IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs October 15, 2008

ALMEER K. NANCE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County

No. 75969 Kenneth F. Irvine, Jr., Judge

No. E2008-00857-CCA-R3-PC - Filed January 23, 2009

The petitioner, Almeer K. Nance, appeals the judgment of the Knox County Criminal court denying

post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of felony murder, especially aggravated robbery,

two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and three counts of aggravated robbery. He

subsequently accepted an agreed sentence of life plus twenty-five years in the Department of

Correction. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the

effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1)

erroneously advising him not to testify at trial, which he asserts effectively deprived him of his

constitutional right; and (2) failing to raise the issues of sufficiency of the evidence and severance

on direct appeal. After a thorough review of the record before us, the judgment of the postconviction court is affirmed. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JERRY L. SMITH and

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JJ., joined.

Albert J. Newman, Jr., Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Almeer T. Nance.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Renee W. Turner, Senior Counsel; Randall

Eugene Nichols, District Attorney General; and C. Leon Franks, Assistant District Attorney General,

for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Factual Background

The underlying facts of the case, as recited in the direct appeal, are as follows:

. . . Essentially, on January 16, 1996, the [petitioner] and Robert Manning robbed at

gunpoint Scott’s Market in Knoxville. Two days later Manning picked up the

[petitioner] at the [petitioner’s] home. Amanda Goode accompanied the pair. In
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looking for a place to rob, the three finally came to a Radio Shack. Goode stayed in

the car while Manning and the [petitioner], wearing toboggans/ski masks, entered the

store. Both men were once more armed with guns, and in the process of the robbery,

the store clerk, Joseph Ridings, was shot in the head. He subsequently died from this

wound. Upon leaving the store, Manning and the [petitioner] rejoined Goode in a

stolen Mazda, and the trio drove from the scene. They then discovered a raised

garage door at the home belonging to Arthur and Patsy Sipf. Again, Manning and

the [petitioner] exited the car. Finding the door from the garage to the living area of

the home unlocked, the two proceeded into the house. Once more the pair donned

toboggans/ski masks. They stole items from the home while holding both Sipfs on

the floor at gunpoint. The offenders then forced the couple into the trunk of one of

the Sipfs’ cars. Having done so, Manning and the [petitioner] left in an automobile

belonging to the Sipfs. Goode continued in the Mazda. At this point . . . the

[petitioner] was apparently returned to his home. . . . 

Some days thereafter, the authorities captured Manning and Goode in

Kentucky and therefrom gained information about the [petitioner’s] involvement in

these crimes. The police arrested the [petitioner] in the early morning hours of

January 22, 1996, and subsequently obtained a signed waiver and confession from

him. 

State v. Almeer Nance, No. E2000-00170-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 23,

2001). Following a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted of felony murder, especially aggravated

robbery, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and three counts of aggravated robbery.

The petitioner appealed the convictions to this court, challenging only the denial of his motion to

suppress. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Id. 

In November 2002, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief asserting

multiple instances of ineffective assistance of counsel at the juvenile, trial, and appellate levels.

Counsel was appointed, but no amended petition was filed. On its own motion, the post-conviction

court dismissed the petition for failure to prosecute in September 2005, and the petitioner appealed

the dismissal. Almeer Nance v. State, No. E2005-02265-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App., at

Knoxville, June 9, 2006). On appeal, this court reversed and remanded to the post-conviction court

with instructions to determine whether the delay in the case was caused by the bad faith of the

petitioner. Id. On remand, the post-conviction court determined that the petition should not have

been dismissed, and an evidentiary hearing was scheduled. At the hearing, only the petitioner and

trial counsel testified. 

The petitioner, who was twenty-nine years of age at the time of the hearing, testified that the

crimes were committed when he was sixteen years old. After a hearing in the juvenile court, his

case was transferred, and he was tried as an adult. Trial counsel was appointed to represent him

following a disagreement with the attorney who had represented him in juvenile court. According

to the petitioner, trial counsel only met with him on four or five occasions, and he felt that she was
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not prepared to try the case. The petitioner acknowledged that trial counsel had explained the crimes

for which he was charged and had filed a motion to suppress his confession to the police.

The petitioner testified that he tried to explain to trial counsel what he believed would be his

defense, specifically that he wanted to testify at trial and explain to the jury that he also was a victim

of his co-defendant. The petitioner testified at the hearing that he knowingly participated in the first

robbery but, afterwards, attempted to distance himself from co-defendant Manning. However,

according to the petitioner, Manning threatened him nonverbally into participating in the subsequent

crimes. The petitioner stated that he was afraid because he was aware of Manning’s reputation and

knew that he had shot other people and was in possession of a gun. Manning testified at trial for the

defense and admitted that he had fired the shot that killed the victim in the murder case. He also

admitted that he had forced the petitioner to commit the crimes with him. 

The petitioner reiterated in his testimony at the hearing that he wanted to testify at trial but

stated that trial counsel did not want him to do so. He testified that he believed if he had testified

at trial, the outcome of the case would have been different. He admitted that trial counsel discussed

with him his right to testify and made him aware that, ultimately, the decision was his. However,

according to the petitioner, trial counsel never prepared him to testify and advised him against it.

According to the petitioner, he followed trial counsel’s advice even though he wanted to testify. 

Trial counsel testified, in contradiction to the petitioner, that both she and the two hired

investigators met with the petitioner on numerous occasions. She stated that she was aware of the

facts of the petitioner’s case and that she had procured co-defendant Manning to testify in the

petitioner’s behalf. According to trial counsel, she pursued a theory of defense that the co-defendant

forced the petitioner into committing the crimes. She also filed a motion to suppress the petitioner’s

confession and vigorously pursued it at all levels. According to trial counsel, this was the

petitioner’s strongest appealable issue, and it was the issue she chose to pursue on appeal to this

court because she felt she had a viable chance of prevailing. She acknowledged that she raised no

other issues on appeal and stated that she felt that the issues of severance and sufficiency of the

evidence did not have merit. She testified that it was her strategy to present only what she believed

to be the strongest issue on appeal so as not to detract from its merit. 

With regard to the petitioner’s right to testify, trial counsel stated that she discussed his right

with him on numerous occasions and made clear to him that it was ultimately his decision. She

acknowledged that she advised him that it would not be a good decision to testify because of his

temper and his immaturity, and she explained the reasoning behind her advice to the petitioner. 

After hearing the testimony presented, the post-conviction court found that the petitioner was

not entitled to post-conviction relief and denied the petition. The petitioner now appeals that denial.

Analysis
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On appeal, the petitioner raises the single issue of whether the post-conviction court erred

in concluding that he was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of

counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective in: (1) misadvising him

regarding his right to testify; and (2) failing to raise the issues of sufficiency of the evidence and

severance on direct appeal. To succeed on a challenge of ineffective assistance of counsel, the

petitioner bears the burden of establishing the allegations set forth in his petition by clear and

convincing evidence. T.C.A. § 40-30-110(f) (2006). The petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s

representation fell below the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Baxter

v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,

104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), the petitioner must establish (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice

resulting from the deficiency. The petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of hindsight, may not

second-guess a reasonably based trial strategy, and cannot criticize a sound, but unsuccessful, tactical

decision made during the course of the proceedings. Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 347 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1994). This deference to the tactical decisions of trial counsel is dependent upon a

showing that the decisions were made after adequate preparation. Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521,

528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). 

 

It is unnecessary for a court to address deficiency and prejudice in any particular order or

even to address both if the petitioner makes an insufficient showing on either. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. In order to establish prejudice, the petitioner must establish a “reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 463 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104

S. Ct. at 2068).

 The issues of deficient performance by counsel and possible prejudice to the defense are

mixed questions of law and fact. Id. at 461. “[A] trial court’s findings of fact underlying a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed on appeal under a de novo standard, accompanied

with a presumption that those findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is

otherwise.” Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Henley

v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997)). However, conclusions of law are reviewed under a

purely de novo standard with no presumption.

I. Right to Testify

First, the petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective because she advised him not

to testify at trial, advice which the petitioner claims “was wrong” “because he was a frail, immature

16 year old, when the crimes occurred” and because his best defense would have been “his own trial

testimony.” Though the petitioner acknowledges that he made the decision not to testify based upon

trial counsel’s advice, he contends that he did so only because he believed if he did not he would,

in effect, have no counsel and because counsel never prepared him to testify. Thus, the petitioner

argues that he had no alternative except to accept trial counsel’s advice. 
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Tennessee recognizes that a criminal defendant has a fundamental right to testify. Momon

v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 157 (Tenn. 2000). Moreover, the right may only be waived personally by

the defendant. Id. at 161; Vermilye v. State, 754 S.W.2d 82, 88 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) (“The

decision as to whether an accused should testify at trial rests with the accused, not defense

counsel.”). Initially, we note that the procedure adopted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Momon

to ensure that a defendant has personally waived his right to testify has no application to this case.

The petitioner’s trial was held prior to our supreme court’s holding in Momon, and the court in

Momon expressly held that the procedures set forth “do not establish a new constitutional rule which

must be retroactively applied,” specifying that the procedure should be applied “in all cases tried or

retried after the date of this decision.” Momon, 18 S.W.3d at 162-63.

At the conclusion of the post-conviction hearing, the court made the following findings:

By [the petitioner’s] own testimony, the most important complaint he has is

that he didn’t testify at his trial, and that if he had testified that he could have

convinced the jurors that he operated under duress and that they would not have

convicted him of felony murder. 

But he’s also very candid - - [the petitioner] is very candid that he understood

it was his right to make the decision about whether he testified or not; that he

followed the advice of counsel, which counsel admits that she gave that he should not

testify and explained to him why. And now he is here saying he wished he had done

otherwise. 

This is not a situation where the Court can look and say with the benefit of

hindsight he should have tried a different strategy because maybe that one would

have worked. As long as [the petitioner] understood his rights at the trial which it’s

clear he did, that it was his decision to make, it’s not ineffective assistance. 

The post-conviction court found that the petitioner understood that the decision to testify was

his decision and that the petitioner made that decision based upon trial counsel’s advice. Indeed,

both the petitioner and trial counsel specifically testified that the petitioner was aware that the

decision of whether he testified at trial was to be made by the petitioner. The petitioner’s argument

is essentially that trial counsel’s advice was uninformed and erroneous advice. We disagree. 

While trial counsel conceded that she advised the petitioner not to testify, merely informing

a client that it is in his best interest not testify does not equate to a denial of the right. Additionally,

it appears that the decision to so advise the petitioner was based upon trial counsel’s preparation and

observations of the petitioner and his inability to control his temper. Thus, as found by the postconviction court, it appears to have been a strategic decision formed in furtherance of the defense,

which was explained to the petitioner prior to his making his decision not to testify. As noted by the

trial court, it is not the function of the courts to second-guess trial strategy. Adkins, 911 S.W.2d at

347. Moreover, the same testimony was put before the jury through another witness, and the only
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evidence presented that the result of the trial would have been different was the petitioner’s own

assertions. Accordingly, we conclude that there is nothing in the record to preponderate against the

post-conviction court’s finding that trial counsel was not ineffective and that the petitioner personally

waived his right to testify. 

II. Issues on Direct Appeal

Next, the petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to raise the issues

of sufficiency of the evidence and severance of the offenses on direct appeal. According to the

petitioner, “[t]he reasons given by counsel, at the evidentiary hearing, for not presenting the issues

on appeal were weak” and “counsel by not presenting the issues for review, in effect, substituted

counsel’s opinion, as to this merits of the issues, for that of this court.” 

If a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on the failure of counsel to raise a

particular issue on appeal, as is the case before us, then the reviewing court must determine the

merits of the omitted issue. Carpenter v. State, 126 S.W.3d 879, 887 (Tenn. 2004) (citing

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375, 106 S. Ct. 2574 (1986)). If the omitted issue has no

merit or is weak, then appellate counsel’s performance will not be deficient if counsel failed to raise

it on appeal. Id. Likewise, if the issue has no merit, then the petitioner suffered no prejudice from

the failure to raise the issue on appeal. Id.

“[T]he determination of which issues to present on appeal is a matter of counsel’s

discretion.” State v. Swanson, 680 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). Further, “the failure

of counsel for a criminal defendant to argue every single issue that a case may present or to present

every issue in an appeal that a client may request is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel.” See

id. at 491. This court should evaluate the questionable conduct from counsel’s perspective at the

time of her conduct with “a strong presumption that [her] conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance.” Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 462. Counsel should not be deemed to have

been ineffective merely because a different procedure or strategy might have produced a different

result. Williams v. State, 599 S.W.2d 276, 279-80 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). Moreover, this court

has held that “[c]ounsel is not constitutionally required to argue every issue on appeal, or to present

issues chosen by his client.” Swanson, 680 S.W.2d at 491. “Ineffectiveness is very rarely found in

cases where a defendant asserts that appellate counsel failed to raise an issue on direct appeal,

primarily because the decision of what issues to raise is one of the most important strategic decisions

to be made by appellate counsel.” Kennath Henderson v. State, No. W2003-01545-CCA-R3-PD

(Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 28, 2005).

With regard to the prejudice prong, the petitioner is required to demonstrate prejudice due

to appellate counsel’s error. In order to establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that, had

counsel raised the issue or issues asserted, there is a reasonable probability that his conviction would

have been reversed. Thus, we are required to examine the merits of the issues which were not raised

by appellant counsel on appeal. Carpenter, 126 S.W.3d at 887.
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In denying relief, the post-conviction court made the following findings:

On the appellate issue, there was a strategy decision that was made. And this

Court is not allowed to look behind strategic decisions, but even if I was allowed to

do that, what [trial counsel] did was a properstrategic decision. That there’s one key

issue she wanted to raise, and she made a decision that that would be most effective

going to the appellate courts if she focused on that issue. That - - if she didn’t detract

from that with other issues. And I think that’s a proper strategy. 

The insufficiency of the evidence is an issue that very seldom wins in front

of the appellate courts. I think that can be shown just by a review of appellate court

decisions. And I think she correctly looked at it and said that if you - - if the facts are

strong in these cases that that would just take away from the issue. And she was

clearly trying to be successful on the suppression issue. So I don’t think there’s

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel shown either. 

Again, we find nothing in the record before us to preponderate against the post-conviction

court’s findings. Trial counsel specifically testified that, as a matter of strategy, she chose to raise

only the suppression issue on direct appeal because she felt that the petitioner had a good chance of

receiving relief on that issue. She stated that she did not want to detract from the issue she believed

to be most meritorious by raising the issues of sufficiency and severance, which she did not believe

were viable for relief on appeal. As found by the trial court, this is a solid strategic decision which

falls “within the wide range of reasonable assistance.” See Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 462. 

Moreover, we note that the petitioner has failed to establish the prejudice prong as well. He

offers no argument and cites to no authority as to why the sufficiency or the severance issue would

have been successful on appeal. Additionally, we note that the petitioner has failed to include a

record of the trial proceedings below or any motions filed; thus, we are precluded from fully

reviewing the merits of the two issues omitted on appeal. It is the petitioner’s burden to prove, by

clear and convincing evidence, that the issues which were not raised on appeal had merit and that

if they had been raised, there is a reasonable probability that the convictions would have been

reversed. The petitioner has failed to carry his burden of establishing that in this case. 

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the denial of post-conviction relief is affirmed. 

___________________________________ 

 JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE