Art of War Papers

Protecting, Isolating, and Controlling Behavior

Population and Resource Control Measures in

Counterinsurgency Campaigns

 Mark E. Battjes, Major, US Army

 Command and General Staff College

 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
The cover photo courtesy of the Library of Congress is that of General 

Dwight Eisenhower giving orders to American paratroopers in England.
Protecting, Isolating, and Controlling Behavior

Population And Resource Control Measures in

Counterinsurgency Campaigns

A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the US Army

Command and General Staff College

by

Mark E. Battjes, Major, US Army

M.S., University of Maryland University College

B.S., University of Southern California

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2011
ii

Combat Studies Institute Press 

publications cover a wide variety 

of military history topics. The 

views expressed in this CSI Press 

publication are those of the 

author(s) and not necessarily those 

of the Department of the Army or 

the Department of Defense. A full 

list of CSI Press publications, many of them available for 

downloading, can be found at http://usacac.army.mil/

CAC2/CSI/index.asp.

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates 

this document as an official publication of the CSI. It is 

prohibited to use CSI’s official seal on any republication 

without the express written permission of the Director of 

CSI.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

 Battjes, Mark E.

 Protecting, isolating, and controlling behavior : population and 

resource control measures in counterinsurgency campaigns / by 

Mark E. Battjes.

 p. cm.

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

 ISBN 978-0-9837226-6-3 (alk. paper)

 1. Counterinsurgency--Case studies. 2. Internal security--Case 

studies. 3. Social control--Case studies. I. Title. 

 U241.B47 2011

 355.02’18--dc23

 2012009657
iii

Abstract

Protecting, Isolating, and Controlling Behavior

Population and Resource Control Measures in Counterinsurgency 

Campaigns, By Major Mark E. Battjes

The classical counterinsurgency theorists emphasize that it is necessary 

for the government to gain and maintain control of the population in order 

to defeat the insurgency. They describe population and resource control 

measures as a means of doing so. However, some contemporary writers 

have questioned the legitimacy of such tactics and doubt that they can be 

employed effectively in modern campaigns. Four case studies from three 

different campaigns: the Philippines, Vietnam, and Iraq, examine how 

population and resource control measures can be employed effectively and 

legitimately by the counterinsurgent force. The case studies reveal that 

protecting and isolating the population is the most critical component of 

any such measures, without this condition the measures will not achieve 

their desired effect. The case studies also reveal that once the protection 

and isolation are in place, the government can focus on controlling the 

behavior of the population. That is, it can prevent behavior that supports 

the insurgency while enabling behavior that supports the government or is 

neutral. This denies the insurgency its means of support and facilitates the 

destruction of its armed and subversive elements by the counterinsurgent 

forces.
iv

Objectives of the Art of War Scholars Program

The Art of War Scholars Program is a laboratory for critical thinking. 

It offers a select group of students a range of accelerated, academically 

rigorous graduate level courses that promote analysis, stimulate the desire 

for life-long learning, and reinforce academic research skills. Art of War 

graduates will not be satisfied with facile arguments; they understand 

the complexities inherent in almost any endeavor and develop the tools 

and fortitude to confront such complexities, analyze challenges, and 

independently seek nuanced solutions in the face of those who would opt 

for cruder alternatives. Through the pursuit of these outcomes, the Art of 

War Scholars Program seeks to improve and deepen professional military 

education. 

The Art of War Program places contemporary operations (such as 

those in Iraq and Afghanistan) in a historical framework by examining 

earlier military campaigns. Case studies and readings have been selected 

to show the consistent level of complexity posed by military campaigns 

throughout the modern era. Coursework emphasizes the importance of 

understanding previous engagements in order to formulate policy and 

doctrinal response to current and future campaigns. 

One unintended consequence of military history education is the 

phenomenon of commanders and policy makers “cherry picking” 

history—that is, pointing to isolated examples from past campaigns 

to bolster a particular position in a debate, without a comprehensive 

understanding of the context in which such incidents occurred. This trend 

of oversimplification leaves many historians wary of introducing these 

topics into broader, more general discussion. The Art of War program seeks 

to avoid this pitfall by a thorough examination of context. As one former 

student stated: “The insights gained have left me with more questions than 

answers but have increased my ability to understand greater complexities 

of war rather than the rhetorical narrative that accompanies cursory study 

of any topic.”

Professor Michael Howard, writing “The Use and Abuse of Military 

History” in 1961, proposed a framework for educating military officers in 

the art of war that remains unmatched in its clarity, simplicity, and totality. 

The Art of War program endeavors to model his plan:

Three general rules of study must therefore be borne 

in mind by the officer who studies military history as a 

guide to his profession and who wishes to avoid pitfalls. 

First, he must study in width. He must observe the way 

in which warfare has developed over a long historical 

period. Only by seeing what does change can one deduce 
v

what does not; and as much as can be learnt from the 

great discontinuities of military history as from the 

apparent similarities of the techniques employed by the 

great captains through the ages....Next he must study in 

depth. He should take a single campaign and explore it 

thoroughly, not simply from official histories, but from 

memoirs, letters, diaries. . . until the tidy outlines dissolve 

and he catches a glimpse of the confusion and horror of 

real experience... and, lastly, he must study in context. 

Campaigns and battles are not like games of chess or 

football matches, conducted in total detachment from 

their environment according to strictly defined rules. Wars 

are not tactical exercises writ large. They are...conflicts 

of societies, and they can be fully understood only if one 

understands the nature of the society fighting them. The 

roots of victory and defeat often have to be sought far 

from the battlefield, in political, social, and economic 

factors which explain why armies are constituted as they 

are, and why their leaders conduct them in the way they 

do.... 

It must not be forgotten that the true use of history, military 

or civil... is not to make men clever for the next time; it is 

to make them wise forever.

Gordon B. Davis, Jr. Daniel Marston 

Brigadier General, US Army DPhil (Oxon) FRHistS

Deputy Commanding General Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair in 

 CAC LD&E the Art of War

 US Army Command & General 

 Staff College
vi

Acknowledgments

This thesis and the research behind it were only possible as a result 

of the tremendous support provided by so many people. Thanks are due 

to the faculty and staff of the Command and General Staff College who 

supported the 2011 Art of War Scholars Program. Many individuals, 

units, and institutions across the United States and the United Kingdom 

generously provided us with their time, facilities, and assistance and we 

owe them a debt of gratitude. Special thanks to Dr. Marston and Dr. Hull 

for their guidance, support, and encouragement. 

Sincerest thanks to my Art of War colleagues of Nathan Springer, Dustin 

Mitchell, Benjamin Boardman, Richard Johnson, Robert Green, Aaron 

Kaufman, and Thomas Walton for all of their assistance and camaraderie 

during the course and throughout our research. A big thanks to my family 

and friends for their support along the way. 

Finally, thanks to Maggie for enduring lengthy, one-sided, animated 

discussions about historical campaigns, carefully editing countless pages 

of text, and for sacrificing time that rightfully belonged to her.
vii

Table Of Contents

Abstract ...............................................................................................iii

Objectives........................................................................................... iv

Acknowledgments............................................................................... vi

Table of Contents............................................................................... vii

Acronyms...........................................................................................viii

Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................... 1

Chapter 2: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Control of the 

 Population ..................................................................................... 7

Chapter 3: The Philippines, 1899-1935 ........................................ 53

Chapter 4: Vietnam, 1954-1963 .................................................... 89

Chapter 5: Vietnam, 1966-1970 .................................................. 129

Chapter 6: Iraq, 2003–2011......................................................... 191

Chapter 7: Conclusions And Recommendations......................... 245

Further Research............................................................................. 257

Bibliography..................................................................................... 259
viii

Acronyms

1AD 1st Armored Division

1ID 1st Infantry Division

101 ABN 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)

25ID 25th Infantry Division

3ACR 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment

3ID 3d Infantry Division

4ID 4th Infantry Division

82ABN 82d Airborne Division

AAR After Action Report

APC Accelerated Pacification Campaign

AQI Al Qaeda in Iraq

ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam

BCT Brigade Combat Team

CGSC Command and General Staff College

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CENTCOM US Central Command

COIN Counterinsurgency

COP Combat Outpost

 CORDS Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development 

 Support

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority

CTZ Corps Tactical Zone

DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam

EFP Explosively Formed Penetrator

FM Field Manual

FWMAF Free World Military Armed Forces

G.O. General Orders

GOI Government of Iraq

GVN Government of Vietnam

HI Harassment and Interdiction
ix

IA Iraqi Army

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IIFFORCEV II Field Force, Vietnam

IIG Interim Iraqi Government 

IP Iraqi Police

ISF Iraqi Security Forces

JAM Jaysh-al-Mahdi

LOC Line of Communication

MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

MEDCAPS Medical Civic Action Programs

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

MNC-I Multi-National Corps Iraq

MND-B Multi-National Division Baghdad

MNF-I Multi-National Force Iraq

NLF National Liberation Front

NVA North Vietnamese Army

OMS Office of the Martyr Sadr

ORLL Operations Report–Lessons Learned

PAVN People’s Army of Vietnam

PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army

 PROVN Program for the Pacification and Long-Term 

 Development of South Vietnam

RD Revolutionary Development

RVN Republic of Vietnam

RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

TAL Transitional Administrative Law

TAOI Tactical Area of Operational Interest

TAOR Tactical Area of Responsibility

TNA Transitional National Assembly

UNSC United Nations Security Council

USAID United States Agency for International 
x

 Development

USMC United States Marine Corps

USOM United States Operations Mission

VBIED Vehicle Borne Improvise Explosive Device

VC Viet Cong
1

Chapter 1

Introduction

Controlling the Population

Population and resource control measures have been employed to one 

degree or another in every modern counterinsurgency campaign. They 

have ranged from the extremely coercive, such as the reconcentration 

of the population by the US Army in the Philippines, to the relatively 

benign, such as registering cars in Iraq. They are also an essential part of 

how Western, liberal, democratic states secure their populations and the 

symbols and mechanisms of their government from violence.

Modern states supply their populations with identification cards, require 

them to register cars, conduct censuses, restrict the ability of the population 

to purchase certain commodities, and deny them freedom of movement 

when security demands it. If the President of the United States is arriving 

in town, it is best to avoid driving anywhere remotely near where he will 

be. Moreover, they do so, generally, without the explicit endorsement 

of the population. All of this notwithstanding, population and resource 

control measures are often viewed negatively.

During the course of the research for this paper, a number of US and 

UK military officers became visibly uncomfortable when asked about 

their employment of them. One US Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) 

commander did not even want to use the term, preferring to say that what 

he was doing was creating a “controlled environment.”1

 Yet, as one senior 

British Army officer noted, “you do have to be hard headed in COIN 

[counterinsurgency] because you are facing one of the most dangerous 

threats to governance.”2

This highlights the primary difficulty associated with the employment 

of population and resource control measures. They are an essential tool in 

a counterinsurgency campaign but how can they be employed effectively 

so that the most severe restrictions can be lifted quickly? How can they 

be enacted and enforced legitimately so that they do not alienate the 

population from the government? Can they be utilized in a manner that 

prevents only behavior that supports the insurgents?

Research Questions

This thesis seeks to answer the following generic research question. How 

can the government and its counterinsurgent forces employ population and 

resource control measures as part of a comprehensive campaign to defeat 
2

an insurgency? To answer this question, this thesis will address several 

supporting questions.

1. What does the historic application of such measures tell us about 

employing them in the contemporary operating environment?

2. How can population and resource control measures be employed 

legitimately? Are there key conditions or outcomes that make their 

employment more or less legitimate?

3. Can the measures be targeted so that they prevent behavior that 

supports the insurgent and enable behavior that supports the government?

4. As population and resource control measures are essentially legal 

actions, is it necessary for them to be employed within a holistic control 

mechanism established by the state?

Methodology

This study is based primarily on the close examination of historical 

case studies. While population and resource control measures have 

been employed in every modern counterinsurgency campaign, it was 

necessary to focus the research on a few case studies in order to examine 

the employment of such measures with sufficient depth. Population and 

resource control measures closely reflect the form of the threatened 

government, respond to the nature of the insurgency, and are shaped 

by the type of counterinsurgent forces that employ them. Therefore, 

only a thorough understanding of the entire campaign allows any valid 

conclusions to be drawn.

In Chapter 2, the thesis considers the nature of war, insurgency, and 

counterinsurgency by reviewing the work of the highly regarded classical 

and modern theorists of war and counterinsurgency. It also briefly examines 

the nature of control in war and why it is such a critical element. The review 

also examines current US Army doctrine regarding the employment of 

population and resource control measures. The second chapter concludes 

with the establishment of a population and resource control measures 

construct whose validity will be tested through the four case studies.

Beginning with Chapter 3, the thesis considers four case studies drawn 

from three campaigns. Each of the case studies has unique characteristics 

that enable the population and resource control measures employed to 

be considered in light of those characteristics. The four case studies also 

benefit from an abundance of primary source material concerning the 

employment of such measures. This is critical as an understanding of how 
3

the measures were actually employed and what their effects were on the 

insurgency can only be obtained through a close reading of the primary 

sources.

The US campaign in the Philippines from 1898 to1935 composes the first 

case study. This campaign is unique as it is the only one in which US forces 

are the colonial power. It is also a campaign in which the US used both 

military and civil law to establish its control over territory. Furthermore, 

it highlights the difficulty of determining the legitimacy of any given 

population and resource control measure. The tactic of reconcentrating the 

population horrified the US public but it was also very effective and does 

not seem to have been considered illegitimate by ordinary Filipinos.

The second case study considers the employment of population and 

resource control measures by the regime of Premier Ngo Dinh Diem in 

South Vietnam from 1954 to1963. This presents an opportunity to research 

the use of such measures by a regime that is allied with and supported by the 

US but without a significant level of US military participation. Moreover, 

it presents an opportunity to reconsider the Strategic Hamlet Program. 

This program has generally been written off as an utter failure but as US 

military and Vietnamese Communist documents have been declassified in 

recent years it is obvious that the truth is much more nuanced.

The next case study also occurs in Vietnam but examines how US ground 

forces supported the Government of Vietnam’s pacification efforts with 

population and resource control measures using the example of the 25th 

Infantry Division’s operations from 1966 to1970. The notable feature of 

this case study is the battle with Communist main force units and their effect 

on the counterinsurgency effort. It also affords a chance to examine how 

well US forces, operating completely outside of the control mechanism of 

the Vietnamese state, performed in support of that mechanism.

The final case study looks at the as yet unfinished US campaign in Iraq. 

Operation Iraqi Freedom has been lengthy, has involved nearly every 

active brigade-size unit in the US Army, and has evolved significantly over 

time. The campaign is also unique in that the US and its Iraqi partners 

confronted multiple insurgent groups within the same geographical area.3

Moreover, during 2006 and 2007 in Baghdad, the insurgencies fought each 

other for control, producing a situation more akin to a civil war than a true 

insurgency. Thus, studying the Iraq campaign, though not yet complete, 

enables a rich analysis of the employment of population and resource 

control measures in the contemporary operating environment.
4

Summary of Results

The historical record indicates that the employment of population and 

resource control measures almost always produces short-term tactical 

success. However, in order for that success to be sustained over time 

and across the entire theater of war, they must be employed within a 

holistic control mechanism that enables them to be synchronized and 

mutually reinforcing. Protection and isolation of the population are the 

most important objective of any population and resource control measure 

regime. If the protection and isolation components break down, all other 

elements will fail. Moreover, it is primarily the security afforded to the 

population through their protection and isolation that makes such measures 

legitimate. 
5

Notes

1. BH020, BCT Commander, Interview by Mark Battjes, Ben Boardman, 

Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, Dustin Mitchell, Nathan 

Springer, and Thomas Walton, 21 March 2011, Washington, DC.

2. BI010, Senior British Officer, Interview by Mark Battjes, Benjamin 

Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, Dustin Mitchell, 

and Nathan Springer, 29 March 2011, United Kingdom.

3. Although the US confronted several distinct insurgencies in the different 

islands of the Philippine archipelago, they did not occur in the same geographical 

space. Moreover, the insurgencies on the outlying islands did not threaten US 

control of the archipelago as significantly as did the Tagalog insurgency on the 

main island of Luzon. 

7

Chapter 2

Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Control of the Population

Undoubtedly some of my readers will accuse me of ignoring the deeper 

causes of revolutionary wars. They will cite poverty, exploitations, 

imperialism, poor administration, and so forth. I plead guilty to 

these charges. I recognize that such conditions breed revolutionary 

wars. The governing authorities should detect and eliminate them 

early because revolutionaries will exploit them to create popular 

support for their cause. Nevertheless, experience indicates that often 

governing authorities do not recognize the danger in time and allow 

a revolutionary movement to spawn. By this time, mere reforms will 

not only be ineffective but will be thwarted by the revolutionaries who 

want only to oust the old regime. Much more important, however, will 

be the fact that often the Free World cannot allow the country to pass 

under the control of Communist-supported revolutionaries. In such a 

situation, we cannot predicate our actions on what might have been. 

We must accept the situation as it is and win. 

―John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War

As the quote above indicates, it is useless to focus on actions that a 

government may have taken to prevent an insurgency from occurring once 

it has begun. Rather, the government must recognize the circumstances 

that confront it and take all necessary action to defeat the insurgency. This 

chapter will examine the nature of war and, within that context, insurgency 

and counterinsurgency. It will discuss why controlling the population is 

necessary for governments, particularly when combating an insurgency, 

and a mechanism that governments and their counterinsurgent forces may 

employ to maintain control where they have it and to regain control where 

they have lost it.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

The US Army’s current understanding of insurgency and 

counterinsurgency is informed by its experience and the writings 

of many historians, theorists, and practitioners. These writers have 

presented insurgency and counterinsurgency in many different ways, 

complicating their study. This section will examine the nature of war 

and use the observations of historians, theorists and practitioners to 

derive characteristics of insurgency and counterinsurgency and establish 

definitions for them.
8

War

Before insurgency and counterinsurgency can be studied, it is necessary 

to examine the nature of war itself. One of the seminal writers on this 

subject is the Prussian military officer, Carl Von Clausewitz. Clausewitz’ 

writing is an excellent starting point for understanding war, as it is studied 

by the US and other Western armies. Another prominent writer on the 

subject, the Chinese general Sun Tzu, has much to say on the specifics of 

waging war but does not, as Clausewitz does, establish what war is at a 

fundamental level.

Clausewitz defined war in two different ways. At the beginning of his 

first chapter, his definition stated, “war is thus an act of force to compel 

our enemy to do our will.”1

 He then noted that:

Force–that is, physical force, for moral force has no existence save as 

expressed in the state and the law–is thus the means of war; to impose 

our will on the enemy is its object. To secure that object we must render 

the enemy powerless; and that, in theory, is the true aim of warfare. That 

aim takes the place of the object, discarding it as something not actually 

part of war itself.2

For Clausewitz this is the central nature of war. It is force, in all of its 

manifestations, employed to render the enemy completely unable to resist. 

Thus, will the enemy capitulate and victory be achieved.

Regarding the use of force, Clausewitz observed that “kind-hearted 

people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm 

or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed and might imagine this 

is the true goal of the art of war.”3

 However, Clausewitz viewed this as a 

dangerous fallacy. He noted that “it would be futile–even wrong–to try and 

shut one’s eyes to what war really is from sheer distress at its brutality.”4

In Clausewitz’ view, war is fundamentally violent and both sides must be 

prepared to use all of the force at their disposal to completely disarm and 

defeat the other.

He clarified this point by stating, “if the enemy is to be coerced you must 

put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you 

call on him to make. The hardships of that situation must not of course be 

merely transient, at least not in appearance. Otherwise the enemy would 

not give in but would wait for things to improve.”5

 If the enemy does not 

capitulate he is still a threat because “so long as I have not overthrown 

my opponent I am bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus I am not in 

control. He dictates to me as much as I dictate to him.”6
9

Clausewitz’ initial definition of war logically leads to these observations. 

As war is a contest between opponents who both seek forcefully to impose 

their will on the other, it is necessary that one be completely disarmed in 

order for the other to win. Thus, each opponent must employ all of the 

elements of power available to them to win. If they do not, they risk giving 

the enemy an opportunity to exploit through a greater exertion of force. 

This was Clausewitz’ conception of absolute war: both sides applying 

every means available to them to win. It was not a vision of war that he 

believed would come to pass but an idealized version of war that could 

never be achieved.7

The use of force is modified, however, by the reason for fighting the war, 

which is the political objective. In Clausewitz’ initial discussion surrounding 

the use of force in war the political objective was overshadowed. However, 

he later noted that:

If it is all calculation of probabilities based on given individuals and 

conditions the political object, which was the original motive, must 

become an essential factor in the equation. The smaller the penalty you 

demand from your opponent, the less you can expect him to try and 

deny it to you; the smaller the effort he makes, the less you need make 

yourself. Moreover, the more modest your own political aim, the less 

importance you attach to it and the less reluctantly you will abandon it 

if you must.8

That is, the nature of war might be absolute, but the men and states 

fighting it would necessarily limit the means they used to achieve their 

objective.9 Nonetheless, Clausewitz stated that the military commander 

must understand the absolute ideal of war and approximate it “when he 

can or when he must.”10

It is the political objective which dictates the military goals to be achieved 

and the overall effort made by the state to accomplish it. This observation 

led to the conclusion that “war is no pastime . . . It is a serious means to 

a serious end.”11 Moreover, “when whole communities go to war–whole 

peoples, and especially civilized people–the reason always lies in some 

political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. 

War, therefore, is an act of policy.”12 Clausewitz referred to this as a more 

precise definition of war. 

He further identified that :

We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true 

political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on by 

other means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature 

of its means. War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, 
10

is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be 

inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small demand; but 

however much it may affect political aims in a given case, it will never 

do more than modify them. The political object is the goal, war is the 

means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation 

from their purpose.13

Thus, in Clausewitz’ conception war could only be understood in relation 

to the reason it was being waged, the political objective. This objective and 

the importance of the objective to the state seeking to accomplish it would 

dictate the conduct of the war, particularly the use of force. Moreover, as 

states fundamentally changed their natures so then would their policies, 

and thus their wars, change.14 Clausewitz summarized:

First, therefore, it is clear that war should never be thought of as 

something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy; otherwise 

the entire history of war would contradict us. Only this approach will 

enable us to penetrate the problem intelligently. Second, this way of 

looking at it will show us how wars must vary with the nature of their 

motives and of the situations which give rise to them.15

Clausewitz was also indicating the need for the state, and the commander, 

to possess a strategy to win the war. He dismissed the definition posited 

by Heinrich von Bülow that differentiated strategy and tactics by the 

distance of marches.16 Rather, Clausewitz stated that strategy was “the use 

of engagement for the purpose of war.”17 He noted that the strategist had 

to “define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in 

accordance with its purpose. In other words, he will draft the plan of the 

war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve 

it.”18

This framework provided a way of understanding war and how it was 

to be waged. Most particularly, war cannot be divorced from the political 

objective and causes that are driving it. Clausewitz cautioned practitioners 

that “the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the 

statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind 

of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to 

turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”19 Once they have made 

this judgment, they must determine a strategy that will employ the means 

available to the state and army to accomplish the political objectives. 

This would, in most cases, lead to a limited war but the statesman and the 

commander both had to be prepared to commit all of the state’s resources 

if it became necessary, approximating an absolute war.
11

Clausewitz’ definition of war is crucial to understand in order to properly 

study insurgency and counterinsurgency. Insurgency and counterinsurgency 

are war, and like all wars, they require particular means to accomplish 

a very specific objective. If they are considered to be something other 

than war, their fundamental nature is denied and inappropriate solutions 

to the problems that they pose may be implemented with disastrous 

consequences. The state and its leaders must understand what is at stake in 

the war and employ all the means necessary to win it.

Observations of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

If insurgency and counterinsurgency are wars with specific objectives 

and particular means of accomplishing those objectives it is important to 

identify them to understand the nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency. 

Many practitioners, theorists, and historians have recorded their 

observations of insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns. Examining 

and comparing these observations, made from the perspective of both the 

insurgent and the counterinsurgent and different cultural backgrounds, 

can yield a description of the particular objectives and means of these 

conflicts. These fundamental characteristics can then be used to derive an 

accurate definition for insurgency and counterinsurgency.

The Insurgent Experience

Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong waged a protracted insurgency 

campaign that culminated in his assumption of total control over China. 

He recognized this war as total and noted, “because ours is the resistance 

of a semi colonial country against imperialism, our hostilities must have 

a clearly defined political goal.”20 He further articulated this objective as 

the “complete emancipation of the Chinese people.”21 In emancipating the 

Chinese people, he also intended to establish a new, Communist regime. 

This new regime would be a major shift in the political governance of 

China. Echoing Clausewitz, Mao noted that this war could not be divorced 

from what he considered China’s national policy.22

Mao understood that accomplishing his objective would require the 

complete mobilization of the Chinese population and the employment of 

every means available to defeat his enemies. He articulated his strategy23

as:

1. Arousing and organizing the people.

2. Achieving internal unification politically. 
12

3. Establishing bases.

4. Equipping forces. 

5. Recovering national strength. 

6. Destroying enemy’s national strength. 

7. Regaining lost territories.24

This strategy required his army to engage in political operations as their 

first and most essential task, because the war required the support of the 

population.25 Gaining and then leveraging the support of the population 

is the essence of the first four steps listed above. Mao’s army had to 

politically indoctrinate the masses, control them, and use that control to 

establish bases from which to develop a disciplined and well equipped 

guerrilla force. This force would then attack the enemy where they were 

weak to build up the strength of Mao’s army and weaken the enemy’s.

Mao instructed his guerrilla bands to seek out the enemy where they were 

weak to attack, exhaust, and ultimately annihilate them.26 The guerrilla 

bands destroyed critical infrastructure such as railroad tracks and depots 

to hamper the enemy. They also employed printing presses, paper, and 

brushes to conduct propaganda to subvert the governing authority outside 

of their areas of control.27 Such political subversion enabled his forces to 

increase the amount of the population under his control and increase the 

size of his guerrilla forces. While these actions did weaken the enemy, Mao 

did not believe that guerrilla warfare alone was sufficient to accomplish 

his objective.

Instead, the weakening of the enemy allowed the war to progress from 

guerrilla warfare to maneuver warfare. He stated that “our fundamental 

strategical form must be the war of movement. If we deny this, we cannot 

arrive at the victorious solution of the war.”28 Mao knew that to win he had 

to completely destroy the ability of his enemy to wage war, which would 

then allow him to gain control over the entire country and complete the 

accomplishment of his political objective.

Mao’s writing greatly influenced the Vietnamese military leader Vo 

Nguyen Giap. Giap modified Mao’s ideas to match the specific conditions 

within Vietnam itself and constructed a campaign to force the French to 

relinquish political control over Vietnam. He identified that the objective of 

the war against the French was “to win back the independence and unity of 

the country, to bring land to the peasants, and to defend the achievements 

of the August Revolution.”29 The August Revolution removed the feudal 

governmental structure in existence under the French and prior to their 
13

rule, so, similar to Mao’s objective, his aim was not just liberation, but a 

fundamental change to the political structure of Vietnam.

Giap recognized that his enemy’s forces, the French, were vastly superior 

to his at the outset of the war. As a result, he determined that:

It was necessary to adopt a strategy of long-term resistance in order 

to maintain and gradually augment our forces, while nibbling at and 

progressively destroying those of the enemy. It was necessary to 

accumulate thousands of small victories and to turn them into one great 

success, gradually altering the balance of forces, transforming our 

weakness into power, and carrying off final victory.30

His strategy was based on a gradual, but steady, alteration of the balance 

of power in his favor. To accomplish this required the use of every means 

available. Thus, the war against the French was a total war.31 It involved all 

elements of power–political, civil, and military–in support of the objectives 

of the campaign. It combined the political work of the party to subvert the 

French-led government and indoctrinate the population with attacks by 

guerrilla forces on the French-led armed forces and terror attacks against 

landholders to gain control of the country side.32

Once his forces began to alter the balance of power, Giap, as with Mao, 

transitioned from guerrilla warfare to maneuver warfare. He noted that:

As the resistance war went on, the strategic role of mobile warfare 

became more important with every passing day. Its task was to annihilate 

a bigger and bigger number of the enemy in order to develop our own 

strength. . . . Only by annihilating the enemy’s manpower could we 

smash his big offensives, safeguard our bases and rear areas, and win 

the initiative. By wiping out more and more of the enemy, by liberating 

larger and larger localities one after the other, we could eventually 

destroy the whole enemy force and liberate our country.33

Giap understood that only by destroying the enemy’s means and will to 

fight could he accomplish his political objective.

Mao and Giap believed that the insurgencies that they led were wars. 

These wars were total, requiring the mobilization of the entire population 

to accomplish the objective of seizing political power and changing 

the political regime within the country. Controlling the population was 

a necessary subordinate objective to facilitate the mobilization of the 

population. Once mobilization occurred, they could leverage the manpower, 

material, and information support provided to alter the balance of power 

between their forces and the government’s forces. After achieving near 
14

parity, they could use their forces to destroy the enemy’s will and means 

to fight and achieve victory.

The French Experience

Roger Trinquier was an officer in the French Army during its 

counterinsurgency campaigns in Indochina and Algeria. Trinquier’s 

participation in these operations and their ultimate outcomes led him to 

write about insurgency and counterinsurgency, which he characterized as 

modern warfare.34 He stated that the objective of modern warfare was the 

“overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement 

by another regime.”35 In this statement, Trinquier indicates his adherence 

to the French theory of guerre revolutionnaire which was developed by 

officers whose service in Indochina confronting Giap’s army had led them 

to formulate a new theory of counterinsurgency.36

The guerre revolutionnaire theorists recognized the insurgent’s objective 

as the capture of political power and therefore concluded that the war could 

not be won through negotiation.37 They also believed that the insurgents 

were either Communists, inspired by Communists, or irresponsible 

nationalists who could easily be exploited by the Communist bloc.38 Thus, 

the West was under permanent assault from the Communist bloc and that 

required a response from all of society which was total. Moreover, as 

negotiations could not resolve the conflict, the war could “end only with 

the effective–if not the total–defeat of the enemy.”39

The total nature of guerre revolutionnaire can be seen in Trinquier’s 

writing regarding the need to gain the support of the population. Trinquier 

asserted that “the sine qua non of victory in modern warfare is the 

unconditional support of a population.”40 In this, he and the other adherents 

of guerre revolutionnaire recognized that the insurgent’s combination of 

military and political warfare was not a weakness but an essential strength.41

He then identified that if such support did not exist for the insurgents, 

they would seek to secure it through any possible means, but especially 

terrorism.42 Moreover, he warned that in countering the insurgents:

it is essential to realize that in modern warfare we are not up against just 

a few armed bands spread across a given territory but rather against an 

armed clandestine organization whose essential role is to impose its will 

upon the population. Victory will be obtained only through the complete 

destruction of that organization.43
15

In other words, in accordance with guerre revolutionnaire theory, 

counterinsurgency was a total war and it required the state to mobilize all 

of its power to wage it. Specifically, Trinquier, restating the theory, noted 

that “control of the masses through a tight organization, often through 

several organizations, is the master weapon of modern warfare.”44 If 

the insurgents exercised this control they could compel the populace to 

participate in the conflict by providing supplies, intelligence, and shelter.45

However, if the government controlled the population through a 

counter-organization, by registering each family with a designated agent 

and tying all of those agents into the government, for example, it could 

deny support to the insurgents by restricting the ownership and use of 

food, livestock, and resources, as well as the movement of the population 

itself.46 These mechanisms enabled the government to isolate and suffocate 

the insurgents, while simultaneously protecting the population. Moreover, 

if the government controlled the population it could use this as a prelude 

to persuading them to provide it their unconditional support, Trinquier’s 

necessary precondition for victory. However, the population could only 

provide this support if they were certain that the government would 

protect them and do everything possible to defeat the insurgents. Once 

the government obtained their support it could use the power generated to 

completely destroy the enemy’s armed clandestine organization and win 

the war.

David Galula was also a French military officer and he served in Algeria 

from 1956-1958. He identified insurgency as a struggle for a series of 

intermediate objectives that lead ultimately to a change in the political 

structure of the country.47 He believed that the conflict inherent in an 

insurgency was the result of the insurgent side’s attempt to seize political 

power.48 Echoing Clausewitz’ definition of war, he stated that an insurgency 

was the “pursuit of the policy of a party . . . by every means.”49

Galula believed that the population was the battleground in an 

insurgency.50 He noted that the exercise of political power, the ultimate 

objective of insurgency, rested on “the tacit or explicit agreement of 

the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness.”51 Therefore, if the 

insurgents could physically control and gain the support of the population 

they would win.52 Therefore, to successfully counter the insurgency, it was 

necessary for the government to control the population.53

Galula’s control mechanism is much less holistic than Trinquier’s 

counter-organization, however. He believed that the government could 

control the population using measures such as a census, curfew, and 
16

movement restrictions to isolate them from the insurgency.54 These 

measures also protected the population, allowing them to support the 

government without fear of reprisal. The government could then destroy 

the insurgent’s political organization, build local political parties, and 

form governments. These local governments would then be used as the 

base of a national party to exercise political power, and therefore control, 

throughout the country.55

Galula’s battle for control of the population did not rely solely on military 

or police forces but was part of a larger political operation.56 He noted that 

the government had to apply all of its sources of power to the war. This 

included the administrative system, economic resources, the media, and 

the security forces.57 The government’s total power had to be utilized to 

achieve victory. He stated that “victory is not the destruction in a given 

area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization. . . . Victory 

is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, 

isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with 

the population.”58 Thus, the government’s control of the population was 

merely the means to achieving their support and destroying the power and 

capability of the insurgents to wage war.

Both Trinquier and Galula recognized insurgency and counterinsurgency 

as war. They believed that the conflict was waged to exercise political 

power; the insurgents seeking to seize it, the government seeking to retain 

it. The insurgent and counterinsurgent fight for control of the population 

because they are the source of political power and their unconditional 

support is the weapon by which either side can destroy the other’s capability 

and will to fight. Without such support, and the power it provides, victory 

is unattainable. Therefore, every means available must be employed to 

control the population and gain its support.

The British Experience

British colonial administrator Sir Robert Thompson served as the 

Permanent Secretary of Defense during the Malay Emergency and 

provided advice to the South Vietnamese government under President 

Diem in the early 1960s. He wrote extensively about insurgency following 

his experiences in these counterinsurgency campaigns.

Thompson identified that an insurgency has two strategic aims, one 

political and one military. He stated, “the political aim is to gain control of 

the population, starting in the rural areas, and to destroy the government’s 

prestige and authority. The military aim is to neutralize the government’s 
17

armed forces and render them powerless to save the country.”59 Thus, 

the insurgency seeks to destroy the government’s ability to fight the war, 

which will ultimately lead to victory. Moreover, the government cannot 

focus solely on defeating the military threat, because the “political and 

subversive struggle will go on and can still win.”60

Thompson believed that to defeat an insurgency, the government had to 

fight the insurgents for control of the population. He noted that “an insurgent 

movement is a war for the people. It stands to reason that government 

measures must be directed to restoring government authority and law and 

order throughout the country so that control over the population can be 

regained and its support won.”61 If the government does not regain control 

of the population, the insurgents could use their control over them to 

pressure the government into negotiating and conceding political victory.62

Gaining control over the population was so important to the government 

that Thompson advocated a range of harsh measures to do so, including 

resettlement of the population into strategic hamlets, movement 

restrictions, curfews, and physical barriers.63 He responded to critics of 

such measures, stating that:

There are many who will criticize the harshness of the measures which 

may have to be used. This is a mistaken attitude. What the peasant wants 

to know is: Does the government mean to win the war? Because if not, 

he will have to support the insurgent. The government must show it is 

determined to win. Only in that way will it instil (sic) the confidence that 

it is going to win.64

However, he noted any such measure must always be employed 

legally, legitimately, and with the aim of protecting the population.65 If 

the government demonstrated its ability to protect the population and its 

determination to totally defeat the insurgency, it could then receive the 

support of the population that would enable it to fully accomplish its 

objective. If it did not, the war would continue until one side triumphed. 

Thompson’s conclusions are echoed by the British Army officer and 

theorist, Lieutenant General Sir Frank Kitson. Kitson combated insurgents 

in Kenya, Malaya, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland. He identified that the 

“ultimate aim of an insurgent organization is to overthrow a government, 

or force it to do something it does not want to do.”66 Moreover, he believed 

that the subversive element of an insurgency, not the armed fighters, was 

more dangerous to the government because of the essentially political 

nature of the conflict.67 Although this is true, it is not unique, as insurgency 

is a form of war and all war is political in nature as identified by Clausewitz.
18

The political nature of the conflict led Kitson to conclude that it was 

essential for the insurgent to have the support of the population to force 

the government to capitulate.68 The insurgents must implement a program 

consisting of military, political, psychological, and economic measures 

that target the population.69 He believed that the insurgents targeted the 

population to first control them and then persuade or coerce them to 

support the insurgency. He went on to state that the government must not 

underestimate the ability of a small group of men to control and extract 

support from the population using threats.70

As a result of this observation, Kitson concluded that the government 

must also control the population.71 He stated, “the aim of the government 

is to regain if necessary and then retain the allegiance of the population, 

and for this purpose it must eliminate those involved in subversion but 

in order to eliminate the subversive party and its unarmed and armed 

supporters, it must gain control of the population.”72 As suggested above, 

government control begins by securing the population from the threats of 

the insurgents. Only if the population is secure will they be able to support 

the government. Once secure, the population can be counter-organized so 

that the government can make its case to them through action, rather than 

mere propaganda.73 In order to be successful, however, “it must base its 

campaign on a determination to destroy the subversive movement utterly, 

and it must make this fact plain to its people.”74 Only by doing so, would 

the population provide its full support to the government.

To accomplish its objective of destroying the subversive movement, 

the government must decide exactly how much force to use and when. 

Kitson did not shy away from the use of force but did believe that only the 

minimum amount of force necessary should be applied.75 The police must 

maintain law and order and confront the subversive organization as long 

as they could do so. The military should be used only as required to defeat 

the guerrilla elements and to impose control over areas of the country that 

had been subverted. He argued that all operations, whether political or 

military, must be conducted in accordance with the law.76

The law is not static, however. Kitson noted that the government may 

modify the law in order to provide it additional powers to combat the 

insurgency.77 Moreover, once an insurgency begins the government 

may implement and enforce the law differently. Thus, the government 

acknowledges that insurgency and counterinsurgency are not ordinary 

affairs, but are in fact war and it must take extraordinary actions to win.

The British theorists identified insurgency as a phenomenon that 

seeks to subvert and destroy the governing authority within a country. 
19

To accomplish its objective the insurgency had to gain control of the 

population to extract support. The government must recognize the danger 

that insurgency poses, understand what is at stake, and provide itself 

with the powers and tools necessary to control the population. Then, the 

government had to gain control of the population and completely destroy 

the insurgency’s means and will to fight.

The American Experience

US Army officer John McCuen was a close observer of the British and 

French campaigns in Southeast Asia and North Africa and the developing 

American campaign in South Vietnam. He classified insurgency as 

revolutionary war and noted that it “obviously has political objectives.”78

The political objectives require the insurgency to gain support from 

the population and therefore, the insurgency would seek to control 

the population using terrorism, intimidation, coercion, and force.79

By controlling the population, the insurgency ensured that no one was 

truly uncommitted; that is, even if they were not actively supporting the 

insurgency they were not providing support to the government.

McCuen’s counterinsurgency strategy mirrors the strategy of the 

insurgents, and therefore he believed that the government must organize 

and control the population to break the insurgency’s hold over it.80 By 

securing, organizing, and if necessary, coercing the population through 

force and sanctions, the government could deny the insurgents the support 

they had previously extracted. He noted that this requirement to control 

the population through any means placed the government in

The first great dilemma of counter-revolutionary warfare–if they use 

intimidation, sanctions, and dislocation to separate the revolutionaries 

from the population, they will antagonize and lose the vital support of the 

people; and if they do not use these pressures, they find that the population 

reacts to the dictates of the more feared revolutionary terrorism, which 

they do not have the means to stop.81 Moreover, he cautioned that the 

government usually facilitated the spreading of the insurgency “by 

always underestimating the problem, making too small an effort, and 

staying mentally one step behind the revolutionaries–reacting rather than 

initiating.”82

The threat the insurgency posed was so great that McCuen concluded that 

“force and sanction–not torture and terror–may be the quickest and most 

humane methods of neutralizing fear of the terrorists, breaking the rebel 
20

organization, destroying revolutionary control and isolating the population 

from further pressure.”83 Once the rebel organization was neutralized or 

destroyed and the population isolated, the government could mobilize 

the population to support it. However, if this was not accomplished, the 

population would never support the government.84

McCuen believed that the government had to commit itself fully to 

defeating the insurgency or it would not win. He noted that “inherent in 

this process is early recognition of the nature of the revolutionary threat 

and application of maximum psycho-politico-military effort in time to 

seize the initiative.”85 Moreover, winning “will take massive organization, 

dedication, sacrifice, and time. The government must decide early if it 

is willing to pay the price. Half-measures lead only to protracted, costly 

defeats.”86 Therefore, it was necessary for the government to employ all of 

its power to destroy the insurgency’s means and will to fight.

Modern Theorists and Historians 

Trinquier, Galula, Thompson, Kitson, and McCuen are generally 

referred to as the classical counterinsurgency theorists. They wrote and 

practiced at a time when Mao’s theory of protracted popular war was 

believed to be the preeminent form of insurgency. This was not in fact 

the case, as each conflict, and thus each insurgency, is unique and shaped 

by the state and the environment in which it occurs. However, Maoist 

insurgency clearly dominates the writing of the classical theorists and the 

belief in its preeminence colored their views as they defined and identified 

the characteristics of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Modern theorists 

have noted that Maoism is no longer predominant but their writing 

identifies many of the same fundamental characteristics of insurgency and 

counterinsurgency found in the work of the classical theorists.

John Mackinlay served as a British Army officer and is now an academic 

and writer on modern insurgency. Mackinlay uses Maoist insurgency to 

frame his ideas about contemporary insurgency. He characterizes Maoist 

insurgency as holistic, consisting of military, subversive, and psychological 

activities deployed across the operational spectrum.87 He identifies that 

ideology and the ability to exploit the grievances of the population are 

central to the success of a Maoist insurgency. Moreover, he notes that Mao 

believed the population to be the primary asset of an insurgency.88

However, despite the above characteristics, Mackinlay does not 

classify Maoist insurgency as war. He asserts that only Mao’s first phase 

is insurgency and that it consists of “political activism, infiltration, 
21

propaganda, subversion and the selective use of terror and assassination.”89

He classifies these activities as politics and not war, stating that they 

cannot be used to defeat armies or seize territory.90 Meanwhile, he only 

acknowledges Mao’s third phase as war.91

This is a strange distinction to make considering Mackinlay’s assertion 

that Mao’s campaign was holistic and Mao’s own belief that his campaign 

was a total war. Mackinlay lists violent activities, such as terrorism and 

assassination, as means of the insurgent. While terrorism and assassination 

may not be the same as armies confronting one another in open combat, 

the classical theorists believed that they posed a threat to the state’s ability 

to control the population, thus threatening the existence of the state itself. 

Furthermore, it seems artificial to draw a line between the phases of Maoist 

insurgency and declare some to be war and others not. Mao believed that 

all phases might be underway at any one time in different portions of the 

country and that the campaign could go backwards from one phase to 

another if the insurgents did not achieve success.

Mackinlay believes that modern insurgencies are evolutionary successors 

of the Maoist model and are essentially political and not forms of warfare.92

Insurgency “is the option of the weaker side whose towering political 

ambitions are not matched with the commensurate power to translate 

them into reality.”93 He notes that the Cold War proxy insurgencies and the 

ability of modern insurgents to gain control of resources within weakly 

governed states has the potential to reduce the need of both insurgents 

and the government to gain the support of the population but nonetheless 

maintains that the support of the population is critical.94

Mackinlay notes that isolating and controlling the population from the 

insurgency is still necessary to achieve its support but believes that this 

can no longer be done through direct methods.95 That is, he thinks that 

the coercive measures cited by the classical theorists are not feasible 

in today’s environment. Rather, he believes that the government and 

counterinsurgent forces must confront the insurgency in the informational 

and social dimensions and remove the desire of the population to support 

the insurgency.96 This differs from the classicists’ views because it focuses 

on changing the population’s attitude towards the insurgency rather than 

on destroying the insurgency’s capability and will to fight.

Australian writer Mark O’Neill has studied insurgency through the 

lens of his country’s long involvement in this type of conflict. He defines 

insurgency as “an organised, violent, and politically motivated activity 

conducted by non-state actors and sustained over a protracted period 
22

that typically utilizes a number of methods such as subversion, guerrilla 

warfare, and terrorism, in an attempt to achieve change within a state.”97

Moreover, he believes that the intersection of politics and the population 

are at the center of all insurgencies.98 This intersection requires the 

counterinsurgent force to think strategically and not focus on the tactical 

and operational components of the military campaign.

In O’Neill’s understanding, insurgency and counterinsurgency are a 

battle for control. He envisions the government controlling its borders, 

the movement of goods across those borders, the information generated 

within the state about the war, and the actions of the population itself.99

However, control is only a first step. He states that “pacification is not 

an end in itself but a means by which the state can create the necessary 

permissive environment, free of major insurgent influence, to enable the 

implementation of comprehensive measures addressing the issues raised 

by the insurgency.”100 Moreover, security, which is often the objective 

of the military campaign, is necessary but not sufficient to defeat the 

insurgency.101

O’Neill notes that control of the population is best achieved with the 

cooperation of the population.102 In other words, the government should 

persuade the population to support it by employing an approach that 

encompasses all of society. However, if the government cannot achieve 

control through cooperation, it must achieve it somehow. In this way, he 

is reinforcing the classical theorists’ notion of control as coercive.103 In 

contrast to Mackinlay, he stresses that insurgency and counterinsurgency 

are war and so such measures are justified because the government must 

control the population to win.104

Mackinlay and O’Neill’s characterizations of insurgency and 

counterinsurgency differ only modestly from those of the classical theorists. 

Other modern writers, however, diverge much more sharply. In his critique 

of the US Army and Marine Corps’ field manual on counterinsurgency, 

Frank Hoffman condemns an over reliance on classical theory. He 

believes that the classical theorists failed to understand how unique the 

Maoist phenomenon actually was and that they would be shocked by the 

complexity of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.105 He also disputes 

some of the characteristics of insurgency that have been articulated above.

Citing the work of another modern writer, Australian Army Officer and 

an adviser to General David Petraeus, David Kilcullen, Hoffman argues 

that some modern insurgents do not seek a political objective or the change 

of a political regime, and that they may only seek political paralysis.106 This 
23

is to some extent a mischaracterization of Kilcullen’s writing. Kilcullen 

does note that some insurgent movements may pursue political objectives 

that are unlikely to be achieved or may not include the seizure of political 

power.107 However, creating political paralysis is a political objective and 

is akin to seizing power since it prevents the state from exercising power. 

It is a de facto seizure of power because the political vacuum that results 

benefits the insurgent. Moreover, although many insurgencies do seek the 

overthrow of an entire state, others merely try to gain autonomy for a 

given region.108

Hoffman also disputes the classicists’ contention, particularly Galula’s, 

that the insurgents must seek support from the undecided mass of the 

population. He contends that massive urbanization has changed the 

dynamics of insurgent support since insurgent movements can now gain 

material support from a variety of sources that are not located within the 

state where the insurgency is active.109 While this assertion is valid to a 

point, it is unsupported by recent history. It may have appeared that Al 

Qaeda in Iraq did not need the support of the population in Anbar province 

but when it lost such support it became nearly impossible for the group to 

exist.

His criticisms notwithstanding, Hoffman does acknowledge that the 

classical theorists have a role to play in understanding modern insurgency. 

He is primarily disputing the lack of emphasis the new manual gives to 

some characteristics of the current operational environment. However, 

Steven Metz disputes both the idea that modern insurgencies bear a 

resemblance to those studied by the classical theorists and the idea that they 

are wars in the Clausewitzian sense.110 He does not deny that insurgencies 

seek political objectives but contends that these are no longer the primary 

motivation for insurgents. Rather, he argues that insurgencies are actually 

competitions in a violent market place and that they satisfy economic and 

psychological needs rather than seek political objectives.111

In Metz’ assessment, insurgencies are really about providing economic 

power and a feeling of self worth to the combatants.112 The contest between 

the government and the insurgent organization may be violent but this 

armed conflict does not rise to the level of war. This is a fine line to draw. 

If an insurgency can only provide economic power and a feeling of worth 

to its members by actively challenging the power of the state, then the 

state no longer has a monopoly on the use of violence. Therefore, it can 

no longer be said to be in control and, as noted above, the absence of state 

control is just as much a political objective as the positive control sought 

by classical insurgencies. In order to regain control, the state will have to 
24

embark on a campaign combining military, political, and civil measures. 

This would appear to be a war that Clausewitz would recognize.

Metz’ counterinsurgency strategy goes beyond those espoused by the 

classicist’s in one significant way. Metz contends that to successfully 

resolve an insurgency requires a fundamental change of society brought 

about through social re-engineering.113 The social re-engineering project 

envisions a wholesale alteration of how the society functions and what 

its values are. In essence, his strategy is the ultimate form of population 

control. It seeks to change the behavior of the population in every 

fundamental way, not merely as it relates to supporting the insurgency or 

the government.

The modern theorists and writers are not in as much agreement on the 

nature of insurgency as are the classical theorists. There are some common 

themes, however. Though the centrality of a political objective is doubted 

by Hoffman, his notion of destabilizing the state rather than destroying it is 

a political objective. Metz’ assertion that insurgents are seeking economic 

and psychological satisfaction is also a political objective. Mackinlay 

and O’Neill both define insurgency as political. Mackinlay and Metz 

dispute the characterization of insurgency as a war but both identify that 

all elements of power will be employed to achieve a political objective. 

Hoffman questions the necessity of gaining support from the population 

but O’Neill and Mackinlay assert that the population is still at the center 

of any insurgency. Metz envisions controlling the population through a 

fundamental re-ordering of society.

Characteristics of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

The above descriptions lead to the conclusion that insurgency and 

counterinsurgency have several defining characteristics. First, the insurgent 

and counterinsurgent both seek a political objective, the exercise of 

political power within a given territory. The counterinsurgent must achieve 

the positive exercise of power. In classical insurgencies the insurgent also 

seeks this objective. However, in some modern insurgencies, the insurgent 

side may only seek to deny the state the ability to govern. Regardless, the 

insurgent seeks political power to gain an advantage vis-a-vis the state.

Because the insurgent is seeking political power within a given territory 

of a state, the insurgency must be conducted within a state. This is not to 

say that the insurgency cannot take any action outside of the targeted state 

but the majority of the campaign will be waged within the confines of that 

state. An insurgency could seek political power in multiple states but it 
25

would still have to wage separate campaigns against each state that it is 

contending with. Similarly, the counterinsurgent may take action against 

the insurgency outside of the state’s borders. However, this will not likely 

end the insurgency as the government must exercise positive political 

power within the state. Therefore, the counterinsurgent’s fight will also be 

primarily within the state.

As the insurgent must seize political power from the state, it cannot by 

definition be a member of that state. This distinguishes insurgency from 

other violent regime change paradigms such as the coup d’etat, which is 

undertaken by elements within the state’s power structure. The non-state 

actor that wages an insurgency is weaker than or disadvantaged by the state, 

which is why it is seeking political power in the first place. Conversely, 

it is states that wage counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency only exists in 

relation to insurgency and if the insurgent is the non-state actor then the 

counterinsurgent must be a state actor.

The population is the ultimate source of political power and their 

support is necessary for either the insurgent or the counterinsurgent 

to be successful. Before garnering the support of the population it is 

necessary for both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent to control the 

population. If the insurgent controls the population it can extract support 

from them and overcome its weakness in comparison to the state. When 

the counterinsurgent controls the population, it denies the insurgency the 

support it requires and uses the separation generated to win their support.

Populations outside of the affected state may have a stake in the outcome 

of the campaign. Diaspora populations and populations of intervening 

states may provide material, financial, moral, or legal support to either 

the insurgency or the counterinsurgency. However, it is unlikely that this 

support will be decisive to the campaign. The counterinsurgent must retain 

political power and the insurgent must seize it, so it is the state’s population 

whose support is decisive.

Insurgency and counterinsurgency involve all instruments of power: 

political, military, civil, economic, legal, and psychological. In order to 

control the population and counter the power of the state, the insurgency 

cannot rely solely on military means. It must employ political subversion and 

organization, civic action to address grievances, and wage a psychological 

warfare campaign to ensure support for its political objective. Similarly, 

if the state wages counterinsurgency solely as a military campaign it is 

likely to lose. Many of the insurgent’s actions cannot be countered by 

the military and must be addressed using the other instruments of power. 
26

Here the state has an advantage because it has access to political, legal, 

economic, and psychological resources that the insurgent does not.

Employing all of the instruments of power simultaneously will not 

guarantee success. Insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns must be 

synchronized between the different instruments of power and coordinated 

across the levels of government from the local to the national level. 

Military force used inappropriately may alienate the population and 

disrupt economic or political measures. The campaigns in each locality 

may be unique for both sides, but all must operate in support of the national 

campaign.

Lastly, insurgency and counterinsurgency are war. Fundamentally, both 

sides are employing force in order to accomplish a political objective, a 

policy, and must destroy the military capability of the other side to compel 

them to consider and agree to a political solution. Kitson identified this 

when he stated that:

The first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sort of 

action which a government facing insurgency should take, is that there 

can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is 

not primarily a military activity. At the same time there is no such thing 

as a wholly political solution either, short of surrender, because the very 

fact that a state of insurgency exists implies that violence is involved 

which will have to be countered to some extent at least by the use of 

lethal force.114

It could even be asserted that insurgency and counterinsurgency are 

the ultimate form of Clausewitzian war because it is a battle for the 

ultimate political objective–exercise of political power. In comparison, 

many so called conventional wars had very limited political objectives. 

The objectives of the US and its allies during the Persian Gulf War of 

1991, those of the British during the Falklands war, Germany’s objectives 

in the Franco-Prussian war, or the British and French objectives during 

the Crimean war were all limited when compared to the objective of an 

insurgency.

Moreover, a characterization of insurgency and counterinsurgency as 

something other than war leads to a dangerous underestimation of the 

threat posed by insurgency. If insurgency is considered to be a political 

campaign as Mackinlay says or a market competition as Metz asserts it 

could lead the state to attempt to counter it with very limited means. This 

might escalate the conflict and result in a more protracted and bloodier 

struggle. The insurgent has no doubt about the nature of his campaign, the 

state should not either. It is a violent contest for political power that must 

be won.
27

Definitions of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

The above discussion allows a definition for insurgency to be created 

which will be used throughout this study. Insurgency is a war waged within 

a state by a non-state actor through a combination of military, political, 

economic, civil, legal, and psychological means to control the population 

and gain its support to destroy or subvert the government’s instruments of 

power and seize political power.

Counterinsurgency only exists as a form of warfare because of its 

reciprocal relationship with insurgency. Therefore, counterinsurgency is a 

war waged within a state by a government and its allies, which may include 

intervening states, using the instruments of state power in a combination 

of military, political, economic, civil, legal, and psychological means 

to maintain control over and support of the population and defeat an 

insurgency to prevent the seizure of political power by a non-state actor.

Population and Resource Control Measures

Many of the modern and classical theorists discussed above assert that 

both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent must control the population to 

be successful in their respective campaigns. However, it is not always clear 

why such control is necessary. What is it about control of the population 

that makes it so essential and how can that control be established and 

maintained by the government and counterinsurgent forces? This section 

will establish why control of the population is necessary, examine the 

population and resource control measure construct derived from the 

classical counterinsurgency theorists and articulated in current doctrine, 

discuss the misconceptions and limitations of this construct, and postulate 

an alternative construct.

Why Control?

Controlling the behavior of their populations is fundamentally what 

governments do. This is particularly true where the employment of 

violence is concerned. The sociological theorist Max Weber believed “that 

a state is a human community that [successfully] claims the monopoly of 

the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”115 Moreover,

the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to 

individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state 

is considered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence. Hence, 

‘politics’ for us means striving to share power or striving to influence 

the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within 

a state.116
28

Weber believed that the state’s very existence depended on its ability 

to control the use of violence. He further identified that this required the 

state’s subjects to obey the authority of the government. If the state lost 

control of the use of violence, the state could no longer claim to govern.117

Thus, control is all important, and it extends not just to the actual use 

of violence, but also to “those material goods which in a given case are 

necessary for the use of physical violence.”118

Weber’s conclusions are echoed by the classical counterinsurgency 

theorists who indicate that control of the population is necessary for 

both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent. Specifically, they identified 

that control was a necessary precursor to achieving the support of the 

population but if security can be achieved then why is control necessary? 

What if the counterinsurgent can exercise control through a third party? 

Can the counterinsurgent skip establishing control by using non-lethal 

means such as economic development and government reforms to gain the 

population’s support? On their face these shortcuts make logical sense, but 

they are dangerous to pursue.

Security is not an Indication of Control

The most obvious manifestation of an insurgency is the ongoing 

violence that highlights the government’s inability to control the use of 

violence and affects the security of the population, the government, and 

the counterinsurgent forces. It would make sense to use the amount of 

security of these three elements as an indicator that the government is in 

control of the population and defeating the insurgency. However, security 

without control can be misleading.119

One of the major difficulties of assessing the security situation is to 

determine the actual level of violence. The most obvious way to do so is to 

record the number of attacks against the population and counterinsurgent 

forces. Unfortunately, this is not a good measure of how secure the 

population actually is. The population will only report acts of violence 

against it if they can be certain that the security forces will be able to take 

action to detain the perpetrators and prevent violent acts in the future. 

Thus, many acts of intimidation against the population will go unreported 

in areas where the government does not have control. Moreover, attacks 

against the counterinsurgent forces are an even worse measure because 

violent groups may choose not to attack them to maintain the illusion that 

the area is secure.
29

Two recent examples demonstrate that security is not a good indicator 

of control. Following the uprising in Sadr City in the late summer and 

early fall of 2004, the 1st Cavalry Division agreed to a cease-fire with 

the leaders of the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) political party and 

their Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia.120 As a result of the agreement, 

attacks in Sadr City fell precipitously during the remainder of 2004 and 

remained low throughout 2005.121 However, the Iraqi government, the 

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and the US Army did not have control over 

the neighborhood; it resided with OMS and JAM. As a result, after the 

bombing of the Golden Mosque in 2006 violence increased in Sadr City 

and a major battle using conventional military forces, including Abrams 

tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles, was waged against JAM to reassert 

control over the neighborhood in early 2008.122 Sadr City appeared to be 

secure but the government did not have control.

Northern Ireland provides another example. The British Army deployed 

to Northern Ireland in 1969 in order to protect the Catholic population 

following riots by Protestant mobs.123 However, by mid-1970, Catholics 

felt that they were under siege from both the mobs and the British Army 

which led to an increase in recruiting for the newly formed Provisional 

Irish Republican Army (PIRA).124 During the intervening time period, 

PIRA established “no-go” areas in Catholic residential neighborhoods 

by emplacing barricades.125 Neither the British Army nor the Royal 

Ulster Constabulary could patrol in those areas and PIRA controlled the 

population.126 After control had been established and the Catholic population 

had been radicalized, PIRA attacked British forces and the first British 

soldier was killed in February 1971.127 PIRA’s campaign accelerated and 

1972 was the worst year of violence during the insurgency.128 The security 

situation appeared positive, especially for the counterinsurgent forces of 

the British Army in 1969 and 1970, but PIRA’s control of the population 

allowed it to radicalize them and initiate a more violent campaign.

Third Party Control

If the government and counterinsurgent forces are not in control of 

the population, someone else will be. Power abhors a vacuum and if the 

counterinsurgent does not maintain control and tries to pass that control to 

a third party, then it is possible that control will be seized by the insurgent. 

This is not to say that a third party can never exercise control. However, 

it must be able to defend its territory from the insurgency and its interests 

must align with the government and counterinsurgent forces. If the former 

is not true the insurgency can attack and defeat the third party to gain 
30

control, if the latter is not true the third party may take action that is 

inimical to the government’s interests.

Two examples from the campaign in Iraq highlight these points. 

Following the first Battle of Fallujah in the spring of 2004, US forces 

transferred control of the city to a group of elders and their local security 

forces, the Fallujah Brigade.129 This arrangement appeared to allow the 

government of Iraq and US forces to exert control over the city through 

a third party but this was an illusion. The elders of Fallujah and their 

security forces could not secure the city and the insurgency scattered the 

Fallujah Brigade and dominated the populace.130 In late 2004, US and 

Iraqi forces mounted an assault to recapture the city.131 Once the coalition 

had re-established control, residents reported that they no longer believed 

insurgent success was inevitable.132

The British experience in Basra, Iraq, illustrates the other problem. 

During 2006, the British Army determined that they had to conclude the 

campaign in southern Iraq quickly and entered into an “accommodation” 

with the leaders of OMS and JAM in Basra.133 After JAM leaders had 

proven their ability to halt attacks against British forces, the British Army 

withdrew from Basra, ceased operations in the city, and released JAM 

members they held in custody.134 Once these concessions were complete, 

JAM resumed attacks on the British Army and battled the Iraqi Army for 

control of the city. In order to prevent the total loss of Basra, the Iraqi 

government mounted Operation Charge of the Knights to retake the city 

using ISF supported by British and American forces.135 While the British 

assumed that they had passed control over to a responsible partner, this 

was not the case.136 JAM and OMS wanted total control over Basra to use 

its lucrative port operations to support their insurgency in the rest of Iraq, 

a goal inimical to those of the Iraqi government.137

Gaining the Support of the Population without Control

Control of the population is very difficult to achieve and requires a large 

commitment of security forces to maintain. Therefore, it might make sense 

to skip establishing control over the population and gain their support by 

improving their material well being. The thought being is that improving 

the population’s material circumstances will lead them to support the 

government and not the insurgency.

This logic is highlighted in much of the recent writing about 

counterinsurgency, particularly that concerning so called “hearts and 

minds” strategies. In a RAND Corporation report issued in 2008, such 
31

strategies were summarized as beginning from the idea that “if the 

government can provide the population with the things they want, a bond 

will form and the population will shun the insurgents. This is the logic of 

appropriateness. The population comes to identify with the government.”138

There are many problems with this assertion but the most glaring is that it 

ignores the possibility that the insurgents will use violence to gain benefits 

for the population under their control and thus undermine the government’s 

control. It further assumes that the government can determine what it is the 

population requires for it to abandon supporting the insurgency.

This logic had great appeal in Iraq and was tried throughout the country 

to various degrees. As part of the cease-fire agreement in Sadr City 

discussed above, the US government spent hundreds of millions of dollars 

upgrading critical infrastructure.139 This was desperately needed but it did 

not connect the population to the government and may have solidified OMS 

and JAM’s control. American Army officer Colonel Craig Collier, who 

served as a battalion commander in Baghdad in 2007-2008, asserts that no 

effort was made to test the validity of the theory that improving material 

well-being would lead to an appreciable weakening of the insurgency.140

Certainly the violence in Sadr City in 2008 demonstrates that it did not in 

that particular case.

Another major difficulty of attempting such as a strategy is the need to 

accurately assess what the population wants in return for abandoning its 

support of the insurgency. One writer has noted that it is often difficult 

for insurgent leaders to understand what the populations they are seeking 

to control want to gain from the insurgency.141 Therefore, it is no great 

surprise that counterinsurgents suffer from the same difficulty. Mackinlay 

believes that the British achieved success in Northern Ireland because they 

raised much of the population into the middle class through economic 

development and education.142 However, it could be asserted that the 

insurgency in Northern Ireland that began in 1969 was not caused by 

relative economic poverty but rather by systematic governmental antiCatholic discrimination coupled with Protestant violence.143 If the British 

had addressed these causes directly in the 1970s, then there would have 

been no need for economic development. Nor can it be demonstrated 

conclusively that it was economic improvements as opposed to changes 

in the political structure and a backlash against violence that ended the 

insurgency.

The last major difficulty with trying to gain support without asserting 

control is inherent in the way people think about their behavior and the 

control they have over it. The Theory of Planned Behavior is a construct 
32

used by psychologists to predict whether an individual will engage in 

a specific behavior by examining three key factors: attitude toward the 

behavior, subjective norms about the behavior, and perceived behavior 

control.144 The Theory of Planned Behavior establishes that all three of these 

factors combine to yield intentions and that this will produce a reasonably 

accurate prediction of behavior.145 Actual behavior control is assumed 

because without it the individual could not engage in the behavior. In other 

words, if it can be determined what a person thinks about a behavior, how 

his or her social group feels about the behavior, and whether or not the 

person believes he or she can engage in the behavior, this will indicate 

whether or not he or she will actually engage in the behavior.

The government and counterinsurgent forces, especially intervening 

forces, have a very difficult time ascertaining the population’s attitude 

towards a specific behavior or the subjective norms regarding it. Even if 

they could determine that the population was favorably disposed to act 

against them, it is difficult to design information operations campaigns that 

can change attitudes and group norms rapidly. However, the government 

and counterinsurgent forces can change the population’s perceived 

behavior control by enforcing restrictions on the behaviors that support the 

insurgents. Thus, the population no longer believes that it can engage in 

such support and therefore will not. This idea is reinforced by the Theory 

of Planned Behavior which demonstrates that if a person believes that he 

or she cannot perform a certain behavior then he or she will not engage in 

that behavior.146 Certain restrictions may remove actual behavior control 

as well.

A simple example will illustrate this idea. Imagine that a member of 

the population wants to support the insurgency. Also suppose that the 

social group this person belongs to does not view aiding the insurgency 

negatively. Then, if he or she has access to some resource that would be 

beneficial to the insurgents and a means of providing it to them–that is, 

actual and perceived behavior control–then he or she will provide support 

to the insurgents. However, if the government and counterinsurgent have 

control over the population they can impose restrictions that remove the 

person’s perceived behavior control and thus prevent him or her from 

supporting the insurgency.

Therefore, a focus on behavior, as opposed to intentions, allows the 

government and counterinsurgent forces to direct their efforts at controlling 

behaviors they can observe and restrict. It is true that insurgency and 

counterinsurgency are ultimately a battle for men’s minds.147 However, 

control gives the government and counterinsurgent forces time, space, and 
33

a mechanism to destroy the insurgency. Then they can employ strategies 

to gain the support of the population who is now free of intimidation and 

coercion.

Current Population and Resource Control Construct

The current construct for population and resource control measures 

will be considered, revised, and then evaluated through examination of 

historical case studies. These case studies will demonstrate that control 

of the population is necessary if the counterinsurgent is going to defeat 

the insurgency and that population and resource control measures can be 

employed to gain and maintain that control. Shortcuts involving security, 

transfer of control to seemingly responsible parties, and gaining support 

through improved material well being provide only the illusion of control, 

however. If this illusion of control is allowed to persist, the counterinsurgent 

may have to expend greater effort later to regain control, because the 

insurgency will have greater material, manpower, and intelligence support 

and a measure of control over the population that must be broken.

To gain and maintain control of the population the counterinsurgent 

can apply population and resource controls. By applying such controls 

the government asserts its authority over the population and breaks 

the insurgent’s domination of them. Further, such controls allow the 

counterinsurgent to protect the population, isolate them from the 

insurgency, prevent behavior which supports the insurgency, enable 

behavior that supports the government, and target the armed and subversive 

components of the insurgency to eliminate them. Thus, these measures aim 

at coercing the population into not supporting the insurgent. Moreover, it 

enables the pro-government portion of the population to provide support 

to the counterinsurgent forces. Once the government’s control has been 

reestablished it can then set about the task of persuading the population to 

voluntarily support it.

The classical theorists identified how the government could employ 

population and resource controls to coerce the population to end their 

support for the insurgency. They articulated a wide variety of specific 

measures such as curfews, census operations, movement restrictions, 

resettlement of the population, and food and resource controls, and provided 

examples of their use. Their ideas have been collected and codified into 

a population and resource control construct that is articulated in the US 

Army’s Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency.
34

However, population and resource control measures cause discomfort 

for many current writers and practitioners. This results from a number 

of misconceptions about the nature of population and resource control 

measures. First, since they are a precursor to gaining the support of 

the population then they should be viewed as providing incentives or 

disincentives to the population. Second, that they are coercive, only 

applied in areas where the population supports the insurgent, and therefore 

are collective punishment. Third, that those measures used in previous 

campaigns can no longer be employed, especially by an intervening power, 

because they will not be viewed as legitimate.

These misconceptions have arisen for a variety of reasons: an incomplete 

understanding of how population and resource control measures were used 

in previous campaigns, classifying insurgency and counterinsurgency as 

something other than war, and a misunderstanding of why population 

and resource control measures are employed. By examining historical 

campaigns and specifying why population and resource control measures 

are used, these misconceptions can be altered.

Theorists and Population Control

All of the classical theorists discussed controlling the population in 

similar terms. They believed that controlling the population allowed the 

government to protect them, to isolate them from the insurgents, to reduce 

the supplies they provide the insurgents, to gather intelligence from them, 

and use that intelligence to target the insurgents, especially the subversive 

element. The major difference is that Trinquier viewed control as an end 

in itself, while Galula, Thompson, Kitson, and McCuen viewed it as a 

precursor to gaining the support of the population.

Trinquier believed that population control measures should remain in 

place across the entire country until the war had been won.148 Galula did not 

address the lifting of the control measures specifically, but did indicate that 

once the subversive element was destroyed, the counterinsurgent should 

begin improving the life of the population.149 This is similar to Thompson 

who stated that once the government had full control of an area, and that 

area was no longer under threat from the insurgency, that all restrictions 

could be removed. Then the government could focus on producing a stable 

community.150

Kitson focused on the destruction of the subversive element as the 

purpose of population control. However, he viewed this as part of the 

government’s overall plan, which included economic, civil, and political 
35

measures to rectify grievances and attract popular support.151 Therefore, 

Kitson believed that control preceded persuasion. McCuen’s ideas were 

similar. He identified that convincing the population to support the 

government through persuasion is the best option. However, he believed 

that coercion, in the form of population and resource controls, might have 

to precede persuasion.

Current Doctrine on Population and Resource Control

Population and resource controls are discussed minimally in the Army’s 

capstone counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24. There are only four 

paragraphs dedicated to the topic and these paragraphs provide only an 

outline of what they are and how they can be utilized.152 However, the 

companion manual to FM 3-24, FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, 

has a much larger section on their employment.

The section in FM 3-24.2 begins by providing the following definition: 

Populace and resource control (PRC) operations are government actions 

to protect the populace and its materiel resources from insurgents, to 

deny insurgents access to the populace and material resources and to 

identify and eliminate the insurgents, their organization, their activities, 

and influence while doing so.153

This is very similar to the concepts of the classical theorists. The manual 

goes on to state that “the objective of populace and resources control is to 

assist in preserving or reestablishing a state of law [and] order within an 

area or entire nation.”154

The list of available populace and resource controls provided in the 

manual is similar to the techniques described by the theorists. It includes 

curfews, movement restrictions, identification cards, rationing of food 

and other essential items, and the organization of the population.155

Resettlement of the population is not included in the list of population 

control measures and is instead categorized as a protective measure.156 The 

manual also addresses intelligence, surveillance, and security operations 

as part of its population and resource control construct.

Misconceptions Surrounding the Use of Population and Resource 

Controls

There are three major misconceptions about the use of population and 

resource control: they are incentives and disincentives to support the 

government, they are collective punishment, and they are not legitimate. 

These misconceptions arise for a variety of reasons and each will be 

discussed in detail.
36

The idea that controlling the population is a necessary precursor to 

gaining its support is a powerful one. However, the conclusion that they 

are incentives and disincentives is a mischaracterization. In the capstone 

report for the RAND Corporation’s counterinsurgency study, authors 

David Gompert and John Gordon refer to population and resource control 

measures as “carrot-and-stick strategies” which seek to employ the logic 

of punishment and reward to the population in order to get them to support 

the government.157 The use of food control by the British in Malaya is 

used as the primary example of this strategy. The authors, citing the 

analysis of the retired military officer and writer, John Nagl, state that food 

control “created a powerful motivation to support the government, while 

establishing negative incentives for insurgents and their supporters–a 

classical carrot-and-stick approach.”158 Unfortunately, this analysis is 

based on a shallow reading of the history of the Malaya campaign.

It is hard to imagine that restricting how, when, and where the population 

can cook its own food would lead to an increase in government support. 

Furthermore, it is difficult to understand how this constitutes a negative 

incentive for the insurgents and their supporters as averred by Gompert 

and Gordon. The food control policy in Malaya was intended to prevent the 

Chinese population from giving food, particularly rice, to the insurgents, 

without which their morale and well being would severely suffer.159 It also 

prevented the insurgents from forcing unsupportive Chinese and Malays 

to provide them food. As a result, the insurgents either had to grow food in 

the jungle, which could be spotted by aerial reconnaissance, or come into 

the open areas surrounding the villages to get food, both of which exposed 

them to targeting by security forces.

When viewed in this manner it is clear that the food controls used by the 

British were primarily intended to control the behavior of the population, 

not provide it an incentive or disincentive to support the government. The 

entire population, those who supported the insurgents, those who supported 

the government, and those who supported neither, were subject to the 

same controls.160 They all received the same ration of food regardless of 

their support for the government and they would all benefit from the lifting 

of the sanctions once the area was determined to be secure.161 Therefore, 

there was no incentive or disincentive to support the government.

There also was not an incentive or disincentive, specifically, to stop 

supporting the insurgents. While it is true that the controls would be 

lifted once an area was deemed secure and no longer subject to insurgent 

influence, this did not prevent portions of the population from wanting 

to provide support to the insurgents.162 However, they no longer had the 
37

ability to provide any support. Moreover, it is possible that the insurgents 

could use the same incentive. That is, they could also promise that the food 

restrictions would be lifted once they achieved control. It is possible that 

the population and resource controls may have convinced some portions 

of the population to support the government but it was not the policy’s 

primary purpose.

Some writers have characterized population control measures as 

collective punishment because they are coercive. The British Army 

officer Julian Paget regarded them as such and believed that they could be 

employed in this manner to utilize less force.163 He drew this conclusion as 

a result of his examination of the British campaigns in Malaya, Cyprus, and 

Kenya. This is not an accurate portrayal of how population and resource 

control measures were employed in Malaya, however.

It is true that the British High Commissioner and Director of Operations 

from 1952-1954, Lieutenant General Sir Gerald Templer, imposed 

collective punishments that included longer curfews and reduced rations 

of rice on some villages during the campaign.164 However, the overall 

population and resource control measures regime which Templer and his 

predecessor, Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, established was not 

collective punishment. Rather, as discussed above, it was designed to 

prevent the population from being able to provide the insurgents with any 

material support and to isolate them from the insurgents.165 The national 

identification card system, curfews, movement restrictions, and food 

controls were implemented across the country and vigorously enforced 

without regard to specifically punishing given communities.

It seems disingenuous to say that population and resource control 

measures are not collective punishment but that they could be used in that 

way. However, if the population is told that they are collectively being 

punished for actions that most of them are not engaging in, they are likely 

to be resentful. Moreover, they are unlikely to understand how this is 

increasing their security or reducing the effectiveness of the insurgents. 

However, if it is explained that the measures are to prevent specific types 

of support from being provided to the insurgents and to increase their own 

physical security, then they can better understand why the measures are 

being employed. They can also see that because such controls are in place 

they can no longer be coerced into providing support when they do not 

want to. They are not in control of their behavior.

Many modern writers do not believe that population control measures 

can be employed today because they will not be seen as legitimate by 
38

the international community. Mackinlay asserts that the direct method by 

which the British separated the insurgents from the population in previous 

campaigns is no longer feasible and only indirect methods can be used.166

Moreover, he recommends that future multinational operations should be 

conducted using only those means that are considered legitimate by all 

members of the coalition.167

Determining the legitimacy of means would seem to be fairly 

straightforward. However, what it is legitimate in one situation may not 

be in another. Trinquier stated, “the people know instinctively what is 

correct. It is only by substantive measures that we will lead them to judge 

the validity of our actions.”168 It is dangerous to reference Trinquier, who 

openly advocated the use of torture, when speaking about legitimacy of 

means, but in this case he is correct. It is ultimately the affected population 

who will determine whether actions taken by security forces are legitimate.

It is inconceivable to most Americans that US forces would create 

walled-in neighborhoods for populations that are only accessible 

through a single access point and require a detailed search to enter. It 

would not be legitimate to impose such a regime in their eyes. Yet, this 

accurately describes the Safe Neighborhood Program in Baghdad, Iraq, 

during 2007 and 2008. Many residents and local governing councils in 

Baghdad specifically requested that their neighborhoods be included in the 

program.169 In their eyes, the tactic was legitimate and effective.

It should also be noted that while it would be preferable for the host 

nation government to execute population and resource control measures, 

this is not the only way for them to be considered legitimate.170 The Safe 

Neighborhood Program was conducted in coordination with the Iraqi 

government and ISF, but it was clear to the population that US forces 

were involved, particularly with the emplacement of the walls. This did 

not diminish the program’s legitimacy for the population and may have 

enhanced it.171

Limitations of the Current Population and Resource Control Construct

While the population and resource control construct derived from the 

theorists and encapsulated in current doctrine is useful, it does have some 

limitations. The first limitation of this construct is that it focuses only on 

the insurgent, not the population’s actions to support the insurgent. The 

way the definition is framed it leads to the conclusion that there are no 

active, willing supporters of the insurgency among the population. Thus, 

if the population can simply be protected and isolated, then support for the 
39

insurgency will end. This is not the case, however. There are always some 

active supporters of the insurgency in the population and if their behavior 

is not addressed support for the insurgency will continue. Moreover, the 

insurgents often use intimidation and coercion to force the population to 

provide it with support. They do not allow the population to be neutral 

but if the population and resource control construct targets behavior that 

supports the insurgency, it can prevent such behavior. This gives the 

population the opportunity to choose neutrality, which is an advantage for 

the counterinsurgent.

Another limitation is that the construct does not address how population 

and resource controls can be employed to enable behavior that supports 

the government. One reason for securing and isolating the population is 

to ensure that it is not subject to intimidation from the insurgency. Doing 

so allows those elements of the population who want to support the 

government to do so. Free of intimidation the population can provide the 

government intelligence on the insurgents, join local security forces, and 

participate in local governance. It also, however, enables the population to 

be neutral. If they are, they are not providing overt support to either side, 

and this is an advantage for the government.

The construct also does not identify how violations of population and 

resource controls will be handled. It promulgates some enforcement 

mechanisms, such as checkpoints and searches, but does not identify what 

actions should be taken to enforce the controls. The manual mentions 

rewarding populations for complying but does not address sanctioning 

violators. This is important because if the counterinsurgents do not enforce 

the controls with sanctions then their impact will be muted.

The construct also does not stress that population and resource controls 

must be legitimate. Perhaps this is assumed but it has to be reinforced. 

If control is to serve as a bridge to ultimately gaining the population’s 

support then the methods employed must be legitimate. Further, legitimacy 

can only be conferred by the affected population. The government and 

counterinsurgent forces may consider any measures that might prevent 

critical support being provided to the insurgency but they must also be 

legitimate.

Lastly, the stated objective of population and resource controls is vague. 

The establishment of law and order can mean many different things in 

many different contexts. If the government and its counterinsurgent forces, 

or the forces of an intervening power, cannot agree on the meaning behind 

law and order, confusion will result. Population and resource control 
40

measures will be employed for varying reasons by different elements and 

this will weaken their effectiveness.

Updated Population and Resource Control Construct

The mischaracterizations of population and resource controls in current 

literature and the limitations identified in the current construct can be 

addressed if a new construct is promulgated. This construct reinforces 

critical points about how and why population and resource control measures 

are implemented and stresses the need to ensure legitimacy. Moreover, 

this construct allows the counterinsurgent to employ a greater range of 

measures through a focus on controlling the behavior of the population.

New Definition of Population and Resource Controls

Population and resource controls are employed to restore the state’s 

control over the use of violence and the material resources which enable 

it. They are legitimate civil and economic restrictions imposed by the 

government on the behavior of the population that are legally enforced by 

counterinsurgent security forces to

1. Protect the population from the intimidation and violence employed 

by the insurgency.

2. Isolate the population from the subversive and armed elements of 

the insurgency.

3. Control the behavior of the population so as to prevent behavior 

that supports the insurgency and enable behavior that supports the 

government and counterinsurgent security forces.

4. Facilitate the destruction of the armed and subversive elements of 

the insurgency by the counterinsurgent security forces.

This construct may be employed throughout all phases of the “clear-holdbuild” strategy that is articulated in current counterinsurgency doctrine. 

During the clear phase it assists the counterinsurgent in separating the 

armed elements of the insurgency from the population so that they can be 

targeted. In the hold phase, the controls deny the insurgency the ability to 

gain material, intelligence, and other support from the population while 

facilitating the identification and destruction of the subversive element. In 

the clear phase it provides a mechanism for the government to maintain its 

control and prevent the insurgency from returning to the area. Throughout, 

this construct enables the government to demonstrate its determination to 

defeat the insurgency and begin the process of persuading the population 

to provide it their support.
41

All of the techniques discussed above can be used within this construct. 

Census operations provide a means of identifying elements of the insurgency, 

organizing the population, determining the exact population that needs to 

be protected, and providing identification cards. Curfew and movement 

restrictions facilitate the isolation and protection of the population and 

provide a means for the counterinsurgent to determine if the insurgency 

is attempting to re-enter the controlled areas. Resource controls such as 

import/export restrictions, rationing, and the establishment of controlled 

items give the government a mechanism for denying material support to 

the insurgency by controlling the ability of their supporters to provide 

it. Resettlement facilitates all of the above by providing the government 

absolute control over the circumstances in which the population lives.

This list is not exhaustive, however. Other control mechanisms that are not 

articulated in the literature could be employed. The government could deny 

the population’s ability to communicate with the insurgency by restricting 

phone, internet, radio, or mail communications. The government could 

prohibit rallies, political meetings, and other public gatherings to prevent 

the subversive element from operating under the guise of a legitimate 

political party. Parties with known affiliations to the insurgency could be 

banned. Citizens could be restricted from possessing or carrying firearms 

and other weapons. Other techniques exist and it is only the imagination 

of the government and counterinsurgent forces that limits the measures to 

be used. However, they must be employed to accomplish their objective 

and in accordance with the six critical components of the construct: 

legitimacy, enforcement provisions, protection of the population, isolation 

of the population, a focus on behavior, and the destruction of the armed 

and subversive elements.

Legitimacy

The legitimacy of the government’s actions can only be determined by 

the affected population. It would be anathema to Americans to restrict the 

ability of a population to move, communicate, or possess weapons, but 

if the insurgency has reached the level where such stringent controls are 

necessary they may be legitimate. The majority of the population desires 

security and freedom from intimidation. If harsh measures can accomplish 

this they will be viewed positively. The legitimacy of population control 

measures can only be assessed by a comprehensive understanding of 

the threat the insurgency poses and the society within which it is being 

conducted.
42

Enforcement Provisions

If the government imposes restrictions on the population, but is unable 

to enforce these provisions through legal sanctions, their efficacy and 

legitimacy will be negatively impacted. Galula identified that if the 

counterinsurgent issues orders to the population to deny support to the 

insurgent that it must be able to enforce those orders or it will have exposed 

the population to reprisals.172 Thus exposed, the population cannot view 

such restrictions as legitimate. Moreover, if the government does not have 

a legal enforcement mechanism, the willing supporters of the insurgency 

are able to violate the restrictions without fear of sanctions. This defeats 

the purpose of establishing the restrictions in the first place.

Legal enforcement also empowers the counterinsurgent security forces. 

They no longer have to determine who is an actual insurgent; violators of the 

sanctions have committed a criminal act and can be detained immediately. 

This eliminates confusion as the counterinsurgent forces no longer have 

to decide whether and how to enforce the population and resource control 

measures. They can do so automatically. However, this requirement also 

means that implementing a population and resource control regime is time 

consuming and man-power intensive.

Security of the Population

The population can openly support the government only if it feels 

secure enough to do so. Kitson noted that an unarmed population cannot 

possibly stand up to violent intimidation from insurgents.173 Trinquier 

identified that the only way the counterinsurgent can gain intelligence on 

the insurgents was if the population felt secure enough to do so.174 Recent 

experience in Iraq and Afghanistan indicates that intimidation can cause 

even a supportive population to provide the insurgents intelligence and 

material support. It is therefore critical that the population and resource 

control regime increase the security of the population. Moreover, if it does 

not increase the population’s security it will undermine legitimacy of the 

control measures.

Isolating the Population from Insurgent Elements

If the population can be thoroughly separated from the insurgency, they 

will be more secure. Moreover, the government and counterinsurgent forces 

can target the armed elements of the insurgency more effectively. Isolation 

makes it more difficult for members of the population who support the 

insurgency to do so and enables others to engage in behavior that supports 
43

the government by providing intelligence, joining local security forces, 

and participating in local governance.

Focus on Behavior

It is difficult for the government and counterinsurgent forces, especially 

an intervening power, to change the intention of the population to support 

the insurgency. This process usually occurs over time and the means utilized 

to do so may not accomplish the objective. However, specific behaviors 

that support the insurgency can be identified and addressed through 

population and resource control measures. This removes the ability of the 

population to support the insurgency without changing their intention to 

do so. While defeating the insurgency in the long term requires a change 

of intentions, the immediate effect of population and resource controls 

that focus on behavior can severely weaken the insurgency and give the 

government time and space to change the attitude of the population.

Facilitate the Targeting of the Armed and Subversive Elements

Defeating an insurgency requires the complete destruction of the 

insurgency’s subversive elements.175 All of the other critical components of 

the population and resource control construct support this aim. However, 

if the government and counterinsurgent forces lose sight of this truth, it 

may encourage them to reduce the use of such controls too early. This is 

tempting, especially if it is viewed as a reward to the population. However, 

it may also hamper efforts to root out the remnants of the insurgency and 

therefore leave the population exposed to future reprisals. The population 

wants to be secure and the best way to accomplish this objective is to 

remove all criminal, terrorist, insurgent, and subversive elements from 

their midst.176

Evaluating the New Construct of Population

and Resource Control

This new construct will be evaluated by comparing its critical 

components to those of population and resource control measure regimes 

used in previous and current counterinsurgency campaigns through the case 

study method. The first campaign considered will be US counterinsurgency 

operations in the Philippines from 1899 to 1935. Then a close examination 

will be made of the efforts of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) and 

the United States in South Vietnam during two distinct periods: the Diem 

regime from 1954 to 1963 with a focus on the Strategic Hamlet Program 

and the role of US ground forces, specifically the 25th Infantry Division, 
44

in supporting the pacification campaign from 1966 to 1970. Finally, the 

US campaign in Iraq from 2003 to present will be considered.
45

Notes

1. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter 

Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 75.

2. Ibid., 75.

3. Ibid., 75.

4. Ibid., 76.

5. Ibid., 77.

6. Ibid., 77.

7. Michael Howard, Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 

University Press, 2002), 51-52.

8. Clausewitz, On War, 80-81.

9. Howard, Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction, 55.

10. Clausewitz, On War, 581.

11. Ibid., 86.

12. Ibid., 86-87

13. Ibid., 87.

14. Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 1976), 76.

15. Clausewitz, On War, 88.

16. Howard, Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction, 36.

17. Clausewitz, On War, 177.

18. Ibid., 177.

19. Clausewitz, On War, 88.

20. Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: 

Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961), 42.

21. Ibid., 43.

22. Ibid., 43.

23. Although this strategy may not have been exactly in the form that Clausewitz 

would have anticipated, it is one that he would recognize. Mao is clearly defining 

the series of engagements that his army will fight in order to win the war. The first 

four steps are engagements to secure further means of war that will then allow 

Mao to confront his enemy directly. In so doing, Mao will destroy his enemy’s 

means and will to resist and therefore win the war.

24. Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 43.

25. Ibid., 88-89.
46

26. Ibid., 46.

27. Ibid., 85.

28. Ibid., 57.

29. Vo Nguyen Giap, “Inside the Vietminh,” in The Guerrilla Selections from 

the Marine Corps Gazette, ed. T. N. Green (New York: Praeger, 1962), 147.

30. Ibid., 148.

31. Vo Nguyen Giap, The Military Art of People’s War, ed. Russel Stetler (New 

York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 92-95.

32. Ibid., 103-05.

33. Giap, “Inside the Vietminh,” 155.

34. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare A French View of Counterinsurgency, 

trans. Daniel Lee (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 7.

35. Ibid., 6.

36. Peter Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The 

Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 

1964), 7. 

37. Ibid., 22.

38. Ibid., 25.

39. Ibid., 29-30.

40. Trinquier, Modern Warfare, 8.

41. Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare, 17.

42. Trinquier, Modern Warfare, 8.

43. Ibid., 8-9.

44. Ibid., 30. Also see Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare, 21.

45. Ibid., 30.

46. Ibid., 33.

47. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice (New York: 

Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 4.

48. Ibid., 3.

49. Ibid., 3

50. Ibid., 7

51. Ibid., 8.

52. Ibid., 7-8.

53. Ibid., 75.
47

54. Ibid., 116-19.

55. Ibid., 123-33.

56. Ibid., 87-88.

57. Ibid., 83.

58. Ibid., 77.

59. Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of 

Malaya and Vietnam (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing , 2005), 29-30.

60. Ibid., 47.

61. Ibid., 51.

62. Ibid., 43-44.

63. Ibid., 142-46.

64. Ibid., 146.

65. Ibid., 146.

66. Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), 282.

67. Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), 

48.

68. Kitson, Bunch of Five, 282.

69. Ibid., 282.

70. Ibid., 283.

71. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 49.

72. Ibid., 49.

73. Ibid., 50-51.

74. Ibid., 50.

75. Kitson, Bunch of Five, 283.

76. Ibid., 289.

77. Ibid., 289.

78. John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (Harrisburg, PA: 

Stackpole Books, 1966), 328.

79. Ibid., 31-37.

80. Ibid., 58.

81. Ibid., 33-34.

82. Ibid., 34.

83. Ibid., 57.

84. Ibid., 64.
48

85. Ibid., 324.

86. Ibid., 330.

87. John Mackinlay, The Insurgent Archipelago (London: C Hurst and Co 

Publishers Ltd, 2009), 18-19.

88. Ibid., 26.

89. Ibid., 4.

90. Ibid., 4-5.

91. Ibid., 4-5.

92. Ibid., 4-5.

93. Ibid., 5.

94. Ibid., 81-88.

95. John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy, Rethinking Counterinsurgency

(Santa Monica, CA: 2008), 51.

96. Mackinlay, The Insurgent Archipelago, 164-70.

97. Mark O’Neill, Confronting the Hydra (Sydney Australia: Lowy Institute, 

2009), 6-7.

98. Ibid., 2.

99. Ibid., 34.

100. Ibid., 35.

101. Ibid., 35.

102. Ibid., 34.

103. Ibid., 34-35.

104. Ibid., 14.

105. Frank G. Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?” Parameters

(Summer 2007): 71.

106. Ibid., 73.

107. David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 2009), 12-16.

108. The Basques are a good example of this. The Basques do not seek an 

overthrow of the entire Spanish state, but rather want autonomy for their region.

109. Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?,” 74-76.

110. Steven Metz, “New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding the 21st 

Century Insurgency,” Parameters (Winter 2007-2008): 22.

111. Ibid., 23.

112. Ibid., 27.
49

113. Ibid., 29.

114. Kitson, Bunch of Five, 283.

115. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays in 

Sociology, trans. and ed. by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1946), 78.

116. Ibid., 78.

117. Ibid., 78.

118. Ibid., 80.

119. O’Neill, Confronting the Hydra, 35.

120. Peter Chiarelli and Patrick Michaelis, “The Requirements for Full 

Spectrum Operations,” Military Review 85, no. 4 (July-August 2005): 4.

121. Ibid., 12.

122. Author’s personal experience while serving in Baghdad during 2007-2008.

123. Rod Thornton, “Getting it Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes Made in the 

Early Stages of the British Army’s Deployment to Northern Ireland,” Journal of 

Strategic Studies 30, No. 1 (February 2007): 75-76.

124. Richard Iron, “Britain’s Longest War,” in Counterinsurgency in Modern 

Warfare eds. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 

2010), 158.

125. Don Mansfield, “The Irish Republican Army and Northern Ireland,” in 

Insurgency in the Modern World, ed. Bard O’Neill (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 

1980), 54.

126. Thornton, “Getting it Wrong,” 86.

127. Ibid., 90.

128. Don Mansfield, “The Irish Republican Army and Northern Ireland,” 55.

129. Carter Malkasian, “The Role of Perceptions and Political Reform in 

Counterinsurgency: The Case of Western Iraq, 2004-2005,” Small Wars and 

Insurgencies 17, No. 3 (September 2006): 373.

130. Ibid., 381.

131. For more information about the battle for Fallujah, see Bing West, No True 

Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah (New York: Bantam Books, 

2005).

132. Malkasian, “The Role of Perceptions and Political Reform in 

Counterinsurgency,” 383.

133. Carter Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” in Counterinsurgency 

in Modern Warfare eds. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey 

Publishing, 2010), 306.
50

134. Ibid., 306.

135. United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, “Operation TELIC Lessons 

Learned Compendium,” http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/F0282A90-99E5-

415E-B3BC-97EAD7D7873A/0/operation_telic_lessons_compendium.pdf, 

(accessed 1 May 2011), 9.

136. There was also some complacency within the British Army that led to a 

nonchalance in applying experiences from Northern Ireland and Bosnia to Iraq 

without thinking through them fully. See Daniel Marston, “Adaptation in the 

Field: The British Army’s Difficult Campaign in Iraq,” Security Challenges 6, no. 

1 (Autumn 2010), 73.

137. Senior British Army officer, conversation with author, 30 January 2011.

138. David C. Gompert and John Gordon IV, War by Other Means (Santa 

Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), 91.

139. Chiarelli and Michaelis, “The Requirements for Full Spectrum Operations.”

140. Craig Collier, “Now That We’re Leaving Iraq, What Did We Learn?,” 

Military Review (September-October 2010): 91.

141. James C. Scott, “Revolution in the Revolution: Peasants and Commissars,” 

Theory and Society 7, no. 1/2 (January-March 1979): 98.

142. Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, Rethinking Counterinsurgency, 51.

143. Mansfield, “The Irish Republican Army and Northern Ireland,” 52-54.

144. Icek Azjen, “The Theory of Planned Behavior,” Organizational Behavior 

and Human Decision Processes 50 (1991): 181-82.

145. Ibid., 182.

146. Ibid., 183-84.

147. Kitson, Bunch of Five, 282.

148. Trinquier, Modern Warfare, 49.

149. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 120-21.

150. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 113.

151. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 50-51.

152. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency

(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2006), 5-21.

153. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, 

(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2009), 3-24.

154. Ibid., 3-24-3-25.

155. Ibid., 3-26.

156. Ibid., 3-27.
51

157. Gompert and Gordon, War by Other Means, 91.

158. Ibid., 91.

159. Richard Miers, Shoot to Kill (London: Faber and Faber, 1959), 161-62.

160. Ibid., 159.

161. Richard Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds: The 

Evolution of British Strategy in Malaya, 1948-1960,” in Counterinsurgency in 

Modern Warfare eds. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey 

Publishing, 2010), 111-12.

162. Ibid., 112.

163. Julian Paget, Counterinsurgency Operations (New York: Walker and 

Company, 1967), 169.

164. Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds,” 111.

165. Paget, Counterinsurgency Operations, 60-61.

166. Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy, Rethinking Counterinsurgency, 51.

167. Mackinlay, The Insurgent Archipelago, 181.

168. Trinquier, Modern Warfare, 50.

169. Author’s personal experience as a Company Commander in Baghdad, 

Iraq, 2007-2008.

170. Wade Markel, “Draining the Swamp: The British Strategy of Population 

Control,” Parameters (Spring 2006): 47.

171. Author’s personal experience as a Company Commander in Baghdad, 

Iraq, 2007-2008.

172. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 116.

173. Kitson, Bunch of Five, 283.

174. Trinquier, Modern Warfare, 35.

175. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 49.

176. Collier, “Now That We’re Leaving Iraq,” 88-89.

53

Chapter 3

The Philippines, 1899-1935

We have only one purpose, and that is to force the insurgents and those 

in active sympathy with them to want peace. 

― Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, Address to the Officers in 

Batangas Province

The pacification of the Philippines by the United States following 

the conclusion of the Spanish American war is in many ways the most 

successful, and yet the least referenced, American counterinsurgency 

campaign.1

 The unique conditions of the campaign make it an excellent 

case study for examining the use of population and resource control 

measures. It is the only counterinsurgency campaign where the US was 

the colonial power. Pacification was led by military and civil authorities at 

different times. The US confronted well-organized insurgent movements 

as well as loosely grouped and led bandit gangs, commonly referred to as 

ladrones.

2

 Moreover, US authorities had to repeatedly contest these groups 

for control of areas of the archipelago.

US authorities responded to these unique conditions by constructing a 

legal framework to control the behavior of the population through specific 

restrictions backed up by legal sanctions. These restrictions ranged from 

the harsh, such as reconcentration of the population into towns, to the 

more benign, such as requiring municipal officers to report ladrones. The 

measures could be implemented either by the military, during periods of 

martial law, or civil authorities once a province was declared pacified.

Overview

In August 1896, the Katipunan, a secret Filipino organization, began 

an insurrection against the Spanish colonial regime. Insurgents under the 

Filipino leader Emilio Aguinaldo, who would later lead the insurgency 

against the United States, captured a Spanish garrison in Cavite Province 

and wrested control from the Spanish authorities. The insurrection spread 

throughout the Tagalog speaking areas of Luzon before Spanish forces 

were able to put it down using harsh tactics that foreshadowed those 

used by the US military. The last insurgent surrendered to the Spanish in 

January 1898 and the insurrection’s leaders were exiled in Hong Kong.3

Less than four months later, the US Asiatic Squadron under Admiral 

Dewey sailed into Manila harbor and destroyed the Spanish fleet on 1 

May 1898.4 Accompanying the victorious US fleet were Aguinaldo and the 

other exiled leaders of the insurrection.5

 The first wave of US Army forces 

did not arrive in the Philippines until 30 June 1898 and did not capture 
54

Manila until 13 August 1898.6 This interlude allowed Aguinaldo and his 

followers to defeat the Spanish garrisons outside of Manila and establish 

their control over a large portion of the main island of Luzon.7

The US Army and the Filipino forces under Aguinaldo maintained 

an uneasy peace around Manila until February 1899. President William 

McKinley decided that the US would occupy and temporarily administer 

the archipelago. He completed a treaty with and purchased the Philippines 

from Spain.8

 Aguinaldo was unwilling to accept US occupation and 

administration and decided to force the US out of the Philippines. 

Aguinaldo’s army attacked the US Army in Manila on 4 February 1899, 

beginning the conventional phase of the war.

From February to November of 1899, the US Army, under the command 

of Major General Elwell S. Otis9

, waged a conventional campaign that 

destroyed Aguinaldo’s Filipino Army and disrupted his putative national 

government. The campaign was concentrated in Northern Luzon and US 

forces did not attempt to control the Tagalog areas of Southern Luzon 

because of limited forces and a belief that destroying Aguinaldo’s army 

would end the insurgency.10 US forces entered into agreements with the 

Sultan of Sulu and other local leaders to assert control over some areas of 

the archipelago but Southern Luzon was controlled by insurgent elements 

loyal to Aguinaldo.11

In November 1899, with his army decimated and his government on the 

run, Aguinaldo directed his subordinates to wage guerrilla warfare.12 The 

transition to guerrilla warfare initiated a US pacification campaign that 

continued with varying degrees of intensity until 1935 when the Philippines 

became a Commonwealth. The US military executed the first phase 

from November 1899 until June 1902. Although areas that were deemed 

pacified were transferred to civilian control after the establishment of the 

Philippine Commission in 1901, pacification efforts remained under the 

control of the military. The civil government of the Philippines controlled 

the pacification campaign during its second phase from June 1902 until the 

start of the Commonwealth in 1935.

The US military’s pacification efforts followed in the wake of its advancing 

forces. After evicting the Filipino Army or guerrilla forces from an area 

the US military occupied key towns and established local governments to 

control the area. McKinley wanted the Philippines to be pacified through 

“benevolent assimilation” and US forces dutifully executed his orders.13

However, the insurgency dragged on and US commanders began using 

all their powers under General Orders Number 100 (G.O. 100) of 1863 to 
55

gain control.14 By 1902, organized resistance under recognized Filipino 

commanders had ended and the civil government assumed control of the 

campaign.

The civil government of the Philippines continued to face armed threats 

to its control of the archipelago. Some of these threats were little more 

than bands of armed criminals but others were run by former Filipino 

Army Officers and capitalized on the rhetoric of Philippine independence. 

The Philippine Commission passed a series of acts that provided civil 

governments powers similar to the military’s under G.O. 100.15 Using 

these powers, the civil government ended armed threats quickly and with 

as little violence as possible. The Governor General considered Luzon 

completely pacified by 1908 and armed resistance after that was rare 

except in the Muslim Moro areas.16

Military Led Pacification, 1899-1902

During the military-led portion of the pacification campaign, US 

forces employed a variety of tactics and techniques to pacify areas under 

insurgent control. Official US policy under Otis and his successors was the 

“policy of attraction.”17 Attraction sought to win the support of Filipinos 

by demonstrating that US governance of the archipelago would be to their 

benefit. To this end, the Army built schools, established local governments, 

and provided medical treatment.18 However, much of the pacification work 

consisted of other tactics common to counterinsurgency campaigns.

Offensive patrols sought to destroy or capture insurgent bands. The 

destruction of food, crops, and homes used by insurgents denied them 

material support. The reconcentration of the population was a harsh 

measure used to break insurgent control and separate the population from 

the insurgents. Many US Army Officers had fought in the Civil War and 

in the campaigns against Native Americans19 in the Western United States 

and so were familiar with the need to control areas engaged in armed 

rebellion.20 The military control mechanism was martial law in the form 

of G.O. 100.

Control Mechanism

The military’s experience during the Civil War and fighting Native 

American tribes yielded an unofficial but well understood doctrine for 

pacification that sought balance between repression and conciliation.21

US officers who had fought the tribes learned that controlling populations 

was critical and it was best to do so without changing local customs and 
56

traditions.22 However, in the Philippines, the US inherited not Filipino 

institutions of law but a Spanish colonial regime. Moreover, Filipino 

insurgent leaders subverted this system during the conventional campaign 

while US control was limited to Manila and Northern Luzon.

In the early stages of the campaign, US commanders felt constrained by 

the policy of attraction and many wanted to be able to use the full range of 

powers granted them under G.O. 100.23 While some commanders did so 

without specific authorization, others waited for the official proclamation 

of G.O. 100 by Otis’ replacement, Major General Arthur MacArthur, in 

December 1900. This followed a ruling by the US Army Judge Advocate 

in the archipelago in June 1900 that martial law already applied.24

The confused status of the Philippines caused by the dithering of the 

McKinley administration, the collapse of many of the Spanish control 

mechanisms, and the paucity of US forces to simultaneously garrison the 

country and fight Aguinaldo’s army left a vacuum of control into which 

the insurgents were able to step. To regain control of subverted areas, the 

military needed to administer martial law. General Order 100 of 1863 is 

not martial law in and of itself. Rather, “martial law is simply military 

authority exercised in accordance with the laws and usages of war.”25 Since 

the US did not have any civil administrators in the Philippines in 1900 and 

the Spanish administrators were no longer effective, the US military was 

the only body able to administer the country.

General Order 100 defined the powers that the military could use to 

impose order. General Order 100 had been written for use in occupied areas 

of the Confederacy during the Civil War. Officers educated at West Point 

had a common understanding of the laws of war that treated insurgency 

and guerrilla warfare as illegal.26 Moreover, they believed that it was both 

legal and legitimate to vigorously repress conquered populations that aided 

insurgents.27 General Order 100 provided the control mechanism within 

which the Army could employ population and resource control measures.

General Orders Number 100

The ruling by the Judge Advocate that martial law already existed in 

the archipelago was in accordance with the opening section of G.O. 100. 

This section stated that “a place, district, or country occupied by an enemy 

stands, in consequence of the occupation, under the martial law of the 

invading or occupying army, whether any proclamation declaring martial 

law, or any public warning to the inhabitants, has been issued or not.”28
57

Thus, the very act of invading and conquering the Philippines allowed, 

and in fact, required, the military to impose control through martial law.

General Order 100 also established that martial law did not have to be 

uniformly applied throughout the occupied territory. Section I, 5 noted 

that: 

Martial law should be less stringent in places and countries fully 

occupied and fairly conquered. Much greater severity may be exercised 

in places or regions where actual hostilities exist or are expected . . . Its 

most complete sway is allowed–even in the commander’s own country–

when face to face with the enemy, because of the absolute necessity of 

the case.29

This section empowered the military to adjust the legal measures that it 

imposed on the population based on the threat to its administration. Thus, 

commanders had extraordinary power to enforce laws that might not be 

specifically mentioned in either the civil code of the Philippines or those 

contained within G.O. 100 itself.

The provision in G.O. 100 regarding military necessity enhanced this 

flexibility. The orders stated that “military necessity, as understood by 

modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those measures 

which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are 

lawful according to the modern law and usage of war.”30 What is meant 

by military necessity is open to interpretation, but it undoubtedly was 

intended to permit commanders to pursue a course of action which they 

believed would bring the war to an end more quickly, as long as such a 

course of action were legal.

Moreover, G.O. 100 noted that military necessity, “allows of all 

destruction of property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, 

travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or means of 

life from the enemy.”31 This section made clear that military commanders 

could legally restrict the movement of people and goods, destroy property 

used to aid the enemy, and impose other restrictions. General Order 100 

specifically stated that “war is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful 

to starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to a 

speedier subjection of the enemy.”32 These sections established a legal basis 

on which population and resource control measures could be imposed.

The previously discussed sections of G.O. 100 referred to operations 

during normal hostilities. That is, during times when two uniformed armies 

confronted one another and the victorious army imposed its control on 

hostile territory. Use of the powers contained therein by US commanders 

in the Philippines was therefore expected, particularly during the fighting 
58

against Spain and against Aguinaldo’s army. However, once Aguinaldo 

declared the start of guerrilla warfare, other sections of G.O. 100 became 

applicable that further increased the power of military commanders to 

impose control.

As noted above, the laws of war at the time took a dim view of insurgency 

and guerrilla warfare. General Order 100 was no exception. Section III, 

52, declared that “if, however, the people of a country, or any portion of 

the same, already occupied by an army, rise against it, they are violators 

of the laws of war and are not entitled to their protection.”33 Thus, military 

commanders could take even harsher measures than allowed under the 

laws of war to control the population. The US in general did not enforce 

this rule in its most extreme manifestation but it did enable commanders 

to conduct operations in a manner which might not otherwise have been 

legal.

It is Section X of G.O. 100 that specifically dealt with operations during 

what it called rebellion. It stated that “the term rebellion is applied to an 

insurrection of large extent, and is usually a war between the legitimate 

government of a country and portions of provinces of the same who 

seek to throw off their allegiance to it and set up a government of their 

own.”34 It could be argued that Filipinos did not consider US rule to be 

legitimate. However, this was the view of the US, and based on the treaty 

with Spain and the purchase of the archipelago, was also recognized under 

international law. The Filipino insurgency against the US was therefore a 

rebellion under G.O. 100.

Under such circumstances, G.O. 100 stated that:

The military commander of the legitimate government, in a war of 

rebellion, distinguishes between the loyal citizen in the revolted portion 

of the country and the disloyal citizen. The disloyal citizens may further 

be classified into those citizens known to sympathize with the rebellion 

without positively aiding it, and those who, without taking up arms, give 

positive aid and comfort to the rebellious enemy without being bodily 

forced thereto.35

This is very important to the concept of population and resource control 

measures because it speaks to their primary purpose. The difficulty 

of determining which citizens are loyal and which are open or covert 

supporters of the insurgency necessitates that the counterinsurgent protect 

and isolate the population from the insurgent. Moreover, it requires the 

counterinsurgent to prohibit behavior that may support the insurgency so 

that offenders can be identified and punished.
59

General Order 100 directed commanders to “protect the manifestly loyal 

citizens in revolted territories against the hardships of war.”36 It further 

instructed them to “throw the burden of the war, as much as lies within 

his power, on the disloyal citizens, of the revolted portion or province, 

subjecting them to a stricter police than the non-combatant enemies have 

to suffer in regular war.”37 Thus, commanders were legally entitled to 

enforce strict control over the population’s behavior and force them to 

declare their fidelity to the government through their actions.

All of the powers and instructions contained within G.O. 100 provided 

US commanders a legal basis upon which to impose population and 

resource control measures. The measures could be harsh as long as they 

were intended to isolate and protect those members of the population who 

did not support the insurgency. Those that did support the insurgency 

could be subjected to harsh restrictions, imprisonment, or even death. 

Moreover, military commanders could legally enforce the restrictions 

without recourse to civilian courts.38 This enabled commanders to dispense 

punishment against violators quickly and decisively.

In many provinces of the Philippines, the military did not have to resort 

to the powers detailed in G.O. 100 to gain control. Following occupation, 

the military established local governments, generally using the same 

Filipino elites who had assisted the Spanish, and then policed the area 

as necessary.39 However, much of Southern Luzon had been unoccupied 

since the arrival of the US Army in 1898 and Filipino insurgent leaders 

loyal to Aguinaldo and Filipino independence were in control of these 

areas. As a result, population and resource control measures had to be 

imposed to break their control and end the insurgency.

Batangas

Background

Batangas is a province in the southern half of the island of Luzon. It 

stretches over 1,000 square miles and at the turn of the 20th century had 

a population of approximately 300,000 people living in 22 towns. The 

largest town was Lipa with 40,000 people. However, most Filipino towns 

consisted of little more than a loose aggregation of villages and scattered 

small holdings.40 Batangas was not especially poor but its agricultural land 

was not sufficient to meet the needs of the population and it had to import 

rice. Most families earned just enough money and produced just enough 

food to survive.41 Yet, Batangueños would prove to be ardent supporters of 

Philippine independence, despite its high personal cost.
60

Batangueños, both the poor and the prominent members of the 

community, eagerly supported the insurrection against Spain. Batangas 

was the last province to succumb to Spanish efforts to end the rebellion. 

The commander of the Batangueño forces, Miguel Malvar, was the last 

insurgent leader to surrender and he inspired much loyalty from the 

population.42

Malvar returned to the Philippines with Aguinaldo, rallied his forces, 

and attacked Spanish garrisons. By June 1898, the province was free 

of Spanish control. The new government collected taxes, established 

schools, started newspapers, and petitioned the national government for 

relief funds.43 US forces conducted brief expeditions into the neighboring 

provinces of Tayabas and Cavite during 1899 but not into Batangas itself. 

Batangas was independent and under Filipino rule.

US Pacification Campaign, January 1900–November 1901

 Batangas’ independence ended when the US Army captured Santo Tomas 

on 9 January 1900. Malvar’s forces initially fought using conventional 

tactics and were repeatedly defeated. The conventional fight ended with the 

capture of Taal on 19 January 1900.44 Future Filipino journalist, legislator, 

and aide to President Manuel Quezon, Teodoro Kalaw, observed that after 

the occupation of Lipa:

The people began timidly to return to their homes, in the beginning with 

much apprehension. Seeing, however, that the Americans did them no 

harm, everyone was soon back in town, living a normal life. The troops 

of the Republic, and its heroic leaders, kept to the mountains in order to 

launch that last phase of the resistance movement against the Americans, 

guerrilla warfare.45

Though defeated in conventional battles by the US Army, Malvar’s 

forces had not suffered many casualties and still represented a major threat. 

Malvar organized his remaining force into three “flying columns” and on 

January 25 the columns conducted two separate ambushes against the 38th 

and 45th US Infantry.46 Moreover, the Filipino control of the population 

that existed prior to the US arrival had not been fully interrupted. Kalaw 

noted that his father, the Municipal President of Lipa, and cousin, the Chief 

of Police, “experienced many bitter moments trying to be faithful to their 

duties and at the same time loyal to their countrymen.”47 Kalaw stated that 

on one side his father and cousin were watched by the Americans while 

on the other they “were pressed by our suffering Revolutionists headed by 

General Malvar.”48
61

US commanders in Batangas focused initially on the destruction of 

Malvar’s guerrillas. Patrols scouted the countryside day and night with 

little intelligence searching for Filipino fighters.49 These tactics yielded 

some success. The report of the Department Commander for Southern 

Luzon from August 15, 1900, showed that the Second District, which 

contained Batangas, produced nearly half of the recorded insurgent deaths 

and over 70 percent of insurgent captures for the entire department during 

that year.50 However, this attrition did not seriously hamper Malvar and 

the insurgency continued. In a letter to his superiors in June of 1901, the 

commander in Batangas, Brigadier General Samuel Sumner, asked for 

reinforcements and noted that he thought it advisable to “arrest all the men 

and bring them to the several posts, force them to surrender arms or give 

information . . . and let it be known that they will be held till the active 

Insurrectos come in and surrender their arms.”51

By the summer of 1901, the US Army began to understand that the 

insurgency in Batangas was different. In his report of 26 August 1901, the 

Department Commander of Southern Luzon, Brigadier General J.F. Wade, 

noted that the “great majority of the people [in Batangas, Cavite, and 

Laguna] are violently opposed to American rule and both hate and fear the 

Americans.”52 Wade stated that Malvar had “undoubtedly also the material 

support of a large number of high-class natives and foreigners in Manila 

and other large towns, who . . . are not satisfied with the course of events 

and probably not quite convinced as to the honesty of our intentions.”53

Wade also indentified that an inability to control the population’s behavior 

seriously hindered pacification efforts. He reported that the guerrillas did 

not stay in the mountains; rather, “the majority of them live at home, even 

in and about the towns we occupy. When wanted, they are warned through 

their system of signals and runners, and gather at night at some designated 

place. The number is limited only by the number required or the number 

of rifles within reach.”54 After the action was over the insurgent fighter put 

down his rifle and assumed the guise of an “amigo.”55

The US Army’s tactics did not prevent the population from supporting 

the insurgency and Malvar intimidated them to deny support to the 

Americans. He declared all those who worked with American forces to 

be traitors and their lives and property forfeited.56 He also established a 

system of control that compelled the population to provide him manpower 

and material support.

In an order issued by his headquarters on 28 April 1901, Malvar assumed 

command of all of Southern Luzon and furthered a system of control already 
62

in place.57 The order directed the organizing chief of military forces in 

each area to “take an average of one unmarried soldier for every hundred 

habitants, apart from the volunteers.”58 It fixed the war tax at 60 centimos

per male and 30 centimos per female for every six months.59 It instructed 

commanders to ensure that “private individuals sow an abundance of rice, 

corn, sweet potatoes, egg plants, tomatoes, beans, and other products of 

prime necessity, for the good of all and in the defense of the nation.”60

This system of control allowed the insurgency in Batangas to resist efforts 

by the US to end it only through security measures. Wade asserted that 

casualties inflicted on Filipino forces were inducing numerous surrenders, 

which was true in the provinces surrounding Batangas, but not in Batangas 

itself.61 American forces burned buildings and crops but this did not inhibit 

the population’s ability to provide support. Eventually, Sumner directed 

his units to occupy barrios for three days at a time.62 This was intended to 

deny Malvar’s guerrillas logistical support but the occupation of barrios 

was for too short of a time period to change the population’s behavior.

The new Philippine Governor General, William Howard Taft, and US 

Army commander in the Philippines, Major General Adna Chaffee, wanted 

the insurgency in Batangas to end rapidly so that the province could be 

transferred to civil control. Sumner was replaced on 30 November 1901 

by the US Army’s premier counterinsurgent in the Philippines, Brigadier 

General J. Franklin Bell.63 The success of Malvar and the Batangueño

guerrillas at controlling the population would now expose them to Bell’s 

most effective tactic, population and resource control measures. 

Bell’s Pacification of Batangas

Bell had served in the Philippines for several years and had pacified 

the Ilocos province in Northern Luzon earlier in 1901. Bell demonstrated 

that he understood the conditions in Batangas and the challenges posed 

by Malvar’s control of the population. In an address to his officers upon 

assuming command, Bell stated that he believed in the policy of attraction 

and benevolent assimilation, but “my experience finally convinced me 

that it alone could not be efficacious in dealing with Tagalos (sic).”64He 

noted that, “Batangas is the very heart of the Tagalo (sic) region” and “the 

insurrection has been more vigorously and numerously sustained here.”65

Further, he stated that “it is not possible to convince these irreconcilable 

and unsophisticated people by kindness and benevolence alone that you 

are right and they are wrong.”66 Instead, it would be necessary to use 

force to change their behavior. American forces would have to compel 
63

community leaders “to order and counsel him [the common villager] to do 

that which we want him to do.”67

Bell told his commanders to protect the population that desired peace 

and to “deprive the insurgents of supplies and prevent them from getting 

more.”68 His purpose was to “turn the inhabitants against the insurrection 

and secure their earnest and loyal assistance in efforts to re-establish 

peace.”69 Moreover, Bell wanted from the population “respect for the 

American flag and submission to constituted authority.”70 To accomplish 

these objectives, Bell implemented population and resource control 

measures.

Bell issued his orders through a series of telegraphic circulars that began 

in December 1901. Reconcentration of the population was ordered in 

Circular No. 2, which directed that:

In order to put an end to enforced contributions, now levied by insurgents 

upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled and outlying barrios and districts, 

by means of intimidation and assassination, commanding officers of all 

towns now existing . . . will immediately specify and establish plainly 

marked limits surrounding each town bounding a zone within which it 

may be practicable, with an average sized garrison, to exercise efficient 

supervision over and furnish protection to inhabitants (who desire to be 

peaceful) against the depredations of armed insurgents.71

Commanders “will also see that orders are at once given and distributed 

to all inhabitants . . . that unless they move by December 25th from outlying 

barrios and districts . . . their property (found outside of said zone at said 

date) will become liable to confiscation or destruction.”72 Once peaceful 

conditions were re-established, the population could return to their former 

homes.73

Circular No. 7 established Bell’s policy of food denial. He noted up 

front that G.O. 100 authorized the starving of hostile belligerents and to 

that end, “every proper effort will be made at all times to deprive those in 

arms in the mountains of food supplies.”74 Bell believed that it would “not 

take more than a week to completely clear all outlying districts of food 

products. Station commanders will begin at once to hunt for and bring in 

these supplies.”75 These supplies were not merely taken from the insurgents, 

but were provided to the people under the US Army’s protection so that 

they would not starve nor have an incentive to leave the protected areas. 

Circular No. 15 directed that “no rice or food products will be permitted to 

leave the limits of the protected zones.”76

Bell complemented the reconcentration and food denial policies by 
64

establishing movement restrictions. Circular No. 14 prohibited movement 

on the roads and trails outside of the restricted zones without a pass 

from the commanding officer that specified the “length of time the said 

individual has permission to be absent, where permitted to go and for 

what purpose.”77 If the pass holder failed to return at the designated hour 

he would be arrested and confined. Additionally, “any able bodied male 

found by patrols or scouting detachments outside of protected zones 

without passes will be arrested and confined, or shot if he runs away.”78

Circular No. 19 established further limits on the population’s behavior. 

Station commanders “convinced that collections are being made for the 

benefit of the insurgent cause, in public markets . . . are authorized to close 

the same.”79 Inhabitants “will be required to enter their habitations not 

later than 8 p.m., and to refrain from again appearing upon the street . . . 

before the break of day.”80 Those found outside during curfew were to be 

arrested and fined.

Circular No. 20 addressed the behavior of both the population and the 

local governing officials. It required the local officials to immediately 

report insurgents in their jurisdiction. If they failed to do so they would 

be “tried and punished by Provost Court.”81 Local officials who tried to 

evade or neglect their duties would also be imprisoned. If the population 

concealed firearms and did not turn them in after being directed to, their 

barrio or homes could be burned.82 Moreover, commanders were instructed 

to ensure that locals did not possess American uniform parts and “native 

troops caught selling any portion of their uniform would be severely 

punished.”83

Summarizing all of his directives to date, Bell stated that “the purpose 

of the preceding telegraphic circulars of instruction has been to place the 

burden of war on the disloyal and to so discipline them that they will 

become anxious to aid and assist the government in putting an end to the 

insurrection and in securing the re-establishment of civil government.”84

In assessing whether a town and its population were supporting the 

insurgents, Bell cautioned his subordinates “not to judge or be mislead 

by words alone.”85 They had to “rely solely upon acts in order to form a 

correct judgment of sincerity.”86

Bell’s population and resource control measures went into effect the 

next day. Over the course of the next four months, Bell issued additional 

directives to improve the effectiveness of the population and resource 

control measures. He banned the possession of war bolos and talibons

throughout Batangas, Cavite, and Laguna provinces.87 He directed his 
65

subordinates to collect intelligence to accurately determine the composition 

of Malvar’s force and the number of firearms they had so that when he 

surrendered it could be ascertained how many of his forces remained in 

the field.88 He instructed his commanders to secure firearms by paying 

the population to turn them in.89 All surrendered personnel would have 

their names, insurgent unit information, residence, and other information 

recorded and tracked.90

Bell’s population and resource control measures produced rapid 

success. Kalaw observed that “such stern measures had to produce results. 

Colonels Katigbak and Kalaw, till then inseparable aides to General 

Malvar, marched into town with all their men and surrendered.”91 The two 

officers led a patrol of 500 Filipino volunteers into the mountains in early 

April 1902 to attempt to capture Malvar. With his wife severely ill, his 

army either surrendered or starving in the mountains, and his control over 

the population broken, Malvar surrendered on 16 April 1902. Once his 

remaining army had also capitulated, Bell ordered an end to the population 

and resource control measures in his final circular on 16 May 1902.92

Malvar explained his decision to Batangueños in a letter written on the 

day of his surrender. He identified as the first two reasons “the desertion 

of my most trusted officers” and “the knowledge that the people in all 

the towns were looking for me, to induce me to surrender.”93 The next 

reason was the “lack of food in the field, owing to the concentration in the 

zone, apart from the increased activity of the American troops; because 

of the adherence of the towns, to the American troops on account of the 

concentration and the measures taken by General Bell.”94 He concluded 

by saying that he had sought only “a government of our own, with a flag 

of our own, under the protection of the American government.” Several 

of Malvar’s subordinates and his brother-in-law, an insurgent leader in 

Tayabas province, indicated that Bell’s tactics were the only ones that 

could have ended the insurgency in Batangas.95

Civilian-Led Pacification, 1902-1935

With the pacification of Batangas complete and the near simultaneous 

end of the brutal campaign on the island of Samar, civilian authority over 

the entire archipelago of the Philippines was firmly established. From this 

point forward it was the responsibility of civil officials to lead pacification 

efforts, though some provinces were governed by serving US Officers. 

Military forces remained in the archipelago and were utilized in support of 

civil pacification efforts but did not lead them.
66

The military’s efforts over the previous three years had brought most 

of the population under the control of the government. However, gangs 

of bandits and committed insurgents continued to use violence to subvert 

government control in support of their aims, regardless of what those aims 

might be. These groups presented threats of varying degrees to US control 

of the Philippines and the civil government had to respond to them to 

maintain legitimacy with the population.96

US civilian authorities, beginning with Taft, constructed a legal 

framework to provide them the tools to respond to both armed resistance 

and political subversion.97 Some of these tools provided for restrictions on 

the population’s behavior that were in place at all times. Others enabled 

civil authorities to implement population and resource control measures 

similar to those used by Bell in Batangas and enforce them using the 

Philippines Constabulary and, if necessary, US Army forces.

Control Mechanism–Civil Law

McKinley’s appointment of Taft as the first Governor General of the 

Philippines, which may have been largely the result of political maneuvering, 

was nonetheless fortuitous. Taft was an expert in constitutional law and 

later served as Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court.98 As a result, he 

was well qualified to establish a legal regime in the Philippines that would 

enable the US to maintain its hard won control of the islands through a 

system of harsh sanctions against undesirable behavior and emergency 

powers during times of crisis.

Taft and his successors were aided in this effort by several decisions of 

the US Supreme Court. These decisions, collectively referred to as the 

Insular Cases, established that Filipinos were subjects of the US, but not 

citizens. This gave the US regime in the Philippines power to restrict or 

revoke certain civil liberties in the Philippines, such as the right to a trial 

by jury. Thus, the US government in the Philippines could implement 

and enforce measures to suppress armed revolts and eliminate political 

subversion that were not available to governments in the homeland.99

Legal Restrictions and Powers in Support of Civil Pacification

The civil government of the Philippines established restrictions 

on behavior and provided civil governments new powers to support 

pacification. The Philippine Commission passed a series of acts over the 

years to modify the Spanish Penal Code and Governors General issued 

Executive Orders when necessary to enforce restrictions. The acts and 
67

orders established new definitions for certain crimes, articulated the 

means of determining proof, and provided civil authorities in the province 

additional powers to control the population. Furthermore, these acts 

directed the Constabulary and local officials to enforce the law and gave 

them the power to do so.

Act No. 518, known as the Bandolerismo Statute, was passed in 

November of 1902 and defined the crime of brigandage.100 It established that 

an armed band consisting of three or more persons formed for the purpose 

of committing robbery, theft, or abduction was guilty of brigandage.101

Notably, the law provided extraordinary power to convict people of 

brigandage with little legal proof. To prove the crime of brigandage it was 

“not necessary to adduce evidence that any member of the band has in 

fact committed robbery or theft or abduction, but it is sufficient to justify 

conviction if, from all the evidence, it can be inferred beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the accused was a member of a band of robbers organized for 

such illegal purposes.”102 Moreover, the act provided that any person 

who abetted such a band by providing it information, material support, 

or shelter could also be punished.103The Bandolerismo Statute was still 

being enforced as late as 1911 and was included in the 1911 Constabulary 

manual.104

Act No. 781 of June 1903, the so-called Reconcentration Act, was even 

more powerful. The act was technically a modification to the act which 

had established the Constabulary but it also provided a new power to the 

civil government to counter armed resistance. Section 6 established that:

In provinces which are infested to such an extent with ladrones or 

outlaws that the lives and property of residents in the outlying barrios

are rendered wholly insecure by continued predatory raids, and such 

outlying barrios thus furnish to the ladrones or outlaws their sources 

of food supply, and it is not possible with the available police forces 

constantly to provide protection to such barrios, it shall be within 

the power of the civil governor, upon resolution of the Philippine 

commission, to authorize the provincial governor to order that the 

residents of such outlying barrios be temporarily brought within stated 

proximity to the polblación or larger barrios of the municipality, there to 

remain until the necessity for such order ceases to exist.105

American civil authorities could now legally reconcentrate Filipinos just 

as Bell had and for the same reason, to break insurgent or criminal control 

over the population.
68

Act No. 781 contained another section that allowed the civil government 

to assert control over the population. Section 5 established that “it shall be 

the duty of all municipal officers, as soon as practicable, to give notice to 

the provincial governor, or inspector of constabulary in the province, of the 

presence of any bands of ladrones or brigands.”106 Municipal officers that 

did not comply “shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand 

dollars and imprisonment not exceeding two years.”107 Given the broad 

definition of brigandage discussed above, Filipino officials in the towns 

that did not report any gathering of armed men might find themselves in 

violation of the law. This section was reauthorized later under Act No. 

1683. The requirements for municipal officers remained the same but the 

maximum punishment was changed to a fine of 2000 Philippine pesos and 

confinement for two years.108

The insurrection against Spain and the insurgency against the US both 

suffered from a lack of sufficient numbers of firearms. This condition 

continued to hamper insurgents and brigands after 1902. To solidify 

the government’s control over firearms, Taft issued Executive Order 

No. 9 on 23 March 1903. The order required any resident who wanted 

to possess a firearm to provide a two hundred dollar bond per weapon 

and file an application.109 Municipalities that wished to arm their police 

forces had to put up a one hundred dollar bond per weapon.110 Approval 

for such applications resided with the chief of the Constabulary and the 

civil governor, respectively. Each firearm application included its kind, 

make, model, and serial number and the amount, caliber, and make of 

ammunition for it. Permits were granted for only one year at a time and 

even registered weapons had to be turned in on demand.111 Passed later, 

Act No. 1780 established a maximum punishment of a 500 peso fine and a 

six month jail term for the unlawful possession of a firearm.112

Act No. 1309 provided the final tool to the civil government for 

controlling the population. It empowered:

The municipal council, with the approval of the provincial governor, 

when the province or municipality is infested with ladrones, to authorize 

the municipal president to require able-bodied male residents of the 

municipality, between the ages of 18 and 50 years, to each assist for 

a period not exceeding five days in any one month in apprehending 

ladrones, robbers, and other lawbreakers and suspicious characters, and 

to act as patrols for the protection of the municipality not exceeding one 

day in each week.113
69

This act gave local governments an enormous ability to control and 

protect their own populations, especially if the local Constabulary unit 

were called away to other provinces.

It was not just armed threats that the US colonial government sought to 

control. Laws were passed that banned political parties, made assembly 

under certain circumstances illegal, and denied Filipinos basic political 

freedoms. Kalaw joined the euphemistically named “Committee on 

Filipino Interests” and noted that they had to meet in secret under such a 

name because working for independence was “considered treason then.”114

The US maintained rigid control over Filipino politics for decades.115

The legal restrictions and pacification powers combined to provide 

the civilian government in the Philippines a tremendous amount of 

control over the population. The legal restrictions on behavior, such as 

brigandage, fire arm possession, the joining of political parties, and the 

reporting requirements for municipal officials, were always in force. 

Emergency pacification powers included reconcentration and forced 

manpower support. Together they produced a control mechanism that gave 

the colonial regime tremendous flexibility in its conduct of pacification. It 

also made pacification easier because it ensured near continuous control 

over the population to begin with.

The Philippine Bill and the Insular Cases

The colonial regime was able to impose such restrictions because 

Filipinos were subjects of the US but not citizens. Congress established 

their status in the Philippine Organic Act, passed on 1 July 1902. The bill 

proscribed powers to the Philippine Commission and placed limits on its 

ability to enforce law and order. However, these limits were not as stringent 

as they were in the US itself. The Supreme Court affirmed the limitations 

established by Congress in a series of decisions in the Insular Cases.

Section 4 of the Organic Act, declared that persons residing in the 

Philippines before the insurrection against the Spanish, and all those born 

thereafter, were “citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to 

the protection of the United States.”116 Crucially, they were not citizens of 

the United States. They were, however, provided several legal protections 

in Section 5.

These protections included many of those found in the US Constitution 

and Bill of Rights. The prohibitions against being tried twice for the same 

crime, unreasonable search and seizure, and excessive bail remained.117

Filipinos were also entitled to freedom of speech, religion, the press, 
70

and assembly. Notably absent, however, were the right to bear arms, the 

right to a trial by jury, and the requirement to be indicted by a grand jury. 

Moreover, while the writ of habeus corpus was affirmed, its suspension 

was allowed “when in cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion the 

public safety may require it.”118

The US Supreme Court affirmed Congress’ power to decide the status 

of any acquired territory and to establish laws that differed from those in 

force within the US for such territory. In 1904 the Court stated in US v. 

Dorr:

We conclude that the power to govern territory, implied in the right to 

acquire it, and given to Congress in the Constitution in article 4, 3, to 

whatever other limitations it may be subject, the extent of which must be 

decided as questions arise, does not require that body to enact for ceded 

territory not made a part of the United States by Congressional action, 

a system of laws which shall include the right of trial by jury, and that 

the Constitution does not, without legislation, and of its own force, carry 

such right to territory so situated.119

Therefore, because Congress had not incorporated the Philippines into 

the territory of the US, Filipinos were only entitled to the rights specifically 

identified in the Philippine Bill. They could not claim all of the rights of 

US citizens contained in the Constitution.

The Court affirmed this decision and extended its conclusions seven 

years later in US v. Dodwell. In Dodwell the Court wrote that:

As to the objection that no indictment was found by a grand jury, as 

required by article 5 of the Amendments of the Constitution, there is 

no such requirement in the Philippine act of July 1, 1902. It is therein 

provided that ‘no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of 

life, liberty, or property without due process of law.’ This court has held 

that due process of law does not require presentment of an indictment 

found by a grand jury.120

While Dodd and Dodwell together do not address all of the rights denied 

to Filipinos they do illustrate that the Philippine Commission’s powers 

to assert control over the population vastly exceeded the power of the 

US Government in the homeland. In its pacification campaigns, the civil 

government would make wide use of its powers.
71

Civilian-Led Pacification in Southern Luzon

From 1902 to 1935 the US civil government in the Philippines conducted 

a number of pacification campaigns. It is beyond the scope of this work 

to address them all. However, a close examination of the campaign in 

Southern Luzon, especially in the province of Cavite, from 1904 to 1906 

will demonstrate how the colonial regime used the legal mechanisms at its 

disposal to control the population and end armed threats.

While there are other lengthy campaigns that could be examined, 

especially in the Moro areas where an insurgency continues to this day, 

only an insurgency that emanated from the Tagalog areas of Luzon posed a 

threat to US control of the entire archipelago. Luzon included the national 

capital, Manila, and was the mostly heavily populated island. Tagalogs 

were the largest single ethnic group and had produced the majority of the 

insurgent leaders. Moreover, Cavite was the birthplace of both Aguinaldo 

and the insurrection against Spain. Thus, once it was finally pacified it 

could be concluded that Filipinos had acquiesced to American rule.

Background

The US military’s campaign in Cavite ended quickly relative to that in 

Batangas when Mariano Trias surrendered in March 1901.121 Trias was the 

first major Tagalog leader to capitulate and his doing so led to the collapse 

of the insurgency in Cavite.122 This did not, however, end the threat of 

insurgency in Cavite.

The provincial governor, Major D. C. Shanks, stated in his report 

of August 15, 1905, that “at the time my last report was submitted, in 

September, 1904, the province had been free for some time from ladrone 

movements.”123 However, in the fall of 1904, some of the Constabulary in 

the province were transferred to the island of Samar and the enlistments 

of many of the soldiers in the native scouts companies came to an end. 

This left the province relatively undefended and the situation was taken 

advantage of by several bands of insurgents operating throughout the 

Tagolog provinces of Cavite, Batangas, Laguna, and Rizal.124

Loosely based at their outset and loyal to specific leaders, the armed 

bands eventually coalesced into a coherent insurgent organization under 

the political leadership of Mariano Sakay, who considered himself to be 

the “president of the Filipino Republic,” and the military leadership of 

Lieutenant General Montalón.125 Montalón controlled a group of armed 

men from Cavite and Batangas province and had secured the loyalty of 

several other armed bands in Southern Luzon.126
72

Fighting began when an armed band attacked the police station and native 

scout barracks in San Pedro Tanasan, Laguna Province on 12 November 

1904.127 Insurgent successes continued over the next several months, 

culminating on 15 January 1905, when Montalón’s forces disarmed the 

municipal police in Taal, Batangas province, looted the treasury, and 

escaped with 20 rifles and 15 shotguns.128

Pacification Campaign

Montalón’s actions convinced the colonial regime that a massive 

response was required. Cavite, Batangas, Laguna, and Rizal provinces 

were grouped into a “provisional constabulary district” under the command 

of the assistant chief of the Constabulary, Colonel D. J. Baker.129 However, 

at no time did Baker or the military assume command of the pacification 

campaign; all four provinces remained under the control of their civil 

governors. Constabulary officers were pulled from stations across the 

archipelago to reinforce the provisional district. Moreover, the Governor 

General directed the US Army to support the campaign, and the 2d Cavalry 

and 7th Infantry were sent to Cavite. In his report of 31 July 1905, Baker 

stated that “the moral effect of these troops, not only in Cavite, where they 

took station, but also in Batangas, was decisive.”130

The Governor General suspended the writ of habeas corpus in Cavite 

and Batangas on 31 January 1905. Baker noted that while no one was 

arrested without at least a reasonable suspicion of guilt, suspension of the 

writ did mean that “the arrested law breakers can not (sic) of right obtain 

bail and again free resume their practices and intimidate the witnesses 

against them.”131 It also freed up officials who would otherwise have had 

to prosecute, try, and counsel the offenders to assist the Constabulary in 

capturing more ladrones.

Baker further stated that the suspension of the writ, and the powers 

of arrest it gave him, “proved an instrument of mercy.”132 Baker and his 

officers made an effort to turn those who had been captured and “many of 

those who had confessedly sinned were encouraged to make atonement 

by giving their influence, by obtaining information through their previous 

connections, or by abstaining from obstructive tactics.”133 Baker’s ability to 

control the population through the power of arrest thus gave him the ability 

to change the behavior of former insurgents to support the government.

Baker did not detail the campaign over the next couple of months in his 

report. However, he stated that it consisted of “weary waits for information, 

the hard and usually profitless marches, the carefully planned but 
73

generally indecisive attacks, the tedious and often fruitless negotiations, 

and the patient but often disappointing efforts to induce the people to free 

themselves from the irresponsible bondage of ladronism.”134 Despite the 

powers of control that the civil government had and the powers of arrest 

given to the armed forces, traditional methods of campaigning proved 

insufficient.

Governor General Luke Edward Wright reported on 1 November 1905, 

that:

The country was intersected with numberless blind trails known only to 

the ladrones, which led to their haunts, and it was useless to conduct a 

campaign in the ordinary way. It was easy for them when pressed to bury 

their guns and scatter themselves among the people of outlying barrios, 

many of whom were their relatives or sympathizers and none of whom 

dare to give information. The ladrones were thus in a position to draw 

supplies at will from the people and to unite or disperse as occasion 

might require.135

Trying to campaign using patrols, marches, and the standard tactics of 

the Constabulary and the Army under such circumstances would produce 

only limited success and would not deny the insurgents the support that 

sustained them. Therefore, because “it was obvious that no real progress 

could be made so long as this state of affairs existed, and accordingly . . 

. it was determined to depopulate all of the outlying barrios and draw the 

people most exposed to ladrone raids and influences in the poblaciones.”136

Reconcentration was ordered for portions of all four provinces but was 

most heavily utilized in Cavite and Batangas. It was not, however, as 

pervasive as it had been in Batangas three years earlier. While Bell had reconcentrated almost the entire population of Batangas to gain control, Baker 

reported that “the extent and degree of each reconcentration was adapted 

to local conditions and necessities. In no case were the rigors or penalties 

of a technical or much less of a popularly understood reconcentration 

enforced.”137 This lesser form of reconcentration was nonetheless still 

effective and Baker stated that the restrictions were lifted as conditions 

justified. Reconcentration in Southern Luzon ended by July 1905.

Summing up the campaign, Baker reported that 422 insurgents were 

killed, captured, or surrendered and the combined force had regained 

control of 518 firearms.138 Of the insurgent leaders still at large he stated:

Of the remnant of the ladrones, Sakay frequents northern Rizal . . . 

Felizardo disarmed and stripped of companions, lurks between here 

and Manila. De Vega and his remaining followers skulk in the forest of 
74

Buenavista and Jalan. Montalón, who has been joined by Natividad’s 

remnant of Oruga’s band, is hidden now here and now there by the 

Cólorum society.139

While he recognized these men as still dangerous, they no longer posed 

a serious threat to government control of Luzon.

Less than a year later, the acting Constabulary Chief, Colonel Henry 

Bandholtz, working through a former Filipino insurgent leader, Dr. 

Dominador Gomez, secured the surrender of Sakay, De Vega, Montalón, 

and others, with no conditions except the offer of a fair trial.140 All were 

convicted, and Sakay and De Vega were ultimately executed. Governor 

General James F. Smith reported on 3 November 1908 that “it is eminently 

gratifying to be able to state that from July 1, 1908, to the date of making 

this report, a state of complete peace and public tranquility has existed 

throughout the Archipelago.”141 It is true that Smith downplayed the 

continuing violence in the Moro areas but his assessment was accurate 

in that the critical Tagalog speaking areas of Luzon were indeed pacified.

Analysis of Population and Resource Control Measures in the Philippines

Population and resource control measures were undoubtedly effective in 

the pacification of the Philippines. This was true whether the archipelago 

was under military or civilian control. Bell’s incredibly detailed and 

interlocking system of population and resource controls ended in less than 

five months an insurgency in Batangas which had resisted all previous 

Army efforts to end it for the prior two years. The Governor General, the 

provincial governors, and the security forces crushed a nascent insurgency 

in Southern Luzon in slightly more than five months once population and 

resource control measures were fully implemented. Moreover, they did so 

with a less pervasive regime than Bell had used. The final death of Tagalog 

insurgency in the archipelago was a quiet one as Sakay, De Vega, and 

Montalón surrendered without conditions.

It could be argued that the effectiveness of population and resource 

control measures in the Philippines is only mildly interesting because such 

a harsh set of restrictions could not possibly be used today. However, close 

examination of the population and resource control measures employed 

yields lessons that can be applied by modern counterinsurgent forces. The 

population and control measures were all legally enforceable, either under 

martial law as represented in G.O. 100, or in the acts and orders passed by 

the US government in the Philippines. They simultaneously protected the 

population and isolated them from the insurgents. Lastly, they prevented 
75

behavior that supported the insurgents and facilitated behavior that 

supported the government.

Legal Enforcement

The control mechanisms created by G.O. 100 and the laws enacted by 

the civil government of the Philippine Commission and the Governor 

General empowered local counterinsurgent commanders to legally 

enforce population and resource control measures. Legal enforcement 

gave the counterinsurgent forces a means of incarcerating or otherwise 

punishing those who violated the restrictions and it allowed them to do so 

without having to determine if the violator was actually an insurgent. A 

distinction was no longer necessary since by violating the restrictions the 

person had committed a crime. This removed one of the main difficulties 

that confronted the counterinsurgent forces during pacification of the 

Philippines.

Wade identified how difficult it was in his 1901 report. He stated that 

“the common solider [of the insurgency] wears the dress of the country; 

with his gun he is a soldier; by hiding it and walking quietly along the 

road, sitting down by the nearest house, or going to work in the nearest 

field, he becomes an ‘amigo’ full of good will”.142 Bell’s population and 

resource control measures alleviated this problem, however. Anyone who 

violated the movement restrictions, the curfew, or was found outside of the 

protected zones could be arrested and charged with a crime, and in some 

cases, shot. Soldiers no longer needed to distinguish between “amigos” 

and active insurgents; if someone was violating the restrictions they could 

be arrested and punished.

Legal enforcement of restrictions during the civil pacification of the 

campaign offered an additional benefit. Since many of the laws that 

established the population and resource control measures were in effect 

all the time, the Constabulary could enforce them and prevent large 

scale uprisings from ever beginning. The very act of joining an armed 

band or possessing a firearm without a permit was a crime punishable by 

incarceration. The insurgency in Southern Luzon that begun in 1904 was 

primarily the result of the transfer of many Constabulary officers to Samar, 

leaving the law unenforced and thus weakening the government’s control 

of the province.

Legal enforcement of population and resource control measures 

produced another advantage for both the military and civilian authorities. 

Since the burden of proof for a violation was low and the punishments 
76

were harsh, the counterinsurgents had enormous leverage over captured 

insurgents and their supporters to induce them to provide support to the 

government. If the prisoners offered help they could be pardoned or the 

sentence reduced, if they did not they would subject themselves and their 

families to the full hardship of the legal penalties. Bell used the surrendered 

Malvar subordinates Katigbak and Kalaw to lead a party to capture him. 

Baker offered amnesty to those he arrested in return for information on the 

remaining insurgents.

Protection and Isolation of the Population

During the campaign, the Filipino population was not subjected to 

attacks by insurgents on a regular basis. The insurgents lived among 

them and had no desire, or need, to attack them. However, the murder 

of “americanistas,” people who assisted US forces or worked for the 

government, was commonplace.143 Protecting those who worked with the 

regime was necessary for it to function, and as Wade identified, protecting 

them reduced the number of forces that were available to patrol in search 

of insurgents. Moreover, as noted numerous times, the insurgents were 

able to blend into the population making it difficult to target them during 

patrols.

The population and resource control measures imposed, especially 

reconcentration, alleviated both problems. Everyone who moved into a 

protected town had to do so without a weapon because of the restrictions 

on the possession of firearms. This reduced the ability of the insurgency to 

target americanistas. Governor General Wright stated that reconcentration 

in 1905 “furnished protection to the law-abiding people against spoliation 

and outrage.”144 Additionally, because the population was concentrated 

into a smaller area the military or Constabulary were able to provide 

protection with a smaller number of soldiers and this freed up forces to 

conduct patrols to target the insurgents.145

Wright highlighted the advantages of isolating the insurgents from the 

population when he noted that “the immediate effect of this reconcentration 

was to cut off the ready source of food supply which the outlaws theretofore 

had and to force them more in the open where they could be reached.”146

The insurgents could no longer hide among the population, because the 

population was inside of the protected zones. Without this source of cover, 

the insurgents could only hope to avoid military or Constabulary patrols. 

If they did not, and did not choose to fight, they could be arrested, as noted 

above, even if they were unarmed.
77

Isolating the population from the insurgency greatly facilitated targeting 

of the insurgents. Obviously, by placing most of the population into 

protected zones any fighters that remained outside were now easily 

identifiable. Bandholtz stated that one of the purposes for re-concentrating 

the population in Albay province in 1903 was “to enable the troops to 

operate freely without any fear of injuring innocent people.” 147Moreover, 

by protecting the population and isolating it from the insurgency it 

was possible to gain additional intelligence. Wright reported that once 

reconcentration had been imposed “the officers in charge soon began 

to get reliable information and guides and to track the outlaws to their 

hiding places.”148 He further noted that the insurgent bands were gradually 

broken up which enabled the counterinsurgent forces to reduce their patrol 

size and increase the frequency of patrols.149 This ensured that Sakay, 

Montalón, and the others were even more isolated and it accelerated the 

end of the insurgency.

Focus on Behavior

The previous chapter argued that it is difficult to change the intentions 

of the population and therefore the counterinsurgent should focus on 

controlling the behavior of the population. In this aspect, the Philippine 

counterinsurgents excelled. Recall the comment of Bell to his officers that 

“it is not possible to convince these irreconcilable and unsophisticated 

people by kindness and benevolence alone that you are right and they 

are wrong.”150 He also told them that “you cannot afford to believe what 

they [Filipinos] say about their relations with the insurrection unless it be 

backed up by some act which has so committed them to the side of the 

Americans as to greatly antagonize the insurgents.”151

Members of the civil government echoed Bell’s astute observation. The 

Constabulary Senior Inspector in Cavite, Captain T. R. Hanson, stated in 

his 1903 report that despite the appearance of security in the province 

“the population had apparently decided that they would not be governed. 

. . . The people in most of the towns are in sympathy with the outlaws 

and warn them of the approach of constabulary or scouts.”152 In his 1906 

report, the governor of Cavite province, Louis J. Van Schaick, stated that 

“I am convinced that ladrone leaders do not produce conditions, but that 

the conditions and attitude of the public produce ladrones.”153

These American observers understood that no amount of attraction or 

benevolence would change the minds of the most committed insurgents. 

However, by directing population and resource control measures at 

behaviors that supported the insurgency the US was able to control the 
78

population, and thus the insurgent leaders, as a prelude to persuading them 

to support US administration of the archipelago. Kalaw, in writing about 

the town of Lipa after Bell had imposed his population and resource control 

measures, said that “henceforth, neutrality would no longer be recognized. 

One either had to go out and fight for the Americans or to stay within 

the town as their prisoner.”154 Note that Kalaw does not say that one’s 

intention to support the insurgency had to change; rather, one’s behavior 

had to change. It was no longer possible to support the insurgency because 

Bell had made it illegal to engage in any behavior that might do so.

The focus on behavior also produced notable success with regards to the 

insurgents. Kalaw noted that “the Revolutionists were slowly starved out. 

With labor forbidden in the fields and communication with their friends 

impossible, they had no way of obtaining food.”155 Bandholtz observed 

that because of the population and resource control measures employed 

in Albay province in 1903 insurgents surrendered “in an emaciated 

condition, many of them covered with tropical ulcers. Some of them had 

ulcerated holes in their calves into which a man could thrust his fist.”156

The population could no longer provide them support and this severely 

inhibited their operations, regardless of whether or not they still had the 

loyalty of the population.

The population and resource control measure regime also facilitated 

behavior that supported the government. It has already been noted that 

both the military and the Constabulary received more information 

and greater assistance once such measures were in place. Even Malvar 

identified that the population of Batangas began to search for him to 

induce his surrender.157 Moreover, as discussed above, the colonial regime 

required municipal officers to provide information on ladrones at all times 

and could also require the population to provide manpower to the police 

or Constabulary during times of crisis.

Notably, the forced behavior change that the population and resource 

control measures brought about was often followed up by permanent 

changes. The Senior Inspector of the Constabulary for Batangas province 

in 1903 observed that the “better class of people discourage ladronism.”158

He also reported that a mass meeting was held in February 1903 to prevent 

ladronism. At this meeting funds were collected so that “a man is employed 

by the various barrios whose duty it is to give immediate information of 

existence of ladrones.”159 Long term behavior change was most notable 

amongst the leaders of the insurgency.
79

Many insurgent leaders determined that it was fruitless to resist US 

administration of the archipelago and thus decided that it was best to work 

for independence through the US rather than against it. Manuel Quezon, 

the first president of the Philippine Commonwealth, was an officer during 

the insurgency against the US His commander ordered him to surrender in 

1901 to find out if Aguinaldo had been captured. After seeing the captured 

Aguinaldo and delivering the message to his commander, Quezon was 

paroled. Two years later, still seething and unwilling to learn English, 

Quezon met with Governor Paras, a Filipino, of Tayabas province. During 

the meeting they “talked about the situation of our country. He [Paras] 

was an honest and a real patriot. He told me that he did not seek the job, 

but accepted it because it was his sincere opinion that the only way of 

promoting the freedom as well as the welfare of the Filipino people was 

by cooperating with the American Government.”160 After the meeting, 

Quezon recalled that “although I dissented from the opinion of Governor 

Paras, his words made some impression on me. I wondered, in my own 

mind, if the freedom which we lost by fighting America could not be won 

by cooperating with her.”161

Quezon’s intentions, to work for independence, were not changed by this 

meeting, but his behavior was. Quezon was not the only former insurgent 

to work with the Americans to govern the archipelago. His opponent in 

the first presidential election was none other than Aguinaldo. Subsequent 

to his surrender in Cavite, Trias was eventually made the provincial 

governor. Countless other insurgent leaders similarly cooperated with the 

colonial regime.

The behavior of the population was changed too, largely because it was 

clear that the US would impose control. Wright observed that:

As it became evident to the inhabitants of the affected provinces that the 

Government was in deadly earnest and proposed finally to make an end 

to ladronism their attitude underwent a material change, so that when 

one or two ladrones came into a barrio they were either seized or driven 

out by the people themselves.162

It is not likely that Wright actually knew whether or not the population’s 

attitude towards ladronism had changed, but it is clear that their behavior 

did.

The change in behavior on the part of both the leaders of the insurgency 

and the people as a result of the population and resource control measures 

also speaks to their legitimacy. It is hard to say whether or not ordinary 

Filipinos considered the US tactics legitimate. Kalaw and others have 
80

argued that they were not. However, this is belied by the fact that the 

leaders of the insurgency chose to work with the colonial regime. 

Moreover, it is likely that ordinary Filipinos considered a government that 

imposed control to be more legitimate than one that did not, regardless of 

the methods it used.163

The US did face legitimacy crises during its administration of the 

Philippines. However, these were caused by violations of the law by the 

Constabulary, such as torture, and corruption within colonial administration, 

not the restrictions in place or powers employed, including reconcentration, 

to pacify areas of the archipelago.164 While working as a journalist for 

El Renacimiento, a nationalistic Philippine newspaper, Kalaw regularly 

investigated alleged abuses of power by the Constabulary.165 He did not, 

however, openly attempt to remove the restrictions that he would later 

declare so awful. Finally, consider the words of an 18 year-old Kalaw on 

the day that Governor General Taft visited Lipa following the pacification 

of Batangas in 1902:

My town takes this opportunity of greeting you and of giving you the 

homage of gratitude. Be pleased to accept it. If my town cannot offer this 

with the brilliance of other more prosperous places you have recently 

visited, rest assured that it is given with the sincerity of a people who, 

even in surrender, have not lost an appreciation for its well-wishers.166
81

Notes

1. Anthony James Joes, “Counterinsurgency in the Philippines, 1898-1954,” 

in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, eds. Daniel Marston and Carter 

Malkasian, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 39.

2. Terms such as ladrones, bandoleros, and others are Spanish in origin and 

reflect the impact of Spain’s long colonial rule of the Philippines. The US 

personnel who participated in the campaign in the Philippines adopted these terms 

and they will be used throughout this paper where appropriate.

3. Glenn Anthony May, Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at War(New 

Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 48-65.

4. Joes, “Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” 41.

5. Ibid., 41.

6. Brian Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Lawrence, KS: University of 

Kansas Press, 2000), 23-24.

7. Ibid., 26.

8. Joes, “Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” 41.

9. Linn records that Otis was “one of the most unpopular, maligned, and 

controversial commanders in the islands.” But also asserts that he was “both more 

interesting and more capable than the caricature ‘Granny’ Otis created by his 

detractors.” See Linn, The Philippine War, 27-29.

10. Linn, The Philippine War, 88.

11. Linn, The Philippine War.

12. Ibid, 148.

13. Ibid, 30.

14. General Orders 100 will be discussed in greater detail below.

15. Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire (Madison, WI: The University 

of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 60.

16. U.S. Bureau of Insular Affairs, Ninth Annual Report of the Philippine 

Commission, 1908, Part 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. War Department, 1909), 43.

17. Joes, “Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” 46.

18. Ibid., 46.

19. An examination of the US Army’s counterinsurgency campaigns against 

Native American tribes is beyond the scope of this paper. However, many of these 

campaigns included population and resource control measures. Most obviously, 

Native American tribes were forced to live on reservations. Moreover, the 

systematic destruction of the American bison was extremely effective at breaking 

the will of the Comanches to continue to fight. For more information on the war 

against the Comanche see S.C. Gwynne, Empire of the Summer Moon: Quanah 
82

Parker and the Rise and Fall of the Comanches, the Most Powerful Indian Tribe 

in American History (New York: Scribner, 2010).

20. Andrew J. Birtle, US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations 

Doctrine, 1860-1941 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1998), 

133. Birtle notes that “most officers began their analysis from the premise that 

force was the sine qua non of Indian pacification. This view stemmed less from 

vindictiveness than acceptance of the brutal fact that government policy ultimately 

entailed the destruction of the Indian’s traditional way of life, something many 

Native Americans were unwilling to accept without a fight.” Birtle, U.S. Army 

Counterinsurgency, 79.

21. Linn, The Philippine War, 9.

22. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency, 101.

23. Linn, The Philippine War, 211.

24. Ibid., 211.

25. Adjutant General’s Office, US War Department, General Orders Number 

100 (Washington, DC: 1863), Section I, 4.

26. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency, 126.

27. Ibid., 126.

28. G.O. 100, Section I, 1.

29. Ibid., Section I, 5.

30. Ibid., Section I, 14.

31. Ibid., Section I, 15.

32. Ibid., Section I, 17.

33. Ibid., Section III, 52.

34. Ibid., Section X, 151.

35. Ibid., Section X, 155.

36. Ibid., Section X, 156.

37. Ibid., Section X, 156.

38. Ibid., Section I.

39. Linn, The Philippine War, 75-76.

40. May, Battle for Batangas, 8.

41. Ibid., 20.

42. Ibid., 50.

43. Ibid., 69-72.

44. Ibid., 125-26.
83

45. Teodoro M. Kalaw, Aide-de-camp to Freedom, trans. Maria Kalaw Katigbak 

(Manila: Teodoro M. Kalaw Society, Inc., 1965), 20.

46. May, Battle for Batangas, 132.

47. Kalaw, Aide-de-camp to Freedom, 24.

48. Ibid., 25.

49. May, Battle for Batangas.

50. US War Department, Report of the Lieutenant General Commanding the 

Army, 1900, Part 3 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900), 221.

51. Samuel Sumner quoted in May, Battle for Batangas, 228.

52. US War Department, Report of the Lieutenant General Commanding the 

Army, 1901, Part 5 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1901), 389.

53. Ibid., 389.

54. Ibid., 390.

55. Ibid., 390.

56. Ibid., 389.

57. Miguel Malvar, “Provisions and Instructions Issued by the Superior 

Commander of Southern Luzon for Observation by this Department,” 28 April 

1901, in John R.M. Taylor, The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States: 

a Compilation of Documents (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research 

Library Microfilm), Exhibit 1156.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. US War Department, Report of the Lieutenant General Commanding the 

Army, 1901, Part 5, 390.

62. May, Battle for Batangas, 236-37.

63. General Bell arrived in the Philippines as a junior officer in 1899, but was 

rapidly promoted to Brigadier General. He participated in every major phase of 

the US Army’s campaign in the Philippines through the pacification of Batangas 

in 1902. His career was briefly threatened after his return from the Philippines 

when he was called before Congress to testify about his actions in Batangas. The 

threat was short-lived, however, and Bell eventually became Chief of Staff of the 

Army.

64. J. Franklin Bell, address to the officers of Batangas province, December 1, 

1901, in Robert D. Ramsey III, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG J. 

Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901-1902 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies 

Institute Press, 2007), 34.
84

65. Ibid., 34.

66. Ibid., 34.

67. Ibid., 35.

68. Ibid., 39.

69. Ibid., 43.

70. Ibid., 41.

71. J. Franklin Bell, Telegraphic Circular No. 2, 8 December 1901, in Robert 

D. Ramsey III, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell 

in the Philippines, 1901-1902 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 

2007), 45.

72. Ibid., 45-46.

73. Ibid., 46.

74. J. Franklin Bell, Telegraphic Circular No. 7, 15 December 1901, in Robert 

D. Ramsey III, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell 

in the Philippines, 1901-1902 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 

2007), 55.

75. Ibid., 56.

76. J. Franklin Bell, Telegraphic Circular No. 15, 23 December 1901, in Robert 

D. Ramsey III, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell 

in the Philippines, 1901-1902 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 

2007), 62.

77. J. Franklin Bell, Telegraphic Circular No. 14, 21 December 1901, in Robert 

D. Ramsey III, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell 

in the Philippines, 1901-1902 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 

2007), 60.

78. Ibid., 61.

79. J. Franklin Bell, Telegraphic Circular No. 19, 24 December 1901, in Robert 

D. Ramsey III, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell 

in the Philippines, 1901-1902 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 

2007), 66.

80. Ibid., 66.

81. J. Franklin Bell, Telegraphic Circular No. 20, 24 December 1901, in Robert 

D. Ramsey III, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell 

in the Philippines, 1901-1902 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 

2007), 67.

82. Ibid., 67-68.

83. Ibid., 68.
85

84. J. Franklin Bell, Telegraphic Circular No. 22, 24 December 1901, in Robert 

D. Ramsey III, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: Brigadier General J. 

Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901-1902 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies 

Institute Press, 2007), 70.

85. Ibid., 71.

86. Ibid., 71.

87. J. Franklin Bell, Telegraphic Circular No. 23, 28 December 1901, in Robert 

D. Ramsey III, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: Brigadier General J. 

Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901-1902 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies 

Institute Press, 2007), 71.

88. J. Franklin Bell, Telegraphic Circular No. 26, 3 January 1902, in Robert D. 

Ramsey III, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: Brigadier General J. 

Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901-1902 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies 

Institute Press, 2007), 73.

89. J. Franklin Bell, Telegraphic Circular No. 34, 12 February 1902, in Robert 

D. Ramsey III, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell 

in the Philippines, 1901-1902 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 

2007), 81.

90. J. Franklin Bell, Telegraphic Circular No. 36, 15 February 1902, in Robert 

D. Ramsey III, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: Brigadier General J. 

Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901-1902 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies 

Institute Press, 2007), 82.

91. Kalaw, Aide-de-camp to Freedom, 36.

92. J. Franklin Bell, Telegraphic Circular No. 38, 16 May 1902, in Robert D. 

Ramsey III, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell in 

the Philippines, 1901-1902 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 

2007), 83-84.

93. Miguel Malvar, “The Reason for My Change of Attitude,” 16 April 1902, 

in John R.M. Taylor, The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States: a 

Compilation of Documents (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research 

Library Microfilm), Exhibit 1172.

94. Ibid.

95. May, Battle for Batangas.

96. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, 55.

97. Ibid., 60.

98. Taft was elected President of the United States after Teddy Roosevelt. He is 

the only person in US history to serve as both President and Chief Justice.

99. Ibid., 60.

100. U.S. Bureau of Insular Affairs, Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine 

Commission, 1903, Part 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904), 

34.
86

101. Ibid., 34-35.

102. Ibid., 35.

103. Ibid., 35.

104. Philippine Constabulary, Manual for the Philippine Constabulary, 1911

(Manila: Bureau of Printing: 1911), 71.

105. RPC, 1903, Part 1, 141.

106. Ibid., 141.

107. Ibid., 141.

108. PC Manual, 1911, 73.

109. RPC, 1903, Part 1, 950-51.

110. Ibid., 951.

111. Ibid., 951.

112. PC Manual, 1911, 74.

113. PC Manual, 1911, 72.

114. Kalaw, Aide-de-camp to Freedom, 45.

115. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, 97.

116. The Philippine Organic Act, 57th Cong., 2d session. (July 1, 1902), Section 

4.

117. Ibid., Section 5.

118. Ibid., Section 5.

119. Dorr v. U S, 195 US 138 (1904).

120. Dowdell v. U S, 221 US 325 (1911).

121. US War Department, Report of the Lieutenant General Commanding the 

Army, 1901, Part 5, 409.

122. Linn, The Philippine War, 295.

123. US Bureau of Insular Affairs, Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine 

Commission, 1905, Part 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1906), 

210.

124. Ibid, 210.

125. US Bureau of Insular Affairs, Seventh Annual Report of the Philippine 

Commission, 1906, Part 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1907), 

30.

126. US Bureau of Insular Affairs, Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine 

Commission, 1905, Part 3 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1906), 

129-30.

127. Ibid., 130.
87

128. Ibid., 130.

129. RPC, 1905, Part 1, 53-54.

130. RPC, 1905, Part 3, 132.

131. Ibid., 132.

132. Ibid., 132.

133. Ibid., 132.

134. Ibid., 132.

135. RPC, 1905, Part 1, 57.

136. Ibid., 57.

137. RPC, 1905, Part 3, 133.

138. Ibid., 133.

139. Ibid., 133.

140. RPC, 1906, Part 1, 30.

141. RPC, 1908, Part 1, 43.

142. Report of the Lieutenant General Commanding the Army, 1901, Part 5, 

390.

143. Linn, The Philippine War, 222.

144. RPC, 1905, Part 1, 57.

145. RPC, 1903, Part 3, 139.

146. RPC, 1905, Part 1, 57.

147. RPC, 1903, Part 3, 139.

148. RPC, 1905, Part 1, 57.

149. Ibid., 57.

150. J. Franklin Bell, address to the officers of Batangas province, 34.

151. Ibid., 35.

152. RPC, 1903, Part 3, 56.

153. RPC, 1906, Part 1, 225.

154. Kalaw, Aide-de-camp to Freedom, 36.

155. Ibid., 36.

156. RPC, 1903, Part 3, 139.

157. Miguel Malvar, “The Reason for My Change of Attitude.”

158. RPC, 1903, Part 3, 53.

159. Ibid., 54.
88

160. Manuel Luis Quezon, The Good Fight (New York: D. Appleton-Century 

Company, Incorporated, 1946), 87-88.

161. Ibid., 88.

162. RPC, 1905, Part 1, 58.

163. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, 62.

164. Ibid, 141-42.

165. Kalaw, Aide-de-camp to Freedom, 45. During the time that Batangas is 

under the control of the Constabulary in 1904 and 1905, Kalaw reported on a 

number of abuses committed by individual Constabulary officers. His paper, El 

Renacimiento, became involved in a libel suit as a result. This was the first of several 

libel suits that the paper would face because of its reporting on the activities of 

individual members of the Constabulary and the Philippine Commission. Kalaw 

does not say that the paper specifically advocated for the removal of the laws that 

the Constabulary was using. Moreover, by the time he assumes the editorship of 

the paper in 1908 he is a close confidante of future Philippine president Manuel 

Quezon who has, as noted above, decided that it is best to work for independence 

through the Americans, rather than against them.

166. Ibid., 38.
89

Chapter 4

Vietnam, 1954-1963

In destroying the strategic hamlets, we must not only destroy the barbed 

wire and installations but must also destroy the enemy’s grip, regain 

the population and not allow the enemy to control the population.

―A Party Account of the Revolutionary Movement in South Vietnam 

from 1954-1963

Vietnam is a difficult conflict to characterize. It was neither a pure 

insurgency nor a state-on-state conventional war. The conflict involved 

the forces of multiple countries on both sides while equipment and support 

were supplied by many more. The Republic of Vietnam (RVN) experienced 

political subversion, targeted assassination, urban terrorism, insurgency, 

and invasion by conventional main force units and formations. At some 

points during the conflict all of these occurred simultaneously. Vietnam 

was a hybrid conflict.1

This makes Vietnam an important case study to examine the use of 

population and resource control measures. Prior to the introduction of US 

ground forces in 1965, population and resource control measures were 

implemented by the Government of Vietnam (GVN) and its security forces. 

However, after the introduction of US ground forces in 1965, it became 

possible for US units to implement and enforce population and resource 

control measures. The simultaneous existence of a conventional main 

force threat and an insurgency during portions of the conflict highlights 

the difficulty of using such measures when confronting a hybrid threat.

It is possible to divide the war in Vietnam from 1954 to 1975 an 

innumerable number of ways. In doing so it should be clear what specific 

aspect of the war is being examined. Then it is possible to divide the 

war in a way that facilitates this examination. A close study of the entire 

period of the war is beyond the scope of this paper, which will conduct 

two specific case studies to examine the use of population and resource 

control measures. This chapter will examine the programs implemented 

by the Diem regime from 1954 to 1963. The next chapter will study the 

use of population and resource control measures by the US 25th Infantry 

Division in Hau Nghia province from 1966 to 1970.

The period of the Diem regime facilitates an examination of how 

population and resource controls measures evolved over time under a 

single government and a single leader of that government. The instability 

of the GVN government after the coup in 1963 until the ascension of 

Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu in 1965 
90

renders any such analysis difficult, if not impossible. However, after 

the introduction of US ground forces the regime stabilized to the point 

where it is again possible to examine the use of population and resource 

control measures. Once US ground forces departed, however, the threat 

to the GVN from a conventional invasion significantly outweighed the 

threat posed by the insurgency and renders an analysis of population and 

resource control measures to counter an insurgency meaningless.

Overview

The Viet Minh defeat of the French Army at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 

was closely followed by the signing of the Geneva Accords which 

divided Vietnam into two independent countries. The northern half of 

the country, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), was controlled 

by the Vietnamese Communist Party2

 under Chairman Ho Chi Minh and 

his top military leader, General Vo Nguyen Giap. The area south of the 

17th parallel, which included central and southern Vietnam, formed its 

own government. The Vietnamese emperor, Bao Dai, asked the staunch 

anti-communist and Vietnamese nationalist, Ngo Dinh Diem, to become 

premier3 in June 1954.4

From 1954 to 1956 the two halves of Vietnam co-existed as both 

governments sought to assert control and some portions of the population 

resettled.5

 However, as it became clear that the GVN was strongly anticommunist and capable of gaining control of the country, and thus thwarting 

the DRV’s intention to unify Vietnam under Communist leadership, the 

Communist cells that had remained in the RVN after the departure of the 

French began to conduct what the Party referred to as political struggle.6

The political struggle was not able to reverse the GVN’s intense targeting 

of the Party apparatus and its increasing control over South Vietnam, 

however. As a result, in January 1959, the 15th Plenary session of the 

Party Central Committee in Hanoi7

 resolved to “liberate” the Republic of 

Vietnam and authorized the use of armed struggle.8

In the years following the decision of the Party Central Committee, 

the Communist cadres in the south expanded the nascent insurgency and 

openly contested the GVN for control of the country. From 1959 to 1963 

the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), supported by American 

advisers, confronted Viet Cong9

 (VC) elements throughout the country. 

The fight during this time period was waged mainly for control over the 

population and ebbed and flowed as the GVN, supported by the US, and 

the VC, supported by the DRV, responded to each other’s initiatives with 

new tactics. Additionally, in 1959 the DRV began construction and use of 
91

the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a supply line for war materiel, men, and equipment 

from the DRV to the RVN.10 The Ho Chi Minh trail and the accompanying 

sanctuary areas in Laos and Cambodia significantly complicated the war 

efforts of the GVN and its allies.

The DRV’s war effort was not limited to an increase in armed activity. 

The VC and its political wing, the National Liberation Front (NLF), 

formed in 1960, continued their campaign of political subversion and 

propaganda against the Diem regime. The Party capitalized on, and 

potentially manipulated and participated in, protests by Buddhists against 

the Diem regime to discredit him in the eyes of Saigon intellectuals as 

well as US journalists and government officials.11 Discontent with Diem 

was not widespread among US civilian and military officials, however, 

many of who viewed Diem as an effective leader and did not believe that 

a credible alternative to him existed.12 Nevertheless, in November 1963, 

a group of Vietnamese generals executed a coup against Diem. The coup 

and the resulting murder of Diem and his brother, Counselor Ngo Dinh 

Nhu, changed the war dramatically. 

The 1963 coup destabilized Saigon and led to a series of coups over the 

next two years which undermined the GVN’s war effort and denied it any 

continuity. Sensing an opportunity, the DRV introduced main force units 

from the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) into the South in 1964 in an 

effort to defeat the GVN militarily before the US could intervene with 

ground forces of its own.13 The VC main force and PAVN units were not 

able to end the war quickly, however, and the US deployed ground combat 

troops to South Vietnam in 1965 to prevent the collapse of the GVN. 

The introduction of US ground combat troops significantly changed the 

dynamics of the war. General William C. Westmoreland, the commander 

of the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, (MACV), decided to 

employ US forces offensively to destroy VC and PAVN main force units 

in order to allow ARVN forces to conduct pacification operations among 

the Vietnamese population in the hamlets and villages.14 Though this 

strategy has been derided, it did take account of the situation in existence 

on the ground, specifically, that the GVN and ARVN could not control the 

population while they were under threat of attack by VC and PAVN main 

force units. The U.S war of attrition continued until the 1968 Tet Offensive 

changed the war once again.

From the time of its intervention in Vietnam until the1968 Tet Offensive, 

the US gradually escalated the war. This included a destructive bombing 

campaign in the north. It was believed that the pressure placed on the 
92

north by the combined air and ground campaigns would demonstrate US 

resolve and force the DRV to negotiate.15 Also during this period the US 

increased its support for the GVN’s pacification effort and created the 

Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) 

organization to coordinate all of its efforts to do so.16

The 1968 Tet Offensive is popularly viewed in the United States as a 

major defeat. However, the VC and the NLF suffered grievous losses in 

the battle and then faced an invigorated GVN.17 In the aftermath of Tet, 

VC control over many of their base areas was weakened and this enabled 

US and ARVN units to execute the Accelerated Pacification Campaign 

(APC). The APC dedicated a greater amount of resources, both civil 

and military, to the pacification effort than had been done to that point 

of the war. Moreover, the new MACV commander, General Creighton 

Abrams, created what he termed a “one war” strategy at the beginning of 

1969 that theoretically balanced the dual mission of US forces between 

offensive operations against Communist main force units and support to 

pacification.18

Also in 1969 the newly inaugurated administration of President Richard 

Nixon ordered a change to US strategy to end the war in Vietnam. The 

new strategy, referred to as Vietnamization, directed a transition of 

combat responsibilities from the US military to the Republic of Vietnam 

Armed Forces (RVNAF). This was a major shift from the strategy 

executed under Westmoreland as it required ARVN to simultaneously 

confront the insurgents of the VC as well as the VC and PAVN main force 

units.19 However, even as the drawdown of US forces and accompanying 

transition occurred from 1969 to 1971, the opportunity offered by the 

1968 Tet Offensive continued to be taken advantage of. The GVN and 

ARVN expanded their control over the country and seriously damaged the 

NLF and VC apparatus in South Vietnam through 1970.20 Unfortunately, 

by 1971 the last US ground combat unit had departed Vietnam and this 

altered the war again. 

The withdrawal of US ground forces and the 1971 invasion of Laos by 

ARVN provided the impetus to the DRV and PAVN to adapt their strategy. 

Rather than supporting an insurgency it now became possible to conduct 

a conventional campaign to defeat ARVN and collapse the GVN. Their 

first attempt to do so, the 1972 Easter Offensive, was repulsed by ARVN 

with the assistance of American air power.21 However, by 1973 all of the 

American advisers, air power, and other support had been withdrawn. The 

GVN and RVNAF were now forced to withstand the coming DRV and 

PAVN onslaught alone. They could not. The RVN ceased to exist after 
93

PAVN tanks smashed through the gates of the presidential palace in Saigon 

on 30 April 1975.22

GVN Campaign, 1954-1963

At the end of the French Indochina War in 1954, neither of the newly 

independent nations had total control over the government apparatus or 

population within its boundaries. This presented a greater threat to the 

RVN than to the DRV as Ho and Giap had control over PAVN and the 

loyalty of the Viet Minh organization. Upon his appointment as premier, 

Diem had no such control over ARVN or the other elements of state power. 

The Party account of this period states that “Ngo Dinh Diem, the then 

Prime Minister, still had no control over the army, the government, and the 

security and police apparatus, not even at the central level.”23 Recognizing 

this, Diem asked for, and the emperor granted him, total control over all 

civil and military matters in South Vietnam.24

Diem then systematically asserted control over all elements of state 

power. His first step was to gain control over the ARVN. He dismissed 

senior commanders, saw off an attempted coup by the French-backed 

General Nguyen Van Hinh, rejected Bao Dai’s appointment of General 

Nguyen Van Vy as Chief of the General Staff, disarmed the imperial guard, 

and replaced all of the French military advisers with US personnel.25 He 

then set about destroying the armed sects, the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and 

Binh Xuyen, who held sway within the police and political apparatus and 

represented a threat to his power. By 1956, Diem dominated all elements 

of state power at the central government level.26

The situation at the village and hamlet level27 was quite different, 

however. The peasants in Long An province, for example, were not 

controlled by either the GVN or the VC.28 Such areas were relatively 

autonomous. In his account of the evolution of pacification in Duc Lap 

village, R. Michael Pearce noted that it was free of government control 

and uncontested by either side from 1954 to 1957.29 To secure the RVN, 

Diem needed to extend his control to the lower levels of government and 

ultimately to the population itself.

Initial Efforts at Control

Beginning in 1956, Diem initiated a series of measures to gain control 

over the population. Some were relatively successful while others were 

failures. The programs were generally executed in isolation from one 

another. That is, there was no overarching control mechanism that they 
94

explicitly connected to and therefore they were not integrated into a 

comprehensive campaign. Despite this shortcoming, Diem’s early efforts 

diminished the VC and disrupted their attempts to dominate the population.

Population and Resource Control Measures, 1956-1958

In 1956, Diem began implementing population and resource control 

measures through a campaign to identify Communists within the RVN 

and have them arrested. This campaign is commonly referred to as the 

“Denounce the Communists” Campaign.30 The Party apparatus in place 

in South Vietnam upon the departure of the French did not completely 

decamp to the DRV and this posed a threat to the GVN. The outlawing of 

the Communist Party, and ultimately any public gathering of opponents 

to the regime, provided Diem’s government with a tool to dismember the 

latent Party organization.

Rather than simply pronounce Communism as illegal, Diem also counterorganized and counter-propagandized the population and members of his 

government to deepen his control. Party accounts31 of the period noted 

that the Diem regime “set up counter revolutionary organizations such 

as the Can Lao Nhan Vi Party, the National Revolutionary Movement, 

the People’s Council for Denunciation of Communism, the Republican 

Youth and Republican Women Movements.”32 The Party also recorded 

that the regime organized rallies and demonstrations against Communism 

and required government workers to attend anti-Communist education 

classes.33 These tactics echo those employed by Communist regimes, 

including the one in North Vietnam. This is likely because Diem and many 

other GVN leaders had been a part of the Viet Minh in its earliest days, 

understood its strategy and tactics, and recognized that controlling the 

population was the critical first step in gaining their unconditional support.

To further connect his government to the population at the village and 

hamlet level, Diem required the hamlet chiefs to organize the population 

into family groups. The Long An province chief from 1957 to 1961, Mai 

Ngoc Duoc, recounted that: 

The task of the hamlet chief was to keep track of any occurrences in his 

hamlet and to report them to the village council. To do this the people 

were organized into family groups, each headed by a family group chief, 

who reported to the hamlet chief. . . . Aside from the job of controlling the 

people in the hamlet, he received instructions from above, for example, to 

make reports on how many poor there were in his hamlet and so forth. His 

main job was just to keep his eyes and ears open and make reports back to 

the village council.34
95

 The Party account asserts that this system allowed the Diem regime 

to control “all the people’s activities” to include forcing them to join the 

government organizations and perform guard duty.35 As pervasive as this 

system was, it was still not a holistic control mechanism that integrated all 

elements of population and resource control. In 1959, however, the Diem 

regime made its first attempt at creating such a mechanism through Law 

10/59 and the agroville program.

Law 10/59 and the Agroville Program

In May 1959, Diem promulgated Law 10/5936 which gave the government 

power to arrest anyone accused of acting in opposition to it and punish them 

without trial, even with death.37 While this law was extremely harsh, it was 

enacted in response to the threat that the Communist subversive element 

posed to the GVN. Diem realized that the Communists could assume the 

guise of another, ostensibly non-Communist, opposition movement and 

continue to subvert his government. It should also be noted that this action 

was implemented through law. This demonstrated that the Diem regime 

understood the importance of making its actions lawful and the actions of 

the Communists unlawful.

Law 10/59 was a major blow to the VC. Party documents refer to the 

law in a vitriolic manner, calling it fascist and part of an organized terror 

campaign by the US and Diem.38 Additionally, the Party recounted that the 

law forced the people “to leave the Party and the revolution, surrender and 

to carry out the enemy’s reactionary policies–failing which they would be 

outlawed and subjected to punishment under the 10/59 law.”39 Diem then 

attempted to create a holistic control mechanism.

In July 1959, Diem instructed his government ministers to create fortified, 

concentrated villages.40 The government instruction to the province chiefs 

stated that this was necessary because:

The population, especially in the South, is living in such a spread out 

manner that the government cannot protect them and they are obliged 

to furnish supplies to the Viet Cong. Therefore, it is necessary to 

concentrate this population, especially the families who have children 

still in the North or who are followers of the Viet Cong here.41

 By resettling the population, especially those with known VC 

connections, the government could both isolate them from the VC and 

maintain surveillance on those under suspicion. Party accounts indicate 

that in addition to the resettlement of the population the regime enforced 

movement controls, curfews, and restrictions on public gatherings.42 By 
96

restricting such a large extent of the population’s behavior it became 

possible for the government to break the VC’s hold over them.

The program was also part of a broader control mechanism that consisted 

of four central components: regrouping the population into agrovilles and 

connecting them with a strategic route system, development of competent 

cadres for village councils and administrative posts, improvement of village 

self-finance resources, and the formation of a vigorous youth movement.43

Such a mechanism, if fully realized, could have provided Diem the means 

to completely wipe out the subversive element, a requirement noted by 

Kitson as being necessary for victory in counterinsurgency.44

The VC recognized the danger that the agrovilles posed to them. The 

Party account identified that the government had set up the agrovilles 

“with the primary purpose of concentrating the population in remote 

base areas to keep them under tight control and to attack and destroy 

our organizations.”45 The agrovilles became a focus of VC attacks and 

they attempted to incite the population to resist the government’s efforts 

at establishing them.46 However, the Party account notes that the GVN 

continued to build and fortify the hamlets, thus challenging their control 

over the population.47

Unfortunately, the Agroville program suffered from a number of 

shortfalls. The program was overly ambitious for the GVN. Each agroville 

was to have a school, market, irrigation canals, and an artificial fish pond.48

The agrovilles were to contain around 400 families making them rather 

large and difficult to defend.49 The program was costly and Diem did not 

ask the US for financial support because he feared interference.50

The GVN also had difficulty demonstrating the benefits of the program 

to the affected population. The agrovilles disrupted the traditional modes 

of work and family life. The peasant farmer “was now obliged to walk 

from the agroville to his own rice fields and gardens. He could not give 

them the constant attention they required to be protected from intemperate 

weather, torrential rains, the ravages of rodents, and theft.”51 Families had 

to leave behind water buffaloes and other valuable animals as well as their 

ancestral shrines.52 All of this may have been tolerable if the agrovilles 

had delivered on their promise of a better life and greater security but they 

did not.

Despite the shortcomings of the Agrovilles and the lack of a truly 

comprehensive control mechanism, Diem was defeating his Communist 

enemies by 1959. The official PAVN history of the war notes that in 1955 

“many provinces in South Vietnam still had several thousand cadre and 
97

Party members and every village had a village Party chapter. By 1958-1959 

many villages had no Party chapter, and many Party chapters numbered 

only two or three members.”53 The damage to the Party apparatus was 

substantial. In some of the lowland districts of Central Vietnam it had been 

destroyed.54

The destruction was not complete, however. The Party acknowledged 

the effectiveness of the Diem regime’s actions but it believed that they had 

ultimately provided an opportunity which could be exploited.55 The Party 

account noted that “the enemy failed in his evil scheme to eliminate our 

Party, the revolutionary armed forces and our movement. Even though the 

enemy caused severe losses to our Party and revolutionary armed forces, 

both still survived and our movement remains active.”56

Communist Response

 Diem effectively consolidated his control over the government apparatus 

and had begun to gain control of the population in South Vietnam between 

1954 and 1959. The Party account credited him saying:

The US-Diem administration was relatively stable. It was able to control 

the rural areas through its oppressive system, and at the same time, it 

also increased its oppression in the cities. The enemy’s administrative 

system, which reached down to the house-block level, enabled him 

to control the people fairly tightly, thus restraining and impairing our 

Party’s structures and causing us much difficulty. With his espionage 

network and his security organization, the enemy forced the majority of 

the peasantry in many areas, including the former resistance base areas, 

to cooperate with him in his oppression of the peasants themselves.57

The Party also noted that Diem “could draft a great number of youths; 

he could build up and promptly equip his army from the popular to the 

regular forces; he could get laborers to build more and more strategic 

roads, military bases, fortifications, airfields, etc.”58

Despite the inflammatory language, there is in these statements a note 

of respect for Diem and his ability to control the population and deny 

such control to the Party. The Party and the VC reacted strongly to the 

challenge. As noted above, the Central Committee in Hanoi authorized 

armed struggle in January 1959. The Agrovilles were an early target of the 

armed struggle. The VC “burned and sacked agroville sites when possible. 

They ordered those under their persuasion not to cooperate with the 

government in implementation of the program. They shrewdly selected 

for special punishment those officials who were active in Agroville work 

and also unpopular among the villagers.”59
98

The special punishment referenced usually meant assassination, though 

kidnapping and intimidation also occurred. The VC targeted the very 

best and very worst government officials. Assassinating the best officials 

ensured that the GVN’s control mechanism in the countryside broke 

down and sowed fear among other government officials and those in the 

population who might support the government. Eliminating the most cruel 

or corrupt officials ingratiated the VC with the population.60

The VC campaign produced significant success by the end of 1959. A 

March 1960 letter from the Nam Bo61 Regional Committee noted that 

the campaign had “made important progress in the last two months of 

1959 and the first two months of 1960 in a number of regions. In many 

places in the rural areas, the masses have been able to utilize the enemy’s 

(word illegible) and have won the first victory for democratic freedom 

and economic rights.”62 This produced a notable change on the ground as 

“a number of regions where there was previously no movement, or where 

the movement was weak, there are now many campaigns, a few relatively 

strong.”63 Some of these campaigns were able to call on as many as two 

thousand people.64

 The Nam Bo Regional Committee believed that “the reason for this 

initial success is that we have correctly carried out Central’s resolutions . 

. . It is also due to the spirit of enthusiasm, the determination for the task, 

and the unflagging efforts of all our comrades.”65 The Party believed that 

their ability to link the armed struggle with their political struggle would 

set the stage for their ultimate victory.66 It was the violence that was the 

critical element of the campaign, however. 

The Regional Committee stated that:

The most significant point is that in the past period we have boldly made 

use of armed activity in combination with the political struggle. Thanks 

to our work in eliminating traitors, striking at those who will not learn, 

and thanks to our offering appropriate resistance to terrorism, the masses 

in many places have been able to step up the struggle with the enemy.67

The violence changed the dynamic of interaction between the VC, 

the GVN, and the population. The Regional Committee identified that 

“the enemy are alarmed and in a state of panic, especially those in the 

bases. In many villages the enemy administrative machinery has broken 

down.”68 Previously, government officials had been able to move about the 

countryside with relative ease but were no longer able to do so.

The fear produced by VC violence meant that some officials “fled to 

sleep inside their military outposts and did not dare to arrogantly conduct 
99

searches as they had before. Hundreds resigned or were too afraid to 

carry out their duties.”69 Thus, government officials could not gather 

the information and enforce the laws that were critical to controlling the 

population. Moreover, in areas where the government was not in control, 

the VC and the Party now were.

The Regional Committee directed its members to capitalize on the 

changed dynamic by reinforcing the Party’s own apparatus in the villages 

and hamlets. It directed them “to push ahead urgently with the task of 

consolidating and developing the Party, Groups, and the network of active 

key personnel.”70 It also ordered them to focus more of their effort on 

building up bases and organizing the masses to resist the GVN when 

it returned.71 In other words, the Party’s strategy was to counter the 

government’s control of the population by breaking it and then using the 

Party’s mechanisms to establish its control over the population.

The Party executed its strategy with brutal efficiency. The PAVN history 

of the war notes that “tens of thousands of puppets, spies, tyrants, and 

enemy armed forces at the grassroots level had been eliminated. Many 

of the enemy’s new agricultural areas, concentration areas, and collective 

living areas had been destroyed.”72 The Party infrastructure had succeeded 

in expanding its numbers with over 500 villages forming guerrilla squads, 

nearly 200 forming guerrilla platoons, and a total of 7,000 armed local 

guerrillas in the Nam Bo region alone.73 To support these full time forces 

the Party collected “contributions from the people in the area where the 

unit was stationed and for which our revolutionary governmental apparatus 

at the village and hamlet level was responsible.”74

The VC were now in control of large swathes of territory and could 

maintain control through a governmental structure supported by armed 

force. They consolidated their domination and connected villages to one 

another in order to deny large chunks of the country to the GVN. Retaking 

these areas would require Diem’s government to execute major military 

operations to defeat the VC guerrillas, dispatch the Party infrastructure, 

and then secure the population from reprisals, a significant undertaking. 

This was not the only threat that Diem faced, however.

The resolution of the 15th Plenum of the Party Central Committee in 

Hanoi authorizing armed struggle spurred the General Military Party 

Committee to discuss “such pressing matters as building bases and 

developing revolutionary armed forces in the South, expanding North 

Vietnam’s role in the revolution in the South, and preparing our armed 

forces to crush any aggressive scheme the enemy might try to carry out.”75
100

Moreover, “preparations for sending the army [PAVN] to South Vietnam 

to join the battle were begun.”76

Rather than facing only a rejuvenated, locally supported insurgency, 

which presented a significant threat on its own, the GVN would have to 

confront PAVN and an insurgency explicitly supported by the DRV. To this 

end, PAVN began construction and operation of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 

By the end of the year, it had successfully delivered small arms, knives, 

explosives, and other military equipment to VC units and transported over 

500 PAVN cadre who “immediately began to form battalions, companies, 

platoons, and sapper teams” in the Central Highlands and Mekong Delta.77

By October 1960, two overland routes ran from North Vietnam through 

Laos and Cambodia into South Vietnam, terminating in the Central 

Highlands and the Mekong Delta. The Ho Chi Minh Trail could be used 

primarily to transport arms, ammunition, and military equipment because 

the VC units received food and life support from the population. Thus, 

the limited capacity of a route operated initially by human porters could 

be conserved for the most critical military supplies. Controlling the 

population was now even more critical to the GVN because doing so 

would require the Ho Chi Minh Trail to deliver food and manpower rather 

than just military supplies.

The Communist campaign in 1959-1960 threatened the very survival of 

the Diem regime. This was acknowledged by the US Embassy in Saigon. In 

a cable to the Secretary of State in September 1960 Ambassador Durbrow 

related that the:

Diem regime [is] confronted by two separate but related dangers. Danger 

from demonstrations or coup attempt in Saigon could occur earlier . . . 

Even more serious danger is gradual Viet Cong extension of control over 

countryside which, if current Communist progress continues, would 

mean loss [of] free Vietnam to Communists. These two dangers are 

related because Communist successes in rural areas embolden them to 

extend their activities to Saigon.78

Not only did Ambassador Durbrow recognize that the survival of the 

RVN was threatened, he also identified that the GVN would need to take a 

series of interrelated actions to confront it. His cable stated that

For Saigon, danger essentially political and psychological measures 

required. For countryside, danger security measures as well as political, 

psychological and economic measures needed. However both sets 

measures should be carried out simultaneously and to some extent 

individual steps will be aimed at both dangers.79
101

Such were the challenges that Diem confronted in late 1960 and early 

1961. Whereas previously his population and resource control measures 

could be implemented separately from security operations, he would now 

have to execute them simultaneously. Failure to do so would expose GVN 

officials and the population to reprisals by VC guerrilla units. This problem 

set required a new program that created a holistic control mechanism. 

Diem responded by implementing the much derided and misunderstood 

Strategic Hamlet Program.

Control Mechanism–Strategic Hamlet Program

The Strategic Hamlet Program has been condemned as an abysmal 

failure or worse by many historians.80 Eric Bergerud derided it as “an 

irrelevant response to the insurgency and consequently doomed from the 

outset.”81 However, much of the documentation that these assessments are 

based on was produced by US observers early in the program’s execution.82

Many US government documents, captured NLF and VC documents, and 

official Party accounts of the war are now available that allow the Strategic 

Hamlet Program to be re-examined more thoroughly. 

Moreover, the Strategic Hamlet Program is often examined in the light 

of a hearts and minds campaign to win the support of the population.83

As discussed in the second chapter, the concept of hearts and minds and 

what it means to win the support of the population is often misunderstood. 

The Strategic Hamlet Program was not intended to be part of a larger 

popularity contest between the GVN and the VC. Rather, it was intended 

to serve as a holistic control mechanism through which Diem could 

control the behavior of the population and connect them more fully to the 

government. He intended to use this control to wipe out the remaining VC 

and Party elements and end the war. 

Purpose

The Strategic Hamlet Program was not solely about concentrating the 

population behind a barrier to protect and separate them from the VC 

insurgents. Rather, it was a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy 

initiated by Diem’s government to regain control over the portion of the 

countryside that had been lost during the previous two years. The purpose 

of the program was:

To achieve the widest possible popular response to the government’s 

counterinsurgency effort by providing the peasants with an increasing 

degree of physical security from Communist intimidation and by 
102

enacting social, economic, and political reforms meaningful to the 

peasants in the context of their own traditions and expectations.84

This political purpose was to be achieved by accomplishing two 

subordinate security objectives: 

First, to sever Communist communication and control lines to the rural 

populace and thus deny the Communists the local resources (manpower, 

food, intelligence, and weapons) necessary to their operations; and 

second, to promote a nationwide self-defense effort at the rice-roots level 

by providing the peasant with weapons and other defense facilities.85

Once these immediate objectives were accomplished, ARVN and the 

GVN’s other counterinsurgent forces could use their control over the 

population and domination of the terrain to target and destroy VC units. 

Moreover, they could use the intelligence collected during the formation 

of the strategic hamlet to identify and eliminate the Front’s subversive 

element within the village. However, to maintain their control the GVN 

needed to take the process one step further and create a determination 

within the population to resist Communist subversion. 

This was reflected in documents indicating that the Strategic Hamlet 

Program’s other purpose as “stated by President Diem, was to create a 

‘state of mind;’ the commitment of the peasants to the support of their 

government and resistance to the Viet Cong.”86 It was this commitment 

to support the government that transformed a group of people who had 

been concentrated and organized into a strategic hamlet.87 The actual 

components of the program, primarily coercive in nature, were intended 

to create the conditions that would allow the population to support the 

government openly without fear of intimidation and reprisal by the VC.

The Front also understood the purpose of the program very clearly. An 

anti-Strategic Hamlet Program pamphlet published by the Front in 1962 

listed four objectives: “a - to control, ‘to protect’, to ‘get a hold of the 

people,’ especially the rural people; b - to collect necessary information in 

order to destroy the organizations of the so-called ‘Vietcongs’ among the 

population; c - to isolate the armed forces of the revolution; d - to establish 

and maintain the ‘white’ zones.”88 They also recognized that the program 

was a “general synthesis of all the military, political, economic, social, 

schemes, together with other policies.”89

The purpose behind the implementation of the Strategic Hamlet 

Program as laid out in the GVN, US, and Communist documents cited 

clearly indicates that Diem and his government, particularly his brother 

Nhu who was in charge of the program, understood the need to conduct a 
103

comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign to defeat the threat from the 

VC. However, if the program was to achieve its fundamental purposes and 

create the general synthesis cited by the Front, all of the components of the 

program had to support the purpose and mutually reinforce one another.

Components

The Strategic Hamlet Program’s components included security 

operations, population and resource control measures, counterorganization of the population, information operations, formation of self 

defense forces, and the creation of a fortified area to protect and isolate 

the population from the insurgents. It was the interaction of all of these 

components, however, that truly gave the program the strength to present 

a serious threat to the VC. 

The first step in establishing a strategic hamlet was an ARVN offensive 

operation to force VC units out of the area where the hamlet was to be 

established. This operation was not conducted to search for the enemy but 

was conducted to deliberately drive the enemy from the area.90 By driving 

the enemy out of the area, the GVN could ensure that it had the necessary 

operational space to implement the other components of the program. 

Once this operation was complete a Strategic Hamlet Operational Team 

would arrive and begin organizing the hamlet and implementing control 

measures.91 If possible, the hamlet would be organized so that families 

would not have to be relocated. The GVN implementing document 

specifically stated that “it is absolutely forbidden to force the people 

to leave their houses and lands behind and go to establish new hamlet 

villages. The people can stay in their respective hamlets and villages 

and set up their own strategic hamlets and villages as already mentioned 

above.”92 In their report on the initial implementation of the program, John 

Donnell and Gerald Hickey noted that “in most strategic hamlets only a 

small percentage of the population is regrouped.”93 They also reported that 

“most families that move inside the perimeter do so voluntarily.”94

Families were regrouped, however. This was especially true in the 

Mekong Delta where the settlement pattern was more dispersed than it 

was in the Central Highlands. If the population in the Mekong Delta area 

was not regrouped, it created defensive works that were in some cases 

four to five kilometers around, far too much for the hamlet’s small selfdefense team to protect.95 As a result, some families were moved within 

the perimeter of the strategic hamlet. This was absolutely necessary if the 

program was to accomplish the security objectives that had been established 
104

for it. Moreover, if the government could demonstrate its ability to protect 

the population then the population could support the government by 

participating in its own defense, serving in the government, and providing 

information to the security forces.

Once the population had been regrouped, the civil defense team within 

the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team would create the hamlet’s defenses. 

The team would utilize the population to build the fences, gates, defensive 

positions, and obstacles.96 The defensive works were “not intended to help 

the village offer resistance to our enemy’s violent attack but it is merely 

aimed at protecting the village from infiltration by the enemy. Provided 

with this fence, each hamlet has only a few known entrances and exits, 

all under constant control.”97 That is to say, the fence and defensive works 

were not the decisive element of the strategic hamlet program, which was 

the “internal organization of the village.”98

The internal organization was carried out to eliminate the Communist 

infrastructure within each hamlet. The security team within the Strategic 

Hamlet Operational Team partnered with the village and hamlet officials 

to take a new census.99 The results of the census were maintained by the 

village officials, the head of the household, and the local ARVN battalion 

commander. Additionally, the security team would nail a census board to 

each home that identified all of the authorized inhabitants.100

After the completion of the hamlet’s defensive works and the census, the 

government imposed population and resource control measures to further 

isolate the insurgents. The government enforced curfews, movement 

restrictions, and “shoot on site” zones.101 It established control over the 

“quantity of paddy, rice, land, and cattle of each family in each hamlet.”102

The government also delivered plastic identity cards to each resident. All 

of these actions set the conditions for the organization of the population.

The population of the strategic hamlet was organized by age and sex 

into groups and each group was assigned specific responsibilities for the 

continued defense of the hamlet.103 The GVN recognized that “after the 

organizational phase, we have to trust the work to the groups concerned 

and guide them as to what needs to be done.”104 It was this final step that 

produced the commitment of the population to resist the Communists. 

That was the program’s essential purpose. Furthermore, it expanded the 

physical isolation of the population into a “psychological separation of the 

people from the VC.”105

The organization of the population was the final component of the 

Strategic Hamlet Program. After it had been accomplished satisfactorily 
105

the government teams could move to another hamlet and begin the process 

again. The GVN believed that if the program was executed properly that 

the hamlet could resist infiltration and small VC attacks.106 It did not expect 

them to withstand large attacks. Rather, it wanted the defense forces to 

delay the VC attack while the population cached supplies and the adults 

left the hamlet.107 This would leave the VC in control of a village that had 

been stripped of supplies and contained only old people and children.

The alarm raised by the self defense forces would draw an ARVN unit.108

This forced the VC to leave the hamlet rapidly and therefore they could 

not regain control of it. If they attempted to leave behind subversive 

personnel, the population control measures in place could identify them. 

The Strategic Hamlet Program’s components created a holistic control 

mechanism that provided the Diem regime with a means of effectively 

targeting the Communist insurgency. However, in order to be fully 

effective the program had to be properly executed and resourced, a major 

challenge for the GVN.

Execution and Results

Creating strategic hamlets required the effective execution of all 

components of the program by GVN officials at the hamlet, village, 

district, and province level. This was a major challenge as “the details of 

the program were worked out by a small group of Vietnamese officials 

(many of them former Viet Minh, including young Major Tran Ngoc 

Chau), assigned to the Presidential planning staff.”109 Thus, the execution 

of the program had to be explained in depth to the lower level officials 

who would run it. Moreover, “there were no known precedents for many 

aspects of the Strategic Hamlet Program and new procedures of all sorts 

had to be established on an ad hoc basis.”110

These conditions meant that the execution of the Strategic Hamlet 

Program would rely heavily on the abilities of individual officials at 

the province level and below.111 The Diem regime recognized this and 

was attempting to develop effective leaders who were staunch antiCommunists, but in many areas the program suffered because of a lack of 

such leaders.112 Moreover, the regime pressured leaders to produce results 

quickly. This yielded a large number of strategic hamlets being reported as 

complete that had not yet executed all of the components of the program.
106

United States officials identified this problem as early as the summer of 

1962. A report from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the Secretary 

of Defense stated that:

As of 30 June [1962], there were approximately 2,000 strategic hamlets 

completed. This represents increase of 1300 since January 1962. . . 

Qualitatively, there is a considerable variation, some being virtual 

fortresses and others having only token size fences or other defensive 

devices which could be easily breached by Viet Cong.113

Such a rapid expansion threatened the program’s viability. Strategic 

hamlets that were only partially completed were not in a position to 

defeat small scale assaults and did not have the infrastructure in place 

to destroy the Communists cadres. Therefore, the population would not 

be sufficiently protected from intimidation and coercion by the VC. If 

the security benefits of the program were not realized then anyone who 

helped to establish the strategic hamlet would be subject to retaliation. 

This undermined the program’s legitimacy with the population.

However, the CIA report also noted that “local observers rightly state that 

until country considerably more saturated with strategic hamlets, many of 

those already in being will be exposed to Viet Cong destruction.”114 Thus, 

there was also pressure to expand the number of hamlets rapidly in order 

to reinforce existing hamlets through the establishment of new ones but, 

if the government did not sufficiently concentrate its efforts in a specific 

area, it risked creating exposed hamlets that were vulnerable to VC attack. 

Rapid expansion also caused significant difficulties for ARVN. As noted 

above, the first step to establish a strategic hamlet was the execution of 

a military operation to drive VC units out of the area. The ARVN was 

not large enough at the time to conduct so many major, simultaneous 

operations. This created a weakness that was identified by the Front.115 The 

Front noted that by expanding the number of strategic hamlets “the enemy 

falls into a grave contradiction, to spread out the troops for occupation and 

to concentrate the troops for attack. This is a vicious circle for them: when 

they concentrate their troops on one strategic hamlet, the people have 

revolted in another strategic hamlet, forcing them to move elsewhere.”116

The program’s requirement to emplace population and resource controls, 

conduct a census, provide identification cards, and organize the population 

also created a heavy burden. If these portions of the program were not 

properly delivered, the hamlet establishment phase often became a period 

of unpleasant, meaningless, forced labor for the villagers. Although all 

of the physical steps might have been carried out, the hamlet was really 
107

nothing more than the population grouping now surrounded by a worthless 

mud wall, with a group of men who had been trained in military tactics and 

provided weapons, but had no desire to use them, a hamlet charter which 

was torn up by the Viet Cong agents who returned to the hamlet once the 

government cadre had left, and with ‘elected officials’ who either fled the 

hamlet or agreed to cooperate with the Viet Cong.117

It was absolutely critical that the program be executed fully for it to be 

successful.

Where good leaders executed the Strategic Hamlet Program properly 

and delivered on the promises of increased security made to the 

population, it performed as intended. A summer 1963 assessment by the 

State Department stated that:

On balance, however, the strategic hamlet has been a success. Much 

of the concern and hesitation originally shown by the peasants has 

disappeared, partly because of the Vietnam Government’s improved 

public information program but also because of the security and other 

benefits the peasants have received once they moved into the hamlets. . . 

there are increasing reports of peasants volunteering intelligence on the 

Communists and of welcoming the strategic hamlet program because it 

has freed them from Communist intimidation and ‘taxation.’118

In Kien Hoa province in the Mekong Delta, the strategic hamlets 

established by Lieutenant Colonel Tran Ngoc Chau, resisted VC attacks 

even as those in the surrounding provinces, such as Long An, collapsed 

during the fall of 1963.119

This demonstrates the difficulty of evaluating the Strategic Hamlet 

Program. Country-wide assessments, such as the State Department’s above, 

provided only an aggregate picture of the progress and accomplishments 

of the program. Because the program was intensely local and relied almost 

exclusively on the abilities of the province chief to be executed effectively, 

its progress can really only be evaluated at the province level and below. 

Even in areas where the program was not executed particularly well, such 

as Long An, it did help the government stabilize the situation in 1962 and 

1963.120

As execution of the program improved, the Strategic Hamlet Program 

grew more effective. In a 1962 report, the State Department concluded 

that “effective GVN control of the countryside has been extended slightly. 

In some areas where security has improved peasant attitudes toward the 

government appear also to have improved. As a result, the Viet Cong has 

had to modify its tactics and perhaps set back its timetable.”121 Despite 
108

this improvement, the memorandum also noted that the VC still controlled 

around 20 percent of the villages and had influence over nearly another 50 

percent of the population.122

By the summer of 1963, the program was picking up momentum rapidly. 

The State Department report this time stated that the:

Strategic hamlet program has already reduced the total area and 

population under Communist control or influence and has weakened 

Communist strength and logistics capabilities. Communist guerrillas 

are reportedly experiencing morale problems and shortages of food and 

supplies in many areas, and have resorted increasingly to outright theft 

and harassment of the peasant in order to gain supplies and recruits.123

The report concluded that “the strategic hamlet program in Vietnam is 

moving from infancy to solid growth in a relatively short time and against 

determined Communist opposition.”124

Were evidence of the increasing success of the Strategic Hamlet Program 

limited to US and GVN documents there would be every reason to be 

skeptical of the program’s efficacy. However, captured enemy documents 

and the official PAVN history of the war indicate how dangerous the 

Communists believed the program was. Moreover, the intense efforts they 

exerted to counter it make clear that they saw it as a significant threat.

Communist Response

 As with Diem’s earlier use of population and resource controls, the 

Strategic Hamlet Program initially caught the Communists off guard. Their 

success at regaining control of the countryside in 1960 and 1961 using 

a combination of armed and political struggle seems to have produced 

a certain amount of complacency that allowed the program to develop. 

In a sort of after action report published in October or November 1962, 

the Front noted that “some comrades even thought that the enemy would 

construct strategic hamlets for our benefit, therefore they neither opposed 

nor made reports to higher authorities.”125

This failure to oppose the establishment of strategic hamlets had severe 

consequences. The report identified that “when the enemy had completed 

the construction, our movement, naturally weak, declined very rapidly.”126

This occurred because the government’s counter-organization within the 

strategic hamlet was able to target both VC armed forces and political 

cadres. The report stated that “each time penetrating the area, we are all 

rounded up and pursued by the enemy. Our cadres and village self defense 

members are attacked and driven away, and consequently they can only 

adhere to hamlets at the outskirt.”127
109

The experience of this Front organization was not uncommon and it 

led to an assessment of the Strategic Hamlet Program that was markedly 

different than that offered by some American observers at the time and 

since.128 A document written in late 1962 or early 1963129 that was classified 

“Top Secret” declared that “to destroy ‘strategic hamlets’ is a life or death 

struggle between the enemy and our troops.”130 This assessment was 

echoed in another Front document which stated that

For the enemy, if the ‘national policy of the strategic hamlets’ fails, 

without the addition of any new factors, then the entire program of 

the enemy’s policies of aggression will fail because the enemy’s entire 

program has been reduced into ‘the national policy of the strategic 

hamlets.’ On the contrary, if the enemy can carry out his national policy 

of the strategic hamlets, then he will win.131

The Party and the Front viewed the Strategic Hamlet Program as an 

existential threat to the insurgency and the entire war effort. The official 

PAVN history recounts that in 1962:

Our full-time armed units encountered many difficulties when they tried 

to operate in the rural lowlands. In the mountains and contested areas, 

our units were forced to move constantly to evade enemy sweeps and 

commando operations, lowering their combat efficiency. Our soldiers 

endured many hardships because food production was unreliable 

and our warehouses, crops, and food stocks were being attacked and 

destroyed. Rightist and negativistic tendencies began to appear among 

our soldiers.132

As a result of the deteriorating situation, the North Vietnamese Politburo 

met in December 1962 to discuss the situation. It was determined that “to 

overcome the situation it would be necessary to mobilize the entire Party 

and the entire population to build up our armed forces and to develop a 

widespread pattern of guerrilla warfare.”133 Additionally, “the Politburo 

decided to quickly send combat forces to South Vietnam and to expand our 

mobile main force troops and our specialty branch units.”134

As the North was increasing its support for the war effort, the Front 

and VC apparatus in the South were developing and disseminating their 

techniques for countering the strategic hamlets. They understood the 

Strategic Hamlet Program much better than US observers did, possibly 

because its architects were former members of the Viet Minh. The tactics 

and techniques to counter and subvert the strategic hamlets were highly 

developed and reflected a deep understanding of the program’s strengths 

and weaknesses.
110

A document intended for Front and VC members stated that “the 

principal force to destroy strategic hamlets is the people’s forces in strategic 

hamlets, armed forces coming from outside will only be used in support 

of this struggle.”135 It also instructed that “the people should be organized 

secretly, or publicly or semi-publicly and change the enemy’s popular 

organizations to ours.”136 These instructions reflect the need to counter the 

government’s organization of the people and its ability to deploy ARVN to 

destroy concentrations of VC units.

Moreover, the Front recognized that it did not need to destroy strategic 

hamlets as soon as they were built if it could utilize their organizations 

for its own purposes. The pamphlet directed that “we must allow only the 

framework of these strategic hamlets to be under enemy control but the 

core (infrastructure) must belong to the revolutionary people. The progress 

of the struggle should smolder and only at a propitious time should efforts 

be made to destroy strategic hamlets.”137 Once the time was right, the VC 

could execute a synchronized plan to dismantle the strategic hamlets.

One Front element reported how this could be accomplished based on 

their experiences in “H” village.138 Using the local Party organization and 

cadres, the VC subverted the strategic hamlet’s organizations and prepared 

them for a single effort to destroy the hamlet’s defensive works.139 Upon 

initiating the plan:

Self defense members will closely watch the enemy stations, stop their 

reinforcement elements, 200 people outside will be directed to come 

and help those inside to revolt. Cadres will use loudspeakers to call the 

people to rise up to destroy strategic hamlets thus to liberate themselves 

and suppress the US and Diem scheme.140

 After the hamlet’s defensive works had been destroyed, the Front’s 

cadres “proceed on warning and educating some collaborators and spies 

so to make the people understand the enemy future scheme.”141 Thus 

intimidated, the Front expected the population to resist government efforts 

to rebuild the hamlet’s defensive works. However, even if the fences were 

rebuilt, “the party committee has been able to adhere to the area, and selfdefense members to carry on their activities.”142 This result was more 

dangerous to the Strategic Hamlet Program than the mere loss of the fence.

As the various pamphlets and instructions were disseminated and support 

flowed in from the North during 1963, VC attacks against strategic hamlets 

increased. The Long An Province representative’s report from June-July 

1963 reported that “Viet Cong activity has picked up considerably–

concentrating on attacking strategic hamlets, tearing down walls and 
111

fences, kidnaping (sic) young men, assassinating hamlet officials and in 

general, destroying the morale and will to resist of the rural population.”143

Not only did the number of attacks increase but their effectiveness 

increased as well. The PAVN history of the war notes that in Cochin China 

“in 1962, we had destroyed 100 ‘strategic hamlets’ but were only able 

to retain control of 15 of them.”144 However, “in 1963 the enemy was 

no longer able to rebuild the ‘strategic hamlets’ that we destroyed. The 

liberated area in Cochin China grew back to the size it had reached during 

the time of insurrection in 1960.”145

This likely resulted from two factors. First, as discussed above, was 

the over-extension of the Strategic Hamlet Program beyond the GVN’s 

ability to properly execute it. The ARVN forces were too few in number 

to react to attacks on a large scale and the defense forces and organization 

of the hamlets were too weak to resist major attacks on their own. Second, 

PAVN determined in 1962 that in order to counter the GVN’s strategy it 

needed to develop the capability to defeat ARVN’s mobile troops when 

they were supported by helicopters and armored personnel carriers.146

This “demanded that our army rapidly strengthen our mobile main force 

elements on the battlefield . . . and that we elevate the combat capabilities 

of our armed forces in South Vietnam to a new, higher level.”147 The GVN 

was no longer only confronting insurgent forces, it now had to counter 

well trained, equipped, and organized main force units.

The Strategic Hamlet Program was not designed to protect the population 

from an assault by such main force units. It was intended only to defeat 

small bands of lightly armed guerrillas. Main force units could only be 

countered by ARVN. Unfortunately, there was not enough ARVN available 

in 1963 to defeat the main force units as they were created. Simultaneously, 

the position of the Diem regime was weakening.

End of the Strategic Hamlet Program

Despite his early success against the Communist insurgency and in forging 

the beginnings of a nation, by 1962-1963 Diem had fallen out of favor 

with some senior members of ARVN, the US government, US journalists, 

and members of the Saigon intelligentsia. As early as November 1962, 

there was already discussion in US policy circles about the possibility of 

another coup against Diem and its effects. The State Department reported 

that the coup most likely to succeed would be one with non-Communist 

leadership and support, involving middle and top echelon military and 

civilian officials. For a time at least, the serious disruption of government 
112

leadership resulting from a coup would probably halt and possibly reverse 

the momentum of the government’s counterinsurgency effort.148

Events would reveal this assessment to be completely accurate.

Diem had meticulously asserted control over all elements of power 

within the GVN over a period of several years. During that time, he 

defeated several coup attempts, improved the organization of the RVNAF 

and the government, and executed a campaign that at times was defeating 

the Communist insurgency. It is unlikely that any new government, no 

matter how well or quickly organized, could possibly assert the control 

that had taken Diem nearly a decade to build up.149

Moreover, the Strategic Hamlet Program, now the centerpiece of the 

government’s counterinsurgency strategy, was reliant on leaders within 

the GVN from top to bottom that were loyal to Diem. The program was 

under the overall direction of Diem’s brother, Nhu. The province, district, 

and military officials who executed the program had been groomed and 

appointed by Diem over several years. Any coup that ousted Diem would 

also have to repudiate the Strategic Hamlet Program.

The coup against Diem occurred on 1 November 1963 and plunged the 

government into chaos. The Party was quick to react and “taking advantage 

of the convulsions and contradictions within the puppet army and the 

puppet regime, all our battlefields increased their operations.”150 Strategic 

hamlets were destroyed throughout the country: over one thousand in 

Cochin China, more than 400 in the Central Highlands, and in Pleiku 

Province alone 289 villages returned to their previous status.151

The increased military operations of the VC and PAVN coincided with 

near total paralysis in the GVN, especially at province level and below. A 

memorandum to President Johnson from National Security Council staff 

member Michael V. Forrestal on 11 December 1963, stated that “a certain 

amount of inertia has occurred in provincial administration since the coup. 

A large number of the province chiefs have been changed and some of the 

newly appointed ones have been changed again.”152 Thus, the coup leaders 

could not effectively respond to VC and PAVN attacks against the strategic 

hamlets.

Moreover, the coup leaders did not want the Strategic Hamlet Program 

to continue given its close association with Diem and Nhu.153
113

The US position was no better. Forrestal told Johnson that:

In light of the above, you might wish to tell McNamara that you hope he 

will be able to focus the attention of the Vietnamese generals on their first 

priority problem, the immediate restoration of administrative initiative 

in the provinces . . . Secretary McNamara might also tell them that in 

his opinion it is of utmost importance to establish a new program for the 

villages and immediately issue the necessary implementing directives. 

He might also offer our help in getting up such a program, something 

which should be rather easy for us to do, since it would draw heavily 

from the old Strategic Hamlet Program.

As the Party and Front were responding aggressively to the opportunity 

presented to them to destroy a program that they considered an existential 

threat, the GVN and its ally, the US, were allowing the very same program 

to die rather than reinforcing it. Simultaneously, they were searching 

for a new program that would be largely the same as the one they were 

killing. Reinforcing and continuing the Strategic Hamlet Program would 

not have guaranteed success over the long term. However, the coup and 

the accompanying dissolution of the program facilitated the Communist 

offensive and resulted in a loss of control in the countryside that the GVN 

would not begin to recover from until after the 1968 Tet Offensive.154

Analysis of the use of Population and Resource Control Measures under 

Diem

It would be easy to write off the Diem regime’s use of population and 

resource control measures from 1954 to 1963 in Vietnam as a failure 

because of the ultimate outcome of the war and the fate of the regime 

itself. However, such an analysis would be shallow and does not take 

into account the complexity of the conflict and the threat that the regime 

confronted. All of the measures employed by the Diem regime had 

shortcomings, particularly in their execution. However, when properly 

executed they presented a significant threat to the Communists who acted 

aggressively to counter them.

The Strategic Hamlet Program was a major undertaking for a nascent 

government that was facing a well organized and supported insurgency. 

This was recognized in the US Operations Mission report on the program 

in 1963 which noted that “it is a costly program and a daring one, a 

program which, if successful, should certainly end the insurgency and 

if unsuccessful will certainly end the counter-insurgency.”155 The report 

acknowledged that the Strategic Hamlet Program was an appropriate 
114

strategy, but “like any good strategy, the greatest risk it entails is the risk 

that it may not be resolutely pushed to final victory.”156

The Strategic Hamlet Program was certainly pushed hard by the regime, 

overextending GVN and ARVN resources beyond their capability to 

support it. This certainly contributed to its collapse. However, this was 

a problem of execution, not design. Furthermore, the collapse of the 

Strategic Hamlet Program cannot be considered in isolation from the coup 

that deposed the Diem regime and the resulting chaos in governance that 

it produced. Had the regime, and the province and district level officials 

that supported it, remained in power it could have adjusted the execution 

of the Strategic Hamlet Program over time to address the shortcomings in 

execution.

The other factor that must be considered in the analysis of the Diem 

regime’s use of population and resource control measures is the change 

in strategy of the Party and its military forces in reaction to them. Diem’s 

early efforts forced the VC to begin conducting armed struggle, which 

changed the dynamic of the war. The success of ARVN and the Strategic 

Hamlet Program’s efforts to counter the insurgency in 1962 drove the 

Party and PAVN to develop and employ main force units in the South 

which denied the regime the ability to conduct a pure counterinsurgency 

campaign. At most, the regime’s population and resource control efforts, 

including the Strategic Hamlet Program, can be graded an incomplete, 

while acknowledging both their successes and failures.

Protection and Isolation of the Population

It is clear that Diem understood the need to protect and isolate the 

population from the VC insurgents and cadre that operated within the 

countryside. Failure to do so, ceded control to the VC and allowed them 

to intimidate and coerce the population into providing support. Moreover, 

the attitude of the average rural Vietnamese peasant was that they would 

follow whichever side was strongest in their area. An old man from Duc 

Hanh, a hamlet in Duc Lap village stated that “outside [the hamlet] the 

people follow the Liberation Front, inside they follow the government. 

They follow whoever is strong.”157

However, the settlement pattern within South Vietnam made protecting 

and isolating the population difficult, especially in the Mekong Delta. 

Hamlets consisted of a number of houses scattered across a wide area 

with dense jungle and inaccessible terrain nearby that could easily 

conceal insurgent elements. The only way to ensure that the population 
115

was protected and isolated was to concentrate them into denser, more 

defensible groupings.

Diem’s first attempt to do this, the agroville program, was largely 

a failure. The agrovilles were too large for the small self defense units 

to protect. Insurgents could easily infiltrate the defenses to intimidate 

the population. If the agroville was attacked in strength, it would be 

easily overrun. Moreover, the agroville program was not part of a larger 

counterinsurgency strategy. It was, despite the simultaneous promulgation 

of Law 10/59, largely an isolated effort.

The Strategic Hamlet Program, on the other hand, was a more holistic 

strategy to protect and isolate the population. Before a strategic hamlet was 

created, ARVN would conduct a large operation to drive armed insurgent 

elements out of the area. The hamlets themselves were more compact 

and easier for a small element to defend. The program also included a 

census, the issue of identification cards, and the counter-organization of 

the population to deny Party cadre the ability to infiltrate and subvert the 

hamlets.

When all elements of the program were executed properly, this strategy 

succeeded in protecting and isolating the population from the insurgency. 

This allowed the government to gain control over the population and deny 

the VC food, shelter, manpower, and intelligence. This caused them a 

number of difficulties and forced them to change their strategy to counter 

it. 

Many detractors of the Strategic Hamlet Program, including Race, 

Bergerud, Pearce, Donnell, and Hickey have focused on the massive 

disruption to the lives of the population that the program caused and on the 

forced labor required to build the strategic hamlets.158 The program, like 

the agrovilles before it, did require the rural population, especially those 

in the Mekong Delta, to move away from their farmlands and the ancestral 

shrines where they practiced their religion. It obviously would have been 

better not to force the population to move in this way but the GVN faced 

a major dilemma. The VC had a pervasive infrastructure throughout the 

rural areas to control the population. The GVN did not have the military, 

police, or government capability required to destroy this infrastructure and 

simultaneously protect and isolate the population while they were spread 

out over a wide area. Therefore, the only means the government had to 

break VC control and destroy the subversive infrastructure was to isolate 

the population in new settlements, establish governing structures in these 

settlements, and use them to target the VC infrastructure. 
116

The VC also placed onerous requirements on the population. One villager 

who formerly lived in the Viet Cong zone recalled, “I had to pay them a tax 

of over a thousand piasters for my house. They don’t call it tax but call it a 

contribution.”159 They also required the population to join work parties and 

assist Communist military forces. The PAVN history notes that rice “was 

transported by civilian porters and by local means of transportation (boats, 

vehicles) belonging to the civilian population.”160 It is unlikely that all of 

this support was voluntary. The VC infrastructure could intimidate and 

coerce the population at will if they were not isolated and protected from 

it. Therefore, if the GVN could deliver security and protect the population 

in the strategic hamlets, it could at least ensure that the population would 

be neutral.

The Strategic Hamlet Program’s isolation and protection of the 

population was working in some areas of the country in 1962 and 1963. 

However, when the Party and Front changed tactics and began using main 

force units to support the operation of the guerrillas, the program could no 

longer effectively do so. The main force units could easily overwhelm the 

hamlet’s defenses, which were not intended to defeat large-scale attacks, 

and ARVN was spread too thin to be able to react to all of the threats. The 

presence of main force units complicated execution of the program and in 

1963 did so to an extent that in the chaos following the November coup it 

rapidly collapsed.

Focus on Behavior

Because the regime’s population and resource control measures did not 

effectively protect and isolate the population throughout the countryside, 

this made it more difficult for it to affect the behavior of the population. 

Those among the population who wanted to support the insurgency could 

at times do so, while those who wished to remain neutral or support 

the government could not. In this, the regime faced the challenge not 

encountered by Bell and the other leaders in the Philippines, of how 

widespread the insurgency was. It affected nearly every area of the 

country rather than the isolated pockets that the Americans targeted in the 

Philippines.

Diem did attempt to prevent behavior that supported the Party or the 

VC. Law 10/59 was promulgated in order to make joining the Communist 

movement, or any other subversive element, illegal. The census of people 

and their agriculture assets, identification cards, curfews, and movement 

controls that were executed as part of the Strategic Hamlet Program were 

intended to prevent the population from providing food, shelter, and other 

support to the insurgency.
117

The control measures also required the population to engage in behavior 

that supported the government. By counter-organizing the population and 

requiring them to participate in their own defense, the GVN tried to more 

effectively connect the peasants in the countryside to the government. In 

securing and isolating the population, the government made it possible for 

some to openly support the government, provide intelligence, or join the 

security forces.

This combination did negatively affect the Front and the VC. The VC 

units in 1962 started to run low on food and had to shelter in the jungle 

instead of in the hamlets. The VC units moving from one area to another 

were exposed to targeting by ARVN as well as the local security forces 

that could shoot on site. The VC had difficulty recruiting additional 

manpower and suffered defections which drove PAVN and the DRV to 

send more manpower south along the Ho Chi Minh trail. In addition, the 

government was able to recruit manpower of its own to defend the hamlets 

and participate in the administration of the local area.

Unfortunately, when the protection and isolation provided by the 

program failed, so did the government’s ability to control the behavior 

of the population. If the VC succeeded in penetrating or infiltrating the 

hamlet, the most active supporters of the government were targeted 

for assassination. Being a particularly competent hamlet or village 

administrator was akin to a death sentence if the VC returned.161 Upon 

their return, the VC could reassert their control over the population and 

once again require contributions to the cause.

This state of affairs created a situation exactly opposite of what the 

controls intended. Those among the population who wanted to support 

the insurgency could do so without fear of arrest. It denied the neutral 

population the ability to remain neutral. They could be intimidated and 

coerced to support the insurgency. Finally, those who desired to support 

the government could not because they would be targeted by the VC. Thus, 

because of the lack of security, the ability of the population and resource 

control measures to control the behavior of the population broke down.

Facilitate the Targeting and Destruction

 of the Armed and Subversive Element

Diem clearly understood the threat posed to his government by armed 

and subversive elements. As early as 1955, he dismantled the armed sects 

that had influence within some portions of the GVN. After dispatching this 

threat, he immediately began concentrating on the Communist armed and 

subversive elements, which presented an existential threat to his regime.
118

Every aspect of the regime’s population and resource control measures 

were designed to facilitate this targeting. From 1956 to 1959, while the VC 

was content to engage only in political struggle, Diem used the Denounce 

the Communists campaign and Law 10/59 to arrest members of the Party 

and their sympathizers. The agroville program’s concentration of the 

population included counter-organizations that could identify subversive 

elements within them for detention. These efforts were effective but did 

not completely destroy the Party’s apparatus.

When the Communists transitioned to armed struggle in 1959 they 

forced Diem to target the armed and subversive elements simultaneously. 

The Strategic Hamlet Program, when properly executed, did both. ARVN 

operations drove armed VC elements away from villages where strategic 

hamlets were to be created. The hamlets were then fortified, armed, 

and population and resource controls imposed. Curfews, movement 

restrictions, and the regrouping of the population into the strategic hamlet 

allowed ARVN and the other local security forces to target VC elements 

operating outside. Inside the hamlet, the census, identification cards, and 

organization of the population into groups gave the GVN a mechanism for 

identifying and arresting the subversive element.

When properly executed, this interlocking system was highly effective. 

The Communists lost control of significant amounts of territory throughout 

1962 and the beginning of 1963. However, the system began to fail as 

the Strategic Hamlet Program was rapidly and less effectively expanded. 

Hamlets where the population was not counter-organized or that did not 

have a complete census could be easily infiltrated and subverted. Self 

defense forces that were not confident that ARVN would support them if 

attacked, did not dare identify VC units moving through the area.

Furthermore, the development and deployment of main force units made 

it more difficult for the regime to target local VC guerrilla bands. Only 

ARVN had the capability to confront main force units and therefore it had 

to be dedicated to the task. This left the local security forces in the hamlets, 

villages, and districts to confront the VC guerrilla bands. However, they 

often were not strong enough, without the backing of ARVN, to do so and 

many collapsed in the face of determined attack.

Ironically, it was the very effectiveness of the regime’s targeting that 

produced this situation. Recall that it was PAVN’s assessment that to 

counter the Diem regime’s strategy, it would have to be able to defeat 

ARVN’s successful sweep operations that led to the development and 

employment of highly capable main force units. Otherwise, the lightly 
119

armed VC guerrillas, isolated and easily targetable as a result of the 

Strategic Hamlet Program, would have been destroyed over time by 

repeated ARVN attacks.

The effectiveness of the Diem regime’s population and resource control 

measures altered the dynamics of the war twice. The combination of Law 

10/59, agrovilles, the Denounce the Communist campaigns, and other 

measures forced the Party to abandon its commitment to political struggle 

only and launch an insurgency. When the regime adjusted to this strategy 

by introducing the Strategic Hamlet Program, the Party expanded the war 

into a hybrid conflict involving an insurgency and conventional battles 

between main force units. This threat was more than the succession of 

GVN regimes in 1964 and 1965 could handle and ultimately led to the 

commitment of US forces to ground combat in 1965.
120

Notes

1. The terms hybrid conflict, hybrid war, and hybrid threat have been used 

recently by US military planners and academics to describe situations in which a 

conventional military is confronted by an enemy that is employing “a full range 

of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics 

and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, 

and criminal disorder.” See Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The 

Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 

2007), 8. Although such conflicts are presented in much of this writing as new 

or novel, with the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese war being the most prominent example, 

hybrid conflicts have in fact existed throughout history. The Peninsula Campaign 

during the Napoleonic Wars was a hybrid conflict. Even World War II contained 

elements of a hybrid conflict as both sides used partisans or raised irregular forces 

to support the conventional war.

2. In their own documents, the Vietnamese Communists refer to the Vietnamese 

Communist Party as “the Party.” Rather than use an acronym such as VCP, this 

paper will follow the same convention.

3. Ngo Dinh Diem’s official position and title is referred to differently in a variety 

of documents and accounts of the war. U.S government documents often refer to 

him as “President,” Communist documents label him “prime minister.” Some of 

this confusion reflects the changing nature of the GVN over his rule. In the text, 

Diem will be referred to as “premier” as a generic and accurate representation of 

his position and power. However, quoted text of original documents will retain 

the title as written.

4. Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken (New York: Cambridge University Press, 

2006), 33.

5. Ibid, 55-56.

6. Vietnamese Communist Party, “A Party Account of the Situation in the Nam 

Bo Region of South Vietnam from 1954-1960,” Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 6, 

Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive [hereafter cited as TTU], 4.

7. The official accounts of the war by the Vietnamese Communist Party put to 

rest the debate about whether the insurgency in South Vietnam was a purely local 

insurgency. Some elements of the war may have been directed by local Party 

leaders and commanders in South Vietnam, but the strategic and operational 

directives emanated from Hanoi.

8. The Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam: The Official 

History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954 – 1975, trans. Merle L. Pribbenow 

(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 50.

9. Though some historians have eschewed use of the term Viet Cong because it 

is a pejorative for Vietnamese Communist, it was the most commonly used term 

in the contemporary documents and therefore its meaning is well established and 
121

understood. Moreover, the term has lost its pejorative connotation since the end 

of the war and is understood by serving officers to be accepted shorthand for 

Vietnamese Communist.

10. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 50-52.

11. Moyar, Triumph Forsaken, 214-218.

12. Ibid., 226. 

13. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 125-126.

14. William C. Westmoreland, “A Military War of Attrition,” in The Lessons 

of Vietnam, eds. W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson Frizzel (New York: Crane, 

Russak and Company, 1977), 57-71.

15. Ibid., 60-61.

16. Pacification and CORDS will be described in more detail in the next chapter.

17. Eric M. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 

Inc., 1991), 236-237.

18. Ibid., 241.

19. James Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam (Lawrence, Kansas: University of 

Kansas Press, 2004), 20.

20. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 308. The spring of 1970 also witnessed 

the invasion of Cambodia by US and ARVN forces that forced Communist main 

forces to retreat further into their sanctuaries and away from the population. The 

invasion and its implications will be discussed further in the next chapter.

21. Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam, 152-153. 

22. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 420.

23. VCP, “Party Account from 1954-1960,” 4.

24. Moyar, Triumph Forsaken, 33.

25. VCP, “Party Account from 1954-1960,” 4-6.

26. Ibid., 6.

27. The political structure of Vietnam built upwards from the hamlet. The 

hamlet was a loose grouping of houses containing between 500-1000 people. 

Several hamlets were then grouped into villages. Villages were contained within 

districts, akin to US counties, and districts in provinces, akin to US states.

28. Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An (Berkeley: University of California 

Press, 1972), 41.

29. R. Michael Pearce, Evolution of a Vietnamese Village-Part II (Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND Corporation, 1966), 7.

30. Moyar, Triumph Forsaken, 65. Also see VCP, “Party Account from 1954-

1960,” 8-9.
122

31. The Communist Party accounts from this period are valuable because they 

present a picture of how the enemy viewed Diem’s actions. While they contain 

some outrageous accusations against the regime, the narrative remains consistent 

across multiple documents and is in general agreement with accounts from US 

and other sources from the same period.

32. VCP, “Party Account from 1954-1960,” 8.

33. Ibid., 8-9.

34. Mai Ngoc Duoc, interview by Jeffrey Race, quoted in Race, War Comes to 

Long An, 52.

35. VCP, “Party Account from 1954-1960,” 32.

36. Unfortunately, very little has been written about Law 10/59 and an original 

text of the law has not been discovered by the author.

37. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 49.Also see Race, 

War Comes to Long An, 19n.

38. VCP, “Party Account from 1954-1960,” 10.

39. Ibid., 11.

40. The Agroville program and its implementation in 1959 is a strong indicator 

of Diem’s thorough understanding of the need to gain control over the population 

and the tools for doing so. Diem initiates the program without Western advice and 

three years before the arrival of Sir Robert Thompson in Vietnam.

41. GVN official correspondence quoted in Joseph T. Zasloff, “Rural 

Resettlement in South Viet Nam: The Agroville Program,” Pacific Affairs 35, no. 

4 (Winter 1962-1963): 328.

42. VCP, “Party Account from 1954-1960,” 8-16.

43. Zasloff, “Rural Resettlement,” 331-332.

44. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 49.

45. VCP, “Party Account from 1954-1960,” 11.

46. Zasloff, “Rural Resettlement,” 337.

47. VCP, “Party Account from 1954-1960,” 11.

48. Moyar, Triumph Forsaken, 82.

49. Ibid., 82.

50. Ibid., 82.

51. Zasloff, “Rural Resettlement” 336.

52. Ibid., 336.

53. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 44.

54. Ibid., 44.
123

55. VCP, “Party Account from 1954-1960,” 54.

56. Ibid., 54.

57. Ibid., 53.

58. Ibid., 53.

59. Zasloff, “Rural Resettlement” 337.

60. Race, War Comes to Long An, 83. Also see Moyar, Triumph Forsaken, 79.

61. Nam Bo is the traditional Vietnamese term for the southern portion of the 

country. Nam Bo includes the Mekong Delta and the areas around Saigon.

62. Nam Bo Regional Committee, “Letter from the Regional Committee to All 

Members of Cells,” 28 March 1960, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 5, TTU, 1.

63. Ibid., 1.

64. Ibid., 1.

65. Ibid., 1.

66. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 50.

67. Nam Bo Regional Committee, “Letter from the Regional Committee,” 1.

68. Ibid., 2.

69. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 55.

70. Nam Bo Regional Committee, “Letter from the Regional Committee,” 7.

71. Ibid., 7-8.

72. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 66.

73. Ibid., 66.

74. Ibid., 67. This account is corroborated by the history of the war in Long An 

province recorded by Race. In it, he notes a massive increase in Party violence and 

Party membership after the 1959 decision to expand the war to armed struggle. 

See Race, War Comes to Long An, 113-120.

75. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 51.

76. Ibid., 51.

77. Ibid., 53. Also see Moyar, Triumph Forsaken, 84-85.

78. Elbridge Durbrow, “Cablegram from Elbridge Durbrow, United States 

Ambassador in Saigon, to Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Sept. 16, 1960,” 

in The Pentagon Papers as published by The New York Times (New York: Bantam 

Books, Inc., 1971), 115.

79. Ibid., 115.

80. See Race, War Comes to Long An, 192 and Bergerud, The Dynamics of 

Defeat, 37.
124

81. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 37.

82. Bergerud’s assessment of the program relies heavily on Race and the work 

done by Donnell and Hickey for the RAND Corporation in early 1962. Race’s 

work is in depth, but focuses only on Long An Province. Donnell and Hickey 

examined a small number of villages in provinces around Saigon for a limited 

period of time at the beginning of the program. Another problem in using Donnell 

and Hickey’s work as heavily as Bergerud does is that the authors explicitly note 

that they considered only the effects of the non-security aspects of the program on 

the life of peasants in the hamlets. This leaves out a critical portion of the program 

and negatively skews the analysis.

83. The term hearts and minds as used in analyzing the conflict in Vietnam 

has generally been construed as an effort to “win the allegiance of the South 

Vietnamese population.” This presents the campaign as a contest between the 

two sides to provide inducements to the population to support them rather than an 

outright battle for control. See Bergerud, Dynamics of Defeat, 141.

84. US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Research 

Memorandum RFE-58, Strategic Hamlets, 1 July 1963. Texas Tech University 

Vietnam Archive, 1.

85. Ibid., 2.

86. John B. O’Donnell, “The Strategic Hamlet Program in Kien Hoa Province, 

South Vietnam: A Case Study of Counter-Insurgency,” (paper presented at the 

conference on Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities and Central Governments, 

Princeton, New Jersey, 11 May 1965,) TTU, 11.

87. Office of Rural Affairs, US Operations Mission Saigon, “Notes on Strategic 

Hamlets,” 15 Aug 1963, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 2, TTU, 3.

88. National Liberation Front, “Anti-Strategic Hamlet Program,” VC Document 

93,Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 1, TTU, 9.

89. Ibid., 11.

90. Government of Vietnam, “Discussion Paper - From Strategic Hamlets to 

Self Defense Village,” TTU, 30.

91. Ibid., 36.

92. Ibid, 46.

93. John C. Donnell and Gerald C. Hickey, The Vietnamese “Strategic Hamlets”: 

A Preliminary Report (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1962), 7.

94. Ibid., 15.

95. O’Donnell, “The Strategic Hamlet Program in Kien Hoa Province,” 24.

96. GVN, “From Strategic Hamlets to Self Defense Village,” 37.

97. Ibid., 37.

98. Ibid., 37.
125

99. Ibid., 38.

100. Moyar, Triumph Forsaken, 157.

101. NLF, “Anti-Strategic Hamlet Program,” 10.

102. GVN, “From Strategic Hamlets to Self Defense Village,” 38.

103. Ibid., 38-39.

104. Ibid., 39.

105. US Operations Mission Saigon, “Notes on Strategic Hamlets,” 4.

106. GVN, “From Strategic Hamlets to Self Defense Village,” 42.

107. Ibid., 42.

108. Throughout the campaign, the GVN established several versions of selfdefense forces to provide security in the hamlets and villages. The two most well 

known are the Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF). They are generally 

referred to as “Ruffs and Puffs” and abbreviated as RF/PF. Both forces were 

lightly armed and dedicated to serve in the area where they were raised. RFs were 

a company that supported a province, while PFs were a platoon that supported 

a village. There were also dedicated security forces in the hamlets which were 

composed of approximately one squad.

109. O’Donnell, “The Strategic Hamlet Program in Kien Hoa Province,” 10.

110. Ibid., 20.

111. US DOS, Strategic Hamlets, July 1, 1963, 4.

112. O’Donnell, “The Strategic Hamlet Program in Kien Hoa Province,” 25.

113. Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 

13 July 1962, Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive, 4.

114. Ibid., 5.

115. NLF, “Anti-Strategic Hamlet Program,” 29.

116. Ibid., 29.

117. O’Donnell, “The Strategic Hamlet Program in Kien Hoa Province,” 25.

118. US DOS, Strategic Hamlets, 5.

119. O’Donnell, “The Strategic Hamlet Program in Kien Hoa Province,” 32.

120. Race, War Comes to Long An, 133. Race is a strong critic of the program 

particularly because of its ultimate failure in Long An. However, his narrative 

demonstrates that the program did stabilize the situation in the province and only 

began to severely deteriorate after the replacement of the province chief in mid1963 and an increase of VC and PAVN main force activity. The VC and PAVN 

destroyed the last strategic hamlets in Long An only in early 1964, after the fall 

of the Diem regime and when the program was no longer supported by the GVN.
126

121. Roger Hilsman, “The Situation and Short-Term Prospects in South 

Vietnam,” in The Pentagon Papers as published by The New York Times (New 

York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1971), 155. Hilsman was the director of the State 

Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The memorandum was written 

based off of information available as of November 1962 and was sent to Secretary 

of State Dean Rusk on 3 December 1962.

122. Ibid., 155.

123. U.S. DOS, Strategic Hamlets, 6.

124. Ibid., 7.

125. “Experiences of Struggle with and Elimination of Strategic Hamlets of H 

Villagers,” October-November 1962, TTU, 2.

126. Ibid., 2.

127. Ibid., 3.

128. As noted above, Race and Bergerud are extremely critical of the program. 

Moyar also details the antipathy towards the program from John Paul Vann and 

the reporters he influenced, notably Neil Sheehan and David Halberstam.

129. The document is not dated and was not captured until 1968. However, it 

includes references to the number of strategic hamlets as of October 1962 which 

indicates that it was written and published sometime after that.

130. National Liberation Front, “Measures Against Village Merging and People 

Concentration,” TTU, 13. 

131. National Liberation Front, “Anti-Strategic Hamlet Program,” 22.

132. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 112.

133. Ibid., 114.

134. Ibid., 114.

135. NLF, “Measures Against Village Merging and People Concentration,” 15.

136. Ibid., 17.

137. Ibid., 18.

138. NLF, “Measures Against Village Merging and People Concentration.” It is 

not clear from the document where in South Vietnam H village is. However, since 

this document was replicated and sent to cadres in other areas of the country it can 

be assumed that the tactics described were generalizable to a significant portion 

of the country.

139. Ibid., 3.

140. Ibid., 4.

141. Ibid., 4.

142. Ibid., 5.
127

143. Long An Provincial Representative’s Report, June-July 1963, in O’Donnell, 

“The Strategic Hamlet Program in Kien Hoa Province,” 29.

144. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 121.

145. Ibid., 121.

146. Ibid., 113.

147. Ibid., 113.

148. Hilsman, “The Situation and Short-Term Prospects in South Vietnam,” 

157.

149. This is not meant to assert that Diem was the only possible leader who 

could successfully prosecute the war against the Communists. Rather, it is 

intended to illustrate that a coup that required a significant amount of change in 

the leadership and organization of the GVN and its counterinsurgency strategy 

would necessarily be chaotic.

150. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 121.

151. Ibid., 121-122.

152. Michael V. Forrestal, Memorandum for the President, 11 December 1963, 

Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 1, TTU, 1-2.

153. Ibid., 2.

154. The GVN’s pacification programs after the fall of Diem will be discussed 

further in the next chapter.

155. USOM, “Notes on Strategic Hamlets”, 5.

156. Ibid., 16.

157. Quoted in R. Michael Pearce, Evolution of a Vietnamese Village-Part I

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1965), 55.

158. It should also be noted that the Communists did not intend to leave the 

population in their dispersed hamlets when the war was over. The PAVN history 

states that in the North in 1961 “eleven million working peasants were organized 

into agricultural production cooperatives.” See Military History Institute of 

Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 91

159. Pearce, Evolution of a Vietnamese Village - Part II, 29.

160. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 85.

161. O’Donnell, “The Strategic Hamlet Program in Kien Hoa Province,” 52. 

Also see Race, War Comes to Long An, 83.

129

Chapter 5

Vietnam, 1966-1970

It essentially amounted to going out and beating the jungle every 

day and every night looking for the enemy. There were all kinds 

of fancy names given to the ‘tactics’: search and destroy, cordon 

and search, sweep and search, anvil and hammer, etc. and etc but it 

all amounted at the tactical unit level to going out, looking for the 

enemy, and trying to kill him.”

―Carl Quickmire, Troop Commander, Quoted in Red Thunder, 

Tropic Lightning

The involvement of American ground combat forces in Vietnam is a 

complicated and difficult operation to analyze and make sense of. As the 

quote above indicates, the reality for tactical units was often very different 

than that presented by commanders above them. American ground combat 

forces were primarily tasked to seek out and destroy the armed forces of 

the DRV and the Front but the tools and methods for doing so were quite 

limited. US units attempted to develop tactics and techniques that would 

produce success in this mission, but because of the nature of the war and 

the tenacity of their enemy, such success was difficult, if not impossible, 

to realize.

They also faced the challenge of confronting the insurgent infrastructure 

in the hamlets and villages of rural Vietnam. The pacification effort that 

was intended to defeat this infrastructure was supposed to be the mission 

of the Vietnamese forces that US units operated with. However, US units 

often found themselves providing support to pacification but the need to 

confront the PAVN and VC main forces, both to protect the pacification 

effort itself and to prevent the conventional invasion that the US rightly 

feared, often forced US units to choose between one or the other. The two 

efforts were inextricably linked and combat power dedicated to one was 

not available to the other.

Overview of US Ground Combat Operations in Vietnam

The succession of different regimes that ran the GVN following the 

1 November 1963 coup that deposed President Ngo Dinh Diem proved 

incapable of prosecuting the war against the VC insurgency or repelling 

the invasion of South Vietnam by elements of PAVN.1

 They could not 

agree on a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy to succeed the 

Strategic Hamlet Program which had ended coincidently with the coup 

against Diem. At the same time, ARVN was not strong enough, despite 
130

the presence of American advisers and the support of American airpower, 

to defeat the VC and PAVN main force units that had begun operating 

throughout the country.2

In response to this situation and concerned over the possibility of an 

imminent collapse of South Vietnam, President Johnson decided to 

gradually escalate the war in 1964, first through air strikes against North 

Vietnam and then by introducing US ground forces in a limited role. It was 

believed that these steps would send the DRV a clear message regarding 

US resolve and that the resulting damage would convince it to end its 

support for the insurgency.3

 They did not, however, and the ground war in 

South Vietnam grew more intense as the DRV and the Front attempted to 

capitalize on the situation and win a quick victory.4

In April 1965, President Johnson authorized the enclave strategy in 

which US forces would defend five coastal enclaves and assist ARVN 

forces within 50 miles of them. This move also failed to significantly 

change the dynamic of the war and so in July 1965 Johnson committed 

US forces to ground combat. The US commander, General William C. 

Westmoreland, envisioned using US forces in three phases.5

In the first phase, US forces would stabilize the situation and secure 

logistical bases. In the second phase, they would seize the initiative by 

operating against VC and PAVN main force bases and sanctuaries. During 

the final phase, the remaining enemy units would be defeated and forced 

across the border into Laos and Cambodia. Westmoreland believed that 

US ground forces were better equipped to confront the VC and PAVN 

main forces and that ARVN would be better utilized providing security to 

the Vietnamese population and confronting VC local and guerrilla units.6

Westmoreland was also concerned that if US units were dispersed into 

small elements to fight VC local and guerrilla forces, that they could be 

exposed to a major attack by main force units. A major US defeat might 

prematurely end the war.7

 Thus, as US units flowed into South Vietnam 

in 1965 and 1966, they were deployed under division and brigade-sized 

headquarters and were dedicated to the mission of confronting and 

defeating the PAVN and VC main force units. The United States Marine 

Corps (USMC) was given responsibility for the I Corps Tactical Zone 

(CTZ), just south of the 17th parallel, while US Army and other Free 

World Military Armed Forces (FWMAF), such as those of South Korea 

and Australia, were given responsibility for operations in the II and III 

CTZs, and eventually in IV CTZ as well.8
131

During 1966 and 1967, US ground forces conducted offensive operations 

to find, fix, and destroy enemy main force units throughout the country. 

Many units, such as the 173d Airborne Brigade and the brigades of the 101st 

Airborne Division, were not assigned a specific area of operations; rather, 

they were deployed throughout the country in response to intelligence 

about the location of enemy main force units. Some offensive operations, 

such as Junction City9, were multi-divisional in strength.10

However, in addition to large scale offensive operations, many US Army 

units engaged in smaller operations, like Operation MAILI11, that focused 

on securing the local population and assisting the GVN’s pacification 

effort. The USMC executed the Combined Action Platoon program 

which had USMC squads fight and live along side Vietnamese territorial 

forces within a village.12 However, most of these operations were short 

in duration and did not receive the same amount of resources as major 

offensive operations.13

The deployment of US ground forces stabilized the GVN and allowed 

the pacification14 effort to take shape. US units inflicted significant losses 

on PAVN and VC forces in terms of personnel, materiel, and supplies. 

Offensive operations had not been sufficient, however, to destroy the main 

force units. In response, the Party decided to alter their strategy and seek 

a “decisive victory” through the execution of a “general offensive-general 

uprising.”15 The offensive began during the Vietnamese holiday of Tet in 

1968.

The Party strategy for the Tet Offensive envisioned luring US forces 

away from populated areas so that VC main force and guerrilla units could 

defeat ARVN units and seize control of the major urban areas including 

Hue, Da Nang, and Saigon.16 While the strategy was initially successful, 

it also presented a tremendous opportunity to US forces. VC and PAVN 

main force units had to engage the more heavily armed US units. Once 

the initial shock of the attacks were over, US units rapidly regrouped and 

decimated the VC and PAVN main forces. The attack was defeated around 

Saigon by mid-February and though hard fighting continued through 

March, PAVN and VC units were soundly defeated.17

The Tet Offensive was not a one off event, however. PAVN and VC units 

launched a second offensive targeted at Saigon in May of 1968. The attack 

failed to penetrate the US screen that had been established around Saigon 

and resulted in even greater losses for the PAVN and VC units that took 

part. Throughout the summer of 1968, US units conducted operations to 

find and destroy the now retreating enemy main force units. The PAVN 
132

and VC main force units assiduously avoided contact but were largely 

forced out of the populated areas of the country. This enabled the GVN to 

launch their Special Pacification Plan, referred to by the Americans as the 

APC.18

In 1969, the new commander of US forces, General Creighton Abrams, 

inaugurated his “one war” strategy that was intended to unify the efforts 

of US units in support of pacification and the battle against PAVN and 

VC main and local force elements.19 The new administration of President 

Richard Nixon further altered the fight for US forces by introducing the 

strategy of Vietnamization. This strategy envisioned a gradual withdrawal 

of US forces and a transition of all security responsibilities to Vietnamese 

forces. The strategy would require US units to operate more closely with 

ARVN and prepare them to confront PAVN and the VC simultaneously.20

The Party and Front launched another offensive following the Tet holiday 

in 1969. This time they hoped to strike American units hard enough in 

order to force the US to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam as part of 

the conditions of a cease fire.21 The offensive failed and did not result in 

the general uprising that the Party and Front had hoped for. Moreover, it 

again allowed US units the opportunity to deploy their superior firepower 

against VC and PAVN main force units and severely degrade their strength.

After the 1969 Tet Offensive, US units continued to execute the one 

war and Vietnamization strategies. They ostensibly focused on small 

unit, combined operations, but continued to be used to fight major battles 

against PAVN, such as the infamous battle at Hamburger Hill.22 However, 

the decimation that PAVN and VC forces had experienced over the last two 

years provided a major increase in security in the countryside of Vietnam 

and the pacification effort began to accelerate.23

US units provided increasing amounts of support to the pacification effort, 

but one major operation remained, the May 1970 invasion of Cambodia. 

US units supported ARVN and conducted combat operations along the 

border with and into Cambodia to destroy PAVN and VC supply points 

and base camps.24 The invasion of Cambodia represented the final step in 

Westmoreland’s three phase plan for the use of US forces and provides an 

example of how US operations did not change significantly despite the one 

war and Vietnamization strategies implemented by US leaders and policy 

makers. It also illustrates that the strategy developed by Westmoreland and 

endorsed in the PROVN study to destroy main force units first to create 

space for pacification was still operative.25
133

Following the invasion of Cambodia, US units returned to their role of 

supporting pacification and improving the combat effectiveness of ARVN. 

As they did so, US units continued their withdrawal from Vietnam. US 

operations became smaller as ARVN division commanders were handed 

responsibility for prosecuting the war against the Communist main 

forces.26 In the end of involvement of US ground combat forces in the war, 

the 101st Airborne Division left Vietnam in the spring of 1972, .27

Control Mechanism - Pacification

Following the end of the Strategic Hamlet Program coincident with 

the coup against Diem on 1 November 1963, the GVN was without a 

holistic control mechanism through which it could define a comprehensive 

counterinsurgency strategy and employ population and resource control 

measures as a part of that strategy.28 However, such a mechanism did 

evolve in the form of pacification.29 The official definition from the 1968 

MACV Pacification Handbook stated that:

 Pacification, as it applies in the Republic of Vietnam, is the military, 

political, economic, and social process of establishing or re-establishing 

local government [that’s] responsive to and involving the participation 

of the people. It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial 

security, the destruction of the enemy’s under-ground government, 

the assertion or reassertion of political control and involvement of the 

people in government, and the initiation of economic and social activity 

capable of self-sustenance and expansion.30

This definition demonstrates just how comprehensive, and complex, 

the system of pacification was. Pacification consisted of a number of 

component programs, encompassed a wide range of military and civilian 

activities, and sought to achieve a variety of aims.31 Notably included in 

those aims are local security and the destruction of the enemy subversive 

infrastructure. The handbook noted that:

The key to pacification is the provision of sustained territorial security. 

Territorial security is security from VC local forces and guerrilla units 

and VC/NVA [North Vietnamese Army] main force units, if any are in or 

threatening the area. It also includes the protection of the people within 

a hamlet from the VC infrastructure and bullies.32

Thus, the first step in pacification was to provide meaningful security 

to the population from all possible threats, including VC and PAVN main 

force units. This is important to note as some writers, such as Andrew 

Krepinevich, contend that pacification presented an alternative strategy 
134

to Westmoreland’s attrition strategy.33 However, the definition makes 

clear that attrition, and the search and destroy tactics associated with it, 

formed one part of the overall pacification strategy. The other elements of 

pacification could not begin until the population was sufficiently protected 

from the VC and PAVN main force units.

The other problem with presenting pacification as an alternative strategy 

to attrition is that pacification as defined above and as understood by 

historians and writers looking back on the conflict was not a fully formed 

concept in 1964 or 1965 as the US contemplated intervening with ground 

combat forces. Pacification with its concepts, objectives, and component 

programs, evolved over time beginning with the Diem regime’s efforts to 

gain control of the country discussed in the previous chapter. Its evolution 

did not occur in a vacuum but in the midst of the dynamic conflict that 

surrounded and was a part of it.

Evolution of Pacification after Diem

Despite the persistent criticism of Diem by those who opposed his 

policies and who ultimately overthrew his government, the new leaders of 

the GVN realized that they needed to assert control over the population, 

particularly in the rural areas. They also recognized that the Strategic 

Hamlet Program, despite is noted shortcomings, provided a starting point 

to do so. Vietnamese Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho had long experience 

in pacification and recalled in a monograph written after the war that:

In the face of the deteriorating situation, the GVN was in a dilemma. On 

the one hand, there was no way to reinstate the Strategic Hamlet program 

since it had been linked with the old regime and officially abolished. On 

the other hand, the GVN could not give the enemy free reign over the 

countryside. As a solution, the government instituted a new pacification 

program, the ‘New Life Hamlet’ program. As a matter of fact, there was 

nothing that could distinguish this program from its predecessor, only a 

change in name.34

 This assertion is supported by the experience of R. Michael Pearce in 

Duc Lap Village, Hau Nghia province. Pearce noted that the requirements 

for what he called a “New Rural Life Hamlet” were: a census completed 

and the VC infrastructure destroyed, a hamlet self defense force formed, 

defensive works constructed, a communications system in place to call 

for reinforcements, organization of the population into groups, and a new 

hamlet government selected.35 The establishment of the New Rural Life 

Hamlet was itself one step in a larger pacification process which included 
135

a military operation to clear the area of VC and PAVN main force units 

and the insertion of teams to improve local governance and development.36

The New Rural Life Hamlet requirements and the pacification process that 

it was a part of were nearly identical to the components of the Strategic 

Hamlet Program.

In an attempt to avoid the problem of overreach that had plagued the 

Strategic Hamlet Program, the GVN executed the pacification programs in 

the context of an “oil-spot” strategy in 1964, the first of which was called 

Chien Thang (Will to Victory).37 As this program failed, the GVN was 

encouraged by MACV and the US embassy to pursue a less ambitious plan, 

referred to as Hop Tac (Victory).38 Hop Tac pursued pacification in only 

three provinces around Saigon.39 Despite the attempt to reduce the scope 

and improve the focus of the GVN’s pacification efforts, the degrading 

military situation and the succession of different governments prevented 

the New Rural Life Hamlet program and its associated pacification 

strategies from ever achieving any momentum.

When Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu 

assumed power in June 1965 they understood the need to address the 

GVN’s lack of control in the rural areas and this led to the creation of a 

new pacification strategy.40 Tho noted that:

The RVN government was fully aware of the Communist dependence on 

the rural area, and the national strategy of ‘Pacification and Development’ 

was designed to separate the Communists from it. The strategy also 

sought to establish the GVN presence in less secure, contested areas 

with a view of controlling the nation’s manpower and resources and 

denying them to the enemy.41

The strategy was not well developed in 1965 when the US intervention 

began, however. The concept of pacification continued to evolve within 

the GVN and in 1966 it became the Revolutionary Development (RD) 

program. With this change came a unification of the pacification effort 

within the GVN. A standing committee, with the Prime Minister as chair 

and representatives from civilian ministries and the military, was formed 

to direct the RD effort.42 MG Nguyen Duc Thang became secretary general 

of the committee and in early 1966 he created the RD cadre program.43

The RD cadre was a team of young men and women who were trained 

to execute the GVN’s pacification in the hamlets after the military had 

secured the area. They were expected to secure themselves as they did so 

and this would prove to be a major challenge to the pacification program.
136

RD also brought the Chieu Hoi program formally under the umbrella of 

pacification. Chieu Hoi, or Open Arms, was the GVN’s amnesty program 

and was intended to allow the non-Communist elements within the VC to 

surrender and return to the GVN. The Vietnamese had never placed much 

emphasis on the program and the effort had previously been run outside 

of pacification. At the insistence of the US, it was brought within RD. 

This did not, however, change the attitude of the GVN to the program 

and it continued to receive little in the way of resources or effort.44 The 

GVN spent just 31 percent of the funds obligated to the program in 1966.45

Though this increased in later years, the Vietnamese remained distrustful 

of any ralliers that came in and thus did not view them as an asset that 

could be leveraged in the fight against the VC in the rural areas.46

In 1967, the pacification program changed names again and became the 

New Model Pacification program.47 The New Model Pacification program 

included an ambitious set of 11 objectives to be accomplished by the RD 

cadre. The objectives included carryovers from earlier programs, such as 

the completion of a census and the organization of hamlet self-defense 

forces, and new objectives like the elimination of illiteracy, improvement 

of health and sanitary conditions, development of agriculture and craft 

industries, and the implementation of land reform.48A hamlet that was 

designated an ap doi moi (Real New Life Hamlet) during that year’s 

pacification plan was to accomplish all 11 objectives. An ap binh dinh

(Pacification Hamlet) would only achieve the first two objectives, which 

were primarily focused on security.49

The New Model Pacification Program was thus far more ambitious than 

the Strategic Hamlet Program had been. It required a major reform to the 

administrative structures in the rural areas of the country and a massive 

change in the everyday life of peasants in the hamlets. It was also far 

less coercive than earlier efforts had been. Tho stated proudly that “the 

spirit of democracy was strong and pervasive, precluding the use of harsh 

measures.”50 Despite this he noted that, “yet the people seemed indifferent 

to the GVN courtship. If successful, the pacification effort would replace 

this indifference with a solid commitment on the part of the people, a 

commitment that would support the defense of the nation and achieve a 

just peace.”51

Despite the heavy commitment of resources to it by the GVN and the 

unification of US support for it under CORDS, the New Model Pacification 

program failed to achieve its objectives in 1967.52 This was primarily due 

to the inability of US ground forces, ARVN, and the local security forces 

to provide sustained security in the hamlets. This exposed the RD cadre 
137

to attacks, undermining their ability to conduct the development activities 

that they were responsible for.

When the Party launched the Tet Offensive in early 1968 it disrupted and 

rolled back pacification efforts as US and ARVN units had to be redeployed 

around the country. Many areas that had previously been under government 

control or contested were now abandoned to the PAVN and VC forces.53

The aftermath of the Tet Offensive, however, created an opportunity for 

the GVN and its allies to jumpstart pacification. The loss to the Front of so 

many experienced cadre in the towns and the decimation of VC and PAVN 

main force units allowed the GVN and the US to execute the APC in late 

fall 1968 and early 1969. The APC did not represent a major change to the 

structure of pacification but was instead a major commitment of resources 

to pacification.54

After the end of the APC and the defeat of the Party’s 1969 Tet 

Offensive, the GVN vigorously pursued pacification. In doing so, the 

GVN made one major modification. Development and pacification efforts 

in 1969 were directed towards villages because “the village was the basic 

administratively organized unit which controlled resources and had a 

budget of its own.”55 The change was also meant to halt the displacement 

of the population from unsecure hamlets to secure hamlets, as this was 

“deemed unnecessary and disadvantageous.”56 This was a dramatic shift 

as all previous incarnations of pacification had focused on the hamlet. 

Moreover, it was a strange change to make as the population actually 

lived in the hamlets. If the population was not secure in their hamlet then 

pacification would necessarily fail.

The change was partly at the urging of US officials in CORDS who 

believed that improved development and government at the village level 

could produce greater gains in the pacification effort.57 Unfortunately, the 

village development efforts were limited by the fact that the authorities 

and resources given to the village were in addition to those already 

ongoing, which meant that the province chief retained the majority of 

power in the governmental structure.58 Moreover, the security situation, 

while improving, was still not certain enough for the population within 

the villages to risk supporting the government and candidates for village 

elections were difficult to find.59

Nevertheless, the massive increase in security brought about by the 

defeat of VC and PAVN main force units and the loss of significant numbers 

of VC cadre in the rural areas allowed the GVN pacification program to 

make rapid gains throughout 1969 and 1970.60 By 1971, the “situation 
138

was so good that the GVN deemed it a most appropriate time to pass on 

to the nation-building phase, particularly development and social reform. 

Pacification was considered an anachronistic term since its most important 

objective [ending the war and achieving peace] had been achieved.”61

Though the GVN had made progress in its battle against the VC, the war 

was by no means over. Robert Komer had cautioned in 1970 that:

The VC, though greatly weakened, is still a force to be reckoned with. 

Indeed, despite the growing evidence as to pacification’s short-term 

impact on rural insurgency, such other factors as new NVA offensives, 

political changes in Saigon, or the terms of a negotiated settlement may 

so affect the final outcome in Vietnam that no real test of pacification’s 

ultimate impact may ever be feasible.62

His analysis proved to be prescient.

Although ARVN defeated PAVN’s 1972 Easter Offensive with the 

assistance of US airpower, it caused major disruption in the nation building 

program and the loss of government control in some hamlets. This had 

been one of the major goals of the offensive. The PAVN history of the war 

states that during the offensive “we would simultaneously mount wideranging military attacks coordinated with mass popular uprisings aimed at 

destroying the enemy’s ‘pacification’ program in the rural lowlands. These 

actions would totally change the character of the war in South Vietnam.”63

They did. The offensive gave PAVN and VC control over significant 

amounts of territory, some of which they would never relinquish. In the 

hours before final implementation of the January 1973 cease fire, PAVN 

units attacked hundreds of villages to further expand their control.64

Although the PAVN units had been badly hurt during the offensive, ARVN 

no longer had the support of US advisers or air power and was nearly as 

damaged as their opponents.65

As a result, pacification was dead in 1973. ARVN and the local security 

forces could no longer provide the security that was the sine qua non of 

the process and the GVN could not draw on the resources of the United 

States to implement such an ambitious program.66 The GVN continued 

the fiction of pacification all the way through 1975 but it could no longer 

mount the coordinated and comprehensive effort required to gain the 

control over the population that it had lost. Whether or not doing so would 

have prevented or merely delayed PAVN’s invasion which ended South 

Vietnam’s independence is not clear.
139

US Support to Pacification

The US was slow to support the GVN’s pacification efforts. The 

majority of US assistance in the years prior to 1963 was directed towards 

the improvement of the RVNAF. As noted in the previous chapter, Diem 

had avoided asking the US for support for both the agrovilles and the 

Strategic Hamlet Programs because he feared that his allies would interfere 

with his execution of the programs. When the US did contribute to the 

Strategic Hamlet program the outlay was a paltry $10 million to support 

an extremely ambitious and costly program.67

American support for pacification remained sparce throughout 1964 

and 1965. Much of the assistance was directed to the various self defense 

forces through the military’s assistance program. The embassy and 

MACV assisted the GVN in making the plans for both Chien Thang and 

Hop Tac. Moreover, MACV assumed the lead for American support of 

pacification during Hop Tac and directed its advisers in the countryside to 

prepare reports on the progress of pacification.68 The lack of US support 

contributed to the failure of both plans, but it was not the major cause of 

failure.

The constantly changing regimes at the head of the GVN made it 

difficult for any pacification program to be properly supported. The chaos 

that regime changes caused contributed to a lack of coordination between 

the various components of the pacification program. Without a solid 

government or a comprehensive pacification program to provide support 

to, there was little point in dedicating resources to pacification. Moreover, 

because the military situation was deteriorating so rapidly, it made more 

sense to focus resources that were going in on reinforcing ARVN.

As the GVN stabilized under Thieu and Ky in 1965, it became possible 

for the US to support the pacification programs more vigorously. The US 

was already providing support to some of the components of pacification 

through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 

and the CIA but the bulk of resources were going to the military. Robert 

Komer portrays this as a situation where pacification was given second 

priority to the military’s attrition strategy.69 However, it should be recalled 

that the GVN’s pacification strategy was dependent upon the rural areas 

being secure from all threats before the process of pacification could begin. 

This included the threat from VC and PAVN main force units, against 

whom Westmoreland’s attrition strategy was directed.

As the US military’s fight against VC and PAVN main forces continued in 

1966, questions began to be raised by President Johnson and Ambassador 
140

Lodge about how much effort should be directed to support pacification.70

A study produced by members of the Army staff entitled “Program for the 

Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam,” or PROVN, 

was published in March of 1966. Krepinevich and Komer maintain that 

PROVN advocated a central role for pacification and that the study’s 

main conclusions were ignored by Westmoreland and MACV.71 While 

it is true that PROVN emphasized pacification much more strongly than 

other strategies had to that point, it nevertheless concluded that in order 

for pacification to be successful, the necessary first step was to destroy VC 

and PAVN main force units.72

Westmoreland was therefore confronted with a dilemma. Destroying the 

VC and PAVN main force units was required to provide the necessary 

space for pacification to succeed but doing so left little in the way of 

resources to provide to the pacification effort. The Combined Campaign 

Plan 1967, AB 142, attempted to set specific roles and responsibilities 

for the military units involved and “established definite RD missions for 

ARVN and US/FWMAF forces. ARVN’s primary responsibility was to 

provide the military support to RD, while the primary responsibility of 

US/FWMAF was to seek out and destroy VC/NVA main force units, base 

areas, and LOCs.”73 Even with this division of labor it was noted that:

The great number of military forces employed in support of pacification 

never seemed to keep up with the requirements occasioned by the 

necessity to deploy a permanent occupation force to every hamlet. The 

situation was such that when protection forces were deployed from a 

certain area considered ‘secure’, that area might relapse into insecurity 

and the local population would lose confidence in the GVN.74

The challenge of supporting pacification was made more difficult by 

the fact that such support was not unified under a single US agency. The 

GVN had conceptually unified its pacification efforts but US support 

was provided through the agency which had responsibility for a specific 

program. Thus, USAID provided support to development efforts and the 

Chieu Hoi program, the CIA provided money and advisors to the RD cadre, 

and the US military supported pacification through its advisory effort 

inside of ARVN. The resulting disunity of effort concerned the President 

and some of his top advisors who felt that MACV was not sufficiently 

supporting pacification and that it would be better to unify pacification 

under a single agency, preferably the military.75

This led to the creation of the short-lived Office of Civil Operations in 

late 1966. The new office was intended to unify the pacification effort but 
141

it never achieved this goal because it did not gain control over personnel, 

logistics, or funding from the responsible agencies.76 Nor was the office 

integrated under the military command structure. As a result, President 

Johnson decided to unify the pacification effort under the command of 

Westmoreland who established a new organization called CORDS.77

CORDS resolved many of the issues that had plagued US support of 

pacification to that point. CORDS was a part of the military command 

structure and its leader, initially Robert Komer, was made a full deputy, 

referred to as DepCORDS, to Westmoreland. The DepCORDS at each 

level was responsible for developing pacification plans that unified the 

civil and military effort and for supervising the execution of those plans.78

Additionally, US units were directed in the 1968 Combined Campaign 

Plan “to coordinate their military plans with provincial RD plans.”79 These 

arrangements gave the DepCORDS access to more resources and greater 

authority to employ them to support pacification.

Moreover, CORDS gained control over nearly all of the US programs 

associated with pacification to include: Chieu Hoi, RD cadre, civic action 

and civil affairs operations of the US military, and all of the associated 

reports and evaluations.80 The consolidation of reports81 provided a 

useful check on the execution of pacification programs. A senior civilian 

responsible for compiling pacification reports for II CTZ recalled that 

Ambassador Colby would often take the reports out to the field and verify 

their accuracy causing some discomfort to US advisers, particularly 

military officers.82

The lack of security at the local level continued to hamper pacification 

efforts, however. In an attempt to improve the situation, Westmoreland 

gave CORDS responsibility for all territorial security forces in May 

of 1967.83 This gave CORDS access to further resources from the US 

military and the military personnel who advised Vietnamese territorial 

security forces. Despite this change, security in the countryside remained 

poor because the threat posed by VC and PAVN main force units was still 

high. Even unified pacification efforts could make little progress in this 

situation.

However, the Tet Offensive, and the decimation of VC and PAVN main 

force units that accompanied it, gave the unified pacification efforts the 

chance to gain ground. The APC in late 1968 and early 1969 showcased 

this as US units and the CORDS organization deployed the bulk of their 

resources into the three month pacification effort.84 This occurred despite 

the fact that doubts had begun to arise about pacification due to the 
142

performance of the Vietnamese RD cadre during the Tet Offensive.85 Many 

had been forced to leave the villages where they operated and shelter at 

the district headquarters.86 The APC theoretically represented the initial 

commitment by the new MACV commander, General Abrams, to execute 

a “one war” strategy in which population security, and thus pacification, 

would assume primacy over the destruction of enemy units.87

United States and GVN operations in support of pacification increased 

from 1969-1971 but large-scale conventional military operations, such 

as the invasion of Cambodia in 1970, continued to take place. United 

States units executed more small unit (company and below) and combined 

operations with Vietnamese forces but much of the focus remained on 

destroying VC units.88 The actions of US units appeared to be different 

from the message being sent by the US chain of command.

Vietnamization and the withdrawal of US ground forces significantly 

altered US support for pacification. Limits imposed on the total strength of 

US military forces in the country resulted in US advisers being withdrawn 

from areas that were deemed secure and significantly reduced their numbers 

elsewhere.89 The civilian agencies involved in pacification also wanted to 

regain control of their personnel and programs and recommended that 

CORDS be stripped of most of its responsibilities.90 This proposal was 

not acted on but did not need to be as the terms of the 1973 Paris Peace 

Accords essentially prohibited CORDS existence.

The Peace Accords permitted a minimal US presence located in the 

Defense Attaché Office in Saigon but it could not provide advice or 

assistance to military operations.91 No longer able to function, CORDS 

ceased operations in February of 1973.92 The US Congress also began to 

reduce the amount of aid provided to the GVN, so the resources required 

to execute an expensive pacification program and upgrade the capabilities 

of ARVN were no longer available.93 US support to pacification dwindled 

alongside the US support to ARVN and the GVN itself, finally expiring 

when the 1975 PAVN invasion ended the RVN.

US Ground Forces Role in Pacification

The GVN’s pacification effort, and the broad US support of that 

effort, evolved significantly during the course of the war. The role of US 

ground forces in pacification also evolved, but not nearly as much as the 

pacification effort itself, the change to a one war strategy under Abrams in 

1969 notwithstanding. Westmoreland believed that the most appropriate 

use of US ground forces in 1965 and 1966 was to locate and destroy the 

VC and PAVN main force units that threatened the very survival of the 
143

RVN.94 This remained the primary mission of US ground forces throughout 

the war.

The 1967 Combined Campaign Plan stated that “the primary 

responsibility of US/FWMAF was to seek out and destroy VC/NVA main 

force units, base areas, and LOCs.”95 Despite the changed dynamic of the 

war following the Tet Offensive and the increased emphasis on pacification 

operations, US ground forces were still directed to focus on enemy main 

force units as late as 1971. The Territorial Security in Vietnam handbook 

published by Military Assistance Command, CORDS in January 1971 

noted, “the best method of protecting the people is to deny the enemy 

access to populated areas. . . . Preventing main forces from reaching the 

population is the task of ARVN, US, and FWMAF units.”96

While this emphasis on the enemy main force units has drawn criticism, 

it was in fact critical if pacification was to achieve any success. As 

discussed above, the pacification strategy required sustained security in 

the countryside before the other activities could proceed. Observing US 

ground force operations in the Mekong Delta in 1966-1967, a pair of 

American researchers reported that there was an “inextricable connection 

between the ‘search and destroy’ and the ‘pacification’ tasks. If one failed, 

the other would also be doomed to failure.”97

While the importance of US ground force operations against VC and 

PAVN main force units was clear, it was not sufficient to win the war. 

The researchers in the Mekong Delta observed that for the Front “the 

relationship between armed force and territorial control is complex. 

Initially, armed force is used to break the control of the opposition. . . . 

The armed units, in turn, protect the political apparatus, and enable it to 

consolidate and further expand its control.”98 This complex relationship 

was true for the GVN and its allies as well. US operations against main 

force units could achieve only so much, pacification had to follow in their 

wake and US manuals recognized as much. The 1968 MAC-V Pacification 

Handbook stated that “operations to annihilate the enemy while clearly 

essential to pacification are, by themselves, inadequate.”99

This recognition meant that US forces would not be limited to conducting 

search and destroy operations. The 1966 Handbook for US Forces in 

Vietnam instructed that “US and Free World Forces of approximately 

brigade size may often be deployed into a province, or even a district, 

for sustained operations over two, three, or four week periods designed 

to destroy local and guerrilla forces and the political and military 

infrastructure of the VC.”100 At their conclusion, these operations were 
144

supposed to have accomplished a number of objectives, including: the 

destruction of village and hamlet VC elements, increased opportunities 

for civic action, and improved GVN control of the area.101

The operations described above were part of a two-phase strategy to 

provide the security required for pacification. In the first phase, US 

ground forces and ARVN would clear the area of VC and PAVN main 

force units and VC guerrilla forces.102 They would then conduct patrols, 

establish outposts, and destroy any remaining VC local forces.103 Then, the 

Vietnamese territorial security forces assumed responsibility for securing 

the area.104 After they did so, US and ARVN forces would move to another 

area to begin the process again.

Unfortunately, as soon as US and ARVN forces left the area, VC units 

often began operating in them again. The problem was identified in the 

Mekong Delta where it was noted that the implication of the US strategy 

for the Viet Cong was obvious in that “their military units, even Main 

Force units, should not directly challenge the US troops, but should strike 

in relatively undefended areas, and force the opposing troops to spread 

themselves thin.”105 This strategy meant that US ground forces would 

spend the majority of their time simply trying to locate and engage PAVN 

and VC forces throughout the war.

While the 1968 Tet Offensive and the new strategy of Vietnamization 

dramatically altered the course of pacification and US support of it, it 

did not significantly change the role of US ground forces. US units did 

conduct an increasing number of joint operations and spent more time 

executing small unit operations but the emphasis remained on keeping the 

main force units away from the populated areas. In fact, as pacification 

progressed and the Vietnamization process accelerated it could be argued 

that US ground forces became even less involved in pacification.

This shift resulted from the need to transition responsibility for 

confronting VC and PAVN from US ground forces to ARVN. By 1970 the 

GVN was making a concerted effort to “to alleviate division commander’s 

territorial responsibilities and to permit them to concentrate more on mobile 

tactical operations since divisions were to gradually take over combat 

responsibilities from the departing US forces.”106 Therefore, even when 

US ground forces were conducting combined operations with Vietnamese 

forces they were most often doing so in order to prepare ARVN for combat 

operations against main force units. This left pacification in the hands of 

GVN cadre teams, territorial security forces, and US advisers.
145

Moreover, US ground forces were gradually being withdrawn from 

across Vietnam beginning in 1969. This meant that each remaining US 

unit was responsible for a much larger area of operations, further reducing 

its ability to dedicate forces to provide security for pacification. When 

major operations were conducted, such as the 1970 invasion of Cambodia, 

US units participated at a high rate and left few, if any, forces behind to 

support pacification.107

US ground force support to pacification throughout the war was, therefore, 

always relatively limited. However, the task that it performed was critical. 

A Vietnamese observer of pacification noted that “while US forces did 

not always participate in pacification operations, their powerful combat 

support assets and intervention capabilities directly contributed to the 

clearing of several pacification areas. Their most significant effectiveness 

was the destruction of enemy bases and lines of communication.”108

This was echoed by Robert Komer, the first head of CORDS, who 

observed that “it is hard to assess the relative extent to which undoubted 

changes in the countryside can be properly attributed to the pacification 

program as opposed to other factors. How much is attributable to the shield 

provided by the allied effort in the ‘big unit’ war, which largely drove the 

VC/NVA main forces from most populated areas?”109 That being said, it is 

also difficult to assess how pacification affected the fight against VC and 

PAVN main force units. The American researchers in the Mekong Delta 

reported that “if Local Force battalions and companies can be kept out of 

an area, the entry of heavy Main Force battalions becomes more risky for 

the Viet Cong, and small unit pacification operations can be conducted 

with greater freedom, which can curtail the movement of critical cadres.”110

In other words, if pacification activities were occurring, disrupting the 

operation of VC political cadres, this would deny VC local forces and 

guerrillas the ability to operate in an area. This in turn limited the ability 

of main force units to enter the area. The main force war and pacification 

cannot be separated. Therefore, US ground force units, though not always 

executing pacification tasks per se, were supporting pacification through 

their actions against VC and PAVN main forces.

Population and Resource Control Measures

 in Support of Pacification

Given the limited role of US ground forces in support of pacification, it 

could be concluded that population and resource control measures would 

not have been useful. However, in addition to their primary role of fighting 
146

the enemy’s main forces, US ground forces also participated in clear and 

secure operations in support of pacification. For these operations to be 

successful, US ground forces had to target and destroy not only the main 

force units in the area, but the VC local and guerrilla units as well.

Moreover, because of the relationship between the effectiveness of VC 

local and guerrilla forces and the ease with which VC and PAVN main 

force units could then operate in any specific area it was necessary to 

disrupt VC local forces and infrastructure to protect the population from 

main force threats. The statement of a former VC cadre from the Duc Hoa 

district in Hau Nghia province about local supply operations supports this 

contention. He reported that:

Cash taxes were forwarded to higher headquarters but rice taxation 

was kept by the finance section of the village committee and stored in 

‘safe’ peoples’ houses. When combat units passed through the village 

they simply requisitioned rice from the finance section. People were 

also expected to keep one jar of rice for the village guerrillas and one 

bushel of paddy in reserve to sell to mobile units when necessary. Thus 

our military units had many advantages. They didn’t have to carry rice 

and could carry more ammo. They also didn’t have to warn a village in 

advance of their arrival and thus safeguarded the security of operations.111

The ability of all levels of VC forces, as well as the PAVN main forces, 

to disappear into the dense jungle of South Vietnam also made gathering 

intelligence on the location of the enemy of paramount importance. This 

could not be accomplished without the support of the population, who 

knew if PAVN or VC units were passing through the area and requisitioning 

supplies. Therefore, population and resource control measures could be a 

useful tool to target and disrupt the local, guerrilla, and main force units.

In practice most of the standard population and resource control 

measures such as issue of identification cards, census operations, curfews, 

movement controls, were employed by Vietnamese government or military 

personnel.112 These actions generally occurred after an area had been 

cleared and US ground forces had departed but US units did sometimes 

support ARVN units as they implemented population and resource control 

measures. Moreover, US ground forces employed a variety of tactics and 

techniques which could be considered population and resource control 

measures.113
147

Cordon and Search

Cordon and search operations were a corollary of the more widely 

known search and destroy operations. In a cordon and search operation, 

a US unit, usually in conjunction with ARVN and territorial security 

forces, would surround a given area, perhaps a hamlet, a known safe 

haven, or even an entire village, and systematically search the area for VC 

personnel, supplies, or physical infrastructure. Suspicious personnel were 

interrogated, supplies confiscated or destroyed, and physical infrastructure 

disabled.114

This tactic was described as a “search and seizure” operation in the 

1963 Army FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations.

115 The manual stated 

that it could be used to “apprehend guerrilla force members, and uncover 

and seize illegal arms, communication means, medicines, and other items 

of a critical nature. A search and seizure operation may be conducted at 

any time and may be used as a preventive measure against the possible 

accumulation of critical items by the population.”116 Viewed as a means to 

prevent the population from storing supplies for the enemy and therefore 

as a method to target their behavior and isolate them from the insurgents it 

is clear that cordon and search operations were a population and resource 

control measure.

US units also conducted cordon and searches with Vietnamese forces 

to execute Hamlet Festival, Go Team, or County Fair operations.117 In 

these operations, US and ARVN units cordoned a selected hamlet and 

then Vietnamese forces would search the hamlet and identify residents 

for screening by intelligence personnel. The remaining residents were 

then gathered together and propagandized. The primary intent of the 

propaganda was to assure the people of the GVN’s concern for their well 

being.118

The operations differed in that the Hamlet Festival would be conducted 

in area where the security presence was intended to be permanent, while 

the GO TEAM and COUNTY FAIR operations were executed in areas 

where security presence would be temporary. Therefore, upon completion 

of all of the other activities in a Hamlet Festival the residents would be 

issued identification cards and family books.119 This action initiated the 

implementation of other population and resource control measures but 

these were not employed by US forces.

In addition to providing the initial cordon element, US ground forces 

might also provide humanitarian supplies and medical treatment. The 

intent of such operations was to separate the population psychologically 
148

from the VC and garner support for the GVN. Though US units did not 

perform many of the tasks associated with these operations, they were an 

essential part of the population and resource control measures employed.

Terrain Denial and Terrain Transformation

The terrain in South Vietnam often provided cover and concealment for 

enemy forces to rest, re-fit, and store supplies. This was especially true in 

areas of dense jungle such as the Ho Bo and Boi Loi Woods near Saigon 

or the swamps of the Plain of Reeds along the Cambodian border west of 

Saigon. United States units employed techniques to deny VC and PAVN 

units the ability to use these areas freely. If this did not work, US forces 

attempted to completely alter the terrain to make it unusable as a sanctuary 

area.

Terrain denial usually employed Harassment and Interdiction (HI) 

fires. HI consisted of unobserved artillery fires onto known and suspected 

enemy base and supply areas.120 The intent was to prevent these areas from 

being used, not only by the enemy but also by the population.121 While it 

was difficult to assess the effectiveness of HI fires, they were undoubtedly 

a population control measure as they forced the complete evacuation of an 

area by civilian personnel, a recognized technique in the counterguerrilla 

field manual.122

Terrain transformation was terrain denial taken to its extreme logical 

conclusion. Terrain transformation operations “involved the use of heavy 

bulldozers to level bunkers, trees, and destroy underground shelters during 

a period of several months.”123 United States units also used napalm or 

other incendiary materials to burn the foliage or airborne defoliants such 

as Agent Orange in these areas to deny the enemy the ability to operate 

under the concealment provided by the jungle canopy.124 Such operations 

therefore completely altered the prevailing terrain conditions and forced 

the complete evacuation of the areas where they were employed.

Movement Control

Standard movement control measures, such as controlling the 

passage of civilians in and out of secured hamlets, were used mostly by 

Vietnamese forces. United States forces did employ some such measures 

in areas outside of those controlled by GVN forces. One example was 

“Checkmate” operations in which US units would establish road blocks 

and conduct random searches of vehicles to prevent the transportation of 

VC supplies and personnel.125 The intent of such operations was to deny 
149

the VC freedom of movement in and around the area of operations. It 

also targeted the behavior of those members of the population who either 

supported the VC or were forced to support the VC and prevent them from 

transporting supplies and materiel.

United States units also enforced movement control by executing patrol 

operations in areas where clearing operations had been recently performed. 

Saturation patrolling, in which a large number of small patrols was sent 

out into a specified area, in combination with the establishment of outposts 

or ambushes, was used to deny enemy forces the ability to infiltrate 

into or exfiltrate out of the cleared area.126 The primary purpose of such 

operations was to provide security to the population and the pacification 

effort. However, they could also deny Communist supporters the ability to 

provide assistance to nearby VC or PAVN units and provided US units a 

means to target them. Therefore, such operations were another means of 

implementing population and resource control.

Civic Actions

United States units also employed various civic actions as a means of 

population and resource control. The most common civic actions performed 

by US units were the Medical Civic Action Programs or MEDCAPS.127

During MEDCAPS, US units would provide medical care to the population 

either as a standalone operation or as part of a combined cordon and search 

operation. They were intended to connect the US unit to the population, 

provide the opportunity to collect intelligence, and continue the process 

of separating the population psychologically from the Front and the VC.

Similar to MEDCAPS were US civic action programs in which US units 

provided basic humanitarian supplies such as food and clothing to the 

population or assisted villagers to dig wells or build sanitation facilities.128

These operations are referenced in the counterguerrilla manual and US 

units are instructed to be prepared to conduct them, though not specifically 

as a means of population and resource control.129 However, like MEDCAPs, 

such actions were undertaken to psychologically separate the population 

from the VC and gave them the opportunity to support the counterinsurgent 

forces through the provision of intelligence. Viewed in this manner, they 

can be considered population and resource control measures.

25th Infantry Division Campaign in Vietnam

The operations of the 25th Infantry Division (25ID), known as the “Tropic 

Lightning,” are an interesting case study through which to examine the use 

of population and resource control measures by US ground combat units 
150

in Vietnam.130 The division deployed to Vietnam fairly early in the war, 

1966, and remained in Vietnam through much of 1970. The division thus 

experienced all the major events associated with the US ground combat 

intervention in Vietnam, which provides a rich body of experiences to 

examine. It also permits an assessment of how changes in leadership and 

policy above the division level affected the operations of tactical units.

Moreover, unlike many other units deployed to Vietnam, the division 

operated primarily in the same geographic area. This provides an 

opportunity to determine how, if at all, the division altered its operations 

over time in response to changes in that area. That this area encompassed the 

strategically important region north and west of Saigon to the Cambodian 

border and a number of critical Communist base and supply areas such 

as the Ho Bo Woods, the Plain of Reeds, and the Iron Triangle makes the 

division’s experiences all the more important to study.

1966–1968 Tet Offensive

The Tropic Lightning deployed to Vietnam in phases during the first four 

months of 1966.131 As soon as it arrived, the division began conducting 

combat operations in the provinces surrounding its base camp, located at 

Cu Chi in Hau Nghia province. Hau Nghia132 was a major focal point for 

the US and GVN war effort because of its closeness to Saigon and the 

critical role it played in supporting Communist forces. Its favorable terrain 

and position on the border with Cambodia had made it “a passageway for 

insurgent men and material bound for other parts of Vietnam.”133 Moreover, 

because of the population’s favorable disposition towards the VC “whole 

insurgent units of battalion size can be moved through the area intact.”134

When the division arrived in Hau Nghia in 1966, the Front and the VC 

were in control of the area and their armed forces were superior to the 

ARVN and territorial forces in the province. The Front had established a 

political apparatus that was supported by the majority of the population and 

VC attacks and intimidation had either silenced or forced into government 

outposts the few GVN officials and security forces that were operating in 

the province.135 The Cu Chi district in Hau Nghia had also been a part of 

Operation SUNRISE, one of the Diem regime’s early executions of the 

Strategic Hamlet Program.136 The program was not well executed in the 

area and this had further strengthened the insurgency.

 The division therefore confronted multiple challenges in Hau Nghia and 

the surrounding provinces. The first was to clear the area of any PAVN and 

VC main force units that could threaten the population and Saigon. Then 
151

it would have to destroy the VC local and guerrilla units that provided the 

force that allowed the VC political apparatus to control the population. 

Once these had been destroyed, the division had to provide security to 

allow the GVN pacification process to take hold and end the enemy’s 

control of the population. Simultaneously, the division had to deny VC 

and PAVN forces the ability to use the Ho Bo, Boi Loi Woods, and Filhol 

Plantation areas as a supply point, and the entire region as a transportation 

corridor for the movement of men and materiel.

Pre-deployment Training

The division was based in Hawaii and as a result had always figured 

prominently in contingency plans for intervention in Vietnam.137 It took 

advantage of the terrain in Hawaii to prepare for operations in the tropical 

jungles of Vietnam:

It constructed 12 SE Asia type ‘villages’ located throughout the training 

area. These villages were used by units during counterinsurgency 

training exercises from company through brigade level. Village search 

techniques, civic action and community relations activities received 

equal consideration with combat operations in the planning of major 

unit exercises.138

The division also established a Special Warfare and Orientation Center 

that included jungle, guerrilla warfare, and small unit counterinsurgency 

training facilities.139 When the division was alerted to deploy it put each 

brigade through “an accelerated training program with emphasis on 

tactics and techniques particular to the type of enemy to be encountered 

in Vietnam.”140 Robert Conner, a junior enlisted man who trained with 

the division in 1966, observed that “the jungle warfare training in Hawaii 

helped tremendously.”141 As the division remained in Vietnam it was filled 

by replacements who did not receive the same pre-deployment training 

and Conner noted that “they didn’t have enough time to train and become 

soldiers.”142

While the division’s pre-deployment training concentrated on combat 

operations, it also included time spent conducting civic actions and 

operations near to the population. To this end, the division executed an 

accelerated Vietnamese language training course which produced 48 

personnel who were qualified in speaking and reading.143 The division also 

initiated Operation HELPING HAND, which collected over 350 tons of 

“clothing, health and sanitation items, basic work items, children’s items, 

and miscellaneous items such as milk and canned goods” from the residents 

of Hawaii for the division to distribute during civic action programs.144
152

As a result of its training the division was well positioned to confront 

the challenges presented to it in Vietnam. The division commander, 

Major General Fred Weyand, had tried to balance its preparation between 

combat operations against PAVN and VC main forces and the small unit 

counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla operations that would necessarily 

take place within the villages. Unfortunately, the division’s training would 

only be a benefit in the village war if the tactical situation and directives 

from its higher headquarters allowed it to fight in this manner. Furthermore, 

this training would benefit only the initial contingent of Tropic Lightning 

soldiers who deployed to Vietnam. The many replacements that filled the 

division’s ranks over the years would receive only the standard training 

provided by the Army.

Early Operations

The division’s mission upon arrival in Vietnam consisted of a number 

of parts. The first three give an indication of the priorities assigned to the 

division by its higher headquarters, II Field Force, Vietnam (IIFFORCEV). 

The division’s mission was to:

(a) Conduct search and destroy operations against VC/NVA forces and 

base camps in TAOR [tactical area of responsibility].

(b) Conduct search and destroy operations against VC/NVA forces 

and base camps outside of assigned TAOR in accordance with operation 

schedules now in effect and to be put into effect by IIFFORCEV.

(c) Conduct clearing operations and reserve reaction operations in 

support of III Corps GVN Revolutionary Development Program with 

emphasis on the national priority areas in Hau Nghia Province.145

The division was therefore directed to focus primarily on combat 

operations against VC and PAVN main force units. Though pacification 

support was listed, the division was to support it through clearing operations 

and “coordination of civic action and psychological operations.”146

This was despite the fact that Weyand and other leaders in the division 

understood the importance of the political struggle in Hau Nghia and the 

surrounding areas.147

The division’s initial operations would conform exactly to the above 

priorities. Its first major operation148 was Operation CIRCLE PINES 

from 30 March to 4 April 1966. The operation “was a search and destroy 

operation in conjunction with III ARVN Corps to locate and destroy VC 

forces and base camps in the FILHOL plantation.”149 Four battalions 

conducted a detailed search of the area, making the operation more like 
153

a cordon and search than a search and destroy, and captured a significant 

amount of supplies and munitions, including over 57 tons of rice.150

The division executed four more battalion or larger search and destroy 

operations over the course of the next month, none of which produced as 

much in the way of captured supplies as Circle Pines had. This pattern 

would seem to support the conclusion that from 1966 to 1967 US ground 

force operations were almost entirely based on Westmoreland’s strategy 

of attrition.151 However, the last operation reported during the division’s 

first quarterly Operational Report–Lessons Learned (ORLL) challenges 

this conclusion, if only modestly.

Near the end of April, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry began execution of 

Operation MAILI. The battalion established a temporary base of operation 

near Duc Lap village and conducted search and destroy operations with 

Vietnamese units to clear hamlets within the village.152 The operation in 

the village was supported by one company from another battalion that 

established blocking positions along the Oriental River to interdict VC 

supply lines into the area.153 The division also executed several MEDCAPS 

and distributed aid items as part of Operation HELPING HAND. The 

division stated that Maili was “a determined effort to pacify an area using 

an American infantry battalion in conjunction with Vietnamese forces over 

a two to three week period.”154

The operation lasted just two weeks but the division reported that 

“initial results have been gratifying in that many of the local populace 

is returning to the villages.”155 Unlike in reports on other operations, the 

division did not highlight the number of enemy casualties that had been 

recorded. Moreover, in the section of the ORLL dedicated to analysis by 

the commander, Weyand noted that “although the operations [like Maili] 

are not spectacular by the standard of VC body count, this combined effort 

is highly successful. In one such operation, a hamlet of 10 families became 

one of thirty families. Such actions as this, disrupts and eventually destroys 

the VC infrastructure.”156

The technique of combining search operations, movement controls, 

civic actions, and temporary occupation of an area appeared to be effective 

in the short term. However, despite the commander’s analysis, no effort 

was made by the division to target the Front’s infrastructure. Therefore, 

without consistent US or ARVN presence PAVN and VC main and local 

force units could easily return to the area. The change in control suggested 

by the population shift was only temporary and, as with so many other 

units in Vietnam, the division would have to return time and again to the 

area.
154

The Tropic Lightning primarily executed battalion and larger search 

and destroy operations through 1966 and into 1967. The quarterly 

report spanning the period from February to April 1967 recorded the 

division’s execution of four major operations, all search and destroy 

missions.157 These operations produced varying degrees of success. When 

the operations were conducted in known VC supply base areas, such as 

Operation MANHATTAN in the Ho Bo and Boi Loi Woods area, searches 

resulted in the capture or destruction of large amounts of supplies. In the 

case of Manhattan, the division reported that over 15 tons of rice, hundreds 

of rounds of mortar ammunition, and more than 100,000 rounds of small 

arms ammunition were captured in just the first seven days.158 Operations 

that were not in such areas produced few tangible results.

Overall, 25ID’s search and destroy operations produced little contact 

with VC and PAVN main force units, which was their essential purpose. In 

March 1967 it commented that contact with enemy forces “was with small 

enemy elements from three to six men, left behind to harass US Forces.”159

The division recognized this problem and in the lessons learned section of 

the report recommended that units make a distinction between hasty and 

deliberate search operations.

The report observed that “generally, the Hasty Search Op is planned to 

move through an AO [area of operations] quickly to catch VC off guard. 

The Deliberate Search is planned with the idea of destroying VC food, 

supplies, equipment and fortifications.”160 Therefore, “the initial phase of 

an op should consist of Hasty Search of the entire AO preferably by the 

use of highly mobile units, such as Mech or Heliborne forces. Subsequent 

phases should employ phase lines which require units to do a thorough job 

prior to moving on.”161 Dividing an operation in this way gave the division 

a better chance of making contact with large enemy elements while still 

preserving its ability to destroy essential supplies. It continued to adapt 

its operations in this manner and began to employ more population and 

resource control measures as time went on.

In the report on operations for the months of May, June, and July 1967, 

the division noticeably increased its use of population and resource control 

measures. As part of the continuation of Operation MANHATTAN it 

employed the engineer battalion’s “Rome Plows”162 to clear vegetation in 

the area and deprive “the VC of the sanctuary they had long established 

throughout the area, especially in the Ho Bo and Boi Loi Woods.”163 The 

operation ultimately resulted in the capture or destruction of 250 tons of 

rice, 5.5 tons of other food stuffs, and a significant amount of weapons and 

munitions.164
155

The division recorded its first execution of a hamlet festival as part of 

a cordon and search and pacification operation called Akumu. During the 

festival, a Civil Affairs team “explained the purpose of the US presence in 

the village to over 19,000 persons. MEDCAPs . . . were held throughout 

the operation.”165 Similar to Maili, Operation AKUMU was limited in 

duration, lasting less than three weeks. Nonetheless, the division reported 

that it “challenged the VC in a formerly secure stronghold, and greatly 

diminished VC influence ‘at the back door’ of Camp Cu Chi. In addition 

VC supply and movement routes through the Filhol Plantation to the Ho 

Bo Woods were severely disrupted.”166

It is difficult to determine how accurate that assessment is. It is almost 

certainly true that supply and movement were disrupted but the results 

of later operations in the area suggest that such disruption was minimal. 

Moreover, it is unlikely that the division appreciably reduced VC influence 

in such a short period of time, especially as it departed the area after the 

operation was complete. Akumu was, however, part of a much larger and 

more significant pacification effort, Operation BARKING SANDS.

BARKING SANDS began in May 1967 and continued through December 

1967.167 The operation was “conducted by the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry 

Division for the pacification of Cu Chi and Trang Bang Districts in Hau 

Nghia Province and in PHU HOA District of Binh Duong Province.”168

The operation emphasized the execution of small unit operations to include 

saturation patrols, “Checkmates,” and company cordon and searches.169

The division believed that the initial phase of the operation had limited the 

ability of the VC to operate freely and “therefore VC control of the AO 

has been reduced.”170 A subordinate operation to clear the Ho Bo Woods, 

Operation KUNIA, was begun in September 1967.

KUNIA expanded on the initial use of Rome Plows to clear vegetation 

that had occurred during MANHATTAN. The objective of KUNIA was “to 

eliminate the Ho Bo Woods as a safe haven for the VC through extensive 

clearing operations and destruction of VC base camps and forces.”171

By the end of the reporting period in October, the division recorded that 

9,645 acres of the Ho Bo Woods had been cleared of vegetation.172 Where 

MANHATTAN could be considered a terrain denial operation, KUNIA 

went the next step and was a terrain transformation operation. After 

clearing the Ho Bo Woods, the division continued KUNIA in the Filhol 

Plantation during the final months of 1967.173

In addition to the terrain transformation operations conducted by the 

Rome Plows, the division was also executing terrain denial using HI 
156

artillery fires. In the quarterly period ending in October 1967, over 124,000 

rounds of artillery were fired in support of HI missions.174 Just over 26,000 

rounds were expended during the period ending in January 1968.175 It is 

not clear what caused the reduction in HI fires. However, it is possible 

that the terrain transformation of KUNIA reduced the need for HI fires on 

known supply areas such as the Ho Bo Woods and Filhol Plantation.

Terrain transformation operations generally coincided with search 

operations that captured large amounts of supplies. Therefore, they did 

produce an effect on the enemy’s ability to stockpile materiel in that area 

for a time. However, the division had to return to these areas repeatedly in 

the coming years either to re-clear the vegetation or to search for supplies 

so it is unlikely that the effect was long lasting.

The unobserved artillery fires used for terrain denial are even less easy 

to assess. Firing at known and suspected VC positions may have disrupted 

operations for a time but given the extensive tunnel and bunker networks 

found during division clearing operations, it is unlikely that the disruption 

was severe. The division did report that HI fires during the day on suspected 

mortar firing positions reduced mortar attacks against US bases.176 They 

did not halt them, however.

In support of its pacification and search and destroy operations 25ID 

continued to execute civic action programs. Hundreds of MEDCAPS were 

conducted during each reporting period and the initial 350 tons of supplies 

dedicated to Operation HELPING HAND were exhausted in late 1967.177

Assessments of such operations were always positive. The division reported 

that “the entire Helping Hand concept was extremely worthwhile and has 

gone a long way toward winning the ‘other war’ in Vietnam.”178 Because 

health care in rural Vietnam was so poor, MEDCAPS were “especially 

beneficial to the local population living in US areas of operation.”179

It is not obvious how HELPING HAND was assisting the division to win 

the support of the population, other than to note that giving away materials 

and supplies was very popular.180 Nor is it clear what affect MEDCAPS, 

which soldiers liked and believed relieved significant amounts of suffering, 

were having on the process of pacification.181 Notably, the VC did not 

attack MEDCAPS. The division reported that “although a definite pattern 

was established there have been no VC incidents at any of the scheduled 

MEDCAPS.”182 The lack of attacks could indicate that the Front did not 

believe that MEDCAPS and other civic actions threatened their control of 

the population as the Strategic Hamlet Program had.

The Tropic Lightning’s operations continued to produce little contact 
157

with the VC and PAVN main force units. From August to October 1967 

it made no contact with PAVN units and observed that “VC activity 

consisted primarily of efforts to delay allied clearing operations.”183 The 

same delaying tactics were reported during the end of 1967 and beginning 

of 1968.184 Given the huge amounts of rice that were captured, over 133 

tons during BARKING SANDS alone, it is not surprising that the VC 

attempted to delay cordon and search and terrain transformation operations 

for as long as possible so that supplies could be evacuated.185 However, it 

also appears that they were following the pattern observed in the Mekong 

Delta of avoiding contact with superior US units and firepower and thereby 

forcing the Tropic Lightning to spread itself thin.

Moreover, despite the division’s reported success in all of its operations, 

they had yet to allow the GVN to establish control over any part of its 

area of operations. It reported that as of the end of October 1967 “the 

RD programs in the designated hamlets are behind the projected time 

schedule.”186 Yet it believed that the VC’s guerrilla forces were finding 

it more difficult to gain support from the population.187 The enemy’s next 

action would put that claim to the test.

Tet 1968–1969

The Party, supported by the Front and PAVN and VC units, launched 

its general offensive and general uprising at the end of January 1968. The 

offensive completely disrupted all pacification efforts and operations in 

support of pacification as US and ARVN units were deployed across the 

country to defeat the attack. RD Cadre had to be withdrawn from their 

hamlets to the relative safety of the district headquarters.188 IIFFORCEV 

recorded in its after action report (AAR) for the Tet Offensive that the 

“VC penetrated about 50 percent of the hamlets pacified during the 1967 

campaign.”189

It is arguable that any of these areas were actually pacified to begin with. 

In the AAR, IIFFORCEV assessed that:

The enemy moved sizeable groups of personnel and significant materiel 

support into Saigon and other critical areas before the offensive began. 

Friendly forces were not warned of these actions by the local population 

which was either indifferent to the enemy’s presence, supported him 

passively, or was afraid of enemy reprisal in the event his presence was 

disclosed.190

This was despite IIFFORCEV’s analysis that VC terrorism in the months 

before the offensive had increased because “the VC political infrastructure 

was losing its influence over key sectors of the population.”191
158

Such a belief was common. A number of captured VC documents in the 

months before Tet were assessed by US intelligence as showing a definite 

loss of VC control over the population.192 Recall also that 25ID believed 

that the VC guerrilla forces were no longer able to garner significant 

support from the population in late 1967. Yet it is likely the case that the 

Communists were able to move the bulk of the supplies to support the 

attack on Saigon directly through the division’s area of operations.193

However, these contradictions also produced better analysis as units 

examined conditions in their areas before the Tet Offensive through the 

lens of what had occurred during it.

The 25ID observed in its report for the period ending on January 31, 1968 

that “the large number of attacks by fire [at the end of the reporting period] 

are believed to have been conducted to cover the movement of VC forces 

to the Saigon area and to cause as many casualties and as much damage as 

possible.”194 If such improved analysis continued it might be possible for 

the division to adjust its operations to better support pacification. Before it 

could do so, however, the Tet Offensive had to be defeated.

Operations During Tet

When the Tet Offensive began, the division was executing its 1967-1968 

Dry Season Campaign. The major component of which was Operation 

SARATOGA, begun in December 1967.195 SARATOGA was intended 

“to pacify 25th Infantry Division’s TAOI [Tactical Area of Operational 

Interest] in the provinces; to secure that portion of the allied base area 

in the Division TAOI; to prevent VC rice taxation, harvesting, or 

transportation within the Division TAOI; and to destroy VC/NVA forces 

within the Division TAOI.”196 The operation was very similar in execution 

to BARKING SANDS. This is not surprising given how successful the 

division believed BARKING SANDS had been.

Once the Tet Offensive began, however, the division suspended Saratoga. 

Instead it mounted counteroffensive operations from 1 February to 10 

March 1968 to defeat VC and PAVN attacks around Saigon.197 The battle 

in Saigon was largely defeated by the middle of February, but the division 

continued to fight hard in the area surrounding it into March.198 As enemy 

units began to retreat from Saigon, 25ID transitioned and began executing 

major search and destroy operations with ARVN forces from 11 March to 

22 April in attempt to engage the fleeing enemy.199 On 7 April, it initiated 

a new operation, TOAN THANG (Complete Victory).
159

The mission of the Tropic Lighting in TOAN THANG was to “complete 

destruction of enemy battalions and company sized units, prevent 

infiltration of major forces from the western zone”200 and “conduct 

combined offensive operation in conjunction with 25th and 5th ARVN 

Infantry Divisions throughout TAOI to destroy enemy forces with priority 

to elements of 7th NVA and 9th VC Divisions.”201 The only operations in 

support of pacification that would be conducted under TOAN THANG 

were MEDCAPS and civic actions. All other operations were suspended 

to focus resources on the destruction of the PAVN and VC main force 

units.

TOAN THANG generated a much greater amount of contact with large 

enemy elements than any of the division’s operations had to that point. 3rd 

Battalion, 22d Infantry defeated an attack against its night perimeter on 12 

April by a battalion sized enemy force, killing over 150 enemy personnel 

and capturing more than 40 AK-47s and 10 crew-served weapons.202

However, this may have been more the result of PAVN and VC main force 

units using Hau Nghia and the surrounding areas as a staging point for a 

second offensive against Saigon and their insistence on attacking superior 

US units than because of the effective execution of operations by the 

Tropic Lightning.203

The division’s units were repositioned around Saigon in the last week of 

April to defeat the Communist offensive against Saigon that was expected 

to begin on 1 May.204 The offensive was quickly defeated and VC and 

PAVN main force units began retreating through the 25ID’s area of 

operations, by 15 May the division’s units “were now employed to pursue 

the fleeing enemy.”205 On that day 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry intercepted a 

VC local force battalion and decimated its remaining numbers, killing 82 

and capturing three.206

Such contacts continued throughout the month. Whereas previous 

operations had most often encountered only a handful of enemy personnel 

at a time, the division’s units were now making contact with platoons, 

companies, and even battalions.207 Each encounter resulted in the killing 

of dozens of enemy personnel. By the end of May, the division recorded a 

total of more than 2,200 confirmed enemy dead.208 It had taken an all out 

enemy offensive to provide the division the opportunity to confront and 

defeat large enemy forces, what it had been sent to Vietnam to do over two 

years earlier.
160

Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II

The damage inflicted by the Tropic Lightning and ARVN on the 

Communist forces during May was severe. In June the PAVN and VC:

Main force units that remained outside SAIGON broke contact, 

dispersed and ex-filtrated west into (illegible) and northwest in WAR 

ZONE C [located along the Cambodian border in Tay Ninh province]. In 

executing this pull back the enemy avoided contact and when engaged 

was quick to disperse into smaller groups and disengage as quickly as 

possible. Intelligence sources clearly indicated the enemy’s intent of 

withdrawing his depleted main force units to those traditional sanctuaries 

for replacements, resupply and retraining for future operations.209

As they did so, the division ended Operation TOAN THANG, Phase I 

and began execution of Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II.

TOAN THANG had become the division’s primary operation and thus 

provided a framework for all other subordinate operations. While some 

elements of the division remained outside of Saigon, the remainder 

of its combat power was dispersed throughout its area of operations to 

“pursue the dispersed enemy and to seek out and destroy his concealed 

weapons, ammunition and supply caches.”210 As the operation developed, 

the subordinate units of the division were given further tasks and more 

specific guidance.

The 2d Brigade was designated to execute TOAN THANG, Phase II in 

Hau Nghia, Gia Dinh, Binh Duong, and Tay Ninh provinces. The brigade 

listed eight specific tasks under its mission statement for the operation. 

The first of which was to “frustrate enemy plans, locate and destroy VC/

NVA forces, base camps and support areas.”211 This task represents no 

change from mission statements for operations before Tet. However, tasks 

four and five were to execute the pacification program and target the Viet 

Cong infrastructure.212

These tasks represented a partial shift in the focus of US ground 

force operations. Unfortunately, what exactly the unit was meant to do 

to execute them was not at all clear. There was no specific guidance on 

how the pacification program was to be supported and no direction on the 

means to target the Viet Cong infrastructure. The concept of operations 

statement provides a good idea of just how much emphasis the new tasks 

would actually receive. It stated that the brigade “conducted combined 

and unilateral offensive operations within the TAOI to pre-empt VC/NVA 

initiatives, to interdict his lines of communications and to counter enemy 

initiatives.”213
161

It is revealing that the concept of operations statement makes reference 

to the enemy’s initiatives twice in a short sentence. The Tet Offensive had 

been a severe shock to many in US ground units. Ron Hart, who served in a 

mechanized infantry unit that was part of the 25ID during Tet, recalled that 

“we all knew when we returned from the field in late January that things 

were going to be quiet in Tay Ninh base camp. After all, this was Tet, the 

Vietnamese new year celebration. We were wrong.”214 The division was 

determined not to be caught by surprise again and yet, most operations 

after Tet looked much like those before it.

The 2d Brigade conducted search and destroy operations or cordon and 

search operations throughout its four provinces relentlessly from June 

1968 to January 1969. Such operations yielded large amounts of destroyed 

or captured supplies, including over 150 tons of rice and tens of thousands 

of pounds of munitions.215 They produced little contact with large enemy 

forces, however. In the summary of nearly every month of the operation 

the brigade reported that enemy contact was limited or that the enemy 

avoided contact.216

While 2d Brigade continued to seek out battles with the enemy main 

force units, 3d Brigade conducted operations intended mainly to secure the 

lines of communication within the division’s area of operations. Its report 

of operations demonstrates little change in operations between pre and 

post Tet. At the beginning of October 1968, the brigade’s units conducted 

local reconnaissance operations or searches.217 As October continued, they 

cleared and established observations posts along main supply routes and 

then executed Rome Plow operations to remove the vegetation from those 

same routes.218

Accelerated Pacification Campaign?

On 1 November 1968, the APC was launched across Vietnam. The 

campaign was intended to reverse the massive loss of GVN control in 

the rural areas of Vietnam that was produced by the movement of US and 

ARVN units to defeat the Tet Offensive. The Tropic Lightning supported 

the campaign by creating Operation COLORS UP, a subordinate operation 

to TOAN THANG, Phase II. The objective of Colors Up was to bring 

every hamlet in the division’s area of operation under some measure of 

GVN control by the end of January 1969.219

Unfortunately, the division reports for this period are largely incomplete 

or unavailable. However, the fragments that are available call into 

question how the division was actually supporting the campaign. The 
162

ORLL ending 31 January 1969220 stated that “throughout the reporting 

period, all divisional resources and assets were committed to Operation 

TOAN THANG which is directed at the destruction of Viet Cong/North 

Vietnamese (VC/NVA) main force units and enemy political and guerrilla 

infrastructure (VCI) operating within the divisional tactical area of 

operational interest.”221

The division assessed that PAVN and VC main force units had withdrawn 

to sanctuary areas “to reorganize, refit, and retrain following the offensive 

against TAY NINH City in the August-September time frame.”222 In 

response to the division’s mission and priorities and

In view of this general enemy situation, the 25th Infantry Division was 

deployed in a manner in which it could maintain continuous surveillance 

of the recognized lines of communications (LOC) and avenues of approach 

for enemy main force units from their sanctuary areas to known target 

areas: namely, SAIGON and TAY NINH.223

No mention is made in the initial pages of the report about how the 

division was supporting execution of the APC, nor is any mention made of 

Operation COLORS UP. The operations of 3d Brigade did not change in 

November 1968.224 The 2d Brigade, however, should have been conducting 

operations to support the APC given its mission to execute pacification as 

part of TOAN THANG, Phase II.

The brigade did not mention any operations specifically in support of 

the campaign in the main body of the AAR.225 However, the commander 

reported that:

 During the TOAN THANG Campaign Phase II, intensified Civic 

Actions and Psychological Operations were conducted, particularly 

during the Accelerated Pacification Campaign from 1 November 1968-

17 February 1969. The Civic Action Program was directed toward short 

range, high impact projects . . . and designed to involve the Vietnamese 

people in the effort on a self help basis. Our purpose was to improve 

the general well-being of the populace and to clearly demonstrate the 

interest of the GVN to the people.226

Of the civic actions that the brigade performed the commander assessed 

that MEDCAPs were the most effective.227

It is hard to determine just how effective such civic actions were in 

bringing the population under the government’s control. A lieutenant 

who served with the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry commented that in 

November 1968 “civic action was then in its good works phase–we bring 

you food, clothing medicine–and we convinced the inhabitants of Co 
163

Trach [a hamlet in the district of Tri Tram] that it was in their interest to 

profess friendliness at least; the inhabitants of another hamlet were not so 

receptive.”228 This observation presents such operations as little more than 

a bribe that might or might not be accepted. Moreover, 25ID had been 

conducting similar actions since the very beginning of its time in country 

and the Tet Offensive revealed that these had not produced much in the 

way of government control of the population.

The 2d Brigade commander recognized the difficulty that the division 

was having with pacification operations. His final recommendation as a 

result of Toan Thang II was that:

All operations must be oriented toward the existing pacification program. 

Pacification must not be overlooked even when the emphasis switches 

to strike rather than consolidation operations. Experience indicates that 

it is extremely difficult to reinforce a pacification program that has been 

supported then suddenly dropped for other tactical operations.229

This was the dilemma that was constantly presented to the Tropic 

Lightning. Pacification only worked if it was continuously supported, but 

doing so meant that the combat units dedicated to it could not be used to 

strike Communist units if and when they were located. As the war moved 

into 1969, the division tried to solve this dilemma and execute operations 

that would support all of its major objectives.

Tet 1969–1970

At the beginning of 1969, General Abrams, published a new campaign 

plan, the objective of which was protection of the population.230 It was his 

assessment that the situation in Vietnam was now favorable to execute the 

one war strategy. Thus, pacification and the destruction of enemy main 

force units were no longer separate fights, but were officially part of a 

single campaign. The Nixon administration also introduced the strategy of 

Vietnamization in 1969.

The Pary and Front also adapted their strategy. As noted in the 25ID 

reports referenced above, the main force units had retreated to sanctuaries 

away from the operational areas of US units to rest, refit, and retrain after 

being badly hurt during the offensives in 1968. Despite the losses, they 

were determined to press ahead in their campaign and force the US to 

accept ceasefire conditions that required it to withdraw all forces from 

South Vietnam.231

To accomplish this goal meant that “both our military and political forces 

must be stronger than the remaining puppet army and administration, and 
164

this is possible only by annihilating, disintegrating and disrupting a major 

part of their infrastructure organization through the use of all forms of 

violence available in the hands of the masses.”232 In order to do so the 

Front leadership directed that “the basic task is to attack enemy posts, then 

gain control over the population. Control hamlets both in daytime and at 

night.”233

The Tropic Lightning would have to change its operational pattern 

to support the new campaign from Abrams and the strategy of the new 

administration. It would also have to use its limited manpower across 

a larger area as time went on. Lastly, it had to do both of those while 

also defeating the coming PAVN and VC offensive which would test the 

division’s ability to fight main forces and still provide protection to the 

population against attacks by local and guerrilla forces.

Operations in 1969

The initial thrust of the offensive began on 22 February 1969. Attacks 

were not nearly as spectacular as they had been during the previous year’s 

offensive, but it cost 25ID a significant number of casualties and a large 

amount of embarrassment over the attack on its base camp at Cu Chi.234

Nonetheless, the division reported several months later that it had defeated 

all of the enemy’s attacks and inflicted heavy casualties in doing so.235

The enemy’s renewed offensive focused the Tropic Lightning’s 

operations in a new direction. Beginning in May 1969 the division 

recorded that it had:

Determined to pursue a three-fold objective aimed at preemption of 

any new enemy offensive moves. Through widespread reconnaissance 

missions and battlefield surveillance, the Division troops would 

detect, engage, and destroy enemy main force units through the rapid 

reinforcement of and application of massive firepower to every contact.236

Moreover, “pacification programs would be vigorously executed in 

order to further erode the enemy’s physical and psychological strength. 

Special emphasis would be placed on the destruction of the Viet Cong 

Infrastructure.”237

As the division adjusted to this new concept of operations, it continued 

to execute the missions that had been its basic means of population and 

resource control since arriving in Vietnam in 1966. The division reported 

that its operations during the month of May “were, for the most part, combat 

assaults, night combat patrols, counter VCI operations, reconnaissancein-force, cordon and search, base camp defense and MEDCAPS.”238
165

However, the effect of such operations improved because the decline in 

quality of Communist units as a result of losses in 1968 gave the division 

the opportunity to collect intelligence during such operations and act on it. 

It did so with deadly effect.

A combined cordon and search operation by 2d Brigade and ARVN in 

mid-May in Ap Giong hamlet led to the capture of a Front official from the 

Cu Chi district who disclosed the location of a VC local force company 

commander.239 The brigade followed up on this information and conducted 

a raid on 26 May in which the C-20 local force company commander 

was killed. A document recovered on his body revealed the location of a 

meeting of all Viet Cong hamlet and district chiefs from Cu Chi set for 29 

May. The resulting combined cordon and search killed 59 soldiers from 

the 3d Battalion, 268th NVA Regiment and “preempted the planned attack 

on the Trung Lap compound which was indicated by documents captured 

after the action.”240

The effect of such operations on the Front’s offensive was noticeable. 

In a document dated May 1969 the Current Affairs Committee C69 made 

exaggerated claims about the success of the spring offensive, especially 

against the Tropic Lightning.241 However, it also observed significant 

weaknesses which were hampering the offensive. Specifically, it stated that 

“a number of local areas and units were unable to go into action when the 

climaxing phase started, and as a result, they failed to attack the enemy in 

time. We also failed to completely destroy enemy units.”242 Moreover, the 

committee noted that “very few enemy pacification personnel, Regional 

and Popular Forces troops, Village administrative officials, tyrants, or 

intelligence agents were eliminated.”243

The committee blamed the weakness on a lack of comprehension of the 

importance of the spring offensive, a failure of fighting spirit, and local 

units relying on outside assistance.244 It also stated that some local units 

did not:

Thoroughly understand the operating procedures and guidelines, such 

as concentrating forces to destroy enemy units, or dispersing troops 

to coordinate with guerrillas and the masses to frustrate the enemy 

pacification plan. The deployment and development of forces in districts 

and villages were not effective.245

Although the Communists blamed internal failings at the local level 

for the weakness of the 1969 spring offensive, the statements indicate 

that it may actually have been caused by the effectiveness of US and 

ARVN operations. The failure of fighting spirit was likely the result of the 
166

destruction that VC and PAVN units had been subjected to over the course 

of the last year and half. Local units expecting outside assistance could be 

an indicator that the supply system, which was reliant on local support, 

was under pressure because of pacification and population and resource 

control measures. Lastly, the failure of the offensive to eliminate members 

of the territorial security forces, pacification personnel, or government 

officials is potentially the result of increased security within the populated 

areas.

This assessment was confirmed in 25ID’s area of operations by a 

document captured by the US 1st Infantry Division in June 1969. The 

document was signed by a cadre from the Rear Service Staff of the Party 

command for South Vietnam. The document recorded that:

The activities of civilian labor teams, assault youth groups, and 

transportation units had been greatly reduced due to the large increase 

of allied operations and that the extensive use of armored vehicles, 

helicopters, air strikes and artillery by US/GVN forces had destroyed 

rice storage, animal and poultry and transportation and hospital areas. 

Pressure was also applied to these areas by a large number of successful 

ambushes.246

The effect of US and ARVN operations was not limited to the activities 

of PAVN and VC units, however. The increased security and isolation of 

the population, coupled with the death of many Viet Cong political cadre, 

had reduced the Front’s control of the population. The captured document 

reported that Trang Bang district in Hau Nghia was an especially weak 

area and “the guerrilla movement had been slowly deteriorating due to a 

lack of cooperation by the local populace. The people refused to conceal 

troops, care for wounded soldiers, store rice or join civilian labor teams.”247

Pacification appeared to be gaining momentum. The division recognized 

that its operations in May were somewhat out of balance and noted that it 

continued “to work towards a balanced mission of pacification, engagement 

of enemy main force units in heavy contact, and the continued upgrading 

of South Vietnamese units.”248 This desire, however, did not markedly 

alter the division’s execution of operations or the population and resource 

control measures that it employed.

Terrain transformation and terrain denial operations continued. The 

division used Rome Plows to clear vegetation from major routes and 

to deny the enemy use of the Boi Loi Woods area.249 The division also 

conducted 685 MEDCAPS and reported execution of a village festival in 

Trang Bang district during which it distributed, through its GVN partners, 
167

over 50,000 piasters and several thousand pounds of captured rice in a 

three day operation.250 It subsequently observed that the village’s security 

ratings had improved and believed that it would become secure during the 

coming months.251

While it is probably true that the village was more secure than it had 

been, it is unlikely that this three day operation had actually produced 

that effect. A document of instruction for VC cadre regarding the 1970 

campaign noted that “spearhead elements and main force units in the subregions remained weak during combat. . . . The material resources problem 

has not yet been solved.”252 The Front assessed that these problems had 

allowed the GVN “to establish posts and watchtowers in a wide area. The 

enemy could not control the people, but he was able to recruit soldiers to 

replace his wounded and dead personnel and increase his troops strength. 

. . . However, the enemy could accomplish a number of activities, and this 

made him more stubborn.”253

Thus, GVN control over the countryside was improving because 

the Party and Front had been so badly hurt. Rural Vietnamese tended 

to support whichever side was stronger and offered the protection they 

desired. At this point during the war, that side appeared to be the GVN and 

its US allies. Exactly how much of this can be attributed to pacification 

and how much to the destruction of PAVN and VC elements is difficult to 

determine.

Operations in 1970

In response to the situation, 25ID focused on improving security in its 

area of operations in 1970. Its first ORLL during the new year noted that 

“while searching for main force units, Division elements sought every 

opportunity to annihilate local force units.”254 It also stated that it “stressed 

small unit operations, pacification, upgrading of ARVN/RF/PF/PSDF 

forces and security of lines of communications.”255

While the emphasis on small unit actions represented a modest shift, the 

focus of operations remained the destruction of enemy units. Pacification 

and the improvement of the Vietnamese security forces were mentioned, 

but were presented as secondary to operations against PAVN and VC 

forces. Nonetheless, the division presented its actions as a new mode of 

operations, which it called protective reaction. The division stated that:

Protective reaction refers to the type of combat operations used by Allied 

commanders against Communist forces in the Republic of Vietnam to 

provide for the security of his unit, his tactical area of operations and 
168

the Vietnamese people. This is accomplished primarily by small unit 

reconnaissance patrols to locate the enemy, disrupt his movements and 

find his caches of arms, ammunition and rations.256

While this new mode of operations presents the protection of the 

Vietnamese people as part of its purpose, the actual operations themselves 

target enemy forces and supplies.

The small unit reconnaissance patrols cited above are in reality much 

the same as the operations the division previously conducted, but on a 

smaller scale. They focus on finding the enemy, akin to search and destroy, 

disrupting his movements, similar to Checkmates, and finding his supply 

stocks, the goal of a cordon and search. The division also recorded that 

“land clearing continued to be a valuable, viable means of denying the 

enemy his traditional sanctuaries and of destroying enemy booby traps 

while minimizing friendly losses. A total of 7,425 acres of land were 

cleared.”257 However, the division was forced to reduce its civic actions 

because of its expanded area of responsibility.258

The 25ID’s emphasis on small unit operations and its employment of 

population and resource control measures was disrupted again when it 

participated in its last major operation of the war, the invasion of Cambodia 

in May 1970. It reported that “the 1st and 2d Brigades, 3d Brigade of 

the 9th Infantry Division and all maneuver battalions of the 25th Infantry 

Division played an integral part in the attack.”259 Bergerud characterizes 

participation in the invasion by US ground forces as a mistake despite its 

overall success.260 However, the operation further changed the dynamic in 

25ID’s area of responsibility and completed the three phase approach that 

Westmoreland had envisioned for US ground combat forces in 1965.

After the invasion of Cambodia, division operations continued to follow 

the pattern established in previous reporting periods that did not include 

major combat operations. It was by now executing Operation TOAN 

THANG, Phase IV, and its report does not indicate a significant change to 

its standard operations. Though not explicitly stated, its operations appear 

to have consisted primarily of the small unit operations discussed above.

Moreover, the Tropic Lightning continued to employ the population and 

resource control measures that it had since arriving. Its engineer assets 

cleared several hundred acres in an abandoned village that contained 

booby traps and tunnels.261 Its supporting artillery continued to fire tens of 

thousands of rounds in support of operations.262 MEDCAPs remained the 

division’s primary civic action program.
169

However, the results of the operations changed noticeably. It appeared 

that pacification was finally achieving great effect in Hau Nghia.263 The 

division captured only 4.9 tons of rice in August and less than one ton 

in October.264 Enemy activity was exceptionally low and the division 

reported that enemy forces “were experiencing severe difficulties in health 

and resupply operations and were forced to concentrate on the solution 

of these problems in lieu of combat operations.”265 It further recorded 

that its main contact was with PAVN and VC rear service elements and 

assessed that the enemy’s main force units “appeared to be preoccupied 

with operations inside Cambodia.”266

The huge reduction in captured supplies demonstrates that PAVN and 

VC supply points had finally been pushed out of the division’s area of 

responsibility. However, it is not clear why this occurred. Certainly 

some of the reduction in supplies is the result of there no longer being 

large PAVN and VC units, whether main force or local force, in the area 

because of the division’s successful operations during and after Tet and the 

invasion of Cambodia. The PAVN history of the war recounted that after 

the US campaign in the summer of 1969 “our main force army was forced 

to withdraw to our base areas to regroup. In the rural areas the strength 

of our local forces was seriously eroded.”267 It may also be the case that 

GVN control over the area had increased to the point where the population 

could no longer provide supplies in the quantities required to produce the 

massive stockpiles that were captured during 1966 and 1967. Again, the 

PAVN history of the war recounted that by September 1969 “they had only 

2,000 tons of food in reserve. Units were forced to begin alternately eating 

rice for one meal and manioc for the next.”268 Moreover, it noted that the 

population was able to provide food, but not in significant quantities. 

It was only enough to “partially resolve their food supply shortage.”269

Which one of these two conditions is responsible for the greater part of the 

effect cannot be determined, however.

The Vietnamization strategy and the improving security situation 

allowed the 25ID and its subordinate units to begin withdrawing from 

Vietnam in the fall of 1970. The division’s 1st and 3d Brigades returned to 

the US in November. The division handed over Cu Chi base camp to the 

ARVN 25th Division in December 1970. The 2d Brigade was the last to 

return home in 1971, but was under the control of IIFFORCEV after the 

division redeployed.270

As 25ID departed Vietnam it left behind an area of responsibility in 

which PAVN and VC main and local force units could no longer operate 

freely. ARVN and the territorial security forces seemed to be capable of 
170

continuing to secure the area given this condition. Outwardly, the GVN’s 

control of the countryside appeared to be improving month by month. How 

deep this control went is not obvious, but the PAVN history of the war 

recorded that in the summer of the 1969 it had lost control of the majority 

of its supply areas in the lowlands of the Mekong Delta.271 Moreover, the 

supply shortages noted above indicate that in some areas the GVN had 

assured at least the neutrality of the population through the pacification 

program. This was no small feat in an area that had heavily supported the 

insurgency before the arrival of the Tropic Lightning.272

Moreover, the area resisted Communist conquest right until the end of 

the war. The previously much derided ARVN 25th Division successfully 

counterattacked the 5th NVA Division in the fall of 1974 and drove it back 

across the Cambodian border.273 The inheritors of the Tropic Lightning’s 

base at Cu Chi were finally surrounded during the final drive for Saigon 

by the PAVN III Corps on 27 April 1975, just three days before the capital 

fell.274 It is hard to believe that an area that had long been a major support 

area for PAVN and the VC could have resisted the onslaught for so long if 

the operations of the Tropic Lightning had not contributed to changing the 

conditions in it dramatically.

Analysis of 25ID Population and Resource Control Measures

The operations of the Tropic Lightning defy easy analysis. The division 

was constantly forced to decide how to allocate its scarce combat power 

between confronting the PAVN and VC main force units, which had come 

close to ending the war before the US intervention, and dedicating them to 

the support of pacification. Moreover, the US manuals and directives told 

the division that the primary way it supported the pacification effort was 

by destroying the main force units.

This dilemma, and the example of the division’s operations, 

demonstrates how difficult it is to fight a counterinsurgency and a main 

force war simultaneously. Multiple times, during Tet 1968, Tet 1969, and 

again during the invasion of Cambodia, the division had to cease all other 

operations and concentrate its forces against the PAVN and VC main force 

elements. As a result, it suspended employment of population and resource 

control measures. This makes it difficult to know how well such measures 

would have succeeded if they had been executed continuously.

The record of the division’s operations also makes clear how little its 

employment of such measures changed between 1966 and 1970. Although 

the number of battalion and larger operations diminished, the small unit 
171

operations that replaced them were nearly identical in mission and purpose. 

The division continued to conduct cordon and searches, terrain denial and 

terrain transformation, MEDCAPS and civic actions, and still sought to 

destroy PAVN and VC armed elements at every opportunity.

To some extent this is the result of guidance given to the division from 

above. Westmoreland decided as early as 1965 that US forces should not 

be used to conduct pacification directly and as late as 1971 US manuals 

were still telling ground combat forces that their primary mission was to 

protect the population from the threat of VC and PAVN main force units.275

The lack of change in employment of population and resource control 

measures may also reflect the fact that they appeared to be working.

Protection and Isolation of the Population

The Tropic Lightning’s operations from start to finish almost always 

included the purpose of finding and destroying the armed PAVN and VC 

elements to protect the population. Yet the division’s early operations 

almost never brought them into sustained contact with such elements 

larger than a few men. The enemy’s main force units assiduously avoided 

contact with the division’s superior firepower despite the large operations 

that were intended to find them.

The inability to find and destroy the enemy’s main, or even local, force 

units presented a major challenge to securing the population. Security 

of the population in areas undergoing pacification was supposed to be 

provided by Vietnamese territorial force units. These units were expected 

to be able to defeat small, lightly armed guerrilla forces. They could not 

defeat attacks by local force or main force units. This was to be done 

by ARVN or US units. However, these units were not in a position to 

reinforce territorial units that were attacked, because they were dedicated 

to the execution of anti-main force operations.

The division was able to secure the population when it combined 

cordon and search operations with other population and resource control 

measures such as Checkmates and saturation patrolling in one area. These 

operations were short in duration, however. Maili and Akumu lasted two 

and three weeks, respectively. While the division’s consistent presence 

nearby improved the security of the population in the short term, it almost 

certainly degraded again as soon as the US units departed.

The division’s early operations also failed to effectively isolate the 

population from main force units. It is true that when PAVN and VC main 

force units were avoiding contact with US units they were not in a position 
172

to threaten the population. However, the Tet Offensive demonstrated that 

this was only by choice. The offensive brought the Vietnamese population 

into sustained contact with these units throughout the country and produced 

a flood of refugees seeking to escape areas under their control.

The population was not isolated from the insurgency, either. The division 

was focused on destroying enemy main forces and was not targeting the 

local guerrilla forces or Front cadres within the hamlets and villages. Again, 

this was supposed to be done by Vietnamese elements, but the division’s 

operations did not support their efforts. The division’s movement control 

operations, terrain denial and transformation efforts, and its use of civic 

actions simply did not isolate the population from the Front cadres and 

guerrillas living among it.

The ability of PAVN and the VC to stockpile supplies, move units 

into position, and launch the Tet Offensive with near total surprise 

demonstrated how thoroughly their cadres were able to intimidate 

and control the population from this position. Government supporters 

and neutral members of the population were forced to accede to Front 

directives. Supporters of the insurgency could remain in contact with the 

cadres and provide materiel, intelligence, and other support as required 

without having to leave their hamlet or village.

After the Tet Offensive, the ability of the division to protect and isolate the 

population improved. However, whether this was because of the outcome 

of the Tet Offensive itself or was the result of the division’s population 

and resource control measures is difficult to determine. Certainly, the 

destruction of a large portion of PAVN and VC armed elements improved 

the security situation in the division’s area of operations. Moreover, the 

invasion of Cambodia forced PAVN and VC units into sanctuaries further 

from the population.

Once 25ID had forced most of the PAVN and VC armed elements out of 

the area, the small unit operations that they conducted in coordination with 

Vietnamese forces probably did improve security for the local population. 

The focus on maintaining a large number of patrols in a concentrated area 

likely prevented VC local and guerrilla force units from operating freely. 

Terrain denial and terrain transformation operations helped to continue 

to deny them access to areas that were closer to the population, thereby 

increasing their isolation from the insurgency.

However, the protection and isolation of the population was never total. 

Despite the noted decrease in the capture of supplies, the division did find 

stockpiles of weapons and food in the fall of 1970. Communist shelling, 
173

mining, and harassing attacks also continued through the end of the 

division’s deployment.276 The population was protected and isolated from 

PAVN and VC main forces, and possibly even VC local forces, but the 

guerrillas and cadres were active to the end. This would have presented a 

continued challenge to GVN control of the area had the Party not changed 

its strategy for conquering the country to one of all out conventional 

invasion by PAVN forces.

Focus on Behavior

The division was limited in its ability to focus on the behavior of the 

population during its operations because of the mission set that it had been 

given. Moreover, Vietnamese forces were supposed to be assisting the 

pacification effort which was intended to end support for the insurgency. 

As a result, the division’s employment of population and resource control 

measures was not effectively focused on the behavior of the population.

Cordon and search operations theoretically presented the division’s 

units with a means of preventing behavior that supported the insurgency. 

By conducting a thorough search of a hamlet, the division could identify 

who had stored caches of weapons, ammunition, rice, or other supplies 

and pass them on to Vietnamese or US interrogators for further screening. 

In practice, almost every Vietnamese household would have had some 

amount of supplies inside it that was designated for support of PAVN or 

VC forces.

A captured VC cadre from Duc Hoa stated that “people were also 

expected to keep one jar of rice for the village guerrillas and one bushel 

of paddy in reserve to sell to mobile units when necessary.”277 Therefore, 

nearly the entire hamlet would need to be questioned. Every single 

person in the hamlet, including the VC cadres and the Front’s supporters, 

could plausibly claim to have been forced to maintain the cache. As the 

population was not protected or isolated from the insurgency they could 

not be expected to deny the Front support even if they wanted to.

Terrain denial and terrain transformation faced similar challenges. While 

terrain denial and transformation efforts probably kept the population out 

of those areas under normal circumstances, the armed elements could 

easily force them to go into them during supply operations. Guerrilla forces 

or cadres could collect rice from the population and then impress a work 

party to move it. The population had no way of refusing the VC’s demands 

and the threat of some of the work party dying from the division’s HI fires 

was probably acceptable to the VC and the cadres.
174

The division’s movement controls were also poorly targeted to prevent 

behavior that supported the insurgency. The Checkmates consisting 

of random road blocks and searches clearly did not prevent the major 

movement of supplies that occurred in preparation for the Tet Offensive. 

The surveillance operations and saturation patrols may have prevented 

Front supporters or guerrillas within a hamlet from leaving, but if they 

were not under threat of being arrested during an accompanying cordon 

and search, they would have no reason to do so.

The division’s operations did not facilitate behavior that supported the 

government either, particularly before the Tet Offensive. The division 

reported that MEDCAPS and civic actions were extremely effective at 

garnering support for the GVN. Yet, prior to Tet, the division gained very 

little actionable intelligence from the population. Its search and destroy 

and cordon and search operations repeatedly failed to make contact with 

large enemy units.

The division reported in its first ORLL after Tet that it had gained 

reliable intelligence during MEDCAPS about the location of booby traps, 

enemy units, and supply caches.278 However, this may have been because 

the MEDCAPS were treating refugees from other areas who now felt 

comfortable disclosing information about the enemy because they were 

no longer under threat; not because the MEDCAP itself encouraged them 

to provide information. In its AAR on Toan Thang II, 2d Brigade reported 

that it received intelligence information from a total of 14 people.279 This 

from an operation that lasted more than six months during which more 

than 600 MEDCAPS were conducted that treated over 50,000 people.280

The Tropic Lightning’s operations also did not allow the neutral population 

to remain so. This stemmed primarily from the inability to protect and 

isolate the population discussed above. However, the division also did not, 

or could not, employ measures that would have made it impossible for 

the Front to coerce the population into providing them support. It is also 

the case that some of the division’s actions during cordon and searches 

and terrain transformation operations probably did not endear it to the 

neutral population, and may have cost it some of their support. The Rome 

Plows tore down valuable fruit trees and units destroyed bunkers inside 

homes that were intended only for the safety of the individual residents.281

Moreover, US soldiers viewed Vietnamese peasants as complicit with the 

VC even if they were being intimidated. A riflemen with the 25ID, Dan 

Vandenburg, recalled that:

One of the biggest disappointment over there was the attitude of the 

Vietnamese peasants. None of them seemed to give a shit about us. The 
175

feeling was mutual . . . There was never any warning of any kind, never 

one ounce of friendliness. On the other hand, I can understand why: If 

they’d have tipped us off , Charlie would have come that night and slit 

their throats but it would have been nice to have seen them take a small 

risk for us once.”282

To prevent actions such as the destruction of valuable fruit trees and 

to improve the attitude of US forces towards the Vietnamese population 

would have required a major commitment to use US forces in close 

proximity to the rural population over an extended period of time. This 

also would have had to coincide with a definite commitment to protect 

the population from all threats, including Front intimidation and coercion. 

This may have been accomplished if the division had been operating under 

a holistic control mechanism that allowed it to focus better on the behavior 

of the population. This would have required the division to leverage a 

control mechanism that was as holistic, pervasive, and coercive as the 

Strategic Hamlet Program, which was anathema to the GVN and to its US 

supporters.

To effectively employ the measures contained in such a mechanism the 

division would have needed to concentrate its operations in a single area 

and to partner more closely with the Vietnamese forces than it did for most 

of its time in Vietnam. Giving US units specific areas of operations was 

resisted by many ARVN commanders who felt it would hurt the prestige 

of the GVN.283 Moreover, because the 25ID did not have the power to 

legally enforce any measures that were put in place, it would have had to 

rely on its Vietnamese partners to do so.284 Lastly, such operations require 

an extraordinary amount of manpower, probably more than was available 

to the 25th and its ARVN partners, to provide the enforcement capability. 

This was especially so because of the settlement pattern of the Vietnamese 

population in the division’s area of operations.

Facilitate Targeting of the Armed

 and Subversive Element

 The division’s primary mission throughout its time in Vietnam was 

to target and destroy the armed elements, particularly the PAVN and VC 

main forces. It did not make targeting of the subversive element part of its 

mission until after the Tet Offensive. Despite the priority placed on it, the 

division’s population and resource control measures generally failed to 

facilitate such targeting.

The division’s early search and destroy operations made contact mostly 

with small elements. Its terrain transformation and cordon and search 
176

operations were often resisted only by harassing attacks designed to slow, 

not stop, them. In fact, the division did not begin to make sustained contact 

with large enemy main and local force units until the Tet Offensive. The 

offensive exposed them and presented the Tropic Lightning the opportunity 

to exercise its superior mobility and firepower against them. The PAVN 

and VC units also cooperated in their own destruction by continuing to 

press their attacks even after it was obvious that they were suffering a 

debilitating defeat.

After the Tet Offensive had ended, the division was able to maintain 

contact with large enemy units through May 1968, but then contact returned 

to its previous pattern. Outside of the two major enemy offensives and the 

invasion of Cambodia the division recorded very little success targeting 

and destroying large enemy elements. However, even during times of 

relatively sparse contact, such as October 1970 when it reported 101 

enemy killed, the division did record a lot of PAVN and VC fatalities.285

These results were mainly due to PAVN and VC elements choosing to 

make contact. Throughout its time in Vietnam, 25ID had trouble gaining 

the initiative and making contact with the enemy. Enemy units, with 

knowledge of the terrain, the acquiescence, if not the support of, the 

population, and the ability to move quickly simply avoided the division’s 

efforts to target it and the division’s population and resource control 

measures did not force the enemy to confront it.

This failure again stems from the inability to effectively protect or isolate 

the population. The previous chapter noted how dangerous the Party 

and Front believed the Strategic Hamlet Program to be because it could 

effectively protect and isolate the population. The division’s operations, 

however, did neither. So it was forced to chase the PAVN and VC units 

around the countryside rather than waiting for them to come to it.286

The division’s operations also did not effectively target the subversive 

element. The Tet Offensive made this readily apparent. In fact, the 

division’s mission statements do not even begin to mention targeting the 

Viet Cong infrastructure explicitly until it appears as part of 2d Brigade’s 

mission statement during Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II. It was not 

explained how the brigade would do this and or with what assets it should 

try to do so.

It would have been difficult for a US unit to target the subversive 

element located within a Vietnamese hamlet, which is why such targeting 

was supposed to be done by the Vietnamese RD Cadre and the National 

Police Field Force.287 For these groups to be successful, however, they 
177

required intelligence provided by the population, which would not be 

forthcoming unless the population was certain of its security. The inability 

to effectively protect and isolate the population thus prevented effective 

targeting of the infrastructure by these elements.

The division did experiment with Combined Reconnaissance Intelligence 

Platoons, a joint US-Vietnamese force with a US platoon as its nucleus, 

to target the infrastructure.288 The division’s reports contain no reference 

to their operations so it is impossible to assess whether or not they were 

effective. They would have needed to maintain a continuous presence in 

one area over a long period of time and this would not have occurred 

except for the periods outside of the major combat operations in 1968, 

1969, and 1970.

It is true that the effectiveness of the Viet Cong infrastructure was 

greatly degraded from its high before the division’s arrival in 1966 but 

this was more likely caused by the deaths of senior cadre during the Tet 

Offensive and its aftermath than the division’s attempts to explicitly target 

them. Moreover, it remained active in the division’s area of operations 

throughout its time in Vietnam. The division continued to capture 

infrastructure members into 1970 and it is unlikely that guerrilla units 

would have continued their harassing attacks against the division in the 

fall of 1970 without the presence of some cadres.

 Overall, the Tropic Lightning’s operations in Vietnam reduced the 

size, capability, and effectiveness of PAVN and VC forces in its area of 

responsibility. However, this was not the result of its employment of 

population and resource control measures, which were effective generally 

only in the short term. Rather, it was due to its ability to effectively prosecute 

the main force war against the enemy when presented the opportunity.

An improved set of population and control measures employed under a 

holistic control mechanism may have made the division’s operations even 

more effective, but it is not certain. Moreover, implementing an improved 

set of measures would have required a number of changes to take place, 

most of which were outside the division’s control. Regardless, they might 

not have changed the ultimate outcome of the war because of the ability of 

the Party, Front, and their armed forces to repeatedly respond to challenges 

to their operations with a change in strategy.
178

Notes

1. For more information about the campaign waged by Diem refer to the 

previous chapter.

2. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 124-126.

3. Westmoreland, “A Military War of Attrition,” 58.

4. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 125.

5. Westmoreland, “A Military War of Attrition,” 62.

6. Ibid., 62-63.

7. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 114.

8. US Army units would also conduct operations in ICTZ beginning in 1968.

9. In US operational reports from the period operation names and many place 

names are written in all capital letters. In the text they will appear with the first 

letter of each word capitalized. However, when the original reports are quoted, 

they will be reproduced exactly as they appear in the report.

10. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 126.

11. Operation Maili will be discussed in further detail below.

12. For more information on Combined Action Platoons and other units 

that executed the local security force mission see the thesis by CGSC Art of War 

Scholar Major Dustin Mitchell.

13. As will be shown later using the reports of the 25th Infantry Division, 

operations, such as Maili, which were intended to support pacification were often 

short in duration and employed very limited amounts of U.S. combat power.

14. Pacification will be discussed in more detail below.

15. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 206-207.

16. Ibid., 207.

17. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 201.

18. Richard A. Hunt, Pacification, The American Struggle for Vietnam’s 

Hearts and Minds (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1995), 157.

19. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 241.

20. Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam, 20.

21. Standing Committee of A. 26, “Matters to be Grasped when Performing 

the Ideological Task in the Party Body,” in Viet-Nam Documents and Research 

Notes, ‘Decisive Victory’: Step by Step, Bit by Bit, TTU, 5.

22. Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam, 44.

23. Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification (Washington, DC: Center for Military 

History, 1980), 17.

24. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 286.
179

25. The PROVN study will be discussed further below. It should also be 

noted that General Abrams was part of the team that produced PROVN and 

therefore would have had a complete understanding of its conclusions and 

recommendations.

26. Tho, Pacification, 37.

27. Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam, 48.

28. There is no clearly defined end date for the Strategic Hamlet Program. 

Some of the strategic hamlets remained in existence throughout the end of 1963 

and 1964 and were subject to VC attacks against them during this time. However, 

as discussed in the previous chapter, the Vietnamese leaders who perpetrated 

the coup against Diem immediately disassociated themselves from the Strategic 

Hamlet Program so it can be concluded that its true end coincided with Diem’s 

death.

29. The term pacification will be used in this paper to describe both the 

general control mechanism and the counterinsurgency strategy employed by the 

GVN and its allies after the Diem regime.

30. United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Handbook for 

Military Support of Pacification, February 1968, Combined Arms Research 

Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS archives [hereafter cited as CARL], 1.

31. A full description and analysis of all of the elements of pacification 

is beyond the scope of this paper. The major component programs on both the 

U.S. and Vietnamese side, such as Chieu Hoi, Revolutionary Development, and 

CORDS, will be briefly described below, but will not be analyzed in depth. The 

focus will remain on the population and resource control measures employed by 

U.S. ground forces in support of the overall pacification effort.

32. MACV, Handbook for Military Support of Pacification, 1.

33. Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 1986), 166.

34. Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification, 15.

35. Pearce, Evolution of a Vietnamese Village - Part I, 18.

36. Ibid., 18-19.

37. Hunt, Pacification, 25.

38. Ibid., 26.

39. Robert Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam 

Conflict (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 140.

40. Hunt, Pacification, 36.

41. Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification, 4-5.

42. Ibid., 32-33.
180

43. Hunt, Pacification, 36.

44. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 144.

45. Hunt, Pacification, 102.

46. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 144.

47. Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification, 16.

48. MACV, Handbook for Military Support of Pacification, A-2.

49. Ibid., A-1.

50. Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification, 72.

51. Ibid., 31.

52. The role of CORDS in support of pacification will be discussed further 

below.

53. Hunt, Pacification, 137.

54. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 223.

55. Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification, 23.

56. Ibid., 24.

57. Hunt, Pacification, 217.

58. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 270.

59. Ibid., 270.

60. Robert Komer, Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in South Vietnam

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1970), 11.

61. Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification, 26.

62. Komer, Impact of Pacification, 19.

63. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 283.

64. Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam, 188.

65. Ibid., 189-190.

66. Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification, 182.

67. Komer, Bureaucracy at War, 138.

68. Hunt, Pacification, 26-27.

69. Komer, Bureaucracy at War, 140.

70. Ibid., 142. 

71. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 181-182. Also see Komer, 

Bureaucracy at War, 142.

72. Dale Andrade, “Westmoreland Was Right: Learning the Wrong Lessons 

from the Vietnam War,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19, no. 2 (June 2008): 158.
181

73. MACV, Handbook for Military Support of Pacification, 5.

74. Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification, 56.

75. Hunt, Pacification, 75-77.

76. Ibid., 82-85.

77. Ibid., 88.

78. MACV, Handbook for Military Support of Pacification, 27-28.

79. Ibid., 5.

80. Hunt, Pacification, 93.

81. One of the major reports involved was the Hamlet Evaluation System 

(HES). The HES was and remains a controversial means of gauging the security 

and pacification status of a hamlet. Responsibility for gathering and inputting 

the data into the HES lay with the district advisers and not the US units on the 

ground and so its usefulness will not be analyzed as part of this paper. See Hunt, 

Pacification 95-96.

82. BH060, Vietnam Political and Military Analyst, Interview by Mark 

Battjes, Ben Boardman, Robert Green, and Dustin Mitchell, 22 March 2011, 

Williamsburg, VA.

83. Hunt, Pacification, 106.

84. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 223-225.

85. This will be discussed further below. Also see II Field Force Vietnam, 

“Combat Operations After Action Report, Tet Offensive,” Bud Harton Collection, 

TTU, 25.

86. Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division, “Operational Report - Lessons 

Learned, Period Ending 31 July 1968,” 27 January 1969, Bud Harton Collection, 

TTU, 29.

87. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 253.

88. Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division, “Operational Report - Lessons 

Learned, Period Ending 30 April 1970,” Bud Harton Collection, TTU, 1-2.

89. Hunt, Pacification, 273.

90. Ibid., 274.

91. Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam, 187.

92. Hunt, Pacification, 274.

93. Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam, 213-216.

94. Westmoreland, “A Military War of Attrition,” 62-63.

95. MACV, Handbook for Military Support of Pacification, 5.

96. MACCORDS, Territorial Security in Vietnam, 1 January 1971, CARL, 

37.
182

97. David W. P. Elliot and W. A. Stewart, Pacification and the Viet Cong 

System in Dinh Tuong: 1966-1967 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 

1969), 64.

98. Ibid., 32-33.

99. MACV, Handbook for Military Support of Pacification, 6.

100. Department of Defense, DoD GEN-25, Handbook for U.S. Forces in 

Vietnam, 1966, CARL, 102.

101.Ibid., 104.

102. MACV, Handbook for Military Support of Pacification, 43.

103. Ibid., 43.

104. DOD, Handbook for U.S. Forces in Vietnam, 105-106.

105. Elliot and Stewart, Pacification and the Viet Cong System, 64.

106. Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification, 37.

107. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 286-287.

108. Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification, 166.

109. Komer, Impact of Pacification, 11.

110. Elliot and Stewart, Pacification and the Viet Cong System, xi.

111. VC Cadre from Duc Hoa District, quoted in Bergerud, The Dynamics of 

Defeat, 96.

112. CORDS, The Vietnamese Village 1970 Handbook for Advisors, 2 May 

1970, CARL, 77-79.

113. In this section, each tactic and technique will be described briefly and its 

use as a population and resource control measure established. The efficacy of the 

tactics and techniques will be examined below through their employment by the 

U.S. 25th Infantry Division.

114. DOD, Handbook for U.S. Forces in Vietnam, 103.

115. U.S. Army, Field Manual 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations

(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1963), 40. Although this manual was 

focused on countering guerrilla operations, which is primarily a military task, it also 

directs units to conduct activities more generally associated with counterinsurgency. 

This includes being prepared to provide humanitarian assistance and support local 

governance. Moreover, the population and resource control measures described in 

the manual for protecting and isolating the population and denying supplies to the 

guerrillas were relevant to the situation that U.S. units confronted in Vietnam. As 

the manual was issued in 1963 it can be assumed that US units preparing to deploy 

to Vietnam in 1965 and later would have been familiar with the manual and the 

tactics and techniques that were described within it. Although the manual does not 

discuss the operations of the British Army in Malaya explicitly, it has clearly been 
183

influenced by them. The manual discusses classifiying areas into red, yellow, and 

green based on the amount of guerrilla activity and their relative security, similar 

to the system employed by Templer. It also discussed using techniques such as 

food control which had not been used recently by the US Army. 

116. Ibid., 40.

117. MACV, Handbook for Military Support of Pacification, 50-52.

118. Ibid., 51.

119. Ibid., 51.

120. Air strikes, including those by B-52 strategic bombers, referred to as 

Arc Light strikes were also used in this manner. BH060. Also see Bergerud, The 

Dynamics of Defeat, 243.

121. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 135.

122. US Army, FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations, 40.

123. Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification, 97.

124. Ibid., 97.

125. Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division, “Operational Report - Lessons 

Learned, Period Ending 31 October 1967,” 5 March 1968, Bud Harton Collection, 

TTU, 5.

126. MACV, Handbook for Military Support of Pacification, 43.

127. Ibid., 21 and 49. However, nearly every 25ID ORLL examined by the 

author contains reference to MEDCAPs. Such operations were a regular feature 

of 25ID operations and have also been a regular feature of U.S. operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan.

128. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 165.

129. U.S. Army, FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations, 107.

130. As much as possible, the operations of the 25th Infantry Division will 

be examined by using the division’s original operational reports. Not all of the 

operational reports from the period were available to the researcher. However, 

enough reports are available during each of the critical periods to present a 

thorough examination of the division’s operations.

131. Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division, “Operational Report on Lessons 

Learned for Period Ending 30 April 1966,” Bud Harton Collection, TTU, 2.

132. The operations presented in this section will primarily be in Hau Nghia 

province. However, some will occur outside of Hau Nghia or in areas that are 

contiguous to it in order to allow a thorough examination of the division’s use of 

population and resource control measures.

133. Pearce, Evolution of a Vietnamese Village-Part I, 6.
184

134. Ibid., 8.

135. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 116.

136. Pearce, Evolution of a Vietnamese Village-Part I, 5.

137. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 118.

138. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 30 April 1966,” 6.

139. Ibid., 7.

140. Ibid., 7.

141. Robert Conner, quoted in Eric M. Bergerud, Red Thunder, Tropic 

Lightning (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1993), 96.

142. Ibid., 96.

143. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 30 April 1966,” 3-4.

144. Ibid., 6.

145. Ibid., 9.

146. Ibid., 9.

147. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 117.

148. The term major operation in Vietnam usually refers to an operation 

of battalion size and higher. The term small unit operations was reserved for 

operations at the company and below. This paper follows the same convention.

149. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 30 April 1966,” 10.

150. Ibid., 10.

151. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 117.

152. Ibid., 149.

153. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 30 April 1966,” 12.

154. Ibid., 12.

155. Ibid., 12.

156. Ibid., 25.

157. Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division, “Operational Report for Quarterly 

Period Ending 30 April 1967,” 19 May 1967, Bud Harton Collection, TTU, 1-8.

158. Ibid., 5.

159. Ibid., 10.

160. Ibid., 30.

161. Ibid., 30.

162. A Rome Plow is “a bulldozer with a sharpened blade set at an angle, 

constructed to be used in jungle clearing operations.” See 25ID, “ORLL Ending 

31 October 1967,” 5 March 1968, Bud Harton Collection, TTU, 5.
185

163. Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division, “Operational Report for Quarterly 

Period Ending 31 July 1967,” 19 August 1967, Bud Harton Collection, Texas 

Tech University Vietnam Archives, 3.

164. Ibid., 3.

165. Ibid., 6.

166. Ibid., 6-7.

167. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 164.

168. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 31 July 1967,” 8.

169. Ibid., 8.

170. Ibid., 9.

171. Ibid., 6.

172.Ibid., 6.

173. Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division, “Operational Report - Lessons 

Learned, Period Ending 31 January 1968,” 15 May 1968, Bud Harton Collection, 

Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive, 3.

174. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 31 October 1967,” 7.

175. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 31 January 1968,” 4.

176. Ibid., 17.

177. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 31 October 1967,” 21.

178. Ibid., 21.

179. Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification, 128.

180 25ID, “ORLL Ending 31 October 1967,” 48. The report cautions that US 

personnel should not be conducting these operations, but should allow Vietnamese 

officials to do so in order to improve their popularity.

181. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 173.

182. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 31 October 1967,” 21.

183. Ibid., 8.

184. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 31 January 1968,” 4.

185. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 31 October 1967,” 6.

186. Ibid., 19.

187. Ibid., 8.

188. 25ID “ORLL Ending 31 July 1968,” 29.

189. II Field Force Vietnam, “Combat Operations After Action Report, Tet 

Offensive,”25.

190. Ibid., 27.
186

191. Ibid., 2.

192. No author, “Viet Cong Loss of Population Control Evidence from 

Captured Documents,” 1968, TTU, 1-3.

193. Ibid., 8.

194. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 31 January 1968,” 5.

195. Ibid., 2.

196. Ibid., 2.

197. Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division, “Operational Report - Lessons 

Learned, Period Ending 30 April 1968,” 31 July 1968, Bud Harton Collection, 

TTU, 3.

198. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 201.

199. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 30 April 1968,” 5.

200. Ibid., 6.

201. Ibid., 7.

202. Ibid., 7.

203. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 209.

204. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 30 April 1968,” 3.

205. 25ID “ORLL Ending 31 July 1968,” 10.

206. Ibid., 10.

207. Ibid., 10-13.

208. Ibid., 2.

209. Ibid., 4.

210. Ibid., 4.

211. Headquarters, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, “Combat Operations 

After Action Report, Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II,” 10 March 1969, Bud 

Harton Collection, TTU, 6.

212. Ibid., 6.

213. Ibid., 6.

214. Ron Hart, quoted in Bergerud, Red Thunder, Tropic Lightning, 173.

215. 2-25ID, “Combat Operations AAR–TOAN THANG, Phase II,” 9-10.

216. Ibid., 7-8.

217. Headquarters, 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, “TOAN-THANG 

Phase II Execution, 1 OCT 68–30 NOV 68,” 31 March 1969, Bud Harton 

Collection, TTU, 2.

218. Ibid., 3-4.
187

219. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 225.

220. The digital copy of this document located by the author contains only the 

first three pages. However, it is those pages of the report in which the division is 

expected to record its major operations during the reporting period and therefore 

a conclusion can be drawn about what the division’s priorities during the period 

were.

221. Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division, “Operational Report Period 

Ending 31 January 1969,” 1 February 1969, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery, 25th 

Infantry Association Collection, TTU, 1.

222. Ibid., 2.

223. Ibid., 2.

224. 3-25 ID, “TOAN-THANG Phase II Execution,” 16-43.

225. The AAR indicates that two enclosures contain detailed execution 

summaries for different periods of the operation, but these are not part of the 

document located by the author. However, the main body of the AAR provides 

some sense of the brigade’s priorities.

226. 2-25ID, “Combat Operations AAR–TOAN THANG, Phase II,” 16.

227. Ibid., 16.

228. Alfred S. Bradford, Some Even Volunteered (Westport, CT: Praeger 

Publishers, 1994), 36.

229. Ibid., 20.

230. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 241.

231. Standing Committee of A. 26, “Matters to be Grasped when Performing 

the Ideological Task in the Party Body,” in Viet-Nam Documents and Research 

Notes, ‘Decisive Victory’: Step by Step, Bit by Bit, TTU, 5.

232. Ibid., 5.

233. “Study of Directive 81 of 5 [Nam] Truong [COSVN] Opening of Phase 

H,” in Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes, ‘Decisive Victory’: Step by Step, 

Bit by Bit, TTU, 11.

234. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 245.

235. Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division, “Operational Report - Lessons 

Learned, Period Ending 31 July 1969,” 18 December 1969, Bud Harton Collection, 

Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive, 1.

236. Ibid., 1.

237. Ibid., 1.

238. Ibid., 11.

239. Ibid., 8.
188

240. Ibid., 8.

241. Current Affairs Committee C69, “Directive No. 78/CTNT, An Order to 

Continued to Take Advantage of our Success, Develop the Overall Attack, and 

Accomplish the 1969 Spring Plan,” 14 May 1969, TTU, 2.

242. Ibid., 5.

243. Ibid., 5.

244. Ibid., 5.

245. Ibid., 5.

246. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 31 July 1969,” 31.

247. Ibid., 31.

248. Ibid., 12.

249. Ibid., 42.

250. Ibid., 78-79.

251. Ibid., 79.

252. SVN People’s Liberation Army, Political Department, “Outline of the 

Reorientation of Forthcoming Missions in 1970 (For Elementary and Intermediate 

Cadre),” 14 January 1970, TTU, 11.

253. Ibid., 11-12.

254. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 30 April 1970,” TTU, 2.

255. Ibid., 2.

256. Ibid., 42.

257. Ibid., 64.

258. Ibid., 16.

259. Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division, “Operational Report - Lessons 

Learned, Period Ending 31 October 1970,” 30 April 1971, Bud Harton Collection, 

TTU, 1.

260. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 287.

261. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 31 October 1970,” 20.

262. Ibid., 21. It is not clear how many of these rounds were fired in support 

of HI missions, however. The division’s earlier reports directly state how many 

rounds were fired for these missions but those in later years do not. Given the 

relative lack of contact and the high number of rounds expended, though, it could 

be concluded that many such missions were still occurring.

263. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 293.

264. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 31 October 1970,” 6, 14.

265. Ibid., 17.
189

266. Ibid., 17.

267. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 246.

268. Ibid., 247.

269. Ibid., 249.

270. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 289.

271. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 246.

272. Pearce, Evolution of a Vietnamese Village-Part I, 6-8.

273. Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam, 212.

274. Ibid., 273.

275. MACCORDS, Territorial Security in Vietnam, 37.

276. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 31 October 1970,” 13.

277. VC Cadre from Duc Hoa District, quoted in Bergerud, The Dynamics 

of Defeat, 96.

278. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 31 July 1968,” 44.

279. 2-25ID, “Combat Operations AAR–TOAN THANG, Phase II,” 19.

280. Ibid., 17. 

281. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 233-234.

282. Dan Vandenburg, quoted in Bergerud, Red Thunder, Tropic Lightning, 

221.

283. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 232.

284. Ibid., 232.

285. 25ID, “ORLL Ending 31 October 1970,” 14.

286. This, however, would have been viewed negatively by Westmoreland 

who observed after the war that “one can point to few cases, if any, in military 

history where victory was achieved by passive defense.” Westmoreland, “A 

Military War of Attrition,” 65.

287. MACV, Handbook for Military Support of Pacification, 17-19.

288. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat, 224.

191

Chapter 6

Iraq, 2003–2011

I never knew how much murder and intimidation was going on. 

When we got the COP [Combat Out Post] in and finally broke the 

intimidation that was the real turning point. They needed that sense of 

security in order to give us or the ISF [International Security Force] 

the information that we needed.

―A US Army Battalion Commander, Interview with author

The US campaign in Iraq has only recently ended with the withdrawal of 

all US combat forces in December 2011 and it will be many years before 

any judgment can be made about its ultimate outcome or its affect on the 

national security of the US At the same time, the length of the campaign, 

the large number of different units that participated in it, and the changing 

strategy employed by the US presents an opportunity to examine US 

operations in depth. This is especially true with respect to population and 

resource control measures. Throughout the campaign, US forces employed 

such measures and altered them as the strategy changed.

Initial efforts to control the population suffered from a lack of 

understanding of the threat, insufficient numbers of security forces, 

and a desire to reduce the presence of US forces among the population. 

However, once the US developed a better understanding of the situation 

that it was confronted with and determined that it needed to operate closer 

to the population the efforts improved. Moreover, a large increase in the 

number of security forces available, US and especially Iraqi, facilitated 

these efforts and dramatically curtailed the insurgency.

Overview

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM began on 19 March 2003 when President 

Bush ordered the execution of a “decapitation strike” to kill the senior 

leaders of Saddam Hussein’s regime in an attempt to immediately 

destabilize it.1

 Less than 24 hours later, the US ground invasion began 

as the US Army’s 3d Infantry Division (3ID) and the USMC’s I Marine 

Expeditionary Force (MEF), supported by the British Army’s 1st Division, 

attacked north from Kuwait. 3ID attacked to seize the Iraqi air base at Tallil 

while I MEF and the British attacked to secure the southern oil fields, the 

city of Basra, and seize the port at Umm Qasr.2

The initiation of ground operations with a relatively small force, 

especially when compared with the size of the force used during Operation 

DESERT STORM, was part of a plan developed by US Central Command 
192

(CENTCOM) that was referred to as the “Running Start.”3 The Running 

Start concept aimed to avoid a lengthy build up of forces in Kuwait in 

order to surprise the Iraqi regime.4

 The attack would begin with only the 

forces immediately available and before the remainder of the assault force 

was ready to begin operations. In fact, 3ID was the only US Army division 

available for combat when the invasion began.5

The Running Start plan was also part of a deliberate effort by Secretary 

of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to limit the number of US forces used in the 

invasion. The previous CENTCOM plan for invading Iraq, Operational 

Plan 1003-98, required as many as 500,000 US troops.6

 Rumsfeld felt that 

this number was far too high and indicated that he thought only 125,000 

would be necessary.7

 The limited number of troops did allow the invasion 

to begin more quickly and achieve strategic, operational, and tactical 

surprise. However, it also reduced the amount of US and coalition forces 

that were available to control Iraq in the wake of the invasion.

 After the seizure of the air base at Tallil, the southern oil fields, and 

the port at Umm Qasr, the invasion force continued its advance north. 

The resistance offered by the Iraqi Army was light but they also did not 

surrender in large numbers as had been expected.8

 However, this did not 

mean that there was no resistance. Heavy fighting occurred around An 

Nasiriyah and As Samawah which cost 3ID a number of casualties. The 

Ba’ath party paramilitary force, the Fedayeen Saddam, carried out these 

attacks.9

The Fedayeen Saddam were a major component of the regime’s survival 

mechanism. They were a lightly armed paramilitary force that would be 

used to contain uprisings in a city for long enough to allow the regime’s 

ultimate defenders, the Republican Guard, to arrive.10 Their attacks did not 

significantly disrupt the invasion force operations but they did provide a 

prelude of the hard fight that the US and coalition forces would confront 

when the insurgency began later.

The US drive to Baghdad continued rapidly as 3ID in the west and I 

MEF in the east aggressively carried out their attacks. Despite the heavy 

fighting in As Samawah, An Najaf, and other cities, they were not cleared 

by the initial force that encountered them. Rather, they were contained and 

bypassed to allow the main body of the attack to continue north. However, 

the bypassed cities provided staging areas for the Fedayeen Saddam to 

attack the invasion force’s LOCs.11 As a result, V Corps altered its initial 

plan and used the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) (101 ABN) and 

the 82d Airborne Division (82 ABN) forces that were available to begin 
193

securing the areas that had been bypassed.12 This action recognized the 

need to assert control over territory and population and, in effect, began 

the occupation of Iraq.

These operations were successful. The entire 1st BCT of the 101 ABN, 

and 2d Battalion, 70th Armor, were dedicated to clear and secure An Najaf.13

The force rapidly gained control over the city and ended the Fedayeen 

Saddam attacks on the LOCs. However, as 3ID moved north, the forces of 

the 101 ABN and 82 ABN would have to secure more cities, leaving fewer 

forces in each to control them. The dedication of combat power to these 

efforts also left fewer forces available to occupy and control Baghdad.

This situation, however, was part of the pre-war plan. In order to reduce 

the number of forces required for the invasion, the CENTCOM planners 

anticipated being able to use Iraqi resources, such as the police and the 

Army, to maintain control.14 Moreover, at a political level, it was believed 

that it would be better for an Iraqi authority to assume control of the 

country.15 It was hoped that this would allow the US to avoid being viewed 

as an occupying power. However, as soon as US forces began securing and 

holding territory, that is precisely what they were.

The rapid advance of 3ID and the I MEF ended with the fall of Baghdad 

on 9 April 2003. This followed two raids into Baghdad, referred to as 

“Thunder Runs,” that were conducted by elements of 2BCT, 3ID on 5 

and 7 April 2003.16 With the fall of the regime, the US Army, Marine, and 

British forces began a transition to stability and support operations that 

were intended to re-establish some measure of civil control.17 However, 

there was not a civilian authority to turn control over to.

The US had created the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 

Assistance in January 2003 to serve as an adjunct to the CENTCOM staff 

and provide support to its efforts to establish a new Iraqi government 

after the invasion.18 The office was headed by Lieutenant General (R) Jay 

Garner, who had very little time and few resources to establish the new 

office. In late April 2003, Garner began the task of creating an Interim Iraqi 

Authority, which would ultimately become a provisional government of 

Iraq.19 A conference of Iraqi exiles had taken place in London in December 

2002 to begin development of a means to govern post-invasion Iraq but 

the conference did not produce a governing structure that could be inserted 

into Baghdad to control the country.20 Thus, with the collapse of the regime 

there was no civilian governing authority in Iraq. Moreover, “just after the 

3d ID and other Coalition elements arrived in Baghdad, Saddam’s army, 

the Iraqi police, and other institutions of authority dissolved. Concurrently, 
194

looters began stealing from buildings and facilities across the capital.”21

3ID and the other coalition elements did not have clear guidance about 

how to react to such a situation and some commanders allowed the looting 

to continue unchecked.22

In May 2003, the Bush administration created the Coalition Provisional 

Authority (CPA) and endowed it with sovereign political power in Iraq.23

The CPA was intended to be a short-lived body which would hand control 

over to an Iraqi governing entity, being developed by Garner, as soon 

as possible. However, the head of the CPA, L. Paul Bremer, decided to 

indefinitely postpone such a handover and delay the formation of an Interim 

Iraqi Government (IIG).24 Although a postponement was necessary, as the 

process of forming such a government had begun in earnest less than a 

year earlier outside of Iraq, it undermined the work done by Garner and 

created a sense in some communities in Iraq that the coalition would 

remain for longer than expected. It also did not improve the coalition’s 

ability to control Iraq, which required a greater number of forces and more 

coordination between the military and the CPA. It would be more than 

a year before the IIG was formed and during that time an insurgency25

developed that would challenge not only coalition control, but would also 

present a challenge to the newly formed government.

An insurgency had not been anticipated by the war’s planners, despite 

what was known about the capabilities of the Fedayeen Saddam and other 

paramilitary bodies in Iraq at the time of the invasion. As a result, when 

insurgent attacks began during the summer of 2003, each of the divisions 

in Iraq reacted differently.26 The insurgency remained at a relatively low 

level throughout 2003. However, it became increasingly clear that it was 

composed of a number of disparate elements including a Sunni Arab 

nationalist insurgency and a Sunni Arab Islamic extremist insurgency led 

by Abu Musab Al Zarqawi which ultimately became Al Qaeda in Iraq 

(AQI).27 A major blow against the insurgency, or so it was believed at the 

time, occurred when Saddam Hussein was captured in December 2003.

 Subsequently, far fewer attacks were recorded during the first three 

months of 2004.28 But, the insurgency intensified in early 2004 with near 

simultaneous events in Fallujah, Najaf and other areas across southern 

Iraq, and the Baghdad slum, Sadr City.29 The murder of US contractors 

in late March 2004 led the Bush administration to order an offensive to 

clear Fallujah, which drew Sunni insurgents from across Iraq to defend the 

city.30 The USMC and US Army forces conducting the attack encountered 

heavy resistance. The administration ended the assault less than two weeks 

after it began, leaving the insurgency effectively in control of Fallujah.31
195

The Shi’a population of Iraq,32 concentrated in the areas south of 

Baghdad and in some neighborhoods of Baghdad itself, had not opposed 

the initial US invasion. However, many Shi’a were opposed to the 

ongoing occupation of Iraq and some of them united under the leadership 

of Muqtada al Sadr to form the Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM), the Army of the 

Mahdi.33 Sadr used CPA actions directed against him to initiate an uprising 

across southern Iraq and in Sadr City.34 Fighting was heaviest in Najaf and 

Sadr City but was largely confined by the summer.

The summer of 2004 included two major events that would shape the 

future of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The first was the transfer of 

sovereignty from the CPA to the IIG in late June 2004. The second was the 

creation of the Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I) headquarters and the 

appointment of General George Casey to serve as its first commander.35

These two events gave shape to a new strategy for the campaign in Iraq.

The IIG was established under the conditions of the Transitional 

Administrative Law (TAL) and was intended to govern Iraq until elections 

in January 2005 to select a Transitional National Assembly (TNA).36 The 

TNA would produce a new Iraqi constitution to be confirmed by a national 

referendum in October 2005. This would lead to a second national election 

to select a permanent government in December 2005. Thus, the strategy 

at the political level was to gradually produce a permanent government of 

Iraq that would be broadly representative of the population.

Casey inaugurated a military strategy whose goal was to transition 

responsibility for security from US and coalition forces to Iraqi forces in 

every province.37 The transition strategy also envisioned a reduction of US 

presence among the Iraqi population and a consolidation of U.S forces on 

as few bases as possible by the end of 2005.38 This strategy also meant that 

US forces would gradually withdraw, leaving fewer to conduct operations 

and control areas in Iraq. At the beginning of 2005 there were three US 

BCTs operating in the eastern half of Baghdad; only one remained at the 

end of 2005.39

The parallel political and military strategies achieved what appeared to 

be significant successes in 2005. All three Iraqi national elections were 

held with minimal disruption by insurgents. Operations in Tal Afar and 

Al Qaim pacified cities that had previously been centers of insurgent 

activity.40 The Iraqi Army (IA) grew rapidly and participated in operations 

throughout the country. However, these successes were largely on the 

surface.
196

Sunni Arabs boycotted the January 2005 election which ultimately 

produced a constitution that might deprive them of access to political power 

and their share of the resources under federalization.41 They were granted 

some representation and did help draft the constitution, which included a 

set, but limited, number of seats for Sunni areas regardless of turnout.42

Sunnis voted heavily in the December 2005 election, but this was only 

for the set number of seats that they had been granted by the constitution, 

and thus it did not greatly improve their representation and power in the 

government.43 Moreover, the IA, while capable of conducting combined 

operations, was not capable of quelling the insurgency, especially in Sunni 

areas where it was viewed as a Shi’a occupation army.44 The IA was largely 

recruited from Shi’a communities and because it was a national army this 

naturally required a mostly Shi’a force to be deployed to Sunni populated 

areas.45 The inability of the IA and the other security forces to control 

the insurgency and deal even handedly with the Sunni population was 

illustrated dramatically in the aftermath of the bombing of the Askariya 

(Golden) Mosque46 in Samarra.

The bombing of the Golden Mosque in February 2006 by AQI initiated a 

cycle of retaliatory violence between the Sunni and Shi’a Arab populations 

in Iraq, which was especially acute in Baghdad.47 Some US officers have 

stated that the bombing of the mosque was not a trigger of the violence, 

but was only an indicator of the failure of the US approach.48 However, 

it is clear that the level of violence between Sunni and Shi’a in Iraq 

dramatically increased after the bombing occurred.

Despite the massive increase in violence and the inability of the IA, 

the Iraqi Police (IP), or any of the paramilitary police organizations of 

the Ministry of Interior49 to control it, the US transition strategy moved 

forward. One BCT (Brigade Combat Team ) was off ramped50 during 2005 

and instead of deploying to Iraq was sent to Kuwait to serve as a theater 

reserve.51 A second BCT was off ramped during 2006 and instructed to 

remain in Germany and begin a training cycle that included the conduct of 

gunnery on its mechanized platforms.52

The worsening violence, which has been characterized as a civil war, 

continued nearly unabated, especially in Baghdad.53 In an attempt to 

halt the violence, US and Iraqi forces in Baghdad executed two major 

operations during the late summer of 2006 called Operation TOGETHER 

FORWARD I and Operation TOGETHER FORWARD II. The concept for 

both operations was for US forces to clear areas of the city, behind which 

Iraqi forces would erect new checkpoints, enforce curfews, and secure the 

population in the cleared areas.54 Although security improved immediately 
197

following US clearing operations, Iraqi forces were unable to maintain 

security and the operations failed to achieve their objectives.

This prompted the US to end the transition strategy. Of the two BCTs that 

had been off ramped the first was already deployed to Iraq and the second 

was ordered to execute an accelerated deployment.55 This presaged an 

even greater increase in the number of US forces in Iraq that is commonly 

referred to as the surge. President Bush announced in January 2007 that an 

additional five US Army BCTs and two USMC infantry battalions would 

be deployed to Iraq to reinforce the US forces already operating in the 

country.56

The change in force levels was accompanied by a change in US strategy 

and a new command team in Baghdad. The new command team consisted 

of Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, who assumed command of 

the Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNC-I) in late 2006, General David 

Petraeus the new MNF-I commander who arrived in February 2007, and 

Ambassador Ryan Crocker who assumed his post in March 2007. The new 

strategy temporarily ended the transition of security responsibility to Iraqi 

forces and focused on the protection of the population using both US and 

Iraqi forces.57 Petraeus believed that a reduction in violence could produce 

space for political reconciliation to occur.58

The surge forces deployed to Iraq at the rate of approximately one BCT 

per month between February and June 2007. Although initially intended to 

be used primarily in Baghdad, Odierno also directed surge forces to Anbar 

province and the areas surrounding Baghdad. The increased force levels 

initially produced an increase in US casualties, but were accompanied 

by a dramatic reduction in violence against Iraqi citizens.59 Moreover, 

by the end of 2007, attacks and casualties of all kinds had significantly 

decreased.60

The increase in US forces represented by the surge was but one of the 

causes of the reduction in violence, however. In 2005, tribal leaders in Al 

Qaim in western Anbar province partnered with USMC forces to drive Al 

Qaeda out of the city.61 In September 2006, in the city of Ramadi in Anbar 

province, a group of Sunni Arab tribal leaders, inspired by the actions 

in Al Qaim, agreed to partner with US forces to fight AQI.62 Key to this 

agreement was that the tribal leaders’ forces would ultimately become 

IPs in order to connect them to the Government of Iraq (GOI).63 The 

movement of Sunni Arabs to partner with US forces and become part of 

the security apparatus in Iraq eventually became known as the Sahwa, or 

Awakening, movement. Following its success in Anbar, the Awakening 

spread to Baghdad in late spring 2007.64
198

The Awakening greatly increased the number of security forces available 

to the US and the GOI to protect the population. In neighborhoods across 

Baghdad and in the areas surrounding Baghdad, US forces partnered with 

the Awakening movement to create irregular security forces that would 

later become known as the Sons of Iraq.65 Not all of these forces were 

destined to become IPs, and in some areas there were far more than could 

ever be integrated into the Iraqi security force structure.66 However, their 

temporary inclusion in the security force structure, coupled with their 

removal from the pool of available insurgent forces, enabled the US and 

GOI to control a greater amount of territory and reduce violence throughout 

the country.

The security situation continued to improve throughout Iraq during the 

remainder of 2007 and into 2008. However, in the spring of 2008 the Shi’a 

insurgency presented a renewed challenge to the GOI and coalition forces, 

despite Sadr having been forced to declare a cease fire in the fall of 2007 

because of the pressure applied by the coalition as a result of operations 

targeting the leadership of JAM.67 The trouble began in the southern Iraqi 

city of Basra, which was the responsibility of British Army forces.

British forces, with agreement from MNF-I, began to withdraw from 

Iraq in 2007 and wanted to transition control of Basra to the GOI.68 To 

facilitate this transition, British forces entered into an “accommodation” 

with JAM elements in Basra to cease operations in the city in return for 

an end to attacks against British soldiers.69 The withdrawal of British 

forces from Basra prevented them from having a good understanding of 

the situation, but they were convinced that the IA division in charge of the 

city was “sufficiently mature to underpin PIC [Provincial Iraqi Control] by 

December 2007.”70 They were not.

Violence increased throughout Basra and shortly after the last 

JAM prisoner was released by British forces in accordance with the 

Accommodation, attacks against British forces resumed as well.71 Basra 

was effectively under the control of JAM. The IA division commander 

wanted to regain control of the city deliberately, but he was overruled 

by the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al Maliki, who ordered two brigades 

to the city to confront JAM in a poorly planned operation.72 Ultimately, 

Operation CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS was supported by US Army, 

USMC, and British forces. It regained control of the city, achieving the 

original objective of the British to transition control of Basra to the GOI, 

though not in the way that they had originally intended.73
199

The operation instigated additional JAM attacks in cities throughout 

Iraq but especially in Baghdad. Attacks increased significantly throughout 

the city and US Army forces were redeployed away from the relatively 

peaceful Sunni neighborhoods of Baghdad to fight against JAM in Shula, 

Sadr City, and other neighborhoods.74 Sadr was again forced to declare a 

cease fire but not before the GOI had regained control of Baghdad and a 

significant portion of Sadr City.

The security situation continued to improve following the end of Charge 

Of The Knights and the violence perpetrated by JAM in the spring of 

2008. The US surge forces withdrew and were not replaced. In January 

2009, the US and Iraq signed a security agreement that established a 

series of milestones for the withdrawal of US forces and the transition 

of responsibility for security to Iraqi forces. US forces ended unilateral 

operations in urban areas on June 30, 2009.75

The transition of responsibility continued throughout 2009 and into 

2010. In 2010, US BCTs began operating primarily as advisers to ISF and 

assumed responsibility for greater and greater amounts of territory as the 

withdrawal continued. By the summer of 2010, only one US BCT remained 

in Baghdad where it was partnered with six different division-size ISF 

elements and the IPs.76 In July 2011, the US had just six BCTs and three 

division headquarters remaining in Iraq. All of these forces withdrew from 

Iraq by mid-December 2011 in accordance with the security agreement.77

Control Mechanism

It might appear that there never existed a holistic control mechanism in 

Iraq. However, Iraq was governed, and therefore controlled, by civil law 

for almost the entire period of the campaign. Unfortunately, it was not 

always clear to commanders on the ground or to the Iraqi people what the 

law said and how it could be applied. As a result, the control mechanism 

of civil law was less effective than it could have been.78

While the invasion was ongoing, control of Iraq was exercised by 

multiple authorities. In areas where the Saddam regime was still in power, 

it exercised control. In areas which the US and its coalition partners 

occupied, they exercised control. In areas where the regime no longer was 

in control but which had not been secured and occupied, it could be said 

that no one was in control.

While the US wished to avoid being characterized as an occupying 

force, the US Army field manual on the law of land warfare identifies that:

Military occupation is a question of fact. It presupposes a hostile invasion, 

resisted or unresisted, as a result of which the invader has rendered the 
200

invaded government incapable of publicly exercising its authority, and 

that the invader has successfully substituted its own authority for that of 

the legitimate government in the territory invaded.79

Therefore, as soon as the US military began securing and holding Iraqi 

cities, such as An Najaf and As Samawah, they were occupied and should 

have been subject to military government. Nor was it necessary to issue a 

proclamation declaring occupation.

Moreover, occupation is not permanent. Rather, “military occupation 

confers upon the invading force the means of exercising control for the 

period of occupation. It does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant, 

but simply the authority or power to exercise some of the rights of 

sovereignty.”80 This meant that, by recognized international law, the US 

and its coalition allies’ occupation of Iraq would had to have been only 

temporary. The occupation and the exercise of some rights of the Iraqi 

state, though, were necessary to “maintaining law and order, indispensable 

both to the inhabitants and to the occupying force.”81

However, even if the US had made the decision to control Iraq through 

a military government it still would have needed sufficient forces to 

do so. The situation in Baghdad demonstrated that the US did not have 

enough forces on the ground to maintain control. The 3ID had around 

1,200 dismounted infantry to conduct patrols and were spread thin trying 

to cover the vast number of critical sites in the capital city.82 Moreover, the 

collapse of the police meant that US forces could not use them to assist in 

the maintenance of law and order.83

The looting in Baghdad and other cities disillusioned many Iraqis, even 

those who may have had a favorable view of the US invasion. The power 

vacuum created by “the regime’s collapse was far more vivid to Iraqis, who 

often did not comprehend why Coalition forces would not immediately 

fill that void.”84 Lawlessness, the collapse of power grids, and general 

insecurity, when combined with a society in which nearly everyone had 

access to firearms, produced a situation that was nearly impossible for the 

US and coalition forces to control.85 This was especially so without clear 

guidance about what powers the military could exercise and which laws it 

should enforce.

In May 2003, the administration established the CPA. Though not required 

to do so, the United States and Great Britain sought legal recognition for 

the new body from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In late 

May 2003, UNSC Resolution 1483 recognized the “specific authorities, 

responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these 
201

states [the United States and the United Kingdom] as occupying powers.”86

Furthermore, the UNSC directed the CPA “to promote the welfare of the 

Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including 

in particular working towards the restoration of conditions of security and 

stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely 

determine their own political future.”87

Recognition by the UNSC and the broad authority that it provided 

gave the CPA tremendous power to shape conditions in Iraq. In truth, the 

CPA had already begun exercising such authority. It issued CPA Order 

No. 1 on 16 May 2003, entitled a “De-Baathfication of Iraqi Society.”88

The order immediately removed all “Senior Party Members” of the Baath 

from government and directed that managers in the top three levels of all 

government agencies be investigated and removed from their positions if 

determined to be full party members, even those junior in rank.89

The CPA followed up this order by issuing Order No. 2, “Dissolution 

of Entities,” on 23 May 2003.90 The specific entities dissolved were 

listed in an annex to the order and included the Ministry of Defense, the 

Iraqi Intelligence Service, the National Security Bureau, the Directorate 

of National Security, the Special Security Organization, and all of the 

military services.91 Also dissolved were all agencies subordinate to those 

specifically named. The plan to utilize Iraqi resources, especially those of 

the military, to help control the country was now impossible.

The first two orders of the CPA can be interpreted as the first major effort 

to implement population and resource control measures by the US and its 

coalition partners. They did so poorly, however. While it was not wrong 

to ban the Baath party per se, it was far more embedded in Iraqi society, 

and its rank structure more inflated, than was understood at the time.92

One Iraqi recalled that the Baath party “had become part of the fabric 

of Iraqi society, a complex, interrelated pyramid of economic, political, 

religious, and tribal links. .. but to dismantle the Party, the Army, and the 

other structure of the state was only to replace them with chaos.”93

Thus, the combination of the two orders ended up depriving the US 

of many tools that could have helped it control the population. The DeBaathfication order banned from government even some low level civil 

servants who could have helped the US administer the country. The 

dissolution of the army and the other elements of the security apparatus 

prevented the US and coalition forces from leveraging their manpower as 

had been intended in the original plan.
202

At the same time, the CPA did not, and probably could not, direct US 

and coalition military forces to enforce the law. CPA Regulation No. 1 

stated that “the Commander of US Central Command shall directly support 

the CPA by deterring hostilities; maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity 

and security; searching for, securing and destroying weapons of mass 

destruction; and assisting in carrying out Coalition policy generally.”94

Deterring hostilities and carrying out policy generally could mean that US 

military forces should enforce the law but they were not directed to do so.

Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 7, issued in early June, reemphasized this point. This order established the 1969 version of the Iraqi 

penal code as the basis of maintaining law and order. It further directed that 

“all judges, police and prosecutors shall perform their duties in accordance 

with CPA Regulation No.1.”95 However, no mention is made of the ability 

of coalition military forces to enforce the law or what power they could 

exercise to control the population.

This lack of guidance was critical, especially as later orders begin to 

establish population and resource control measures under law. An example 

is CPA Order No. 3., originally issued 23 May 2003, but later amended 

and revised. Order No. 3 prohibited Iraqi citizens from carrying weapons 

and required them to register small arms weapons to keep in their home or 

business.96 It also provided that “firearms or Military Weapons, including 

Special Category Weapons, possession or use of which is unauthorized, 

are subject to confiscation by Coalition Forces and other relevant 

authorities.”97

The order also allowed for those in violation of it to be arrested and 

prosecuted but it did not specifically say that this would or could be 

done by coalition military forces.98 Thus, one interpretation of the order 

is that US and coalition forces were allowed to confiscate weapons that 

they found in violation of the order, but were not allowed to arrest those 

violators. This had to be done by an Iraqi authority.

Further clarification of the powers of US, coalition, and Iraqi military 

forces was not forthcoming as the situation developed. UNSC Resolution 

1511 reaffirmed the status of the CPA as the governing authority within 

Iraq and directed that it transfer sovereignty to an Iraqi governing body 

as soon as possible.99 It further authorized “a multinational force under 

unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the 

maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.”100 Therefore, the UNSC 

provided the military forces within Iraq a broad mandate to implement 

control measures to ensure security, but the CPA regulations and orders 
203

that they were operating under did not specifically direct them about how 

they could do so.

The Iraqi Governing Council, formed under the CPA’s guidance, 

produced the TAL in the spring of 2004 to govern the country when 

sovereignty was transferred.101 The UNSC endorsed this law and the IIG 

that would form as a result of it in Resolution 1546.102 The resolution 

also specifically reauthorized the multinational force presence codified in 

Resolution 1511 and decided that the:

Multinational force shall have the authority to take all necessary 

measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in 

Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed to this resolution expressing, 

inter alia, the Iraqi request for the continued presence of the multinational 

force and setting out its tasks, including by preventing and deterring 

terrorism.103

Thus, the military forces within Iraq, to include US, coalition, and Iraqi 

forces, again received broad guidance to control violence in Iraq. Their 

specific authority to do so, however, was limited by the TAL itself. The 

TAL stipulated that all laws in force on June 30, 2004, would remain in 

effect, which meant that all the previous CPA orders were still valid.104

However, it also proscribed certain actions that impeded the ability of 

security forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations.

The TAL placed the Iraqi military under civilian control and subject to the 

restrictions contained within it.105 One such restriction regarded search and 

seizure. The TAL stated that “police, investigators, or other governmental 

authorities may not violate the sanctity of private residences, whether these 

authorities belong to the federal or regional governments, governorates, 

municipalities, or local administrations, unless a judge or investigating 

magistrate has issued a search warrant.”106 The TAL also granted Iraqis 

“the right of free movement in all parts of Iraq.”107

Taken together, the three provisions referenced above could be 

interpreted to mean that the Iraqi military could not employ population and 

resource control measures to counter violence, despite the broad authority 

granted by the UNSC resolution. However, the text of the TAL provided 

one further complication. It stated that until a permanent constitution was 

adopted “the Iraqi Armed Forces will be a principal partner in the multinational force operating in Iraq under unified command pursuant to the 

provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511.”108 It was 

therefore still not clear how much authority the US, coalition, and Iraqi 

forces actually had to control the population and what specific powers they 

could use to do so.
204

Thus, despite the existence of a number of laws that could be used to 

employ population and resource control measures, it was not clear to 

commanders on the ground what they could actually do. Moreover, the 

laws were relatively limited in scope. No mention is made in any specific 

directive of the ability to enforce curfews, impose movement restrictions, 

or conduct unannounced searches for weapons, munitions, or other 

materiel. In fact, the text of the TAL made it appear that such measures were 

prohibited. Some US commanders employed these measures anyway.109

The TAL remained in effect until the Iraqi Constitution was approved 

by a national referendum in October 2005. The new law did little to 

clarify the set of authorities and powers that could be used to confront the 

insurgency. It stated that “the Iraqi Armed Forces shall defend Iraq and 

shall not be used as an instrument of oppression against the Iraqi people.”110

This clause, interpreted broadly, could restrict the IA’s ability to execute 

counterinsurgency operations. The new constitution also contained a 

number of restrictions similar to those contained in the TAL.

It directed that “the sanctity of the homes is inviolable and homes may 

not be entered, searched, or put in danger, except by a judicial decision, 

and in accordance with the law.”111 It further identified that “each Iraqi 

enjoys the right of free movement, travel, and residence inside and outside 

Iraq.”112 Once again, these articles appeared to deny the security forces the 

ability to employ population and resource control measures in an effort to 

counter the insurgency.

However, the constitution did allow the Council of Representatives 

to ratify the declaration of a state of emergency if requested by both the 

President and the Prime Minister.113 Once the state of emergency was in 

place, “the Prime Minister shall be authorized with the necessary powers 

that enable him to manage the affairs of the country within the period 

of the state of emergency.”114 The ability to impose a state of emergency 

therefore provided the Iraqi government with the flexibility to confront the 

insurgency. It was still unclear what measures the Prime Minister could 

authorize the security forces to use, however.

Moreover, the new constitution did not specify how the Iraqi security 

forces would cooperate with the US and coalition forces to confront the 

insurgency. In fact, the text of the constitution makes no reference to the 

presence of foreign militaries on Iraqi soil. A series of UNSC resolutions 

provided the authorization for the continued presence of US and coalition 

forces within the country.
205

The first reauthorized coalition presence through 2006.115 The next 

permitted the coalition to remain until the end of 2007.116 Resolution 

1790 then extended the mandate through 2008.117 While these resolutions 

directed that the multinational force undertake certain additional tasks, 

each also reaffirmed “the authorization for the multinational force as set 

forth in Resolution 1546.”118 Thus, the UNSC resolutions provided the 

coalition with broad authority to take action to maintain security within 

Iraq, but how it should do so under the restrictions of the new Iraqi 

constitution was not specified.

Again, this produced a situation where the powers and authorities of 

the various governments, commanders, and their security forces were 

not clear. The text of the Iraqi constitution proscribed narrow limits of 

authority, but then provided flexibility through the mechanism of a state 

of emergency. The UNSC resolutions gave MNF-I broad authority, but 

also directed that it should be used in accordance with the wishes of the 

Iraqi government. These contradictions undermined the civil law control 

mechanism.

US Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq

The US counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq evolved over time and met 

with many setbacks. It was also plagued by inconsistencies within the US 

military community about the nature of the insurgency and the proper 

response to it. As early as July 2003, the commander of CENTCOM, 

GEN John Abizaid, commented that the US confronted a classic guerrilla 

campaign.119 However, at the strategic level a former member of the 

Army staff recalled that in December 2003, “we were actually told to take 

the word insurgency out of the National Military Strategy and take all 

reference to Iraq out of it.”120

The debate about the nature of the opposition that the US was 

confronting would continue for a number of years. The former Army staff 

member observed that “there starts to be some debate in 2005 as folks try 

to determine is this really an insurgency or not.”121 The debate was not 

limited to whether or not the US was confronting an insurgency, but also 

how best to counter any insurgency in Iraq.

Abizaid, a highly educated Arabic speaking American of Lebanese 

descent, believed that US forces were an anti-body to the Iraqi state 

and therefore their presence inflamed the insurgency.122 This assessment 

seemed plausible at the time and partially drove the decision to adopt 

the transition strategy. A US Army field grade officer who served in Iraq 
206

during 2004 recalled that “the strategy was get out of the cities. It was very 

in line with GEN Abizaid’s anti-body thoughts.”123

Moreover, the US Army lacked a comprehensive doctrine on 

counterinsurgency to guide how commanders responded to the threats that 

they faced. A US Army history of the campaign written at the Combined 

Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth noted that:

Instead of relying on institutional experience or well-established doctrine, 

each American unit in Iraq in the summer of 2003 tended to focus on 

their immediate challenges and ultimately each took a unique approach 

to the problems it perceived in their area of responsibility (AOR). In 

many cases, the commander’s perception of the threat became the most 

important factor driving the unit’s approach.124

As will be shown, this did not mean that US units did not execute 

counterinsurgency operations or did not employ classic counterinsurgency 

tactics and techniques. What it did mean, however, was that unit operations 

were not synchronized across the theater. A US Army field grade officer 

recounted that one battalion was allowed to continue to operate in the city 

of Tikrit in 2004 while another battalion from the same BCT was forced to 

leave the city of Samarra.125

The US military did attempt to improve the understanding of 

counterinsurgency tactics and techniques and their application in Iraq. In 

2005, Casey established a counterinsurgency academy at Camp Taji, Iraq. 

All incoming commanders and staffs had to attend the one-week course 

before assuming responsibility for their area of operations.126 The course 

provided the incoming commanders and staffs with examples of tactics 

and techniques that had been successful, but it did not improve operational 

synchronization. A US Army company commander who served in Iraq in 

2005 recalled that “every unit over there was going as hard as they could 

in their own direction. We all had a mission and we all were plowing ahead 

as hard as we could, doing our own thing.”127 That is to say, some units 

were executing counterinsurgency tactically within their own battlespace, 

but these actions were not synchronized to produce operational effects 

across the theater.

The synchronization of operations improved when the transition strategy 

was abandoned and the new command team arrived at the end of 2006 and 

the beginning of 2007. Critically, they did not direct all units to execute 

their operations in the same way tactically. Rather, they designed the 

campaign to coordinate unit operations across the battlespace to achieve 

operational success. The same company commander stated that in 2007 
207

“we were all pulling together. ... I knew the guys in my sister battalions in 

the north of Baghdad were doing the same thing I was doing in southern 

Baghdad.”128 The synchronization of operations would prove critical to the 

effectiveness of the entire campaign.

Also in 2006 the US Army and USMC issued an updated manual 

on counterinsurgency. Its affect on US military operations in Iraq is 

not certain, however. Some units that were in Iraq in late 2006 had not 

received the manual before they deployed. Nonetheless, they understood 

counterinsurgency tactics and techniques. As a US Army field grade officer 

recalled, “we all knew what the options were out there ... and you knew 

what had to be done, even at the soldier, platoon, company level ... but we 

finally got the ‘let’s do it’ guidance.”129

This guidance allowed commanders to confront problems that they had 

identified in their area of operations and provided them the resources to do 

so.130 It also ensured that within the framework of the broader campaign all 

units would execute operations that were mutually supportive. Moreover, 

it reflected an abandonment of the anti-body theory of the insurgency and 

led US units to conduct operations to secure the population in much closer 

proximity to the population than had been done before.

The changing nature of the campaign described above can be illustrated 

by examining the employment of population and resource control 

measures by US units. Throughout the campaign, US units implemented 

such measures with varying degrees of success. As the campaign evolved 

so did the use of population and resource control measures. This section 

will examine the use of population and resource control measures during 

two portions of the campaign.

The first portion of the campaign that will be examined is the period 

immediately following the invasion until the implementation of the 

Baghdad Security Plan in early 2007.131 Then the period between the 

implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan until the end of 2008 will 

be considered. Although US units have continued to employ population 

and resource control measures in partnership with Iraqi forces since the 

beginning of 2009, the reduced threat and the changed nature of the 

relationship between these forces makes it less valuable to study for the 

purpose of this paper.
208

Post Invasion–Implementation of the

Baghdad Security Plan

Following the fall of the regime and the end of major combat operations, 

US units were deployed across Iraq to secure and assume control of the 

vast territory. 1AD assumed control of Baghdad, 101 ABN was sent north 

to Mosul, 4ID assumed responsibility for much of the Sunni triangle in the 

area north of Baghdad, including around Saddam’s hometown of Tikrit, 

and 3ID and 3ACR took control of Anbar province.132 Each division 

confronted an unique set of circumstances and executed operations 

differently as a result.

These varying approaches were manifest not just during the early period 

immediately following the invasion, but were prevalent throughout the 

campaign, at least until the implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan. 

As a result, US units employed population and resource control measures 

in order to confront the specific problems that they identified, but in 

general did not synchronize such efforts across the battlespace. These 

individual efforts were often tactically successful but they did not translate 

into operational and strategic success.

Early Employment of Population and Resource Control Measures

Population and resource control measures were common place early 

in the campaign. One of the very first CPA orders issued concerned the 

possession of weapons. Many units responded by issuing weapons cards 

under the commander’s authority as the occupying military officer.133

These cards provided authorization for the Iraqi populace to maintain a 

weapon in their home or place of business but did not allow them to carry 

such weapons. It was difficult for such measures to be effective, however, 

as the number of weapons and their penetration within the population was 

so great.134

Restricting the possession of weapons was a relatively even-handed 

response to the insurgency. Not all of the early population and resource 

control measures were so restrained. Some units responded to insurgent 

attacks by imposing population and resource control measures punitively. 

In his personal account, Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Sassaman recalled 

that after an attack against his battalion in November 2003 he detained 

about two dozen local sheiks.135 He asserted that the primary reason for 

doing so was to gather intelligence but also noted that “that there was a 

punitive purpose as well.”136
209

Sassaman’s battalion then imposed a restrictive population and resource 

control regime on the town of Albu Hishma, which was near the site of 

the attack. The day after the attack, “we began to wrap the entire village 

in barbed wire, and closed all but one entrance and exit.”137 The battalion 

also issued identification cards to adult males and imposed a curfew. 

These measures were not, however, to protect the population from the 

insurgency, but to protect Sassaman’s own unit. He recalled that “the 

Iraqi citizens, not surprisingly responded with anger and hostility of their 

own.”138Similar actions occurred elsewhere in Iraq as towns that were 

viewed as uncooperative were wired in.139

As the campaign evolved the employment of population and resource 

control measures by US units became more nuanced, however. In the 

summer of 2004, the 1st Infantry Division (1ID) conducted Operation 

BATON ROUGE to regain control of the city of Samarra. After clearing 

the city, a curfew was imposed, but violence continued. A US Army 

field grade officer recalled that “after a week or two of this contact, we 

realized that it was cyclic in nature. We set up a vehicular curfew that 

started at 1800 and the pedestrian curfew at 1900. The mines were going 

out between the two because there were no Iraqi cars on the road at that 

time.”140 The battalion responded by adjusting “the curfew so that the 

vehicle and pedestrian curfew [were] on at the same time.”141

Employing population and resource control measures to react to specific 

enemy actions also occurred in Tikrit during the same time frame. A US 

Army battalion commander recalled that “we had a period of time where it 

seemed like every VBIED [Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device] 

that took place was a taxi cab. So I did a program called ORANGE 

CRUSH,142 registration of every taxi cab. We pull them over, queue them 

up, make sure that we have water for them, give them a few dinar when 

we register them.”143

To conduct this operation, the battalion partnered with the local Iraqi 

forces to establish checkpoints to stop every taxi cab, photograph the driver 

with the cab, and then place a shipping label that the battalion had printed 

out on each one.144 Although there were a large number of such vehicles 

in the city and the battalion did not have the ability to track each one, this 

measure was still effective. The battalion commander noted that “it pulled 

the taxi cabs off the grid.”145 One of his field grade officers observed that 

“the insurgents had no idea what the hell we were doing, but they stayed 

away from taxis.”146
210

Although the disruption to the insurgency as a result of such operations 

was only short term, it provided units time and space to adjust and continue 

to target the insurgency. Moreover, they helped to protect the population as 

attacks by VBIEDs often resulted in more Iraqi than American casualties. 

In a large city such as Tikrit it would have been difficult to completely 

control vehicular movement but in smaller towns units did exactly that.

The town of Haqlaniyah is near Haditha in western Anbar province. In 

2005 this area was the responsibility of Multi-National Force West, the 

USMC command in Iraq. The Marine unit responsible for the area had 

seen heavy fighting and did not have enough combat power to control 

every town within the area. As a result, the town of Haqlaniyah had not 

had any US presence for an extended period of time.147 In preparation for 

the constitutional referendum and national elections in late 2005, a US 

Army battalion was deployed to regain control of the town.

The battalion executed a night attack to secure the town. The night time 

assault gave the battalion a number of advantages over the insurgents in 

the town but the commander recalled that:

Those advantages kind of disappeared when the sun came up and people 

started walking around and our momentum slows down. We decided 

not to stop the momentum and we shut down all vehicle traffic through 

PSYOP [psychological operations] broadcast teams and every method 

possible. I made it very clear that no one was going to move a vehicle, 

and no one did.148

This proved feasible for a few days, but then the battalion had to adjust. 

The commander remembered that:

It would start to be a pain in the ass because sooner or later people 

needed to start going places: food needed to be delivered, fuel needed 

to be delivered, people needed to go to the hospital. Things needed 

to happen. We started a vehicle registration program. I directed that 

everyone in town who owned a car had to present their ID and register 

their car and we would provide them a pass ... to put in their windshield 

and that would allow them to move their vehicle.149

The battalion employed this measure to deter attacks by car, including 

VBIED attacks, but also was able to use it to target the insurgency. The 

battalion commander noted that during the registration process several 

people on its targeting list came with their cars and were detained on the 

spot.150 The battalion combined the vehicle registration operations with 

patrols, observation posts, and sniper positions to deter movement of any 
211

kind. The commander recalled that the operations “suppressed the enemy’s 

freedom of movement because of the vehicle ban, the aggressive patrolling, 

and the use of snipers, even if they weren’t snipers. The feedback we got 

from the enemy talking was that Haqlaniyah was a very inhospitable place 

to be.”151

The battalion’s employment of population and resource control measures, 

in concert with standard operations such as patrolling, was tactically very 

effective. The battalion did not remain in the area beyond the execution of 

the elections, however. The population and resource control measures and 

level of patrolling could not be maintained. Therefore, the tactical success 

that the battalion achieved did not translate into broader operational 

success, despite the low level of violence across Iraq during the elections.

Baghdad

US units were also employing population and resource control measures 

in response to specific enemy actions in Baghdad, though the enormity 

of the city made this difficult.152 The two most significant threats to the 

population and US forces in Baghdad were VBIED attacks by Sunni 

insurgents and Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP)153 Improvised 

Explosive Device (IED) attacks by Shi’a insurgents. The former, though 

they were sometimes used to attack US forces, were more often employed 

to cause large numbers of casualties among the Shi’a population of 

Baghdad; the latter exclusively targeted US forces.

During late summer of 2005 there were a large number of VBIED attacks 

in Baghdad, including one day which AQI dubbed the “day of a thousand 

VBIEDs.” In response to these attacks, Iraqi security forces, particularly 

the Public Order Battalions from the Ministry of Interior, established 

vehicle checkpoints throughout the city. Iraqi security forces also wanted 

to establish a berm or wall around Baghdad and control all movement into 

the city. Checkpoints on roads leading into the capital were established, 

but a berm was not.154 These checkpoints were often insufficiently manned 

and protected, and failed to prevent VBIED attacks in the city.

Other measures did, however. In preparation for the referendum and 

national elections in the fall of 2005, US forces emplaced concrete 

barriers around polling sites.155 These sites were then secured by IA or 

Public Order Battalion units to deny VBIED attacks on election day. The 

GOI also imposed a night-time curfew and imposed a total ban on vehicle 

movement in the days prior to the elections. Few attacks were conducted 

during the elections and this allowed a fairly high participation rate. So the 
212

measures did produce tactical success. Once they were lifted, however, the 

effects disappeared.

EFP attacks were especially difficult to counter. During 2004 and 2005 

the sophistication of EFPs advanced significantly. By the fall, multiple 

penetrators were being combined into a single device that could be rapidly 

emplaced and easily camouflaged. In an effort to combat this, the unit 

responsible for securing many of the routes in east Baghdad conducted 

operations to deny insurgents the terrain that was most favorable to the 

employment of EFPs. They did so using a variety of methods.

The first method was to simply use random patrols of armored vehicles 

along the routes to deny insurgents the opportunity to emplace them. They 

also established temporary observation posts with patrols to surveil one 

intersection that had been used in a number of EFP attacks. Moreover, the 

unit utilized a camera mounted on a large tower to persistently observe the 

intersection from a nearby US base. If insurgents were identified a patrol 

could be diverted to the location.

The battalion also conducted an operation to remove all potential 

camouflage along Route Brewers.156 First, the battalion secured large 

armored bulldozers which pushed all of the trash and debris away from 

the shoulders of the road. The battalion then removed the metal guard 

rails from the highway, which had been used to conceal EFPs. Finally, 

the battalion employed a specialized vehicle which combined a spray of 

a flammable mixture and an ignition source to burn all of the vegetation 

remaining along the side of the road.

These operations did deny Shi’a insurgents the ability to use this terrain 

for EFP attacks, but only for a short period of time. Eventually, the patrols 

became less effective as the insurgents lessened the time needed to emplace 

the devices. Persistent observation and occupation of the intersection was 

consistently effective, but consumed a large amount of combat power. 

Removing camouflage reduced attacks for a short period of time, but EFPs 

were soon emplaced among new camouflage.157

Similar operations were occurring across Baghdad with similar results. 

US forces, the GOI, and Iraqi forces would implement a new measure and 

attacks would recede. Once the measure was lifted, or the insurgents had 

determined a means to respond to it, the attacks returned. This pattern was 

seen during Operations Together Forward I and II. US forces searched an 

area, Iraqi forces temporarily secured it, but attacks resumed soon after the 

clearance concluded.
213

The measures were not synchronized in a way to produce lasting 

effects. Moreover, operations of individual units, such as the terrain denial 

operations described above, were not supported by those of other units. 

However, outside of Baghdad, US units in 2005 and 2006 began to employ 

population and resource control measures and synchronize operations in 

ways that produced long term effects.

Tal Afar and Ramadi

The city of Tal Afar lies west of Mosul in the Ninewah province of Iraq 

and has a mixed Sunni and Shi’a population. The city had been cleared by 

US forces in 2004, but soon after their departure the city was under the 

control of Sunni insurgents who were using it to support their operations 

in the rest of Iraq.158 The security situation was so poor that the Iraqi police 

commander of the region could not find an officer to become the chief of 

police in the city. The man who eventually did so recalled that:

No one wanted to take this position. He [the regional police commander] 

asked many, many officers to take this position and no one would accept 

the position in Tal Afar. Tal Afar was tough city and the population was 

mixed–Sunni, Shi’a, Turkomen–and it was very dangerous. He told me 

he asked 64 officers and they all turned him down.159

To regain control of the city, Casey deployed the 3ACR under the 

command of Colonel H.R. McMaster to Tal Afar in late spring 2005 to 

conduct Operation RESTORING RIGHTS. Rather than simply clearing the 

city as had been done previously, 3ACR conducted a deliberate campaign 

to remove the insurgent presence and ensure that it did not return. The 

unit began by conducting cordon and search operations in the surrounding 

villages to force the insurgents out of them and isolate Tal Afar.160

The unit then entered into a partnership with the Iraqi forces in the city, 

led by the mayor/police chief, to continue the campaign into the city. 

As part of this plan, the unit employed a number of population control 

measures. The former mayor remembered that:

We had checkpoints in the city on the road to Mosul on the Sinjar road, 

the Muhallahbiya road but that didn’t prohibit terrorists from entering 

the city. They would come at night easily into the city in cars. Or they 

would use sheep to pretend to be shepherds. So we found a way to stop 

it. What we did is we had checkpoints around the city but it is a big city 

and would need a lot of checkpoints to stop everything. The terrorists 

could also attack those CPs at night. It wasn’t very effective. So we saw 

that it would be better, especially since the 3d Iraqi Army Division had a 
214

lot of cranes, that they make a berm that it would be difficult for cars to 

pass. So it would make the cars that wanted to get to the city, they could 

only go through the checkpoints.161

After isolating the city, 3ACR was able to conduct a clearing operation 

of the city and establish combat outposts (COPs) that US and Iraqi forces 

jointly occupied inside it.162 The commander of a battalion attached to 

3ACR during the operation stated that his “battalion task force moved 

into the violent Sarai neighborhood and transitioned to stability operations 

within 72 hours.”163 The employment of population and resource controls 

did not end there, however.

The same battalion commander noted that his battalion collected census 

information as part of the process of settling claims for damages done 

during operations. The commander observed that:

The census helped us gain situational awareness because it documented 

identities, afforded a means of cross-checking stories and histories, 

and provided pictures of suspected insurgents that we could use to 

test the veracity and accuracy of our intelligence sources. After we 

had established the credibility of an intelligence source, we could then 

ask him to identify insurgents from among the census photos and to 

provide detailed witness statements of violent acts by those insurgents. 

Altogether, the census enhanced our targeting and thus our ability to 

defeat insurgent cells.164

Although the berm, the checkpoints, and the large number of US forces 

living in the city severely disrupted the daily life of the population, this was 

welcomed. The former mayor remembered that “the Shi’a liked it. They 

knew the reason why. The Sunnis, the tribal leaders that were loyal to us 

told their people it was OK. ... The people who want security, they have to 

sacrifice. Everyone has to sacrifice if you want security.”165 The anti-body 

theory of the insurgency did not prove true in Tal Afar. US units, partnered 

with Iraqi forces and taking steps to secure the population, successfully 

eliminated the Sunni insurgency in the city.

Operation RESTORING RIGHTS eliminated a base of support for 

the Sunni insurgency and facilitated permanent GOI control of the city. 

This was made possible by 3ACR’s large amount of combat power and 

the manner in which it synchronized its operations and its employment 

of population and resource control measures. Shaping operations outside 

of the city removed potential support areas for the insurgency before 

operations in the city began. Population and resource control measures 

within the city denied insurgents freedom of movement and facilitated the 

unit’s targeting of them.
215

The operations in Tal Afar demonstrated that synchronized population 

and resource control measures could help US forces achieve more than 

just short term tactical effects. This lesson was absorbed by the unit which 

replaced 3ACR, the 1st BCT from 1AD, which applied and expanded on 

them to achieve another significant success in the city of Ramadi.

The successful operations in Al Qaim in late 2005-early 2006 had begun 

to improve the situation in Anbar province as Al Qaeda was denied the 

use of a critical base of support near the Syrian border and along the main 

route leading east to Ramadi, Fallujah, and then Baghdad. However, the 

Sunni insurgency was still deeply embedded in the city of Ramadi. In fact, 

an August 2006 assessment from a USMC intelligence officer from I MEF 

concluded that “the social and political situation has deteriorated to a 

point that MNF and ISF are no longer capable of militarily defeating the 

insurgency in al-Anbar.”166 A battalion commander who served in Ramadi 

in 2006 recalled that the BCT commander he served under was ordered to 

retake Ramadi “but don’t make it like Fallujah.”167

In other words, do not conduct a direct assault on the city that will 

destroy it and cost significant US casualties. 1BCT, 1AD did not; rather, it 

executed synchronized operations that employed population and resource 

control measures. A US Army BCT commander noted that initially the five 

battalions in Ramadi were conducting largely independent operations.168 To 

rectify this situation and confront the insurgency the BCT “had to develop 

a series of mutually supporting operations that would systematically 

deprive the enemy of his safe havens.”169

The unit did this by systematically clearing areas, establishing COPs 

in them, and then building up local security forces to help protect the 

population. The unit also conducted a census operation. A battalion 

commander in Ramadi recalled that “my goal was that every house in 

Anbar was numbered. What I wanted to get done was that they could tell 

us who lived in every house before you went in. We were trying to figure 

out who was who.”170 The BCT combined census information from all 

of its subordinate battalions into a database that was created by a junior 

enlisted intelligence analyst in one of the battalions.171

The BCT also employed other population and resource control measures. 

In coordination with the Iraqi forces in the town it imposed a curfew, 

established “gated communities” that had access control and patrols, and 

“tried to get to the point where we had windshield stickers and register 

vehicles.”172 The unit also conducted terrain denial operations. The unit 

“did all kinds of terrain denial: kinetic/non-kinetic, direct fire, indirect 
216

fire, fast movers [fixed wing aircraft], UAVs off set” in order to deny the 

insurgents the ability to use a particular area or draw them to an area and 

target them with lethal fires.173

As the effects of these operations accumulated it produced a profound 

change in the population. The BCT commander stated that “as we took the 

fight to the enemy and deprived him of more and more resources and control 

over parts of the population some of the local sheikhs took heart from that 

and that coupled with our presence in combat outposts in their tribal areas 

encouraged them to stand up and form the Awakening Movement.”174 One 

of the battalion commanders recalled that the improved security provided 

by the unit’s operations and establishment of COPs “broke the intimidation. 

That was the real turning point. They needed that sense of security in order 

to give us or the ISF the information that we needed.”175

As in Tal Afar, the operations of 1BCT, 1AD in Ramadi produced not 

just tactical effects, but contributed to operational and strategic effects. 

Ramadi lies along the main highway leading from Anbar into Baghdad. So 

by denying the Sunni insurgency control of the city, US forces removed 

a critical support base from which it had been supporting operations in 

Baghdad. Moreover, by controlling this city that lied along a crucial LOC 

for the insurgents, it allowed units operating both west and east of Ramadi 

to better target their own operations, because it was no longer supplying 

Sunni insurgent attacks in them.

The other major effect of the operations in Ramadi was to provide 

additional momentum to the Awakening movement. Because the US 

unit’s operations and population and resource control measures effectively 

protected and isolated the population from the insurgency it allowed 

the population, now free from intimidation, to choose to protect itself, 

and in the process support US forces and the GOI.176 They did so on a 

tactical level by providing intelligence information. On an operational and 

strategic level, they joined the Iraqi Police and began a process by which 

a greater number of Sunni Arab Iraqis would become part of the security 

force structure.

The US operations in Tal Afar and Ramadi proved that the anti-body 

theory of the insurgency was a fallacy. They also showed that if US forces 

synchronized their operations to target the enemy’s support areas that they 

could defeat the Sunni insurgency in that area. Moreover, they demonstrated 

that by using population and resource control measures as part of those 

synchronized operations, US forces could better protect and isolate the 

population, giving them the ability to support the counterinsurgents without 
217

fear of intimidation or murder. US forces would apply these lessons during 

2007 and 2008 in operations in Baghdad and the surrounding areas.

Baghdad Security Plan–2008

The operations in Ramadi were beginning to show significant success 

in the fall of 2006. At the same time, the US was undergoing a major 

review of its strategy and force structure in Iraq. In the new year, the US 

announced that it would increase its force structure by an additional five 

US Army BCTs and two USMC infantry battalions. However, these forces 

would not arrive immediately and their deployment would actually occur 

throughout the first six months of the year.

What did change dramatically at the end of 2006 and the beginning 

of 2007 was the US strategy in Iraq. While the change has generally 

been credited to General Petraeus, Lieutenant General Odierno actually 

developed and began implementing a new operational plan in late 2006 

and early 2007, prior to Petraeus’ arrival. A field grade officer on the 

MNF-I staff during the time period recalled that Odierno and Colonel 

Hickey developed an operational concept for the campaign that “was all 

about locating the enemy’s safe havens and sanctuaries and then disrupting 

those.”177

Once a safe haven or sanctuary was identified, MNC-I would use the 

incoming surge forces and “put a unit right on top of that place. ... If they 

are disrupted there, where will they go next? Then put another unit down 

there.”178 The officer recalled that this concept was how “the Battle of 

the Belts179 was conducted.”180 Denying the Sunni insurgency their supply 

bases in the areas surrounding Baghdad could potentially slow the violence 

in Baghdad itself, which was raging essentially unchecked in late 2006.

This idea was reflected in a briefing that Odierno gave Petraeus in early 

February 2007. In it Odierno described his intent for MNC-I’s operations, 

key to which was that “militarily, we must interdict accelerants of Baghdad 

sectarian violence emerging from Southern Salah ad Din, Eastern Diyala, 

and Western Anbar, exploiting recent successes in these areas.”181 To 

accomplish this, Odierno would use some of the surge forces in Baghdad 

itself to increase the security of the population, the rest would be used in 

an offensive operation to secure the Baghdad Belts and deny AQI use of 

these areas.182

Also critical to Odierno’s plan were population and resource control 

measures. In the same briefing to Petraeus, he indicated that one of the 

conditions for beginning his operations was that the GOI needed to extend 
218

the “existing state of emergency, with measures including at a minimum: 

banning vehicles from selected locations; controlling access into, and 

internal to, the city as required; random searches of vehicles, people, 

businesses, and homes; full enforcement of weapons ban.”183

Thus, Odierno sought to ensure, through the GOI, that all of the 

measures that he wanted to employ with both US and Iraqi forces were 

legal in accordance with the Iraqi constitution. This action allowed him to 

give the “let’s go” guidance to commanders that they had needed to begin 

employing such measures on a large scale. Moreover, by establishing it as 

a criterion to begin operations he ensured that it would be more difficult 

for the GOI to end the employment of such measures prematurely.

Battle of the Belts

Notwithstanding the original plan to use the majority of the surge forces 

inside of Baghdad itself, many of the surge BCTs were actually deployed 

to areas surrounding Baghdad to deny these areas as safe havens and bases 

of support for the Sunni insurgency. They conducted operations to prevent 

the movement of weapons, munitions, and fighters into Baghdad to assist 

in halting the cycle of retaliatory violence that gripped the city. The BCT 

commander responsible for the area east of Baghdad recalled that “our task 

was to block accelerants, bad people, Sunni extremists, Shi’a extremists, 

and foreign fighters in the Mada’in Qada184 to prevent them from getting 

into Baghdad.”185

In order to accomplish this task the unit created a framework operation 

called Operation NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE, “that was a series of CPs 

[checkpoints] on known routes of infiltration ... It started out with just 

us and then partnered with the Iraqis. ... We picked certain locations on 

certain MSRs where we put these and then we would change them out.”186

Although the checkpoints rarely captured materials bound for Baghdad, 

they disrupted the flow of such materials and were a means of “trying to 

control things and also deter bad things from happening.”187

The unit employed additional population control measures. They 

conducted census operations to “map out who lived where and how many 

Sunnis and Shi’as.”188 In the process of collecting this information, the 

units were able to build relationships with the population which could 

later be leveraged to gain intelligence information about the enemy. The 

relationship also facilitated the unit’s ability to explain the actions that it 

was taking.
219

This proved critical when the unit conducted terrain denial operations. 

The BCT commander recounted that he fired artillery on locations that had 

been used by insurgents to shoot mortars at coalition bases.189 Though this 

often upset the population in the area, he was able to use relationships with 

the sheiks to explain why he was conducting these actions and told them 

that “I will stop firing those fires as soon as you stop people from going 

into your backyard and firing mortars.”190

On the other side of the Tigris River, another BCT was conducting 

similar operations in the farmland south of Baghdad. This area had seen 

very little US presence during the campaign and the Sunni insurgency was 

using it as a support base for attacks in Baghdad when the BCT arrived in 

the summer of 2007. The BCT commander recalled that:

Our job was to go in and clear out the insurgents. When you look at 

a map, along the Tigris there was a route, it was called Route Gnat, it 

was basically a hardball, intermittent dirt road that ran all the way from 

Sayifia right into Baghdad. ... homegrown Al Qaeda were using that, 

and other insurgents were using that, as a means to get into the city, and 

also transit further out to the west, because they could just go around 

Baghdad off that route and it had to be blocked. So, we had to block 

the insurgents, defeat the enemy threat in the region, and protect the 

population. Those were the three missions.191

To accomplish these missions, the BCT executed a deliberate plan to 

systematically clear areas of the Sunni insurgents, establish COPs, and 

then build local security forces to maintain security. A major component of 

this plan was the employment of population and resource control measures. 

The BCT recognized that the limited road networks in the area were all 

essential LOCs for the insurgents. This led the unit to establish movement 

controls on the routes. The BCT commander stated that:

We physically blocked the roads coming into Baghdad. In the south ...we 

physically blocked that exit of the southern portion of the battle space 

and put our checkpoints out, our patrols, until we could get others to 

come out and to man those checkpoints. Curfews, no vehicles moving; 

no vehicles moving on that road unless we clear it and, at night time, no 

vehicles moving.192

Physically blocking the insurgent LOCs produced immediate effects. A 

company commander in the BCT reported that “there were three Tier 1 

hotspots193 on Route Tampa that died after I took crossing point Whiskey 1 

over the Bismarck Canal and blocked it so that they couldn’t get out there 

anymore. Within a month, three Tier 1 hotspots on Tampa were gone.”194

The unit did not limit its movement controls to the road, however.
220

The BCT also identified that Sunni insurgents were using the Tigris 

River to transport supplies. As a result, the BCT prohibited all river traffic 

and the commander made it “very clear, to every leader in the area, ‘You 

will not be on the water; and, if you’re on the water, you will be deemed as 

hostile.’”195 To make this restriction effective, the BCT coordinated with 

the unit on the other side of the river to help them enforce it.196

Like its sister unit across the river, the BCT also employed terrain denial 

fires, shooting artillery onto historical insurgent mortar firing points. The 

BCT fired the artillery onto these sites “to force them into areas where we 

could engage them. That was the key.”197 The BCT also conducted census 

operations and enrolled the Iraqi populace in a biometric database using 

the Biometric Automated Tool Set (BATS) and Handheld Interagency 

Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE).198199

Despite the invasive, coercive, and restrictive nature of the measures, 

the population was generally positive about their effects. The BCT 

commander recalled that “we presented it to them that, ‘this is to secure 

you.’ ... they had movement; they just didn’t have freedom of movement 

to where they could go anytime they wanted to, day or night.”200 He also 

noted that once an area was cleared and the restrictions were in place that 

the populace would work with his units to identify caches of weapons, 

munitions, and other supplies.201

Similar operations were being conducted to the northwest of Baghdad 

in the area around the town of Sab al Boor. The US Army battalion 

commander in that area recounted that:

We did an operation where we looked at all the LOCs coming into Sab 

al Boor and we routed everybody through a checkpoint or a series of 

checkpoints that were integrated. So we now had at least control of access 

or for people leaving the city as well. So we could put a stranglehold on 

supplies and things going in. We did cache clearances and other things 

because we had a lot of unpopulated areas in the city.202

What is critical to note about these operations is that they were being 

conducted not only to improve security in the areas where they took place, 

but also to support operations in Baghdad itself. This was despite the fact 

that the BCTs conducting operations in the Baghdad Belts were not under 

the control of Multi-National Division, Baghdad (MND-B). They were 

also, in the case of the first two BCTs described, mutually supportive of 

one another.

This synchronization of operations across the battlespace, both in 

method and in purpose, allowed each of the unit’s population and 
221

resource control measures to be more effective. Previously, if one US unit 

interdicted a LOC being used by the insurgency, it could easily transfer 

its supplies to another that went to the same location. This was especially 

true for Baghdad. However, with US units interdicting all of the LOCs into 

Baghdad, it made it much more difficult for the insurgency, particularly 

the Sunni insurgency, to resource attacks in the capital.

Baghdad

While US forces in the Baghdad Belts were interdicting the movement 

of fighters and supplies, what Odierno had called “accelerants”, into the 

city, the units in the city were confronted by a battle between Sunni and 

Shi’a insurgents for control of the city. One BCT commander who served 

in Baghdad recalled that “the real problem, however, when we got there, 

was the cycle of violence between Sunni and Shi’a. We had AQI, but Shi’a 

extremists were in the northern part of our AO, but were trying to expand 

their control over physical territory.”203 A member of the MNF-I staff 

noted that “the militants who ran Sadr City were trying to project power 

into West Baghdad and then the militants who held sway in Dora and a 

couple of other spots in West Baghdad were trying to project power into 

East Baghdad.”204

Another issue was that the Sunni and Shi’a insurgents were presenting 

themselves as protectors of their own populations against attacks by the 

other. A US Army field grade officer recounted that Sunnis in Baghdad felt 

that they had to “rely on Al Qaeda and other Sunni extremists as the only 

recourse against the Shi’a expansion.”205 The presence of AQI was used 

“as an excuse” by the Shi’a community to justify attacking Sunnis as a 

“way to get at AQ.”206

The battle between Sunni and Shi’a insurgents created a situation 

where units in different parts of Baghdad confronted similar but opposite 

problems. One BCT commander stated that his unit had to “deny the 

access of the Shi’a extremists to the Sunni populated areas and we had to 

defeat Al Qaeda.”207 Another BCT commander recounted that he “wanted 

to separate them [Al Qaeda in Iraq] from the Shi’a neighborhoods and 

protect the people, to keep the flow of insurgents from going in freely and 

coming out freely, and hiding among the populace.”208

The overarching operation that would guide and facilitate all unit 

operations in Baghdad was the Baghdad Security Plan, officially called 

Operation FARDH AL QANOON (Enforcing The Law). The Baghdad 

Security Plan was similar in concept to Operations Together Forward I and 
222

II which had failed to create a lasting security improvement in Baghdad. 

There were major differences between the first two operations and the new 

Baghdad Security Plan, however.

The previous two operations had combined clearance of neighborhoods 

by US forces with long term security provided by Iraqi forces after the 

US unit departed the neighborhood but, the Baghdad Security Plan, as 

described by the MND-B commander, consisted of:

Three basic parts: clear, control and retain. The first objective within 

each of the security districts in the Iraqi capital is to clear out extremist 

elements neighborhood by neighborhood in an effort to protect the 

population and after an area is cleared, we’re moving to what we call the 

control operation. Together with our Iraqi counterparts, we’ll maintain 

a full-time presence on the streets, and we’ll do this by building and 

maintaining joint security stations throughout the city.209

Moreover, rather than relying on Iraqi forces, primarily IPs, to provide 

security to the population after the clearance operation was completed, the 

plan involved “the application of military force to ensure that the security 

of the people of Baghdad is solidly established and sustained.”210 This was 

critical because the IP, IA, and Iraqi National Police (INP) had failed to 

secure the population during previous operations.

US units also employed far more population and resource control 

measures than had been used to this point in the campaign. In fact, senior 

staff at MNC-I asserted that “population control is a key part of Operation 

FARDH AL QANOON.”211 The baseline of which was the set of security 

measures outlined by Odierno in his briefing to Petraeus. As previously 

discussed, US and Iraqi forces had regularly enforced such measures in 

Baghdad for limited periods of time. During the Baghdad Security Plan, 

the measures would be combined and maintained to break the cycle of 

violence. At the center of these measures was the establishment of safe 

neighborhoods, also called gated communities.

The concept behind the safe neighborhoods was simple: completely 

surround a single neighborhood212 with a solid set of concrete walls, create 

a limited number of access points to the neighborhood, and then conduct 

searches of and enforce movement restrictions on all traffic, vehicular 

and foot, moving in and out of the neighborhood. The walls denied the 

insurgent groups’ freedom of movement in the city, protected and isolated 

the population from them, and facilitated US and Iraqi targeting operations. 

Moreover, the walls could address either problem set described above: 

they could secure a Sunni community from Shi’a insurgent attacks and 
223

allow them to disavow AQI or they could secure a Shi’a community from 

Sunni insurgent attacks and allow them to disassociate from JAM and 

other Shi’a extremists.

While some units established walls unilaterally, others emplaced them 

very deliberately in consultation with the local community. One BCT 

commander recounted that the local neighborhood leader “explained to us 

where best to put the walls ... and then we took up on that and drew out 

a plan, which included the barriers along the MSR [main supply route], 

all the way to the MSR overpass. That would be the only way in.”213

Moreover, the emplacement of walls “was based on risk assessment and 

was tied to the placement of combat outposts.”214

As the walls started to go in around Baghdad some communities began 

asking for them. One US Army battalion commander remembered that 

“we actually had a neighborhood that asked for concrete. ... We did an 

operation at the request of the leadership of one of the neighborhoods and 

we walled in a neighborhood because they wanted us to wall them in.”215

Even in neighborhoods where the population initially viewed the walls 

negatively, the attitude changed once the population recognized a tangible 

improvement in their security.216

Emplacement of the walls often resulted in a rapid reduction of violence. 

One US Army BCT commander recalled that the walls “dramatically 

stopped the flow of violence and lethal aid into the neighborhood.”217 A 

US Army battalion commander in another part of the city observed that 

after the walls were in place, “we didn’t see the attacks on the Sunni 

population coming from the Shi’a. We saw a reduction of the SVBIED 

[Suicide VBIED] attacks.”218 The security and isolation provided by the 

safe neighborhoods also allowed the population to begin supporting US 

forces and the GOI.

The Sunni Awakening movement that had begun in Al Qaim and Ramadi 

spread into Baghdad in the late spring of 2007. Once walls were established 

around some neighborhoods of Baghdad, local leaders came forward and 

offered to form local security forces to reinforce the protection provided 

by US and Iraqi units.219 The local Iraqi populace also then felt secure 

enough to provide intelligence to US and Iraqi forces. A BCT commander 

stated that after the emplacement of walls “exponential tips came into 

company commanders.”220

The safe neighborhood program did not entirely account for the reduction 

in violence, however. The level of violence had been so high for so long 

that many neighborhoods which had once been mixed were entirely 
224

segregated by the time the program began. A senior civilian serving at 

MNC-I remarked that the walls were:

not stopping anything, the worst of the violence [had] run its course 

and the communities had been separated. People had swapped houses. 

So then you’re making these enclaves and these enclaves, at a certain 

stage, people feel safer. Initially there’s a sense that ‘I feel safe in 

my neighborhood,’ but then there comes a time of ‘but it’s not my 

neighborhood really, and I can’t go back where I am really from.’ It 

started to cement divisions in a society which had been very mixed.221

This is a valid criticism of the program and many of the walls were 

still in place as of 2010.222 However, it is not true that all of the violence 

had run its course. The BCT and battalion commanders interviewed noted 

significant reductions in violence. In June 2007, after the safe neighborhood 

program had been executed in many neighborhoods, units were still 

finding the bodies of Iraqi civilians who had been murdered by Sunni 

or Shi’a insurgents.223 Moreover, the walls did not just target the SunniShi’a violence itself, they also served to interdict the flow of weapons, 

munitions and materials and facilitated the targeting of insurgents by US 

and Iraqi forces.

The safe neighborhood program was not the only population and resource 

control measure employed in Baghdad. Units also reinforced the actions 

of the BCTs in the Baghdad Belts by interdicting the flow of supplies into 

their neighborhoods. A US Army field grade officer recounted that “we 

knew where the Al Qaeda lines were coming from Anbar. Let’s make it 

difficult, the first time they approach Baghdad, the Sunni terrorists, let’s 

make it difficult for them to get into those neighborhoods.”224

In order to make it difficult, the BCT extended the walls associated with 

the safe neighborhood program west along the main road leading into 

Baghdad from Anbar province. The BCT commander stated that “we put 

nine foot barriers on both sides of the MSR. Once you got into there you 

couldn’t get off into the farmlands and infiltrate into the city. Once you got 

into the pipe you had to go through a series of CPs [checkpoints] manned 

by the Iraqi Army.”225 Other units in Baghdad were interdicting supply 

bases by using terrain denial fires.

One BCT Commander recounted that “on that far eastern edge along 

the river there was a perfect rectangular palm grove region and the [main 

supply route] ran right along that. So you had a major confluence of major 

high speed avenues of approach.”226 He recalled that Sunni insurgents 

“would camp out and stage and cache” supplies in the palm grove.227 In 
225

response he fired artillery and mortars “on preplanned targets and denied 

that area because I couldn’t patrol it. Area denial.”228 The commander noted 

that once he began conducting terrain denial operations “it dramatically 

cut down the numbers of IED incidents I was having ... Eventually they 

just stopped going in there.”229

Units within Baghdad supported their interdiction efforts by conducting 

cordon and searches of neighborhoods to capture or destroy enemy 

supplies. Large cache finds consisting of several IEDs or hundreds of 

pounds of homemade explosive were common in Baghdad through the 

summer of 2007.230 As operations continued into the fall of 2007 and winter 

of 2008, cache finds occurred less often and contained fewer weapons and 

munitions.

However, it is hard to assess precisely the effects that all of these operations 

achieved. Those interviewed believed that they reduced violence and the 

flow of weapons and munitions into Baghdad. Yet, attacks continued to 

occur in Baghdad, though at a greatly diminished rate. Moreover, it is 

difficult to separate and isolate the effects of the operations in Baghdad 

from the operations in the Baghdad Belts. Nor is it possible to determine 

how much of the reduction in violence and the flow of supplies was the 

result of the Awakening movement and the corresponding reduction in the 

number of Sunnis who provided support to the Sunni insurgency.

This is not necessarily a major concern. The employment of population 

and resource control measures by US units early in the campaign was often 

done in isolation. It was therefore easier to assess their effects. Yet, this 

isolation also meant that any success that was achieved was necessarily 

limited and did not produce lasting operational and strategic effects. This 

problem was recognized at MNC-I.

Senior members of the MNC-I staff wrote in the summer of 2007 that 

“population control, however, cannot be solely focused on actions at the 

tactical level that center on restricting movement or acquiring data on the 

population. Strategic and operational-level leaders must plan, coordinate, 

and execute activities that set the conditions for success at the tactical 

level.”231 This analysis facilitated the synchronization and coordination 

of population and resource control measures throughout the theater and 

therefore they produced more significant effects over a longer period of 

time. It could be said that the whole effect was greater than the sum of the 

individual effects.
226

Analysis

It is clear that the employment of population and resource control 

measures by US forces evolved significantly during the campaign. Early 

efforts to do so were sometimes ineffective and almost always isolated 

in time and space. As the nature of the conflict changed, so did the 

employment of population and resource control measures. Units began 

to employ them comprehensively, aligning the purpose of the measures 

with the units’ objectives. Moreover, at an operational level the measures 

were synchronized across the battlespace so that unit operations would 

mutually reinforce one another.

Protection and Isolation of the Population

It is perhaps on this count in which US units’ employment of population 

and resource control measures evolved the most. Many of the early 

examples discussed above were not used to protect the population; rather, 

their focus was on increasing the protection of US forces. Although 

they sometimes also resulted in improved security for the population, as 

happened during ORANGE CRUSH in Tikrit, this effect was ancillary and 

transient in nature.

Some of the measures employed did isolate the population, as in 

the case of the town of Albu Hishma but they did not do so from the 

insurgency itself. Little analysis was done regarding where the insurgency 

was receiving support from and whether or not such support was being 

willingly supplied by the population or supplied as a result of coercion. 

Moreover, because the measures did not produce increased security for 

the population, the isolation only served to anger them and potentially 

contributed to an increase in support for the insurgents in the area.

Beginning with Operation RESTORING RIGHTS in Tal Afar, US 

forces’ employment of population and resource control measures began 

to improve in this regard. The operations in Tal Afar were deliberately 

planned to remove bases of support from the control of Sunni insurgents 

and then permanently transfer that control to the GOI. This systematic 

isolation of the insurgency allowed 3ACR and its Iraqi partners to 

consistently improve the security of the population.

Furthermore, by isolating the city with berms and controlling movement 

into and around it with checkpoints, the US and Iraqi forces were able to 

assure the population that if the insurgents in their midst were removed 

they would no longer be able to intimidate or coerce them. Thus, the 

isolation and security provided by the population and resource control 

measures mutually supported one another and produced lasting effects.
227

A similar situation occurred in Ramadi. US forces synchronized their 

operations to target the bases of support for the insurgency both in and 

outside the city. As these were secured and brought under the control of 

US and Iraqi forces, it allowed them to continue to clear other parts of the 

city. Once residents of Ramadi realized that the Sunni insurgents could no 

longer execute their campaign of murder and intimidation, they supported 

the US effort by joining local Iraqi security forces in large numbers. Again, 

isolation and security reinforced one another.

The cycle of retaliatory violence between Sunni and Shi’a in Baghdad 

produced a situation where almost every person in the city had to side 

with extremists on one side or the other. As a result, the neutral population 

was reduced to an extremely low level and both the Sunni and Shi’a 

insurgencies were deeply embedded in the city. Moreover, because the 

insurgents and the population were so closely tied together, it was difficult 

for US forces to separate them. As one BCT commander recalled “we 

didn’t have a controlled environment. We didn’t know who was going in 

and was going out and who lived there. ... We knew that was a bad AQ 

spot. We also knew there were some good people in there who needed to 

be protected.”232 However, once the population and resource controls were 

employed, particularly the safe neighborhood program, they effectively 

isolated and secured the population from the insurgents that were attacking 

them. This meant that they could now renounce their alignment with the 

extremists within the neighborhood, facilitating the ability of US and Iraqi 

forces to target them.

Even if the population did not become openly supportive of US 

forces and the GOI, their neutrality reduced support for the insurgency. 

However, in many neighborhoods the population did openly support 

the counterinsurgent effort, if not necessarily the GOI, by joining the 

Awakening movement and becoming SOI. This enabled them to protect 

their own families and neighborhoods and produced an additional increase 

in the number of forces available, reinforcing the security and isolation of 

the population.

Baghdad involved isolation and security not only at a tactical level 

in individual neighborhoods but operationally as the actions of units 

in Baghdad itself and in the Belts were synchronized and mutually 

supporting. Units were deployed into areas that were known support 

bases for the insurgency and ordered to interdict the flow of weapons 

and munitions into Baghdad that supported the insurgency. Movement 

restrictions, curfews, terrain denial, and cordon and search operations 

were employed in combination and resulted in a major reduction in the 
228

amount of accelerants that reached Baghdad. This further improved the 

security of the population in Baghdad and isolated those living in the Belts 

from the insurgency.

Legitimacy

The belief that US forces represented an anti-body in the Iraqi state and 

would inflame the insurgency probably also contributed to a reluctance to 

employ population and resource control measures because of a fear about 

their legitimacy. If US forces employed population and resource control 

measures it might reinforce the view of the population that they were 

occupiers and not liberators. Moreover, the confusing nature of the civil 

law control mechanism denied US commanders a clear understanding 

of what they could and could not do to control violence in their areas. 

Therefore, actions that might be perfectly legitimate in terms of providing 

security to the population may not have been strictly legal.

The US and the administration should never have been concerned 

about appearing to be occupiers. Not because it wasn’t a valid concern, 

but because occupation is a question of fact. After having invaded Iraq, 

deposed the Saddam regime, established a security presence in most major 

cities, and dissolved all elements of the state that could be used to control 

the population, the US and its allies were occupiers. It was at that point 

more important to implement measures to maintain control than it was to 

worry about how such actions would be perceived.

Recall that many Iraqis were incredulous that the US had disbanded all 

elements of the state control apparatus and then failed to fill the void thus 

created. The gap between the existing capability of the fledging Iraqi state 

and its security forces to exert control and the capability it required was 

vast, and remained so for many years. Odierno proposed to fill that gap 

with US forces in late 2006 and 2007 in order to provide space for the GOI 

to develop its own capability.233

Moreover, by failing to exert control the US allowed the situation to 

get so bad that it led to a civil war, particularly in Baghdad. A senior 

civilian with MNC-I stated that “it started as soon as 2003. As soon as 

the regime fell and security forces dissolved, people were forming their 

own neighborhood groups.”234 Then when the US did finally start to assert 

control in order to end the civil war it was “almost a conceit in a way 

because we created these problems. They have a civil war and then we 

come in as if we’d never been there and the past had nothing to do with 

us.”235
229

The anti-body theory was also thoroughly disproved in many areas of 

the country. While it is true that some Shi’a insurgents solely targeted 

US forces, they facilitated such targeting by coercing and intimidating 

the population. Thus, even if the outward effects of violence were only 

observable as attacks on US forces, there remained an underlying issue of 

security. This denied the population the ability to be neutral, they had to 

support the insurgents or they would be intimidated or killed.

It is also probably the case that the US would not have been able to 

legitimately execute the safe neighborhood program early during the 

campaign. However, other measures should have been used to maintain 

control and prevent the widespread lawlessness and insecurity that was 

prevalent in Iraq. This would best have been done in combination with 

Iraqi forces, but, as they were dissolved in the wake of the invasion, none 

were available until much later in the campaign.

This last point is probably the most important regarding legitimacy. 

Although US units did unilaterally employ restrictive population and 

resource control measures that were viewed legitimately by the Iraqi 

populace, they were most effective when done in partnership with local 

forces. This is especially true of local police. Areas, such as Ramadi 

and many neighborhoods of Baghdad, where US units employed such 

restrictive measures and then formed local security forces to become 

police witnessed a much greater decrease in violence than where US forces 

employed them unilaterally or even in combination with the Iraqi Army.

Facilitate the Targeting of the

Armed and Subversive Element

It is difficult to assess just how well the employment of population 

and resource control measures supported the targeting of the armed 

and subversive element of the insurgency. The commanders that were 

interviewed could not provide the level of detail necessary to make any 

such analysis valid. A precise analysis will have to await the declassification 

of US operational reports in the coming years. Moreover, many upper 

level Sunni and Shi’a insurgents were targeted by US and Iraqi special 

operations forces, and how control measures supported their targeting may 

never fully be known.

It does appear, anecdotally, that such measures supported targeting of 

the insurgency to some extent. Commanders recalled that they were able 

to arrest suspected members of the insurgency in their areas during the 

implementation of population and resource control measures. Census 
230

operations provided greater information on who actually lived in the area 

and gave units pictures of the population in the area. After some controls 

were applied and security improved, units received additional intelligence 

from the population. Thus, population and resource control measures may 

have improved the ability of US forces to target members of the insurgency, 

but how much so is not clear.

However, these measures were effective at targeting the insurgents’ bases 

of support. In Tal Afar, Ramadi, the Baghdad Belts, and Baghdad itself, 

the US deliberately applied combat power and population and resource 

control measures to assert control over such areas and deny the insurgency 

the ability to use them. Additionally, the US applied the control measures 

systematically to the insurgents’ LOCs. Such actions forced the insurgents 

to either locate a different support base and LOC or, once the controls were 

synchronized across the battlespace, openly fight US and Iraqi forces to 

control them.

Targeting insurgent bases of support and LOCs was effective not only 

because it denied the insurgency free access to specific areas, but also 

because the insurgency was road bound.236 The vast expanses of desert 

and minimal numbers of roads through them created a situation where 

insurgents had to utilize the road networks to transport weapons, materiel, 

and fighters. Furthermore, even in areas where they might have walked, 

such as Baghdad, they could not if they wanted to conduct the dramatic 

attacks that had become the norm, which required large explosive devices 

weighing hundreds of pounds.

When US forces employed measures that denied insurgents the use of 

vehicles it sometimes reduced violence dramatically, even if the attacks 

did not need to be conducted by vehicle. One BCT commander recalled 

that “we put in a series of barriers ... just Jersey barriers [about 3 feet high], 

and we cut the murder rate in there in one week by 50 percent because 

the death squads couldn’t come in.”237 Thus, even if the population and 

resource control measures did not facilitate targeting individual members 

of the insurgency, they did enable US forces to target the support structure 

of the insurgency and limit the number and type of attacks the groups 

could conduct.

The effectiveness of the population and resource control measures at 

targeting the insurgency has had one significant unintended consequence, 

however. US officers that served in Baghdad in 2010 reported that 

Iraqi forces were reluctant to remove the controls for fear of being held 

accountable if an attack subsequently occurred.238 The security forces have 
231

become reliant on the population and resource control measures to provide 

security. A US Army company commander observed that “if you are going 

to take the t-walls down that means you really have to have a connection 

to the people.”239 How long the Iraqi populace is willing to tolerate such 

invasive control measures and how well the GOI and its security forces 

will respond when they are forced to remove them remains to be seen.

Population and resource control measures were not the answer to the 

challenges that the US and GOI confronted in Iraq. However, they did form 

a critical part of the campaign, especially during late 2005 and after once 

they were employed in a deliberate and synchronized manner across the 

battlespace. They helped to protect the population, isolate the insurgency, 

and target the insurgents’ bases of support. Moreover, by enabling the US 

and GOI to finally exert control over the population and provide them the 

security they desired, they were viewed legitimately by the population.
232

Notes

1. Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degan, and David Tohn, On Point, The United 

States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat 

Studies Institute Press, 2004), 86.

2. Ibid., 88-89.

3. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II (New York: Pantheon 

Books, 2006), 50.

4. Ibid., 50.

5. Fontenot, Degan, and Tohn, On Point, 94.

6. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 4.

7. Ibid., 4.

8. Fontenot, Degan, and Tohn, On Point, 102.

9. Ibid., 102.

10. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 62.

11. Fontenot, Degan, and Tohn, On Point, 209.

12. Ibid., 210-218.

13. Ibid., 217.

14. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 68.

15. Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 

2008), 374.

16. Fontenot, Degan, and Tohn, On Point, 336.

17. Ibid., 339.

18. Feith, War and Decision, 349-50.

19. Ibid., 422-25.

20. Ibid., 379-81.

21. Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the 

New Campaign (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 

90.

22. Bing West, The Strongest Tribe (New York: Random House, 2009), 5.

23. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 26.

24. Ibid., 27.

25. The insurgency in Iraq is not, and never has been, a single, well-defined 

insurgency. Multiple insurgent groups with diverse objectives have formed, 

fought, disbanded, re-formed, and changed names and objectives during the 

campaign. Throughout this paper the author will attempt to identify the specific 

insurgent group being referred to, however a certain amount of generalization will 
233

be necessary. If the term “insurgency” is used without any modifiers or descriptors 

it is used to refer generically to the violent campaign conducted by the multiple 

groups against US/Coalition forces and the Government of Iraq.

26. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 289.

27. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 101-103.

28. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 36.

29. At the time of the invasion, this area of Baghdad was called Saddam 

City. However, after the regime fell it was renamed in honor of a Shi’a Grand 

Ayatollah, Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr, who was assassinated in Najaf in 1999 with 

two of his sons. One of Muhammed Sadiq’s other sons, Muqtada al Sadr, would 

eventually become a major leader of the Shi’a insurgency in Iraq. See Wright and 

Reese, On Point II, 34-35.

30. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 290-291.

31. This is generally referred to as the First Battle of Fallujah. For more 

information about Fallujah, see West, The Strongest Tribe, 29-36. The city 

was eventually brought under coalition control following the Second Battle of 

Fallujah, Operation AL FAJR, in November 2004. These two actions profoundly 

affected Sunni perceptions regarding the coalition. See Malkasian, “The Role of 

Perceptions and Political Reform in Counterinsurgency.”

32. This paper will not examine in depth the divisions within Iraqi society. 

Broadly, two major divisions exist: an ethnic division between Arabs and Kurds 

(and other minority populations such as the Turkomans), and a sectarian division 

between Sunni Muslims (which include Sunni Arabs and the majority of the 

Kurdish population) and Shi’a Muslims. The Arabs form the ethnic majority and 

the Shi’a Muslims are the sectarian majority. These divisions produce three major 

population groups around which the narrative of the insurgency in Iraq can be 

constructed with reasonable accuracy: Sunni Arabs, Shi’a Arabs, and the Kurds.

33. The Mahdi is a central figure in Twelver Shi’a ideology, which is prevalent 

in Iraq. Twelver Shi’as believe that the 12th Imam of the Muslim faith disappeared 

and that his return would herald the coming of the Mahdi. The Mahdi is a divine 

redeemer who will rid the world of evil upon his return. See Karen Armstrong, 

A History of God (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), 160-162. This book also 

provides good information on the origin of the schism in Islam between Sunni and 

Shi’a and how it has evolved over time.

34. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 39.

35. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 294.

36. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 41.

37. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 294.

38. West, The Strongest Tribe, 79.

39. Author’s personal experience serving in 2BCT, 3ID in eastern Baghdad 

in 2005.
234

40. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 298-299.

41. Ibid., 301.

42. Malkasian, “The Role of Perceptions and Political Reform in 

Counterinsurgency,” 385-86.

43. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 301.

44. Ibid., 301.

45. The Ministry of Defense did make an effort to recruit more Sunnis into 

the Army in 2005, but this measure was largely unsuccessful. The previous 

incarnations of the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and the Iraqi National 

Guard, had been recruited to serve in their home areas which would have allowed 

Sunnis to protect Sunni areas and Shi’a to protect Shi’a areas.

46. The Golden Mosque is an important site in Twelver Shi’a ideology. It is 

the place where the 12th Imam is believed to have been taken into hiding by Allah 

and many believe it is also the place where he will reappear. Additionally, the site 

is the burial place of the 10th and 11th imams.

47. BH020, BCT Commander, Interview by Mark Battjes, Ben Boardman, 

Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, Dustin Mitchell, Nathan 

Springer, and Thomas Walton, 21 March 2011,Washington, DC.

48. Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009), 33.

49. The name, composition, and purpose of these paramilitary police units 

have changed a number of times during the campaign. In their initial iteration 

they consisted of Public Order Battalions, which mostly executed static security 

operations, and Police Commando units, which conducted raids against suspected 

terrorists. These organizations were later disbanded and combined into Iraqi 

National Police units which were organized similarly to Iraqi Army infantry 

battalions, but not as heavily armed. Presently, such units are called Iraqi Federal 

Police.

50. The term “off ramped” is used by US planners to indicate that a unit will 

no longer deploy according to its original timeline.

51. BA020, Battalion Commander, Interview by Mark Battjes and Benjamin 

Boardman, 23 February 2011, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

52. BB010, Battalion Commander, Interview by Mark Battjes and Nathan 

Springer, 2 March 2011, Fort Bliss, TX.

53. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 304.

54. West, The Strongest Tribe, 79. Also see Ricks, The Gamble, 49-50.

55. BA020 and BB010. 

56. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 304.

57. There has been some disagreement within the US military about whether 

or not the new strategy represented a real change in the mission of US forces. See 
235

Ricks, The Gamble, 217-219. In an interview conducted by the author, a former 

member of the Army staff recalled that “particularly under GEN Casey the focus 

was on transition.” He also noted that “if you look at GEN Casey’s strategic 

assessment in the winter of 2006 it says that the strategy has failed to achieve 

its objectives under the security, development, economic and political lines of 

operation.” One of the key objectives under the security line of operation was 

the protection of the population. BH030, Iraq Veterans Panel, Interview by Mark 

Battjes, Robert Green, Aaron Kaufman, and Dustin Mitchell, 22 March 2011, 

Washington, DC.

58. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 304.

59. Ricks, The Gamble, 248-249.

60. Ricks has reproduced an MNF-I chart that shows the number of security 

incidents per week in Iraq from January 2004 to October 2008. It is included on 

page 13 of the photographic insert in The Gamble.

61. BH040, Afghanistan Veterans Panel, Interview by Richard Johnson, Aaron 

Kaufman, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 24 March 2011, Washington, 

DC. Also see West, The Strongest Tribe, 101-02.

62. BH040. Also see Neil Smith and Sean McFarland, “Anbar Awakens: The 

Tipping Point,” Military Review (March-April 2008): 49.

63. Interview BA020.

64. Dale Kuehl, “Testing Galula in Ameriyah, The People are the Key,” 

Military Review (March-April 2009): 76.

65. BA090, Brigade Commander, Interview by Mark Battjes and Benjamin 

Boardman, 24 February 2011, Fort Riley, KS. BG090, Battalion Commander, 

Interview by Mark Battjes and Nathan Springer, 16 March 2011, Fort Stewart, 

GA.

66. BE060, Brigade Commander, Interview by Mark Battjes and Thomas 

Walton, 9 March 2011, Fort Irwin, CA.

67. West, The Strongest Tribe, 319.

68. United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, “Operation TELIC Lessons 

Learned Compendium,” http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/F0282A90-99E5-

415E-B3BC-97EAD7D7873A/0/operation_telic_lessons_compendium.pdf 

(accessed 1 May 2011), 9.

69. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 306.

70. UK MOD, “Operation TELIC Lessons Learned,” 9.

71. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 307.

72. West, The Strongest Tribe, 351.

73. UK MOD, “Operation TELIC Lessons Learned,” 9.

74. Author’s personal experience while serving as a company commander in 

Baghdad during 2007-2008.
236

75. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 309.

76. BG020, Brigade Commander, Interview by Mark Battjes and Thomas 

Walton, 14 March 2011, Fort Stewart, GA.

77. One of the US BCTs that was withdrawn from Iraq in December 2011 

was reassigned to Kuwait under the control of US Army Central Command 

(ARCENT). 

78. This section will describe the body of civil law that governed Iraq during 

the campaign. It will mention the broad authorities of and the limitations that were 

imposed on the security forces within Iraq. It will demonstrate how unclear the 

overlapping provisions were and this will contribute to the later analysis of the 

effectiveness of the employment of population and resource control measures. 

Despite the lack of clarity, US forces, as will be shown, employed population and 

resource control measures throughout the campaign.

79. Department of the Army, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare

(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1956), A-90–A-91.

80. Ibid., A-91.

81. Ibid., A-91.

82. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 469.

83. Ibid., 465-466.

84. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 91.

85. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 469-470.

86. United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1483,” 22 May 2003 http://

www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions03.html (accessed 1 May 2011), 2.

87. Ibid., 2.

88. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 26.

89. Coalition Provisional Authority, “Order No. 1, De’Ba’athification of Iraqi 

Society,” in Wright and Reese, On Point II, 593-594.

90. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 26.

91. Coalition Provisional Authority, “Order No. 2, “Dissolution of Entities,” 

in Wright and Reese, On Point II, 598.

92. West, The Strongest Tribe, 7.

93. Quoted in Wright and Reese, On Point II, 96.

94. Coalition Provisional Authority, “Regulation No. 1,” 16 May 2003, http://

www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAREG_1_The_Coalition_

Provisional_Authority_.pdf (accessed 1 May 2011), 1.

95. Coalition Provisional Authority, “Order No. 7,” 9 June 2003, http://www.

iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030610_CPAORD_7_Penal_Code.pdf (accessed 

May 1, 2011), 1.
237

96. Coalition Provisional Authority, “Order No. 3, (Revised) (Amended),” 

31 December 2003, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031231_

CPAORD3_REV__AMD_.pdf (accessed 1 May 2011), 3.

97. Ibid., 4.

98. Ibid., 4.

99. United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1511,” 16 October 2003 

http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions03.html (accessed 1 May 2011), 2.

100. Ibid., 3.

101. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 37.

102. United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1546,” 8 June 2004 http://

www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions04.html (accessed 1 May 2011), 1.

103. Ibid., 4.

104. Iraqi Governing Council, “Transitional Administrative Law,” 8 March 

2004 http://www.constitution.org/cons/iraq/TAL.html (accessed 1 May 2011), 

Article 26. 

105. Ibid., Article 5.

106. Ibid., Article 15(B).

107. Ibid., Article 13(D).

108. Ibid., Article 59(B).

109. BB030, Brigade Commander, Interview by Mark Battjes and Nathan 

Springer, 3 March 2011, Fort Bliss, TX.

110. Transitional National Assembly, “Iraqi Constitution,” retrieved from 

http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf (accessed 1 May 2011), 

Article 9(A).

111. Ibid., Article 17.

112. Ibid., Article 42.

113. Ibid., Article 58(9)(A).

114. Ibid., Article 58(9)(C).

115. United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1637,” 8 November 2005 

http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions05.htm (accessed 1 May 2011), 3.

116. United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1723,” 28 November 

2006 http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions06.htm (accessed 1 May 2011), 

3.

117. United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1790,” 18 December 2007 

http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions07.htm (accessed 1 May 2011), 4.

118. Ibid., 3-4.
238

119. West, The Strongest Tribe, 10.

120. BH030.

121. Ibid.

122. West, The Strongest Tribe, 20.

123. BH030.

124. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 113.

125. BH030.

126. Ricks, The Gamble, 12.

127. BA070, Battery Commander, Interview by Richard Johnson and Thomas 

Walton, 24 February 2011, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

128. Ibid.

129. BD010, Field Grade Officer, Interview by Benjamin Boardman and 

Dustin Mitchell, 14 March 2011, Fort Knox, KY.

130. Ibid.

131. Dividing the Iraq campaign is decidedly difficult. Even determining 

when the surge began is difficult because of the phased nature of the deployment 

of surge forces. However, the Baghdad Security Plan provides a clear dividing 

line. It is implemented after President Bush has announced the surge and Generals 

Petraeus and Odierno have taken command and therefore the period after it clearly 

includes the change to US strategy and force posture.

132. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 28.

133. Author’s personal experience serving as a battalion staff officer in 2003.

134. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 469-470.

135. Nathan Sassaman with Joe Layden, Warrior King (New York: St. 

Martin’s Press, 2008), 183.

136. Ibid., 183.

137. Ibid., 184.

138. Ibid., 184.

139. West, The Strongest Tribe, 23.

140. BD010.

141. Ibid.

142. At the time of the invasion and the period immediately following it, 

most Iraqi taxi cabs were orange and white. Later in the campaign, just about any 

Iraqi car could potentially serve as a taxi.

143. BC020, Brigade Commander, Interview by Robert Green and Aaron 

Kaufman, 2 March 2011, Fort Bragg, NC.
239

144. BH030. 

145. BC020.

146. BH030.

147. BB030.

148. Ibid.

149. Ibid.

150. Ibid.

151. Ibid.

152. Unless otherwise noted the accounts in this section are based on the 

author’s personal experience serving in Baghdad during 2005 as a BCT planner 

and later a battalion Assistant Operations Officer.

153. EFPs are also referred to as Explosively Formed Projectiles. However, 

the term penetrator is more accurate as the purpose of the metal slug formed by 

the explosive is to penetrate armor.

154. At the time, I recall that this idea seemed particularly ill conceived. 

However, the Baghdad Security Plan and accompanying operations in the areas 

surrounding Baghdad did almost exactly that.

155. BD020, Commander, Interview by Benjamin Boardman and Dustin 

Mitchell, 14 March 2011, Fort Knox, KY.

156. Route Brewers runs generally NW to SE in the eastern half of Baghdad. 

It terminates next to the then American Forward Operating Base Rustamiyah and 

connects to the Main Supply Route across the river from west Baghdad. Therefore, 

it had a high volume of combat logistics patrols along it which provided a large 

number of targets for EFPs.

157. The proliferation of trash was an especially difficult problem. The city 

government of Baghdad was not yet capable of consistently picking up trash in 

every neighborhood so Baghdadis would dispose of their trash along the sides of 

the roads. RTE Brewers was a favored spot to do so.

158. Jay B. Baker, “Tal Afar 2005: Laying the Counterinsurgency 

Framework,” Army (June 2009): 62.

159. BH070, Iraqi Mayor, Interview by Mark Battjes and Robert Green, 25 

March 2011, Washington, DC.

160. West, The Strongest Tribe, 84.

161. BH070.

162. Ibid.

163. Chris Gibson, “Battlefield Victories and Strategic Success: The Path 

Forward in Iraq,” Military Review (September-October 2006): 48.
240

164. Ibid., 50.

165. BH070.

166. I Marine Expeditionary Force, “State of the Insurgency in al-Anbar,” 17 

August 2006, reprinted in Ricks, The Gamble, A-1.

167. BA020.

168. BA010, Brigade Commander, Interview by Richard Johnson and 

Thomas Walton, 22 February 2011, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

169. Ibid.

170. BA020.

171. BA010.

172. Ibid.

173. Ibid.

174. Ibid.

175. BA020.

176. Some Iraqi commentators have noted that while Sunnis in Anbar did 

ally with the Americans, it was the ability of their men to join the security forces 

that really created the feeling of safety and security within the population. It is 

likely that, as in many other instances discussed in this paper, the two actions were 

mutually reinforcing. See Najim Abed al-Jabouri and Sterling Jensen, “The Iraqi 

and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” Prism 2, no. 1 (2010): 11.

177. BH030.

178. Ibid.

179. The Baghdad Belts are the generally rural areas that surround the city 

itself. The US had failed to control them for most of the campaign and they had 

become prime support areas for the city itself. A captured AQI document indicated 

that the belts were a critical part of the supply lines for Baghdad.

180. BH030.

181. Multi-national Corps Iraq, “MNC-I Inbrief GEN Petraeus,” 8 February 

2007, reprinted in Ricks, The Gamble, C-13.

182. West, The Strongest Tribe, 327.

183. MNC-I, “MNC-I Inbrief,” C16.

184. A Qada is an administrative area in Iraq that is roughly analogous to a 

U.S. county.

185. BA040, Brigade Commander, Interview by Aaron Kaufman and Dustin 

Mitchell, 23 February 2011, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

186. Ibid.
241

187. Ibid.

188. Ibid.

189. Ibid.

190. Ibid.

191. BE060, Brigade Commander, Interview by Mark Battjes and Thomas 

Walton, 9 March 2011, Fort Irwin, CA.

192. Ibid.

193. A “Tier 1 hotspot” refers to a location that has been historically used by 

the insurgency to conduct attacks, in this case IED attacks. It is called a “hotspot” 

because when groups of attacks are analyzed and differentiated by various color 

shades on a map, those areas with the highest concentration of attacks appear to 

be hot – i.e. red. A Tier 1 hotspot is an area with an extremely high concentration 

of attacks. 

194. BA070.

195. BE060.

196. Ibid.

197. Ibid.

198. The BATS and HIIDE are two complementary pieces of equipment used 

by U.S. forces to collect biometric data. The centerpiece of the BATS is a laptop 

that can be used to upload and link biometric data to a centralized served. It can 

also be used to enter biometric data and print out identification cards based on the 

data entered. The HIIDEs is a device that can be carried by an individual soldier 

and is capable of uploading fingerprints, iris scans, and facial recognition pictures 

of individuals. The process of enrolling people in the system is commonly referred 

to by U.S. forces as “BATS/HIIDESing” or another variation.

199. BA070.

200. Ibid.

201. Ibid.

202. BE080, Battalion Commander, Interview by Robert Green and Aaron 

Kaufman, 7 March 2011, Fort Irwin, CA.

203. BH020

204. BH030.

205. BD010.

206. Ibid.

207. BH020.

208. BA090.
242

209. Joseph F. Fil, quoted in Kimberly Kagan, “Enforcing the Law: The 

Baghdad Security Plan Begins,” Iraq Report (10 February-5 March 2007): 3.

210. Kagan, “Enforcing the Law: The Baghdad Security Plan Begins,” 4.

211. Joseph Anderson and Gary Volesky, “A Synchronized Approach to 

Population Control,” Military Review (July-August 2007): 145. 

212. Defining what constituted a single neighborhood proved to be a 

challenge as the views of US forces, Iraqi forces, the GOI, and the Iraqi populace 

that actually lived in an area about what was a single neighborhood did not always 

correspond.

213. BH020.

214. Ibid.

215. BG090.

216. BB010. Also BG090.

217. BA090.

218. BB010.

219. BH020.

220. BA090.

221. BF020, Civilian Advisor to MNF-I, Interview by Richard Johnson and 

Aaron Kaufman, 11 March 2011, Boston, MA.

222. BG030, Troop Commander, Interview by Mark Battjes, Nathan Springer, 

and Thomas Walton, 14 March 2011, Fort Stewart, GA.

223. Author’s personal experience as a company commander serving in 

Baghdad in 2007-2008.

224. BD010.

225. BH020.

226. BA090.

227. Ibid.

228. Ibid.

229. Ibid.

230. Author’s personal experience as a company commander serving in 

Baghdad in 2007-2008.

231. Anderson and Volesky, “A Synchronized Approach to Population 

Control,” 146.

232. BH020.

233. MNC-I, “MNC-I Inbrief,” C-2.

234. BF020.
243

235. Ibid.

236. West, The Strongest Tribe, 53. West asserts that the Iraqi insurgency 

was the world’s first “vehicle-based guerrilla movement.” Whether this statement 

is historically accurate is debatable, but it does illustrate the point that the Iraqi 

insurgency, both Sunni and Shi’a, was extremely reliant on the use of roads.

237. BH020.

238. BG010, Battalion Commander, Interview by Nathan Springer, 14 March 

2011, Fort Stewart, GA.

239. BG030.

245

Chapter 7

Conclusions and Recommendations

The next and perhaps overlapping step in mobilizing the masses must 

be to give the population the security it needs to escape reprisals by the 

revolutionaries. This security affords to the population the opportunity 

to choose other alternatives besides that of supporting the revolutionary 

cause. The security must be apparent, effective, and stable so that the 

people recognize its existence, can depend on it, and will be confident of 

the future. 

―John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War

Conclusions

This study examined the employment of population and resource control 

measures by counterinsurgent forces during three unique conflicts and 

some conclusions can be drawn from this examination. However, before 

any conclusions are discussed, a note of caution is in order. Population and 

resource control measures are not a panacea for addressing the problems 

caused by an insurgency. They should form a part of the solution and 

are a valuable tool for counterinsurgents but they should not be relied 

upon in all circumstances. Moreover, while almost every instance of 

their employment produced short-term tactical success, it is only when 

employed appropriately as part of a holistic control mechanism that they 

are able to facilitate long-term operational success.

Some such measures are harsh and invasive and should be employed 

only when, and for as long as, is absolutely necessary. When the existence 

and nature of the state is at stake, however, government leaders should not 

hesitate to employ them. It should also be recognized that some population 

and resource control measures are a part of the control mechanism which 

modern states use to protect their populations and secure them from 

violent actors day in and day out. Identification cards, address lists, and 

restrictions on firearms and munitions are all features of liberal democratic 

states. The more effectively these measures are employed before a crisis 

begins, the less likely it is that the harsher and more restrictive measures 

will be necessary.

Evaluating the Framework

The second chapter posited a framework for population and resource 

control measure regimes composed of six critical components. Those 

critical components are: legitimacy, enforcement provisions, protection of 
246

the population, isolation of the population, a focus on behavior, and the 

destruction of the armed and subversive elements. The employment of 

population and resource control measures in the case studies reveals that 

this framework is valid. However, it also revealed that the framework is 

incomplete and needs to be adjusted.

Protection and Isolation are Most Important

The first adjustment is that protection and isolation of the population 

must be emphasized as the most important components of any population 

and resource control measure regime. Observations in each of the case 

studies reveal that if the population is not protected from insurgent violence 

and subsequently isolated from the insurgency, then all other components 

of the framework will fail. This is, perhaps, intuitive. However, it was not 

always obvious to the practitioners involved in the conflicts.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the measures employed in the Philippines, 

especially reconcentration, were consistently able to protect and isolate the 

population from the insurgency. As a result, the counterinsurgent forces, 

whether US Army or Philippines Constabulary, were able to control the 

behavior of the population and deny further support to the insurgency. 

Moreover, it facilitated their targeting of the insurgent armed forces and 

they were able to restore control of violence to the state quickly.

In Vietnam, during both the Diem regime and the US ground force 

intervention, the counterinsurgent forces were never able to consistently 

protect, isolate, or control the population. Where they were able to do 

so, the population and resource control measures were effective. Once 

Viet Cong forces were again able to contact and threaten the population, 

however, the regime broke down. The Front and Party recognized this 

and responded to Government of Vietnam success in pacification with 

renewed offensives. A South Vietnamese brigadier general recalled after 

the war that “the most discernible pattern in pacification was that progress 

depended entirely on security ... This pointed to another significant pattern: 

a major enemy spoiling action could always be expected when pacification 

seemed to attain a reasonable degree of success.”1

In Iraq, as was shown in Chapter 6, the employment of population and 

resource control measures by US forces early in the campaign was often 

limited and not directed at protecting and isolating the population. Thus, 

the measures produced some tactical success, such as those in Tikrit and 

Haqlaniyah, but never achieved lasting effects in terms of countering 

the insurgency. However, as the campaign evolved, US forces improved 

their employment of such measures and directed them towards protecting 
247

and isolating the population. Where this was done in Al Qaim, Tal Afar, 

Ramadi, and Baghdad, it achieved not only tactical success but more 

enduring operational success.2

Control Mechanism

Another adjustment that must be made is an explicit recognition that 

the population and resource control measures must be employed within 

a holistic control mechanism. While components of the framework, 

notably legal enforcement by counterinsurgent forces, might lead to 

this conclusion, it is important enough that it should be explicitly stated. 

This control mechanism may take the form of a body of laws, as in the 

Philippines and Iraq, or it may be a comprehensive counterinsurgency 

strategy such as the Strategic Hamlet Program or Pacification.

The control mechanism identifies to all of the actors in the campaign–

the insurgents, the counterinsurgents, and the population–what measures 

will be employed, how they will be enforced, and what legal sanctions 

will accompany violations. This leads to clear enforcement powers for the 

counterinsurgent forces, which improves their ability to employ them. In 

the Philippines, US Army and Constabulary forces were never burdened 

by trying to separate ordinary criminals from true insurgents. The 

control mechanisms, first military law and then civil law, simply defined 

certain actions as criminal with a low burden of proof, and this gave the 

counterinsurgents the ability to detain and punish any who violated them, 

insurgent or not.

This was not the case for US forces in Vietnam or Iraq. As there was 

no clear ability for these forces to legally enforce population and control 

measures, it constantly put young Soldiers and Marines in a position where 

they had to differentiate between an insurgent, who could be detained, or 

a simple violator, who might be questioned but could not be detained. 

This led to extremely negative situations. Just one example is the conduct 

of Soldiers in Lieutenant Colonel Sassaman’s battalion in Iraq who 

temporarily detained two Iraqi men for violating curfew and then forced 

them to jump off a bridge into a river.3

The control mechanism also provides the population the ability to deny 

insurgent demands for support on the basis that they will be imprisoned or 

otherwise sanctioned. While this may or may not prevent the insurgents 

from coercing the population, it does make it more difficult. This was 

especially true in the Philippines but it was also true in Vietnam. Party 

leaders directed their cadres to “ensure a legal standing for the masses.”4
248

Cadres who had required the population to tear up their identification 

cards were thoroughly admonished.5 In Iraq, vehicle registration enabled 

the population to deny insurgents the use of their vehicles.6

Moreover, the control mechanism synchronizes the efforts of all of the 

counterinsurgent forces across the theater. This synchronization ensures 

that when population and control measures are employed that they are 

mutually supporting. Bell’s employment of such measures would have 

been far less effective if Malvar and his guerrillas could have received 

support from other communities outside of Batangas province. However, 

because the US Army was in control of these areas and operating under 

the same control mechanism as Bell’s forces, it would have been simple to 

extend the employment of such measures to other communities and further 

Malvar’s isolation.

In Vietnam, US operations were intended to support pacification by 

defeating the threat presented by People’s Army of Vietnam and VC 

main force units. They were therefore somewhat synchronized with the 

pacification control mechanism. Unfortunately, the movement of US and 

ARVN forces around the battlefield to confront the PAVN and VC main 

forces exposed the weakness of the security forces assigned to hold areas 

undergoing pacification. The Vietnamese brigadier general recalled that:

The great number of military forces employed in support of pacification 

never seemed to keep up with the requirements occasioned by the 

necessity to deploy a permanent occupation force to every hamlet. The 

situation was such that when protection forces were deployed from a 

certain area considered ‘secure,’ that area might relapse into insecurity 

and the local population would lose confidence in the GVN.7

Only after the PAVN and VC main forces had been forced out of South 

Vietnam in the aftermath of the 1968 Offensive, 1969 Tet Offensive, and 

the invasion of Cambodia would this problem be rectified.

The US campaign in Iraq decidedly suffered from a lack of synchronization 

through 2006. Individual units employed population and resource control 

measures but these only achieved short-term tactical success against 

the insurgency in their area. They had no effect, and possibly even a 

negative effect, on the insurgency beyond their boundaries. Only later 

in the campaign when such measures were synchronized and mutually 

supportive did their employment facilitate long-term operational success 

against the insurgency across the battlespace.
249

Targeting the Armed and Subversive Element

The case studies also demonstrate that a population and resource control 

measure regime is most effective when all components support the targeting 

of the armed and subversive element of the insurgency. This could be taken 

to mean that the regime should target only the insurgents themselves. 

However, the case studies indicate that targeting the insurgency’s support 

bases and lines of communication is also effective.

In Batangas province, Bell did this by simply removing all possible 

means of support from the insurgency through reconcentration. Malvar’s 

guerrillas had no other available means of supply and so were denied the 

ability to continue operating. In Vietnam, US ground forces consistently 

used terrain denial and terrain transformation operations. Unfortunately, 

these were not PAVN’s and the VC’s only bases of support in the area so 

targeting them was not decisive. Tal Afar, Ramadi, the Baghdad Belts, and 

Baghdad all demonstrate that removing bases of support and interdicting 

lines of communication can significantly weaken the insurgency.

It could be argued that such an approach will not work when there 

are significant bases of support external to the state. It is true that such 

a situation makes this approach more difficult but it does not mean that 

targeting bases of support and lines of communication within the state is 

worthless. There existed major bases of support for the Sunni insurgency 

outside of Iraq. Nonetheless, by removing internal supply bases from 

the control of the Sunni insurgency, MNC-I [Multi-National Corps-Iraq] 

severely degraded its ability to support operations, especially in Baghdad.8

It is also not certain how well such an approach could be applied to the 

war in Afghanistan. A member of the MNF-I [Multi-National Force-Iraq] 

staff during the surge commented that “we have never applied the same 

approach [Odierno’s targeting of bases of support with surge forces] at the 

operational level in Afghanistan.”9

 It could be argued, however, that recent 

coalition efforts in Afghanistan to regain control of Marja do represent a 

similar approach. What is clear is that the insurgency in Afghanistan, like 

that in Iraq, is not monolithic and therefore targeting bases of support and 

lines of communication can only be done with an accurate and thorough 

assessment of each threat group and its means, methods, and bases of 

supply.

Neutrality of the Population

Another adjustment to the framework concerns the ability of the 

population to be neutral. This is a minor adjustment but an important one. 
250

The original framework states that the counterinsurgent should employ 

population and resource control measures in order to prevent behavior that 

supports the insurgents and enable behavior that supports the government. 

However, such measures should also make it possible for the population 

to simply remain neutral.10

This is important because a neutral population is, in general, an 

advantage for the counterinsurgent. The counterinsurgent usually has 

greater capabilities and therefore the insurgent has to leverage the support 

of the population in order to challenge the government’s control. If the 

insurgent is unable to leverage the population, because they are protected 

and isolated from him, then he will remain at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the 

government. A population that is not forced to support either side is in 

essence supporting the government.

It should also be recognized that in preventing behavior that supports the 

insurgent, the government is actually coercing the population to remain 

neutral. In other words, if the population intends to support the insurgents, 

but the government’s population and resource control measures prevent 

them from doing so, their behavior is now neutral. If they do not contest this 

situation, they have acquiesced to the government’s control. Therefore, it 

is important for the government to both enable neutrality and to enforce it.

Temporary in Nature-Sliding Scale of Control

The final adjustment to the framework is to recognize that population 

and resource control measures represent a means for the government to 

increase and decrease its control over the population. That is to say, they do 

not have to be employed in an all or nothing fashion, but can be increased 

or decreased as the situation requires. Many of the measures discussed, 

such as identification cards, censuses, registration of vehicles, and control 

over the purchase and use of arms, ammunition, and other materials, 

can and should be employed by the government at all times. However, 

harsher measures, such as curfews, movement restrictions, barriers, and 

resettlement, must be used only as long as the situation requires them to 

be.

This allows the government and the counterinsurgent to increase its 

control from a baseline state in response to an insurgent threat and clearly 

inform the population of the reason for its actions. The government may 

not wish to set a deadline for removing the restrictions but should indicate 

that once the threat from the insurgency is over that they will be lifted. 

This contributes to the legitimacy of the measures and also indicates to 
251

the population that the counterinsurgent intends to return the situation to 

a relative state of normalcy as quickly as possible. The other reason to 

emphasize their temporary nature is to prevent the security forces from 

becoming reliant upon them.

In the Philippines, as shown in Chapter 3, the temporary nature of 

reconcentration was highlighted by the actions of Bell, Baker, and 

Bandholtz, all of whom ended the harsh measures of control as soon as 

they were no longer necessary. Emphasizing the temporary nature of the 

Strategic Hamlet Program may have helped Diem’s efforts against the VC, 

though how much so is not obvious. How the Iraqi populace will react 

if the most invasive measures used during that campaign are not lifted 

remains to be seen but the current uprisings across the Arab world indicate 

that they are unlikely to tolerate them for much longer.

Control

The case studies also lead to the conclusion that control, of territory 

and population, is of central importance to any counterinsurgency 

campaign. This seems to be intuitive and the theorists all made this point. 

However, there is often in contemporary writing on insurgency, an intense 

focus on winning the support of the population and a corresponding 

degradation of the importance of physical control over territory and 

population.11 Yet, physical control over territory and population can give 

the counterinsurgent a tremendous advantage as it denies the insurgents’ 

freedom of maneuver and facilitates the targeting of their bases of support 

and lines of communication.

 The other reason control is so important is because when it is lost, it 

is often very difficult to regain. The case studies illustrate this point very 

well. The US Army was unable to occupy and control southern Luzon 

during the early phase of its campaign in the Philippines. As a result, the 

insurgency became entrenched there, particularly in Batangas. Malvar’s 

forces were able to resist two years of persistent effort by the US Army 

and were only defeated after Bell imposed an exceptionally restrictive and 

coercive population and resource control regime. Later on under civilian 

control, insurgencies were defeated much more rapidly because the 

Constabulary was able to maintain persistent control over the archipelago.

Diem was severely disadvantaged compared to the Party, PAVN, and 

the VC because of the terms of the 1954 Geneva Agreement. He did not 

immediately have control over the instruments of state power and his 

government lacked a presence in many rural areas for a number of years.12
252

Thus, he was denied control over the country and the rural population. As 

a result he had constantly to engage in operations to regain and maintain 

that control over the coming years. All of his successors, and his US allies, 

faced the same challenge. Despite massive efforts during his regime and 

later, the GVN never really had full control over its territory and population 

and this hampered the war effort. Moreover, the VC and the Front realized 

how important such control was. A report by US researchers concluded that 

“the objective of the Viet Cong system in Dinh Tuong province, at least to 

the time when active field research on this study ended in November 1967, 

was to establish control over both territory and people.”13

In Iraq, the failure of the US and its partners to control the territory of 

Iraq in the wake of the invasion was nearly catastrophic. Although the 

insurgency built slowly over time, it was raging in many parts of Iraq 

by the spring of 2004. Operations to regain control, such as in Fallujah 

and Najaf, were costly in terms of casualties and legitimacy. Moreover, 

the need to control Baghdad ultimately required a massive influx of US 

manpower and the extension of US Army tours in Iraq to 15 months. 

A US Army battalion commander commented that:

If you really go back and look at the force requirements that were laid 

out initially, which was a half a million, we never would have lost 

control and by losing control because we had a smaller force and we 

tried to do it with the minimal force, similar to what we set off to do 

in Afghanistan. We probably would have saved ourselves a number of 

years and a number of lives.

His words are echoed by a British Army Battle Group commander who 

noted that “you get one shot at this [controlling territory and population] 

and if you get it wrong from the outset you must accept your own 

consequences and say ‘It will take me a long time to get it back.’”14

Recommendations

The conclusions above regarding the framework naturally lead into a set 

of recommendations. The first recommendation is that counterinsurgents 

use the framework outlined, with the modifications listed, to design 

population and resource control measure regimes when they are to be 

employed. This is not meant to be limiting in any way. The framework 

is sufficiently flexible that it can be applied in a variety of situations 

and allows for the use of almost any measure which may be legitimate 

and enforceable by the counterinsurgent forces. If such measures are 

to be employed, however, a thorough understanding of the threat, the 
253

environment, the population, and the society are required in order to make 

them successful.

The next recommendation concerns the concept of occupation and the 

role the military plays in it. There was a lot of concern within the US 

administration in the run up to the Iraq war that the invading coalition forces 

would be perceived as occupiers. This led to decisions concerning force 

structure and roles and responsibilities that exacerbated the insurgency 

which ultimately began. As already discussed, concerns about perception 

are ridiculous as occupation is a question of fact.

Moreover, occupation includes moral and legal obligations to protect the 

noncombatants within the occupied territory. In the immediate aftermath 

of an invasion these moral and legal obligations are the responsibility of 

the military. It is highly unlikely that the US or any of its allies will in the 

near future develop a paramilitary security force to serve in this capacity. 

Therefore, the military, especially the US Army and USMC, must be 

prepared to perform the roles associated with occupation; it is an integral 

part of war.

The next recommendation is less a recommendation than a caution 

not to become overly reliant on technology to support population and 

resource control measures. In recent decades the US military has grown 

fond of seeking technological solutions to problems. This was true as far 

back as Vietnam where the helicopter and starlight scope were viewed as 

technologies that could change the nature of the war. It was even more so 

in the campaign in Iraq, during which a variety of new technologies were 

rapidly designed, fielded, and deployed to respond to insurgent challenges.

These technologies were often used to support the employment of 

population and resource control measures. US units used x-ray and other 

scanning technologies at check points, hand held devices to capture 

biometric identity data, and surveillance cameras mounted on blimps and 

masts. The hunger for improved technology has even infected our Iraqi 

partners and may have encouraged them to purchase and rely on devices 

with dubious credibility.15

Population and resource control measures are manpower intensive. The 

best technology for finding weapons, munitions, and other contraband is 

the same now as it was in the Philippines: well trained, disciplined soldiers. 

Even the biometric devices, which have yielded valuable captures, may be 

impeding US units from conducting census operations rapidly.16 Consider 

that in the Philippines, US units collected information on potential 

insurgents by hand and sent it to a single office in Manila for processing 
254

which was then able to disseminate accurate intelligence information to 

over 450 posts across the archipelago.17
255

Notes

1. Tho, Pacification, 164.

2. While this thesis was being written a new book was released which 

contains more information on the campaigns in Al Qaim, Tal Afar, and other 

locations in Iraq during the pre-surge period. Readers should see James A. 

Russel, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in 

Anbar and Ninewah, Iraq, 2005-2007 (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 

2011).

3. Sassaman, Warrior King, 240-41. Regardless of whether either of the 

men drowned as was later alleged, the example illustrates how easy it is for 

young Soldiers and leaders to make bad decisions when not provided clear 

guidance about how to enforce population and resource control measures. If, 

for example, curfew violation was always to be punished by detention for a 

certain period of time–a week say–then there would not have been any need for 

the young leaders involved in this incident to apply their judgment. They would 

have detained the men knowing full well that they would be in detention for a 

certain period of time. Moreover, if this were also clear to the population itself, 

they would know that failure to return home on time would always result in 

detention and therefore should be avoided as much as practicable.

4. Nam Bo Regional Committee, “Letter from the Regional Committee,” 6.

5. Ibid., 2.

6. BC020.

7. Tho, Pacification, 56.

8. Such a situation was also present in the campaign in Dhofar, which this 

paper did not consider in depth. However, in Dhofar the Sultan’s Armed Forces 

established a series of fortified lines across the desert to interdict the flow of 

supplies from Yemen to the insurgents. These lines did not halt the flow of 

supplies, but did severely degrade it and facilitated the end of the insurgency. 

BI050, Dhofar Veterans Panel, Interview by Mark Battjes, Ben Boardman, 

Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, Dustin Mitchell, Nathan 

Springer, and Thomas Walton, 28 March 2011, United Kingdom.

9. BH030.

10. It should be noted here that “neutral” does not mean that the population 

is not providing support to the government in any manner. This is especially 

true in the case of the payment of taxes. A government that collects taxes in any 

form from its citizens will not allow those under its control to not pay taxes just 

because they consider themselves to be “neutral.” In reality, neutral behavior is 

acquiescence to government control and this includes support that is required by 

law. One can easily imagine many citizens in modern democracies (US, Canada, 

UK, etc.) that do not support their government and would not voluntarily assist 
256

it any way. However, at almost every level of government such states collect 

taxes from their citizens automatically. It would in most cases be quite difficult 

for citizens of modern states to completely deny their governments support of 

any kind.

11. Mackinlay, Hoffman, and Metz all aver in some fashion that physical 

control of population and territory is not as important as winning the battle of 

ideas. Mackinlay does so because he believes that coercive control measures 

are not feasible for interventionist forces, Hoffman because he believes that 

the ability of insurgent’s to gain external support overmatches the ability of 

the government to control its territory, and Metz because he believes only a 

complete alteration of society can end an insurgency. See Chapter 2 for a more 

in depth discussion of the views of modern COIN writers.

12. Chapter 4 details how Diem systematically gained control over the 

instruments of power within the GVN and then attempted to gain control 

over the rural areas of the country. As he did so, the Party, PAVN, and the VC 

changed their strategy to counter his actions resulting in a constant battle for 

control over the population.

13. Elliot and Stewart, Pacification and the Viet Cong System in Dinh 

Tuong: 1966-1967, x.

14. BI110, Battalion Commander, Interview by Mark Battjes, Richard 

Johnson, and Dustin Mitchell, 8 April 2011, United Kingdom.

15. Rod Norland, “Iraq Swears by Bomb Detector U.S. Sees as Useless,” 

The New York Times, November 3, 2009.

16. Fully enrolling someone in the device is a laborious process. Even if 

only some of the data is collected, say thumb and index finger fingerprints, 

photograph, and name, a single entry could take 10 minutes. Furthermore, 

the biometric data must be stored on a server, updating which is an uncertain 

prospect given the instability of secure broadband networks in austere 

conditions. However, recording name, address, occupation, and taking a digital 

photograph requires less than 1 minute and can easily be cataloged and stored 

locally on a laptop computer.

17. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, 76-82.
257

Further Research

There are also a number of topics concerning the employment of 

population and resource control measures that merit further research. The 

first is whether and how such measures can be employed to support all of 

the lines of operation in a campaign. They are primarily associated with 

the security line of operation, but if properly employed they might also 

support the governance and economic development lines of operation.*

Another promising line of research concerns the difference between 

legitimacy and legality in the employment of population and resource 

control measures. The case studies illustrate that measures which are legal 

may not be legitimate. Conversely, measures that are legitimate may not 

be strictly legal. This is a line of inquiry that the author wanted to pursue 

but did not feel able to properly complete given constraints on time and 

access to sufficient primary resources. While the legality of any measure 

is a matter of fact, its legitimacy is not. Moreover, legitimacy must be 

examined from the perspective of three different groups: the population 

of the state where the campaign is being conducted, the counterinsurgent 

forces, and the populations of the intervening powers. Gaining insight on 

these perspectives requires access to a large number of primary sources, 

especially those which capture the attitudes of these groups at the time of 

the conflict.

Further research is also needed on how population and resource 

control measures should be employed differently when confronting a truly 

local insurgency versus an externally supported insurgency. That was not 

the focus of this paper and so any conclusions drawn regarding this topic 

from the case studies would be shallow. This line of research would be 

especially relevant for operations in Afghanistan as some in the panoply 

of different insurgencies there may truly be local.
258

Note

*One US Army battalion commander noted that his area of Baghdad “had 

a lot of retail areas but no real industries and the only way people are going 

to come to a retail area is if they feel secure.” As security improved, partially 

because of the employment of population and resource control measures, the 

retail areas rebounded. BG090.
259

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Interviews

Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Scholars 

Program 2011. Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research 

Study 2011. Research Study, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Ike Skelton 

Chair in Counterinsurgency, 2011. This study included interviews 

of counterinsurgency practitioners and policy professionals from 

the United States and United Kingdom. All interviews are held 

with the Ike Skelton Chair in Counterinsurgency, CGSC Fort 

Leavenworth, KS.

Boston, Massachusetts

BF010, Former Army Officer. Interview by Richard Johnson 

and Aaron Kaufman, 11 March 2011.

BF020, Civilian Advisor to MNF-I. Interview by Richard 

Johnson and Aaron Kaufman, 11 March 2011.

BF030, Battery Commander. Interview by Richard Johnson and 

Aaron Kaufman, 12 March 2011.

BF040, Battery Commander. Interview by Richard Johnson and 

Aaron Kaufman, 14 March 2011.

Fort Bliss, Texas

BB010, Battalion Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and 

Nathan Springer, 2 March 2011.

BB020, Battalion Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and 

Nathan Springer, 2 March 2011.

BB030, Brigade Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and 

Nathan Springer, 3 March 2011.

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

BC010, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Robert Green and 

Aaron Kaufman, 1 March 2011.

BC020, Brigade Commander. Interview by Robert Green and 

Aaron Kaufman, 2 March 2011.

BC030, Battalion Commander. Interview by Benjamin 

Boardman and Richard Johnson, 1 March 2011.

BC040, Battalion Commander. Interview by Benjamin 
260

Boardman and Richard Johnson, 2 March 2011.

BC050, Battalion Commander. Interview by Benjamin 

Boardman and Richard Johnson, 2 March 2011.

BC060, Battalion Commander. Interview by Benjamin 

Boardman and Richard Johnson, 3 March 2011.

Fort Irwin, California

BE010, Transition Team Leader. Interview by Mark Battjes and 

Thomas Walton, 7 March 2011.

BE020, Transition Team Member. Interview by Mark Battjes 

and Thomas Walton, 7 March 2011.

BE030, Company Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and 

Thomas Walton, 8 March 2011.

BE040, Transition Team Leader. Interview by Mark Battjes and 

Thomas Walton, 9 March 2011.

BE050, Battery Commander. Interview by Robert Green and 

Aaron Kaufman, 8 March 2011.

BE060, Brigade Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and 

Thomas Walton, 9 March 2011.

BE070, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Robert Green and 

Aaron Kaufman, 9 March 2011.

BE080, Battalion Commander. Interview by Robert Green and 

Aaron Kaufman, 7 March 2011.

BE090, Battalion Commander. Interview by Robert Green and 

Aaron Kaufman, 7 March 2011.

Fort Knox, Kentucky

BD010, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Benjamin Boardman 

and Dustin Mitchell, 14 March 2011.

BD020, Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and 

Dustin Mitchell, 14 March 2011.

BD030, Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and 

Dustin Mitchell, 14 March 2011.

BD040, Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and 

Dustin Mitchell, 15 March 2011.

BD050, Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and 

Dustin Mitchell, 15 March 2011.
261

BD060, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Benjamin Boardman 

and Dustin Mitchell, 16 March 2011.

BD070, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Benjamin Boardman 

and Dustin Mitchell, 16 March 2011.

BD080, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Benjamin Boardman 

and Dustin Mitchell, 17 March 2011.

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

BA010, Brigade Commander. Interview by Richard Johnson 

and Thomas Walton, 22 February 2011.

BA020, Battalion Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and 

Benjamin Boardman, 23 February 2011.

BA030, Vietnam Veteran. Interview by Aaron Kaufman and 

Dustin Mitchell, 24 February 2011.

BA040, Brigade Commander. Interview by Aaron Kaufman and 

Dustin Mitchell, 23 February 2011.

BA050, Battalion Commander. Interview by Robert Green and 

Nathan Springer, 23 February 2011.

BA060, Battalion Commander. Interview by Robert Green and 

Nathan Springer, 23 February 2011.

BA070, Battery Commander. Interview by Richard Johnson and 

Thomas Walton, 24 February 2011.

BA080, Counterinsurgency Advisor. Interview by Richard 

Johnson and Nathan Springer, 9 March 2011.

BA090, Brigade Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and 

Benjamin Boardman, 24 February 2011.

Fort Stewart, Georgia:

BG010, Battalion Commander. Interview by Nathan Springer, 

14 March 2011.

BG020, Brigade Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and 

Thomas Walton, 14 March 2011.

BG030, Troop Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes, Nathan 

Springer, and Thomas Walton, 14 March 2011.

BG040, Brigade Commander. Interview by Nathan Springer 

and Thomas Walton, 15 March 2011.
262

BG050, Battalion Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes, 15 

March 2011.

BG060, Battalion Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes, 15 

March 2011.

BG070, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Nathan Springer and 

Thomas Walton, 15 March 2011.

BG080, Battalion Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and 

Thomas Walton, 16 March 2011.

BG090, Battalion Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and 

Nathan Springer, 16 March 2011.

BG100, Brigade Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and 

Nathan Springer, 16 March 2011.

United Kingdom

BI010, Senior British Officer. Interview by Mark Battjes, 

Benjamin Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron 

Kaufman, Dustin Mitchell, and Nathan Springer, 29 March 2011.

BI020, Battle Group Commander. Interview by Aaron Kaufman 

and Thomas Walton, 31 March 2011.

BI030, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Robert Green and 

Thomas Walton, 29 March 2011.

BI040, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Mark Battjes and 

Dustin Mitchell, 1 April 2011.

BI050, Dhofar Veterans Panel. Interview by Mark Battjes, 

Benjamin Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron 

Kaufman, Dustin Mitchell, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 

28 March 2011.

BI060, Dhofar Veterans Panel. Interview by Interview by Mark 

Battjes, Benjamin Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, 

Aaron Kaufman, Dustin Mitchell, Nathan Springer, and Thomas 

Walton, 2 April 2011.

BI070, Retired General Officer. Interview by Interview by Mark 

Battjes, Benjamin Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, 

Aaron Kaufman, Dustin Mitchell, Nathan Springer, and Thomas 

Walton, 30 March 2011.

BI080, Retired General Officer. Interview by Benjamin 

Boardman, Robert Green, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 

3 April 2011.
263

BI090, Retired General Officer. Interview by Benjamin 

Boardman, Robert Green, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 

4 April 2011.

BI100, Senior Army Officer. Interview by Mark Battjes, Richard 

Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, and Dustin Mitchell, 4 April 2011.

BI110, Battalion Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes, 

Richard Johnson, and Dustin Mitchell, 8 April 2011.

BI120, Retired Army Officer. Interview by Benjamin Boardman, 

Robert Green, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 8 April 2011.

BI130, Platoon Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman 

and Richard Johnson, 5 April 2011.

BI140, Afghan Army Advisor. Interview by Benjamin Boardman 

and Richard Johnson, 5 April 2011.

BI150, Company Sergeant Major. Interview by Aaron Kaufman 

and Dustin Mitchell, 5 April 2011.

BI160, Company 2nd In Command. Interview by Aaron 

Kaufman and Dustin Mitchell, 5 April 2011.

BI170, Afghan Army Advisor. Interview by Aaron Kaufman 

and Dustin Mitchell, 5 April 2011.

BI190, Senior Non-Commissioned Officer. Interview by Mark 

Battjes and Thomas Walton, 5 April 2011.

BI200, Platoon Commander. Interview by Aaron Kaufman and 

Dustin Mitchell, 7 April 2011.

BI210, Company 2nd In Command. Interview by Mark Battjes 

and Thomas Walton, 7 April 2011.

BI220, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Aaron Kaufman and 

Dustin Mitchell, 7 April 2011.

BI230, Company Commander. Interview by Robert Green and 

Nathan Springer, 7 April 2011.

BI240, Company Grade Officer. Interview by Benjamin 

Boardman and Richard Johnson, 7 April 2011.

BI250, Battalion Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman 

and Richard Johnson, 7 April 2011.

BI260, Non-Commissioned Officer. Interview by Robert Green 

and Nathan Springer, 7 April 2011.
264

BI270, Company Grade Officer. Interview by Mark Battjes and 

Thomas Walton, 7 April 2011.

BI280, Commander’s Panel. Interview by Richard Johnson, 1 

April 2011.

BI290, Battery Commander. Interview by Richard Johnson, 1 

April 2011.

BI300, Company Commander. Interview by Richard Johnson, 

2 April 2011.

BI310, Company Commander. Interview by Benjamin 

Boardman and Nathan Springer, 31 March 2011.

BI320, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Benjamin Boardman 

and Dustin Mitchell, 29 March 2011.

BI330, Dhofar Veteran. Interview by Robert Green, 28 March 

2011.

Washington, DC

BH010, Senior Policy Official. Interview by Mark Battjes, 

Benjamin Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron 

Kaufman, Dustin Mitchell, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 

21 March 2011.

BH020, Brigade Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes, 

Benjamin Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron 

Kaufman, Dustin Mitchell, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 

21 March 2011.

BH030, Iraq Veterans Panel. Interview by Mark Battjes, Robert 

Green, Aaron Kaufman, and Dustin Mitchell, 22 March 2011.

BH040, Afghanistan Veterans Panel. Interview by Richard 

Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 

24 March 2011.

BH050, Historian. Interview by Mark Battjes, Robert Green, 

Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, and Dustin Mitchell, 22 March 

2011.

BH060, Vietnam Political and Military Analyst. Interview by 

Mark Battjes, Benjamin Boardman, Robert Green, and Dustin 

Mitchell, 24 March 2011.

BH070, Iraqi Mayor. Interview by Mark Battjes and Robert 

Green, 25 March 2011.
265

Official Reports and Memoranda

Bureau of Insular Affairs, United States. Fourth Annual Report 

of the Philippine Commission, 1903, Part 1. Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1904.

———. Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 

1905, Part 1. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1906.

———. Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 

1905, Part 3. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1906.

———. Seventh Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 

1906, Part 1. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1907.

———. Ninth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 

1908, Part 1. Washington, DC: US War Department, 1909.

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State. 

“Research Memorandum RFE-58, Strategic Hamlets.” 1 July 

1963. Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, TX.

Central Intelligence Agency. “Memorandum for the Secretary of 

Defense.” 13 July 1962. Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive, 

Lubbock, TX.

Donnell, John C. and Gerald C. Hickey. The Vietnamese 

“Strategic Hamlets”: A Preliminary Report. Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND Corporation, 1962.

Elliot, David W. P. and W. A. Stewart. Pacification and the Viet 

Cong System in Dinh Tuong: 1966-1967. Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND Corporation, 1969.

Forrestal, Michael V. “Memorandum for the President.” 11 

December 1963. Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 1. Texas Tech 

University Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, TX.

Headquarters, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. “Combat 

Operations After Action Report, Operation TOAN THANG, 

Phase II.” 10 March 1969. Bud Harton Collection. Texas Tech 

University Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, TX.

Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. “TOANTHANG Phase II Execution, 1 Ooctober 68–30 November 68.” 

31 March 1969. Bud Harton Collection. Texas Tech University 

Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, TX.
266

Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division. “Operational Report on 

Lessons Learned for Period Ending 30 April 1966.” Bud Harton 

Collection. Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, 

TX.

———. “Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 

April 1967.” 19 May 1967. Bud Harton Collection. Texas Tech 

University Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, TX.

———. “Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 

July 1967.” 19 August 1967. Bud Harton Collection. Texas Tech 

University Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, TX.

———. “Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Period Ending 

31 October 1967.” 5 March 1968, Bud Harton Collection. Texas 

Tech University Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, TX.

———.”Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Period Ending 

31 January 1968.” 15 May 1968. Bud Harton Collection. Texas 

Tech University Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, TX.

———.”Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Period Ending 

30 April 1968.” 31 July 1968. Bud Harton Collection. Texas Tech 

University Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, TX.

———.”Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Period Ending 

31 July 1968.” 27 January 1969. Bud Harton Collection. Texas 

Tech University Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, TX.

———. “Operational Report Period Ending 31 January 1969.” 

1 February 1969. 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery, 25th Infantry 

Association Collection. Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive, 

Lubbock, TX.

———. “Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Period Ending 

31 July 1969.” 18 December 1969. Bud Harton Collection. Texas 

Tech University Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, TX.

———.”Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Period Ending 

30 April 1970.” Bud Harton Collection. Texas Tech University 

Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, TX.

———.”Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Period Ending 

31 October 1970.” 30 April 1971. Bud Harton Collection. Texas 

Tech University Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, TX.

Hosmer, Stephen T., and Sibylle O. Crane. “Counterinsurgency, 

A Symposium 16-20 April 1962.” RAND Corporation Reports.

Washington DC: RAND, 1962.
267

II Field Force Vietnam. “Combat Operations After Action 

Report, Tet Offensive.” Bud Harton Collection. Texas Tech 

University Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, TX.

Military History Institute of Vietnam. Victory in Vietnam: The 

Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975, 

translated by Pribbenow, Merle L. Lawrence, KS: University 

Press of Kansas, 2002.

Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom. “Operation TELIC 

Lessons Learned Compendium.” http://www.mod.uk/NR/

rdonlyres/F0282A90-99E5-415E-B3BC-97EAD7D7873A/0/

operation_telic_lessons_compendium.pdf (accessed 1 May 2011).

Pearce, R. Michael. Evolution of a Vietnamese Village - Part I. 

Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1965.

———. Evolution of a Vietnamese Village - Part II. Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1966.

Tran Dinh Tho. Pacification. Washington, DC: Center for 

Military History, 1980.

War Department, United States. Report of the Lieutenant 

General Commanding the Army, 1900, Part 3. Washington DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1900.

———. Report of the Lieutenant General Commanding the 

Army, 1901, Part 5. Washington, DC: Government Printing 

Office, 1901.

Zasloff, Joseph T. “Rural Resettlement in South Viet Nam: The 

Agroville Program,” Pacific Affairs 35, no. 4 (Winter 1962-1963): 

327-340.

Personal Accounts

Anderson, Joseph and Gary Volesky. “A Synchronized Approach 

to Population Control.” Military Review (July-August 2007): 145-

147.

Bradford, Alfred S. Some Even Volunteered. Westport, CT: 

Praeger Publishers, 1994.

Chiarelli, Peter and Patrick Michaelis. “The Requirements for 

Full-Spectrum Operations.” Military Review (July-August 2005): 

4-17.

Colby, William. Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s 

Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam. Chicago: Contemporary 

Books, 1989.
268

Collier, Craig. “Now That We’re Leaving Iraq, What Did We 

Learn?” Military Review (September-October 2010): 88-93.

Feith, Douglas J. War and Decision. New York: Harper Collins 

Publishers, 2008.

Giap, Vo Nguyen. “Inside the Vietminh.” In The Guerrilla 

Selections from the Marine Corps Gazette, edited by T. N. Green, 

147-77. New York: Praeger, 1962.

———. The Military Art of People’s War, edited by Russel 

Stetler. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970.

Gibson, Chris. “Battlefield Victories and Strategic Success: 

The Path Forward in Iraq.” Military Review (September-October 

2006): 47-59.

Kalaw, Teodoro M. Aide-de-camp to Freedom, translated by 

Katigbak, Maria Kalaw Manila: Teodoro M. Kalaw Society, Inc., 

1965.

Komer, Robert. Bureaucracy at War: US Performance in the 

Vietnam Conflict. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986.

Kuehl, Dale. “Testing Galula in Ameriyah, The People are the 

Key.” Military Review (March-April 2009): 72-80.

O’Donnell, John B. “The Strategic Hamlet Program in Kien Hoa 

Province, South Vietnam: A Case Study of Counter-Insurgency.” 

Paper presented at the conference on Southeast Asian Tribes, 

Minorities and Central Governments, Princeton, New Jersey, 11 

May 1965. Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, 

TX.

Quezon, Manuel Luis. The Good Fight. New York: D. AppletonCentury Company, Incorporated, 1946.

Sassaman, Nathan with Joe Layden. Warrior King. New York: 

St. Martin’s Press, 2008.

Smith, Neil and Sean MacFarland. “Anbar Awakens: The 

Tipping Point.” Military Review (March-April 2008): 41-53.

Westmoreland, William C. “A Military War of Attrition.” In The 

Lessons of Vietnam, edited by Thompson, W. Scott and Donaldson 

Frizzel, 57-71. New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1977.
269

Documents, Letters, and Captured Enemy Material

Bell, J. Franklin. Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders. 

In Robert D. Ramsey III, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla 

Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901-1902. Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007.

Coalition Provisional Authority. “Order No. 1, De’Ba’athification 

of Iraqi Society.” 16 May 2003.

———.”Order No. 2, “Dissolution of Entities.” 23 May 2003.

———.”Regulation No. 1.” 16 May 2003. http://www.

iraqcoalition.org/regulations/ 20030516_CPAREG_1_The_

Coalition_Provisional_Authority_.pdf (accessed 1 May 2011).

———.”Order No. 7.” 9 June 2003. http://www.iraqcoalition.

org/regulations/ 20030610_CPAORD_7_Penal_Code.pdf 

(accessed 1 May 2011).

———. “Order No. 3, (Revised) (Amended).” 31 December 

2003. http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031231_

CPAORD3_REV__AMD_.pdf (accessed 1 May 2011).

Current Affairs Committee C69. “Directive No. 78/CTNT, An 

Order to Continued to Take Advantage of our Success, Develop 

the Overall Attack, and Accomplish the 1969 Spring Plan.” 14 

May 1969. Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, 

TX.

Durbrow, Elbridge. “Cablegram from Elbridge Durbrow, United 

States Ambassador in Saigon, to Secretary of State Christian A. 

Herter, 16 September 1960.” In The Pentagon Papers as published 

by The New York Times, 115-18. New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 

1971.

“Experiences of Struggle with and Elimination of Strategic 

Hamlets of Villagers.” October-November 1962. Texas Tech 

University Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, TX.

Government of Vietnam. “Discussion Paper–From Strategic 

Hamlets to Self Defense Village.” Texas Tech University Vietnam 

Archive, Lubbock, TX.

Hilsman, Roger. “The Situation and Short-Term Prospects in 

South Vietnam.” In The Pentagon Papers as published by The 

New York Times, 155-57. New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1971.
270

Iraqi Governing Council. “Transitional Administrative Law.” 

8 March 2004. http://www.constitution.org/cons/iraq/TAL.html 

(accessed 1 May 2011).

Komer, Robert. Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in South 

Vietnam. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1970.

Malvar, Miguel. “Provisions and Instructions Issued by the 

Superior Commander of Southern Luzon for Observation by 

this Department.” 28 April 1901. In Taylor, John R.M. The 

Philippine Insurrection Against the United States: A Compilation 

of Documents (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research 

Library Microfilm).

———. “The Reason for My Change of Attitude.” 16 April 

1902. In Taylor, John R.M. The Philippine Insurrection Against the 

United States: A Compilation of Documents (Fort Leavenworth, 

KS: Combined Arms Research Library Microfilm).

Nam Bo Regional Committee. “Letter from the Regional 

Committee to All Members of Cells.” March 28, 1960. Douglas 

Pike Collection: Unit 5. Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive, 

Lubbock, TX.

National Liberation Front. “Anti-Strategic Hamlet Program.” 

VC Document 93, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 1. Texas Tech 

University Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, TX.

———. “Measures Against Village Merging and People 

Concentration.” Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive, 

Lubbock, TX.

Office of Rural Affairs, US Operations Mission Saigon. “Notes 

on Strategic Hamlets.” 15 August 1963. Douglas Pike Collection: 

Unit 2. Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, TX.

Political Department, People’s Liberation Army. “Outline of the 

Reorientation of Forthcoming Missions in 1970 (For Elementary 

and Intermediate Cadre).” 14 January 1970. Texas Tech University 

Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, TX.

Standing Committee of A. 26. “Matters to be Grasped when 

Performing the Ideological Task in the Party Body.” In Viet-Nam 

Documents and Research Notes, ‘Decisive Victory’: Step by Step, 

Bit by Bit. Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, TX.

———. “Study of Directive 81 of 5 [Nam] Truong [COSVN] 
271

Opening of Phase H.” In Viet-Nam Documents and Research 

Notes, ‘Decisive Victory’: Step by Step, Bit by Bit. Texas Tech 

University Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, TX.

Transitional National Assembly. “Iraqi Constitution.” http://

www.uniraq.org/documents/ iraqi_constitution.pdf (accessed 1 

May 2011).

United Nations Security Council. “Resolution 1483.” 22 May 

2003. http://www.un.org/ Docs /sc/unsc_resolutions03.html 

(accessed 1 May 2011).

———.”Resolution 1511.” 16 October 2003. http://www.

un.org/Docs/sc/ unsc_resolutions03.html (accessed 1 May 2011).

———.”Resolution 1546.” 8 June 2004. http://www.un.org/

Docs/sc/ unsc_resolutions04.html (accessed 1 May 2011).

———.”Resolution 1637.” 8 November 2005. http://www.

un.org/Docs/sc/ unsc_resolutions05.htm (accessed 1 May 2011).

———.”Resolution 1723.” 28 November 2006. http://www.

un.org/Docs/sc/ unsc_resolutions06.htm (accessed 1 May 2011).

———.”Resolution 1790.” 18 December 2007. http://www.

un.org/Docs/sc/ unsc_resolutions07.htm (accessed 1 May 2011).

“Viet Cong Loss of Population Control Evidence from Captured 

Documents.” 1968. Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive, 

Lubbock, TX.

Vietnamese Communist Party. “A Party Account of the Situation 

in the Nam Bo Region of South Vietnam from 1954-1960.” 

Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 6. Texas Tech University Vietnam 

Archive, Lubbock, TX.

Doctrinal References

Adjutant General’s Office, U. S. War Department. General 

Orders Number 100, Washington, DC: War Department, 1863.

Army, Department of the. Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land 

Warfare. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1956.

———. Field Manual 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations. 

Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1963.

———. Field Manual -3-24, Counterinsurgency. Washington 

DC: Department of the Army, 2006.
272

———. Field Manual 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency. 

Washington DC: Department of the Army, 2009. 

Civil Operations Rural Development Support. The Vietnamese 

Village 1970 Handbook for Advisors. 2 May 1970. Combined 

Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Defense, Department of. DoD GEN-25, Handbook for US 

Forces in Vietnam. 1966. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS.

Military Assistance Command, Civil Operations Rural 

Development Support. Territorial Security in Vietnam. 1 January 

1971. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, United States. 

Handbook for Military Support of Pacification. February 1968. 

Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Philippine Constabulary. Manual for the Philippine 

Constabulary, 1911. Manila: Bureau of Printing: 1911.

Secondary Sources

Afsar, Shahid and Chris Samples. “The Taliban: An 

Organizational Analysis.” Military Review (May-June 2008): 58-

73.

Al-Jabouri, Najim Abed and Sterling Jensen. “The Iraqi and 

AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening.” Prism 2, no. 1 (2010): 3-18.

Andrade, Dale. “Westmoreland Was Right: Learning the Wrong 

Lessons from the Vietnam War.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19, 

no. 2 (June 2008): 145-181. 

Armstrong, Karen. A History of God (New York: Ballantine 

Books, 1993.

Azjen, Icek. “The Theory of Planned Behavior.” Organizational 

Behavior and Human Decision Processes 50 (1991): 179-211.

Baker, Jay B. “Tal Afar 2005: Laying the Counterinsurgency 

Framework.” Army (June 2009): 61-67.

Beckett, Ian. “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in 

Dhofar, 1965-1975.” In Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, 

edited by Marston, Daniel and Carter Malkasian, 175-190. Oxford: 

Osprey Publishing, 2010.

Bergerud, Eric. The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in 

Hau Nghia Province. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1991.
273

———. Red Thunder, Tropic Lightning. Boulder, CO: Westview 

Press, Inc., 1993.

Birtle, Andrew J. US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency 

Operations Doctrine 1860-1941. Washington, DC: Center of 

Military History, United States Army, 2003.

Burton, Brian and John Nagl. “Learning As We Go: The US 

Army Adapts to COIN in Iraq, July 2004-December 2006.” Small 

Wars and Insurgencies 19, no. 3 (September 2008): 303-327.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Howard, 

Michael and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ:: Princeton University 

Press, 1976.

Fontenot, Gregory, E. J. Degan, and David Tohn. On Point, 

The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004.

Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and 

Practice. Saint Petersburg, FL: Glenwood Press, 1964.

———. Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958. Santa Monica, CA: 

Rand Corporation, 2006.

Gentile, Gian. “A Strategy of Tactics: Population Centric COIN 

and the Army.” Parameters (Autumn 2009): 5-17.

Gompert, David C. and John Gordon IV. War by Other Means. 

Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008.

Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor. Cobra II. New 

York: Pantheon Books, 2006.

Greem, T.N. The Guerilla: Selections from the Marine Corps 

Gazzette. New York: Praeger, 2005.

Gywnn, Major General Sir Charles W. Imperial Policing.

London: MacMillian and CO. Ltd., 1934.

Hoffman, Frank. “Neo-Classical Counter-Insurgency?” 

Parameters, Summer 2007: 77-87.

———. Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. 

Arlington, VA: The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007.

Howard, Michael. Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction. 

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

———. War in European History. Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 1976.
274

Hunt, Richard. Pacification: The American Struggle for 

Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995.

Iron, Richard. “Britain’s Longest War: Northern Ireland 1967-

2007.” In Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, edited by 

Marston, Daniel and Carter Malkasian, 157-174. Oxford: Osprey 

Publishing, 2010.

Joes, Anthony James. “Counterinsurgency in the Philippines, 

1898-1954.” In Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, edited by 

Marston, Daniel and Carter Malkasian, 39-56. Oxford: Osprey 

Publishing, 2010.

Kagan, Kimberly. “Enforcing the Law: The Baghdad Security 

Plan Begins.” Iraq Report. (10 February-5 March 2007):1-19.

Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla : Fighting Small 

Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York: Oxford University 

Press., 2009.

Kitson, Frank. Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, 

Insurgency, Peacekeeping. London: Archon Books, 1971.

———. Bunch of Five. London: Faber and Faber, 1977.

Krepinevich, Andrew F. Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore, 

MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Linn, Brian. The Philippine War, 1899-1902. Lawrence, KS: 

University of Kansas Press, 2000.

Mackinlay, John. The Insurgent Archipelago : From Mao to Bin 

Laden. New York.: Columbia University Press, 2009.

Mackinlay, John and Alison Al-Baddawy. Rethinking 

Counterinsurgency. Santa Monica, CA: 2008.

Malkasian, Carter. “Counterinsurgency in Iraq.” In 

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, edited by Marston, Daniel 

and Carter Malkasian, 287-310. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010.

Malkasian, Carter. “The Role of Perceptions and Political 

reform in Counterinsurgency: The Case of Western Iraq, 2004-

2005.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 17, no 3 (September 2006): 

367-394.

Mansfield, Don. “The Irish Republican Army and Northern 

Ireland.” In Insurgency in the Modern World, edited by O’Neill, 

Bard, 44-85. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980.
275

Mao, Tse-Tung. On Guerrilla Warfare. New York: Praeger, 

1961.

Markel, Wade. “Draining the Swamp: The British Strategy of 

Population Control.” Parameters (Spring 2006): 35-48.

Marston, Daniel. “Adaptation in the Field: The British Army’s 

Difficult Campaign in Iraq.” Security Challenges 6, no. 1 (Autumn 

2010): 71-84.

———. “Lost and Found in the Jungle.” In Big Wars and Small 

Wars, edited by Hew Strachan, 96-114. London: Routledge, 2006.

———. “Realizing the Extent of Our Errors and Forging the 

Road Ahead: Afghanistan 2001-2010.” In Counterinsurgency in 

Modern Warfare, edited by Marston, Daniel and Carter Malkasian, 

251-286. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010.

Marston, Daniel, and Carter Malkasian, eds. Counterinsurgency 

in Modern Warfare. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008.

May, Glenn Anthony. Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province 

at War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991.

McCoy, Alfred W. Policing America’s Empire. Madison, WI: 

The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009.

McCuen, John J. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War. 

Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1966.

Metz, Steven. “New Challenges and Old Concepts: 

Understanding the 21st Century Insurgency.” Parameters (Winter 

2007-2008): 20-32.

Miers, Richard. Shoot to Kill. London: Faber and Faber, 1959.

Moyar, Mark. Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965.

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

O’Neill, Bard. “Revolutionary War in Oman.” In Insurgency in 

the Modern World, edited by O’Neill, Bard, 213-234. Boulder, 

CO: Westview Press, 1980.

———. Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to 

Apocalypse. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005.

O’Neill, Mark. Confronting the Hydra. Sydney, Australia: Lowy 

Institute, 2009.

Paget, Julian. Counterinsurgency Operations. New York: 

Walker and Company, 1967.
276

Paret, Peter. French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to 

Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine. New 

York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964.

Race, Jeffrey. War Comes to Long An. California: UC Press, 

1972.

Ricks, Thomas E. The Gamble. New York: The Penguin Press, 

2009.

Rubin, Barnett and Ahmed Rashid. “The Great Game to the 

Great Bargain.” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 6 (November-December 

2008): 30-44.

Russel, James A. Innovation, Transformation, and War: 

Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewah, Iraq, 

2005-2007. Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2011.

Scott, James C. “Revolution in the Revolution: Peasants and 

Commissars.” Theory and Society 7, no. 1/2 (January-March, 

1979): 97-134.

Semple, Michael and Fotini Christia. “How to Flip the Taliban.” 

Foreign Affairs (July-August 2009).

Shy, John, and Thomas Collier. “Revolutionary war.” In Makers 

of Modern Strategy : Military Thought from Machiavelli to the 

Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret, 815-862. Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press., 1986.

Stubbs, Richard. “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and 

Minds: The Evolution of British Strategy in Malaya 1948-60.” In 

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, edited by Marston, Daniel 

and Carter Malkasian, 101-118. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010.

Thompson, Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency. London: 

Chatto and Windus, 1967.

Thompson, W. Scott and Donaldson Frizzell. The Lessons of 

Vietnam. New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1977.

Thornton, Rod. “Getting It Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes Made 

in the Early Stages of the British Army’s Deployment to Northern 

Ireland.” Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 1 (February 2007): 

73-107.

Trinquier, Roger. Modern Warfare: A French View of 

Counterinsurgency. Westport, Connecticut: Praego, 1964.
277

Ucko, David. The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming 

the US Military for Modern Wars. Washington DC: Georgetown 

University Press, 2009.

Weber, Max. “Politics as a Vocation.” In From Max Weber: 

Essays in Sociology, translated and edited by Gerth, H.H. and C. 

Wright Mills, 77-128. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.

West, Bing. No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle 

for Fallujah. New York: Bantam Books, 2005.

———. The Strongest Tribe. New York: Random House, 2009.

Willbanks, James. Abandoning Vietnam. Lawrence, KS: 

University of Kansas Press, 2004.

Wolf, Charles Jr. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New 

Myths and Old Realities. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 

1965.

Wright, Donald P., and Timothy Reese. On Point II. Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2008.


Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

Visit our website at: 

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/index.asp

Art of War Papers