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OVERSIGHT OF THE SEC’S 

AGENDA, OPERATIONS, AND 

FY 2014 BUDGET REQUEST 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 16, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services 

Serial No. 113–20 

( 

(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas, Chairman 

GARY G. MILLER, California, Vice Chairman 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama, Chairman 

Emeritus 

PETER T. KING, New York 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JOHN CAMPBELL, California 

MICHELE BACHMANN, Minnesota 

KEVIN McCARTHY, California 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri 

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan 

SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin 

ROBERT HURT, Virginia 

MICHAEL G. GRIMM, New York 

STEVE STIVERS, Ohio 

STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee 

MARLIN A. STUTZMAN, Indiana 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida 

ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

ANDY BARR, Kentucky 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking 

Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

CAROLYN MCCARTHY, New York 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

AL GREEN, Texas 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

JOHN C. CARNEY, JR., Delaware 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

DANIEL T. KILDEE, Michigan 

PATRICK MURPHY, Florida 

JOHN K. DELANEY, Maryland 

KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona 

JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio 

DENNY HECK, Washington 

SHANNON MCGAHN, Staff Director 

JAMES H. CLINGER, Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on: 

May 16, 2013 ..................................................................................................... 1 

Appendix: 

May 16, 2013 ..................................................................................................... 53 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, MAY 16, 2013 

White, Hon. Mary Jo, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission .. 8 

APPENDIX 

Prepared statements: 

Neugebauer, Hon. Randy ................................................................................. 54 

White, Hon. Mary Jo ........................................................................................ 55 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Bachus, Hon. Spencer: 

Letter to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke dated March 14, 

2013 ................................................................................................................ 79 

Witness bio of Hon. Mary Jo White ................................................................ 81 

Maloney, Hon. Carolyn: 

Letter to Senator Jack Reed from SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, dated 

November 28, 2011 ....................................................................................... 82 

Pearce, Hon. Stevan: 

Article entitled, ‘‘Wind farms get pass on bald eagle deaths,’’ dated May 

14, 2013 .......................................................................................................... 86 

Wall Street Journal article entitled, ‘‘SEC Bears Down on Fracking,’’ 

dated August 25, 2011 .................................................................................. 92 

White, Hon. Mary Jo: 

Written responses to questions submitted by Representative Huizenga ..... 95 

Written responses to questions submitted by Representative McCarthy .... 98 

Written responses to questions submitted by Representative Murphy ....... 100 

Written responses to questions submitted by Representative Pearce .......... 101 

Written responses to questions submitted by Representative Stivers ......... 103 

Additional information provided for the record in response to questions 

posed by Chairman Hensarling and Representative Hultgren during 

the hearing .................................................................................................... 110 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF THE SEC’S 

AGENDA, OPERATIONS, AND 

FY 2014 BUDGET REQUEST 

Thursday, May 16, 2013 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 

Washington, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeb Hensarling [chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Hensarling, Miller, Bachus, 

Royce, Garrett, Neugebauer, McHenry, Pearce, Posey, Fitzpatrick, 

Westmoreland, Luetkemeyer, Huizenga, Hurt, Stivers, Fincher, 

Stutzman, Mulvaney, Hultgren, Ross, Pittenger, Barr, Cotton, 

Rothfus; Waters, Maloney, Velazquez, Watt, Sherman, Meeks, 

Scott, Green, Cleaver, Moore, Perlmutter, Himes, Peters, Carney, 

Sewell, Foster, Murphy, Delaney, Sinema, Beatty, and Heck. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The committee will come to order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess of the 

committee at any time. 

The Chair will now recognize himself for 4 minutes for an opening statement. 

Like most Americans, I was both angered and appalled to learn 

of the IRS’ campaign to selectively intimidate Americans based 

upon their political beliefs. And yet, it was just days ago that our 

President urged college graduates not to view the government as 

‘‘some separate, sinister entity.’’ And to ignore the voices warning 

that, ‘‘Tyranny is always lurking just around the corner.’’ 

But it is under this President’s watch that we get the news that 

the IRS, perhaps the single most feared government agency, has 

been caught trampling upon our most sacred right, namely our 

freedom of speech. Using the IRS to selectively punish and harass 

one’s political opponents is right out of the Watergate playbook, a 

playbook I thought had disappeared 40 years ago. In 2013, this is 

something that we would expect perhaps in Venezuela or Cuba, but 

not in the United States of America. 

This is an issue that should rise above partisanship. It hits at 

the heart of who we are as a people, and why we fight for justice 

and fear such a large powerful government that clearly has become 

too big to manage. 

What the IRS did was wrong, because it tried to turn our citizens 

into subjects. It is wrong because it violates both our constitutional 

and civil rights. It is wrong because it treats citizens wishing to 

2 

speak out against the government’s policies, exercising a God-given 

right, like enemies under state investigation. 

In a word, Mr. President, it is tyranny. Now fearful and outraged 

Americans want to know just how pervasive the IRS’ tactics of harassment have become within the Administration. 

So, the question is most relevant to this SEC oversight hearing 

we are having today. The SEC has three statutory purposes: protecting investors; maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets; 

and facilitating capital formation. 

And that is why it is most disturbing to many of us to realize 

that while the SEC has missed numerous mandatory rulemaking 

deadlines, it is devoting time and resources to a discretionary rulemaking, and more specifically, a highly controversial discretionary 

rule to force public companies to report all perceived facets of political involvement. 

This rulemaking is well known to be a part of a partisan political 

agenda of labor union bosses, George Soros, and assorted leftist 

groups who conveniently would not have to abide by the rule. 

Media Matters was quoted as saying that this is in part to ‘‘make 

the case that political spending is not within the fiduciary interests 

of publicly traded corporations and therefore, should be limited.’’ 

A New York City public advocate was quoted as saying, 

‘‘Strength that all of these organizations can bring to bear against 

companies: boycotts; shareholder actions; legal actions; you name 

it, it is on the table.’’ 

The Center for Public Accountability: ‘‘We and our partners are 

putting pressure on companies to adopt political disclosure, to 

change the behavior of companies and trade associations and their 

political spending.’’ 

Now, the American people are horrified at those who would use 

the strong arm of government for partisan political advantage, but 

it remains to be seen whether this could ever happen at the SEC. 

One of our chief oversight responsibilities regarding the SEC is 

to ensure the agency is a good steward of its resources, both its 

time and its budget, which has tripled over the last 10 years, and 

there are serious concerns. 

These discretionary projects come at the expense of more important and legally required tasks that actually help struggling working families secure their financial futures, such as the bipartisan 

JOBS Act, which the SEC has regrettably and deliberately failed 

to implement on time. 

A change in leadership represents an opportunity for a fresh 

start. While the SEC’s recent history is riddled with misplaced priorities and misallocated resources, hopefully a fresh start is exactly 

what will happen at the SEC under the new leadership of our witness, Chairman White. 

I now recognize the ranking member for 5 minutes for her opening statement. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much. 

The Honorable Ms. White, I welcome you to the committee this 

morning. I congratulate you on your appointment and I am poised, 

as many of us are, to work with you to make sure the SEC can do 

its job. 

3 

And as you perhaps already know, it is not going to be easy. It 

is going to be very difficult for a lot of reasons. First, allow me to 

do everything that I can to make you feel comfortable in being here 

with us today, and while my colleague has referred to the debacle 

at the IRS, I assure you none of us think you had anything to do 

with that. 

And so, you should not have to take any kind of reprimand. You 

should not have to endure any kind of similar criticism, and so I 

wish to say that on behalf of many of our colleagues who understand that you have this huge responsibility of being the cop on the 

block, I am focused at this particular time on something called cost/ 

benefit analysis, and I am very worried. 

I am very worried, and at question time, I will perhaps have the 

opportunity to raise some questions and create some discussion 

about cost/benefit analysis. The reason I am so focused on it is, I 

worked with institutional investors who came to us during the 

Dodd-Frank conference committee because they were concerned 

that many of the big companies that they were investing in appeared not to be under the control of a board of directors. 

Many of them were not participating, and we still have questions 

that are going on in some of our big financial institutions about not 

only pay and other kinds of things, but whether or not some people 

should hold dual positions, as perhaps you are very much aware. 

They came to us and they wanted to create an opportunity for 

our proxy materials to include the ability to nominate directors to 

those boards. They thought it was very important because, don’t 

forget, they are the ones responsible for the retirements of our 

teachers, our firefighters, our police officers, and our first responders, all of those upon whom we depend. 

And so, they want to have a say. They want to be involved. They 

want to be able to nominate and, lo and behold, some of my friends 

on the opposite side of the aisle teamed up with some of the business interests and went to court, into the 9th Circuit here in Washington, D.C., and they got a ruling against the SEC. 

But the SEC went back and not only did they send out a directive to all of its personnel about, okay, let us see if we can do even 

better. They have a reputation for having done well on cost/benefit 

analysis. 

And when we look at GAO, a report that took a look at how the 

SEC does cost/benefit analysis, they received compliments that 

they do a good job, but the court ruled. 

The SEC has made an attempt to improve even more, but, lo and 

behold, we have a bill before us that is going to be on the Floor 

tomorrow, where the SEC is going to be challenged with the kind 

of burdens that are going to make your job even tougher, and there 

is no more money to go along with it. 

And in addition to piling up unreasonable conditions on cost/benefit analysis, they are saying you must review it every 5 years, and 

you must go all the way back to the Depression era. 

This is unreasonable, and I want you to know that while all this 

other stuff is going on, we still depend on you and the SEC, but 

you are going to be doing it with your hands tied behind you. 

Because my friends who can rail about all of the other stuff that 

is going on—that makes for good propaganda—are not going to do 

4 

anything to help you get the resources you need to do your job. But 

some of us are committed to the proposition that if we are to protect investors, if you are to carry out your mission, that you must 

have the support, and we are going to fight for you. 

We are going to fight for you, and we are not going to blame you 

for anybody else’s mistake. You start anew in this job. You need 

to have the opportunity to get this job done. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time if I have any. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the chairman 

of the Capital Markets Subcommittee, the gentleman from New 

Jersey, Mr. Garrett, for 3 minutes. 

Mr. GARRETT. I thank the chairman for holding this important 

hearing today, and I thank Chairman White as well for your participation. 

Chairman White, I want to commend you, first of all, for your 

first month on the job. As indicated already, the job is only going 

to get only harder as the days go along. 

It appears from what I have seen thus far, you are taking a pragmatic, commonsense approach to your issues at task, and I greatly 

appreciate it. I think this is refreshing. 

But as you move forward, as has already been indicated, there 

will be pressures from outside forces that will begin to push you 

harder and more frequently. 

And I encourage you to resist the temptation to take those more 

ideological, political positions, but continue as you have to seek logical, consensus-driven ones. 

Your work and comments on Title VII, which is a cross-border 

application section, the JOBS Act implementation, the equity market structure prioritization, have all been very positive in my view. 

So, I encourage you to continue down this pragmatic path, a reasonable path, and not be overly influenced by outside special interest and political groups. 

And this brings me to the topic I am sure you have already heard 

about and will hear about today, as the chairman mentioned, our 

concerns are about an independent agency being subject to political 

pressure by the White House and this Administration and by outside political special interests groups. 

There appears to be a coordinated effort to use any and all methods possible to tamp down political opposition, in some cases to stifle Americans’ constitutional rights of freedom of speech. 

This recent incident that had come to light just recently with the 

IRS has only helped crystallize for Americans exactly what this Administration and outside special interests appear to try to do. 

Whether it is in the tax code, the corporate political disclosure 

process, union rules, EPA guidelines, et cetera, it becomes painstakingly clear that this Administration is more worried about 

crushing its political opposition than about governing and leading 

the American people through our current economic downturn. 

Now I know, as indicated, you just started and you have not had 

anything to do with the issues as of yet. But we are just giving you 

an opportunity today to make a clear and emphatic statement that 

you will refuse to be bullied by these outside radical groups that 

are trying to exploit the corporate disclosure process. 

5 

Moreover, you are going to have an opportunity to make a clear 

and concise statement that you agree to formally and permanently 

remove the corporate political disclosure measure from your regulatory flexibility agenda. 

As you are aware, these types of political witch hunts will only 

poison the well and make achieving your other priorities more difficult. 

With all the important work the SEC has to do with finalizing 

the JOBS Act and Dodd-Frank rulemakings to policing bad actors 

in the market and working with Congress to reform the equity 

markets, it would be a shame to have these worthwhile goals suffer 

because of political and ideological pressure. 

I think we should all agree that the SEC should remain focused 

on its core mission: protecting investors; ensuring orderly and fair 

markets; and facilitating capital formation—not on partisan political moves outside of your main purview that would limit the debate and deprive Americans of their constitutional rights. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady 

from New York, the ranking member of the Capital Markets Subcommittee, and notes her presence on the top row yet again. We 

are happy to have you rejoin us. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The gentlelady is recognized for 3 minutes. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Three minutes, good heavens. First of all, thank 

you, Chairman Hensarling and Ranking Member Waters. And I 

would like to give an especially warm welcome to my fellow New 

Yorker, Chairman Mary Jo White. 

I was absolutely so pleased when President Obama nominated 

you and even happier when you were confirmed by the Senate with 

such a strong bipartisan vote. 

And I can say, from very close personal observation over her entire career, she will not be bullied. She has a career of great distinction in both the public and private sector. 

I will never forget her touring the infamous Kenmore Hotel, 

probably the largest drug den in the City of New York, probably 

in the Nation, and it was the largest, I believe, public forfeiture 

where the Federal Government seized the property to stop the injustice of illegal drug dealing. 

I want to report to her that it is now a very important community center serving people and helping people. That is just one example of her hands-on work on the ground. 

She has taken on big issues, small issues, and has always been 

accessible. So, congratulations. My friend, Mel Watt, wants to know 

how you got confirmed so strongly. We would like to follow the 

same procedure and get him confirmed very quickly, too. 

I am still deeply concerned over the fact that this country lost 

over $14 trillion in wealth in a financial crisis that economists tell 

us could have been prevented with stronger and better financial 

regulation. 

So the country is looking to you for that leadership and I certainly will join with the ranking member and any likeminded member on either side of the aisle to work for you to get the resources 

6 

that you need in a position that has really grown in responsibility 

as your budget has decreased. 

As you yourself have said, ‘‘The SEC has a number of new regulatory responsibilities, but because of sequestration we are unable 

to build the structure for that oversight that we are mandated to 

carry out.’’ 

It is our responsibility to give you those resources. There is a 

saying in New York that investors lost more in Madoff, in that 

scandal, than the SEC’s entire budget since the Commission’s inception in 1934. 

So there is something seriously wrong with that. We just had a 

hearing last week on a number of derivatives bills that will be your 

responsibility to implement and to enforce. 

And I look forward to working to make sure that you get your 

resources and that bills that are put in the area that I believe will 

create barriers to the SEC with your ability to get done, such as 

one that will be on the Floor tomorrow, we will be working together 

to help you get the resources you need. 

I am so pleased with your appointment. Thank you for being 

here today. We look forward to your testimony. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from Texas, Mr. Neugebauer, for 1 minute. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this 

hearing. 

And, Chairman White, welcome. Congratulations on your appointment. 

I was just listening to my colleague on the other side of the aisle; 

that is a familiar story in Washington, ‘‘Well, we didn’t do our job 

because we didn’t have enough money.’’ But when you go back and 

you look at the record, whether it is Madoff, Stanford, Bear 

Stearns, Lehman, or the Reserve Primary Fund, it wasn’t necessarily a case that we didn’t have regulations. It was a case that 

we had regulators who weren’t actually doing their job. 

And you go back and look at the record where the regulators had 

some reason to believe that Mr. Madoff was involved in some activities, but failed to follow up on it, and the same with Stanford. 

So what we did is, since we had people who weren’t doing their 

jobs, we went out there and said, let us pass some more regulations. That will help. 

And so we went out and passed more regulations and now we 

have created this huge new risk category called regulatory risk 

that is impeding the ability of many of our financial institutions in 

America to be competitive. 

And so, Chairman White, I hope that as you look at your organization, you are not necessarily looking for more resources, but making sure that the people under your charge are actually doing their 

jobs. 

With that, I yield back my time. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from Illinois, Mr. Foster, for 2 minutes. 

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you. I thank the chairman and the ranking 

member. 

Chairman White, I appreciate your testifying before our committee today, and I congratulate you on your nomination. 

7 

I want to emphasize to my colleagues the importance of fully 

funding the SEC. The President’s request for Fiscal Year 2014 

seeks $1.67 billion, a 26 percent increase in the current level, 

which is not incommensurate with your additional responsibilities 

in the wake of the financial crisis. 

Some of my colleagues will assert that it is too costly to fully 

fund an agency whose primary responsibility is the regulation of 

the securities markets and a wide variety of other market issues, 

but I would respond by reminding my colleagues of the costs of deregulation and of inadequately funded regulators. Families in America lost more than $16 trillion during the finan- cial crisis of 2008, $16 trillion. That is, incidentally, or interestingly, enough to fully fund the SEC for about 1,000 years. Bearing 

in mind how many of our constituents lost their homes, retirement 

funds, and small businesses a short time ago, it is imperative that 

this Congress provide the agencies that are charged with policing 

the financial markets with the funding that they need to hire staff 

in the numbers and quality necessary to successfully execute their 

important tasks. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from North Carolina, Mr. McHenry, for 1 minute. 

Mr. MCHENRY. Chairman White, thank you so much for your 

leadership. I congratulate you on being the 31st Chair of the SEC. 

Knowing tough prosecutions, such as the John Gotti case that 

you previously oversaw, I think Washington should be a little bit 

easier on you than that. Having said that—yes, exactly—having 

said that, we understand your commitment to the mission of the 

Securities and Exchange Commission, but we want to make it clear 

that we have statutory and legislative directives for the Securities 

and Exchange Commission to get on with the job of implementing 

the JOBS Act. 

This is going to be a question that is going to be recurring, so 

the faster you get done with that, the more efficiently you get done 

with that, the better off we all are and we can move on to other 

questions. 

With that, yesterday the House overwhelmingly passed a renewed Regulation A, giving the SEC a deadline for writing those 

regulations. I hope you will be able to comply with that statutory 

deadline. I welcome you for your first House testimony and I look 

forward to the answers to our questions. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now yields 1 minute to the 

gentleman from Virginia, the vice chairman of the Capital Markets 

Subcommittee, Mr. Hurt. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for holding 

today’s committee hearing. I, too, join in welcoming Chairman 

White to this committee. 

I believe that the formal responsibility of this committee is to 

provide appropriate oversight and scrutiny of the Federal agencies’ 

budgets under our jurisdiction. At a time when our Nation is approaching a national debt of $17 trillion, Federal agencies must 

learn to work smarter and to do more with less. 

As we have seen from this budget request, the SEC has requested a 30 percent increase in funding. Undoubtedly, WashVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:27 Nov 15, 2013 Jkt 081755 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\81755.TXT TERRI
8 

ington has piled new responsibilities onto the SEC as a consequence of Dodd-Frank. I remain concerned, however, that the 

SEC has not made the necessary changes to its internal operations 

and structure or prioritized much-needed technology upgrades to 

oversee our capital markets. 

Additionally, it is important that we ensure that the SEC is committed to completing the rulemakings required by Congress on 

time, such as those implementing the JOBS Act. I think that we 

can all agree that properly functioning capital markets will lead to 

the real jobs that Americans need, that people in my Virginia district need. 

I would like to thank you again for your appearance here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and I yield 

back my time. 

Chairman HENSARLING. We have no additional opening statements, so today we welcome the Chairman of the Securities and 

Exchange Commission, Mary Jo White. She was sworn in as the 

31st Chair of the SEC on April 10th of this year, so she brings all 

the wisdom and insight of 36 days of being on the job to our committee today. 

Most recently, she has served as the chair of the litigation department of the New York law firm of Debevoise & Plimpton. Before that she served as the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District 

of New York from 1993 to 2002, where she oversaw the prosecutions of John Gotti, as well as the defendants responsible for the 

1993 World Trade Center bombing. 

Born in Kansas City, Missouri, she received her law degree from 

Columbia Law School, and she has a Masters in Psychology from 

The New School for Social Research, and a Bachelor’s degree from 

the College of William and Mary. 

Chairman White, welcome to the committee for your first appearance. I feel quite confident it will not be your last. You will be recognized to give an oral presentation of your testimony. And without 

objection, your written statement will be made a part of the record. 

Once you have finished presenting, each member of the committee 

will have 5 minutes within which to ask questions. 

I wish to alert all committee members that we have agreed to 

allow the Chairman to be excused at 1 p.m. 

Chairman White, again, welcome, and please proceed with your 

testimony at this time. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARY JO WHITE, 

CHAIRMAN, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

Ms. WHITE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Hensarling, Ranking Member Waters, and members of 

the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf 

of the Commission regarding the agency’s recent activities, budget 

request, and upcoming challenges. Let me say, I am very pleased 

to be back in public service and to be appearing before this committee for the first time. I look forward to working with you to advance the Commission’s critical mission of protecting investors, facilitating capital formation, and maintaining fair and efficient markets. 

9 

As has been said, I have been Chair of the SEC for only a month, 

but in this short period I have been impressed by the commitment 

and expertise of my four fellow Commissioners and my colleagues 

across the agency. And I am committed to working tirelessly with 

them on behalf of investors and our markets. 

I have also been struck by the massiveness and importance of 

the SEC’s responsibilities. Our agency is responsible for implementing and enforcing the Federal securities laws, overseeing over 

25,000 participants in the securities markets, and reviewing disclosures and financial statements of more than 9,100 reporting companies. 

My written testimony details the extensive work being done in 

the divisions and many of our offices that is so critical to the savings of American families and the growth potential of American 

businesses. With the passage of the Dodd-Frank and JOBS Acts, 

the SEC’s vast responsibilities have become greater than ever. 

As I enter this job, a number of immediate priorities are clear. 

They include completing in as timely and smart a way as possible 

the rulemaking mandates contained in both the Dodd-Frank Act 

and the JOBS Act; further strengthening our enforcement and examination functions, thus bolstering investor confidence and the integrity of our financial markets; and fully understanding and providing expert oversight of today’s complex and dispersed marketplace so that it can be wisely regulated, which will require investing in technology and expertise to keep pace with the markets we 

oversee. 

Continued funding at the current level and the staffing it supports would present significant challenges as we attempt to fulfill 

these and our many other responsibilities. The agency’s Fiscal Year 

2014 budget request will allow us to add approximately 676 new 

positions needed to improve core operations and effectively execute 

against both existing and new responsibilities. 

While our funding is fully offset by securities transaction fees, 

and thus will not impact the deficit, we understand we must seek 

to use appropriated funds as careful stewards in the most efficient 

and effective way possible. We also acknowledge the need for the 

agency to continue to enhance its effectiveness and efficiency. 

In recent years, the agency has made significant strides to 

strengthen its examination and enforcement functions, improved 

its capacity to assess risks, enhanced its technology, and reformed 

its operations. 

With this in mind, the Fiscal Year 2014 budget request would 

provide additional funding in the following key areas. 

Expanding oversight of investment advisers: During Fiscal Year 

2012, the SEC was able to examine only about 8 percent of registered advisers. Significant additional coverage is essential if investors are to be appropriately protected. 

Bolstering enforcement: it is important that we continue to send 

a strong message to would-be wrongdoers that misconduct will be 

swiftly and aggressively punished. 

Hiring additional economists to support economic analyses in 

connection with Commission rulemaking and risk analysis. 

Building oversight of derivatives and clearing agencies: two facets of our Dodd-Frank mandates. 

10 

Enhancing reviews of corporate disclosures, including staff to review draft registration statements submitted by emerging growth 

companies under the JOBS Act. 

Investing in technology, a need that in my view cannot be overstated. While the SEC is rapidly modernizing our systems, significant investments are needed to properly oversee the markets and 

entities we regulate including improving our IT security and building data analysis tools. 

And finally, enhancing training and development programs to increase our expertise and help maximize our efficiencies. 

Thank you for inviting me to be here today to discuss the SEC’s 

many initiatives. Your continued support will allow us to better 

protect investors and facilitate capital formation, more effectively 

oversee the markets and entities we regulate, and build upon the 

significant improvements the agency has made to date. 

I would be happy to answer any questions that you may have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman White can be found on 

page 55 of the appendix.] 

Chairman HENSARLING. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

The Chair will now recognize himself for 5 minutes for questions. 

Chairman White, you can probably appreciate this, but having 

been in office for 10 years, I have yet to meet a head of a government agency who did not ask for more resources. So, you are certainly not atypical in that respect. 

But the questions we have—a number of which obviously clearly 

predate your tenure—deal with the challenges with which your 

agency is faced. Is it a question of competence, is it a question of 

priorities, or is it a question of resources? 

Many of my colleagues will be speaking more to these issues, but 

with respect to priorities, as you probably noted throughout my 

opening statement, I still have concerns, as do many, about the 

SEC devoting resources to a discretionary rulemaking dealing with 

corporate political reporting. 

So the first question I have is, do you believe the SEC should require disclosure of items that are not material under Rule 10b-5? 

Ms. WHITE. I think the answer to that is that the SEC does have 

authority, certainly with respect to line item disclosures, to require 

them if they would be helpful and important to investors. But 

plainly, the core of required disclosures is what will be material to 

investors. 

Chairman HENSARLING. Okay. 

Let me ask you this, Madam Chairman. Okay, the bulk of it is 

material, but you may require disclosure of items that are immaterial. But doesn’t the SEC have to demonstrate materiality in order 

to bring a 10b-5 enforcement action? And if so, what is the point 

of adopting reporting rules if you cannot enforce them? 

Ms. WHITE. Certainly in a 10b-5 action, the SEC would have the 

burden to prove materiality. You can have compliance infractions 

and violations that don’t have materiality as an element. 

Chairman HENSARLING. Okay. Let us look at materiality then. 

Is it, in your opinion, material where—from what source a public 

company buys its coffee? Rainforestconcern.org has alleged that 

11 

many public companies are helping destroy rainforests by their selection of coffee. 

Is that material? 

Ms. WHITE. I know that is an issue that presents itself in some 

of our disclosure rules that are under litigation now, that were actually mandated by Congress. 

It is a very fact-specific analysis. As you stated, depending on the 

company circumstances, I don’t hear materiality in what you are 

stating. 

Chairman HENSARLING. Let me try another one. 

Is it material whether a company chooses to lease office space to 

an abortion clinic? Is that material? 

Ms. WHITE. It is a fact and circumstances analysis to determine 

materiality. And so, you would have to look at all the facts with 

respect to that particular company in that particular situation. 

Chairman HENSARLING. I am not really hearing an answer in 

there, Madam Chairman. But my thought process was or my understanding was that materiality is relevant to the investor. And 

I am just somewhat curious about rules that potentially could be 

adopted that really accommodate kind of the infinite and diverse 

political views of our Nation. And at a time when most of my constituents care about whether or not their investments will help 

them pay their increased health care premiums or help send a kid 

to college, I am not really sure that they want their SEC engaged 

in what they believe to be political policy. 

And let me ask you this, Madam Chairman. Do you have any 

concern that it would undermine the credibility of your agency if 

there was a public perception that the agency was engaged in partisan political rulemaking? 

Ms. WHITE. I think any government agency always has to be 

wary of, aware of the perception that it may be acting for political 

purposes, or any purpose other than fulfilling its core mission. 

I am a very—for good or ill—apolitical person, and a very independent person. And my intention in running the SEC as Chair is 

to do the best job I possibly can in fulfilling that mission. But the 

answer— 

Chairman HENSARLING. I’m sorry. My time is drawing to a close. 

I realize you have been on the job for 36 days, but are you aware 

if the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has contacted you 

or anyone at the SEC regarding the SEC’s Reg Flex agenda which, 

as you well know, recognizes your rulemaking priorities? And if so, 

have individuals from the OMB expressed an interest in seeing the 

potential rulemaking regarding political reporting moved forward? 

Ms. WHITE. I am not aware of any such contact, Mr. Chairman, 

or any such view being expressed to the SEC. 

Chairman HENSARLING. Okay. I would respectfully request that 

when you return to the SEC, you ask the question and present the 

committee with an answer. 

[The information requested can be found on page 110 of the appendix.] 

The Chair now recognizes the ranking member for 5 minutes. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

12 

As I referenced in my opening statement, my concern about cost 

benefit analysis, and the court case relative to the use of proxies 

to nominate to boards, I am very, very worried that this is going 

to be a tactic that will be employed over and over again in order 

to try and impede the SEC’s ability to do its work. 

We are aware, of course, of that case relative to the proxies, but 

there are two other cases that have already been brought to the 

court. I suspect there will be more. And I am worried about the 

costs. 

I don’t know what the cost of litigation was in the proxy case. 

And I don’t know what the cost of litigation may be in the two 

cases that are before the courts. But do you see this as another 

way to have to spend precious resources that could be going to rulemaking if you end up having to fight all of these court battles? 

Ms. WHITE. Clearly, any activity that occupies you significantly 

costs more resources, including litigation. 

I do believe in the importance of robust economic analysis with 

respect to our rulemaking. My predecessor issued guidance to enhance the SEC’s work in that arena in March of 2012. I think that 

is very important analysis to the rulemaking. Obviously, it is our 

responsibility also to make certain that our rules withstand a judicial challenge. 

We need to be sure that we are being efficient as we do the economic analysis and we do the litigation so that it doesn’t prevent 

us from doing necessary rulemaking. 

Ms. WATERS. Oh, good. I guess we agree, as any reasonable person would, that it costs money to fight these battles in court. 

Ms. WHITE. No question about that. 

Ms. WATERS. And that takes away from your budget? 

Ms. WHITE. No question that is part of the budget consumption, 

yes. 

Ms. WATERS. Added to that, there is a bill that will be on the 

Floor tomorrow, H.R. 1062, the SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, 

the cost/benefit analysis bill. 

There is a requirement in H.R. 1062 that the Commission revisit 

all past rulemakings 1 year after enactment, and every 5 years 

thereafter. To me, this seems like an unreasonable requirement, 

particularly when we consider that you would have to revisit longstanding provisions in our securities laws dating back to the Great 

Depression. 

I would like you to comment on this. Is this reasonable? How do 

you envision being able to do that? 

Ms. WHITE. I am familiar with the bill. And as I said before, I 

am a firm supporter of rigorous economic analysis. I do have concerns about this bill in terms of our being able to carry out our 

rulemaking function expeditiously and to provide market participants with certainty. 

I think, at least as I read it, it would add additional new requirements to the SEC’s economic analysis, the one you mentioned being 

one that is particularly of concern to me—the retrospective review 

that would need to be done after a year and then every 5 years 

under various criteria. 

First, that sort of pops out to me as creating uncertainty for the 

market, and putting the rules under kind of constant challenge. I 

13 

guess I would add, though—and I go back to how committed I am 

to both the guidance that my predecessor issued—but robust economic analysis throughout everything we do, frankly, at the SEC, 

not just the rulemaking, and we have enhanced that function. 

We have recently actually been, praised may not be a word you 

use here, but we have gotten positive comments from the GAO and 

the Chamber, as well as a recent comment on our cross-border rule 

about how well and robust the SEC is doing with respect to economic analysis. 

I think we have to take great care that we don’t impose additional requirements. I think these would provide at least the basis 

for a lot of challenges in court. Obviously, the rules should be subject to valid challenges, but that would create a lot of litigation that 

I think would undermine our ability to do our job. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And in addition to 

my concerns about the cost and the time and the burdens that are 

being placed, I am taking a look at H.R. 1062. In your opinion, does 

this legislation appropriately balance investor protection with other 

missions of the Commission such as capital formation? 

Ms. WHITE. I think our mission is the tripartite mission we have 

all been talking about and reciting. And it is not just a mantra. I 

think you do have to sometimes effect a balance. I don’t think they 

should be in conflict with each other. 

I think what you would end up with here is an inability to—it 

doesn’t just apply, as I read the bill, to rulemaking, but also interpretive guidance of various kinds. I think it would end up hampering us in our mission to fulfill our duty to investors, but also 

capital formation and the functioning markets. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. 

Garrett, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARRETT. I thank the chairman. 

Going back to my opening statement, discussing the ongoing concerns being raised by the American public about this Administration’s attempt to bully organizations and groups that disagree with 

them politically, and in light of the chairman’s comments with regard to some specific examples, can you commit formally today on 

removing the mention of a corporate political disclosure requirement from your Reg Flex agenda? 

Ms. WHITE. Mr. Chairman, I think—my response to that is essentially, the petitions for requiring the political contributions are 

being reviewed in our Corporation Finance Division. That review is 

not completed. I can’t prejudge the issue until I am the beneficiary 

of that analysis. 

No one is working on a proposed rule now, and the Reg Flex 

agenda, I think, will come to me somewhat later in my tenure than 

today. 

Mr. GARRETT. And just to spend 10 seconds on the examples that 

the chairman raised, I think your response was first, the difference 

between materiality and important. And second, you said these 

would be fact-specific to a particular company? 

Ms. WHITE. Materiality tends to be fact-specific. 

14 

Mr. GARRETT. But any rule that you would promulgate, if you 

were to adopt any of those, as the chairman was suggesting, would 

not be for a specific company. It would be for all public companies, 

would it be not? 

Ms. WHITE. That is correct, and the petitions do make the argument that such disclosure would be material— 

Mr. GARRETT. Right. And— 

Ms. WHITE. —across companies. But I get your point. 

Mr. GARRETT. —the three main core missions of the SEC are 

what? Protecting the investors, ensuring orderly and fair markets, 

and facilitating capital formation. Using those as your core missions, do any of those examples that the chairman just gave you 

fall into any of those categories? Facilitating capital formation? 

Fair and orderly markets? Protecting investors? 

Ms. WHITE. Those arguments, as I understand it, have been 

made in the petitions. I don’t think it would be appropriate for me 

to comment and prejudge those arguments until I have gotten the 

staff’s briefing. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay. 

With regard to—I will just say it—with regard to economic analysis, your predecessor issued a memorandum last March providing 

guidance to SEC staff on economic analysis and SEC rulemaking. 

She indicated that this guidance was binding for SEC staff. 

Have you also indicated to your staff—do you believe this guidance is also binding on them, as well? 

Ms. WHITE. Yes, and I fully support it. And my understanding 

is that it is being followed, since my predecessor issued the guidance to the staff. 

Mr. GARRETT. Without objection, I ask unanimous consent to put 

the prior memo from March 16th in the record. 

Chairman HENSARLING. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you. With regard to equity market structure, I know that we just had this roundtable, and that was good, 

a lot of back-and-forth. There seemed to be unanimity in certain 

areas where we could go forward on this. 

Do you agree that the SEC should conduct a comprehensive review of the equity market structure regulatory regime? 

Ms. WHITE. I think there is no question about that. We did issue 

the concept release on the equity market structure in 2010. 

Mr. GARRETT. Right. 

Ms. WHITE. And that work is actually continuing in that direction, to do that comprehensive review. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay. But that one was not truly a comprehensive 

review back in 2010. 

Ms. WHITE. Essentially, lots of comments came in. There was a 

lot of work done. The Flash Crash happened. Dodd-Frank happened. There was a slowdown of that review. 

However, it has continued, and is reaching the point where it is 

yielding some data and analysis that I think will be very useful. 

But certainly, it does recite that it is a comprehensive review of 

those issues. 

Mr. GARRETT. Great. And just yesterday, thank you, I had the 

opportunity to be at the rating agency roundtable that you had. Do 

you believe that the SEC should finalize—as I pointed out in my 

15 

comments there—Section 939(a), before moving forward what I believe is really an unworkable and unwise idea of having the government select rating agencies or establishing a new or rotating formula? 

Ms. WHITE. We have obligations under 939(a) and 939(f). But I 

am committed to— 

Mr. GARRETT. But you would do 939(a), which is basically the 

first, before we get onto the start of the beginning of the alphabet, 

before we go down to the rest of it? 

Ms. WHITE. I haven’t—and I really can’t commit to sequencing. 

I understand the importance of 939(a). It is something we need to 

carry out. 

Mr. GARRETT. The importance of it is that it is mandatory, and 

later on it is discretionary, right? 

Ms. WHITE. And—I am sorry. Later on? 

Mr. GARRETT. Yes— 

Ms. WHITE. We are required to do the study we are doing now. 

Yes. In that sense, it is not discretionary. But obviously, we make 

a decision as to what to do following the information that came in, 

including at that roundtable. 

But what I am trying to do with all these rules and these 

rulemakings, is to make sure that we have the bandwidth so that 

one doesn’t detract from the other. 

Mr. GARRETT. And the last question with regard to the CFTC, I 

appreciate what you are all doing over at the SEC. The CFTC is 

working at a different pace than you are. 

Are you committed to sitting down with CFTC Chairman Gensler 

to see if you can actually get it done jointly, since there is no benefit in having you working at cross purposes? That is a yes or no, 

I guess? 

Ms. WHITE. We are totally committed to that. There have been 

a lot of discussions, prior to my arrival as well. But we are totally 

committed to that. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Mrs. 

Maloney, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. During your confirmation hearing in 

March, you indicated that one of your highest priorities would be 

to further strengthen the enforcement function of the SEC in a way 

that is ‘‘bold and unrelenting.’’ 

Your predecessor had the same concern. In fact, one of the last 

letters that Chairman Schapiro sent was to Senator Reed, saying 

that certain statutory changes could enhance the effectiveness of 

the Commission’s enforcement program. 

I would like unanimous consent to place former Chairman 

Schapiro’s letter in the record. I think it is an important letter. 

And— 

Chairman HENSARLING. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. It is my understanding that under 

the statute, the SEC cannot collect an amount equal to what investors actually lost as a result of a finding of abuse. 

Can you comment on the limitations of the SEC on penalties? 

Can you comment on your feelings? Do you share her concerns? 

What actions do you intend to take in this area? 

16 

Ms. WHITE. I totally share the concerns. I think one of the most 

important things you do in a law enforcement agency, which the 

SEC is, is to have a strong enforcement arm that is a deterrent, 

not only to the individual committing the instant violation, but to 

those who might be thinking about committing violations in the future. 

And the SEC’s penalty structure doesn’t allow, I don’t think, a 

meaningful penalty in many situations, even in the case of the 

most serious offense or in the case of a recidivist. 

We can’t, for example, pitch a penalty to the amount of investor 

loss, which tends to be the big number in the big frauds, and we 

should do that. We don’t have enhanced penalties for someone who 

commits a more serious violation 3 or 4 or 5 times. 

And so, I fully support former Chairman Schapiro’s request for 

legislation. I also support the bill that has been introduced to try 

to give that to the SEC. 

Mrs. MALONEY. What other ways do you see the SEC strengthening enforcement in addition to penalties? What other ways do 

you intend to enforce measures? 

Ms. WHITE. As we speak, essentially I am undertaking a review 

with the enforcement division of their various practices and policies 

to see if we can, in effect, enhance their ability to more efficiently 

go after the most serious wrongdoers up the chain, if the evidence 

goes up the chain, and to look at the settlement policies, as well 

as their capacity to litigate. 

I think one thing that needs to happen at the SEC, and actually 

in our current budget request for enforcement, we are seeking 131 

new positions, many of them for litigation and trial work, which I 

think we very much need to have. 

Mrs. MALONEY. In terms of a global marketplace, which we have, 

what powers does the SEC have to enforce our laws and rules and 

regulations in a foreign country? 

Ms. WHITE. We don’t have powers to enforce in a foreign country. 

It is a global market. We certainly have global frauds that we have 

jurisdiction over to bring enforcement action against—again, depending on what the facts are, what the involvement of U.S. players are, but if you have a completely foreign company, a foreign national who commits a fraud, certainly in the United States, is the 

simplest example, we can proceed, and do proceed, against foreign 

nationals. 

We also have in our regulatory powers the ability to deal with, 

for example, foreign issuers who don’t play by the rules. We have 

a lot of initiatives going on, for example, and enforcement actions 

included involving CEOs in companies in the People’s Republic of 

China, as one example. 

Mrs. MALONEY. What about foreign subsidiaries that are connected with our financial institutions? Again, the enforcement powers in those situations? 

Ms. WHITE. It will depend on what the facts are in a particular 

enforcement matter as to what you can do with respect to the foreign subsidiaries. You certainly don’t have the power to go into another country and enforce our laws against a foreign subsidiary in 

those countries. 

17 

You also do get into difficult issues with respect to getting documents in the United States when you are investigating a global institution that has a foreign subsidiary. 

Mrs. MALONEY. My time has expired. Thank you. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from California, the vice chair of the committee, Mr. Miller, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. MILLER. Welcome, Chairman White. It is good to have you 

here. I have somewhat of a concern on overreach that the chairman 

mentioned in his opening statement on the intent behind the 

Volker Rule as it prohibits insurance depository institutions’ affiliates from engaging in proprietary trading. 

And the statute specifically prohibits trading by an insurance 

business for the general account of the insurance companies, 619. 

I believe you are familiar with that. The proposal prevents the very 

trading, though, that Congress allows. Before you have an insurance company that happens to have a holding of a minor, small 

bank. And now those banking rules are being applied to the insurance company. 

Your predecessor stated in March that the SEC was looking at 

whether there would be flexibility on this point. What is your position at this point on the rule? 

Ms. WHITE. If I caught the full range of your question— 

Mr. MILLER. Do you want me to restate it? Insurance company 

during their normal frame of business, they have a minor holding 

in a bank. 

Ms. WHITE. Right. 

Mr. MILLER. Now, those banking regulations are being applied to 

the insurance company. 

Ms. WHITE. And we are very focused on that issue as we go 

through this rulemaking, and fully take the point. 

Mr. MILLER. Do you agree with your predecessor? Section 13 of 

619 is very clear. And my concern is that the perception on the 

street is that you are moving in a different direction. And I hope 

you are a breath of fresh air on this issue. 

Ms. WHITE. I don’t think that is the case. But if we need to say 

something more that we can say at this point, given that we are 

in the midst of the rulemaking, perhaps we should, and I will review that. 

Mr. MILLER. Okay. Daily Average Revenue Trades (DARTs) are 

another concern. Regulators around the world are looking at U.S. 

markets and expressing concerns over high-level DART trading. 

Three years ago, the SEC put out a concept release on the market 

structure, but has not acted in any way on the items they proposed. 

I understand you are only a month on the job, but where do you 

think you will see some of these changes occur in the area? 

Ms. WHITE. I think, if you are talking about the concept release 

in 2010 on the equity markets, that is an extremely high priority 

to complete, to continue. It is something that did get delayed by the 

press of other business, but it has proceeded in the last 2 years, 

and it is nearing a place where I think we are going to be getting 

very useful data and analytics that will be very helpful to those 

issues. 

Mr. MILLER. Okay—conflict minerals, I am assuming? 

18 

Ms. WHITE. I’m sorry. 

Mr. MILLER. Conflict minerals? 

Ms. WHITE. Yes. 

Mr. MILLER. We are all concerned about what is happening in 

the Democratic Republic of Congo, but if you believe in a rule of 

law, you are innocent until proven guilty. If you look at the way 

that is being applied—and I know this is not an expertise of the 

SEC, and I don’t think you should even be involved in this, but the 

problem is, you have businesses out there having to prove that 

there are no conflict minerals in their product, and if you can’t 

prove it, you are found guilty at that point. And your mission is 

to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, 

and capital formation. 

The SEC has little or no experience in crafting trade sanctions. 

Yet, that is the position you have been put in. And the burden on 

American businesses is huge. There is not even an exemption for 

recycled material. 

But if you look at the application of the rule in the guidelines, 

we are impacting a huge sector of the African continent rather 

than dealing with the specific problem. What is your opinion on 

that issue, and how could you see us going forward in a more favorable direction, or at least a direction that is more fair to American 

businesses? 

Ms. WHITE. I appreciate the question. That is one of the congressionally mandated rulemakings that the SEC was required to 

make. We certainly got a lot of comments along the same lines as 

yours. Again, this does precede me, but my understanding is that 

the staff, particularly of the Division of Corporation Finance, took 

great pains to try to reduce the burdens, but still be true to the 

statutory language and objective. 

Some of the issues—this rulemaking has also been challenged. It 

is currently under challenge in the D.C. courts, and those issues 

have been raised there as well. 

Mr. MILLER. I know you are very busy. It has been a tough 30 

days, but I would like to see you do a few things: conduct a brief 

review of a small-business impact, and publish that study so we 

can actually review it; provide a means of minimizing eliminating 

unnecessary costs and burdens upon small businesses, which today 

they are very, very heavy on the business sector; explore innovative 

means of meeting the intent of exempting recycled material might 

be one way of doing it, because I don’t believe anybody can find a 

source of recycled material. 

Create a safe harbor that allows public companies to exercise 

reasonable due diligence. And I think reasonable due diligence is 

most important, and provide measures to reduce potential liability 

for public companies. You have General Motors, or Boeing, that 

might have a million different parts, or a million different contractors, and the liability falls back on them. I would like to see you 

do something in that area. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Ms. 

Velazquez, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. VELAZQUEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

19 

Chairman White, to better oversee the emerging crowdfunding 

industry, and prevent instances of fraud, the JOBS Act requires 

anyone acting as an intermediary to register with the appropriate 

self-regulatory organization as well as the SEC. How will this 

added layer of SEC oversight better protect investors? 

Ms. WHITE. I think you mentioned two of the safeguards that are 

in the crowdfunding legislation and structure. The funding portal 

and the self-regulatory organization are very important to seeing to 

it that when we do actually do the rulemaking in that arena, investors are protected. The SEC always has to be focused on maximizing investor protection wherever it can be. Those are safeguards 

in that legislation. 

Ms. VELAZQUEZ. I am concerned about the likelihood that two 

regulators will create confusion and drive up costs, regulatory costs 

for small businesses. What is your take on that? 

Ms. WHITE. The SEC is, and certainly I personally am very focused on small businesses and their ability to more easily raise 

capital. Some of the market structure issues relate to that as well. 

And in terms of inconsistency between regulators in the same 

space, the goal should be for consistency. 

Ms. VELAZQUEZ. We are starting to hear from most Federal agencies about the impact that the sequestration is having on their dayto-day operations. And I would like to ask you, what effect, or what 

impact is sequestration having on the SEC’s ability to implement 

the Dodd-Frank Act and the JOBS Act? 

Ms. WHITE. There is no question that it is having a significant 

impact on the SEC, although to credit our financial management 

folks in particular, I think the SEC anticipated well and planned 

well for the possibility of sequestration. And so, I don’t think we 

will have furloughs, for example. 

But we certainly have had to slow investments in various IT initiatives that are important to enforcement and examination. We 

have also had to delay hiring to build out the staff we need for the 

new responsibilities under Dodd-Frank. 

Ms. VELAZQUEZ. Beyond sequestration, what effects will further 

reductions in your budget have on rulemaking and enforcement? 

Ms. WHITE. I guess everyone who comes says this, but I am 

struck by the massiveness of our responsibilities, and the need for, 

certainly, the funding that we have sought in this budget. 

I think the independent consulting group that actually reported 

to us per Dodd-Frank pointed out the gap between our funding and 

the ability to carry out our mission. We have tried to be surgical 

with respect to our request, and really to target the most pressing 

needs, but we need the funding. 

Ms. VELAZQUEZ. Chairman White, the SEC has been criticized 

for the proposed rule on general solicitation, and advertising of private securities. Specifically, stakeholders have stated that the rule 

does not provide a proper mechanism for validating accredited investors, which will create confusion in the marketplace. 

Do you expect the SEC to clarify this rule to help small companies verify which investors can invest in their securities and avoid 

unintentional violations? 

Ms. WHITE. That, again, is among the many rulemakings that 

are currently under active discussion between the staff and my felVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:27 Nov 15, 2013 Jkt 081755 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\81755.TXT TERRI
20 

low Commissioners. We are very much aware of that issue as we 

go forward. 

Ms. VELAZQUEZ. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from Alabama, Mr. Bachus, our chairman emeritus, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And it is ‘‘Chairman,’’ Chairman White. The Senate confirmed 

you unanimously, and I think you come with eminent qualifications, and I think many of us were thrilled with your nomination. 

And I want to just introduce in the record, Chairman Mary Jo 

White’s biography, and invite all of the Members to read it. I think 

anyone who thinks she is going to be bullied probably has not read 

her biography. 

She was the first woman in over 200 years to serve as the U.S. 

Atorney for the southern district of New York, and others have 

mentioned many of your prosecutions. They didn’t mention the embassy bombings in Africa, which you successfully prosecuted. 

Chairman HENSARLING. Without objection, that will be entered 

into the record. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

The question of funding has come up this morning. We as a committee have urged you to do more economic analysis. You have the 

implementation of Dodd-Frank, which we described many times as 

one of the most massive statutes ever passed by this Congress. 

You mentioned investor advisers, and we very much think that 

there ought to be more frequent examinations, as do you and your 

predecessor. Others have mentioned the JOBS Act and others so 

you have many other rulemaking responsibilities, and you are 

being asked to review existing statutes. 

So you do have very much of an increased workload. And I do 

want to say publicly that I think it would be penny wise and pound 

foolish for there not to be some bipartisan agreement for a funding 

increase. And I would urge you to use the goodwill that you have 

with both the Senate and the House to be a catalyst for that. 

Ms. WHITE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BACHUS. We have discussed this morning, the chairman and 

the subcommittee chair, political contributions and their disclosure. 

We have all kind of followed the IRS, and I think we are all very 

concerned with the constitutional rights to free speech, free association, the right to participate in the political process. 

And I would urge you to look at—also, you mentioned investors. 

And I can’t really see any more than maybe tenuous at the most, 

a remote, tie between the coordination of the SEC in disclosing 

this. And I think there may be some nebulous benefit. 

The chilling effect on that, or the message it has sent would be 

serious. I would urge you—and I will note—I am not sure if anyone 

mentioned that the catalyst for this was, I think, 11 law school professors. And I think you will acknowledge they are not economists, 

they are not business people. They are not investing capital. They 

are not running companies. 

They don’t have a fiduciary relationship with the shareholders. 

And I also would ask you to respect State, corporate law, which you 

did as a U.S. Attorney. And also remember that there is the fiduVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:27 Nov 15, 2013 Jkt 081755 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\81755.TXT TERRI
21 

ciary role of the board of directors as you move forward with that 

petition. 

Ms. WHITE. I appreciate that. I take your points. I can’t prejudge 

the issue, but I fully take your points. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. Governor Tarullo has talked about Section 165, that there may be inadequate capital standards for 

broker-dealers, and I am not going to again ask you to pre-judge 

that. But I see that as a usurping of the SEC’s authority by the 

Federal Reserve. 

And I see nothing in Dodd-Frank Section 165 that allows them 

to do that. I am going to give you a letter that I wrote to Chairman 

Ben Bernanke, and I really pointed out four reasons why I believe 

the Fed is wrong on this issue. 

Probably the most important is that our national treatment of 

foreign broker-dealers, and foreign financial institutions has always 

been evenhanded with our domestic institutions. And as you know 

from being in New York, it is very important that we are evenhanded in that regard. So I am going to introduce this for the 

record, and I ask you to— 

Chairman HENSARLING. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

Mr. BACHUS. —defend the SEC’s jurisdiction. 

Ms. WHITE. I appreciate that. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, 

Mr. Watt, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for being here, Madam Chairman. I have, over 

the last month or so, started having a greater degree of empathy 

toward regulators who have come before the committee. 

[laughter] 

Ms. WHITE. It is a dying breed, right? 

[laughter] 

Mr. WATT. So, I have a couple of softball questions to— 

[laughter] 

Ms. WHITE. Good! 

Mr. WATT. —pose to you. 

Ms. WHITE. Can I say, yes now or— 

[laughter] 

Mr. WATT. Seriously, a month or so ago a number of House and 

Senate Members sent a letter to the SEC about the question of predispute arbitration agreements, that broker-dealers and investment 

advisers are entering into with customers. And the SEC has the 

authority under Section 921 of Dodd-Frank to promulgate some 

rules about this. 

Because of my service on the Judiciary Committee, I am a little 

concerned that these supposedly voluntary agreements are not so 

voluntary at all. And that they often restrict access to participating 

class actions, for example, and things of that sort. 

So I wanted to see whether you think that is an issue and whether the SEC is planning to promulgate rules, and if so, when that 

might occur? Is it a high priority issue for the Commission? 

Ms. WHITE. It is one that is under—I guess active work is the 

right term. 

22 

The SEC has not made a decision whether to exercise its discretionary authority in that space. It has gotten a lot of pre-proposal 

comments on it, lots of discussion on it, with both sides represented 

in that discussion. 

Recently, I think on March 1st, if I am remembering correctly, 

as part of a request for further public information on the standards 

that ought to apply to brokers and investment advisers, legal 

standards and also just possible harmonization of those regulations, one set of those questions to get information for the staff was 

addressed to the various alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 

that are used by both the broker community as well as the investor 

advisory community. 

So that is something that will be coming in shortly and then we 

will review that and proceed to figure out what to do about it, but 

no judgment has been made yet. 

Mr. WATT. Thank you. I am glad that you all are looking into 

that in a very balanced way. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I think I will yield back the balance of my 

time without treading into any additional territory here. 

[laughter] 

Chairman HENSARLING. No additional territory tread on in the 

last minute, 36 seconds. 

The gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Pearce, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Madam Chairman, for being here today. A Wall 

Street Journal article from August 25, 2011, discusses the SEC 

questioning oil and gas companies about fracking. 

And the SEC’s comments in that article—and, Mr. Chairman, I 

request unanimous consent to place this article into the record. 

Chairman HENSARLING. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

Mr. PEARCE. In the article, the SEC is saying that the questions 

are directed to minimize the environmental impact and that is according to copies of the letters that you all sent. 

And so my question is, under your watch, are you going to continue asking such questions? 

Ms. WHITE. That is an area I have to say that I will probably 

have to get back to you on. I am not familiar with what the history 

on that has been and I certainly would commit to get back to you 

on that. 

Mr. PEARCE. I appreciate that, but in the hearing on September 

15, 2011, the SEC Chairman promised to get back to me on at least 

five different things and I am still waiting. My ears are just delicately waiting for even a phone call. 

Ms. WHITE. Just hold me to it. I will get back to you on it very 

promptly. 

Mr. PEARCE. Okay. Is it possible that we might deal with some 

of the questions that were raised in this hearing on September 25, 

2011? 

Ms. WHITE. I haven’t seen what that is— 

Mr. PEARCE. No, I understand. 

Ms. WHITE. But yes is the— 

Mr. PEARCE. Yes, they—track along the same way. 

Ms. WHITE. I will look at— 

23 

Mr. PEARCE. They track along the same way. 

So basically, this idea that the SEC is interested in what people 

are doing to mitigate environmental impact is a curious thing. I 

can understand the rationale because if you are messing up the environment, then you will be subject to lawsuits or fines or something which would affect the stock price, so I follow the rationale. 

One of the other questions I am sure you will have to ask the 

system, but have you ever asked anything with regard to the killing of bald eagles or other migratory birds? 

We have two acts, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Golden 

and Bald Eagle Protection Act. So my question is, I know you have 

asked questions on fracking, but have you ever asked any company 

regarding wind energy if they are involved in the killing of these 

species? 

Ms. WHITE. Not that I am aware of, but— 

Mr. PEARCE. But you see the discontinuity— 

Ms. WHITE. Yes, I take that point. 

Mr. PEARCE. That you have an interest in the environmental impact, and with the things that are happening in the IRS right now, 

it gives one pause to ask if you are only concentrating, in the SEC, 

on those conservative organizations. 

Are these Nixonian tactics spreading across from the IRS to you? 

The Fish and Wildlife Service has yet to convict anyone. BP paid 

$100 million in fines for killing birds in that spill. Exxon killed 85 

birds and paid a $600,000 fine, but this Administration is doing 

zero. 

They haven’t fined any wind companies and the estimates are 

that the wind companies kill 530,000 birds a year. And in fact, the 

golden eagle is diminishing in population in parts of California because of the wind generators, and so your agency has been asking 

questions, and I will take it that it is your responsibility. But if 

your agency has not also been asking questions—to protect the environment and protect the species of other laws, then I think that 

we have a right to question whether or not your agency is being 

used as a political tool by the Administration the way that other 

agencies appear to have been used. 

And we look at the AP scandal. This Administration is appearing 

to get a scandal a day. But please understand that if you are going 

to question one group of companies on their environmental impact, 

you must also ask the other side of the political equation, if there 

is a political equation business, about their environmental impact 

and their impact on endangered species. 

Does that seem credible? 

Ms. WHITE. Clearly, I need to look at the specifics of these particular issues, but I will say this. The SEC is an independent agency. I think— 

Mr. PEARCE. The IRS is, too. We have been told that in the press 

in just the last couple of days. 

Ms. WHITE. And my experience with the SEC over my career has 

been that it is a very apolitical agency. I have no reason to think 

they are not on this, although I obviously am going to look into 

these specifics. 

And I can also assure you that I am— 

Mr. PEARCE. —my time has lapsed— 

24 

Ms. WHITE. —that I am also— 

Mr. PEARCE. Before it lapses, Mr. Chairman, I request unanimous consent to put this other article from the Dispatch in the 

record. I will submit that. 

Chairman HENSARLING. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

Ms. WHITE. And I would just add that I am a very, very independent person, also. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Sherman, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I stopped reading science fiction when I got to 

Congress because in my work I found more strange and wonderful 

things than could be in the pages of science fiction. 

I want to discuss with you a little bit the proposal for disclosure 

of political expenditures. 

You have been called upon by the Chair of the relevant subcommittee to resist outside political pressure, refuse to be bullied, 

and to demonstrate the SEC’s independence by immediately exceeding to the demands of the Chair of the relevant subcommittee 

and the full committee. 

[laughter] 

We have been told that there is a constitutional right of corporate CEOs to use other people’s money, in this case the shareholders, on political communications or propaganda without even 

disclosing what they are doing. 

This is, of course, the strangest of all constitutional rights since 

it is vested only in corporate CEOs. None of my constituents whom 

I know well have the authority to spend other people’s money on 

political communications. 

Now, if indeed we do have these disclosure requirements, it is 

critically important that they be impartial. 

Could you imagine any draft emerging from the SEC that would 

impose one kind of disclosure requirement on, say, Koch Brothers 

Industries and a different disclosure requirement on, say, Berkshire Hathaway or Ben and Jerry’s? Or would the regulations be 

even-handed regardless of which corporation was involved? 

Ms. WHITE. Again, I emphasize there isn’t a current proposal. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Right. 

Ms. WHITE. We don’t have a recommendation even from the division as to whether or not to recommend the rule proposal. But if 

you are talking about required disclosure on a particular subject, 

that is generally applied uniformly. 

Certainly, you don’t make distinctions on any factors you 

shouldn’t be. Sometimes, you will have scaled disclosure for smaller 

companies and things like that, but— 

Mr. SHERMAN. But not a requirement that a corporation must 

disclose its conservative expenditures and ignore its liberal ones. 

I would point out that materiality is what is of interest to investors and not all investors focus exclusively on earnings per share. 

We already require the disclosure of executive pay, of involvement in terrorist countries, in the conflict diamonds, and now millions of Americans, all of them potential investors or investors 

through their pension plan want to know about these political exVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:27 Nov 15, 2013 Jkt 081755 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\81755.TXT TERRI
25 

penditures. I hope you will, when you come before us next time, be 

able to report that this process has gone forward. 

Another process that should go forward is the Franken-Sherman 

Amendment dealing with credit rating agencies. Many have pointed to the fact that they gave AAA ratings to junk bonds as the 

cause of the great calamity that hit us in 2008. 

Congress, in the law that was signed in July 2010, required the 

SEC to either implement the Franken-Sherman solution or to come 

up with a better one. You have done neither. 

I would hope that next time you come here, you will be able to 

say that you adopted regulations consistent with the statue to provide for a panel to choose the credit rating agencies, especially for 

mortgage-backed securities, so that we end the process where the 

issuer selects the evaluator of the bonds being issued, which is like 

the umpire being selected by the home team. 

And the one other thing I would want to mention—my time is 

going quickly—is that the FASB derives much of its power by the 

mandate of the SEC. 

They are coming up with a draft regulation today which will substantially harm small business, which will throw a real monkey 

wrench in the real estate economy. 

They had promised 67 Members of Congress who wrote them 

about this that they wouldn’t adopt regulations which would have 

that effect. And I hope that just as we oversee you, you will oversee 

them. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Fitzpatrick, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield my first 30 

seconds to Mr. Garrett of New Jersey. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you. 

And just briefly, in retort to the gentleman from California, I 

wish to remind the gentleman from California that it is the Constitutional and legislative authority of this committee to have oversight of the SEC. When we direct the SEC to do something, we are 

doing so within our legal authority to do so. 

That is not the case when outside organizations are using bullying techniques against the organization, and it is not the case 

when this Administration exerts undue influence outside the normal channels. 

I yield back to the gentleman. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. I thank the gentleman. 

As a result of several factors like the U.S. credit downgrade, as 

well as the euro debt crisis, there was about $170 billion in outflows and money market funds during the summer of 2011. And I 

understand that some funds saw redemption request beyond 30 

percent of total assets. 

However, no fund broke the buck during this period, which 

seems to have been a good test for the effectiveness of the 2010 

rule change’ specifically, Rule 2a-7. The question is, how would you 

rate the performance of money market funds since the SEC’s 2010 

amendments, Rule 2a-7? 

Ms. WHITE. I think that the 2010 reforms, which were designed 

to make them more resilient—the staff has done an economic study 

26 

of that particular issue, economic analysis of it, and I think the 

conclusion is that they are more resilient. 

What the study also says, though, is that the systemic risks run 

on the funds concern, as we saw during the financial crisis, is not 

met, or was intended to be met, by those reforms, but certainly, I 

think they have done well. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. But do you support the study conclusion that 

the reforms—it is much less likely that a fund would break the 

buck? 

Ms. WHITE. I think the—as I recall, what the study says is if the 

same stress that was apparent during the crisis was present, you 

still had that potential risk. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. On April 25th, when you spoke at the meeting 

of the FSOC, you told them—and this is a quote from that meeting—‘‘I think it is important to move ahead with further reform of 

money market mutual funds.’’ You said that you believed this reform would be best handled by the SEC. 

Do you believe the SEC must act with new rules for money market funds in order to stave off some action from FSOC? 

Ms. WHITE. I can’t speak for FSOC. I can speak for myself and 

the SEC, that I think that money market funds are investment 

products. And if something more is to be done—and, indeed, I 

made a statement of FSOC that I am expecting that the staff will 

soon make recommendations to the Commissioner in this field that 

should be done by the SEC. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Have you had time to review the extensive 

money market fund comment file at the SEC and FSOC? And is 

there still a possibility that after reviewing all the data, all the 

comment letters, that you will decide not to move forward with 

major changes in the money market fund? 

Ms. WHITE. My statement at FSOC is still the current state of 

affairs, which is I think it is important to move forward with further reforms. All issues are currently under discussion between the 

staff and the Commissioners, but I do expect the staff and the 

Commissioners to be dealing with that in the near future. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Ma’am, before I came to Congress, I was a local 

elected official in Bucks County, not far from the City of New York, 

and a lot of local officials and State officials rely on money market 

funds as a source of sort of cash management. It is an important 

tool to have in the toolbox. 

Numerous municipalities and municipal organizations have written to the SEC and FSOC with concerns about how new regulations on money market funds would impact their costs of borrowing. If there were large outflows from the $2.7 trillion money 

market mutual fund industry, do you think that banks or other alternatives to money market funds would redeploy those assets to 

meet the needs of these municipal borrowers without imposing new 

borrowing costs on those municipalities or States? 

Ms. WHITE. Let me say one thing that I think is very important, 

which is that there is no question about the utility of money market funds, both to investors and to those who borrow short term. 

And certainly one of our objectives in doing anything further at all 

would be to preserve the value of that product. 

27 

We also—and again, our economic study addressed this—you 

want to have a very careful eye on the impact of, where does this 

money go if it actually does leave the money market funds? You 

don’t want it going into more systemically at-risk institutions. So, 

the staff and the Commissioners are very cognizant of those factors. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. So you will consider the cost on municipal organizations with respect to any reforms that are suggested or— 

Ms. WHITE. We are considering all issues and all impacts. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Chairman HENSARLING. I now recognize Mr. Green of Texas. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank Chairman White for appearing today. My understanding 

is, that has been codified, such that you are the Chair— 

Ms. WHITE. I tried to call myself ‘‘Chair,’’ but I was told I was 

violating the statute, so— 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. 

I want to accord you every respect that you have earned, and I 

greatly appreciate your appearance here today. 

I do want to take just a moment to say to persons who may be 

viewing and to you that there is a spirit of bipartisanship that 

creeps into this committee from time to time. And yesterday was 

one such occasion when we passed the Homes for Heroes Act. 

I want to thank the chairman of the committee, Mr. Hensarling, 

and the ranking member, Ms. Waters, because they were very instrumental in getting this done. I would also thank the staff, again, 

because without a great staff, you can’t do great things, and they 

have done a tremendous job. 

If I may, I would like to just visit with you about the budget, 

which is a part of the style of the hearing today. And I do want 

to mention to you that the President has asked for $1.67 billion. 

My understanding is that these are not dollars that would come 

from taxes. The $1.67 billion would come from fees that are collected. And my question to you is, are the transaction fees and 

other fees sufficient to cover the $1.67 billion that has been requested? 

Ms. WHITE. The answer to that is it would not have any impact 

on the taxpayers. It would be deficit-neutral. And I think it is approximately $0.02 to the $1,000 ratio—would cover it, is my understanding. 

And obviously, you would also have the ability to charge a slightly higher amount if you needed to, but I don’t believe that is necessary. 

Mr. GREEN. And is it true—I believe you have said it, but some 

things absolutely require repeating—that the amount in question 

would not involve one cent, not one cent of tax dollars? Is this true? 

Ms. WHITE. That is correct. 

Mr. GREEN. Hence, the amount in question would not in any way 

impact the deficit? Is this true? 

Ms. WHITE. That is right. It is deficit-neutral. No impact at all 

on the deficit. 

28 

Mr. GREEN. And notwithstanding the lack of impact of your request on the deficit, is it also true that you are subject to sequestration? 

Ms. WHITE. Yes, we are. 

Mr. GREEN. And is it true that you have not furloughed anyone 

thus far, but sequestration is having an adverse impact on your 

technology needs, your training needs, your contracts? In fact, you 

need to hire about 676 additional people. Is this correct? 

Ms. WHITE. That is correct. 

Mr. GREEN. And could you just explain for just a moment some 

of what you might do with the 676 new people? Let me just mention some of what I have been accorded. 

I have an indication that you currently oversee about 35,000 entities, including 11,000 investment advisers, 9,700 mutual fund and 

exchange traded funds, and 4,600 broker-dealers with more than 

160,000 branch offices. 

I show that you have approximately 460 transfer agents that you 

have to work with at 17 national security exchanges, 8 active clearing agencies, 10 Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs), as well as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). 

This is just a little bit of what you do. It appears to me that we 

need to make more of the fact that you do have a very large job 

to do, and we need to well define what you do. So, could you say 

just a little bit more about what you do and why it is so important 

that you get this $1.67 billion in fees, not tax dollars, and why it 

is so critical to the operation that you oversee? 

Ms. WHITE. Yes. As I think I said earlier, one of the things that 

struck me in my first month here—and I have reviewed the budget 

request, I fully support it—is just how massive the responsibilities 

are of the SEC. 

This budget request is, I believe, not only responsible, but surgical in many ways. It is essential for the SEC to be able to carry 

out its mission. 

I cited one example on investment advisers. We would— 

Mr. GREEN. Allow me to interrupt for just a moment and ask this 

quickly. Do you have an internal process by which you do this such 

that it is not done arbitrarily, capriciously, or willy-nilly? 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Chairman White can submit the answer in writing. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Royce, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Chairman White, welcome. 

I listened closely to your comments before the Appropriations 

Committee, stating that we must find common ground with our 

counterparts abroad, and nit together a regulatory network that offers protection, consistency, and stability to market participants. 

On this subject, at a hearing in October 2011, I asked Secretary 

Geithner about the extraterritorial application of derivative rules. 

Specifically, his thoughts on whether a misalignment between U.S. 

and foreign jurisdictions on either timing or content could, as Fed 

Chairman Bernanke stated previously, cause a ‘‘significant comVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:27 Nov 15, 2013 Jkt 081755 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\81755.TXT TERRI
29 

petitive disadvantage.’’ Those would be Chairman Bernanke’s 

words. 

The Treasury Secretary agreed, saying—and I will quote him— 

‘‘The Fed Chairman is right to point out that there are provisions 

of the law that, because of how they treat the foreign operations 

of U.S. affiliates, could cause that problem that we are worried 

about.’’ 

I assume you agree with Chairman Bernanke and Secretary 

Geithner about the competitiveness issues that could arise with 

cross-border application. Just maybe a yes or no on that, Chairman, if it is okay. 

Ms. WHITE. I do agree with that. I think our rules are also quite 

robust as well. 

Mr. ROYCE. I also asked then-Secretary Geithner about the divide between the CFTC and the SEC on timing and on content. 

And he asserted, and I will just go with what he said, ‘‘If you don’t 

have alignment among them, then you are right to say how are we 

going to convince the rest of the world to come to a common standard?’’ 

So these comments were 20 months ago, and still today, the 

CFTC and the SEC are not on the same page. One, yours, is conducting a deliberate process with a proposed rule versus rushed 

guidance and no-action letters, over at the CFTC. 

We have heard from foreign regulators, both in testimony and in 

a recent letter, that the bifurcated U.S. approach is causing confusion, and putting us at a disadvantage. And I have a couple of letters here from The Journal today, ‘‘New U.S. rules hinder derivatives trading in Asia,’’ and this is sort of a common theme that we 

see. 

Briefly, do you agree that misalignment between the SEC and 

the CFTC is problematic, and would your preference be that the 

CFTC extend their executive order, which expires on July 12th, to 

avoid market uncertainty and avoid the confusion and measurable 

impacts similar to last year? 

Ms. WHITE. I guess my first point is plainly, yes, consistency is 

an objective, I think of everyone, to avoid the issues that you are 

mentioning. We have been working with the CFTC and our foreign 

counterparts for quite some time, and we continue to do that as we 

try to fashion these rules. It is not required that they be joint, but 

plainly, it is extraordinarily important for the marketplace that we 

try to reach that common ground. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. I am going to ask you another question, 

because we are 5 years out from one of the biggest regulatory 

breakdowns in U.S. history, at least from the standpoint of Mr. 

Markopolos, who testified here, but I tend to agree with him on 

that. I think that the SEC’s failure to detect the multi-billion-dollar 

Ponzi scheme run by Bernie Madoff was truly egregious. 

And one of the takeaways from it, as he testified to us about the 

over-lawyered nature and the culture and the desire to get into the 

equation expertise with market experience, do you now have an 

adequate complement of staff at the SEC with market experience 

in investment and in trading? And do you believe having a workforce with deep knowledge of the inner workings of our capital 

markets will assist you as head of the SEC? 

30 

And lastly, among the recommendations of the Boston Consulting 

Group study required by DFA was that the number of offices and 

divisions reporting to the SEC Chairman be streamlined at 

present. Chairman White, you have 22 direct reports. Do you believe this is a structure that promotes efficiency? What will you do 

to address this? These were the other issues I was going to ask 

you. 

Ms. WHITE. First, on the market-expert question, it is an extremely high priority of mine to see that we indeed—and not just 

in enforcement and the obvious divisions—throughout the agency, 

enhance the number of experts, economists, market experts, and 

traders that we need. Enforcement has done that since the Madoff 

situation. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Any further answer can be submitted in writing. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. 

Meeks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Welcome. Congratulations to 

you, I think. 

Let me ask you a question. Basically, Section 913 of the DoddFrank Act required the SEC to study the differences in the standard of care for investment advisers, the fiduciary standard and 

broker-dealers, the suitability standard, and provided the SEC with 

the authority to impose the fiduciary standard on broker-dealers. 

Now, there was a staff report that recommended that the SEC 

consider rulemaking that would uniformly apply the fiduciary 

standard no less stringent than currently applied to investment advisers to broker-dealers. 

My question is, how is the SEC taking into consideration the possibility of a likely impact on smaller accounts if brokers leave the 

marketplace or reduce the quality and depth of the services they 

provide? I am just concerned, if they just left the marketplace. 

Ms. WHITE. If those rules were applied? 

Mr. MEEKS. That is correct. 

Ms. WHITE. I think one of the reasons—and again, this precedes 

my arriving at the SEC—but that the SEC decided to get additional information with respect to the business models, the market 

of brokers, and investment advisers was so that they would have 

that additional information before the SEC makes any decision on 

those issues. 

Plainly, what you have seen in the marketplace, and the SEC 

has gotten data on this, is that retail investors can be confused as 

to whether they have hired a broker or investment adviser and 

don’t realize the standards may be different and may mean something to them. And so, you obviously want to be very careful to protect those interests. 

But on the other hand, you also want to take into account the 

different business models and to make an optimal decision. So no 

decisions will be made on this issue until that information comes 

in. It was put out for request on March 1st, and then the SEC staff 

will analyze that and make a decision. 

31 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me—and I appreciate that, and I applaud the 

SEC’s approach because I think it has been careful, in particular, 

your decision to ask for the RFI to provide the information. 

But you know that the Department of Labor (DOL) has indicated 

that it intends to fast-track a rule that would impose its own 

standard of care on brokers. And I am concerned that the DOL’s 

fast-track approach will seriously undermine the kind of approach 

that the SEC has been going by, if not completely negated it. 

And so I was wondering, does the SEC share any similar concerns? 

Ms. WHITE. The answer is that the staff has been in very close 

contact, frequent contact with the staff at the Department of Labor 

as well to discuss the issues you mentioned, as well as others. Obviously, they are an independent different agency than the SEC. 

They have to make their decisions ultimately. 

But one of the things we are certainly engaging in the dialogue 

for is to make certain that the differences in our space, and all the 

issues are on the table for them to consider as well. So, we are continuing those dialogues. 

Mr. MEEKS. So you are having this kind of cross-dialogue with 

the DOL so that we could try to make sure that—I don’t want the 

kind of confusion that would come particularly in regards to many 

of those that service IRA services, because then small folks—I 

know especially in the African-American community, if we we don’t 

have those brokers, then they won’t have the opportunity to invest. 

And so, I don’t want the complications or the confusion to cause 

individuals to leave the market, and thereby cause people not to be 

able to save for retirement. 

Ms. WHITE. I take your point completely. And my understanding 

is that is part of the discussion. They will ultimately make their 

independent decision. But we are certainly informing them from 

our expertise and knowledge what the marketplace looks like, and 

what the effects could be. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me just ask another question that is off topic a 

bit. I am, as you know, from New York. And I am kind of concerned 

about our current market structure, when you talk about technology and the significant rise of what is called ‘‘DART trading’’ 

and fragmented liquidity. A lot of complexities, a lot of which I am 

just trying to figure out and understand as I talk to some of my 

folks. 

But particularly, as it does erode the public price to help for 

smaller-cap companies—I am looking at the smaller-cap companies, 

and the effects that it has. So I am wondering—and I know that 

there are some programs or some pilot programs—I see I am out 

of time—that are being utilized and looked at. Is the SEC interested in looking at pilot programs or initiating pilot programs in 

that area? 

Ms. WHITE. We recently had a decimalization roundtable that 

was directed to that, and there was enthusiasm for a pilot program 

in terms of what the spread should be, and how one might structure a pilot program. 

All those views are being considered under discussion now between the staff and soon I think there are going to be recommendaVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:27 Nov 15, 2013 Jkt 081755 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\81755.TXT TERRI
32 

tions made to the Commission. But certainly, we are always focused on small businesses and the small-cap companies as well. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 

Neugebauer, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman White, the SEC’s mission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and to facilitate capital formation. I think the Dodd-Frank Act has attempted to address the 

first two parts of that mission—investor protection and promotion 

of fair markets. 

I am interested in hearing your perspective on what you think 

the role of the SEC is for capital formation, and how you see your 

tenure there facilitating that? 

Ms. WHITE. First, it is a critical part of our mission. All parts of 

our mission are critical. But capital formation is certainly very 

much on my mind, and I think on the agency’s mind. 

At the moment where we are focused, in terms of the staff work, 

is predominantly on the JOBS Act and the rulemakings under that. 

Plainly, the objective of the JOBS Act is to facilitate capital formation. 

I think before the JOBS Act was enacted, the staff was quite focused on a review of what one might do really across-the-board, 

across markets, to facilitate capital formation because that is what 

is critical to the health of the Nation. It is what is critical to the 

health of investors. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. One of the things that I think sometimes the 

agencies do, is they are really good at waiting around for Congress 

to encourage them to do something, or in some cases, instruct them 

to do that or regulate that they do, or legislate that they do that. 

Do you see yourself fostering an agency where you can see opportunities in the marketplace where you can sometimes streamline 

some of these processes, instead of waiting for us to ask you to do 

that? One of the things I get frustrated with is that the government is really supposed to work for the people. And certainly, making sure that markets are transparent and operate with integrity 

is an important part of that. 

But the other part of it is this capital formation piece. Your predecessor came to talk about that. And we didn’t ever hear much out 

of that. 

Ms. WHITE. It is certainly my impression that the staff is quite 

focused on that. I certainly am quite focused on that. 

I think one of the things that I actually think should be a priority—it is a priority of mine as an example—is to simplify, make 

more meaningful the disclosure requirements, not just for small 

companies, but for larger companies, so that we end up not having 

it be so burdensome, and perhaps make it more informative. 

So that is an example. But it is our responsibility to stay focused 

on capital formation. And certainly during my tenure, we will. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. So when are we going to finish the jobs? 

Ms. WHITE. As promptly as I possibly can. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. That is— 

Ms. WHITE. I am a member of a 5-person Commission, but it is 

a high priority of mine to finish all of the congressionally mandated 

33 

rulemakings. And I am trying to provide the leadership at the 

Commission to do that. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. I think we are disappointed, because I think 

we were all kind of excited that we actually were able to pass 

something, and then I think, the honeymoon has kind of worn off 

on that now, because there was a lot of excitement about that, because it had taken so long to get the wagon up and running. 

Ms. WHITE. I appreciate that. There is excitement. I hope it is 

still out there, but I understand your point completely. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Section 939(a) of Dodd-Frank sought to end 

the Federal Government’s apparent endorsement of credit rating 

agencies and investor overreliance on them by almost requiring 

every Federal agency to review any of their rules using credit ratings to assist creditworthiness. 

The SEC has not yet completed its work to comply with Section 

939(a). Nevertheless, the SEC announced on February 26th that it 

would convene a credit ratings roundtable, I guess, on May 14th— 

and I assume that already happened—to examine the feasibility of 

a system in which the public or private utility would assign credit 

rating agencies to determine credit ratings for structured finance 

products. 

Do you believe that the SEC should reinsert the government into 

the rating business? 

Ms. WHITE. The roundtable was to inform the staff and the Commissioners as to what judgments should be made in that space. In 

terms of the removal of the references, some have been done, but 

that remains as the priority as well. 

But I can’t really prejudge the assignment issue since we just received the additional information that the staff and the Commissioners had decided was needed in the roundtable we just had. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. I think it would be interesting, it would be informative if you could kind of follow up with me on that after you 

have had a chance to debrief on that roundtable. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired, 

and Chairman White can follow up in writing. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. 

Cleaver, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Chairman, last weekend, the Kansas City Royals lost a 

weekend series to the New York Yankees. Do you believe that the 

IRS was involved in any way? 

[laughter] 

Ms. WHITE. Do I believe what was involved? I am sorry. 

Mr. CLEAVER. That is all right. 

Ms. WHITE. It was pure skill by the Yankees, I think. I am from 

Kansas City, though, so I like them, too. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Yes, I know you are. My real issue is regarding sequestration. Do you fear at all, or do you have any concern over 

the fact that with sequestration, that you will have the dollars to 

sufficiently oversee things such as the over-the-counter derivatives 

and a lot of other areas that this committee is going to hold the 

SEC responsible for monitoring and providing oversight? 

Ms. WHITE. There is no question that the sequestration has an 

impact in that particular space, some of the hiring we need to do 

34 

to build out. And that was not a regulated market, or sets of market. It is a big one. It is a complicated one. 

We are not able to—because of sequestration, that hiring can’t 

occur now at least. And so, that is a concern. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Let me stay with sequestration for a minute. Your 

predecessor, Ms. Walter, in a speech sometime back at American 

University, was suggesting—she did not say—but was suggesting 

Elisse—is that right? How do you pronounce the name? 

Ms. WHITE. ‘‘Elisse.’’ 

Mr. CLEAVER. ‘‘Elisse’’—that the SEC either wanted or had secured or was looking at some kind of technology that would allow 

you to study the markets quantitatively. Is that a reality now, or— 

Ms. WHITE. I believe what she was referring to was the Midas 

system, which we are very excited about. And it will provide a lot 

of very useful information to the staff and the Commission on market structure. That is part of what our trading and markets group 

is analyzing, and including data from that informing the study we 

are doing of the equity market structure. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The gentleman yields back the balance 

of his time. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, 

Mr. McHenry, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

There have been comments about the IRS in this hearing. And 

some are trying to make light of what is a rather serious breach, 

and has a huge chilling effect on average Americans, average, everyday nonpolitical Americans. And it is a very serious matter. 

Chairman White, thank you for your testimony. I know you have 

a very serious approach from your time as a U.S. Attorney, and you 

have carried that through now with your tenure at the SEC. 

I have said publicly, and I have said to you, I have very high 

hopes for your tenure at a very troubled agency, a troubled agency 

on the enforcement front, which you are front-and-center on. And 

we, again, have high hopes for how you are going to follow the rule 

of law, and ensure that the agency adheres to that. 

Likewise, we have some very important congressionally mandated rules. And I have expressed this to you directly as well. The 

JOBS Act was a bipartisan bill passed over a year ago and signed, 

one of the rare bipartisan bills that Congress was able to get 

through both the House and the Senate, and have the President 

sign. 

We talked about enthusiasm. You have mentioned enthusiasm 

for the JOBS Act. It is about getting capital to small businesses 

and moderate-sized businesses, and get to that other function of 

the SEC, which is to foster capital formation. 

So I ask you, Chairman White, where is the implementation? 

First, who sets the agenda at the Securities and Exchange Commission? 

Ms. WHITE. I am told I do. So I am— 

Mr. MCHENRY. Fantastic. Where is the JOBS Act implementation on your agenda? 

35 

Ms. WHITE. The answer is that it could not be a higher priority 

with me. I know you are looking for a time. It will be done as 

quickly as possible. 

What I have done since I have arrived is to look at the work 

streams that were there, to make them more efficient and not overlapping, if I could, so that you didn’t have the same people working 

on the same rules. 

They remain, along with the Dodd-Frank rulemaking that isn’t 

finished, at the top of my priority list. And I am going to get them 

done—I am on a 5-person Commission, even though I set the agenda—as promptly as I can. 

Mr. MCHENRY. I respect that. We, on this side of the aisle, like 

the Commission’s structure. But you set the agenda. I would like 

to know if Reg D, lifting the ban on general solicitation, is at the 

top of your agenda that you are setting? 

Ms. WHITE. Certainly, I consider it to be the top. If we are saying 

there is one thing at the top, it is among the top things on my 

agenda. 

Mr. MCHENRY. What is higher? 

Ms. WHITE. There is nothing higher. I am proceeding on—as I 

said I would try to do—parallel tracks, depending on the readiness 

to go forward. 

Mr. MCHENRY. We welcomed your announcement yesterday of a 

new Director of Corporation Finance, a permanent Director for Corporation Finance. You are reloading the staff there, and we encourage you to do that. That is where the JOBS Act regulations will 

be written. 

On Section 2, I have asked about that. On an enhanced Reg A, 

we passed a bill yesterday with wide bipartisan support in the 

House to direct the SEC to get an enhanced Reg A-plus done by 

October 31st. Do you foresee being able to achieve that? 

Ms. WHITE. Certainly, we will do everything in our power to do 

that. There is not a rule proposed yet. As you know, almost always, 

we have, for good reason, a notice-and-comment process. 

I think it is a challenging date to actually have it done. Again, 

we are extremely focused on it. There are issues beyond just raising the amount that we need to be dealing with and are dealing 

with. 

Mr. MCHENRY. This has been a long time coming. We had one 

offering in 2011 under Reg A. There has been a complete abandonment, and no serious review of Reg A within the SEC. And it is 

high time. That is why we mandated it within the JOBS Act. 

Let us move to the crowdfunding. Where is crowdfunding on your 

agenda? That is a personal interest of mine, because that is a legislative priority that I have, and continue to have. And I want to see 

this capital flourish so we can get small businesses access to this 

capital. 

Ms. WHITE. It is among those at the top. Nothing is higher in the 

sense that—I have several things at the top, and we are very focused on that. That is one where I know there has been both disappointment, and still excitement to get it done. So it is a very 

high priority to get it done as promptly as I can. 

36 

Mr. MCHENRY. I urge you to set the agenda, to drive this train 

forward, and to make sure that we have full implementation of the 

JOBS Act. Thank you for your testimony. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The gentleman yields back his 3 seconds. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Wisconsin, Ms. 

Moore. 

Ms. MOORE. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

And let me join my other colleagues in congratulating you on 

your appointment. Your outstanding credentials precede you. And 

hopefully, it will ploy you in these hard times. 

Many on this committee, on both sides of the aisle, have asked 

you about your budget and about the sequester. So, I can’t resist 

sort of pursuing that a little bit further. 

You seem to be a little bit reluctant to give us the—to discourage 

us about it. But I am very concerned, as some folks are, about how 

you will actually be able to carry out the new mandates under 

Dodd-Frank with the—not only the sequester, but operating under 

the current continuing resolution. And even though there are no 

taxpayer funds that are at risk here, you still are subject to the sequester. 

I think my colleague Mr. Green, in particular, laid out some of 

the challenges of oversight with regard to over-the-counter derivatives. But I am really curious about the amount of dark pooled 

trading that has occurred in the past couple of years. It has more 

than doubled. 

And so, I am wondering about your ability to have oversight over 

that. Also, the push for having the so-called office of investor advocate and the accredited investors—how we will provide the adequate oversight of an area like that? 

Ms. WHITE. Let me correct a misimpression. I am not shy about 

what we need. I don’t mean to be. I was asking—I think, answering 

a specific question about sequestration and what the specific impacts— 

Ms. MOORE. Right. 

Ms. WHITE. —of that are on us. 

We very much need what the President has asked for in this 

budget for Fiscal Year 2014. Again, the massiveness of our responsibilities is what sort of hit me between the eyes in the last month. 

And I am very concerned that if we don’t get that appropriation, 

we cannot do our job. So, I don’t want to be lacking in clarity there. 

In terms of the market structure issue and the dark pools, again, 

that is one of the issues—that set of issues, the market structure 

issues—that, as I was being briefed to come onto this job, struck 

me as one to which we must bring a sense of urgency to fully understand all those issues so that we can regulate wisely in that 

space. 

The data that is out there now is not conclusive—for example, 

high frequency traders have a speed advantage. But what the experts don’t agree on is what the impact or harmful impact of that 

may be. 

So, that is an area where I am also concerned about getting more 

market expertise into the mix at the SEC. And certainly, if we 

don’t get the funding that we are seeking, that could be compromised. 

37 

Ms. MOORE. Thank you for that answer, for your candor. 

We have been visited, I think, by companies that have indicated 

that they want to see—permit larger kick sizes for small companies 

in order to support secondary market research and market making. 

And, it makes sense in one sense. But I am wondering if the sequester and the C.R. are prohibiting the agency from studying that 

and moving that further. 

It is the same thing with really giving us the definition of an accredited investor. I don’t see Representative Stivers in here today, 

and we just sent you a letter May 10th regarding publishing your 

final rules on municipal advisers. I know there is a lot on your 

plate. 

I was encouraged by your public remarks regarding the money 

market mutual funds, which kind of got politicized or something 

with the last Administration. So, I know I am asking a lot, but can 

you just tell me some of these things that are right on the precipice 

of being put out, what the time table is, what we can do here in 

Congress to help roll these things out a little bit faster? 

Ms. WHITE. I appreciate the support, both in terms of our budget 

request and otherwise. Very much so. I think I have said publicly 

that I do expect in the near future on the further money market 

reforms, that will be keyed up by the staff for the Commissioners. 

I have—again, my highest priority is the other rulemakings to 

finish on—in terms of the spread, the tick sizes. That was the subject of our roundtable recently. I think it was in February. 

Under active discussion, we are sort of looking at whether there 

should be one or more pilot programs in order to further that, and 

that decision ought to be made pretty quickly, I think. 

Accredited investors—we are very focused on that, as well, in 

terms of what should be done there. Clearly, we try not to have any 

of our core mission compromised by budgetary concerns, but it is 

not realistic to say that they are not. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

Ms. MOORE. I thank the chairman. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from Michigan, Mr. Huizenga, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. 

And Madam Chairman, I appreciate you being here, as well. 

Neither one of us were around this institution when Dodd-Frank 

came into effect. But we are both dealing with the echo effects of 

it. And I want to explore that a little bit. 

I have to tell you, I was thrilled earlier, I think, in one of your 

responses to my colleague, Mr. Neugebauer, from Texas. You 

said—I believe the quote was, it is one of your highest priorities 

to ‘‘simplify reporting requirements.’’ 

We have one of those solutions for you, myself and my colleague, 

Mr. Garrett from New Jersey. It is called H.R. 1135. It is dealing 

with pay ratio. And Section 953 of Dodd-Frank has been labeled by 

some a logistical nightmare because of all the different factors that 

are having to be put in place to consider calculating total compensation. 

And I am curious—there are a lot of questions out there on 

whether transit benefits or employee-paid health care costs should 

be a component of compensation. Should domestic and all multiVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:27 Nov 15, 2013 Jkt 081755 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\81755.TXT TERRI
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national employees be a part of the calculation? And what about 

part-time employees or independent contractors? 

It seems to me that it is a vague statue, if you would agree or 

disagree with that. And what factors do you believe must be considered in determining this calculation? Have you looked at that at 

all? 

Ms. WHITE. I have looked at that. And there are others who 

think very strongly that needs to be done as quickly as possible. 

The complication with that is in the definition of ‘‘total compensation.’’ 

And there is a specific definition of that which applies to when 

you are disclosing your top executive’s compensation. That is, the 

statutory definition that leads to all the other issues you have just 

teed up in terms of some of those complexities. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. I guess, ultimately, my question is, to what end? 

To what good? And that—when they sent around executive compensation and surveyed, they believe that is an estimate of 3 

months—in some cases longer—to calculate and gather all those 

pay ratios. 

And I am—I would love to know whether the Commission has— 

the staff has made any effort to identify the costs to business for 

this, when there is, in my view of it, absolutely no benefit to the 

health and well-being and safety and soundness of either a corporation or the investors in it. 

It seems to me that it is trying to turn it into a political football. 

And I am curious—and we can—love to submit these, as well, to 

get maybe a further, more full answer from you. But it seems to 

me, we need to find out from you whether you believe that the significant amounts of time and money that are going to be spent developing it are worthwhile. 

Ms. WHITE. Very quickly. It is a mandated rulemaking for us. So, 

as a regulator— 

Mr. HUIZENGA. H.R. 1135 will take care of that. And we will alleviate you of that burden, so—the other thing I have is—we are 

working on some draft legislation regarding mergers and acquisitions, and earlier, you were talking about small businesses and trying to focus and concentrate on that. 

Our proposal is to right-size Federal regulation of M&A intermediaries and business brokers. And it has been one of the top recommendations for the Government Industry Forum on Small Business Capital Formation, which the SEC annually holds. It has been 

a recommendation in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011. 

Do you see that this is an important small business capital formation concern? And under your leadership, what priority are you 

going to be giving to these small business issues? 

Ms. WHITE. I certainly appreciate the concern of that issue. And 

I will give a very high priority to small business issues during my 

tenure. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Okay. Just to clarify right now, presently, brokerdealer registration is a one-size-fits-all approach. And 90 percent of 

the requirements are totally irrelevant to a broker-dealer engaging 

in a limited capital raising activities. This could be something as 

small as selling an LLC. Because it has membership shares and 

those kinds of things. 

39 

And— 

Ms. WHITE. I will commit to reviewing that specifically. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. —that is great, because I know staff has acknowledged that concern, but the SEC has not addressed it yet. And I 

look forward to that. 

Finally, on brokers, I just wanted to echo my friend, Mr. Meeks, 

as well. It seems that the SEC and the DOL are in a race. And 

one of those, in my opinion, shouldn’t be in the race. It seems to 

me that we need to make sure that we are looking at that standard 

of care for retail accounts, especially when it is including those 

IRAs. And I am looking forward to an update from you on that. 

So, those are my three issues. 

Other than the last 10 seconds I have, we are talking budgets. According to my calculations, about $550 million of your budget 

goes to folks who make $100,000 or more on your staff. And I understand $100,000 in Washington, D.C., isn’t the same as in Zeeland, Michigan. But you have 85.75 percent of your employees 

making $100,000 or more. 

I would like you to review that, as well. 

Ms. WHITE. We do need the expertise, too, though. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Delaware, Mr. 

Carney, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Madam Chairman—if that is the appropriate 

title—for coming in today. 

Welcome. 

You sound like you are just what the doctor ordered for this position. And we wish you well. 

I don’t think there is any risk that you are going to be bullied 

by anyone, as has been alluded to earlier. Anyone who has gone 

toe-to-toe with John Gotti and some of the folks that you prosecuted, I think we don’t have to worry about being bullied. 

I think a greater concern is that we will distract you from your 

priorities here in Congress, or not give you the resources that you 

need to do the job. 

I support the request that you are making for your budget, as 

many of us here do. I hope, as our chairman emeritus said earlier, 

that we can come up with a bipartisan agreement on that. 

Your expenditures are covered by the fees charged, and so it 

doesn’t add to the budget, as you say, and we ought to give you the 

resources you need to—we can’t afford not to, frankly, as has been 

stated by so many others. 

Ms. WHITE. Thank you for that. 

Mr. CARNEY. I would like to hear your opinion of H.R. 1256, the 

Swap Jurisdiction Certainty Act. I was a co-sponsor of that piece 

of legislation. The SEC came out with a proposed regulation, and 

in some ways, it mirrors the approach. 

Could you tell us a little bit about your thinking there? You addressed it a little bit with Mr. Royce and Mr. Garrett earlier today, 

but tell me about your thinking and the prospects for getting that 

done in these various markets. 

Ms. WHITE. The cross-border aspect as well? 

Mr. CARNEY. Yes. 

40 

Ms. WHITE. Yes. It is a complex area. You obviously have a lot 

of regulators in the space in terms of—many of our proposals are 

consistent with our domestic counterpart the CFTC. We are working with them and the international regulators. 

Mr. CARNEY. You are working with them right now? 

Ms. WHITE. Yes. 

Mr. CARNEY. So your hope is that you can have, as the legislation 

will require, a set of joint regulations. It doesn’t make sense to us, 

I think, and I would be interested on your opinion, to have conflicting or different regulations there. 

Ms. WHITE. I think the products are somewhat different between 

SWAPs and security-based SWAPs, so there can be differences, but 

clearly consistently is the objective— 

Mr. CARNEY. Right. 

Ms. WHITE. It is a very global marketplace. I believe that in your 

bill, H.R. 1256, there is a presumption that the top nine— 

Mr. CARNEY. G8 plus Hong Kong is what it was. 

Ms. WHITE. Yes. That is the only aspect that actually—not actually the only aspect, but that gives me some concern because I 

think what we have proposed is that the SEC make a judgment 

when requested about substituted compliance. 

Mr. CARNEY. Right. 

Ms. WHITE. Some of these countries really don’t have regulations 

in that space so if we have to kind of—when it comes out of the 

gate, we have to basically prove that the presumption doesn’t 

apply, it takes a lot of resources but— 

Mr. CARNEY. But what should be clear is that you have the authority in the bill, and I would encourage you to use it. If those regulations are not what they ought to be from your perspective, then 

you can apply the SEC’s regulations to those U.S. companies, U.S. 

persons as defined— 

Ms. WHITE. I think our staffs are working on this aspect. 

Mr. CARNEY. Yes. 

Ms. WHITE. So, okay. 

Mr. CARNEY. That is great. I think it is important that it get 

done that way, certainly that there is consistently and I think, as 

has been referenced earlier by others, the confusion and lack of 

clarity can create more problems than if you have a consistency 

there. 

So that is really all I have. I want to, again, welcome you. Thank 

you for your willingness to take on this very important position. I 

hope, after today’s hearing, you don’t have second thoughts and decide to do something else. 

Ms. WHITE. I haven’t left the room yet, at least. 

Mr. CARNEY. No, you haven’t. You haven’t left the room. You are 

still here and we wish you well. Thank you. 

Ms. WHITE. Thank you very much. 

Chairman HENSARLING. Nor are you allowed to for another 45 

minutes. 

Ms. WHITE. I know that. 

[laughter] 

I knew that. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The gentleman yields back. 

41 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 

Hurt, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And let me, again, echo my thanks for your being here. As a 

former prosecutor, I especially appreciate your history and experience in enforcement of the laws of the United States. 

I certainly think that we would all agree that the firm and fair 

enforcement of the laws is very important to cultivating our capital 

markets and instilling confidence in them. 

I would also echo what has been said about the importance of implementing the JOBS Act. I come from a rural district in Virginia 

where we have places with unemployment at 10 percent, some 

places have been up to as high as 20 percent. 

We need jobs, and I believe capital formation will lead to that. 

One of the things that, in additional to enforcement, or one of 

thing—one of the responsibilities, in addition to enforcement, obviously is facilitating capital formation. 

It would seem to me that when you have 4,000 employees, and 

you look at the breakdown of economists versus lawyers, you have 

59 economists, and you have 1,750 lawyers, I guess the question is, 

how do you facilitate capital markets when you have that ratio of 

enforcement versus market expertise that Mr. Royce talked about? 

Ms. WHITE. I think first, we are, as you noted, a law enforcement 

agency and so certainly we have a significant number of lawyers 

in our enforcement division and our examination divisions to enforce the laws and to look for compliance in the laws. 

But in terms of the economists that we have, we do have 59. 

Now, one of our requests in this budget request is for another 45 

positions, I think 10 of them would actually be Ph.D. economists, 

but all have expertise—I don’t know if they are all nonlawyers, but 

close to that for our risk strategy and financial innovation division, 

which is where we do that kind of analysis. 

We have experts elsewhere in the other divisions, too, particularly in enforcement now. We will always need to have a very significant complement of lawyers, but where you have seen the most 

growth, including this budget, is in the arena of the economists and 

experts to support them. 

So you have to get the right balance there, but a big part of what 

we do is law enforcement and that is going to lead to a lot of lawyers. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you. With respect to the health of the capital 

markets in the United States, one has been offered that the best 

measure of that is, in fact, the number of IPOs that we see on an 

annual basis. 

We know that number had declined. In fact, the reason that we 

adopted the JOBS Act was to try to encourage more of that activity 

and try to take the burdens that we in Washington place on that 

activity, try to take them away at least temporarily. 

I wish we could do it permanently, but we have recognized, as 

a body, that we need to do that at least temporarily to help encourage this. 

It is particularly discouraging that those numbers wane when 

you consider the number of IPOs that you see in other countries. 

And so, I was wondering if you could speak to that? Does that conVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:27 Nov 15, 2013 Jkt 081755 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\81755.TXT TERRI
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cern you? And what specifically can we do in Washington to encourage more of that activity? 

Ms. WHITE. I guess one just sort of data point, although I don’t 

want to overstate this, is there has actually been an uptick in IPOs 

and the value of IPOs in this first quarter or so of this year. 

It doesn’t mean that it lasts. Obviously, it is a matter of real concern. I think I mentioned before the capital formation study that 

the Corporation Finance Division in the SEC was doing before the 

JOBS Act was enacted; was partially directed at that. 

I think it is a complex set of factors. It is not easy to sort of say 

this will do it, but it is certainly something we are very focused on 

studying and to make a contribution to that analysis as to whether 

further legislation might help it, other things might help it— 

Mr. HURT. And wouldn’t you agree that those diminished numbers must be, at least in some part, a reflection of the policies that 

are adopted at the SEC and here in the United States Congress? 

Ms. WHITE. You certainly focus on whether that is so, particularly for smaller businesses. But I think it is a very complex subject, so I don’t have an answer for you on that, but you certainly 

focus on the question quite closely. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you. I yield back my time. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The gentleman yields back. Mrs. Beatty 

from Ohio is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. BEATTY. Thank you, Chairman Hensarling, and Ranking 

Member Waters. 

And thank you, Madam Chairman, for being here, and I certainly 

join my colleagues in thanking you for sitting through all of this 

today. And certainly, as you stated in your testimony, the breadth 

of what you do there is vast. 

With that said, I have two questions. One, being an OMWI, I 

guess I could say, person because I am a minority and a female 

and being a small business owner, last month the SEC’s Office of 

Minority and Women Inclusion submitted their annual report. 

And in the report, it talked about the percentage of contracts 

that went either to women or minorities and while there was a 

small increase, 21 percent, I believe, of the contracts went to either 

a minority or a female. 

But when they separated them and looked at them, there was a 

decrease in contracts going to minorities. I get a lot of questions, 

because I have been a small business owner for over 20 years, from 

people who are female or minorities wanting to know with the Federal Government and, more specifically, with the SEC, how they 

can get engaged. 

So I guess my question to you is, can you discuss briefly how you 

would approach increasing the participation of minorities and 

women doing business with the Commission? 

Ms. WHITE. Yes, and we are very focused on that, as is the head 

of our OMWI office. Part of what we are doing, and it will be enhanced as we go forward, is a lot of outreach to potential vendors 

and contractors with the SEC. 

So you can at least make the process clear? Is it available? How 

do you participate in that process? Actually, we were pleased with 

the results of those efforts so far, but we have obviously much further to go. 

43 

But we are quite focused on—the outreach has been—efforts and 

they have been extensive and a lot of them and I think giving really clear instructions as to how best to compete for those contracts. 

But we need to do more in that space, no question. 

Mrs. BEATTY. Okay, and my second question is, in 1982, an accredited investor was required to have at least a million dollars or 

$200,000 in cash. 

So here we are, 30-some years later, after inflation has cut the 

value of a dollar by almost two-thirds. Do you think an individual 

still should qualify as an accredited investor with those same dollar 

amounts? 

Ms. WHITE. I think that is an issue, and I believe my predecessor 

actually testified before a subcommittee or this committee about it, 

which we are very focused on at the SEC and really considering 

what the range of factors should be. Not just the dollar amounts, 

but what else should go into an optimal definition of accredited investor as we sit here in 2013. So, that is being worked on. 

Mrs. BEATTY. Thank you. I yield back the rest of my time. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The gentlelady yields back. 

I now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. 

Mulvaney. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Thank you. 

Madam Chairman, I want to focus on my questions or at least 

with my questions on the SEC’s mandate, which I have as to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation. 

So on the facilitate capital formation, let us talk a little bit about 

the budget request that you bring to us for 2014, $1.674 billion, 

which by the way, I think, if my math is correct, represents about 

a 26 percent increase over the 2012 budget. 

And I guess, as a point of departure, is it fair to say your workload has gone up by 26 percent in the last 2 years? What is driving 

that? That is a fairly dramatic increase in a time when most folks 

are looking at reductions in their budgets. So, tell me a little bit 

about that. 

Ms. WHITE. Okay. To start with that, I think it is—we obviously 

have new responsibilities we have talked about under Dodd-Frank, 

significant new responsibilities. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Right. But Dodd-Frank was before 2012. 

Ms. WHITE. Yes. But the build-out of what you need—the regulations are still under consideration being proposed. The personnel 

that you need, and the structure that you need is basically coming 

now in order to build that. So, that is a part of it. 

I think the other part of it is—and part of our request, by the 

way, does go for additional positions in Corporation Finance, for example, which is dealing with the implementation of the JOBS Act, 

the amendments. 

Some of it is that we just haven’t had the funding in the past 

to do our job. And I can’t really say it any other way. 

Mr. MULVANEY. This comes out of the fees paid by folks who are 

using the services. Would you agree with me that every penny that 

goes to the SEC for its budget is money that is not available for 

capital formation? 

44 

Ms. WHITE. I wouldn’t agree with that, actually, no. Because I 

think what we are focused on with really everything we do, including—in my mind, they don’t sort of separate out investor protection, orderly and efficient markets, and capital formation. 

So when we essentially fund something that goes, let us say, predominantly to investor protection, as some people would see it, that 

also facilitates capital formation. So I don’t see that as a— 

Mr. MULVANEY. So is it fair to say it is not available for capital 

formation? When you take it, you take it out of the market, and 

it is no longer available for capital formation? 

Ms. WHITE. I would agree. I think it is $0.02 to $1,000. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Let us talk about the other portions of the mandate—protecting investors, and orderly and efficient markets. Help 

me understand which of those three mandates speaks to the conflict minerals rule. 

Ms. WHITE. The conflict minerals rule is a congressionally mandated rulemaking. We obviously went through our process. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Is it fair to say that it doesn’t—that none of the 

three mandates really speak directly to the conflict minerals rule? 

It may be our fault, and that is blaming you. But— 

Ms. WHITE. No, no. I appreciate that. I have heard arguments 

that it advances one or more of our tripartite mission. But I take 

your point. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Is it fair to say that perhaps it is possible that 

other rules may be more in line with your mandate than the conflict minerals rule? 

Ms. WHITE. It is under litigation. Certainly, part of our mandate 

is to do the rulemaking that is required of us by Congress. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Okay. Let us talk about that. Because you are 

right, and I can’t disagree with that, because it is the law. But my 

point is that it looks like—and I know I am not alone in this— 

there are other rules from Dodd-Frank, so ones that are contemporaneous with the conflict minerals rule, that don’t have rules yet, 

that are either late or haven’t even started yet. 

In fact, I think that Commissioner Gallagher, in his speech back 

in September, gave a perfect example. He said, ‘‘The mandate in 

Dodd-Frank, Section 939(a) for Federal agencies to remove references to credit ratings from the rule books may well be the clearest, most direct mandate we at the SEC have been given. It has 

the virtue of being responsive to one of the core problems underlying the financial crisis.’’ 

Yet, that rule went after—it is not even finished yet, I don’t 

think—conflict minerals. Why is that? Why did the conflict minerals go before other rules that apparently at least one of your 

Commissioners thinks are much more in line with your mandate? 

Ms. WHITE. At least as I see my space, there are a lot of mandated—there are lots of mandates that are quite clear from Congress. 

That is one where we have moved forward on some of our regulations and statutes. There are also discussions among the staff and 

the Commissioners on others. Again, I go back to— 

Mr. MULVANEY. Do you know why conflict minerals 1502, 1504, 

went before 939(a)? 

45 

Ms. WHITE. I don’t know that. It precedes my time there. So I 

don’t know. It is in a different division than the credit rating issues 

and rules. But I am not saying that is the explanation for it. 

Mr. MULVANEY. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The gentleman from Washington, Mr. 

Heck, is now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman White, let me add my voice of congratulations, not just 

for your nomination, but for your successful confirmation. 

I have a couple of quick questions regarding H.R. 1062, if I may, 

please. We have discussed that briefly here this morning. To begin 

with, in your opinion, and with advanced apologies for my split infinitive, in your opinion, is passage of H.R. 1062 necessary in order 

for the SEC to successfully fulfill its statutory mission? 

Ms. WHITE. I certainly—is it necessary to pass it to do that? Is 

that the question? I’m sorry. I didn’t quite catch your question. 

Mr. HECK. Is passage of H.R. 1062 necessary in order for the 

SEC to successfully fulfill its statutory mission? 

Ms. WHITE. I do not believe so. I am a firm believer in robust 

economic analysis, which is very much a part of our mission, and 

requirements that we assume, and that inform all of our rulemaking. 

But I am concerned that H.R. 1062 would layer on additional and 

different requirements that are not obviously presently required by 

law, and not necessary to our robust rulemaking. And I would 

worry that we couldn’t carry out our mission as we do now. 

Mr. HECK. In that regard, would you then therefore characterize 

it as undesirable in your pursuit to successfully fulfill your statutory mission? 

Ms. WHITE. I certainly would be very concerned about whether 

we could do our job if it passed. 

Mr. HECK. Lastly, given your reference to your avowed allegiance 

to robust economic analysis, including cost/benefit analysis, in your 

opinion, has the level of recent economic analysis, cost/benefit—presumably, including cost/benefit analysis by the SEC, been a material factor in impeding or inhibiting the facilitation of capital formation in the marketplace? 

Ms. WHITE. The answer is, I think it is essential to good rulemaking. Let me just be very clear about that. Obviously, it takes 

time and resources, as do a lot of things that are difficult but important do. 

So I do think we need, at the agency, to be able to carry out that 

robust economic analysis to which I am firmly committed in a way 

that it doesn’t impede our ability to promptly carry out our rulemaking mandates. 

Mr. HECK. I am not sure I understood how your answer was responsive to my question. So— 

Ms. WHITE. I apologize. 

Mr. HECK. Let me ask again. In your opinion, has the recent 

level of economic analysis by the SEC been a material factor in impeding or inhibiting the facilitation of capital formation in the marketplace? 

Ms. WHITE. I don’t think—and I am not trying to be nonresponsive—I can answer that other than to say that all the work we do 

46 

that takes time can obviously slow down a rulemaking that may facilitate capital formation. 

But I wouldn’t single out economic analysis for that. And I do 

think it is very important to informing wise rulemaking. 

Mr. HECK. I was trying to be as objective as possible by asking 

it in terms of, at the level. But let me ask with kind of a more biased characterization. 

Has the absence of robust economic analysis and cost/benefit 

analysis been a material factor in impeding or inhibiting the facilitation of capital formation? 

Ms. WHITE. I don’t think at the SEC there is an absence of robust economic analysis. I do not think— 

Mr. HECK. Including cost/benefit analysis? 

Ms. WHITE. Including cost/benefit analysis. And I think third 

parties have made that observation recently that we are doing a 

very good job at it. 

Mr. HECK. Is there any way I can reasonably or logically infer 

from your comments, other than that your view is H.R. 1062 is 

both unnecessary and undesirable? 

Ms. WHITE. I am troubled by H.R. 1062 for the reasons I have 

stated. 

Mr. HECK. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Hultgren is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman White, thank you so much for being here. I appreciate 

it, and I appreciate your service. 

I have a couple of questions for you. The agency that you now 

lead has had some challenges and some failures in the past years: 

it failed to prevent a taxpayer bailout of Bear Stearns; it failed to 

prevent the collapse of Lehman Brothers; it failed to do anything 

about the largest investment banks loading up on toxic assets; it 

failed to transfer employees to the now defunct Consolidated Supervised Entities Program, which oversaw the five independent investment banks, two of which failed spectacularly during the financial crisis; it failed to do anything about the credit rating agency 

oligopoly that bestowed AAA ratings on securities that later proved 

to be no better than junk; and it failed to uncover two multi-billiondollar Ponzi schemes run by Allen Stanford and Bernie Madoff, despite multiple warnings by market professionals, resulting in untold economic harm to thousands of individual investors. 

Also, your agency has received a 300 percent increase in the last 

decade in your budget. Your agency has missed 70 percent of DoddFrank rules and 100 percent of JOBS Act rules. 

With all of those failures, why should you and the SEC be rewarded with a $1.674 billion budget? 

Ms. WHITE. I think the agency would not dispute that it has had 

challenges, and had some of the issues that you have identified. I 

think the SEC, before my arrival, has also done a great deal to remediate those issues. 

I think we have to—when we step back and look at sort of percentages of budget request increases, you also have to look at, so 

what are the responsibilities, what is the market that we regulate? 

47 

And you have had an—obviously, a vast growth in the equities 

market. You have had a vast growth in the SEC’s responsibilities 

to regulate. Assets under management have more than tripled. 

So I think if you sort of laid those side by side, those budget increases would make very good sense, but in my judgment, would 

not be sufficient for us to carry out what is on our plate today to 

fulfill our missions, including the congressionally mandated rulemaking, but really, all of our responsibilities over this marketplace. 

We have tried to pinpoint exactly what we need, and say why. 

Mr. HULTGREN. I think that gets to some of the concerns I have 

heard from my colleagues as well, that with all these failures, and 

then with rules congressionally mandated activities that are being 

pushed off to do optional activities concerns us when there is a request for additional dollars. 

Let me shift gears, because I just have a short time. But Chairman White, I wonder if you could discuss the economic and cost/ 

benefit analysis that FINRA is required to perform when it issues 

a new rule, a rule amendment, or an interpretation? And how does 

the SEC oversee that process? 

Ms. WHITE. I think in terms of the SROs, they are not subject 

to the SEC guidance, per se, in terms of economic analysis and 

cost/benefit. The rules are put out for public comment. Often, the 

comments include comments about cost and cost benefits. 

The SEC, in its oversight role of the SROs, makes certain that 

those comments are taken into consideration. When we get a rulemaking from the SROs, for example, they do provide what they 

think the impact will be of their rules. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Let me ask you this, does FINRA also consider 

cost/benefit and economic issues when administering its other operations, such as its exam and inspection programs? 

Ms. WHITE. The answer is even as a formal matter, as a formal 

matter do they? I don’t know the answer to that. I think they certainly do in a—I don’t want to use the word ‘‘holistic’’ again, but 

I guess in a holistic sense. I may need to get back to you on that— 

Mr. HULTGREN. If you could, that would be great. If you can give 

us some more information on it for the record, that would be terrific. 

[Additional information provided by Chairman White can be found 

on page 110 of the appendix.] 

Mr. HULTGREN. Mandatory arbitration is hardwired in definitive 

rules. It compels broker-dealers to arbitrate disputes if the customer elects. If and when the SEC reviews whether broker-dealership had the same right to include arbitration clauses in their customer contracts, do you agree that customers and broker-dealers 

are entitled to fair and equal treatment with respect to mandatory 

arbitration, whether it is imposed through FINRA rules or by 

agreement of the parties in the customer contract? 

Ms. WHITE. Certainly, to be fair and equal treatment, in terms 

of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration, I talked about that a little bit 

earlier, that the SEC has been given authority to deal with that, 

hasn’t made a decision what, if anything, should be done about it. 

48 

Mr. HULTGREN. In my last remaining seconds, when does the 

SEC expect to finalize the risk retention rule mandated by DoddFrank? 

Ms. WHITE. That is something that is preceding actively. That is 

one where we are required to do joint rulemaking with other regulators. So that is the process for that. But it is in quite active dialogue now, and is progressing. 

Chairman HENSARLING. Time is— 

Mr. HULTGREN. My hope is to finish up quickly. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Cotton, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COTTON. Chairman White, thank you for your time today. 

Thank you for your distinguished service to our country and your 

willingness to come serve again. 

I would like to talk a little about the potential for a political expenditure disclosure rule. Your spokesman, John Nester, said earlier this week that the timing of such a rulemaking ‘‘will be influenced by the ongoing workload of Dodd-Frank and JOBS Act rulemaking.’’ 

Can you tell us, where does the political expenditure disclosure 

rulemaking rank in SEC priorities? 

Ms. WHITE. The status of that is that it is—the petitions we have 

received seeking that disclosure are being reviewed in the Division 

of Corporation Finance with a goal to determine whether or not to 

recommend the pursuit of any rulemaking. 

There is no proposed rulemaking being worked on now. Finally, 

the Division of Corporation Finance has a lot of these rules, mandated rules we have been talking about. And so, that is all I can 

say about the status. 

I haven’t been given the results of that review. But no rule is 

being worked on. 

Mr. COTTON. Would such a rulemaking ever precede rulemakings 

on the dozens of rulemakings that have missed deadlines from the 

Dodd-Frank Act or the JOBS Act? 

Ms. WHITE. The answer is that the focus is on the congressionally mandated rulemakings. We have to be able to engage—not 

speaking about this one in particular—but with important discretionary rulemaking. 

But the focus—again, I have said what the status of that is. The 

focus of Corporation Finance, which is the division that is reviewing these petitions, is on the mandated rulemakings. 

Mr. COTTON. You have, I know, many fine staff attorneys who 

are experts in corporation finance regulations and laws. I attended 

school with some, served with some who were hired by your agency 

because of their expertise. 

My legal skills were such that I left the law and joined the Army, 

and went to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Ms. WHITE. Thank you for your service. 

Mr. COTTON. Thank you. How many experts in the mishmash of 

campaign finance laws do you have at your agency? 

Ms. WHITE. I don’t know who might have specific expertise in 

that. Sometimes people have expertise you don’t know about. But 

49 

obviously, you are familiar with kind of the profile of expertise that 

we have at the SEC and that we don’t have at the SEC. 

Mr. COTTON. Yes. There are very complicated laws, because oftentimes they are simply complicated, incumbent protection rackets 

that politicians in both parties who like to stay in office have 

passed. 

Getting on to the substance of a potential rulemaking like that, 

would it apply to corporate spending only, or could it potentially 

reach the spending of directors and officers in their personal capacities as well? 

Ms. WHITE. My understanding of what is being reviewed are the 

petitions. I think with the petitions have sought is the spending by 

the corporations. But I believe it is confined to that. 

Mr. COTTON. Do you think it would be appropriate to require a 

publicly traded company to disclose the private political activities 

of its officers, directors, or other employees and agents? 

Ms. WHITE. Because that is at least part of the subject matter 

that is under review, not the precise subject matter, I don’t think 

I should comment or prejudge until I have the benefit of the staff’s 

review. 

Mr. COTTON. If you proceeded with the rulemaking, would that 

rulemaking be applied to labor unions? 

Ms. WHITE. I don’t want to speculate. Specific petitions are being 

reviewed. There is no recommendation. No one has reached a conclusion as to whether there should be any proposed rulemaking 

going forward. But I certainly can’t talk about the dimensions of 

something that hasn’t proceeded out of the review stage. 

Mr. COTTON. Do labor unions file any reports with your agency? 

Ms. WHITE. Specifically, not that I am aware of. 

Mr. COTTON. Me, either. I must have been confused when I asked 

that question. They file reports with the Department of Labor, fill 

a form LM-1, 2, 3 and 4. Are you aware of any efforts by the Department of Labor to impose similar requirements on labor unions? 

Ms. WHITE. I am not. 

Mr. COTTON. Would any rulemaking by your agency apply to 

nonprofit organizations such as MoveOn.org, or Organizing for 

America? 

Ms. WHITE. I can’t comment on what dimensions of something 

that I don’t have the benefit of the review or any recommendation 

whether or not to proceed with any proposed rule. 

Mr. COTTON. I would assume that such a rulemaking would not 

apply to such nonprofits, since those are normally regulated by the 

Internal Revenue Service. 

Final question, are you concerned at all about partisans of the 

President and the left using your independent agency to help develop a political-enemies list of the President? 

Ms. WHITE. I am not. I think the SEC is an independent agency, 

and I am a very independent chairman of that agency. 

Mr. COTTON. Yes, ma’am, you are, and I appreciate your service. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Rothfus, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

50 

And again, let me echo Representative Cotton’s commendation on 

your service, the distinguished career you have had in the prosecutions of terror in New York City. So, thank you for that. 

If I can just follow up a little bit on the disclosure of the political 

contributions rule, just an issue that occurs to me is, how farreaching might this be, as your staff looks at that? For example, 

municipal bonds, we have issuers across the country, school boards 

or school districts issuing bonds. Are we going to get into the political contributions of school directors? 

Are we going to get into the political contributions of hospital administrators, as a hospital—the municipal bond market? Again, we 

have no idea what the contemplation is, the frustration is, that this 

is a discretionary effort, while we are waiting for mandatory regulations under the JOBS Act. So, I will just ask you to comment on 

that. 

Ms. WHITE. The highest priority is the congressionally mandated 

rulemakings. Again, what the staff is reviewing are petitions submitted to the SEC. Obviously, they don’t—they seek what they 

seek, right, which is narrower than the concerns of the Chair. But 

I take your points. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Thank you. It seems to me that the only place in 

this country that is really booming is this town we are sitting in 

right here. And your arrival in Washington coincides with the tremendous growth of the wealth of this City. 

It has the highest per capita income in the country. Seven of the 

10 richest counties in the country are right around Washington, 

D.C. And it seems that the bigger this town gets, the more negative 

impact it has on the rest of the country. 

In Fiscal Year 2010, when Congress and the White House were 

under unified Democrat control, and more than a year after the fiscal crisis that hit, the SEC’s budget was $953 million. Four years 

later, the Administration is here looking for a $1.6 billion allocation. That is a 70 percent increase in just 4 years. 

We need to have the right tax and regulatory policies in place to 

get the rest of the country booming again. And getting these regulatory policies right means we need to think about the impacts of 

regulations, the burdens on business. We really need that cost/benefit analysis. 

How does the SEC measure the pros, and cons, and burdens, and 

benefits in its rulemakings? 

Ms. WHITE. It is a very—I keep using the word, but it is a very 

robust process, where all those factors are taken into consideration. 

I think probably it was entered into the record the easiest place to 

sort of look at our process is to look at the guidance that was 

issued in March of 2012. But plainly, all of those impacts are considered. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. We are competing with the rest of the world in 

capital formation. And we want to attract businesses to this country, to invest in this country, and to raise capital in this country 

so we can get jobs going in this country. 

And it seems to me that we need to be cognizant of that marketplace, and making sure that our regulations aren’t going to be driving businesses offshore. 

51 

Ms. WHITE. And I think those are obviously extremely important 

impacts. 

Mr. ROTHFUS. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair recognizes recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky, 

Mr. Barr, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman White, thank you for your service. And congratulations on your appointment and confirmation. 

I wanted to explore, and continue to explore the issue of coordination between your agency and the CFTC, particularly with respect to implementation of Title VII of Dodd-Frank. Mr. Garrett, 

Mr. Royce, and Mr. Carney, during this hearing, have highlighted 

the divergence of some of the rulemakings or proposed rulemakings 

between the SEC and the CFTC. 

And an example of that is the cross-border application of derivative reforms, which has been very controversial, and potentially 

very disruptive. An example of this would be foreign regulators 

who have expressed concern, and even come to Congress to highlight the significant competitive disadvantage that U.S. actors 

would experience. 

For example, Masamichi Kono, a Japanese regulator, asserted 

that, ‘‘There are firms outside the U.S. who have started to decline 

transactions with U.S. counterparties because of the uncertainties 

in the rules and also the apparent lack of coordination between 

regulators.’’ 

Likewise, Patrick Pearson, head of financial market infrastructure at the European Commission, concluded, ‘‘We produce for regulators an 80-page comparison between 342 pages of European 

rules and all of the relevant rules in Title VII and the CFTC requirements. The message is, we have a problem. That is an objective fact.’’ 

Now, I would commend the SEC and your deliberative approach 

on this issue, unlike the CFTC, the proposed rule and comment 

that you all—that procedure that you all have followed. And my 

question would be, why did you all choose this approach? 

Could the deliberative approach alleviate the chaos around the 

CFTC’s guidance of last October? And specifically, in reference to 

your response to Mr. Garrett when you said that you are committed to working with CFTC Chairman Gensler, can you address 

how you will deal with the need for coordination on this cross-border issue? 

Ms. WHITE. Yes. First, I would say the Commission did unanimously propose the cross-border rule. We think it is a robust rule, 

but we also are cognizant of the global marketplace and other regulators in it. 

We are very concerned about preventing risk to the United 

States from securities-based swaps transactions, wherever they 

occur. Our model is the substituted compliance model, which we 

think is a step forward that carries out the statutory objectives, but 

takes account of the global marketplace. 

So we have gotten some positive feedback on that from our counterparts. We continue to discuss with the CFTC and our foreign 

regulators just how to do this best. Obviously, we have put out a 

52 

proposed rule. We had the benefit of comments that the CFTC got 

before on what they did. 

We are continuing the dialogue. We will obviously take the comments that we get quite seriously. But I think what the regulators 

have to do in the United States and abroad is to solve it in an optimal way. 

Mr. BARR. Specifically, in terms of your interface with Chairman 

Gensler, the CFTC has exemptive relief on cross-border that is, I 

think, slated to expire on July 12th. And as I understand it, that 

is in the middle of your own comment period on the issue. Is your 

preference that the CFTC continue the exemptive order to allow 

consistency or to provide for consistency? 

Ms. WHITE. I think, ultimately, the objective here—even though 

it is not mandated—is consistency. Plainly—and we hear it everywhere—I am sure you hear it everywhere—market certainty is awfully important everywhere, but particularly in this space, it is a 

heretofore totally unregulated space, basically. That is one of the 

problems that was being dealt with in Title VII. So I think we 

should and we are in continuous dialogue to try to try to come to 

consistency. 

Mr. BARR. Another example of perhaps divergence between SEC 

and other regulators, the SEC has proposed capital rules for 

nonbank security-based swap dealers that largely follow the capital 

rules for registered broker-dealers, even though these rules differ 

in significant ways from the capital rules for derivative dealers proposed by CFTC, my understanding is that the SEC’s proposed capital rules for nonbank security-based swap dealers are generally 

more onerous than those that apply to CFTC-regulated swap dealers or banks that act as dealers, in particular because of the large 

capital deductions that apply only under the SEC’s proposed rules. 

Again, a competitiveness issue. Could you comment? 

Ms. WHITE. I would probably have to get back to you on the details of that, but plainly, a focus as we go through this includes 

competitive impact, but I would probably need to respond to you 

further. 

Mr. BARR. We can provide that in writing, and we appreciate 

your work to continue to facilitate coordination. 

Chairman HENSARLING. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

There are no other Members in the queue. In recognition of Chairman White showing up early for the hearing, we will allow her to 

depart early from the hearing. 

The Chair notes that some Members may have additional questions for this witness, which they may wish to submit in writing. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 legislative days for Members to submit written questions to this witness 

and to place her responses in the record. Also, without objection, 

Members will have 5 legislative days to submit extraneous materials to the Chair for inclusion in the record. 

Again, I want to thank the Chairman for her testimony today. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:53 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(53) 

A P P E N D I X 

May 16, 2013 

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