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80–463PDF 2013

SECURING U.S. INTERESTS ABROAD:

THE FY 2014 FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUDGET

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 17, 2013

Serial No. 113–39

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable John F. Kerry, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State ... 4

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable John F. Kerry: Prepared statement ............................................. 9

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 62

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 63

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Material 

submitted for the record ...................................................................................... 65

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa: Prepared statement ............................................................... 67

Written responses from the Honorable John F. Kerry to questions submitted 

for the record by: 

The Honorable Edward R. Royce ........................................................................ 68

The Honorable Edward R. Royce on behalf of the Honorable Gus Bilirakis, 

a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida ............................... 84

The Honorable Edward R. Royce on behalf of the Honorable Michael R. 

Turner, a Representative in Congress from the State of Ohio ..................... 86

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York ...................................................................................................... 87

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Texas ............................................................................................. 97

The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California ...................................................................................................... 100

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas .................................................................................................................. 107

The Honorable Albio Sires, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New Jersey .................................................................................................... 109

The Honorable Matt Salmon, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Arizona .......................................................................................................... 111

The Honorable William Keating, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Massachusetts ................................................................... 116

The Honorable George Holding, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of North Carolina .................................................................................... 119

The Honorable David Cicilline, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Rhode Island ....................................................................................... 123

The Honorable Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ............................................................................. 135

The Honorable Doug Collins, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Georgia .......................................................................................................... 136

The Honorable Mark Meadows, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of North Carolina .................................................................................... 139

The Honorable Luke Messer, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana .......................................................................................................... 141

(1)

SECURING U.S. INTERESTS ABROAD: THE FY 

2014 FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUDGET 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce (chairman of 

the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs will come to order. 

Today we are privileged to hear from the Secretary of State, 

John Kerry. 

Of course, Senator Kerry is from Massachusetts, and our committee mourns those lost in the terrorist attack at the Boston Marathon. Our hearts go out to the victims and to the family members 

who have lost loved ones. 

Secretary Kerry comes to testify on his department’s budget request. Needless to say, given Washington’s chronic budget deficit, 

wasteful spending is intolerable, but even good programs must be 

subject to prioritization. We can’t do everything. 

Along those lines, it is inexcusable that the State Department 

has been operating for 4-plus years without a presidentially-nominated, Senate-confirmed Inspector General. This committee is committed to its responsibility for overseeing the spending and other 

operations in the State Department. And that is a bipartisan commitment I am pleased to join Mr. Engel in carrying out. 

The threats facing our Nation, unfortunately, are mounting. 

Iran, North Korea, and Syria are just the ones that we read about 

in the headlines. The terrorist threat is, unfortunately, constant, 

with al-Qaeda franchises continuing to grow. 

Mr. Secretary, our plate is full, and we look forward to working 

with you to advance our Nation’s interests. 

Regarding Iran, we can’t be moving fast enough to increase the 

economic pressure on the Iranian revolutionary regime there. The 

ranking member and I have introduced legislation to do just that. 

I hope the administration would come to see the need to send nothing but the strongest signal that Iran’s drive to develop nuclear 

weapons will be stopped. Greater economic pressure must be part 

of that message. The current policy is simply not working. 

Likewise, with North Korea, we need to be imposing crippling financial sanctions on this increasingly belligerent regime. In 2005, 

the Treasury Department was allowed to counter North Korea’s ilVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:30 Aug 21, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\041713\80463 HFA PsN: SHIRL
2

licit activities. It countered those activities because it was discovered that North Korea was counterfeiting U.S. $100 bills, was 

drug-running, and was involved in weapons sales. And, frankly, 

that tactic dramatically curtailed North Korea’s access to the foreign currency that that regime needed for its nuclear and missile 

programs. Those programs increasingly threaten us. We must get 

back to that policy. 

A robust human rights policy is especially critical in the case of 

North Korea. The Kim regime will never be at peace with its democratic neighbors or us so long as it is at war with its own people, 

including running a brutal labor camp system, described as a concentration camp by those few who have come out of that system. 

Promoting human rights here is in keeping in American values but 

also presents a critical tactical tool for dealing with the regime. 

And, sadly, it is clear that the U.S. international broadcasting, essential in promoting human rights, is in disarray. Secretary Clinton said as much when she last appeared before the committee. 

Another challenge facing us, Mr. Secretary, is seeing a successful 

transition in Afghanistan. The consequences of failure would be 

great. Our struggle against terrorism would be set back significantly. We appreciate the risks that the men and women of the 

State Department take. And I want to express my condolences to 

the family of Anne Smedinghoff, recently killed in Afghanistan 

along with three other Americans. 

This committee and several others have been examining the 

events of Benghazi. We understand that the State Department has 

implemented many of the reforms recommended by the Accountability Review Board in order to better protect the Department’s 

employees. That is good, since the Board found ‘‘systemic failures 

in leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels’’ under 

the Secretary’s predecessor. 

But the committee remains concerned about the Review Board’s 

process. We have outstanding requests for information from your 

department, Mr. Secretary, that must be answered. These include 

why the four State Department employees the Board singled out 

for poor performance are still on the payroll. Seven months after 

Benghazi, the terrorists are still alive and free. 

Mr. Secretary, there are great challenges for our Nation, too 

many challenges. The difficulty of prioritizing is compounded by 

our fiscal crunch. Through it all, though, I look forward to working 

together to ensure that America maintains its traditionally positive 

and essential role in the world. 

I now turn to our ranking member, Mr. Engel from New York, 

for his statement. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Secretary Kerry, as the ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and as a longtime supporter of yours, I would like 

to welcome you to the Foreign Affairs Committee today, the first 

time you are joining us in your new capacity. 

At the outset, I would like to express my condolences on two recent tragedies: First, the death in Afghanistan of Anne 

Smedinghoff, a young Foreign Service Officer, who was by all accounts a rising star; and, secondly, the bombings that hit the Boston Marathon in your home State of Massachusetts. 

3

Mr. Secretary, you are here at a time when the United States 

faces an increasing number of difficult and complex challenges 

around the world. Syria remains engulfed in a horrific civil war 

that has left more than 70,000 dead. Iran continues its pursuit of 

a nuclear weapons capability. And North Korea seems determined 

to generate a crisis that could have serious implications for our national security. 

The primary purpose of today’s hearing is to assess how the 

President’s Fiscal Year 2014 international affairs budget responds 

to the threats and opportunities we face as a Nation. We spend just 

over 1 percent of our national budget on diplomacy and development, which are key components of America’s national security 

strategy. Diplomats and aid workers strengthen alliances and prevent wars while telling America’s story, and they do it on the 

cheap. 

While I would have preferred to see higher funding levels for our 

diplomats, I will support the broad outline of the 2014 international affairs budget request, which cuts overall spending by 

about 4 percent, based in large part through our reduced presence 

in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

However, the effects of sequestration, which I strongly opposed 

from the beginning, are leaving many State Department functions 

dangerously short of funds. The budget request includes critical 

funding to enhance security for our brave diplomats and development workers. We should act as soon as possible to implement the 

recommendations of the Accountability Review Board for Benghazi 

and fund the State Department’s security proposal. I am also 

pleased that the budget request continues to provide robust funding for PEPFAR and the Global Fund, maintaining U.S. leadership 

in global health. 

In addition, the 2014 budget increases vital humanitarian assistance to help the Syrian people, but I believe we must do more to 

tip the balance in favor of the Syrian opposition. I recently introduced the bipartisan Free Syria Act, which provides a comprehensive strategy to end the conflict in Syria. This includes the arming 

of carefully vetted members of a Syrian opposition committed to a 

peaceful, democratic Syria. 

Mr. Secretary, I look forward to working with you to bring the 

Assad regime to an end and address the humanitarian crisis he 

created. 

I believe that Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability is 

perhaps the foremost threat facing the United States and the world 

today. Over the past 4 years, President Obama has unified the 

international community against this threat and signed into law 

the strongest-ever sanctions against the regime in Tehran. 

Iran has been forced to the negotiating table, but they refuse to 

negotiate seriously. Meanwhile, their centrifuges are spinning more 

efficiently than ever. I urge the administration to continue to increase the pressure on Iran and to keep all options on the table 

until Iran abandons its nuclear weapons program once and for all. 

Chairman Royce and I have introduced bipartisan legislation to increase the pressure on Iran, and I hope the administration will embrace our legislation. 

4

I also want to congratulate President Obama on his tremendously successful trip to Israel and for fully funding aid to Israel 

in the budget request. I had the pleasure of traveling with the 

President to Israel, where he worked to strengthen the eternal 

bond between Israel and the United States and was received enthusiastically by the Israeli people. 

Mr. Secretary, Israel has repeatedly emphasized that it seeks unconditional direct negotiations with the Palestinians, and I applaud 

the administration for urging the Palestinians to accept that offer. 

Regrettably, the Palestinians keep raising one condition after another, casting doubt on their commitment to ending the conflict 

with Israel. 

I also want to work closely with you, Mr. Secretary, to build upon 

the terrific work of Secretary Clinton in supporting the Republic of 

Kosova. Likewise, I would like to praise the excellent efforts of EU 

Foreign Policy Chief Lady Catherine Ashton for leading the talks 

between Belgrade and Pristina. It is my understanding that Lady 

Ashton has again convened the parties, who are meeting as we 

speak. 

In previous talks, Kosova negotiated in good faith with Serbia in 

the EU-facilitated dialogue, but Serbia walked away from the table. 

It is critical for Serbia and Kosova that an agreement on normalization be reached. In the end, the people of Kosova simply want 

to be treated fairly. Just like their Balkan neighbors, their future 

requires a clear path into NATO and the EU, and the five EU holdouts should finally recognize Europe’s newest country. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I look forward to Secretary 

Kerry’s testimony. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

Well, this morning we are joined by John Kerry, the 68th Secretary of State. Prior to his appointment, the Secretary served as 

United States Senator from Massachusetts for 28 years and 

chaired the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate for 4 of 

those years. And now he has to answer the questions. 

But, Mr. Secretary, welcome. Welcome to the House. 

And, without objection, the Secretary’s full prepared statement 

will be made part of the record. Members here will have 5 days to 

submit statements, questions and extraneous materials for the 

record. And we will ask that Mr. Secretary, if you could summarize 

your remarks in 5 minutes, we will then follow with questions. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN F. KERRY, 

SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Secretary KERRY. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 

ask you just remember, what goes around comes around. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Engel, Ranking 

Member, thank you for your comments about Boston. It is impossible for me to express my sadness and my anger, frankly, over 

those terrible events. It is just hard to believe that a Patriots’ Day 

holiday, which is normally such a time of festivity, is turned into 

bloody mayhem. 

But I know how resilient Bostonians are, and I think a lot of you 

do, despite the fact that it took us 86 years to win a pennant. I 

5

have talked this week with friends and family up there, as recently 

as this morning. And the granddaughter of a very, very close supporter and friend of mine through all of my political career is fighting to keep both of her legs. 

You know, Boston is not going to be intimidated by this, but we 

are going to find out who did this. And the police work being done 

is extraordinary. The FBI is remarkable. There is great deal of forensic evidence, and we are hopeful that we can bring people to 

justice. 

Turning to the business before us this morning, I do promise to 

remember how important the lessons are I learned during my time 

in Congress, which means: Keep your remarks short so we can get 

to the questions. And I will try to do that as fast as I can, but there 

are some things I want to share with you. 

One of lessons that I have learned and particularly been reinforced in my early travels—and let me just say what a privilege it 

is to appear before this committee. I honor the Congress, having 

spent 28 years in it. I respect what each of you represent. And I 

come before you to be accountable on behalf of the administration. 

I look forward to our question-and-answer period. 

As Senator Lindsay Graham said very eloquently, America’s investment in foreign policy is national security insurance. And there 

really isn’t anything foreign about foreign policy anymore. That has 

come home to me again and again. If we can make the small, smart 

investments up front, then I believe we avoid more costly conflicts 

and greater burdens down the road. 

In the past few months, we have seen a number of developments 

that underscore the stakes for having a strong American presence 

in every part of the world. American engagement was essential to 

the rapprochement between two of our closest partners, Israel and 

Turkey. And that was a positive step toward stability in a volatile 

region of the world where we need partnerships. 

The committee is more than immersed in Syria. We have contrib- uted nearly $385 million to humanitarian relief to provide essential 

resources to the Syrian people, including sending flour to bakeries 

in Aleppo and providing food and sanitation in Atmeh, in the refugee camp. And I expect that we will talk about Syria somewhat 

today. 

Having just returned from Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo, where the 

North Korea issue took center stage, we are reminded once again 

that America is the guardian of global security. We should be 

proud of that, and we should carry that mantel. We will not turn 

our back on the prospect of peace, but neither are we going to hesitate to do what we need to do to defend our allies and our interests. 

And all of this speaks to why this budget is not just a collection 

of numbers; it is an illustration of our values and our priorities. 

Budgets, deficits, debt—these are weighty decisions. I had the 

privilege of serving on the super committee and thought we could 

have gotten there. And I have a record of wanting to do deficit reduction. 

And I know you are all grappling with these choices. We are 

grappling with them at the State Department. And I think our proposed budget is responsive to and reflective of our national ecoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:30 Aug 21, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\041713\80463 HFA PsN: SHIRL
6

nomic reality. As part of the budget, we are going to help cut our 

deficit responsibly while investing in areas that attract economic 

growth, create good jobs for Americans, and secure our national interests. 

Our 2014 budget request represents a 6-percent reduction from 

2012 funding levels. And we have examined our request—and the 

reason we mention 2012 is 2013 was a CR, as all of you know. We 

have examined our request with a clear determination to improve 

efficiency and economize where possible. We have implemented reforms that reduce costs without jeopardizing vital contributions. 

And I think we deliver the maximum bang for the minimal expenditure of our citizens’ dollars—about one single penny for our national security and global interests out of every single dollar. 

Now, let me give you a couple of examples of the kind of highimpact, low-cost work that we are doing to try to make the world 

safer. 

With just over $3.5 million, the State Department’s Bureau of 

Conflict and Stabilization Operations made key investments leading up to the recent elections in Kenya, and I know that that 

helped to prevent a repeat of the violence that we saw 5 years ago. 

It also provided the accountability that allowed Odinga to concede 

without instilling violence. 

Our antiterrorism assistance funding has helped the lives of hundreds of people in places like Pakistan, India, Lebanon, by training 

local law enforcement to detect and neutralize explosive devices 

and help us interdict plots before they come to our shores. 

Our 2014 budget request maintains our commitments to advancing peace, security, and stability in places where all three can be 

very scarce commodities. 

I have already traveled three times as Secretary to the Middle 

East and North Africa, a region struggling to respond to its citizens’ growing expectations for dignity and opportunity. The very 

values that we have been promoting they are trying to embrace. 

Leaders there are making difficult decisions, and the United States 

cannot make those decisions for them, but we can do a lot to be 

a partner for all those on the side of freedom and democracy. 

To that end, the budget includes a request for $580 million for 

the Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund so that we can 

help give reformers the tools and resources they need to make the 

right decisions on behalf of their citizens. And this fund also allows 

us to say to people in the region, if you are willing to take on the 

deep-rooted challenges of democracy and throw off the yoke of dictatorship, we are here for you. 

When we look at the threats that emanate from failed and potentially failing states, I think it is important that we learn the lessons of the past. The U.S. homeland will not be secure if violent 

extremists are bent on attacking us and they can find a safe haven 

in places like the Sahel or the Maghreb. 

The threats that we are dealing with in that part of the world 

range from al-Qaeda rebels to narcotraffickers. And this budget 

sets aside $8.6 billion for our security for counterterrorism law enforcement assistance. I ask you, every member, just compare that 

$8.6 billion to the more than $1 trillion we have spent fighting in 

7

Iraq and Afghanistan, and I think you will agree that it is both 

pennywise and pound-wise. 

The simple fact is the United States cannot be strong at home 

if we are not strong in the world, in today’s world. This is particularly true when it comes to our domestic economic renewal. We 

need to, I think, be more visible, engaged, and strong in certain 

places, particularly to stoke our economic engines with the trade 

and business opportunities that are available all across this planet. 

And that is why the President is committed to successfully completing the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and 

the Trans-Pacific Partnership. We want to tap the growing markets 

of the Asia-Pacific, which are vital to economic recovery. And I 

might point out, most of the growth in the world that is in the double digits or high single digits is in those parts of the world. 

I know you will agree with me on the value of investing in our 

relationship with Asia because many of you, including the chairman, the ranking member, Representative Salmon, and Representative Marino, have traveled to that region recently. In fact, you 

were there on the very day that I assumed these responsibilities. 

When it comes to shoring up our economic health and protecting 

our national security, I believe our development work is one of our 

strongest assets. And so let me be clear: Development is not charity; it is an investment. And I believe it is an investment and President Obama believes it is an investment in a strong world and a 

strong America. 

Eleven of our top 15 trading partners were once beneficiaries of 

U.S. foreign assistance. You just can’t afford to pull back from what 

that lesson tells us. South Korea, that I was just in, 15 years ago 

was an aid recipient. Today it is giving aid around the world. 

That doesn’t mean we can’t work in better, more efficient ways, 

but let me highlight just a few of the reforms that we have undertaken. 

U.S. food aid, for instance. By giving ourselves the flexibility to 

choose the most appropriate and efficient type of food assistance, 

we are going to reach an estimated 2 million to 4 million more people every year with the very same discretionary funding. At the 

same time, we are going to save approximately $500 million in 

mandatory funding over the next decade, which we can use to reduce the deficit. 

American growers and producers will still play a major role in 

this food assistance. Over half of the funding we are requesting for 

emergency food aid must be used for the purchase and shipping of 

U.S. commodities overseas. But by giving us the ability to modernize, including the flexibility to also procure food aid in developing countries closer to the crisis areas, not only do we feed more 

people, but we get food to malnourished people 11 to 14 weeks faster. 

So here is the bottom line: This change allows us to do more, to 

help more people lift themselves out the hunger at a rapid pace 

without spending more money. I think that is a great deal for the 

American taxpayer. 

The final area I want to mention is how this budget cares for our 

most valuable resource, and that is the personnel, the men and 

8

women of the State Department and USAID who are on the front 

lines. 

We have requested $4.4 billion to fortify our worldwide security 

protection and improve our overseas infrastructure. Two-point-two 

billion dollars of this is set aside for constructing secure diplomatic 

facilities. And this is part of our commitment to implement in full 

the recommendations of the ARB so that we can obviously mitigate 

the risk of future tragedies. 

This has been a hard year for the State Department family, a 

family that knows exactly how risky the work that we signed up 

for can be in a dangerous world. Chairman, you both mentioned, 

Mr. Ranking Member, the situation of the loss of Anne 

Smedinghoff. She is being laid to rest right now, while I am here. 

And I visited with her family in Chicago on the way back from 

Seoul, and we will have a memorial service for her at the State Department on the 2nd or 3rd of May. 

I met her on my last visit. Earlier in the week, you know, I sat 

with her parents, and we swapped stories about her enthusiasm, 

her energy, her vitality. She really wanted to make a difference in 

the lives of people she had never met, and she was. 

So Anne and Ambassador Stevens are really cut from the same 

cloth, and that is, frankly, what made them such outstanding 

Americans as well as members of the State Department family. As 

Secretary, my job is to make sure we protect these people. Frankly, 

it is all of our job. I think you know that. We cannot do it by retreating from the world. 

We stand for optimism. We stand for opportunity. We stand for 

equality. And we stand in opposition to all those who would replace 

hope with hate, who replace peace with violence and war. That is 

what we believe, that is when America is at its best, and those are 

the values of the State Department and the USAID that I intend 

to defend every single day. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know I went a little over. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Kerry follows:]

9


80463a-1.eps

SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN F. KERRY 

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 

WASHINGTON, DC 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17,2013 

Thank you Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel. 

Before I begin, I want to express my grief and anger over the terrible events that struck my home 

city of Boston earlier this week. I know just how resilient Bostonians are, and I've talked this 

week with friends and family still wrestling with what happened to children and loved ones. But 

Boston will not be intimidated by cowardly acts of wanton destruction. As President Obama said 

on Monday, we will not rest until we have gotten to the bottom ofthese bombings and the 

perpetrators have been brought to justice. 

Turning to the business of the budge!... I promise to remember the most important lessons I 

learned during my time in Congress. First, keep your remarks short so we can get to the 

questions. 

And second, a lesson which has hit home particularly during my travels as Secretary there 

really is no longer anything foreign about foreign policy. 

As Senator Lindsey Graham has said very eloquently, America's investment in foreign policy is 

"national security insurance." He's right. lfwe can make the small smart investments up front, 

we can avoid much more costly conflicts and burdens down the road. 

In the past few months, we have seen several developments that underscore the stakes for having 

a strong American presence in every part of the world. American engagement was essential to 

the rapprochement between two of our close partners, Israel and Turkey-a positive step toward 

stability in a volatile region of the world. 

This committee is well aware of the ongoing crisis in Syria. We have contributed nearly $385 

million in humanitarian relief to provide essential resources to the Syrian people, including 

sending flour to bakeries in Aleppo and providing food and sanitation in Atmeh refugee camp. 

expect we will have the chance to discuss Syria at length today. 

Having just returned from Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo where the North Korea nuclear issue took 

center stage, we are reminded once again that America is the guardian of global security. We 

will not tum our back on the prospect of peace, but neither will we hesitate to do what is needed 

to defend our allies and interests. 

All this speaks to why this budget isn't just a collection of numbers; it's an illustration of our 

values and priorities. Budgets, deficits, debt-these are weighty decisions, and I know each of 

you is grappling with them carefully. 

We are grappling with them at the State Department too, and I think our proposed budget is 

responsive to and reflective of our national economic reality. As part of the President's budget, 
10


80463a-2.eps

it will help cut our deficit responsibly while investing in areas that attract economic growth, 

create good jobs for American workers, and secure our national interests. 

Our 2014 budget request represents a six percent reduction from 2012 funding levels. We have 

examined our request with a steely-eyed determination to improve efficiency and economize 

wherever possible. We have implemented reforms that reduce costs without jeopardizing vital 

contributions. This budget delivers maximum bang for the minimal possible taxpayer buckactually, for about one single penny out of the taxpayer dollar. 

Let me give you a few examples of the kind of high-impact, low-cost work we do every day to 

make the world safer. With just over $3.5 million, the State Department's Bureau of Conflict 

and Stabilization Operations made key investments leading up to the recent elections in Kenya 

that helped prevent a repeat of the violence we saw five years ago. 

Our anti-terrorism assistance funding has helped save the lives of hundreds of people in places 

like Pakistan, India, and Lebanon by training local law enforcement to detect and neutralize 

explosive devices. 

Our 2014 budget request maintains our commitments to advancing peace, security, and stability 

in places where all three can be scarce commodities. I've already traveled three times as 

Secretary to the Middle East and North Africa-a region struggling to respond to its citizens' 

growing expectations for dignity and opportunity. Leaders there are making difficult decisions, 

and the United States cannot make those decisions for them, but we can do more to be a partner 

for all those on the side of freedom and democracy. 

To that end, this budget includes a request for $580 million for the Middle East and North Africa 

Incentive Fund so that we can help give reformers the tools and resources they need to make the 

right decisions on behalf of their citizens. This fund allows us to say to people in the region: "If 

you're willing to take on the deep-rooted challenges and make the tough choices, we are here for 

you 

When we look at the threats that emanate from failed and potentially failing states, we must heed 

the lessons of our past. The U.S. homeland will not be secure ifviolent extremists bent on 

attacking us find a safe haven in places like the Sahel or the Maghreb. The threats we're dealing 

with in that part of the world range from al-Qaeda rebels to narcotraffickers. This budget sets 

aside $8.6 billion for our security, counterterrorism, and law-enforcement assistance. Compare 

that $8.6 billion to the more than $1 trillion we have spent fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan and 1 

think you'll agree this is both a penny and pound-wise investment. 

The simple fact is, the United States cannot be strong at home if we're not strong in the world. 

This is particularly true when it comes to our domestic economic renewal. 

We need to do more to get out there and stoke our economic engines with the trade and business 

opportunities available in other countries. That's why the President is committed to successfully 

completing the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Trans-Pacific 

Partnership. We want to tap the growing markets of the Asia Pacific, which are vital to 

2 
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80463a-3.eps

American economic recovery. And 1 know you agree with me on the value of investing in our 

relationship with Asia, because many of you, including Chairman Royce, Representative Engel, 

Representative Salmon, and Representative Marino have traveled to the region recently. You 

were there on the day I became Secretary, in fact. 

When it comes to shoring up our economic health and protecting our national security, our 

development work is one of our strongest assets. Let me be clear: development is not charity. 

It's an investment in a strong America and a free world. Eleven of our top IS trading partners 

were once beneficiaries of U.S. foreign assistance. We can't afford to pull back. But that 

doesn't mean we won't work in better, smarter ways. 

Let me highlight the reforms we are making with this budget to one of our most visible forms of 

assistance U.S. Food Aid. By giving ourselves the flexibility to choose the most appropriate 

and efficient type of food assistance, the U.S. government will reach an estimated 2-4 million 

more people every year with the same discretionary funding. At the same time, we will save 

approximately $500 million in mandatory funding over the next decade, which we will use to 

reduce the deficit. 

American growers and producers will still playa major role in our food assistance. Over half the 

funding we are requesting for emergency food aid must be used for the purchase and shipping of 

U.S. commodities overseas. But by giving us the ability to modernize, including the flexibility 

to also procure food aid in developing countries closer to crisis areas, not only can we feed more 

people, we can get food to malnourished people 11-14 weeks faster. Here's the bottom line: this 

change allows us to do more to help more people lift themselves out of hunger and poverty 

without spending any more money. That's a great deal for the American taxpayer. 

The final area I want to mention is how this budget cares for our most valuable resource: the 

brave men and women of the State Department and USAID. We have requested $44 billion to 

fortify our worldwide security protection and improve our overseas infrastructure. $2.2 billion 

of this is set aside for constructing secure diplomatic facilities This is part of our commitment to 

implement in full the recommendations of the independent Accountability Review Board so that 

we can mitigate the risk of future tragedies like the one we suffered last year in Benghazi 

This has been a hard year for our State Department family ... a family that knows how risky the 

work we signed up for can be in a very dangerous world. Just two weeks ago in Afghanistan we 

lost a bright, committed Foreign Service officer-Anne SmedinghofI I met her on my last visit, 

and earlier this week, 1 sat with her parents. She was just 25 years old. She wanted to make a 

difference in the lives of people she had never met, and she was willing to take risks to do it. 

Anne and Ambassador Chris Stevens really were cut from the same cloth. That's what made 

them such outstanding members of the State Department family, and such outstanding 

Americans. 

As Secretary, my most important job is to protect the men and women under my watch so they 

can carry out their national security mission. But we cannot do it by retreating from the world. 

3 
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We stand for optimism and opportunity and equality. And we stand in opposition to all those 

who would replace hope with hate. That's what we believe---and those are the values the State 

Department and USAlD defend every day. Thank you. 

### 

4 
13

Chairman ROYCE. Let me raise a couple of issues. 

This committee has been frustrated in obtaining documents and 

other information from the Department concerning the Benghazi 

terrorist attacks. Of course, our investigation predates your tenure, 

so I am hopeful we will be able to resolve this as you get your team 

in place so that we can move forward on this important issue. 

I would also like to call your attention to the State Department’s 

Inspector General’s Office. This is the key independent office looking at waste and fraud. Mr. Secretary, as of today, there has been 

no permanent State Department Inspector General for over 5 

years. This includes President Obama’s entire first term. The committee raised this issue in a bipartisan letter sent to you in February, and we would like to see an immediate appointment to this 

position. 

On North Korea, you know my views on this, but the United 

States, past administrations, have tried to offer North Korea aid—

we have offered over $1 billion—or sanctions relief for nuclear commitments. Administrations from both parties have been embarrassed when the regime tore up those agreements. Former Secretary of Defense Gates was fond of saying, ‘‘I am tired of buying 

the same horse twice.’’ My concern is that the administration may 

be thinking of doing just that. 

And I would just ask, how is this different, this approach to 

North Korea, from the past attempts to offer aid in exchange for 

a change in policy which never came? 

Secretary KERRY. Great questions all, and all deserve a straight 

answer, and I will give it to you. 

On the IG, you are absolutely correct. We are trying to fill a 

number of positions right now, the IG among them. The greatest 

difficulty I am finding, now that I am on the other side of the fence, 

is, frankly, the vetting process. And I have some folks that I selected way back in February when I first came in, and we are now 

in April and I am still waiting for the vetting to move. I have 

talked to the White House. They are totally on board. They are trying to get it moved. 

So I hope that within a very short span of time you are going 

to see these slots filled. They need to be, and that is just the bottom line. It is important, and I commit to you we will. 

Chairman ROYCE. I think this is the longest gap that we have 

had in the history of this position. So if you could talk to the President about this in short order, we would very much appreciate it. 

Secretary KERRY. I don’t need to talk to the President. We are 

going to get this done. 

Chairman ROYCE. Okay. 

Secretary KERRY. We know it. And we are trying to get the right 

people. Matching person to task and also clearing all the other hurdles is, I am finding, not as easy as one always thinks. But we will 

get it done. 

On the subject of Benghazi, look, I was on the other side of the 

podium, the dais, just a short time ago when that was a big issue. 

And we held hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee in the 

Senate, and we wanted materials, and we got a lot. 

In fairness, I think the administration has testified 8 times, has 

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tions before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Twenty-five 

thousand documents have already been turned over. Video of the 

actual event has been made available to members to see. If you 

haven’t seen it, I urge you to see it because it is enormously helpful 

in understanding the flow of events and what happened. And the 

people who were involved have all been interviewed, and not only 

interviewed but those FBI interviews were made part of the record 

and, in an unprecedented way, have been made available to the 

Congress in order to read, verbatim, those testimonies. 

So if you have additional questions or you think there is some 

document that somehow you need, I will work with you to try to 

get it and see if we can provide that to you. But——

Chairman ROYCE. I have to just disagree for a minute. Instead 

of handing over copies of the documents and records that we have 

requested, as has always been customary practice in the past, the 

Department has insisted that the committee staff sift through 

thousands of pages of materials in a room in which they are monitored by the Department. And they can’t remove any or make electronic copies of those documents. 

Mr. Secretary, these are unclassified documents that relate to 

the critical issue of Embassy security. And the Department is literally spending thousands of taxpayers’ dollars a week to slow the 

progress of the committee’s review. 

So this has resulted in a great deal of wasted time and money. 

I think it runs contrary to the administration’s promise of increased transparency. And I hope you will reconsider the Department’s position on this issue. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I didn’t know there was a position that 

does what you are describing. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary KERRY. There is certainly no position by me to delay 

anything, and I was not aware that—now, if there is anything that 

is appropriate to turn over—what I want to check, Mr. Chairman, 

is what is the historical precedent with respect to investigative document, FBI document, which we don’t control. I just want to find 

out what the story is on that. 

I will work with you. And you will have me up here again, and 

if I haven’t worked with you, I am sure I will know about it. So 

I promise you, we will work together to try to do that. 

On North Korea, let me just make it clear, I have no desire as 

Secretary of State and the President has no desire to do the same 

horse trade or go down the old road. And I just came from Beijing 

and from discussions there, where I articulated as strongly as I can 

that we are not going to go down the same road, that the policy 

of Russia, the policy of China, the policy of South Korea and Japan 

and the United States, all of us, is denuclearization. 

The single country that has the greatest ability to be able to impact that is China. And so we had that discussion, and we agreed 

in the very next days now to engage in an ongoing process by 

which we work out exactly how we are going to proceed so that it 

is different. That is our goal, and I can assure you I want to reach 

it. 

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Martin Dempsey, will be traveling to China in the next days. We will have another—Deputy SecVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:30 Aug 21, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\041713\80463 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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retary Burns will be going in about 2 weeks. We are going to keep 

the pressure on this in order to try to make this outcome different. 

Chairman ROYCE. In the past, in 2005, as I indicated, we did find 

a way to incentivize those financial institutions that were assisting 

North Korea by giving them access to the hard currency. Frankly, 

what we did was freeze those accounts by giving those banks a 

choice between doing business with the United States or business 

with North Korea. 

At the same time, we could tackle the illicit shipments on the 

high seas, as we have done before, with the Proliferation Security 

Initiative. We could ratchet up the radio broadcasts into the country. We could make a strong stand, as I am sure we will, on North 

Korean human rights abuses, letting the regime know that they 

are on notice, that they will be held to account. We could take them 

to the International Criminal Court. 

These types of steps, especially in relation to the activities we 

have seen out of North Korea—I think it is time we pursue something that is capable of cutting off the access to hard currency on 

the part of the regime. 

But we thank you——

Secretary KERRY. Those are all options, Mr. Chairman, and there 

are many others. And we are going to explore every single option. 

The one commitment I make to you is, it is very clear to me that 

nothing short of a change is going to get us where we need to go. 

We cannot repeat the same. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

We go to Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, again, Mr. Secretary, welcome. 

I had the honor a few weeks ago of accompanying the President 

on his trip to Israel. The Israelis have repeatedly said that they are 

willing to negotiate with the Palestinians face-to-face, across a 

table, with no preconditions. That is how the situation in Northern 

Ireland was taken care of; that is what you do when you really 

want to end a conflict. Unfortunately, the Palestinians have refused. This past week, Prime Minister Fayyad, one of the most 

moderate of the Palestinians, resigned. 

I am wondering if you can give us your assessment about what 

is going on in the Middle East and what we are doing to back the 

Israelis in their, you know, legitimate quest to say, we want to negotiate, no preconditions. 

Also, with Iran, it is clear to me that Iran is buying time as their 

nuclear program advances. The recent P5-Plus-1 talks seem to 

have failed, and talks are delayed now until the Iranian elections 

in June and Ramadan, which starts in early August. So when do 

we say, enough is enough? And what are the administration’s plans 

for moving forward? 

And on Syria, the State Department and USAID have worked 

hard to address the humanitarian catastrophe, but I don’t believe 

that this civil war can be won with only humanitarian assistance 

and diplomacy. 

Do you believe, Mr. Secretary, that the United States will have 

any type of influence in the post-Assad Syria if we don’t provide 

16

certain elements of a Syrian opposition with the weapons necessary 

to defend themselves and force Assad from power? 

So I would like you to answer those questions. 

Secretary KERRY. All six of them in 3 minutes. 

Mr. ENGEL. We will give you extra time. 

Secretary KERRY. Congressman Engel, I am going to start with 

your last question, and I am going to work backwards. 

On Syria, we are working very, very closely with the Syrian opposition, with the Syrian military coalition, and with our core partners, as well as with the standard groups, G8, et cetera. I was just 

at a G8 meeting. We met with the Syrian opposition at that meeting. And I am flying to Istanbul for a Saturday meeting with all 

of the core group members and more of the Syrian opposition, because we are trying to get everybody on the same page here. 

The fact is that some people are providing weapons, and they 

have chosen to do that. Others are apparently about to decide to, 

some of our friends. And others have chosen a different path of providing different kinds of assistance. 

The point is, the opposition, I believe, is making headway on the 

ground. I believe Assad’s days are numbered. I am not going to get 

into the game of months or how long. I am convinced that he is 

going to go; the question is when and how. 

Obviously, there are dangers of extremists who are finding some 

funding and engaged in the battle. And we want to try to separate 

them, if that is possible. We also want to make certain that the 

people we are working with are committed to pluralism, diversity, 

to a democratic process, to all Syrians being represented, including 

the Alawi, the Ismaili, the Druze, the Christians, so forth. There 

have to be a series of guarantees. 

So we are trying to proceed carefully to make sure that we are 

not contributing to a worse mess but that we are actually finding 

a constructive path forward. 

The most important thing about Syria I want to leave with everybody is this: There is a communique that was issued in Geneva 

last year, which the Russians signed on to and the international 

community signed on to, that calls for a transitional government 

chosen by mutual consent from both sides, which obviously does 

not include Assad because he will not be consented to, which then 

provides for this opportunity for a peaceful transition that maintains the institutions of the state. That is a critical goal here. 

So we are trying to proceed thoughtfully and carefully. And I 

think this meeting this weekend is going to be a very important 

one in terms of determining what options might be available on the 

road ahead. 

On the Middle East, you can tell from my early travels and my 

engagements that we are committed to trying to find out what is 

possible. I am not going to come here today and lay out to you a 

schedule or define the process, because we are in the process of 

working that out with the critical parties. 

But in my meetings on both sides, I have found a seriousness of 

purpose, a commitment to explore how we actually get to a negotiation. And we all have some homework to do. We are doing that 

homework. And I ask you simply give us a little bit of time here. 

17

But I can guarantee you that I am committed to this because I 

believe the window for a two-state solution is shutting. I think we 

have some period of time, in 1–11⁄2 to 2 years, or it is over. And 

everybody I have talked to in the region and all of the supporters 

globally who care about the peace—and I have been struck in my 

travels, incidentally, by how many people everywhere raise this 

subject and want to us move forward on a peace effort—they are 

all worried about the timing here. 

So there is an urgency to this, in my mind. And I intend, on behalf of the President’s instructions, to honor that urgency and see 

what we can do to move forward. 

With respect to Iran, I would just say to you very simply, we are 

in the closest communication possible with Israel, our friends and 

others concerned about this. We are discussing the clock, the time 

frame, on Iran’s enrichment and on the nature of the threat. I 

think we are in sync. 

And the President has made his policy crystal-clear: No option is 

off the table, and Iran will not get a nuclear weapon. That is the 

policy. I reaffirm it today. And we are going to continue to leave 

the door to diplomacy open, but we understand there is a clock. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Chairwoman Emeritus Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman, 

Ranking Member. 

And welcome, Mr. Secretary. It is always a pleasure to see you. 

Mr. Secretary, days ago, the Venezuelan people faced impediments to a free and fair election due to the destructive and corrupt 

policies of Chavista loyalists. The CNE has stated that it will not 

allow a recount in Venezuela in an open and transparent manner. 

The U.S. must not, therefore, recognize these election results until 

a full and transparent recount and audit are conducted. 

Will you pledge here today that the United States will refuse to 

recognize the accreditation and swearing-in of Nicolas Maduro? I 

will ask for your answer at the end. 

And does the lack of a coherent response from our State Department legitimize the Maduro regime? 

Mr. Secretary, here is a list of the voting irregularities cited by 

the opposition in Venezuela, for your review. And, as we know, 

Venezuela’s largest supporter has been the Castro regime, as both 

continue to use oppressive tactics against their people. 

Yet, by cutting U.S. democracy funds for Cuba, this administration is undermining the opposition and our efforts to help true 

democratic reform on the island. Due to this proposed cut, civil society leaders may not be able to advance their democratic cause. 

And as our Nation continues to face economic woes, the policy of 

the United States must be to be to good stewards of U.S. taxpayer 

dollars. 

When I chaired this committee, I placed holds on the assistance 

to the Palestinian Authority. Fayyad’s resignation casts a greater 

shadow on the future makeup of the P.A., and it opens the door for 

renewed reconciliation efforts between Fatah and Hamas. So if the 

P.A. is committed to the peace process, then why does the administration see the need to use U.S. taxpayer dollars to entice the P.A. 

18

to go back to the negotiation table? We cannot even guarantee that 

these funds will not end up being funneled to Hamas. And the administration is also requesting $580 million for a Middle East and North Africa fund. What specific benchmarks can ensure greater accountability and transparency in these funds? And 

who will oversee the implementation of this money? 

Mr. Secretary, lastly, I have two questions for a written reply, to 

allow the Camp Liberty residents in Iraq to go back to Camp 

Ashraf. The double-layered T walls that were protecting the camp 

were removed, and now the residents are vulnerable to armed attacks, as they were on February 9th, when eight residents were 

killed. Will the U.S. ask the Iraqi Government to adequately protect the residents in Camp Liberty? 

Another question for a written response highlights Greece’s importance to the United States and asks for your help in urging Turkey to allow the Christian church seminary in Halki to reopen. 

So, Mr. Secretary, on Venezuela, will the U.S. recognize Maduro 

as the President in spite of no recount? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I can’t give you a yes-or-no answer on 

that because we think there ought to be a recount. I don’t know 

whether it is going to happen in the next days. They are talking 

about having an inauguration on Friday. Obviously, if there are 

huge irregularities, we are going to have serious questions about 

the viability of that government. But that evaluation has to be 

made, and I haven’t made it yet. So I can assure you——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Will you be sending someone to the swearing-in ceremony, a U.S. delegation? 

Secretary KERRY. If it is under contested circumstances, I would 

be very doubtful of that. There is certainly no plan to. But I need 

to find out—you know, we have to take a look at what is going to 

flow here. 

Originally, Maduro also said there ought to be a recount. And 

then——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And now the CNE has said no recount. 

Secretary KERRY. Correct. Now the CNE has stepped in and said 

no. I am not sure that is over yet. The OAS has asked for a recount, others have. So let’s see where we come out on that. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Secretary KERRY. Was the Camp Ashraf a written? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. That is for written, but if you would care to 

comment——

Secretary KERRY. Oh. Well, I will just tell you very quickly, I met 

with Prime Minister Maliki a few days ago. This concern about 

what is happening there at Camp Liberty was very much on our 

minds, in terms of security. 

We are working with them now in terms of trying to interview. 

We have actually run into some problems with that. There was an 

Albanian offer to take some people; that was turned down. So we 

are working through a complicated situation. We will give you a 

full written answer on that. 

With respect to the Mideast—well, let me leave the Mideast, 

North Africa to last. 

On the Palestinian Authority, look, I have to tell you, there is no 

way any of that money is going to Hamas. There is no relationship 

19

right now between the P.A. and Hamas. In fact, there is still a 

pretty vigorous competition going on, and I don’t anticipate a reconciliation in the next days or weeks, frankly. 

One of the things we need to do, Madam Chairwoman, is 

strengthen the P.A. You know, somebody here has to tell me who 

is going to take the place of either Salam Fayyad—and now that 

is up for grabs—or Abu Mazen. And it seems to me that for Israel, 

for us, for the world, that not strengthening the P.A. is to work 

against our own interests. 

Admiral Bushong, who is there now, is doing an extraordinary 

job following up on what General Dayton started a number of years 

ago to help build the security capacity in the West Bank. Last year, 

the entire year, not one Israeli was killed from an incident from 

the West Bank. 

So we need to recognize, even as there are difficulties, a lot is 

happening. Their economy is actually growing at a relatively decent 

rate. There is a level of cooperation which is growing and capacity 

that is growing. So we want to continue that, and I think that to 

not invest would be remarkably shortsighted, particularly given 

where we are now. 

Prime Minister Netanyahu has agreed in the last days to engage 

in a new initiative in terms of the economy, not as an alternative, 

not as a substitute—I want to emphasize this—to the political 

track, but in addition to, because he believes that you need to advance the economic strength. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time. 

Chairman ROYCE. We will go now to Mr. Brad Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your continuing 

service to our Nation. Condolences on what has happened in your 

home State and to several of the State Department employees who 

work under your leadership. 

I just have too many questions, so this may be a relaxing 5 minutes in that, for the most part, I hope you will respond for the 

record. 

There is probably no more important country than Pakistan and 

nothing more important than our public outreach to the Pakistani 

people. Yet we are broadcasting only in Urdu. This committee 

voted overwhelmingly, unanimously, that we should spend $1.5 

million broadcasting in the Sindhi language. And I hope that the 

Voice of America will broadcast in the several major languages of 

Pakistan, even though there are elements of the Pakistani Government who have a phobia for the use of any language other than 

Urdu. You wouldn’t dream of trying to sell a product here, at least 

in my city of Los Angeles, broadcasting only in one language. 

We have 37 partners who are visa waiver countries. Some 74 

Members of this House have cosponsored the bill I introduced with 

Congressman Poe. Similar bills have gotten—and we introduced 

that bill last year. Now this year in the Senate, both Barbara 

Boxer and Senator Wyden have bills that have significant support. 

Now, not every country can be a visa waiver country, but Israel 

meets the numerical test better than Hungary, Lithuania, and Latvia, who were made visa waiver countries a few years ago. And 

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thing. But every country in Europe, and our Canadian neighbors 

to the north, have worked these out and have given visa waiver 

status to Israel. I hope that when Israelis want to see Mickey 

Mouse, they come to Disneyland or Disney World and not Euro 

Disney. Those shekels could be useful here. 

As to Iran, I want to commend the administration for the sanctions already imposed, but we have not sanctioned shipping companies that continue to service ports operated by the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps. We have not sanctioned the exchanges 

houses, currency dealers, and precious-metal dealers that are helping Iran evade sanctions. And I hope that you would instruct your 

staff to focus on those sanctions. 

Likewise, we have issued an exemption to Chinese financial institutions doing transactions with the Central Bank of Iran, citing 

a ‘‘reduction in Chinese purchases of Iranian oil.’’ I hope would you 

furnish for the record what significant reductions there have been 

in Chinese purchases of Iranian oil and also furnish the statistics 

with regard to India and Turkey. 

I want to add my voice to that of Ileana Ros-Lehtinen when it 

comes to the MEK residents of Camp Hurriya and the importance 

of us using our efforts with Iraq to make sure that they comply 

with international law and restore the protective barriers that had 

been there. 

I hope that you would condemn Azerbaijan’s threats to shoot 

down civilian airliners that fly into the Nagorno-Karabakh Airport 

and Turkey’s blockade of Armenia. 

My last question probably does deserve an oral response, but it 

is a premature and unfair question because matters need to be 

analyzed. And that is, do you see any parallels between what happened in Boston and international terrorist incidents that have 

happened in the past, whether those incidents actually occurred or 

whether they were nipped in the bud? I realize it is premature, but 

given your role as heading our foreign policy operation, do you see 

anything that has happened abroad that might be parallel to what 

we have seen in Boston? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, you know, Congressman, I am not going 

to speculate. I have no evidence, and it would be inappropriate for 

me just to cross any line here on that. Terror is terror. You know, 

a bomb going off in a mass of people is a bomb going off in a mass 

of people. And whether it is homegrown or foreign, we just don’t 

know yet. And so I am not going to contribute to any speculation 

on that. 

You know, Europe has had its share of, you know, bombs on 

trains—Madrid, London—buses, you know, in Bulgaria. That was 

Hezbollah. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Uh-huh. 

Secretary KERRY. But it is inappropriate for me to go into that 

territory. If you don’t mind, I just——

Mr. SHERMAN. I fully understand. 

Secretary KERRY. Let the people do their jobs and the forensic 

work, and we will see where we are. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We will go now to Chris Smith, Africa and 

Human Rights Subcommittee chair. 

21

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

First of all, let me begin by thanking you for raising your voice 

on behalf of Iranian Pastor Saeed Abedini. We all appreciate that. 

I hope it makes a difference, and I hope you will continue to do so. 

Four questions, Mr. Secretary. 

Within the last 2 years alone, I have chaired three congressional 

hearings on the systematic abduction of Coptic Christian teenage 

girls, and even of young mothers, who are then forced to marry 

Muslim men, Egyptian men, and are forced to renounce their 

Christian faith. There was a piece in today’s Inter Press Service 

news agency that more than 500 Christian girls have been abducted in the last 2 years, according to the Association of Victims 

of Abduction and Enforced Disappearance, average age 13 to 17. 

I have raised this with our Ambassador, Ambassador Patterson. 

As a matter of fact, 1 year after I gave her—and Frank Wolf actually physically put in her hands, the information about what is 

going on, by Skype she talked to our committee. I asked her about 

it. She said she had not gotten around to it. 

I ask you, I appeal to you, to raise this issue with President 

Morsi. I doubt that you have because you probably have not been 

briefed. But it is a horrible human trafficking issue, and I do hope 

you will raise it. 

Secondly, Chen Guangcheng has testified at three of my four 

hearings on his case, twice by phone and last week in person, right 

where you sit. Chen, as we all know, is unimaginably brave, a 

human rights defender who exposed the hideous practice of forced 

abortion in China, defended women in a class action suit. And for 

that, he and his wife were tortured with unbelievable methods. 

And now his nephew, Chen Kegui, has become his proxy and is 

himself being tortured. 

He appeals strongly to you, to me, to the President, and all of 

us in Congress, to raise his nephew’s case and that of the other 

Chens, but also to ask for information specifically about his case, 

which he has been unable to get from the Department. 

You know, the issue of forced abortion and sex-selection abortion 

is so horrific. China is missing tens of millions of little girls who 

have been picked out and killed by sex-selection abortion. A woman 

named Mara Hvistendahl has written a book, and points out there 

are over 160 million females missing from Asia’s population, more 

than the entire population of women and girls in the United States 

of America. It is terrible, it is destabilizing, it is a crime against 

women. Chen paid the price for that; now his nephew is. 

Thirdly, on October 5, 2011, you wrote an excellent letter to Secretary Clinton asking that Jacob Ostreicher be assisted in Bolivia. 

I have been down there twice. I visited him in Palmasola Prison, 

and I also visited him again with Nydia Velazquez in his hospital 

room. He is very, very sick. He has never been charged with anything. Eighteen months in a terrible prison. He is, like I said, sick. 

We have never been able to get intervention above an Assistant 

Secretary level. Will you please see fit to call Evo Morales, initiate 

an effort to rescue this man? Several of the prosecutors that were 

involved with prosecuting him are now behind bars because they 

broke Bolivian law. 

22

And, finally, child abduction, particularly to Japan—nobody has 

come back from Japan; 300 cases, nobody has come back. I am running out of time, so real quick. We need to push the child abduction 

cases, especially as it relates to Japan. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Congressman Smith, let me begin by saluting your unbelievably long-term passion for all of these human 

rights issues. You and I have worked together on a couple of 

things, and I really respect your tenacity and your focus. And I 

know that it makes a difference for these people that you raise 

these issues. 

I will tell you directly that, on the Chen Guangcheng, I raised 

not only the issue of his nephew but his family. And I raised it 

while I was in China last week, at the highest level. And there is 

nowhere that I visit that I do not raise the issue of our human 

rights cases. 

With respect to child abduction in Japan, I met not—the answer 

is yes, I raised it, again, at the highest level. I know people personally who have had children abducted, and they have never gotten 

a response, they have never come back. 

I might add, I have raised that issue—the last conversation I 

ever had with Mubarak was a half-hour struggle with him over the 

issue of Colin Bower from Massachusetts, who has two kids that 

were kidnapped out of Massachusetts and taken to Egypt, and he 

has had unbelievable difficulty having the law enforced and being 

able to visit them and so forth. 

This is a huge issue. We have families of kids who have been abducted, gone to Japan, they can’t see them, they don’t get to them 

again. We have to resolve this. And, to his credit, Prime Minister 

Abe has submitted to the Diet the Child Abduction Convention and 

has pledged to try to get it passed. And I think we will find, perhaps, new cooperation with this administration. 

So these are all extraordinary issues. And, most importantly, on 

the abduction of these young women, the Coptics, you know, there 

still is slavery in the world. You know that, I know that. And it 

is a tragedy. There is human trafficking that takes place in many 

more places than people think, in many more ways than people 

think. 

And we are going to raise that. We are raising that within the 

State Department. I raised it as chairman; we held the first hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee on it in the Senate. And 

I promise you we will continue to focus on that in the days ahead. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Gregory Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is delightful to see you, 

Mr. Secretary. And again, thank you for your dedication to our 

country and all of the work that you have done over the years, first 

in the Senate and now as Secretary of State. 

Mr. Secretary, I applaud the Obama administration’s ambitious 

negotiations on the two important trade agreements that you 

talked about, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 

with Europe, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement with 

trading partners in Asia. These negotiations hold the promise of 

boosting the U.S. economy with increased access to our largest 

markets and stronger investments in our Nation that will lead to 

more jobs. The economic potential is critical at a time when one in 

23

five jobs in our country are trade dependent. But trade is always 

about much more than about tariffs and nontariff barriers. 

Europe, we know, is critical to helping the United States with 

challenges that cut across the foreign policy spectrum. Iran, Syria 

to name a couple. And Asia is also key to several of our strategic 

economic security interests, as you highlighted in your recent trip. 

Mr. Secretary, I believe that while we deepen our economic ties to 

the EU and Asia, there is also that we can’t lose sight of the strategic importance of other critical nations like Turkey and Russia. 

Tackling some of our toughest geopolitical challenges will require 

a closer connection, I believe, to these Nations. Yet, and I praise 

you on your recent trip to Turkey, where you have gotten Turkey 

closer to resolving tensions with Israel. That is a move that I think 

is tremendously important, and I commend you on that. 

I am concerned about Russia and Russia’s recent reaction to the 

list of names released by the U.S. Treasury under the requirements 

of the Magnitsky law. So my first question is, Mr. Secretary, as the 

administration focuses its foreign affairs budgets, how would you 

collaborate with Russia and Turkey, and what role do they play to 

balance the deepening of ties with the EU and Asia, while also, you 

know, and while working together with them, Russia and Turkey 

on some strategic and mutual interests that we have? 

And lastly, Mr. Secretary, you know, I have worked in the Western Hemisphere for a long period of time. And I would like a view 

of whether or not and how the administration is looking at the 

Western Hemisphere, and I think in a post-Cold War viewpoint. I, 

like anybody else, believe that all votes should be counted. In fact, 

I wish all votes were counted in 2000. But didn’t happen here. But 

at any rate, you know, working with our strategic partners, you 

know, Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Venezuela happens to be there, they 

seem to be working with one another in connection with us because 

we see poverty beginning to be lowered there. What is our overall 

policy, or how is the foreign affairs budget, the State Department’s 

budget would be prioritized in the entire region as opposed to just 

focusing on one country, since they seem to be trying to work together closer than ever before? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, thank you very much, Congressman 

Meeks. I am very, very hopeful. I am planning a trip shortly to 

both Colombia and Brazil, and other countries, hopefully, as time 

permits. We have had some issues, obviously, with Argentina in 

late time over some debt issues and repayment and so forth which 

we need to work through. But look, the Western Hemisphere is our 

backyard. It is critical to us. Too often, countries in the Western 

Hemisphere think that the United States doesn’t pay enough attention to them. And on occasion it has probably been true. I think 

we need to reach out vigorously. We plan to. The President will be 

traveling to Mexico very shortly. And then south, I think he is 

going. I can’t remember which other countries, but he is going to 

the region. I will be going. We will have other high-level visits. And 

we intend to do everything possible to try to change the attitudes 

of a number of nations where we have had, obviously, sort of a 

breach in the relationship over the course of the last few years. 

The TTIP and the TPP, I will say to everybody here, are really 

critical to the United States, as well as to Europe and the Pacific 

24

relationship. Japan is very anxious to be involved in the TPP. They 

have taken steps to try to meet the standards. Canada, New Zealand, and Australia still need to make a decision about them coming in. But the hope is that we could get to the July negotiations 

with Japan and really move forward on that. Europe is very excited 

about the TTIP. And Turkey would also like to have a negotiation 

that is parallel to the negotiation with respect to the TTIP. 

So I think what we are seeing here is an enormous opening up 

of opportunity to raise the standards by which people have been 

trading to the highest common denominator, not the lowest, and to 

begin to open up new opportunities for growth in countries that are 

struggling right now to find that growth. So I think these are plusplus, win-wins for everybody, and we are going to continue to work 

toward them. On Turkey, Russia, you know, Russia, some people 

criticize and say, well, what happened to the reset? I think they are 

overlooking. Are there counter reactions to some things? Yes, there 

are. Have we gone down into a lower moment of that relationship? 

The answer is yes. And we have these fights over adoption, over 

Magnitsky, et cetera. But on big issues, I want everybody to take 

notice that Russia has cooperated with us with respect to Afghanistan and the northern route, which has been critical. Russia has 

cooperated with us on the WTO, cooperated with us on Iran, Iran 

sanctions, on the U.N. resolution, cooperated with us on the DPRK, 

and cooperated with us on the START treaty. 

Those are big ticket items. So even though there have been some 

bumps in the road, I am very hopeful that we can move this relationship back to a more visibly completely constructive place. And 

we need to work at it. I had a very good meeting in London with 

Foreign Minister Lavrov to that end. I have been invited to go to 

Russia, which I will do prior to the G8. And I look forward to trying to work to do that. 

Turkey has been tremendously cooperative and very positive in 

a number of different ways. Foreign Minister Davutoglu and I have 

a very good working relationship. I met with Prime Minister 

Erdogan a number of times already this year as Secretary. They 

have pledged to be supportive of the Middle East peace process. 

They are being supportive with respect to Syria. They are hosting 

this meeting this Saturday in an effort to bring the Syria core 

group together. And Turkey is talking with us right now about 

helping with respect to both Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh, two 

frozen conflicts where we need to break out of the past. And I think 

Turkey is going to be a constructive player in those. So I look forward to a productive relationship. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Dana Rohrabacher, chairman of 

the Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats Subcommittee. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Welcome aboard. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you, sir. Good to see you. How you 

doing? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Good to see you. We worked together on a 

number of issues in the past. 

Secretary KERRY. A lot of years. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I have got three specific things I would like 

to ask you about very quickly, two of them very quickly anyway. 

Number one, you have already been alerted in the hearing as to 

25

our concerns, and you have already expressed your concern about 

the MEK’s vulnerable situation in Camp Liberty. We do know that 

there was an attack on February 8, or last February, because it 

was on the 9th, and eight people were killed, and many were 

wounded. We have asked them to take down the structures—not 

asked them, the structures giving them protection have been taken 

down. Are we going to—the question is, are we going to hold the 

Maliki government responsible for their safety? And if there is another attack and more of them are murdered, are we going to withdraw any of—will the administration withdraw its requests for aid 

to a regime that is murdering innocent refugees in a camp that we 

helped put there? That is number one. Number two—why don’t you 

go ahead and answer number one. Are we in any way going to 

pressure the Maliki regime on this issue? 

Secretary KERRY. I raised this issue directly with the Prime Minister when I was there a couple of weeks ago. We are deeply engaged in this. I am very concerned about the potential of another 

attack. We are trying very hard to find a place to resettle everybody. I will tell you——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I want to say, Senator—Mr. Secretary, I have 

got two more questions that are important. 

Secretary KERRY. Okay. Go ahead. But I will just say to you the 

answer is yes, we are looking for accountability, and we are working very hard to provide safety. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Accountability for the Iraqi Government is 

important on this issue. 

Secretary KERRY. It is Iranian Government that I believe was behind the attack. We need the Iraqi Government to help provide security. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Maliki’s coziness to the mullahs in Iran is 

disturbing. And this may reflect that. The administration is asking 

for hundreds of millions of dollars in aid, military aid for Pakistan. 

So we are asking for aid, hundreds of millions of dollars, if not $1 

billion and other aid, to a government that is holding in prison the 

doctor who helped us bring to justice Osama bin Laden, a government that gave Osama bin Laden 10 years of safe haven. 

When, my question to you specifically is, how much longer are 

we going to rely on quiet diplomacy, talking with the Pakistanis 

about trying to free Dr. Afridi, who is an American hero? How long 

are we going to use quiet diplomacy rather than just cutting off 

their aid? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, you know the old saying, Dana, about 

cutting off your nose to spite your face. Cutting off aid to Pakistan 

would not be a good move, certainly at this point in time, for a lot 

of different reasons. We are working with Pakistan with respect to 

nuclear weapon safety and nonproliferation. We are working with 

Pakistan to get our supplies both in and out of Afghanistan. Pakistan has lost perhaps 50,000 people in the last years to terror. 

They have soldiers——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Again, Mr. Secretary, Dr. Afridi was given 

safe haven. They are the terrorists’ friends, and here we are planning to give them millions of dollars, and they have ended up giving some of our aid to terrorists who are killing us. And the guy 

who tried to save us is languishing away in a dungeon. Shame on 

26

us, not you, Mr. Secretary, shame on us if we ignore Dr. Afridi languishing away in a dungeon. 

Secretary KERRY. Congressman, we are not ignoring Dr. Afridi at 

all, believe me. This discussion we have, and it goes on. But it is 

just not as simple, it is just not as simple as holding everything 

accountable to one thing where they, they assert that there were 

certain laws that were broken. You know the arguments. Now, that 

complicates it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I have got 30 seconds, Mr. Secretary, and I 

got one more issue that is vitally important to bring up. 

Secretary KERRY. Absolutely. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And that is, I know that you are new to this 

job. We wish you all the success. I do not believe that Secretary of 

State Hillary was honestly cooperative with this committee about 

Benghazi. And you take a look, we have made request after request 

about, for example, just to get the list of the names of the people 

who were evacuated from Benghazi. And we haven’t even gotten 

that, much less some of the other important questions. 

Now, I know the State Department has flooded us with paper for 

some of the more insignificant things. Mr. Secretary, we think that 

there was a cover-up of some kind of wrongdoing that led this administration to lie to the American people about the nature of the 

attack immediately after the attack, and for a week after that attack. We need to have these questions answered. We need to talk 

to the people who were on the scene. Can you give us a commitment now that for this administration, you will be coming up with 

the request, the honest request of this investigative committee as 

to who was evacuated and how to talk to them so we can get a 

straight answer and an understanding of what happened in 

Benghazi? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, before I became Secretary, Congressman, 

I believe I got the answers to who was evacuated, and had a pretty 

good sense of what happened there. But now that I am the Secretary, and I am responsible to you and the Congress, I can promise you that if you are not getting something that you have evidence of, or you think you ought to be getting, we will work with 

you. And I will appoint somebody to work directly with you starting 

tomorrow with you, Mr. Chairman, to have a review of anything 

you don’t think you have gotten that you are supposed to get. Let’s 

get this done with, folks. Let’s figure out what it is that is missing, 

if it is legitimate or isn’t. I don’t think anybody lied to anybody. 

And let’s find out exactly together what happened, because we got 

a lot more important things to move onto and get done. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Sires of New Jersey. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I am sorry 

about what happened in your State. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. SIRES. I share your hurt. I have three questions. One of the 

questions is can you give me a status and the latest efforts we are 

making to release Alan Gross from Cuba? 

Secretary KERRY. Excuse me? 

Mr. SIRES. Alan Gross from Cuba. What are our latest efforts to 

have him released? And where are we with that? The other part 

27

of that question is we have in New Jersey a million-dollar bounty 

on Joanne Chesimard, who has been living in Cuba for many, 

many years. She is the person that shot a State Trooper in New 

Jersey and fled to Cuba. I wonder if you are going to raise that 

issue when there is some sort of conversation. 

The second question I have is, you know, I represent a great deal 

of Coptic Christians in my district. And it seems that Egypt is 

making a concerted effort to remove the 16 million Coptic Christians in Egypt. I mean a couple of weeks ago, there were more 

murders in Egypt. Nothing seems to be done. And the final question I have is do you anticipate any cuts to the assistance that we 

are going to give Israel in the coming year? 

Secretary KERRY. Do we anticipate any cuts? 

Mr. SIRES. Any cuts. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I will answer the last part first, and then 

I will get to Alan Gross. Israel got a plus-up in the budget I think 

to $3.1 billion total. But that is subject to sequester, as is everything. And we are not able to undo that. So there will be a plusup, but then there will be a reduction from the plus-up. It is still 

a net plus up, but there is a sequester that will apply to everything, including Jordan, Egypt, Israel. Sequester, folks, was not 

supposed to happen. That was the theory. And we are living with 

it. And so we have cuts that we don’t want. And that is the absence 

of making the policy choice itself. 

So, yes, there will be cuts under the sequester. Now, on Alan 

Gross, there is a lot of effort that has gone into that. Senator Leahy 

just came back, he was down there, he visited with Alan Gross, and 

has talked to the government about it. They were, and have been, 

attempting to trade Alan Gross for the five spies that are in prison 

here in the United States. And we have refused to do that because 

there is no equivalency. Alan Gross is wrongly imprisoned. And we 

are not going to trade as if it is a spy for a spy, which they are 

trying to allege. We are trying to work this out on a humanitarian 

basis. 

And I am personally engaged, as others are. I have had personal 

meetings before I even became Secretary, trying to get Alan Gross 

out of there. And I hope that somehow we can appeal to the regime’s—I guess I should rephrase that. We can find out whether 

there is a humanitarian capacity or not, because he does not belong 

in prison. He is sick. He has been there for 3 years now or more. 

And he ought to be released on a humanitarian basis. We are going 

to continue to press it. 

Mr. SIRES. And Joanne Chesimard? 

Secretary KERRY. I don’t have the background on that. I need to 

get that. And I will get back to you. 

Mr. SIRES. All right. Joanne Chesimard, just for the record, 

killed a State Trooper in New Jersey. And New Jersey has a $1 

million bounty. And she has been living in Cuba home free for the 

last 20-some-odd years after killing a State Trooper in New Jersey. 

Secretary KERRY. Let me get the file on that and see where we 

are, and I will get back to you. 

Mr. SIRES. She fled to Cuba, yes. 

Secretary KERRY. I appreciate it. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. And the Coptic Christians in Egypt? 

28

Secretary KERRY. I have met with President Morsi several times. 

I have raised the issue of protection. Generally speaking, when we 

have raised issues, there has been a response, but it is not even 

and it is not across the board. And we are very concerned about 

safety and security going forward. Egypt is in, you know, a very, 

very difficult state right now. There is no other way to describe it. 

And there are a number of forces at play, not just within Egypt. 

But certain states in the vicinity are supporting groups that are 

creating problems. You have got the black box, you have got other 

groups that are being funded from outside. And we are trying very, 

very hard to move things toward a place of stability. But it is very 

complicated because the Muslim Brotherhood, obviously, raises 

questions of the readiness and willingness of people to work with 

it in not just Egypt itself, but outside of Egypt. So they need to be 

showing the opposition and the rest of the world with greater clarity that they are prepared to protect rights, and prepared to provide security, and prepared to be inclusive. And we have again and 

again been talking to them about the need for a broader-based governance than is currently being provided. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Chabot, chairman of the Asia Subcommittee. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, with regards to North Korea, the Obama administration has thus far pursued a policy that some have referred to as ‘‘strategic patience.’’ In 

other words, we hope that Kim Jong Un is going to see the error 

of his ways and stop the dangerous theatrics and return to the negotiating table and move toward denuclearization. 

Instead, we find ourselves, I am afraid, in a situation where the 

current dictator has surpassed even his tyrant father and grandfather in unpredictability and recklessness. In a joint subcommittee 

hearing last week, I think most of our members agreed that the 

policy of strategic patience, if you want to call it that, has been a 

failure. I would appreciate your response, but I will get all the 

questions out, and then you can respond. 

The second question is with reference to Burma. Certainly we 

have witnessed dramatic changes in that Nation over the past 2 

years, but I think we all agree that there may well be some bumps 

in the road ahead. We applaud the reforms instituted thus far, and 

certainly we are happy to see an emerging new political process in 

last spring’s elections. However, we are also witnessing an escalation of ethnic violence. The military remains one of the most powerful actors in the country, and instead of working to curtail ethnic 

violence, it is thought by many to actually be the perpetrator. It 

would appear that President Thein Sein cannot keep his regional 

commanders under control in many instances. 

What steps will the administration be taking in its discussions 

with Burmese officials to stress that continued progress in civil society and democracy building is preferable to a policy that could, 

in fact, lead to further ethnic strife and a potential civil war? Also, 

as one of the co-founders of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus, I 

would like to talk about Taiwan just for a minute. In 2001, there 

was the announcement by President Bush of Washington’s willingness to cooperate with Taiwan in acquiring eight diesel electric 

29

submarines at a cost of $12 billion. The official position of Taiwan’s 

Ministry of National Defense remains committed to procuring those 

submarines from the U.S. 

However, as the U.S. stopped making diesel submarines many 

years ago, the sale has been stalled. I know we worked with France 

and some of our allies on this. Could you advise what the current 

status of the submarines being acquired by Taiwan is? 

Finally, you don’t necessarily have to comment on this but if you 

would like to, you can. Former President Chen Shui-bian languishes to this day in a jail cell in Taiwan. To me, it smacks of the 

criminalization of politics. To the extent that this administration 

communicates with President Ma, I would urge you to encourage 

President Ma to do the humanitarian thing. President Chen’s 

health is failing. I will now yield back. Thank you. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate it. I will 

take that and just follow up on it. And let me see what we can do 

about that. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Secretary KERRY. On Burma, you are absolutely correct, there 

will be bumps in the road, I hope not big ones. Obviously, things 

are happening today that were unimaginable a few years ago as 

the generals who imprisoned Aung Sun Suu Kyi are now standing 

with her and working toward this democratic process. But I am 

very worried about the minority up in the northwestern corner who 

are still being very badly treated. And there are other issues, obviously, of the military. I can’t sit here and tell you I know with confidence how this is going to play out. But we are constantly working to push it toward greater democratization, toward the fulfillment of the promises that are on the table. That was the purpose 

of President Obama’s visit. I think it had an historic impact. And 

I think generally speaking, we are moving in the right direction. 

On North Korea, I would not describe our strategy as strategic patience. I would call it strategic impatience. And the conversations 

that I had in the region made it clear that we are not going down 

the same old road. We are not going to reward them and come to 

the table and get into some food deal without some pretty, you 

know, ironclad concept of how we are going forward on the 

denuclearization. 

Now, I am going to be candid with you. You know, we have responded absolutely, I think, appropriately to the threats by making 

it clear that since Guam was now potentially threatened, or Hawaii 

was potentially threatened, or even, according to their biggest bragging, that the continental United States could be reached, the 

President took the steps necessary that any President ought to 

take to make sure that you are not taking anything for granted. 

And so we have made it clear we will defend our allies, and our 

friends, and our interests. Now, that said, I think it is very clear 

from the last 15 or 20 years that the United States of America 

doesn’t have direct influence with North Korea other than the military threat. And that has huge risks and dangers with somebody 

as untested, as provocative, and who has already proven themselves willing to be reckless over the course of the last months. 

China does have a relationship. China provides almost threequarters of the fuel to the North. China is a significant banking 

30

conduit for the North. China provides significant food aid to the 

North. I think it is fair to say that without China, North Korea 

would collapse. Therefore, I think it is important for us to work 

with China. And I think China has indicated its willingness to 

work with us. Now, you know, they also are worried about instability. And I can understand that. China doesn’t want to create 

greater instability in the Korean Peninsula, or create a situation 

which, from the humanitarian point of view, they would inherit 

most of the problems with it. 

So, hopefully diplomacy can actually work here. And that is the 

key, to work with the Chinese to change the equation that has had 

a bad repetition syndrome of total reneging, of complete failure, 

and of increased nuclearization. We have to try to change that. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Mr. 

Secretary. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am sure you remember, I was on the staff of 

the Committee on Foreign Relations when you joined the Committee on Foreign Relations in 1985, and worked with you for the 

next 5 years. I was also proud to head up Kerry for President in 

the Commonwealth of Virginia, where we carried for Kerry in 

terms of the Democratic primary vote. And I was also a delegate 

to the Democratic convention on your behalf that year. And now 

you are Secretary of State and I am here. 

Secretary KERRY. This is leading up to a big ask. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yeah. Yeah. That ambassadorship to Switzerland 

is coming open. And I want to welcome you and congratulate you. 

And I know you are going to be an historic Secretary. I wanted to 

ask you about two things: I wonder if you would comment on 

USAID. Some of us are very concerned. And as you may know, 

Howard Berman, former chairman of this committee, and I introduced a bill trying to streamline and make more focused the AID 

legislation. But in some ways, AID has over the years been 

hollowed out. It was once a place of great expertise that lots of development experts went to. It has largely become a contracting 

management agency today. And I don’t mean that to disparage 

AID. I think Congress has a lot to do with that degradation. But 

shouldn’t we be rebuilding AID to be the lead premiere development agency in the United States Government? And I know you 

spent time when you were in the Senate, Mr. Secretary, on that 

subject. So I think we would all benefit from hearing your views. 

And then secondly, congratulations to you and to the President in 

trying to engineer a rapprochement between Turkey and Israel. I 

wonder if you might comment on how you think that is going. I 

think that is a very important relationship in terms of our policy 

in the Middle East. And I think it is very important that that relationship work, and again, would welcome your views on that broad 

subject. Thank you. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you. Thank you very much, Congressman. And I am grateful for your friendship and support through 

the years. And thank you for being part of the staff early on when 

I first came. And I appreciate that kind of friendship. It is important. 

31

Mr. CONNOLLY. If you would keep Switzerland in mind again, 

please. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you. Say it again. Excuse me? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I said thank you for that, but just keep Switzerland in mind, please. 

Secretary KERRY. Okay. AID is our lead and premiere development agency. It really is. And it does amazing things that a lot of 

people don’t see in a lot of parts of the world. There is just an extraordinary amount of great work that is going on. You always 

hear about a flagship problem. It is easy to find the problem. And 

there will be problems. Because some of what AID has to do is be 

the development entity in places no one else will go, and sometimes 

invest in a place where the economy is not where it would support 

necessarily a market solution, which is why AID has to be there. 

So you have got sort of the Millennium Challenge Corporation 

over here, and you have got AID. AID is the preponderance of our 

expenditure, obviously, but it has adopted significant reforms in 

the last few years that have actually moved some of the sort of development challenge kinds of enterprise into AID. Wherever we 

can, we are trying to do economic-based aid in a local way that is 

sustainable and that will result in long-term gains, not a project 

that comes, and when the project is over the money is gone and 

there is nothing to show for it. But there are some places where 

you still have humanitarian demands and other kinds of demands 

that will not lend themselves to that. And we just need to understand that. We have to understand that is, you know, for the 

minimalist fraction of a percentage of our aid that that may represent, it is still an expression of our values and interests. And it 

is important. 

Now, we are—I am not going to sit here and tell this committee 

that the job is done. We are very focused on how we take the rest 

of the Department, AID, and bring it along further on this effort 

to sort of react to a changed world and to change requirements. 

And I think you will see that as we go through this next year in 

many ways in the programs that we are developing and supporting. 

But Raj Shah has done a great job of pressing the reform agenda. 

There are people who don’t like it in some places. There is always 

resistance to reform. So we are going to push ahead, I can promise 

you, and I think you will like the results as we go forward. One 

quick thing on the rapprochement, Mr. Chairman, if I can just say. 

There is a very important next step that will take place—what are 

we today, the 17th? Next week there will be a meeting between the 

Israelis and the Turks that is the next step of the agreed upon 

roadmap of the rapprochement. And hopefully, that will resolve the 

compensation for victims. And then there will be an exchange of 

Ambassadors, and we move to the fullness of the relationship that 

we are looking for. I am very hopeful that that can go forward 

without any hitch. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Joe Wilson of South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank 

you for being here. Our sympathy and solidarity for your hometown 

of Boston. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you very much. 

32

Mr. WILSON. As we proceed, in 1999, one of the achievements of 

the Clinton administration was a nonproliferation agreement with 

the Russian Federation. As part of that, there was the agreement 

to dispose of high grade plutonium, instead of for weapons to be 

made into fuel. And that resulted in a mixed oxide fuel fabrication 

facility being built at the Savannah River site in Aiken, South 

Carolina. 

Sadly, in the most recent budget, the administration is reducing 

the funding for the construction of the facility. It is 60 percent completed. It can indeed be such a great testimonial to the relationship 

that we have with the Russian Federation, fulfilling our agreements, but providing for fuel of what has been something that from 

an environmental standpoint, from a nonproliferation standpoint, 

all of it is just so positive. What do you see should be done? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I just was asking, because I was unfamiliar with that. And I am just told it is a DOE issue, which is 

why I am not familiar with it. I didn’t realize that cut had taken 

place. Obviously, from a macro policy point of view, we are very 

supportive of the nonproliferation initiative. I was very concerned 

about the Russian suspension of a component of it recently. I hope 

that we will get back on track, because that has been really one 

of the most constructive things I can think of in terms of nonproliferation in the last 50 years. 

Mr. WILSON. It really is. And I appreciate you recognizing that. 

And it is virtually joint DOE and State. So I hope you will look into 

that. 

Secretary KERRY. The funding part is not joint, but the policy 

part of it is. But I am on it. 

Mr. WILSON. Excellent. Additionally, Secretary Clinton was very 

positive in promoting trade. In the State of South Carolina, we 

have had the remarkable situation in the last 2 years of becoming 

the leading exporter of cars of any State in the United States, 

BMW; the leading exporter of tires of any State in the United 

States, thanks to Bridgestone, Michelin, Continental Tire. We are 

very grateful for the investments in our State with GE, Westinghouse, Boeing. Will you continue the policies promoting economic 

trade between our country and developing countries and countries 

all over the world? 

Secretary KERRY. Hugely. I said in my opening statement before 

the Foreign Relations Committee for my confirmation that today, 

in today’s world, foreign policy is to a large degree economic policy. 

And I am deeply committed, I am working right now to close out 

my appointments, the President’s appointments within the State 

Department with respect to our economic effort. I personally believe this is how we are going to be able to do things is leverage 

assistance. And I wish we had more time, I could sort of talk about 

a modern day Marshall Plan, if you will, which is going to involve 

the private sector to a large degree. And that is the way you are 

going to make a difference. What these countries need are jobs for 

young people, masses of young people. 

So we need to try to find ways to, and I think the TTIP, the TPP, 

other kinds of initiatives can help do that. In the West Bank, what 

I was about to describe earlier, was that Prime Minister 

Netanyahu and President Abbas have agreed to this add-on initiaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:30 Aug 21, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\041713\80463 HFA PsN: SHIRL
33

tive of trying to bring the private sector to the table for rapid economic development to really make a difference, as well as for some 

infrastructure. 

So I think you can join both, leverage development, create jobs, 

brings you stability. That is sort of the new model. And I think we 

have to do a lot of work together to try to develop it. 

Mr. WILSON. And another positive example has been the nuclear 

agreement that we have had with India. And I hope we can proceed with that. Energy, which would be so important for that country to continue its development. I am also very grateful to be one 

of the very few Members of Congress, including Ranking Member 

Elliott Engel, who have been to North Korea. I saw a situation 

where it seems like to me it would be in the interests, and you 

have already touched on this, it would be in the interests of China 

for a more rational existence to be there. They can already see the 

positive example of South Korea. Seoul, actually through their investments, employs 2 percent of the people of China. 

I can imagine that North Korean investments is nonexistent. So 

I hope that you will persist in pointing out what would be positive 

for China to see change in North Korea. Thank you. 

Secretary KERRY. Congressman, thanks for your thoughtful comments. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Ted Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, it is a 

pleasure to welcome you to the committee. I also add my thoughts 

and prayers to the City of Boston, as well as the family of Anne 

Smedinghoff, and her colleagues in the Foreign Service who continue to mourn her loss. I would also ask you, Mr. Secretary, as 

you begin your tenure, that you continue to push for information 

about my constituent, Robert Levinson, now missing from Iran for 

2,230 days. I have a few questions to ask now. I will submit some 

other questions for the record for you to respond to. I would like 

to first just point out that last July’s Burgos, Bulgaria bus bombing 

was carried out by three Hezbollah terrorists. Killed three Israelis 

and a Bulgarian national. Last month, a three-judge panel issued 

a decision and described Hezbollah’s activities across Europe. And 

the President, when he was in Israel just recently was very clear 

in saying that every country that values justice should call 

Hezbollah what it truly is, a terrorist organization. 

Mr. Secretary, I hope that you will continue to impress upon the 

Europeans why it is so important that the EU designate Hezbollah 

a terrorist organization. I would like to follow up on something you 

said earlier. You said that you thought the window for a two-state 

solution is shutting, that there is perhaps 11⁄2 or 2 more years or 

it is over. I would just ask if you believe that to be the case, I just 

hope that you will press Prime Minister Abbas, President Abbas on 

preparing his people for peace, on if there is this short window that 

is left, why is it that there is not more focus on negotiations, that 

he continues to impose conditions? That rather than focusing on 

negotiations, much time was lost as he bypassed those negotiations 

to go to the United Nations. Statements that could be made to help 

stop incitement. There is an awful lot that can be done, and I hope 

when I am finished, I hope you will speak to that. And then finally, 

34

I would like to talk about Iran sanctions and follow up on something that my colleague, Congressman Sherman, said earlier. 

He talked about significant reductions. And I would acknowledge 

that under section 1245(d) of the Defense Authorization Act, a 

waiver of sanctions can be granted if the President makes a determination and reports to Congress that a country has significantly 

reduced its volume of crude oil purchases. 

Now, because of the sanctions, Iran’s oil exports have dropped by 

60 percent over the past year. And I commend State Department 

greatly, and this administration, for doing what it has had to do 

to get countries to comply. In December, waivers for China and 

several other cooperating countries were renewed for another 180 

days. But over the past 3 months, China’s imports of Iranian crude 

have steadily increased, as I understand it, from 354,000 barrels 

per day in February to 415,000 barrels per day in April. And I 

would ask you, Mr. Secretary, what constitutes significant reduction? And shouldn’t significant reduction be defined differently at 

this point, given where the Iranians are in their nuclear program? 

And with the additional now outside information that Iraq is producing 3 million barrels more per day, Libya’s production has been 

restored to pre-revolution levels, or about 1.4 million barrels per 

day. 

What are we doing to encourage the other countries to do more 

so that oil production—oil importation, rather, is really reduced? I 

am grateful for the State Department’s efforts. But given where we 

are and given the timing, it seems that before waiving sanctions 

again there should be much more done and expected of the Chinese 

in terms of real reduction. And if you could speak to that, I would 

be grateful as well. 

Secretary KERRY. You know what I want to do is send you the 

statistics that show you, and I don’t have them all here now, but 

I will get them to you, with respect to the China question. There 

is a point where these reductions become very, very—I just say this 

to you, it is not an excuse, but there is a point where these reductions become not only very difficult for a particular country to go 

beyond a certain point, but also where they have an impact on the 

global price. So if you want the price to go up here, you can have 

the Chinese vying for more somewhere else because they can’t get 

it where they are getting it now, and you are going to see some 

price changes that may have everybody screaming as the summer 

comes and people—so things are interconnected. But I will nevertheless show you—I am not saying that is a reason for doing it. 

There has been a net reduction, and I will give you those stats. 

Let me come back, the two questions, three you asked about, on 

Levinson, I have actually engaged in some back-channel diplomacy 

in an effort to try to see if we can get something done there. That 

has been raised at very high levels. And it is not a forgotten issue 

by any means. We are on it. On the Hezbollah, every conversation 

I had in Europe and elsewhere, I urged the labeling as a terrorist 

organization. Because it is. And I emphasized to our European 

friends particularly, the importance of that in terms of giving us 

greater financial tools to be able to restrict the flow of financing 

that allows them to engage in these activities. 

35

And finally, on the two-state solution, look, the hurdle we have 

to get over here, part of the difficulty is that the level of mistrust 

on both sides is gigantic. President Abbas deep down is not convinced, and that may be a light word for it, that Prime Minister 

Netanyahu or Israel are ever going to give them a state. And on 

the other side, Israel is not convinced that the Palestinians and 

others are ever going to give them the security that they need. 

So we have to find an equation here, folks, where we can try to 

dispel those years of mistrust and get both sides to understand 

that both things are, in fact, possible. That is as far as I am going 

to go in terms of talking about the challenge here. But I think that 

that is the complication. And we are trying to undo years of failure. 

And I think one can. I believe we can. But it has got to go carefully, step by step. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. McCaul, chairman of the Homeland Security Committee. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Secretary, congratulations on your new assignment. I know you will continue to 

serve the country well. And my condolences to the people in Boston. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I plan to visit on Friday. I think the response efforts of the Boston Police Department, the fire department, and the 

people of Boston is a true inspiration, and makes me proud to be 

an American. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Mr. MCCAUL. My question has to do with Benghazi. Earlier this 

year, Secretary Clinton testified. And I asked her about a classified 

State Department cable marked ‘‘secret’’ from Ambassador Stevens 

to the State Department on August the 16th. And in that cable, he 

essentially warns the Benghazi consulate could not withstand a coordinated attack. And that is a quote. The Regional Security Officer believed that our consulate could not be protected at an emergency meeting, which is a very extraordinary thing, less than a 

month before the attack on September 11. A contingency plan was 

supposedly drafted to move the consulate operations to a CIA 

annex about a mile away. And this cable came on the heels of three 

significant events: One, April 6, 2012, a crude IED was thrown 

over the wall of the U.S. facility in Benghazi; on May 22, the Red 

Cross building was hit by two RPG mortars by the Brigades of the 

Blind Sheik; on June 6, the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi was targeted by an IED attack that blew a hole in the perimeter wall at 

the Benghazi consulate. Again, the Brigades of the Blind Sheik 

take credit and responsibility for this. 

In written questions after the hearing, I asked the Secretary, 

who in the State Department saw this cable and what specific actions were taken in response? I was disappointed, quite frankly, 

with her response. And I hope that you can do better. Her response 

simply identified personnel in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs as having reviewed the 

cable. But it did not say who received the cable specifically and 

what specific actions were taken in response to what I consider to 

be a cry for help from our Ambassador to our State Department in 

36

Washington that possibly could have prevented that tragic event 

from occurring. 

Mr. Secretary, can you tell me which individual or individuals 

saw this cable and what specific actions were taken? 

Secretary KERRY. I can’t tell you which ones reviewed it because 

there is a process going on right now, which is supposed to come 

to me very shortly, which is an internal review and analysis of who 

did what and who may have or may not have made the right judgment, or no judgment, or whatever. And I have to act on that. 

So I have not seen that yet. And I don’t want to—you know, I 

am not going to prejudice anything that I have to do here. I think 

the chairman raised the issue of people still working. There is a 

process. There is a due process, there is an administrative internal 

process. It will come to me. And I will have to make some kind of 

a decision. I am not even sure exactly what the parameters of that 

are yet because I have waited until it is ripe and comes to me. But 

I know that it is coming. And I will then know exactly who made 

what decision or didn’t, and I will have some responsibility to act 

one way or the other regarding it. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, I appreciate that. But can I have your assurance that you will let this committee know which individuals actually received that cable——

Secretary KERRY. Sure. 

Mr. MCCAUL [continuing]. And what response was taken? 

Secretary KERRY. You have a right to know. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I certainly appreciate that. One last question. This 

is sort of a mixture of State Department and the Department of 

Homeland Security. But recently, the Global Entry program was offered to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is where 15 of the 19 hijackers 

came out of. I can’t think of any greater threat to aviation security 

than the Saudi Peninsula with Yemen right south of Saudi Arabia. 

For the life of me, I don’t understand why Saudi was given preferential treatment over our NATO allies who fought alongside with 

our soldiers and fought and died and were wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan. And instead of rewarding NATO, our NATO allies with 

this Global Entry, we are rewarding Saudi Arabia. I personally—

I am not trying to be political here—I think it is a dangerous policy. And it could result in American lives being killed. 

Secretary KERRY. I am just trying to determine, and I apologize, 

but I am trying to determine who actually makes the final decision 

on that. And I am told it is an interagency process, which is, you 

know, doesn’t satisfy me and it won’t satisfy you. I need to find out 

where that final decision gets made. But, but, and I want to say 

this in fairness, Saudi Arabia has cooperated with us and is cooperating with us in extraordinary ways. There are plots that we have 

uncovered that have never come to light, and won’t, and shouldn’t 

because of Saudi Arabia’s assistance. Saudi Arabia is providing invaluable assistance in the counterterrorism efforts in the Arabian 

Peninsula. And Saudi Arabia has an extremely effective, and has 

entered into with us, a major capacity to vet, to determine the security. And as you know, in the Global Entry program you go 

through a huge background analysis and check. Plus, you have 

major biometrics that are a component of it. I went through this 

a year ago or so so that I could join it. And I remember, you know, 

37

every fingerprint, every sort of aspect of you is proctologized. And 

so you wind up with a pretty good sense of who is who. So I personally have confidence in the capacity of Saudi Arabia to do that. And 

I think I wouldn’t prejudice them automatically by virtue of what 

happened. I would look at the procedure and check and see what 

goes into it in fairness. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I agree. My time has expired, but I will say—and 

the Saudis have been extraordinary allies with respect to intelligence. I agree with you on that point. But I do think it merits review by your Department as well. 

Secretary KERRY. I will check out on the final review. But I have 

great confidence in the Saudi Arabian contribution. The Kingdom 

has been very, very helpful in any number of ways. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Secretary, going back to your earlier comments as you referenced the Benghazi review, can you provide us 

a copy of that internal review once it is completed? 

Secretary KERRY. I don’t know. Honestly, I just don’t know 

whether there is a privacy internal administrative restriction that 

we all have given through Congress. I don’t know what the law is. 

Chairman ROYCE. We will make a request on that. 

Secretary KERRY. I will take a look at that. 

Chairman ROYCE. We appreciate your follow-up on it. We go now 

to Karen Bass of California. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I want to congratulate Secretary Kerry on your appointment, and also join my colleagues in 

expressing my condolences. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you. 

Ms. BASS. I look forward to working with you, and especially 

working with the committed women and men at the State Department. I have to tell you that I have really enjoyed working directly 

with the State Department. And I am honored to have an excellent 

Pearson fellow in my office, who I am looking forward to continuing 

to work with. As the ranking member of the Africa Subcommittee, 

I wanted to share with you several priority issues that I hope you 

will consider. First of all, U.S.-Africa trade relations. Number two, 

the importance of development assistance programs, including global HIV/AIDS funding through PEPFAR. And number three, support for peacekeeping operations. 

As you know, the U.N. is considering establishing a peacekeeping 

force in Mali. And there is already a substantial peacekeeping mission in the DRC. I know you are aware that six of the 10 fastest 

growing economies in the world are located in sub-Saharan Africa. 

And it is my hope, to the extent possible, that the State Department will prioritize trade with African Nations. You should know 

that we have a bipartisan, bicameral effort working in conjunction 

with Chairman Smith to quickly put forward a renewal of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. 

So I have four questions I would like to ask you. I wanted to 

know, what steps are you taking to focus on Africa’s extraordinary 

growth potential? What are your thoughts about the U.S. appointing a special envoy to the DRC? Does the request for peacekeeping 

operations accurately reflect the growing needs on the continent? 

And can you comment on the significance of the 6-percent cut to 

USAID HIV/AIDS funding? 

38

Secretary KERRY. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. Let me 

emphasize, first of all, that we were really pleased that PEPFAR 

was able to be held whole. I think that is vital. I have personally 

visited, I was in Durban, north of Durban, in the mountains watching how that program is being effectively administered, and the difference it has made. We are looking at, as Secretary Clinton said 

when she testified, we have the potential to have an AIDS-free generation as a result of what we have done. And we should be very, 

very proud of that. That will continue completely. With respect to 

the DRC, the answer is yes, we are going to appoint a Great Lakes 

Special Envoy in short order. I think you will be very pleased with 

the President’s choice. That is also caught up in the vetting process 

right now. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. 

Secretary KERRY. But I am very anxious to do that, because I believe that without a great deal of input, one could deal with M–23 

and encourage Rwanda to perhaps take a different approach, help 

President Kabila to be able to deliver better governance. There is 

a lot that we can do. But we have got to be able to be there and 

be engaged. 

To that end, in answer your question, is the level of funding sufficient? I tell you the answer is it is what we can ask for under 

the budget constraints we are living with. But I don’t think anybody should kid themselves that we are stepping up to do what is 

possible, and what is perhaps morally critical with respect to developing an indigenous African capacity to respond through the AU or 

otherwise to some of these crises. And as you know, we have a 

number of U.N. efforts there now that are just not yet sufficient to 

be able to do the job. 

So we have some development work to do in that. And it would 

be such a return on investment. Because a lot of this violence is 

thuggism, it is just criminals that run around and are unleashed. 

And if we had the ability to be able to provide some order, I think 

we could do a lot more for economic development and peace. 

Ms. BASS. Absolutely. And Mr. Secretary, before I finish, I really 

think that we need to just change our perspective on how we view 

the continent. With some of the world’s fastest growing economies 

on the continent, I would like for you to address the significance 

or the priority that the State Department would put on it. 

Secretary KERRY. Six of the 10 or 12 fastest growing countries 

in the world are in Africa. And I want to say to our colleagues we 

all are concerned about our economic future, China is investing 

more in Africa than we are. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Secretary KERRY. And we need to—I mean, it doesn’t have to be, 

you know, a zero sum game. But we ought to recognize where our 

future economic interests and capacity may lie. And I think that 

is why these investments are so small against the return on investment in the long run. And Africa we need to be deeply engaged in, 

and intend to be. The President will travel there. And we have a 

lot do. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We will go to Judge Poe, chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. 

39

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, 

for being here. I want to, first of all, thank you for your help last 

year on the Foreign Aid Transparency Act. I think we can—if we 

get this passed this year, it will do a lot to explain to the American 

public why we give foreign assistance if it is held accountable by 

some type of legislation. So thank you for your work on that. 

I want to talk about if I have time, four different issues: North 

Korea, Benghazi, the MEK, and also Pakistan. 

I read recently that when you were in China, that you suggested 

the United States would reduce our missile defense system in Asia 

in exchange for Chinese help with North Korea even though we 

were being threatened by nuclear attack by the North Korean Government. First of all, is that an accurate statement? And if so, explain that, if you would. 

Secretary KERRY. No, not an accurate statement. I think it was 

corrected while I was over there. There was reporting to that effect. 

What I—there was no offer, no deal, no contemplation of it. What 

I did say, publicly, and I will say it again, is that the President 

took specific deployment steps of missile defense in direct response 

to North Korea. And it stands to reason that if the North Korean 

threat disappears, there would be a logical question of whether or 

not that same level of deployment is necessary. It is all, I stated, 

was a sort of fact based on the rationale of the deployment itself. 

Mr. POE. Do you think that the United States should give aid to 

North Korea of some type to temper their sabre rattling, which 

they seem to do about this time every year? 

Secretary KERRY. No. 

Mr. POE. All right. Thank you for those comments. Glad I agree 

with you totally. Just want to clear that up for the record. 

As all have said regarding Boston, and Chairman McCaul especially, the activity of our first responders was textbook. But also 

the people. How they came out of the stands and down the street 

to help other wounded, and critically wounded citizens, and noncitizens as well, people from all over the world. I especially am encouraged by the cowboy from Costa Rica who is now an American citizen, how he helped with one of the runners. And that is why one 

of the best parts of America is its people. 

You had mentioned bringing those perpetrators to justice, and 

they will be brought to justice. 

But buttressing in on Benghazi, it has been 7 months since that 

attack. People are frustrated, Members of Congress are even frustrated, 100 want a select committee to study Benghazi. Of course, 

many of them aren’t on any committee of jurisdiction, but they 

want a committee. And I hear comments all the time, ‘‘Why haven’t 

we captured somebody who did these bad things in Benghazi?’’

Reports indicate that the Libyan Government really won’t do 

anything because, reportedly, some of the groups, the militia 

groups that support the Libyan Government may be involved in the 

attack. Would you comment on that, if you can? 

Secretary KERRY. I don’t have any knowledge whatsoever about 

that. Let me just say that one of the first things I did when I came 

in was call Director Mueller at the FBI to get an update on this. 

Because, obviously, we—you know, there is no family in America 

40

that wants justice more than the State Department family, believe 

me. 

So I wanted to know where we are, and I think we are making 

progress. Now, there is video, as you all know. We have identified 

people. And they are building a case. You know, we are going 

through the tedious, laborious, and very difficult process of gaining 

evidence from a part of the country which is dangerous. And working in a place where the standards are different and the expectations are different. We are working through that. 

But I can guarantee you this, and I think all of you know because of Bob Mueller’s service, and the extra years that people 

passed a law to allow him to serve, there is no more dedicated or 

capable leader of the FBI, and there is nobody more committed to 

do this. So I have confidence in that. I also have confidence in 

something else. This President of the United States made it clear 

once before that he would do what was necessary to bring somebody to justice. And I guarantee you, he has made it clear, yet 

again, that we will find justice here. And the President will do 

what is necessary. Our hope is to work with the Libyan Government and do this through a process. 

Mr. POE. I will submit further questions for the record, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. We will go to William Keating of Massachusetts. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. 

Secretary, for being here. I know that both of us, although we are 

here, part of us are still back home in Massachusetts this morning. 

But getting to the theme of this morning’s hearing, your theme 

of small, smart investments is right on point. I couldn’t agree with 

it more. One of those areas that the administration and you have 

been involved with personally and Secretary Clinton had been involved with is really dealing with issues like the National Action 

Plan for Women, Peace and Security in the world. And I think that 

we can’t approach the broader issues of poverty and the rule of law 

and education and healthcare around the world without dealing 

with these issues. They are core to any advancement in that area. 

And, furthermore, I think they are the smartest way to make some 

of these investments for our dollar and to be effective. 

So I would like you to just do two things, if you could, comment 

on. One is generally comment on your ability to deal with these 

gender equality advancement issues with women around the world. 

And, number two, particularly, gender-based violence, you know it 

in your capacity, you knew it when you were a prosecutor, as I did. 

They know no borders or bounds when you are dealing with violence based on gender-based violence. And internationally the violence that so many women experience take many different forms, 

from rape to early forced marriage to harmful traditional, you 

know, practices that occur, such as genital mutilation, honor 

killings, acid violence, sexual violence and contact. And I could go 

on and on and on. But can you comment on the Department’s first 

time ever strategy to prevent and respond to gender-based violence 

globally? Those are the two things I would like you to come on, Mr. 

Secretary. 

41

Secretary KERRY. Thank you, Congressman. Good to see you. 

Thanks for our shared feelings about what has happened up in 

Boston. 

Secretary Clinton did a terrific job of putting this issue squarely 

on everybody’s agenda. And I am determined to make certain that 

we live up to that standard, if not exceed it. And we are in—I think 

we are in a good start to do that in terms of trafficking issues and 

other things. But in London last week at the G8 Minister’s meeting, Foreign Minister Hague of Great Britain made the centerpiece 

of our meeting sexual violence as an instrument of war. And we 

had a, you know, a meeting, we had outside representatives come 

in who helped to raise the profile of that. And, in my judgment, you 

know, was a very valuable moment for people to realize that this 

is going to be held accountable as a war crime. And that we are 

going to keep this gender-based violence front and center as we go 

forward. 

I would also say to everybody when I was in Afghanistan, a couple weeks ago, when Ann Smedinghoff was my control officer, she 

helped put together a remarkable meeting of 10 entrepreneurs, 10 

women in Afghanistan who are struggling against all of the resistance, culturally and historically, in that country to stand up and 

start businesses and help girls go to school, help women be able to 

be entrepreneurs, a remarkable process. And the courage that they 

exhibited deserves everybody’s support. It will certainly get ours in 

the State Department, and we are going to continue this in many, 

many different ways over the course of next year. I think you will 

see us continue it. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. In terms of accountability, Mr. Secretary, could that also include some conditions that might be tied 

to aid from time to time to some extent? 

Secretary KERRY. You know, Congressman, there are some places 

that I think lend themselves to that kind of conditionality, and 

there are others that just don’t. And I don’t think there is a blanket, cover-all way of explaining, you know, a set of standards that 

is going to apply everywhere. In some countries, the standards actually can be counterproductive, and you don’t get done what you 

are trying to do. It really depends what is the package, what is the 

nature of the program. And I think you have to be pretty customized in that approach. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. 

And, Mr. Chairman, as I turn it back to you, I do want to thank 

the members of the committee as well as the Members that I have 

been talking to on the floor for their genuine and heartfelt concern 

about what is occurring in Boston. I know we are all in this together. And I want to thank the Secretary for his remarks. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you very much, Congressman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Keating. 

We go now to Matt Salmon, chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, welcome. First of all, I would like to submit several written questions that were put together by 700 retired Special Forces operators that are in regard to Benghazi. And I would 

just like a written response to that. 

42

Also, you have urged us to review the video from the attack of 

that night. We have requested that video, but the Department has 

not provided it. When I mean ‘‘we,’’ the committee. 

Secretary KERRY. We don’t have it. I think it’s a—I saw it in a 

classified briefing. I believe it may be the agency or something. 

Mr. SALMON. Would it be possible for you to take measures to ensure that we do get it? 

Secretary KERRY. I will try to find out where it is and what the 

deal is. I am surprised. I would think——

Mr. SALMON. We have requested that video, but it has not been 

provided. 

Secretary KERRY. Okay. We had an all-Members briefing, I am 

reminded, in the Senate, and it was shown there. 

In the House. There was an all-Members briefing in the House, 

apparently, which did show it. 

Mr. SALMON. Okay. If we could get that as a committee, it would 

be extremely helpful. 

Secretary KERRY. Mr. Chairman, do you know which committee 

would have hosted that? All Members? Maybe the leadership did. 

But I am confident that—look, every Member who was there saw 

it. And if you haven’t seen it, I am confident people will make arrangements for you to see it. 

Mr. SALMON. Great. 

I have a few questions regarding the Western Hemisphere and 

some energy issues. As the chairman mentioned, I am the chairman of the Western Hemisphere committee. And I am very interested in what the next move is going to be from the administration 

regarding the XL Pipeline. I believe that it has been documented 

over and over and over again the jobs that that will produce, the 

benefit to our economy. Your State Department has said that there 

are no significant greenhouse gas issues with it or problems with 

regarding to global warming. And so I am kind of wondering why 

the administration continues to stall on that. 

Also, regarding liquid natural gas, we have an overabundance of 

LNG in this country. And a great opportunity to export, especially 

to the Caribbean. With the current economic problems in Venezuela, and I think their diminished capacity to provide this great 

commodity, we have a phenomenal opportunity, again, to provide 

jobs in the United States. And export—the President said he wants 

to double our exports over the next 5 years. I wholeheartedly endorse that idea. It is wonderful. Here is an opportunity to actually 

put our money where our mouth is. And I am wondering what it 

is going to take to get the Department of Energy to get off the dime 

on issuing these permits so that we can get on with exporting that, 

especially to the Caribbean. 

And then, finally, I am a strong supporter of the Transcontinental Hydrocarbon Agreement with Mexico. I think it provides yet another wonderful opportunity for the United States and 

America to enter in a great economic joint venture, as well as make 

the Western Hemisphere energy independent, which I think is a 

great goal. We have some great opportunities, I think, to do economic activities with our partners here in the Western Hemisphere. But I think—I think it is time for us to move forward with 

that. 

43

I have met with some of your personnel, and they have submitted language that is acceptable. I would like all hands on deck 

from your Department to help get that done now. Thank you. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Let me begin by saying, first of all, there is no—I assure you, 

there is no stalling going on. The law is being followed. We are just 

following the law. We have a procedure that had do in EIS. The 

EIS was appropriately contracted out. EIS was done. Then we have 

a public reporting period. That public reporting period is going on 

right now. Then after the public reporting period, there is an option—it is all under the law, to perhaps get more information if 

there is some reason the public comment required it, there is a determination of public interest, then ultimately the decision will 

come to me. 

It is not ripe, it is not there. And I am staying as far as away 

from that as I can now so that when the appropriate time comes 

to me, I am not getting information from anyplace I shouldn’t be, 

and I am not getting engaged in the debate at a time that I 

shouldn’t be. But we are following the legal procedure that is required. I assure you. 

Secondly, regarding LNG and so forth. Look, I spent a lot of time 

on energy and climate and so forth when I was in the Senate. And 

I would love to see the Western Hemisphere be energy independent. It is not a dream. It is conceivable that it could happen. 

You and I might have a slightly different sense of what the mix 

of energy ought to be and how you might achieve it. 

Mr. SALMON. You would be surprised. 

Secretary KERRY. It is doable, and I think proceed it. I think 

there is a Canada-U.S.-Mexico-Latin America, you know, Central 

American component to this which is really worth exploring much 

more vigorously, and I am prepared to do that. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Cicillini of Rhode Island for 

5 minutes. And afterwards we will go 3 minutes per member. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Mr. Secretary, and thank you for your continuing service to our Nation. I, too, want to extend my condolences to you for 

the recent loss at the State Department. And I know I speak for 

all Rhode Islanders when I extend our condolences for the residents 

of the City of Boston and of Massachusetts and express that you 

will—they will continue to remain in our thoughts and prayers. 

I would also like to add my voice to the priorities that were set 

forth by my colleague, Congresswoman Bass, about the continent 

of Africa and the importance of remaining fully engaged in that region of the world. I am very pleased to hear your response to that. 

And with your indulgence, I will submit written questions with respect to the status of the implementation of the recommendations 

of the Accountability Review Board as they relate to diplomatic security. A question regarding the waiver program for Portugal and 

the Lajes Air Force Base in the Azores and mitigating the impact 

there. A question regarding Armenia. Particularly NagornoKarabakh. A question about our longstanding relationship with 

Greece. And, finally, the State Department’s role in protecting 

44

LGBT individuals and human rights of those individuals all around 

the world. 

But I would like to ask you today, Mr. Secretary, to speak to two 

specific areas: Syria and North Korea. As you know, Mr. Secretary, 

over 1 million refugees have currently left Syria. At the Kuwait 

conference in January, pledges were made of $1.5 billion in humanitarian assistance, but only a small percentage of countries that 

have made that pledge have fulfilled their pledges. 

And so I would like you to speak to what efforts are underway 

to ensure that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in particular 

are making good on their commitments, and what coordination is 

underway with donor countries to ensure that the assistance is 

reaching the affected individuals? I would also like your thoughts 

on whether or not we are considering closing the Syrian Embassy 

here in the United States and what is the rationale of keeping that 

relationship ongoing. 

And, finally, on the issue of Syria, I would like you to speak 

about what efforts are being made with respect to protecting Syrian girls and women in the refugee camps. We have seen some recent reports, again, that talk about sexual violence and the exchange of money for family members in exchange for young women 

being forced to marry, and so the sexual violence of these refugee 

camps is a particularly important issue. 

And, secondly, I would ask you to talk a little bit about what 

your recent trip to Seoul and Tokyo might have contributed to your 

thinking about what is happening on the Korean Peninsula, what 

is your assessment of what is likely to happen, what we might be 

able to do as Members of Congress to help bring stability to that 

region of the world and to protect American national security interests on the Korean Peninsula. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, thank you, Congressman. Good to see you 

again, and I appreciate the questions. 

On Syria, let me just say very quickly, we are really in touch 

very directly with these donor countries. As I said, we have given 

$385 million to the refugee issue. They are probably—we are nearing the million mark over at—the fourth largest city in Jordan 

today is a tent city. It is a refugee camp. And you can imagine the 

destabilizing impact and the problems with the Jordanians, who 

have other issues and challenges economically. So this is a big deal. 

In Lebanon, you don’t have camps. In Lebanon, the refugees are 

spread throughout the country. But the estimates are they may be 

as much as 10 to 20 percent add on in terms of population. And 

then in Turkey, you have very significant numbers of refugees in 

addition. You also have displaced persons within Syria itself. 

So this is reaching a major humanitarian crisis level. And it is 

one of the reasons why we are going to meet in Istanbul this weekend is some of the donor countries will be there. But none of us 

want to sit around and simply see this refugee crisis grow and 

grow and grow and ultimately wind up with an implosion of the 

country itself. 

That may happen. I am not going to sit here and tell you that 

we can prevent that. But the best shot at preventing it is to try 

to get to the negotiating table to get the Geneva communique implemented so you can save the institutions of the state, not wind 

45

up with an enclave state with huge instability and problems with 

extremist groups that have grown stronger as a result of this conflict. So time is our enemy. Sooner is better in terms of getting to 

the table and conceivably getting some agreement. 

Just very quickly, because I know the gavel has rung. On North 

Korea and the peninsula, I will just repeat again. President Park 

has a new policy called Trust Politic. And she wants to reach out 

to the north. She obviously can’t do that in the middle of this kind 

of process. My hope would be that the Chinese will come to the 

table in a way that they never have before, that we can work with 

the Chinese to redefine what is in all of our interests, which is a 

kind of stability in the peninsula moving north to a 

denuclearization, and ultimately, hopefully, an integration into the 

community of nations, based on economic reform which China, the 

United States, others could become engaged in. And that could ultimately even open up the possibility of President Park’s outreach to 

be able to have an impact. 

Absent China coming to table, I believe Kim Jong Un laterally 

calculates that ‘‘I can get away with anything if China isn’t going 

to hold me accountable.’’ So that is where we are. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Adam Kinzinger of Illinois. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for being here, Mr. Secretary. Since my time has 

been cut down, I want to just make a few brief comments, and then 

a couple of very brief questions for you, sir. 

First off, I want to say I was one of six Republicans to support 

the President in Libya. I supported his decision to go in there. I 

think it was the right thing to do. I believe, as you had mentioned 

in your testimony, in the strength of America and that America 

cannot retreat from the world. Even at times when we face tough 

budgets and everything else. I am glad to hear you say that. Where 

I was dismayed in the Libya situation, though, and what I have 

seen since then is this idea of America leading from behind. And 

it is a strategy that I know was mentioned a couple times in passing. But I worry that we are now trying as a Nation to be more 

of a leader from behind. And I believe personally that when America retreats from the world or retreats from a leadership role in the 

world, that chaos ensues. And so it is an area, and I want you to 

address that, but I want to make a couple of other quick comments. 

You mentioned, I think, in one your—in your Senate confirmation hearing that you hear from diplomats, they wonder if the 

United States can continue to deliver. And I appreciate that. And 

I wonder if that is related to the new strategy of leading from behind, and not necessarily a financial issue? 

I believe one of the greatest mistakes we have made in the last 

few years was not leaving a leave-behind force in Iraq. And I believe that now what we are going to see in Iraq actually frightens 

me. And I know you all are doing great work there. And I want 

to be very clear that the Department of State has a strong presence 

in Iraq, and I appreciate that. But I believe not leaving behind 

American troops was a major mistake. And that turns me to Afghanistan. As we are looking at winding down Afghanistan, a concern I have is the IMET funding for training and education. Ninety-five percent of soldiers are reported as illiterate. 

46

So my question to you specifically, first off, to address the leavefrom-behind strategy, sir, and how you see it. And then, secondly, 

from Afghanistan, are we in a position with the President’s timetable for withdrawal, which I believe was basically based on an arbitrary date, but are we in a position without a strong U.S. military presence after 2014 to leave behind an Afghan military that 

can defend itself against a resurgent Taliban or against al-Qaeda. 

And with that, I will give you the remaining minute, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary KERRY. I really appreciate it. Two very good questions. 

Let me begin. And I am really happy to have this opportunity. Let 

me kill this idea of leading from behind. I don’t know where it 

comes from. I don’t know what it means. 

Mr. KINZINGER. I don’t either. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, how I don’t know how you lead from behind. If you are leading, you are leading. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Confused me too, sir. 

Secretary KERRY. Let me just finish. I believe that this President 

led on Libya. The fact that you decide not to put your boots on the 

ground doesn’t mean you are not leading. There are different roles 

for different people to play. Now, I respectfully suggest that almost 

ever member of this committee would have said, ‘‘I don’t want 

boots on the ground in Libya.’’ I also believe most people would say, 

‘‘I don’t want boots on the ground in Syria.’’ But it doesn’t mean 

we are not leading. We are leading. 

The President sent me to Rome to bring together the—together 

with our Italian friends, a core group. And we upped what we were 

doing. And we led the effort to try to get greater support. I went 

to Turkey, I met with Foreign Minister Davutoglu. And the prime 

minister, and we agreed there, at the President’s instruction, to see 

if we could put together an additional effort with respect to Syria. 

That meeting will take place this Saturday. That is leadership. I 

believe the President has led from the beginning in helping to put 

the Syrian opposition on the map, to get it recognized, to have the 

Paris meeting, the London meeting, the subsequent meeting in 

Rome and so forth. And to me that is leadership. So put it behind. 

I am just going to say one word on Afghanistan. The whole purpose of our policy today is to train and equip the Afghan army to 

be able to fend for itself. Most of the reports, colleagues who have 

been traveling there, friends from the Senate who have told me 

they went over recently, were encouraged by what they have seen 

the Afghan army capable of doing. You don’t see major assaults of 

the Taliban against the army. You see people blowing themselves 

up. You see cowards coming out or people convinced, young children, 16, 17 years old, to go blow themselves up. You don’t see the 

leadership blowing themselves up, ever. 

So I think that the fact is that what we are seeing are sort of 

a kind of desperation on the part of the Taliban. And hopefully, in 

this fighting season, we will see what the value and capacity of the 

Afghan army is. And in the next fighting season. We still have two 

fighting seasons to see how this army develops. And as to the leaving of the troops in Iraq, look, the Iraqis would not give our troops 

immunity. 

Mr. KINZINGER. I don’t think we pushed very hard for that, Mr. 

Secretary. 

47

Chairman ROYCE. Hold on. 

Mr. KINZINGER. I know my time is up. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. If the members can be brief with their questions—little iconic here—we can get through all of the members 

here. 

Alan Grayson of Florida. 

Mr. GRAYSON. As briefly as possible, Mr. Secretary, I wanted to 

ask you a few questions about the Visa Waiver program. Are you 

familiar, in general, with the program? 

Secretary KERRY. In general, yes. That is a pretty good way to 

describe it. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Well, formerly the administration had the authority to add countries to the Visa Waiver program, and now it does 

not. Would you like to see that authority on behalf of the administration restored? 

Secretary KERRY. Which authority? 

Mr. GRAYSON. The authority to add countries to the Visa Waiver 

program, which allows qualifying citizens of those countries to 

come to the United States on a short-term basis without a visa. 

Secretary KERRY. Sure. I think if people qualify. Look, we have 

a standard, as you know, that people are supposed to meet in order 

to be able to qualify for it. And, sure. Look, you are not going to 

have every country in the world being visa waivered, for obvious 

reasons. But where people can meet the standards of requirement 

with respect to the rate of refusal, which is the key standard, we 

are all for it. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Would you like to see strong strategic allies like 

Israel and Brazil and Poland rewarded for their cooperation with 

U.S. foreign policy by including them in the Visa Waiver program? 

Secretary KERRY. Yes. But I am not in favor of waiving standards to do it. I think we have to have people meet the standard 

and proceed from there. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Up to now, the standard has been what you described, which is a 3 percent rejection rate, as determined by the 

Customs and Immigration Service. 

Secretary KERRY. Right. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Some countries go slightly beyond that in part because there isn’t a uniform standard applied by Embassies 

throughout the world, some Embassies have a more liberal policy 

with regard to applications than others do. With that in mind, instead of outsourcing the decision making to the Customs and Immigration Service, would you like to see input with regard to diplomatic and security and also economic considerations when these 

determinations are made? 

Secretary KERRY. I would have to review that. Let me just tell 

you that there are—there are several established criteria in the act 

with respect to the current standard for the Visa Waiver. One is 

that government provides reciprocal Visa Waivers; two, that the 

government issues secure machine-readable passports; three, that 

the government certifies they have a program to incorporate biometric identification into their passports; four, that the government 

reports the thefts of blank passports; five, that they maintain the 

low immigrant refusal rate; and, six, that they maintain less than 

2 percent rejection for travel for nonimmigrant applicants. 

48

So those are the standards in the current law. And you guys, obviously, have the right to change that if you see fit. But that is the 

current standard. And I am not in favor of waiving that. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Well, none of those standards are economic. For 

instance, none of them consider the economic benefit to the United 

States. None of those standards are security-related, for instance, 

concerning the benefit to loyal allies——

Secretary KERRY. Will you give us a lot more analysts in the 

budget so we can do all of that? 

Mr. GRAYSON. Would you be in favor of considering those favors 

as well, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary KERRY. I want to have some evaluation of it to me to 

make a judgment as to whether or not it makes sense. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Brooks of Alabama. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Kerry, 7 

months ago, Americans were murdered at the Benghazi consulate. 

You mentioned earlier in your testimony that the administration 

has testified eight times, given 20 briefings and provided 25,000 

pages of documents about Benghazi. Yet the American people still 

do not know why Ambassador Susan Rice, during a heated Presidential race, made so many false statements to the American people about what happened in Benghazi. More specifically, on September 16, 2012, on ‘‘This Week with George Stephanopoulos,’’ Ambassador Rice stated, and I quote, ‘‘What this began as, it was a 

spontaneous, not a premeditated response to what transpired in 

Cairo.’’

Yet on the very same day, Libyan President Mohammed 

Magariaf stated on NPR, ‘‘The idea that this criminal and cowardly 

act was a spontaneous protest that just spun out of control is completely unfounded and preposterous. We firmly believe that this 

was a precalculated, preplanned attack that was carried out specifically to attack the U.S. consulate.’’

Similarly, the State Department’s own Accountability Review 

Board concluded that there were no protests prior to the attack on 

the U.S. consulate. Again, on September 16, 2012, on ‘‘Meet the 

Press’’ with David Gregory, this time, Ambassador Rice stated, 

‘‘What happened in Benghazi was, in fact, initially a spontaneous 

reaction to what had just transpired hours before in Cairo, almost 

a copycat of the demonstrations against our facility in Cairo, which 

were prompted, of course, by the video.’’

Ambassador Rice made three false statements in one sentence. 

First, Ambassador Rice misrepresented that Benghazi was a spontaneous reaction to the Cairo protests; second, Ambassador Rice 

misrepresented that Benghazi was a copycat of the Cairo demonstrations; and, third, Ambassador Rice said Benghazi was 

prompted, of course, by an anti-Muslim video, when there was little, if any, credible evidence to support this claim. 

Secretary Kerry, as we now know, the Libyan President told the 

truth, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations did 

not. My question to you is, can you give assurances to the American people that you will conduct an investigation that will find out 

why Ambassador Rice made so many false statements to America 

49

about what happened in Benghazi and that you will share your 

findings with the American people? 

Secretary KERRY. No. Because I don’t think it is necessary. Ambassador Rice has apologized for her mistaken comments, which 

were based on talking points that she was given. And she has 

made it clear that she was mistaken. I am absolutely confident beyond any reasonable doubt Ambassador Rice did not purposely mislead anybody. She was using the talking points. And there was confusion in the early hours about the demonstration that took place 

in Cairo, and a release that had taken place from an Embassy person in Cairo, which, incidentally, was inappropriate. 

A release that was not very well thought out that said something 

about—I can’t remember the surprise language, but it looked as if 

we were not standing up for freedom of speech. That was subsequently retracted. And in the process, I think there was a sufficient 

level of confusion. I think she would tell you she over-relied on 

those talking points. But I can tell you that Susan Rice would 

never go out and purposely mislead you. 

Now, at some point, we have got to find a way to make a judgment here about how much information we have and how much information is sort of somewhere out there in, you know—that might 

contribute something further here constructively. 

I will work with you, Mr. Chairman. I do not want to spend the 

next year coming up here talking about Benghazi. If there is something legitimate that really needs to be put on the table, I will put 

it on the table. And I will work with you in good faith. And I believe after we do that with you and the ranking member, you will 

not have questions. And I ask you to, you know, put what your 

members feel they need—but let’s put this behind us. We have got 

serious, major, big, current, important issues vital to our national 

security to be debating. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary KERRY. And I will help you clear the air on this, but 

I want to do it in a fair-minded way. 

Chairman ROYCE. We have made several requests here today. 

We will follow up. 

Will we go now to Mr. Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for sharing your time with 

us. 

Let me start, like my colleagues, expressing my condolences to 

the families of those lost in Boston, my wishes for a full recovery 

for those injured, and our solidarity with all of the people of Boston. I also want to extend condolences to Ann Smedinghoff’s family, 

as well as her family at the State Department. I also think it is 

important to note the countless acts of heroism we saw in Boston. 

That reflected, I believe, the truest reflection of the American spirit. And it is also the spirit I think we see in the people like Ann 

Smedinghoff and Chris Stevens and all the others who work on behalf of our country around the world putting their lives on the line 

every day. 

So let me ask also thank you for your emphasis in this budget 

to making sure that our people around the world in harm’s way 

have the security that they deserve. 

50

Let me now turn my questions, really want to focus on Israel and 

the Palestinians. You talked about the window closing on a twostate solution, potentially as soon as in 18 months, a focus you indicated on both sides for seriousness of purpose. And in the context, if we look around the region, with Egypt, Syria, and in particular, the threat of nuclear Iran. But at the same time, you noted 

that Abbas was not convinced that there was a pathway to peace. 

And I think what we have seen in the last number of months and, 

unfortunately, on Saturday, with the resignation of Salam Fayyad, 

is the partner for peace—I have questions about it. 

And my question for you is, how do we, in light of Salam 

Fayyad’s resignation, and the direction that the P.A. seems to be 

taking, how do we help get them to the table for negotiations so 

that the window doesn’t close and we can find a pathway to peace. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, it is a really excellent question. And I am 

happy to clarify it because I think it is important in this whole context to do so. 

First of all, I have enormous respect for Salam Fayyad. I have 

worked with him closely, had many, many meetings with him. I 

think a lot of people had confidence in his stewardship, financially, 

in his financial stewardship, the accountability, transparency he 

brought. But, first of all, he is not going away completely. He is 

going to be there as a caretaker. I don’t know how long that 

caretakership will take. But he will be there to work in a transition, number one. Number two, he will remain involved in Palestinian affairs, I am confident. Number three, the peace process and 

the capacities of the Palestinians are, in the end, bigger than one 

person. They just are. And there are people who can continue this 

journey. And I am confident of that. I believe that there is a way 

for President Abbas to be persuaded of the good faith efforts that 

the Israelis are prepared to take, providing they take them. And 

I think there is a way to get to these negotiations. 

So I am not saying to you there is no pathway for peace. I am 

saying to you that he comes to the table with enormous mistrust, 

as do the Israelis, who pulled out of Gaza and continue to get rockets on them. And who pulled out of Lebanon and—we all know the 

history here. We all know. 

The art here is not to get trapped in the past and in who did 

what to whom at some point. It is to take the place where we are 

today and be as constructive as possible to move it forward. I think 

that there is a way to avoid the unachievable preconditions. I believe there is a way to build a series of initiatives that can speak 

to this mistrust. But you have to do it quietly, and you have to do 

it patiently. But you also have to do it rapidly at the same time 

because of this time frame. 

You know, President Abbas has the power to go to the United 

Nations again, tomorrow. He has the power to ask to be part of an 

agency or recognized now, given the recognition which was a vote 

of 120 something, 140 to 9. I think that it would be difficult maybe 

to find those 9 next time. And people know that. You may find 4 

or 5, but you won’t find the 9. 

So given that, he is restraining from doing that. That is his sign 

of good faith at this moment too. He would like to see if we could 

get this process moving. So everybody needs to kind of not react 

51

the normal sort of tit for tat, stereotypical way. Give peace a 

chance by providing some opening here for the politics and the diplomacy to work. That is what both sides need to do. That is what 

I believe both sides are prepared to do. And the proof will be in the 

pudding. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Cotton of Arkansas. 

Mr. COTTON. Mr. Secretary, thank you for your time today. 

Thank you for your service to our country, including your service 

as a young man in uniform in Vietnam. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. COTTON. The United Nations recently approved the Arms 

Trade Treaty. Article 5 of that treaty requires nations to create a 

national control system, which includes a national control list. Article 10 requires nations to regulate the brokering of conventional 

arms. I am concerned that in the unlikely event that treaty is approved by the Senate, it could be used to justify such measures as 

a national gun registry, a ban on certain kinds of firearms or ammunition, or licenses to purchase firearms or ammunition. Can you 

assure the committee today that the administration does not intend 

to pursue such measures, should the treaty be approved? 

Secretary KERRY. I can absolutely guarantee you that this administration is not going to do anything to violate the second 

amendment rights of any citizens of the United States nor the Constitution itself. And whatever we agree to will be constitutional and 

appropriate. 

Mr. COTTON. And that includes in the interim period for the treaty as ratified, there is a customary international legal norm that 

nations will not attempt to frustrate or block the purpose of the 

treaty. The administration will not do something to enact those 

measures I mentioned earlier through Executive Order or regulation. 

Secretary KERRY. The President, I think he has made it clear. I 

think you see that—look, I am out of politics now. But I think 

watching the debate on guns right now, it seems to me the President’s position is pretty clear. He is not proposing—I think, you 

know, as controversial as some of the issues may be, there is nothing there that would suggest a fundamental violation of second 

amendment rights, notwithstanding that people can still disagree 

with one position or another. 

Mr. COTTON. Thank you. Like to move now to Syria and arming 

the Syrian rebels. Last May, as a Senator, you said the United 

States should at least consider establishing a safe zone and providing lethal military assistance to the rebels if they could be more 

unified and, obviously, identifying them as moderate elements. 

Based on reporting in The New York Times and The Wall Street 

Journal, we now know that Secretary Clinton, Secretary Panetta, 

General Petraeus all supported taking those measures. The President and his advisors in the White House blocked them. Wondering 

what your current position is on whether the United States should 

engage in providing that kind of assistance. I know you said in 

Doha most recently that our Middle Eastern allies should consider 

it, and we encourage that. But where does the United States currently stand on it? 

52

Secretary KERRY. Well, the United States policy right now is that 

we are not providing lethal aid. But we are coordinating very, very 

closely with those who are and with our core group allies here. And 

the meeting that we will have in Istanbul this week is really to 

evaluate sort of where the situation on the ground is and what 

accelerants to Assad’s departure might make the most sense. And 

we will have that meeting. 

And just final comment on the—with respect to—well, I will just 

leave it there. I think that covers it. 

Mr. COTTON. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Dr. Ami Bera of California. 

Mr. BERA. Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for appearing here. 

And, like my colleagues, I want to thank you for your service to our 

country and continuing service. I look forward to working with you. 

You know, as my colleagues have already expressed, our condolences go out to the families and victims in Boston. You know, what 

it does point out, that we have to remain vigilant against those 

that are jealous of our freedoms and our way of life. And we have 

to remain vigilant against terror, whether domestic or foreign. I 

want to compliment Chairman Chaffetz for convening a series of 

hearings on South Asia, especially in light of our drawdown of 

troops in Afghanistan. And at one of those hearings, we had the 

pleasure of questioning Under Secretary Blake and talking about 

the importance of holding onto our gains in Afghanistan and continuing to maintain some stability. And the importance of India in 

this role. 

I know there had been trilateral negotiations between the United 

States, India, and Afghanistan to, again, stabilize the region. And 

a recognition of India’s critical role in helping maintain those goals 

and the stability and the economics of South Asia. 

I would like to hear from you just an update on how those negotiations are going. And your thoughts as we are drawing down on 

how we maintain the gains and the safety and don’t let terror reemerge in Afghanistan. 

Secretary KERRY. The negotiations on the bilateral security 

agreement? 

Mr. BERA. Correct. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, they are proceeding. I think they are 

going effectively. I had a very good meeting with President Karzai 

a few weeks ago. I think he is well disposed to want to finalize that 

agreement. I think it is in everybody’s interest to do so. I have confidence that that will happen. 

I think, look, I think, you know, the jury’s out on the question 

of where—of exactly how independent this army that we have 

helped to build is going to be. But it is performing pretty effectively 

right now. And the early indications seem to be that the morale is 

high, the enthusiasm and energy is up. I think the green-on-blue 

incidents have gone down. Knock on wood. You have to keep working diligently at that. But this is the fighting season. This is the 

time for the test. And we are all going to sort of see how it plays 

out. 

Mr. BERA. I am curious about your perspective on India’s role in 

helping develop an economy in Afghanistan. 

53

Secretary KERRY. India can play a huge role. I have been a longtime big believer in India’s capacity to be an enormously important 

partner in a number of different things. I think I recall taking the 

first trade mission to India in the 1990s when they first began 

their economic transformation, a far cry from where India is today. 

And I have always believed in, because of their democracy, because 

of their tradition, there are great reasons for us to partner with 

India in many significant ways. But India and Pakistan obviously 

have a very different relationship. And so it is a very complicated 

circle between Afghanistan, Pakistan, India. How much India is in 

Afghanistan affects Pakistan’s views. And they each have a capacity to see bad things happening, depending on what the other does. 

So we have to work at that diligently. 

Mr. BERA. I thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We will go to Mr. Weber of Texas. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman——

Secretary KERRY. Mr. Chairman, thanks for your largesse there. 

I apologize. 

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Kerry, good to see you. Appreciate your being 

here. I have three questions for you. You said to Brad Schneider 

that the art here is to not to get trapped in the past, was what you 

said regarding Benghazi. Toward that end, I have two questions. 

Number one, your predecessor said that those four employees in 

the State Department that didn’t, I guess, pay attention to the requests for help, firing them was not an option, it didn’t rise to the 

level of a fireable offense. A, I want to know if you have got a policy going forward to define what a fireable offense is. Because if 

that is not, then I don’t know what is. B, have you got a policy 

going forward to where they get—people who are getting those requests for more security can pay close attention to it at some level 

so that we don’t lose more Americans? 

And, finally, my third question is, we have got people that are 

trapped in a camp called Camp Liberty that have had a lot of protections removed. You may have addressed this earlier; I had to go 

to another committee. So to keep them from getting trapped, can 

you tell us that you will move forward on getting them moved out 

of that camp to a safer camp? And I will yield to you. 

Secretary KERRY. Congressman, thank you for those questions. I 

appreciate it. 

With respect to the issue of Benghazi and paying attention to the 

past and those employees, what is the standard. I have learned 

that apparently there is a—there are a set of rules that govern 

that. And so, as you know, we operate under standards by which 

people have expectations that those standards will be adhered to 

in terms of firing, hiring, discipline, and so forth. 

So I am waiting for this report to come to me which will give me 

a full indication of what my options are under the law. Following 

those rules. But let me make it dead clear to everybody here, the 

first conversation I had when I became Secretary of State and entered into our first meetings was where are we on the Administrative Review Board proposals and requirements. I get a, if not weekly, I mean, you know, I mean, not a weekly, but more so, if necessary, updating. And I am constantly asking, where are we? And 

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54

derstands the vigilance that is necessary going forward and the accountability that will be present going forward. 

So it is a good question. We are clearly under the gun on that, 

and every incident, whatever, is going to be subject to a new standard. I know that coming in as Secretary. 

Your third question is about the MEK and being trapped in the 

past with respect to Camp Liberty versus Camp Ashraf. You know, 

Camp Ashraf has been judged to be not safe. Now, Camp Liberty 

has proven also to have its problems with respect to security, and 

I understand that. Which is why I raised the issue with Prime 

Minister Maliki when I was there. And I am not saying to you 

today that I am satisfied yet that it has that. I am worried about 

the security situation there. And, as such, we have been trying to 

raise our level of initiative to move people. You know, we have contacted countless countries, we have been refused by countless countries. 

We had worked out an arrangement with the Albanians to take 

about 250 people. But then the people in the camp themselves declined to go. Subsequently, we have had an interview process, because we are trying to interview people to figure out where the best 

fit may be for them to go, and they have suspended taking part in 

the interviews because they want to go back to the camp where 

they were. So we are trapped in a kind of a round-robin of different 

perceptions of what people’s interests are here, and we are trying 

to work through that. And I can guarantee you it is a high priority. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We will go now to Lois Frankel of Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Secretary Kerry. Thank you for being 

with us today. I have three questions, I will try to be quick with 

them. 

I met recently folks from the U.S. Institute of Peace, and they 

explained to me that they go to dangerous areas of the world, such 

as Libya, with their missions of peace and understanding. And that 

they are able to reach out to folks who might be, and audiences 

that might be more hostile to agencies that are closely related to 

the United States. And I am just wondering, number one, whether 

you work, or the State Department works with the institute? 

Secretary KERRY. Whether it works—I couldn’t hear you very 

well. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Whether the State Department works with the Institute of Peace at all. 

Secretary KERRY. Oh, absolutely. Work closely with them. And I 

admire their work enormously. They do an amazing amount of 

work on conflict prevention, conflict mediation, conflict termination. 

It is excellent work. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you for that. 

Secondly, two more questions. Secretary Clinton was here to testify about what happened in Benghazi. And one of her recommendations was that we allow the State Department, when contracting for security in high-threat regions, to use a best-value contracting rather than the lowest bid. And Mr. Radel here filed a bill 

that many of us, I think, joined on to accomplish that. And I am 

wondering whether you support that. 

55

Secretary KERRY. Boy, do I ever. I thank you for raising that. It 

is—I just ran into this the other day in one of the stops I made 

in Asia where the Ambassador was telling me they have to hire security at the lowest price. Folks, let’s get serious. Of course, I absolutely support that. We have got to have the ability to make value 

judgments in the provision of security to our personnel. Thank you 

for asking. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you. I think I will just—I wanted to just 

thank you for continuing the work of Secretary Clinton in advancing the status of women around the world. And I know as you come 

back, we will have some more questions on that. And I thank you 

very much. 

Secretary KERRY. Look forward to talking with you about it. 

Ms. Frankel. I yield my time. 

Chairman ROYCE. We thank the gentlelady. 

We go to Mark Meadows of North Carolina. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here. 

Secretary KERRY. You are a patient soul, you guys down here at 

the third tier. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, freshman have their privileges. As we go to 

that, I want to shift a little bit to the budget, as we start to enter 

into this. I think your Fiscal Year 2014 looks at $1.8 billion in global food aid to be administered by USAID. One of the concerns I 

have, though, is a shifting of the resources away from the requirement that food be U.S. grown and be more flexible. Do you not see 

this as having a negative implication on American farmers? 

Secretary KERRY. Not ultimately. Honestly, I don’t, Congressman. And I got to know American farmers pretty well in 2004, 

2003. And I am——

Mr. MEADOWS. How does buying food from a foreign source help 

American farmers? 

Secretary KERRY. Because the market right now with respect 

to—this is not what our farmers are depending on right now. Our 

farmers are exporting at a greater level than any time in recent 

memory. That market is only going to pick up. There are billions 

of people to feed. And our capacity within this program is not going 

to make the difference to the farmers. It does make a difference to 

our expenditures to be able to provide more people food, faster, 

when our goal is to deal with malnutrition, and we can win by 11 

to 14 weeks. That is the difference between living and dying. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Let me move on. One of the other areas that we 

have had a plethora of expert witnesses here talking about military 

versus economic versus political reform in Egypt. And it gets highlighted over and over about F–16s getting—being given to Egypt or 

sold to Egypt. We have got 1.3 billion in your new request. Would 

it not be more prudent to look at shifting some of those funds to 

be more balanced on the economic and political, or do you feel like 

it is necessary to continue to shift F–16s to Egypt? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Congressman, I will tell you that—and 

this will be counterintuitive to a lot of people coming from me—but 

one of the best investments we made in Egypt over the last 30 

years is the Egyptian military and our relationship with it. 

Mr. MEADOWS. But we have a government that has changed now. 

56

Secretary KERRY. Well, we have a government that has not yet 

completely changed it, and I will tell you how and why I am saying 

what I am saying. And it is important for us to focus on. 

I believe Egypt, were it not for the restraint shown by the military, were it not for the leadership of the SCAF, who knows what 

would have happened. Egypt could have been in unbelievable 

bloodshed and civil war. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Agreed. 

Secretary KERRY. But the military, largely through the ethic that 

had been created working and training at Fort Benning in America 

and various places, there were officer-to-officer relationships. We 

had majors who could talk to each other. We had colonels who 

could call on the phone and say, you guys got to be restrained here, 

you know, here is how you handle this. 

And I met many times with Field Marshal Tantawi during the 

time that the military was managing the country. And the fact is 

that they held to what they said they would do. They held an election. They created a democracy. Now, you know, the people who 

won surprised a lot of folks, in a sense; didn’t surprise others, given 

the base of the country. But they had a democracy, they had an 

election, they turned over their power, and they went back to the 

barracks. 

And they have been, I think, an important ingredient to the 

peace with Israel. Right now the Gaza peace is holding because of 

the mil-to-mil relationship and the intel-to-intel relationship. We 

do not want to lose that. 

And, thirdly, this is not—you know, I would love to make a larger economic effort, but, as the chairman knows, we worked this 

with Chairwoman Granger and others to try to have some component of economic assistance. But unless there is economic reform 

in Egypt, unless they can meet the IMF standards, unless they 

reach out to the opposition and bring them more into the governance, unless they create stability and a capacity to invite capital 

back from other countries with the sense of security they have created, unless those things happen, right now giving more money 

would actually be not to good avail. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Tulsi Gabbard of Hawaii. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your presence here today and your 

candid answers and commitment to working with us on issues that 

we all care very much about. 

I want to extend my own appreciation, the appreciation of families across my State of Hawaii on your recent focus specifically on 

Asia and the Pacific and recognizing the necessity for that focus, 

especially as we are facing the threats that are very real for folks 

in Hawaii and Guam and other places, and appreciate your commitment there. 

Today you talked about doing things differently going forward, 

and I have a two-part question based on how we go forward, how 

do we do things differently. 

From the aid perspective, what other real incentives can we provide that go beyond food aid should we get to a position where we 

can negotiate and have conversations with North Korea? 

57

And on the sanctions front, I think the chairman had mentioned 

earlier in his testimony about the 2005 sanctions on hard currency. 

We have heard from various experts that that worked while it was 

in place but it was perhaps prematurely stopped. And I wanted to 

get your thoughts on maybe why that was and what your feeling 

is on those types of sanctions going forward. 

Secretary KERRY. I am sorry, which type of sanction are you referring to? 

Ms. GABBARD. On hard currency. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, with North Korea, we actually don’t have 

a lot of options, to be honest with you. But as I think I have described in the course of the hearing this morning, the North Koreans, for the moment, see their nuclear program as the centerpiece 

of the regime’s capacity to hold itself together. And as long as that 

is true, we are not going to be able to do very much until they shift 

into a denuclearization posture. 

Now, one of the considerations here that is central to anything 

to do with North Korea is sort of, you know, what their perceptions 

are about their relationship with us and what China will or won’t 

do with respect to its relationship with them. The North Koreans, 

it appears, believe that, you know—they literally believe—I mean, 

we are told that they believe we are prepared to go to war with 

them, that we are going to try to destroy them. I mean, you know, 

there is a certain mythology but there is also a certain hardcore belief to that, and that drives their policy. 

We need to obviously shift that into a denuclearization. And until 

we get to denuclearization, we are not going to go down the road 

of providing aid to them of any kind. Because we have been 

through too many divorces. And I think we need to find that we 

are getting a sort of verifiable, clear track to the denuclearization, 

at which point you could, you know, venture to do something. 

But I think the biggest thing we ought to try for with China is 

a paradigm shift, where they really decide that they are going to 

try to be like China in terms of their economy and shift into a different economic model, at which point all these issues about sanctions and hard currency and everything else become moot. I don’t 

see much changing until we get that bigger shift. 

Chairman ROYCE. We have gone over the time for the Secretary 

of State. We will go to one last question for Doug Collins of Georgia, followed by one last question for Brian Higgins from New 

York. 

Mr. Collins? 

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here. 

One of the things, I thought it was interesting, I was going between committee meetings but watching because I was very attentive to what you have to say, especially as it regards, when you 

said you are not into politics anymore, I think you are getting back 

into it today here at the committee hearing. But it is good for your 

answers to hear. 

The question I have, though, is when Secretary Clinton was here 

in January, she strongly endorsed remedying a lapse in something 

that I have looked forward to, of getting back on regular order, in 

which we actually pass the appropriations bills as we should. You 

58

know it has been over a decade since that has actually happened 

with the State Department. 

However, the fact of the matter is the House did pass an authorization last Congress with strong bipartisan support that included 

total funding levels at or above what the Senate appropriators had 

endorsed, as well as a helpful security authority, such as this best 

value for local guards. It has been consistent in both places. 

I wanted to just, the question I have for you is, do you agree with 

Secretary Clinton on the importance of having these appropriations 

bills pass? And is that a priority for you? 

Secretary KERRY. Yes. I——

Mr. COLLINS. Because undoubtedly it was not in the Senate. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, it was not that it wasn’t a priority; it is 

that we just couldn’t get it done. 

Mr. COLLINS. Couldn’t get it done. And I think that is what we 

have to get to. We have to get back to regular order and function 

like the people want us to function. 

Secretary KERRY. Can I just comment to all of you? Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, in your leadership roles, I will tell you 

that we are diminished in our leverage in other parts of the world 

when we go out there today and say, hey, you guys have to get 

your budget together, you know, you have to meet the IMF standards, you have to do this or that. And people kind of—you can tell 

from the look that they are sort of asking, well, how is your budget 

deal going? 

So I have argued this before, I gave a speech at UVA in which 

I talked about getting our domestic effort together so that we can 

really speak, as we say in the parlance of the law, with clean 

hands. And we need to do that. 

Chairman ROYCE. And if I could respond as chairman, Mr. Engel 

and I are working in tandem on an authorization bill. We will have 

that passed over to the Senate. We are talking to our Senate counterparts. And it is our goal to have that on the President’s desk. 

But any assistance that the Secretary of State could give us in this 

regard would be very welcome. 

Secretary KERRY. Very supportive, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Secretary KERRY. And I congratulate you on that. That is great. 

Chairman ROYCE. We are going to go to Mr. Higgins for his question. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for sticking it out. 

I have been working with the State Department regarding the 

assassination of John Granville, a United States AID diplomat 

from Buffalo who was murdered 5 years ago in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum. Islamic extremists were convicted of his murder, 

and last year they escaped from prison. The accomplice in the prison who helped them escape was just pardoned by the al-Bashir 

government. The State Department has done tremendous work in 

keeping the pressure on, and I just want to encourage that to continue. 

Also, in August 2006, I had traveled to Beirut, Lebanon, shortly 

after the Hezbollah-Israeli war. We came over the Mediterranean 

from Cyprus and landed in military helicopter on the Ambassador’s 

residence in Beirut. Ambassador Feltman, at the time, was visibly 

59

shaken and took us into the residence and said that anti-American 

sentiment was at an all-time high. We then moved to the Prime 

Minister at the time, Prime Minister Siniora’s residence, and I had 

asked the Ambassador what his concern was. And his concern was 

that the Lebanese National Guard was guarding the Embassy but 

that the next day 75 U.S. Marines would be deployed to the Embassy to guard the interests of the U.S. Ambassador’s residence. 

As you know, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 

forms the basis for diplomatic security that is responsible for security personnel. But it is specific to protection of classified information, and it is the host community who is responsible for the security of diplomatic personnel. 

I am just wondering if you think it is time that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations be changed to put a greater emphasis on security being the responsibility not of the host nation 

but of the nation who has representation in that country. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I know what you are getting at. And, you 

know, I think it would be difficult to say that we ought to change 

the fundamental premise, because in most countries or in, you 

know, the vast majority of countries, you can rely on people. I 

mean, you know, we get great help in many parts of the world, and 

we give great help to people who come here. And I think that is 

fundamentally how it ought to work. 

But we ought to have a capacity, obviously—and this is what we 

are doing now. As a result of Benghazi, we have made evaluations—this was part of the ARB—and we now have judgments 

about high-risk, high-threat locations, and we are beefing up our 

Marine detachments in those places. So we have asked the Congress for the money and for the additional 1,000 Marines, and that 

is part of the request. And we are waiting, you know, for the deployment, et cetera, to get that done. 

But the bottom line is I think we shouldn’t chuck the Vienna 

Convention. I think we ought to maybe tweak it appropriately, create some judgments there that allow adequate domestic security 

where you have a serious enough threat that you can’t count on the 

local community. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, we want to take this opportunity to 

thank the Secretary for his testimony here today. We face some 

daunting challenges abroad, but we look forward to following up on 

the items that we discussed. 

And we stand adjourned. 

Thank you again, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it. 

Thank you, sir. 

[Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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FlJLL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Edward R. Royce (R-CA), Chairman 

April 17, 2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live via 

the Committee website at hltp/!www.ForeignAlTairs.house.gov) 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESS: 

Wednesday, April 17,2013 

9:30 a.m. 

Securing U.S. Interests Abroad: The FY 2014 Foreign AtIairs Budget 

The Honorable John F. Kerry 

Secretary of State 

U.S. Department of State 

By Direction of the Chairman 

to make It, plCJ!me~ ,1cceSSIUc to 

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COl\lMlTTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINl'TES OF FULL COI\L\lUTTEE HEARING 

Day Wednesdav lIate, ___ 241'-'1'-'7'-''/l'-'3'----__ f{oom __ ----'2~1'_'7'''_2 __ _ 

Starting Time 9:.U l1.m. .Ending Time 12:46 J!,.m. __ .. 

Recesses ;-,--fl..,.; ~lO ___ 1 ~to __ I ~to __ )( __ 10 __ ) ~to __ ) ~to __ ,

Presiding Member(s) 

Chairman Ed Roya 

Check all of the following that apply: 

Open Session [ZJ 

~:xecutive (clo.ed) Session 0 I eJ.vised [ZJ 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Eleclnon1cany Recorded (taped)[ZJ 

Stenographic Record [ZJ 

Securing U.S. Interests Abroad: The FY 2014 Foreign Affairs Budget 

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

See AtIached Sheet 

NON·CO.VlMlTn:K MEMBERS PRESE:'<T: 

None 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attachcd'f YesEJ NoD 

(If "no ", please list hdow and include title, agency, department, or nrganization.) 

ST ATEWENTS FOR TH E IU:CORD: (List m,y sratenum"I' swmilled for the record) 

SFR: Chairman Royce on beha{{ of Rep. Turner. Del. Faleomaveaga 

TIME SCHEDlLED 10 KECONVENE ___ _ 

~~rEADJOURNED 12:46p.m. ~~ 

.Jean Marter, Director of Committee Operations 
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Present 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

HOlJSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

"Securiug lJ.S.Interests Abroad: The FY 2014 Foreign Affairs Budget" 

April 17,2013 

Member Present Member 

Edward R. Royce. CA X Eliot L. EngeL NY 

Christopher H. Smith, NJ Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, AS 

lie ana Ros-Lehtinen, FL X Brad Sherman, CA 

Dana Rohrabacher. CA X Gregory W. Meeks. NY 

Steve Chabot. OH X Albia Sires, NJ 

Joe Wilson, SC X Gerald E. Connolly, VA 

Michael T McCauL TX X I1leodore E. Deutch, FL 

Tcd Poe. TX X Brian Higgins, NY 

Matt Salmon, AZ X Karen Bass. CA 

Tom Marino, PA X Willianl Keating. MA 

JcffDlllican, SC X David Cicilline, RI 

Adam Kinzinger, IL X Alan Grayson. FL 

Mo Brooks, AL X Juan Vargas, CA 

Tom Cotton, AR X Bradley S. Schneider, lL 

Paul Cook. CA Joseph P. Kennedy III. MA 

George Holding, NC X Ami Bera, CA 

Randy K Weber, Sr., TX X Alan S. Lowenthal, CA 

Scott Perry, PA X Grace Meng, NY 

Steve Stockman, TX X Lois Frankel. FL 

Ron DeSantis, FL X Tulsi Gabbard. HI 

Trey RadeL FL X Joaquin Castro, TX 

Doug Collins, GA 

Mark MeadO\>s, NC 

Ted S. Yoho. FL 

Luke Messer. IN 
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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS


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" ... the addition of a large, market-based producer will indirectly serve to mcrease gas 

supply diversity in Europe, thereby providing European consumers with increased 

flexihility and market power. II 

"Increased LKG exports will provide similar assistance to strategic U.S. allies in the 

Pa.l:iHc Basin.1! 

" ... thc ability oftbc United States to provide a degree of increased energy security and 

prieing relief to LNG iUlpurl~rs in the. region will be an important and strategic assct. ll 

As you know, the Department of Energy is currently reviewing 20 permit applications to export 

U.S. natural gas to non~rree Trade Agreement countlies to determine if it would be in the puhlic 

interest I believe that exports of U.S. natural gas will help strengthen our strategic paltnerships 

with key alhe.':> and bolsler our national securit.y. 

!vir. Chainnan, thank you again for the 0PPOltunity to submit a statement for the record. llook 

forward Lu continuing to wurk wiLh you on strengthening our diplomatic relations with our allies. 
67

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 

ENI F.H. F ALEOMA V AEGA (D-AS) 

RANKING MEMBER 

Securing Interests Abroad: The FY 2014 Foreign Affairs Budget 

April 17, 2013 

Me Chainnan, Ranking Member: 

I would like to personally welcome Secretary Kerry and commend him on his 

appointment I especially thank Secretary Kerry for the attention he is paying to the Asia-Pacific 

region. 

Finally, we are presented with a Foreign Affairs budget which increases funding to the 

Asia-Pacific region by 7% over 2012 levels. The funding will primarily support the Lower 

Mekong Initiative which increases cooperation with Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia. 

While I am a strong supporter of in creased assistance for Vietnam and the Philippines, I 

have serious reservations about assisting Indonesia and I continue to call upon the Department of 

State and the Obama Administration to hold Indonesia accountable for its human rights abuses in 

West Papua and for its failure to implement Special Autonomy, as promised 

Regarding Vietnam, I believe the US. should additionally focus efforts on Agent Orange 

remediation as we have a moral obligation to clean up the mess we left behind years ago. I also 

believe the US. Department of State should dismiss the unfounded rhetoric put fOfV\iard by 

critics of Vietnam who are unaware of Vietnam's accomplishments. 

Vietnam is key to the success of the US. pivot to Asia and it is my sincere hope that we 

will establish greater economic, strategic and diplomatic cooperation between our two countries 

based on principles of truth and respect. On the matter of the South China Sea, I hope the US. 

will stand with those who stand with us as we work towards a peaceful resolution for all 

involved 

Because April 17 each year marks the anniversary of American Samoa becoming a US. 

Territory, I am unable to attend today's hearing as I am in my district celebrating this historical 

event. However, I offer Secretary Kerry my very best and, on behalf of the people of American 

Samoa, we extend to him our highest regards 
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Ouestiou 1: 

Questions for the Record 

Submitted by Chairman F;dward R. Royce 

1'0 Secretary of State John F. Kerry 

The Department has requested $580 million in FY 2014 for a Middle East and North Africa 

Incentive Fund (MENA IF). This total includes $330 million for the Incentive Fund; $145 

million for a Contingency Fund; $75 million for the Middle East Partnership Initiative 

(MEPI); and, $30 million for the USAlD Middle East Regional Office (MER). 

The proposed $330 million for the Incentive Fund would establish a funding mechanism 

within the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) that functions like the Millennium 

Challenge Corporation (MCC). The threshold for MCC support is already low, doesn't the 

Incentive Fund remove that threshold altogether and undermine the MCC? What specific 

problem does the creation of the Incentive Fund overcome? Why can't the same services 

be provided through existing funding mechanisms? 

The $145 million request for the Contingency Fund replaces the existing Middle East 

Response Fund (MERF) which is an ad-hoc amalgamation of funds brought together to 

respond rapidly to the Arab Spring. How can the Department justify the continuation of a 

rapid response account when MERF is being spent slower or on pace with bilaterally 

appropriated funding? 

The events unfolding in the Middle East and North Africa are the pre-eminent foreign policy 

challenge of this time. U.S. strategic and security interests in the region are unchanged, but the 

pursuit of them relies on sustained democratic, economic, security and justice sector reforms that 

respond to the aspirations of the region's citizens for dignity, opportunity, and selfdetermination. Achieving these outcomes requires committing resources commensurate with the 

challenge and changing the U.S Government's approach to assistance. While bilateral funding 

in the region is being reassessed to meet new requirements, and existing programs are being 

better calibrated to emerging needs, ongoing security commitments and challenges remain. Our 

ability to capitalize on these opportunities requires both new resources and new methodologies to 

encourage refonners in the region moving to undertake the political, security sector, and 

economic reforms that respond to citizen demands. 

Through the President's FY 2014 request for $580 million for the Middle East and North Africa 

Incentive Fund (MENA IF), the U.S. Government wil1 support the transparency, citizen 

engagement, and reform orientation necessary on the part of local authorities to sustain and 

advance democratic transitions, and in doing so wi11 alter the assistance relationship between the 

U.S., its partner governments in the region, and their citizens. 

Modeled in part on the single account established for the fonner Soviet Union and Eastern 

Europe (AEECA) and drawing on the best practices of the Mil1ennium Challenge Corporation 

(MCC) and lessons learned from decades of USAID development programs, the MENA IF will 

provide the platform from which the U.S. can respond to contingencies and new opportunities 

across economic, political, and security spheres, begin to address the imbalance between U.S. 
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military and economic assistance in the region, and promote institutional reform. It will provide 

the United States with additional tools to work with international partners toward our shared 

reform objectives, and, through loan guarantee and debt relief authority, to leverage limited 

assistance dollars for maximum effect and impact. 

The MCC and the MENA IF would pursue different but complementary goals in the region. The 

MCC provides a mechanism to support economic growth in the countries in which it works; the 

need for this type of targeted assistance will continue to exist in the MENA region and globally. 

The MENA IF, however, is designed to incentivize reform efforts across government 

institutions, including but not limited to economic policies. The focus of the MENA IF is on the 

development of sustainable democratic governance structures that support broad inclusion in 

both the political and economic institutions of a country. 

Question 2: 

Why have you requested a 20% increase over FY 2013 for the Office of the Secretary? Are 

these positions necessary or do they replicate functions already contained inside the 

Department? 

The "Otlice of the Secretary," as listed in the State Department Budget, is not limited to my 

immediate staff, or Executive Otlice. It also includes the otlices of the Deputy Secretaries, the 

Under Secretaries, the Otlice of Policy Planning, the Executi ve Secretariat, the 2417 Operations 

Center, the Otlice of U. S. Foreign Assistance, and the offices of a few special envoys and special 

representati ves. 

The Department's FY 2014 request of $105.5 million for the Otlice of the Secretary reflects a 

$11.3 million or 13% net increase over the FY 2012 actual leveL However, there is no increase 

in stafting or funding requested in FY 2014 for my Executive Otlice. 

The increases for Otlice of the Secretary in FY 2014 include: 

• Office of Foreign Assistance Resources: $3.55 million to upgrade the budget data system and 

support the Foreign Assistance Dashboard, which will better enable a wide variety of 

stakeholders, including u.s. citizens, civil society organizations, the Congress, us. 

Government agencies, donors, and partner country governments, to examine, research, and 

track US. Government foreign assistance investments in an accessible and easy-tounderstand format; 

• Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues: $967,000 to support 5 new positions, which will 

help address the increasing demand for cyber capacity building, training, and policy 

development necessary to fulfill its responsibilities for leading US. international cyber 

policy development and strategic planning; 

• Otlice of Global Women's Issues: $5.1 million to manage programs that promote integration 

of gender equality and advancement of the status of women and girls in all Department 

programming and diplomacy. 
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Ouestion 3: 

What steps are you taking to mIlllmlze redundancies and inefficiencies at the State 

Department? In particular, how do you plan to deal with the redundancies and 

overlapping responsibilities amongst the Bureau of Budget and Planning (BP), the Office of 

the Director for Foreign Assistance (F), and USAID's Office of Budget and Resource 

Management (BRM)? 

The President has made it a priority of his Administration to save taxpayer dollars, streamline 

operations and improve government services. To that end, he has waged an aggressive campaign 

to eliminate duplication and waste. 

In light of fiscal constraints, the Department and USAID are working to streamline their 

operations and assistance budgets by taking steps such as consolidating assistance accounts, 

setting targets for reduced operational spending, and taking advantage of cost efficiencies in 

programs to continue to meet our objectives. 

The Department and USAID have also taken steps to eliminate and consolidate foreign 

assistance accounts to streamline operations and avoid waste. For example, in 2012 the 

Department of State and the Department of Defense worked together to review our assi stance 

programs in Pakistan and decided that FY 2012 would be the last year of funding for the 

Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). This fund was originally designed to be a 

short-term surge fund to identify and fill specific gaps. While Pakistan continues to have 

significant gaps in its counterinsurgency and counterterrorism (COTN/CT) capabilities, we 

realized that changes on the ground - including the loss of field-based trainers in Pakistan -

meant that we needed to change our approach to security assistance. We continue to build our 

security cooperation, including COIN/CT, and continue security assistance to Pakistan through 

Foreign Military Financing. 

Likewise, changing priorities, the need for greater budget flexibility, the downward funding 

trajectory for Europe and Eurasia, and successes in a number of countries over time led the 

Administration to request last year the normalization of programs funded through the Assistance 

for Europe and Eurasia Countries Account (AEECA) and the elimination of the account. 

Consistent with last year's request and the FY 2013 CR, the FY 2014 budget requests programs 

previously funded under AEECA were shifted to other accounts as appropriate. 

In addition to foreign assistance programs, we have been consolidating management services 

within State and USATD, so that we can 1) maximize our program resources, and 2) maintain a 

robust platform to support the diplomacy and development missions. The shared services 

concept is widely used in the government and private sectors to deliver quality services at best 

cost, with satisfied customers. Fifteen services were set for consolidation. Over 98 percent of 

these services have been consolidated at posts where State and USATD are collocated in the same 

building or compound. Over 95 percent of services have been consolidated where State and 

USATD are not collocated on a new embassy compound We are reviewing additional services 

beyond the 15 consolidation opportunities. 
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In FY 2013, the Department also is working toward OMB's targeted spending reductions of 

$182 million less than FY 2010 on travel, supplies, IT devices, printing and reproduction, 

executive fleet, and promotional items. In December 2012, leadership at all posts were advised 

of government-wide mandates to reduce cost, scrutinize travel, review service contract requests, 

and hasten adoption of cost savings within the "Top Eight Initiatives'" Warehousing, Voucher 

Processing, Utilities, TDY International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS), 

Regionalization of Support Services, Furniture Pool, Expendable Supplies, and Local 

Transportation. Leadership at posts were directed to discuss the budget and procurement 

implications of these orders with their section heads and regional bureau executive office, and to 

constrain spending. 

The Budget of Bureau Planning (BP), the Oflice of Foreign Assistance (F), and the Bureau of 

Resource Management (BRM) at USAlD work together to produce a coordinated budget that 

includes the operational and programmatic resources required to achieve our foreign policy, 

national security and development goals. This arrangement focuses the use of our resources and 

assists in eliminating overlap and duplication. Each otlice has a distinct role. 

The Bureau of Budget and Planning manages the State Operations budget. The Otlice of the 

U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources was created by Secretary Condoleezza Rice to strengthen the 

Secretary's ability to oversee and coordinate State and USAID foreign assistance to ensure that 

resources are strategically allocated, properly coordinated, and effectively used to support U.S. 

foreign policy, development, and national security priorities. The inaugural QDDR called for the 

establishment of BRM at USAlD, enabling USAlD to propose a comprehensive development 

and humanitarian assistance budget for USAlD-managed programs and to have increased 

responsibility in the execution of development resources. 

Onestion 4: 

What are the functional differences between USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives 

(OTI), of Bureau of Conflict Stabilization Operations (CSO), and the Middle East 

Partnership Initiative (MEPI)? Isn't it true that all three have the authority to work with 

the same implementers for the same programs - at least with respect to the NEA region? If 

so, what is the rationale behind maintaining, or indeed expanding, three bureaucratic 

structures? 

The many U.S. otlices involved in responding to conflict, crisis and other contingencies offer a 

rich variety of networks, geographic focus, and specializations. Offices vary in their time 

horizon for engagement, capabilities and comparative advantages, partner relationships, and 

experience in the region. 

USAlD's Otlice of Transition Initiatives (OT!) has developed innovative models of operation 

that support short-tenn assistance for political transition and stabilization needs. The Middle 

East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) works almost exclusively with citizen groups to build the 

capacity of democracy activists, grassroots organizations, civil society, and emerging leaders 

across the Middle East and North Africa. The Bureau of Conflict and Stability Operations 

(CSO) operates within the State Department to drive policy to address urgent challenges of 

violence and conflict in priority places. 
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In a conflict as complicated as Syria's, for example, it is important to leverage the strengths of 

various offices in a coordinated manner. In the U.S. Government's support for the Syrian 

civilian opposition, the activities of each implementer are coordinated and defined jointly by the 

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) as directed by Ambassador Ford, U.S. Ambassador to 

Syria, and Ambassador Taylor, head of the Middle East Transitions Office. The programs of all 

three offices are also highly collaborative in the field, with team leadership co-located in the 

Syria Transition Assistance Response Team (START) based in Adana, Turkey 

Through in-kind assistance to emergent governing bodies and civil society, OTi strengthens the 

capacity of key institutions to identify and respond to local needs, and support nonsectarian 

actors seeking to constructively participate in the political transition. OTi specializes in 

providing prompt material support to the existing new governing councils in liberated Syria; it 

does little training. CSO supports initiatives to train Syrian in-country activists, through a 

remote platform, and it provides some material support, such as communications equipment, to 

promote their cohesion and resilience. CSO's operations funds allow for broad flexibility, 

including work with armed actors. MEPI is supporting local governance structures in so-called 

liberated areas and working with civil society, grassroots organizations, and key opposition 

constituencies in Syria, building on its work in Syria since 2006. MEPI is focused on the longertenn capacity of opposition structures and leaders by building their actual governance capacity 

by helping new councils assemble Syrian teams that will continue after the MEPT program 

concludes. OTi is not doing that kind of institution building from scratch. 

Ultimately, each of these offices has a specialty, and each of these skill sets is necessary for 

different requirements that the U.S. faces in extremely complex environments in the NEA region. 

We anticipate with time that the MEPI program will work with and equip only civil society 

activists, OTi will work mainly with governing councils and CSO will do only training of 

officials and activists. 

Ouestion 5: 

The Bureau of [uropean and [urasian Affairs (EUR) consists of various regional offices 

with overlapping areas of responsibility as noted in the Office of the Inspector General 

(OIG) March 2011 report. The report recommended immediate consolidation of these 

offices. What steps are you taking to correct this inefficient Bureau and save U.S. taxpayer 

dollars? 

As recommended by the Office of the Inspector General, the Bureau of Eurasian Affairs (EUR) 

completed a review of the four functional offices identified in the inspection as offices with 

potential overlap. 

EUR has examined the question of possible duplication between the Ofllce of European Union 

and Regional Afl'airs (ERA) and the Ofllce of Policy and Global Issues (PGI), and has 

determined that there is no meaningtul overlap. PGI covers a broad range of functional bureau 

and global issues as they pertain to the complete range of EUR countries and sub-regions across 

the whole bureau. ERA covers some of those issues as they pertain specifically to the European 

Union (EU) (as a collective body) in ERA's role as the de facto EU desk and the equivalent of 

the country desk for the U.S Mission to the EU in EUR. 
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As for the Office of European Security and Political Affairs (RPM) and the Office of Policy and 

Regional Affairs (PRA): RPM serves as the equivalent ofa country desk for the U.S. Missions to 

NATO and the OSCE, with primary responsibility for providing support and approving guidance 

to each. In an exception to this general rule, PRA takes the Bureau lead in approving guidance to 

these missions in the areas of missile defense, non-proliferation and strategic arms control. With 

guidance from the EUR Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary, RPM and PRA directors reviewed 

the portfolios of their respective action officers and revised position descriptions to ensure that 

any duplication was eliminated. Both offices communicate regularly and work closely with all 

EUR offices so that ambiguities in responsibility for NATO- and OSCE-related issues are 

addressed promptly and the appropriate office takes action. 

This was accepted by the OIG on AUb'llst 4,2011. 

Ouestion 6: 

The Administration has requested $78 million in FY14 for UNESCO. These funds require 

Presidential waiver which, if granted, would open up other UN organizations to Palestinian 

inclusion. Can you please explain the rationale behind providing any funding to UNESCO 

given the organization's acceptance of Palestine as a member? Doesn't this undermine our 

efforts to support a negotiated Middle East peace settlement between all parties? 

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) promotes US. 

national interests. At its core, UNESCO is an anti -extremism organization, and one that uses 

cooperation to address shared challenges. The work that UNESCO does to promote peace, 

intercultural dialogue, tolerance, and education for all is essential to combating violent 

extremism. UNESCO's coordination of the global tsunami warning system has already proven 

invaluable for helping prevent massive casualties from deadly tsunamis, some of which threaten 

large populations along the U.S. coastline. 

UNESCO serves US interests. Many American companies - including Google, Apple, 

Microsoft, and Procter and Gamble - have partnered with UNESCO to advance core American 

values, like press freedom, and access to education. At the same time, these companies are 

expanding their global reach into new and untapped markets. 

In addition, UNESCO supports and furthers fundamental American values, including promoting 

literacy for women and girls; promoting tolerance and respect for all by creating curriculum 

programs for global dissemination; and supporting Holocaust education as a means to combat 

anti-Semitism and prevent future atrocities. UNESCO also plays a critical leading role in 

promoting freedom of the press and safety for journalists globally. 

The United States remains a steadfast ally of Israel at UNESCO, and has been able to 

successfully advocate for Israel within the Organization. The most recent example is at the 

UNESCO Executive Board meeting in April, where the United States played an instrumental role 

in negotiating a compromise between the Israelis and Palestinians, resulting in the deferred 

consideration of five contentious recurring resolutions on cultural sites in the region. 

This latest example of U.S. engagement on behalf of Israel in the UN system underscores the 

critical importance of a continued strong U.S. presence at UNESCO. However, without 

resuming payment of assessed contributions due to UNESCO, the United States will lose its vote 
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at the 37th General Conference in November 2013 - an unprecedented consequence that will 

harm both U.S. interests and those of our allies. 

At the same time, we continue our active engagement across the spectrum of UN agenci es and 

directly with the Palestinians to underscore that similar efforts to pursue status as a Member 

State will only risk undermining a return to direct negotiations which remain the only path 

forward to a just, lasting, and comprehensive regional solution to end the conflict. 

We believe that our actions must be determined by our own national interest both in a just, 

lasting, and comprehensive regional solution and in a responsible and capable lJN system. We 

remain convinced that the best way to advance these interests is to demonstrate our commitment 

to Middle East peace and to maintain our investment in and our leadership within the UN 

system. 

Many of our allies have given us a clear message - including through statements at the UNESCO 

Executive Board that just ended in Paris - that they want the United States to remain an active 

player at UNESCO and in the multilateral system more broadly. They see the United States as a 

vital and powerful voice for freedom and democratic values. 

As you will recall, it was under the leadership of George W Bush that the United States rejoined 

UNESCO in 2003 following a prolonged absence. In a bipartisan effort, President Bush and the 

late Representative Tom Lantos led the charge in convincing members on both sides of the aisle 

in Congress that the United States is far better off being at the table at UNESCO. By 

withholding our contributions, not only do we cut off support for important programs that 

advance U.S. interests, we weaken our ability to promote our priorities, risk losing altogether our 

voting rights, and effectively empower others to determine how and when America engages. As 

a result, our ability to defend Israel from unfair and biased attacks in the UN will also be greatly 

damaged. 

Ouestion 7: 

The U.S. government, along with other international donors, has committed to channel at 

least 50 percent of its development assistance through the Afghan national budget, rather 

than through contractors and nongovernmental organizations operating on behalf of the 

U.S. government. The FY14 budget request includes a significant amount allocated to onbudget assistance. Does the Afghan government actually have the capacity to manage the 

amount of funding envisioned in the international community's pledges of direct 

assistance? What risk mitigation mechanisms do we have in place--beyond standard 

monitoring and evaluation-to combat fraud, waste, and abuse? 

We believe it is critical to the achievement of our national security objectives to have a strong 

partnership with an effective Afghan Government. One avenue we have used to improve the 

performance of the national government and to ensure the long term sustainability of 

development gains is to employ capable Afghan ministries in the implementation of development 

projects. 

Over the last ten years the United States has worked closely with many parts of the Afghan 

Government to improve its capacity to responsibly and transparently provide services to the 
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people of Mghanistan. In order to facilitate further capacity development and increase Mghan 

ownership of development projects we have in some cases provided funding directly to 

ministries after an extensive assessment of each ministry's capacity to manage the project. Tn 

addition, the Afghan Government continues to take action to improve the transparency of its 

budgeting procedures and the capacity of its ministries. This includes specific transparency and 

anti-corruption measures included in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. 

We understand your concerns about providing U.S. assistance directly to the Afghan 

Government and recognize the risks. The Department of State and USAlD provide funding to 

the Afghan Government only for specific projects and we assess the financial management and 

organizational capacity of each prospective Mghan ministry prior to initiating a project. Any 

risks identified in the assessments are addressed prior to the disbursement of project funding in 

order to protect taxpayer money to the fullest possible extent. Additional protective measures 

may include, but are not limited to, requiring the Afghan Ministry of Finance to establish noncommingled, separate bank accounts for each project; disbursement of funds only after 

verification that the ministry has achieved a performance milestone or we have verified accrued 

costs; annual audits by Office of the Inspector General approved certified public accounting 

finns; substantial involvement and oversight by USAID and Department of State staff in 

procurement processes; third-party management, monitoring and evaluation of services; and 

technical assistance to increase the capacity of ministries. All on-budget assistance requires 

compliance with USAlD or Department of State accountability and oversight procedures, 

including site visits by U.S. staif or third-party contractors, as well as regular reporting. We 

also work closely with the World Bank and other donors to make sure that our contributions to 

the World Bank administered Mghan Reconstruction Trust Fund are subject to similar 

protections. 

Our experience in Mghanistan has shown that on-budget assistance, subj ect to stringent 

accountability and oversight measures, is an effective way to build Afghan capacity, increases 

public contidence in the government, can be used to incentivize reform, sets the stage for 

sustainable future results, and has a greater positive impact on the Afghan economy, which is of 

increasing importance as the security transition approaches. 

Question 8: 

Although the total FY 14 request for Pakistan has decreased because of the phase out of the 

Pakistan Counterinsnrgency Capabilities Fnnd (PCCF), the Administration is still seeking 

$1.3 billion for Pakistan. Repeated assessments from the three Inspector General offices 

charged with monitoring U.S. non-military aid programs in Pakistan continue to document 

that USAID has not been able to demonstrate measnrable progress in the implementation 

of U.S. assistance. What is your assessment of the success - or lack thereof - of our civilian 

and security assistance to date? 

The Administration is seeking $1.16 billion in assistance to Pakistan in FY 2014 to promote core 

U.S. national interests. This includes advancing our goals in Afghanistan, which our forces have 

sacrificed so much to achieve. We are constantly evaluating our assistance to Pakistan to ensure 

that it is consistent with our interests, and have proven successes with both our security and 

civilian assistance. 
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Through our civilian assistance, we are making measurable progress in sectors most important to 

Pakistan's stability energy, economic growth, stabilization of vulnerable areas, education, and 

health. For example, energy is a key priority due to critical shortages that undermine Pakistan's 

economic and political stability. Since October 2009 U.S. assistance has added 900 MW to 

Pakistan's electricity grid, almost half the installed capacity of the Hoover Dam, benefitting over 

12.6 million people. Our stabilization initiatives aim to make communities in conflict and postconflict regions, particularly along the border with Afghanistan, inhospitable to insurgents and 

extend the writ of the government, supporting our goal of national and regional security. To that 

end, USAID and the State Department have funded the construction of over 650 km of roads in 

these extremism-prone border regions, increasing commercial activity and stability. And since 

October 2009, we have rebuilt 40 schools destroyed by militants in Pakistan's tribal areas, 

including 17 girls' schools, enabling 8,600 children to return to schooL 

In this same vein, our security assistance programs focus on strengthening Pakistan's capabilities 

in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, and on promoting closer security ties with the United 

States. Over the past two years, we have closely calibrated our security assistance to ensure what 

we provide is commensurate with Pakistan's cooperation on our mutual interests. Our militaryto-military relationship is now on a stronger footing and we are moving forward with a security 

assistance program that is more realistic and narrowly focused to pursue joint action on areas of 

mutual interest 

While there are certainly areas of disagreement between our two nations, and places where we 

would like to see further Pakistani action, our counterterrorism and non-proliferation 

collaboration with Pakistan is now at its strongest point in the past few years, due in large part to 

our security assistance. The Pakistan Military continues its operations against terrorist targets in 

Afghan border areas, with an increase in the number of sorties due to the capacity they have 

developed in night vision and precision strike. For example, the March and April campaign in 

the Tirah Valley received critical support from Pakistan Air Force operations using F-16s. 

Additionally, bilateral cooperation on our shared interest in countering IEDs is improving. We 

find that the Government of Pakistan is increasingly acknowledging the threat TEDs present, 

including to Pakistan's own domestic security, and is working to build its counter-lED 

capabilities within law enforcement, legislative, and military areas - supported by our security 

and civilian assistance. For example, since the opening of the NATO supply lines in mid-20l2, 

the United States and Pakistan have conducted several senior and working-level meetings to 

increase cooperation to disrupt the flow of lED materials in Pakistan and across the 

AfghanistanlPakistan border. The result of these meetings has been increased cooperation and 

transfer of information at the borders, embedding of senior liaisons to better communicate and 

coordinate action, and an increased focus on enforcing existing counter-TED (C-TED) related 

legislation and pursuing more effective legislation where needed. More is still required to 

disrupt and decrease the thousands of TED casualties that occur each year in Pakistan and 

Afghanistan, and our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and remaining PCCF security assistance 

funds have targeted C-TED as a critical capacity to enhance. 
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Qnestion 9: 

The FY 2014 reqnest for Contribntions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) 

includes $50 million for a "UN Presence in Syria," despite the fact that a UN mission in 

Syria has not been approved by the UN Security Conncil. Additionally, the request 

includes a request for authority to transfer additional resources from the proposed 

"Middle East Incentive Fund" into CIPA, presumably for a UN peacekeeping operation in 

Syria. Meanwhile, the request does not inclnde funding for Mali, despite the fact that the 

UN is expected to approve a mission by the end of this month. Could you please help 

rationalize the CIPA request for FY2014? Would you please also confirm that the 

Administration will not seek to pay assessments - throngh "credits" or other mechanisms -

above and beyond the rate permissible by law? 

The UN Security Council established the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria 

(UNSMIS) in April 2012. The mission ended August 19,2012, given the continued use of heavy 

weapons and an insutlicient reduction in the level of violence; however, the Security Council 

continues to monitor the situation closely. Should conditions pennit, the international 

community may deploy another UN mission. For FY 2014, the Administration has requested 

funding for the possible deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation to assist with a postcontlict transition that could include tasks such as facilitating a political transition; managing the 

disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants; carrying-out demining 

activities; coordinating security sector refonn (SSR) of the Syrian security apparatus; and 

promoting human rights and rule of law activities as part of support to a political transition in 

Syria, if conditions permit. The proposed transfer authority request from the Middle East North 

Mrica Incentive Fund (MEN A IF) would bolster our ability to provide assessed contributions 

should there be any Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (ClP A) funding 

shortfalls, including Syria. 

Prior to the finalization of the FY 2014 budget request, the Administration anticipated continuing 

to use of voluntary Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds to support the Mrican-Led 

International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). The FY 2014 PKO budget request includes 

$83.75 million for Mali to support 1) AFISMA, 2) equipping and training African units 

participating in AFISMA (or a follow-on UN-led mission in Mali), and 3) security sector refonn 

(SSR) with the government of Mali when it is no longer subject to coup sanctions. Because the 

UN Security Council approved the UN-led Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 

Mali (MINUSMA) well after the FY 2014 budget request was finalized, funds to support a UN 

assessed peacekeeping mission were not included in the FY 2014 CWA budget request. The 

U.S. assessed share of expenses for MINUSMA is estimated to be approximately $337 million 

for FY 2014, which is not included in the FY2014 CWA request. However, as many of the 

countries participating in AFISMA will also contribute troops to MINUSMA, PKO funds for 

Mali will still be needed to provide equipment and training for troops deploying to MINUSMA 

and to support SSR with Mali. 

The Administration is committed to paying UN assessments in full Timely and full payment of 

peacekeeping assessments since January 2009 has enhanced the UN's ability to attract and retain 

peacekeeping forces, improved u.s. relationships with those troop contributors, and helped save 

lives and reduce suffering by strengthening UN peacekeeping. The FY 2013 Full Year 
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Continuing Resolution (CR) does not provide the authority to use ClP A appropriations to pay at 

the higher peacekeeping assessment rate of 28.38 percent for 2013, but rather continues the 

current cap of27.14 percent (the previous 2012 rate). We will continue to explore all available 

options to avoid new cap-related peacekeeping withholdings and arrears to continue to meet 

President Obama's commitment to pay our dues on time and in full. This includes working with 

Congress to secure additional authority to use appropriated CIPA funds, including FY 2013 

funds, to pay our assessed peacekeeping contributions at the new rate. As we explore all of our 

options, we will of course continue to consult closely with Congress on the appropriate way 

forward. 

Ouestion 10: 

This budget proposes to spend $240 million on a pay raise for overseas Foreign Service 

Officers that the State Department has never shown is necessary. FSOs cnrrently receive a 

24% locality pay premium while stationed in Washington, DC. The State Department has 

begnn phasing in this DC locality pay for overseas postings as well, nsing temporary 

anthority in the 2009 snpplemental appropriations bill. According to GAO, the average 

FSO salary already increases by $2,400 per year when FSOs move overseas inclnding 

benefits like free honsing, edncation for children, danger and hardship raises, and COLAs. 

The permanent repeal of this raise was highlighted as an iIInstrative savings by the 

President's bipartisan National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility. How can you justify 

spending nearly a qnarter of a billion dollars on an across-the-board raise for overseas 

diplomats? Wonldn't funds be better spent on targeted incentives for hard-to-fill posts and 

language deficiencies - two longstanding problems? 

Locality pay in the United States is a pay adjustment that addresses disparities in federal and 

non-federal salaries in a given locality. When locality pay was created by Congress in 1990, it 

applied onl y to positions in the continental United States. 

Locality pay ditIers substantially from the allowances and ditIerentials cited, which are provided 

to employees for service at places in foreign areas where conditions differ substantially from 

those in the continental United States. They compensate for higher prices, deficient and/or 

unavailable local goods and services, difficult and unhealthful conditions and, in the case of 

danger pay, incentivize service at places in foreign areas with extremely high crime rates, civil 

insurrection or wartime conditions which threaten physical harm or imminent danger. 

Overseas Comparability Pay is intended to close the gap created by locality pay when Foreign 

Service (FS) personnel work abroad. Congress began authorizing Overseas Comparability Pay 

(OCP) for FS personnel serving overseas in August 2009. At present, the first two of three 

phases have been authorized, with OCP paid at 16.52 percent of base salary. This authorization 

has been continued in subsequent appropriations bills. 

The locality pay for Washington, DC, is 24.22 percent; thus when FS personnel go abroad, their 

pay is reduced by 7.7 percent. Without the current, two-thirds OCP authorization, FS personnel 

going abroad would receive an immediate 24.22 percent pay cut. 
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The pay reduction lowers contributions to Social Security and the Thrift Savings Plan since these 

are based on pay plus locality pay. 

Locality pay is based upon surveys conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The "basic 

locality rate," for locations outside of defined metropolitan areas is referred to as the "Rest of 

U.S." and is set at 14.16 percent. This is significantly higher than that received abroad in the 

absence ofOCP 

In a matter of equity, the intelligence community pays full Washington, D.C, locality pay, plus 

allowance and hardship pay, to their employees who are stationed abroad, and has since 2003. 

Eliminating the OCP would have an immediate and negative impact on retention and morale, 

particularly at critical mid-levels. 

Locality Pay and OCP 

To illustrate, FS personnel making $100,000 per year in Washington currently take a pay cut of 

about $7,149 when deployed overseas, based on two-thirds of OCP. Even with a $2,400 "pay 

increase" per GAO, they still face a reduction in pay. 

• FS personnel who move from Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea - a high cost, difficult, 

and generally hard-to-fill post - to a federal job in a rural U.S. location, would take only a 

2.36 percent pay cut, based on the rest of the U.S locality pay, despite the substantial 

differences in living conditions. 

• Moving from Papua New Guinea to ButTalo, New York, would actually increase FS 

personnel pay by half of a percent. 

If she/he moved from Papua New Guinea to the Los Angeles/Orange County area, she/he 

would currently see a pay increase of 10.64 percent, as Los Angeles has locality pay at 

27.16 percent. 

Question 11: 

President Qbama declared that the "cyber threat is one of the most serious economic and 

national security challenges we face as a nation" and that "America's economic prosperity 

in the 21st century will depend on cybersecurity." Tn your confirmation hearing, you state 

called cybersecurity the "21st century nuclear weapons equivalent." However, the State 

Department's budget request does not include the word cybersecurity even once. The State 

Department should be funding diplomatic and programmatic efforts to protect our country 

from cyber attack. Why has the State Department failed to include cybersecurity in its 

strategy to "advance peace, security and stability"? Why has the State Department not 

included any financing for cybersecurity programs? 

The State Department recognizes that cyber issues, including cybersecurity, lie at the heart of 

many of our most pressing national security challenges, and we have taken strong proactive and 

innovative steps to address the cybersecurity challenges facing our nation. Our FY 2014 budget 
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request recognizes the importance of appropriately funding the Department's efforts to enhance 

the security of the United States from cyber threats. 

U.S. cyber policy, as tramed by the May 2011, u.s. iflternatioflal Strategy.fix C:yber.lpace, 

encompasses economic, security, crime, military, Internet governance, capacity building, and 

Internet freedom issues, and represents a new foreign policy imperati ve for the United States. 

The Department is a key player in U.S. efforts to address the full range of cyber threats we face 

today, including defending against distributed denial of service attacks against our financial 

industry, dealing with the large-scale cyber theft of intellectual property and trade secrets from 

the private sector, combating cybercrime, and building consensus on the nonns of responsible 

conduct in cyberspace for state actors. 

The Department's Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues (S/CCI) was created in February 

2011 to lead the Department's global diplomatic engagement on the full range of cyber issues, 

including cybersecurity. S/CCI was a first-of-its-kind initiative that has subsequently been 

emulated by over a dozen countries, including the UK, Gennany, Russia, Japan, and China. 

S/CCI coordinates the Department's cyber work; leads its cyber policy development and 

strategic planning etJorts; serves as the Department's liaison to the White House, federal 

departments and agencies, and the private sector; plans coordinate the Department's diverse 

cyber work; and executes cybersecurity and cybercrime capacity building programs. 

S/CCT leads U.S cyber engagements with a multitude of states, bilaterally and in regional groups 

such as the European Union and NATO. In the last year alone, we have launched dedicated 

whole-of-government senior-level cyber policy dialogues with Tndia, Brazil, South Africa, South 

Korea, Japan, and Germany in order to share perspectives and build a consensus view on the 

future of cyberspace. We also continue to seek deeper engagement with countries like Russia 

and China, who may have a different world view, but with whom we need to find ways to 

develop stronger relationships. 

S/CCl's FY 2014 budget request is $4.367 million, which will allow S/CCI to add additional 

personnel to implement and expand the Department's international cyber diplomacy efforts 

around the globe. 

In terms of protecting our own networks and infrastructure, the Department has established a 

global "defense-in-depth" cybersecurity program that leverages the cybersecurity expertise of the 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Bureau of Infonnation and Resource Management to identify 

and mitigate threats to our networks and infonnation assets. As part of those efforts, in March 

the Department launched the Foreign Affairs Cybersecurity Center (FACC), a state-of-the-art 

cyber operations facility that focuses on detecting and understanding the emerging cyber threats 

and activities within the Department and the entire foreign affairs community. 

The State Department also participates in interagency efforts to implement President Obama's 

recently issued Executive Order on Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (E.O.) and 

new Presidential Policy Directive on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (PPD-21) to 

address the threats we face from cyber attack on our most critical assets, networks, and systems. 

Under DHS' coordination of an Integrated Task Force, the interagency is addressing the E.O. 

and PPD-21 actions in nine work groups in which the State Department is participating. As part 
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of this effort, the Department is collaborating on stakeholder engagement, particularly with other 

countries, informing them of the E.O. and PPD-21 developments; planning for international 

input and participation, where appropriate; and noting where there may be international 

implications for other areas of implementation. 

The Department will continue to protect our nation's national interests and cybersecurity by 

working with other nations on efforts that will ensure a secure, open, interoperable, and free 

Internet. 

Question 12: 

How is the work of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) funded under State, 

USAID, USTDA, OPIC, Ex-1m, MCC, Peace Corps, African Development Foundation, 

Treasury and other implementing agencies coordinated to help countries take advantage of 

AGOA? Is the State Department engaging with African countries about AGOA 

implementation outside of the AGOA Forum? If so, how and when? 

The interagency coordinates economic engagement with Africa and the promotion of the 

African Growth and Opportnnity Act (AGOA) through a number of mechanisms. The USTRchaired Trade Policy Staff Committee and the Commerce-chaired Trade Promotion Coordination 

Committee provide a tramework for regular interagency dialogue on trade-related topics, 

including AGOA. 

The State Department, along with other agencies, regularly engages with African countries about 

AGOA implementation outside of the annual AGOA Forum. Our embassies in African countries 

hold discussions with host government counterparts on the political and economic reforms 

needed to maintain or re-acquire eligibility for AGOA benefits, and USTR chairs annual 

interagency discussions to review countries' adherence to AGONs eligibility criteria. 

State also participates in USTR-Ied Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIF A) 

Council meetings, during which strengthening AGOA utilization is trequently an agenda item. 

The United States has TIF As with 11 countries or regional economic communities in subSaharan Atrica During the most recent TIF A Council meeting, with Nigeria in December 2012, 

the two sides discussed how to increase and diversify Nigeria's utilization of AGOA benefits. 

In conjunction with the June 2012 AGOA Forum, State and other agencies hosted a U.S.-African 

Business Conference in Cincinnati in response to Atrican requests for increased interaction with 

the U.S. private sector to expand trade and investment linkages. The conference included 

structured networking opportunities, panel discussions, and site visits centered on energy, 

transportation, and water and sanitation sectors. 

State has also developed the African Women's Entrepreneurship Program (AWEP) to strengthen 

African women's abilities to integrate into the global economy, including through taking 

advantage of AGOA to export to the United States. Successful A WEP alumnae exporting under 

AGOA include a Kenyan businesswoman who exports home decor goods to Walmart, Marshalls, 

Target, Saks Fifth Avenue, and Neiman Marcus; and a businesswoman from Cameroon who 

secured a $45million deal to export her Chia seed to a California company. 
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To strengthen AGOA utilization, USAlD - in cooperation with State, USTR, and the 

Departments of Commerce and Agriculture - launched the African Competitiveness and Trade 

Expansion Initiative (ACTE) in 2011 The ACTE initiative provides up to $120 million over 

four years to improve Africa's capacity to produce and export competitive, value-added 

products, including those that can enter the United States duty free under AGOA ACTE 

supports the work of USAlD's three regional trade hubs and enhances trade opportunities for 

Africans and Americans alike. The trade hubs provide targeted assistance to African businesses 

and educate private sector groups and associations about AGOA opportunities. The hubs also 

support AGOA-eligible countries to develop action-oriented strategies to take advantage of 

AGOA and focus on areas of competitive advantage. 

MCC's work, while not tied to AGO A directly, has helped a significant number of African 

countries realize the potential of AGOA through the agency's work to reduce poverty through 

sustainable economic growth. MCC is partnering with 14 African countries to improve their 

capacity for trade by removing internal barriers to trade; building institutional capacity in areas 

such as customs and national standards; developing business skills; and building the 

transportation, energy, and other infrastructure needed to enable trade and business expansion 

that can propel economic growth. 

Export-Import Bank coordinates with the Foreign Service and Foreign Commercial Service on 

the United States Government's economic engagement with Africa pursuant to the African 

Growth and Opportunity Act. By supporting US exports such as aircraft, rail, power and other 

infrastructure related exports to Sub-Saharan Africa, Ex-Im Bank has helped build the 

framework for trade between Africa and the US. 

Ouestion 13: 

Of the overalliMET account, how much funding is provided to Iraq for military training? 

Of those funds, what is the percentage of IMET assistance that is dedicated to the Kurdish 

Peshmerga? Additionally, does the Department have any controls in place to ensure that 

funding passing though Baghdad does in fact reach Peshmerga forces? In the absence of 

such controls, how does the Department avoid an imbalance of security assistance funding 

and training between Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga? 

Since 2010, the Department of State has allocated approximately $2 million annually in IMET to 

the Government of Iraq. TMET -funded courses expose defense establishment personnel to 

U.S. military training, doctrine, and values and are intended to promote democratic values, build 

capacity in key areas, increase the professionalization of the forces, and build lasting military-tomilitary relationships. 

As per our normal practice in other countries, the Department of State partners with Iraq's 

central government, as the sovereign government, in its security cooperation efforts. As such, 

the Department of State does not dedicate a set amount of funding to the Kurdistan Regional 

Government Ministry of Peshmerga (MoP), but rather offers particular training and education 

opportunities to the Iraqi government, of which the MoP is considered a part. The United States 

develops the TMET plan in conjunction with the Iraqi government and requires that candidates 
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for particular courses meet certain pre-requisites such as rank, language skill, and professional 

focus, but the Iraqi government has discretion in the candidate selection process. However, we 

do not advise the Iraqi government regarding the proportion ofIMET funding dedicated to MoP 

As a general rule, when conducting exchange programs and training programs with Iraq, the 

Department of State seeks to have a diverse pool of participants, representing a balance of 

genders, regions, sects and ethnic groups. 
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Questiou 1: 

Questions for the Record 

Submitted on behalfofthe Honorable Gus M Rilirakis 

By Chairman Hdward R. Royce 

To ,'-,'ecretary olSlale John F. Kerry 

Secretary Kerry, last March at a meeting in Korea, President Obama announced that he 

had been told by Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan that he had decided to reopen the Halki 

Seminary. Over a year later, Halki is still closed and no resolution appears to be in sight. 

Turkey's disregard for Ecumenical Patriarchate, the spiritual home of the world's oldest 

and second largest Christian church, has a long and bitter history and they have repeatedly 

ignored calls to facilitate the reopening of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Theological 

School of Halki without condition or further delay. What is the State Department's 

position on the opening ofHalki and what path forward do you see? 

The United States fully supports etforts to reopen Halki Seminary, a vital institution of spiritual 

learning for Orthodox Christians around the world. We will continue to urge the Government of 

Turkey at the highest levels to reopen the seminary as a symbol of its commitment to religious 

freedom. Secretary Kerry raised this issue with Foreign Minister Davutoglu during his most 

recent visit to Istanbul on April 21. He also met separately with Ecumenical Patriarch 

Bartholomew I to underscore our commitment to Halki' s reopening and the rights and status of 

the Patriarchate in Turkey. The Ambassador and otlicers from the U.S. Embassy and Consulate 

General also engage on this issue on a regular basis. 

Though incremental, some progress has occurred. The Turkish government's return of property 

surrounding the Seminary to the Church in January was a positive step, and the current 

constitutional redrafting process is encouraging an unprecedented dialob'lle on individual rights 

and religious treedom. We will continue to encourage the government of Turkey to work 

cooperatively with the Ecumenical Patriarchate to pass legislation and overcome political 

roadblocks that are hindering the reopening of this historic institution. We will also encourage 

Turkey to take additional steps to promote religious freedom, such as allowing more religious 

communities to own property, register their places of worship, and train their clergy. 

Question 2: 

As a result of the recent financial crisis in Cyprus, the new government finds itself having 

to implement very difficult austerity and financial measures to get the Cypriot economy 

back on track. Do you agree it would be unreasonable to expect the Cypriot government to 

engage in a new round of UN talks before the country has gotten back on its feet 

economically and is able to devote the necessary attention to the diplomatic 

process/problem of negotiating a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus question? Do you 

agree that negotiations for the solution of the Cyprus question should only resume once the 

appropriate preparations take place, so as to ensure that these will be meaningful and 

result-oriented, allowing for substantial progress and real prospects for a solution? 
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1 am pleased that both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders recently reaffinned their 

commitment to finding a solution, and expect negotiations will resume once appropriate 

preparations have been made. The UN Secretary General's Special Advisor for Cyprus 

Alexander Downer was in Cyprus recently to hold meetings with both leaders on the way 

forward. During his visit, he expressed understanding that President Anastasiades must address 

significant economic challenges in the short term. The United States remains committed to 

supporting efforts under UN auspices to reunify Cyprus as a bizonal, bicommunal federation 

We do not seek to impose deadlines, but as the parties themselves have said in the past, the status 

quo is unacceptable. So while I recognize the challenging nature of the process, I hope the 

parties will reach a settlement as soon as possible. 
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Question for the Record 

Submitted on behalf of the Honorable Michael R. Turner 

By Chairman Hdward R. Royce 

To ,')'ecretary o/Slale John F. Kerry 

Questiou 1: 

Mr. Secretary, with respect to the energy needs of our allies and recent economic 

analysis, do you believe that exports of U.S. natural gas can assist our diplomatic 

efforts to help bolster energy security abroad for our key allies and strengthen our 

strategic partnerships? 

The increase in US gas supplies is already having foreign policy impacts. Although the 

United States for the moment is still a net importer of natural gas, the United States also 

exports natural gas by pipeline and has exported liquetied natural gas (LNG) from 

Alaska. The decline in US. LNG imports has boosted global supplies and given some 

consumers, particularly in Europe, greater t1exibility in meeting their energy needs. A 

number of our allies and partners have also expressed a desire to import natural gas from 

the United States, which they see as a secure and potentially cheaper source of supply. 
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Question 1: 

Questions for the Record 

Suhmitted hy Ranking Memher Hliot I". Hngel 

1'0 Secretary o{State John F. Kerry 

What is your assessment of Egypt's current commitment to close relations with the United 

States and to its peace treaty with Israel? Is Egypt capable of controlling the Sinai, and 

what is it doing now to get the sitnation nnder control? How do yon assess the Morsi 

government's performance on human rights, including freedom of expression? 

Egyptian civilian and military leaders, including the Presidency, have repeatedly assured us of its 

commitment to the Peace Treaty with Israel and its commitment to a good relationship with the 

United States; we have made clear that the two are inextricably tied Egypt has affirmed its 

commitment to these two things not just in words, but also through actions. including continued 

efforts to strengthen the Egypt-brokered Gaza ceasefire, increase security for our U.S Mission, 

and pursue dialogue between our two governments. 

As great as our interest is in a stable, secure Sinai that is free from extremism, no one has a 

greater interest in achieving this stability and security than Egyptians themselves Egyptian 

officials recognize the need to reassert control over the Sinai, and they have addressed problems 

of stability and extremist violence through stepped-up action against terrorist networks, increased 

weapons interdiction, and enhanced border protection Our Embassy and the Administration 

have been working with the Egyptian government to advance and assist with those efforts, 

including through our military assistance. 

Egyptians enjoy greater freedom today than prior to the January 2011 revolution, but freedom of 

expression, association, women's rights, religious freedom, and rule of law remain areas of 

concern We believe Egypt's prosperity and stability will hinge on upholding and protecting 

these universal rights, and we have repeatedly raised these concerns, including on individual 

cases, at high levels with the Egyptian government. President Morsi has publicly stated his 

respect for freedom of expression and ordered that all legal complaints filed by the presidency 

against journalists be dropped. He has also underscored his commitment to govern for all 

Egyptians. President Obama, our Ambassador in Cairo, and I have consistently made clear to 

our Egyptian counterparts the need to follow through on commitments to protect the rights of all 

Egyptians. We support a number of programs on the ground that reinforce these rights and aid 

creation of strong democratic institutions to sustain them. 

Question 2: 

Last month, Kenyans elected Uhuru Kenyatta as their next President. However, the ICC 

has indicted both Mr. Kenyatta and his running mate, now Vice President William Ruto. 

How, if at all, will the State Department engage with President Kenyatta and his 

administration? 
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The United States congratulated the people of Kenya for voting peacefully on March 4. Since its 

independence in 1963, Kenya has been one of America's strongest and most enduring partners in 

Africa. Our partnership is based on a shared commitment to democracy, security, and 

opportunity. We remain committed to that enduring partnership, which does not depend on 

particular individuals or offices. The State Department will continue to work closely with Kenya 

and the Kenyan people. At the same time, accountability for political violence is a critical 

ingredient to lasting peace in Kenya. In that regard, we welcome and wish to underscore the 

importance of Kenya's commitment to uphold its international obligations, including those with 

respect to international justice. We urge the Government of Kenya to live up to commitments to 

seeking justice for the victims of the 2007-2008 post-election violence, including by cooperating 

fully with the ICC process. We cannot ignore the serious charges set out in the ICC proceedings, 

and we will calibrate our engagement with Kenya's elected leaders accordingly. US policy, 

values, laws, and interests will guide this engagement. 

Ouestion 3: 

Mr. Secretary, from your recent conversations in Beijing with the top levels of the Chinese 

leadership, what is yonr nnderstanding of the Chinese government's commnnications with 

Pyongyang? Beyond China's public statements, have the Chinese conveyed their 

frnstrations directly with the North Korean leadership abont the North's bellicose 

rhetoric? And finally, what is your understanding of the commitments that Beijing has 

given, if any, to try to dampen tensions on the Korean peninsnla and rein in North Korea's 

aggressive behavior? 

The United States continues to work closely with China to deepen our dialogue on North Korea 

to achieve our shared goal of verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful 

manner. Through our discussions, we will continue to encourage China to leverage more 

effectively its unique relationship with the DPRK. Chinese officials have made clear their 

concerns about North Korea's bellicose rhetoric, destabilizing and provocative behavior, and 

commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 

China has repeatedly and publicly urged the DPRI( to avoid actions or rhetoric that increase 

tension on the Korean Peninsula. We worked closely with China in the adoption of UN Security 

Council Resolutions 2087 and 2094, which impose new sanctions on North Korea. Chinese 

officials have stated publicly that China is committed to strict implementation of UNSC 

sanctions We continue to press China to enforce all relevant DPRI(-related UNSCRs and to 

address North Korea's threats to regional peace and security and the global non-proliferation 

regime. 

Onestion 4: 

The fragile peace of Northern Ireland is threatened by the UK government's efforts once 

again to access the Boston College Oral History Archives on the Troubles in Northern 

Ireland. The United States invested substantial political capital in the peace process to 

promote the political courage needed to overcome what had been viewed for decades as an 

unbridgeable sectarian divide. The U.S. government not only has a right but an obligation 
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to ensure that the path in Northern Ireland is forward and not backwards. How do you 

intend to handle this issue? 

The United States' response to the United Kingdom's request in this case is subject to our 

obligations under our Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT). On April 15,2013 the U.S. 

Supreme Court declined to hear a challenge to a First Circuit Court of Appeals decision not to 

block the release to the UK ofmaterials responsive to the MLAT request 

Following the resolution of pending litigation, we will closely coordinate next steps with the 

Department of Justice, which is primarily responsible for MLAT matters under the treaty 

Our view of the current situation in Northern Ireland is shaped by long experience as well as 

more recent events. In the last several years, the Northern Ireland Executive has worked to build 

a peaceful and prosperous future for all the people of Northern Ireland. On May 9, Northern 

Ireland's First Minister and deputy First Minister announced they will introduce a new plan to 

build a united community. We welcome this announcement as a step towards healing the 

divisions of the past and forging a shared future. 

The United States fully supports the efforts in Northern Ireland to eradicate false excuses for 

political violence and build a brighter future for its people. However, many complexities 

surround the past in Northern Ireland. We have stressed to leaders in Belfast, London, and 

Dublin that addressing these historically divisive issues is vital for continued progress in 

securing a lasting and a prosperous peace in Northern Ireland. We assess that greater efforts by 

political leaders are required to generate the long-delayed vision and path to a future in Northern 

Ireland that all its inhabitants can embrace. That is why I have engaged with key figures in 

Northern Ireland, Ireland, and the UK government. On March 18, I met separately with UK 

Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Theresa Villiers, Irish Deputy Prime Minister Eamon 

Gilmore, and Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams. In these meetings, I stressed the importance of 

the U.S., Irish, and UK governments working together to encourage and support Northern 

Ireland's leaders to work collaboratively and fully support the rule oflaw. 

On March 28, commemorating the 15th Anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement, I released a 

statement encouraging all parties to rededicate themselves to achieving a shared future and to 

healing the divisions of the past. I also stressed the need for Northern Ireland's leaders to work 

together in full support of the rule of law. 

On the same day, President Obama released a statement encouraging the political parties to work 

together in the service of lasting peace and prosperity. The President reaffirmed the United 

States' commitment to the Northern Ireland Peace Process. 

While troubling, we do not believe that recent spates of unrest signal a return to the violence of 

the past. The United States has consistently engaged both politically and economically with 

Northern Ireland, and we continue to support the vision that was set out in the Good Friday and 

subsequent agreements. 
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Question 5: 

The United States suspended most of its assistance to Mali following a military coup there last 

year. Although Mali has not yet restored democratic rule, some have called for the US to 

resume assistance to the Malian military to combat rebels in northern Mali. What is your view 

on this issue? 

Although the Malian military must play a role in the future stability of its country, unresolved 

tensions among multiple factions within the Malian military and the lingering influence of junta 

leader Captain Sanogo and his supporters in Mali's transitional government make identifying 

appropriate partners and normalizing relations with the Malian military inadvisable at this time. The 

US. government must avoid the perception that we are aligning ourselves with those who overthrew 

Mali's democratically-elected government and engaged in human rights violations. Once a 

democratically-elected government takes office, we look forward to reengaging with Mali's military 

to support the full restoration of civilian control over the military, accountability for human rights 

violations, and future reform efforts 

We nonetheless recognize that the absence of an effective Malian military continues to prevent the 

government of Mali from fully exerting control over its territory. We are coordinating efforts in the 

region with our European partners, including the European Union, which has launched an integrated 

training mission for the Malian armed forces and is rebuilding military elements and their command 

structures. This complements US support for the African-led International Support Mission in Mali 

(AFTSMA). US. resources have focused on providing logistics support for African forces deploying 

as part of AFISMA. US funds are also supporting training and equipping requirements for some 

African troops as part of AFTSMA. That force will soon transition into the {..TN Multidimensional 

Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 

2100 (2013) We will provide vehicles, communications equipment, personal equipment, field 

kitchens, field hospitals, and generators to some AFISMA contingents to help them meet the UN's 

equipment standards in order to transition from a regional force into effective UN peacekeepers. 

US. Africa Command's Army component command is providing pre-deployment training, including 

human rights training, in coordination with the Department's Afiica Contingency Operations and 

Training Assistance (ACOTA) program. In addition, we have significantly assisted the ongoing 

French- and African-led counterterrorism and military operations in northern Mali. 

Given the presidential elections currently scheduled for July 2013, we are laying the policy and 

budget groundwork for a return to security assistance and training for the Malian armed forces. We 

are collaborating with other international partners (particularly the European Union and the United 

Nations) who have been working directly with the Malian military. In a burden sharing effort, these 

other donors have been assisting the Malian military. The Departments of Defense and State 

continue to monitor the ever-evolving security situation so that, once a democratically-elected 

government is in place and appropriate Malian counterparts can be identified, military-to-military 

and law enforcement cooperation can resume 
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Question 6: 

Press reports from April 18 indicate that Britain and France have informed the United 

Nations there is credible evidence that Syria used chemical weapons on more than one 

occasion since December. And recent press reports indicate that the government of Israel 

is "nearly 100 percent" certain that Syria has recently deployed chemical weapons against 

their own population. Does the United States agree with the findings of our British, French, 

and Israeli allies? Ifso, what action is the United States planning to take in response? 

As you heard yesterday, our intelligence community does assess with varying degrees of 

confidence that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a small scale in Syria, 

specifically the chemical agent sarin. This assessment is based in part on physiological samples 

We are working to establish credible and corroborated facts to build on this intelligence 

assessment, in order to establish a definitive judgment as to whether or not the President's red 

line has been crossed, and to inform our decision making about next steps. 

The President has made clear that the use of chemical weapons - or the transfer of chemical 

weapons to terrorist groups - is a red line for the United States. Our red line has not changed. 

However, precisely because the President articulated a firm red line, we have an obligation to 

fully investigate any and all evidence of chemical weapons use within Syria before we can draw 

a definitive conclusion. 

That is why we are pressing for a comprehensive United Nations investigation that can credibly 

evaluate the evidence and establish what took place We and other partners have offered 

support, including by providing information regarding credible allegations of the use of chemical 

weapons. However, the Assad regime's staunch refusal to allow the l)N to investigate any and 

all credible allegations of chemical weapons has made such a comprehensive investigation 

difficult, if not impossible, thus far. 

But we are not depending solely on the UN investigation. We are also working with our friends, 

allies, and the Syrian opposition, to procure, share and evaluate additional information associated 

with reports of the use of chemical weapons so that we can establish the facts 

Given the stakes involved, and what we have learned from our own recent experience, 

intelligence assessments alone are not sufficient - only credible and corroborated facts that 

provide us with some degree of certainty will guide our decision-making; the intelligence 

assessment is only one part of a broader process. 

We are prepared for all contingencies so that we can respond appropriately to any confirmed use 

of chemical weapons, consistent with our national interests. 

The United States and the international community have a number of potential responses 

available, and no option is off the table. 
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Question 7: 

The Administration on several occasions has discussed the Middle East peace process with 

senior Turkish officials. What is your vision for a Turkish role in Middle East peace 

efforts? Given Turkey's warm relations with Hamas, should Turkey be invited to play any 

role, and, if so, why? 

We welcome broad international support for the obj ective of Middle East peace based on a twostate goal and we appreciate the interest of many in the international community who wish to be 

helpful. We believe our close ally Turkey can playa constructive role in promoting Middle East 

peace, in close coordination with the United States. While we do not always agree with 

Turkey's statements or approach on this issue, as allies, we have an ongoing and transparent 

dialogue that allows us to say when we disagree. The Secretary has conveyed our position on 

Hamas to senior Turkish officials. Hamas is a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization under 

U.S. law, and we regard it as a destabilizing force within Gaza and in the region. 

Question 8: 

How do you assess the legality of the settlement of mainland Turks in occupied northern 

Cyprus? 

Any comprehensive agreement to end the long-standing division of Cyprus will need to take into 

account issues of citizenship and residency on the island. T believe that a plan dealing with these 

and other questions needs to be worked out between the communities, with United Nations 

support, and needs to be acceptable to majorities in both of the island's communities. T strongly 

support efforts under UN auspice to reunify the island, which is the only practical way to resolve 

the many critical issues between the communities 

Question 9: 

Could you provide an update on the implementation of the recommendations of the 

Accountability Review Board for Benghazi, and particularly on improved planning and 

training, such as the multi-bureau supports cells for new posts or training of personnel 

serving in high-risk areas? 

The independent Benghazi Accountability Review Board (ARB) made 29 recommendations in 

key areas such as training, fire safety, staffing, and threat analysis. To hold ourselves 

accountable for implementation, we divided the recommendations into discrete tasks and then 

assigned bureaus with the tasks and deadlines. 

To date, the Department has taken action to substantially address all of the ARB's 

recommendations, insofar as resources and staff training cycles pennit. Some of this work -

such as enhancing language and security training or constructing facilities - requires a multi-year 

commitment. Others - such as expanding the presence of Marine Security Guard - require 

ongoing interagency cooperation and continued funding. Tn support of these efforts, the 

Department has done the following: 
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The Department reviewed our presence and stafling footprint at high-threat posts, and 

established a High Threat Board to review our presence at High-Threat, High-Risk 

posts every 6 months. 

We are improving training for our employees headed to high-threat posts, and have 

expanded the number of posts trom 13 to more than two dozen, where such additional 

security training is required. 

We surveyed fire and life safety equipment, and have procured needed equipment for 

posts. 

All posts performed a review of tripwires to determine if any had been breached in 

the past year The Department then developed and issued revised guidance on 

responding to tripwires, and established a Washington-based "Tripwires Committee" 

to review tripwires upon breach. 

With Congressional support, we are creating 151 new DS positions; 113 are expected 

to be hired this fiscal year. The remainder will be hired in FY 14. 

The Department is working with the Department of Defense, and the Congress, on 

increasing the number of Marine Security Guard Detachments deployed to U.S. 

diplomatic posts overseas. 

We developed a concept for "Support Cells" for openedlreopened posts; the process is 

being incorporated into the Foreign Atfairs Handbook (F AH). 

The Department established a six-person panel to thoroughly review DS' organization 

and management structure; the panel has developed draft findings. 

The Department will never be "done" when it comes to security. The stark fact is that we can 

never truly eliminate the risks that our diplomats and development experts face as they advance 

America's national interests abroad But we must always be working to find ways to minimize 

that risk 

Following through on our progress will, of course, require continued support from the Congress 

Your support for our FY 2013 funding request to enhance embassy security - as recommended 

by the ARB - has been invaluable. To truly address the findings of the ARB, we hope Congress 

will continue to be a partner, in terms of providing resources and oversight. The FY 2014 budget 

requests the resources necessary to carry on this important work. 

Ouestion 10: 

The Durban Platform agreed to in South Africa in 2011 set the world on the path to 

establishing a "legal instrument or legal outcome" by 2015 to reduce global greenhouse gas 

emissions and help developing countries deal with the impacts of climate change. With a 

year and a half to go, there have not been any significant breakthroughs to indicate an 

agreement is imminent. However, the Administration is working through other 

mechanisms to advance the climate discussion, such as the U.S.-Asia-Pacific 

Comprehensive Partnership for a Sustainable Energy Future last year. Over the next year 

and a half, what should the United States be doing to reach a final agreement? How can 

initiatives, such as the U.S.-Asia-Pacific Partnership, contribute to a final, holistic 

agreement? 
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President Obama and I have made climate change a top priority and we are committed to making 

concrete and meaningful progress on this important international challenge. 

The United States has demonstrated real leadership in the international community, both within 

and outside of the UN, on the issue of climate change. We are working with our international 

partners to continue to make progress on (1) reducing emissions, (2) adapting to a changing 

climate, and (3) looking ahead to a post-2020 world. This includes working through the Durban 

Platform, a process under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to 

negotiate a new global climate agreement by 2015 that is applicable to all. 

The United States is committed to negotiate an agreement that is ambitious, flexible, dynamic, 

applicable to all, and feasible. It should allow for the widest possible participation, and reflect a 

structure that all countries-including the United States-can implement. 

The President has expressed his commitment to continued action to reduce our emissions at 

home, and is exploring a range of options for doing so. In his State of the Union message, he 

challenged Congress to find a market-based solution to address climate change, and we know 

members of Congress are working on a variety of options for action. 

We are making excellent progress toward our goal of reducing emissions in the range of 17% by 

2020. Our energy-related C02 emissions are down 8.8% over 2005 levels. 

Tn addition to remaining actively engaged in the UN negotiations, we are also working actively 

in other fora, including the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF). The MEF 

plays an important role in promoting dialogue among key developed economies like the U.S. and 

EU and major emerging economies like China and India to combat climate change and promote 

clean energy, and to advance international consensus on climate change in the UN context 

Further, in 2012, the United States, along with the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and six 

developed and developing country partners, launched the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to 

Reduce Short Lived Climate Pollutants (CCAC) to address some of the pollutants, like methane, 

black carbon, and HFCs, that have significant warming impact in the short term as well as 

significant health and agricultural impacts. Tn just one year, we have expanded the coalition to 

include 60 partners (including 30 governments), and raised more than $35 million in pledges 

Multilateral efforts like the MEF and CCAC, as well as our revitalized bilateral cooperation with 

key partners such as China, Tndia, and others, will continue to catalyze action around the world 

in a way that is complementary to our efforts within the UN negotiations. We expect that such 

efforts will help to build the mutual confidence needed for progress towards a new agreement. 

Ouestion 11: 

In geographically large countries, a lack of access to U,S. Consular Offices serves as a 

deterrent to travel to the United States for millions of business visitors and tourists. For 

example, in Brazil, there are only four consulates. Many would-be visitors would have to 

travel thousands of miles to the nearest consulate for the required personal visa interview. 
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The quality of remote video conference technology has improved significantly in recent 

years - and is now used routinely for secure communications in the State Department and 

other sensitive federal agencies, as well as in such demanding environments as battlefield 

medicine. The use of video conference technology to conduct visa interviews will enable 

U.S. consulates to expand access to visa services without reducing the level of security for 

visa interviews, and with little cost. 

Over the past year, the State Department, in an effort to fulfill the goals of the President's 

National Tourism Strategy, has made remarkable progress toward reducing wait times for 

visa interviews. As demand continues to increase and to meet the President's goal of 

attracting 100 million tourists by 2021, we need to develop effective and economical tools to 

sustain this progress. 

In 2009, Congress authorized a State Department pilot program to utilize 

videoconferencing technology for visa interviews. Yet, no pilot program has been initiated. 

Can you give us an update on any efforts to implement a pilot videoconferencing program 

in certain consulates? What are the reasons for the delay? 

After Congressional authorization of the pilot program in 2006, we tested the option of video 

visa interviewing and detennined it is not a solution for handling an ever-increasing number of 

applicants. A combination of security, technical integrity, and productivity concerns rendered 

the process impractical for field deployment. Technical security concerns are acute especially in 

certain countries. 

Video Visa Interviewing is Less Efficient: The travel and tourism industry has long advocated 

that video visa interviewing would be a more efficient and convenient method for fulfilling our 

legal requirement to interview visa applicants. In fact, video interviewing is less efficient 

because of delays in setting up before the camera and providing instructions remotely, meaning 

the Department would actually adjudicate fewer visa applications than under current procedures. 

Video Visa Interviewing is Less Effective: In situations where an interview is warranted by 

concerns related to fraud, security, or other eligibility considerations, the interview requirement 

plays a crucial role in our national and border security. The "in-person" nature of an interview is 

vital - the consular officer cannot pick up subtle messages conveyed in an applicant's demeanor 

and expressions and tone in a video interview, no matter how high-resolution the picture may be. 

There are other physical cues to fraud that are also unavailable by video. For example, is the 

conduct, demeanor, and presentation of an applicant fully consistent with their purported 

profession and circumstances? Is the applicant being "coached" to provide specific answers 

from off-camera? This is information that is only made available by physical proximity 

Video Visa Interviewing Does Not Save Resources and is Less Secure: Any video 

interviewing scenario would require the use of brick and mortar interviewing facilities, operated 

by consular staff and subject to Diplomatic Security facility protection requirements. The law 

permits only specially-trained, U.S. citizen Department employees with secret clearances and 

consular commissions to interview and adjudicate, and these individuals may only adjudicate 
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visa applications in consular facilities that meet strict security and technology standards. 

Consular employees must be present to verify applicants' identities There is no scenario in 

which it is possible to ensure the integrity of our application process and have applicants 

interview "in the comfort of their homes," as the travel and tourism industry envisions. 

Protection of our officers, consular staff, records, and systems is mandated by law and regulation 

and cannot be compromised. Remote facilities potentially could put visa applicants at risk, if 

those interviews were conducted in facilities vulnerable to physical or technical attack. 

Moreover, consular officers who would otherwise adjudicate visa applications would have to be 

sent on a regular basis to these remote facilities to ensure the integrity of the equipment and to 

monitor operations This requirement decreases the potential efficiency gains from remote 

interviewing. There is also no guarantee that a host government would permit offsite facilities to 

be established in a given country. 

Technical Concerns: Cyber security and bandwidth remain key challenges. Commercially 

available systems and software cannot guarantee the security of the video link in all countries, 

and it may be exceptionally difficult to ensure the security of the remote location from which the 

interview is conducted. This is especially true for certain countries where visa demand is 

highest. Remote interviewing is also dependent on abundant internet bandwidth - an asset that is 

difficult to come by in most developing countries -where visa demand is highest. The efficiency 

gains for consular officers and visa applicants alike are lost if a connection cannot be 

consistently maintained and an in-person interview ultimately must be conducted. 

Status of Pilot Program: For the reasons stated above, the Department has not conducted a 

pilot program since 2006, instead choosing to focus its efforts and limited resources on 

endeavors that would result in far greater levels of efficiency - secure visa facilitation programs. 

Question 12: 

There is a serious and ongoing conversation in Congress regarding the use of drones 

overseas. What is yonr assessment of the impact the nse of drones has had on the U.S. 

relationship with Pakistan and other nations in which lethal drone strikes have been 

employed? To what extent does the Secretary of State or the conn try ambassador have an 

opportunity to express his or her views on the foreign policy implications of drone strikes 

before they take place? 

Any decision to use force abroad, even when our adversaries are terrorists dedicated to killing 

American citizens, is a significant one. While T cannot address any specific situation in this 

context, decisions to capture or use force against individual terrorists outside the United States 

and areas of active hostilities are made at the most senior levels of the Government, informed by 

departments and agencies with relevant expertise and institutional roles. The Secretary and other 

senior State Department officials regularly express their views, and the views of our ambassadors 

in the field, on the foreign policy implications of our counterterrorism policies and activities 
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Ouestion 1: 

Questions for the Record 

Submitted by the Honorable Michael T. McCaul 

1'0 Secretary a/State John F. Kerry 

Can you please describe that process and explain what role the State Department had in 

deciding to include Saudi Arabia in the Global Entry Program? Did the State Department 

have a chance to provide DHS with input about the decision to include Saudi Arabia in the 

Global Entry program before a decision was reached? If so, what was the natnre of those 

comments? Do you think the decision to include Saudi Arabia in the Global Entry Program 

enhances onr national secnrity? Was this decision made based on diplomatic 

considerations? Or purely on security considerations? Does it make any sense to you that 

Sandi Arabia be inclnded in this program when other allies, snch as Great Britain, have 

been excluded? What is the national security case for including Saudi Arabia in this 

program; will this enhance our nation's security? 

The Global Entry Program is run exclusively by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. As 

the Department of State has no role in administering this program, the Department of Homeland 

Security would be best placed to provide additional information. 

Onestion 2: 

Mr. Secretary, China has the second largest economy in the world after the United States 

and is forecasted to grow 8.2 % this year, according to the Asian Development Bank. China 

is also a major U.S. foreign debt holder, holding over $1.2 trillion in U.S. Treasury 

Secnrities, the largest by anyone conntry. Yet yonr Department is reqnesting tens of 

millions of dollars in funding for China, inclnding millions from the Economic Support 

Fnnd. This is insnlting to me and my constitnents who don't need to look at any nnmbers 

to know that China is doing jnst fine withont onr help. How can yon possibly justify 

borrowing trillions from China only to tnrn that money aronnd-interest and all-and pnt 

it right back into their pockets? What do yon say to my constitnents who have to pay for 

that assistance at a time when many are facing their own economic hardships and resent 

the fact that we wonld hand this money off to a rich competitor? 

The President' FY 2014 budget request includes $7.7 million for foreign assistance to China. 

This amount is consistent with previous Fiscal Year Requests, although Congress has historically 

appropriated additional funds for China ($12 million in both FY 2011 and FY 2012). 

This assistance does not support the Government of China, but advances several U.S. pnorltles 

in China: improving conditions for the Tibetan people, stopping the spread of pandemic disease, 

and promoting rule oflaw. Of the $7.7 million requested, $4.5 million or 58 percent will provide 

assistance to Tibetan communities in China. These programs build sustainable livelihoods for 

Tibetan people, support economic integration, and promote sustainable development in the 

Tibetan Autonomous Region and in other Tibetan communities in China. We are also requesting 

$2.4 million for HIV/AIDS programs in China to mitigate the spread of disease across borders 
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into Southeast Asia and throughout the world. The remammg $800,000 requested would 

support a Resident Legal Advisor at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing to provide expertise on 

criminal law and procedure to Chinese officials, jurists, and academics and to support efforts by 

the U.S. Embassy to promote long-term criminal justice reform in China. 

Question 3: 

Mr. Secretary, as you know, on February 1, 2013, a suicide bomber killed himself and a 

Turkish-national security guard outside our embassy in Ankara. Mustafa Akarsu, the 

guard killed defending our embassy, had served the U.S. Government for over twenty 

years. Like many foreign nationals working abroad for our government, Mr. Akarsu 

hoped to take advantage of a Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) so that one day he could move 

his family to the United States. SIV's are not easy to get: one must serve faithfully for 15 

years or more and be recommended by the principal officer of a Foreign Service 

establishment provided that the Secretary of State approves such a recommendation. For 

Mr. Akarsu, he and his family were so close to coming to the United States and then 

tragedy struck. Sadly, the Immigration Nationality Act is silent on the eligibility of 

surviving family members of a U.S. Government employee killed in the line of duty who 

has already met all of the other reqnirements to be granted a Special Immigrant Visa. And 

so a grieving family, whose husband and father defended our embassy for over two 

decades, the dream of America died along with their loved one. 

This week I introduced the Mustafa Akarsu Local Guard Force Support Act to say thank 

you to Mr. Akarsu and his family for making the ultimate sacrifice on behalf of our nation 

and to clarify that surviving family members of a foreign employee killed in the line of duty 

are still eligible for a Special immigrant Visa if they have satisfied all other requirements 

under current law. 

Can you comment on this legislation and the contributions that local guards, like Mr. 

Akarsu, play in protecting U.S. facilities and personnel abroad? 

The Department deeply appreciates the actions of Representative McCaul and the bill's 

co-sponsors in introducing such legislation, and we welcome further Congressional action on this 

issue. As T recalled during a memorial ceremony for Mr. Akarsu in Ankara, "Mustafa laid down 

his life for all of us. He guarded these gates for more than 20 years. But he didn't just stand 

guard; he stood tall, taking pride in his work for the people of Turkey and the people of the 

United States. And when the menace of terrorism came to these gates, Mustafa didn't hesitate 

for a moment He and his fellow guards acted heroically, saving lives with quickness and with 

bravery." Mustafa Akarsu and his local guard colleagues are the United States' first line of 

defense at more than 270 diplomatic posts around the world. They put their lives on the line 

every day to keep our people safe. Local guards perform many essential tasks, including 

greeting and screening visitors, vehicles, and packages entering our diplomatic missions, and 

searching for weapons, explosives, or other dangerous items that may harm our personnel. As I 

noted, Me Akarsu "wanted to give his children an opportunity to earn an education in the United 

States. And Mustafa was so keen on these plans, that I'm told his boss eventually gave him a 
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nickname: Yari Amerikali - Half-American. And today, it's our duty to complete those dreams 

for him." 

We look forward to this legislation moving forward through the committee process and to the 

floor vote. The passage of this legislation is a priority of the U.S. Department of State. 
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Question 1: 

Questions for the Record 

Suhmitted hy the Honorahle Rrad Sherman 

1'0 Secretary a/State John F. Kerry 

Voice of America estimates that one hour of Sindhi broadcasting a day can be done for $1.5 

million a year. There is probably no population more important to ns in onr efforts against 

terrorism and extremism than the people of Pakistan. Bnt for many years, the Pakistani 

government has focnsed the conntry and its institntions on jnst using one langnage, Urdn, 

when in fact Sindhi is spoken by tens of millions of people. VOA broadcasts for abont 12 

honrs a day in U rdn while there is cnrrently no Sindhi service. Are we effectively reaching 

the popnlation of Sindh withont broadcasting in the native Sindhi language? 

Engagement with audiences in Pakistan is an essential element of our bilateral relationship with 

that nation. The Broadcasting Board of Governors' (BBG) current international media efforts 

provide a variety of programming in multiple lant\uages for audiences in both urban and rural 

Pakistan. 

Since Pakistan is primarily a television market, the BBG has added a signiticant number of 

television afiiliates in Pakistan for programming in Urdu from Voice of America (VOA). 

However, radio for Pakistan remains a focus as well, with programs in prime time from 7 p.m. 

onward each day -- six hours of live programming, including four News Hours and two live 

discussion shows. (Research indicates that three-quarters of native Sindhi speakers understand 

Urdu, while only three percent of Pakistan's Sindhi speakers understand none of the languages in 

which VOA broadcasts.) In addition, there is 24-hour news and current atTairs programming 

from VOA available on the Internet and via social media. VOA also provides English-Iallb'llage 

broadcasts for Pakistani audiences, including a Learning English program for Josh FM and 

another for G I-TV. 

The BBG-tunded Radio Mashaal, operated by Radio Free EuropelRadio Liberty, broadcasts 

Pashto language programming for nine hours every day via cross-border medium wave and 

shortwave radio frequencies, satellite and streamed Internet audio. Radio Mashaal broadcasts 

into the Pashtun heartland along the Afghanistan-Pal<istan border in a coordinated stream with 

VOA's Deewa Radio, which is also in Pashto. Mashaal's website, m~,ffii!!jJx1:lcc!i.Q~, and a 

variety of digital media also provide Pashto language audiences in Pakistan, Afghanistan and 

around the world with access to original, multiple-media content. 

The Department of State deploys Urdu-speaking Foreign Service ofiicers stationed in Pakistan, 

and an Urdu-speaking public affairs spokesman from Washington, D.C., to Pakistan, to engage 

with Urdu media on a regular basis. We are also looking for ways to establish a full time Urdu 

spokesperson position based in Islamabad. 

Our public affairs staff in Karachi appreciates the need to engage with the Sindh press and have 

recently expanded efforts to do so via direct media outreach and increased translation of press 

releases, facts sheets on U.S. assistance, social media postings, and other Public Diplomacy 
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products into the Sindhi language. Sindhi broadcasters also have access to press releases, audio 

and video soundbites and events from State On Demand and other sources on the web, utilizing 

voiced translations over these elements. 

USAlD has also expanded its outreach in the last two years to the Pakistani public via paid and 

earned media. A nationwide television, radio, print, and billboard campaign in Urdu began last 

year and has increased recognition of US assistance. In December 2012, USAID began a 

weekly Pashto-language radio show focused on a particular assistance project each week The 

radio show was complemented by a month-long TV campaign that aired an advertisement per 

day in Pashto on three TV stations. USAID intends to continue these outreach efforts in local 

languages in the coming year. For example, in advance of opening a photo exhibit highlighting 

USAID's 50 years of assistance to Pakistan in Hyderabad last month, USAID ran Sindhi print 

and radio advertisements to publicize the exhibit. 

Both the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the Department of State will continue to explore 

other options for reaching out to the Pakistan people in their local languages through our 

international media and public diplomacy programs. 

Ouestion 2: 

75 Members of Congress are cosponsoring the Visa Wail'er for Israel Act, H.R. 300, the 

Honse bill I introdnced with Rep. Ted Poe (R-TX). There are 37 conntries in the Visa 

Waiver Program, but not Israel. Israelis with passports can visit most of Europe, Canada, 

and several other countries around the world, visa-free. Trips to the U.S. by Israelis 

totaled nearly 320,000 visits annually the past three years. In 2011, Israelis spent over $1.6 

billion in travel and airfare to the United States. Given the economic and cultural benefits 

of adding Israel the U.S. Visa Waiver Program, is this something the State Department 

should support? 

Under current law, a country must meet a number of requirements to qualify for designation 

under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). Israel does not currently meet all of the thresholds for 

inclusion in the VWP, even with the elimination of the visitor visa refusal rate requirement. For 

example, Israel does not grant reciprocal visa free privileges to all US. citizens. For years, US. 

citizens of Palestinian or Arab origin seeking to enter Israel have faced several restrictions 

pertaining to regions or ports of entry that are not encountered by other US. citizens. The 

Department has raised this concem with Israel multiple times. While the Department recognizes 

and values the economic and cultural benetits Israeli travelers contribute to the United States, we 

are statutorily bound by the law (INA 217) to ensure that countries meet every requirement 

before designation in the program. 

Although in 2008 the law gave the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the 

Secretary of State, the authority to wai ve the visa refusal rate requirement up to ten percent, this 

provision was suspended in July 2009. At no time were those countries that benetitted from the 

waiver authority in 2008 exempt from having to meet all other requirements of the program 

before designation. Prior to using the waiver authority, there were additional security measures 

contained in law that needed to be considered. 
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Questiou 3: 

Iu August 2012, Azerbaijan's President pardoned and praised a confessed axe-murderer 

Ramil Safarov, who was convicted of killing an Armenian officer at a 2005 NATQ training 

program in Hungary. What is the State Department doing to urge Azerbaijan to reincarcerate Ramil Safarov? Will the Administration tie military assistance to Azerbaijan 

to a reversal of Baku's aggressive policies? 

Mr. Safarov was tried and convicted of a brutal murder. The United States was extremely 

troubled to learn that he would not serve the remainder of his sentence, as were many of our 

Allies. Immediately after learning of Azerbaijani President Aliyev's pardon of Ramil Safarov, 

the United States raised its concerns directly and forcefully with the highest levels of the 

government of Azerbaijan. In addition, both the White House and the State Department released 

strong public statements of concern over Mr. Safarov's transfer and subsequent pardon. 

As a co-chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, 

the United States continues working to help the sides reach a peaceful resolution to the NagornoKarabakh conflict. The United States condemns any action that fuels tension in the region or 

threatens to damage the peace process. 

Security assistance for Azerbaijan is carefully reviewed to ensure it does not undermine efforts 

for a peaceful settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Question 4: 

Azerbaijan has threatened to shoot down civilian aircraft that fly into the airport of the 

Nagorno-Karabakh. What consequence would Azerbaijan face if it were to shoot down 

civilian aircraft flying into the airport in Stepanakert? 

As a Co-Chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe OSCE Minsk Group 

along with Russia and France, the United States remains committed to helping the sides find a 

peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. T have discussed the issue of civil flights to 

Nagorno-Karabakh with the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan at the highest levels. The 

Minsk Group Co-Chairs are working to help the sides find a means of resolving this issue 

diplomatically, and have received assurances from the sides that they will reject any threat or use 

of force against civil aircraft. We remain concerned about any action that could fuel tension in 

the region or threatens to damage the peace process. 

Question 5: 

The Turkey-Armenia protocols, which were announced on April 22, 2009, sought to end 

Turkey's blockade of Armenia and establish diplomatic and economic relations. What 

meaningful steps has Turkey taken to ratify the protocols? What is the State Department 

doing to press Turkey to end its blockade of Armenia? 
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The Obama Administration strongly supports the efforts of Turkey and Armenia to nonnalize 

their bilateral relations. We continue to use our interactions with senior Turkish officials to urge 

ratification of the protocols. We have also called on Turkey to take unilateral measures, such as 

re-opening the border with Armenia, which would facilitate trade and commerce. The United 

States maintains an ongoing dialogue with Turkish and Armenian officials at all levels on these 

issues, and we will continue to support the courageous steps taken by individuals in Armenia and 

Turkey to foster a dialogue that acknowledges the history they share in common. 

Question 6: 

T would like to thank the State Department for leading two resolutions on Sri Lanka at the 

U.N. Human Rights Council. I believe that an independent international investigation is 

important to determine the facts about and responsibility for serious crimes committed at 

the end of the war in Sri Lanka. Will the U.S. be leading a resolution when Sri Lanka is 

brought up again next March to initiate such an investigation? Are there other 

mechanisms to explore outside the UN Human Rights Council to make a credible 

investigation a reality? 

We appreciate your concern about the human rights situation in Sri Lanka, a concern that the 

State Department shares. For the second consecutive year the international community carne 

together at the UN Human Rights Council to note strong and continuing concerns regarding the 

rule of law, human rights, reconciliation, and accountability in Sri Lanka. This year's resolution 

built upon last year's resolution, and noted the High Commissioner's call for an independent and 

credible international investigation into alleged violations of international humanitarian and 

human rights law. It also addressed longstanding concerns about the rule of law, judicial 

independence, religious discrimination, freedom of expression, reconciliation, and accountability 

in Sri Lanka. The Department will remain actively engaged in pursuit of these objectives. 

As the U. S. government explores next steps, we will renew our consideration of all mechanisms 

available, both in the Human Rights Council and elsewhere. We will continue to examine all 

options for etrectively pressing the Government of Sri Lanka to take the steps toward 

accountability and reconciliation that the country needs and its people deserve. We will also 

continue our bilateral drorts through sustained diplomatic and programmatic engagement with 

the government and Sri Lankan civil society in support of accountability, reconciliation and 

democracy. 

Question 7: 

Despite the increased U.S. sanctions, there are many areas where Iran sanctions 

enforcement should be improved. 

Could you please explain why the administration has not sanctioned foreign shipping 

companies that continue to service ports operated by the I RGC (the Revolutionary 

Guards), foreign airports that continue to service Iranian airlines sanctioned for sending 

arms and personnel to aid Assad, exchange houses, currency traders and precious metal 

dealers that are helping Iran evade sanctions? 
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The State Department renewed the exemption to our Iran sanctions targeting financial 

transactions with the Central Bank of Iran for China in December, citing a "significant 

reduction" in Beijing's purchase ofIranian oil. 

What is the current status of overall Iranian oil exports and specifically to China, India 

and Turkey? What standard are you using to determine what qualifies as a "significant 

reduction" in purchases of Iranian oil and is there evidence that China reduced its 

purchases of Iranian oil? 

The United States has built and led a global coalition to create the toughest, most comprehensive 

sanctions to date on the Iranian regime. Our sanctions are having a real impact on the ground in 

Iran, exacerbated by the regime's own mismanagement of its economy. We will be happy to 

meet with you and/or your statT, and provide a briefing on these very important issues. 

Question 8: 

On February 9, 2013, dozens of rockets were fired on Camp Hurriya in Iraq where 

approximately 3,100 members of the MEK have been residing. They were recently 

relocated from Camp Ashraf. Seven unarmed residents were killed and many more were 

wounded. The Hezbollah Brigades, an Iranian-affiliated group in Iraq, claimed 

responsibility for the attack and "warned that others would follow." What is the State 

Department doing to press the Iraqi government to take meaningful steps to provide better 

security and better living conditions for the residents? 

Following the February 9 rocket attack targeting Camp Hurriya, the Government of Iraq (GOI) 

has taken steps to enhance security in and around the camp and we continue to urge the 

government to take all possible measures to ensure the safety of Camp Hurriya residents. United 

Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and the GOI are trying to work with the residents 

on security enhancements and we continue to tlrmly support the GOI and UNAMI's efforts in 

this endeavor. To date, the UN reports that over 250 bunkers and over 500 small T-walls have 

been delivered to the camp. However, the MEK must also do what it can to facilitate and 

enhance security at the camp, and ensure that safety equipment is used for its intended purpose 

of protecting individuals. 

We believe the permanent resettlement of former Ashraf residents outside Iraq is the only 

sustainable solution to ensure the safety of the residents, and remain committed to assisting the 

United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI), the United Nations High Commissioner 

for Retugees (UNHCR) and the Government of Iraq in this endeavor. The resettlement of Camp 

Hurriya residents outside Iraq requires immediate and urgent attention. Camp Hurriya remains a 

target and further delays only jeopardize the safety and security of residents. 

The United States has called on the leadership of the MEK to immediately and unconditionally 

accept available offers for resettlement and to ensure that all residents are able to freely 

participate in the UNHCR interview process, and have the opportunity for private conversations 

with monitors and other visitors. In that light, the residents of Camp Hurriya must resume full 

participation in resettlement interviews to ensure that individuals avail themselves of safe and 
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secure relocation opportunities outside Iraq. 11 is imperative that the leadership put the safety 

and security of their people foremost by taking advantage of these opportunities. 

UNAMI continues to assess that conditions at Camp Hurriya are well in excess of basic 

humanitarian standards for the provision of life support systems such as housing conditions, 

water, electricity, medicine and food supply. The camp is routinely monitored by United 

Nations agencies, who confirm that the camp has more than adequate basic life support. USG 

officials, including high-level ofllcials from Washington, have also visited the camp and 

confirmed the accuracy ofUNAMI's assessment of the living conditions. 

Question 9: 

Secretary Kerry, you mentioned our recent refocus on Asia and the fact that a significant 

part of that has to do with trade. I see a lot of wisdom in the "Asia Pivot." I do want to 

caution the Administration, however, on the trade aspects of the pivot. The Trans-Pacific 

Partnership (TPP) negotiations seem to be the big economic component of the pivot, and I 

am afraid this is a mistake. If you look at the admittedly early experience of the KQRUS 

FT A, you will see that it has not delivered promised benefits to American manufacturers or 

workers. The agreement went into effect in 2012. Qur merchandise trade deficit with 

Korea in 2012 was $16.6 billion, up from $13.2 billion in 2011. Exports from the United 

States did not increase - they actually fell by about a billion, to $42.3 billion in 2012. I fear 

a similar result with Vietnam, Malaysia and Japan, significant economies taking part in 

TPP with which we do not yet have an FT A. Should we be certain that we will have a 

positive impact on our trade balances before we enter into the TPP? 

Trade Agreements generally take several years to reveal their true impact on the countries 

involved, and this holds true in the case of our FT A with Korea. While we have seen positive 

results already, the tariff cuts and non-tariff provisions of the agreement will be phased in over 

time. Today, almost 80 percent of US. consumer and industrial exports to Korea, and over twothirds of America's agricultural exports, are already duty free. By January I, 2016, Korean 

tariffs on more than 95 percent of exports of US. industrial and consumer goods to Korea will 

have been eliminated. 

Despite sluggish global economic growth and reduced demand in Korea, which is at a 3-year 

low, injust the first year of the agreement, we are already seeing tangible benefits for businesses, 

workers, and consumers on both sides. Thanks to KORUS, the U.S. is fairing well compared to 

Korea's other top trading partners that do not have FTAs with Korea, such as China and Japan, 

which have both seen drops in their exports to Korea. 

For example, overall exports of US. manufactured goods to Korea have grown, with notable 

increases in the transportation sector, which experienced a 24 percent increase to $5 billion. 

US. passenger vehicle exports to Korea increased by nearly 50 percent. US. chemical and 

pharmaceutical exports have also increased by 20 percent and 30 percent, respectively, and we 

cannot forget about services. For example, exports of US. services - such as legal services, and 

travel services - increased by 9 percent in 2012 over 2011. Moreover, more high-tech trade has 

brought firms increased revenue related to royalties and licenses. 
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There is also strong U.S. export growth in the agriculture sector. U.S. exports offresh fruits and 

nuts, wine, and fruit juices, for example, have shown tremendous - even triple-digit - increases 

under KORUS. From day one, the tariffs on more than 10,000 products were cut to zero. Over 

the coming years, many more sectors will benefit as the agreement is phased in. 

The Asia-Pacitic region will see signiticant economic growth in the coming years, with some 

experts predicting up to 50% of global growih centered there. In addition, more than one billion 

Asian-Pacitic middle class consumers will be generated during this time. The TPP will tap this 

economic dynamism through increased market access, lower taritIs, and deeper integration 

through supply chain convergence and enhanced regulatory coherence. It will solidify the 21 <, 

century rules of trade, incorporating safeguards for innovation, addressing concerns in 

technology industries, and protecting workers and the environment - all key concerns for our 

policy makers and our population. 

Participating in such a game changing, paradigm shifting agreement is crucial if we are to 

continue generating jobs for American workers and spur increased export opportunities for our 

companies. Our industrial and agricultural goods will benetit from additional market access and 

taritI elimination in Vietnam, Malaysia, and Japan. They will also protit from comprehensive 

supply chain enhancements that will make goods originating from the TPP region more 

competitive against goods emanating from elsewhere. The TPP will serve as a catalyst for 

necessary structural and systemic reforms in these nations and our negotiators - cognizant of the 

non-tariff impediments that exist in these countries - are working tirelessly and creatively to 

ensure a level playing field is secured during the negotiations. Moreover, the TPP has significant 

strategic value in providing the economic foundation for our security alliances in the region, 

broadening the links necessary to consolidate our worldwide leadership position in the coming 

decades. 
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Question 1: 

Questions for the Record 

Submitted by the Honorable Ted Poe 

1'0 Secretary a/State John F. Kerry 

Three Inspector General offices charged with monitoring U.S. non-military aid programs 

in Pakistan found that USAID has not been able to demonstrate measurable progress in the 

implementation of U.S. assistance. Do you agree with this finding? If so, how does your 

budget request address these concerns so there will be measurable progress in the aid you 

are requesting here? 

We do not agree with this finding. Through our civilian assistance, we have made substantial 

and measurable progress in sectors most important to Pakistan's stability: energy, economic 

growth, stabilization of vulnerable areas, education, and health. For example, energy is our top 

assistance priority in Pakistan, as critical energy shortages undennine Pakistan's economic 

growth and even political stability. Since October 2009, U.S. assistance has added 900 MW to 

Pakistan's electricity grid, almost half the installed capacity of the Hoover Dam, benefitting over 

12.6 million people. Our stabilization initiatives aim to make communities in conflict and postconflict regions, particularly along the border with Afghanistan, less hospitable to insurgents and 

extend the writ of the civilian government, supporting our goal of national and regional security. 

To that end, to date USAID and the State Department have funded the construction of over 650 

km of roads in these extremism-prone border regions, increasing commercial activity and 

stability. And since October 2009, we have rebuilt 40 schools destroyed by militants III 

Pakistan's tribal areas, including 17 girls' schools, enabling 8,600 children to return to schooL 

The Administration is seeking $8576 million in non-military assistance to Pakistan in FY 2014 

to continue promote core U.S. national interests, as a stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan that 

can provide alternatives to extremism for its population is in our long-term national security 

interest. This also includes advancing our goals in Afghanistan, which our forces have sacriticed 

so much to achieve. We are constantly evaluating our assistance to Pakistan to ensure that it is 

consistent with our interests and producing measurable results. 

Question 2: 

Elements of the Pakistani security establishment have assisted groups like the Haqqani Network 

and the Taliban in numerous attacks on American soldiers in Afghanistan and have attacked the 

U.S. Embassy and ISAF Headquarters in KabuL Additionally, the Pakistani security services 

have a history of supporting Lashkar-e Taiba and the 2011 David Headley trial in Chicago 

clearly showed the links between the lSI and the Mumbai attacks. According to U.S. law, is 

Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism? 

The United States and Pakistan continue to have a vital, shared strategic interest in the fight 

against terrorism. Pakistan has suffered greatly at the hands of terrorists and extremists, with 

more than 6,000 military and civilian casualties over just the past year. We believe Pakistani 
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leaders - civilian and military alike - understand that Pakistan's security and economic interests 

will ultimately be best served by a more stable region free from violent extremism. 

Pakistan is a key ally in the shared fight against al-Qaida. Through our mutual efforts with 

Pakistan, we have been able to substantially weaken al-Qaida's leadership and operational 

capabilities. As President Obama has said, since 2001, more terrorists have been killed in 

Pakistan than in any other country. Pakistan has also publicly called on the Taliban to enter into 

a dialogue with the Afghan government. Pakistan supported the listing of the Haqqani Network 

under the UNSCR 1988 (Taliban sanctions) regime. 

Of course, there is no denying that safe havens on both sides of the border continue to pose a 

serious threat to Afghans, Pakistanis, and Americans alike. We have long expressed our view 

that we are especially troubled by the safe havens the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network, and 

groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) have in Pakistan. The United States and Pakistan have a 

strong shared interest in working together to tackle these safe-havens, from which terrorists 

threaten both of our countries and others in the region. 

We continue to press Pakistan to take additional steps to dismantle all terrorist groups, no matter 

whom they target or where they strike. This includes LeT, which carried out the terrible attacks 

in Mumbai in 2008 that killed six U.S. citizens, and remains a serious threat to regional stability. 

We also continue to underscore that there must be a coordinated and concerted effort to combat 

extremists of all kinds, whoever they threaten. 

Question 3: 

Given the recent terrorist attack that killed 7, do you support adding T -walls to Camp 

Hurriya? Would the residents of Camp Hurriya be safer in Camp Ashraf? 

Following the February 9 rocket attack targeting Camp Hurriya, the Government of Iraq has 

taken steps to enhance security in and around the camp. We continue to urge the government to 

take all possible measures to ensure the safety of Camp Hurriya residents. The United Nations 

Assistance Mission for Iraq (UN AMI) and the GOI are trying to work with the MEK camp 

leadership on security enhancements and we continue to firmly support the many efforts of the 

GOT and UNAMI in this endeavor. Since the attack, UNAMI reports that over 250 bunkers and 

nearly 600 small T-walls have been delivered to the camp and other security measures have been 

put into place. As we have seen from other terrorist incidents, no amount of physical structures 

can guarantee the safety and security of Camp Hurriya or Camp Ashraf, which clearly 

underscores the urgency of resettlement of residents outside of Iraq. 

We join UNAMI and other nations in urging the permanent resettlement of former Ashraf 

residents outside Iraq. Resettlement is the only sustainable solution to ensure the safety of the 

residents. We remain firmly committed to supporting and assisting UNAMI, UNHCR and the 

Government of Iraq in their efforts to facilitate resettlement. The resettlement of Camp Hurriya 

residents outside Iraq requires immediate and urgent attention. We have made known to the 

MEK leadership and Camp Hurriya residents that Camp Hurriya remains a target and further 

delays in resettlement jeopardize the safety and security of residents 
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Question 1: 

Questions for the Record 

Submitted by the Honorable Albio Sires 

To Secretary u.lState John F Kerry 

As a result of the recent financial crisis in Cyprus, the new government finds itself 

having to implement very difficult austerity and financial measures to get the 

Cypriot economy back on track. Do you agree it would be unreasonable to expect 

the Cypriot government to engage in a new round of UN talks before the country 

has gotten back on its feet economically and is able to devote the necessary attention 

to the diplomatic process/problem of negotiating a just and lasting solution to the 

Cyprus question? Do you agree that negotiations for the solution of the Cyprus 

question should only resume once the appropriate preparations take place, so as to 

ensure that these will be meaningful and result-oriented, allowing for substantial 

progress and real prospects for a solution? 

I am pleased that both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders recently reaUirmed 

their commitment to finding a solution, and expect negotiations will resume once 

appropriate preparations have been made. The lJN Secretary General's Special Advisor 

for Cyprus Alexander Downer was in Cyprus recently to hold meetings with both leaders 

on the way forward During his visit, he expressed understanding that President 

Anastasiades must address Cyprus' significant economic challenges in the short term. 

The United States remains committed to supporting efforts under UN auspices to reunify 

Cyprus as a bizonal, bicommunal federation. We do not seek to impose deadlines, but as 

the parties themselves have said in the past, the status quo is unacceptable. So while 1 

recognize the challenging nature of the process, 1 hope the parties will reach a settlement 

as soon as possible. 

Question 2: 

Significant natural gas finds off the coast of the Republic of Cyprns could contribute 

to the European Union's plans for energy diversification and future energy 

security. Do you continue to support the right of Cyprns to explore for natural gas 

in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ)? Are you concerned about threats by other 

countries to interfere in such exploration? 

1 support Cyprus' right to explore for energy in its offshore areas. Disputes over energy 

exploration in Cyprus must ultimately be resolved through the negotiation process, under 

UN auspices, to reunify the island. Such a settlement will help to strengthen regional 

stability as it would facilitate the normalization of relations between Cyprus and Turkey. 

I believe that the island's oil and gas resources, like all of its resources, should be 

equitably shared between both communities in the context of an overall settlement. 
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Question 3: 

US Policy has always supported a solution to the Cyprus question that involves a bizonal, bi-communal, reunified Cyprus. T am concerned that funds used for bicommunal programs on Cyprus have been obligated without appropriate advance 

notification to and consultation with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. 

How can we work to address this issue and ensure that USAID funding is working 

in concert with US policy? 

Every activity implemented with US. funding in Cyprus is designed to help Greek 

Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots chart a path to peace and reunification in line with the 

Congressional mandate. 

The United States is committed to consultation and transparency with the government of 

the Republic of Cyprus on our foreign assistance program. We have and will continue to 

be transparent and sensitive to issues raised by the Republic of Cyprus. Likewise, we 

will continue to consult with and be sensitive to the concerns of the Turkish Cypriot 

community. 

That said, for the US. foreign assistance program to be effective, neither side can be 

allowed to make funding decisions reserved for the US. Government. Indeed, it would 

contravene current Congressional report language directing that the organizations 

implementing the US. foreign assistance program, as well as the specific nature of that 

assistance, not be subject to the prior approval of any foreign government. 

Question 4: 

The Turkish Foreign Minister recently sent you a letter regarding the Cyprus 

question. During your recent meetings in Turkey, Mr. Secretary, did you discuss 

the Cyprus question with Turkish officials? Did you convey that US policy still 

continues to support the solution of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation in Cyprus, 

based on UN Security Council Resolutions? 

In my recent meetings with Turkish officials, I discussed a range of pressing issues, 

including Cyprus. T expressed my support for the reunification of Cyprus as a bizonal, 

bicommunal federation, which has been the longstanding policy of the United States, 

consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolutions. 
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Ouestion 1: 

Questions for the Record 

Suhmitted hy the Honorahle Matt Salmon 

1'0 Secretary o/State John F. Kerry 

Why was there no military response to the events in Benghazi on September 11, 20l2? 

a. Were military assets in the region available? If not, why not? 

b. If so, were they alerted? 

c. Were assets deployed to any location in preparation for a rescue or recovery 

attempt? 

d. Was military assistance requested by the Department of State? If so, what type? 

e. Were any US Army/Naval/USMC assets available to support the US diplomats in 

Benghazi during the attack? 

f. What, if any, recommendations for military action were made by DOD and the US 

Africa Command? 

With regard to Question I d, the Department of State requested military assistance from the 

Department of Defense in response to the attack on our mission in Benghazi, Libya. When 

requesting such assistance, the Department of State did not and does not specify the type of 

assistance being requested. The Department of Defense determines what response capabilities 

are available and how best they can respond. 

For Questions la, Ib, Ic, Ie, and If, the answers are not within the purview of the Department of 

State. We respectfully defer to the Department of Defense 

Ouestion 2: 

What, if any, non-military assistance was provided during the attack in Benghazi? 

The Special Mission Compound (SMC), where seven State Department personnel, including the 

Ambassador, were present, came under attack at approximately 9:42 p.m. local time on 

September 11. Personnel at the Annex received a call from one of the Diplomatic Security 

agents at the SMC alerting the Annex to the attack, and an Annex response team departed its 

compound at approximately 10:05 local time to render assistance. 

Upon notification of the attack from a Diplomatic Security agent around 9:45 local time, 

Embassy Tripoli set up a command center and notified Washington. Soon after, Embassy Tripoli 

chartered a private airplane and deployed a seven-person security team, which included two U.S. 

military personnel, to Benghazi. This team arrived at the Annex prior to the second attack and 

rendered assistance during that attack. 

At the direction of the U.S military's Africa Command (AFRICOM), DoD moved a remotely 

piloted, unarmed surveillance aircraft which arrived over the Special Mission Compound. A 

second remotely piloted, unarmed surveillance aircraft relieved the first, and monitored the 
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eventual evacuation of personnel from the Annex to Benghazi airport later on the morning of 

September 12. 

Question 3: 

How many US personnel were injured in Benghazi? 

In addition to the four Americans who lost their lives, two Diplomatic Security (OS) personnel 

were injured in Benghazi. One DS agent suffered severe injuries during the attack at the Annex. 

Another OS agent was injured after the blast percussion at the Annex caused him to fall from a 

ladder. We refer you to other agencies for information on their personnel. 

Question 4: 

Why have the snrvivors of the attack not been questioned? Where are the survivors? 

The survivors have been questioned by the FBI and the independent Benghazi Accountability 

Review Board, as well as Department officials. As Secretary Clinton indicated in her testimony 

on January 23, the primary concern and focus of the Department immediately following the 

tragic attacks on our mission in Benghazi was the safety and well-being of our personnel. Our 

top priorities were the evacuation of personnel to a safe location and the provision of crucial 

medical treatment and, as such, the Department did not debrief evacuated personnel in the 

immediate hours after the attacks. 

The FBI conducted law enforcement interviews of four of the five evacuated agents, with a DS 

special agent present to support the FBT, on September 15 and 16. The fifth DS agent was 

unable to participate at that time for medical reasons; however, that agent was interviewed by the 

FBT in late September. 

DS and other Department of State officials held conversations with the five DS agents in the 

United States starting in late September, following their initial interviews with the FBI. 

All State Department employees who survived the attacks were also interviewed by the 

independent Benghazi Accountability Review Board, and the ARB's comprehensive report has 

been shared with the Congress. 

One of the five survivors is currently recovering in the hospital, and the other four have returned 

to duty. 

Questions: 

5. Who was in the White House Situation Room (WHSR) during the entire 8-hour period 

of the attacks, and was a senior US military officer present? 

6. Where were Leon Panetta and General Martin Dempsey during the crisis, and what 

inputs and recommendations did they make? 
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7. Where were Tom Donilon, the National Security Advisor, Denis McDonough, his 

deputy, Valerie Jarrett and John Brennan during the attacks, and what (if any) 

recommendations or decisions did any of them make? 

8. Why were F-16 fighter aircraft based in Aviano, Italy (less than two hours away) never 

considered a viable option for disruption (if not dispersal) of attackers until "boots on 

the ground" (troop support-General Dempsey's words) arrived? 

9. Were any strike aircraft (such as an AC-130 gunship) in the area or possibly overhead 

that would cause former SEAL Tyrone Woods to laser-designate his attacker's position 

and call for gunship fire support, thereby revealing his own location that led to his 

death? 

10. Who gave the order to "stand down" that was heard repeatedly during the attacks? 

For these questions, the answers are not within the purview of the Department of State. We 

respectfully defer to the White House and the Department of Defense. 

We do note for questions 8 and 10, respectively, that the independent Benghazi Accountability 

Review Board stated in its report: 

• The Board found no evidence of any undue delays in decision making or denial of 

support from Washington or from the military combatant commanders. 

• The interagency response was timely and appropriate, but there simply was not enough 

time for armed U. S. military assets to have made a difference. 

Ouestion 11: 

What threat waruings existed before the attack, and what were the Department of Defense 

and Department of State responses to those warnings? What data (which will reveal exact 

timelines and command decisions) is contained within the various SITREPS, records, logs, 

videos, and recordings maintained by the myriad of DOD, Intelligence Community and 

State Department Command Centers that were monitoring the events in Benghazi as they 

unfolded? 

The independent Benghazi Accountability Review Board (ARB) found that "intelligence 

provided no immediate, specific tactical warning of the September 11 attacks." However, as the 

ARB noted, "2012 saw an overall deterioration of the security environment in Benghazi, as 

highlighted by a series of security incidents involving the Special Mission, international 

organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and third-country nationals and 

diplomats .. 

Our personnel both in Libya and in Washington were monitoring the fluid security environment 

in Benghazi in the months preceding the attack, including the attacks and incidents directed at 

foreigners. U.S. personnel in both Tripoli and Benghazi convened meetings regularly to review 

mission security posture, including in response to the incidents that took place over the course of 

the year. For example, following the April attack against our compound and the June attack on 

our ally, the United Kingdom, we took a number of steps to enhance security at the U.S. Mission 

in Benghazi, including raising the walls, adding razor wire, enhancing security camera coverage, 

adding security lighting, and adding additional local guards at night. We also stepped up our 
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engagement with Libyan forces, particular! y with regard to seeking an increased Government of 

Libya security presence outside the Mission. 

Additional data, including from SITREPS, emails, and other records, can be found in the 

documents we have made available to your committee. Detailed timelines can be found in the 

unclassified and classified reports of the independent Benghazi Accountability Review Board, 

which reflect the input of the people on the ground in Benghazi and Tripoli, and have been made 

available to Congress. 

Question 12: 

Why did the Commander-in-Chief and Secretary of State never once check in during the 

uight to find out the status of the crisis situation iu Benghazi? 

As Secretary of State Clinton told the House Foreign Affairs Committee in January, she talked to 

the President that night and was in "constant communication" with the senior administration 

officials throughout the night Like other officials, she received frequent updates during the 

attacks on September II - 12. 

Question 13: 

What was the nature of Ambassador Stevens' business in Benghazi at the time of the 

attack? 

Ambassador Stevens understood that diplomacy, by its nature, must be practiced in dangerous 

places because U.S. interests suffer and our security is threatened when we are absent He was in 

Benghazi to meet with Libyan officials and re-engage with the contacts that he had developed 

during his time there as Special Envoy, as well as to open an "American Corner" [library and 

resource center 1 at a local language school. He wanted to reaffirm that he and the United States 

recognized the importance of Libya's second city, the cradle of its revolution. 

Question 14: 

What guidance has been provided to survivors and family members since the time of the 

attack, and who issued that guidance? 

Tn the aftermath of the Benghazi attacks, a Department-wide coordination effort was launched to 

support the survivors and the families of those injured or killed. The Office of Casualty 

Assistance in the Bureau of Human Resources (HR), in coordination with the offices of Medical 

Services, Logistics Management, and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security Offices of Victims' 

Resource Advocacy Program (VRAP) and Peer Support Caring Outreach Coordinator, assisted 

with the repatriation of remains and medical assistance for those injured. HR's Office of 

Employee Relations, in coordination with the American Embassy in Tripoli, provided specific 

information and assistance to the families in regard to workers compensation, which is overseen 

by the Department of Labor 
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The Office of Casualty Assistance and DS' VRAP Coordinator notified next of kin about grief 

and loss resources, provided information on Department benefits, issued information to assist as 

families arranged final details, and explained program eligibility options for help with expenses, 

such as the International Victim Expense Reimbursement program and federal tax relief for the 

year of the death and the preceding year. 

HR's Office of Employee Relations and Embassy Tripoli collected and submitted the appropriate 

Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA) claim forms to the Department of Labor, Office 

of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP), for benefit determinations. The Department of 

Labor sends final benefit decisions to the surviving family members or personal representatives. 

For the officers injured in the attack, the Office of Medical Services arranged medical evacuation 

to the United States in coordination with DOD. Following repatriation, the Office assigned a 

Social Worker from its Employee Consultation Service to liaise with the employees and provide 

assistance as needed while receiving care at a local hospital. 

Question 15: 

Why are so many agencies now requiring their personnel that were involved in or have 

access to information regarding the events that took place in Benghazi sign Non-Disclosure 

Agreements? 

As part of their employment, most Department employees sign the Classified Information 

Nondisclosure Agreement (Standard Form 312). The Department has not asked employees to 

sign any separate non-disclosure agreements regarding events in Benghazi. 
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Qnestion 1: 

Questions for the Record 

Submitted by the Honorable William Keating 

To Secretary of State John F. Kerry 

Central Asia- The President's bndget reveals an overall increase in fnnding for Central 

Asia. How does this increase apply to U.S. policy in the region? Will some of this fnnding 

go toward the Administration's Silk Road Initiative to fnrther integrate the conntries along 

the NDN? Will we begin to see this vision become a reality and if so, how? 

The United States supports a New Silk Road vision for a peaceful, secure, and prosperous 

Afghanistan at the heart of a peaceful, secure and prosperous region. Improving connections 

across South and Central Asia is made all the more urgent as Afghanistan moves through the 

transition process, developing a private sector-led economy, putting its economy on a more 

sustainable footing. 

To support thi s policy, the President's FY2014 budget requests additional resources for the 

regional economic integration (REI) of Central Asian states to support the New Silk Road vision 

(approximately $3 million in FY2012; $18.5 million in FY 2014). This increase reflects the 

importance and opportunity to use assistance resources to accelerate implementation of the New 

Silk Road vision. The funds will be used not only to increase trade, transit and investment, but 

also to connter transnational threats, increase cooperation on energy resources, develop 

sustainable people to people constituencies for regional engagement, and promote the rational 

use of natural resonrces across the region. 

While onr resources to date have been relatively modest, we have made progress. Onr targeted 

assistance has advanced technical nnderstanding of large-scale energy projects snch as CASA1000, and also facilitated energy trade between Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan. Tn 

partnership with the Aga Khan Development Program's Pamir Energy project, we have 

snpported the installation of new transmission lines which are powering two villages comprising 

a total of 128 households, bnsinesses and government buildings in Afghan Badakhshan. Power 

links to a third Afghan village will be complete this summer. Associated training of engineers to 

maintain the new lines is also taking place. 

Women's economic empowerment has been a cross-cutting priority, and in 2011 we hosted 124 

dynamic women business leaders from across Central Asia at the Women's Economic 

Symposium (WES) in Bishkek, including then Kyrgyz Republic President Roza Otunbayeva. 

The participants developed a roadmap to increase women's entrepreneurship and regional trade, 

and we are now supporting a range of follow-on activities including a Central Asia-Afghanistan 

Women's Business Association, proposed by WES participants. Through this diplomatic and 

programmatic initiative thus far, women have started an impressive 141 businesses and expanded 

57 existing businesses. SCA is currently funding an independent evaluation of the WES and will 

use the results to inform the design of future programs, including building stronger links between 

women leaders in Central and South Asia. 
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World Trade Organization (WTO) membership for Central Asian countries can also facilitate 

greater regional trade, however for many years Kyrgyzstan was the sole member. At the end of 

2012 Tajikistan's accession was also approved, and we are now providing technical assistance on 

implementation of WTO accession laws and regulations in the country. Kazakhstan and 

Mghanistan are also making solid progress on their accession bids and Turkmenistan and 

Uzbekistan have also recently expressed interest in joining the WTO. U.S. assistance to small 

and medium-sized enterprise development, agricultural production, water management, and 

vocational training are also beginning to expand Afghanistan's economic ties with Central and 

South Asia. 

Notably, we have also successfully leveraged other resources in support of the New Silk Road 

vision; between Fiscal Years 2010 and 2014, estimated outlays from other donors, such as the 

Asia Development Bank and the World Bank, in support of energy transmission lines, 

hydropower plants, and reforms total more than $2 billion. 

Note that the funds targeted for REl are being shifted from the South & Central Asia Regional 

budget to the Central Asia Regional budget in FY 2014. Taking into consideration this internal 

shift from one operating unit to another, the request for Central Asia, as a whole, is essentially 

straightlined from FY 2012, reflecting an increase ofless than one-half percent. 

Question 2: 

Are the Magnitsky Act and following Russian retaliation efforts, including the adoption 

ban and the Russian list of Americans, redefining the "reset?" Can other players, like 

Germany, playa greater role in maintaining Russia's relationship with the West? 

Moreover, what international efforts are taking place to ensure that NGOs working in 

Russia are granted a more secure, stable place in Russian civil society? 

The United States' policy towards Russia over the past four years began with the recognition that 

the state of the relationship as the President took office did not serve the United States' foreign 

policy interests. The Administration's policy has been premised on the recognition that we 

should cooperate with Russia in those areas that advance our mutual interests, engage Russia in a 

frank discussion of our policy differences, and firmly stand by our principles, our partners, and 

our allies. 

The United States continues to have differences with Russia's leadership about human rights and 

growing restrictions on civil society. I and officials at all levels of the Department of State 

regularly and directly raise these concerns with Russian government counterparts. T am 

committed to having an honest and open dialogue on civil society and human rights issues with 

the Government of Russia and with Russian civil society. Tn government-to-government 

discussions, I voice concerns both publicly and privately about the new laws that restrict the 

work of civil society. 

Russia and Europe are each highly important to the other, and T encourage like-minded nations, 

especially those in the OSCE region that share our concerns, to voice in public and private their 

views about the negative developments for NGOs, civil society, and human rights in Russia. 
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Qnestion 3: 

An election is supposed to take place for the Northern Provincial Council in the 

traditionally Tamil area of Sri Lanka in September, the first one in the area since the end 

of the war. A party meeting of the Tamil National Alliance has already been attacked 

while the police stood by. Will the US support sending international election observers to 

watch the campaign and the election, since there is likely to be violence? 

Over the past several years, the U. S. government, through USAID, has strengthened the capacity 

of several local Sri Lankan organizations to promote election monitoring and voter education and 

registration. The recent elections in the Eastern, Northwestern, and Central Provinces provided 

an opportunity for these organizations to further develop their skills. 

For the elections in the Northern Province, USAlD will work with local organizations through 

two different programs. The Democracy and Governance office will provide grants to support 

election monitoring, voter education and documentation using Elections and Political Process 

funding. In addition, the Office of Transition Initiatives will support a range of elections-related 

activities through their Reintegration and Stabilization in the East and North (RISEN) program. 

The activities for the RISEN program are still being finalized, but will include voter outreach 

activities and support for domestic monitoring. 
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Question 1: 

Questions for the Record 

Submitted by the Honorable George Holding 

1'0 Secretary of State John F. Kerry 

In 2010, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen rightly stated that the 

greatest threat to our national security is our national debt. As the House Foreign Affairs 

Committee begins to consider the State authorization bill, where should the Committee 

look to find wasteful spending and programs? What do you suggest the Department do to 

increase the evaluation and monitoring of assistance it implements? Will the Department 

start publishing and posting, potentially on the web, data in a more transparent manner, 

including for security assistance? 

The President has made it a priority of his Administration to save taxpayer dollars, streamline 

operations and improve government services. To that end, he has waged an aggressive campaign 

to eliminate duplication and waste. 

Tn light of fiscal constraints, the FY 2014 budget request for the Department and USATD makes 

tough trade-offs within their operations and assistance requests, including targeted reductions to 

numerous programs to focus on the highest priorities, and takes advantage of cost efficiencies in 

programs to continue to meet our objectives. For example, the budget: 

• Reduces funding for the Frontline States reflecting current program needs and U.S. 

policy, including a targeted decrease in Iraq programs and presence, the transition to a 

civilian-led mission in Afghanistan, and the elimination of the Pakistan 

Counterinsurgency Capability Fund; 

• Refonns our food aid program to ensure the United States can respond most 

etfectively and etliciently to humanitarian crises and chronic food insecurity. 

Refonns will enable the United States to reach more people in need - at less cost per 

person - by increasing tools available, including local and regional purchase, purchase 

of U.S. agricultural commodities and products, cash vouchers, and cash for work 

programs; 

Makes tradeotls across regional assistance budgets, including reducing Europe and 

Eurasia by 21 percent and the Western Hemisphere by 14 percent (excluding Title II). 

The East Asia and the Pacitic request sees the most significant increase - more than 7 

percent above FY 2012 to support the Asia - Pacific rebalance. 

• Focuses Feed the Future and Global Health Initiative programs on countries with the 

greatest need and capacity for sustainable progress. 

• Identifies cost savings by implementing administrative efficiencies in travel, utilities, 

communications, supplies and equipment spending. 

In FY 2013, the Department is working toward OMB's targeted spending reductions of$182 

million less than FY 201 0 on key operational costs, including travel, supplies, IT devices, 

printing and reproduction, executive fleet, and promotional items. In December 2012, leadership 

at all posts were advised of government-wide mandates to reduce cost, scrutinize travel, review 

service contract requests, and hasten adoption of cost savings within the "Top Eight Initiatives": 

Warehousing, Voucher Processing, Utilities, TDY International Cooperative Administrative 
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Support Services (lCASS) Cost Management, Regionalization of Support Services, Furniture 

Pool, Expendable Supplies, and Local Transportation. Leadership at posts were directed to 

discuss the budget and procurement implications of these orders with their section heads and 

regional bureau executive office, and to constrain spending. 

Regarding your question on aid transparency, we strongly support the principles of aid 

transparency and will continue to prioritize ongoing efforts to make assistance information more 

transparent and available to the public. The Department of State and USAlD are working with 

the interagency to make all US. foreign assistance data available on the Foreign Assistance 

Dashboard, which can be found at http://toretgtlassi~t§..nce.gov. 

The Bulletin on Collection of U.S. Foreign Assistance Data that the Office of Management and 

Budget released this fall (Bulletin 12-01) represents a significant step forward for the US. 

Government's aid transparency effort, and is a great example of interagency coordination and 

collaboration on this front The Bulletin 

• Streamlines foreign assistance reporting tor multiple different uses to minimize the 

burden on field and agencies; 

• Sets a standard and builds the foundation tor future reporting tor all agencies that fund or 

execute foreign assistance funds, including defining the standard data fields for reporting 

to ensure standardization, coherence and comparability in our data; and 

Fultills part of the US National Action Plan for the Open Government Partnership. 

The Department and USAlD are fully committed to implementing evaluation practices based on 

U.S. and international best practices, and both have robust evaluation policies which emphasize 

the use of evaluations. An important element of these policies is to ensure evaluation reports are 

transparent and widely available. We are also working diligently to build the capacity of 

Department staff to perform evaluations. These efforts are growing and require that foreign 

assistance resources be dedicated specifically for evaluation purposes. 

Question 2: 

How will you and the Department work with both Kosovo and Serbia to achieve a long 

term solution to promote domestic and regional stability? 

On April 19, the Governments of Kosovo and Serbia concluded an agreement in the context of 

the European Union-facilitated Dialogue on principles for the nonnalization of their relations. 

Though the Dialogue has been an EU-led process, we have engaged consistently with both 

countries' political and social leaders and at the highest levels in Washington, Brussels, Belgrade 

and Pristina in support of the ED's efforts. Deputy Assistant Secretary of European Affairs 

Philip Reeker traveled to Brussels numerous times and met with Prime Ministers Thaci and 

Dacic as well as ED counterparts on the margins of many of the Dialogue meetings hosted by 

ED High Representative Ashton. 

The Dialogue agreement is a significant development that facilitates both countries' European 

integration as well as promotes stability, peace, and reconciliation in the region. Those living in 

northern Kosovo have the ability to help build legitimate political, justice, and administrative 

institutions, which the area has lacked for more than a decade. Instead of diverting large sums of 
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money to supporting parallel governing structures in the north, the Government of Serbia can 

instead focus on investing in its infrastructure and promoting investment. The Government of 

Kosovo can focus on building institutions in the north and ensuring that all of its citizens benefit 

from improving ties with its neighbor. We are encouraging Kosovo and Serbia now to fully 

implement all Dialogue agreements reached to date, so that citizens in both countries can build a 

more prosperous future, and we remain committed to working with both governments, the EU, 

and other international partners to help them achieve these goals. 

The United States has long supported integrating the entire Balkan region into European and 

Euro-Atlantic institutions, including Kosovo and Serbia, and we and our European partners 

cooperate closely with the Serbian and Kosovo governments as they work to realize that goal. 

Our programs, assistance, and activities in Serbia are all aimed at furthering the development of 

a more prosperous country that is in harmony with European standards and values. Our 

programs aim to strengthen the institutional capacity of key government bodies, promote 

transparency, combat corruption through the improvement of adherence to the rule of law, 

support civil society development, and create opportunities for private sector economic growth. 

Serbia has made great strides in strengthening its democratic institutions and practices and has 

the potential to become an anchor of trade and stability in the region. As a result of continued 

progress on implementing necessary reforms and in concluding this important agreement with 

Kosovo, the European Commission recommended to EU member states that negotiations be 

opened with Serbia on EU accession. 

In Kosovo, we continue to support and encourage the necessary reform work to further Kosovo's 

Euro-Atlantic integration efforts. Our assistance efforts focus on strengthening rule oflaw, 

fighting crime and corruption, ensuring Kosovo can remain a diverse country, building 

institutions, increasing educational opportunities, and expanding private-sector led economic 

development. Kosovo has made significant progress in its reform agenda, as evidenced by the 

recent European Commission recommendation to open negotiations on a Stabilization and 

Association Agreement. 

Question 3: 

Opportunities for new commercial shipping routes, energy exploration, and tourism are 

emerging in the Arctic Region, In certain Arctic areas, we are beginning to see some of 

these activities already underway. I am concerned however that the United States is not 

only falling behind in terms of being able to secure our interests, but we are also failing to 

fully engage in the international discussion to ensure we have a primary role in shaping the 

future talks and policy. China has applied for Permanent Observer status in the Arctic 

Council even though they are not a littoral state. Do you view this, or a potential European 

Commission bid for a formal role in the Arctic, as a challenge to U.S. sovereignty and 

interests in the Arctic? What should the U.S. be doing right now along with other littoral 

states to ensure we are prepared ahead of time to meet the challenges and opportunities in 

the Arctic? Is the current work of the Arctic Council enough? 

The Department of State is fully engaged in international discussions about the Arctic. The 

United States is a leader in the Arctic Council, and has led or co-led all major projects since its 
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inception. Many of these have helped to advance our national interests such as the recent Arctic 

search and rescue agreement. That agreement and the ongoing work on an agreement on Arctic 

oil pollution preparedness and response highlight the need shared by all Arctic States in securing 

assets for use in emergency situations in the Arctic. 

Observer status in the Arctic Council carries with it no participatory rights. Indeed, the Council 

is structured to ensure the observers do not participate in decision-making about the Arctic. At 

the technical level, including in the working groups, they are encouraged to participate where 

they can meaningfully contribute such as in climate change or biodiversity projects. The United 

States works with all Arctic States, not just littoral states, to ensure that we are all well-prepared 

for the rapid changes taking place in the Arctic. This is why we joined in the establishment of 

the Arctic Council in 1996 and have played a leading role in that body. The Arctic Council is the 

only body of its kind in the region, focusing on environmental protection and sustainable 

development. We are active in the wide array of activities on-going in its working groups and 

task forces. The United States also participates in other organizations that play important roles in 

the Arctic, such as the International Maritime Organization with respect to shipping, and the 

International Civil Aviation Organization with respect to aviation. The United States will 

become the Arctic Council's Chainnan in 2015-2017 and the Department of State is at present 

working to prepare for the US. Chairmanship of the Council. 
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Qnestion 1: 

Questions for the Record 

Suhmitted hy the Honorahle David N. C'ieilline 

1'0 Secretary o/State John F. Kerry 

What efforts are nnderway to ensnre that Knwait, Sandi Arabia, and the United Arab 

Emirates, in particnlar, are making good on their commitments of aid to Syrian refngees, 

and what coordination is nnderway with donor conntries to ensnre that the assistance is 

reaching the affected individnals? Are we considering closing the Syrian Embassy here in 

the United States? What is the rationale for continning the bilateral relationship? What 

efforts are being made with respect to protecting Syrian girls and women in the refngee 

camps? We are seeing reports, again, that are talking abont sexnal violence, etc. 

The UN humanitarian appeals for inside Syria and for refugees in neighboring countries are 

currently 63% and 55% subscribed, respectively. International donors have provided nearly 

$816 million of the $1.6 billion requested in the combined U.N. appeals for Syria and 

neighboring countries. 

Kuwait recently fulfilled its $300 million pledge and strongly urge other countries to follow 

Kuwait's lead and work through UN agencies and international NGOs. 

The United States has urged other donors at the highest levels to fulfill pledges made at the 

International Humanitarian Pledging Conference in Kuwait on January 30. 

We expect revised appeals for inside and outside Syria to be released at the end of May, so this is 

a good time to examine how the international community is doing in responding to the crisis. In 

our discussions with organizations we fund, like UNHCR, we are asking them to identify how 

they will target the most vulnerable and incorporate more robust support for over-burdened host 

communities. 

In response to your question about the Syrian embassy, on May 2012, in response to the heinous 

massacre in HouIa, we declared the Syrian charge d'affaires persona non grata. This was a strong 

signal of our disapproval of the regime. however the embassy continues to provide visa and 

passport services, both of which are critical for the Syrian-American diaspora. 

On the issue of what efforts are being made with respect to protecting Syrian girls and women in 

the refugee camps. we are very concerned by reports of sexual and gender-based violence 

(GBV), and are working closely with humanitarian partners to strengthen protection for 

vulnerable refugees, particularly women and girls. Our humanitarian funding helps support 

programs to prevent and respond to GBV, including by providing assistance to GBV survivors 

and working with communities to prevent GBV. 

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). which has received over $ I I I 

million in U.S. government funding for its Syrian response thus far, provides GBV services and 

coordinates protection and GBV services provided by other UN agencies and implementing 
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partners. UNHCR also works with host governments to develop capacity to help GBV survivors. 

The U.S. government also supports NGO and International Organization (10) partners to 

complement UNHCR's programming and activities, providing over $4 million to programs 

throughout the region to address GBV prevention and treatment. 

In Jordan, UNHCR works in partnership with the Family Protection Department (FPD), affiliated 

with the Jordanian Public Security Department (PSD), to strengthen its capacity to address GBV 

and provide psychosocial support services in the northern part of the country (Irbid, Ramtha, 

Mafraq and Za'atri camp). PRM supplements UNHCR's efforts by supporting a program 

through a non-government organization (NGO) partner, which provides direct services for 

women and children in Ramtha, Mafraq, Irbid and the Za'atri refugee camp. This project will 

assist over 20,000 refugees through direct case management for survivors (including male and 

child survivors of GBV), individual therapy, group therapy, supplemental psychosocial activities, 

health services (including reproductive health and care for survivors of sexual assault), and 

referrals. Another US.-funded NGO program is working to educate the refugee population on 

GBV and to build the capacity of health workers to better identify and respond to GBV cases 

they encounter. 

In Lebanon, UNHCR, UNICEF, and other agencies are identifying gaps in GBV programs, 

providing technical training to Ministry of Social Affairs workers dealing with GBV survivors, 

and expanding referrals for survivors to receive specialized services. Recognizing that refugees 

in Lebanon are not in camps and are geographically spread across the country, the United States 

is complementing UNHCR's efforts by funding a non-government organization to map local 

agencies that specialize in assisting women and girl survivors of violence in the north and Bekaa 

and conducting intensive GBV capacity development training for two clinics so they can 

appropriately receive and manage GBV cases. Syrians also access gender-based violence 

services provided through a separate NGO program targeting primarily Iraqi refugees. 

In Turkey, the government is the primary service provider to Syrian refugees through its Disaster 

and Emergency Planning Agency (AFAD) with UNHCR serving in an advisory capacity on 

camp services. The US government is funding the United Nations Population Fund 

(UNFPA) to support GBV prevention and response in refugee camps, as well as reproductive 

health services. We are also funding an NGO for primary health care, mental health, and 

psychosocial support in both urban and camp environments that includes medical treatment and 

counseling to GBV survivors. 

In Iraq, UNHCR is working with the refugee population to raise awareness of GBV and through 

its partners, is providing social counseling and legal support to survivors. 

In addition, the United States has provided funding to the United Nations Relief and Works 

Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to support both its humanitarian 

response to the Syrian conflict as well as the development of a gender-based violence referral 

system for Palestinian refugees, including those affected by the conflict. UNRWA is working to 

ensure GBV survivors have access to necessary support from UNRWA staff and external 

medical services and to increase community awareness of this issue. UNRWA has included 

Palestinian refugees from Syria that are displaced in Lebanon in its GBV programming and is 
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currently developing a referral system for Palestinian refugees inside Syria, despite the 

operational challenges. 

Protection is at the heart of what PRM's work and we will continue to work with partners to 

monitor GBV risks in refugee host countries as the situation evolves. 

We work with our partners, tapping into their expertise, to determine the best way to deliver 

assistance in a culturally sensitive manner. For example, one of our NGO partners conducted 

assessments to inform their GBV programming. Although GBV is a sensitive issue, NGO 

representatives expressed surprise at how readily interviewees shared stories and fears. The 

assessments included not only female refugees but men and boys as well as service providers. 

The NGO noted that it was not easy to determine if participants were speaking about personal 

experiences, situations they witnessed or stories they heard. As a result, the NGO concluded that 

GBV is prevalent in the Syrian crisis; the NGO is continuing to develop relationships and gather 

data to understand the scope of the problem. During the assessments, the refugees indicated that 

they preferred to obtain GBV-related services in a location that would not identify them as a 

SUrvIVor. For this reason, the NGO has incorporated GBV programming into medical service 

provision. 

The U.S. government partners incorporate protection, in this case GBV education and support to 

survivors, as a component of a wide range of assistance programming including health, 

education, psychosocial, economic, and water, sanitation and hygiene assistance. Programs are 

designed to protect those most at risk and prevent violence. 

Question 2: 

What is your assessment of what is likely to happen on the Korean Peninsula? 

What might we do, as Members of Congress, to help bring stability to that region of the 

world and to protect American national security interests on the Korean 

Peninsula? 

North Korea remains one of the most opaque countries in the world. The United States 

continues to closely monitor developments there, but our insights are limited. We remain 

vigilant against North Korea's threats and continue to prepare for any and all contingencies. We 

remain steadfast in our commitment to defend our Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japanese allies, 

through the full range of capabilities, and we continue our close coordination with our other SixParty Talks partners as well, as we pursue our shared goal of the denuclearization of the Korean 

Peninsula in a peaceful manner. 

To achieve this goal, we use a dual-track approach of employing pressure to compel North Korea 

to choose a different path while offering Pyongyang the option for an improved relationship with 

the United States and integration into the international community should North Korea 

demonstrate a willingness to fulfill its denuclearization commitments, cease its provocative 

actions threats, and comply with its international obligations. 
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Congressional interest in the DPRK demonstrates the commitment of the American people to 

addressing threats to the United States and international security, and the global nonproliferation 

regime, and to working toward a better future for all of the people on the Korean Peninsula. 

Congress demonstrated its strong commitment to the North Korean human rights issues by 

passing the 2004 North Korea Human Rights Act and its reauthorizations in 2008 and 2012. 

Continued bipartisan Congressional support for our policy and request for resources to support 

the Department of State's rebalance of diplomatic activity to the Asia-Pacific region - as 

outlined in the President's Budget request - will increase our ability to respond appropriately to 

developments on the Korean Peninsula. 

Question 3: 

What is the status of the implementation of the recommendations of the Accountability 

Review Board following the attack in Benghazi, as they relate to diplomatic security? 

The independent Benghazi Accountability Review Board (ARB) made 29 recommendations in 

key areas such as training, fire safety, staffing, and threat analysis. To hold ourselves 

accountable for implementation, we divided the recommendations into discrete tasks, and then 

assigned bureaus with these tasks and deadlines. 

To date, the Department has taken action to substantially address all of the ARB's 

recommendations, insofar as resources and staff training cycles permit. Some of this work -

such as enhancing language and security training or constructing facilities - requires a multi-year 

commitment. Others - such as expanding the presence of Marine Security Guard - require 

ongoing interagency cooperation and continued funding. In support of these efforts: 

• The Department reviewed our presence and staffing footprint at high-threat posts; and 

established a High Threat Board to review our presence at High-Threat, High-Risk 

posts every 6 months. 

• We are improving training for our employees headed to high-threat posts, and have 

expanded the number of posts where such additional security training is required; 

We surveyed fire and life safety equipment, and have procured needed equipment for 

posts. 

All posts performed a review of tripwires to determine if any had been breached in 

the past year. The Department developed and issued revised guidance on responding 

to tripwires, and established a Washington-based "Tripwires Committee" to review 

tri pwires upon breach. 

• With Congressional support, we are creating 151 new DS positions; 113 are expected 

to be hired this fiscal year. The remainder will be hired in FY 14. 

• The Department is working with the Department of Defense, and the Congress, on 

increasing the number of Marine Security Guard Detachments deployed to U.S. 

diplomatic posts overseas. 

We developed a concept for "Support Cells" for openedlreopened posts; the process is 

being incorporated into the Foreign Affairs Handbook (F AH). 

The Department established a six-person panel to thoroughly review DS' organization 

and management structure; the panel has developed draft findings. 
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The Department will never be done when it comes to security. The stark fact is that we can 

never truly eliminate the risks that our diplomats and development experts face as they advance 

America's national interests abroad. But we must always be working to find ways to minimize 

that risk. 

Following through on our progress will, of course, require continued support from the Congress. 

Your support for our FY 2013 funding request to enhance em bassy security - as recommended 

by the ARB - has been invaluable. To truly address the findings of the ARB, we hope Congress 

will continue to be a partner, in terms of providing resources and oversight. The FY 2014 budget 

requests the resources necessary to carry on this important work. 

Question 4: 

What is the statns of the U.S. visa waiver program for the country of Portugal? 

Portugal is currently a member of the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). It was designated as a 

member participant in 1999. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in consultation with 

the Department of State, is required under law to review the designation status of a VWP country 

at least once every two years. The evaluation looks at the etJect that each program country's 

continued designation has on the law enforcement and security interests of the United States, 

including its interest in the enforcement of U.S. immigration laws. Portugal is currently 

undergoing a formal VWP review, which is scheduled to conclude in September 2013. We refer 

you to DHS for further information about the VWP review process. Congress will be notified of 

the results of this review. 

Question 5: 

Is the State Department considering taking action to fund the Azores Cooperative 

Initiatives Program (ACIP)? The Lajes Air Base on Terceira Island in the Azores has 

proven nsefnl to the United States and has been a source of friendship between the United 

States and Portugal, especially the Regional Government of the Azores. If the U.S. proceeds 

with cnts to Lajes Field, what does the State Department intend to do to mitigate the 

impact that such cessation may have upon U.S.-Portugal relations? 

Founding NATO member Portugal is one of our oldest and closest allies. One of Secretary of 

State Kerry's first calls in office was to Portuguese Foreign Minister Portas, and the U.S.-

Portugal Bilateral Commission (SBC) meets twice yearly for high-level strategic discussions. 

The most recent SBC meeting on April 17 showcased our robust engagement with Portugal, both 

current and envisioned. 

The U.S. Air Force (USAF) presence at Lajes Airfield in the Azores is but one facet of this 

engagement. The impending USAF force reduction at Lajes is a result of Department of Defense 

(DoD) budget considerations and operational needs and is not a reflection of our commitment to 

Portugal. To mitigate the political and economic impact of the decision and strengthen the 

partnership with Portugal, DoD recently organized a Business Executives for National Security 
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(BENS) visit to the Azores. We encourage the Azorean government to study closely BENS' 

comprehensive report on the islands' economic potential. 

The State Department and U.S. Embassy Lisbon also are attempting to mitigate the effects of the 

Lajes downsizing. U.S. Ambassador to Portugal Allan Katz recently led a Portuguese delegation 

to Boston and Kansas City to explore mutually beneficial business opportunities. The Embassy 

has hosted a series of innovation and entrepreneurship roundtables to encourage economic 

growth in Portugal and the Azores. Embassy-funded public diplomacy projects in the Azores 

have supported the arts and culture, sustainable economic development, scientific research, 

education, and mutual understanding. 

The Azores Cooperative Initiative Program (ACIP) was a Department of Defense effort that was 

suspended in 2011. At that time, DoD reviewed ACIP requests and concluded that there was no 

legal authority under which it could fund ACIP activities. DoD's decision was not based on 

policy grounds, but rather on whether ACIP activities could be supported with DoD 

appropriations. 

Question 6: 

President Qbama has identified genocide prevention as a "core national security interest 

and core moral responsibility" of the United States. Can you foresee any circumstances in 

which you, or any official of the U.S. government, should be anything less than fully honest 

and forthright in condemning any known instance of genocide, including the Armenian 

Genocide? Would you discipline, penalize, or otherwise take action against a U.S. Embassy 

employee simply for speaking truthfully about the Armenian Genocide? 

The U.S government clearly acknowledges and mourns as historical fact that 1.5 million 

Armenians were massacred or marched to their deaths in the final days of the Ottoman Empire. 

These horrific events resulted in one of the worst atrocities of the 20th century, and the United 

States recognizes that they remain a great source of pain for the people of Armenia and of 

Armenian descent as they do for all of us who share basic universal values. As President Obama 

said in his April 24 statement, on Armenian Remembrance Day, we remind ourselves of our 

commitment to ensure that such dark chapters of history are not repeated. 

Question 7: 

In light of the priority that the President has attached to moving Turkey toward an honest 

reckoning with its past, will any representatives from the State Department be 

participating in any commemorations of the Armenian Genocide that will be taking place 

in either Washington, DC or Turkey? If not, please explain. 

A senior representative from our Consulate in Istanbul attended the April 24 commemoration 

event in Istanbul, where the vast majority of ethnic Armenian citizens of Turkey live. This was 

the largest and most public event held in Turkey on Remembrance Day itself In addition, 

Ambassador Heffern participated in a Remembrance Day event in Yerevan. 

Question 8: 
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On April 22, 2009 just two days before the anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, 

President Obama did not acknowledge the Armenian Genocide because of the TurkeyArmenia protocols. They sought to end Turkey's blockade of Armenia and establish 

diplomatic and economic relations. In response to Senator Menendez's question during his 

confirmation hearing in March 2009, Assistant Secretary of State Gordon indicated that he 

hoped Turkey's blockade of Armenia would have been lifted by October 2009. It's been 

nearly four years and Turkey has reneged on its agreement to end its blockade. Former 

Secretary of State Clinton stated numerous times that the ball was in Turkey's court, but 

the reality is that Turkey has not made any progress on ratifying these protocols. Would 

the Administration criticize Armenia if it withdrew its signature from the Protocols, 

considering that, in the Secretary's own words, the ball has remained in Turkey's court for 

nearly three years? 

The Obama Administration strongly supports the efforts of Turkey and Armenia to normalize 

their bilateral relations. We continue to use our interactions with senior Turkish officials to urge 

ratification of the protocols. We have also called on Turkey to take unilateral measures, such as 

re-opening the border with Armenia, which would facilitate trade and commerce. The United 

States maintains an ongoing dialogue with Turkish and Armenian officials at all levels on these 

issues, and we will continue to support the courageous steps taken by individuals in Armenia and 

Turkey to foster a dialogue that acknowledges the history they share in common. 

Ouestion 9: 

The Nagorno Karabakh Republic was one of the three parties to negotiate and sign the 

cease fire agreement, which stopped the war in 1993 and they were full parties to the Minsk 

Group negotiations until 1998, when Azerbaijan succeeded in excluding them. Do you 

support the reinstatement of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic as a full participant in all 

aspects of the Minsk Group peace process? If yes, what is the Administration doing to 

reinstate Karabakh into the negotiations? 

As a Co-Chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group 

along with Russia and France, the United States remains committed to helping the sides find a 

peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As part of that effort, the Co-Chairs 

routinely meet with senior officials from the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments, as well as 

the de facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh. The United States, Russia, and France are 

actively working to help the sides reach agreement on a way forward. 

Ouestion 10: 

In August 2012, Azerbaijan's President pardoned, praised, and promoted a confessed axemurderer Ramil Safarov, who was convicted of killing a sleeping Armenian at a 2005 

NATO English language training program in Hungary. Moreover, Azerbaijan continues to 

reject the international community's and Armenia's calls to pull back snipers and 

President Aliyev has repeatedly stated that "only [the] first stage" of the war is over, that 

Azerbaijan is prepared to attack Nagorno Karabakh, and that "Our main enemies are 

Armenians of the world". In light of Azerbaijan's public acts and threats of aggression, 
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what are you doing to urge Azerbaijan to re-incarcerate Ramil Safarov? Why does the 

Administration support allocating military assistance to Azerbaijan, when it continues such 

belligerent and provocative policies? Azerbaijan has threatened to shoot down civilian 

aircraft that fly into the Nagorno Karabakh airport. What warnings have we given Baku 

about threats against civilian airliners, and what consequence would Azerbaijan face if it 

were to shoot down civilian aircraft? 

Mr. Safarov was tried and convicted of a brutal murder. The United States was extremely 

troubled to learn that he would not serve the remainder of his sentence, as were many of our 

Allies. Immediately after learning of Azerbaijani President Aliyev's pardon of Ramil Safarov, 

the United States raised its concerns directly and forcefully with the highest levels of the 

government of Azerbaijan. In addition, both the White House and the State Department released 

strong public statements of concern over Mr. Safarov's transfer and subsequent pardon. 

As a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, the United States continues working to help the sides 

reach a peaceful resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. I have discussed the issue of civil 

flights to Nagorno-Karabakh with the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan at the highest 

levels. The Minsk Group Co-Chairs are working to help the sides find a means of resolving this 

issue diplomatically, and have received assurances from the sides that they will reject any threat 

or use of force against civil aircraft. The United States condemns any action or rhetoric that 

fuels tensions in the region or threatens to damage the peace process. 

Security assistance for Azerbaijan is carefully reviewed to ensure it does not undermine efforts 

for a peaceful settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh. Such assistance is focused on counterterrorism 

and maritime security. 

Question 11: 

Can you give us an update on efforts to protect Armenian and other minority populations 

in Syria? Qut of all the countries that have accepted refugees from Syria, Armenia has the 

least amount of resources to provide for them. Would the Administration be willing to 

provide funds to Armenia to help manage this humanitarian burden? 

The State Department is closely tracking the situation inside Syria including the status of 

minority populations. The U.S. government is providing funding to the United Nations, the 

International Committee of the Red Cross, and non-governmental organizations to meet the 

humanitarian needs of all those affected by the crisis inside Syria. These agencies are a key part 

of the international humanitarian system, governed by humanitarian principles, that brings 

technical expertise and operational capacity to respond to a large-scale crisis such as this. Of the 

nearly $410 million in humanitarian assistance that US AID and the State Department are 

providing in response to the Syria crisis, the State Department's contributions total nearly $185 

million. Our contributions provide life-saving emergency assistance to meet basic humanitarian 

needs, such as shelter, water, sanitation, and health both inside Syria and in host countries. 

Humanitarian need is not solely concentrated in areas held by one side of the conflict or the 

other, and it is not dependent on political affiliation Humanitarian partners provide aid in a 
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neutral and impartial manner. The United Nations is seeking access to all communities in need 

on a regnlar basis. It is unacceptable and a violation of humanitarian principles for the Syrian 

regime to deny this access. 

On the issue of assistance to Syrians in Armenia, the Bureau of Population, Refugees and 

Migration's (PRM) contribution to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR) also supports assistance programs for refugees and asylum seekers in Armenia, 

including Syrians. The Armenian government estimates that approximately 6,000 to 8,000 

Syrians have fled to Armenia since the start of the conflict. Of those, only 10% (or 

approximately 600 individuals) have applied for asylum. Most of the Syrians who have fled to 

Armenia are of Armenian descent and are thus able to obtain Armenian citizenship. In 

cooperation with the Armenian Red Cross Society, UNHCR has provided winter clothing and 

footwear to a total of 343 Syrian asylum seekers (225 adults and 118 children). A number of 

families have received support to cover utility costs. With funds provided by UNHCR, the 

l)NHCR mission in Armenia has procured and distributed household items to 422 Syrians. 

Some of the most vulnerable families also received food packages and sanitary items. UNHCR 

supports a medical assistance program, through which over 200 individuals have received 

medical treatment and/or medication. Finally, UNHCR is supporting a newly-established NGO, 

the Center for Coordination of Syrian Armenian Issues, with some office equipment, furniture 

and capacity building. Similar support has also been extended to the Cilicean School No. 14, 

which many Syrian children attend. 

Questiou 12: 

Mr. Secretary, as you know, the spiritual head of the second largest Christian Church in 

the world, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, has a number of his religious freedoms 

withheld by the government of Turkey. Secretary Hillary Clinton put particular effort into 

urging Turkey to allow the Church's seminary at Halki to reopen. Please describe any 

steps you plan to undertake to further this effort. On a number of occasions during her 

term as Secretary of State, she was led to believe that the seminary was on the verge of 

being reopened. The Bush Administration was also led to believe this through public 

statements made by Turkish government officials. What do you plan to do to move the 

reopening of Halki from rhetoric to reality? 

The United States fully supports efforts to reopen Halki Seminary, a vital institution of spiritual 

learning for Orthodox Christians around the world. We will continue to urge the Government of 

Turkey at the highest levels to reopen the seminary as a symbol of its commitment to religious 

freedom Secretary Kerry raised this issue with Foreign Minister Davutoglu during his most 

recent visit to Istanbul April 21. He also met separately with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew 

T to underscore our commitment to Halki's reopening and the rights and status of the Patriarchate 

in Turkey. The Ambassador and officers from the US. Embassy and Consulate General also 

engage on this issue on a regnlar basis. 

Though incremental, some progress has occurred. The Turkish government's return of property 

surrounding the Seminary to the Church in January was a positive step, and the current 

constitutional redrafting process is encouraging an unprecedented dialogne on individual rights 
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and religious freedom. We will continue to encourage the government of Turkey to work 

cooperatively with the Ecumenical Patriarchate to pass legislation and overcome political 

roadblocks that are hindering the reopening of this historic institution. We will also encourage 

Turkey to take additional steps to promote religious freedom, such as allowing more religious 

communities to own property, register their places of worship, and train their clergy. 

Ouestion 13: 

Mr. Secretary, as you know, Greece, like Great Britain, Australia and few others nations, 

fought as our ally in every international conflict during the 20th Century. Greece 

continues that valuable cooperation through permitting our military's extensive use of its 

strategically crucial Souda Bay facility during our operations in the Middle East. Do your 

frequent trips to Turkey and absence of trips to Greece indicate a lessening of Greece's 

importance to America? 

Relations between Greece and the United States are excellent. Our two countries share deep ties 

of friendship and cooperation based on our mutual commitment to liberty and democratic values. 

These bonds are further cemented by the millions of Americans who trace their ancestry to the 

Hellenic Republic. We appreciate Greece's important contributions to NATO, from its 

stabilization efforts in the Balkans to its assistance in improving maritime security. We also very 

much value our bilateral military cooperation, especially at the Naval Support Activity on Souda 

Bay, Crete. T met with Foreign Minister Avramopoulos on April 23 and had an excellent 

discussion on the full range of bilateral, regional, and global issues on which we cooperate. I 

look forward to further strengthening our relationship with Greece, and to continue working 

together on common challenges. 

Ouestion 14: 

Mr. Secretary, as you may know, unlike its brother Church, the Catholic Church, which 

chooses its Pope by a vote of the College of Cardinals, the Christian Orthodox Church is 

prohibited by the government of Turkey from selecting succeeding Ecumenical Patriarchs 

by the Church's gathering of Metropolitans in their Holy Synod. Turkey insists that its 

Prime Minister, who is of the Muslim faith, select a succeeding Ecumenical Patriarch from 

a list submitted to him by the Holy Synod. As you know, the Ecumenical Patriarch is the 

spiritual head of millions of Americans and 300 million other Orthodox Christians around 

the world. Is this matter of Turkish interference in the selection of Ecumenical Patriarchs 

on your agenda of issues you plan to encourage Turkey to change? 

The Holy Synod of the Greek Orthodox Church selects the Ecumenical Patriarch, and the current 

Ecumenical Patriarch, Bartholomeos, was elected Patriarch by the Church's Holy Synod in 1991 

The Government of Turkey does not recognize the ecumenical nature of the Patriarchate, or the 

Patriarch's "first among equals" status among the leaders of the world's 300 million Orthodox 

Christians. The Government of Turkey, citing decrees by the Governor of Istanbul dating from 

1923 and 1970, has held that only Turkish citizens may vote in the Church's Holy Synod or be 

elected Patriarch. The decrees also hold that if a patriarch cannot be elected within eight days, 
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the Governor of Istanbul can appoint a patriarch - though this aspect of the decree has never 

been tested. 

The United States supports the Church's right to choose its own Patriarch, its efforts to obtain 

citizenship for Church Metropolitans, as well as gain recognition of the Patriarch's ecumenical 

status from the Turkish government. We will continue to urge the Turkish government to work 

cooperatively with the Patriarchate to resolve these and other matters of importance to Orthodox 

Christians and other religious minorities in Turkey to demonstrate its respect for religious 

freedom. 

Question 15: 

Mr. Secretary, in light of Turkey being of significant value to the United States, 

particularly with respect to Syria, do you believe that American policy should stay silent on 

Turkey's actions against other American allies, like Cyprus? Specifically, Turkish-Cypriots 

strongly oppose Turkey's transfer of what they claim are hundreds of thousands of Turks 

to Cyprus in an apparent effort to alter the demography and western orientation of that 

country. Assuring Cyprus remains a western society and democracy and an alwaysreliable ally of America and Israel is in America's long-term interests. Are those interests 

important enough for America to urge Turkey to stop these efforts on Cyprus? 

Any comprehensive settlement plan will need to take into account issues of citizenship and 

residency on the island. I believe that a settlement plan dealing with these and other questions 

needs to be worked out between the communities, with United Nations support, and needs to be 

acceptable to majorities in both of the island's communities. I strongly support the settlement 

process, which is the only practical way to resolve the many critical issues between the 

communities. 

Question 16: 

Mr. Secretary, as you may know, in 2004 American foreign policy was focused on helping 

Turkey begin EU accession talks by overcoming the obstacle of Turkey's military 

occupation of one third of a EU conntry, Cyprus. You will recall that America had a major 

hand in drafting a new Cyprus constitution and pressing Cyprus very hard for a 

referendum on it. If adopted, it gave Turkey the constitutional right to keep troops on 

Cyprus. And, if the Greek-Cypriots rejected the constitution, as became the case, it could 

make them appear responsible for the continuing division of that country. Today, Cyprus 

is the only country in the Eastern Mediterranean, other than Israel, that is energy rich, 

western oriented and a traditional democracy. As well, it has a very close relationship with 

America and Israel. Do America's interests today suggest that we treat Cyprus in this way 

again with another round of settlement talks? 

I continue to support the reunification of Cyprus as a bizonal, bicommunal federation, which has 

been the longstanding policy of the United States, consistent with United Nations Security 

Council Resolutions. The best way to achieve a just and lasting settlement is for the Cypriot 

parties themselves to negotiate their own solution, with strong support from the international 
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community, including the United States, whenever the parties seek such support. The U.S. 

government is not a participant in the negotiations, but we have offered to provide any help that 

both sides would find useful. As a friend to all the people of Cyprus, 1 will continue to urge the 

leaders of both communities to engage constructively in the negotiations and support this process 

as the best way to reach an agreement. 

Ouestion 17: 

Secretary Clinton showed great leadership in protecting the human rights of LGBT 

individuals around the world, especially at the UN and at the OAS. How will you continue 

and build upon this legacy? 

I fully support continuing and expanding the work begun by Secretary Clinton to promote and 

protect the human rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender 

(LGBT) individuals globally. Human rights are a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and have 

been central to American leadership through both Republican and Democratic administrations. 

U.S. leadership on advancing human rights for all people, including LGBT individuals, is 

consistent with this Administration's policy of principled engagement with the world and its 

commitment to uphold universal human rights. By supporting the inherent dignity of each 

person we help to foster a just world for all people and we lead by example, enhancing U.S. 

strategic interests as we advance our values. 

The Department of State is continuing efforts to implement our strategy to promote and protect 

the human rights ofLGBT persons. This strategy calls for a six pronged approach (1) combating 

laws that criminalize LGBT activity or status, (2) protecting vulnerable refugees or asylum 

seekers who are LGBT, (3) supporting human rights and non-discrimination of people who are 

LGBT through relevant foreign policy contracting and grant-making activities, (4) developing an 

urgent response mechanism to expedite our response to the human rights abuses abroad of people 

who are LGBT, (5) advancing the human rights of LGBT people through multilateral 

mechanisms, and (6) identifying, developing, and promoting international norms that can 

reinforce human rights protections for LGBT people. We remain fully committed to the goals of 

this strategy and are heavily focused on what more we can do to combat violence against LGBT 

individuals. We are also actively working to increase contributions to the Global Equality Fund, 

which strengthens our capacity to support civil society organizations and programming seeking 

to advance and protect the human rights of LGBT people globally. We are engaging foreign 

governments and private donors to contribute to this important effort. 

Finally, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL), which leads our monthly 

LGBT Task Force meetings, is continuing to work with our regional and other functional 

bureaus to develop ideas, share best-practices, and institutionalize this policy priority throughout 

the Department of State and within the interagency. As our missions abroad do more, the results 

of our actions continue to demonstrate the strength of U. S. actions to promote and protect the 

human rights ofLGBT individuals globally. 
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Question: 

Question for the Record 

Suhmitted hy the Honorahle Scott Perry 

1'0 Secretary o/State John F. Kerry 

With regard to the Benghazi attack, in her January 23 testimony before this Committee, 

Secretary Clinton noted that she wished the ARB had "more leeway" in recommending 

disciplinary action against 4 State Department employees whose actions resulted in an 

inadequate security posture at the U.S. consulate in Benghazi. I have worked with my 

colleagues on this Committee to introduce a bipartisan bill, which would specifically 

address this issue by amending the ARB anthorizing statnte. Are you in favor, as was your 

predecessor, of giving the ARB "more leeway?" My understanding of the personnel process 

is that a recommendation by an ARB is not a prereqnisite for disciplinary action taken by 

the State Department. It is just that: a recommendation. Why does the Department refuse 

to fire these individuals? What can you tell us about the status of these employees? 

I am in favor of amending the Accountability Review Board (ARB) statute to ret1ect the ARB's 

recommendation - to specify unsatisfactory leadership as a ground for disciplinary action. 

The status of the four individuals cited by the ARB is under review by the Department. In 

December 2012, former Secretary Clinton accepted Eric Boswell's decision to resign his position 

as Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security. The other three individuals were relieved of their 

duties. All four individuals have been placed on administrative leave pending further action. 
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Questiou 1: 

Questions for the Record 

Submitted by the Honorable f)ouglas A. Collins 

To Secretary olState John F. Kerry 

What couditions has the State Department put on foreign assistance to the Egyptian 

government? What are the qualitative or quantifiable results we are expecting from Egypt? 

What is the measurable return tax payers are guaranteed for this level of investment? 

Our assistance to Egypt serves U.S. national interests of promoting regional peace and security, 

ensuring regional stability, and encouraging economic, democratic, and security sector reforms 

to help shape and support Egypt's democratic transition. For over 30 years, Egypt has been an 

important partner for the United States in maintaining Middle East peace - a role it continues to 

this day. The United States relies on Egypt to maintain peace with Israel, implement critical 

counterterrorism and nonproliferation initiatives, and support mutual strategic goals in the 

region. Egypt has witnessed dramatic change; yet in the midst of this instability, the Egyptian 

government has remained committed to peace with Israel Our assistance is a critical factor in 

sustaining that role. 

While the State Department does not support political conditions on our assistance, several of 

our assistance programs that directly support the Government of Egypt include mutually-agreed 

to benchmarks. We continually review our assistance, using qualitative and quantitative 

measures, to ensure that our contributions serve U.S. interests in Egypt and the region, while also 

shaping and creating a stable and secure country for all Egyptians. 

Our military assistance to Egypt funds border security and counters weapons smuggling efforts, 

including along the border with Gaza; helps ensure overflight privileges for military aircraft; 

allows Egyptian forces to provide secure transit of the Suez Canal; and enables Egypt to 

participate in peacekeeping operations. We also see signs that the military is placing a greater 

priority on counter-terrorism and border security responsibilities - a focus that we strongly 

support and that our assistance encourages. 

Our economic and development assistance encourages private sector growth and employment; 

improves access to education; empowers youth and women; and promotes democratic principles, 

human rights, and civil society. For example, USAID is working with Alexandria's Chamber of 

Commerce to help entrepreneurs open more than 3,700 small and medium sized businesses 

through streamlined procedures. USAID's education programs have improved early grade 

reading nationwide, improving literacy by 91 % in pilot schools, and after 6 months of 

implementation this program will reach 1.4 million students. USAID voter education initiatives 

have reached over 40 million individuals, helping develop electoral reform policies and the 

issuance of over 40,000 ID cards for marginalized women, providing them with voter education 

to support their participation in upcoming elections. 
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In addition to our strategic security, economic, and political interests, we often receive direct and 

indirect returns on investment to the U.S. Treasury, institutions, and private sector. For example, 

the United States has launched the Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund, a private, non-profit 

corporation seeded with U.S. Government funds. After ten years, the Fund will be liquidated 

and 50 percent of the proceeds will be returned to the United States Treasury. Additionally, 

through our signature U.S. - Egypt Higher Education Initiative, which we will launch this year, 

the US will invest in scholarships, most of which will fund students' attendance at US colleges 

and universities, and in higher education partnerships between U.S. and Egyptian institutions. 

Lastly, the US. private sector realizes direct and indirect benefits of assistance to Egypt through 

increased opportunities for foreign investment in Egypt, trade between our two countries, and 

clear efforts to maintain security in the region. 

Question 2: 

In FYll and FYI2, the Administration responded to the Arab Spring with the Middle East 

Response Fund (MERF). These funds where reallocated from existing funds, $135 million 

in FYll and $166 million in FYI2. In both years these funds were spent at the same pace or 

slower than normal appropriations, even though they were designated as "rapid response 

funding." The MERF funds have been renamed Contingency Fund which functionally 

operates under the MENA-lncentive Fund. The State Department is asking for $580 

million for the MENA-Incentive Fund; $150 million which is allocated for the Contingency 

Fund or MERF. The Contingency Fund is categorized as "rapid response funds." If "rapid 

response funds" aren't being spent rapidly, why are they necessary? 

The Department plans to make just one-third of the Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund 

(MENA-IF) available for support to interim governments and emerging civil societies as they 

address immediate stabilization, security and early transition needs. Such activities are shortterm in nature. Examples of such contingency needs include elections support, short-term 

security sector support, weapons abatement, and deployment of additional staff. This is 

distinguished from the two-thirds of the MENA IF that we would provide for longer term 

programs in support of democratic reform, which will be designed through joint analysis and 

planning with the governments and civil societies of recipient countries. 

Some funds may be needed urgently and true emergency funds have moved quickly. However, 

the key need for such contingency funds is to fill gaps and meet needs that emerge that we could 

not identify at the time we submit our annual budget request. Timing of the actual delivery of 

assistance is due to a number of factors, including host country capacity. Often the initial 

commitment and the beginning of planning for the program is the critical point of our 

engagement with transitioning countries, sending an important signal of US. commitment and 

providing an avenue of discussion with key interlocutors. Or, we may need to make a 

commitment to a multilateral effort that leverages others' funds, while the actual program is 

initiated later. We cannot take those steps without having funds available. 

The FY 2011 - 2012 Middle East Response Fund (MERF)-designated funds were simply a set 

aside of funds that normally we would have allocated to regular bilateral programs. We were 

unable to make specific decisions at the outset given the ongoing transitions, but anticipated we 
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would need to provide additional funding to the region when needs became apparent. Doing this 

reduced funds available for the rest of the world, but ensured they were available and could be 

provided for anticipated needs. Once programs were identified, the funds were provided via 

regul ar processes. 

Our ability to respond to emerging opportunities and to cement our support for the transitions 

depends on our ability to identify funds quickly that will allow us to meet short-term needs. 

Initial transition support commitments in FY 2011 through FY 2013 have totaled over $1.8 

billion, spanning the range of humanitarian, economic stabilization, security sector reform, and 

political reform requirements in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Syria. These funds were 

reallocated from programs in the region or by reducing funding available in regional/global 

accounts for other needs; and carried with them real opportunity costs to other programs. 

Without the creation of the MENA-IF, needs arising from democratic transitions will further 

erode existing programs that remain a priority and impact our ability to respond to emergent 

needs in other regions. 
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Questiou 1: 

Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Mark Meadows 

To Secretary olState John F. Kerry 

Receutly, Iran has stepped up its aggressive actions and rhetoric toward Azerbaijan. It is 

very concerning to see the Iranian Parliament discussing annexing Azerbaijan. 

Azerbaijan, being a steadfast partner of the U.S. and Israel, is one of a few countries in the 

region we can count on. There is no question that most of the Iranian pressure is in 

response to Azerbaijan's commitment to partnership with the U.S. How does the 

Administration work with Azerbaijan to make sure that Iranian pressure does not 

destabilize Azerbaijan and the whole region? 

The U.S. and Azerbaijan have clear, shared interests in building regional security, diversifying 

energy supplies, pursuing democratic and economic reforms, combating terrorism, and stemming 

the flow of illegal narcotics and weapons of mass destruction. The government of Azerbaijan 

has played a critical role in enforcing international sanctions against Iran, while cooperating 

closely with our ally, Israel. 

Caspian maritime domain awareness, border security, combating illegal trafficking, and NATO 

interoperability remain top priorities for U.S.-Azerbaijan security cooperation. To that end, we 

convene the U.S.-Azerbaijan Security Dialogue each year to review progress, raise important 

bilateral issues, and pursue additional areas of cooperation. We also work closely with 

Azerbaijan on counterterrorism measures. 

We continue to support Azerbaijan's independence by cooperating closely with Azerbaijan to 

diversify energy routes and resources for European markets. Our work with Azerbaijan on 

advancing democratic and economic refonns also remains a key priority, including promoting 

respect for fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, and the development of a vibrant civil 

society, which we believe are essential to Azerbaijan's long-term prosperity and success. 

Question 2: 

After Vladimir Putin took over last year, Russia has been pursuing a much more assertive 

foreign policy in its neighborhood. Russia is trying to subordinate small nations in its 

neighborhood under the cover of artificial integration into a "Eurasian Economic Union". 

This policy is particularly visible in the South Caucasus. For instance, Moscow has recently 

forced Armenia to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the Russian-led Customs 

Union and reinforces its military presence in Armenia and the North Caucasus. Azerbaijan 

is facing huge pressure too, as it is resisting Russia's attempts to increase its influence in 

Azerbaijan. After the shutdown of the Gabala Radar Station, which was the last vestige of 

Russian military presence in Azerbaijan, Russia has become increasingly more aggressive 

vis-a.-vis Azerbaijan. Under these circumstances, it is essential that the US should actively 

engage with regional partners to boost their independence. What is the Administration's 
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policy regarding assertive Rnssian policies in the region? How do yon work with regional 

partners to make sure that they don't yield under Russian pressure? 

The United States' support for the independence of the states that emerged from the dissolution 

of the Soviet Union is unwavering and non-negotiable. The United States stands for the right of 

every independent country to choose its alliances and associations - political, military, 

economic, or otherwise - according to its own interests and free from coercion of any kind. We 

also stand by the principle that states have the right freely to choose whether to allow foreign 

forces to be stationed on their territory and that forces that do not have the consent of the host 

state should be withdrawn. 

The United States has consistently articulated this policy since the breakup of the Soviet Union. 

We have put this policy into action by developing durable, individually tailored relations with 

each of these nations based on the interests and values we share with each one. In the cases of 

Armenia and Azerbaijan, the United States has robust bilateral relationships with both countries 

in all areas, including ongoing dialogues on democracy and human rights, increasing bilateral 

trade and investment, and security cooperation. 
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Question 1: 

Questions for the Record 

Suhmitted hy the Honorahle [,uke Messer 

1'0 Secretary o/State John F. Kerry 

There have been discussions on the Hill and elsewhere that call for a re-examining of U.S. 

aid to Egypt given the change in leadership since the aid package was instituted. In light 

of the regime change in Egypt, is there a need to reevaluate how the U.S. provides aid to 

Egypt? 

Our aid does not support anyone party or individual in Egypt; it supports our national security 

interests and the Egyptian people. We continue to focus our assistance to Egypt on addressing 

the profound changes undefV\iay there while also supporting our enduring security interests. At a 

time when Egypt most needs assistance to aid its poor, create new jobs to employ its educated, 

energetic youth, and prevent it from heading toward a disastrous economic collapse, the United 

States can playa significant role in assisting Egypt on its path toward democratic reform, 

economic stabilization, and security. 

Following the revolution, the United States realigned over $190 million in support of critical 

economic recovery needs and democratic development. We are now focusing our economic 

assistance on preventing a destabilizing economic crisis; encouraging private sector growih and 

employment; improving access to education; empowering youth and women; and promoting 

democratic principles, human rights, and civil society. 

As I stated in my testimony, our support to the military has been a strong investment. Our 

assistance continues to advance shared security interests such as border security, countering 

terrorism and weapons smuggling, and creating more professional Egyptian forces. This 

assistance helps ensure over-flight privileges for military aircraft and allows Egyptian forces to 

provide secure transit of the Suez Canal. In response to emerging needs, we are partnering with 

Egypt to further target our assistance in crucial areas such as border security and counterterrorism efforts. 

By having a place at the table, we can continue to engage our partner, Egypt, on implementing 

the necessary reforms in their economic, security, and political sectors to keep Egypt stable. 

This stability is necessary to allow Egypt to turther its democratic transition and continue its 

long-standing role of maintaining regional peace and stability. Our assistance is a critical factor 

in sustaining that role, especially now when the Egyptian people are looking for a sign of U.S. 

support during this critical political transition. 

Question 2: 

What is your assessment of the transition to democracy? What strategic leverage is 

available to the United States to encourage the Egyptian government for progress in the 

democratic transition? 
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Egyptians enjoy greater freedom today than prior to the January 2011 revolution, but freedom of 

expression, association, and assembly; women's rights, religious freedom, and rule oflaw remain 

areas of concern. Healthy democracies require appropriate checks and balances, and while the 

judiciary and citizen movements have been essential sources of accountability and checks on 

executive power, we look forward to parliamentary elections and the establishment of an 

empowered legislative branch as called for in the Constitution. We hope to that all Egyptians 

will participate in these important elections. Egypt's prosperity and stability will hinge on these 

factors-an engaged citizenry; accountable public institutions with appropriate checks and 

balances; and the advancement of fundamental freedoms and protection of human rights; and 

these are therefore the factors we track and promote in our programs and diplomatic engagement. 

We have repeatedly raised these issues, including on individual rights cases, at the highest levels 

of the Egyptian government. President Morsy has professed his commitment to govern for all 

Egyptians. President Obama, our Ambassador in Cairo, and I have consistently made clear to 

our Egyptian counterparts the need to follow through on this commitment. We support a number 

of programs on the ground that reinforce these principles and help create strong democratic 

institutions to sustain them. 

Ouestiou 3: 

Does the Administration believe that a negotiated solution is possible in Syria? If so, what 

would that look like? Do you see any solution in which Assad remains in power to be either 

possible or acceptable? If Assad does manage to stay, would the United States deal with 

him and his government? 

We believe that the best way to end the Syrian crisis is through a negotiated political solution. 

The regime and its supporters will fight to the last person standing. To get to a sustainable 

peace, Syrians need a political solution that assures all citizens of their rights. 

The opposition and members of the regime without blood on their hands must come together to 

negotiate a deal like the framework laid out in the Geneva communique. This framework -

agreed last June by the penn anent members of the United Nations Security Council, Turkey, and 

Arab League states - calls for a transitional governing body formed on the basis of mutual 

consent of the opposition and the Syrian regime to be given full executive powers and guide the 

country to elections. 

This means that Asad, who has long lost his legitimacy and whom the opposition will never 

accept, will not play any role in that transitional governing body. Tfhe is unwilling to decide that 

he should transfer executive authority, we will continue to find ways to pressure him to think 

differently about what lies in the future 

While this administration continues to take a hard look at every available, practical, and 

responsible means to end the suffering of the Syrian people, we do not believe at this time that it 

is in the United States' or the Syrian people's best interest to provide lethal support to the Syrian 

opposition. The judgments we make must pass the test of making the situation better for the 

Syrian people and must also take into account the long-tenn human, financial, and political costs 
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for us, Syria, and the region We continue to believe that a political solution to the crisis is the 

best way to save the Syrian people further suffering and to avert further destruction of the 

country, for which the regime bears overwhelming responsibility. 

As President Obama told the Syrian people in a recent message, "More Syrians are standing up 

for their dignity. The Asad regime will come to an end. The Syrian people will have their 

chance to forge their own future And they will continue to find a partner in the United States of 

America." 

We look forward to working with Congress throughout this process as we seek to protect the 

interests of the United States in the region and support the needs of the Syrian people in their 

struggle to create a free, stable, and democratic Syria. 

Question 4: 

I was pleased that you publicly spoke out against the imprisonment of U.S. citizen Saeed 

Abedini, who has been detained for nearly six months and was sentenced to eight years in 

prison in Iran on charges related to his religious beliefs. His family recently visited him 

and reported that he has suffered new attacks and beatings, making his physical condition 

more serious than ever. Is there anything that the U.S. - unilaterally or with our alliescan do to pressure the Iranian government to act and free Saeed? 

I share your deep concern for the serious human rights abuses faced by US. citizen Saeed 

Abedini, unjustly imprisoned in Iran on charges related to his religious beliefs and activities. I 

also share your concern about reports that Mr. Abedini has suffered physical abuse by Iranian 

authorities, and of his deteriorating health condition while in prison. 

The Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom Suzan Johnson Cook and other 

senior State Department officials met with Mrs. Abedini March 15 and conveyed our 

commitment to resolving this case and reuniting Me Abedini with his family. 

On March 22, I issued the following public statement on this case: "1 am deeply concerned about 

the fate of U. S citizen Saeed Abedini, who has been detained for nearly six months and was 

sentenced to eight years in prison in Iran on related to his religious beliefs. I am 

disturbed by reports that Mr Abedini has suffered and psychological abuse in prison, 

and that his condition has become increasingly dire. Such mistreatment violates international 

norms as well as Iran's own laws. I am also troubled by the lack of due process in Mr. Abedini' s 

case and Tran's continued refiJsal to allow consular access by Swiss authorities, the Us. 

protecting power in Iran. I \'ielcome reports that Mr. Abedini was examined by a physician and 

expect Tranian authorities to honor their commitment to allow Me Abedini to receive treatment 

for these injuries from a specialist outside the prison. The best outcome for Me Ahedini is that 

he be immediately released" 

We raised this case at the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) in Geneva on March 22. 

We have also raised this case with the office of UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in 
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Iran, Dr. Ahmed Shaheed, whose recent report to the HRC cites Mr. Abedini's case as an 

example oflran's violation of human rights, including religious freedom. 

Acting Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Uzra Zeya highlighted the 

case of Me Abedini and others imprisoned for their beliefs when she and T held a press 

conference April 19 to release the Country Reports on Human RiRhts Practices/or 2012. 

We appreciate H.Res. 147 calling for Mr. Abedini's release. We commend you and other 

Members of Congress for elevating this case, and we want to work closely and constructively 

with you to raise awareness and secure his release. 

The Department of State's highest priority is the safety and welfare of U.S. citizens overseas, and 

we remain deeply concerned about Mr. Abedini's detention and the conditions he faces in prison. 

We are committed to doing all we can to ensure Me Abedini receives the medical attention he 

urgently needs. We will continue to use diplomatic engagement to apply international pressure 

on Iran to secure his release. We have reached out to numerous allies and our friends in civil 

society to urge them to press the Iranian government to release Mr. Abedini. Moreover, I will 

continue to use all the appropriate tools at the Department's disposal to promote and protect 

human rights, including religious freedom, for all people in Iran and around the world. 

We have been in frequent contact with Mrs. Abedini and her attorney since we became aware of 

this case last year, and we will remain in touch as we work to achieve our common objective of 

securing his freedom. 

Questiou 5: 

When America provides foreign assistance to conn tries around the globe, American 

taxpayers want and deserve to know that their money is being invested wisely, in projects 

that are snccessfully improving life for people on the gronnd. Timely, comprehensive and 

transparent information on how aid dollars are spent, and the res nits of aid projects, 

allows Americans to hold their government accountable and also lets citizens of aid 

recipient countries provide feedback on the quality of that aid.What initiatives do you 

support to make the foreign assistance process more transparent? 

We strongly support the principles of aid transparency and accountability, and will continue to 

prioritize ongoing etTorts to make assistance reporting more readily available to the public. 

The Foreign Assistance Dashboard (www.ForeignAssistance.gov) managed by the Department 

of State is one easy-to-understand and accessible tool for providing detailed foreign assistance 

budget, tinancial, and programmatic data to the public. 

The Dashboard currently contains budget data for the Department of State, USAID, and the 

Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), as well as financial data for USAlD and MCC. The 

Dashboard will continue to make foreign assistance data more available with the goal of 

publishing more granular activity level infonnation and data on programs from additional 

agencies this coming year, including the U.S. Treasury, Department of Agriculture, and the 

Department of Defense. 
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In accordance with OMB Bulletin 12-01 on the Collection of U.S. Foreign Assistance Data, 

which mandates data collection from all U.S. Government agencies implementing foreign 

assistance, the Dashboard will expand the availability of robust foreign assistance data. 

The Department has also implemented a rigorous evaluation policy requiring that all large 

programs be evaluated. Unclassified evaluation reports will posted to a new Department web 

site (under construction) to assure transparency. 

We will continue to prioritize aid transparency and accountability efforts to ensure U.S. 

taxpayers can have easy access to information showing how U.S. foreign assistance is spent. 

Question 6: 

The transition to electoral democracy taking place in the Arab Spring countries presents 

an opportunity for millions of women to be liberated from harmful practices and political 

disenfranchisement, yet women of the Arab Spring continue to struggle for eqnality, and 

political and social tensions are increasing. Many of the affected countries are embracing 

religions extremist leaders who snpport polices that obstruct women's equality and 

freedom. What should the U.S. do about the role of women in Islamist governments? 

We support the aspirations of women throughout the ~1iddle East and North All-iea who seek 

opportunities for political and civic participation, live free from violence, and receive equal 

economic opportunities and civil rights. The U.S. regularly meets with civil society, 

entrepreneurs, teachers, politicians and women to hear their concerns and priorities and 

appropriately integrate them into our policy and programming efforts. We regularly encourage 

political pallies, govemments, police and security forces, religious leaders and other civil society 

groups to include more women in their organizations and to hear from women's rights advocates. 

We seek to engage actors from across society, both secular and religious, who wish to build a 

peaceful and prosperous future consistent with democratic values. We judge political parties by 

their deeds and words not by their origins. We expect all parties to uphold universal values. 

There have been many troubling instances of new politicians in transition countries maldng antiwomen statements and proposing laws which would restrict the rights of women and girls. We 

have also witnessed troubling acts of violence against women attempting to exercise their rights 

to peaceful assembly and association. We strongly disagree with these positions and have made 

our views known publically and privately. The participation of new political parties in 

governance means that there are opportunities for women to shape their roles. For example, 

when some members of Tunisia's National Constituent Assembly proposed language to make 

women "complementary" to men in the draft constitution, Tunisian women and men as well as 

civil society leaders and women's rights advocates strongly protested. Tunisia has a long history 

of some of the most progressive rights for women in the region. Politicians from both Islamist 

and secular parties reacted to the protests by amending the statement, and the current draft now 

uses "equality" to define women's status. 

We note that whether in republics with secular or Islamist parties or in monarchies, women 

across the region are very often excluded from political decision-maldng positions. For example, 
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in Morocco, the Islamist Justice and Development party is in a coalition government with three 

secular parties and only controls 12 of the 31 cabinet positions. Yet they were the only one to put 

forth a woman for a ministerial slot. Ending the discrimination women experience requires the 

commitment of all - political parties as well as civil society and entrepreneurs. 

The United States is making a number of significant efforts to support the economic and political 

empowerment of women. For example, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) funds 

numerous initiatives to support women's empowerment, including the Arab Women's 

Leadership Institute (A WLI). A WLI trains female elected officials and women seeking 

government positions on good governance and coalition building to support their efforts to lead 

constituent-driven reforms. Numerous AWLI trainees have gone on to win public office and 

play active roles in developing gender-based advocacy efforts. 

In addition, at the 9th Forum for the Future, 21 regional governments (including Tunisia, Egypt, 

Libya and Yemen), along with the G-8, agreed by consensus to the Tunis Declaration. The U.S. 

co-hosted the Forum with the Republic of Tunisia and women's empowerment was one of the 

priorities. In the Declaration, the Ministers agreed that the full and equal participation of all 

people regardless of race, sex, or religion is critical for political and economic development. 

Ministers, in particular, recognized the critical role women play in the transformations underway 

in the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) region, and underscored the importance 

of progress on long-standing BMENA objectives related to gender equality, with a view to 

achieving women's full political, social, and economic empowerment. They also reaffirmed the 

ongoing need for further progress in addressing a range of issues affecting the condition of 

women, including gender-based discrimination and violence; forced and early forced marriage; 

low rates of women's participation in economies, public service, and decision-making 

institutions including parliaments; and barriers to women's access to education. Ministers also 

acknowledged the importance of integrating international commitments into their national laws, 

including comprehensive national family policies to encourage women's participation in public 

life. We are following up with civil society this year to encourage them to continue to dialogue 

with their governments around these commitments. 

Question 7: 

In the coming year, what role will the State Department play in pressuring the Arab Spring 

governments to reject policies that discriminate or perpetnate harmfnl practices against 

women? 

In every single country in the world, the United States supports full and equal citizenship without 

qualifications based on gender, creed, culture, ideology, or religion. There are no acceptable 

reasons to have second-class citizenship for anyone based on these factors. Women and girls in 

the region will define their own roles in their societies, and we will continue supporting and 

empowering them through civil society capacity building and public diplomacy programs, 

political and economic reform efforts, long-standing development assistance, and diplomatic 

interventions. We strongly support reform as the basis for stability in the region, including 

peaceful and meaningful democratic transitions throughout the region. As we assert our national 

interests in promoting democracy and stability, we remain mindful of each circumstance's 

uniqueness and tailor our engagement accordingly. 
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Early and forced marriage, female genital mutilation/cutting, acid-related violence, honor 

killings, and other harmful traditional practices are all great concerns to the United States. We 

know that many of these practices, including early and forced marriages occur in transition 

countries such as Egypt and Yemen. Other harmful traditional practices such as female genital 

mutilation/cutting are prevalent in Egypt and other parts of the Middle East, although data is 

scarce. The United States considers violence against girls and women a policy imperative and 

we work with our international partners and other stakeholders to do the same. T he problem of 

these harmful traditional practices is, at its root, a manifestation of the low status of women and 

girls around the world. Ending harmful traditional practices requires elevating their status in our 

dialogues and freeing women's potential to be agents of change in their community. We support 

awareness and prevention programs to address some of these practices by working with local 

partners to ensure men and boy's engagement in preventing violence against women and girls. 

We also promote women's economic and entrepreneurial opportunities which are integral to any 

sustainable approach to ending violence against women and girls. 

One example of such a program will be supported by USAID's Center of Excellence on 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance. The program will work with the Government of 

Jordan to develop an awareness-raising campaign working with Syrian refugees and host 

communities to reduce or prevent early marriage, human trafficking, child labor and genderbased violence among vulnerable populations within the Syrian refugee community and host 

communities. 

Several Middle East Partnership Initiative projects support civil society-led campaigns to address 

the practice of early and forced marriage and raise awareness in rural areas on the dangers of 

early and forced marriage, including the Access to the Constitution in Morocco project with the 

American Bar Association (ABA) which engages civil society in advocacy campaigns that focus 

on the implementation of constitutional articles. Outreach activities that raise public awareness 

of constitutional developments include advocacy caravans," radio public service 

announcements, and social media tools to invite citizen participation and feedback. Another 

example of a successful program working with community leaders to address a harmful 

traditional practice is a project the Secretary's Office of Global Women's Issues funded which 

supported public awareness programs to reduce violence against women and female genital 

mutilation/cutting with influential community leaders in Egypt. 

Question 8: 

The State Department claims to be interested in how religious freedom impacts U.S. 

foreign policy, but the annual International Religious Freedom report has failed to make 

any new designations. Is the State Department considering adding any new designations to 

the annual International Religious Freedom report? 

I am a strong believer that advancing religious freedom is essential to a successful foreign policy, 

and I support the use of designations under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 as a 

tool to advance that objective. I would note, however, that we do not typically make Country of 

Particular Concern (CPC) designations at the same time as we release the annual report. We will 
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designate epe countries when criteria are met. That designation can come at any time. A epe 

designation for particularly severe violations of religious freedom is one of a number of possible 

actions that can be taken as part of a broader strategy to improve respect for religious freedom in 

a country. We do not wait until a country reaches the level of a epe to encourage broad 

systemic reforms. We publicly catalog failures to adhere to international human rights 

commitments in our annual religious freedom report. We raise specific cases of religious 

freedom violations and abuses. We press for reforms bilaterally and multilaterally. We also 

fund programs to address international religious freedom concerns. 

Diplomatic engagement is an essential component to achieving lasting improvements in 

international religious freedom and can be used to convey the consequences - including the 

prospect of sanctions - if a government does not take steps to rectify its violations of religious 

freedom. Our goal is to work constructively with foreign governments to help them improve 

religious freedom and to avoid conditions leading to a epe designation.