IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

March 2, 2016 Session

IN RE ESTATE OF PATRICK TAKASHI DAVIS

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County

No. 14P622 Randy M. Kennedy, Judge

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 No. M2015-01425-COA-R3-CV – March 30, 2016

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Appellant appeals the trial court’s determination that Appellee, who was born in 1992, is an 

heir-at-law of the Decedent, who died intestate. Appellant argues that the Appellee, as a 

child born out of wedlock, was required to file a claim against decedent’s estate within the 

statutory period in order to inherit. However, the Decedent is listed on Appellee’s birth 

certificate. Under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 68-3-305(b) (1992), in order for his 

name to be listed on Appellee’s birth certificate, the decedent would have signed an 

“affidavit . . . acknowledging paternity.” With the enactment, in 1994, of Tennessee Code 

Annotated Section 27-7-113, such “affidavits” were deemed “voluntary acknowledgment[s] 

of paternity,” which constitute a “legal finding of paternity.” It is undisputed that the 

decedent’s estate consists only of real property. Because the inclusion of decedent’s name on 

Appellee’s birth certificate evincesthe execution of a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity 

that constitutes a legal finding of paternity, Appellee’s portion of the estate vested, upon 

decedent’s death, in Appellee pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 31-2-103 and 

the laws of intestate succession, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 31-2-104. Affirmed and 

remanded.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court 

Affirmed and Remanded

KENNY ARMSTRONG,J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which RICHARD H. DINKINS

and BRANDON O. GIBSON, JJ., joined.

David J. Callahan, III, John Richard Manson, and Alexander Stephen Fasching, Nashville, 

Tennessee, for the appellant, Crystal Wey.
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James G. King, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Bryant Takashi Davis, and Peggy 

Duncan Mathes, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Estate of Patrick Takashi Davis.

OPINION

I. Background

Patrick Takashi Davis (“Decedent”) died intestate on July 22, 2013. On April 14, 

2014, Appellant Crystal Wey, without defining her relationship to the Decedent, filed a 

Petition for Letters of Administration in the Circuit Court for Davidson County (the “trial 

court”), seeking to open Decedent’s estate. In her petition, Ms. Wey listed three heirs-at-law: 

Bryant Takashi Davis, Miles Takashi Davis, and Patrick D. Davis. Ms. Wey referred to 

these heirs-at-law as Decedent’s sons and attached, to her petition, Patrick Davis’ birth 

certificate, which listed Decedent as his father. By order of May 9, 2014, the hearing on the 

petition was continued “to enable heir-at-law Mr. Bryant Davis to retain legal counsel.”

The hearing on Ms. Wey’s petition was held on July 16, 2014. By order of July 16, 

2014, the trial court opened the Estate of Patrick Takashi Davis (the “Estate,” and together 

with Bryant Takashi Davis, “Appellees”). Peggy D. Mathes was named Administratrix for 

the Estate.

On July 21, 2014, before letters of administration were issued to Ms. Mathes, Ms. 

Wey filed two claims against the Estate. The first was on behalf of her minor son, Alejandro 

Yandel Wey, whom Ms. Wey claimed was Decedent’s “surviving child” and rightful heir. 

The second claim was filed on behalf of Ms. Wey’s other son, Miles Takashi Davis, whom 

she also claimed was Decedent’s son and heir. Ms. Wey attached Miles’ birth certificate to 

the claim filed on his behalf; Decedent is listed as Miles’ father on the birth certificate. Ms. 

Wey did not file Alejandro’s birth certificate with the trial court. 

On July 23, 2014, the trial court issued Letters of Administration. On August 13, 

2014, Ms. Mathes filed a petition to declare the Estate insolvent. Therein, she stated that the 

sole Estate asset was real property located in Nashville, Tennessee. Ms. Mathes averred that 

this real property, which was valued at $73,000 for tax purposes, vested in the Decedent’s 

heirs-at-law at Decedent’s death pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 31-2-103 

(“The real property of an intestate decedent shall vest immediately upon death of the 

decedent in the heirs . . . .”). In her petition, Ms. Mathes also noted that the time for filing 

claims against the Estate had expired. Because the Estate was insolvent, Ms. Mathes asked 

that the real property be sold to provide funds for the payment of claims and the costs of 
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administration of the Estate. Also, on August 13, 2014, Ms. Mathes filed an exception to the 

claims filed on behalf of Alejandro and Miles on the ground that Ms. Wey had failed to 

provide evidence proving that Decedent was the father of these children. By agreed order of 

September 10, 2014, the hearing on the exceptions was continued for the purpose of 

procuring genetic testing to establish or disprove Decedent’s paternity of Alejandro.

On September 24, 2014, the trial court ordered the real property sold at public auction 

to cover costs of administration. In the meantime, DNA testing was performed, and the 

Decedent was excluded as Alejandro’s father. Consequently, on or about October 1, 2014, 

Ms. Wey filed a notice of nonsuit as to Alejandro’s claim against the Estate, and on October 

9, 2014, the trial court entered an order of voluntary dismissal as to Alejandro’s claim.

On October 8, 2014, Ms. Wye filed a petition for declaratory judgment establishing 

heirship. In her petition, Ms. Wey argued, in relevant part, that 

11. Petitioner had previously included Bryant T. Davis and Patrick D. Davis 

with service of documents as potential heirs-at-law of the Decedent, however 

neither party had established or even made a claim of Heirship against the 

estate within one year of the Decedent’s death. There are no persons other

than those mentioned interested in this proceeding.

12. Under Tennessee law, any child born out of wedlock must make a claim 

against the estate by establishing paternity by clear and convincing proof 

within one year from the date of death of the decedent:

A child born out of wedlock, whose paternity was not 

adjudicated prior to the death of the father, can establish the 

right to inherit by intestate succession by asserting that right 

against the estate of the deceased owner of the property in which 

an interest is claimed within the time allowed for creditors to file

claims against the estate and by establishing paternity by clear 

and convincing

proof.

Bilbrey v. Smithers, 937 S.W.2d 803, 808 (Tenn.1996). Subsequent to Estate 

of Tanner, the Court observed “[a]s evidenced by the language of Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 30-2-307(a)(1)(B) and § 30-2-310, claims not filed within twelve 

months of the decedent's death are barred.” In re Estate of Snapp, No. E2009-

00551—00A—R3CV, 2010 WL 1924017, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 

2010); see also Diggs v. Carter, 2014 WL 2016609, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App, May 

15, 2014).

13. To be adjudicated a lineal descendant under Tennessee intestacy law, a 
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child born out of wedlock who did not establish paternity prior to the putative 

father's death, must prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence. See 

TENN. CODE ANN § 31-2-105(2)(B); Majors v. Smith, 776 S.W.2d 538,

540 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); see also Muse v. Sluder, 600 S.W.2d 237 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 1980) . . . .

14. Here, only the Heir, Miles Takashi Davis, has fully complied with the 

requirement of filing his Claim of Heirship within one year of the decedent’s 

death, and has provided clear and convincing evidence to support his claim. To 

Petitioner’s knowledge, Bryant T. Davis and Patrick D. Davis have provided 

no evidence whatsoever as to their heirship, aside from having the same last 

name as the Decedent, and have made no effort to file a claim of heirship in 

this matter. As such, Petitioner asks that this court issue a declaratory judgment 

that Miles Takashi Davis is the sole heir of the Estate of Patrick Davis.

By order of November 19, 2014, the trial court allowed Ms. Wey to amend her 

Petition for Letters of Administration to omit Appellee and Patrick Davis as Decedent’s 

heirs-at-law and to list Miles as the Decedent’s sole heir-at-law. On January 22, 2015, Ms. 

Mathes filed the birth certificates of Patrick Davis and Bryant Davis. Both birth certificates 

list Decedent as the father.

Ms. Wey’s petition for declaratory judgment was heard by the trial court on February 

23, 2015. By order of June 5, 2015, the trial court held, in pertinent part, that:

1. Miles Davis, a minor, is a rightful Heir-at-Law of the Decedent pursuant to 

his birth certificate and Parentage Order from the Davidson County Juvenile 

Court.

2. Patrick D. Davis presented evidence of a birth certificate that listed the 

Decedent as his father, however this evidence was overcome by sworn 

testimony by his mother which established that Patrick D. Davis has no 

biological or legal relationship to the Decedent, and therefore is not an Heir-atLaw of the Decedent.

3. Despite objection by counsel for the Claimant, this Court has determined 

that Bryant Davis, pursuant to his presentation of a birth certificate listing the 

Decedent as his father, is a rightful Heir-at-Law of the Decedent.

On March 25, 2015, Ms. Wey filed a motion to alter or amend the trial court’s 

judgment, along with a memorandum of law in support thereof. By her motion, Ms. Wey 

asked the court to reconsider its ruling that Bryant Davis was Decedent’s heir-at-law by 

virtue of the fact that Decedent was listed as Bryant’s father on his birth certificate. On May 

20, 2015, Ms. Mathes filed a response in opposition to the motion to alter or amend, wherein 

she argued, inter alia, that a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity executed in conjunction 
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with Decedent’s name being listed as the father on Bryant’s birth certificate constitutes a 

legal finding of paternity for purposes of intestate succession.

On May 22, 2015, Ms. Wey filed a motion requesting an amended inventory of the Estate. 

Therein, she claimed that there was personalty remaining in the Estate. The disputed 

property allegedly included personal and household items that were left inside Decedent’s 

home, and a vehicle, the whereabouts of which were unknown. In response, on August 29, 

2014, Ms. Mathes filed an inventory, wherein she listed the real property and a “67 Chevy 

Truck (whereabouts unknown, not in possession of Administrat[rix]).” On June 12, 2015, 

the trial court entered an order regarding the Estate property, wherein it held that “there 

remains no personal property belonging to the decedent at his death, but Bryant Davis shall 

be charged with the sum of $1,300 to be deducted from his share of the residuary estate for 

the proceeds of the sale of vehicles belonging to the [D]ecedent and the value of the truck 

still in his possession.” Following a hearing on June 26, 2015, the trial court entered an order 

denying Ms. Wey’s motion to alter or amend.

II. Issues

Ms. Wey appeals. She raises three issues for review as stated in her brief:

I. Whether the trial court erred in finding a presumption existed that a child 

born out of wedlock is an heir-at-law to their purported father’s estate based 

solely on a birth certificate voluntarily acknowledged by the Decedent 

purported father, and where Decedent purported father had falsely 

acknowledged paternity on a birth certificate in the past.

II. Whether the court erred in allowing Bryant Davis to late-file a birth 

certificate thereby effectively extending the statutory claim period beyond one 

year in order to allow Bryant Davis to claim heirship in Decedent’s estate. 

III. Whether the court erred in finding that Appellant listing Bryant Davis as an 

heir on the initial Petition for Letters of Administration relieved Bryant Davis 

from the requirement [of] asserting heirship against the Estate within one year 

of the Decedent’s date of death, and despite Appellant having later properly 

amended the Petition removing Bryant Davis.

III. Standard of Review

We note at the outset that the record in this case does not contain a transcript; 

however, there is a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c) Statement of the Evidence. 

This case was tried without a jury. Accordingly, we review the findings of fact made by the 
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trial court de novo, with a presumption of correctness unless the preponderance of the 

evidence is to the contrary. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). The trial court’s conclusions of law, 

however, are reviewed de novo and “are accorded no presumption of correctness.” 

Brunswick Acceptance Co., LLC v. MEJ, LLC, 292 S.W.3d 638, 642 (Tenn. 2008).

To the extent that the question of Appellee’s heirship requires this Court to interpret 

Tennessee’s paternity statutes, we are guided by the familiar rules of statutory construction. 

“The most basic principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the 

legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute's coverage beyond its 

intended scope.” Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995) (citing State v. Sliger, 

846 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tenn.1993)). “The text of the statute is of primary importance.” Mills 

v. Fulmarque, 360 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tenn. 2012). A statute should be read naturally and 

reasonably, with the presumption that the legislature says what it means and means what it 

says. See BellSouth Telecomm’ns., Inc. v. Greer, 972 S.W.2d 663, 673 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1997).

IV. Analysis

It is undisputed that the res of Decedent’s Estate consists of only real property. 

Tennessee Code Annotated Section 31-2-103 providesthat “[t]he real property of an intestate 

decedent shall vest immediately upon death of the decedent in the heirs as provided in § 31-

2-104.” In its June 26, 2015 order denying Appellant’s motion to alter or amend the trial 

court’s ruling on her petition for declaratory judgment, the trial court found, in relevant part:

2. The Court finds that the question of law is whether the Court can presume a 

person is an heir-at-law based solely on the production of a birth certificate 

signed by the Decedent father.

3. The Court finds that the acknowledgement of paternity contained within. the 

birth certificate creates a rebuttable presumption of parentage. Such an 

acknowledgement exists in this matter, as the decedent's name is listed on 

Bryant Davis’ birth certificate.

4. The acknowledgement of paternity is governed by T.C.A. § 24-7-113(a), 

where it states “[a] voluntary acknowledgement of paternity...shall constitute a 

legal finding of paternity on the individual named as the father of the child in 

the acknowledgement, subject to rescission as provided in subsection (c). The 

acknowledgement, unless rescinded pursuant to subsection (c), shall be 

conclusive of that father’s paternity without further order of the court.”

5. The Court notes that this statute was probably written with child support in 

mind, and the Court notes that determining parentage for the purposes of child 

support is distinguishable from determining parentage for the purposes of 

heirship.

6. The Court finds, however, that the acknowledgement of paternity is 
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conclusive of the father’s paternity without further orders of the court, and is 

thusly an adjudication as considered by T.C.A.§ 31-2-103(a)(2)(B).

A copy of Bryan Davis’ birth certificate is included in the appellate record. The birth 

certificate indicates that Bryant Davis was born on March 8, 1992 at the Centennial Medical 

Center in Nashville. As found by the trial court, Decedent is listed as Bryant’s father on the 

birth certificate. Furthermore, Decedent’s surname is listed as Bryant’s surname on the birth 

certificate. At the time of Bryant’s birth, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 68-3-302 of the 

Vital Records Act of 1977, provided, in relevant part, that:

(a) When a birth occurs in an institution . . . the person in charge of the 

institution or such person’s designated representative shall obtain the personal 

data, prepare the certificate, secure the signatures required by the certificate 

and file it with the office of vital records . . . within the required ten (10) days.

Tenn. Code Ann. §68-3-302 (1992)

It is undisputed that Bryant was born out of wedlock; it is also undisputed that 

Decedent is listed as the father on Bryant’s birth certificate, and Decedent’s surname is listed 

as Bryant’s surname. At the time of Bryant’s birth, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 68-

3-305(b) provided, in relevant part, that:

(b)(1) If the mother was not married at the time of either conception or birth or

between conception and birth, the name of the father shall not be entered on 

the certificate of birth and the surname of the child shall be that of the legal 

surname of the mother. All information pertaining to the father shall be 

omitted.

(2) If affidavits of both parents acknowledging paternity on a form provided by 

the state registrar are submitted at the time of registration of the birth, then 

legal surname of the father may be entered on the certificate as that of the child 

and the father’s name and other personal information may be entered in the 

spaces provided on the certificate, notwithstanding the absence of a marriage 

relationship between the parents.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-3-305(b) (1992).

Importantly, Appellant does not contest the validity of Appellee’s birth certificate, nor 

does she dispute that the birth certificate was procured according to the procedures outlined 

in sections 68-3-302 (1994) and 68-3-305(b) (1994). Accordingly, in order for Decedent to 

be listed as the father on Bryant’s birth certificate, Decedent would have completed an

affidavit acknowledging his paternity; otherwise, according to the statutory scheme, the 
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“father” information on Bryant’s birth certificate would have been omitted. Therefore, we 

conclude that Decedent completed an affidavit acknowledging paternity in conjunction with 

his name being listed as Bryant’s father on the birth certificate. 

As set out in its June 26, 2015 order, supra, the trial court relied on Tennessee Code 

Annotated Section 24-7-113 in reaching its conclusion that Decedent’s acknowledgment of 

paternity in relation to Bryant’s birth certificate constitutes a “legal finding of paternity.” 

Tennessee Code Annotated Section 24-7-113 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) A voluntary acknowledgement of paternity which is completed under the 

provisions of . . . § 68-3-302 or 68-3-305(b) shall constitute a legal finding of 

paternity on the individual named as the father of the child in the 

acknowledgment, subject to rescission . . . .

(b)(1) A voluntary acknowledgement of paternity which is completed under 

the provision of . . .§ 68-3-302 . . . when certified by the state registrar or other 

governmental entity maintaining the record of acknowledgment . . . shall be a 

basis for establishing a support order without requiring further proceedings to 

establish paternity.

(2) An acknowledgment of paternity executed as described in subdivision 

(b)(1) shall be entitled to full faith and credit in any judicial or administrative 

proceeding in this state.

(3) No judicial or administrative proceedings are required, nor shall any such 

proceedings be permitted, to ratify an unchallenged acknowledgement of 

paternity in order to create the conclusive status of the acknowledgement of 

paternity.

Tennessee Code Annotated Section 24-7-113 did not become effective until July 1, 1994, 

which was approximately two years after Bryant’s birth. Act of May 10, 1994, ch. 988, sec. 

1, 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts 988 However, from the time of its enactment, Tennessee Code 

Annotated Section 24-7-113 referenced Tennessee Code Annotated Section 68-3-305(b),

which was in existence in 1992 when Bryant was born. Although, at the time of Bryant’s 

birth, section 68-3-305(b)(2) referred to “affidavits . . . acknowledging paternity,” in direct 

response to the 1994 enactment of Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-113, the 

Legislature changed the language of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 68-3-305(b) as 

follows:

Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 68-3-305(b), is amended by deleting 

subdivision (2) in its entirety and by substituting and adding the following 

language:

(2)(A) If an original, sworn acknowledgement signed by both the mother and 
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the biological father of a child on a form provided by the state registrar or the 

Department of Human Services is submitted to the office of vital records, at 

any time prior to the child's 19th birthday, the legal surname of the father may 

be entered on the certificate as that of the child and the father’s name and other 

personal information may be entered in the spaces provided on the birth 

certificate, notwithstanding the absence of a marriage relationship between the 

parents of the child.

(B) The acknowledgement form shall be in the form of an affidavit, shall be 

approved by the state registrar and the Department of Human Services and 

shall contain a written explanation of the benefits, rights, and responsibilities 

of establishing paternity of a child and shall contain in a distinct portion a 

provision for the putative father to acknowledge under oath his receipt and 

understanding of these rights and responsibilities and in a further separate 

distinct portion it shall contain a provision for an optional sworn waiver of the 

right to request parentage tests under § 24-7-112.

Act of May 10, 1994, ch. 988, sec. 12, § 68-3-305, 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts 988. Although, in 

its 1994 amendment to section 68-3-305(b), the Legislature did not use the specific term 

“voluntary acknowledgment of paternity” that it used in section 24-7-113, it is clear that the 

Legislature intended the “sworn acknowledgment” or “affidavit” contemplated in section 68-

3-305(b) to receive the legal status of a section 24-7-113 voluntary acknowledgment of 

paternity. Semantics aside, we can only conclude that, with the enactment of section 24-7-

113, those “affidavits” that had previously been executed under section 68-3-305(b) were 

given the status of voluntary acknowledgments of paternity constituting a “legal finding of 

paternity” and were “entitled to full faith and credit in any judicial . . . proceeding.” Tenn. 

Code Ann. §§ 24-7-113(a) and (b)(1). In this regard, the trial court’s analysis is correct: the 

“affidavit . . . acknowledging paternity” that Decedent would have executed, under section 

38-3-305(b) (1992), in order for his name to appear on Bryant’s birth certificate would 

“constitute a legal finding of paternity” after the enactment, in 1994, of section 24-7-113. 

Section 24-7-113 provides that after sixty days from the execution of a voluntary 

acknowledgment of paternity, it may only be challenged on the basis of “fraud, whether 

extrinsic or intrinsic, duress, or material mistake of fact,” and that challenge must be made 

within five years of the date the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity was executed. Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 24-7-113(e). After five years have elapsed from the date of the execution of the 

voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, the voluntary acknowledgment of paternitymay only 

be challenged under a fraud theory. Id. Appellant has not alleged fraud in the procurement of 

the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. In the absence of any allegation of fraud, and in 

the absence of any proof of rescission on the part of Decedent, Bryant’s birth certificate 

constitutes a “legal finding of [Decedent’s] paternity” pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated 

Section 24-7-113(a). 
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Appellant challenges Bryant’s paternity by arguing that, as a child born out of 

wedlock, Bryant was required to file a claim against the Estate in order to inherit. In support 

of her argument, Appellant relies on the case of Bilbrey v. Smithers, 937 S.W.2d 803 (Tenn. 

1996). The Bilbrey case, however, is distinguishable from the instant appeal in that Bilbrey

involved “a child born out of wedlock, whose paternity was not adjudicated prior to the death 

of the father . . . .” Id. at 808. In Bilbrey, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that if a child’s 

paternity was not adjudicated prior to the father’s death, then that child could only “establish 

the right to inherit by intestate succession by asserting that right against the estate of the 

deceased owner of the property in which an interest is claimed within the time allowed for 

creditors to file claims against the estate and by establishing paternity by clear and 

convincing proof.” Id. Although Appellant’s brief states that “[p]er Bilbrey any child born 

out of wedlock seeking to claim a portion of the putative father’s estate must first assert a 

right against the estate . . .,” the Bilbrey holding does not apply to any child, but only to those 

children born out of wedlock, “whose paternity was not adjudicated prior to the death of the 

father.” Id. Here, under the paternity statutes referenced above, Appellee’s paternity was 

established by the Decedent being listed as the father on Bryant’s birth certificate. 

Accordingly, Bryant was not required to file a claim against the Estate. Rather, at the time of 

Decedent’s death, Bryant was already an heir-at-law pursuant to his birth certificate. 

Therefore, Bryant’s portion of the Estate, which consists of only real property, vested in him 

immediately upon Decedent’s death. Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-2-103.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court. The case is remanded 

for such further proceedings as may be necessary and are consistent with this Opinion. Costs 

of the appeal are assessed against the Appellant, Crystal Wey and her surety, for all of which 

execution may issue if necessary.

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KENNY ARMSTRONG, JUDGE