The Canadian

 Theater 1813

The U.S. Army Campaigns

of the War of 1812
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CMH Pub 74–3
•••

The Canadian Theater 

1813

by

Richard V. Barbuto

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Center of Military History

United States Army 

Washington, D.C., 2013

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Introduction

The War of 1812 is perhaps the United States’ least known conflict. Other than Andrew Jackson’s 1815 victory at New Orleans and 

Francis Scott Key’s poem “The Star-Spangled Banner” written in 

1814 during the British attack on Baltimore, most Americans know 

little about the country’s second major war. Its causes are still debated 

by historians today. Great Britain’s impressment of American sailors, 

its seizure of American ships on the high seas, and suspected British 

encouragement of Indian opposition to further American settlement 

on the western frontier all contributed to America’s decision to declare 

war against Great Britain in June 1812.

None of these factors, however, adequately explain why President James Madison called for a war the country was ill-prepared to 

wage. Moreover, the war was quite unpopular from the start. Many 

Federalists—chiefly in the New England states—opposed an armed 

conflict with Great Britain, continued to trade with the British, and 

even met in convention to propose secession from the Union. Some 

members of the president’s own Republican Party objected to the 

war’s inevitable costs and questionable objectives, such as the conquest of Canada.

To declare war was one thing, but to prosecute it successfully was 

a different matter. Much of the story of the War of 1812 is about 

the unpreparedness of America’s Army and Navy at the conflict’s 

outset, and the enormous difficulties the new nation faced in raising 

troops, finding competent officers, and supplying its forces. Most 

of America’s military leaders were inexperienced and performed 

poorly, particularly in the first two years of war. Only gradually did 

better leaders rise to the top to command the more disciplined and 

well-trained units that America eventually fielded. But despite costly 

initial setbacks, by the time the fighting stopped American arms had 

won key victories at Chippewa, Lundy’s Lane, and New Orleans 

under excellent officers such as Winfield Scott, Jacob Brown, and 

Andrew Jackson. Although the United States achieved few of its 

political objectives in the War of 1812, its Regular Army emerged 

more professional, better led, and fit to take its place as the foundation of America’s national defenses.
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I encourage all Army leaders and soldiers to read this pamphlet 

and the others in our series of campaign pamphlets in commemoration of the bicentennial of the War of 1812. We can all profit from 

greater knowledge about the beginnings of our Army: an Army forged 

in victory and defeat during what has often been called the second 

war of American independence.

RICHARD W. STEWART

Chief Historian
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•••

The Canadian Theater

1813

America had gone to war in June 1812 convinced that the conquest of Canada would be a simple matter. Such had not been the 

case. The nation’s military had proven unprepared, its leaders often 

incompetent, and its men poorly trained and ill-equipped. AngloCanadian resistance had been stiffer than expected, while at home 

political and regional differences had hampered an effective mobilization of America’s vastly superior resources. What successes the 

U.S. Army had achieved in 1812 had largely been overshadowed by 

ignominious defeats at Detroit, the River Raisin, and Queenston. 

By year’s end, Canada stood defiant and America had actually lost 

some territory to Great Britain along the Northwest frontier. Significant changes were going to be necessary if the United States was to 

achieve a more satisfactory outcome in the upcoming year. In the fall 

and winter of 1812–1813, President James Madison’s administration 

began to make some badly needed adjustments.

Strategic Setting

Perhaps one of the greatest steps to improve the U.S. Army’s 

performance was initiated by the U.S. Navy. Understanding that 

control of the Great Lakes would be essential to operations west 

of the St. Lawrence River, in October 1812 the Department of the 

Navy appointed Capt. Isaac Chauncey to command in the Great 

Lakes with orders to build ships and wrest control of the waters from 

the British Royal Navy. The department conferred upon Chauncey 

the courtesy title of commodore given to officers who commanded 

squadrons. An able administrator, Chauncey energetically embarked 

on a naval arms race from his base at Sackett’s Harbor, New York, 

on Lake Ontario.

In December 1812, President Madison relieved Secretary of War 

William Eustis. Eustis had been an adequate peacetime secretary, but 

the requirements of the war had overwhelmed him. Madison directed 
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that his secretary of state, James 

Monroe, fill in as secretary of war 

until he was able to find a permanent replacement. Monroe’s 

tenure was brief, for in February 

1813, the president appointed 

Brig. Gen. John Armstrong as 

the secretary of war. Armstrong, 

a former senator and minister 

to France, had served in the 

Revolutionary War and had been 

present at British General John 

Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga. 

He had also authored the notorious Newburgh Addresses that 

had nearly caused the Continental 

Army to mutiny in 1782. Armstrong commanded the defenses 

of New York City when he received the call to join the cabinet. 

The new secretary had pretensions 

of being a strategist and an administrator, claims that his actions 

would tragically disprove.

Meanwhile, in January 1813, 

Congress bolstered the nation’s military strength by adding nineteen 

infantry regiments and one regiment of rangers. President Madison 

filled the officer positions with persons nominated by congressmen 

and state governors. Although many of the new officers had held 

commissions in their states’ militias, very few had seen active service. 

Since regimental commanders were responsible for filling the ranks 

of their companies, the secretary of war assigned each regiment a 

geographic area from which to draw recruits. To facilitate recruiting, Congress had earlier raised the pay of all ranks. A private now 

earned $8 a month, a significant increase over the $5 monthly pay 

at the start of the war. Recruiting still lagged, however, so Congress 

authorized a third lieutenant and an additional sergeant for each 

company. This action gave regimental commanders more resources 

to direct their recruiting efforts. Unfortunately, the need for troops on 

the front lines was so demanding that companies were often marched 

off as soon as one hundred men could be recruited. Thus, a regiment 

rarely had all of its companies assembled together. A few companies 

James Madison,

Engraving by David Edwin

(Library of Congress)

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•••• 9 ••••

might be actively serving on the 

frontier, while others were training elsewhere and yet others were 

still being recruited.

More regiments meant more 

generals were required to lead 

them. President Madison named 

four new major generals: William Henry Harrison, James 

Wilkinson, Wade Hampton, and 

Morgan Lewis. Only Harrison 

would prove to be a successful commander. Madison also 

appointed seven new brigadier 

generals. Finally, Armstrong and 

Madison rationalized command 

issues by creating nine military 

districts and appointing generals 

to direct each. Assisted by a complete staff, each general would 

command all regular troops and 

militia in federal service within 

the boundaries of his district.

As the nation attempted to 

improve its military organization 

and leadership, Secretary Armstrong sent to the Army’s senior officer, Maj. Gen. Henry Dearborn, 

a strategy for 1813 that designated control of Lake Ontario as the key 

to future operations against Lower Canada. The secretary directed 

General Dearborn to send four thousand troops to the naval base at 

Sackett’s Harbor and three thousand to Buffalo, New York. Cooperating with Captain Chauncey, Dearborn would first attack the British 

naval base at Kingston and then follow with attacks on York and the 

British forts along the Niagara in Upper Canada. Destruction of the 

British squadron at Kingston would give control of Lake Ontario to 

Chauncey. Dearborn and Chauncey, vastly overestimating British 

troop strength at Kingston, believed that city to be too strong to attack. They offered Armstrong a counterproposal to first raid York to 

capture or destroy vessels being built there. Then, they would attack 

Fort George at the northern mouth of the Niagara River. Once solidly 

positioned at Fort George, Dearborn could handily cut the British line 

of communications westward. The British presence on the Upper Great 

John Armstrong,

by John Wesley Jarvis

(National Portrait

 Gallery, Smithsonion) •••••••••••••••
•••• 10 ••••

Lakes would wither and disappear. Reluctantly, Armstrong agreed to 

this new strategy. Madison and his cabinet needed a victory to dispel 

the gloom of the failed campaigns of 1812.

Meanwhile, Lt. Gen. Sir George Prevost, Governor General 

of British North America, was astounded that the Canadian provinces had survived the 1812 campaign. Prevost understood that 

resources from Great Britain would continue to be meager as long 

as the empire was locked in a life or death struggle with Napoleonic France. The government in London considered the war with 

America a sideshow to the main event in Europe. Cautious by nature, Prevost wisely set forth a defensive strategy along the border 

with the United States. In his judgment, the cities of Montreal and 

Quebec were essential to maintaining a British presence in North 

America. If necessary, territory in the province of Upper Canada 

could be lost temporarily. As long as the British held Quebec and 

Montreal, British forces could eventually recapture any lost lands 

to the west. He therefore issued orders to his subordinate generals 

not to take undue risks and to maintain their fighting strength as 

much as possible. Thus, the year 1813 began with the British on the 

defensive and the Americans anxious to advance deep into Canada 

in order to achieve their war aims.

Operations

Once Madison and his cabinet agreed on York as an appropriate 

first objective, Dearborn and Chauncey began planning in earnest. 

Chauncey believed that the British were building two brigs of eighteen guns each at York. He also surmised that York had immense 

amounts of naval stores to support the Royal Navy on Lake Ontario. 

Chauncey expected that a raid on York would decisively shift the balance of naval power to the Americans. The two commanders agreed 

that they would follow up the raid on York with an attack on Fort 

George. Simultaneously, American forces at Buffalo would cross the 

Niagara River to seize Fort Erie at the southern entrance to the river. 

With Fort Erie in American hands, the various American war vessels 

hemmed in at the naval yard at nearby Black Rock, New York, could 

escape into Lake Erie to augment the squadron being built at Erie, 

Pennsylvania. Chauncey sent Master Commandant Oliver Hazard 

Perry to Erie to supervise shipbuilding so as to gain control of Lake 

Erie in the summer. Control of Lake Erie would enable General 

Harrison’s Northwestern Army to recover Detroit and to clear the 

British from western Upper Canada (Map 1).
Stoney Creek

6 Jun

Beaver Dams

24 Jun

Sackett’s Harbor

28–29 May

York

27 Apr

Fort George

28 May

St. Lawrence R

Ottawa R

H

du

os

R

n

Lake Champlain

Lake George

Lake Oneida

L a k e O n t a r i o

L a k e E r i e

G e o r g i a n B a y

T h a m e

R

s

Fort Erie

Fort Niagara

Kingston

Oswego

Albany

Queenston Lewiston

Burlington Heights

Black Rock

Bualo

Prescott

Ogdensburg

French Mills

Plattsburgh

Montreal

Ottawa

Erie

N E W Y O R K

P E N N S Y L V A N I A CONNECTICUT

V E R M O N T

S T T M A S S A C H U E

U P P E R C A N A D A

L O W E R

C A N A D A L A K E O N TA R I O

OPERATIONAL AREA

April–June 1813

Battle Site

0 100 25

Miles

Map 1
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Dearborn chose newly promoted Brig. Gen. Zebulon M. 

Pike to lead the assault on York. 

Already famous as a western 

explorer, Pike had also earned a 

reputation as a gentleman and 

a competent commander who 

led by example. As a colonel, 

Pike had commanded the 15th 

U.S. Infantry, a regiment raised 

largely in New Jersey. He had 

trained his soldiers and had ensured that they were well cared 

for during the harsh winter of 

1812–1813. In March, Pike and 

his 15th Infantry trekked through 

deep snow from Plattsburgh 

to Sackett’s Harbor. Following 

promotion to brigadier general 

in April, Pike assumed command 

of Dearborn’s 1st U.S. Brigade.

One of Pike’s key subordinates, Bvt. Lt. Col. Benjamin 

Forsyth, shared few similarities 

with his commander. Colonel 

Forsyth commanded a battalion of the U.S. Rifle Regiment. While 

brave like Pike, Forsyth was neither a stickler for discipline nor as 

industrious. Pike trained and inspected and otherwise kept his men 

engaged in soldiering when not in action. Forsyth allowed his riflemen much freedom when not in action, but in combat they could be 

counted on to press the fight to the utmost. However, he turned a 

blind eye to his men’s looting of the dead, wounded, and captured 

enemy. Pike and Forsyth played conspicuous roles in the raid on York.

The Raid on York, April 1813

Shortly after the ice had receded from Sackett’s Harbor, Chauncey 

ordered the embarkation of the landing force. Starting on 20 April, 

eighteen hundred soldiers and eight hundred sailors crowded aboard 

thirteen warships. Embarkation took three long days, and the squadron had barely cleared the harbor when a heavy rainstorm drenched 

sailors and soldiers alike. Only half of the passengers could fit in 

the comparative shelter below deck. Those remaining were forced 

Zebulon Pike,

from a print dated 1814 

(Library of Congress) •••••••••••••••
•••• 13 ••••

to withstand strong wind and 

driving rain on the overcrowded 

decks. Unable to move through 

the heavy storm, Commodore 

Chauncey ordered the squadron returned to calmer waters. 

Chauncey started again on 25 

April; however, strong waves 

jostled the vessels and many soldiers were seasick for much of the 

voyage. Finally, the next evening, 

the Americans came into sight 

of their objective, the village and 

naval base at York.

British Maj. Gen. Roger 

Hale Sheaffe defended York with 

about 400 regulars, 525 militia 

and shipwrights, and as many as 

100 native warriors. The main 

defenses of York were west of 

the town and boatyard. These 

defenses consisted of the garrison—a group of barracks surrounded by an earthen rampart 

and a number of cannon—and 

three other batteries extending 

westward: Government House 

Battery, Half Moon Battery, and 

Western Battery. To the west of 

Western Battery, the land was flat 

and heavily wooded, except for 

a cleared area around a ruined 

French fortification, Fort Rouillé. 

Chauncey anchored his squadron 

in an extended line opposite Fort Rouillé, well out of range of the 

British batteries. At 0700, he ordered the troops to disembark. 

Chauncey had enough ships’ boats to carry three hundred men 

to shore at a time. Forsyth took one hundred seventy of his men on 

the first wave, alongside soldiers of the 15th Infantry. Indian warriors waiting on shore opened fire, which the riflemen returned from 

their landing boats. Forsyth’s riflemen hit the shore, scrambled over 

the bank, spread out, and began a relentless movement through the 

1st U.S. Rifle Regiment, by 

Don Troiani

(Don Troiani Image Bank)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 14 ••••

woods, inflicting casualties among the native warriors. East of the 

riflemen, boatloads of the 15th Infantry landed, formed into platoons, 

and climbed the banks. There they were met by the concentrated 

musketry of the grenadier company of the 8th Regiment of Foot. The 

grenadiers followed up their gunfire with a bayonet assault that forced 

the American infantry back down the embankment. However, the 

American riflemen salvaged the situation. Forsyth was everywhere 

encouraging and guiding his men. The riflemen’s fire drove off the 

Indian warriors, and the British grenadiers, cut to pieces, withdrew 

as well.

General Pike and his staff landed with the next wave of attackers, as General Dearborn watched the assault from his flagship. Pike 

formed his infantry in line facing east with Forsyth’s riflemen on the 

left. With regimental flags flying, the Americans entered the clearing 

around Fort Rouillé. General Sheaffe, at the head of a mixed force of 

regulars and militia, entered the clearing from the east. The guns of 

the American schooners opened fire on the British with grapeshot. 

American musket, rifle, and cannon fire proved too intense for the 

defenders. After several minutes, Sheaffe ordered his troops to withdraw eastward toward the Western Battery. The British commander 

realized that these Americans were not like the amateurs he had easily 

beaten six months earlier at Queenston Heights.

Over the next two hours, boats shuttled between ship and shore 

bringing more Americans to the fight. Elements of the 6th, 15th, 

and 16th U.S. Infantry as well as two volunteer companies, the Albany Greens and the Baltimore Volunteers, came ashore. West Point 

graduate Lt. Alexander C. W. Fanning of the 3d U.S. Artillery and 

his gunners manhandled a 6-pounder gun and a howitzer out of the 

boats and up the embankment. With no horses, the artillerymen 

pulled guns and limbers along a path through the woods. Pike formed 

his brigade in column and readied it to move eastward through the 

woods and against the British defenses. American schooners moved 

opposite the four British batteries and opened up a heavy fire. Then, 

disaster befell the British. A gunner in Western Battery accidentally 

brought his lit portfire into contact with a box of artillery ammunition. The resulting explosion killed about a dozen artillerists and 

wounded many more. The British regulars recovered quickly, but 

many Canadian militiamen drifted away from the danger.

General Sheaffe, seeing the strong American brigade approaching the Western Battery, gave orders to abandon that position and 

the Half Moon Battery to its rear. He apparently had decided that 

he could not successfully defend York with the meager force at his 
•••• 15 ••••

disposal and began extracting his regulars from the town. General 

Pike sent his advance guard, four companies of the 6th U.S. Infantry, 

ahead. They discovered that the British appeared to be gathering at 

Government House Battery. Pike ordered his artillery to send some 

rounds into the British defenses. 

A little after 1300 catastrophe struck. A massive explosion erupted 

from the earth near the Government House Battery. Three hundred 

barrels of gunpowder ignited and instantaneously pulverized the roof 

and walls of the stone magazine in which they had been stored. A 

fireball rose, followed by a high column of black smoke. Timber, stone, 

and iron cannon shot were thrown high into the air before raining 

down on British and American alike up to five hundred yards from 

the explosion. Col. Cromwell Pearce, the commander of the 16th U.S. 

Infantry, recorded that “the noise of the explosion was tremendous. 

The earth shook and the sun was darkened, while the crashing of the 

rocks, high in the air, and the groans of the wounded, rendered it one 

of the most awful sights in nature.” American losses were 39 killed and 

224 wounded in the explosion. The wounded suffered cruelly: limbs 

and skulls fractured and flesh pierced by shards of iron and splinters 

of timber. General Pike was among the wounded, tragically hit by a 

large stone that crushed his spine. His staff evacuated him to the fleet. 

What happened next reflects immense credit on the American 

soldier. In the face of extraordinary casualties, those still remaining 

on their feet did not falter. The officers rallied their men and the advance continued, around the blackened crater where the ammunition 

magazine had been minutes earlier, and through the abandoned garrison. Moments later, Colonel Pearce came upon a group of Canadian 

militia officers carrying a white flag. Before he left York with his regulars, General Sheaffe had ordered these incredulous militia officers 

to surrender their village. They could not believe that Sheaffe had 

abandoned the provincial capital without a more determined fight.

Lt. Col. George Mitchell of the 3d U.S. Artillery negotiated 

a simple surrender document that respected private property, but 

yielded public property to the victors. The Americans occupied the 

village, although not until the British had managed to burn a ship 

that was under construction. Pike died aboard the schooner Madison, 

Chauncey’s flagship. His friends placed a captured flag under his head 

before he expired. Americans, British, and Canadians alike turned 

their attention to treating the hundreds of wounded. A handful of 

American regimental surgeons and surgeon’s mates worked through 

the next two days with little sleep or food. William Beaumont, surgeon’s mate of the 6th U.S. Infantry, recalled that his fellow surgeons 
•••• 16 ••••

were “wading in blood, cutting off arms, legs, and trepanning heads 

to rescue their fellow creatures from untimely death.

Neither Dearborn and Chauncey nor their officers were able to 

maintain control of all of their soldiers and seamen. Some Americans 

slipped away from their units to pillage local homes. Unknown arsonists burned some public buildings, including the parliament buildings 

of Upper Canada. While many vandals were clearly American military men, a few were Canadian civilians. When the Americans had 

arrived in the village of York, they had freed a number of inmates 

from the local jail. These prisoners were disaffected Canadians, 

many of whom had been born in the United States and had spoken 

against the war or had evaded duty in the militia. These individuals 

also contributed to the mischief. Eventually, Dearborn put enough 

patrols on the streets to stop the looting, but much damage had 

already occurred.

For three days after the raid, soldiers and sailors loaded a mountain of captured supplies and equipment aboard Chauncey’s ships. 

Immense quantities of food, sails, cables, iron implements, tools, and 

artillery came into the possession of the attackers. The Americans 

then loaded the wounded below deck, and finally, the rest of the 

soldiers came aboard. Soldiers and sailors crammed the decks, with 

no space below. Heavy winds blew adversely into York Harbor for 

days, thus preventing the ships from making headway out into the 

lake while cold rain drenched those on deck. Dysentery broke out and 

all suffered enormously. Finally, twelve days after landing at York, 

the squadron made its way across the lake and dropped anchor at 

the mouth of Four Mile Creek, New York, named for its distance 

from Fort Niagara. The troops came ashore, but no tents awaited 

them. The men had to bed down on wet ground and were caught in 

frequent rainstorms. The American landing force of eighteen hundred had suffered about three hundred twenty casualties, mostly to 

the magazine explosion. This reflected a casualty rate of nearly 18 

percent, a heavy loss. 

General Pike’s death proved particularly tragic. Surgeon’s mate 

William Beaumont wrote to his parents of the “death of our ablest, 

bravest & highly respected, & almost adored Col. Pike, in consequence 

of the explosion. His cool, calm, intrepid & brave conduct, during the 

engagement, unites the highest esteem & admiration of all Officers of 

the Army & cannot but remain the tribute of universal applause & 

approbation!” Despite the losses sustained in the battle and sickness 

among the survivors, Dearborn and Chauncey immediately began 

preparations to capture Fort George and to seize the Niagara Peninsula.
•••• 17 ••••

United States Infantry Pvt. 15th 

Regiment, 1812–1813,

by Don Troiani

(Don Troiani Image Bank)

•••••••••••••••

Operations on the Niagara 

Peninsula, May–June 1813

The raid on York represented a well-executed joint 

operation between the U.S. 

Army and Navy. The subsequent landing at Fort George, 

a much larger operation, was 

also planned and executed to 

near perfection. Chauncey’s 

fleet shuttled several thousand soldiers from Sackett’s 

Harbor until Dearborn had 

about forty-seven hundred 

regulars at Four Mile Creek. 

Dearborn organized his force 

into an advance guard and 

three brigades.

General Dearborn gave 

command of the advance 

guard to Col. Winfield Scott. 

Scott had commanded American forces atop Queenston 

Heights in the last phase of 

that battle. Captured and 

eventually exchanged, Scott had been promoted and given command 

of the 2d U.S. Artillery. Dearborn held Scott in high regard and had 

made him his adjutant general. For the Fort George operation, Scott 

handpicked his landing force. It included Forsyth’s rifle battalion, 

three infantry companies, and two artillery companies fighting as 

infantry.

Dearborn’s brigade commanders represented a mixed bag. Brig. 

Gen. John Boyd commanded the 1st U.S. Brigade. Boyd had spent 
•••• 18 ••••

nine years in India commanding native forces, and returned 

to America in 1798 a rich man. 

He had commanded the 4th 

U.S. Infantry at the Battle of 

Tippecanoe in 1811 and was 

promoted to brigadier general 

soon after the declaration of 

war. Brig. Gen. William Winder 

commanded the 2d U.S. Brigade 

in Dearborn’s army. A prominent Baltimore lawyer and militia officer who lacked military 

experience, Winder had risen 

rapidly over a year’s time to the 

rank of brigadier general. Some 

considered Winder’s promotion 

politically motivated because he 

was the nephew of the Federalist governor of Maryland. Brig. 

Gen. John Chandler commanded 

the 3d U.S. Brigade. A veteran 

of the Revolutionary War from 

Massachusetts, Chandler had 

been a blacksmith, tavern keeper, 

militia officer, and state senator. 

A political appointee, Chandler 

received a commission as a brigadier general in 1812 and, like Winder, 

had seen no military action thus far in the war. 

Too ill to command on the ground himself, Dearborn gave command of the operation to his second in command, Maj. Gen. Morgan 

Lewis, who also lacked recent military experience. Another veteran of 

the Revolutionary War and a former governor of New York, Lewis 

was the brother-in-law of the secretary of war and a personal friend 

of the president.

Fort George was located near the northern mouth of the Niagara River, about one thousand yards directly south of Fort Niagara 

on the opposite shore. The small village of Newark (now called 

Niagara-on-the-Lake) was immediately northwest of Fort George 

and across the river from Fort Niagara. Fort George consisted of 

six bastions connected by an earthen parapet topped by a wooden 

palisade. A shallow ditch surrounded the fortification. Inside were 

Winfield Scott,

by Joseph Wood

(Library of Congress) •••••••••••••••
•••• 19 ••••

a few wooden barracks, warehouses, and blockhouses as well as a 

stone magazine. The British commander, Maj. Gen. John Vincent, 

defended Fort George with five artillery pieces: three guns and two 

mortars. He had eleven other pieces located in five detached batteries along the riverbank facing Fort Niagara. The Americans had 

twenty-five artillery pieces mounted in Fort Niagara or in batteries 

along the eastern riverbank. 

General Vincent had a slender force under his command—one 

thousand regulars, three hundred militia, and sixty native warriors. 

He was well aware that his fort was a major American objective. 

He did not know, however, how the Americans would attack. 

Therefore, he split his meager command into three elements. He 

placed one force along a likely landing beach on Lake Ontario to 

the west of Niagara. He sent another to guard against a potential 

river crossing south of the fort. He retained the last element under 

his personal command at Fort George. Vincent had troops and 

guns thinly spread along a five-mile arc. While he fully intended 

to defend the fort, he also understood that his ultimate goal was 

to keep his forces intact for future operations. 

General Dearborn gave Colonel Scott the task of planning the 

attack on Fort George. Scott aimed to destroy Vincent’s division, not 

just seize the fortification. There were two escape routes out of Fort 

George. One route headed west along the shore of Lake Ontario. This 

would take Vincent’s retreating army to Burlington Heights, a natural 

defensive position overlooking Burlington Bay at the head of Lake 

Ontario. The second route that Vincent might take was the river road 

connecting Fort George with the village of Queenston and the security 

of Queenston Heights. Scott planned to close both escape routes. The 

major landing would take place west of Niagara between that town 

and Two Mile Creek. The bulk of the American army would land 

there and head directly toward Fort George. However, Scott planned 

for Col. James Burn and his 2d Regiment of Light Dragoons to cross 

the Niagara River several miles south of Fort George and block the 

road leading to Queenston. 

Scott and Chauncey then focused on the Navy’s role. In this, they 

were assisted by Master Commandant Perry. When the energetic Perry 

had learned of the planned attack, he had rushed to Fort Niagara 

to be a part of the upcoming battle. The day before the landing, 

Chauncey and Perry reconnoitered the shore from the schooner Lady 

of the Lake. They planted buoys marking the location for each of 

Chauncey’s vessels so that they would be well positioned to cover the 

landing with naval gunfire.
•••• 20 ••••

After midnight on 27 May, thousands of American soldiers 

at Four Mile Creek east of Fort Niagara entered bateaux and 

scows. Chauncey’s vessels pulled the landing craft out into Lake 

Ontario about two miles from shore. Each brigade formed in a 

line of boats with Scott’s eight hundred men in twenty vessels in 

the lead. When dawn came, a heavy fog covered the lake. Soldiers 

and sailors waited impatiently to begin their rush to the shore. 

When the fog eventually cleared, General Vincent saw sixteen 

ships and a vast number of bateaux laden with soldiers moving, 

relentlessly, toward the landing beach. Moments later, more than 

fifty guns from the American squadron roared out. Solid shot and 

exploding shells crashed onto the shore and the fields beyond. 

Perry moved between ships in a gig and shouted commands to 

the ships’ captains to better adjust their gunfire. British infantry 

and native warriors kept under the cover of streambeds as Scott 

and his advance guard approached. 

Despite the heavy naval gunfire, the British and natives fired at 

Scott’s men as they landed. The American advance guard formed 

under fire and assaulted up the twelve-foot-high embankment just 

beyond the landing. Fighting was desperate. Scott nearly reached 

the top of the bank when he dodged a bayonet thrust, lost his footing, and fell back down onto the beach. Dearborn, watching from 

the flagship Madison, cried out that Scott had been killed. Winfield 

Scott picked himself up and climbed back up the bank. 

General Boyd’s brigade landed, formed, and threw its weight 

into the assault. Eventually the Americans gained the crest of the 

embankment. The British were hardly twenty yards away when the 

two sides opened up a furious, violent firefight. Despite the arrival 

of reinforcements, the British could not stand up to superior numbers. Vincent, well aware that he was vastly outnumbered, ordered 

his men to abandon Fort George and to move on the southerly 

road toward Queenston. Along the way, he picked up another 

road leading westward to Burlington Heights and relative safety. 

He ordered the guns of Fort George spiked and the magazine and 

bastions blown up. 

With the British retreating, Scott formed his advance guard to 

maintain contact. Forsyth’s riflemen, advancing in a skirmish line, 

followed the enemy. Scott himself took two companies of artillery 

and moved directly to Fort George. He found a horse and galloped 

toward the fort ahead of his men. Just as he approached the main 

gate, the magazine exploded. A piece of falling timber knocked Scott 

from his mount, causing him to break his collarbone in the fall. 
•••• 21 ••••

Despite his injury, Scott entered the abandoned fort, found an axe, 

and chopped down the flagpole to claim the British flag. Meanwhile, 

Capts. Thomas Stockton and Jacob Hindman rushed past Scott 

and cut the fuses leading to the gunpowder stored in each bastion. 

(See Map 2.)

Scott turned his attention to pursuing the British, gathered his 

advance guard, and set off on the road toward Queenston. Colonel 

Burn and his dragoons had been delayed in crossing the river and arrived too late to block the British escape. Burn eventually joined with 

Scott’s men in pursuing the British. Morgan Lewis, unaware of the 

situation and exceptionally cautious by nature, sent two orders to Scott 

to call off the pursuit. General Lewis feared that Scott risked defeat 

if Vincent turned to fight. Scott continued his advance until General 

Boyd caught up with him and ordered him to return to Fort George. 

There was nothing more to do; General Vincent managed to escape, 

and within days he and his weak division were at Burlington Heights.

Capture of Fort George, engraving by Alonzo Chappel

(Library of Congress) •••••••••••••••
27 May

28 May

30 Dec

17 Dec

19 Dec

19 Dec

19 Dec

30 Dec

27 May Four Mile Cr

Frenchman’s Cr

L a k e O n t a r i o

L a k e E r i e

Niagara R

Niagara R

Goat Island

Niagara Falls

Queenston Heights

Beechwoods

to Burlington

Heights

Tuscarora Village

G r a n d I s l a n d

Fort George

Fort Erie

Fort Schlosser

Fort Niagara

Manchester

Lewiston

Queenston

Newark

Youngstown

Chippewa

Bualo

Black

 Rock

N E W Y O R K

U P P E R

C A N A D A

N I AG A R A R I V E R

OPERATIONAL AREA

May–December 1813

0 5

Miles

U.S. Movement

British Movement

British Retreat

Battle Site

Map 2
•••• 23 ••••

Upon learning the American fleet was at Fort George, Governor General Sir George Prevost planned a riposte. He and his naval 

commander, Commodore Sir James Yeo, decided to raid the key 

American naval base at Sackett’s Harbor to capture what naval stores 

they could and to destroy the shipbuilding facilities and any vessels 

under construction. They understood that the defense of Upper 

Canada was impossible if the Americans gained naval superiority 

on Lake Ontario. On the evening of 27 May, Yeo’s squadron towed 

nine hundred soldiers in thirty-three bateaux and other small craft 

onto the lake and headed for the American base. The wind was weak, 

and on the following day, the British squadron was still approaching 

Sackett’s Harbor. American picket ships spotted the British and sailed 

back to sound the alarm. The senior American officer at Sackett’s 

Harbor, Col. Electus Backus of the 1st Regiment of Light Dragoons, 

had only 313 dragoons, 142 artillerymen, and 167 men of the Albany 

Volunteers to defend the base. He therefore sent word to the local 

militia commander, Brig. Gen. Jacob J. Brown, who ordered out the 

county militia before riding to Sackett’s Harbor from his home eight 

miles away. Additionally, there were over three hundred wounded and 

sick in the hospital in Fort Volunteer.

Prevost knew that he had lost the element of surprise and contemplated aborting the mission. However, the British saw a number 

of bateaux carrying soldiers along the shore toward Sackett’s Harbor. These were about two hundred fifty American recruits. The 

wind shifted direction sufficiently for Prevost to send a gunboat and 

about forty Indians in canoes to intercept the American bateaux. The 

Americans, hearing the yells and seeing the Indians in their war paint, 

pulled for shore and fled into the forest. The natives followed, and in 

an uneven battle, killed over twenty Americans at the cost of just a 

single warrior. Over one hundred fifteen Americans then reboarded 

their boats and paddled out to the British fleet to offer their surrender 

rather than to fall into the hands of the Indians. For the Americans, 

the battle for Sackett’s Harbor was off to a shaky start.

Encouraged by his easy victory over the recruits, Prevost decided 

to go ahead with the attack. The next morning, at dawn on 29 May, 

the British came ashore on Horse Island, continuously under fire from 

the Albany Volunteers. As more British infantry landed, the Albany 

Volunteers broke contact and withdrew across the causeway that linked 

the island to the mainland. They took up a position to the right of 

General Brown and several hundred militiamen. Brown had placed 

his citizen-soldiers behind a natural breastwork to give them cover 

and confidence. The militia and volunteers opened fire as the British 
•••• 24 ••••

rushed across the narrow path between the island and the mainland. 

The militia fired a ragged volley and then quickly withdrew without 

orders. Brown was furious. He desperately tried to rally his scattering 

command, taking him temporarily out of the battle. Fortunately for 

the Americans, the wind was so weak that only three British vessels 

could work their way close enough to shore to add their firepower to the 

battle. Meanwhile, the Albany Volunteers linked up with the regulars 

under Colonel Backus. Both groups slowly withdrew toward the barracks at Basswood Cantonment, where they stood and fought it out.

British and American regulars exchanged a heavy fire in which 

Colonel Backus fell mortally wounded. Command of the regulars and 

volunteers devolved upon Maj. Jacint Laval of the light dragoons. The 

British made several assaults on the barracks and nearby Fort Tompkins but were thrown back each time. To their great credit, a body 

of militia under the leadership of Capt. Samuel McNitt rallied and 

rejoined the fight. In the confusion, an American naval officer ordered 

the burning of the shipyard and the nearly completed ship, General 

Pike. Brown confronted another body of wavering militiamen and 

successfully directed them back into battle. Prevost saw the shipyard 

on fire, and sensing the futility of continuing the attack against stiff 

American resistance, ordered his forces to return to their boats. As 

the British withdrew, the Americans turned their attention to putting 

out the fires. The British had suffered more than 250 casualties, while 

the Americans recorded 156 casualties on the twenty-ninth and nearly 

140 more on the day before. Colonel Backus died eight days after 

the battle. Brown had missed much of the desperate fighting while 

rallying straggling militiamen. Nonetheless, the duty of writing the 

battle report fell to him as did the glory of the victory. Seven weeks 

later, the president named Brown a brigadier general in the Regular 

Army. Chauncey and his squadron returned to Sackett’s Harbor a 

few days after the battle and contemplated just how close the British 

had come to destroying the shipyard and its hoard of naval stores. 

Never again would Chauncey leave his base at risk. 

Shorn of naval support after Chauncey’s withdrawal, Dearborn’s 

army suffered two major setbacks that effectively doomed the 1813 

campaign to clear the British from the Niagara region. The first setback, the nighttime Battle of Stoney Creek, evolved from Dearborn’s 

belated attempt to pursue the British force that had escaped after the 

fight for Fort George. Dearborn was very ill and his handling of the 

campaign reflected muddled thinking. General Winder, the Baltimore 

lawyer, lobbied hard to get command of the pursuing force. The cautious Dearborn eventually gave Winder what he wanted.
•••• 25 ••••

Winder started out on 1 June, marching his seventeen hundred 

men along the narrow plain between the escarpment and Lake Ontario. Several creeks and ravines cut his line of march, while a handful of Indians and Canadian militiamen shadowed the column. By 

the next day, Winder’s advance guard reached Forty Mile Creek, so 

named because it was that distance from the mouth of the Niagara 

River to the east. Dearborn, unsure of British strength, ordered former blacksmith John Chandler to take his brigade and join Winder. 

Chandler outranked Winder and would take command. On 5 June, 

Chandler’s brigade caught up to Winder’s just west of Stoney Creek, 

a minor stream emptying into Lake Ontario. The American advance 

guard under Capt. Jacob Hindman had aggressively pushed back a 

British picket. This small engagement gave the Americans confidence 

but caused dismay in the British camp. 

Chandler chose a good location for the two brigades. The left 

flank was anchored by the escarpment and the right flank by a swamp. 

However, he allowed his subordinate commanders to choose the positions of their bivouacs, resulting in a patchwork of unit campsites. A 

battery of guns covered the main road, but with no infantry within 

supporting distance. The 25th U.S. Infantry encamped about two 

hundred yards forward of the rest of the army. These soldiers started 

a number of campfires and began cooking supper when their regimental commander, Lt. Col. Joseph Lee Smith, ordered the men to 

pull back closer to their comrades. The men obeyed, leaving their fires 

burning. Smith’s decision probably saved his men from being overrun 

in the ensuing battle. Unfortunately, he moved without informing 

Captain Hindman, whose advance guard battalion was posted on 

Smith’s right flank. For other security, Chandler had deployed a rifle 

company as a picket west of the camp. The riflemen posted a few 

sentries, with the rest asleep in a church building. Chandler had also 

dispatched eight hundred soldiers of the 13th and 14th U.S. Infantry 

to guard the supply boats on the lake shore. This left him with about 

two thousand men at the main encampment.

Numerous members of the command later commented on the 

faulty arrangement of their camp. Lt. Ephraim Shaler, in his memoir, 

critiqued Chandler’s decision to allow each unit to choose its own 

position.

This was a great military blunder and the first I had discovered since 

we left Fort George. Being in an enemy’s country and within a few 

miles of a large body of well disciplined troops (besides militia and 

Indians, who had been hanging about us all day, though generally at 
•••• 26 ••••

a respectful distance) the whole brigade should have been encamped 

in regular military order, having a rallying point designated by the 

commanding General, to be understood by every commandant 

of a regiment; but unhappily for us, no such point was designated

Despite their commander’s error, many of the regimental officers 

fully expected to be attacked in the darkness, and they directed their 

soldiers to sleep with their weapons loaded.

British General John Vincent and his small division were only 

twelve miles away, perched on Burlington Heights. Vincent was in a 

difficult spot. Food and ammunition were both in short supply, and 

the Americans heavily outnumbered his force. However, he had to 

hold his position for as long as possible because it guarded the supply line to Maj. Gen. Henry Procter’s division around Detroit. Loss 

of Burlington Heights would lead to the loss of all British holdings 

west of Lake Ontario. Vincent’s second in command, the very able 

Lt. Col. John Harvey, scouted the American camp. He discovered 

the haphazard layout and reported this to Vincent. Until this time, 

Vincent believed that he had only two options, either to defend Burlington Heights in an unequal battle the following day or to withdraw 

back to York. Harvey, and others, suggested a third option, a night 

attack on the American camp. Vincent reluctantly agreed. Night attacks were notoriously risky, but all of his options were uncertain. 

Colonel Harvey took eight hundred infantrymen and a handful 

of Indian warriors and stealthily approached the American camp. 

He cautioned his soldiers not to make any sounds that might alert 

the Americans. The British had even removed the flints from their 

muskets so that no weapon could accidentally discharge. Along the 

way, the British captured or bayoneted at least three sentinels. They 

surrounded the church containing the sleeping picket guard and 

quietly captured Lt. Henry Van Swearingen and twenty-five of his 

riflemen. At 0220 on 6 June, the British assault columns came close 

enough to the American camp to see the campfires left burning by 

the 25th U.S. Infantry. Believing that they had caught the Americans 

by surprise, several of the attackers cheered as they moved forward. 

An American sentinel fired his musket and withdrew to the nearest 

American unit. The Americans quickly formed their lines as the 

British moved through the abandoned camp and realized their error.

Now the British were at the disadvantage. Backlit by the campfires, the British were easily seen by the Americans, who were themselves still in darkness. As the first American volleys tore into their 

ranks, the British were frantically returning the flints to their firelocks. 
•••• 27 ••••

The billowing smoke from the American muskets and cannon soon 

provided concealment for both sides. The natives allied to the British, 

as well as many British soldiers, let loose frightening yells. This terrorized many of the Americans; the memory of the Raisin River Massacre was still fresh on their minds. Eight-year-old Elizabeth Gage, 

War of 1812 Color Bearer of the 25th U.S. Infantry,

by Don Troiani

(Don Troiani Image Bank)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 28 ••••

in whose house several officers had taken up quarters, recalled many 

years later, “The officers rushed out of the house when the noise 

commenced and soon some of the soldiers came running in. I well 

remember how scared they were. They thought it was the Indians, 

from the yelling, and were afraid of being tomahawked.” Captain 

Hindman’s advance guard of about three hundred men was caught 

forward of the main body of Americans. Unaware that Colonel 

Smith had pulled back a few hours earlier, Hindman held his ground. 

General Winder, not knowing that there were still Americans forward 

of the artillery, saw the activity and decided that this was a body of 

British. He ordered the artillery to fire into Hindman’s men with canister. Charged in the front by a line of British bayonets and receiving 

deadly fire from their own artillery in the rear, Hindman’s soldiers 

withdrew as best they could.

Meanwhile, the outnumbered British could not make an impression on the main American line. They charged the 25th U.S. Infantry 

at least three times and were thrown back by volleys of musketry. 

Many of the British soldiers began slipping quietly in the dark toward the rear and relative safety. Then, a chain of events occurred 

that tipped the scales in favor of the King’s men. Chandler, riding 

frantically from unit to unit, was thrown from his horse and knocked 

unconscious. Coming to but shaken, he limped toward his artillery 

unit to direct its fire. The artillery was in the center of the American line but was still unsupported by infantry. For some unknown 

reason, the artillerymen had no muskets with them. Maj. Charles 

Plenderleath, commander of the British 49th Regiment of Foot, found 

himself a short distance from the American guns as they discharged. 

Plenderleath, on horse, ordered a bayonet assault and led fewer than 

thirty infantrymen at a dead run directly toward the American cannon, hoping to reach them before they fired again. 

The impact was horrific. Unable to defend themselves from British steel, the unarmed American gunners fled, died, or surrendered. 

General Chandler, not realizing that the guns were now in enemy 

hands, staggered into the swarm with sword in hand and was quickly 

captured. Within minutes, General Winder and his staff rode up to 

the guns in the darkness. Winder was about to direct the fire of the 

artillery when British soldiers surrounded and captured him.

In the few remaining hours of darkness, firing slackened and 

eventually ceased. The British gathered their wounded and prisoners and trudged back to Burlington Heights. American regimental 

commanders, eager to receive orders from their brigade commanders, 

heard nothing and therefore did nothing. They did not learn that their 
•••• 29 ••••

generals were missing until the next morning. Command devolved 

upon Colonel Burn of the light dragoons. While personally brave, 

Burn was entirely unsuited for the task at hand. The American brigades were still more or less intact and in possession of the battlefield, 

yet he ordered a withdrawal to Forty Mile Creek. 

At this point, Commodore Chauncey’s decision to remain at Sackett’s Harbor came into play. Royal Navy Commodore Yeo brought 

a small squadron from Kingston to see the situation at Fort George 

for himself. The feverish Dearborn was alarmed to learn that British 

vessels were sailing near the mouth of the Niagara. With most of his 

army forty miles away, he feared that Yeo was about to land a force 

to retake Fort George. He ordered the army to return to Fort George. 

Yeo’s ships harried the American withdrawal by attacking the column’s 

supply boats until the force finally reached Fort George on 9 June. 

After the Battle of Stoney Creek, Lt. Joseph Hawley Dwight 

recorded in his journal his frustration at the incompetence of his 

superior officers. “Here we saw the blessed effects of having plough 

joggers for generals whose greatest merits consist of being warm 

partisans and supporting administration right or wrong.” Dwight 

was not the only disgruntled soldier. Many believed that their commanders had demonstrated shortcomings and a fatal lack of resolve. 

Within weeks, a second disaster shocked the Americans and threw 

them back onto the defensive for the remainder of the year. Dearborn, 

still too ill to lead effectively, appointed General Boyd as his second in 

command. The British, augmented with several hundred Indian warriors, successfully bottled up the Americans in Fort George. Desirous 

to seize the initiative once again, Dearborn directed Boyd to seize a 

British outpost, the DeCew House. Lt. James FitzGibbon, leader of 

a highly effective British guerrilla band, made his headquarters at this 

location, roughly ten miles southwest of Queenston. Boyd gave the 

mission to conduct the raid to Lt. Col. Charles G. Boerstler, commander of the 14th U.S. Infantry. Lt. Col. Cyrenius Chapin and his 

guerrilla band of American mounted volunteers guided Boerstler’s 

battalion. Boerstler and Chapin could hardly tolerate one another. 

Nonetheless, the American force started out on 23 June and reached 

Queenston after dark. 

Early the next morning, Boerstler’s command of about five hundred regulars of the 14th U.S. Infantry and two dozen of Chapin’s 

volunteers climbed the escarpment and picked up a trail heading 

toward the DeCew House near the village of Beaver Dams. A small 

force of Indians under the command of Dominique Ducharme ambushed the Americans as they passed through a forest known locally 
•••• 30 ••••

as the Beechwood. The confused fighting lasted for three hours as the 

warriors surrounded the Americans. Boerstler’s men were running 

out of ammunition and Boerstler himself was wounded in the thigh. 

British Lieutenant FitzGibbon eventually arrived at the battle and 

approached the Americans under a flag of truce. He told Boerstler 

that he would be unable to prevent a massacre unless Boerstler surrendered immediately. The bluff worked. The Americans had suffered 

about thirty killed and another fifty wounded. Unable to break free 

of the ambush and fearing a slaughter, Boerstler agreed to surrender 

his command. The Battle of Beaver Dams ended as the 14th U.S. 

Infantry trudged off to captivity. 

Fed up with Dearborn’s lack of success, Secretary Armstrong 

moved him to a quiet command in New York City and appointed 

General Wilkinson to replace him. The American army on the Niagara Peninsula, demoralized by defeat and now riddled with disease, 

barely managed to hold on to Fort George while it awaited its new 

commander.

Defending the Northwest, January–August 1813

The loss of Brig. Gen. James Winchester’s brigade on the River 

Raisin in January 1813 shattered William Henry Harrison’s plans to 

recapture Detroit. The short battle had cost the Americans nearly 

nine hundred men killed or captured. Fewer than one hundred had 

evaded capture to return to American lines. Encouraged by the series 

of British victories in late 1812 and early 1813, the Indians of the 

Northwest Territory drove American settlers eastward. The Shawnee 

chief, Tecumseh, provided vision and charismatic leadership to this 

revived native movement. 

Other factors forced General Harrison to adopt a defensive 

posture, at least temporarily. His militia forces would reach the end 

of their short term of service in February and March, leaving him 

with only some regulars and twelve-month volunteers. British naval 

forces controlled Lake Erie, at least until summer when Perry’s fleet 

being built at Erie might be ready to challenge them. Therefore, supplies for Harrison’s army had to be moved by land and river, always 

a challenge on the frontier. The thawing roads were impassible for 

wagons and artillery, and supply columns were always under the 

threat of ambush. Harrison decided to plan the 1813 campaign with 

deliberation and solid preparation. To that end, he determined to 

construct a large base of operations on the south bank of the Maumee 

River, not far from where that river entered Lake Erie. Harrison was 

well served in this endeavor by Capt. Eleazar Wood, a particularly 
•••• 31 ••••

energetic and skilled engineer and a graduate of the United States 

Military Academy. 

Wood laid out a fortification on high ground about three hundred 

yards from the river. The fort enclosed eight acres and consisted of 

seven blockhouses and five batteries connected by a high timber palisade. Captain Wood directed workers to build two traverses inside the 

fortification. Each traverse was a continuous earthen wall, ten feet in 

height, which would limit the damage of artillery rounds landing inside 

the fort. Wood wrapped the two ammunition magazines in earthen walls 

for added protection. The Americans mounted twenty artillery pieces 

in the batteries, including four 18-pounder cannon, heavy pieces for 

frontier work. Harrison named the complex Fort Meigs, in honor of 

the governor of Ohio, whose citizens were protected by the new fort. 

On 25 April, British General Procter departed Fort Amherstburg 

on the Detroit River with nearly one thousand regulars and militia. 

On 27 April, he united with Tecumseh, who had brought nearly 

fourteen hundred Indian warriors to the Maumee River. The two 

leaders decided on a formal siege of Fort Meigs. The following day, 

in a rainfall, the British prepared four battery positions on the left 

bank of the river opposite the American fort. Tecumseh positioned his 

forces south of the river to encircle the American position. The British 

brought eight artillery pieces with them, including two 24-pounder 

guns. Over the next few days, they threw nearly one thousand rounds 

into the fort. This heavy fire killed seven Americans and wounded 

seventeen others, light casualties for the intensity of the cannonade. 

The Americans, who were short on artillery ammunition, set about 

recovering some of the shot that had landed in the fort. The armorers issued a measure of whiskey for each recovered cannon ball, a 

powerful incentive for the men under siege. 

On 3 May, the Americans discovered that the British had established a battery of guns on the southern side of the river only four 

hundred yards from the fort. Now the fort was in a cross fire. The 

men reacted quickly, throwing up shorter traverses at right angles to 

the new line of enemy fire. The following day, Procter demanded that 

Harrison surrender. With morale high and casualties low among the 

garrison, and with the knowledge that Kentucky militia under the 

command of Brig. Gen. Green Clay was coming down the river from 

Fort Defiance by flatboat, Harrison shrugged off the demand. When 

General Clay managed to get a message through that his Kentuckians were only a few hours away, Harrison devised a plan to break 

the siege. He sent Capt. John Hamilton through Indian lines to link 

up and deliver the plan to Clay.
•••• 32 ••••

General Harrison directed that two-thirds of the Kentucky militia, about eight hundred men, land on the north bank of the river 

and stealthily move toward the British batteries to spike the guns and 

destroy the gun carriages. Hamilton provided Clay with the necessary 

spikes. As soon as the Kentuckians silenced the four British batteries, they were to regain their boats and cross back to the south bank 

before the British in their nearby camp could react. The remainder 

of the Kentuckians, about four hundred, would land on the south 

side of the river and cut their way through the Indian warriors and 

reach the safety of the fort. Meanwhile, Harrison would assault and 

destroy the lone British battery on his side of the Maumee. The plan 

was solid, but the execution was not. 

Early on 5 May, Clay directed Lt. Col. William Dudley to lead his 

regiment in an assault of the British batteries, while Clay moved with 

Lt. Col. William Boswell’s smaller regiment directly to Fort Meigs. 

Clay and Boswell’s men fought their way through the native warriors 

and reached the fort, bringing their wounded with them. Dudley’s 

regiment, however, headed for disaster. Dudley divided his men into 

three columns. The left column would quietly move around the batteries, interposing itself between the guns and the British camp beyond. 

The center column would form a reserve. Dudley would lead the right 

column directly to the guns. However, Dudley had not briefed his men 

thoroughly, particularly of the importance of moving to Fort Meigs as 

soon as the batteries were dealt with. Dudley’s column assaulted the 

guns successfully without losing a man. The spikes were inexplicably 

missing, and Dudley’s men vainly attempted to drive musket ramrods 

into the touchholes of the cannon. While Dudley’s men fumbled in 

trying to destroy guns, the left column ran into enemy warriors and 

pursued them into the forest and out of range of the covering fire from 

the American guns in Fort Meigs. Rather than obey orders to return to 

Fort Meigs immediately after spiking the guns, Dudley instead followed 

his left column into the forest. Procter, learning that his batteries had 

been taken, immediately counterattacked (Map 3). 

The American units entering the forest lost their cohesion as 

Indian warriors drew them deeper into a trap. The Indians killed 

Dudley and dozens of his men. Hundreds of Americans surrendered 

to the British in the hope of escaping the scalping knife. As the new 

prisoners were marched off toward the British camp, the Indians escaped control and began shooting and tomahawking the Kentuckians. 

The British guard proved insufficient to stop the massacre. At least 

forty Kentuckians died after their surrender. Although one British 

soldier died trying, Procter failed to stop the killing. When Tecumseh 
•••• 33 ••••

arrived on the scene and brought his men under control, he accused 

Procter of moral cowardice. Relations between the two were shaky 

from that moment forward.

Meanwhile, Col. John Miller of the 19th U.S. Infantry led a 

sortie of about three hundred fifty regulars, volunteers, and militia 

that successfully captured the battery on the southern side of the 

river. Tecumseh’s warriors counterattacked, but Miller’s men repelled 

their repeated assaults and returned to the fort with forty-one British 

Fort Stephenson

1–2 Aug

1 Aug

Perry’s Naval Engagement 10 Sep

Fort Meigs 28 Apr–9 May

21–28 Jul

Moraviantown

5 Oct

Maumee R

Thames R

River Raisin

Detroit R

Sandusky R

Lake

St. Clair

L a k e

H u r o n

L a k e E r i e

Fort Deance

Fort Miami

Fort Amherstburg

Fort Seneca

Frenchtown

Brownstown

Sandwich

Detroit

M I C H I G A N

T E R R I T O R Y

I N D I A N A T E R R I T O R Y

O H I O

U P P E R

C A N A D A

N O R T H W E S T O P E R AT I O NS

27 April–5 October 1813

British Movement

British Retreat

Battle Site

0 25 50

Miles

Map 3
•••• 34 ••••

prisoners. Miller lost thirty killed and nearly ninety wounded in the 

sharp battle. 

Despite destroying Dudley’s regiment, Procter was unable to 

continue the siege. Tecumseh’s Indians drifted away with the weapons and clothing looted from the Kentuckians. Canadian militiamen 

appealed to Procter to return home to plant corn. Dysentery and 

fever had thinned British ranks and supplies were running short. He 

therefore lifted the siege on 9 May. Subsequent news of the American 

successes at York and Fort George further dampened Procter’s likelihood of victory, while General Sheaffe refused to send reinforcements 

westward as he judged they were needed along Lake Ontario and the 

Niagara region.

Procter understood the overriding importance of control of 

Lake Erie in defending western Upper Canada. However, he was 

unwilling to gamble his slender force of regulars in an attack on 

the American squadron under construction at Erie. Instead, in 

July he gave in to Indian demands to renew the attack on Fort 

Meigs. This time, the American garrison was much stronger than 

in May. Having failed to lure the defenders out of the fort, Procter 

departed Fort Meigs and moved against Fort Stephenson, a small 

timber stockade fortification surrounded by a ditch, located on the 

Sandusky River. Maj. George Croghan of the 17th U.S. Infantry 

Miller’s Charge on 5 May 1813

(Fort Meigs Association)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 35 ••••

led about two hundred regulars in a determined defense. On 1 

August, Procter demanded the fort’s surrender. Failure to capitulate, he warned, might result in a massacre by the Indians fighting 

alongside the British. Croghan refused. A British cannonade by 

three 6-pounder guns failed to breach the stockade. Nonetheless, 

the following day, Procter ordered an assault. The Indians who 

were supposed to join the attack failed to do so. American gunfire 

cut down British infantrymen in the ditch, and Procter called off 

the attack. The British suffered nearly one hundred casualties, including twenty-nine prisoners, while the defending Americans lost 

one soldier killed and seven wounded. Procter withdrew to lick his 

wounds. The British failure at Fort Stephenson marked the limit 

of their successes. The advantage was about to shift inexorably to 

Harrison, and the turning point proved the most decisive naval 

fight of the war.

Operations in the Northwest: The Offense, September–October 1813

In 1813, Master Commandant Perry directed a most improbable 

undertaking, the creation of a naval squadron from scratch on the 

shores of Lake Erie. Just as his superior Isaac Chauncey had engaged 

in a naval arms race with Sir James Yeo on Lake Ontario, Perry was 

in a desperate race to outbuild British Capt. Robert Heriot Barclay’s 

squadron. Both Perry and Barclay were dependent on their leaders, 

Chauncey and Yeo, for every sailor, shipwright, cannon, sail, and cable. 

Barclay’s vessels were stationed at the shipyard at Amherstburg on 

the Detroit River. After Fort George fell in May, American vessels at 

Black Rock on the Niagara River evaded the British and joined the rest 

of the Lake Erie squadron in Presque Isle Bay at Erie, Pennsylvania.

Although well protected from lake storms and British guns, 

Presque Isle Bay was nearly blocked at its mouth by an extensive 

sandbar. Allowing only six feet of draft, the sandbar prevented Perry’s 

brigs from leaving the bay when loaded with cannon and stores. At the 

end of July, Perry was ready to move, and as luck would have it, just 

as Barclay’s squadron, which had been blockading the harbor, moved 

off. The Americans sent their smaller craft into the lake to protect the 

effort of the larger ships to cross the sand obstacle as best they could. 

Perry’s men off-loaded the guns and rigging from the brigs Lawrence

and Niagara and attached water-filled containers called camels to 

the sides of the Lawrence. As water was pumped out of the camels, 

the Lawrence rose in the water. Crews dragged the Lawrence across 

the wide sandbar and into deep water. The Americans repeated the 

process with the Niagara. 
•••• 36 ••••

The entire process took four days during which time the squadron 

was particularly vulnerable to attack. On 4 August, with Lawrence

still unarmed and Niagara only part way across the sandbar, Barclay 

returned to Presque Isle. Had he attacked, the ensuing fight would 

have been one-sided. However, Barclay did not realize the vulnerable 

state of the American squadron. Without his flagship, the sloop-ofwar Detroit, which was not yet ready at the Amherstburg shipyard, 

Barclay did not believe he could successfully challenge Perry. He 

therefore drew off to consolidate his fleet. Perry quickly rearmed his 

brigs and set sail westward, looking to bring Barclay to battle.

At dawn on 10 September, the Americans spotted six of Barclay’s vessels. Perry gave the order to close, but the wind was against 

him. The American squadron consisted of the brigs Lawrence and 

Niagara and seven smaller vessels. Few crewmen in either fleet were 

fully trained sailors. Many were soldiers and recently recruited landsmen. Kentucky riflemen sat high in the rigging of the American ships 

to pick off officers aboard British ships. Perry had the advantage 

in firepower. His vessels had a combined broadside weight of 912 

pounds, nearly twice that for Barclay’s ships. Despite this advantage, 

the battle could easily have gone to Barclay. 

In midmorning, the wind shifted in favor of the Americans. While 

the British vessels formed in line to await the Americans, Perry’s 

squadron was strung out in a column a mile long. Perry aboard his 

flagship, Lawrence, ran up his battle flag, a blue pennant emblazoned 

with the immortal words of naval hero James Lawrence, “Don’t Give 

Up the Ship.” Trailing astern came Niagara commanded by Master 

Commandant Jesse D. Elliott. Shortly after noon, Lawrence came 

into reach of the long-range guns of three of Barclay’s vessels. For 

the next two hours, Lawrence fought for survival in an uneven contest. For some inexplicable reason, Elliott hung back out of the fight. 

Every officer aboard Lawrence except Perry was killed or wounded 

and few guns were still firing. Perry knew that the only way to win 

this battle was to bring Niagara into action. He climbed into a ship’s 

boat and a crew rowed him through a hail of bullets and cannon 

shot over to Niagara. He took command of Niagara and quickly 

reengaged Barclay’s larger vessels. The British squadron could not 

fend off Niagara with its fresh guns and crew. By 1500, the wounded 

Barclay surrendered his squadron. Perry returned to the stricken 

Lawrence and was greeted with three cheers from the survivors. He 

wrote a message to Harrison: “We have met the enemy and they are 

ours: Two Ships, two Brigs, one Schooner & one Sloop.” Conditions 

were now ripe for Harrison’s advance to retake Detroit.
•••• 37 ••••

Henry Procter well understood that the loss of the British 

squadron left his forces vulnerable if the Americans attacked. 

Barclay’s boats had transported 

supplies across the length of 

Lake Erie. Now, supplies were 

reduced to a trickle. Procter 

declared a limited martial law in 

western Upper Canada in order 

to seize food and wagons and 

to deal with disaffected citizens. 

He consulted with his immediate 

superior, Maj. Gen. Francis de 

Rottenburg, who had replaced 

General Sheaffe following the 

loss of York. After a flurry of exchanged letters, Procter secured 

permission to retreat eastward. 

Tecumseh, eventually learning 

that the British would be abandoning his native warriors, was 

incensed. Nonetheless, he agreed 

to move eastward with Procter 

along the Thames River, with 

an understanding that the combined force would make a stand.

General Harrison also understood the implications of Perry’s victory and prepared for an offensive to destroy Anglo-Indian power in the region. By September, 

he had the services of two regular brigades under the command of 

Brig. Gens. Lewis Cass and Duncan McArthur. Revolutionary War 

veteran and Kentucky Governor Isaac Shelby was moving quickly 

to join Harrison with three brigades of Kentucky militia. Harrison 

also had the services of a uniquely American military formation. 

Congressman Richard M. Johnson was commissioned a colonel and 

commanded a strong regiment of mounted Kentucky volunteers. Clad 

in long black hunting shirts and armed with an assortment of rifles, 

tomahawks, and hunting knives, these experienced frontier fighters 

gave Harrison a mobile shock force. Perry’s squadron controlled Lake 

Erie, easing Harrison’s logistical efforts and giving the Americans 

greater operational reach.

William Henry Harrison, 

by Rembrandt Peale

(National Portrait Gallery, 

Smithsonian)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 38 ••••

On 27 September, Perry landed Harrison’s infantry at the mouth 

of the Detroit River on the Canadian side just south of Fort Amherstburg. That same day, the British, their Indian allies, and hundreds 

of civilians had begun a slow retreat up the Detroit River to Lake 

St. Clair heading toward the mouth of the Thames River. Harrison’s 

men entered Detroit on the twenty-ninth. Capt. Stanton Sholes, who 

commanded a company of the 2d Artillery, recalled, “A part of our 

Army Crossed over to Detroit. At our landing we were met by the 

Citizens men women and Children, on the shore. They manifested 

great Joy, at our timely arrival.”

On 2 October, Harrison set out after Procter. The British had 

a head start of nearly a week, yet their column, burdened by heavy 

baggage, traveled slowly. To quicken their pace, the British burned 

excess weapons, ammunition, and food as they moved eastward along 

the Thames River. Harrison’s forward patrols captured ammunition 

bateaux that had fallen behind in the retreat. 

Learning that Harrison was closing rapidly, Procter chose to make 

his stand just west of the settlement at Moraviantown. He placed his 

regulars on the left, while Tecumseh’s native warriors occupied the 

right. The regulars were anchored by the river on their left and an 

extensive swamp on their right. Not having enough men to cover his 

front in strength, Procter placed his regulars in open order through 

nearly two hundred yards of open woods. A narrow swamp in front 

of the regulars helped shield their position. Tecumseh’s position to the 

north was more protected. The Indians occupied the edge of a broad, 

heavily wooded swamp that ran generally parallel to the river. Because 

they were forward of the regulars, Tecumseh’s warriors flanked any 

attack moving along the road to Moraviantown. 

After his engineer, Eleazar Wood, reconnoitered the enemy positions, Harrison decided to make his main attack against the British regulars, while a brigade of Kentucky militia faced Tecumseh’s 

force in the great swamp. Harrison initially ordered Johnson and his 

mounted riflemen to move across the small swamp in front of the 

British regulars and to attack Tecumseh’s left, where the native warriors linked up with the right of the British line. Johnson offered a 

different course of action. He volunteered his regiment in an attack 

directly into the British regulars. Struck by this bold and unorthodox 

plan, Harrison agreed. Johnson ordered his brother and second in 

command, Lt. Col. James Johnson, to take half the regiment against 

the British line while he led the other half into Tecumseh’s men.

Richard Johnson ordered the bugle to sound the advance. James 

Johnson’s mounted riflemen moved through the woods quickly. The 
•••• 39 ••••

British infantry managed only a ragged volley before the mounted 

Kentuckians, yelling “Remember the Raisin,” rode them down. This 

phase of the battle lasted less than ten minutes. Meanwhile, Colonel 

Johnson’s men charged into Tecumseh’s men in the swamp. Unable 

to navigate the wetlands on horse, Johnson’s men dismounted. The 

Kentucky militia infantry joined the desperate fight. The battle in the 

wooded swamp lasted nearly an hour and was brutal in the extreme 

until Tecumseh was slain. Without their leader, the Indians faded 

into the forest.

No one can say for certain who killed Tecumseh. None of the 

Kentuckians had ever seen him in person. It is most likely that his 

followers took the body and buried it in the forest to keep it out of 

American hands. Johnson’s men flayed the skin of a dead chieftain 

thought to be the great Shawnee leader and brought pieces of it 

back to Kentucky as souvenirs. Procter fled the battlefield after he 

saw his regulars break. About 250 British soldiers managed to withdraw back to Burlington Heights, but 634 were killed or captured. 

Remember the Raisin!

© Ken Riley •••••••••••••••
•••• 40 ••••

Harrison’s men found thirty-three Indian bodies and suspected that 

many more had been carried off. Only about four hundred natives 

withdrew with the British; the rest lost heart with the death of their 

leader and returned to their villages. Miraculously, Harrison lost only 

seven killed and twenty-two wounded. The Americans captured ten 

artillery pieces and recovered many of the battle flags lost at Detroit, 

River Raisin, and Fort Meigs.

Without sufficient provisions to pursue Procter’s broken army, 

Harrison returned to Detroit. Within the next ten days, he dictated 

an armistice to the dispirited Indians. The Indians could return to 

their traditional lands but had to pledge peace, return all prisoners, 

and leave hostages as a guarantee of their future good behavior. The 

Americans provided food and other supplies to the natives. President Madison appointed Brig. Gen. Lewis Cass as governor of the 

Michigan Territory. Cass also governed that part of western Upper 

Canada that fell under American control. He allowed British officials 

willing to take an oath of fidelity to the United States during the occupation to continue in their civil offices. Harrison and Perry were 

celebrated throughout the United States for their decisive victories. 

As for Procter, Governor General Prevost ordered a court-martial 

for the losing commander. The court convicted Procter on several 

charges and suspended him from rank and pay for six months.

The Advance on Montreal, October–November 1813

American success in the West was not matched in the eastern 

theater. Indeed, the continued weaknesses in the U.S. Army in the 

second year of the war were nowhere so well illustrated than by the 

campaign to seize Montreal in the fall of 1813. In March, Secretary 

Armstrong had ordered General Wilkinson, then at New Orleans, 

to report to General Dearborn. Wilkinson was a shady character. 

Although unproven at the time, he was suspected to be in the pay 

of Spanish authorities in Mexico to spy for them. He had also been 

deeply involved in Aaron Burr’s prewar plot to build an empire from 

lands within the Louisiana Territory, but had managed to evade 

charges. Wilkinson’s new command was the 9th Military District, 

comprising upstate New York, Vermont, and parts of Pennsylvania. 

His nemesis, Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton, was also assigned to the 9th 

Military District.

General Hampton, like Wilkinson a veteran of the Revolutionary 

War, was a successful politician and an enormously wealthy South 

Carolina planter. Hampton and Wilkinson had begun their feud 

before the war, and the small officer corps had been bitterly divided 
•••• 41 ••••

in its allegiance between them. Secretary Armstrong promoted both 

men to major general on the same day, Wilkinson taking precedence. 

By summer, Hampton commanded the division of troops on Lake 

Champlain, while Wilkinson and Armstrong moved to Sackett’s 

Harbor to devise a strategy. Hampton secured Armstrong’s agreement 

that he would receive orders only from Armstrong, and not from 

Wilkinson. Hampton’s men were largely new recruits. To his credit, 

he conducted a robust training regimen, although he was accused of 

condoning harsh discipline in order to gain results. Still, there were 

signs that all was not well in the training camps. Pvt. A. S. Cogswell 

of the 11th U.S. Infantry wrote in a letter to a friend:

There is three of our officers appointed to inspect the flour, but they 

do not know good flour from Lime, therefore our Bread has been 

for some time (to speak politely about it) most damnable poor stuff, 

being made mostly of Rye flour, the other parts of our Rations are 

very good, except the whiskey.

Armstrong, Wilkinson, and Chauncey haggled over strategy. 

They considered three options. The first was to restart the floundering campaign on the Niagara Peninsula. The second was to capture 

Kingston, thus depriving the Royal Navy squadron of its essential 

base. The third choice was to seize Montreal, thus cutting off supplies and reinforcements to all British posts on the Great Lakes. Occupation of the Niagara Peninsula would not be decisive to the war 

effort. The choice boiled down to Kingston or Montreal. Chauncey 

preferred to take possession of Kingston, thus eliminating the British squadron. Armstrong and Wilkinson quibbled over the goal of 

the offensive, and in early October, Wilkinson seemed to consent 

to Kingston. Throughout the protracted process of deciding on a 

strategy, Wilkinson was hampered by a debilitating illness. His physician treated him with laudanum, a mixture of opium and alcohol, 

which probably contributed to his cloudy judgment throughout the 

campaign. (See Map 4.)

Meanwhile, Hampton was not brought into the planning process. 

He was aware that his troops would contribute to the campaign, either by threatening Montreal while Wilkinson moved on Kingston 

or by joining Wilkinson somewhere on the St. Lawrence River for a 

combined thrust against Montreal. In September, Hampton marched 

his division of four thousand soldiers north across the border and 

rested at Odelltown. He apparently planned an advance on a route 

parallel to the Richelieu River, thus avoiding the major strongpoint 
•••• 42 ••••

at Isle aux Noix. However, he changed his mind because that line 

of advance would cross territory affected by drought and there 

would be insufficient water for men, horses, and cattle. Instead, he 

moved back south and then westward to Four Corners, New York 

(present-day Malone), on the Chateauguay River. The Chateauguay 

flowed northeast and entered the St. Lawrence opposite Montreal. 

Armstrong instructed Hampton to remain there to give Wilkinson 

more time to prepare for his end of the campaign.

Four weeks after he left Odelltown, Hampton received the order 

to proceed from Armstrong. Hampton’s division advanced down the 

Chateauguay River on 21 October, with Brig. Gen. George Izard as 

second in command. Nearly all of the fourteen hundred New York 

militiamen with him refused to cross the border. The remaining troops 

crossed into Canada, where they ran afoul of Lt. Col. Charles-Michel 

de Salaberry’s French-speaking militia from Lower Canada. 

On 25 October, Hampton encountered a series of barricades and 

abatis that de Salaberry had erected to impede American progress. 

By interviewing the locals, he learned that there were essentially five 

defensive lines stretching nearly two miles along the river. The route 

through the British position was a road through a fairly dense forest. Hampton needed the road to move his guns and supplies. Each 

defensive line consisted of a breastwork of dirt and timber built along 

a stream emptying into the river. The streambed served as a ditch, 

which strengthened the defensive value of the breastwork. The first 

defensive line was further strengthened by an abatis, which extended 

from the river’s edge to a swamp several hundred yards into the forest.

Hampton understood that a direct assault through the strong 

British position would be costly. He learned that there was a ford 

across the Chateauguay located behind the last defensive line, and 

chose a risky strategy which, if successful, would turn the entire defensive line. He ordered Col. Robert Purdy to lead his brigade across 

to the right bank of the river and move directly to the ford. Crossing 

at the ford, Purdy would trap the defenders between himself and 

Hampton. When Hampton heard the firing coming from the distant 

ford, he would order General Izard’s brigade into a frontal attack on 

the first defensive line. Hampton’s plan would catch the defenders 

between two fires, prompting them either to retreat or be captured.

The plan came unraveled almost from the beginning. After sunset 

and in a rainfall, Purdy took his men on a long march through the 

woods and bogs on the right (eastern) bank of the river. In the dark, 

the local guides got lost and Purdy’s men stumbled about trying their 

best to move toward the ford. Meanwhile, back at headquarters, 
Chateauguay

26 Oct

Crysler’s Farm

11 Nov

St.

Lawrence

R

St.

Lawrence R

Chateauguay R

Ottawa R

Lake Champlain

Lake George

R

i

ch

e

li

e

u

R

Salmon R

L a k e O n t a r i o

W I L K I N S O N

W I L K I N S O N

W I L K I N S O N H A M P T O N 16 Nov

Grenadier

Island

Wolfe Island

Long Sault Rapids

Kingston French Creek

Ogdensburg

Prescott

French Mills

Four Corners

Plattsburgh

Lacolle Mill

Isle aux Noix

St. Johns

Montreal

Ottawa

Sackett’s Harbor

Odelltown

N E W Y O R K

T V E R M O N

U P P E R

C A N A D A

L O W E R

C A N A D A

L O W E R

C A N A D A

S T. L AW R E N C E R I V E R

OPERATIONAL AREA

September–December 1813

U.S. MovementBattle Site

0 50 25

Miles

Map 4
•••• 44 ••••

Hampton received a letter directing him to construct winter quarters 

on the American side of the border. Apparently Secretary Armstrong 

was not serious about pressing the campaign. Shaken, Hampton 

could not recall Purdy and therefore decided to continue the attack. 

Hampton ordered Izard to occupy the British forces in the first 

defensive line to draw their attention away from Purdy, who would 

supposedly arrive at the ford soon. Izard ordered the 10th U.S. Infantry forward toward the abatis, and with some difficulty, deployed 

them on line. The regiment marched to the ravine and opened a 

brisk fire on de Salaberry’s men positioned behind the abatis. The 

10th maintained fire until it ran low on ammunition. On the opposite side of the river, Purdy heard the firing and oriented his men to 

move forward. He sent out an advance guard of two companies to 

feel their way through the thick woods, but they encountered some 

warriors and a company of militia. The two sides opened fire and 

sustained the firefight for perhaps fifteen minutes. With very poor 

visibility, both sides believed they were outnumbered and withdrew. 

The Canadian militia fell back upon another company of militia, and 

the combined forces cautiously moved forward to reestablish contact 

with the Americans. Purdy received exaggerated reports from his 

advance guard and an order from Hampton to break off the attack 

and return to the west side of the river. He rallied his men together 

as best he could in preparation for a withdrawal. Meanwhile, Izard 

brought up his entire brigade to support the 10th U.S. Infantry in 

front of de Salaberry’s line. 

Izard formed his three battalions into line and advanced on the 

British position. De Salaberry posted a skirmish line of three companies in front of the abatis. The Americans stood in ranks shoulder to 

shoulder and fired volleys at the Canadians who were hiding behind 

trees and rocks and firing independently. The Canadian fire proved 

quite accurate but could not prevail against the sheer volume of the 

American musketry. De Salaberry pulled his skirmishers back behind 

the abatis and Izard advanced. The intense firefight resumed. Soon 

the Canadians sent their Indian allies into the woods on the western 

side of the fight along with several buglers blowing a charge. To Izard, 

the signs were ominous; he believed the British were outflanking the 

American left. 

Meanwhile, on the opposite side of the river, the two Canadian 

companies made contact with Purdy’s much larger force in the woods 

and opened a brisk fire, which the Americans returned. Neither side 

knew the strength of the other. Eventually the Canadians withdrew 

out of range but re-formed and moved forward yet again. Outnum-
•••• 45 ••••

bered nearly twenty to one, the two Canadian militia companies 

charged the ragged line of Americans in the dense underbrush. 

Thrown back again by the volume of fire, the Canadian militia broke 

contact and withdrew. Some Americans pursued but came into view 

of Canadians on the left bank, who opened fire across the water and 

checked their advance.

Stymied on both flanks and disheartened at the obvious lack 

of confidence shown in his force by the secretary of war, Hampton 

ordered a general withdrawal. His division had lost about fifty men. 

Later, Wilkinson ordered him to continue on toward Montreal, but 

he refused, citing a lack of supplies and sickness among the troops. 

Hampton wrote to Armstrong:

The force is dropping off by fatigue and sickness to a most alarming extent and, what is more discouraging, the officers, with a few 

exceptions, are sunk as low as the soldiers, and endure hardship 

and privation as badly. . . . Fatigue and suffering from the weather 

have deprived them of that spirit which constituted my best hopes.

Many of Hampton’s officers were disgusted at their commander’s 

lack of resolution in pressing the attack. Maj. John Ellis Wool, a 

particularly audacious and competent leader, later wrote of the battle 

that “no officer who had any regard for his own reputation, would 

voluntarily acknowledge himself as being engaged in it.” One prong 

of the American offensive had been defeated, by stalwart Canadians 

to be sure, but also by confusion and mistrust in the mind of the 

commander, induced not by enemy action but by the intrigue and 

incompetence of superiors. Hampton would resign in March of the 

following year.

When General Hampton was just starting his campaign, Wilkinson ordered his division of seven thousand soldiers to concentrate on 

Grenadier Island, halfway between Sackett’s Harbor and Kingston. 

Wilkinson’s quartermasters gathered large numbers of rivercraft to 

support the invasion. Then, Wilkinson changed his mind and opted 

to move against Montreal rather than Kingston. Chauncey protested. 

There were rapids along the river, complicating and slowing down 

movement. British batteries on shore could bring the American vessels under fire. It was late in the season and ice would hamper movement if the Americans did not take their objectives quickly. Also, 

Chauncey noted, his gunboats would be of less use supporting an 

assault on Montreal than a landing against Kingston. His protests 

fell on deaf ears.
•••• 46 ••••

Wilkinson organized his division into four brigades commanded 

by Brig. Gens. John Boyd, Jacob Brown, Leonard Covington, and 

Robert Swartout, and a reserve commanded by Col. Alexander 

Macomb. Wilkinson’s division got underway on 16 October heading 

down the St. Lawrence in a convoy of schooners, bateaux, scows, and 

gunboats. When the British realized that Montreal, and not Kingston, 

was the object of the advance, the commander in Kingston sent out a 

brigade under Lt. Col. Joseph Morrison and a handful of rivercraft 

led by Cdr. William Mulcaster to shadow the Americans. 

The American flotilla threaded its way through the picturesque 

Thousand Islands with Brown’s and Macomb’s brigades in the lead. 

Brown outranked Macomb and commanded the combined force. On 

1 November, Brown ordered his boats into a wide cove on the New 

York shore where French Creek entered the larger river. He pushed 

his boats up French Creek and placed two 18-pounder guns to 

cover his camp on a low bluff above the cove. Late in the afternoon, 

Commander Mulcaster caught up with Brown. Mulcaster led eight 

watercraft—schooners, sloops, and gunboats—but only three vessels 

could enter the cove due to wind and current. The Royal Navy officer 

wanted to destroy Brown’s bateaux. Mulcaster’s shipboard cannon 

and Brown’s two guns exchanged fire for an hour. Unable to silence 

the American cannon, Mulcaster drew off. However, early the next 

morning the British squadron reappeared and this time the Americans 

were ready for them. During the night, Brown had his men build a 

furnace to heat the cannon balls red hot. The firefight was short. 

After the American guns set one gunboat ablaze, Mulcaster drew 

his force off. He feared that he would be trapped in the cove as the 

rest of the American vessels drew nearer. The British put out the fire 

and Mulcaster escaped with light casualties. The next day, the rest of 

Wilkinson’s division arrived at French Creek.

Meanwhile, back at Fort George, Winfield Scott was chaffing 

for combat. In a questionable interpretation of his orders, Scott had 

departed the Niagara River on 13 October with a few companies of 

the 2d U.S. Artillery and raced to join Wilkinson. The anxious and 

ambitious Scott left his slow-moving artillery and rode on by himself, 

finding the Americans on 6 November. Scott pleaded for a command. 

Since Macomb now commanded the reserve brigade, Wilkinson put 

Scott in charge of the 3d U.S. Artillery, Macomb’s regiment. That 

day, Wilkinson first learned of Hampton’s fight on the Chateauguay 

River. Assuming that Hampton would continue the advance, Wilkinson wrote to Hampton, directing the other division commander to 

link up with his column near Montreal Island.
•••• 47 ••••

The St. Lawrence River 

narrowed where the hamlet of 

Prescott on the Canadian shore 

faced the village of Ogdensburg, 

New York. Near Prescott, the 

British had thrown up earthworks to protect a battery of 

seventeen guns. Later, this small 

fortification would be named 

Fort Wellington. However, on 6 

November this nameless battery 

presented the first serious challenge to the American advance. 

Wilkinson ordered his men off 

their boats. They would trudge 

along the New York shore at 

night while the crews rowed the 

watercraft past the British guns. 

Fortunately, a fog covered much 

of the river between Ogdensburg 

and Prescott. Nonetheless, the 

British opened a relentless fire 

on any boats that came into 

view. By dawn, more than a 

hundred American boats had 

safely passed Prescott and only 

one American had died in the 

fierce cannonade.

Over the next several days, 

Canadian militia swarmed the 

northern shores of the St. Lawrence, firing cannon and muskets whenever American vessels 

drew near. Brown led his and 

Macomb’s brigades at the head 

of the lengthy American convoy, 

landing as necessary to drive off British defenders. Brown’s advance 

guard brigades also included Benjamin Forsyth’s battalion of riflemen 

and about two hundred fifty horsemen from the 1st and 2d Regiments 

of Light Dragoons. Brown’s troops moved along the roads paralleling the river, clearing the way forward despite destroyed bridges and 

sporadic enemy musketry.

U.S. Light Dragoon, 

1813–1814,

by H. Charles McBarron

(Company of Military 

Historians) •••••••••••••••
•••• 48 ••••

Wilkinson, by now quite feverish and taking doses of laudanum, 

landed his remaining three brigades near the farm of prominent 

businessman, John Crysler, not far from the Long Sault Rapids. 

Boat pilots and crews would navigate about eight miles of rapids, 

while the soldiers marched along the northern shore, now cleared in 

front by Brown, Macomb, Scott, and Forsyth. Unfortunately for the 

Americans, Morrison was close to the American rear.

Colonel Morrison commanded a mixed group of British regulars, 

Canadian regulars and militia, and a small body of Indian warriors, 

about twelve hundred in all. The evening of 10 November was stormy, 

leaving all the soldiery wet and cold on the following morning. Morrison’s light troops skirmished with the Americans on farmer Crysler’s 

plowed fields and in the woods farther east. Commanding from his 

bed aboard ship, Wilkinson ordered Boyd to take command of the 

three American brigades and to drive off Morrison if the British 

approached. Early in the afternoon, Morrison did just that. Boyd, 

commanding about twenty-two hundred infantry and a small number 

of dragoons, turned the army about and ordered General Swartout 

to counterattack. Boyd and Covington would support the attack. 

The battle of Crysler’s Farm had begun.

The Americans pushed a few companies of Canadian light troops 

westward through the woods for about a mile. During this movement, 

the American battalions became separated and disordered. Emerging 

from the wood line, the Americans saw British regulars drawn up for 

battle and came under fire from three 6-pounder cannon. The British 

guns fired spherical case shot, a hollow iron ball filled with twentyseven musket balls and gunpowder, fused to explode over the heads of 

troops. The U.S. artillery was still loaded on boats when the fighting 

began, and it took nearly two hours before four American 6-pounder 

guns entered the fray. Many American infantry, anxious to fight, fired 

their muskets without orders and sergeants struggled to restore order. 

Boyd decided to attack the left flank of the British line. He ordered 

Swartout to use the woods north of the open fields for cover until he 

could attack directly into the British line. He sent his own brigade, 

under Col. Isaac Coles, to support Swartout. Canadian light troops 

and Mohawk warriors fired upon the American columns as they 

struggled over fallen trees. As two U.S. battalions emerged from the 

woods and attempted to change formation from column into line, 

anxious American soldiers again opened fire despite the shouted commands of their leaders. The British initiated a controlled fire, which 

played havoc on the Americans struggling to overcome their disorder. 

Swartout’s troops balked and slowly the battalions disintegrated, the 
•••• 49 ••••

men streaming back the way they had come. About the same time, 

Coles’ men emerged from the woods, experienced the same heavy fire, 

and followed the example of Swartout’s men.

General Covington, seeing the disorder on the right flank, formed 

his brigade into line and advanced directly on the British center. His 

men descended into a deep, water-filled ravine, crossed it with difficulty, and emerged onto a muddy field. British infantry and artillery opened fire immediately. Covington was mortally wounded in 

the opening volley, and he turned command of the brigade over to 

Col. Cromwell Pearce. Pearce got the brigade into enough order to 

continue the attack. Both sides engaged in a firefight. British musketry, the result of superb training, more than made up for inferior 

numbers. American companies and battalions lost cohesion, as the 

men sought cover where they could. 

American artillery crews moved their four guns with great difficulty across the ravine and emerged about four hundred yards from 

the British line. The artillery did not have case shot, but fired canister 

instead. A canister round was essentially a tin can filled with musket 

balls and, like a shotgun blast, was devastating at close range. This 

deadly fire stabilized the battle somewhat as Swartout, Coles, and 

Pearce tried desperately to rally their men. Many of the infantrymen 

had exhausted their ammunition and the supply wagons were still 

on the boats. The British sent a battalion to capture the American 

guns, but the artillery easily repulsed this attack. American dragoons 

attacked the right of the British line but were themselves thrown 

back. Boyd, believing that he had carried out his orders to prevent 

the British from interfering with the advance downriver, ordered his 

brigades to withdraw and re-form. This left the British in possession 

of the battlefield and established their claim to the victory.

Wilkinson ordered the army to embark and to cross over to the 

American shore. Many officers and men complained that they had 

won the battle and could finish off the British the next day. They 

criticized Boyd’s lack of determination and general incompetence. 

He had committed battalions piecemeal allowing the enemy to defeat 

them individually. Lt. Joseph Hawley Dwight wrote in his journal: 

“To describe the battle correctly is impossible. There was no order 

or system displayed on our part. Our troops fought well when not 

disheartened by conflicting orders.” Some, however, understood that 

the Americans would have to match their opponent’s discipline and 

skill if they were to prevail. 

The day after the battle, Wilkinson received a letter from Hampton 

revealing that he was returning to Plattsburgh. Wilkinson convened a 
•••• 50 ••••

council of war that reluctantly agreed that to pursue the campaign without Hampton’s active support would be futile. He withdrew the army to 

winter quarters at French Mills, just inside the New York border. 

The winter at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, is etched into American 

memory. The more brutal conditions at French Mills in northern New 

York are largely forgotten. The men lived in tents while they built 

their huts. The quartermasters could not establish regular deliveries 

of food until late in December. On 16 November, Lt. Reynold Kirby 

of the 3d U.S. Artillery recorded, “The face of the country where we 

are now located with a prospect of remaining a long time is wild & 

uninhabited – it will be long ere we shall be under the cover of our huts 

which we are about to erect. The weather is cold & the ice is forming 

in the river.” Men starved, fell ill, and died. Wilkinson established a 

comfortable headquarters in the village of Four Corners, and he put 

Brown in charge of the division at French Mills. Wilkinson allowed 

many of his officers to depart the army to spend the winter at their 

homes. Finally, on Christmas Day, the men occupied their crude huts. 

Spring would bring new leaders and a new campaign.

Destruction on the Niagara, December 1813

When Wilkinson gathered his forces for the move on Montreal, he 

stripped Fort George of regulars. Militia Brig. Gen. George McClure 

took command of the post that had been in American hands since 

May. McClure’s aide, Lt. William Rochester, wrote to his father: “The 

regulars here have all gone. We have about 800 militia here, who are 

completely raw, untrained, and lawless.” These militiamen, it seems, 

spent their days looting local Canadian farms. In early December, 

their short enlistments up, hundreds of militiamen returned to New 

York despite McClure’s entreaties to remain at Fort George. With 

fewer than two hundred men, McClure could not maintain America’s 

last toehold on the Niagara frontier. He decided to destroy the post 

and to return to the American side of the river. He also decided to 

burn the unoffending village of Newark, ostensibly to prevent British 

forces from using its homes as shelter. 

Colonel Chapin of Buffalo, a medical doctor and the leader of a 

detachment of New York volunteers, argued forcibly that destroying 

the town would only invite retaliation. His arguments fell on deaf ears. 

In the swirling snows of 10 December 1813, McClure’s men ordered 

the citizens of Newark out of their homes and then torched the buildings. Nearly four hundred women, children, and elderly men, with 

little more than the clothes on their backs, sought shelter in the nearby 

farms. McClure’s contingent then moved to Fort George and destroyed 
•••• 51 ••••

the main magazine and spiked some of the guns. However, they left 

the fort’s wooden palisades intact as they returned to New York. The 

citizens on the American side of the border were aghast at the needless destruction and braced themselves for the reprisals sure to follow.

Follow they did. Late in the evening of 18 December, a force 

of five hundred sixty British regulars crossed the Niagara River 

near Youngstown, a small settlement south of Fort Niagara. Approximately four hundred American regulars defended the fort, led 

by Capt. Nathan Leonard. Despite warnings of an impending raid, 

Leonard was not in the fortress, but rather at his home two miles 

away. The British commander in Upper Canada, Lt. Gen. Gordon 

Drummond, ordered his men to conduct a bayonet assault. Three 

parties of attackers, equipped with axes, scaling ladders, and unloaded 

muskets headed for the earthen bastions and the main gate. Entry 

into the fort was effortless; the American sentries had left the main 

gate unlocked to ease the passage of guards.

Swarming into Fort Niagara, British infantry quickly subdued 

most of the garrison. The stoutest resistance came from the sick in 

the hospital. In obedience to General Drummond’s intent, the British 

went about their grisly work, even killing Americans as they surrendered. When dawn arrived, sixty-five Americans and six British were 

dead. The British would hold Fort Niagara until the end of the war.

British Maj. Gen. Phineas Riall followed up the capture of the 

fort with a devastating early morning raid on the American shore. A 

force of one thousand British soldiers and five hundred allied Indians 

attacked the villages of Lewiston, Manchester (now Niagara Falls), 

and the Tuscarora Indian village. Taken by surprise, the militia put up 

a feeble resistance. Soon hundreds of civilians were fleeing eastward. 

The native warriors took scalps freely until stopped by British officers. 

The soldiers torched every structure along the river.

Jonas Harrison, the collector of customs for the District of Niagara, 

wrote to his superior: 

The citizens about Lewiston and its vicinity below the slope or 

highland that forms the Falls of Niagara escaped by the Ridge Road 

towards Genesee Falls, all going the one road, on foot, old and young, 

men, women, and children, flying from their beds, some not more 

than half dressed without shoes or stockings, together with men on 

horseback, wagons, carts, sleighs and sleds, overturning and crushing 

each other, stimulated by the horrid yells of the 900 savages on the 

pursuit, which lasted eight miles, formed a scene awful and terrific 

in the extreme. The small military force we had were the first to fly.
•••• 52 ••••

Riall followed up this foray with a raid on the villages of Black 

Rock and Buffalo. In the early hours of 30 December, one thousand 

British regulars and four hundred Indian warriors crossed the Niagara 

River north of Black Rock. The Americans were more prepared this 

time. They had hounded the deplorable McClure out of command. 

His replacement, Maj. Gen. Amos Hall, gathered about two thousand 

militiamen from the local counties. The Americans offered a stronger 

resistance, but the fear of British bayonets and Indian scalping knives 

was palpable. By the end of the day, thirty-one British and about an 

equal number of Americans lay dead. The British took one hundred 

thirty prisoners; the rest of the militiamen escaped to their homes. 

The civilians were not so fortunate; hundreds fled in the snow, seeking shelter to the east. Riall, according to plan, torched nearly every 

structure within his reach. Twelve days later, General Cass wrote to 

Secretary of War Armstrong: “I passed this day the ruins of Buffalo. 

It exhibits a scene of distress and destruction such as I have never 

before witnessed.”

Analysis

Despite marked improvements in the Regular Army during 1813, 

strategic success eluded the American cause. Mediocre leaders made 

too many faulty operational decisions and failed to press the fight 

despite opposition. Harrison’s and Perry’s triumphs in the west did 

not translate into success elsewhere. The war along the border with 

Canada would continue into 1814.

President Madison and Secretary of War Armstrong rightly 

understood that the capture of either Montreal or Quebec would 

cut the British line of communications and result in the strangulation of all resistance to the west. Nonetheless, Washington directed 

that the major efforts of 1813 were to reestablish American control 

over the Northwest and to defeat the British on Lake Ontario. Dearborn and Chauncey compounded this strategic misdirection when 

they expended their efforts against York and Fort George instead 

of Kingston, the center of gravity of British operations in Upper 

Canada. Chauncey believed that the capture of the naval stores and 

armament at York would irrevocably shift the balance of naval power 

to his Lake Ontario squadron. Despite the American victory at York, 

the shift proved limited at best. The Americans captured food and 

equipment destined for British forces to the west, contributing to 

Harrison’s victory in western Upper Canada. However, the loss of 

Pike, a competent and inspiring leader, was tragic.
•••• 53 ••••

Likewise, the capture of Fort George had led to a very limited improvement in the American situation. Once the Americans had seized 

the fort, they had to retain it. The defense of Fort George, and the 

appalling losses at Stoney Creek and Beaver Dams, bled the American 

army of valuable manpower. In the end, the British pinned down an 

American division until Armstrong and Wilkinson shifted the focus 

of American action against Montreal, where it should have been in the 

first place. Armstrong acted weakly in dealing with his subordinates 

and lost valuable time in choosing the objective of the operation. He 

could not quell the feud between Wilkinson and Hampton, and their 

lack of trust doomed the campaign from the beginning.

Some blame for the disappointing failures of 1813 must rest at 

the feet of the national government, which failed to mobilize the 

country’s resources. Congress and the Madison administration had 

not entirely understood the difficulties of expanding the army and 

navy from their meager prewar strengths. Few citizens were willing 

to join the Regular Army despite increases in pay and shortening of 

enlistment terms. There were not enough experienced officers and 

noncommissioned officers to train the many new regular and volunteer regiments. Dependence on state militias was misplaced. Acquiring 

supplies and food and moving these commodities to the frontiers of 

America were daunting tasks never satisfactorily accomplished. While 

soldiers were adequately armed, they often lacked warm clothing and 

frequently went hungry. 

Perhaps the gravest mistake the administration made was in its 

choice of generals. Of the four men Madison had promoted to major 

general, only Harrison pressed the fight. Wilkinson, Hampton, and 

Lewis were all disappointments. Among the brigadier generals, Boyd, 

Chandler, and Winder all exhibited personal courage yet performed 

inadequately. Fortunately, the year’s events had allowed the president 

to identify a few competent officers, such as Brown, Macomb, and 

Scott, whom he could turn to in the coming year. It remained to be 

seen whether these men could build upon the trials and disappointments of the previous eighteen months to forge a more effective army. 
•••• 54 ••••

•••

The Author

Richard V. Barbuto is a professor and deputy director of the 

Department of Military History at the U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College. He holds a Ph.D. degree in history from the 

University of Kansas. He is the author of Niagara 1814: America 

Invades Canada (2000) and Long Range Guns, Close Quarter Combat: 

The Third U.S. Artillery Regiment in the War of 1812 (2010).
•••• 55 ••••

•••

Further Readings Elliott, James E. Strange Fatality: The Battle of Stoney Creek, 1813.

Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2009.

Everest, Allan S. The War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley. Syracuse, 

N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981.

Gilpin, Alec R. The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest. East Lansing: 

Michigan State University Press, 1958.

Graves, Donald E. Field of Glory: The Battle of Crysler’s Farm, 1813.

Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 1999.

Hickey, Donald R. The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict. Urbana: 

University of Illinois Press, 1989.

Mahon, John K. The War of 1812. Gainesville: University of Florida 

Press, 1972.

Malcomson, Robert. Capital in Flames: The American Attack on 

York, 1813. Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2008.

__________. Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario, 

1812–1814. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1998.

Skaggs, David Curtis and Gerard T. Altoff. A Signal Victory: The 

Lake Erie Campaign, 1812–1813. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 

Press, 1997.

Wilder, Patrick A. The Battle of Sackett’s Harbour: 1813. Baltimore, 

Md.: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1994.

For more information on the U.S. Army in the War of 1812, please 

read other titles in the U.S. Army Campaigns of the War of 1812 series 

published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History.
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