www.ndu.edu/inss dh No. 74 1 

In 2010, a National Defense University (NDU) research project called 

TIDES1 (Transformative Innovation for Development and Emergency Support) 

was invited to partner with a company to produce a tradeshow about humanitarian 

assistance and disaster relief missions and related capabilities. Despite senior-level 

Department of Defense (DOD) guidance to pursue public-private partnerships, 

DOD attorneys told TIDES managers to reject the agreement. Differing legal 

interpretations of the word partner generated concern that the proposed partnership could create an impermissible perception of government endorsement of a 

private company. Even though it would have advanced the government’s mission 

and promoted efficiency, a variety of obstacles scuttled the proposed cooperation.

Such limitations on public-private engagement are often reported at combatant 

commands and raise questions about what policies and activities are appropriate.2

The examples cited in this paper collectively represent a broad landscape of situations 

in which well-intentioned people pursued cooperation between a DOD organization and private entities yet encountered serious obstacles. These examples generated 

provocative and interesting questions about how best to conduct public-private cooperation (PPC) and these questions led to a diverse array of insights into the nature 

of PPC, which in turn evolved into a collection of far-ranging recommendations.

This paper is intended to promote PPC in DOD.3 The opening section 

articulates the imperative for PPC. It then proposes an analytical framework 

that features four broad categories along a continuum of formality: contractual 

arrangements, well-defined standards and protocols, broad frameworks for 

interaction, and emergent or undefined situations. The next section presents 

Public-Private Cooperation in 

the Department of Defense:

A Framework for Analysis and 

Recommendations for Action

by Linton Wells II and Samuel Bendett

Defense Horizons

National Defense University

Center for 

T

e

chnology and 

National Se

curity Poli

c

y

About the Authors 

Linton Wells II is the Director of the 

Center for Technology and National 

Security Policy (CTNSP), Institute for 

National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. He is also a 

Distinguished Research Professor and 

serves as the Transformation Chair. 

Samuel Bendett is a Research Analyst 

in CTNSP.

Key Points

◆ Several official national security 

documents, joint publications, 

and DOD directives emphasize 

partnerships between the government and private sector. Yet efforts to implement public-private 

arrangements often encounter 

difficulties, especially in DOD. 

◆ Public-private cooperation (PPC) 

must be based on shared visions, 

principles, goals, objectives, standards. There needs to be a sense 

of community around a common 

purpose. Cooperation is most 

effective when all partners gain 

something of value and make 

concessions symmetrically.

◆ DOD must pay more attention to 

PPC, clarify authorities, and allocate 

appropriate resources. Incremental 

changes can bring benefits now, 

but systemic solutions will be needed for DOD to implement PPC on a 

scale to meet the evolving demands 

of the new strategic environment.

◆ This paper anticipates challenges 

and identifies steps to overcome 

them. In subsequent research, a 

broader, multi-dimensional framework could be developed to explore 

more examples in greater depth.

October 2012
2 dh No. 74 www.ndu.edu/inss

examples from each of the four categories, including how 

the collaborators overcame the challenges they faced and 

practical implications for future PPC efforts. The paper 

ends with key observations and recommended next steps 

for further research and reform.

The Imperative to Cooperate

PPC has proved to be effective at the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).4

 DOD leaders are expressing interest 

in implementing parallel approaches. PPC is intended to 

further policy objectives, enhance U.S. operational capabilities, reduce costs, gain access to nonmilitary expertise 

or assets, or build greater capacity in partners. As DOD 

adapts to meet evolving roles and missions in an unpredictable and complex world amid fiscal constraints, the 

expertise and involvement of the private sector, including 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), research institutions, and academia will be essential.

The National Security Strategy (NSS), Quadrennial 

Defense Review, Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, National Defense Strategy, and several 

joint publications and DOD directives emphasize partnerships between the government and the private sector.5

A notable study conducted by the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies observed that the private sector has appeared with increasing frequency in each NSS 

since 2002, reaching no fewer than 44 times in the 2010 

version.6 The NSS notes that America’s “ability to apply 

the ingenuity of our public and private sectors toward 

the most difficult foreign policy and security challenges 

of our time will help us protect our citizens and advance 

U.S. national security priorities.”7

Yet efforts to implement public-private arrangements often fall short, especially in DOD. Proponents 

of PPC face significant hurdles establishing or sustaining cooperation. For example, Admiral James Stavridis 

and his colleague Evelyn Farkas, two path-breaking 

practitioners of PPC at both U.S. Southern Command 

(USSOUTHCOM) and U.S. European Command 

(USEUCOM), observed in a recent paper three types 

of systemic challenges: legal and regulatory restrictions, 

lack of trust, and lack of proper institutionalization of 

public-private efforts.8

Some leaders are trying to do better. To paraphrase 

one combatant command’s forward-leaning guidance: “The 

public and private sectors offer resources, access, and expertise beyond USSOUTHCOM’s authority and capacity. Leveraging such expertise [from the private sector] in peacetime improves our domain awareness and enhances stability. 

In times of crisis or disaster, these resources improve our 

ability to respond effectively.9 To be successful in the complex, dynamic, politico-military environment of the 21st century, DOD must embrace PPC as a central operating tenet.

Analytic Framework for PPC

This paper introduces an analytic framework to categorize PPC within DOD on the basis of the arrangement’s 

formality, reflecting the reality that much cooperation between DOD and the private sector evolves organically, by 

necessity. A description of the four categories follows:

◆ Category I. Contractual arrangements reflect PPC 

based on clear rules of governance, risk, and accountability. Advantage: institutionalization, shared goals, clearly 

defined expectations and criteria for performance lead to 

success. Over time they accrue the benefits of precedent 

and familiarity. Disadvantage: inflexibility.

◆ Category II. Well-defined standards and protocols 

characterize PPC based on agreed-upon, consistently 

applied processes. Advantage: shared standards and executable protocols regarding what to do and how to do 

it. Disadvantage: different interpretations of how to apply the standards makes them hard to replicate and scale.

◆ Category III. Broad frameworks for interaction reflect PPC based on statements of objectives and intent 

rather than shared processes of accountability and action. 

Advantage: provide forums for discussions that facilitate 

spontaneous cooperation or at least mitigate conflict. In 

complex, rapidly evolving situations such as in the aftermath of a humanitarian disaster, traditional command and 
www.ndu.edu/inss dh No. 74 3 

control among diverse first responders and stakeholders is 

impossible, so such frameworks for interaction are vital to 

prevent conflict. Disadvantage: lack of accountability and 

ownership inherent in loose accords often lead to inaction, 

dissatisfaction, and disuse.

◆ Category IV. Emergent/undefined situations reflect 

circumstances that require cooperation because of rapidly 

changing events. This category portrays the ambiguous 

reality of complex environments where governments and 

private-sector organizations and individuals must act in 

the absence of the guidance described in categories I, II, 

and III. When clear roles and responsibilities are absent, 

those working on such emerging issues adapt opportunistically, usually based on personalities and circumstances. 

Much of the PPC that occurs at this level is never documented precisely because it is informal and spontaneous. 

Advantage: Because few or no formal sets of collaborative 

mechanisms or procedural guidelines have been established, actors have maximum flexibility to be adaptive and 

creative. Disadvantage: Even when cooperation is possible, 

the lack of guidance can lead to unintended competition 

and perhaps conflict. It is hard to institutionalize lessons 

learned and develop structured paths to improvement.

Category I: Contractual 

Arrangements.

Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). CRAF uses contractual arrangements with U.S. civilian airlines to 

expand DOD airlift capabilities in emergencies when 

U.S. military airlift capacity alone cannot meet demand. 

Commercial airlines pledge aircraft to CRAF to be activated if needed. The airline companies are incentivized 

to participate through several mechanisms that reduce 

cost and risk at government expense. CRAF consists of 

three activation stages with clear transition, governance, 

and decision processes. There are established procedures for communication and dispute resolution. Few 

instances of PPC require such sophisticated escalation; 

however, CRAF’s structure of clearly defined escalation stages for increasing degrees of involvement and 

established processes for managing disputes can offer 

lessons for many PPC designs.10

Overcoming challenges: CRAF is a successful program that has saved cost and increased DOD airlift capacity 

when needed, while also providing stability and business to 

the commercial airline companies. When issues have arisen 

due to changes in the external environment, contracts have 

been renegotiated through the existing dispute resolution 

mechanisms in the CRAF program. This is one reason why 

CRAF has enjoyed stability and longevity.11

The “So what?” lessons:

◆ Sorting out the details: Large-scale PPC is possible 

through the use of detailed contracts. This approach may 

be effective for agreements of varying size, scale, and scope. 

Investing time and attention in precise details when both 

parties support such specificity can be a way to avoid difficulties that arise from ambiguous roles, inadequate planning, 

unforeseen circumstances, or unintended consequences.

◆ Adopting a phased approach: Clear escalation 

stages and dispute resolution processes are critical to such 

agreements. Recognizing that PPC is often desirable in 

circumstances that are evolving suggests that there are 

advantages to building phases into the expectations for cooperation. Setting thresholds for action can allow oversight and 

investment to increase in proportion to risk, reward, or size of 

the cooperation. Multiphased approaches may allow PPC to 

make immediate gains on easier-to-address issues and gain 

momentum to move toward deeper levels of cooperation.

Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs). A CRADA is designed to accelerate the development 

of both militarily and commercially viable products by creating a structured environment for protecting intellectual 

property (IP) through the use of specific requirements defined by the public sector. CRADAs leverage private sector 

resources and knowledge to meet the needs of government 

agencies at no financial cost to the government. They offer 

both parties the chance to share technical expertise, ideas, and 

information in a protected environment.12 In a CRADA, all 
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parties are allowed to keep research results confidential for 

several years. Furthermore, while the government and private 

partner(s) share IP created jointly, private partners also can 

receive exclusive rights for their uniquely generated IP to 

support commercial opportunities.13

Overcoming challenges: Despite the contractual protection a CRADA offers, there is no single process, assessment framework, or standardized approach for establishing 

a CRADA or assessing its effectiveness. The Air Force and 

Navy each use standard (but different) CRADA templates 

and processes for monitoring them. However, the Army 

delegates CRADA arrangements to the individual laboratories that are conducting the research. This inconsistency 

creates flexibility for the specific Services but lengthens 

the processes for engaging private partners and reduces the 

likelihood of leverage or efficiency across CRADA efforts.14

The “So what?” lessons:

◆ Recognize and respond to each collaborator’s concerns: 

Companies face concerns around IP in a competitive marketplace that prevents robust cooperation with government. This 

kind of confidentiality agreement can unlock the potential for 

public-private innovation. Gaining insights into a potential 

partner’s unique goals and concerns in different situations 

helps resolve barriers to cooperation. The evolution of CRADAs offers insight into how DOD can interact with multiple 

partners in a mutually collaborative relationship when those 

partners may have competitive relationships in different contexts. Moreover, this example illustrates how collaborators can 

adopt specific policies and mechanisms that respond to the 

unique concerns of particular actors or situations.

◆ Recognize that progress is possible: Until the 1980s, 

when reforms such as the establishment of CRADAs were 

introduced, the Federal Acquisition Regulations and the 

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement were 

so restrictive that DOD put itself at a disadvantage. The 

laws and policies intended to create a level playing field for 

competition actually deterred many players with valuable 

skills from getting on the field at all. When Congress realized that, it changed the rules to facilitate further PPC and 

unleashed a flood of cooperation. A review should be conducted not only of what additional legislative and regulatory 

changes will be needed to advance PPC further, but also of 

actions the Executive Branch can take on its own.

Category II: Well-defined 

Standards and Protocols

Medical Support through USNS Comfort and USNS 

Mercy. USNS Comfort and her sister ship, USNS Mercy, are 

noncommissioned U.S. Navy ships staffed by mixed military 

and civilian crews, including both military and civilian medical staff. They provide mobile, flexible, and rapidly responsive 

afloat medical capabilities for acute medical and surgical care 

in support of relief and humanitarian operations worldwide. 

Both ships have seen numerous deployments (Comfort generally in the Atlantic, Mercy in the Pacific), including foreign 

and domestic, combat support, and relief missions.15

Overcoming challenges:

◆ Lack of a consistent approach to staffing the missions: Each mission has been manned differently, drawing 

on nonmilitary medical centers, available medical staff, and 

volunteers. While the military recognizes that embarking 

NGOs and staff from diverse backgrounds is consistent with 

the goals of the mission and increases the impact of the ship’s 

presence on the targeted communities, there is no easy way to 

interoperate with many NGOs. Embarked civilians often are 

more like passengers than partners, which can lead to missed 

opportunities for more productive engagements during missions. An efficient procedure for sustainably integrating the 

private organizations into the ships’ operations is still needed.

◆ Unresolved legal issues: There are legal impediments that entities in the private sector are unaccustomed 

to dealing with or that present unique challenges for 

DOD when working with actors outside of DOD.16

◆ Lack of a consistent set of measurements: 

Operational lessons learned are captured for each mission, 

but there is no standardized set of measurements or 

processes to link operations with strategic objectives across 
www.ndu.edu/inss dh No. 74 5 

missions.17 Data-gathering has improved significantly in 

the past 2 years, but it still tends to focus on capturing raw 

numbers rather than evaluating impact, analyzing trends, 

or examining outcomes longitudinally.

The “So what?” lessons:

◆ Good policy enables good cooperation: Despite 

many successes, the hospital ships show how policy, legal, 

procedural, and regulatory constraints can hamper PPC. 

Identifying and addressing obstacles early will greatly 

enhance the probability of successful cooperation. Ultimately, permanent flexible authorities and better policies 

are needed to streamline cooperation with NGOs.

◆ Engage the partners before a crisis: Much of the 

innovation in PPC has emerged from crises like natural disasters. In such situations effective responses often hinge on 

social networks and personal trust, and these usually take 

time to develop. Sustained and consistent outreach to the 

private sector before, during, and after disasters can lead to 

lasting partnerships and better policies. Tabletop exercises 

and simulations that stress-test PPC design through different scenarios will increase the likelihood that the right 

partners perform their roles when needed. The Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) continuously 

works on such procedures with state and local emergency 

managers. U.S. Northern Command has similar relationships with the National Guard and local responders.18

Involving collaborators earlier in a strategic planning process would improve cooperation and outcomes and would 

speed responsiveness to any situation. This should include 

building a planning framework based on different scenarios to develop manpower requirements, align terminology, 

mesh objectives, and define methods of engagement among 

the different participants. Rather than disconnected events, 

exercises should form a continuous framework that builds 

on previous errors, which could be corrected in subsequent 

interagency and multidisciplinary exercises.

◆ Measure success the same way: Developing shared 

frameworks of performance objectives and measurements 

for assessing, comparing, and learning from operations 

would help nontraditional partners to cooperate.19 When 

partners define progress in the same way (or in complementary ways), it encourages them to work together 

organically rather than through continual negotiation.20 It 

would also allow for comparative analysis and adoption of 

best practices between areas of responsibility, as has been 

possible on an anecdotal basis between Africa Partnership 

Station21 and Operation Continuing Promise.

22

◆ Be mindful of security restrictions: PPC often involves complicated and potentially controversial issues 

around information-sharing since many potential privatesector collaborators will not have clearances. This requires 

creative workarounds to coordinate activities and communicate within bounds that make all parties comfortable.

Category III. Broad Framework 

for Interaction

Aid and International Development Forum (AIDF) and 

TIDES. AIDF is a United Kingdom–based for-profit company that hosts an annual tradeshow on humanitarian aid 

and development solutions, including ways for businesses 

to work with NGOs, United Nations organizations, and 

other government entities. It also involves supplier exhibits 

of existing and potential solutions for austere environments. 

TIDES is a DOD research project dedicated to open-source 

knowledge-sharing to promote sustainable support to populations under stress in postdisaster, postwar, or impoverished 

regions. AIDF sought to partner with TIDES to use the 

project’s expertise on disaster scenarios and response. In exchange AIDF offered to let TIDES display its logo in the 

conference brochure and they reduced the exhibit fee.

Overcoming challenges:

◆ Words matter: Legal interpretations of the word 

partner differ; in some contexts it connotes a form of contractual obligation for services performed rather than the 

colloquial sense of cooperation often implied in policy statements. DOD attorneys argued that highlighting certain 
6 dh No. 74 www.ndu.edu/inss

responses in the conference environment could be interpreted as endorsement, thereby violating the requirement 

that DOD maintain independence. It was the “risk of exclusion” consideration that made the word partner in the 

AIDF-TIDES discussion impossible to overcome.

◆ Perceptions matter: There were concerns that 

showing the TIDES government logo on a for-profit 

entity’s Web site or in its catalogue could be construed 

as an inappropriate use of the government’s imprimatur. There was also risk to the government should the 

for-profit entity engage in activities inconsistent with 

the purposes of TIDES or government regulations.

The “So what?” lessons:

◆ Choose words carefully: Be sensitive to the fact that 

partnership is an elastic term that covers a range of intentions and activities. Begin early to identify and address 

potential liability issues, inappropriate positioning, and 

potential conflicts of interests among the partners. PPC 

could benefit from sound legal advice early in the process.

◆ Leverage the capabilities of different organizations: Clearly define the boundaries and objectives of 

the differing organizations. TIDES and STAR (Sharing 

to Accelerate Research23)-TIDES have complementary aims but different structures—TIDES is a DOD 

research project while STAR-TIDES is a global knowledge-sharing network—so they have correspondingly 

different “boundaries” regarding who participates and 

how and when they may do so. Mapping out this distinction among different stakeholders may suggest ways 

to work through specific legal constraints.

◆ Search for common ground among parties and begin 

cooperation there, expanding outward to more specific areas 

later: The “lowest common denominator” among those procedures, expectations, policies, norms, goals, or capabilities 

that works well with all parties would serve as the foundation for cooperation. This is also true when working to 

identify shared goals and shared expectations. Even where 

one side can dictate terms, it could be counterproductive 

to do so. Collectively, approaches should promote unity of 

effort, recognizing that there will not be unity of control. 

There will often be no rulebook, authorities will be confusing, and precedents may not be obvious or accessible. If a 

consensus on a division of labor or agreement is not readily 

attainable, at least seek to align common goals, operating 

principles, or expectations to minimize misunderstandings, 

redundancies, or conflicts.

Category IV: Emergent/Undefined 

Situations

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Rapid Power Grid 

Disruption. Threats to power grids have significant consequences for economic activity, public safety, and national security.24 There are myriad vectors for disrupting power grids 

including malevolent attacks, human error, natural disaster, 

or even geomagnetic storms.25 The interconnected nature of 

power systems and their dependence on computer control 

systems requires close coordination and cooperation across 

many different organizations to minimize potential effects 

and to restore service as quickly as possible.

Wide area power grid disruptions can occur with little 

notice. Under these circumstances, it is essential to enable 

communication and cooperation to avoid potentially catastrophic damage to infrastructure and public safety caused 

by a lack of consultation and uncoordinated actions among 

multiple private power companies, the public sector (at 

Federal, state, local, and tribal levels), and third parties (hospitals, citizens) as each reacts to protect its own assets.

Power grids represent a type of critical infrastructure 

that requires PPC to secure.26 As the 2010 National Security Strategy states:

The private sector, which owns and operates most of 

the nation’s critical infrastructure, plays a vital role 

in preparing for and recovering from disasters. It is 

advantageous, therefore, to strengthen public-private 

partnerships by developing incentives for government 

and the private sector to design structures and systems 

that can withstand disruptions and mitigate associated 
www.ndu.edu/inss dh No. 74 7 

consequences, ensure redundant systems where necessary 

to maintain the ability to operate, decentralize critical 

operations to reduce single points of disruption, develop 

and test continuity plans to ensure the ability to restore 

critical capabilities, and invest in improvements to, 

and maintenance of, existing infrastructure.27

Overcoming challenges: The lack of an operational 

coordination framework to share information, understand 

potential effects, and prioritize mitigation steps is a core 

challenge for responding to a massive disruption of the 

power grid or nearly any consequence management situation. In many cases, the government is being left out of 

planning because private companies are building plans to 

shut down their systems to mitigate their own risks. While 

these steps protect a utility’s expensive equipment, they 

may increase the extent and duration of power outages. 

A rapid coordinated response to a disruptive event is vital 

to minimize impact and avoid unintended consequences.

◆ Establish common processes and procedures: Putting in place a variety of platforms for promoting awareness 

and resilience can speed responses. These would include 

processes and systems to support private and public information-sharing about preparation, contingency planning, 

and responses; a shared global event monitoring network 

to increase awareness and identify lessons learned and best 

practices; knowledge of primary interdependencies including other critical infrastructures likely to be affected; and 

prioritized mitigation strategies to restore power as quickly 

as possible to high impact areas and sectors. Such a framework for establishing common processes and procedures in 

response to a power grid failure can be broadly applicable to 

a range of multistakeholder environments and public-private situations requiring collective actions leading to shared 

consequences. Similar concepts apply to building partner 

capacity for maritime security and enforcement in littorals 

as well as consequence management of epidemiological crises, whether from bioterror attack or influenza outbreak.

◆ Leverage technology to share information: Existing (or developing) open-source collaborative platforms 

based on social media and other “edge” technologies can 

speed insights about potential consequences of a power 

outage if properly leveraged. The widespread nature of 

such disruptive events would require a distributed communications platform to share information and mobilize 

resources quickly to where they are most needed.28 Innovative organizations such as the International Network of 

Crisis Mappers29 and open-source information-sharing 

platforms have proved the value of integrating collaborative technologies into public-private cooperation. Field 

experiments conducted by TIDES with DOD and NGO 

partners (discussed below) have reinforced these points.30

The “So what?” lessons:

◆ New cooperation mechanisms are needed: PPC 

in fast-moving, highly-distributed activities should be 

based on common principles, processes, or procedures to 

minimize tension or conflict as multiple actors respond 

to emerging situations. Open source collaborative platforms can enhance situational awareness. A number of 

such capabilities can be implemented quickly.31

◆ Connect before a crisis: The worst time to meet 

potential collaborators is after a major challenge, conflict, 

or crisis has begun. Exercises, simulations, conferences, 

working groups, or training and education programs can 

help people from different sectors and communities become more comfortable with each other and capable of 

working together ahead of time.

Field Experimentation at Camp Roberts. Each 

quarter, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, TIDES, and other 

organizations (both private sector and nonprofit) convene at Camp Roberts in central California to conduct 

field experiments known as Research and Experimentation for Local and International Emergency and 

First Responders (RELIEF). These events help diverse organizations and individuals collaborate across 

organizational boundaries under different simulated 

crisis conditions. RELIEF brings together public- and 
8 dh No. 74 www.ndu.edu/inss

private-sector individuals and entities for several days to 

design, develop, and test open-source technical solutions 

for specific crisis scenarios. Such cooperation has already 

generated support in real-world situations across various 

information flows—voice, video, and data—among diverse participants and geographic boundaries.32 On occasion, RELIEF has catalyzed commercial competitors 

to collaborate on humanitarian relief efforts.

In 2012, a new type of activity called the Joint Interagency Field Experimentation (JIFX) began at Camp Roberts. Participants include multiple combatant commands and 

several other U.S. Government agencies such as USAID and 

FEMA, as well as the private sector, and looks at scenarios 

beyond the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief focus 

of RELIEF. The JIFX approach also opens a more structured 

way to address the Camp Roberts collaboration that eventually could move some of these interactions into category III.33

Overcoming challenges: There is a broadly accepted 

principle that government organizations are required to refrain from giving any one company preferential treatment 

over another arbitrarily. At Camp Roberts, some privatesector organizations participate and others do not. Should 

RELIEF prohibit certain private-sector organizations from 

participating if their competitors or similar entities cannot 

attend because of their own funding or policy constraints?34

This notion, known as the “exclusionary principle,” prevents 

one company from being disadvantaged, but it can also prevent a company from contributing. No consistent processes 

or clear guidelines exist to resolve this question.

The “So what?” lessons:

◆ Include counsel as an enabler, not a constraint: It is 

essential to consult counsel early and often in developing 

cooperative arrangements with the private sector. Ideally, engagement with legal advisors should occur before a specific 

partner is considered so that general principles and guidelines 

or even a well-developed policy can be formulated. Generally, any form of cooperation must be able to address three 

legal issues: government personnel shall not use government 

property for other than authorized purposes;35 government 

personnel shall not use public office for private gain;36 and 

government personnel shall not give preferential treatment 

to any private organization or individual.37 Cooperation between DOD and private-sector entities is a recognized need 

of DOD, confirmed by strategic guidance. Precedents exist; 

many are provided in this paper. Legal counsel can advise 

decisionmakers on how to enter into cooperative agreements 

legally, ethically, and prudently.

◆ Prepare to answer questions about profit when 

dealing with companies: Anticipate that issues around 

profit, preferential treatment, and IP will arise and 

develop processes or principles for addressing them. 

Consider using CRADAs or challenge grants as mechanisms to support IP development and distribution 

related to activities. If there is no time or inclination 

to use a CRADA, other frameworks, such as the Linux 

model, may be used to address IP concerns or other issues surrounding the appropriate use of resources.

◆ When in doubt, return to the mission as a source 

of guidance: A mission-related rationale, a strong operational justification, and transparent decisionmaking are 

compelling rebuttals to any claim of undue influence or 

inappropriate conduct in the course of PPC.

◆ Create the tools you need: Explore the possibility of creating or using existing nonprofit organizations 

with appropriate tax status to coordinate funding between different sources. This has two benefits: it enables 

commingling public-sector and private-sector funding 

to support activities, and it does not restrict providing 

funding to private-sector or civil society organizations 

that otherwise would be unable to participate.38

Conclusions

The paper suggests several broad conclusions about 

enhancing PPC that can be applied immediately:

PPC Objectives Need to Be Clarified Early. Since different types of PPC support different types of objectives, 

the first step is to determine the types of PPC that presently exist and the type of cooperation that is desired. The 
www.ndu.edu/inss dh No. 74 9 

continuum of formality approach proposes four categories, each with its own set of problems to overcome. This 

paper describes potential solutions that might be used in 

other PPC contexts to overcome similar challenges.

PPC Should Promote Mutual Benefits. PPC must be 

based on shared visions, principles, goals, objectives, and 

standards—and these must be measured and assessed 

across all stages of an operation. In sum, there needs to 

be a sense of community around a common purpose. Cooperation is most effective when all partners gain something of value and make concessions symmetrically.

Having a Central Coordinator of PCC Is Useful. Organizations that want to undertake significant PPC can benefit 

from a centralized coordinator to make their capabilities more 

accessible to private sector agents. The lack of a central point 

of contact is one of the primary complaints of many NGOs 

that want to work with the government. Centralized offices 

or coordinators such as the Global Partnership Initiative at 

the Department of State, Office of Public-Private Cooperation at USSOUTHCOM, or Special Advisor for Public-Private Collaboration at USEUCOM are examples of significant efforts. U.S. Northern Command actively participates in 

conferences on public-private coordination.39 These kinds of 

structures can separate organizations that are well prepared to 

work with outside entities from those that struggle.

Senior Sponsorship Is Key. Offices dedicated to PPC 

need direct sponsorship from senior leaders in their organizations. If a DOD office has a Senior Executive Service or 

general officer/flag office advocate for PPC, the efforts are 

more likely to be successful. Without such sponsorship, it is 

very difficult to secure enough support to change policies, 

behaviors, and expectations, let alone resource allocations.

Cross-cultural Issues Must Be Addressed. Advocates of 

PPC need to understand and address directly the different 

cultures, norms, and expectations of diverse organizations to 

minimize mistrust, frustration, burnout, or default. It may 

be a cliché to acknowledge the cultural differences inherent 

in PPC, but acting on that knowledge and being responsive 

to the characteristics of different partners is not common.

Build Flexibility into Contracts. PPC based on contractual arrangements (category I) needs to be flexible 

enough to adjust to external changes. Incorporating procedures for communication and dispute resolution would 

help the PPC agreements to endure.

Develop a Framework for Interaction. PPC based 

on a broad framework of interaction (category III) 

needs to evolve as quickly as possible to build welldefined standards and protocols. Not doing so would 

lead to “PPC drift,” with little accountability and clarity of authority. Such drift would eventually result in 

frustration and call into question the ongoing relevance of the agreement.

Assess Emergent Conditions. Emergent conditions (category IV) require a process to assess the potential nature and implications of a problem, as well 

as potential stakeholders. In these types of conditions 

it is particularly important that communications be 

based on a broad framework of interactions. It also 

may be important to develop “what if ?” scenarios to 

evaluate how potential problems might metastasize 

into actual ones.

Recommendations and Next Steps

This paper proposes broad recommendations to help 

provide a framework for the future of PPC in DOD. The 

Defense Department needs to pay more attention to PPC, 

clarify authorities, and allocate appropriate resources. Incremental changes could bring benefits now, but systemic 

solutions will be needed for DOD to implement PPC on 

the scale that will be required to meet the evolving demands of the new strategic environment. There are several 

significant steps Defense Department leadership could 

take to promote PPC DOD-wide. These recommendations center on policy and doctrine, organization, training 

and education, and congressional support.

Policy and Doctrine

Policy direction: This paper recognizes the work 

that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is 

conducting to produce a detailed directive on PPC that 

gives clear, actionable, senior-level guidance, confers 

legitimacy, and elevates the role of PPC in DOD, such 

as Joint Publication ( JP) 3-08, Interorganizational 
10 dh No. 74 www.ndu.edu/inss

Coordination During Joint Operations. Such a publication 

is urgently needed.

PPC doctrine: The Joint Staff and Services should 

further develop doctrine to support PPC in order to 

enlist greater private sector engagement, following the 

example laid out by JP 3-08. The 2011 update of this 

document addresses40 the urgent need for cooperation 

with the private sector (including nongovernmental 

organizations). This paper complements JP 3-08 by 

providing additional recommendations and specific 

examples concerning DOD engagement with the private sector.

Organization

DOD-wide PPC coordination: OSD should create 

a DOD-wide coordinator for PPC policy. The coordinator might report to the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, or Deputy Chief Management Officer. This office should reach out to counterpart 

organizations at the Department of State and USAID 

to establish a regular coordination mechanism for harmonizing a national approach to PPC as an element of 

foreign policy and national security.

Joint Staff PPC coordination: The Joint Staff 

should establish a PPC coordination office, possibly within the J5 or J7. This office should maintain a 

strong communication and coordination channel with 

the proposed civilian PPC office in OSD. Currently, 

the new JP 3-08 outlines the role for various joint and 

interagency efforts, such as joint interagency coordination groups and joint interagency task forces.41 Building on the need for interagency cooperation, this paper 

was drafted as a way to address specific examples of engagement with the non-NGO private sector in order to 

highlight some of the issues that may be encountered 

by such interagency entities.

Engage lawyers early: Particular attention should be 

given to building a collaborative relationship with DOD 

Counsels General and Judge Advocates General. For reasons 

described above, legal constraints are likely to emerge as impediments to PPC on several levels. Focusing attention on 

preparing DOD lawyers to be enablers can have significant 

impact on the effectiveness and scope of future PPC.

Learn from the special operations forces (SOF) 

community: The SOF community could serve as advocates for PPC and provide valuable lessons. The community represents a respected cadre of warfighters who have 

decades of experience collaborating with nonmilitary 

organizations in diverse environments.

Consider establishing an officer PPC subspecialty: 

Consideration should also be given to developing a subspecialty of officers who understand PPC and evolve into 

advocates for it and leaders of it as they rise through the 

ranks. The military has cultivated cadres of champions in 

civil affairs, regional specialties, and counterinsurgency, 

among others. PPC demands similar expertise.

Improve coordination of PPC activities among combatant commands: A coordinating body among combatant 

commands should be established to identify best practices, 

share lessons learned, and coordinate PPC advocacy. While 

JP 3-08 addresses the needs and roles of several joint interagency groups within DOD, this paper offers specific 

examples of how such cooperation can be established and 

what problems and issues might be avoided in implementation of the new doctrine.42 A growing number of combatant 

commands are assigning responsibility for PPC advocacy 

and dedicating resources to it. The next step toward consolidating these gains is to improve communication and coordination between small groups of leaders at each command.

Training and Education

Incorporate PPC into military and civilian education: Educating military officers on the fundamentals of 

PPC can help shape DOD willingness and capacity to 

engage in such activities. PPC principles and concepts 

should be incorporated into professional military education (PME) and joint PME at all levels from junior officers to Capstone and Pinnacle courses. Similar education 

and training should be made available to civilians who 

will work with organizations in the private sector.

Promote organizational learning: Organizational 

learning and adaptation is just as important for the success of PPC as training and education for individuals. A 
www.ndu.edu/inss dh No. 74 11 

robust mechanism for capturing best practices and lessons 

observed as well as annual training exercises and events is 

needed to stimulate ongoing discussion and learning on 

PPC. Lessons are never “learned” until behaviors change, 

and training, experimentation, and simulations are an effective means by which to gather insights and change behavior. 

These also could serve as a valuable forum for convening 

non-DOD stakeholders along with DOD counterparts.

Congressional Support

Over time, advocates for PPC throughout the executive branch will need to work with Congress to consider legislative initiatives to clarify laws, authorities, 

oversight, and guidance to advance PPC.

Additional Research Dimensions

This paper is intended to begin a discussion based 

on PPC case studies to help anticipate challenges and 

identify steps to overcome them. The analytic framework 

it presents is based on a continuum of formality; in subsequent research, a broader, multidimensional framework 

could be developed to explore more examples in greater 

depth. Six possible additional dimensions of PPC are:

◆ Policy objectives: DOD policy objective for the 

cooperation (for example, research and development, 

humanitarian relief, and cost reduction are all widely divergent objectives)

◆ Type of partners: The type of private partner(s) in the 

cooperation (for example, private sector entity, NGO, academic institution, local group, or multinational organization)

◆ DOD stakeholders: DOD stakeholders involved in 

the cooperation (for example, Service, COCOM, or agency)

◆ Structure of collaboration: The structure of the relationship between DOD and collaborator(s) (for example, bilateral 

or multilateral cooperation, alliance, or coalition partnerships)

◆ Duration of collaboration: The duration and frequency of cooperation (for example, one-off, annual, 

frequent, or circumstantial)

◆ Scope of collaboration: The volume, scale, and scope 

of the cooperation (for example, number of organizations, 

Acknowledgments

The authors appreciate the support of Mr. George Topic of the Center for Joint and Strategic Logistics, as well as Dr. Ralph Welborn, 

Mr. Oscar De Soto, and Mr. Josh Marcuse of Booz Allen Hamilton 

in preparing this paper.

countries, programs, activities involved, or the level of time 

or financial investment required).

PPC is an increasingly important part of the DOD 

toolkit, especially as the Defense Department faces the dual 

challenges of internal resource constraints and a complex 

and competitive external environment. However, DOD will 

have to bridge important gaps between high-level policies 

and the on-the-ground procedures to implement them. In 

some cases, new authorities, resources, infrastructure, and 

cultural changes may be needed. By providing examples of 

how innovative people have solved some of the challenges 

they faced, this paper aims to help bridge those gaps.

Notes

1 TIDES is described in category III of the analytic framework. 

See <www.star-tides.net>.

2 For example, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) 

has chosen to use the term public-private cooperation (PPC) in lieu of 

public-private partnership for this exact reason. Additionally, cooperation is preferred by some governments in coalition contexts. The 

authors’ use of cooperation is intended to encompass the spectrum of 

action that includes communication, cooperation, coordination, and 

collaboration plus, in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization context, 

consultation. 

3 Both the State Department and USAID have extensive 

public-private activities under way. Therefore, this paper focuses on 

improving PPC in DOD.

4 A review of multiple databases, case studies, and concept 

papers has identified over 4,000 examples of PPC. Valuable resources 

include: U.S. Department of State’s Global Partnership Initiative Office, with special thanks to Jim Thompson, Deputy Special Representative for Global Partnerships; RAND Corporation’s Arroyo Center; 

National Council for Public-Private Partnerships; USAID; and 

Global Development Alliance.

5 For example, in DOD Instruction 3000.05 on stability operations, combatant commanders are directed to “align DOD theater 

strategies and plans with complementary stability operations–related 

capabilities, strategies, and plans of other U.S. Government agencies, foreign government and security forces, and the private sector” 

(emphasis added).

6 Daniel Runde et al., Seizing the Opportunity in Public-Private 

Partnerships: Strengthening Capacity at the State Department, USAID, 

and MCC (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, November 1, 2011).

7 National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White 

House, 2010).
12 dh No. 74 www.ndu.edu/inss

8 James G. Stavridis and Evelyn N. Farkas, “The 21st Century 

Force Multiplier: Public-Private Collaboration,” The Washington 

Quarterly 35, no. 2 (April 2012), 7–20.

9 USSOUTHCOM Policy Memorandum 05-09, “Public Private Cooperation Policy,” June 10, 2009.

10 See <www.dot.gov/ost/oet/craf.htm>.

11 See <http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/

TestimonyAviation/2009-05-13-Coretz.pdf>.

12 See <www.usgs.gov/tech-transfer/what-crada.html>.

13 See <www.wpafb.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD070905-013.pdf>; see also <www.imagingnotes.com/go/article_free.

php?mp_id=191>.

14 See <www.flcnortheast.org/WestPoint2010/Ryan.pdf>; see 

also <www.ott.nih.gov/cradas/model_agree.aspx>; and <www.usgs.

gov/tech-transfer/handbook/TT_Handbook-CRADA.doc>.

15 See <www.med.navy.mil/sites/usnscomfort/Pages/default.

aspx>; see also <www.msc.navy.mil/N00P/overview.asp>.

16 USSOUTHCOM has requested a change in legislative language 

to make it easier to provide such expenses to nongovernmental organizations desiring to support humanitarian and civic assistance activities. 

17 See <www.med.navy.mil/sites/nmcsd/scmsca/Shared%20Documents/Operational%20Medicine/Navy-NGO%20Coordinations.pdf>.

18 See <www.northcom.mil/News/2012/022412.html>.

19 See <www.med.navy.mil/sites/usnsmercy/Pages/default.aspx>; 

and <www.med.navy.mil/sites/usnscomfort/Pages/default.aspx>.

20 See <http://coe-dmha.org/>.

21 A strategic program designed by U.S. Africa Command to 

build the skills, expertise, and professionalism of African militaries, 

coast guards, and mariners.

22 U.S. military exercises conducted by USSOUTHCOM that 

provide medical, dental, and veterinary aid to Latin America.

23 TIDES is a part of STAR.

24 See <www.ndia.org/Divisions/Divisions/EnvironmentAndEnergySecurity/Documents/Content/ContentGroups/Divisions1/

Environment/Energy_PDFs/2008%20DSB%20Energy%20Briefing.

pdf>.

25 See NDU, Energy and Environmental Security Policy Program, After Action Report on a roundtable exercise on “Severe Space 

Weather Threats: National Electrical Grid and Impacts to Critical 

Infrastructures” held on October 3, 2011.

26 Critical infrastructure is by no means the only aspect of citizen 

security where cooperation between the government and private sector is increasingly important; cybersecurity, food security, civil aviation, 

and other forms of transportation, and even financial regulation, are 

other examples. Power grids are an excellent representative example of 

this broad requirement for enhanced cooperation.

27 National Security Strategy, 19.

28 Two new DOD initiatives in this area are Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency’s Social Media in Strategic Communication 

and the pending Information Volume and Velocity Joint Capability 

Technology Demonstration.

29 See <http://crisismappers.net/>.

30 RELIEF 11-02, Experiments at NPS/Virginia Tech Advanced Research Institute in Arlington, VA, March 2011.

31 For more information on extreme weather and DOD coordination with private enterprises, contact Dr. Steven Ramberg, Chief of 

Naval Research Chair and Distinguished Research Fellow at National 

Defense University. See also Linton Wells II and Ralph Welborn, 

“From Haiti to Helmand: Using Open Source Information to Enhance Situational Awareness and Operational Effectiveness,” available 

at <http://star-tides.net/content/haiti-helmand-using-open-sourceinformation-enhance-situational-awareness-and-operational--0>.

32 See reports on the February 29, 2012, and March 1, 2012, 

RELIEF events at <http://star-tides.net/blogs/camp-roberts-reliefsecond-day-wrap>; and <http://star-tides.net/blogs/camp-robertsrelief-first-day-wrap>.

33 See Raymond R. Buettner, “Multi Institutional Semi-Structured Learning Environments,” forthcoming.

34 Some of these organizations cannot participate because of their 

size or internal policies regarding what kind of sponsored exercises their 

employees can participate in or they will subsidize.

35 See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(9).

36 See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(7).

37 See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(8).

38 For more insight into lessons and recommendations regarding 

the Camp Roberts experiments and open-source public-private partnerships regarding crisis situations, contact John Crowley at <john@

crisispatterns.org>.

39 See <www.northcom.mil/News/2011/072911a.html>.

40 Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, June 24, 2011), 

available at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_08.pdf>.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

The Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

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them effectively into policies through research, teaching, 

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The Defense Horizons series presents original research 

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