being blown out of the water and the 

unpleasant rolling of the small ship gave the 

soldiers an edge, however. “We were so sick and 

tired of being on that destroyer that we would 

have fought the entire German Army in French 

Van Autreve as a Young Soldier
99

Morocco, just to get off.” The destroyer’s mission was to sail up a river, cross a chain obstacle, 

and provide demolition support for the landing. 

The enemy was not the German Army, however, but the French Foreign Legion, which 

capitulated after three days of fighting. After 

the landing, Van Autreve rejoined his unit, 

which had the dangerous mission of defusing 

dud shells and breaching minefields. He spent 

the remainder of his time in North Africa 

emplacing and removing mines.

Mine removal was every bit as dangerous as 

fighting with a front-line infantry unit. In fact, 

many times he found himself in front of them, 

clearing and marking paths through minefields. 

Throughout the latter half of the war, the 

Germans sowed mines liberally and rigged 

many with booby traps and trip wires. Once, in 

support of a tank company, Van Autreve was 

clearing mines in front of the column. Suddenly 

the lead U.S. tank encountered a German tank 

in the road. The two tanks exchanged fire over 

his head for fifteen minutes, then the battle 

moved elsewhere.

Ground forces were not the only danger. 

Sergeant Van Autreve and a few of his soldiers 

found a water well. They had undressed and 

begun to take a long overdue bath when a 

Luftwaffe fighter flying overhead saw them 

and dove down to attack. Unsure of the 

nationality of the out-of-uniform men, the 

pilot deliberately fired wide and enjoyed himself chasing the naked men across the desert. 

Terrified at the time, Van Autreve only later 

could see the humor in the episode. He experienced another problem with his uniform 

during a mine-clearing operation. Without a 

helmet, shirt, and tie, he was concentrating 

intently on locating “bouncing betty” mines 

and did not see Maj. Gen. George S. Patton’s 

caravan approaching. The general, a stickler for 

correct uniforms, chewed out Van Autreve 

until his company commander rescued him.

Van Autreve stayed with the 15th Engineers 

as the 9th Division “Old Reliables” invaded 

Sicily, redeployed to England, landed in 

Normandy four days after D-day, and advanced 

across France. Near the German border, he suffered a relapse of malaria and was placed on a 

limited assignment. Because he had worked on 

the railroad before induction into the Army, he 

found himself as a train guard watching for 

pilferers until the end of the war in Europe. 

After thirty months of duty with combat engineers, he out-processed through Camp Lucky 

Strike in France in July 1945 and was shipped 

home.

Sergeant Van Autreve left the Army that 

year, worked for his father for a time, and then 

enrolled in Ohio Northern University. An automobile accident and a chance meeting with an 

Army pal who had become a recruiter brought 

him back into the service. “My insurance expired, 

so economically I was in a bind. Two or three 

drinks with my buddy resulted in my being reintroduced to the Army. I thought about the good 

times and the bad times. How am I going to pay 

off the damage to my car and [what about] the 

possibility of a lawsuit?” He drew an assignment 

to Fort Knox, Kentucky, for two years and then 

back to Europe in 1950 for his first peacetime 

overseas tour. Before he reached his European 

assignment, a stint working for a moving company while on leave changed his life.

While helping his brother-in-law move a 

family’s furniture, he met Rita Spinoza, originally from Norwich, Connecticut. She was 

instantly attracted to the thirty-year-old combat 

veteran whom she invited to dinner, a highly 

unusual experience for a mover. Thinking the 

invitation merely perfunctory, he was not sure if 

he should show up. When Rita’s mother followed up the invitation with a phone call, he 

accepted. He now realizes, “I was moving into a 

trap and didn’t know it at the time.” The trap 

was sprung—after dating a few months Leon 

and Rita married in November 1950.

That month the newly married Van 

Autreves moved to Böblingen, Germany, 

where Sergeant Van Autreve reported to 

Company A, 54th Engineers, for duty as a 

platoon sergeant. Soon after he arrived, his 

first sergeant became upset over the lack of 

volunteers for the NCO Academy. Seeing an 
100

opportunity, Van Autreve promptly volunteered, a decision that later “really paid off.” 

He was promoted to E–7, then the highest 

pay grade, soon after graduation, summoned 

to the battalion commander’s office, and told 

“You are going to be the First Sergeant of 

Headquarters Company.” Although he considered himself unprepared for the job, he 

remembered that the colonel, impressed with 

his performance at the academy, thought otherwise, and his new duties began almost 

immediately.

Unfamiliar with the administrative requirements of being a first sergeant, Van Autreve 

“studied his head off every night” to learn 

them. The company had a history of disciplinary problems, which First Sergeant Van 

Autreve determined to solve by his own methods. Rather than send errant soldiers to the 

commander for nonjudicial punishment, a 

measure that permanently marred their records, 

he preferred marching them in full field gear 

around the quadrangle under his personal 

supervision. “That reduced our number of 

problems, dramatically and rapidly.” At the 

same time, remembering his own lack of 

preparation for the job and the lack of transition with the previous first sergeant (who had 

been relieved), he trained his own platoon sergeants by rotating them into his slot for a week 

at a time.

In the early fifties overseas duty was pleasant in Germany. The exchange rate between the 

mark and dollar was favorable, and despite the 

low pay soldiers could afford to enjoy themselves “on the economy.” Since relatively few 

were married, Van Autreve did not have to deal 

with as many family issues as do first sergeants 

today. Soldiers needed the commander’s permission to marry German nationals, and the 

low pay also discouraged them from marrying 

anyone until they advanced in rank. By the end 

of his four-year tour in Germany, Van Autreve 

had mastered the intricacies of the first sergeant’s job and was ready to leave Europe for 

home. He returned to Ohio in an ROTC post 

at Toledo University.

Master Sergeant Van Autreve owed his 

assignment to Lt. Col. C. Craig Cannon, his battalion commander in Böblingen. When the colonel and his wife visited the Van Autreves’ quarters, the topic of his reassignment had arisen. 

Because his father suffered from emphysema, 

Van Autreve indicated his preference for a duty 

station near their home in Delphos. With 

Colonel Cannon’s assistance, the ROTC posting 

was secured, only eighty miles from his parents’ 

home. There, as a senior instructor, Van Autreve 

taught military history and logistics to cadets of 

all four years. At the same time, the professor of 

military science allowed him to take courses at 

the university, provided he maintained a passing 

grade average. Van Autreve took advantage of 

this opportunity, majored in history, and became 

a member of Phi Alpha Theta, the national history honor society. In fact, over the course of his 

career, he would accumulate some 140 semester 

hours from six universities. Between instructing 

and teaching, he had little free time to enjoy the 

comfortable living conditions, which included 

air-conditioned quarters on campus.

From Toledo University, Van Autreve moved 

to Fort Knox for an assignment with the 

Continental Army Command (CONARC) 

Armor Board. Working in the Engineer Section, 

he put to good use his combat experience with 

mines. The section tested a wide variety of mines, 

determining the best ways to emplace, detect, 

and ultimately defuse them. When the Army 

created the NCO “supergrades” of E–8 and E–9, 

Van Autreve and seven other NCOs competed 

for one E–8 slot in the section. Although Van 

Autreve was unsure of his chances, General 

Bruce C. Clarke, the CONARC commander, 

remembered that Van Autreve had graduated as 

the number-one student at the Constabulary 

NCO Academy and personally selected him for 

the E–8 slot. With that promotion, Van Autreve 

took charge of the Engineer Section.

After two years at the Armor Board, Van 

Autreve received orders for a one-year unaccompanied tour in Korea. There he served as 

a company first sergeant in the 8th Engineer 

Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, from 1960 
101

to 1961. A steep hill, OP–7, near the company area allowed him to use the same technique he had used in Germany to deal with 

soldiers guilty of minor infractions. He gave 

them a choice of nonjudicial punishment by 

the company commander or a hike up the 

hill with the first sergeant. As before, most 

chose the hike over a permanent blemish on 

their record.

First Sergeant Van Autreve again used his 

ingenuity to solve a recurrent theft problem. 

Nearby Korean villagers appeared to be stealing 

building supplies, vehicles, and anything else 

not nailed down. When Van Autreve’s Christmas 

lights disappeared, he could take no more. (At 

the time, first sergeants had greater authority 

than they do today.) Van Autreve placed the 

nearby village, the “ville,” off-limits to his soldiers. The economic impact of his action 

encouraged the local “mamasan” to ensure that 

the lights were returned. The problem with 

petty thievery quickly ended.

Besides disciplinary problems and theft, he 

had to deal with fights between his soldiers and 

KATUSAs (Korean Augmentations to the 

United States Army), venereal disease, and the 

most-frustrating constant turnover of personnel. The one-year overseas tour meant that soldiers constantly rotated in and out of the company, making it difficult to keep trained soldiers 

in key positions. The isolated location of the 

company required the first sergeant to solve 

problems himself instead of referring them to 

higher headquarters. After a year in Korea, Van 

Autreve returned home and was assigned to the 

Engineer Center at Fort Belvoir.

Originally slated for another first sergeant 

position, he arrived to find it already filled and 

instead became the senior bridge instructor at the 

Engineer School. After a year of instructing students in mine warfare and Bailey and treadway 

bridge construction, he became the sergeant 

major, E–9, of the supporting 91st Engineer 

Battalion. His elevation to sergeant major was a 

triumph over the favoritism evident in promotions and selections. His former unit had supposedly sent his records to the promotion board, but 

when he appeared before the board, the records 

were missing. Fortunately, the board president 

delayed proceeding until Van Autreve’s records 

were found on the post sergeant major’s desk, 

where they had been held up for two days. “Had 

it not been for the president of the board I would 

not have become a sergeant major, because he 

pursued the matter so diligently. You were supposed to play the political program to survive. It 

was all predicated on someone like the president 

of that board who feels that you’ve been maligned 

and does something about it.”

After only a year and a half with the 91st, 

Sergeant Major Van Autreve was called in by 

his battalion commander. General Herbert B. 

Powell, the CONARC commander, would 

interview him for the position of CONARC 

sergeant major. Van Autreve was wary. Before 

the interview, the incumbent sergeant major 

told him that the job was mainly ceremonial. So 

he “went in to see the general, saluted, and right 

off the bat, said, ‘Sir, I don’t want the job.’ He 

was very gracious and asked me why. I said, ‘I’ve 

been told that it was primarily ceremonial and I 

just don’t want that kind of job.’” The general 

told him if he did not want the job, he did not 

have to take it, and there the matter ended.

While at Fort Belvoir, Sergeant Major Van 

Autreve saw his battalion load out and prepare 

for deployment during the Cuban Missile Crisis 

in the fall of 1962. The 91st remained on standby status for a week. Although it never deployed, 

the entire experience provided the battalion 

some valuable lessons in readying its equipment 

and personnel for emergency deployments.

In 1963 Van Autreve became a member of a 

65-soldier Military Technical Advisory Team 

(MILTAG), training Indonesian Army units in 

combat engineering. At the same time the Soviet 

Air Force was training the Indonesian Air Force, 

so Van Autreve had the unusual experience of 

working next to Russian advisers. He was 

impressed by the average Indonesian soldier, who 

routinely participated in a variety of rather dangerous training exercises, such as hurdling over 

knives, points up, and riding a suspension traverse “slide-for-life” over bayonets and other 
102

“very penetrating obstacles.” Although he found 

the work satisfying, he believed that the team did 

not have enough training in Indonesian customs 

and language before attempting to advise that 

country’s army. This was a prophetic observation, 

applicable to the Army’s advisory effort a few 

years later in Vietnam.

In 1964, following his tour in Indonesia, the 

Army sent Van Autreve back to Germany as 

sergeant major of the 317th Engineer Battalion, 

located outside Frankfurt. He was immediately 

appalled by the lack of discipline and generally 

poor conditions at McNair Kaserne and confronted several soldiers after his arrival. “Rita 

and I went to the PX and snack bar,” he related. 

“There was profanity and I told the offending 

soldier to knock it off. He cursed me and was 

about to pull a knife on me, when I hit him with 

a metal tray.” Another time they encountered a 

soldier who was throwing garbage cans at people waiting in line at the theater. “He was either 

bombed or on dope and had utter disregard for 

what I told him. I brought this to the attention 

of a passing captain, who said, ‘No, I don’t want 

anything to do with this.’ Well, that gave me an 

indication that things were pretty tough.” After 

this incident, he and the battalion commander 

met with the officers and senior NCOs to 

determine how best to improve the discipline of 

the organization. “It took us, by God, four or 

five months to get that place squared away.”

In addition to his duties as sergeant major, 

Van Autreve became the housing coordinator 

for Fichstein, responsible for ninety sets of family quarters. Conditions there were also marginal, and it took about three years for the sergeant major to turn both the unit and the kaserne around. By enforcing standards, eliminating nonproductive NCOs, and making the 

working and living areas something of which 

the soldiers could be proud, he slowly improved 

the morale and readiness of the 317th. As the 

senior enlisted man in the battalion, he consistently encouraged the commander to spend 

Brigade Sergeant Major Van Autreve of the 20th Engineer Brigade with Vietnamese Children
103

more time with the soldiers in the field, showing them that he could share some of the misery 

they experienced, for example, while erecting a 

bridge in the rain.

In 1966 Van Autreve had his first opportunity for consideration as Sergeant Major of the 

Army (SMA) when the V Corps commander 

nominated him ahead of his seniors. The 

Seventh Army and U.S. Army, Europe, commanders agreed, although ultimately Chief of 

Staff General Harold K. Johnson chose Sgt. 

Maj. William O. Wooldridge. Van Autreve thus 

remained with the 317th Engineers until the 

following year, when his tour in Germany was 

over and he volunteered for duty in Vietnam.

Although he was originally slated for duty as 

sergeant major of the 588th Engineer Battalion, 

circumstance sent him elsewhere. During his 

standard three-day in-processing, the U.S. Army, 

Vietnam, sergeant major invited him for a drink 

at the NCO Club. Since Van Autreve had decided to avoid alcohol entirely in the combat zone, 

he declined. That night the 20th Engineer 

Brigade sergeant major, when leaving the club, 

tripped, fell, and broke his leg. Because he would 

require hospitalization until the end of his tour, 

Sergeant Major Van Autreve stepped in as his 

replacement. The 20th was collocated with the 

101st Airborne Division. Since the proximity of 

the two units required Sergeant Major Van 

Autreve to coordinate frequently with the sergeant major of the 101st, George W. Dunaway, 

later the second Sergeant Major of the Army, 

they soon became close friends and developed a 

high respect for one another.

As the new brigade sergeant major, Van 

Autreve faced several problems and tackled 

them with his customary zeal and innovation. 

He found that his first sergeants tended to 

remain in the base camps, enjoying hot food 

and comfortable quarters, while their soldiers 

manned the “Rome Plow” tractors clearing 

roads in the jungle and lived with the risk of 

enemy fire, mines, and jungle predators. The 

enlisted man “thought that the platoon sergeant 

was the senior noncommissioned officer in his 

company. I finally got together with the brigade 

commander and if we went out to the field, I 

would take the helicopter and go back and get 

the first sergeant, and he went to the field with 

me. We had to introduce some first sergeants to 

line troops, and troops to first sergeants.”

Another problem, similar to the one he faced 

in Korea, was the rapid turnover of soldiers on 

one-year tours of duty. “There was no capability 

of bonding people, because people came to you, 

not as a unit, but as one, two, three, or four 

replacements. They would take a month in order 

to get indoctrinated, work for five to seven 

months, and then prepare to go home.” Officers 

stayed in command only six months, “so you’re 

introduced to this company commander and in 

two or three months you begin to assimilate his 

philosophy, and then he leaves. Another company commander comes in and you start all over 

again. My feeling is that resulted in the loss of 

lives.” The turnover in NCOs meant that by the 

time they learned how to “fight Charlie,” it was 

time to rotate home. For many NCOs and their 

soldiers, the enemy did not give them five or six 

months to learn their job.

The disparity between rear areas and combat 

areas was another concern. Visiting the 1st 

Logistics Command sergeant major, whom he 

knew from his Fort Belvoir days, Sergeant Major 

Van Autreve was amazed by his excellent living 

conditions—kitchen, lounge, steak, lobster, and 

Philippine cigars. “We had some soldiers with 

Special Forces on top of Nui Ba Den. When you 

go to the top of Nui Ba Den, these guys are not 

luxuriating with any steak. Their fatigues were 

ripped and dirty. The only water they had was 

what they gathered in this huge tarp-like thing in 

a hole.” It was perhaps fortunate that unlike the 

infantry who were brought back to the rear after 

an operation, the combat engineers tended to 

stay in the field continuously, unexposed to such 

demoralizing contrasts. They also did not have as 

much of an opportunity to use drugs or become 

discipline problems.

Halfway through Van Autreve’s tour in 

Vietnam, Sergeant Major Dunaway came over 

from the 101st to visit. Having informed Van 

Autreve that he, Dunaway, had been selected 
104

as the next Sergeant Major of the Army, he 

also said, “I’m very impressed with your effort 

and what you do. I’m going to do the best I can 

to aid you in future.” A year later, in 1969, 

Sergeant Major Van Autreve found out exactly 

what that meant. Ready to rotate home from 

Vietnam, he had not yet seen any orders. He 

informed Dunaway, who saw to it that he 

received an assignment to Alaska as the sergeant major of U.S. Army, Alaska (USARAL). 

“I will never, never stop thanking George 

Dunaway for what he did for me.” Without 

the assignment to Alaska, where he was rated 

by a general officer, he felt that he would never 

have been seriously considered for Sergeant 

Major of the Army.

The USARAL commanding general, Maj. 

Gen. Kelly B. Lemmon, had selected Van 

Autreve because he was looking for an outsider 

to work out some of the problems in his command. With the excellent hunting and fishing 

there, many NCOs had become “homesteaders,” 

remaining on station in Alaska for five or six 

years. Too many officers and NCOs, Lemmon 

believed, focused on recreational activities rather than on training. One Friday afternoon at 

1400, General Lemmon and his sergeant major 

went to the main gate; there they wrote down 

the names of officers and NCOs departing early 

for a long weekend and leaving their soldiers 

unsupervised during the duty day. Such direct 

actions soon gained the attention of troops and 

commanders alike.

In the late l960s and early l970s, junior 

enlisted councils, 24-hour hotlines, and the 

open-door policy were prevalent in many units. 

Although designed to improve the lot of junior 

enlisted men and junior officers, these innovations often undermined the chain of command 

and involved senior commanders and NCOs in 

petty problems that should have been solved at 

a much lower level. Sergeant Major Van Autreve 

insisted that every soldier who came to him or 

the commanding general with a problem be 

accompanied by his first sergeant and company 

commander. He almost reached the end of his 

tether when he had to respond to a complaint 

from a specialist’s wife over the size of lettuce 

heads in one commissary compared to those in 

another.

As in Germany, Van Autreve ran into disciplinary cases at the post theater—drinking, 

refusal to stand during the National Anthem, 

and profanity. Correcting such problems took 

hard work and persistence. During his four 

years in Alaska, Van Autreve tightened NCO 

standards, meeting with the NCOs once a 

month to discuss problems. NCOs were now 

expected to stay in the company area until the 

end of the duty day and to be available for soldiers after duty hours and on weekends. He 

reviewed personnel records to weed out and 

reassign homesteaders. With two infantry brigades and several supporting artillery battalions 

in the command, the combat engineer Van 

Autreve also hit the books to learn everything 

he could about the other arms. Before visiting a 

unit, he gave it twenty-four hours’ notice to 

prepare. He also used the same time to brush up 

on the organization and missions of the particular unit, always writing down five or six key 

questions to ask soldiers.

Van Autreve enjoyed his tour in Alaska. 

Soldiers trained in some of the most arduous 

conditions possible, where temperature extremes 

made everything difficult and one mistake 

could be fatal. Such situations made the soldier 

in Alaska one of the best trained in the Army. 

While always teaching others, Van Autreve also 

found he constantly had new things to learn. 

One of the contingency missions for USARAL 

was rescuing survivors from airplanes that 

crashed while flying the polar route. Van 

Autreve, then fifty-two, undertook parachute 

training to prepare himself for the mission, or at 

least to better understand what the soldier in his 

command had to endure.

In 1970 Sergeant Major Van Autreve was 

considered again for selection as Sergeant 

Major of the Army. When Silas Copeland 

received the nod, Van Autreve thought that he 

would finish his career in Alaska in 1974. 

However, Lt. Gen. Melvin Zais, commanding 

general of the Third U.S. Army, accompanied 
105

Van Autreve to his 1973 interview with the 

Chief of Staff, General Creighton W. Abrams. 

Before the interview, Zais told Van Autreve, “I 

personally think that you would do an excellent job but you have never been a division 

sergeant major.” Van Autreve asked, “General, 

how does an engineer become a division sergeant major?” 

During the interview General Abrams 

asked only one question, “If you were Chief of 

Staff of the Army, what would you do?” Van 

Autreve told him, “I would ensure the restoration of the noncommissioned officer corps to its 

rightful position. Give [the NCO] the authority 

to act and if he can’t do it and cut the mustard, 

get rid of him.” Expecting a third rejection after 

what he thought was the world’s shortest interview, he was surprised to learn of his selection. 

He should not have been surprised—his forceful and innovative actions when dealing with 

severe discipline problems in Germany and 

Alaska, as well as his efforts to increase standards among the NCO Corps, had made him 

the ideal man to help the Chief of Staff solve 

the Army’s post-Vietnam problems.

After his swearing-in ceremony and a very 

short transition with his predecessor, Silas 

Copeland, Van Autreve began to work on what 

he saw as his highest priority, increasing the 

standards of the Army’s Noncommissioned 

Officer Corps. He met with a Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) staff officer who 

gave him twenty NCO personnel files, all for 

sergeants major, all containing numerous Articles 

15 and courts-martial. Van Autreve marked out 

the names and personal information on them 

and made copies. When speaking to groups of 

NCOs, he would throw the copies out into the 

audience, saying, “It’s your fault that you allow 

these people to survive.” Then, accompanied by 

personnel experts, he would answer any questions 

the NCOs had. After a while, NCOs knew “what 

was coming and they’d start ducking, because I’d 

throw the files out there and I’d really get hostile 

about the fact we tolerated those incompetent 

people, who survived the system and became 

sergeants major.”

The new SMA also worked to eliminate 

favoritism in the NCO assignment process. 

When he began his tour, he found in the basement office of the Pentagon “a guy who carried a 

list of seven sergeants major who were the ‘turnarounds.’ You could guarantee that those people 

were just going to replace one another in choice 

assignments as they moved back and forth across 

the country.” When the Office of Personnel 

Operations became the Military Personnel 

Center (MILPERCEN), this process came into 

the open and ceased. Also, the authority given to 

Sergeant Major of the Army Dunaway to review 

proposed selections of command sergeants major 

became a powerful tool in Van Autreve’s hands 

for eliminating favoritism.

Unlike his predecessors, Van Autreve did 

not receive guidance from the Chief of Staff 

soon after he took office. “I’d been there about 

three or four weeks and I’m getting a little disturbed because the General hadn’t sent for me 

yet. The advice I had gotten was that, ‘The 

General will send for you when he wants to see 

you. Do not intrude.’” Finally, the new SMA 

met the chief in the hallway and asked about 

the matter. Surprised that he had not come in 

earlier, General Abrams quickly placed the 

Van Autreve Takes the Oath of Office of Sergeant Major 

of the Army. Standing Beside Him Is General Abrams.
106

SMA on his “immediate access” list. Van Autreve 

later learned that although the chief had directed a major to report on what the SMA was 

doing, the officer had failed to forward the 

information to the chief ’s office. When Abrams 

saw the reports, his only guidance was, “Just 

keep doing what you’re doing.”

Although SMA Van Autreve had direct 

access to both the Chief of Staff and the Vice 

Chief of Staff, he often preferred not to go to 

that level because he “felt that 95 percent of the 

problems I encountered in the field I should be 

able to take care of by going to action officers.” 

Most of the problems he heard about from his 

travels and phone calls to his office were not 

caused by high-level policies that required the 

attention of the chief. Guidance from the 

experts in the particular field, who could call the 

affected unit, usually solved the problem.

Given the state of the Army after the war in 

Vietnam, Sergeant Major of the Army Van 

Autreve heard a continuous series of complaints 

as he traveled to Army units. Unfortunately, 

young soldiers had become accustomed to 

bypassing their chain of command, as Van 

Autreve had experienced in Alaska. Twentyfour-hour hotlines, junior enlisted and junior 

officer councils, and the open-door policies were 

often overloaded by petty complaints that could 

have been solved more efficiently at a much 

lower level. Van Autreve found that “soldiers had 

been led to believe that they didn’t have to talk 

to noncommissioned officers. We had to reinforce and kind of reinvent the wheel from the 

standpoint of the NCO corps.” To gain a more 

accurate view of the pulse of the Army, he would, 

after talking to groups of soldiers, talk one-onone with Soldiers of the Month, NCOs of the 

Month, and NCOs of the Quarter, that is, some 

of the most dedicated enlisted men. Once he got 

them to relax and open up, he was able to tap 

into the perspectives of soldiers most apt to put 

the needs of the institution before their own 

personal wants.

Back in his office, Van Autreve handled 

complaints flooding in by telephone and mail. 

In most cases he referred them back to the soldier’s first sergeant or sergeant major, whom the 

soldier had usually bypassed. This approach 

reinforced the authority of the NCOs at the 

unit level and gave the SMA office time to 

handle such problems. A typical complaint was 

the lack of transportation in Alaska. When soldiers turned in their automobiles for shipment 

to the lower forty-eight states a few weeks 

before leaving, they were left with no personal 

transportation. For example, walking to the 

commissary at thirty or forty degrees below zero 

was an extreme hardship for such soldiers and 

their families. Having served in Alaska, Van 

Autreve could appreciate the problem and, as 

SMA, draw attention to it.

General Abrams reinforced the success of 

Van Autreve’s predecessors in persuading the 

Army Staff to include the SMA in decisions 

affecting enlisted soldiers. In one case the chief 

asked SMA Van Autreve to listen in on a major 

briefing about moving missiles out of Alaska. 

The briefing officer covered the difficulties of 

moving equipment and the details of its transport. When General Abrams asked Van Autreve 

what he thought of the briefing, he replied, 

“Well sir, we haven’t discussed the people problem.” Van Autreve later recalled that “General 

Abrams hit the table...hard, exclaiming, ‘That’s 

exactly the point. We spent hours talking about 

missiles, but we haven’t spent five minutes talking about the people who are going to be displaced. Where are they going and how are they 

going to get there?’”

Although Sergeant Major Van Autreve 

learned a great deal from official Department of 

Defense and Department of the Army briefings, 

he learned more by talking directly to action officers and noncommissioned officers who dealt 

with daily issues. Not as concerned about making 

an impression, they were more candid; in that 

informal situation, they often passed on more 

detailed information, often not included in their 

briefings to the Chief of Staff. In addition, at this 

lower level, they dealt with problems and issues 

impacting more on the soldier, while the Chief of 

Staff himself tended to focus on those which 

affected the entire Army.
107

One issue that the SMA had to resolve 

was that of MOS reclassification. As the Army 

reduced its strength after Vietnam, it required 

soldiers, particularly NCOs, to change from 

overstrength to understrength MOSs to qualify for promotion. In general, the reclassifications were from noncombat to combat MOSs 

and caused disruptions when, for example, an 

administrative NCO (71L) suddenly became 

an infantryman (11B). On his tours of Army 

posts, the SMA fielded numerous complaints 

regarding the changes, and it was his job to 

respond in laymen’s terms.

As Sergeant Major of the Army, Van 

Autreve’s greatest challenge was the “reincarnation of the NCO corps.” Besides the reclassification of MOSs, the Army initiated the 

Qualitative Management Program to weed out 

substandard NCOs in the course of reducing 

enlisted strength. The SMA received much bitter correspondence from wives whose NCO 

husbands had told them that their career was on 

track, when in fact the NCO had major problems he had not disclosed. Such communications put the SMA in a delicate position. The 

direct approach might well lead to marital problems, compounding an already difficult situation. Instead, Van Autreve tried to contact the 

NCO’s sergeant major, who in turn encouraged 

the sergeant to talk to his wife. But such problems had always afflicted the Army in periods of 

demobilization and downsizing, and often there 

were no easy answers.

As part of the rejuvenation of the NCO 

Corps, Van Autreve gave NCOs more voice in 

command decisions, reduced the Army’s reliance on soldiers’ councils, increased professional 

standards for NCOs, further developed the 

Noncommissioned Officer Education System, 

and encouraged NCOs to have the moral courage to police their own ranks. His tour also saw 

an increased emphasis on training. Standards 

were raised and units encouraged to use their 

training time more efficiently. While on the 

rifle range, soldiers not firing at the moment 

trained in another skill. The use of multiechelon 

training allowed battalions to exercise on one 

level while their unengaged companies, platoons, and squads trained on different tasks. 

The resulting decentralized instruction forced 

NCOs to take more responsibility for training 

their squads, sections, and crews; improved their 

skills; and increased the respect they received 

from their own soldiers.

As did his predecessors, SMA Van Autreve 

had numerous opportunities to talk to members 

of Congress, in both informal discussions and 

formal testimony before the Senate Armed 

Services Committee. Many of his acquaintances 

were committee members who were instrumental in improving Army pay and benefits. As the 

Office of the Sergeant Major of the Army 

became more firmly established, members of 

Congress relied more heavily on the SMAs for 

information concerning the enlisted soldier. 

The SMA and his wife also had several opportunities to visit the White House. When 

Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. 

Ford presented posthumous Medals of Honor, 

Rita Van Autreve consoled the wives of senior 

officials as well as family members. Her husband said later, “Rita, for thirty minutes, had a 

far more demanding job than I had, because 

afterwards, they will talk about the wife of the 

Sergeant Major of the Army.”

The role of the SMA’s wife became important enough that by 1972 the Chief of Staff, 

General Abrams, decided that every SMA 

should be married. Earlier, during Dunaway’s 

tenure, the Army had provided travel funds 

for the SMA’s wife because of her important 

role in family support matters. Rita Van 

Autreve traveled with her husband on all of 

his trips in the United States, continuously 

meeting with groups of Army wives and 

becoming a polished speaker. She often established bonds with soldiers’ wives by reminding 

them that she too had once been the wife of a 

junior enlisted soldier and that she understood 

their problems. As the all-volunteer Army 

became stabilized, with its increasing number 

of married soldiers, addressing the concerns of 

the family became critical. A soldier who felt 

that his family was suffering needlessly 
108

because of his Army service would not likely 

reenlist. Rita Van Autreve was an important 

answer to this growing need.

Van Autreve had always considered the twoyear SMA tour too short, believing that an occupant was only beginning to hit his stride after 

two years. He personally would have liked another year but also believed that after three years “the 

length of service takes a toll. Pretty soon you’re 

getting short with your answers. You’re not 

responding like you should, because you’re tired. 

You know, you’re wearing out,” adding that 

“when I was Sergeant Major of the 317th 

Engineers, I was there a bit too long.” Many 

senior noncommissioned officers also requested 

that Van Autreve serve another year. However, 

General Frederick C. Weyand, who replaced 

General Abrams after his death in 1974, decided 

to keep the SMA tour at two years. In addition, 

General Abrams had already extended Van 

Autreve’s time in service past thirty years so that 

he could serve a full two years as SMA.

When Sergeant Major Van Autreve retired 

on 30 June 1975 with over thirty-one years of 

Army service, he could look back on his tour as 

Sergeant Major of the Army with great satisfaction. The NCO Corps had regained much of the 

stature it had lost during the war in Vietnam. 

The Army’s leadership reestablished the NCO 

chain of command, tightened NCO standards, 

expanded the NCO education system, and, as 

part of the overall reduction in force, forced out 

marginal NCOs. His two years had also seen 

improvements in training and equipment as the 

Army regained its focus after ten years of fighting a low-intensity war of attrition in Vietnam. 

As SMA Van Autreve admitted: “No Sergeant 

Major of the Army can say that he really did

anything. He can say he contributed to an 

accomplishment.” Nevertheless, Sergeant Major 

of the Army Van Autreve made significant contributions to the rejuvenation of the NCO Corps. 

His insistence on uncompromising standards for 

NCOs, his constant efforts to see troop units 

firsthand, and his work with Army Staff action 

officers all ensured that the necessary policies 

were implemented to put the noncommissioned 

officer back into the chain of command.

After a brief illness Leon L.Van Autreve 

passed away in his home in San Antonio, Texas, 

on 14 March 2002. Secretary of the Army 

Thomas White noted that the Army lost a 

patriot, a soldier, and a role model. “We are 

grateful for Sgt. Maj. of the Army Van Autreve’s 

selfless service to our great nation and the soldiers he loved,” White said. “His legacy endures 

forever in our noncommissioned officer corps—

the finest in the world.”2 Van Autreve was laid 

to rest at the Fort Sam Houston National 

Cemetery on 20 March 2002.

At His Retirement Ceremony, SMA Van Autreve Is 

Congratulated by His Successor, SMA William G. 

Bainbridge (left), and Chief of Staff 

General Frederick C. Weyand (center).

2 David Schad, “Former SMA Van Autreve Passes Away,” 

Army News Service, 15 March 02.
109

Assignments

1938–1940 Clerk, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 148th Infantry, 

Ohio Army National Guard, Spencerville, Ohio

1941 Basic Engineer Training, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

1941 185th Engineer Battalion, Fort Campbell, Kentucky

1942–1944 15th Engineer Battalion (Combat), 9th Infantry Division, Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina; North Africa; Sicily; Europe

1945 Headquarters, 723d Railway Operations Battalion, Europe

1946–1948 Student, Ohio Northwestern University (break in service, 1949–1950)

1950–1954 Platoon Sergeant, First Sergeant, HHC, 54th Engineer Battalion, Germany

1954–1958 Senior Instructor, ROTC, University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio

1958–1960 Member, Continental Army Command Armor Board, Fort Knox, Kentucky

1960–1961 First Sergeant, Company B, 8th Engineer Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, 

Republic of Korea

1961–1962 Senior Bridge Instructor, Engineer Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

1962–1963 Sergeant Major, 91st Engineer Battalion, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

1963–1964 Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia

1964–1967 Sergeant Major, 317th Engineer Battalion, Germany

1967–1969 Command Sergeant Major, 20th Engineer Brigade, Republic of Vietnam

1969–1973 Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army, Alaska, Fort Richardson, Alaska

1973–1975 Sergeant Major of the Army

Selected Decorations and Awards

Distinguished Service Medal

Legion of Merit with Two Oak Leaf Clusters

Bronze Star Medal with One Oak Leaf Cluster

Air Medal

Army Commendation Medal with Three Oak Leaf Clusters

Good Conduct Medal with Ten Oak Leaf Clusters

Asiatic-Pacific Theater Campaign Medal

American Campaign Medal

European–African–Middle Eastern Campaign Medal

World War II Victory Medal

Army of Occupation Medal

National Defense Service Medal

Vietnam Service Medal

Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal

Parachutist Badge
110

SMA Bainbridge
A native of rural Galesburg, Illinois, 

William G. Bainbridge was born on 17 

April 1925.1 His family lived on several 

farms in the area, and he attended the nearby 

rural district schools. Bainbridge remembers his 

youth as a time of few material goods when 

everyone in his family had to “pull together.” 

Despite the need to work on his family farm 

and to hire out on other farms for extra cash, he 

enjoyed school and placed a high value on education. Within a matter of weeks of graduating 

from Williamsfield High School in 1943, the 

eighteen-year-old found himself inducted into 

the U.S. Army.

When the United States entered World War 

II, Congress required that all incoming soldiers 

be draftees. This was to allow the War Department 

more flexibility in assigning newly inducted 

troops. As a result, William Bainbridge could not 

immediately follow his older brother into the 

Army. Instead, he had to volunteer for the draft 

in June 1943. “I don’t have any regrets,” he later 

said, “because the thing to do was to go into the 

service, if you could...it just didn’t seem right for 

me not to go.”

After his induction Bainbridge reported to 

Camp Grant, Illinois, where he received his 

first uniforms, the usual medical exam and 

obligatory shots, and a battery of classification 

tests. He was initially offered a chance to serve 

in the Navy, but turned it down: “I can always 

walk farther than I can swim.” He later recalled 

that his first experiences with the Army were 

rather confusing because most of the soldiers 

running Camp Grant had been in the service 

only a matter of weeks and themselves had 

little training or experience.

Bainbridge completed basic training at 

Camp Wallace, Texas, near San Jacinto Beach 

and the city of Galveston. The future Sergeant 

Major of the Army remembers the location as 

having high humidity and mosquitoes so large 

they must have been “crossed with turkeys.” 

However, the seventeen-week course, which 

combined basic and advanced training in antiaircraft artillery, went well for him. “I was in 

good physical shape,” he said, and “I didn’t have 

any problem with the classroom work.” Having 

come off the farm, he felt “invincible.” The 

toughest part of those first weeks was getting 

used to the hectic schedule.

Basic training dictated six-day weeks of 

twelve-hour days beginning at 0500. The regimen included serious physical training, and 

25-mile marches were common, together with 

the ordinary military subjects. There were long 

classes on aircraft identification, but the troops 

practiced dismounted drill only once a week, 

firing the .30- and .50-caliber water-cooled 

machine guns and old British Enfield and 

Springfield M1903 rifles. The M1 semiautomatic rifle, so commonly identified with World 

War II, was not issued to the men in Bainbridge’s 

group until after basic training. Later in their 

training at Camp Wallace, the men learned to 

fire 90-mm. antiaircraft guns. Despite the 

tough training schedule, at formations, when 

the American flag was lowered each evening, 

everyone was attired in Class A uniforms.

Life in the rapidly expanding wartime 

Army often had its dreary side. The newly 

constructed barracks at Camp Wallace and 

other posts had no wall lockers, just open bars 

and beams in the squad bays. The trainees were 

William G. Bainbridge
112

not allowed to have civilian clothes, primarily 

due to the lack of storage space. Every Saturday 

there was a footlocker inspection. Food shortages and poor preparation made meals “terrible” according to Bainbridge, with various goat 

meat dishes sometimes appearing in the mess 

hall.

The war and the rapid expansion of the 

Army made it impossible to find enough experienced soldiers to act as drill sergeants. 

Therefore, most basic training cadre came 

from the existing active-duty force augmented 

by reserve and National Guard personnel of 

limited experience. With the exception of topics like the Articles of War, which required 

instruction by an officer, noncommissioned 

officers carried out all training. Sergeant 

Simpson, the platoon sergeant, left 

a permanent impression on young 

Bainbridge. “He trained us and 

told us the little things that we 

should do...the things you ought 

to do right...he also took care of 

us,” Bainbridge said. He did not 

forget those traits. “You have to 

take care of soldiers,” he told an 

interviewer years later, “and you 

can’t do it by lip service because 

they will find you out in a heartbeat.”

While at Camp Wallace, 

Bainbridge applied for flight 

training. “I wanted to be a hot 

pilot,” he later said. “I liked airplanes...it seemed a little bit more 

glamorous.” Initially he was sent 

to Sheppard Field, near Wichita 

Falls, Texas, for two weeks of orientation. The next stop was the 

University of North Dakota at 

Grand Forks. There, Bainbridge 

packed a year of college education 

into about five months and 

learned to fly a Piper Cub. Having 

completed the initial phase of the 

air cadet program, he next reported to the 

flight-training center at Santa Ana Army Air 

Base, California, in February 1944. The trip 

from North Dakota took six days on a crowded 

troop train. At Santa Ana there were more 

tests and orientations to determine what sort 

of aircraft he was most suited to fly. Shortly 

after his arrival, however, he was told that there 

were more flying cadets than there were planes. 

Anyone with previous ground force training 

was reassigned.

Bainbridge was promptly transferred to 

Lowery Field near Denver, Colorado, for gunnery school. There, he waited six weeks to go 

into training. During that time he worked 

double-shift KP (kitchen police) duty every 

day. In the end Bainbridge was again transferred when the Army determined that it 

already had enough gunnery students. 

Bainbridge at Flying School in Grand Forks, 

North Dakota, 1943
113

Although the end of his flight training was a 

great disappointment, it turned out to be a 

lucky break; by early 1944 U.S. bomber crews 

over Europe were suffering heavy losses.

After a two-week layover awaiting orders at 

Jefferson Barracks, St. Louis, Missouri, Bainbridge 

was ordered to Camp Atterbury, Indiana. He 

found himself assigned to Company A, 423d 

Infantry, part of the newly organized 106th 

Infantry Division. The last division organized for 

service in World War II, the 106th had just come 

back from maneuvers in Louisiana. Many of its 

trained troops, however, had been transferred as 

fillers to other divisions, and the new men had to 

fill the ensuing vacancies. As a private first class, 

Bainbridge was initially assigned as the company 

radioman. However, the company commander 

quickly recognized his leadership potential and 

made him a squad leader with a direct promotion 

to sergeant.

The 106th Infantry Division received its predeployment training at Camp Atterbury. 

Bainbridge remembered that he and his fellow 

soldiers tried to familiarize themselves with the 

new weapons, such as the 37-mm. antitank gun 

and the rocket-launching bazooka. With one 

Browning automatic rifle team, squad tactics were 

limited. Despite the 25-mile endurance hikes, the 

division’s morale was high, with the infantry 

weapons demonstration for Under Secretary of 

War Robert P. Patterson one of the highlights of 

his time at Atterbury. More important, Sergeant 

Bainbridge earned a promotion there as well as 

the Expert Infantry Badge. Beyond the pride, 

professionalism, and leadership earning the award 

demonstrated, the pay raise of five dollars per 

month meant a lot in those days.

In the early fall of 1944 the 106th Division 

prepared to depart for Europe. In October the 

division traveled by troop train to Camp Miles 

Standish, near Boston, to await embarkation. 

After a coordination “SNAFU”—their designated ship was too large to enter Boston harbor—the division again traveled by train to 

New York. There, after loading throughout the 

night, the men of the 106th Division embarked 

on the huge liner Queen Elizabeth. On board, 

they were billeted four and five deep in “staterooms,” spending one night above deck and one 

night below. Again, Bainbridge thought the 

food was terrible—British rations with lots of 

mutton. The trip was uneventful, however, as 

the fast liner, sailing independent of the slow 

convoys, zigzagged across the Atlantic to lessen 

the chance of being torpedoed.

After landing in England, the 106th 

Division spent three weeks at a staging area 

near Cheltenham. There they were outfitted, 

honed their skills in the classroom, and did a 

little sightseeing. The time, however, proved a 

brief respite as it had become evident that the 

war in Europe would not be over that year.

In early December 1944 Sergeant Bainbridge 

and his regiment crossed the English Channel to 

Le Havre, France, and then moved by foot and 

truck to the Siegfried Line in the rugged Schnee 

Eifel (Snow Mountain) sector of Germany, east 

of St. Vith, Belgium. There, they replaced the 2d 

Infantry Division. Bainbridge remembers the 

unit’s being thinly stretched with squads covering 

1,500-meter fronts in their supposedly quiet sector. The 423d Infantry sent out combat patrols to 

gather intelligence but had little idea of what was 

to come. In early December, however, the 

Germans secretly completed the buildup for their 

Ardennes offensive, later known as the Battle of 

the Bulge. Then, on 16 December 1944, “all hell 

broke loose.”

For five days the men of the 423d and other 

units in the Ardennes delayed the German 

advance. Everyone, including cooks and clerks, 

was thrown into the line. But the regiment was 

unequipped to face concentrations of German 

armor exploiting the element of surprise. 

Penetrating gaps in the thinly held line, the 

Germans overran the division rear, and artillery 

support immediately slackened. Meanwhile, rain, 

snow, and fog prevented American warplanes 

from supporting the ground forces. On 18 

December powerful German panzer and infantry 

units isolated the 422d and 423d Infantries from 

each other and cut them off from the rest of the 

division. By then the 423d had suffered over 300 

casualties, spent all of its mortar rounds, lost most 
114

of its machine guns, and run short of rifle ammunition. The next day German artillery swept the 

regiment’s front, and shortly afterward, enemy 

infantry coursed over the American positions. 

With the 423d cut off, tactical control and supporting fire gone, increasing numbers of wounded, and rifle ammunition down to just five rounds 

per man, the regiment surrendered on 19 

December.2 “We traded our lives and space for 

time,” Bainbridge later said of their action in the 

snow. The 106th’s stiff resistance was a major factor in upsetting the German timetable for reaching the Meuse and cutting off the Allied armies 

from their vital logistical lifelines at Antwerp.

The Germans searched the captured 

Americans of the 423d and immediately segregated the officers, NCOs, and privates. 

Alternating sets of guards then marched them 

to a railhead. Bainbridge and the other POWs 

spent the next five nights and four days packed 

into freight cars with straw-covered floors with 

neither food nor toilets. Water was available 

only once to the prisoners when Allied war 

planes caused a delay and other POWs forced 

to work on the railroad gave them some. 

Bainbridge and his fellow soldiers were finally 

unloaded at Stalag 9B, Bad Orb, east of 

Frankfurt. Three weeks later the NCOs were 

taken to Stalag 9A at Ziegenhain near Giessen.

Prisoner-of-war camp conditions were 

intolerable. More than 3,000 Allied soldiers 

filled the camp, with 250 men stuffed into each 

barrack. Despite the often subfreezing temperatures, outside latrines were necessary supplements to the single ones inside. Since baths and 

mandatory delousing came but every six weeks, 

the men, their bedding, and clothes were infested with vermin. Rations consisted of two-thirds 

of a canteen cup of vegetable soup each day with 

a slice of black bread on Sunday. Sometimes the 

Germans included a little horsemeat. Sergeant 

Bainbridge later recalled, “my love of country, 

the way I was brought up, and my family life 

helped sustain me.”

The American 6th Armored Division liberated Stalag 9A on Good Friday in 1945 and 

provided needed medical attention and decent 

food. The repatriated GIs at first received soup 

and bread, a loaf and a half at a time. After ten 

days of rebuilding their strength, Bainbridge 

and his fellow soldiers flew to Camp Lucky 

Strike, near Le Havre. There, they received an 

additional two weeks of medical care and as 

much food as they cared to eat. Finally, they 

convoyed home by ship. The return crossing 

took two weeks with hundreds of former POWs 

and rotating aircrew members on board.

The war concluded shortly after Sergeant 

Bainbridge’s return to the United States. After 

three days at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, he 

went to Fort Sheridan, Illinois, where he was 

given sixty days of leave. Like many others, he 

immediately returned to his hometown for a 

reunion with family, friends, and other veterans. On 20 June 1945, he married Hazel Smith 

Bainbridge as a Prisoner of War Shortly Before Being 

Liberated from Stalag 9A
115

of Momence, Illinois, a girl whom he had 

known since grade school.

At the conclusion of his leave, Bainbridge 

reported to Miami Beach, Florida. He shared a 

hotel with nearly 700 other soldiers and dependents all awaiting reassignment. Transferred to 

Camp Maxie, near Paris, Texas, he was soon 

joined by his new wife and lived in an upstairs 

room and bath, while working as an armorer at 

an infantry replacement training base. Hazel 

Bainbridge returned home to Illinois when her 

husband again transferred to Camp Roberts, 

California. There, on 7 December 1945, 

Bainbridge received his discharge and returned 

to civilian life in Galesburg, Illinois.

When fighting broke out in Korea in 1950 

William Bainbridge had been a farmer in 

Victoria, Illinois, for several years. During that 

time he had joined the Army Reserve, and in 

October 1950 he was recalled to active duty. 

Granted a delay to harvest the crops and settle 

his personal affairs, he finally reported for duty 

in January 1951.

Recalled as a staff sergeant, Bainbridge 

in-processed at Fort Sheridan and was told 

that he would be sent to Camp Breckenridge, 

Kentucky. He instead ended up at Camp 

Atterbury, where he had been with the 106th 

Infantry Division during the last war. He 

served as platoon sergeant, then first sergeant 

(as a sergeant first class, E–6) of the 5012th 

Army Service Unit, a joint Army–Air Force 

food service school.3 After a year the Army 

consolidated that and other Army school elements at Fort Sheridan, where Bainbridge 

became the personnel NCO. A year later a 

second consolidation transferred Bainbridge 

to Fort Riley, Kansas. As the period of his 

recall was about to expire, Bainbridge requested enlistment in the Regular Army with the 

intention of becoming a career soldier. After a 

grade determination, he reenlisted as a sergeant first class.

In February 1958 Bainbridge departed for 

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, to become the 

operations sergeant of the 3d Battalion, 4th 

Training Regiment, which then included the 

Fifth Army food service school. His elevenmonth tour there resulted in his first decoration, 

the Army Commendation Medal. Bainbridge 

was then assigned to VII Corps in Stuttgart, 

Germany, in January 1959. His family, which 

now included two daughters, had been living in 

house trailers for nearly a decade. In Germany, 

conditions were little better. After traveling to 

Europe by ship, the Bainbridge family found 

itself separated due to the lack of family quarters. Hazel and the children lived in Warner 

Kaserne near Munich, nearly three and a half 

hours by automobile from Stuttgart. “They had 

been maid’s quarters,” Bainbridge remembered, 

“the worst quarters we ever had.”

At the time the VII Corps included two 

cavalry regiments, three infantry divisions, and 

two armored divisions. At the corps headquarters, Bainbridge served successively as operations sergeant, G–3 air sergeant, and secret 

document control NCO for the corps G–3.

Reassigned to Fort Riley in August 1962, 

Bainbridge found himself returning to Europe 

four months later. The construction of the 

Berlin Wall caused that unexpected turn of 

events. The military and diplomatic crisis that 

followed led to a partial mobilization, and 

Bainbridge became the acting sergeant major of 

the 1st Battle Group, 28th Infantry, on its initial 

deployment to Operation Long Thrust.4 In 

February 1963 he received his permanent promotion to the newly established grade of E–9. 

The 1st Battle Group was later reorganized into 

the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 28th Infantry as 

part of the Reorganization Objective Army 

Divisions (ROAD) program.

In August 1965, three years after his first 

assignment to the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, 

Sergeant Major Bainbridge deployed with the 

1st Infantry Division to Vietnam. During the 

movement of the division, Bainbridge served as 

sergeant major of the troopship carrying some 

of the men and their equipment into combat. 

Serving in the Big Red One first in War Zone 

C at Phuoc Vinh, north of Saigon, he was later 

selected by Maj. Gen. Jonathan O. Seaman, 

commander of the newly created II Field Force 
116

at Long Binh, as his sergeant major. The II 

Field Force, a corps-level organization, included 

the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, a brigade of 

the 101st Airborne Division, and the 11th 

Armored Cavalry Regiment. General Seaman, 

who had previously commanded the 1st Infantry 

Division when it was deployed to Vietnam, had 

obviously been impressed with Bainbridge’s 

performance.

In Vietnam, Sergeant Major Bainbridge had 

quickly earned a reputation for always accompanying his men on their field operations. At first 

he noticed improvements resulting from the 

changes in training made since World War II. 

Later, however, he judged that the situation had 

changed for the worse, especially when replacements came to Vietnam. The one-year tours of 

duty for soldiers caused a continual turnover of 

personnel. Also, NCOs were lost due to battle 

casualties and the lack of any mobilization to tap 

the senior enlisted men in the reserve components. His experience led him to become a strong 

supporter of the Noncommissioned Officer 

Candidate Course (NCOCC) established to 

help solve those problems.

In September 1966 Bainbridge became sergeant major of the Infantry Training Center at 

Fort Benning, Georgia. He remained there until 

August 1967, when he was reassigned to First 

Army headquarters at Fort George G. Meade, 

Maryland. Bainbridge began to identify and 

solve soldier problems at both posts.

At Fort Benning he drastically reduced the 

assignment of trainees to post details and reduced 

harassment. At First Army, Bainbridge believed, 

his greatest accomplishment was bringing the 

NCOs together to work as a cohesive group. He 

also worked on solving the chronic problem of 

finding adequate quarters for NCOs.

Bainbridge became sergeant major of U.S. 

Army, Pacific (USARPAC), at Fort Shafter, 

Hawaii, in January 1969. The designee for that 

post, Sgt. Maj. Joseph A. Venable, had died in a 

helicopter crash in Vietnam, so Bainbridge 

accepted the challenge. He served as a “voice of 

the soldiers,” establishing a good working relationship with General Ralph E. Haines, Jr., 

USARPAC commander. Bainbridge traveled 

with General Haines on numerous trips to U.S. 

and allied bases around the Pacific rim and 

coordinated the first command-wide sergeants 

major meeting that brought in senior noncommissioned officers from major Army headquarters in USARPAC and on a rotating basis from 

Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, and 

Indonesia. At the same time he continued to 

work closely with senior NCOs of the U.S. 

Army, Vietnam, and Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam, as well as the senior 

enlisted personnel at Pacific Air Force, Pacific 

Fleet, Marine units, Coast Guard stations, and 

Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), 

headquarters in Hawaii. Bainbridge left 

USARPAC in October 1972.

In February 1968 the Command Sergeants 

Major Board had selected Bainbridge to be one 

of the first command sergeants major in the 

Army. That elite group included Sergeant Major 

of the Army Wooldridge and three other future 

CSM Bainbridge Is Initiated into the Pleiku Elephant 

Riding Society in Phu Nhon District, Vietnam, 1969.
117

Sergeants Major of the Army—George 

Dunaway, Silas Copeland, and Leon Van 

Autreve. It came as no great surprise when Col. 

Karl Morton, the first commandant of the 

newly established Sergeants Major Academy at 

Fort Bliss, Texas, selected Bainbridge as the 

academy’s command sergeant major.

The education and training of noncommissioned officers had gradually improved since 

World War II, but the Army needed a senior 

NCO school as a capstone for the 

Noncommissioned Officer Education System 

(NCOES), which had evolved from the 

Noncommissioned Officer Academies originating in the late 1950s. Having seen the benefits 

of enhanced NCO professional development 

while at the same time being unable to attend 

an NCO academy himself because of critical 

duties, Sergeant Major Bainbridge was particularly pleased to be part of the first staff and 

faculty of the new Sergeants Major Academy, 

now a formal senior enlisted service school.

The three years that Sergeant Major 

Bainbridge and his wife spent at Fort Bliss were 

rewarding, if somewhat challenging at first. Once 

again, they had to contend with a shortage of 

family quarters (a consistent worry for NCOs 

that Bainbridge would later make a priority as 

Sergeant Major of the Army), together with borrowed offices and other unfinished facilities. 

Nevertheless, Mrs. Bainbridge continued the 

involvement in community affairs that had 

marked her previous tours with her husband. 

Bainbridge himself later credited the work of his 

wife as the foundation of much of his success. 

Bainbridge’s own sense of history, both 

institutional and personal, was always a part 

of his life and career. Twenty years later, 

Bainbridge asserted that “World War II was 

won in the [prewar] classrooms at the Army 

War College and the Command and General 

Staff College,” adding that “the conflict in the 

[Persian] Gulf was won by the NCO 

Education System.” The academy, he felt, was 

the capstone of that system.

In July 1975 Army Chief of Staff General 

Frederick C. Weyand selected Bainbridge to 

serve as his Sergeant Major of the Army. The 

president of the selection board was Lt. Gen. 

John Forrest, with Maj. Gens. James Hamlet, 

John W. McEnery, and David E. Ott and outgoing Sergeant Major of the Army Leon L. Van 

Autreve serving as members. Bainbridge later 

remembered the board as one of the two best he 

had ever faced, the other being the board that 

chose the previous Sergeant Major of the Army 

in 1973. “There were fair questions,” he said. 

“There were no trick questions at all. It just was 

a good board.”

In outlining the duties of the office, General 

Weyand asked Bainbridge to look for “things 

you think soldiers need, that they’re not getting. 

Let us know if we can help from this office.” In 

practice Bainbridge found the new job comfortable and the “formidable” Pentagon generals 

supportive. Bainbridge had few problems adapting to his new surroundings. 

Bainbridge already knew many on the Army 

Staff from previous assignments. “I couldn’t 

travel anywhere or go into any office,” he later 

said, “without running into someone who had 

been through that academy, or who had served 

with me at USARPAC or at First Army. So it 

was sort of like ‘old home week,’ really.” It was 

thus easy to work with General Weyand and the 

various action officers on his staff. “I took issues 

to the Chief of Staff or the Vice-chief of Staff 

only if absolutely necessary,” he said. “I always 

found that it was much easier to work with the 

staff, who used their natural expertise and their 

desire to get things done in their own bailiwicks, rather than have it come from the Chief 

as a directive.”

From time to time Sergeant Major 

Bainbridge had to venture into new areas. For 

example, he began to accompany the Chief of 

Staff to congressional hearings, even testifying 

himself. Regarding such topics as commissary 

operations, troop strength, housing problems, 

pay, and personnel policies, not to mention soldier morale, congressmen put special value on 

the words of the Army’s senior enlisted soldier.

Sergeant Major of the Army Bainbridge 

also traveled extensively. He made it a point to 
118

visit troops in Europe, Korea, and the Far East 

each year. He also tried to visit as many big 

stateside installations as possible, often hitting 

reserve and National Guard units in conjunction with such travels. He later admitted that 

seeing everyone was impossible and his itinerary 

had to be guided by necessity and events. 

Although many of his visits were at the request 

of the host installation, he insisted that his 

travel would be troop oriented.

His visit to Johnston Island was typical. The 

Army troops on that Pacific isle served isolated 

tours, away from their families and without 

many of the amenities of normal posts. Their 

“theater,” for example, was merely an open area 

where a screen and projector could be erected at 

night when the weather cooperated. SMA 

Bainbridge convinced the Army and Air Force 

Exchange System (AAFES) to bring good 

entertainment to a hardship duty station at no 

cost. The prestige of his office was such that he 

could call the AAFES commander directly and 

request that he give attention to the situation on 

Johnston Island.

Sergeant Major Bainbridge followed the 

examples of his predecessors and had his wife 

accompany him when he made official visits. 

The additional information she gathered and 

the reassurance her presence gave soldiers’ families were so valuable that the practice has been 

continued by successive Sergeants Major of the 

Army. (The positive impact had not been lost 

on the Chiefs of Staff. During the tenure of 

Sergeant Major of the Army Dunaway, General 

SMA Bainbridge Talks with a Soldier During Exercise REFORGER 1979.
119

Abrams had made it a matter of policy that the 

Sergeant Major of the Army should be married.) Remembering his own experiences, 

Sergeant Major Bainbridge was convinced that 

Army leaders “have to take care of the family. If 

you don’t, you’re going to lose a soldier.”

As the others before him, Sergeant Major 

Bainbridge received dozens of complaints each 

week from enlisted soldiers. Although he 

believed that 90 percent of those written complaints could have been handled through command channels, he attempted to resolve every 

one of them. In many cases, he believed, the 

soldiers involved simply wanted advice and the 

personal touch. He took his role as the voice of 

the soldier in the Office of the Army Chief of 

Staff very seriously.

Bainbridge served as Sergeant Major of the 

Army for four years, formally ending the twoyear tradition. General Bernard W. Rogers, who 

replaced Weyand as Chief of Staff in October 

1976, had asked Bainbridge to remain in office 

to push through his initiatives. Although the 

Sergeant Major was glad to have the opportunity to work with an officer whose confidence 

he enjoyed, he was reluctant to break the tradition of serving for a short period with one Chief 

of Staff and thought it important to keep the 

established selection process intact. He agreed 

with Sergeant Major of the Army Dunaway 

that keeping a fresh flow of ideas from recent 

troop experience was critical.5 General Rogers, 

however, convinced Bainbridge to continue 

serving as SMA for the duration of his own 

term as Army Chief of Staff.

Among the accomplishments of Bainbridge’s 

term as Sergeant Major of the Army, he felt 

proudest of securing permanent funding for the 

NCOES. Next he valued his work on the Army 

Policy Council to which General Weyand 

appointed him. In keeping with his feeling that 

the duties of the Office of Sergeant Major of the 

Army were best carried out by working with the 

appropriate action and staff officers, Bainbridge 

was instrumental in having senior NCOs placed 

on the General Staff. He served on the Army 

Uniform Board during his entire tenure and 

designed the insignia of rank for the Sergeant 

Major of the Army that was used until October 

1994: two stars between three chevrons and three 

lower arcs.

Bainbridge believed that the Office of 

Sergeant Major of the Army changed with each 

incumbent and each Chief of Staff. He enjoyed 

“having the entire Army to explore.” Although 

he was not a policy maker, he influenced several 

key decisions affecting the Army of the future. 

“What was good enough yesterday,” he said, 

“certainly is not going to be good enough 

tomorrow.” A strong believer that command 

sergeants major, indeed all senior NCOs, are 

teachers, Sergeant Major Bainbridge judged as 

vital their role in passing on information to the 

new soldiers entering the Army.

Despite all his accomplishments, SMA 

Bainbridge left office recognizing that there 

were many unresolved issues. He regretted the 

amount of time it often took to get things done 

and was especially frustrated by selected noncommissioned officers who declined attendance 

at the Sergeants Major Academy.

The retirement ceremony for Sergeant 

Major of the Army Bainbridge took place at 

Fort Myer on 18 June 1979. It was quite a 

thrill for him to review the Old Guard with 

the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the 

Army and received the Distinguished Service 

Medal while his family watched. As Sergeant 

Major of the Army, Bainbridge had met both 

Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter. 

Speaking of his retirement ceremony, however, 

Sergeant Major Bainbridge said, “It can’t get 

much better than that.”

In a sense, Bainbridge served beyond his 

retirement. For many years he had been active in 

the Association of the United States Army and 

the Noncommissioned Officers Association. 

That work continued. In addition, he served as 

secretary to the Board of Commissioners of the 

Soldiers’ and Airmen’s Home in Washington, 

D.C., for three years and for nine years as its first 

director of member services.

The new Chief of Staff, General Edward 

C. Meyer, honored Sergeant Major Bainbridge 
120

after his retirement by presenting him with the 

Army General Staff Identification Badge, only 

recently authorized for NCOs. It recognized 

that he “was the one individual most responsible for the assignment and recognition of 

Senior Staff Noncommissioned Officers to 

positions of responsibility as action officers on 

the Army General Staff and to the Army 

Secretariat.”

“He worked continuously,” SMA William 

A. Connelly later stated, “to expand the role of 

the Senior Noncommissioned Officer within 

the Headquarters, Department of the Army.”6

As Bainbridge once said, “You’ve got to trust 

your noncommissioned officers, because that’s 

what they’re there for.” He devoted his career 

to that ideal.

1. Except as noted, this section is based on 

Interv, Erwin H. Koehler with William G. 

Bainbridge, 10 Mar 94, Palm Bay, Fla.

2. The predicament of the 423d that SMA 

Bainbridge described is amplified by Hugh M. 

Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, U.S. 

Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: 

Center of Military History, 1994), pp. 65–66. 

Information from that study has been used here 

to enhance the points Bainbridge made in his 

interview of March 1994.

3. Prior to the creation of pay grades E–8 

and E–9, the ranks of staff sergeant, sergeant 

first class, platoon sergeant, and first sergeant 

were one grade lower than they are today.

4. Operation Long Thrust was a tactical 

deployment of troops from the continental 

United States to Europe during what has become 

known as the Berlin Crisis.

5. Interv, Erwin H. Koehler with George W. 

Dunaway, Dec 93, Las Vegas, Nevada.

6. Memo, SMA William A. Connelly for 

the Director of the Army Staff, 13 Dec 79, 

author’s files, CMH.

Notes
121

Assignments

1943 Inducted into service, Camp Grant, Illinois, and Basic Training, 

Camp Wallace, Texas

1943–1944 Air Cadet, U.S. Army Air Forces, University of North Dakota;

Santa Ana, California

1944–1945 Squad Leader, Company A, 423d Infantry, 106th Infantry Division, Europe

(break in service, 1946–1950)

1951–1958 Platoon Sergeant, Personnel NCO, First Sergeant, 5012th Army Service 

Unit, Fort Sheridan, Illinois; Camp Atterbury, Indiana; Fort Riley, Kansas

1958–1959 Operations Sergeant, 3d Battalion, 4th Training Regiment,

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri

1959–1962 Operations Sergeant, G–3 Air Sergeant, Secret Document Control NCO, 

Headquarters, VII Corps, Stuttgart, Germany

1962–1965 Sergeant Major, 1st Battle Group, 28th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division,

Fort Riley, Kansas

1965–1966 Sergeant Major, 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry; Sergeant Major, II Field

Force, Republic of Vietnam

1966–1967 Sergeant Major, Infantry Training Center, Fort Benning, Georgia

1967–1968 Sergeant Major, First United States Army, 

Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

1969–1972 Command Sergeant Major, United States Army, Pacific,

Fort Shafter, Hawaii

1972–1975 Command Sergeant Major, Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas

1975–1979 Sergeant Major of the Army

Selected Decorations and Awards

Distinguished Service Medal

Legion of Merit with Two Oak Leaf Clusters

Bronze Star Medal

Purple Heart with One Oak Leaf Cluster

Air Medal

Army Commendation Medal with Three Oak Leaf Clusters

Good Conduct Medal with Ten Oak Leaf Clusters

American Campaign Medal

European–North African–Middle Eastern Campaign Medal

World War II Victory Medal

National Defense Service Medal

Army of Occupation Medal

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal

Vietnam Service Medal

Prisoner of War Medal

Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal

Combat Infantryman Badge
122

SMA Connelly
William A. Connelly was born on 2 

June 1931 in Monticello, Georgia, 

and lived in a small town or rural setting until he graduated from high school.1 During 

the summers he worked in the local peach-packing plants and later in a dairy. He then attended 

Georgia Southwestern College, driving a school 

bus in Americus, Georgia, to pay his tuition. He 

intended to major in agriculture and work in soil 

conservation, but the lure of $33.00 every three 

months in the Georgia National Guard led him 

to enlist in 1949. His pay more than covered his 

annual college tuition of $37.50. He became a 

private in Company C, 190th Tank Battalion, 

stationed in Americus. After his first summer at 

Camp Stewart, he was promoted to private first 

class and before finishing college had progressed 

through the ranks to sergeant.

Weekly National Guard drill sessions lasted 

for only a couple of hours, and soldiers forgot 

what they had learned from one meeting to the 

next. Some of the noncommissioned officers 

(NCOs) and officers, although combat veterans 

of World War II, had served in the Army Air 

Corps or in the Seabees (Navy construction battalions) during the war and knew little about 

tanks or peacetime soldiering. However, the 

unit benefited from the camaraderie of a group 

of lifetime friends and neighbors. NCOs and 

soldiers downplayed rank and deference to 

superiors. The soldier in charge of a project or 

detail was the one who knew best how to get it 

done, regardless of rank. 

Sergeant Connelly’s time in the National 

Guard made its imprint on him. He left the 

190th with a love for tanks and an understanding of the difficulty of training a National 

Guard unit for war. Both impressions impacted 

on decisions he would make later in his career.

After finishing two years of college, 

Connelly landed a job in Macon and continued 

his education. He had to drive seventy miles to 

attend National Guard meetings, and when he 

missed some of them his commander told him 

he might be drafted. Instead, Connelly and several friends decided to join the Marine Corps. 

The Marine recruiter accepted them, but their 

company commander declared them essential to 

the National Guard. In the end, Connelly volunteered to be drafted into the Army. Unaware 

of the law that allowed him to go into the 

Regular Army retaining his previous rank, he 

became a “slick-sleeve” private all over again. 

However, after a personnel officer had screened 

his records, Connelly was quickly promoted to 

sergeant first class (E–6).

In March 1954 Connelly formally entered 

the active Army at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, 

where he went through basic training with 

recruits destined for the 82d Airborne Division. 

Eight weeks later, he moved to Fort Knox, 

Kentucky, for Advanced Individual Training 

(AIT) with the 761st Tank Battalion. Due to his 

previous experience and rank, he soon became a 

tank commander and “Trainee of the Cycle.” 

Being older and senior in rank presented 

both problems and benefits. He was somewhat 

out of shape compared with the younger soldiers and despite his rank felt that he did not 

know what he thought an NCO should know. 

Age gave him the maturity to see his own shortcomings. He sat down with the instructors at 

night to talk over what he knew and what he 

still needed to learn. He developed the habit of 

William A. Connelly
124

assessing the training techniques of the instructors, using the ones he found effective later in 

his own career. The exposure to soldiers from 

different parts of the country and from different 

ethnic groups broadened the perspective of this 

country boy from a small southern town.

During his training, Sergeant First Class 

Connelly took the Officer Candidate Test and 

scored high enough for the examining corporal to ask him if he wanted to attend Officer 

Candidate School. Connelly replied, “Hell, no. 

I want to serve my two years and get out of 

here.” He soon changed his mind, however. 

He later earned a reserve commission and 

would serve over thirty years as an enlisted 

man in the Regular Army.

After AIT Connelly became a tank commander in Company B, 761st Tank Battalion, 

on a permanent basis. The battalion, assigned to 

the 3d Armored Division, had two missions, 

supporting the Armor School and training for 

its wartime roles. At the time, AIT students 

normally trained as part of “packet platoons” 

and later deployed overseas as a unit, maintaining the cohesion developed during AIT. After 

the first eight-week cycle, Connelly progressed 

to platoon sergeant and later to company first 

sergeant, all in the same company in which he 

had received his training.

He received the assignment as first sergeant 

by volunteering when the incumbent received 

orders for Europe. Sergeant First Class Connelly 

was only twenty-three and had “the least experience of anybody there.” But because no one else 

volunteered and he felt sorry for the lieutenant, 

Connelly told him, “Well, if nobody else will take 

the job, I’ll take it.” Fortunately, the battalion 

sergeant major took him under his wing and 

taught him the first sergeant’s administrative 

duties—suspense files, morning reports, AWOL/

absentee baggage, and so forth. When a master 

sergeant reported into the unit, Connelly became 

the “field first,” the NCO who led the company 

in the field while the assigned first sergeant 

handled administrative duties in garrison. Later, 

as the Army grew more complex, an administrative warrant officer appeared in each tank company to free the first sergeant for his more traditional duties with soldiers.

The pace of promotions became glacial 

after the Korean War. “It seemed like, for several years, someone had to die or retire to create 

a vacancy.” Even NCOs who had been promoted during the war had to worry about keeping their rank. These were the days of the 

“blood stripe”: Since promotions were more 

decentralized than they are today, an NCO who 

got another in trouble could often get his stripe. 

Recognizing the effect such stagnation of promotions had on morale, the Army eventually 

created the NCO “supergrades,” E–8 (master 

sergeant or first sergeant) and E–9 (sergeant 

major) in 1958.

Life for soldiers with families could be difficult. Quarters were available only for senior 

NCOs and officers, and real estate agents took 

advantage of soldiers looking for housing downtown. Low pay made it difficult to own a car to 

commute to work, so many carpooled. “Sergeants 

first class, staff sergeants, and master sergeants 

had the same hard time that privates, first class, 

and specialists have today.”

In January 1955 Connelly, still a sergeant 

first class, received orders for his first overseas 

tour of duty and a chance to soldier in a tank 

unit with a wartime mission. The 826th Tank 

Battalion was in Hammelburg, Germany, the 

site of General George S. Patton’s abortive raid 

to free American prisoners of war in 1945. The 

826th was part of the 19th Armored Group, a 

combined-arms unit with armored infantry and 

artillery in addition to tank battalions. Connelly 

became a tank commander and attended a tank 

commanders’ course on gunnery, maintenance, 

and tactics at Vilseck. Despite his relative lack of 

experience in armor, after the course Connelly 

“knew that tank as well as any of my crew members and as well as any other tank commander.” 

Unlike those at Fort Knox, the tankers in 

Germany had the opportunity to fire all of the 

gunnery tables and, before Germany negotiated 

the Status of Forces Agreement, could freely 

maneuver over the countryside. Since that 

assignment, Connelly preferred duty overseas, 
125

which was geared toward a real wartime mission, 

to that at stateside posts. During his tour, he 

again became a platoon sergeant.

Not long after Connelly’s arrival in 

Germany, Hammelburg returned to German 

control and the 826th moved to Schweinfurt. A 

year later it rotated to Fort Benning, Georgia, as 

part of Operation Gyroscope, exchanging 

equipment with the 714th Tank Battalion. By 

moving as a unit, the 826th retained its cohesion and teamwork. At Fort Benning, Georgia, 

Sergeant First Class Connelly served as a platoon sergeant and later as a battalion operations 

sergeant until 1958.

Connelly had been in the United States 

only two years when he returned to Germany. 

This time he went to Fürth, assigned as a platoon sergeant in the 2d Battalion, 67th Armor. 

The battalion was equipped with the heavy 

M103 tank, armed with a 105-mm. gun. The 

shortage of officers meant that he was a platoon 

sergeant for a platoon leader who was also a 

sergeant first class. Although the platoon leader 

was “a good guy,” Connelly was the only NCO 

drawing proficiency pay. He told his company 

commander, “If there is going to be a platoon 

leader in this outfit, it’s probably going to be 

me.” Having two NCOs of the same grade in 

the same platoon appeared a bad idea. To solve 

the problem, the captain transferred Connelly 

to another company, where he served as a platoon sergeant with no officer. While in Fürth, 

he was promoted to the pay grade of E–7. He 

served in the 67th Armor until 1961.

Once back in the United States, Connelly 

was assigned to the 3d Medium Tank Battalion, 

32d Armor, 24th Infantry Division, at Fort 

Stewart, Georgia. His stateside respite lasted all 

of thirty days. In 1961 the Berlin Crisis erupted 

as the Soviets threatened to unilaterally disrupt 

the status quo in the former German capital and 

allowed the Communist East German government to build the infamous Berlin Wall to prevent East Germans from escaping to freedom in 

the West. The 24th Division reinforced U.S. 

forces in Germany, with the 3d Battalion 

assigned to Augsburg. 

Shortly thereafter the battalion was issued 

the new M60 tank. Sergeant Connelly had 

“never seen the morale of a unit increase as 

much as when we got seventeen brand-new 

M60 tanks. It was like every soldier had a 

brand-new Cadillac.” The M60 was diesel 

powered, making it less likely to catch fire if 

hit; carried the more potent 105-mm. gun; was 

more mobile; and best of all, was almost 

Connelly (right) Relaxes with Fellow NCOs at the Seventh Army NCO Academy.
126

impossible to fuel with five-gallon fuel cans, 

which relieved tankers of one of their more 

onerous tasks.2 The sense of pride in the new 

tanks added to Connelly’s great satisfaction in 

serving with several excellent NCOs and officers. Two of his company commanders later 

became general officers.

In those days before extensive involvement 

in Vietnam, the Army was stable and units in 

Europe could spend a great deal of time on 

training. Experienced officers and NCOs continually taught classes on tank gunnery and 

tactics, as well as everything from map reading 

to first aid. The crisis in Berlin and the proximity of Warsaw Pact forces added a sense of 

urgency to such efforts. 

During this tour Connelly was promoted 

and assigned as the battalion operations sergeant and later company first sergeant. After the 

promotion, Col. Norman Stanfield, the commander, informed Connelly of his next position 

in no uncertain terms: “Look, I’ve listened to 

the reasons why you didn’t want to be ops sergeant, but when you come back Monday morning, you are going to be the battalion operations 

sergeant.” Acquiescing to the commander’s 

wishes, Connelly “spent a good time as ops sergeant and never regretted it.” In 1964 First 

Sergeant Connelly was reassigned to Fort 

Stewart, this time to the 4th Battalion, 68th 

Armor, 2d Infantry Division.

At Stewart, Connelly began what he 

thought would be a three-year tour in the 

United States after he had spent so much of his 

career overseas. That was not to be. Unrest in 

the Dominican Republic led to the deployment 

of U.S. forces to protect American lives and 

stabilize the country. After the lightly armed 

contingents of the XVIII Airborne Corps 

arrived under the auspices of the Organization 

of American States, the need for armor quickly 

became apparent. A handpicked company from 

the 68th Armor was selected to deploy as a 

show of force. As the headquarters company 

first sergeant, Connelly had been trying to move 

into a line company. He got his chance when 

the other first sergeants turned out to be nondeployable and he was selected to go with the 

deploying company. 

The company embarked on a landing ship, 

tank (LST), and departed without knowing its 

destination. Upon arrival in the Dominican 

Republic, it disembarked, met elements of the 

82d Airborne Division, and set up a perimeter. 

After a week, the company sent a tank company 

through the streets of the capital to run rebel 

forces out. The tankers operated under strict 

rules of engagement. They could return fire 

with their .45-caliber pistols if fired upon but 

needed clearance from the company commander to fire their tank submachine guns. The 

XVIII Airborne Corps commander, Lt. Gen. 

Bruce Palmer, Jr., had to approve the firing of 

the coaxial .30-caliber machine gun. To fire the 

.50-caliber machine gun, the tankers had to get 

approval from the theater commander, a 

Brazilian general. To fire the 90-mm. main gun, 

they needed Pentagon approval. Fortunately, the 

company never got into a firefight that required 

that it fire its main tank guns. Generally, 

General Palmer used the company as a show of 

Connelly on Duty in the Dominican Republic, 1965
127

force wherever fighting broke out—the arrival 

of tanks being sufficient in many cases to stop 

the fighting immediately.

The deadliest enemy was boredom. The 

company leaders kept the men occupied without allowing them to leave the perimeter by 

holding area beautification contests and taking 

organized trips to the beach to swim. Their task 

was made easier by the fact that the unit was 

composed of the best 110 soldiers from an 

already tight-knit battalion. The company 

remained in the Dominican Republic for ten 

months, until elections were held and the situation stabilized. Thirty days after the company 

arrived back at Fort Stewart, it redeployed to 

Fort Knox and became part of the 66th Armor 

with a mission of supporting the Armor School.

In December 1966 Master Sergeant 

Connelly was reassigned to the Georgia National 

Guard as an adviser. He went to a tank battalion 

in Macon but moved on to Griffin with the 

196th Cavalry Squadron, serving as senior adviser with no officers assigned over him. The squadron was spread out across Georgia, and many of 

its personnel drilled on weekdays rather than on 

weekends. This required a great deal of flexibility 

on Connelly’s part. The squadron NCOs held 

the organization together despite frequent 

changes and redesignations. “They were a cav 

squadron one year, then an engineer unit the next 

year, the next year a straight tank battalion, the 

next year armored infantry.”

Most Guardsmen joined the unit partly to 

supplement their income, but some enlisted to 

avoid the draft as the war in Vietnam escalated. 

Connelly recalls, “We had a waiting list to 

join...and I don’t remember how many times I 

was offered bribes. Influential people would call 

me up about getting people into the unit.” 

Personnel turnover, the lack of combat experience, the lack of officer education programs, and 

the limited 38-day training year made it almost 

impossible for the squadron to adequately prepare for war: “Every summer camp that I went 

to was like starting all over again.” Although 

Connelly felt frustrated by having to put the 

best face on the dismal level of training achieved, 

he considered the assignment rewarding because 

he worked with dedicated NCOs who had a 

“lifetime invested in their unit.”

In October 1969 he received orders for 

Troop B, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry 

Division, stationed in Quan Loi, Republic of 

Vietnam. There, he would continue his long 

line of tours as a troop first sergeant, serving in 

that capacity for the entire one-year tour. Troop 

B, an air cavalry unit, flew almost continuous 

combat missions and became one of the most 

highly decorated units in Vietnam. Connelly’s 

troop had over 600 soldiers and 54 warrant officers (pilots and copilots), but only a few NCOs 

had previous combat experience in Vietnam and 

only one from Korea. Many of the squad leaders 

were privates first class who had attended the 

Noncommissioned Officer Candidate Course 

(NCOCC).3

During one operation, a rifle platoon rappelled from helicopters into a landing zone 

under enemy fire. All the platoon’s leaders were 

either injured or hit by enemy fire in the first 

few minutes, and the unit had to be extracted 

almost immediately. A specialist fourth class 

Connelly as First Sergeant of Troop B, 1st Squadron,

9th Cavalry, in Vietnam, 1969
128

was the only experienced soldier available to 

direct the effort. First Sergeant Connelly and 

the troop commander flew overhead, observing, 

until the commander told Connelly to go down 

and “get those guys out.” Once inside the landing zone, Connelly recalls, “There were all kinds 

of fire and noise and everything, but all I did 

was calm down this young specialist four” who 

actually handled the extraction. At Connelly’s 

insistence, the young soldier was awarded a 

Silver Star for his initiative and bravery.

Tanker Connelly’s experience had not prepared him for the kind of combat in Vietnam 

or for the lack of discipline among the troops. 

By late 1969 drug use and racial strife were 

becoming major problems. Junior NCOs often 

lacked the training, experience, and maturity to 

deal with the many situations that arose. 

Connelly thought himself among the least 

combat-experienced NCOs, but those with 

more such experience were often in “soft” jobs, 

“in Bien Hoa, or in a club, or in the United 

States. Anybody that had any influence whatsoever didn’t go to Troop B, 1st Squadron, 9th 

Cavalry. I probably wouldn’t have had to go, if 

I didn’t want to, but I was just a guy that did 

what the hell I was told to do.”

Despite his feelings about his own lack of 

experience, Connelly applied imaginative solutions to the drug problems. He searched tents 

for drugs without worrying excessively about 

“probable cause.” As he put it, “I didn’t know 

what probable cause was, except that I was 

probably going to get killed over [t]here if I 

didn’t get these soldiers off drugs.”

Besides drug abuse, the frequent change of 

commanders prevented an accumulation of 

combat experience in a unit. To maximize combat command experience throughout the officer 

corps, the Army rotated officers into six-month 

command tours. The short command tours 

resulted in a roller-coaster effect in learning the 

lessons of combat. Connelly later stressed, “The 

biggest problem that a soldier, his platoon 

leader, platoon sergeant, and first sergeant have 

got is to change company commanders. We can 

live with that in peacetime, but you can’t do that 

during war.” With only six months to learn the 

job and make their mark, commanders tended 

to focus on avoiding mistakes and micromanaged operations. This undercut the authority of 

subordinate leaders. Fortunately for Troop B, 

First Sergeant Connelly spent his entire oneyear tour with the unit, which benefited from 

his no-nonsense style of leadership.

In November 1970 Connelly left Vietnam 

for a tour as first sergeant of the Reception 

Company, 1st Training Brigade, at Fort Knox. 

Although he preferred an armor assignment, he 

later admitted that the experience of seeing 

young men become soldiers gave him valuable 

insights into a part of the Army he had seen 

only as a young draftee. Later, as Sergeant 

Major of the Army, he used some of the lessons 

he had learned there to improve the process and 

to adapt it for the all-volunteer Army.

After over ten years of first sergeant duty, 

Connelly was promoted and became sergeant 

major of both the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 

1st Training Brigade. The advancement occurred 

at a time when he had felt that he was stagnating in his career and that NCOs who had once 

worked for him were passing him by. He recalls, 

“I had been a first sergeant so long that my 

daughter called me ‘Top,’ because she thought 

that was my nickname. I never got discouraged. 

I was a good first sergeant, and I loved what I 

was doing. I used to tell my wife, ‘Oh well, the 

Army will recognize my talents one of these 

days, and I’ll move right along.’” In the next six 

years, Connelly “moved right along” farther than 

he had ever thought possible.

In June 1973, Sergeant Major Connelly was 

selected to attend the Sergeants Major Academy 

at Fort Bliss, Texas. At the time he was promoted 

to sergeant major, he was also on the command 

sergeants major list. In the early days of the 

Sergeants Major Academy, many sergeants major 

saw no need to attend. Connelly’s brigade commander, who wanted to keep him in the brigade, 

offered to help him avoid attending, but he 

replied, “Colonel, you know, I’ve been going all 

over Fort Knox here, talking about the NCOES 

[Noncommissioned Officer Education System] 
129

and the Sergeants Major Academy. I’m one of 

the guys on the study group at Fort Knox to 

study the NCO Education System and I sign up 

for it on the ground floor.”

Connelly did well at the academy. There, he 

met Glen Morrell, who would later succeed him 

as Sergeant Major of the Army. He graduated 

from the Sergeants Major Academy in 

December 1973, about the same time he was 

commissioned a captain of Armor in the 

reserves. Then, for the fourth time in his career, 

he received orders for duty in Germany.

A confident academy graduate, Command 

Sergeant Major Connelly had orders assigning 

him to the 1st Battalion, 35th Armor, 1st 

Infantry Division, in Erlangen. Upon arrival, he 

met his sponsor, the acting battalion sergeant 

major, who was on the promotion list for sergeant major. Connelly reported to the battalion 

commander, Lt. Col. Frederick B. Hull, who 

told him that since he had an acting sergeant 

major, he did not need him. Connelly told him 

“very, very politely” that the Department of the 

Army, not the battalion commander, had 

assigned him there and that the commander 

would have to have the orders changed if he did 

not want him as his sergeant major. After the 

commander checked with brigade headquarters, 

he announced that Connelly was indeed to be 

the battalion sergeant major. To his credit, he 

told Connelly that their rocky start would not 

affect their working relationship.

Connelly’s stand and later performance as 

battalion sergeant major impressed the brigade 

commander, Col. Thomas P. Lynch. When 

Lynch was promoted to general and took command of the Seventh Army Training Command 

in 1975, he took Connelly with him to be his 

command sergeant major.

The Training Command at Grafenwöhr 

included the Hohenfels and Wildflecken 

Training Areas as well as several outlying communities. Sergeant Major Connelly was the commander’s eyes and ears for community matters, a 

task that took up most of his time. He traveled to 

the training areas and communities, coordinating 

with the local sergeants major and visiting units 

while they trained. Informal discussions with 

soldiers revealed that they expected tough, realistic training, and Connelly saw that training 

facilities were updated and made to simulate real 

combat. Many of the improvements made during 

his tenure were the forerunners to those later set 

up at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort 

Irwin, California, when Connelly was Sergeant 

Major of the Army.

In 1975 the U.S. Army, Europe, was recovering from the effects of the war in Vietnam. For 

the previous ten years, it had virtually served as a 

replacement depot for Southeast Asia. Training 

facilities had been allowed to deteriorate, and 

training money was scarce. The attention of both 

officers and NCOs had been on counterinsurgency warfare, tactics, and doctrine, which obviously could not be applied to the defense of the 

Fulda Gap. Connelly observed, “We didn’t have 

any trained commanders, from lieutenant colonel 

on down. We had company commanders, captains, that didn’t know as much as a twelvemonth second lieutenant knew in the late fifties, 

as far as maneuvering a tank company.”

After a year and a half Connelly took over 

as sergeant major of the 1st Armored Division. 

Since one of its brigades had been stationed in 

Grafenwöhr, he had become familiar with the 

division. But the 1st Armored was one of the 

most dispersed in Europe, with units scattered 

across southern Germany; thus Connelly found 

himself traveling over the entire area, visiting 

units and inspecting training programs. In the 

eighteen months he was in the division, he saw 

vast improvements in training, a reduction of 

drug and alcohol abuse, closer community relations with the local German citizenry, and 

more recreational facilities available for soldiers. Although he regularly put in twelve- to 

eighteen-hour days, seven days a week, he later 

judged the improvement in overall readiness 

and morale well worth the effort. By the time 

he left Germany in 1977, he had been there 

four years in three tough assignments.

While in Germany, Connelly was nominated for consideration as the Sixth Army command sergeant major. Since he believed that 
130

assignment would not be beneficial for his 

career and since Maj. Gen. William L. Webb, 

Jr., the division commanding general, did not 

want to lose him, his name was withdrawn from 

consideration. However, General Webb soon 

found he could not keep Connelly forever.

When Webb was unable to accept an invitation to speak at the Command and General Staff 

College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, he sent 

Connelly, having a great deal of confidence in the 

sergeant major’s knowledge of training in Europe. 

Connelly’s talk so impressed General Frederick J. 

Kroesen, the new Forces Command (FORSCOM) 

commander, that he asked Connelly to consider 

serving as the FORSCOM sergeant major. 

Connelly was positive but at the time did not 

think it would really happen and had only a vague 

idea of what FORSCOM was or did. He was 

selected for the post shortly thereafter.

In some ways Sergeant Major Connelly 

regarded the new assignment as “the only good 

deal he had in his career.” FORSCOM headquarters at Fort McPherson, Georgia, was only sixtyfive miles from his home. He expected to serve 

three years there, followed by a year somewhere 

else, and then to retire with thirty years of service. 

He later learned that he had 

been selected because of his wide 

variety of assignments in troop 

units and because “he had more 

time as a first sergeant than most 

of [the other candidates] put 

together.” His tour as an adviser 

with the National Guard also 

had been an important factor in 

his selection.

General Kroesen’s marching orders to Connelly were 

similar to those he would 

receive later as Sergeant Major 

of the Army. Kroesen told 

Connelly to visit as many units 

as possible during his three 

years, as well as neighboring 

reserve and National Guard 

units as he traveled to active Army posts. 

Kroesen and his staff also gave Connelly a thorough briefing on FORSCOM, on the major 

Army commands (MACOMs), and on how 

they all related to each other and to the reserve 

component.

Connelly spent most of his FORSCOM 

tour on the road, meeting most of the sergeants 

major of divisions, corps, readiness regions, and 

armies. At the time the Army was developing 

the “round-out” concept, whereby National 

Guard brigades became the third brigades 

“rounding out” two-brigade active component 

divisions. Connelly quickly found that the 

National Guard was no more prepared for war 

in 1978 than it had been when he was a 

Guardsman in the 1950s or an adviser in the 

1960s. He observed, “I’m seeing the same people. They’re just getting older, but they’re not 

getting any better trained.”

Guard commanders were responsible for 

units spread out over the entire state and had no 

way of visiting all of them during a two-year 

command tour, except at annual training. 

Nevertheless, by the time Connelly completed 

his tour at FORSCOM, he had a broader perspective of the Army than before. He knew how 

it fit together at the highest levels, became more 

SMA Connelly Visits an Infantry Unit in the Field in 

Germany, 1982.
131

aware of the role of the reserve component, and 

knew the strengths and weaknesses of the 

mixed system. General Kroesen was confident 

of Connelly’s ability to understand the “Total 

Army” and highly valued his sergeant major’s 

observations and reports. Because FORSCOM 

was the largest major command, his tour as its 

sergeant major, together with his extensive time 

in Europe, gave him an excellent preparation for 

his next assignment.

In 1979, as Sergeant Major of the Army 

Bainbridge was completing his four-year tour, 

General Robert M. Shoemaker, the new 

FORSCOM commander, recommended Sergeant Major Connelly for the SMA position. 

Competing with seventy-six other command 

sergeants major, he did not expect to land the 

position because his twenty-five years of service 

made him junior to most of the others on the 

list. He thought he would have a better chance 

next time and told his wife Bennie, “It doesn’t 

make a damn. I could sit here as FORSCOM 

Sergeant Major for another three or four years.”

At the interview, Connelly thought his 

chances of selection had disappeared when he 

noted that General John F. Forrest, the 

FORSCOM deputy commander, was the board 

president. Earlier, Connelly had seen the general fall asleep in the middle of a briefing he was 

presenting, and had shaken him, saying, 

“General, are you awake? Hell, I’m talking to 

you.”4 To make matters worse, Connelly himself 

had not gotten much sleep the night before the 

interview and had bloodshot eyes from having 

walked through a dust storm the day before. 

Fortunately, General Forrest had a sense of 

humor about the sleeping incident and apparently did not notice Connelly’s appearance.

The selection board asked Connelly what 

he thought of as the greatest problem facing the 

Army today and, if he were Sergeant Major of 

the Army, how he would address it. Based on his 

experience in tank battalions, he identified 

recruiting, retention, training, and equipment as 

the Army’s most pressing problems. There were 

no simple remedies—all would need to work 

hard to correct them.

The candidate list was narrowed to five finalists, and Connelly was pleasantly surprised to 

find his name among them. Later, General 

Bernard Rogers, the outgoing Chief of Staff, 

interviewed the five finalists, starting with 

Connelly. General Kroesen, who was then scheduled to take command of USAREUR, told 

Connelly that if he was not selected, he would 

like for him to be his sergeant major. Connelly 

was again pleased, but he knew he had lost his 

last chance for yet another tour in Europe when 

Sergeant Major of the Army Bainbridge informed 

him that he had been selected.

After the notification, Connelly and 

Bainbridge spent a week discussing the current 

actions and problems facing the office. Although 

Bainbridge’s entire office staff would leave with 

him, the departing SMA found Connelly an 

outstanding NCO, Sergeant Don Kelly, who 

knew how the Army Staff operated and how to 

get things done in the Pentagon. Throughout 

Connelly’s career, he had never even called the 

Department of the Army and thus needed an 

experienced hand to help him with the highlevel fundamentals. Later, when Kelly was 

selected to attend the Sergeants Major Academy, 

Connelly encouraged him to go regardless of 

how much he needed him. “After all the hell I 

have raised about people turning down the 

Sergeants Major Academy, I can’t very well have 

you not go.”

The new Chief of Staff, General Edward C. 

Meyer, swore in SMA Connelly on 2 July 1979 

in a small ceremony with a few close friends. The 

parades would come later. As SMA-designee, 

Connelly had stopped by Meyer’s office earlier, 

when the general was still the deputy chief of 

staff for operations. Meyer told him:

You and I came up in the same way. We spent a lot of time 

in the armored and infantry divisions, in TO&E [Table of 

Organization and Equipment] units, and we know how 

they work. There’s one thing I want to do while I’m in 

office and I want you to help me do it. The majority of the 

Army is not in divisions. I want you and I to visit as many 

of those soldiers as we can. When you go to an installation, 

make sure to visit the support sections. Go to the communications and the engineers. I want you to continue 

working with the National Guard and reserves.
132

He further told Connelly to have the 

MACOMs work out a Noncommissioned 

Officer Development Program. “Don’t write the 

program yourself, write a regulation that requires 

them to do it.” In conjunction with his office 

staff, the new sergeant major of the Army, with 

the assistance of the Army Staff, wrote the 

regulation, rewrote it, and submitted it to the 

Chief of Staff for his approval. General Meyer 

was pleased: “That is absolutely on target. 

That’s what I want. Put it out.”

Sergeant Major of the Army Connelly 

capitalized on the knowledge, experience, and 

reputation he had gained as the FORSCOM 

sergeant major. He “just had to broaden himself 

as SMA. No one in the job ever did it before 

and the only one who knew the job was the one 

who just left it and retired. The circumstances, 

SMA staff, and Chief of Staff under which each 

SMA served were different for each one.” After 

a week in office, he told General Meyer that he 

did not yet know how to be Sergeant Major of 

the Army. The chief simply replied, “I don’t 

know how to be Chief of Staff yet either.”

One of Connelly’s first official functions 

was to speak to a group of MACOM chaplains. 

He had no idea of what to tell them but knew 

he would have to “clean up his act.” In his opening remarks he noted that he been a first sergeant for about five years before he “learned that 

the chaplain was on his side.” This and other 

anecdotes from his troop duty elicited laughter, 

broke the ice, and made the rest of his talk go 

well. It also showed him that he was at his best 

when being authentic and working from his 

extensive experience in troop units. That, after 

all, was the reason that he and his predecessors 

had been selected for the position.

Like the five previous Sergeants Major of 

the Army, Connelly spent most of his time traveling. He was fortunate to have a first-rate staff 

in the office to take care of matters when he was 

on the road. He later observed that today the 

use of cellular telephones has made such burdens easier. In his time, Connelly often had to 

stop at public pay phones to find out what was 

happening back in the Pentagon.

General Meyer, like his predecessors, expected 

the SMA to take his wife with him on his travels 

around the Army. He also told him that there were 

no restrictions on his travels and that he did not 

need a written report when he returned. Instead, 

he was to informally brief the chief in person. 

With Meyer’s support, Connelly also saw that his 

travels included reserve units—he was their sergeant major too. In many cases weekend drill 

schedules of National Guard and reserve units 

allowed him to visit these compounds on Saturday 

and Sunday while touring active Army units during the week. Connelly also maintained a working 

relationship with the Readiness Region sergeants 

major, as well as those at the National Guard 

Bureau and the Office of the Chief of the Army 

Reserve. There, his experiences both as a 

Guardsman and as National Guard adviser gave 

him insights into the capabilities and problems of 

the reserve component.

One issue that Connelly wished to avoid 

was protocol. Years earlier the Sergeant Major 

of the Army had been accorded the same protocol as a four-star general. He could take his wife 

at government expense and stay in quarters 

sometimes better than those given to two- or 

three-star generals. Connelly told his staff, 

“Let’s not get wrapped around the axle with this 

business. Don’t let me become a controversial 

Sergeant Major of the Army. We don’t need that 

and the office doesn’t need that.” He accordingly 

ensured that travel reimbursements were made 

strictly according to regulation. Once, when his 

wife was given temporary duty pay, Connelly 

found out that the finance officer had been 

instructed to do so. Connelly immediately had 

the finance office’s instructions changed.

Bennie Connelly traveled with her husband 

on about one-third of his trips—to Korea, 

Hawaii, Europe, and all over the United States. 

She spoke at community centers, to officers’ 

wives, to NCO wives, and to the people who ran 

the facilities that served families. After a trip, 

just as Sergeant Major Connelly briefed the 

Chief of Staff, she would brief the chief and 

other offices dealing with family support issues. 

As 55 percent of the Army was married, this 
133

area had become increasingly important. The 

old phrase, “If the Army wanted you to have a 

wife, it would have issued you one” was changed 

to “You recruit a soldier, but reenlist a family.” 

Without the draft, reenlistment was essential to 

maintaining personnel strength.

Sergeant Major Connelly received about a 

hundred complaints a month from soldiers 

throughout the Army. Ninety percent of them 

could be handled by his office staff over the 

telephone and usually dealt with minor matters. 

Often, soldiers had already received responses 

from their chains of command but were dissatisfied with the answers or simply wanted their 

feelings aired at a higher level. 

One day, one particular soldier would not wait 

to call. He drove to the Pentagon, walked right 

into the SMA’s office, and told the administrative 

assistant that he was on orders for Europe and did 

not want to go. A call to his unit revealed that he 

had signed out three weeks before and should have 

already been overseas. Connelly, who subsequently 

helped the soldier work out his difficulties, felt he 

could not “let those things get under my skin, 

because after all, that’s what the Sergeant Major of 

the Army is for.” 

Other soldiers who came into the office had 

no complaints, but simply wanted to personally 

see the Sergeant Major of the Army; they had 

heard him speak before and happened to be in the 

area. Connelly was pleased that soldiers felt that 

freedom. As FORSCOM sergeant major, he himself had never dared to visit the Pentagon, because 

he was “afraid that someone there would ask him 

a question and he wouldn’t know the answer.”

The Chief of Staff considered Sergeant 

Major Connelly a member of his principal staff 

and had him attend his daily meetings. There, 

Connelly had a chance to report on recent trips 

or other issues and have direct input into all of 

the Army Staff sections. Connelly also sat on the 

weekly Army Policy Council, chaired by the 

Secretary of the Army. In fact, the Chief of Staff 

told him that there was no briefing or meeting so 

classified that he could not attend. Connelly, 

however, had to be selective. There were so many 

meetings going on in the Pentagon daily that he 

could have spent every day of his tour doing 

nothing but attending meetings.

Connelly’s experience at the Seventh Army 

Training Command and later at FORSCOM 

proved valuable as the Army activated the 

National Training Center. The new instructional center had been one of General Kroesen’s 

projects as FORSCOM commander. At first, 

Connelly could not believe that such an ambitious project would ever see completion. To 

many at the time, officer and NCO alike, the 

high-tech tracking and recording of the actual 

movement of units and the assessment of results 

of direct and indirect fires seemed something 

out of “Star Wars.”5 Yet by the time Connelly 

left office, the NTC was a fact.

While general officers concentrated on the 

training facilities and high-tech equipment, 

Sergeant Major Connelly looked to the establishment of a post suitable for soldiers and their 

families stationed at Fort Irwin. The fort, originally designed only for temporary use, now 

needed a chapel, post exchange, family quarters, 

and a host of other facilities necessitated by the 

fact that the area is isolated, about forty miles 

from the nearest town. At first it seemed that the 

major construction effort was devoted to ranges 

and training facilities, while construction of facilities to support families lagged behind. After one 

visit, Connelly told the Chief of Staff, “The Army 

is not fulfilling its part of the deal. We have 

ranges second to none in the whole world, and 

folks living in a damn base camp.” Subsequent 

changes eventually made Fort Irwin a good post 

for Army families and a desirable assignment.

The greatest test facing SMA Connelly was 

the accession and retention of soldiers. The Army 

was still somewhat “hollow,” with fully equipped 

units lacking the soldiers necessary to fill them 

out. Instead of eliminating whole units, the Army 

had chosen to retain them on the rolls with 

reduced manning. Earlier in Germany, Connelly 

had seen tank companies at gunnery ranges with 

all their authorized tanks, but with cooks and 

clerks manning them. He noticed a steady 

improvement, not only in numbers but also in 

quality. In 1979 less than 50 percent of recruits 
134

were high school graduates. Four years later it was 

over 90 percent. High School graduates were 

easier to train and more likely to finish their 

enlistment. The appearance, discipline, and 

morale of soldiers also greatly improved.

Sergeant Major Connelly testified before 

Congress on several issues that affected soldiers 

and their families. In 1980 he appeared before 

the House Committee on Armed Services, 

along with his counterparts from the other services, to answer questions about medical care for 

handicapped dependents and dependent dental 

care. He stressed the importance of such benefits and their ties with recruitment and reenlistment. In 1983 he spoke to the House Committee 

on Appropriations on the overall quality of life 

for soldiers and their families.6 Such testimonies, as well as congressional interest, did much 

to help transition the Army to a first-class volunteer force. After fifteen years of existence the 

Office of the Sergeant Major of the Army, 

together with counterparts in the other services, 

had repeatedly proved a reliable source of information about conditions for enlisted soldiers 

and their families.

Connelly originally was scheduled for a 

three-year tour, and like his predecessors thought 

that three years was the right length. Later, however, General Meyer told him that he did not 

want to break up the team he had assembled 

when he took office and asked if Connelly would 

extend for a year. At long last the idea that the 

Chief of Staff and the Sergeant Major of the 

Army ought to serve a four-year tour together 

had arrived. The precedent would stand. Connelly 

later said that he “spent the last six months of his 

fourth year trying not to look tired,” adding that 

in retrospect, the succession of four-year tours 

over time had prevented some outstanding NCOs 

from having a chance at the job. Perhaps the 

Chief of Staff might have shared these sentiments 

regarding his own job. Both Connelly and Meyer 

retired in June 1983.

Their four years had seen a vast improvement 

in the quality of soldiers, regarding both education and discipline. Connelly himself had tirelessly pushed for improvements in the quality of 

life for soldiers and families, which paid off in 

attracting high-quality men and women to the 

Army and encouraging them to reenlist. Most 

important, he capitalized on his extensive experience in individual and unit training to involve 

NCOs from corporal to sergeant major in their 

soldiers’ training. He drafted the regulation to 

establish the Noncommissioned Officer 

Development Program, which created a roadmap 

of NCO professional development, outlining 

education requirements and tightening standards 

of performance. When he became Sergeant Major 

of the Army in 1979, the Army was hollow. 

When he left in 1983 it was a better-trained force, 

manned by high-quality soldiers.

1. Except as noted, this section is based on 

Interv, Erwin H. Koehler with William A. 

Connelly, 24 Jan 94, Monticello, Ga.

2. The fuel inlet was so far recessed in the 

engine decking that tank crewmen required a long 

nozzle or funnel to reach it.

3. The term old-timers used to denote those 

who earned their stripes by attending NCOCC 

was “instant NCO.”

4. Forrest had been on the road for many days 

and had not gotten much sleep the night before the 

briefing.

5. In fact, the computer center at Fort Irwin 

that tracks movement and fires is nicknamed “Star 

Wars.”

6. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on 

Armed Forces, Military Personnel Subcommittee, 

Hearings on Civilian Health and Medical Program of 

the Uniformed Services (18 June, 15 September 

1980), 96th Cong., 2d sess.; Committee on 

Appropriations, Hearings on Military Construction 

Appropriations for 1984 (23 February 1983), 98th 

Cong., 1st sess.

Notes
135

Assignments

1950–1954 Basic Training, Tank Crewman, Company C, 190th Tank Battalion,

Georgia National Guard, Americus, Georgia

1954–1955 Tank Crewman, Commander, Platoon Sergeant, First Sergeant, Company 

B, 761st Tank Battalion, 3d Armored Division, Fort Knox, Kentucky

1955–1956 Tank Commander, Platoon Sergeant, Company B, 826th Tank Battalion, 

19th Armored Group, Hammelburg; Schweinfurt, Germany

1956–1958 Operations Sergeant, Platoon Sergeant, Company B, 826th Tank Battalion, 

Fort Benning, Georgia

1958–1961 Platoon Sergeant, Companies B and C, 2d Battalion, 67th Armor,

4th Armored Division, Fürth, Germany

1961–1962 Platoon Sergeant, Company B, 3d Medium Tank Battalion, 32d Armor, 

24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia; Augsburg, Germany

1962–1964 First Sergeant, Operations Sergeant, 32d Tank Battalion, Munich, Germany

1964–1967 First Sergeant, Company C, 4th Battalion, 68th Armor, 2d Infantry 

Division, Fort Stewart; Dominican Republic; Fort Knox, Kentucky

1967–1969 Chief Enlisted Adviser, 196th Cavalry Squadron, Georgia National Guard, 

Griffin, Georgia

1969–1970 First Sergeant, Troop B, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, 

Republic of Vietnam

1970–1973 First Sergeant, Reception Company, 1st Training Brigade; Sergeant Major, 

1st and 2d Battalions, Fort Knox, Kentucky

1973 Student, Class #2, Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas

1973–1975 Command Sergeant Major, 1st Battalion, 35th Armor, 1st Armored 

Division, Erlangen, Germany

1975–1976 Command Sergeant Major, Seventh Army Training Command, 

Grafenwöhr, Germany

1976–1977 Command Sergeant Major, 1st Armored Division, Ansbach, Germany

1977–1979 Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Forces Command,

Fort McPherson, Georgia

1979–1983 Sergeant Major of the Army

Selected Decorations and Awards

Distinguished Service Medal

Bronze Star Medal with V Device and Two Oak Leaf Clusters

Meritorious Service Medal with One Oak Leaf Cluster

Air Medal with V Device

Army Commendation Medal with Two Oak Leaf Clusters

Good Conduct Medal with Ten Oak Leaf Clusters

Army of Occupation Medal (Germany)

National Defense Service Medal

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal

Vietnam Service Medal

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Gold Star

Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal

Combat Infantryman Badge
136

SMA Morrell
“I was always fortunate in the Army, I had good 

people that worked for me.” 1

With those words Glen E. Morrell 

summarized his four-year term as 

Sergeant Major of the Army. An 

unassuming man, Glen Morrell was born 26 May 

1936 in Wick, West Virginia, near Wheeling. In 

this rural environment, young Morrell became an 

avid fisherman and reader. His father worked for 

the Hope Natural Gas Company, now part of 

Exxon, while his mother kept the house in order. 

Glen Morrell was his parents’ youngest, with four 

sisters and two brothers.

Morrell remembered his parents’ instilling 

discipline in him at an early age—whipping was 

the standard punishment. Having “respect for 

other people” and “giving everybody a chance” 

were hallmarks of growing up in the tiny village of 

Stumptown, where Morrell learned many lessons 

that later proved useful in the Army. “People that 

came from the larger cities seemed to have more 

problems,” he noticed. Glen Morrell attended the 

public school in Normantown, West Virginia, a 

six- or seven-mile bus trip from Stumptown. The 

school building housed all grades, including high 

school. Morrell felt lucky—their school had a 

gymnasium. The only school sport was basketball, 

but there were many outdoor adventures in that 

mountainous area. “I read a lot,” Morrell recalled, 

and “we never even had a television until after I 

came into the Army.” Even listening to the radio 

was a rare pastime since the batteries were expensive and the area had no public power.

His best subjects were math, science, and 

history. His teachers were very thorough and very 

strict. Some had served in World War II and carried an air of military discipline with them. 

People took schooling seriously. While in secondary school, Morrell worked at several parttime jobs. Most involved farm work in the local 

fields, earning him “a lot of money” for that time. 

A boy normally received $1.50 for a day’s wage, 

but Morrell worked especially hard and eventually earned up to $2.00 over the daily average. In 

addition, his own family always had a large garden and farm animals that kept him busy. Morrell 

completed his high school courses in early 1954, 

graduating in May of that year. At the time his 

local prospects seemed limited. Except for the 

gas company, that part of West Virginia offered 

few job opportunities. Not wanting to take on 

some short-term job, Morrell turned to his longtime interest in the Army.

“All I wanted to do was join the Army 

and jump out of airplanes,” he later said. 

Morrell’s father was a veteran of World War 

I, and one brother had served in World War 

II. Another brother had been a paratrooper in 

the Korean War. But they had all been drafted 

and had a hard time understanding why 

young Glen wanted to volunteer. In the fall of 

1954, however, he enlisted.

Morrell had enlisted for service in the 11th 

Airborne Division, but was assigned initially to 

the 82d Airborne Division.2 After a two-day stay 

for shots and screening at Fort Jackson, South 

Carolina, Morrell and his fellow recruits traveled 

to Camp Gordon, Georgia, for eight weeks of 

basic training. There, they lived in World War 

II–vintage wooden barracks with coal furnaces. In 

the open squad bays there were no lockers, only 

wooden rods behind each bunk. Since the recruits 

were allowed no civilian clothes and few other 

Glen E. Morrell
138

personal belongings, the lack of space seemed 

inconsequential.

Morrell’s fellow recruits came from all over 

the United States. They were “a pretty good 

bunch of people” and “we all worked together,...that was the only way you were going to 

get out of the doggone place.” The cadre 

trained the recruits hard, even on weekends. 

The sergeants, Korean War veterans, did the 

instructing. “They were all good people,” 

Morrell remembered, “and knew what they 

were doing.” The only officer he remembered 

seeing throughout the training cycle was his 

company commander.

Basic training had not changed much since 

World War II and Korea. Morrell and the others 

learned how to use the Ml rifle, still the standard 

issue. No “bolos” were allowed.3 Each recruit 

remained on the rifle range until he qualified. The 

men also learned how to use the early rocket 

launchers—bazookas—and to defend themselves 

from the effects of tear gas and chlorine. In addition, they practiced dismounted drill every day 

and received instruction in general military subjects. Each trainee went through day and night 

infiltration courses. There were also inspections 

nearly every day: “You might have a full field layout or just stand-by in the barracks area, or the 

whole barracks, or you would have a rifle inspection, or an in-ranks inspection in Class A uniform.” While there was little formal physical 

training, the trainees were in good shape since 

they “walked or ran everywhere.”

There were no discipline problems. “You 

know, everybody was pretty serious back then,” he 

recalled. “They wanted to graduate and get the 

hell out of there.” The only real concern was “trying to clean a weapon to the satisfaction of the 

people who were inspecting it.”

The basic trainees’ food ration was small in 

the mid-1950s. Looking back on his own experience, Morrell recalled eating lots of C-rations 

“even in the mess hall, about twice a week.” At 

other times the troops ate cold cuts rotated out of 

emergency storage supplies. Morrell remembered 

serving on the KP (kitchen police) detail five or 

six times during his training cycle. After his 

retirement, Morrell would bring the benefits of 

those early experiences to his work on the Task 

Force 2000 food study that critiqued the new 

MRE and tray rations.4

Private Morrell received a brief leave after 

his graduation from basic training. Afterward 

he reported to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 

where he was assigned to Battery A, 319th 

Field Artillery, 82d Airborne Division. He 

wanted to be in the infantry but was assigned to 

the field artillery instead, in accordance with the 

“needs of the service.” Morrell recalled that soldiers of that era did not receive any advanced 

individual training (AIT) in a formal school 

setting and instead learned from what amounted to on-the-job training in their assigned unit. 

There were advantages to that system, but it was 

hard for the unit to track the proper training of 

each individual, and such informal systems 

worked best only when the number of replacement troops coming into the Army remained 

small. Morrell trained on the “split-railed” 105-

mm. howitzer especially designed for airborne 

operations but spent much of his first enlistment working as a forward observer.

Soon after Morrell’s arrival at the 82d in 

1955, he went to the jump school at Fort Bragg. 

This three-week course, little different from 

modern training, kept students on the go all day. 

Training consisted of a lot of running and 

jumps from a 34-foot tower, the highest tower 

then in use.5 Morrell had a few problems but 

quickly got over them. “I was always scared of 

heights, but it’s just different being in an airplane.” The new paratroopers made five qualifying jumps before receiving their wings. Morrell 

liked the thrill of jumping and continued to 

jump throughout his long career.

When his first enlistment in the Army 

expired, Sergeant Morrell left the service. He 

considered becoming a highway patrolman but 

was told he would have to wait for training. In 

January 1958 Morrell decided to reenlist in the 

Army. “I found out that I really liked the Army 

after I got out,” he said. Since a soldier could reenlist for a specific unit, Sergeant Morrell asked for 

the 82d Airborne Division.
139

Shortly after reporting for duty, Morrell 

received orders posting him to Germany. Although 

he thought he was heading for Baumholder, his 

orders were changed in transit. “I didn’t know I 

was going to Berlin until I got to Frankfurt.” 

Morrell was assigned to the Combat Support 

Company, 2d Battle Group, 6th Infantry, a good 

unit with high morale and good leadership, with 

several “old combat veterans” providing cohesion 

and continuity.

Initially assigned as squad leader of a 4.2-

inch mortar section, Sergeant Morrell later 

worked in the Fire Direction Center when the 

sergeant there went on emergency leave. When 

that NCO (noncommissioned officer) returned, 

Morrell filled a vacancy in the mortar platoon as 

platoon sergeant and later worked in the regiment’s reconnaissance unit.

Once a year the Berlin troops trained at 

Grafenwöhr, Germany. More frequently, they used 

smaller training areas including the Grünewald 

forest in Berlin. There, they used subcaliber devices 

to conduct exercises, but it was hard to train properly in an urban area. Morrell described his unit as 

“very proficient. The leadership was good. We had 

good officers. It was just a good unit.” Every Friday 

the Berlin troops held a parade.

While stationed in Berlin, Sergeant Morrell 

graduated from the local NCO academy. It was a 

small school, with four training platoons, and all 

the students were E–5s and E–6s. The academy 

emphasized drill and ceremonies, the conduct of 

physical training and inspections, and general 

“spit and polish.” Classes on how to plan and 

present training classes were also emphasized, 

and Morrell considered the instructors good, but 

there was little in the way of tactical instruction.

During his first enlistment Corporal 

Morrell had married Karen Wade of Parkersburg, 

West Virginia. When Morrell reported for duty 

in Germany, Karen remained stateside for nearly a year because the waiting list for quarters in 

Germany was long. When the quarters became 

available, they proved among the best the 

Morrells encountered.

At that time no “structured programs”—

organized communities or activities—existed. 

Soldiers made friends and found things to do in 

their off time as best they could. “We survived,” 

Morrell later said, “and had a good family life. I 

was always home. I didn’t have money to go do 

anything else.” Then, an E–5 made $205 a 

month. Morrell remembered, however, that a 

good meal with a bottle of wine cost only $5.00 

on the local economy. With virtually no promotion opportunities from 1958 to 1960, money 

remained tight for soldiers like Sergeant Morrell.

In 1960 the 6th Infantry’s combat support 

company was phased out, and Sergeant Morrell 

transferred to the 14th Armored Cavalry, stationed in Fulda. At the time Morrell considered 

changing his field artillery military occupational 

specialty (MOS) and remaining in Berlin.6

However, he decided to accept the transfer and 

remain in the Field Artillery to better his 

chances of promotion. Consequently, he spent 

the next two years in a mechanized howitzer 

battery performing reconnaissance and working 

in the Fire Direction Center.

Shortly after Sergeant Morrell arrived in 

Fulda, the Soviet and East German governments erected the Berlin Wall. During the prolonged international crisis that followed, 

President John F. Kennedy extended the overseas tours of all troops in Germany. In the 

meantime, Morrell and his fellow soldiers of the 

14th Armored Cavalry spent most of their time 

patrolling the critical border areas they shared 

with the 2d Cavalry. “Every time you turned 

around you were on alert.”

New tensions and discipline problems also 

began to arise. Unit leadership was inexperienced, and some NCOs were former officers 

who had accepted positions as noncommissioned officers in order to stay on active duty 

during previous reductions in the force structure. Morrell remembered that such men often 

lacked both the skills and motivation required 

of good NCOs. Then, in the early l960s, the 

problems of drugs and racial tension also began 

to appear in military units. When Sergeant 

Morrell received orders transferring him back to 

the United States early in 1962, he looked forward to the new assignment.
140

Before leaving Germany, Sergeant Morrell 

had read about the Special Forces. “I’m always 

looking for adventure,” he said. At reenlistment 

time he signed up for the new outfit. When he 

reported to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, he 

underwent Special Forces training—“survivaltype skills and working in small groups.” The 

trainees for what became the Green Berets 

underwent medical, communications, and engineer training. They learned how to conduct clandestine operations and how to train indigenous 

people. With his field artillery background, 

Morrell naturally “was the heavy weapons guy.”

After a lengthy field evaluation of the 

Special Forces skills of the men, they reported 

to units. As Special Forces soldiers, they later 

received language training according to probable deployment areas. But at that time they 

“trained based on what was happening in 

Vietnam.” For that reason he received French 

language instruction at first, since the French 

had worked so long with the peoples of Vietnam. 

Later in his Special Forces career, Morrell also 

picked up Spanish.

Morrell was soon promoted to staff sergeant and assigned to the newly activated 

Company C, 5th Special Forces Group, serving 

as the heavy weapons sergeant in an “A” 

Detachment.7 Nevertheless, advanced instruction emphasized cross-training in all the occupational specialties of the detachment. There 

were also many field training exercises and practice airborne operations. Detachment members 

learned to work with indigenous people, conduct raids and ambushes, and operate from 

small boats. In January 1963 Morrell’s detachment of the 5th Special Forces Group received 

orders for temporary duty in Vietnam. Deployed 

for a six-month period, the men found their 

orders changed when they arrived in Saigon. 

The U.S. command planned to assign A teams 

throughout the country. Morrell’s detachment 

was initially assigned to War Zone D in the III 

Corps area north of Saigon and operated from 

the tiny village of Nuoc Vang, north of Phuoc 

Vinh City.

The Special Forces mission around Nuoc 

Vang was to secure the village area and train the 

local Vietnamese security forces, including some 

ethnic Cambodians. Although French forces 

had operated there nearly a decade earlier and 

little had happened since that time, there were 

serious logistical problems. “We went in there 

and I didn’t have ammunition for my M1 rifle,” 

Morrell recalled. He had one clip for the rifle 

and one for his .45-caliber pistol. To supply 

their personal weapons, the U.S. forces had to 

take the ammunition from the machine guns 

they had already found in the village. The 

detachment was without adequate ammunition 

for nearly ten days before the command in 

Saigon ordered a resupply.

During Morrell’s first tour in Vietnam, the 

U.S. forces had good relations with the local 

people since they brought in money and purchased all their food from local suppliers. Morrell’s 

detachment also trained the militia-like defense 

Morrell as a Young Soldier in Vietnam
141

forces, laid minefields around the village, and 

staged ambushes. There was little fighting, “just 

skirmishes here and there,” but “we got ambushed 

a few times while hauling supplies in from Phuoc 

Vinh.” At the time, helicopters were scarce, and 

everything was transported in convoys using 

World War II–vintage trucks.

After returning from his first tour in 

Vietnam, Morrell was reassigned to Company 

B, 5th Special Forces Group. During that time 

he received his promotion to sergeant first class.

In 1964 Morrell returned to Vietnam for a 

second tour, this one lasting a full year. The airplane that carried him to Saigon also brought 

the colors of the 5th Special Forces Group now 

permanently stationed there. From Saigon, 

Morrell flew to Pleiku and then convoyed to 

Dak Pek, the location of a split A Detachment 

that also covered Dak To. Dak Pek “was way out 

in the middle of nowhere,” an established but 

isolated camp “in the high country up in the 

mountains,” along the north edge of the II 

Corps area, close to the Laotian border. Morrell’s 

detachment worked with five companies of 

Montagnards, the ethnic tribal peoples of that 

area. The leaders of those well-seasoned troops 

had served with the French, and Morrell 

remembered them as good, effective soldiers.

The remote location of the Special Forces 

camp at Dak Pek posed serious operational and 

logistical problems. Everything had to be 

brought in by convoy from Pleiku, and it was 

difficult to get air support. The mountainous 

terrain made tactical operations difficult also. “It 

took you all day to get to the top of one of the 

mountains, where you had to go back and go 

down on the other side.” The normal operational routine was to go out for three days and 

work back to the camp at Dak Pek. During this 

time enemy activity accelerated, with elements 

of the regular North Vietnamese Army engaging American forces in January 1965.

At the conclusion of his second tour in 

Vietnam, Sergeant First Class Morrell returned 

to duty with the Special Forces Training Group 

at Fort Bragg. There he attended the Jumpmaster 

School in 1965 and in late 1966 received orders 

assigning him to the 8th Special Forces Group 

in Panama. Morrell reported there early in 1967 

after a period of temporary duty for Spanish 

language training in Washington, D.C. He was 

assigned to Company A, 8th Special Forces 

Group.

At the Jungle Operations Training Center, 

the Special Forces trained soldiers from many 

different Latin American nations. Most of the 

instruction reflected the experiences and tactical 

doctrine developed in Southeast Asia. “We had 

a lot of airborne operations.” While there, 

Morrell also served on the local marksmanship 

team, but his overall evaluation of the assignment was unfavorable. Although his wife and 

children joined him in Panama, they had to live 

in flimsy temporary quarters built on stilts. 

Morrell judged it “the worst quarters I ever lived 

in.” His assignment in Panama was supposed to 

last three years, but in 1969, two years later, 

Morrell was again ordered to Vietnam.

Since 1966 the 5th Special Forces Group 

had operated the MACV ReconnaissanceCommando (Recondo) School near Nha Trang. 

Morrell knew many instructors stationed there, 

and they requested his assignment to the school. 

He remained there until the last three months 

Morrell at His Base Camp in Vietnam
142

of his tour. Transferred to the headquarters at 

Nha Trang, Morrell became the local-purchase 

NCO. “I’d go down and buy items that the ‘A’ 

camps wanted, but you couldn’t get through the 

regular supply channels.”

In 1970 Morrell left Vietnam for the last 

time. Later, he reflected on the two and a half 

years he spent there: “It was a shame that so 

many of our young people got killed over there in 

that quagmire, but that’s history.” He felt that the 

Army had done a superb job through more than 

a decade of commitment there. The political climate back home, however, had steadily eroded 

the support the American troops needed.

Approved for promotion to E–8 when he 

left Vietnam, Morrell thought he would be 

assigned to the 10th Special Forces Group at 

Fort Devens, Massachusetts. He requested a 

change in his orders, however, and returned to 

Panama. During his second tour there, from 

1970–1973, Morrell served as first sergeant of 

Headquarters Company, 8th Special Forces 

Group, then as the group intelligence sergeant.

In the spring of 1973 Master Sergeant 

Morrell was selected to attend the new Sergeants 

Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas. For a soldier who had spent nearly twenty years in field 

assignments, the academic environment proved 

quite a challenge at first. “I did do some hard 

work there,” said Morrell, noting the great 

amount of reading required. In addition, the 

students had to lead discussion groups and take 

academic classes. There were approximately 

eighteen other Special Forces soldiers at the 

academy then, and they assisted one another. 

“We worked together and studied together. We 

probably had a ‘leg up’ on a lot of people that 

didn’t have such a close-knit group.” While the 

informal group support of the Special Forces 

students was not always popular with the staff 

and other students, Morrell welcomed the help.

While Morrell was at the academy, he also 

entered a nighttime Associate Degree program, 

which he believed would help his career. 

Although he had previously “worked every correspondence course under the sun,” college 

courses were a new experience. Morrell took 

CLEP tests and plowed through the necessary 

coursework to receive his degree from El Paso 

Community College.8

Initially, other senior NCOs greeted the 

Sergeants Major Academy graduates suspiciously. For his part, Morrell sympathized with 

those noncommissioned officers who had been 

unable to attend the academy for one reason or 

another and felt that promotion boards often 

put undue emphasis on college work as opposed 

to troop experience. Later, as Sergeant Major of 

the Army, Morrell could influence the situation: 

“you need to look at the whole person and see 

where they’ve been assigned.” Unit personnel 

policies often deprived NCOs of opportunities 

because it was difficult to “set aside the money 

and resources and let people go to school.” Still, 

Morrell knew the day was coming when the 

academy diploma would be the key to promotion to command sergeant major. He graduated 

in December 1973.

Following graduation, Master Sergeant 

Morrell moved to Fort Riley, Kansas. There, he 

served as first sergeant of Company A, 1st 

Battalion, 2d Infantry, and later of the 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company of 

the 1st Infantry Division. Three times during 

his stay at Fort Riley, Morrell requested assignment to the Ranger school. The 1st Ranger 

Battalion of the 2d Infantry had been activated, and Morrell was anxious to become part of 

that organization. Each time his request was 

denied, however, largely because the 1st 

Infantry Division was a REFORGER (Return 

of Forces to Germany) unit and would not 

release senior NCOs.

In March 1976 Morrell reported to the 

Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) at St. 

John’s University in St. Cloud, Minnesota. He 

received his E–9 stripes there in a special ceremony arranged by the local professor of military science. A noncommissioned officer who 

had always enjoyed being in a field environment with troops, Morrell did not particularly 

care for ROTC duty. He considered the Army 

ROTC cadre outstanding, but the duty just 

was not his “cup of tea.” At that time military 
143

personnel were not particularly welcome on 

college campuses, and Morrell noticed that 

some members of the staff did not wear their 

uniforms home. The number of cadets was 

small, and they focused on academic work; 

only about a dozen graduates received Army 

commissions each year.

Nevertheless, duty at St. John’s provided 

Morrell the time to do many things with his 

family. He could also indulge his lifelong passion for fishing and hunting. He swam a great 

deal and increased his running capacity. But his 

primary job at St. John’s was to manage the 

office and the enlisted staff. His small detachment consisted of a master sergeant, a civilian 

“supply sergeant,” and various civilian and military clerks. Morrell handled large amounts of 

correspondence and helped conduct field training exercises at nearby Camp Ripley. But he 

never took part in the ROTC summer camp 

since he arrived too late for the 1976 exercise 

and left the detachment in January 1977.

In December 1976 Morrell was selected for 

the position of sergeant major of the 1st Ranger 

Battalion, 75th Infantry, at Fort Stewart, 

Georgia. The return to duty with troops excited 

him and offered the prospect of finally going to 

Ranger school. He reported to the Ranger 

training center at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 

January 1977. The transfer was so abrupt that 

Morrell had to leave his wife to settle their 

affairs in Minnesota.

Morrell considered the Ranger school “the 

best realistic training I ever received in the 

Army.” Difficult as it was in the winter months, 

Morrell was able to use his lengthy experience 

to help many other students. He proved particularly proficient in land navigation and often 

found himself “on the point” during field problems. He lost a lot of weight during Ranger 

training and was exhausted. “You had to be 

physically fit and you had to be mentally tough” 

to make it through the training. The oldest 

Ranger student at forty-one, Morrell was the 

Distinguished Honor Graduate of his class.

Upon completion of Ranger school, Sergeant 

Major Morrell reported to the 75th Infantry at 

Fort Stewart. His duty consisted of “training day 

and night, seven days a week....All we did was 

train, train, train and running exercises,” he said. 

“We worked a lot with the forerunners of Delta 

Force, Blue Light.” Much of the training focused 

on counterterrorist operations. Some excellent 

training took place in the Mojave Desert. There 

were no double standards determined by duty 

position or rank. K. C. Leuer and Joseph 

Stringham, both of whom later became general 

officers, were “great trainers,” who trained their 

soldiers “in all aspects of what their mission in 

life was.” As a result, the troops always had “skyhigh” morale. “You had standards there, and discipline.”

As anywhere else, however, there were problems to solve. The battalion’s remarkably fast 

pace caused a high rate of personnel turnover. 

There was also a general lack of experienced 

leadership available for assignment to the unit. 

In addition, the 1st Ranger Battalion had many 

well-educated soldiers. Some had college 

degrees, and many went on to Officer Candidate 

School, college ROTC programs, or the U.S. 

Military Academy after they left the service. 

Sergeant Major Morrell regretted that many 

good soldiers left the unit after three or four 

years for either officer training or careers outside the service.

Morrell returned to Germany in July 1979 

and was assigned to the 10th Special Forces 

Detachment at Flint Kaserne in Bad Tölz until 

October 1981. Duty as the command sergeant 

major of Special Forces, Airborne, Europe, was 

demanding. “Every day saw something new in 

that place,” Morrell recalled. As the command 

sergeant major, Morrell assisted the commander 

in overseeing the kaserne and conducting military operations. The Seventh Army NCO 

Academy there received many official visitors. 

In addition, the Special Forces ran a Platoon 

Confidence Course, providing mini–Ranger 

training for platoons from units all over Europe. 

Sergeant Major Morrell still found time to ski, 

hunt, and fish.

Following his second tour in Germany, 

Morrell was reassigned to Headquarters, U.S. 
144

Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), Fort 

Sheridan, Illinois. At the time Morrell regretted 

an assignment that took him away from troops. 

However, he found recruiting duty rewarding, 

and he learned a great deal. With no previous 

experience in this field, he found it difficult at 

first to function as the command sergeant 

major. However, the large number of combat 

veterans serving as recruiters gave Morrell a 

common frame of reference. He was pleased to 

find the USAREC commander, General 

Howard G. Crowell, Jr., interested in working 

with him “to make life a little bit better for 

recruiters. Good people recruit good people.” 

He found that the noncommissioned officers 

assigned to the Recruiting Command were 

excellent and highly motivated soldiers.

In his new position, Morrell focused on 

soldier and family problems of the recruiters in 

the field. One critical task, he found, was to 

match areas of assignment with specific recruiting sergeants. Morrell saw firsthand the problems with housing and medical care the 

recruiters and their families faced when there 

were no military installations in the area. He 

also had to work with the command to overcome the special difficulties recruiting offices 

faced in high-crime neighborhoods, while also 

working to secure better housing for recruiters, 

especially in high-cost areas. But he gave particular attention to Army pay and promotion 

policies that caused a hardship for recruiters, 

since recruiting duty often diminished their 

promotion prospects. He made several recommendations to the Recruiting Command 

regarding the issue, including assigning fewer 

sergeants (E–5) to recruiting duty and providing retention incentives. Although he achieved 

limited success in these areas, the experiences 

at USAREC provided him with important 

SMA Morrell with Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham, Jr.
145

insights that he later used to the Army’s 

advantage as sergeant major at the U.S. Army 

Forces Command (FORSCOM) and as 

Sergeant Major of the Army.

The FORSCOM commander, General 

Richard E. Cavazos, was looking for a command 

sergeant major to replace outgoing Sgt. Maj. 

Robert Ivey in June 1982. At Ivey’s suggestion, 

Cavazos selected Glen Morrell. At FORSCOM, 

Morrell again focused on training. Moreover, he 

found that he had to spend a lot of time “going 

out and really trying to find out about the policies that were implemented by the Department 

of the Army and FORSCOM.” He sought to 

ascertain if they were actually workable in the 

field. It was a big field, one that included all divisional units in the continental United States 

(CONUS) as well as in Alaska and Panama. In 

addition, it included all of the major National 

Guard and reserve commands.

At FORSCOM, Morrell found a considerable number of problems to solve. For example, 

it was difficult to find qualified people to man 

the readiness regions established to assist the 

reserve components. The soldiers who staffed 

those regions faced many of the same difficulties as the recruiters. Morrell found that the 

reserves were good soldiers who really wanted 

to do an outstanding job. “The reason you find 

good units or some bad units” depended upon 

“leadership, getting people qualified, and 

resources.” When the Guard and reserve senior 

NCOs began attending the annual FORSCOM 

Command Sergeants Major Conference, closer 

working relationships began to develop with the 

active force as well as between the Guard and 

reserve.

When General John A. Wickham, Jr., 

became the Army Chief of Staff, he began the 

selection process for the Sergeant Major of 

the Army who would serve with him. General 

Cavazos recommended Sergeant Major 

Morrell. After careful deliberation, Wickham 

selected Morrell, who received his formal 

appointment three weeks after his interview. 

He took his oath in a “very moving ceremony” 

in the office of the new Chief of Staff. With his 

family and many friends looking on, SMA 

Morrell began a fast-paced four-year tour. From 

Morrell’s perspective, General Wickham had 

the interest of the whole Army—the enlisted 

people, the noncommissioned officers, the officers, and the families—at heart.

In his initial guidance to the new Sergeant 

Major of the Army, Wickham told Morrell to 

be himself and “go do the things that needed to 

be done in the Army.” The chief seated the 

SMA on his right at staff meetings and “we 

pushed a lot of things through that would not 

have been accomplished if it hadn’t been for all 

of us working together.”

Morrell spent about 25 percent of his time as 

Sergeant Major of the Army in his office at the 

Pentagon. Answering the many official inquiries 

and letters from the field required a lot of 

research. Besides his small staff, Morrell brought 

young soldiers to the office from the administration school at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Even 

when he was not present, he knew that his office 

staff worked many nights and weekends handling requests from congressional committees, 

soldiers, families, and retirees.

He often gave testimony to Congress on 

such issues as soldiers’ quality of life, the needs 

of service families, and related financial matters. 

In addition, Morrell also gave periodic briefings 

to members of the general staff, to Secretary of 

the Army John O. Marsh, Jr., and to Secretary 

of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Morrell felt 

Weinberger “was interested in soldiers;...interested in families; and...interested in the services.” In turn, Morrell attended many briefings by 

agencies such as the Military Personnel Center 

(MILPERCEN).

Sergeant Major Morrell focused on several 

major initiatives during his tenure. Chief among 

them was the continued development of the 

Noncommissioned Officer Education System 

(NCOES), which he believed was vital to establishing a solid corps of NCOs. During Morrell’s 

term of office the Primary Leadership Course 

and the Primary Noncommissioned Officer 

Course combined to form the Primary Leader 

Development Course, while the Sergeants 
146

Major Academy took over the responsibility for 

developing the common core training for the 

NCOES. Morrell constantly battled for resources to enhance NCO educational programs. 

Many commanders, and even a few noncommissioned officers, still needed to be convinced 

of the need for the NCOES.

Sergeant Major Morrell’s other initiatives 

included the improvement of enlisted quarters. 

Among other things, he felt better quarters 

would encourage noncommissioned officers to 

live on post, closer to the men with whom they 

worked. Morrell also endeavored to improve the 

quality of life of single soldiers by bringing their 

concerns to the attention of the General Staff.

In fact, Sergeant Major Morrell could 

remember few goals that he did not achieve, at 

least in part, while he was Sergeant Major of the 

Army. He had hoped to correct an overbalance 

in some occupational specialties. He also wanted to see stricter enforcement of weight, physical training, and substance abuse standards. He 

convinced the Army Staff to reduce the time an 

NCO could remain on active duty after refusing 

to take an assignment or to attend the Sergeants 

Major Academy. 

As Sergeant Major of the Army, Glen 

Morrell took several major trips to military “hot 

spots.” He found constant stress among 

American troops in Korea and examined their 

training along the Demilitarized Zone. He 

noted the difficult living conditions U.S. troops 

and dependent families endured there and made 

several recommendations for improvement. 

Morrell also recommended lengthening the tour 

of duty in Korea to alleviate the personnel problems resulting from the constant turnover of 

soldiers—a suggestion that was not supported.

Morrell (second from right) with Command Sergeants Major
147

While Morrell did not go to Grenada during Operation Urgent Fury, he did visit later 

to discuss the operation with the sergeants 

major at their locations in CONUS. He noted 

the confusion during that operation, the problems with airborne and interservice cooperation, 

and the need for more combined operations 

training. He later regarded with pride the effect 

increased emphasis on NCO training had on 

Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

Sergeant Major Morrell traveled with 

General Wickham to South America, China, 

Fort Bliss (to speak at the Sergeants Major 

Academy), and Fort Bragg. For the most part 

Morrell tried to travel alone. He found that 

“they had a structured briefing everywhere 

General Wickham went,” and he thus preferred 

to divorce himself from such “dog and pony 

shows” when possible. Although he tried to visit 

as many active and reserve installations as possible, when it came to choosing destinations, “a 

lot of the determination was made by calls from 

the major command sergeants major.”

The Sergeant Major of the Army wanted 

to meet with troops and families and gather 

information on training and policy issues that 

the Chief of Staff might have missed. “I always 

enjoyed talking to soldiers,” Morrell said. 

“That’s what I wanted to do.” During a visit he 

would routinely get up early and take physical 

training with the troops or by himself. Later he 

would pay a call to the commander and the 

host sergeant major then meet with small 

groups of troops. He was careful never to 

interfere with training. Twice each year Morrell 

visited Germany and traveled to American 

troops stationed in Italy, Turkey, and Greece 

less frequently. His wife often accompanied 

him and visited dependent quarters, the Army 

community service organizations, commissaries, medical facilities, schools, and post 

exchanges. She also spoke at women’s luncheons and wives’ clubs.

The highlight of Morrell’s tenure as 

Sergeant Major of the Army was his ten-day 

trip to the People’s Republic of China in the fall 

of 1986. This first major visit by Army personnel since General George C. Marshall was 

Secretary of State reestablished an American 

military presence there. Incidentally, its purpose 

was to enlist the support of the Chinese for 

talks with North Korea. Sergeant Major Morrell 

and his wife accompanied Army Chief of Staff 

Wickham and his wife, as did Col. John 

Shalikashvili, a Medical Corps officer, a political affairs officer, and others. The Chinese 

arranged a special program for the wives while 

their military officials arranged tours and meetings for the military staff.

The demonstration of a Chinese division 

on the attack impressed Morrell. He inspected 

their equipment, which he found obsolete, and 

talked to Chinese soldiers who showed little 

reluctance to speak their minds. Morrell conducted briefings on the role of the noncommissioned officer in the U.S. Army. He also visited 

a Chinese military academy, a field artillery 

school, several ships, and an air force base. He 

noted wryly that it was difficult to figure out 

who was in charge in Chinese military formations. They appeared to have no pattern of control, although the performance of Chinese 

counterterrorist teams impressed him greatly. 

Visits to the Great Wall and the Forbidden City 

added interest to the trip and a perspective on 

the Chinese culture.

As Sergeant Major of the Army, Glen 

Morrell of course participated in many social 

events and ceremonies. With other senior enlisted personnel, he met President Ronald Reagan at 

the interment of the Unknown Soldier of the 

Vietnam War and attended embassy affairs, congressional breakfasts and luncheons, as well as 

Memorial Day and Independence Day celebrations. The governor of West Virginia honored 

Sergeant Major Morrell, as did the Veterans of 

Foreign Wars. In turn, he presented many medals, certificates, and letters of commendation to 

enlisted soldiers.

Of all his accomplishments as Sergeant 

Major of the Army, Morrell felt that the most 

rewarding was “being able to do something for 

the good of the enlisted people and the noncommissioned officer corps.” It was an honor 
148

“being their representative to the Chief of Staff, 

the Department of the Army staff, the senior 

leaders in the Department of Defense, and at 

the congressional level.” Throughout his tenure, 

he stuck by his principles and “always treated 

people like I’d like to be treated.”

SMA Glen E. Morrell retired from active 

service on 30 June 1987. General Wickham 

attended the impressive ceremony at Fort 

Myer. The Old Guard honored Morrell with a 

review conducted entirely by its noncommissioned officers. Morrell affirmed that the 

“American soldier...has been trained and has 

the desire to be the best that there is at whatever their job might be. They’ll go the extra 

mile time and time again if they are trained 

and provided excellent leadership.” Glen E. 

Morrell had served as an American soldier for 

thirty-three years.

1.iExcept as noted, this section is based on 

Interv, Erwin H. Koehler with Glen E. Morrell, 

31 Mar 94, Port St. John, Fla.

2. At that time Army volunteers could enlist 

for service in specific units.

3. A bolo, technically a shot that completely 

missed the black bullseye on the firing range, 

was also the name given to a soldier who failed 

to make a passing grade in marksmanship. The 

term was often extended to cover any instance of 

failing to achieve a qualifying standard.

4. The meal, ready to eat (MRE), is a prepackaged field ration that replaced the combat ration 

(C-ration). The C-ration, which was canned and 

packaged in cardboard, was bulkier, but the MRE 

requires water for preparation. When water was 

scarce or hard to transport, the MRE caused logistical and morale problems. Tray rations are meals 

prepackaged on serving trays to be heated and 

served in field kitchens, much like airline food. 

Morrell felt that the initial problems with tray 

rations resulted from a lack of training in the 

proper use of the new equipment.

5. As Sergeant Major of the Army, Morrell 

tried to end the use of the 250-foot towers at 

Fort Benning. He felt too many soldiers were 

injured there.

6. The numbered and assigned career field to 

which each soldier was assigned and which, in 

part, determined promotion opportunities.

7. Although Morrell appreciated his promotion, he was frustrated by and confusing uniform 

change that occurred at nearly the same time. 

New pay grades were added and the rank structure was adjusted in such a way that Morrell 

found himself a rank higher wearing the same 

stripes.

8. College Level Examination Program 

(CLEP) tests were administered by a college 

board. Many colleges awarded undergraduate 

credit based upon a given score on any one of the 

several tests.

Notes
149

Assignments

1954–1957 Cannoneer, Forward Observer, Battery A, 319th Field Artillery, 82d 

Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

1958–1960 Squad Leader, Platoon Sergeant, Combat Support Company, 2d Battle 

Group, 6th Infantry, Berlin, Germany

1960–1961 Artillery Operations and Intelligence Sergeant, 14th Armored Cavalry 

Regiment, Fulda, Germany

1962–1963 Heavy Weapons Sergeant, Staff Sergeant, Company C, 5th Special Forces 

Group, Fort Bragg; Republic of Vietnam

1964–1965 Heavy Weapons Leader, Company B, 5th Special Forces Group,

Republic of Vietnam

1965–1966 Heavy Weapons Instructor, Sergeant First Class, Special Forces Training 

Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

1967–1969 Heavy Weapons Leader, Company A, 8th Special Forces Group, Panama

1969–1970 Heavy Weapons Leader, Headquarters and Headquarters Company 

(HHC), 5th Special Forces Group, Republic of Vietnam

1970–1973 Operations Sergeant, Company B; Assistant Intelligence Sergeant, First 

Sergeant, HHC, 8th Special Forces Group; Intelligence Sergeant, 

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 3d Special Forces 

Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, Panama

1973 Student, Class #2, Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas

1974–1976 First Sergeant, Company A, 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry; First Sergeant, 

HHC, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas

1976–1977 Chief Instructor, Reserve Officer Training Corps Detachment,

St. John’s University, St. Cloud, Minnesota

1977–1979 Command Sergeant Major, 1st Ranger Battalion, 75th Infantry,

Fort Stewart, Georgia

1979–1981 Command Sergeant Major, Special Forces Detachment (Abn), Europe,

Bad Tölz, Germany

1981–1982 Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Recruiting Command,

Fort Sheridan, Illinois

1982–1983 Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Forces Command,

Fort McPherson, Georgia

1983–1987 Sergeant Major of the Army

Selected Decorations and Awards

Distinguished Service Medal

Meritorious Service Medal with Two Oak Leaf Clusters

Army Commendation Medal with Three Oak Leaf Clusters

Good Conduct Medal with Ten Oak Leaf Clusters

Army of Occupation Medal

National Defense Service Medal

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal

Vietnam Service Medal

Overseas Service Ribbon

Army Service Ribbon

NCO Education Ribbon

Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal

Combat Infantryman Badge

Ranger Tab

Master Parachutist Badge

Recruiter Badge
150

SMA Gates
Born in the Piedmont region of North 

Carolina on 14 June 1941, Julius W. 

(Bill) Gates was the sixth of nine children.1 With a farm to maintain, the Gates family “believed in hard work.” When Gates was 

eight years old, his father bought a service station and built a new home nearby. His family 

operated the service station and continued to 

work on the farm.

Gates attended grade school in Carrboro, 

North Carolina, and high school in Chapel Hill. 

School was a good experience, and the teachers 

maintained constructive professional relationships with the parents. They concentrated on 

the basics and made sure that each student had 

a firm foundation. In school, Gates’ best subjects 

were history and geography. Math was a real 

challenge. Gates loved sports, but family responsibilities prevented his involvement in team 

sports. At age sixteen he quit school and accepted employment as an assistant service manager 

with the local Ford dealer to help support his 

family.

After working at the dealership for a year 

and with his parents’ reluctant consent, Bill 

Gates enlisted in the Army on 12 August 

1958. He was seventeen when he signed up for 

three years. “It’s what I always wanted to do,” 

he said. “I was influenced by people coming 

back from the Second World War....I was 

impressed by all the uniforms...when they 

came home.” His brother had served in the 

Pacific during World War II. Two of his 

uncles had served in the European theater, 

and one of them had participated in the 

D-day invasion at Normandy. A third uncle 

had served in the Korean War.

After initial processing at Raleigh, North 

Carolina, Gates reported to Fort Jackson, South 

Carolina, for further processing, basic training, 

and Advanced Individual Training (AIT). Gates 

spent a week and a half at the reception station, 

where he and his fellow recruits were administered tests, issued clothing, and given medical 

examinations. Restricted to the company area, the 

new recruits could not even visit the post exchange. 

“We pulled a lot of details....We found out what 

KP [kitchen police] was. In fact, we volunteered 

for KP, because everybody was saying how great it 

was. I never volunteered for it again.”

At the reception station, Gates and his fellow recruits listened to stories from the “old 

soldiers,” who themselves had been in the 

Army a month or less. The new men were told 

of the tough discipline and terrors of life on 

“Tank Hill” at Fort Jackson. Gates found some 

basis of truth in the stories when he reported 

to his basic training company. The trainees 

were “herded like cattle” and billeted in World 

War II–era, two-story, open-bay barracks with 

rows of double bunk beds. Successful completion of basic training required teamwork, 

Private Gates discovered. The eight weeks of 

training were not difficult for the future 

Sergeant Major of the Army, which he attributed to the way his parents raised him and the 

challenges associated with farm life.

The basic training cadre consisted of platoon sergeants rather than drill sergeants. The 

only distinctive part of their uniform was a helmet liner—there were no special patches, badges, or hats in those days. The cadre presented 

basic military subjects, such as physical training, 

drill and ceremonies, and proper fit and wear of 

Julius W. Gates
152

the uniforms. Committee group instructors 

taught the more technical skills, including 

marksmanship.

In basic training the day began at 0430, 

with “lights out” at 2200 hours. Gates remembered many of his fellow recruits’ working late 

in the latrine and under the fire lights. Training 

continued on the weekends with Saturday 

inspections and makeup training on both 

Saturday and Sunday. Trainees also were 

required to attend church services. Physical 

training consisted of the “daily dozen” standard 

exercises including the push-up, sit-up, and side 

straddle hop. Drill and ceremonies instruction 

began with the trainees’ learning to stand at 

attention, parade rest, and how, when, and 

whom to salute and progressed to marching 

drills in formation under arms.

Daily inspections were made of the trainees’ 

lockers, living area, and equipment. Gates and his 

fellow recruits had to buy a display for footlockers. 

The display had to have specific items, with specific name brands. They used the display items 

only for inspections. The experience left Gates 

with a strong distaste for discipline without purpose, a feeling that would influence him throughout his career. Like the instruction in drill and 

ceremonies, inspections were progressive: the 

individual, his area, his equipment, the barracks, 

and the company area. Except during inspections, 

Gates did not see the company commander or the 

first sergeant, although the executive officer spent 

a great deal of time with the troops.

During basic training in the 1950s, recruits 

qualified with the .30-caliber M1 rifle. They 

also underwent extensive chemical-biologicalradiological (CBR) training, including a gas 

chamber exercise. The infiltration course, with 

live explosives, overhead machine-gun fire, and 

barbed wire, gave the recruits a convincing, 

memorable experience.

Plenty of food was available, although the 

trainees had to run into the mess hall and eat 

quickly. The food was different from the meals 

served today. Pork, beans, and potatoes were 

frequent staples, while in the field the trainees 

ate combat rations, which provided a constant 

topic for discussion. “You were not allowed to 

waste any food,” Gates remembered. The old 

rule “Take all you want, eat all you take!” definitely applied. During the sixth week of basic 

training the trainees gained post privileges, 

which meant they could go to the post exchange 

and other on-post facilities. But the most 

important thing Gates earned at the completion 

of basic training was a title—“soldier.”

After basic training, Private Gates remained 

at Fort Jackson for eight weeks of infantry AIT. 

He learned to use the Browning automatic rifle, 

the 3.5-mm. rocket launcher, the 106-mm. recoilless rifle, the 81-mm. mortar, and the .30-caliber 

machine gun. The advanced trainees also learned 

about mines and land navigation as well as 

squad-level tactics and live-fire exercises, developing in the process a sense of team spirit. “We 

all had something in common, we were aspiring 

to become infantrymen.” Again, committee 

group instructors conducted most of the training.

Private Gates graduated from AIT in 

December 1958. He then shipped out to Fort 

Dix, New Jersey, en route to Germany to join 

the 3d Battle Group, 6th Infantry, in Berlin. It 

took fourteen days for Gates to reach Germany 

by ship, a voyage that seemed an eternity 

because he was on KP duty every day.

One of Gates’ first special assignments in 

Berlin was standing guard at Spandau Prison, 

where Nazi war criminals including Rudolf 

Hess and Albert Speer were still confined. 

Forces from the four victorious powers of World 

War II—the United States, Great Britain, 

France, and the Soviet Union—provided the 

prison guard detachments that rotated quarterly.

The city of Berlin was itself divided into 

sectors controlled by the four occupying powers 

and was a focal point of Cold War confrontation between East and West. Gates and his fellow soldiers toured Communist East Berlin, but 

there was a “sense of possible confrontation...a 

definite separation of the two sides.” When 

Soviet troops delayed an American military 

convoy at “Checkpoint Charlie” along the border, the West Berlin commander deployed his 

only company of tanks and threatened to fire on 
153

the Soviets. “There was [a Soviet] army right 

there in East Germany, and that one company 

of tanks would have gotten sucked up in no 

time at all. But we fully intended to defend a 

part of that city,” Gates recalled. Fortunately, the 

incident was resolved peacefully; but tensions 

remained high.

While stationed in Berlin, Gates served as a 

sniper, senior rifleman, and fire-team leader. 

Periodically, his unit would travel to the training 

areas in West Germany, such as Hohenfels, 

Grafenwöhr, or Wildflecken, for infantry tactical training. In Berlin, they spent a great deal of 

time preparing for parades. Gates remembered 

the annual Armed Forces Day parade in particular. “We rehearsed for the parade a hundred 

times. We were supposed to impress the Soviets, 

and we did.”

Gates became a specialist fourth class and 

attended a local noncommissioned officer 

(NCO) academy, which taught leadership 

principles and the methods of presenting 

physical training, writing lesson plans, conducting dismounted drill, and presenting 

classes. The academy also featured map reading, which would grow in importance as the 

Vietnam War heated up. All things considered, however, Specialist Gates did not learn 

much at the school. “The academy was geared 

toward [polishing] the pipes in the shower 

room and spit shining floors and making them 

look like glass....The time that was wasted 

doing those things probably wasn’t worthwhile. But those were the types of things that 

we learned more in the NCO academy in 

Berlin than anything else.”

In comparison, the Third Army NCO 

Academy at Fort Jackson offered more meaningful classes and “hands-on” instruction. As a 

student platoon sergeant, Gates had to inspect 

barracks, write operation orders, conduct peer 

counseling, and prepare for and conduct training sessions. Gates proved to be an apt student 

and was selected as the Distinguished Honor 

Graduate of his class. As a sergeant, Gates 

would learn to appreciate the academies as “an 

opportunity...to see and talk to NCOs from the 

rest of the Army.” Gates also made progress in 

his civilian education. On the advice of his platoon sergeant in Berlin, he successfully passed 

the General Educational Development (GED) 

tests and received a high school diploma.

At the end of his three-year enlistment, 

Gates left the Army and returned to his 

hometown. He resumed working for the Ford 

dealer but soon missed the Army. He had little 

in common with his old friends, many of 

whom had married or left the area. Shortly 

after his release from active duty, Gates reenlisted in the Army. “I made up my mind...to 

go all out and make the Army a career.” Part 

of that resolve came from the opportunity to 

select airborne duty at Fort Campbell, 

Kentucky, for his next assignment, as Gates 

always appreciated a challenge.

Gates with His Jump Equipment
154

In the early 1960s airborne volunteers 

went directly to airborne units, each of which 

conducted its own jump school. However, until 

the new recruits became jump qualified, they 

had to live apart from the rest of the unit to 

some extent. Nevertheless, assigned to the 

“Rakkasans” of the 3d Battle Group, 187th 

Infantry, Specialist Gates quickly became part 

of the 101st Airborne Division. After a week 

of attending a pre-airborne school, which 

focused on intensive physical training, he 

entered the division jump school. Airborne 

school at Fort Campbell was similar to the 

training at Fort Benning today, except that 

Fort Campbell did not have a 250-foot tower. 

Each airborne recruit had to make five qualifying jumps from C–l19 airplanes. Within a 

month Gates received his jump wings.

Duty in the 101st Airborne Division left an 

“everlasting impression” on Gates. The senior 

noncommissioned officers were “colorful folks,” 

whose knowledge, experience, and judgment he 

came to respect highly. Many had served in 

World War II and Korea, and since the NCOs 

rotated back and forth between Fort Campbell 

and other airborne units in Okinawa and 

Germany, they were all well known to the soldiers 

of the 101st Airborne Division. The senior sergeants conducted tough, realistic training, which 

made their soldiers physically and mentally sharp. 

The paratroopers developed a strong unit 

cohesiveness as a result of their shared danger, 

close acquaintance, and the fact that they had all 

volunteered for airborne duty. Unit cohesiveness 

was important to the division, which served as 

part of a quick-strike reaction force. During the 

domestic disturbances of the early 1960s, the 

101st Airborne Division was deployed to several trouble spots within the United States. For 

example, when James Meredith, an African 

American, enrolled at the University of 

Mississippi, Gates’ unit provided security.

Elite troops like those of the 101st Airborne 

Division were beginning to take counterinsurgency training in the early l960s. To hone operational readiness, Gates trained at Natchez Trace 

in Tennessee, in the swamps of Florida, and in 

the Monongahela River valley of West Virginia. 

By the time he left Fort Campbell, he had made 

nearly seventy jumps and earned his “Master 

Wings.” Before his career was over, he would 

tally almost 300 jumps.

With his mind firmly fixed on making the 

Army his career, Gates took advantage of every 

opportunity to acquire new knowledge and 

skills. While he was stationed at Fort Campbell, 

he attended the Jumpmaster, Pathfinder, Aerial 

Delivery, Air Transportability, and CBR Schools. 

As part of his professional development, 

Sergeant Gates also attended the Army’s rigorous Ranger course. At the time, the 101st 

Airborne Division required its Ranger school 

candidates to first attend a two-week 

Reconnaissance-Commando (Recondo) school, 

“the toughest damn school I have ever been to 

in my life,” according to Gates. “They harassed 

the hell out of you, and they kept you in a total 

state of stress...the entire time you were there.” 

However, the discipline, patrolling, mountaineering, and survival training prepared the men 

for the Ranger school. The men who passed the 

division Recondo course “were those guys who 

could continue to put the left foot in front of 

the right, and continue to go, and react under 

the stressful situation.” The three-mile “Recondo 

march,” with full packs, was “the fastest march I 

have ever been on in my life.”

Ranger school was more of the same, with 

an even greater emphasis on teamwork. Ranger 

students learned to make terrain models, formulate operation orders, coordinate support, 

and lead patrols in difficult situations over 

tough terrain. They learned a variety of skills, 

from operating small boats to mountaineering. 

Gates’ tenacity paid off at the completion of 

Ranger school. Once again, he was selected as 

the class Distinguished Honor Graduate. 

In 1965 Sergeant Gates returned to the 

101st Airborne Division, where the division 

commander promoted him to staff sergeant and 

assigned him to the Recondo School as an 

instructor. During the summer months his 

duties included training cadets at Camp 

Buckner, West Point, New York. All of Gates’ 
155

experiences in the 101st Airborne Division paid 

significant dividends during his two tours in 

Vietnam, the first from 1966–1967 and the second in 1969–1970. Both times he went overseas 

as an individual replacement.

Gates served his first tour in Vietnam with 

Company B, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d 

Infantry, 101st Airborne Division. The battalion 

had deployed to the Central Highlands of 

Vietnam near Pleiku as part of the 101st Airborne 

Division’s 1st Brigade. When Gates reported to 

the battalion’s base camp at Phan Rang (south of 

Nha Trang, along the coast), he received a week of 

training. From there, he went to the field as a rifle 

squad leader. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne 

Division, was the reaction force for the I Field 

Force, covering the entire Central Highlands. 

Gates spent his first tour in Vietnam entirely in the 

field carrying out independent platoon search-anddestroy missions. However, “every couple of weeks 

we would...form a company perimeter [to] resupply,...change clothes, and give the guys an opportunity to take a bath.” During his first tour in 

Vietnam, the 502d made only one jump, a 

rehearsal for an operation that never materialized.

After about two weeks in country, Staff 

Sergeant Gates got his first taste of live combat, 

the “most dynamic thing that can happen to an 

individual.” When the 95th Regiment of the 

North Vietnamese Army (NVA) attacked a 

Special Forces camp at Dak To, Gates’ unit 

rushed to the scene. There was no time to think 

about the situation. He and his men simply 

fought as they had trained.

Morale was outstanding throughout his 

tour. The soldiers of the 502d Infantry were 

tough, well trained, and highly disciplined. 

Midway through his tour, Gates was wounded 

while leading his squad during an assault on an 

enemy base camp. He completed his first year of 

combat as a platoon sergeant and returned to 

the United States in the spring of 1967.

Promoted to sergeant first class, Gates 

served as an instructor in the Ranger Training 

Command at Fort Benning. His responsibilities 

included teaching basic subjects like hand-tohand combat, bayonet training, land navigation, 

physical training, forced marches, and basic 

patrolling techniques. He was the principal 

instructor for bayonet training and assistant 

principal instructor for land navigation.

While Gates was with the Ranger Training 

Command, he became the first American to 

attend the British Army Tactics School in 

South Wales. His attendance at the course 

paved the way for a future student exchange 

program. While there, he also made three parachute jumps from a balloon with the British 

parachute regiment. Meanwhile, Gates found 

time to complete the precommission correspondence course and the Infantry School instructor 

training course, in addition to serving as the 

Webelow leader for a local Cub Scout troop.

In January 1969 duty called Gates to 

Southeast Asia a second time. He reported to 

Company K of the 75th Infantry, the Ranger 

element of the 4th Infantry Division. As part of 

the I Field Force, Company K was based at 

Pleiku. “Our mission was to patrol within the 

area of operation, detect the enemy, and then 

report that information to the next higher headquarters.” Operating primarily on the 

Cambodian border, the unit conducted surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting, and ambush 

operations. While there, he served as operations 

sergeant, first sergeant, and platoon sergeant.

Two operations during Gates’ second tour 

in Vietnam stood out. During the first, six 

four-man Ranger teams from Gates’ platoon 

went into the mountains of Pleiku. Their 

mission was to place surveillance on a suspected NVA infiltration route into the division’s area of operations. The Rangers provided critical information about enemy movements that prevented a surprise attack on the 

division’s base camp at Pleiku. The second 

operation, an area ambush between Pleiku 

and An Khe, resulted in the capture of a 

high-ranking North Vietnamese officer. Years 

later, Gates recalled with pride the conduct of 

American soldiers in Vietnam.

In 1970 Sergeant First Class Gates was 

posted to Germany directly from his second 

tour in Vietnam. He served thee years with the 
156

2d Battalion, 54th Infantry, 4th Armored 

Division, later redesignated the 1st Armored 

Division. Gates served for two years as the battalion S–2 Intelligence Officer, since there was 

a shortage of commissioned officers. He also 

served as battalion operations NCO. Although 

Gates was confronted with shortages in personnel, equipment, and spare parts; tense race 

relations; drug abuse cases; and the many difficulties incumbent to the transition to an allvolunteer Army, he had fond memories of that 

tour. The quarters were among the best he ever 

had, and his family accompanied him. He also 

took advantage of professional development 

opportunities by taking courses in combat 

intelligence, personnel, and physical security.

Upon his return from Germany in 1973, 

Gates reported to the Mountain Ranger Camp 

in the national forest at Dahlonega. He served 

as chief instructor of the patrolling committee, 

supervising instruction in patrolling and aggressor operations. He greatly admired the local 

residents, calling them “some of the finest people” he had ever met.

As an instructor, Gates accompanied 

extended patrols, complete with jumps into the 

cold winter weather and rugged terrain. While 

at the Mountain Ranger Camp, he also attended the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer 

Course at Fort Benning and graduated as the 

Distinguished Honor Graduate of his class.

In 1974 Gates was promoted to master sergeant and returned to Fort Benning as first 

sergeant of the 3d Ranger Company. After a 

year he moved to the Basic Noncommissioned 

Officer Course, also at Fort Benning, as the 

enlisted company commander. Gates spent 

many hours leading, training, and providing 

support for the students.

Gates knew that he would need an associate 

degree to maximize his career opportunities. He 

began taking college courses at night while 

attending the Advanced NCO Course during 

the day; later, he earned an Associate Degree 

from the Community College of El Paso while 

attending the Sergeants Major Academy. After 

he graduated from the academy, he continued 

his education at the University of Maryland, 

majoring in management.

As a master sergeant, Gates attended the 

Sergeants Major Academy and graduated in 

January 1977. He regarded the academy experience as unique, since he was responsible only for 

himself and his family. The academy introduced 

its students to small-group instruction, a new idea 

in the Army. Gates particularly enjoyed associating closely with a wide variety of top NCO students, calling it a time to “see, hear, and experience 

working with NCOs from our Total Army.” The 

academy emphasized the unique role of the noncommissioned officer as a leader who had to “get 

weapons to fire, equipment to work, soldiers 

properly trained, enforce standards and discipline, 

and take care of soldiers and families.”

The academy was also family oriented. 

Many of the spouses developed leadership skills 

through peer instruction, work in family support centers, and volunteer work. Always a family man, Gates gained a new appreciation for 

the idea that “the more we get the spouses and 

families involved, the healthier the Army 

becomes.” He saw more clearly that the work of 

spouses was vital to the preparation of soldiers 

for deployment. During contingency operations 

overseas, the spouses of senior soldiers increasingly gave valuable assistance to soldiers’ families, often providing the working staff at family 

support facilities and operating family communications centers.

After graduation, Gates reported to 

Company A, 1st Ranger Battalion, 75th 

Infantry, at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and served 

as first sergeant. He spent most of his time 

training in the field and preparing for emergency deployments. Tough, realistic training 

took the men of the 1st Ranger Battalion to 

faraway places such as Panama, Alaska, and the 

Nevada desert. A typical practice emergency 

deployment mission would be planned and 

executed within twenty-four hours. Such a 

mission would include a lengthy flight, with 

in-flight rigging, a night jump, mission accomplishment, and return to home base. The men 

of the 1st Ranger Battalion were the “best sol-
157

diers in the world,” men of exceptionally high 

physical, mental, and emotional standards 

reflected in their total commitment to accomplishing their mission. Many of the officers 

and noncommissioned officers who served in 

the 1st Ranger Battalion went on to serve with 

distinction at higher levels of responsibility in 

the Army. Many were promoted to general 

officer or command sergeant major.

Gates was selected to organize the newly developed 24th Infantry Division Noncommissioned 

Officers Academy and to serve as its first commandant. Building the organization from the 

“ground, up” was a tough and rewarding experience that gave him an appreciation of the 

quality, capability, and high performance standards expected of the Noncommissioned 

Officer Corps. 

In 1978 Gates was promoted to sergeant 

major and shortly afterward began a two-year 

assignment with the Army Reserve Officer 

Training Corps (ROTC) staff at the Virginia 

Military Institute (VMI). It was a unique experience for Gates, the chief instructor. The institute had a Ranger platoon and a tank platoon 

equipped with M48 tanks. Gates trained the 

cadets in individual, squad, and platoon tasks 

and accompanied them during summer training 

at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Service at VMI 

was “not the real Army,” and he longed for an 

assignment with soldiers. He received his promotion to command sergeant major in 1979 

while serving at VMI.

In 1980 Gates reported to the 2d Battalion 

(Mechanized), 50th Infantry, 2d Armored 

Division (Forward), in Garlstadt, Germany. 

He served as battalion sergeant major and later 

as the sergeant major of the 2d Armored 

Division (Forward) Separate Brigade Task 

Force. He found in Garlstadt good soldier support facilities and “the best soldier and family 

housing in all of Europe.”

The missions of the 2d Armored Division 

(Forward) included preparing for the deployment of the rest of the division from Fort Hood, 

Texas, and preparing to fight as a separate brigade working with the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) allies. Division personnel also assisted with the pre-positioning of 

materiel in southern Germany. Command 

Sergeant Major Gates’ “time was almost totally 

occupied training soldiers.” Elements of the 

division rotated through the Hohenfels training 

site, at one point remaining there nearly ninety 

days. They also trained in Denmark and Belgium 

and participated in the annual REFORGER

exercises.2

After serving three years in the brigade, 

Gates was selected as the 3d Infantry Division’s 

command sergeant major, which required another family move, this time to Würzburg. While 

assigned to the 3d Infantry Division, Sergeant 

Major Gates spearheaded the effort to refurbish 

its NCO academy. With the introduction of new 

equipment such as the Abrams tank, the Bradley 

fighting vehicle, computers, and the tactical artillery fire control system, NCO education and 

capabilities took on new importance. Realizing 

the need for unit-duty-performance–oriented 

NCO training, Gates assisted his commander in 

producing an NCO development program that 

would later become the Army’s model.

From Germany, Gates returned to the 

Sergeants Major Academy in 1984. As the 

school’s command sergeant major, he worked 

closely with its commandant, Col. Fitzhugh H. 

Chandler, Jr. Although this tour at the academy 

lasted less than a year, it gave Gates the opportunity to influence NCO training policies 

throughout the Army. Among his projects at 

the academy were the further development of 

the common core subjects for the basic and 

advanced courses and construction of the new 

academic building. Although he attempted to 

keep his travel time to a minimum, he visited 

both the Command and General Staff College 

(CGSG) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the 

Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, 

Pennsylvania, to explain the academy’s programs and the role of command sergeants major 

in supporting and assisting commanders.

In addition, Command Sergeant Major 

Gates worked through the Fort Bliss chain of 

command to have constructed a new gym and 
158

additional housing for the academy students. 

Foreign students also began to attend the 

academy during this period: NCOs from the 

armed forces of the Philippines, Italy, and Great 

Britain came to the academy either as students or 

as supplementary staff. Meanwhile, Gates’ wife 

Margaret administered the academy spouse program. She championed the acquisition of a 

permanent facility for spouse and community 

activities, and she initiated an informational 

exchange program between CGSC and 

Sergeants Major Academy spouses.

Gates’ selection as command sergeant major 

of Eighth Army and U.S. Forces, Korea, came in 

May 1985. Accompanied by his family, he saw 

firsthand the problems facing the American 

forces there. From the command headquarters 

at Yong Son, Gates worked to improve the 

training of both U.S. and Korean forces. During 

his tenure, the Republic of Korea established an 

NCO academy system and began sending noncommissioned officers to the United States for 

training. In addition, Gates assisted in the 

development of the new Noncommissioned 

Officer Evaluation Report and spearheaded the 

needed renovations of the Eighth Army NCO 

Academy. He was also instrumental in making 

sure that the airborne-qualified soldiers of the 

Aviation Brigade’s Pathfinder Detachment 

received jump pay. 

The presence of unsponsored family members caused problems for the American forces in 

Korea. In addition to the financial burdens they 

imposed on the soldiers, Gates found that available quarters and schools were often inadequate, 

with some U.S. troops still living in unheated 

Quonset huts. As the command sergeant major, 

Gates worked hard to have more soldier barracks and recreation facilities built. He established throughout the command additional 

soldier programs, such as the Soldier of the 

Quarter program, supported by the Association 

of the United States Army. Gates’ wife worked 

with other spouses and the chain of command 

to improve conditions at a local orphanage. 

Despite the sometimes-harsh living conditions, 

“the soldiers’ morale and esprit de corps were 

outstanding.”

Near the end of his tour in Korea, 

Command Sergeant Major Gates requested 

reassignment to the Joint Readiness Training 

Center ( JRTC) at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. 

Instead, he found that he was one of thirty 

candidates for the position of Sergeant Major 

of the Army. With a selection board consisting of a lieutenant general, four major generals, and incumbent SMA Glen E. Morrell, the 

field narrowed quickly.

The board asked Gates a wide variety of 

questions about Army priorities and policy 

issues such as the role of women in the Army. 

They gave particular concern to family issues 

and asked for his opinion about his wife’s role. 

CSM Gates in the 2d Armored Division 

(Forward) in Germany
159

True to his usual course, Command Sergeant 

Major Gates told the selection board that he 

thought the top priority of the Army should be 

training. “That means everybody training, 

regardless of what their MOS is...for their wartime mission.” When they asked Gates what he 

thought his duties would be, he replied, “I think 

[most of ] the Sergeant Major of the Army’s job 

is to keep the Chief of Staff informed about the 

enlisted perspective of the Army, and let him 

know what soldiers feel, or believe, or how they 

perceive different programs and policies...at the 

canteen-cup level.” Chief of Staff General Carl 

E. Vuono agreed with Gates and endorsed his 

selection as Sergeant Major of the Army four 

days later.

The next four years proved busy for the new 

Sergeant Major of the Army. As Gates met the 

demands of office calls by the Secretary of the 

Army and other high-level officials, serving on 

the General Staff, and attending hundreds of 

meetings and functions, he found that his 

“greatest challenge” was keeping in touch with 

unit soldiers and providing soldier feedback to 

General Vuono and the Army Staff. 

Visiting Army installations throughout the 

world was one way of taking the Army’s pulse. 

As Sergeant Major of the Army, Gates visited 

sites ranging from small radio communications 

stations in Germany to troop elements stationed in remote Pacific islands. He attempted 

to visit every division and major command 

annually as well as to address every class at the 

Sergeants Major Academy. He also visited every 

NATO REFORGER exercise, all Team Spirit 

maneuvers in Korea, and made many trips to 

the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort 

Irwin, California, JRTC, and National Guard 

SMA Gates (top right) and Chief of Staff Carl E. Vuono (top, second from right) with Troops in the Field
160

and Reserve training sites. In addition, Gates 

participated in the observance of the forty-fifth 

anniversary of the D-day invasion and often 

traveled with the Chief of Staff. He later estimated that he spent only about 20 percent of his 

time in his Pentagon office. During his tenure 

as Sergeant Major of the Army, Gates served on 

twenty-seven boards and commissions ranging 

from the Army and Air Force Exchange Service 

board of directors to the Army Clothing and 

Equipment Board. He testified annually before 

three congressional committees and made 

countless media releases, both live and written. 

On one occasion, President George H. W. Bush 

invited Sergeant Major and Mrs. Gates to 

attend a dinner honoring the queen of Denmark 

at the White House.

The wife of the Sergeant Major of the Army 

had an important role in supporting her husband’s career. Gates had married Margaret 

Wilson on 13 June 1964. A native of Pontotoc, 

Mississippi, Margaret had grown up in a farm 

family similar to her husband’s. The couple began 

their married life in a trailer, experienced the full 

range of military quarters, and once had to live in 

a twenty-foot camper for nearly six months with 

two children and a dog. Their two daughters, 

Melissa and Laura, also endured their father’s 

long separations and abrupt transfers and sometimes had to take intercontinental flights to 

attend school. While Sergeant Major Gates 

believed such experiences built self-confidence in 

his family, they also made him acutely aware of 

the strains that the families of soldiers faced. 

Margaret Gates worked hard as an “extension” of her husband’s office. Since the number 

of families in the Army had vastly increased 

since 1958, she recognized early on the importance of family support. As she had in Germany, 

Korea, and the United States, Mrs. Gates continued working to improve childcare centers, 

hospitals, support centers, and schools for military personnel and their families. She was 

involved with selecting talent for the Soldier 

Show and served on numerous boards and commissions in support of Army families. She took 

the greatest pride, however, in helping to organize Fisher House, a national network of nonprofit “homes away from home” designed to 

provide on-site accommodations for families 

with a family member in a hospital.

While Bill Gates was Sergeant Major of the 

Army, world events moved rapidly. During his 

term of office the Berlin Wall came down and 

the Communist governments of Eastern Europe 

collapsed. In the fall of 1989 Gates accompanied the Chief of Staff on a visit to the Soviet 

Union. He toured the Kremlin, as well as several major cities and military training sites. He 

watched as Soviet officers using American computers war-gamed an assault on Western 

Europe. As he observed the Soviet Army, however, Gates was not always impressed, in part 

because the Soviets did not have a professional 

NCO corps and could not understand the role 

of the American noncommissioned officer.

The visit to the Soviet Union abruptly 

ended when the Chief of Staff returned to 

Washington to help plan for Operation Just 

Cause in Panama. Gates spent Christmas 1989 

with the troops in Panama. “The soldiers who 

were required to fight and win Operation Just 

Cause were highly trained, disciplined, and 

motivated to do what was right, and they did a 

great job.” His foreign travel with the Chief of 

Staff also included a tour of the Middle East, 

where they visited Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 

Israel, and U.S. troops in the Sinai Desert. 

During Operations Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm, Gates visited Southwest Asia 

three times and spent Christmas 1990 with the 

troops in Saudi Arabia. With information gathered on those trips, he helped solve problems 

concerning replacement centers, post exchange 

services, and soldier mail.

Despite the extensive travel Gates undertook 

as Sergeant Major of the Army, he had time to 

improve training, enhance the status of the NCO, 

and improve the quality of life for soldiers. As a 

member of the Uniform Board, he influenced 

more than 150 minor uniform changes including 

the introduction of desert boots and a belted overcoat with improved styling. He was also instrumental in ensuring that a bottle of hot sauce was 
161

included in all Meals, Ready to Eat (MREs). 

Though seemingly minor, these changes were 

often exceedingly important to average soldiers. 

Also introduced during Gates’ tenure was the 

Army Communities of Excellence (ACOE) program, designed to encourage soldiers to help 

themselves by making facility improvements that 

otherwise would not have been possible. His concern for single soldiers caused the establishment of 

the Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers 

(BOSS) program as well.

To Gates, however, training remained the 

Army’s critical issue. “Making training the 

number one priority in the Army...had a lot to 

do with pulling the Army together, and causing 

us to focus on our wartime tasks.” The NCO 

Battle Staff Course, the Command Sergeant 

Major Designee Course, a new NCO Evaluation 

Report, and the self-development test (a replacement for the Skill Qualification Test) were 

firmly established during Gates’ tenure. Working 

closely with General Vuono, Gates assisted with 

the success of the Year of Training followed by 

the Year of the NCO. Sergeant Major Gates 

believed that a strong NCO Corps was critical 

for a strong Army.

He regarded with pride the many accomplishments made during his term of office, 

including the first NCO historical volume and 

the introduction of Army Field Manual 21–101, 

defining the training role of the noncommissioned officer.3 He also admired General Vuono 

and the general’s support for NCO training. 

With Vuono’s total support, Gates launched the 

NCO Journal as an official publication. At the 

same time, he recognized that the time had 

come to “build the Army of the future, and 

make it a smaller, more deployable, more lethal, 

better trained, and better equipped Army.” To 

that end, Gates closely followed the introduction of new technology, training techniques, the 

changing roles of women, the assurance of equal 

opportunity, and the systematic reduction in 

force. He called for additional efforts to assist 

General Vuono and SMA Gates with a Young Soviet Soldier
162

soldiers leaving the Army prior to their normal 

retirement. His efforts and concern resulted in 

the establishment of the Army Career and 

Alumni Program.

Near the end of Gates’ tenure, he was 

asked to comment about his most difficult and 

most rewarding experiences: “My most difficult experiences were seeing our great soldiers 

committed to combat...visiting our wounded 

and injured in medical facilities...and attending memorial services for our fallen soldiers...

seeing the pride on the faces of our soldiers 

returning safely home from war in Panama and 

the Middle East...and seeing my wife survive 

heart surgery were, beyond a doubt, my most 

pleasant experiences.”

Sergeant Major of the Army Julius W. 

Gates retired with an impressive ceremony at 

Fort Myer on 30 June 1991. He used even that 

opportunity to enhance the prestige of noncommissioned officers. As had several of his predecessors, he saw to it that the ceremony, with the 

Chief of Staff and other dignitaries attending, 

was carried out entirely by the noncommissioned officers of the Old Guard. True to his 

form of placing soldiers before himself and 

showing pride, affection, and admiration for 

soldiers who serve in the ranks, Gates remarked 

during his retirement address that he hoped the 

audience had come to see examples of the best 

trained, best equipped, best led, and best soldiers in the world instead of to see an old soldier 

retire from the Army. “On the field in front of 

you are your nation’s finest, your soldiers. Thank 

you for allowing me the opportunity to serve in 

the ranks with them.”

1. Except as noted, this section is based on 

Interv, Erwin H. Koehler with Julius W. Gates, 

24 Mar 94, Huntingdon, Tenn.

2. Return of Forces to Germany, large-scale 

military exercises intended to demonstrate the 

capability to reinforce NATO with forces based 

in the United States.

3. Department of the Army, Field Manual 

22–102, Soldier Team Development (Washington, 

D.C.: Department of the Army, 1987).

Notes
163

Assignments

1958–1961 Rifleman, Sniper, Fire Team Leader, Company A, 3d Battle Group,

6th Infantry, Berlin, Germany (break in service)

1961–1966 Rifle Squad Leader, Company A, 3d Battalion (Airborne), 187th Infantry, 

101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky

1966–1967 Rifle Squad Leader, Company B, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry, 

101st Airborne Division, Republic of Vietnam

1967–1968 Platoon Sergeant, Instructor, Ranger Training Command,

Fort Benning, Georgia

1969–1970 Operations Sergeant, Platoon Sergeant, First Sergeant, Company K,

75th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, Republic of Vietnam

1970–1973 Battalion Intelligence Officer and Battalion Operations Sergeant,

2d Battalion, 54th Infantry, 1st Armored Division, Germany

1973–1974 Chief Instructor, Ranger Training Command, Dahlonega, Georgia

1974–1975 First Sergeant, 3d Ranger Company, Ranger Department,

Fort Benning, Georgia

1975–1976 Enlisted Company Commander, Basic NCO Course, 

Fort Benning, Georgia

1976–1977 Student, Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas

1977–1978 First Sergeant, Company A, 1st Ranger Battalion, 75th Infantry,

Fort Stewart, Georgia

1978 Commandant, Noncommissioned Officers Academy, 24th Infantry 

Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia

1978–1980 Chief Instructor, ROTC Detachment, Virginia Military Institute,

Lexington, Virginia

1980–1982 Command Sergeant Major, 2d Battalion, 50th Infantry, 2d Armored 

Division (Forward), Garlstadt, Germany; Würzburg, Germany

1982–1983 Command Sergeant Major, 2d Armored Division (Forward) Separate 

Brigade Task Force, Garlstadt, Germany

1983–1984 Command Sergeant Major, 3d Infantry Division, Würzburg, Germany

1984–1985 Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy,

Fort Bliss, Texas

1985–1987 Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Forces Korea/Eighth U.S. Army,

Yong Son, Republic of Korea

1987–1991 Sergeant Major of the Army

Selected Decorations and Awards

Army of Occupation Medal

National Defense Service Medal with Service Star

Vietnam Service Medal

NCO Professional Development Ribbon

Army Service Ribbon

Overseas Service Ribbon

Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal

Combat Infantryman Badge

Ranger Tab

Master Parachutists Badge

Army Staff Badge

Distinguished Service Medal

Defense Superior Service Medal

Legion of Merit

Bronze Star Medal with V Device and Three Oak Leaf Clusters

Purple Heart

Defense Meritorious Service Medal

Meritorious Service Medal with Four Oak Leaf Clusters

Air Medal

Army Commendation Medal with Three Oak Leaf Clusters

Army Achievement Medal

Good Conduct Medal with Ten Oak Leaf Clusters
164

SMA Kidd
Richard A. Kidd, the second of five children, was born into a military family in 

Morehead, Kentucky, on 24 June 1943.

His father, Samuel D. Kidd, had served in the 

infantry in World War II when his National 

Guard unit was called to federal service. Shortly 

after leaving the Army at the end of the war, 

Kidd’s father returned to active service in the 

administrative field and, after serving over 

twenty-eight years, retired as a chief warrant 

officer. As an Army family member, Kidd lived 

at posts in many different places throughout the 

United States as well as Nürnberg, Würzburg, 

and Schweinfurt in Germany.

Although his father never stressed the 

military as a potential career for his children, 

Kidd remembers his parents teaching him 

things that were instrumental to his later success in the Army, especially discipline, belief in 

God, and frankness and honesty. While growing up at home, he also learned the importance 

of committing to do a job properly. “My parents were firm believers in ‘if it’s worth doing, 

it’s worth doing well.’”

Kidd was an avid athlete. Although he was 

good enough to be on the school basketball, 

baseball, and wrestling teams and even boxed in 

Golden Glove competitions for a short period, 

he most enjoyed the challenge of playing football. 

As both a running back and a defensive linebacker, he learned from football, above all the 

other sports he knew, the value of teamwork. “As 

a running back, especially, you learn that you 

don’t go anywhere without the rest of the team.” 

This lesson would pay great dividends when he 

traded in his football jersey for Army fatigues.

As a student, Kidd’s favorite subject was 

mathematics. He also found history a fascinating field of study when taught by a teacher who 

made the subject “come alive.” Although he did 

not go on to earn a college degree immediately 

after attending high school, Kidd accumulated 

college credits at various times throughout his 

later years and earned both Associate and 

Bachelor degrees in Science.

Kidd was no stranger to hard work. In addition to chores at home, his studies, and athletic 

activities during the school year, he ran a thriving paper route and worked at the post swimming pool and bowling alley during summer 

vacations. The future Sergeant Major of the 

Army (SMA) also achieved considerable 

acclaim working at the local Army post exchange 

as one of its youngest branch managers and 

even considered a career with the Army and Air 

Force Exchange Service (AAFES). However, 

with the draft a reality in the early 1960s, he 

decided to get his military obligation behind 

him to allow continued upward mobility with 

AAFES without interruption. He therefore 

chose to join the Army for a three-year enlistment, which at the time would fulfill his entire 

military obligation.

With the full intention of staying in uniform for only three years, Kidd left his home in 

Arlington, Virginia, and was sworn into active 

service at Fort Holabird, Maryland, on 30 

March 1962. As a private, he attended basic 

training at Fort Gordon, Georgia, and was 

Richard A. Kidd

This section is based on Intervs, Mark F. Gillespie with 

Richard A. Kidd, 1 Sep 94, and Glen R. Hawkins with 

Richard A. Kidd, 23 Feb 93, Washington, D.C.; Mark 

Kalinoski, “Straight from the Top,” Soldiers 48 ( June 

1993):21–23.
166

shocked at two things about the Army—how 

much he liked the challenge and how little privacy was afforded to the basic trainees. Kidd’s 

upbringing helped him to make an almost natural adjustment to military life, such as saying 

“yes, sir” and “no, sir,” keeping physically fit, and 

maintaining a short haircut, “but even all my 

playing sports in high school didn’t prepare me 

for the lack of privacy I encountered in basic 

training such as rows of toilets in the open 

without stalls. We’ve really come a long way 

since then with respect to improving the living 

conditions and privacy for soldiers.”

The cadre at Fort Gordon quickly noticed 

substantial leadership potential in the new private. He rapidly gained positions of responsibility within his platoon and was asked to take the 

Officer Candidate Test, which he passed. His 

cadre strongly recommended he appear before 

the Officer Candidate School review board, but 

Kidd declined the offer because it incurred an 

obligation exceeding three years.

The professionalism of the drill sergeants 

Kidd encountered in basic training made a lasting impression on him. “They were good role 

models with positive attitudes and gave plenty of 

encouragement.” The training “was realistic, well 

presented, and kept you challenged.” Although 

he never had to do KP (kitchen police) duty as a 

punishment during basic training, Kidd recalled 

having to do his fair share of peeling potatoes, 

washing dishes, serving food, and so forth, from 

dawn to dusk. “It was a learning experience that 

was very humbling. There are times I think it 

ought to be brought back as something that 

brings you into total touch with reality.”

Upon enlisting, Kidd had wanted to be in 

the Special Forces. However, since one had to be 

at least a sergeant to join the Green Berets, he 

sought airborne and infantry training as these 

seemed the most challenging alternatives. 

Because he was only assured of one choice, he 

opted for airborne training, on the assumption 

that infantry would be easier to obtain later. 

That assumption proved wrong when Kidd was 

slated to become a radio repairman instead of a 

combat infantryman when he moved to Fort 

Benning, Georgia, in June 1962 for Advanced 

Individual Training (AIT). After arriving at 

Fort Benning, he requested to talk to his new 

company commander about transferring into 

infantry training. The company commander 

told him it was indeed possible, but that he 

would have to wait a few months until a slot 

opened. When Kidd asked what he would be 

doing in the meantime, he learned he would 

“pull KP and other details.” Thereupon he 

decided it was better to be a radio repairman 

“communicator.” In retrospect, Kidd found his 

decision to have been sound because the Army 

expects its combat units to be able to “move, 

shoot, and communicate.” His early training in 

the communications field enabled him to thoroughly understand the last of those key tasks.

After AIT, airborne school proved especially challenging for Kidd because of his fear of 

heights. “I wanted to pit myself against the 

toughest challenges and push to overcome those 

things that I considered weaknesses.” Although 

Kidd in Basic Training, Fort Benning, Georgia, 1962
167

he dreaded heights, he learned to control his 

fear. Later in his career, he even took military 

free-fall training, commonly referred to as 

HALO (High Altitude, Low Opening), as well 

as mountain climbing.

Kidd never informed his parents about his 

airborne training until after he had completed 

four of the five jumps required to qualify as a 

military parachutist. He enjoys telling that 

when he at last called home to relate his airborne experiences, his mother, Mona P. Kidd, 

nearly fainted and had to sit down. Kidd had 

injured his leg on the fourth jump but wanted 

to graduate with his buddies so badly that he 

made his fifth jump on the bad leg. After graduation, he was hospitalized.

In November 1962, after leaving the hospital, Kidd went to his first troop assignment 

in Mainz, Germany, as a radio maintenance 

specialist in the 504th Infantry, “Devils in 

Baggy Pants,” the airborne element of the 8th 

Infantry Division. The previous month had 

seen Cold War tensions escalate to the brink of 

open conflict during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 

and units stationed in Germany were on constant alert.

Kidd’s first day with the 8th Infantry 

Division provided him with a valuable lesson on 

soldier morale. Upon arriving at the front gate 

of the post wearing the hard-earned hallmarks 

of airborne soldiers—glider patches on their 

garrison caps and trousers bloused over jump 

boots—he and two other airborne-qualified 

soldiers were shocked and dismayed at being 

informed of the division commander’s policy 

forbidding such wear. Kidd’s spirits, along with 

Kidd (right), as a Young Soldier, Ready to Jump in Germany, 1963
168

those of his fellow paratroopers, were soon lifted when the division commander’s replacement 

flew down to Mainz one morning and 

announced to the assembled troops that henceforth airborne soldiers could wear their distinctive patches and jump boots. He endeared 

himself even further with the enlisted men by 

ordering all troops to be dismissed for the rest 

of the day, much to the consternation of the 

company commanders and first sergeants.

Kidd rapidly advanced through various 

positions in the communications field while 

stationed at Mainz and ended his European 

tour in December 1965 as a sergeant and the 

chief of radio maintenance for 

his battalion. During his 

assignment in Germany he 

encountered the first leader 

who would set him on the 

path to an Army career spanning more than thirty-three 

years. Sgt. Leo Santerre, a 

young platoon sergeant, epitomized the successful noncommissioned officer (NCO). He 

looked sharp and was competent, confident, caring, physically fit, mentally alert, morally 

straight, and dedicated.

While still stationed in 

Germany, Kidd volunteered 

several times for duty in 

Vietnam, which by then had 

become an active combat theater, but his requests were always 

denied. Instead, he was given 

orders to report to the 82d 

Airborne Division at Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina. During 

this tour of duty Kidd met his 

future bride, Sylvia E. J. Gooch. 

Her father, also a military man, 

was stationed in Heilbronn, 

Germany, where Kidd’s father 

was stationed. They became 

engaged and set a marriage date for immediately 

upon Kidd’s return from Vietnam, since he was 

still determined to get his orders changed.

En route to his new post, Kidd stopped at 

the Pentagon personnel office to find out how 

he could land a combat assignment in Vietnam. 

The personnel officer asked him which unit he 

preferred. Upon hearing Kidd’s reply of “173d 

Airborne,” the officer disappeared into a back 

room for a few minutes and returned with the 

news, “Sergeant, you’re on your way!” Although 

his new orders assigned him to the 173d 

Airborne, by the time he actually got to a troop 

unit in Vietnam in January 1966, he had been 

diverted first to the 101st Airborne Division 

and finally to Company C, 2d Battalion, 5th 

Kidd at a Temporary Base Camp in Pleiku,

Republic of Vietnam, 1966
169

Cavalry, a nonairborne infantry company in 

the 1st Cavalry Division.

Although initially requesting reassignment 

to the division’s airborne brigade, Kidd later 

regarded himself fortunate for having stayed in 

the “Cav” and “Charlie” Company. There he met 

Capt. Charles H. Fry, his company commander, 

who became the second major force in convincing him to make the Army a career: “If you 

want to be part of a professional Army and you 

and the other good NCOs we have are willing 

to stick it out, you can help make a difference in 

the quality of tomorrow’s Army.”

Although assigned as the company’s communications chief, Kidd longed to serve as an 

infantryman. Captain Fry gave him that opportunity on the condition he also fulfill his communications responsibilities. Kidd accepted, 

serving admirably first as a squad leader and 

later, after promotion to staff sergeant, as a platoon sergeant in combat. His combat tour was 

only briefly interrupted by a short stay in a hospital in Japan to recover from malaria and an 

infection caused by an only partially effective 

Viet Cong booby trap.

Before Kidd finished his year of duty in 

Vietnam, Captain Fry recommended him for a 

direct commission as a first lieutenant. Although 

the division headquarters approved the commission, the approval arrived as Kidd was en 

route to the 82d Airborne Division at Fort 

Bragg. Because direct commissions had to be 

approved and given by the division to which the 

soldier was assigned, the recommendation package had to be forwarded to Fort Bragg. Although 

the package arrived intact, a few additional prerequisites had to be fulfilled. Then, mysteriously, 

half of the package was lost and had to be 

restarted. By then, however, Kidd felt it was not 

meant to happen and had decided to discontinue pursuing the matter. He later acknowledged this as a stroke of luck because many of 

those who received direct commissions were 

involuntarily forced out of the service or 

returned to their former enlisted ranks during 

the massive reductions in force after the Vietnam 

War. Moreover, he would not have been eligible 

for the post of Sergeant Major of the Army, 

since any commissioned service now disqualifies 

one from consideration.

As planned, Kidd married Sylvia in 

Olympia, Washington, immediately upon his 

return from Vietnam in January 1967. Three 

weeks later, they arrived at Fort Bragg, where he 

began working as the wire foreman in the 82d 

Airborne Division’s 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry. 

But after Captain Fry inspired him to stay on 

active duty beyond his initial enlistment and 

since he had the opportunity to serve as a combat leader in Vietnam, Kidd was anxious to 

transfer into the Special Forces, the organization he had originally sought to join. Several 

months later he finally managed to break 

through the bureaucratic barriers and entered 

the rigorous Green Beret training program.

To become fully qualified in Special Forces 

in that era, a soldier had to pass a basic Special 

Forces training course and then master three of 

the five Special Forces military occupational 

specialties. Kidd’s communications specialty 

counted as one of them. With his combat experience and strong determination to overcome 

challenges, Kidd excelled in all phases of Special 

Forces training and graduated as the 

Distinguished Honor Graduate. He was also 

the Distinguished Honor Graduate of the light 

weapons course that qualified him for another 

of his three required specialties. In 1969 he 

attended the Operations and Intelligence courses at Fort Bragg and Fort Holabird. At Fort 

Bragg, the Kidds’ first child, daughter Shelly, 

was born in June 1970. Kidd received orders to 

return to Vietnam in November 1970 and 

found himself serving there during the same 

period as his father.

This time, Kidd found himself working as a 

light weapons infantry adviser with South 

Vietnamese units as part of a MACV five-man 

mobile advisory team. He was quite surprised at 

how much had changed since his last tour, especially regarding the sharp increase in restrictions 

on how, when, and where the enemy could be 

confronted, which later became known as the 

rules of engagement.
170

He also perceived deterioration in the professionalism and performance of American 

forces in the field during operations. In one 

instance, an American infantry company was 

assigned to cooperate with the South Vietnamese 

force he was advising in setting up a night 

ambush. Late that night, Kidd first checked the 

Vietnamese soldiers, who appeared alert, and 

then went to check on the Americans. He was 

appalled to find most of them asleep with the 

unmistakable odor of marijuana smoke wafting 

from their position. “We took corrective actions 

to ensure the safety of the force and requested 

no further joint operations with that particular 

unit.” As did many soldiers who returned to 

Vietnam in the early 1970s for a second or third 

tour, Kidd recalled that during his first tour in 

1966–1967, the attitude of the soldiers was generally much more idealistic and drug use was 

virtually nonexistent.

Kidd’s next station was with the U.S. Army 

Advisory Group, Fifth Army, at Fort Sheridan, 

Illinois, as the senior enlisted adviser to the 

Army National Guard and Army Reserve in 

the region. While there, he was sent to Fort 

Benning, Georgia, to attend the Advanced 

NCO Course in September 1972. Kidd continued his tradition of academic excellence by 

being an honor graduate, missing the award of 

Distinguished Honor Graduate by only a fraction of a point. Upon his return from the professional development course, he continued his 

duties as a senior enlisted adviser. The Kidds’ 

second child, son Ryan, was born in September 

1974 in Appleton, Wisconsin. During his tour, 

Kidd was also selected for promotion to master 

Kidd as First Sergeant of Company B, 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry “Buccaneers,” at Camp Howze, Korea, 1977
171

sergeant and for immediate attendance at the 

U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy 

(USASMA) in Fort Bliss, Texas.

He attended Class 8 at USASMA in 1976–

1977 and first met his predecessor, SMA Bill 

Gates, as a fellow student. Despite his best 

efforts to return to Fort Bragg and the Special 

Forces after graduating from the Sergeants 

Major Academy, Kidd was given orders to 

Korea with a follow-on assignment to Fort 

Lewis, Washington. The posting to Fort Lewis 

after Korea came as a surprise because “I put it 

down as one of my preferences at the urging of 

my wife, Sylvia, fully expecting not to be given 

any of my choices.”

Kidd began his tour in Korea in February 

1977 and reported for duty with the 1st 

Battalion, 32d Infantry (“Buccaneers”), at 

Camp Howze. His new battalion commander, 

Lt. Col. Stephen Silvasy, appeared enthusiastic 

about obtaining an academy graduate and 

informed him to be prepared to be an intelligence sergeant, an operations sergeant, and one 

of his company first sergeants. When Kidd 

asked him which assignment to be ready for 

first, Silvasy replied, “All three!” In reality, Kidd 

started as the intelligence NCO but soon had 

to replace the outgoing operations NCO while 

still keeping the intelligence section functioning.

Two months later, a first sergeant was 

relieved and Master Sergeant Kidd became his 

replacement. Kidd quickly found the cause of 

his predecessor’s downfall: The former first sergeant had been micromanaging his platoon 

sergeants. This became apparent at Kidd’s first 

meeting with the platoon sergeants to go over 

the weekly training and routine taskings. At 

first they all wanted to find out exactly how he 

wanted them to accomplish their missions. 

“You’re the platoon sergeants,” Kidd replied. “If 

I have to tell you how to do your job, I don’t 

need you.” He swiftly instituted a system of 

issuing tasks and missions and letting the 

NCOs take full advantage of their experience 

and initiative to accomplish them—letting people do what they were trained to do.

Additional morale problems in the company stemmed from the former first sergeant’s 

holding the company to more restrictive rules 

than he himself had followed regarding Korean 

nationals visiting the camp. Moreover, the 

KATUSA (Korean Augmentation To United 

States Army) reinforcements were not being 

properly integrated into the company to receive 

their training. Kidd announced that “the same 

rules applied for everybody” and set about integrating the Koreans into the company. Although 

the KATUSA issue was more difficult to solve, 

the new first sergeant’s leadership had a major 

part in curing the company’s ills. Soon the company was passing IG inspections and winning 

division-wide sports and military skills proficiency competitions with regularity. “Teamwork 

gets it done every time.”

In March 1978 Kidd returned to Fort Lewis 

as first sergeant of the “Can Do” Combat Support 

Company in the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry 

Regiment (“Always First”), 9th Infantry Division 

(“Old Reliables”), commanded by Capt. Charles 

Moore. Proving that even good first sergeants 

can make an occasional unintended mistake, 

Kidd started off his first morning’s PT formation 

almost literally on the wrong foot. He had arrived 

at Fort Lewis shortly after the switch had been 

made from wearing combat boots to athletic 

shoes as the required footwear for physical training (PT). Upon seeing the company in formation 

for the morning’s exercise in such informal footwear, he had the company return to the barracks 

to put on their combat boots. No one apparently 

had the presence of mind to inform the new first 

sergeant of the change; thus everyone returned to 

formation in combat boots. The company then 

proceeded to do exercises and a company run in 

the prohibited footwear. Only later in the day did 

a fellow first sergeant telephone him about the 

new rule. Kidd’s strong leadership and experience 

overcame the mishap, and soon the company 

gained a reputation as the best in the division, the 

one through which distinguished visitors to the 

battalion, brigade, division, and even the post 

were regularly escorted to make a favorable 

impression.
172

While at Lewis, Kidd was selected for promotion to sergeant major and designated as a 

command sergeant major (CSM). Despite his 

background in infantry and Special Forces, he 

was summoned to an interview with the commander of the division’s aviation battalion, Lt. 

Col. Dean Owen. When it became obvious that 

the battalion commander was briefing on his 

goals and vision for the battalion rather than 

conducting an interview, Kidd stated that the 

battalion CSM should be the most knowledgeable NCO in his unit. He protested that he was 

not qualified in aviation and therefore not 

qualified to hold such a position. The battalion 

commander countered that he needed Kidd’s 

experience and leadership skills as an NCO—

the battalion was already strong in technical 

expertise. The division CSM ultimately encouraged Kidd to take on the challenge, and he 

accepted the assignment.

Although he initially considered his lack of 

knowledge about aviation a disadvantage, Kidd 

later termed the job “one of the greatest learning 

experiences for me, especially working with 

pilots and aviation warrant officers.” The vexing 

issues he eventually solved included getting 

everyone into the same uniform for formations 

and finding time and motivation for physical 

training. “I wasn’t very popular with a lot of 

them because of that.”

This was also Kidd’s first assignment to a 

unit with female soldiers. He candidly admitted 

his lack of experience and his need to become 

more familiar with the rules that applied to 

them. “I discovered that all they wanted was to 

be treated like soldiers...equal, pull the same 

duties, etc.” One example that came to his 

attention concerned guard duty. Although 

minor to an outsider, it was important to those 

involved. Regulations required female soldiers 

to pull guard shifts in pairs based on concerns 

for their safety at isolated guard posts. Every so 

often, one of the pair was selected as the colonel’s orderly—an honor bestowed on a soldier 

detailed to stand guard as a reward for exceptionally outstanding appearance and knowledge 

at the formal inspection preceding the actual 

posting—which usually entitled the soldier to 

take the day off. Even if selected, however, 

female soldiers had to accompany their partners 

to the guard post. Kidd carefully read the regulations and determined that the guard posts his 

soldiers manned were not isolated, since they 

were at the airfield directly behind battalion 

headquarters. Subsequently, double posting of 

females ceased, and morale in the battalion 

improved measurably.

In November 1979 Kidd was reassigned to 

the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment (“Devil’s 

Deuce”), as the command sergeant major. 

Feeling more at home with the infantry, Kidd 

also carefully watched how others handled 

problems of morale and discipline. One memorable aspect of his new battalion was “court 

night,” when battalion-level Articles 15 were 

adjudicated. The battalion commander, Lt. Col. 

Alan Wetzel, required all new officers and soldiers to attend the first available session after 

they arrived. In the first session Kidd attended, 

an NCO was charged with using illegal drugs. 

When the NCO was found guilty and sentenced to a reduction in grade, his first sergeant 

and the battalion sergeant major, Kidd in this 

instance, stood on either side of him and ripped 

the stripes off his uniform. “You could see 

everyone in the room flinch when that happened. It sure got the former sergeant’s attention as well as everyone else’s in attendance.” 

Kidd considered this just one of many reasons 

why the battalion was best in the division and 

had the least number of problems.

Kidd received orders posting him back to 

Germany in July 1981 as the commandant of 

the 1st Armored Division’s NCO Academy at 

Katterbach. Upon arrival, Kidd was dismayed at 

the shabby state of the academy’s facilities. It 

did not even have a sign in front to indicate the 

academy’s existence. During his initial office 

call with the commanding general, Maj. Gen. 

John C. Faith, Kidd stated that he would prefer 

assignment with a troop unit. Learning this was 

not an option, Kidd gave a litany of the things 

wrong with the facility. The general asked him 

to outline the deficiencies in a formal paper. 
173

Kidd was pleased to find the new commanding 

general, Maj. Gen. Thomas F. Healy, who 

assumed command shortly after Kidd’s arrival, 

very interested in the Noncommissioned Officer 

Education System (NCOES) and willing to 

order the corrective action needed. “It took 

three whole years to get it completely fixed. 

When I arrived, everyone wanted to go to the 

Seventh Army NCO Academy. By the time I 

left, after much work by a great team of soldiers, 

NCOs, and civilians, everyone wanted to go to 

the 1st Armored Division’s ‘Old Ironsides’ 

Academy instead.”

Sergeant Major Kidd returned to Fort 

Lewis in July 1984 and began a remarkable fiveyear progression of assignments as command 

sergeant major of the 4th Battalion, 23d Infantry 

(“Bar None”), commanded by Lieutenant 

Colonel Cima; the 3d Brigade (“Red Devils”), 

9th Infantry Division, commanded by Col. 

Barry R. McCaffrey; the 9th Infantry Division, 

commanded by Maj. Gen. Donald S. Pihl and 

later Maj. Gen. John M. Shalikashvili; and 

finally, the I Corps (“America’s Corps”), commanded by Lt. Gen. William H. Harrison and 

later Lt. Gen. Calvin A. H. Waller. Acting corps 

commander Maj. Gen. Thomas H. Tait, in concert with General Waller (who had been called 

away to be General H. Norman Schwarzkopf ’s 

deputy commander during Operation Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm), nominated 

Command Sergeant Major Kidd to be the 

Sergeant Major of the Army. Kidd found the 

nomination quite an honor. Although he knew 

he had a competitive record, he did not think he 

had much of a chance of being selected because 

he did not come from a major command as the 

previous Sergeants Major of the Army had and 

because he had never previously worked for the 

incoming Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon 

R. Sullivan. “I am glad I was wrong,” Kidd later 

noted.

Kidd traveled to Washington, D.C., in May 

1991 for a personal interview by Sullivan along 

with the other finalists. He was uncertain what 

to expect when outgoing Sergeant Major of the 

Army Gates asked him to leave his hotel room 

and pick up the house phone in the lobby. It was 

Sullivan on the line to congratulate him as the 

new Sergeant Major of the Army. Kidd experienced a cascade of emotions—happiness and 

pride at being given the great honor, sadness at 

leaving the I Corps and Fort Lewis which had 

become the place he wanted to live upon retirement, anxiety about being able to fulfill the 

imposing responsibilities entailed in the job, 

and concern about the effect on his family.

For Kidd’s family, the move to Washington, 

D.C., was difficult. Allowing their son Ryan to 

remain behind was a most trying and emotional 

decision. Ryan was to begin his junior year at 

Spanaway High School just outside of Fort 

Lewis, and Shelly was attending college at 

Western Washington University. Ryan asked to 

be allowed to stay and finish high school with 

his friends as well as continue with his involvement in many school activities, programs, and 

sports. After they made arrangements for Ryan 

to finish school at Fort Lewis—with the stipulation that his 4.0 grade point average not slip—

the new Sergeant Major of the Army and his 

wife headed east for the nation’s capital. The 

Kidds’ faith in Ryan proved well founded when 

he graduated two years later as valedictorian of 

his class with a 4.0 GPA and a write-up in the 

national High School Who’s Who in Sports.

Many challenges confronted the incoming 

SMA. The most serious was the turbulent 

reduction of the Army’s forces from the Cold 

War level to one suitable and sustainable for a 

new, but uncertain international environment. 

Finding ways to ease the hardship and pain of 

soldiers and their families who elected to leave 

the Army as a result of the massive reductions 

soon proved the toughest issue he had ever dealt 

with. As the senior representative of the enlisted 

force, Kidd needed to ensure that the concerns 

of the soldiers, especially with respect to the 

method and fairness of the reduction process, 

had been heard and taken into account by the 

Army’s leaders faced with this difficult, unpleasant task. Critical to his efforts in this area was 

the provision of adequate services to ease transitions to civilian life.
174

During Kidd’s visits with soldiers, it quickly 

became apparent that soldiers hungered for 

information about the Army’s restructuring 

effort and its potential effect on their careers. 

Kidd swiftly addressed soldiers’ concerns by 

making himself available through internal command information media, i.e., Army News 

Service, Soldiers Radio and Television, Soldiers

magazine, newspapers, and radio and television 

stations at installations he visited. Taking an 

aggressive approach, he told the Army’s story to 

the various external audiences through interviews with the print and electronic media. Kidd 

felt that whatever success the Army had with its 

restructuring effort was attributable to the availability of information to soldiers and their 

families. He strongly believed that soldiers 

make better-informed decisions about their 

future in the Army if they have current and 

accurate information. An indicator of the Army 

leadership’s success in communication was that 

the Army did not need an enlisted reduction in 

force during the drawdown (other than a onetime reduction in force for sergeants major).

The Army Chief of Staff and his sergeant 

major also grappled with the steady increase in 

the Army’s participation in operations other than 

war. Despite the Army’s participation in humanitarian assistance missions like Provide Hope, 

Provide Relief, and Provide Promise, Kidd 

believed that the Army’s core mission was not 

changing. “We have built-in communications, 

self-sustaining capability, a logistics system and a 

chain of command, so we can superimpose ourselves into all those operations other than war. 

But that is not our primary mission. Our primary 

mission is [still] ‘warfighting’—fighting and winning our nation’s wars.”

The Army’s increasing participation in joint 

and noncombat operations was at least in part 

the reasoning behind the redesigning of the 

Sergeant Major of the Army’s chevrons. Kidd 

felt that adding the American eagle to the chevrons would be symbolic of an era of increased 

joint operations, and that it would bring his 

insignia more closely in line with those of every 

service senior enlisted representative with an 

eagle or part of an eagle depicted. On 13 

October 1994, Sullivan pinned the new insignia, designed by Kidd, to the SMA’s sleeve at a 

cere mony in the CSA’s office.

The newly redesigned stripes featured the 

original two stars centered on the chevrons, 

but the stars were now separated by the familiar eagle found in the SMA shield, CSM brass, 

and specialist rank. The stripes, stars, and 

American eagle represented every enlisted 

rank in the Army. The American eagle symbolized the Army’s link to the nation as well as 

the SMA’s link to the Chief of Staff and to the 

enlisted soldiers.

Kidd, like his predecessors, traveled extensively to measure the pulse of the enlisted force 

and keep the Army leadership informed of the 

soldiers’ hopes and concerns. Although he occasionally accompanied General Sullivan on his 

trips, more often he traveled elsewhere to better 

cover the Army, periodically meeting with other 

senior enlisted service representatives to share 

joint concerns or to exchange information prior 

to testimony before Congress. He also made 

several trips to check on troops engaged in every 

Army mission, always impressed by soldiers 

showing “the same zeal and capability as they 

did during the warfighting missions.” During 

visits with soldiers in Saudi Arabia, Croatia, 

Haiti, Cuba, Panama, the Sinai, and many other 

foreign places, as well as at hurricane relief, 

flooding, earthquakes, and forest fires here at 

home, Kidd observed Guard, reserve, and active 

components working extremely well together, 

noting that “with the downsizing, we will all 

become even more interdependent—truly 

America’s Army.”

Another vital issue to command Kidd’s 

attention was the NCOES, which, like his predecessors, he considered the key to the NCO 

Corps’ success. With the reduction of personnel 

and major cuts to the Army’s budget spurring 

significant realignments, the NCOES program 

changed to link NCO courses with promotions 

and supported the Army’s “select, train, promote, assign” philosophy. Sergeant Major Kidd 

convinced the Army leadership of the impor-
175

tance of NCOES and of maintaining adequate 

funding so that at a minimum all promotable 

soldiers have the opportunity to attend NCOES 

schools.

Other challenges included maintaining and 

improving the quality of life for soldiers and 

their families. In particular, Kidd strongly supported initiatives such as Better Opportunities 

for Single Soldiers, which provided “soldier 

feedback to commanders and the communities...[and] provide[d] soldiers with a quality of 

life that is more like home.” Kidd also made 

health care for soldiers and their families a top 

priority. Here, one problem was regulatory: The 

number of health care professionals available to 

the Army was congressionally mandated to correspond with the number of troops, not with the 

population of family members. He thus worked 

hard to support innovative ways to combine the 

assets from military facilities and the network of 

health professionals in the civilian community 

to produce the best overall care possible for soldiers and their families.

Other matters that absorbed Kidd’s attention were the Army’s policies regarding homosexuals and women in combat. Kidd did not shy 

away from the difficult issues, about which 

enlisted soldiers and their families had strong 

feelings. It was part of Kidd’s mission to listen to 

their concerns and convey them to the Army 

leadership. “The bottom line, overwhelmingly 

[was] that soldiers and family members did not 

want the ban [against homosexuals] lifted. The 

women in combat issue was more an officer issue 

than an enlisted issue. The enlisted females feel 

they truly have the opportunity to go from private to CSM.” Kidd placed equal importance on 

his duty to communicate and clarify the Army’s 

policies whenever questioned about them during 

his visits to the field. “I tell the soldiers what the 

requirement is, make sure they understand it, 

and that they follow it. Informed soldiers make 

better career and lifetime decisions for themselves and their families.”

Kidd’s working relationship with the Chief 

of Staff was much the same as that of his predecessors with their chiefs. “I have unobstructed 

access to the chief whenever I need it. Obviously 

I show the courtesy not to barge in on him 

whenever he has a visitor, but it has never been 

a problem to see him. Whenever I return from 

a trip, my report goes directly to him first, and 

then it goes out to the Army staff to handle any 

actions that it requires.” Kidd did not receive an 

NCO evaluation report. Sullivan commented 

that since he did not rate three-star generals, it 

made no sense to rate the Sergeant Major of the 

Army. Their relationship, as Kidd described it, 

was similar to that of any commander and his 

sergeant major: They often sat down and informally discussed the focus and direction of their 

unit—only in this case, that unit was the entire 

Army. Kidd spent better than one-half to twothirds of his time traveling, to better allow him 

to stay in touch with the concerns of the enlisted force.

In addition to keeping the chief and Army 

Staff informed, Kidd conferred with the 

Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of the Army, and 

the Under Secretary of the Army, among others, 

concerning enlisted issues. Kidd’s membership 

on myriad boards and councils also ensured that 

the voice of the enlisted ranks was heard in the 

government’s policy-making circles. Kidd’s wife 

Sylvia was indispensable in keeping him abreast 

of the morale and condition of the enlisted force 

and their families. Having been raised in a 

military family, she had considerable experience 

to draw on in making her many contributions to 

improve conditions for military families. In particular, Mrs. Kidd was one of those responsible 

for the development of the Army Family Team 

Building Program. “She is a great Mom and 

Army wife,” Kidd declared, recognizing all she 

had accomplished.

Reflecting on the future of the Office of the 

Sergeant Major of the Army, Kidd noted that 

with each SMA the office had grown somewhat. Each SMA had looked for new ways to 

provide input to the Chief of Staff, participate 

with the Army Staff in the formulation of 

enlisted policies, and better represent soldiers 

and their families. He and other senior NCOs 
176

agreed that downsizing the force and the great 

changes in basing and deployments would be 

some of the major challenges facing his successors. “I have found above all, however, that soldiers just want to know what’s going on and to 

know the truth. They want to know that they 

are appreciated and that their families will be 

taken care of. They are proud of who they are, 

what they are, what they do, and how very well 

they do it. They do everything the nation asks 

of them and they do it in a most professional 

manner. We have the finest Army ever assembled....God I pray we can keep it that way. 

America’s Army all the way—Hooah!”

After thirty-three years of service and as 

part of the leadership responsible for transforming the Army of his early days, Kidd truly 

made a difference. Drawing his energy from 

the soldiers who surrounded him, Kidd’s only 

regret was that he had not been able to visit 

every soldier. On 16 June 1995, in an allenlisted retirement review on Fort Myer’s 

Summerall Field, Kidd conducted one last 

inspection. With the 3d U.S. Infantry (The 

Old Guard) Command Sergeant Major, Kidd 

trooped the line of the enlisted soldiers of the 

Old Guard. Ceremony host Sullivan expressed 

his admiration and went on to proclaim Kidd 

as an outstanding soldier and warrior: “Men 

and women of America’s Army, the soldiers 

and noncommissioned officers, warrant officers and officers of America’s Army know how 

to perform to standard. That’s what this 

parade is all about, that’s what these men and 

women are all about, that’s what Sergeant 

Major of the Army Richard A. Kidd has been 

all about for 33 years. The Army is a better 

place to serve because of Sergeant Major of 

the Army Richard Kidd’s service to the Army 

and our Nation.”
177

Assignments

1962 Inducted into service, Fort Holabird, Maryland; Basic Training, Fort Gordon, 

Georgia; Infantry Radio Maintenance Course and Basic Airborne 

Training, Fort Benning, Georgia

1962–1965 Radio Maintenance Specialist, Headquarters and Headquarters Company 

(HHC), 1st Airborne (Abn) Battle Group, 504th Infantry; HHC, 1st 

Battalion (Abn), 509th Infantry; Radio Mechanic and Chief, Radio 

Maintenance, HHC, 2d Battalion, 509th Infantry, 8th Infantry 

Division, Mainz, Germany

1966–1967 Communications Chief, Squad Leader, Platoon Sergeant, Company C, 2d 

Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Republic of Vietnam; 

Patient, Medical Holding Company, 106th General Hospital, Japan

1967–1970 Wire Foreman, HHC, 3d Battalion (Abn), 325th Infantry, 82d Airborne 

Division; Weapons Training (Special Forces), Company B, U.S. Army 

Special Forces Training Group (Abn); Light Weapons Infantryman, 

Heavy Weapons Leader and Operations Sergeant, Company B, 6th 

Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

1970–1971 Light Weapons Infantry Adviser, U.S. Army Mobile Advisory Team, 

Military Region 3; Third Regional Assistance Command, U.S. Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam, Republic of Vietnam

1971–1976 Senior Enlisted Adviser, U.S. Army Advisory Group, Fifth Army, Fort 

Sheridan (duty in Appleton, Wisconsin)

1976–1977 Student, Class #8, U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas

1977–1978 Infantry Operations and Intelligence Sergeant, HHC; First Sergeant, 

Company B, 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, Republic 

of Korea

1978–1981 First Sergeant, Combat Support Company, 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry; 

Command Sergeant Major, HHC, 9th Aviation Battalion; HHC, 2d 

Battalion, 2d Infantry, 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington

1981–1984 Commandant, NCO Academy, 1st Armored Division, Katterbach, 

 Germany

1984–1991 Command Sergeant Major, 4th Battalion, 23d Infantry; 3d Brigade; 9th 

Infantry Division; I Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington

1991–1995 Sergeant Major of the Army

Selected Decorations and Awards

Distinguished Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster

Defense Superior Service Medal

Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster

Bronze Star Medal 

Meritorious Service Medal with Two Oak Leaf Clusters

Air Medal 

Army Commendation Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster

Good Conduct Medal with Ten Oak Leaf Clusters

National Defense Service Medal with Service Star

Vietnam Service Medal 

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Gold Star

Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal

Combat Infantryman Badge

Master Parachutist Badge

Special Forces Tab
178

SMA McKinney
Born on 3 November 1950 in the deep 

south of Monticello, Florida, Gene C. 

McKinney knew he wanted to join the 

military even as a youth.1 He and twin brother 

James, along with their six siblings, were raised 

by hard-working parents who served as role 

models for their children. Elizabeth, a stern 

person, taught her children “not to hate” and to 

never say unkind words about anybody, no matter who they were. Their father, Henry, instilled 

in his children the principle that if you worked 

hard and kept at it, you would succeed. Though 

Henry did not have much education, his message to his children was to be consistent, remain 

focused, and not to let outside interferences 

deter them from pursuing their goals. 

The twins helped their father work in the 

fields and saved their money to buy their own 

school clothes. Their Florida town had 2,400 

residents, and the eight McKinney children grew 

up in a house with only two bedrooms and no 

indoor plumbing. After graduating from high 

school in 1968 in nearby Tallahassee, Gene’s first 

goal was to “get out of Monticello.” Though 

unsure about what exactly he wanted to do in life, 

he knew he wanted something better, and he was 

determined to see what was beyond Tallahassee. 

While in school, Gene was drawn to soldiering and it had “stuck in his mind” to join. He 

recalled seeing soldiers drive up Route 90, which 

ran through Monticello, during the Cuban 

Missile Crisis and that sold him on military service. While others wanted to be doctors or lawyers, he wanted to be in the U.S. Army.

James joined the Army right away, but 

Gene wanted a taste of the world first and 

headed north to Detroit. Having experienced 

riots and killing in Detroit’s turbulent streets, 

Gene decided, “I can be paid for doing this,” and 

followed his brother James into the Army. He 

attended basic combat and advanced individual 

training at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and graduated 

as a cavalryman. He then went on to Airborne 

and Parachute Riggers training and was the 

honor graduate of his Riggers course. After the 

completion of his training and like so many others of that era, McKinney, now a private first 

class, was shipped off to Vietnam. He served 

with the “Sky Soldiers” of the 173d Airborne 

Brigade as part of the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry. 

The 173d was the first major unit deployed to 

Vietnam and had made history as the only U.S. 

Army unit to conduct a combat parachute assault 

in Vietnam. McKinney joined the 173d in 1969 

and celebrated his nineteenth birthday in 

Vietnam, hauling grenades and watching his step 

for fear of mines.

McKinney recalled the magnificent job performed by the soldiers and noncommissioned 

officers during his time in Vietnam. A volunteer 

himself, he did not notice a distinction between 

draftees and enlistees, with each pulling his fair 

share of the load. His toughest problem was 

preventing his youthful exuberance from leading him to take unnecessary risks. Reflecting 

later that he might have been naïve, he did not 

recall drug, racial, or discipline problems in his 

unit. Though there were tensions among the 

different groups, it was not excessive or unusual 

for the times. Being a minority, McKinney saw 

the Army as a place of opportunity.2

In December 1969 McKinney was promoted to sergeant, and in 1970 he left Vietnam. 

He returned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 

Gene C. McKinney
180

where he became a parachute rigger with the 

612th Quartermaster Battalion. He was later 

assigned to the installation’s transportation section but decided to leave the service to attend 

college at home in Florida. McKinney got out 

of the Army and went to work installing heating and air conditioning units to earn money for 

tuition, but he was not happy. 

It was while McKinney was in Florida that 

he began courting his sweetheart, Wilhemina, a 

Florida A&M student studying music education. 

They both wanted to attend college, but unable to 

afford both tuitions he decided to reenter the 

Army with only a 38-day break in service. 

McKinney recalled that his mother had a lot to 

do with his decision to return. She said “You’ve 

been to Vietnam, seen some of the hardest combat known to man, and they made you a sergeant. 

You’ve obviously done well for yourself in the 

service. Why leave it now?”3 Her words made 

sense, and he joined the Army for a second time 

in 1971. He was assigned to Fort Benning, 

Georgia, and served with the 1st Battalion, 58th 

Infantry, as a scout team leader. He and Wilhemina 

married on 19 August 1972.

During this period the Army was in turmoil. The war in Vietnam had drawn to a close, 

the draft had been abolished, and the recruiting 

slogan was “Let the Army Join You.” Drug use 

was rampant and racial tensions were high, as 

integration remained controversial in southern 

states like Georgia. McKinney was assigned to 

the battalion’s School of the Soldier program 

developed to help overcome the discipline problems of the time. He served in that position 

until he left Fort Benning.4

In 1973 McKinney attended the Basic 

NCO Course at Fort Knox, Kentucky. His 

first personal experience with the Army’s education system offered him a perspective on 

learning and a realization of how much he 

needed to learn. In hands-on courses students 

typically taught themselves, with the everpresent cadre nearby to assist when required. 

Private McKinney in Vietnam
181

McKinney completed the course as the Honor 

Graduate.

The following year, Staff Sergeant McKinney 

and his wife left for their new assignment to the 

3d Squadron of the 12th Cavalry at Büdingen, 

Germany. Confronted with problems similar to 

those McKinney had faced in Georgia, the 

squadron commander tried to overcome the frustrations of his men by fostering healthy competition. He developed a unit sports program and 

selected McKinney to lead it. By now McKinney 

had noticed that soldiers were changing their 

attitudes and becoming more professional, primarily because they were volunteers, not draftees, 

and truly wanted to be in the Army.

It was during this assignment that 

McKinney decided he wanted to make the 

military his career. The Army had “grown on” 

him, and he felt a strong sense of patriotism in 

serving his country. McKinney served four years 

in Germany before reassignment to Fort Bliss, 

Texas, with the 3d Squadron, 3d Armored 

Cavalry Regiment (ACR).

While at Fort Bliss, he met First Sgt. Felix 

Helms, who would be a positive influence in 

his life. Helms was McKinney’s first sergeant, 

and he saw the young soldier’s potential from 

the moment he met him. McKinney described 

Helms as “tough as nails, but he always looked 

out for my best interests.” One day he called 

McKinney into his office and asked him to 

take over the communications section because 

he said it “lacked leadership.” McKinney told 

him he could barely spell communications, let 

alone run the section with all of its different 

radios and specialized equipment. Helms 

responded, “You’re an outstanding leader and 

good leaders always find a way.”5

McKinney continued his work in the signal section for almost a year. He then returned 

to a scout section and later was selected as a 

master gunner.6 He credited Helms’ faith in 

his leadership ability for his success with that 

assignment. “He was always trying to teach me 

something. I would be on my way out the front 

door for the day and he’d call me in and say, 

‘Come here, let me show you how to run a 

suspense file.’ Or, maybe it was how to counsel 

or how to set up a duty roster. It doesn’t really 

matter. When you get down to it, it's not about 

what skills he taught me, it’s the fact that he 

gave a damn about me.”

As an African American, McKinney was 

always aware of the ethnic tensions in American 

society. When he and his brother James would 

visit home, sister Essie recalled they would discuss 

racial harmony in the Army. But a particular incident stuck with the young staff sergeant. As the 

squadron master gunner, McKinney was selected 

to go along with other unit personnel to Georgia 

to train an armored unit. For the initial briefing 

he picked a seat in front near his squadron commander, as the discussion that morning would be 

on gunnery. A colonel walked to the front of the 

room and upon seeing McKinney, responded 

with “hmmm.” Feeling a bit apprehensive, 

McKinney fell back a bit. His squadron commander, Lt. Col. Jerry C. Rutherford, however, 

stood up and looked the colonel in the eye and 

said “Let me tell you, if you don’t accept that sergeant, you don’t accept the team and I’ll pack my 

bags and we’ll be gone tomorrow.”7

Sergeant McKinney Surrounded by Sheridan Tanks
182

McKinney realized that some people evaluated him not on his performance, but on the color 

of his skin. By speaking up, his commander created an environment that made everyone feel like 

they were a part of the team. McKinney wanted 

to prove his commander right, so he set out to 

show them what he should really be judged by—

his actions. At night when others were on ranges, 

he stayed longer. He made sure the gun bores 

were correctly aligned and the ammunition was 

secure. He made it his priority to ensure everything was done correctly. And when he traveled 

with other NCOs of the organization, he told 

them the story of his commander so they could 

feel he would support them as well.

Upon completion of his tour in Texas, 

McKinney returned to Germany in 1983 and 

was assigned as a platoon sergeant to Troop G, 

2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 

in Bamberg, Germany. Soon after his arrival 

McKinney was tapped again for his leadership 

qualities. The commander and first sergeant of 

Troop F were relieved and the squadron sergeant major placed him in the vacant first sergeant position. There he faced some tough 

challenges, yet he would soon realize his greatest impact would be the training of his subordinate noncommissioned officers. 

Due to a restructure of military occupational specialties, his unit received platoon sergeants coming directly from the medical field. 

These sergeants were not skilled at their duties 

and McKinney needed to come up with a plan 

to train them quickly. As a unit responsible for 

an important border security mission during the 

Cold War, the competency of each leader was of 

extreme importance. McKinney developed an 

NCO professional development program; each 

morning at 0500 he taught basic skills, such as 

map reading and land navigation, to his newly 

acquired cavalry sergeants. It took time and 

personal commitment, but he quickly saw the 

improvement among his men.

When McKinney returned to the United 

States, he again went to Fort Bliss and the 3d 

Armored Cavalry Regiment as an operations 

sergeant with Headquarters Troop, and later as 

the first sergeant of the Air Cavalry Troop. 

When the regiment reorganized, the Air Cavalry 

Troop became a provisional 4th Squadron and 

McKinney, now selected for sergeant major, 

became the new squadron’s sergeant major. Then, 

in 1987 he left the 3d ACR to attend the U.S. 

Army Sergeants Major Academy, located at 

nearby Biggs Army Airfield.

McKinney enjoyed the course presented at 

the academy. A graduate of the First Sergeant 

Course, he was familiar with the school’s small 

group instruction process and was physically and 

mentally prepared for the training. Though he 

would not realize it until later in his career, the 

exposure the school gave him to international 

studies would pay off in future assignments. Just 

as important as the academics, however, was the 

fact that the school gave senior noncommissioned officers serving in positions of increased 

responsibility some “down time” to relax and 

reflect. All in all, he felt it was a great experience. 

Upon graduation in July 1988, McKinney 

and family headed back to Bamberg and to the 

2d Squadron of the 2d Armored Cavalry 

Regiment, where McKinney became the squadron command sergeant major (CSM). McKinney 

realized that his duties had not really changed 

as he progressed through the ranks, he just had 

a larger “police area.” He believed that his job at 

the squadron level was to listen to soldiers, to 

provide input on decisions affecting enlisted 

soldiers, to oversee the maintenance of the unit’s 

equipment, to maintain a relationship with the 

unit’s first sergeants, and to oversee training and 

leader development. He particularly felt that 

coaching and mentoring those subordinate to 

him was of great importance and a “big part” of 

CSM duties. 

To many it was no surprise when McKinney 

was selected as the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored 

Division’s command sergeant major. Confident 

that he was qualified for his duties, McKinney 

set out to share his philosophy with a larger 

audience. As the senior noncommissioned officer of the brigade, he focused on making sure 

that his units were prepared to “roll out of the 

gate” when the call came. The 1st Brigade 
183

served as the forward element of the 1st 

Armored Division and had the mission of protecting the Fulda Gap as part of the Cold War 

defense of Central Europe. 

McKinney worked to maintain unity of 

command and cohesiveness within the squads 

and teams of his units. Toward this end, he 

tutored his senior NCOs on how to organize 

routine details. Instead of forming ad hoc groups 

of duty soldiers to perform necessary chores, 

McKinney had his NCOs assign tasks to entire 

teams and squads. This approach both maintained command and control and provided junior 

NCOs valuable training and leadership opportunities that otherwise would have been lost. 

As McKinney progressed, he felt confident 

that he was able to perform effectively at each 

level of command. For that, he credited the 

Noncommissioned Officer Education System 

(NCOES), of which he was a product. Confident 

in his own abilities, he tried to focus on what his 

commanders were thinking. By 1990 McKinney 

was being considered for an even higher position, this time as the 8th Infantry Division sergeant major. 

With the nation transfixed by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, McKinney was 

torn between staying with his brigade, which he 

was sure would need him for eventual deployment, or moving to the 8th Division. It took 

words from his commander, Col. Daniel R. 

Zanini, to convince him that his talents would 

be best used in the 8th Infantry Division. As it 

turned out, neither unit fully mobilized for 

Operation Desert Storm.

McKinney arrived at the division headquarters in Bad Kreuznach on a Thursday and found 

himself on a field exercise in Hohenfels the very 

next day. The division commander, Maj. Gen. 

John P. Otjen, called for McKinney within 

twenty-four hours of his arrival for his initial 

counseling session. Otjen spelled out the environment as he saw it and what he expected from 

McKinney. He charged McKinney to “train 

every soldier and noncommissioned officer from 

individual tasks to Tank Table VIII gunnery.”8

When asked if he could do it, McKinney replied, 

“sir, I have broad shoulders.” General Otjen 

asked what he could do to help, and McKinney 

responded that he only needed to make sure that 

the officers allowed the noncommissioned officers to execute the training plans.

With that, McKinney set out to develop 

NCO-led ranges. The events leading up to the 

qualifications would encompass all levels of 

individual and team training. He felt that dormant sergeants major blossomed at the opportunity to truly lead their crews through the 

training. With the support of his division commander, McKinney was able to assist the NCOs 

of his division to train individual soldiers and 

then hand off the qualified crews to the officers. 

The officers, who had been preparing themselves for the “Superbowl of tank gunnery,” 

CSM McKinney at Welcome Ceremony as the 8th 

Infantry Division CSM
184

Tank Table XII, received prepared small units, 

and the division crew qualification went 

extremely well.9 McKinney recalled that his 

commander referred to him as the “American 

Express” of noncommissioned officers, meaning 

that he would “not leave home without” him.

After two years with the 8th Infantry 

Division, McKinney was selected for the prestigious position of command sergeant major of 

the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). With 

only four years of service in successive command sergeant major billets, McKinney was 

somewhat apprehensive to assume his duties 

because he was slated to replace a popular and 

well-respected noncommissioned officer. 

McKinney knew there was little training for 

duties at this level, so he decided his best 

approach to the position was to “be who you 

are.” He continued to listen to soldiers, develop 

leaders, and provide input to commanders on 

issues relating to the enlisted force.

It was during this period that the Army initiated a major force reduction. While McKinney 

was the USAREUR command sergeant major, 

the command shrank from 190,000 to 67,000 

soldiers.10 Meanwhile, the number of deployments was on the rise as soldiers were being 

called to places like Macedonia, Rwanda, and 

Somalia. McKinney toured all of USAREUR to 

talk to soldiers and their families about issues 

that concerned them and visited soldiers in the 

field and deployed areas. He felt that showing 

concern for soldiers paid large dividends. While 

receiving briefings on equipment, he would ask 

the soldiers to “tell me something about you.” 

He felt that when you tell people how much you 

care for them, they would not disappoint you. 

McKinney stressed quality-of-life issues 

while he was in Europe. He thought that a good 

quality of life brought soldiers peace of mind. 

Arguing that young people were smart and 

trustworthy, McKinney was an early supporter 

of the Single Soldier Quality of Life program, 

which provided single soldiers the same freedoms and responsibilities afforded their married 

counterparts. The new standard for single-soldier 

housing provided increased privacy for all soldiers and promoted a dormitory-type environment.11 Unfortunately, while the concept was 

good, the execution of the program was “horrible” in McKinney’s opinion, because too many 

leaders did not support the initiative. He felt 

that for the initiative to have succeeded, the 

Army should have first sold the idea to the officers and NCOs who make the difference in the 

ultimate success or failure of any program.

After three years at USAREUR, McKinney 

competed with his brother James among others 

for the position of Sergeant Major of the Army 

(SMA). The finalists were ordered to Forces 

Command headquarters to confer with the 

incoming Chief of Staff, General Dennis J. 

Reimer. Reimer interviewed him for over an 

hour, and then McKinney returned to Germany. 

A few days later Reimer called and asked, “am I 

speaking to the right McKinney?” After being 

assured that he had reached Gene McKinney, 

Reimer announced his congratulations. Reimer 

later noted that “You look so much alike, if one 

of you went on leave I could use the other to 

backfill and nobody would know the difference.”12 McKinney was sworn in on 30 June 

1995 in the Chief of Staff ’s private office at the 

Pentagon, the first ever African American to 

serve in this prominent position.

As was the case with previous Sergeants 

Major of the Army, McKinney had an open 

door to General Reimer whenever he needed to 

see him. Reimer did not give McKinney any 

specific guidance as to his duties. Again 

McKinney relied on the techniques that got 

him to his new position—being authentic and 

taking care of soldiers. He set out to go where 

the soldiers were. After each trip to the field, he 

furnished Reimer with a trip report that outlined his observations. 

One of McKinney’s first priorities was to 

work on preparing noncommissioned officers 

for the twenty-first century.13 Several weeks 

after assuming his duties as SMA, he addressed 

the 1995 Worldwide Noncommissioned Officer 

Education System Conference. He affirmed 

that because of emerging technology, NCO 

education needed to focus more on leadership. 
185

Moreover, the education system needed to have 

a single standard so that soldiers going to different academies received the same training.

As SMA, McKinney realized that the level 

of responsibility being thrust on young specialists 

and sergeants was far different than in the past. 

He feared that many first-term soldiers believed 

that the jobs they were doing were going unnoticed and unrewarded. On deployments he 

observed sergeants manning observation posts, 

running patrols, preparing operations orders, and 

taking care of logistics—all without an officer or 

senior NCO in sight. He felt that young soldiers 

needed more opportunities to get promoted and 

promised to look hard at those issues.14

In late 1995 the nation was shocked when 

three soldiers from Fort Bragg, members of an 

extremist group known as skinheads murdered 

a black couple in Fayetteville, North Carolina. 

In partial response, Secretary of the Army 

Togo D. West, Jr., immediately formed the 

Task Force on Extremist Activities.15 West 

selected McKinney as one of the panel’s five 

members. The task force found minimal evidence that there was extremist activity in the 

Army and concluded that the killings were an 

isolated incident. The task force called for 

increased education and a review and clarification of Army regulations. 

Before the task force completed its final 

report to the Secretary, McKinney and his wife 

Wilhemina suffered their own tragedy. Their 

only son, eighteen-year-old Zuberi, a college 

freshman, was critically injured in a car accident. 

Previous to the accident, McKinney had been 

carefully preparing for an appearance before the 

SMA McKinney with Soldiers in Macedonia
186

House Appropriations Committee to discuss an 

issue dear to his heart, quality of life. Reimer 

urged McKinney to stay with his son, saying, 

“We’ll cover this. Your primary job is to stay 

there.” McKinney replied that the soldiers 

needed him and that it was his duty to appear 

before Congress. So while his son was in a 

coma, he journeyed to Capitol Hill to speak on 

behalf of the enlisted force. Reimer recalled 

that, “even during that time, the soldiers were 

always on his mind.”16

In his testimony to the Military Construction 

Subcommittee, McKinney focused on three 

problem areas: adequate family housing, improving single-soldier living conditions, and childcare. He told the committee he believed that 

quality of life must be at the forefront to attract 

and retain quality soldiers, civilians, and family 

members.17 After the testimony, McKinney 

quickly returned to his son’s bedside in Florida. 

Zuberi succumbed to his injuries sixteen days 

after the accident. McKinney would later say that 

the only true wish he ever had was to “have his 

son back on this earth.”

McKinney worked to expand the prestige of 

senior noncommissioned officers and to 

strengthen the Command Sergeants Major 

Program. He noted that most senior NCOs had 

more education, preparation, and responsibility 

than when McKinney had first entered the service. Consequently, he proposed a tiered system 

of special duty assignment pay (SDAP) for 

CSMs who were assigned to positions where 

their rater, senior rater, and reviewer were all 

general officers. Based on the special qualifications and the demanding nature of the position 

of command sergeant major, the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army approved the proposal.18

Within his first sixteen months as Sergeant 

Major of the Army, McKinney traveled to eight 

overseas locations and twenty stateside installations. The soldiers and family members he met 

repeatedly stated that their lives were adversely 

affected by the changes going on in the Army.19

McKinney noted that in a seven-year period, 

from 1989 to 1996, the Army had reduced the 

total force by 463,000 soldiers, slashed the budget by 38 percent, closed 674 facilities worldwide, and cut the number of divisions from 18 to 

10. Meanwhile, operational deployments 

increased by 300 percent, placing great strains on 

the soldiers and units that remained. The changes were occurring so quickly that many soldiers 

were uncertain of their role and future in the 

Army. McKinney challenged NCOs to take 

charge of change in their respective areas, to 

consider the “big picture,” and to understand 

why things were being done and what the result 

would be. He believed the role of the noncommissioned officer was to keep those soldiers who 

were filled with uncertainty focused on their 

goals and on the missions at hand.20

Late in 1996 allegations surfaced that 

cadre personnel and drill instructors were sexually abusing female recruits at Army training 

centers. Secretary of the Army West responded 

to the allegations with a promise to take a hard 

look at the entire Initial Entry Training program. He formed an advisory panel and selected McKinney to serve as a member of the Task 

Force. Meanwhile, McKinney held a town hall 

meeting at one of the affected training sites, 

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. There 

he spoke with almost 1,400 soldiers, trainees, 

and senior NCOs, including drill instructors. 

During his two-day visit he found that morale 

for the most part was good, but that the soldiers were frustrated with the adverse media 

attention. During a question-and-answer session McKinney affirmed that “the system we 

have works...but if soldiers want to fix the 

problem, they must come forth—not only for 

themselves, but for those who will come 

after.”21 He trusted that most soldiers had 

faith that the Army would do what was right 

in light of the allegations.

As the task force explored the allegations, 

McKinney himself became a target of the 

probe. In February 1997 a former aide accused 

him of making sexual advances. She charged 

that it was improper for McKinney to sit on a 

panel investigating sexual misconduct when he 

may well have been guilty of similar behavior.22 Under growing pressure from congres-
187

sional leaders, Reimer suspended McKinney 

from his duties a week after the allegation surfaced. The Army announced that the suspension was in the best interest of both the individual and the institution, since continued 

public attention was making it difficult for 

McKinney to fulfill his responsibilities as 

Sergeant Major of the Army.23

General Reimer gave McKinney an office at 

Fort Myer, Virginia, which afforded McKinney 

the opportunity to devote much of his time to 

working with his lawyers on the case. The Army 

began an Article 32 investigation of the charges 

against McKinney that lasted twenty-seven days. 

During the investigation five more female soldiers came forward to accuse him. In October the 

investigating panel cleared McKinney of charges 

of sexual impropriety but referred his case for 

court-martial based on alleged improper behavior 

during the investigation. Reimer permanently 

reassigned McKinney to the Military District of 

Washington and stripped him of his position as 

Sergeant Major of the Army, returning him once 

again to the rank of command sergeant major.

In March 1998 a military panel of eight 

senior-ranking soldiers convicted McKinney of 

obstructing justice but acquitted him on eighteen 

sexual misconduct–related charges.24 The court 

reduced him to the grade of E–8 and issued a 

reprimand. McKinney retired in September. 

Because the United States Code entitled soldiers 

serving in the senior enlisted position of each 

service to receive retirement pay at the highest 

rate achieved, he collected retirement pay as a 

Sergeant Major of the Army.25

Though the final days of his career were 

marred by investigations and accusations, 

McKinney recalled that there was not a day in 

his military service he did not enjoy. The 

events leading up to his removal from office, 

while stressful, gave time for introspection and 

allowed him to be “introduced to himself.” He 

believed he had done his duty as a soldier and 

would do it all over again. McKinney was a 

soldier who understood soldiers’ concerns and 

who made those around him feel they were a 

part of his team.
188

1. i

Except as noted, this section is based on Interv, 

Daniel K. Elder with Gene C. McKinney, 26 Nov 01; 

Lee N. Coffee, Jr., “Carrying the Baton,” Unpubl Ms, 

Oct 96, author’s files, U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as CMH); 

Wil Haygood, “A Soldier’s Story,” The Boston Globe, 14 

Mar 99, p. A01.

2. Elaine Sciolino, “In Limbo: A Soldier’s Soldier 

Reviews His Rise and Fall,” The New York Times, 16 

June 97, pp. A1, A14.

3. David Abrams, “SMA McKinney Launches 

each day with NCO Creed,” NCO Journal (Fall 

1995):14.

4. School of the Soldier was an informal course 

loosely based on the Civil War–era program of 

instruction that taught drill and the manual of arms. 

The 1970s version was for those lacking discipline 

and attempted to rehabilitate poor performers through 

extensive training given by dedicated leaders.

5. Abrams, “NCO Creed,” pp. 15–16. 

6. Master gunners were put through intensified 

training in maintenance, weapons, ammunition, conduct of fire, range operations, and other aspects of 

armored warfare and were authorized to teach their 

unit personnel.

7. Transcript, Address by McKinney to PreCommand Course, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 22 Aug 

96, pp. 7–8, author’s files, CMH.

8. Tank Tables are the different levels of tankweapons qualification, which are published in the 

Field Manual 17–12 series. The qualification levels 

are typically Tables I to XII taken from these manuals.

9. Gene C. McKinney, “Meeting Leadership 

Challenges as a Team,” Parameters (January–February 

1996):10–13.

10. General Dennis J. Reimer, Speech notes, 

SMA Swearing-in Ceremony, n.d., Washington, 

D.C., copy in Dennis J. Reimer papers, Military 

History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

11. Karen Peterson, “The Good Life at Graf,” 

Soldiers (October 1994):30.

12. Sciolino, “In Limbo,” p. A14.

13. David Abrams, “NCOES Conferees Set 

Future Course,” NCO Journal (Fall 1995):18–19.

14. Abrams, “NCO Creed,” p. 15.

15. Rpt, “The Secretary of the Army’s Task Force 

on Extremist Activities: Defending America’s Values,” 

21 Mar 96, pp. i–ii, copy in CMH library.

16. Memo, Maj. Michael Galloucis, Public Affairs 

Officer, to the Chief of Staff, n.d., sub: Approved 

Quotes by Gen. Dennis J. Reimer, author’s files, 

CMH.

17. Transcript, “Statement by Gene C. McKinney, 

Sergeant Major of the Army, before the Military 

Construction Subcommittee of the House 

Appropriations Committee, House of Representatives, 

Second Session, 104th Congress, on Quality of Life,” 

29 Feb 96, pp. 1–6, author’s files, CMH.

18. Memo, SMA Gene C. McKinney for 

DCSPER [Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel], 4 

Apr 96, sub: Request for Special Duty Assignment 

Pay (SDAP), author’s files, CMH.

19. Gene C. McKinney, “The NCO Corps: 

Leading through Change,” Army (October 1996):27.

20. Ibid., p. 28.

21. Gil High, “Combating Sexual Harassment,” 

Soldiers (February 1997):4–5.

22. Sciolino, “In Limbo,” p. A14.

23. U.S. Army News Release 97–15, “Sergeant 

Major of the Army Suspended Pending Outcome of 

Investigation,” Washington, D.C., 10 Feb 97.

24. Greg Jones, “Court-martial Panel Finds 

McKinney Guilty of Obstruction of Justice, Former 

Sergeant Major of the Army Gets Rank Reductions, 

Reprimand,” Army News Service, 17 Mar 98.

25. Gerry J. Gilmore, “Federal Statute Entitles 

McKinney To Retire with Top Enlisted Pay,” Army 

News Service, 13 May 98.

Notes
189

Assignments

1968 Inducted into Service, Basic Training, Advanced Individual Training,

Fort Knox, Kentucky

1968–1969 Airborne School, Parachute Riggers Course, Fort Benning, Georgia

1969–1970 Infantryman, 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade,

Republic of Vietnam

1970–1971 Rigger, 612th Quartermaster Battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 

(break in service, 38 days)

1971–1973 Scout Team Leader, 1st Battalion, 58th Infantry, 197th Infantry Brigade, 

Fort Benning, Georgia

1973 Basic NCO Course, Fort Knox, Kentucky

1974–1977 Squad Leader, Light Armored Vehicle Section Leader, 3d Squadron, 

12th Cavalry, 3d Armored Division, Büdingen, Germany

1977–1983 Scout Section Leader, Communications Sergeant, Platoon Sergeant, 3d 

Squadron and 4th Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 

Fort Bliss, Texas

1983–1984 First Sergeant, Fox Troop, 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 

Bamberg, Germany

1984–1987 First Sergeant, Sergeant Major, Air Cavalry Troop and 4th Squadron 

(Provisional), 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Bliss, Texas

1988 Student, Class #31, Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas

1988–1990 Command Sergeant Major, 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 

Bamberg, Germany

1990 Command Sergeant Major, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, 

Vilseck, Germany

1990–1992 Command Sergeant Major, 8th Infantry Division, Bad Kreuznach, 

 Germany

1992–1995 Command Sergeant Major, United States Army, Europe, and Seventh 

Army Training Center, Heidelberg, Germany

1995–1997 Sergeant Major of the Army

1997–1998 Military District of Washington

Selected Decorations and Awards

Legion of Merit 

Bronze Star Medal with One Oak Leaf Cluster

Meritorious Service Medal with Three Oak Leaf Clusters

Army Commendation Medal

Army Achievement Medal

Good Conduct Medal with Ten Oak Leaf Clusters

National Defense Service Medal with Service Star

Vietnam Service Medal

Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal

Combat Infantryman Badge

Parachutist Badge
190

SMA Hall
Born a self-described “country boy” on 31 

May 1947, Robert E. Hall grew up in his 

birthplace of Gaffney, South Carolina.1

Hall was a playful child, enjoying outdoor 

activities with others and occupying his time 

playing baseball or war on the nearby mountain. 

Both his parents worked in the textile 

industry, and his grandparents owned a farm 

where they grew cotton and corn. Raised around 

a table where military service was expected, he 

regularly interacted with male role models who 

would influence his future. His father was a 

World War II veteran who had received a battlefield commission and the Silver Star and 

Purple Heart. His uncle had been a prisoner in 

Germany during the war, and though it was 

never openly discussed, Robert knew that he 

would also serve his country.

After graduating from high school, Hall 

attended Limestone College in Gaffney. Unsure 

which ran out first, his money or his grades, he 

decided to leave college. It was 1968, and Hall 

did not doubt that he would be drafted; it was 

just a matter of when. Since his relatives had 

served in the Army, he knew that was the service for him. After a visit by a recruiter he was 

sold on Air Defense Artillery (ADA), and he 

enlisted with no expectation other than serving 

his initial hitch and getting out. In February 

1968 his parents drove him fifty miles to 

Charlotte, North Carolina, where he left on his 

first bus ride to attend basic training at Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina. 

Upon arrival, Hall met his drill instructor, a 

very solid noncommissioned officer (NCO) 

who, like most of the trainers, had recently 

returned from Vietnam. At that time drill 

instructors did not conduct much of the training. Rather, they focused on the discipline and 

movement of their platoons to the training sites, 

while committee groups performed the actual 

instruction.2 Although Hall admitted he was 

“not necessarily a model trainee,” he quickly 

learned to do what he was told and mastered the 

tasks expected of him.

After graduation, Hall went on to Fort 

Bliss, Texas, where he received his Advanced 

Individual Training (AIT) to become an “air 

defender.” Expert instructors conducted the 

schooling. He was trained on the Nike-Hercules 

system, designed to shoot down high-flying 

Russian aircraft during the Cold War.3 After 

completing his training, Hall was confident that 

he knew the basics of soldiering and was ready 

to go on to his first assignment to learn how to 

be a good missile crewman.

He was posted to Fort Story, Virginia, as a 

Nike-Hercules missile crewmember. Private 

First Class Hall was made an acting sergeant 

after only about nine months in the Army. 

There were plenty of Specialists Four and Five 

in his unit, but there was a shortage of “hard 

stripe” noncommissioned officers. As soldiers 

rose through the ranks, those who were deemed 

technicians were selected to become specialists. 

Those who were able to lead were made sergeants.

The NCOs of Hall’s unit had been around 

missile systems for a long time, and he felt he 

had to struggle to attain their level of proficiency. Though aware of the leaders above him, 

Hall did not recall a lot of oversight and supervision. Soldiers did not see their first sergeant 

unless they were in trouble, and he was not a 

Robert E. Hall
192

person they wanted to see. Soon after Hall 

entered the service the Army established the 

rank of command sergeant major, but he never 

saw one at Fort Story.

Hall began to study his supervisors to find 

the best traits that each had to offer and adopted them for his own. Occasionally, however, 

Hall would come across a poor leader make a 

note not to repeat that person’s mistakes. He 

relied on the discipline instilled in him at a 

young age to allow him to differentiate between 

right and wrong.

After a year at Fort Story, Hall, now an E–5, 

married Carolyn Atkins. He was then selected to 

serve as a Chaparral missile system crewmember 

in the newly formed 8th Battalion, 61st Air 

Defense Artillery.4 After attending a five-week 

NCO transition course at Fort Bliss, Hall and 

the rest of the battalion underwent a grueling 

six-month unit-training period at White Sands 

Missile Range in New Mexico. During the 

training Hall would at times return home at 

0200, only to get up at 0500 to resume training 

at the Doña Ana Range. Not only were Hall and 

his comrades learning a new weapons system, 

they were also learning how to come together as 

a unit, with privates and sergeants learning at the 

same time.

In 1971 Hall’s unit moved to Korea, where 

it provided short-range air defense for the 2d 

Infantry Division. Because of his role in area 

defense, squad leader Hall moved throughout 

the 2d Division area supporting multiple units. 

While there, he received a good perspective on 

the division area and was able to visualize the 

doctrine of the battlefield. Divisional air 

defense was a new concept, and Hall’s unit 

spent an average of three to four days a week 

in the field. When deployed, his squad was 

responsible for engaging any hostile aircraft 

that might fly into its sector from the north. 

While in Korea, Hall was promoted to staff 

sergeant, and he soon found himself on orders 

to return to Fort Bliss.

Hall would eventually spend many assignments at Bliss, the home of air defense artillery. 

He was first assigned to the 5th Battalion, 67th 

ADA, and later to the 3d Battalion, 6th ADA, 

in support of the ADA School. Both were support units that assisted the NCO and officer 

courses conducted at Bliss. They did everything 

from air-defense missions to indirect-fire missions with 13.5-mm. training simulators. 

Hall recalled that team training during that 

era was not as focused as it would be later in his 

career. The training plans usually were only as 

good as the noncommissioned officer executing 

them. If an NCO had a wide range of experience, he taught a wide range of subjects. Hall 

felt this resulted in a lack of focus, but the situation improved over time as the Army developed standards for training events.

While Hall was at Fort Bliss, the government abolished the draft. Hall felt that the new 

philosophy that accompanied the transition to 

the all-volunteer Army caused much confusion. 

On one hand, the Army’s new recruiting slogan, 

Hall in Korea, 1971
193

“Let the Army Join You,” gave many people the 

impression that the Army was willing to lower 

its standards in order to appeal to the youth of 

the day. Colored furniture began appearing in 

barracks rooms, while more substantive changes did indeed seek to make life easier for the 

common soldier. On the other hand, “where the 

rubber meets the road,” there were many NCOs 

who were still trying to adhere to the old ways, 

saying “hell no, this is not what we are supposed to be doing.” 

Contributing to the turmoil was the fact 

that the Army was also suffering from a shortage of noncommissioned officers. During the 

Vietnam War era, mid-grade NCOs were in 

high demand and frequently had to serve multiple combat tours. Many were killed, injured, or 

simply left the service to escape the burdens of 

repeated overseas assignments. Still others, 

including Hall, were offered commissions, thus 

depleting the pool of experienced NCOs even 

further. The end result was a dearth of quality 

leadership in the NCO ranks at a time when the 

Army was going through the difficult transition 

to a peacetime, volunteer force—a situation that 

further undermined the overall discipline and 

efficiency of the force.

In 1974 Hall was selected to attend the 

Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course 

(ANCOC) at Fort Bliss. This was a newly 

developed course under the Noncommissioned 

Officer Education System (NCOES). Though 

the training was geared toward specific military 

occupational specialties (MOSs), it did not 

compare to current training. The courses were 

not conducted in a “live in” environment as the 

students went to classes during the duty day and 

returned home at the conclusion of training.

Upon graduation, Staff Sergeant Hall was 

reassigned to Germany, initially as a squad 

leader and later as a platoon sergeant in the 2d 

Battalion, 59th ADA, 1st Armored Division. 

Still a relatively young soldier, Hall initially 

struggled with his new role supervising a platoon. He soon realized that his troubles stemmed 

from the fact that he was trying to act as a 

“super squad leader,” running four squads, rather 

than pulling them all together as one. But as his 

experience increased he was able to expand his 

leadership skills. 

In 1975 the battalion sergeant major selected Hall to serve on the battalion staff as the 

operations sergeant. Without the benefit of any 

specialized training or without a key trainer for 

the position, Hall was forced to learn his responsibilities on the job. Sometimes it was through 

mistakes that he learned how to do things correctly. He continued to develop and challenge 

himself. Hall was selected as the 1st Armored 

Division Noncommissioned Officer of the Year 

and was inducted into the prestigious Sergeant 

Morales Club, only the fifty-fifth soldier to earn 

that honor.5 It was through these opportunities 

that Hall felt that he gained an advantage over 

others who may not have received as in-depth an 

education into their profession. By researching 

and studying the regulations in preparation for 

the competitions, Hall recognized he was better 

prepared for his job.

Throughout his tour, Hall was disappointed 

by the lack of money available to conduct the 

type of training that he thought should be done. 

Nevertheless, his unit maintained a rigorous 

training cycle and he believed that it was ready 

to fight if called. The battalion spent a large 

amount of time taking part in field training at 

locations in Grafenwöhr, Wildflecken, and 

Hohenfels, Germany. It also went to Crete, 

Greece, every summer. Comparing the pace to 

that later in his career, Hall noted that though 

busy, he at least knew with a fair degree of certainty where he was going to be and when he 

would return home. 

Upon completing his tour in Germany, Hall 

returned to Fort Bliss, where he was selected for 

promotion to sergeant first class. He initially 

was assigned as the Intelligence NCO for a 

training battalion but eventually became the 

battalion’s senior instructor. After a month or 

two the Department of the Army selected him 

to go to Drill Sergeant School.

It was 1977, and the Army’s drill sergeant 

training program had undergone significant 

changes since its inception in the early 1960s. 
194

In 1962 Secretary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance 

had directed Assistant Secretary Steven Ailes 

to study recruit training in the Army. Ailes had 

found that the staffing at Army training centers was inadequate and that the caliber of the 

noncommissioned officers was below the standards of other services. As a result, in 1963 the 

Army conducted pilot trainer courses at Fort 

Jackson, South Carolina, using techniques 

developed by the George Washington 

University Human Resources Research Office. 

This experiment led in turn to the establishment of the Drill Sergeant Program at Fort 

Leonard Wood, Missouri, in September 1964. 

Over the years the course continued to evolve 

and spread to other locations.6

Hall attended the Fort Sill, Oklahoma, 

Drill Sergeant School and was surrounded by 

good soldiers. At the time he was a sergeant 

first class and had little desire to become a drill 

sergeant. He had already served as a squad 

leader and platoon sergeant, and his main 

desire was to be a first sergeant. Little did he 

know that becoming a drill sergeant would 

help him achieve his goal. In any case, his 

opinion about drill sergeant school changed 

the moment he arrived at Fort Sill and saw the 

professionalism of the drill sergeants—and 

“the hat,” the distinctive headgear worn by 

those who completed the course.7

The course was tough, and Hall walked the 

fields at night practicing his commands and 

Hall on His Promotion to Staff Sergeant
195

techniques. He recognized that the burden of 

basic training was shifting from committee 

group instruction, as he had experienced as a 

recruit, to a system that included more involvement by the drill sergeant.

Soon after graduation, Hall returned to 

Fort Bliss and joined the 4th Training Brigade. 

He was assigned initially to an AIT company 

but later moved on to a Basic Combat Training 

(BCT) company. At one time, Halls’ BCT company had only four drill sergeants for three 

platoons and the duty was long and hard. He 

would start his day by waking the troops and 

spend the day training them. The drill sergeants 

also had other routine duties, such as charge of 

quarters, staff duty, and courtesy patrol. If he 

had all-night duty he would quickly return 

home to change clothes, shine his boots, and 

then go back to work until it was time to put the 

trainees to bed.

The new inductees at that time ranged 

from very good to poor and included a few 

individuals who probably had little choice but 

to join the military. The drill sergeants were 

not supposed to discharge more than 5 percent 

of the recruits in a unit, so he had to identify 

early those who were not going to make it. He 

remembered one soldier who was having a 

tough time in every subject, from map reading 

to the code of conduct and general orders. He 

just could not catch on. Late one night Hall 

saw him going into the latrine to meet with 

one of his fellow trainees. He followed them 

and saw that the other soldier was trying to 

teach him to read. Evidently, his peers had 

been covering for him as they all pitched in to 

help him succeed. Still, the Army could not 

keep a soldier who could not read, and Hall 

was saddened by the loss of that soldier.

In 1979 Hall was selected as the Fort Bliss 

Drill Sergeant of the Year. He was sent to Fort 

Monroe, Virginia, to represent his command at 

the Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC) drill sergeant competition. Competing against twenty-five other candidates, he 

was selected as the Army’s Drill Sergeant of the 

Year. Along with the accolades that accompanied 

his selection, the award included a one-year 

assignment at TRADOC headquarters to serve 

on the staff of the TRADOC commander, 

General Donn A. Starry. Hall would be the only 

soldier on Fort Monroe authorized to wear the 

coveted campaign hat.

Hall returned to Fort Bliss and quickly 

moved his family to Virginia. In his new job he 

reported directly to the TRADOC command 

sergeant major and provided input to the 

TRADOC staff. Occasionally, Starry himself 

would walk up the stairs and sit down beside 

him and ask, “Hey drill sergeant, what’s going 

on around the Army today?” 

Hall’s primary responsibility was to travel 

to the Army’s training centers and provide 

feedback to TRADOC headquarters, usually 

traveling every week to a new location. He 

would typically meet with his counterpart at 

the installation, the unit’s drill sergeant of the 

year. They would exchange ideas, and Hall 

would provide suggestions based on his visits to 

other installations. Contrasting these trips with 

those he would later make as Sergeant Major of 

the Army (SMA), Hall recalled that when he 

was SMA people would eventually take his 

suggestions to heart.

After Hall’s one year had expired, he 

joined TRADOC’s Office of the Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Training. Although there for only a 

short period, he was involved in evaluating a 

new training concept for NCOs, the fledgling 

Primary Leadership Development Course 

(PLDC). Traditionally, sergeants from the 

combat and noncombat arms trained separately. Combat-arms soldiers attended the 

Primary Noncommissioned Officer Course 

(PNCOC), while others attended the Primary 

Leadership Course (PLC). The 

Noncommissioned Officer Academy at Fort 

Stewart, Georgia, however, was testing a new 

training program in which NCOs from all the 

arms and branches trained together. The 

TRADOC CSM dispatched Hall to “go find 

out what they are doing.” After observing soldiers from different career fields and backgrounds training together, Hall was impressed. 
196

He notified the TRADOC CSM that he 

should come to Georgia to see the course for 

himself, and they spent a few days observing 

the pilot program. Upon his return to 

TRADOC, Hall prepared a staff study on 

combining the current NCO courses into 

PLDC and briefed the idea to the TRADOC 

deputy commanding general, who agreed with 

the proposal. 

During Hall’s assignment at Fort Monroe, 

the Army began the First Sergeant Course. 

With the course still in its infancy, Hall participated in the self-paced pilot program at Fort 

Bliss. He completed his studies ahead of the 

other students and was the first ever to graduate 

from the new course. 

While at TRADOC, Hall was selected for 

promotion to master sergeant. After convincing 

the TRADOC CSM that he should be a first 

sergeant in Germany, he learned that his former 

unit, the 2d Battalion, 59th ADA, had vacancies 

and they wanted him. However, when he arrived 

in 1982 as a promotable sergeant first class, the 

battalion had eight excess E–8s. It was a blow to 

Hall, and he ended up working as a platoon 

sergeant with a first sergeant who was a peer. 

Hall joined the Stinger Platoon for the unit’s 

participation in the training exercise 

REFORGER.

8 When he returned from the 

exercise, Hall’s superiors appointed him the 

headquarters platoon sergeant to help the unit 

get through its annual general inspection. 

Afterward, he moved to battalion headquarters 

to write an NCO development program.

One day Hall went into the battalion headquarters when the unit was on alert. The battalion commander asked him “why aren’t you 

rolling out with your battery?” By then, Hall had 

been in Battery A, Battery B, and Headquarters 

Battery and was not sure which unit he was in 

anymore. The commander informed him that 

he was the new first sergeant of Battery B. 

Elated to have finally landed a first sergeant 

position, Hall jumped in one of the last trucks 

leaving the motor pool.

Hall’s Battery B earned a reputation as the 

best unit in the battalion, earning thirteen of the 

fifteen streamers available for top performance. 

He recognized that the soldiers and NCOs of his 

unit were hard workers who were looking for 

good leadership, which he strived to provide. 

Though his unit did not have the same personnel 

shortages that had bedeviled him during his previous tour, money for repair parts was a major 

concern. During one training exercise, Hall suggested that the unit should drive from its base at 

Schwabach to the training site at Vilseck—a 

distance of seventy miles—rather than follow the 

traditional method of shipping its equipment by 

rail. After some convincing, his commander gave 

in and they drove. The lack of spare parts, maintenance time, and equipment soon became evident, as the unit “left equipment from the front 

gate of Schwabach to the back gate of Vilseck.” 

For the rest of their thirty-day exercise the unit 

worked on its equipment, and at the end all 

vehicles drove home under their own power.

With a little over one year’s time as a master 

sergeant, Hall was selected to attend the 

Sergeants Major Academy. His attendance 

would coincide with the completion of his 

three-year tour in Germany. Together with wife 

Carol, who was eight-and-a-half months pregnant with son Jason, and his two daughters 

Apra and Rea, Hall left for Fort Bliss a month 

ahead of his June reporting date for the sixmonth-long Sergeants Major Course. 

Hall enjoyed much about the course and his 

return to Texas. The academy conducted training through the small-group process, and he 

appreciated his new-found skills.9 Through the 

course he met people from around the Army, all 

of whom had different experiences, and they all 

learned from each other. The course was right 

on target for Hall, and he felt that the students 

were better prepared for their next level of 

assignment as a result. He believed the presence 

of his family was an important aspect of the 

program. It allowed him to spend more time 

with them without the rigors of a typical duty 

assignment, and he was able to enjoy the time 

together with them.

Hall finished the course with high marks 

and graduated in the top 10 percent of his class. 
197

He was selected to remain as an instructor for 

the course he had just finished. After a little 

over a year on instructor duty, he was selected 

for promotion to command sergeant major and 

was sent to Fort Stewart, Georgia. There, he 

became the battalion command sergeant major 

for the 5th Battalion, 52d Air Defense Artillery 

(later redesignated as the 1st Battalion, 5th 

ADA). 

CSM Hall typically started his day with 

physical training. The battalion had its own 

parade field, and every morning started with 

exercises and a four-mile run. After cleaning up 

and breakfast, the soldiers would undergo training. The unit began a program in which the battalion commander would turn the unit over to 

Hall for one week every quarter and he would 

take it to the field. At first, Hall had the unit 

perform maneuvers, gunnery, and collective training tasks. The battalion would then march back 

on Friday afternoon for a brief recovery period 

and close out any business at hand, at which 

point Hall would turn the battalion back over to 

the commander. Hall soon realized that he had 

the wrong focus during these training sessions, 

that he should have focused on individual and 

small-unit training. He therefore decided to alter 

these sessions to concentrate on the type of tasks 

NCOs were expected to perform, such as conducting road marches, setting up rifle ranges, and 

overseeing weapons qualification tests.

As a result, his battalion soon had a reputation as one of the top units in the 24th Infantry 

Division (Mechanized). By then, a new training 

doctrine had emerged that required units to 

focus on tasks they would have to perform in 

combat. Hall saw it as his responsibility to train 

his first sergeants, oversee the training of platoons, and spend time with his soldiers. He 

spent the majority of his time making sure the 

troops and their leaders were properly trained 

and prepared for whatever might lay ahead.

In 1989 Hall was “directed by the division 

commander to report to a new duty station.” He 

became the commandant of the 24th Infantry 

Division NCO Academy, the same academy that 

he observed conducting the first PLDC when he 

worked at TRADOC. Located twenty miles 

from the division headquarters, Hall’s camp 

encompassed 5,000 acres of training area and had 

its own dining facility, exchange, barbershop, and 

bachelor enlisted quarters (BEQ). Besides PLDC, 

the academy taught the Basic Noncommissioned 

Officer Courses (BNCOC) for five different 

combat specialties and averaged 3,000 students 

per year. With good facilities, adequate funding, 

and the finest noncommissioned officers as cadre, 

Hall went to work turning out superb NCOs for 

the 24th Division.

In the early days of August 1990, Iraqi 

leader Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. 

Anticipating that the Army would deploy the 

24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Hall 

immediately sent his academy into 24-hour 

operations. Within six days he had graduated 

both the BNCOC and PLDC students. He 

then convinced the division commander to 

close the academy on the grounds that the 

school cadre were the finest NCOs in the division and that their services were now needed 

with the division’s units.

After closing the academy, Hall learned that 

the division needed someone to take an advance 

party overseas. He volunteered immediately and 

was put on an aircraft bound for Saudi Arabia. 

His job was to get the advance party safely to 

Saudi Arabia and to map out the ground for the 

follow-on units. In those early days he was not 

sure what he would find when he got to Saudi 

Arabia and he was quite relieved that the advance 

group did not have to fight its way in. 

As the rest of the division arrived in the 

Middle East, Hall spoke with the division sergeant major about assigning him to a unit, especially when he learned his old unit, the 1st 

Battalion, 5th ADA, did not have a CSM, but 

without success. With no particular unit responsibilities, Hall set about establishing a rest and 

relaxation (R&R) area for the weary front-line 

troops. He then established Victory Station, a 

replacement camp that included the division’s 

personnel, replacement, and finance elements. It 

became the transit point for new arrivals before 

they moved forward to their assigned units. 
198

In October 1990 the division commander, 

Maj. Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, selected Hall to 

represent the division at the annual Association 

of the United States Army (AUSA) conference 

in Washington, D.C. When Hall returned to 

Saudi Arabia, he assumed duties as the division 

artillery command sergeant major. Not an artilleryman, Hall had to learn about the howitzer 

weapon system. Nevertheless, he never once felt 

out of place with the division artillery. When he 

was promoted to CSM, he replaced his branch 

insignia with that of the command sergeant 

major. As far as he was concerned leading and 

training were the same, and he knew he was 

fully prepared for his new assignment. 

He recalled one day standing on a hill watching a lieutenant maneuver his platoon into an 

area. Hall knew how to deploy a unit, but was not 

sure what was going on. After a few minutes the 

lieutenant approached Hall apologetically 

explaining he knew that he had taken some shortcuts. Hall asked, “What should you have done?” 

The lieutenant drew the platoon area in the sand, 

describing how he could have set up his platoon 

differently. Hall asked him if he was going to do 

it right the next time, and the lieutenant responded affirmatively. About a week later Hall was 

again on a hill watching a unit deploy when the 

same lieutenant ran up the hill and said, “I told 

you I’d do it right the next time.” Hall agreed and 

told him “lieutenant, you are all right.”

There was great confidence among the soldiers and noncommissioned officers of the division artillery. Over the years Hall had prepared 

soldiers to go to war, and now war had come. 

They had a job to do and were not hesitant, the 

prevailing attitude being “let us do what we 

came to do and let’s get it over with.” The soldiers focused intently on their training as they 

waited for their next mission—indeed there 

CSM Hall During Desert Storm as Division Artillery CSM in Iraq, 1991
199

were no distractions and little else to do but 

train and maintain their equipment until 

ordered to go to war.

That order came in February 1991, when the 

commander of the U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM), General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, 

instructed the 500,000 troops under his command 

to push the Iraqis out of Kuwait. Within 100 

hours, the coalition destroyed almost 4,000 Iraqi 

tanks, captured an estimated 60,000 Iraqi soldiers, 

and ruined 36 Iraqi divisions at the cost of 148 

American dead.10

Hall stayed in Saudi Arabia until April 

1991. He had arrived on one of the division’s 

first flights into Saudi Arabia and left on one of 

the division’s last flights out. Once home the 

division resumed normal training. He was just 

becoming reacquainted with the daily routine of 

garrison life when he was nominated for the job 

of the 2d Infantry Division CSM in Korea. 

Soon thereafter, the commander of the 2d 

Division, Maj. Gen. James T. Scott, called Hall 

and asked, “Do you want to come to Korea?” 

The Hall family moved to Yongsan in 

December 1991, and the new division sergeant 

major reported for duty twenty miles to the 

north at Camp Casey in Tongduch’on. The 

transition to his new duties was facilitated by 

the fact that General Scott had been the assistant division commander of the 24th Infantry 

Division and Hall’s senior rater when he had 

been commandant of the NCO Academy. 

Having worked with Scott before, Hall was able 

to set to work right away.

Scott and Hall instituted a program where 

squad leaders became solely responsible for the 

weapons qualification training of their troops. 

The division tasked different units to run the 

ranges, but squad leaders would bring their 

squads to the ranges as a team. Leaders would 

teach and coach their soldiers on proper techniques and then qualify them on their weapons. 

This technique improved qualification scores 

throughout the division.

When Hall arrived in Korea, the division 

employed a nine-month training cycle. During 

the first three months of this cycle, the division focused on individual training. Company 

level training occupied the second three 

months, and battalion-level training the third. 

But Scott and Hall were troubled by the nagging question, “What if we had to fight while 

we are only in the individual stage?” 

Consequently, they dropped the nine-month 

training in favor of a three-month cycle in 

which the division accomplished the entire 

range of training tasks, from individual to battalion, every ninety days. 

When Hall became the CSM of the 2d 

Division, he knew that many of the other sergeants major in the division had more seniority. Anxious to avoid any resentment, he set 

out to build a team. He was impressed with 

the high quality of the division’s sergeants 

major. Unfortunately, the high turnover rate 

due to the one-year rotation policy in Korea 

made it difficult to maintain a tight-knit team. 

Determined to fix this problem, he convinced 

the Department of the Army to establish twoyear tours for brigade CSMs in Korea. Eighth 

Army supported the concept and set aside 

quarters to accommodate family members of 

2d Division brigade CSMs. The new policy 

brought greater stability and cohesion to the 

2d Division.

Despite the fact that the division was highly dispersed, Hall did not find it difficult to 

meet with the soldiers under his charge. He had 

access to vehicles and a helicopter and was able 

to visit all the division’s units. While Hall was in 

Korea the 2d Division hosted two presidents, 

George H. W. Bush and William J. Clinton. 

When President Clinton arrived in 1993, Hall 

knew he played the saxophone and that he loved 

the tune “B Flat Blues.” As the president was 

greeting the soldiers, the 2d Infantry Division 

band swung into that tune and someone held up 

a saxophone. Clinton, who gave them a “thumbs 

up,” climbed on the bandstand and joined them 

in the song, much to the appreciation of the 

gathered crowd.

As Hall’s two-year tour drew to a close, 

his commander nominated him to be the 

First Army CSM. He flew to Fort Meade, 
200

Maryland, and interviewed for the job. After 

returning to Korea, he learned he had been 

selected and packed up the family once again. 

The First Army’s primary mission was to 

oversee the U.S. Army Reserve and Army 

National Guard units in twenty states and the 

District of Columbia. The Department of the 

Army had recently changed the mission of 

the armies from commanding reserve component (RC) units to supporting them. Hall 

gained a new appreciation for the RC, not 

having previously spent much time with them 

other than working with the Georgia Army 

National Guard while assigned to Fort 

Stewart. He was impressed by the dedication 

it took for a soldier to work a full-time job, 

have a full-time family life, and serve in one 

of the reserve components. He quickly realized that the advertisements about the RCs 

were only half right, because “this ain’t parttime work.” 

Hall learned patience. Accustomed to a full 

training year, he now oversaw units that trained 

for only thirty-nine days a year. He felt he had 

to learn a new language with different rules, 

regulations, and acronyms. He also gained a 

new appreciation for the citizen-soldier. One of 

his toughest challenges was balancing annual 

training (AT) and schooling requirements. A 

unit typically had a choice—it could either send 

a soldier to school or to AT, which was its one 

chance a year to train as a unit. Although a 

champion for NCOES and MOS-producing 

schools, Hall realized that sending soldiers off 

to school sometimes meant that an infantry 

brigade would have as few as nine full squads on 

the ground during training.

As First Army CSM, Hall noted how much 

the National Guard had changed since the days 

prior to Operation Desert Storm. Before 

Desert Storm Hall had felt that the Guard 

had not truly focused on training. Now, however, all that had changed, in part, Hall believed, 

because of the influx of combat veterans from 

the Gulf War.

After only eleven months with First Army, 

Hall was interviewed for consideration as the 

command sergeant major for Central Command 

in 1994. Several days after the interview, the television news reported that Iraq was once again 

massing troops on the Kuwait border. Later that 

evening, the CENTCOM commander, General J. 

H. Binford Peay III, asked Hall to be his sergeant 

major and informed Hall that he intended to 

deploy to Kuwait immediately. Four days later 

Hall flew to Tampa, Florida, was issued his desert 

camouflage fatigues, and deployed to Kuwait.

Fortunately, a second war between Iraq and 

the United States did not occur at that time, 

and Hall soon found himself attending to the 

myriad tasks associated with the administration 

of a forward-deployed force in peacetime. The 

job was nevertheless challenging. CENTCOM 

was a joint command, and Hall soon discovered 

that the services each viewed the senior enlisted 

position a little differently. He found that not 

only did he have to tell someone what to do, but 

why they should do it.

Hall had to wrestle with four different sets 

of rules for physical training, weight control, 

awards, and evaluations. He had not been 

exposed to this level of “jointness” before and 

felt that the Department of Defense did adequately prepare service members for that type of 

environment. Later, as Sergeant Major of the 

Army, he would recommend that the Army 

establish a training program for soldiers destined for assignment to a joint command. Still, 

the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that 

comprised CENTCOM were more alike than 

not. The concerns of the enlisted force were 

generally the same, no matter the service, and all 

personnel were devoted to the same mission.

Hall was one of the final candidates during 

the selection process for the tenth Sergeant Major 

of the Army. Incoming Chief of Staff General 

Dennis J. Reimer interviewed him, but he was not 

selected. Instead, he went back to work as 

CENTCOM’s command sergeant major.

After the Gulf War Hall had promised 

himself that he would never return to that part 

of the world. It was a promise he would not be 

able to keep. The United States had troops 

deployed in twenty countries throughout 
201

Southwest Asia and the Middle East, and Hall 

believed they all deserved his time. Consequently, 

he would make twenty-nine trips to the area 

during his tenure as Central Command’s CSM. 

In October 1996 the Army suspended 

SMA Gene C. McKinney amid accusations of 

impropriety. In June 1997 Chief of Staff 

Reimer appointed two acting Sergeants Major 

of the Army and by October had decided that 

he would appoint a permanent replacement 

for McKinney. Hall, who had just returned 

from the Middle East, received a phone call 

from Reimer asking if he would be in 

Washington for the annual AUSA Convention. 

When Hall answered affirmatively, Reimer 

asked if Hall would stop by his quarters that 

Sunday. Hall went to Reimer’s house as 

expected, only to discover that the Chief of 

Staff wanted him to be the new Sergeant 

Major of the Army. 

The following morning General Reimer 

stepped before an audience of three hundred of 

the Army’s top NCOs at the AUSA CSM 

Conference and introduced Hall as the eleventh 

Sergeant Major of the Army. Hall took the 

opportunity to speak from the heart and asked 

those present to “keep the faith. Faith in the 

Army, faith in the leadership, and faith in themselves.” Later, at his Pentagon swearing-in ceremony on 24 October, Reimer asked Hall to be 

a forceful advocate for soldiers and to keep his 

eye on the future. He took those comments as 

his marching orders. 

With the office’s having been vacant for 

almost eight months, Hall quickly set about filling the void and reminding the Army there was 

still a Sergeant Major of the Army. He felt that 

the enlisted force at the time was strong and was 

functioning pretty much as usual. Probably the 

first SMA to tote a laptop computer on his travels, Hall published his electronic mail address in 

Soldiers magazine so soldiers could contact him 

directly. However, he was keenly aware that the 

connectivity provided by modern technology 

raised the risk of soldiers’ circumventing the 

chain of command, and he was not one to allow 

the computer to replace face-to-face leadership.

With the Army still dealing with the repercussions of the sexual harassment scandal, Hall 

noted that “we can’t do a lot about making yesterday perfect, but we can do an awful lot about 

making tomorrow better.”11 A former drill sergeant with experience during troubled times in 

the late 1970s, Hall likened discipline and 

related issues to a pendulum. “When it seems to 

sway too far towards leniency, it rights itself.” 

Hall felt that his experiences in basic soldiering skills gave him credibility when addressing concerns at the training centers. The Army 

had conducted opinion surveys across the force, 

and one of the recommendations was that the 

Army needed to do more to foster strong values 

and beliefs. In response, the Department of the 

Army identified seven core values—loyalty, 

duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, 

and personal courage—and gave Hall the 

responsibility to “figure out what to do with 

them.” Hall responded by developing a tag to be 

worn and card to be carried by every soldier that 

enumerated the Army’s values. He put special 

emphasis on the wording that appeared on the 

card. He hoped to instill pride—pride in uniform, pride in country, and pride in service. 

Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera, General 

Reimer, and Hall unveiled the new cards at a 

Pentagon ceremony on 17 July 1998.

During Hall’s many trips to Capitol Hill, 

his message remained the same: Improve the 

quality of life for the enlisted force. He pared 

his concerns down to four major issues—pay 

and entitlements, housing, medical care, and 

retirement benefits. As a result of testimony by 

Hall and other senior military leaders, Congress 

reinstated 50 percent pay benefits for military 

personnel who retired after twenty years of service. Hall also testified frequently about quality 

of life and morale, welfare, and recreation issues, 

telling Congress that “our nation owes its soldiers a quality of life commensurate with that of 

the private sector and the peace of mind that 

their families will be taken care of when they 

deploy.” 

Hall believed that the Sergeant Major of 

the Army was the leader of the NCO Corps. 
202

Though he realized that all NCOs worked for 

their commanders, the SMA provided direction 

and focus for the noncommissioned leaders of 

the Army. He felt his primary job was fourfold: 

to visit with soldiers wherever they worked, 

whether in the motor pool or in the field; to 

foster the development of the noncommissioned officer corps; to work with the Army 

Staff on actions affecting the enlisted force; and 

to represent the interests of enlisted men and 

women before the Department of Defense and 

Congress. After finding out what the soldiers in 

the field were concerned about, Hall made it his 

responsibility to return to Washington and “do 

something about it.”

Hall believed that a particular challenge to 

the NCO Corps, and a busy Army, was to make 

sure that the troops were trained and ready. He 

knew that NCOs were responsible for the individual and crew/squad/section training of their 

soldiers. They were also responsible for the good 

order and discipline of their units; consequently, 

Hall was concerned that noncommissioned 

officers maintain the highest standards. He 

knew that through leader development and 

tough, realistic training those standards could 

be achieved.

In June 1999 General Eric K. Shinseki was 

sworn in as the new Army Chief of Staff. In an 

effort to bring all components of the Army 

together, he declared, “we are the Army—totally 

integrated, with a unity of purpose—no longer 

the Total Army, no longer One Army. We are 

The Army.”12 Hall had seen integration at its 

best when he had served at First Army, and he 

readily picked up the Chief of Staff ’s message. 

Indeed, during his first trip to Bosnia he found it 

was nearly impossible to tell who was active, 

SMA Hall in a Bunker in Bosnia with 1st Cavalry Division Soldiers
203

Guard, and reserve. He would sit around a table 

with soldiers and the conversation would usually 

turn to “where are you from and what do you do?” 

When somebody would say “I am in the Guard” 

or “I am a Reservist,” another soldier at the table 

would inevitably turn and say, “I didn’t know 

that.” He saw that soldiers did not care who was 

active and who was in the reserves. They only 

cared whether a soldier could do the job.

Shinseki set out to transform the Army to 

carry it into the twenty-first century. As Hall 

kept his eye on the future, he believed that noncommissioned officers would still have to exhibit 

the same qualities that had always characterized 

their profession. Despite all the technology and 

digitization, Hall knew that the NCO would still 

be the one to tell a soldier “take off your boots so 

I can see your feet,” and to shake a canteen to 

ensure the troops had water. While the Army 

certainly needed NCOs who could master 

emerging technologies, these NCOs still had to 

be able to lead soldiers on the battlefield.

Hall’s highest honor and most memorable 

experience came on a day he did not look 

forward to. His career ended just as it had 

started three decades earlier, on a parade field. 

This time it was a special ceremony to honor 

him for his faithful service. Hall had brought 

credibility back to soldiers, the Army, and to 

the Office of the Sergeant Major of the Army. 

He had also served as a forceful advocate for 

soldiers. After traveling around the world 

twelve times and talking with more than 

60,000 men and women in uniform, Hall 

walked across Summerall Parade Field at Fort 

Myer, Virginia, for the last time on 22 June 

2000. For only the second time, the positional colors of the Sergeant Major of the 

Army, which were established while Hall was 

in office, were displayed together with the 

colors of the Chief of Staff of the Army. In a 

Concurrent Resolution, both the South 

Carolina House of Representatives and the 

Congress of the State of South Carolina commended Hall on his thirty-two years of dedicated and distinguished service to the U.S. 

Army as he returned to his childhood home 

of Gaffney, South Carolina.13
204

1. iExcept as noted, this section is based on 

Intervs, Frank R. Shirer with Robert E. Hall, 9 

Jun 00, Washington, D.C., and Daniel K. Elder 

with Robert E. Hall, 5 Oct 01, Gaffney, S.C.

2. Committee groups were teams of military 

instructors who specialized in specific topics, 

such as communications, first aid, or marksmanship.

3. The 41-foot Nike-Hercules surface-toair-missile had a range of over seventy-five 

miles and traveled at speeds of greater than 

mach 3.5. It was in service from 1958 to 1974.

4. A mobile, light air-defense system with a 

turret mounted on a tracked vehicle carrying 

four ready-to-fire missiles, the Chaparral was a 

ground-launched version of the air-to-air 

Sidewinder.

5. Lt. Gen. George S. Blanchard created the 

Sergeant Morales Club in 1974 to recognize the 

professionalism of VII Corps soldiers. General 

Blanchard and CSM William Strickland later 

expanded it to all of U.S. Army, Europe. Soldiers 

were recommended by their chain of command to 

appear before a series of selection boards.

6. Paul D. Hood, “Implementation and 

Utilization of the Leader Preparation Program,” 

George Washington University Human Resources Research Office, Washington, D.C., Mar 67, 

p. 13.

7. The headgear worn by drill sergeants was 

based on the 1883 U.S. Army campaign hat. 

The Army reintroduced it in 1964 for wear by 

those serving on drill sergeant duty. 

8. The Stinger is a man-portable, shoulderfired, infrared homing (heat seeking) air defense 

guided missile. Return of Forces to Germany 

(REFORGER) was an annual exercise in which 

joint services participated in overseas training to 

reinforce the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO).

9. Small groups were used to develop skills 

such as problem solving, interpretation of concepts, and application of principles and basic 

information to practical problems. The smallgroup process promoted collaboration and the 

development of interpersonal skills better than 

traditional classroom lectures.

10. David W. Hogan, Jr., 225 Years of Service: 

The U.S. Army 1775–2000 (Washington, D.C.: 

Center of Military History, 2000), pp. 34–35.

11. “Reimer swears in Hall as 11th SMA,” 

Pentagram, 24 Oct 97, p. 3.

12. Transcript, “Army Chief of Staff Arrival 

Ceremony,” 22 Jun 99, author’s files, U.S. Army 

Center of Military History, Washington, D.C. 

(hereafter cited as CMH).

13. Concurrent Resolution 1720, “Sergeant 

Major Robert E. Hall, Resolutions,” South 

Carolina Congress, adopted 31 May 00, author’s 

files, CMH.

Notes
205

Assignments

1968 Inducted into service, Basic Training, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

1968 Advanced Individual Training, Fort Bliss, Texas

1968–1970 Switchboard Operator, Launcher Crewman, Assistant Section Chief, 

Battery D, 4th Battalion, 59th Air Defense Artillery (ADA), Fort 

Story, Virginia

1970–1972 Squad Leader, Battery D, 8th Battalion, 61st ADA, Fort Bliss, Texas; 

Republic of Korea

1972–1974 Squad Leader, Battery C, 5th Battalion, 67th ADA and Battery C, 

3d Battalion, 6th ADA, Fort Bliss, Texas 

1974–1977 Squad Leader, Platoon Sergeant, Operations and Intelligence Sergeant, 

2d Battalion, 59th ADA, 1st Armored Division, Schwabach, Germany

1977–1979 Instructor, Senior Drill Sergeant, Battery C, 4th Training Brigade, 

Fort Bliss, Texas

1979–1980 Army Drill Sergeant of the Year, Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and 

Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia 

1980–1982 Operations and Training Staff NCO, Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia 

1982–1985 First Sergeant, Battery B, 2d Battalion, 59th ADA, 1st Armored Division, 

Schwabach, Germany

1985–1986 Student, Class #26, Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas

1986–1987 Instructor, Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas

1987–1989 Command Sergeant Major, 5th Battalion, 52d ADA, 24th Infantry Division 

(Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia

1990–1991 Command Sergeant Major, Division Artillery, 24th Infantry Division 

(Mechanized), Saudi Arabia; Iraq

1991–1993 Command Sergeant Major, 2d Infantry Division, Yongson, Republic of 

 Korea

1993–1994 Command Sergeant Major, First U.S. Army, Fort Meade, Maryland

1994–1997 Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Central Command, MacDill, Air Force

Base, Florida

1997–2000 Sergeant Major of the Army

Selected Decorations and Awards

Defense Distinguished Service Medal

Distinguished Service Medal

Defense Superior Service Medal

Legion of Merit with One Oak Leaf Cluster

Bronze Star Medal 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal

Meritorious Service Medal with Five Oak Leaf Clusters

Joint Service Commendation Medal

Army Commendation Medal with Four Oak Leaf Clusters

Army Achievement Medal with One Oak Leaf Cluster

Good Conduct Medal with Ten Oak Leaf Clusters

National Defense Service Medal with Service Star

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal

Southwest Asia Service Medal

Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)

Kuwait Liberation Medal (Government of Kuwait)

Drill Sergeant Badge
206

SMA Tilley
J

ack L. Tilley was born on 3 December 

1948 and grew up in Vancouver, 

Washington.1 A people person who liked

 dealing with others, Tilley had a goal—to 

enjoy life. Not a particularly scholarly student, 

Tilley was a sports enthusiast who had boxed 

for about five years as a youth and occasionally 

sparred with professionals in Portland, Oregon. 

Without a family background in the military, 

he was only slightly aware of the war in 

Vietnam and how it might affect him.

While at the beach soon after graduating 

from high school, Tilley and five friends decided to join the Army. Only two, Tilley and 

Prentice (Barney) Boykin, would eventually follow through with their plan. Tilley went to the 

recruiter in June 1966 and filled out the forms 

and took the required tests. He was not too 

concerned about what he wanted to do in the 

Army, so the recruiter suggested that he become 

a “tanker.” Remembering tanks from the movies, Tilley agreed as long as he would be able to 

“jump out of airplanes.”

The Army shipped Tilley and his hometown buddy to basic training at Fort Lewis, 

Washington, where they received “the biggest 

shock of their life” when they stepped off the 

bus. Tilley was quickly introduced to Army 

push-ups, recalling he did about fifty just getting from the bus to the reception station. His 

life had taken a 180-degree turn, and he was 

unsure that he was ready for Army life.

Private Tilley and his platoon were assigned 

to Drill Sergeant Lewis, a tall, thin staff sergeant. Lewis commanded respect just by his 

presence and was a true professional. Lewis 

lived upstairs in the same open platoon bay as 

the trainees. While committee groups conducted training and testing, drill instructors like 

Lewis were mostly charged with molding the 

character of the recruits.

Graduation was a big day. Tilley marched 

around the Fort Lewis parade field with the 

rest of his platoon while his family looked on. 

He was proud of wearing the Army uniform 

and being a soldier. The accomplishment of 

completing basic training, having a “little 

money” in his pocket, and being allowed to 

shop in the post exchange were the early highlights of Tilley’s budding career—a career that 

would eventually take him to the top of his 

chosen profession.

Tilley never thought much about promotion until he was a staff sergeant. While watching others move up the ranks, he also hoped he 

would someday get promoted. Not expecting to 

be more than a good specialist, Tilley tried to do 

the best he could and to focus on his job, whether he was a private first class or, later, as a noncommissioned officer (NCO).

After a few weeks of leave, Tilley was off to 

Fort Knox, Kentucky, for Advanced Individual 

Training (AIT) as an armored crewman. Although 

the trainees were surrounded by drill sergeants, the 

atmosphere was more relaxed and Tilley enjoyed 

some additional freedoms, including occasional 

passes to nearby Louisville. With the ongoing 

war in Vietnam, the trainees began to talk 

more of combat, noticing that the school 

stayed filled to capacity. Tilley’s training consisted of learning how to operate an M48 tank, 

mastering each task and moving to the next 

one. At times Tilley wondered if he would be 

able to retain it all.

Jack L. Tilley
208

Upon graduation, Tilley went directly to the 

Airborne School at Fort Benning, Georgia. 

Though the parachute training would not be of 

much use to him in his first assignment to 

Vietnam, Tilley gained additional confidence 

from the course. It prepared him both physically 

and mentally for the rigors he was about to face.

After completing “jump school,” Tilley and 

Boykin, along with five of the other 400-plus 

graduates, were bound for Vietnam. Both Tilley 

and Boykin were sent to the 173d Infantry 

Brigade (Airborne) in Pleiku. Several days after 

their arrival, Tilley was reassigned to the 1st 

Infantry Division and sent to Camp Zion, leaving Boykin behind. Tilley would have the 

unfortunate duty of escorting home the body of 

his boyhood friend a few months later.

On his first night with the Big Red One, 

Tilley was given a room with only a set of box 

springs to lie on. He put his duffel bag behind his 

head to sleep, only to be awakened by two drunken soldiers fighting over a mattress. The next day 

he was issued an M14 rifle without ammunition 

and sent in the back of a truck to Phu Loi to join 

his unit, “Quarter Cav,” Troop A, 1st Squadron, 

4th Cavalry. Fortunately for the ammo-less 

Tilley, the trip proved uneventful.

After a short period of in-country training 

on booby traps, the terrain, and the M48A3 

tank, Tilley was shipped out to the field, where 

his platoon was pulling airfield security duty. He 

was initially assigned duties as an assistant gunner on an armored cavalry vehicle (ACAV), a 

gasoline-powered M113 tracked troop carrier 

armed with a .50-caliber machine gun. Soon 

after his arrival his platoon was attacked and 

suffered a high number of casualties, including 

the platoon leader and platoon sergeant. Because 

of the losses, Tilley was reassigned as a loader 

for A–25, one of his troop’s M48A3 tanks, and 

later became a driver.

Troop A regularly conducted search-anddestroy and route-security missions. Each morning it would “sweep” the roads to ensure they 

were clear of mines and then sit along the roads 

to make sure they stayed clear. Since the enemy 

often placed mines on the sides of the road, the 

tankers were careful to drive straight down the 

center. During monsoon seasons the tanks were 

limited to improved roads, and in one operation 

Tilley mired his tank up to the turret ring and 

required a tank retriever to extract him.2

The greatest lessons he learned in Vietnam 

were to listen to his NCOs and to pay attention 

to detail. He realized that situations were apt to 

change quickly, and he always wanted to be 

prepared. People got hurt most when they 

became complacent and let down their guard. 

He also learned that if he was going to do 

something he had to do it to the best of his ability. He owed that to himself and the soldiers 

around him. He was confident in the people 

with whom he served and knew they were 

among the best. Tilley did not witness much 

indiscipline within the ranks in 1967, and he 

was proud of his unit and its accomplishments.

Private Tilley at Airborne School
209

The final days of January 1968 represented 

a turning point in the war in Vietnam. Tet, the 

Vietnamese New Year, began with a bad omen 

for Tilley and his comrades. After taking fire in 

the early morning from friendly “gunship” helicopters, his troop moved toward Saigon, the 

South Vietnamese capital, which was under 

attack from all quarters. Skirting Highway 13, 

which had not been cleared, the troop advanced 

slowly until the division commander, Maj. Gen. 

John H. Hay, Jr., demanded that Quarter Cav 

get on the road and pick up the pace. Tilley, 

second in line, grabbed his seldom-worn 

armored vest and sat on it for added protection. 

The first vehicle struck a mine, but the troop, 

with Tilley now in the lead, continued past the 

damaged vehicle toward Saigon, running over 

barriers placed in the road by the enemy.

Soon after arriving in Saigon, Troop A was 

dispatched to Tan Son Nhut Air Base, a primary target of the Viet Cong offensive. A large 

enemy force had infiltrated the Vinatexco textile factory across Highway 1, and Tilley’s troop 

was sent to dislodge it. During the operation, an 

ACAV fell off an eight-foot cliff and Tilley was 

sent to help retrieve it. His tank was supposed 

to knock down a wall so two ACAVs could 

reach the damaged vehicle. The plan was for 

one of the ACAVs to provide covering fire 

while the other towed out the disabled vehicle. 

Tilley’s tank broke through the wall, but the two 

ACAVs were unable to make it in. Seizing the 

initiative, Tilley maneuvered his tank up to the 

disabled ACAV and pulled it to safety. He then 

rejoined the defensive perimeter guarding Tan 

Son Nhut. For his actions that day, Tilley 

received the Bronze Star for valor.

By the time Tilley’s tour was complete, he 

had been promoted to Specialist 5.3 He returned 

to the United States and took leave to just “gear 

down.” He then reported to Fort Benning, 

Georgia. The armor unit to which he was 

assigned was full, so the assignments NCO 

asked Tilley if he “could sing.” He replied, “if I 

do, people will leave.” The NCO then promptly 

assigned Tilley duties as a drill sergeant. Posted 

to Fort Benning’s Sand Hill area, Tilley first 

served as a drill sergeant candidate for about a 

month and a half and then went off to Drill 

Sergeant School. It proved to be one of the 

toughest schools Tilley would attend. Not comfortable talking in front of a large group, Tilley 

later credited the course for giving him maturity 

and “pulling him out of being a young adult.”

Now a sergeant (E–5)—the conversion 

from specialist occurring when he became a 

drill instructor—Tilley enjoyed training recruits. 

He was exposed to Secretary of Defense Robert 

S. McNamara’s Project 100,000 social experiment when he lost a coin toss with a fellow drill 

instructor and assumed command over an 

unpromising collection of recruits.4 The soldiers 

in his platoon had only 3d- or 4th-grade educations, yet they did a great job. Admittedly, it 

took longer to teach them, but for the most part 

he believed they were pretty good soldiers. 

Drill Sergeant Tilley
210

Many were smart, Tilley recalled. They just had 

not had the opportunity to go to school.

Now promoted, Staff Sergeant Tilley’s first 

hitch was coming to a close in 1969 and he 

decided to get out of the Army. Unhappy with his 

company commander, Tilley rationalized: “I’ll 

show him. I will get out.” He first went to Georgia 

and then to Washington, working in a paneling 

factory and later for a chemical company. But 

Tilley, who had enjoyed the Army, continued to be 

drawn to military service. One day while on vacation he visited Fort Lewis and sat to watch the 

soldiers train. Tilley began to reconsider, thinking 

how one man (his former commander) had caused 

him to readjust his entire life and do something he 

had not wanted to do.

Tilley continued to consider the idea of 

returning to the Army, visiting his local recruiting office and becoming friends with one of 

the recruiters. One day in 1971 his friend 

called him and told him that if he intended to 

come back in he must do it within the next 

couple of days, or he would not be able to 

retain his previously earned staff sergeant rank. 

Tilley filled out the required forms and told his 

civilian boss he was leaving so he could reenlist 

in the Army.

Tilley and his wife Gloria, whom he had 

married in 1970, moved to Fort Polk, Louisiana, 

in 1971. He was again assigned duties as a drill 

sergeant. Tilley noticed that the quality of 

recruits had improved compared to his earlier 

tour. He also experienced the increased scrutiny 

that the Army was beginning to apply to drill 

instructors as it moved to an all-volunteer force. 

While at Fort Polk, Tilley met some first-class 

noncommissioned officers who would serve as 

role models later in his career. As Tilley put it, 

he picked up their traits and put them in his 

“rucksack” to use as his own.

When Tilley’s oldest son Brian contracted 

pneumococcal meningitis, the family was reassigned to Fort Lewis, Washington, in 1974 so 

Brian could receive the specialized care he 

needed. Tilley went back to tanks and became a 

tank commander in the 9th Infantry Division’s 

2d Battalion, 77th Armor. Over the next five 

years he rose from tank commander to section 

sergeant and eventually to tank platoon sergeant. He assumed the last post with the 3d 

Battalion, 32d Armor, in Friedberg, Germany, 

the same installation that Elvis Presley had 

served at from 1958 to 1960.

By now Tilley was thoroughly proficient in 

tank operations and was assigned to Fort Knox, 

Kentucky, as an instructor. He taught smallarms qualification and tank gunnery to AIT 

students as part of the Armor School’s training 

committee. He also provided instruction on the 

.50-caliber machine gun and land navigation. 

Tilley was eventually selected as a senior tank 

commander and was responsible for conducting 

the first-ever M1 Tank Training course at Fort 

Knox.5

By 1980 the Army had been experimenting 

with the XM1 Main Battle Tank (Abrams), a 

revolutionary combat vehicle that would be the 

centerpiece of the future Combined Arms battlefield. The Abrams initially was equipped with 

a 105-mm. smoothbore barrel and a 1,500-horsepower turbine engine, capable of reaching 

speeds of up to forty-five miles per hour. Tilley 

was involved early in the process of preparing 

lesson plans and training devices for the M1. 

According to Tilley, changing from M60A1-

series tanks to the M1 was like “going from a 

Volkswagen to a Cadillac.” 

Tilley continued to gain experience with 

the M1 and went to Florida to assist in evaluating a new concept for tank training, the Unit 

Conduct of Fire Trainer (UCOFT) tank simulator.6 Colonel A. P. O’Meara, Jr., made Tilley a 

gunner during a few trial exercises. When 

Colonel O’Meara asked his opinion of the 

simulator, Tilley responded, “buy the system,” 

convinced it would take training to a higher 

level. Tilley would later caution, however, that 

simulators could not completely replace handson training. In his opinion, soldiers still needed 

to “mount the tank, feel the breech recoil, and 

smell the smoke coming off the main gun 

round.” Those actions differed profoundly from 

simply pulling a trigger and watching a laser 

beam in a simulator.
211

Near the end of the first OSUT cycle at 

Fort Knox, Tilley was tapped to fill in as company first sergeant. Shortly thereafter, the battalion commander reassigned Tilley as the battalion operations sergeant, a master sergeant 

position. Within a matter of days Tilley went 

from senior tank commander, to first sergeant, 

and finally to operations sergeant. With little 

advance training or preparation, Tilley was now 

on the battalion staff, faced with publishing 

operations orders and training schedules. He 

appreciated the personal development that came 

from this experience and would later put it to 

use as a first sergeant and sergeant major.

Tilley was accustomed to field duty by now 

and longed to return to the line. After being 

selected for promotion to master sergeant in 

1984, Tilley was selected for first sergeant duty 

in Company B, 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, the 

unit responsible for conducting OSUT for M1 

tank crews. His company had trainees, drill sergeants, and committee group instructors. Tilley 

discovered that some tank commanders had 

never been drill sergeants, some drill sergeants 

had never been tank commanders, and that a 

rivalry existed between them. To remedy this 

situation, Tilley began rotating his personnel 

between drill sergeant and tank commander 

slots. For each training cycle, Tilley put a different drill sergeant into a tank commander slot, 

while making a tank commander a drill sergeant. After a few cycles the group began to 

realize the importance of both roles, and the 

friction disappeared.

Tilley found that a special relationship 

existed between a commander and his first sergeant. Soon after assuming his duties, Tilley 

explained to his company commander that he 

had never been a first sergeant and might need 

some help. The commander replied that he had 

never been a commander and might need 

Tilley’s help. As Tilley was probably the oldest 

soldier in the company, all the soldiers looked to 

him for advice. He believed it was his job to 

make the company commander and the unit 

successful and that he would share in their successes as he pushed them forward.

During Tilley’s time as first sergeant, the 

Army began to investigate allegations that drill 

instructors and cadre personnel were abusing 

trainees, a problem that Tilley believed was 

widespread. The drill instructors were watched 

closely, and Tilley began to fear that they were 

apprehensive in performing their duties. OSUT 

carried soldiers further than normal basic training and allowed the trainees more freedoms. It 

thus posed somewhat different problems for the 

cadre from what they were accustomed to. 

Tilley set high standards for himself and expected others to follow his example. Communication, 

counseling, and staying focused on his responsibilities were the keys to Tilley’s leadership style.

In 1985 Tilley became the Basic 

Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) 

chief at the Fort Knox Noncommissioned 

Officer Academy. As the course chief, he counseled soldiers and monitored training to ensure 

that the course was conducted to standards. He 

also rewrote the program of instruction for the 

M1 armored crewman NCO course. Tilley felt 

that M1 crews needed to be able to react 

quickly and to understand thoroughly the 

complex system at their disposal, and he hoped 

that the course he had developed would instill 

those traits. 

As a senior NCO, Tilley was unable to 

attend such newly instituted Noncommissioned 

Officer Education System (NCOES) courses 

as the BNCOC. His exposure to the academic 

environment at the Fort Knox NCO Academy, 

however, had given him a good grasp of how 

the Army was educating NCOs. He felt his 

time at the academy, coupled with his experience as a tank commander, platoon sergeant, 

operations sergeant, and first sergeant, had 

rounded him out and allowed him to put his 

position as a senior noncommissioned officer 

into perspective. His depth of experience and 

fine qualities as a leader led to his early selection to attend the Sergeants Major Academy 

after being a master sergeant for only one year. 

Leaving his family in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, 

Tilley departed for El Paso to attend the sixmonth-long course.
212

Tilley’s initial apprehension about attending the course quickly gave way to excitement, 

not only about the opportunity to receive the 

advanced training, but also at the prospect 

that somebody might “mess up and actually 

promote me.” Attending lectures, completing 

research papers, doing foreign country and 

national security studies, Tilley felt the course 

provided excellent training for future and 

serving sergeants major. 

Tilley was assigned to Korea after graduation in 1987. Upon his arrival in Seoul, a senior 

NCO explained that they needed a first sergeant right there at the reception center. Tilley 

thought, “great, I am going to be able to stay 

right here in Seoul.” After walking him around 

the installation the NCO noticed Tilley’s nametag. He gestured to the nametag and said 

“Tilley? Oh, they already called about you. You 

are going to Camp Casey,” forty miles away in 

the city of Tongduch’on. There, Tilley assumed 

duties as the first sergeant of Company C, 1st 

Battalion, 72d Armor.

Tilley replaced a first sergeant who had 

just been relieved and quickly set to work. 

First, he sat down with the commander and 

they established a plan that Tilley immediately 

executed. He developed standard operating 

procedures for actions on alert—procedures 

that allowed his company to finish loading 

equipment ahead of the others. Soon his company achieved the highest scores in tank gunCSM Tilley and General William W. Crouch Award NATO Medals to Redeploying Soldiers.
213

nery and performed extremely well during the 

annual Inspector General visit. Tilley credited 

the motivated soldiers of his unit with their 

many successes. He felt the unit’s proximity to 

a hostile border, its focus on training and 

preparation, and the limited number of distractions in Korea all contributed to Company 

C’s high morale and winning spirit.

Upon completing his tour in Korea, Tilley 

returned once again to Fort Knox, Kentucky. 

Working primarily as a chief instructor, he was 

soon selected for command sergeant major 

(CSM) and moved to the 1st Battalion, 10th 

Cavalry, 194th Separate Armored Brigade, in 

1988. The 1st Battalion, 10th Cavalry, was a 

COHORT unit, and Tilley found that his 

responsibilities were similar to those of a first 

sergeant.7 He felt that as the battalion’s senior 

NCO, he needed to be visible to the soldiers 

and to talk to them in their environment. Tilley 

could usually be found walking through the battalion area on the weekends visiting with the 

soldiers of his battalion. He tried to keep his 

commander informed and to serve as an “honest 

broker” within the unit. After a year and a half 

with the 10th Cavalry, Tilley became the 194th 

Armored Brigade’s command sergeant major 

and served with the 6,000-plus soldiers of the 

brigade for almost two years. As the Army 

reshaped its force, the 194th was selected for 

inactivation and Tilley was nominated for the 

1st Armored Division CSM position.

In 1992 Tilley went to Germany along 

with five or six other sergeants major to interview with 1st Armored Division commander, 

Maj. Gen. William M. Boice. After the interviews, Boice announced that all had done a 

great job, but that he had selected Tilley for 

the position. After handshakes and congratulations, within a few moments Tilley was left 

alone. He went to his new commander’s office 

and said “sir, I’ve never been a division sergeant 

major before. What do you want me to do?” 

Boice answered, “go home, get your stuff, and 

come back to work as quickly as you can.” 

Tilley went on to serve for over five years as 

the 1st Armored Division’s sergeant major.

From the division’s headquarters in Bad 

Kreuznach, Tilley would begin his days sometimes as early as 0330, driving to the remote 

locations occupied by subordinate units for 

physical training or to meet with the soldiers of 

the command. He improvised a unit checklist to 

keep track of which units he had not been 

around to see in a while. Although it was sometimes difficult because of the division’s dispersion, Tilley attempted to develop his subordinate leaders by doing things they liked to do. 

Whether running or playing racquetball, Tilley 

found his best method of mentorship was simply to communicate with those around him. 

In June 1991 civil war erupted in Yugoslavia 

when Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed their 

independence. The fighting soon spread to the 

former Yugoslav state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 

and in 1992 the United Nations deployed 

18,000 U.S. peacekeepers and 7,000 multinational forces to the Balkans as part of the United 

Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR). The 

following year UNPROFOR extended its activities to the former Yugoslav Republic of 

Macedonia in an effort to prevent ethnic violence from spreading out of Bosnia-Herzegovina 

into Macedonia. Soldiers from the 1st Armored 

Division’s Task Force 3–12 joined the UN’s 

Macedonian operation in 1995. As the war in 

Bosnia raged on, international mediators met in 

Dayton, Ohio, to work out a peace agreement, 

which was finally signed in November 1995. As 

part of the agreement, the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) agreed to assume responsibility for enforcing the peace in Bosnia through 

a special Implementation Force (IFOR). The 

U.S. Army chose the 1st Armored Division to 

spearhead its contribution to IFOR.

Prior to December Tilley had been alerted 

twice to go to the Balkans. Each time he had 

readied himself, but his unit had soon stood 

down. The third notification occurred in 

December 1995. After arriving at the division 

headquarters soon after learning of the alert, 

Tilley knew by the flurry of activity that this time 

it was for real. Initially he was concerned that the 

division would have to fight its way into Bosnia. 
214

Fortunately this did not occur, though there was 

no shortage of obstacles for the division to overcome. Flooding on the Sava River, a French rail 

strike, and the bitter Bosnian winter all complicated the deployment, yet in the end Task Force 

Eagle was able to move more than 25,000 

troops, their equipment, and 11,000 vehicles into 

the IFOR sector within sixty-five days of notification—a tremendous feat.8

Tilley and the division commander, Maj. 

Gen. William L. Nash, arrived by air at their new 

headquarters in Tuzla, Bosnia, three days before 

the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to 

IFOR. At the time the rest of the division was 

stalled at the Sava River on the Bosnian-Croatian 

border at Zupanja, Croatia, as the division’s engineers attempted the largest river crossing since 

World War II. Just as the engineers were poised 

to cross, a thaw caused the Sava to swell from 300 

to 600 meters wide. The sudden flood swamped 

most of the engineers’ equipment. The engineers 

overcame the dilemma by rebuilding the 

approaches to the Sava and by using Chinook 

helicopters to deploy ribbon bridge sections into 

the river. Their efforts paid off when the bridge 

was finally completed at 1000 hours on 31 

December 1995.9

Nash’s primary directive to Tilley during the 

Bosnian operation was to enforce basic standards. 

Tilley went to the river to check on the situation 

there and then traveled throughout the division’s 

area of operations to meet with the troops. He 

observed that the soldiers were well trained, in 

good spirits, and focused on the mission at hand. 

He was also aware of the difficult conditions 

under which the troops had to operate—the cold, 

the mud, the sometimes unfriendly populace, and 

the ever-present threat of mines.

Having served a one-year tour in a combat 

zone early in his career, Tilley was concerned 

that soldiers might lose their edge in what was 

also predicted to be a one-year deployment. To 

overcome his concerns about complacency, 

Tilley felt he needed to be among the troops, 

giving encouragement and listening to their 

concerns. He occasionally traveled with a band 

that entertained the “Iron Soldiers” of the division and was always careful to scrutinize the 

amount of recreational equipment available. 

The United Services Organization (USO) 

assisted the division’s morale-building programs 

by bringing performers from the United States 

to entertain the troops and demonstrate public 

support for the soldiers overseas.

The 1st Armored Division returned to 

Germany in December 1996, and for Tilley it 

was like coming to a new unit. Many people in 

the division had rotated and returned to the 

United States, and Tilley had to get to know a 

whole new crop of soldiers. In July 1997, after 

more than five years as the division sergeant 

major, Tilley intended to head back to Fort Knox, 

Kentucky. He would serve as a battalion sergeant 

major there for eighteen months and retire. A 

couple of weeks before he left Germany, however, 

a friend encouraged him to contend for the position of the Space and Missile Defense Command 

(SMDC) sergeant major in Arlington, Virginia. 

He was ultimately selected.

Coming from a command of about 18,000 

soldiers, Tilley had to adjust to the size of the 

SMDC, which numbered only about 1,200 

soldiers and 1,500 civilians. Working with 

civilians was nothing new to Tilley, since he 

had worked with them in the 1st Armored 

Division. Tilley felt that “civilians were soldiers 

too,” only that “they elected” to serve their 

country out of uniform. He noted they had the 

same desire as soldiers to make things better 

for those around them.

While serving with the SMDC, Tilley took 

part in a conference sponsored by the U.S. Army 

Sergeants Major Academy on the future development of Army noncommissioned officers. The 

five-day workshop focused on identifying issues 

for NCO professional development, to include 

the strengths and weaknesses of the present system and its ability to meet future challenges.10 A 

by-product of the workshop was the development 

of a “Future NCO Vision” that charted a course 

for Army NCOs into the twenty-first century.

After only five months with SMDC, Tilley 

was selected as the Central Command 

(CENTCOM) senior enlisted adviser to replace 
215

Robert E. Hall, who had become 

the eleventh Sergeant Major of 

the Army. Tilley was excited to 

move to Tampa, Florida, and to 

work with enlisted soldiers from 

all services. As a unified combat 

command, CENTCOM had a 

“real world” mission with an 

area of operations covering a 

25-nation area around Southeast Asia. 

Tilley’s approach to leadership at CENTCOM flowed 

from his earlier assignments. He 

felt that no matter what their 

service, enlisted personnel had 

similar needs and concerns and 

he needed to be active in meeting them. After learning about 

the different cultures and rules 

that characterized each service, 

he set about routine operations 

at the joint headquarters.

In late 1999 Tilley was 

nominated for the position of 

Sergeant Major of the Army. 

The following May the SMA 

nominating board interviewed 

him and twelve other candidates. The board selected five 

finalists, Tilley among them. 

Chief of Staff General Eric K. 

Shinseki then interviewed each 

of the finalists—an experience 

that Tilley recalled as “picking 

his brain.” Confident after his 

interview, Tilley returned to 

Tampa, took leave, and went 

golfing. He was on the second hole when SMA 

Robert Hall called to tell him that he had to 

return to Washington for an interview with 

Secretary of the Army Louis E. Caldera. Tilley 

asked if that was another step in the selection 

process and Hall told him he was “one of one” for 

this last meeting. At the conclusion of this last 

interview, Caldera told Tilley to “tell Sergeant 

Major Hall I am giving you a thumbs up.”

On 23 June 2000, Jack L. Tilley was sworn 

in as the twelfth Sergeant Major of the Army in 

the Pentagon’s Hall of Heroes. With friends 

and family looking on, Tilley anticipated that 

this moment would be the highlight of his 

career. He was soon to discover that his new 

position entailed “a lot more responsibility.” 

SMA Tilley in the Driver’s Compartment of a Fox NBC 

Vehicle at Fort Hood, Texas
216

General Shinseki instructed him to “stay focused 

on noncommissioned officer and soldier” issues 

and to visit with soldiers. Tilley quickly learned 

that accomplishing these goals was not just a 

matter of “doing the same thing at higher levels.” Rather, once again in his career he was 

working in new territory. He was advising the 

Chief of Staff, the Secretary of the Army, and 

Congress on soldier issues. He was traveling the 

globe to visit with the enlisted force. And he 

was constantly working to get information 

flowing from the lowest enlisted ranks in the 

field to the highest officials in Washington.

As the representative of the enlisted force, 

Tilley had unrestricted access to the Army 

Chief of Staff. Typically, he would sit down 

with General Shinseki every Monday for a 

candid discussion about how things were 

going in the Army. Cognizant that he had 

only four years as Sergeant Major of the 

Army, Tilley believed that he owed it to every 

soldier in the U.S. Army to give 150 percent 

of his effort every day. 

From his initial selection as the twelfth 

Sergeant Major of the Army, Tilley was 

immersed in an Army of change. In 1999 

General Shinseki had announced, “We will 

transform the most respected Army in the 

world into a strategically responsive force 

that is dominant across the full spectrum of 

operations.” As the first step in a threephase plan, in April 2000 the Army initiated 

the transformation process by converting 

two brigades at Fort Lewis, Washington, 

into Initial Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs). 

The IBCTs were designed to enable the 

Army to deploy faster and to be ready to 

fight upon arrival. Shinseki’s ultimate objective was to transition the entire Army to a 

new generation of combat systems that were 

more mobile, more deployable, and more 

lethal than those of the past.11 Tilley assumed 

the SMA mantle in the midst of these 

important initiatives, and they would occupy 

much of his attention.

One of the more outward signs of the transformation process was the Army’s decision to 

adopt the black beret. In October 2000 General 

Shinseki announced that all soldiers would don 

berets as the standard headgear. He stated that 

the beret was “symbolic of our commitment to 

transform this magnificent Army into a new 

force.” Though initially there was some grumbling, Tilley felt that if the force could not agree 

on such a basic issue, “you couldn’t transform 

the Army.” The Army officially transitioned to 

the beret on 14 June 2001, the Army’s 226th 

birthday. 

As part of transformation, Tilley believed 

that the NCOES would have to be restructured. 

Through forums like the first-ever Nominative 

Command Sergeants Major Conference, which 

Tilley created in January 2001 at Fort Bliss, 

Texas, he gathered suggestions and feedback 

about necessary reforms. He proposed to include 

more nonpromotable master sergeants in the 

Sergeants Major Course. Such an action would 

help ensure that NCOs received training earlier 

in their careers, something he believed was 

critical given the increasingly decentralized 

nature of Army operations. Having himself 

attended the academy after only seventeen years 

of service, Tilley felt that the general requirement that attendees have at least twenty years of 

service could be reduced.

While transformation issues dominated 

much of Tilley’s time, he never forgot the 

basics. During his tenure, Congress authorized 

a significant and welcome pay increase for soldiers. Nevertheless, in Tilley’s testimony before 

the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on 

Personnel in February 2002, he asserted that 

there was still “room for improvement in future 

funding.” As always, the welfare of Army soldiers and Army families remained uppermost 

in Tilley’s mind.

As much as Tilley loved the Army, the 

most rewarding times of his life were those he 

spent with his wife Gloria and their two boys, 

Brian and Kevin. Acknowledging that Gloria 

was “in the military just like me,” Tilley considered her to be his best friend and sounding 

board. After a particularly demanding trip he 

told her that he had “been to 40 installations in 
217

both Germany and Korea.” She replied, “What 

have you done for your Army?” Her advice and 

counsel would help Tilley focus on what was 

really important, and she was always quick to 

give him an honest assessment of how he was 

doing.

On 11 September 2001, a hijacked commercial jet liner loaded with passengers 

slammed into the side of the Pentagon, killing 

and injuring many civilians and service members. Tilley was on his way to a Better 

Opportunities for Single Soldiers Conference 

when he learned the news and immediately 

returned to the building. Once there, he went 

to his office to ensure that everyone had been 

evacuated. He then went outside to provide 

first aid and comfort where needed.

After the terrorist attack, he was quick to 

remind soldiers to “focus on the basics” during 

the uncertain times. He told soldiers that “the 

need for communication was more important 

than ever,” and that the best way to help people 

was to simply talk with them. As the military 

increased its antiterrorist activities after 

September 11, he further cautioned that what 

people were most afraid of was the unknown. 

Reflecting on his service in Vietnam, he 

remembered that as a young soldier he had 

learned to “listen carefully to what my sergeant 

had to say and that if I knew the basics, I didn’t 

have much to be afraid of.”12

In less than three years, SMA Tilley traveled 

more than 500,000 miles to 200 CONUS and 

OCONUS locations, visiting approximately 

200,000 soldiers. He believed that soldiers 

expected him to be honest, fair, and straightforward—in short, to “tell it like it is.” Having done 

just that for thirty-three years, he felt he would 

continue to succeed as Sergeant Major of the 

Army. His unique position as the Army’s seniormost enlisted soldier gave him the opportunity to 

speak out on the behalf of all servicemen and 

women, and he did so with vigor. Yet Tilley 

avowed: “I don’t feel I stand out. . . . I am just a 

soldier getting a job done. I am no different than 

anybody else, I just have a different job.” With 

that, Tilley continued to get the job done.

On 15 January 2004, Sergeant Major of 

the Army Jack L. Tilley retired from the U.S. 

Army ending thirty-five years of active service. He has spent his time in retirement 

advocating for soldiers and their families. He 

has served on the Secretary of Veterans 

Affairs’ Operations Enduring Freedom and 

Iraqi Freedom Special Advisory Board and 

the Army Retirement Board. He is cofounder 

of the American Freedom Foundation, an 

organization that honors the armed forces 

and raises money for foundations and charities that support veterans and Army families. 

Jack Tilley continues to be a valuable asset to 

the U.S. Army.
218

1. Except as noted, this section is based on 

Interv, Daniel K. Elder with Jack L. Tilley, 4 

Feb 01, Fort Myer, Va., and 24 Jul 01, Fort Riley, 

Kans.

2. The point where the turret of a tank 

mates with the chassis is commonly referred to 

as the turret ring, named after the large gear 

that couples the two together.

3. Prior to 1989 the Army had specialist 

ranks ranging from Specialist 4 (E–4) to 

Specialist 8 (E–8).

4. Secretary of Defense McNamara directed 

in 1966 that the armed forces begin permitting 

recruits from the bottom percentile of the 

physical and mental categories. Eventually over 

350,000 such individuals were admitted.

5. OSUT melded Basic Combat Training 

and Advanced Individual Training into one 

course at one location.

6. The UCOFT was a virtual-reality tank 

simulator in which the tank commander and 

gunner could practice their skills in both day 

and night scenarios while under the scrutiny of 

“master gunners” or specialists.

7. COHORT, or Cohesion, Operational 

Readiness, and Training, was a program designed 

to develop vertical and horizontal cohesion in 

units by permitting soldiers and leaders to do 

their training with the same company or battalion for three years.

8. U.S. Army, Europe, News Release, 20 Feb 

96.

9. David L. Treleaven, “Engineers in Bosnia: 

an Overview,” Engineer (March 1996):36–37.

10. John D. Winkler et al., Future Leader 

Development of Army Noncommissioned Officers: 

Workshop Results (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND 

Corporation, 1998), p. xi.

11. “Army Officially Begins Creation of 

Initial Brigade Combat Teams,” Army News 

Service, 20 Apr 00.

12. “Tilley Tells Soldiers To Know Basics,” 

Army News Service, 25 Sep 01.

Notes
219

Assignments

1966 Inducted into service, Basic Training, Fort Lewis, Washington

1966 Advanced Individual Training, Fort Knox, Kentucky

1967–1968 Scout Vehicle Operator, Troop A, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division, 

Republic of Vietnam

1968–1969 Drill Sergeant, Company A, 10th Battalion, 2d Brigade, Fort Benning, Georgia 

(break in service, 1969–1971)

1971–1974 Drill Sergeant, Company C, 5th Battalion, 1st Brigade, Fort Polk, Louisiana

1974–1975 Tank Commander, Company B, 2d Battalion, 77th Armor, 9th Infantry Division, 

Fort Lewis, Washington

1976–1977 Tank Commander, Company B, 4th Battalion, 64th Armor, Aschafenberg, Germany; 

Company A, 3d Battalion, 32d Armor, 3d Armored Division, Friedberg, Germany

1977–1978 Platoon Sergeant, Section Leader, Company B and Headquarters 

Company, 3d Battalion, 32d Armor, 8th Infantry Division, Germany

1979–1985 Platoon Sergeant, Senior Instructor, 1st Training Brigade, U.S. Army Armor School; 

Senior Tank Commander, Operations Sergeant, First Sergeant, Sergeant Major, 

Companies A, B, and C, 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, Fort Knox, Kentucky

1985–1986 Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course Chief, Noncommissioned Officers 

Academy, Fort Knox, Kentucky

1986–1987 Student, Class #28, Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas

1987–1988 First Sergeant, Company C, 1st Battalion, 72d Armor, 2d Infantry 

Division, Republic of Korea

1988–1990 Command Sergeant Major, 1st Battalion, 10th Cavalry, 194th Separate 

Armored Brigade, Fort Knox, Kentucky

1990–1992 Command Sergeant Major, 194th Separate Armored Brigade, 

Fort Knox, Kentucky

1992–1997 Command Sergeant Major, 1st Armored Division, Bad Kreuznach, Germany; 

Tuzla, Bosnia

1997–1998 Command Sergeant Major, Space and Missile Defense Command, Arlington, Virginia

1998–2000 Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force 

Base, Tampa, Florida

2000–2004 Sergeant Major of the Army

Selected Decorations and Awards

Defense Superior Service Medal

Legion of Merit with One Oak Leaf Cluster

Bronze Star Medal with V Device and One Oak Leaf Cluster

Meritorious Service Medal with One Oak Leaf Cluster

Army Commendation Medal with Two Oak Leaf Clusters

Army Achievement Medal with Two Oak Leaf Clusters

Good Conduct Medal with Ten Oak Leaf Clusters

National Defense Service Medal with Service Star

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal

Vietnam Service Medal

Armed Forces Service Medal

Vietnam Service Medal

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm

Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal

NATO Medal

Parachutist Badge

Drill Sergeant Badge
SMA Preston
Kenneth O. Preston was born on 18 

February 1957 in Annapolis, Maryland, 

into a military family.1 After his father 

was discharged from the U.S. Army and his 

mother completed her service with the U.S. Air 

Force, the family relocated to Garrett County, 

Maryland, settling in the farm community of 

Mount Savage. The oldest of four children, 

Preston worked on the family farm and enjoyed 

a sheltered, happy childhood. He took pleasure 

in school work and excelled in the study of 

mathematics, history, and foreign languages. 

The young Preston was also an enthusiastic 

athlete who played baseball and basketball and 

competed in gymnastics. 

Preston was a diligent student. His goal was 

to complete a university education, but he did 

not want to be a financial burden to his family. 

He knew the chances of winning either an athletic or academic scholarship were slim, so he 

considered enlisting in the Army during his 

senior year of high school. His primary enticement was the possibility of earning future 

tuition assistance with the Montgomery GI 

Bill, but he was also conscious of his family’s 

long tradition of service to the country. In addition to his parents, his grandfather had been a 

“doughboy” in the U.S. Army during World 

War I, and his great great grandfather served in 

the Union Army during the U.S. Civil War. In 

January 1975 he met with an Army recruiter, 

and two months later he decided to enlist as an 

armored vehicle crewman. He graduated from 

high school and in June went to Fort Knox, 

Kentucky, to begin his career as a soldier. 

Preston was apprehensive, but he soon discovered that he was well prepared for the challenges of basic training. Physically fit, accustomed to working outdoors, and familiar with 

firearms, Preston excelled. Basic training built a 

foundation for his career as a soldier, and the 

discipline and leadership provided by his drill 

sergeants made a profoundly positive and lasting impression on him. The professionalism, 

technical competence, and uncompromising 

standards of his drill sergeants were the model 

that Preston followed throughout his career. He 

would later recall, “They could just look at you 

with one of those stern looks and you knew 

exactly what you were supposed to accomplish.” 

Preston remained at Fort Knox for Advanced 

Individual Training. During the autumn of 1975, 

he practiced his new trade on the M60A1 main 

battle tank, taking a turn at each crew position. 

This intense, eight-week training program 

instilled in Preston an enduring fascination with 

tanks and tank gunnery. 

After graduation, Private Preston returned 

home to Mount Savage and married Karen 

Smith, his high school sweetheart. In November 

1975 the newlyweds packed up their 1971 Ford 

station wagon and headed to their first duty station with the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort 

Hood, Texas. He was assigned to Headquarters 

and Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, 8th 

Cavalry. 

Preston’s military bearing made quite an 

impression on his new unit, and he was offered a 

position as the battalion commander’s jeep driver. 

He declined, preferring to begin his apprenticeship as a loader on the battalion commander’s 

tank. He soon built a reputation as an outstanding soldier. His technical competence and performance of duty earned him rapid promotion. 

Kenneth O. Preston
222

Within a year he was promoted to specialist and 

assigned as a gunner, and within two years he was 

a sergeant. 

Preston had joined an Army in transition. 

The drawdown at the end of the Vietnam War, 

reduced budgets, and a renewed focus on the 

conventional deterrent in Europe meant that 

stateside units were undermanned and underfunded. The Army was desperately short of 

senior noncommissioned officers; as a consequence, junior sergeants like Preston were 

assigned duties beyond their rank and experience. Preston made the most of his opportunities. He assumed responsibility as “a sort of 

assistant platoon sergeant” for the headquarters 

tank section, supervising daily vehicle maintenance and training the tank crews.

During his tour, Preston participated in 

many field and gunnery training exercises. He 

took great pride in the performance of his unit 

during force-on-force engagements, and he 

became a student of the complex art of tank 

gunnery. Assignment to the 1st Cavalry Division 

also afforded him the opportunity to observe 

testing and fielding of new equipment. The 

division participated in the testing of a simulated tactical engagement system that was a 

predecessor to the Multiple Integrated Laser 

Engagement System. The division also assisted 

the armored units of the Texas Army National 

Guard in their transition from the M48 to the 

M60 tank. Preston was assigned to a cadre unit 

that helped prepare and execute the new equipment training program for an armored battalion 

in the Dallas–Fort Worth area. The experience 

that Preston gained would pay off handsomely 

later in his career. 

Kenneth and Karen Preston had two children during their tour at Fort Hood. Denied 

quarters on post, Kenneth and Karen rented a 

mobile home in Killeen, Texas. Fortunately, several of the senior noncommissioned officers from 

the company looked after the young family. They 

shared guidance, thoughtful advice, and a helping 

hand. The Prestons were grateful for the assistance, and they felt “very blessed” that the unit 

leaders provided support and attention. As a 

result, the importance of Army families and the 

critical role that leaders play were lessons that 

Preston learned early in his career. 

Thirty months after reporting to Fort 

Hood, Preston received orders assigning him to 

U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). Preston’s initial period of enlistment was nearly complete. 

He could not receive permission to bring his 

family to Germany unless he reenlisted and 

committed to serving a full tour overseas. 

Preston chose to remain in the U.S. Army. In 

addition to the enormous satisfaction he derived 

from his job as a soldier and a leader, the experience of family life at Fort Hood was the deciding factor. Preston later reflected, “The quality 

of life that I was able to provide for my family 

at Fort Hood and in the Army was better than 

what I would have been able to provide coming 

back to the mountains of western Maryland.” In 

February 1978 Preston left for Europe and was 

assigned to Company B, 1st Battalion, 33d 

Armor, 3d Armored Division, in Gelnhausen, 

Federal Republic of Germany. 

Upon arriving in Gelnhausen, Preston discovered that his new unit was away at the 

Preston at Basic Training, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1975
223

Hohenfels Training Area. He restored a disabled M60 tank to operational readiness while 

awaiting the return of the battalion. In March 

he was selected to attend the Basic 

Noncommissioned Officer Course and was 

away at class when his family arrived in April. 

Upon graduation, he immediately deployed to 

the Grafenwöhr Training Area, pausing only to 

change from his Class A uniform to fatigues. 

At Grafenwöhr, Preston was assigned as a 

gunner on his platoon leader’s tank. He was 

surprised to discover that the personnel situation in his new company was not much different from the one he had left at Fort Hood. The 

unit was undermanned and short of senior 

noncommissioned officers. The situation went 

from bad to worse when the platoon leader and 

tank commander received a compassionate 

reassignment to the United States. Preston was 

assigned as the tank commander. Determined 

to make the best of things, he promoted his 

driver to gunner and convinced a turret 

mechanic to act as his tank driver. Preston 

quickly trained up his ad hoc crew and led the 

men through the gunnery cycle and qualification. This demonstration of technical proficiency and leadership was not lost on his company commander. When the unit returned to 

garrison, Preston was made the gunner on the 

company commander’s tank. He also returned 

to discover that his family had moved into new 

quarters while he was away, and, as he would 

later recall, “I actually had to ask somebody 

where I lived.” 

Preston was building a reputation as an outstanding noncommissioned officer and tank 

gunner. During the next tank gunnery cycle, his 

tank crew achieved the second highest score in 

the battalion. Once again, his company commander took notice, and the young sergeant was 

given the opportunity to command his own tank. 

United States Army, Europe, underwent a 

transformation in doctrine and organization during Preston’s tour. The Army’s focus on countering the Soviet threat in central Germany caused 

changes in tank gunnery standards. The emphasis was on successfully engaging multiple targets 

at long range. New tank gunnery ranges were 

being built at the Grafenwöhr Training Area in 

accordance with the new qualification standards. 

Preston studied the new guidelines and visited 

the new range complex. He then formulated a 

training plan for his crew and executed it with 

vigor, spending hours in the motor pool rehearsing target engagement and crew drills. The test 

came in the winter of 1979 when the 3d Armored 

Division returned to Grafenwöhr to conduct 

tank gunnery qualification. The new qualification standards proved daunting, and many crews 

had to make several runs down the range course 

in order to make the grade. Preston’s crew not 

only qualified on the first run but also achieved 

the highest score in the battalion. He topped that 

performance in the next gunnery cycle by attaining the highest qualification score in the 3d 

Armored Division. The division commander, 

Maj. Gen. Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., presented Preston 

with an Army Commendation Medal in recognition of this accomplishment. Preston said, “I 

love gunnery and I loved taking a crew and training it to perform like a world class athlete.”

In September 1980 Preston was selected by 

his chain of command to compete for a position 

in the prestigious Sergeant Morales Club. This 

organization was established in 1973 to promote “the highest ideals of integrity, professionalism and leadership for the enlisted force serving in Europe.”2 Preston prepared for the difficult series of board interviews while simultaneously training for another gunnery cycle and a 

Return of Forces to Germany, or REFORGER, 

exercise. He was promoted to staff sergeant on 

the day of the final interview. Karen sewed the 

new chevrons onto his Class A uniform the 

night before the board meeting. He passed 

through the selection process with flying colors. 

It was a great honor and a true reflection of his 

commitment to duty, professionalism, and leadership. Before his time in Germany ended, 

Preston was assigned as company master gunner. It was a fitting end to a successful tour.

In February 1981 the Preston family arrived 

at Fort Knox, where their third child was born in 

June. Staff Sergeant Preston had hoped to attend 
224

Drill Sergeant School and serve in a training 

brigade, but he was instead posted to the Armor 

School as an instructor in the Weapons 

Department. For the next fourteen months 

Preston would teach armor officers attending the 

Armor Officer Basic Course the fundamentals of 

tank gunnery. This was an exciting time to be 

assigned to the armor schoolhouse. The M60A3 

tank was entering the inventory, and the new 

XM1, the prototype of the M1 tank, was undergoing testing and evaluation. Preston observed 

these developments while honing his skills as a 

trainer. He presented platform lectures on tank 

gunnery to armor officers and spent long hours 

on Wilson Range at Fort Knox, climbing in and 

out of tank turrets as he trained future tank platoon leaders in crew drills, turret operations, and 

gunnery fundamentals. 

The Armor School required Preston to train 

soldiers on the M60A1, M60A3, and the new 

XM1. He quickly mastered all three programs of 

instruction and was one of the first noncommissioned officers selected to work on the training 

team for the M1 Abrams tank. Being one of the 

Preston (third from the left) Receiving the Army Commendation Medal for Achieving the Highest Tank Gunnery Score 

in the 3d Armored Division, Grafenwöhr, Germany, 1979
225

few instructors qualified on all three tanks meant 

that he would “teach armament controls and 

equipment on an M60A1 in the morning, teach 

the laser range finder on an M60A3 in the afternoon, and the next day be out on a range firing 

Tank Table VII on the Abrams tank.” 

In recognition of his abilities as a trainer, 

Preston was selected to participate in an instructor 

exchange program between the U.S. Army Armor 

School and U.K. Royal Armoured Corps Gunnery 

School. In October 1983 he and his family moved 

to Lulworth, England, where he served as a gunnery instructor on a variety of different vehicle 

types, from tanks to reconnaissance and infantry 

fighting vehicles. Once again, Preston demonstrated his ability to master new weapon systems 

and train diverse groups of soldiers in the art of 

tank gunnery. While in England, Preston was 

promoted to sergeant first class.

Preston returned to the Armor School at 

Fort Knox in October 1985. He became the 

project officer for fielding the M1A1 tank in 

the Gunnery Training and Doctrine Branch. 

He wrote the gunnery manual for the new tank 

and traveled around the country helping units 

transition to the vehicle. He also made presentations to senior Army leaders on the capabilities of the M1A1 and the training programs 

developed by the Armor School. 

In February 1987 Preston’s tour with the 

Armor School ended, but he remained at Fort 

Knox as a platoon sergeant with Company C, 

1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry. One of the unit’s 

missions was to support the training activities of 

the Armor School by providing training vehicles and range support. Sergeant First Class 

Preston put his knowledge of tank gunnery to 

good use, and within a year he was assigned as 

first sergeant to the battalion’s headquarters 

company. 

One year later he transferred to Company 

C, 2d Battalion, 10th Cavalry, 194th Armor 

Preston in the Commander’s Cupola of His M60 Tank, Grafenwöhr, Germany, 1980 
226

Brigade (Separate), and again assumed duties as 

a tank platoon sergeant. His new unit was experiencing a number of difficulties. The battalion 

had transferred many of its most seasoned soldiers to a sister battalion scheduled to rotate to 

Korea. As a result of these levies many senior 

noncommissioned officer positions were 

unfilled. This was unfortunate for Company C 

because it had recently completed the transition 

from the M60A3 to the M1 and the soldiers 

were still learning how to handle their new 

tanks. Preston had faced these circumstances 

before. He assumed the role of company master 

gunner and prepared and executed a training 

plan focused on vehicle maintenance and crew 

drills. In five short months Company C was 

able to perform all tasks to standard. It was a 

fitting end to his long tour at Fort Knox.

In the summer of 1989 Preston received 

orders to report to the 11th Armored Cavalry 

in Fulda, Federal Republic of Germany. The 

commander of the regiment, Col. John Abrams, 

had served with Preston in the 1st Battalion, 

33d Armor, in Gelnhausen. Colonel Abrams 

remembered Preston’s expertise in tank gunnery and made him the regiment’s tank master 

gunner. For the next nine months Preston 

worked to improve gunnery training programs 

and crew performance. His efforts culminated 

in a successful platoon qualification course 

(Tank Table XII). Preston explained, “I put 

together a Tank Table XII scenario that really 

tested those platoons. At the end, Colonel 

Abrams knew which of the twenty-seven tank 

platoons in the Regiment were the most 

lethal.”

Preston was also the noncommissioned 

officer in charge of the regimental tactical command post. He was responsible for the maintenance, readiness, and performance of the soldiers and vehicles assigned to this forward 

headquarters, including two M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, four M577 armored command post carriers, and a small collection of 

trucks and light, wheeled vehicles. It was 

Preston’s job to supervise the positioning, 

assembly, disassembly, and movement of this 

small but vital unit. It was an experience that he 

would draw on years later in the deserts of Iraq.

Preston’s reputation as a leader and trainer 

continued to grow. Colonel Abrams chose 

Preston to serve as first sergeant of Troop A, 1st 

Squadron. Preston recalled, “There were a lot of 

discipline issues there in the troop, there were a 

lot of things that had been deferred and hadn’t 

been taken care of so there was some housecleaning work that needed to be done.” Together 

with his new commander, Preston reestablished 

discipline and executed a demanding training 

program. Within a year, Troop A was one of the 

best outfits in the 11th Armored Cavalry, 

achieving the best gunnery scores in the regiment and winning the prestigious USAREUR 

Cavalry Cup in 1990. In July Preston’s name 

was posted on the E–8 promotion list, and he 

was frocked to the rank of first sergeant.

In August 1990 Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein 

ordered his armed forces to invade Kuwait. The 

United States, acting in coalition with its allies, 

sent forces to the Persian Gulf to defend Saudi 

Arabia. U.S. Army units were sent to the Middle 

East from their bases in Europe, but the 11th 

Armored Cavalry was not among them. Instead, 

the regiment moved to the Wildflecken Training 

Area where it trained replacements from the 

Individual Ready Reserve. In the dead of winter, 

the disappointed men of Troop A built tank 

ranges and prepared the reservists for combat. 

Preston remarked, “Everybody was a little 

depressed. We felt we were being left out of the 

fight.” However, the troopers of the regiment 

would have an important role to play in securing 

the peace. In May 1991 the 11th Armored 

Cavalry deployed to Kuwait to help protect the 

shattered country in support of Operation 

Positive Force. Troop A spent several months 

patrolling the Iraqi border, clearing roads, and 

protecting American diplomats and facilities. In 

the fall of 1991 the regiment returned to Fulda.

The end of Operations Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm marked the beginning of a 

period of great change for the U.S. Army. The 

force that had guarded the ramparts of freedom 

in Europe and had achieved a spectacular victory 
227

in the Persian Gulf was to be significantly 

reduced in size. The Army was also undergoing 

many cultural changes with a focus on improving 

the quality of life of single soldiers. The commander of USAREUR, General Crosbie E. 

Saint, began a “Single Soldier Initiative” designed 

to improve barracks life and increase recreational 

opportunities for single and unaccompanied soldiers. Under this directive, units removed headquarters and work spaces from barracks, providing soldiers more private living space and common areas. This concept was embraced by the 

senior leadership of the Army and codified as the 

Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers program. Preston believed this was long overdue, 

and he worked with his soldiers to improve their 

living and common areas. First Sergeant Preston 

stressed the need to maintain standards. “You can 

still have a disciplined, clean, healthy barracks 

environment,” he said, “and give soldiers the same 

kind of comforts and freedoms that their married 

counterparts enjoy.” Preston and his men reconstructed the barracks day room using their own 

labor and materials. Troop A became a model for 

the rest of the regiment, and Preston would never 

forget the positive effect this program had on the 

morale and performance of his soldiers. 

In June 1992, after two years on the promotion list, Preston advanced to the grade of E–8. In 

July he joined the Master Gunner Branch of the 

Weapons Department of the Armor School at 

Fort Knox. Preston’s first task was to consolidate 

the maintenance and gunnery divisions of the 

branch, turn in excess equipment, rewrite programs of instruction, and realign training facilities. He rewrote the gunnery manuals and traveled around the Army checking training and 

ensuring that gunnery standards were being followed. Once again, the chain of command recognized his problem-solving and leadership abilities. He was assigned as the first sergeant of the 

Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course 

Company, Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) 

Academy, nine months after arriving at Fort 

Knox. The company was the largest in the academy, and the students were drawn from six military occupational specialties. Preston’s new 

responsibilities included leading the students 

assigned to his company and supervising the 

work of the training cadre. He would note, “It 

was very busy. It was more challenging than I had 

ever imagined.” Preston proved equal to the task, 

and a year later he was promoted to deputy commandant. His duties were to supervise the staff of 

the academy, write policy, and direct programs for 

the commandant. Preston enjoyed his work at 

the academy, but as he approached the start of his 

twentieth year of active service he began to contemplate retirement. He felt he had achieved 

everything that he had set out to accomplish. He 

submitted his request for retirement in October 

and looked forward to returning to the mountains of western Maryland. The command sergeant major of the NCO Academy urged him to 

delay his final decision until the results of the 

next promotion board were released. Preston 

took his advice. In December 1994 the list for 

promotion to E–9 was published and his name 

was among the selectees. After consulting with 

his family, he accepted the promotion and the 

additional service obligation. The Army was not 

finished with Kenneth Preston.

In June 1995 Preston reported to the 

Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas. 

He excelled throughout the nine-month course 

and was selected to participate in a two-week 

exchange program with the German 

Bundeswehr, Unteroffizierschule des Heeres

(NCO Academy), in Weiden, Germany. He also 

was afforded the opportunity to participate in 

war game exercises at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

Preston was selected to be command sergeant 

major while attending the academy. In August 

1996 he received orders to report to the 1st 

Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, where he 

became command sergeant major of the 3d 

Battalion, 8th Cavalry, of the 3d Brigade. He 

arrived in November to discover that his new 

battalion was undergoing an emergency deployment to Kuwait. He barely had time to draw his 

personal equipment before he was put on a 

plane and flown out to join his new unit. He 

was introduced to his battalion commander just 

as the unit was lining up in a convoy prior to 
228

moving to positions along the Iraqi border. 

Although his introduction to his new battalion 

was abrupt, it was not long before Preston was 

familiar with every NCO in the battalion.

The 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, was one of 

the first battalions in the Army to be equipped 

with the new M1A2 tank. Preston had become 

familiar with this model during his last tour 

with the Weapons Department at Fort Knox, 

and he put this knowledge to good use during 

the battalion’s four-month deployment to 

Kuwait. When the battalion returned to Fort 

Hood, Preston launched a number of NCO 

professional development initiatives and instituted a new soldier nutrition and fitness program. The battalion drew on Preston’s technical 

expertise during each gunnery cycle and when 

fielding new equipment like the M88A2 recovery vehicle. He built on the lessons learned as a 

first sergeant and focused on realistic training, 

family readiness, and soldier quality of life. He 

would recall, “It was rewarding to have your 

piece of the Army and to mold it and grow 

leaders. I enjoyed that as a first sergeant and as 

a battalion sergeant major.” 

In August 1998 Preston was promoted to 

command sergeant major (CSM) of the 3d 

Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. As brigade CSM, 

Preston focused on field discipline and the construction and distribution of unit logistical 

packages. Drawing on his experiences as a first 

sergeant with the 11th Armored Cavalry, he 

rewrote the brigade’s logistics and casualty 

evacuation standard operating procedures. 

These efforts contributed to the success of the 

3d Brigade’s National Training Center rotation 

in the early autumn of 1999. 

With a little over one year’s time as a brigade sergeant major, Maj. Gen. George W. 

Casey, Jr., the 1st Armored Division commander, asked Preston to submit an application package for the position of command sergeant major, 

1st Armored Division. After a whirlwind interview process, General Casey selected Preston as 

his CSM and requested that he report as soon 

as possible to the division headquarters at Bad 

Kreuznach, Germany. This marked the end of 

his tour at Fort Hood. In three short years 

Preston had risen from battalion to division 

command sergeant major. After taking a brief 

period of leave, he again set off for Germany. 

The 1st Armored Division was a busy unit in 

January 2000. In addition to providing forces for 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, the division 

was moving subordinate units to new permanent 

locations throughout Germany. General Casey 

asked CSM Preston to act as his eyes and ears by 

traveling around the division to observe training 

and talk to soldiers. General Casey also directed 

Preston to develop a physical fitness program 

that would increase soldier fitness and build 

teamwork and pride at the company/troop/battery level. Preston coordinated with the division 

staff to establish the Commander’s Physical 

Fitness and Excellence Award. Preston supervised the formation of an evaluation team that 

tested every company-size unit in the division by 

administering a weigh-in, body fat test, and an 

Army physical fitness readiness test. The highest 

scoring unit received a special streamer and 

division-wide recognition. This represented the 

culmination of a competitive year-long process 

that focused on the effectiveness of companylevel physical fitness programs. Preston also 

strove to strengthen unit discipline by reviewing 

and standardizing the procedures for all changeof-command ceremonies. 

In March 2001 Preston became the command sergeant major, V Corps. He moved his 

family to Heidelberg, Germany. Preston’s duties 

and responsibilities as V Corps CSM were less 

clear-cut than those at the 1st Armored Division. 

The divisions assigned to V Corps did not 

require the close supervision of another CSM, 

so Preston decided to focus on the 3d Corps 

Support Command and the assigned, independent brigades. He acted as a type of “division 

CSM” for these large, disparate, and dispersed 

units, mentoring senior NCOs, inspecting training, and advising the V Corps commander on 

the condition of his force multipliers. 

On 11 September 2001, terrorists flew 

hijacked airliners into the World Trade Center in 
229

New York City and into the Pentagon in Arlington, 

Virginia. The V Corps commander immediately 

issued orders to secure corps facilities and housing 

areas against attack. Preston inspected the construction of barriers and the conduct of security 

patrols. He saw his primary task as teaching soldiers “the lost art of guard duty.”

In the early months of 2002, the V Corps 

was ordered to make arrangements for a possible 

invasion of Iraq. In November 2002 the V Corps 

headquarters deployed to Kuwait and assumed 

command of all U.S. Army ground forces. During 

the long winter months the V Corps received 

and deployed reinforcing units while continuing 

to train and prepare. The ground attack was 

launched on 20 March 2003. CSM Preston 

moved with the V Corps assault command post, 

circulating through the corps area, functioning as 

the eyes and ears of the commander, assisting 

units with equipment and logistical issues while 

providing guidance and leadership to his soldiers. 

When Baghdad fell, Preston acted as the V 

Corps liaison with U.S. Army Central Command 

and helped establish unit boundaries and headquarters locations for V Corps units. Preston 

selected the Al Faw Palace in Baghdad as the 

location for the V Corps headquarters, and, 

together with the command sergeants major 

from the corps brigades, he laid the boundaries, 

architecture, and defenses of what would grow 

into the Combined Joint Task Force–7 headquarters and Camp Victory. 

Over the summer, the responsibilities of the 

headquarters continued to grow, and Preston 

not only worked with representatives of the U.S. 

State Department to establish the enlarged 

embassy and governmental area in Baghdad 

that became known as the Green Zone, but also 

continued to visit units throughout the country, 

talking to soldiers and acting as the eyes of the 

corps commander. 

In August 2003 Sergeant Major of the 

Army Jack L. Tilley decided to retire. One of his 

final acts was to ask Preston to apply for the 

position of Sergeant Major of the Army. Preston 

was reluctant to do so while the soldiers of V 

Corps were engaged in the difficult task of stabilizing Iraq, but Tilley was insistent. The new 

Chief of Staff, General Peter J. Schoomaker, 

also asked Preston to apply.3 After discussing 

the matter with Karen and the V Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, Preston 

submitted his application packet and flew back 

to Washington, D.C., for an interview. A few 

weeks later the Chief of Staff called to congratulate him for being selected as the top 

enlisted soldier in the U.S. Army. Preston 

remained with the V Corps, however, until it 

was relieved by the III Corps in December 

2003. 

On 15 January 2004, Kenneth O. Preston 

was sworn in as the thirteenth Sergeant Major 

of the Army. Before being sworn in, he attended 

the Nominative Command Sergeants Major 

Conference at Fort Bliss, Texas. He took this 

opportunity to meet with the senior noncommissioned officers of the Army and to get a 

sense of the challenges faced by their respective 

commands. In February he testified before 

Congress, discussing “everything from housing 

to child care, youth services, military pay, medical and dental access, Tricare and force protection.” Preston would later remark, “It was a busy 

time.”

The main effort of his term as Sergeant 

Major of the Army would be to support an 

Army at war by building healthy soldiers, developing highly trained noncommissioned officers, 

and strengthening support for Army families. 

Together with General Schoomaker, Preston 

worked to transition the force to a wartime 

Army. General Schoomaker directed Preston to 

focus on improving soldier fitness and discipline 

across the force. Preston reminded the Army’s 

noncommissioned officers that “standards and 

discipline are related.” It was not enough to 

establish and enforce standards. Leaders at all 

levels must be held accountable. This was how 

the Army would “grow sergeants” and empower 

junior leaders.4 Schoomaker and Preston synchronized their travel schedules, moving 

throughout the combat theaters and across the 

Army, sharing their observations with each 

other and the Army Staff. 
230

Preston learned quickly that crisis management was a large part of the job. In January 

2004 Headquarters, Department of the Army, 

investigated reports of detainee abuse at the 

Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The report of the 

investigation, known as the Taguba Report, was 

leaked to the media in the spring of 2004.5 The 

resulting scandal damaged the reputation of the 

Army. Preston engaged with the media and 

explained the process of the investigation and 

the facts as he knew them. He also sought to 

maintain morale by communicating with soldiers and leaders in the field, expressing confidence in their ability, reminding them that there 

were “hundreds of thousands of soldiers 

deployed around the world that are doing the 

right thing and treating people with dignity and 

respect, and serving as role models and ambassadors in all these locations.”6

The experience caused Preston to ponder 

the possible causes of the events at Abu Ghraib. 

It was clear to him that the attention this scandal received reflected “the nature of the current 

fight and potentially the modern day battlefield 

where the actions of a few leaders and soldiers 

have strategic level impacts.” The soldiers and 

leaders at Abu Ghraib had failed to maintain 

fundamental standards of leadership and discipline. The Army would have to do a better job 

of preparing soldiers and leaders for the rigors 

of this kind of war.

On 10 April 2007, General George W. 

Casey, Jr., was sworn in as Chief of Staff of the 

United States Army. He asked Preston to stay 

on as Sergeant Major of the Army. Preston 

readily agreed, re-forming the successful command team that had led the 1st Armored 

Division.7 General Casey established four strategic imperatives that would frame the work 

done during his term as Chief of Staff: sustain 

the all-volunteer force; prepare forces to succeed 

in the current conflict; rebuild unit readiness; 

SMA Preston Addresses Members of Congress on Army Family Quality of Life Issues.
231

and continue to transform the force “to meet 

the demands of the 21st Century.”8

Preston believed that the first step in achieving General Casey’s imperatives was to enhance 

soldier fitness. With General Casey and the 

Army Staff, he worked to develop the 

Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program. The 

program, based on research conducted by the 

Positive Psychology Center at the University of 

Pennsylvania, represented a new, holistic 

approach to measuring the emotional, social, 

spiritual, and family dimensions of individual 

readiness.9 The purpose was to build resilience 

in the minds and bodies of soldiers stretched to 

the limit by the demands of combat and the 

stress of multiple deployments.10

Preston thought that traditional measures 

of soldier fitness were too narrow, and he advocated a comprehensive approach to soldier fitness. He traveled around the Army educating 

leaders and soldiers about the benefits of the 

program. While he encouraged leaders to make 

the most of these new tools, he reminded them 

that there is no substitute for strong leadership. 

No program, regardless of how well conceived 

or funded, could succeed if noncommissioned 

officers did not look after the health and welfare 

of their soldiers. Soldier fitness would no longer 

be simply measured by scores achieved on the 

physical fitness test. Leaders were tasked to take 

a more holistic view, focusing on diet, mental 

health, and family issues. 

Preston also realized that the unrelenting 

demands of war would eventually drive a soldier 

“to a point where he has to choose between his 

family and the Army.” Recalling his days as a 

young married soldier at Fort Hood, he knew 

that quality of life was one of the most important factors in retention. Quality of life went 

beyond “just soldier pay.” It included “medical, 

dental, housing, youth services” and “things we 

provide for all families.” He was determined to 

raise the quality of life for Army families. 

Together with General Casey and Secretary of 

the Army Preston M. “Pete” Geren, he helped 

create the Army Family Covenant in 2007. This 

simple statement of principles recognized the 

sacrifices that Army families make in support of 

the mission and declared the Army’s commitment to improve housing, schools, and youth 

services; to expand educational opportunities 

for family members; and to enhance access to 

health care. The Army increased funding for 

these priorities from $700 million to $1.4 billion in Fiscal Year 2008.11 It also built nearly 

eighty thousand new housing units on thirty-six 

installations and opened over sixty new child 

care centers. Preston’s dedication to Army families made a significant contribution to the longterm health of the Army and is one of his most 

significant achievements.12

Preston served as a valued adviser to General 

Casey for all issues regarding force structure and 

transformation. He was a driving force behind 

the fielding of the new Army Combat Uniform, 

improved body armor, the M4 rifle, and other 

SMA Preston (right) and Sfc. Dale Green Prepare to 

Drive an M1A1 Tank at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, 2006. 
232

associated equipment. In the words of General 

Casey, “He worked with the precision of an 

engineer and the capability to understand what 

a Soldier needs.”13

The demand for troops by the combatant 

commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan placed 

an enormous strain on the Army. Preston was 

a tireless advocate, and he never missed an 

opportunity to describe to leaders at the highest levels the burden being shouldered by his 

soldiers. In January 2009 President Barack H. 

Obama assumed the duties of Commander in 

Chief. Shortly after his inauguration the president called a meeting of all his senior enlisted 

advisers to get a sense of the challenges being 

faced by the men and women of the armed 

forces. Preston used the opportunity to explain 

the relationship between “recruiting, retention 

and stress on the force.” He made clear that the 

stress does not end with the fifteen-month 

deployment; the year spent recovering at home 

was nearly as busy. Units had to repair and 

replace equipment, transition to new leadership, begin a new training cycle, and prepare 

for the next deployment. It was an important 

message to carry to the new Commander in 

Chief.

Together with Secretary Geren and General 

Casey, Preston sought ways to bring greater 

attention to the sacrifices of soldiers and their 

families while emphasizing the amazing feats 

these soldiers were accomplishing in service to 

the country. Throughout 2009, “The Year of the 

NCO,” he traveled around the Army, meeting 

with soldiers, conducting interviews with the 

media, and speaking to civic organizations. He 

reminded his audiences of the sacrifices being 

made by Army personnel and their families 

while recognizing their achievements. He 

explained the role and value of the NCO Corps, 

calling it the “glue” that held the Army together. 

Everywhere he connected with audiences and 

shared the stories of soldiers working to protect 

our country and its way of life.14

Perhaps Preston’s most important and 

enduring legacy was his work to transform the 

Noncommissioned Officer Education System 

(NCOES). Drawing on his experiences in 

Kuwait, Kosovo, and Iraq, Preston realized that 

warfare had changed. Platoons and squads no 

longer operated under the close supervision of 

their officers. Small units had “to be able to 

operate while dispersed and fragmented across 

the battlefield.” Noncommissioned officers 

needed a deeper understanding of how their 

tasks tie in with the larger mission at the strategic level. The Army needed to build strong, 

junior leaders with the “maturity and depth of 

understanding” to make good decisions in difficult, often chaotic environments.15 Preston felt 

the NCOES was not adequately preparing the 

Army’s junior leaders “to think systematically 

and strategically.”16 The NCOES, he believed, 

should promote lifelong learning, emphasize 

self-development, and focus on the needs of an 

Army at war. Working together with the 

SMA Preston and Wife Karen During His Retirement 

Ceremony at Conmy Hall on Fort Myer, Virginia 
233

Training and Doctrine Command and the 

Sergeants Major Academy, Preston sought to 

transform the way the Army trained and prepared noncommissioned officers.17

The first step was to expand basic training 

from nine to ten weeks to increase the time that 

young soldiers would spend learning in a “simulated operational environment.” Basic training 

would emphasize “warrior tasks” like field craft, 

advanced rifle marksmanship, and battle drills. 

Advanced individual training would also take 

on a combat focus, moving away from practicing basic skills toward the fundamentals of 

leadership.18

The core courses that made up the 

NCOES were redesigned: the Primary Leader 

Development Course was changed to the 

Warrior Leader Course; the Basic 

Noncommissioned Officer Course was revised 

to the Advanced Leader Course; and the 

Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course 

became the Senior Leader Course. Each curriculum incorporated skills that had formerly 

been taught in higher-level courses. The 

intent was to challenge students and prepare 

them to step into positions of increased 

responsibility. Distance learning and structured self-development were integrated into 

each curriculum.19 Soldiers were required to 

complete many hours of online instruction 

and mentored distance learning before they 

were qualified to attend a residence course.20

This maximized the time and resources available for professional education by taking 

advantage of new technologies. It also required 

noncommissioned officers to shoulder more 

responsibility for their own education and 

professional development.21

Preston worked to integrate the new 

NCOES with the Army Force Generation 

cycle, a process that produced trained and ready 

units to meet the requirements of combatant 

commanders. Preston helped synchronize the 

academic calendar with unit deployments, creating periods for qualified noncommissioned 

officers to leave their units and attend the 

required courses. Preston’s vision, determination, and thoughtful guidance played a critical 

role in changing the way the Army prepared 

junior leaders for combat. General Casey recognized him as “the architect of the greatest renovation in career development for our NCOs 

since the Vietnam War.”22

In January 2011 Preston began his seventh 

year as Sergeant Major of the Army. General 

Casey’s tenure as chief of staff was scheduled to 

end in the spring, and Preston decided he would 

step down as well. On 1 March 2011, Kenneth 

O. Preston retired. As the thirteenth Sergeant 

Major of the Army, he had served the longest 

term in the history of the position, helping 

guide the Army through two wars. Preston had 

helped change the way the Army measured soldier fitness, improved the quality of life for 

Army families, and assisted in the redevelopment of the manner in which NCOs were 

trained. His dedication to duty, professional 

competence, and hard work were an inspiration 

to all who served. Preston would often remind 

his noncommissioned officers, “The knowledge 

that you gain is not solely yours to keep, but 

yours to take and pass on to the Soldiers of your 

organization. Use what you learn to teach your 

Soldiers and make them better.” SMA Preston 

lived that ethos for thirty-six years of exemplary 

service to his country. 
234

1. Except as noted, this section is based on 

Intervs, Stephen W. Lehman with Kenneth O. 

Preston, 15 Mar 11, and Robert M. Mages with 

Preston, 14–15 Feb 12, author’s files, U.S. Army 

Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, 

D.C.

2. U.S. Army, Europe, Regulation 600–2, 8 

November 2005, author’s files, CMH.

3. Linda Crippen, “Casey and Preston,” 

NCO Journal (March 2011):16.

4. Sergeant Major of the Army Kenneth 

Preston, Standards and Discipline, 2005, author’s 

files, CMH.

5. The report of the Article 15–6 

Investigation of the 800th Military Police 

Brigade was conducted by Maj. Gen. Antonio 

M. Taguba. The media labeled the document 

“the Taguba Report,” after the author.

6. Sergeant Major of the Army Kenneth O. 

Preston, Sergeant Major of the Army Leader 

Book Notes, May 04, author’s files, CMH.

7. Crippen, “Casey and Preston.”

8. Transcript, Statement by General George 

W. Casey, Jr., Chief of Staff, United States Army, 

before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 

U.S. House of Representatives, on the Army’s 

Strategic Imperatives, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 15 

Nov 07, pp. 2–3, author’s files, CMH.

9. University of Pennsylvania, Positive 

Psychology Center, Comprehensive Soldier 

Fitness: An Overview, author’s files, CMH.

10. U.S. Army, Comprehensive Soldier 

Fitness: Frequently Asked Questions, author’s 

files, CMH.

11. U.S. Army, 2009 Posture Statement, 

Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program, 

author’s files, CMH.

12. Elizabeth M. Lorge, “Army Leaders 

Sign Covenant with Families,” Army News 

Service, 17 Oct 07, author’s files, CMH.

13. General George W. Casey, Jr., “Remarks 

for the Retirement Ceremony of Sergeant Major 

of the Army Ken Preston,” Army News Service, 

1 Mar 11, author’s files, CMH.

14. Peter J. Chadwick, “SMA Visits Fort 

McPherson for ‘Year of the NCO’ Event,” Army 

News Service, 5 Mar 09, author’s files, CMH.

15. Linda Crippen, “Preston Has Left the 

Building: The Longest Serving SMA Retires,” 

NCO Journal (March 2011):14.

16. Briefing, USASMA Reorganization, 

United States Army Sergeants Major Academy, 

10 Apr 09, author’s files, CMH.

17. David Melancon, SMA Outlines 

Changes to Army Education during Visit to 

Europe, http://www.ArmyNCOES.com, 1 Nov 

07, author’s files, CMH.

18. Ibid.

19. U.S. Army, Welcome to NCOES, 

Information About the U.S. Army NCOES 

System, author’s files, CMH.

20. John Harlow, “Turning NCOES into a 

life-long learning strategy,” TRADOC News 

Service, 22 Oct 07, author’s files, CMH.

21. “NCOES Adding More SelfDevelopment Courses,” Army News Service, 25 

Jan 11, author’s files, CMH.

22. Casey, “Remarks for the Retirement 

Ceremony of Sergeant Major of the Army Ken 

Preston.”

Notes
235

Assignments

1975 Inducted into service, Basic and Advanced Individual Training, Fort Knox, 

 Kentucky

1975–1978 Armored Vehicle Crewman, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, 

8th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas

1978–1981 Armored Vehicle Crewman, Tank Commander, Company B, 1st Battalion, 33d 

Armor, 3d Armored Division, Gelnhausen, Germany

1981–1983 Gunnery Instructor, Weapons Department, U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, 

 Kentucky

1983–1985 Gunnery Instructor, U.K. Royal Armoured Corps Gunnery School, Lulworth Camp, 

 England

1985–1987 Project Officer, Gunnery Training and Doctrine Branch, U.S. Army Armor School, 

Fort Knox, Kentucky

1987–1988 Platoon Sergeant, Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, the School Brigade, Fort 

Knox, Kentucky

1988–1989 Platoon Sergeant, Company C, 2d Battalion, 10th Cavalry, 194th Armor Brigade 

(Separate), Fort Knox, Kentucky

1989–1990 Regimental Master Gunner, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 11th Armored 

Cavalry, Fulda, Germany

1990–1992 First Sergeant, Troop A, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry, Fulda, Germany

1992–1993 Instructor, Master Gunner Branch, Weapons Department, U.S. Army Armor School, 

Fort Knox, Kentucky

1993–1994 First Sergeant, Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course Company, 

Noncommissioned Officer Academy, Fort Knox, Kentucky

1994–1995 Deputy Commandant, Noncommissioned Officer Academy, Fort Knox, Kentucky

1995–1996 Student, Class #46, Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas

1996–1998 Command Sergeant Major, 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort 

Hood, Texas

1998–2000 Command Sergeant Major, 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas

2000–2001 Command Sergeant Major, 1st Armored Division, Bad Kreuznach, Germany

2001–2002 Command Sergeant Major, V Corps, Heidelberg, Germany

2002–2003 Command Sergeant Major, Combined Joint Task Force–7, Baghdad, Iraq

2004–2011 Sergeant Major of the Army

Selected Decorations and Awards

Legion of Merit with One Oak Leaf Cluster

Bronze Star Medal

Defense Meritorious Service Medal

Army Meritorious Service Medal with Three Oak Leaf Clusters

Army Commendation Medal with Four Oak Leaf Clusters

Army Achievement Medal with Two Oak Leaf Clusters

Southwest Asia Service Ribbon

Liberation of Kuwait Ribbon (Kuwait)

Kosovo Medal

NATO Medal

Joint Meritorious Unit Award

Lyndon B. Johnson Nov 63

Stephen Ailes Jan 64

 Harold K. Johnson Jul 64

Stanley R. Resor Jul 65

 William C. Westmoreland Jul 68

Richard M. Nixon Jan 69

Robert F. Froehlke Jul 71

 Bruce Palmer, Jr. (acting) Jul 72

 Creighton W. Abrams Oct 72

Howard H. Calloway May 73

Gerald R. Ford Aug 74

 Fredrick C. Weyand Aug 74

Martin R. Hoffman Aug 75

 Bernard W. Rogers Oct 76

Appendix

Chronological List of Presidents, Secretaries of the Army, Chiefs of Staff, 

and Sergeants Major of the Army

Presidents of the United States

Secretaries of the Army

 Chiefs of Staff of the Army

Sergeants Major 

of the Army

Jul 66 William O. Wooldridge

Sep 68 George W. Dunaway

Oct 70 Silas L. Copeland

Jul 73 Leon L. Van Autreve

Jul 75 William G. Bainbridge
238

James E. Carter Jan 77

Clifford L. Alexander, Jr. Feb 77

 Edward C. Meyer Jun 79

Ronald W. Reagan Jan 81

John O. Marsh, Jr. Jan 81

 John A. Wickham, Jr. Jun 83

 

 Carl E. Vuono Jun 87

George H. W. Bush Jan 89

Michael P. W. Stone Aug 89

 Gordon R. Sullivan Jun 91

William J. Clinton Jan 93

Togo D. West, Jr. Nov 93

 Dennis J. Reimer Jun 95

Louis E. Caldera Jul 98

 Eric K. Shinseki Jun 99

George W. Bush Jan 01

Thomas E. White May 01

Presidents of the United States

Secretaries of the Army

 Chiefs of Staff of the Army

Sergeants Major 

of the Army

Jul 79 William A. Connelly

Jul 83 Glen E. Morrell

Jul 87 Julius W. Gates

Jul 91 Richard A. Kidd

Jun 95 Gene C. McKinney

Jun 97 CSM Jerry T. Alley

 (acting/rotational)

 CSM James C. McKinney

 (acting/rotational)

Oct 97 Robert E. Hall

Jun 00 Jack L. Tilley

Appendix—continued
239

Presidents of the United States

Secretaries of the Army

 Chiefs of Staff of the Army

Sergeants Major 

of the Army

Appendix—continued

 Peter J. Schoomaker Aug 03

Francis J. Harvey Nov 04

Preston M. Geren Mar 07

 George W. Casey, Jr. Apr 07

Barack H. Obama Jan 09

John M. McHugh Sep 09

 Martin E. Dempsey Apr 11

 Raymond T. Odierno Sep 11

Jan 04 Kenneth O. Preston

Mar 11 Raymond F. Chandler III

241

Bainbridge, William G.

Bainbridge, William G. “First, and Getting 

Firster.” Army 25 (October 1975):23–24.

———. “Quality, Training and Motivation.” 

Army 26 (October 1976):27–29. 

———. “Today’s Volunteer Is a Quality Soldier.” 

Army 27 (October 1977):28–30.

———. “We Have Met the Challenge.” Army

28 (October 1978):26–28.

——— and Dan Cragg. Top Sergeant: The Life 

and Times of Sergeant Major of the Army William 

G. Bainbridge. New York: Ballantine, 1995.

Carney, Larry. “Bainbridge Hailed as NCO 

Leader.” Army Times, 2 Jul 79, p. 16.

———. “Our Business Is Soldiers, Says 

Departing SMA.” Army Times, 4 Jul 83, p. 2.

———. “New SMA Opposes O’seas Kin Cuts.” 

Army Times, 23 Jul 79, p. 5.

———. “New SMA Outlines Priorities for His 

Term.” Army Times, 27 Jun 83, p. 16.

Cragg, Dan. “Where Are They Now? SMA 

William G. Bainbridge.” Army Times, 1 Aug 83, 

p. 14.

“How Fair Is the Centralized Enlisted 

Promotion System?” Commanders Call (March–

April 1978):5.

“The Professional.” Commanders Call (March–

April 1977):3–5. 

Connelly, William A. 

Connelly, William A. “For NCOs: Leadership, 

Hard Work and TRAINING.” Army 30 

(October 1980):21–24.

———. “NCOs: It’s Time To Get Tough.” Army

31 (October 1981):29–31.

———. “Sergeant Major of the Army.” Army 32 

(October 1982):27–30.

———. “The Soldier Remains Our Ultimate 

Weapon.” Army 29 (October 1979):23–24.

“The Worsening Plight of the ‘Army’s Own.’” 

Army 30 (April 1980):9–11.

Copeland, Silas L. 

Copeland, Silas L. “The NCO Must Grow with 

Army.” Army 22 (October 1972):24–25.

———. “Winding Down of War Calls for Top 

Leaders.” Army 21 (October 1971):26–27.

“Let’s Build a Better Army.” Soldiers 26 ( July 

1971):5–7.

“The SMA Talks to the Troops Man to Man.” 

Soldiers 26 (December 1971):4.

“A Word from the Army’s New Top EM.” Army

19 (October 1970):35.

Further Readings
242

Dunaway, George W.

Dunaway, George W. “Let’s PULL Together: 

Professionalism-Unity-Leadership-Loyalty: A 

Winning Combination.” Army Digest 24 ( June 

1969):27–28. 

———. “New Emphasis Aims at Putting More 

Strength in ‘Backbone of the Army.’” Army 19 

(October 1969):33–36. 

———. “New Voice at the Top for the Enlisted 

Man.” Army 18 (November 1968):47–48.

———. “‘People Benefits’ Will Get More 

Emphasis in ‘70s.” Army 20 (October 1970):33–

35.

Gates, Julius W.

Binder, James L. “A Talk with the SMA.” Army

39 ( January 1989):25–27. 

Cox, Matthew. “Ranger Hall of Fame Inducts 

Gen. Colin Powell: Twelve Inductees also 

Includes Former SMA Gates.” Army Times, 23 

Oct 00.

“From the Top.” Army Trainer 9 (Fall 1989):2–5.

Gates, Julius W. “Bootprints That Will Never 

Fade.” Army 40 (October 1990):33–36.

———. “Soldiers, Standards, Service.” Army 39 

(October 1989):36–40.

———. “The Thunder of a Mighty Fighting 

Force.” Army 38 (October 1988):41–42.

———. “Training: ‘Our Top Priority.’” Army 37 

(October 1987):31–32. 

“NCOs: Maintain the Momentum.” Field

Artillery 55 (December 1987):45–47. 

Schad, Dave. “Noncom Know How.” Soldiers 42 

(August 1987):21.

“Vuono, Gates Address NCO Training, 

Upgrades.” Army Times, 24 Jul 89, pp. 15, 20, 46. 

Hall, Robert E.

Hall, Robert E. “Focus on Fundamentals of 

Soldiering in these Tough, Turbulent Times.” 

Army 48 (October 1998):27–28.

———. “My Message to Soldiers.” Soldiers 53 

(February 1998):2–4.

———. “New SMA Talks to Soldiers.” Army 

Times, 28 Dec 98.

———. “The Noncommissioned Officer Corps: 

Meeting the Army’s Challenges.” Army 49 

(October 1999):36.

———. “Now Hear This.” Army Times, 28 Dec 

98.

McHugh, Jane. “Hall and the Army: ‘A Family 

Affair’—New Sergeant Major of the Army 

Knows Life as Soldier, Husband, Father.” Army 

Times, 3 Nov 97.

Murdock, Karen. “A Soldier’s Request: ‘Keep the 

Faith.’” NCO Journal 7 (Winter 1997):10–13.

Prater, Phil. “Farewell SMA Hall.” Soldiers 55 

( June 2000):46–48.

Kidd, Richard A.

“Being a Soldier.” Soldiers 49 (May 1994): inside 

back cover. 

D’Amato, John K. “SMA Leadership 

Conference.” NCO Journal 2 (Fall 1992):12–15.

Dubia, John A., and Richard A. Kidd. “Retired 

but Still Serving and Focusing on Health Care 

Issues.” Army 50 (October 2000):199–200.

———. “Retired but Still Serving and Focusing 

on Health Care Issues.” Army 51 (October 

2001):185–86.
243

“Facing the Future.” Soldiers 48 (July 1993):6–7.

Ide, Douglas. “Lessons on Leadership.” Soldiers

50 (February 1995):18–20.

———. “No Regrets.” Soldiers 50 ( June 

1995):24–25.

Kidd, Richard A. “NCOs Make It Happen.” 

Army 44 (October 1994):31–36. 

———. “Soldiering When Less Is More.” Army

43 (October 1993):25–29.

———. “Threshold of a New Chapter in Army 

History.” Army 42 (October 1992):37–39. 

———. “Where Our Soldiers Stand.” Army 41 

(October 1991):37–39.

McKinney, Gene C.

Abrams, David. “SMA McKinney Launches 

Each Day with NCO Creed.” NCO Journal 5 

(Fall 1995): front cover, 14–16. 

Adelsberger, Bernard. “SMA to the Troops: 

Your Job Comes First.” Army Times, 18 Sep 

95.

Coffee, Lee N. “Sergeant Major of the Army 

Gene C. McKinney.” Our Heritage (Fall 

1996):30–31. 

Cox, Matthew. “McKinney Calls it a Double 

Standard.” Army Times, 29 Mar 99.

Gillis, G. E. “Fresh Set of Allegations Brought 

Against SMA McKinney.” Army Times, 28 Jul 

97.

Ide, Douglas. “New SMA: View from the 

Top.” Soldiers 50 (October 1995):28–29. 

Kissellbrack, Kent. “Professionalism: Key to a 

Good Leader.” KORUS (April 1996):14. 

McHugh, Jane. “Acting Sergeants Major of 

the Army Pull Double Duty: SMA’s 

Replacements Begin Rotations as Army’s Top 

Enlisted Soldiers.” Army Times, 28 Jul 97.

———. “Article 32 Hearing Ends for SMA.” 

Army Times, 8 Sep 97.

———. “Case Prepared against McKinney.” 

Army Times, 24 Feb 97.

———. “Formal Charges Brought against 

SMA: Adultery, Assault and Battery among 

McKinney’s Alleged Offenses.” Army Times, 

19 May 97.

———. “McKinney: Resignation Not an 

Option.” Army Times, 28 Apr 97.

———. “McKinney Out: Search for SMA 

Starts Immediately.” Army Times, 20 Oct 97.

McKinney, Gene C. “Meeting Leadership 

Challenges as a Team.” Military Review 76 

( January–February 1996):10–13. 

———. “The NCO Corps: Leading Through 

Change.” Army 46 (October 1996):27–30.

———. “Our Army—In Touch with America.” 

Army 45 (October 1995):29–33. 

McKinney v. Caldera, no. 00–728, filed 28 

Mar 01 (memorandum opinion granting the 

defendant’s motion to dismiss).

McKinney v. White, no. 01–5172, D.C. Circuit 

Court, 7 Jun 02 (dismissal of appeal).

Schmitt, Eric. “In Reversal, Army Suspends 

Sergeant In Sex-Assault Case.” New York 

Times, 11 Feb 97.

Sciolino, Elaine. “In Limbo, a Soldier’s Soldier 

Reviews His Rise and Fall.” New York Times, 

16 Jun 97.
244

Morrell, Glen E.

“As the SMA Sees It.” Army Trainer 4 (Fall 

1984):21–24.

Morrell, Glen E. “Hard Work, Leadership Still 

Keys to Quality.” Army 34 (October 1984):51–53. 

———. “The NCO: More Vital Than Ever to 

Readiness.” Army 33 (October 1983):27–30. 

———. “NCOs Are the ‘Vital Link in the 

Chain of Command.’” Army 35 (October 

1985):63–65.

———. “Performance, Character and Contact.” 

Soldiers 39 ( January 1984):6–9.

———. “What Soldiering Is All About.” Army

36 (October 1986):39–42.

——— and John A. Wickham. “Changing of 

the Guard.” Soldiers 42 ( June 1987):6–7.

“Soldiers Deserve the Best Leaders.” Soldiers 40 

(December 1985):6–8. 

Preston, Kenneth O.

McIlvane, Rob. “SMA Preston Reflects on 

Army’s Growth.” Army News Service, 22 Feb 11.

Preston, Kenneth O. “The NCO Corps—Our 

National Asset: The Year of the NCO.” Army

(October 2009):44–53.

______. “Soldiers: America’s Strength.” Army

(October 2008):33–36.

______. “This Is Our Time to Carry on the 

Legacy.” Army (October 2007):33–36.

______. “Transforming Our Army—A Soldier’s 

Perspective.” Army (October 2006):29–32.

______. “U.S. Soldiers—Ambassadors of 

Democracy.” Army (October 2005):33–38.

Tilley, Jack L.

Sparks, Donald. “Full Speed Ahead.” NCO 

Journal 10 (Winter 2000–2001):12–17.

Tilley, Jack L. “The American GI—Person of 

the Century: ‘Our Heritage and Legacy.’” Army

50 (October 2000):33–34.

———. “The Fundamental of Soldiering.” Army

51 (October 2002):35–40.

———. “Sergeant Major of the Army: Speaking 

for Soldiers as their Supporter and Advocate.” 

Army 51 (October 2001):35–36.

Note: Tilley also wrote weekly articles in the Talon, 

the official newspaper of the 1st Armored Division, 

while deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995–

1996.

Van Autreve, Leon L. 

“As I See It.” Soldiers 30 ( July 1975):6–9. 

Van Autreve, Leon L. “Pride in Profession: 

The NCO’s Hallmark.” Army 23 (October 

1973):21. 

———. “Where the ‘People’ Programs Are: The 

NCO at the Apex.” Army 24 (October 1974):17–18.

“Walking Tall—and Eager.” Soldiers 29 

(February 1974):28–33.

Wooldridge, William O.

“Army Opens a Can of Legal Worms.” Armed 

Forces Journal 107 (14 March 1970):11.

Army Times, 11, 17 Sep 68; 14, 23 May, 13 Jun 73. 

Belair, Felix, Jr. “Four Army Club Men Refuse 

To Testify.” New York Times, 24 Oct 69.

Huet, Marc. “Army Sgt. Maj. Conference Brings 

Changes.” Stars and Stripes, 1 Apr 67.
245

Martin, Carl. “Sergeant Major of the Army 

Wooldridge.” Army Digest 21 (December 

1966):48–50.

Naughton, James M. “Ex-Sergeants Say Army 

Wouldn’t Uncover Noncom Club Frauds.” New 

York Times, 9 May 73.

New York Times, 6, 26 Sep, 8, 24 Oct, 5 Dec 69.

Sorley, Lewis. Honorable Warrior: General Harold 

K. Johnson and the Ethics of Command. Lawrence: 

University Press of Kansas, 1998.

“This Is the Man.” Army Digest 21 (September 

1966):5.

“Tradition Begins.” Army Digest 23 (September 

1968):10–11.

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 

Committee on Armed Services, Special 

Subcommittee on Enlisted Promotion Policy 

Review, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on 

Government Operations. Fraud and Corruption 

in Management of Military Club Systems: Illegal 

Currency Manipulations Affecting South 

Vietnam, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, ser. 1, pts. 

1 and 2.

———. Fraud and Corruption in Management 

of Military Club Systems: Illegal Currency 

Manipulations Affecting South Vietnam, 92d 

Cong., 1st sess., 1971, Senate Report 

92–418.

———. Fraud and Corruption in Management of 

Military Club Systems: Illegal Currency 

Manipulations Affecting South Vietnam, 93d 

Cong., 1st sess., 8 May 73, ser. 2.

Washington Daily News, 27 Sep 69.

Washington Post, 3 May 73.

Wooldridge, William O. “Contact Point with 

the Top for the Soldier in the Field.” Army 17 

(October 1967):53, 70, 72.

———. “First Look at a New Job.” Army 16 

(October 1966):43, 84.

———. “So You’re Headed for Combat.” Army 

Digest 23 ( January 1968):6–11. 

Note: Wooldridge wrote letters in many issues of 

Army Digest while he was SMA.

Miscellaneous

Abrams, David. “Senior Enlisted Leaders 

Discuss Current Issues.” NCO Journal 6 

(Summer 1996):20–22. 

———. “SMA’s Role Evolves, Grows.” NCO 

Journal 5 (Summer 1995):44–45. 

Arms, Larry A. “The Army’s SMAs: From the 

Beginning....” NCO Journal 4 (Summer 

1994):9–12. 

Bednarek, Janet R. The Enlisted Experience: A 

Conversation with the Chief Master Sergeants of 

the Air Force. Air Force History and Museums 

Program. Washington, D.C.: Government 

Printing Office, 1995.

Cavazos, Jamie. “...to the Present.” NCO Journal

4 (Summer 1994):13.

Chapin, John C. Uncommon Men: The Sergeants 

Major of the Marine Corps. Shippensburg, Pa.: 

Beidel Printing House, 1993.

Crist, Charlot D. Winds of Change: The History 

of the Office of the Master Chief Petty Officer of 

the Navy. Washington, D.C.: Government 

Printing Office, 1992.

D’Amato, John K. “The SMA Leadership 

Conference.” NCO Journal 2 (Fall 1992):10, 

12–13.
246

Department of the Army Historical Summary.

Fiscal Years 1969–1986. Washington, D.C.: 

Center of Military History, 1973–1994.

Emerson, William K. Chevrons: Illustrated 

History and Catalog of U.S. Army Insignia.

Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution 

Press, 1983. 

Fisch, Arnold G., Jr., and Robert K. Wright, Jr. 

The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps. 

Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 

1989.

Fisher, Ernest F., Jr. Guardians of the Republic: A 

History of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps of 

the U.S. Army. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole 

Books, 2001.

Merrick, Yamamoto M. “The Sergeants Major of 

the Army: On Leadership and the Profession of 

Arms. Alexandria, Va.: Institute of Land Warfare, 

Association of the United States Army, 1996.

Morden, Bettie J. The Women’s Army Corps, 

1945–1978. Washington, D.C.: Center of 

Military History, 1990.

NCO Education and the Development of NCOES. 

Fort Bliss, Tex.: U.S. Army Sergeants Major 

Academy, 1992.

“Reunion: Retired SMAs Sound Off on the 

State of the NCO Corps.” NCO Journal 6 (Fall 

1996):10–16.

The U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officers Corps: 

A Selected Bibliography. Washington, D.C.: The 

Information Management Support Center, 

1998.

Ultima Register, 1973–1987. Fort Bliss, Tex.: 

U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, 1987.

Weigley, Russell F. History of the United States 

Army. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 

1984.

“Yes, No and Maybe to Top NCO Pleas.” Army 

Times, 29 Dec 65.