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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BENNIE E. BARNES, )

Plaintiff )

) C.A. No. 05-112 Erie

vs. ) District Judge McLaughlin

) Magistrate Judge Baxter

STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al., )

Defendants. )

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

I. REPORT

It is respectfully recommended that this action be dismissed as legally frivolous in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1915(d).

II. RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Bennie E. Barnes, presently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at

Albion, Pennsylvania, brings this action pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Named as

Defendants are the State of Pennsylvania and the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County,

Pennsylvania. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated the Double Jeopardy and Due

Process clauses of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. In particular, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants “entered into a Civil Conspiracy with the Plaintiff(s) [sic] trial attorney

and the State Government prosecutor, resulting in unwarranted prosecution.” (See Complaint at

Section II.B). As relief, Plaintiff requests monetary damages in the amount of $5,000,000.00. 

(See Complaint at Section VI).

Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on April 11, 2005, which was

granted by this Court by Order dated April 28, 2005.

On April 23, 1996, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (hereinafter, “Act”), Pub.L.No.

104-134, was enacted to amend 28 U.S.C. §1915, which establishes the criteria for allowing an

action to proceed without payment of costs. Section 1915(e) as amended, states in relevant part:

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“The court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that -- ...(B) the action or

appeal -- (I) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted...” 

A claim is frivolous if it: 1) is based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory and/or, 2)

contains factual contentions that are clearly baseless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327

(1989). A plaintiff has failed to allege a section 1983 claim if the court is satisfied “that no

relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the

allegation.” Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41 (1957). This Court has discretion to dismiss frivolous or malicious in forma pauperis

complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989)

the U.S. Supreme Court has instructed that section 1915(d) provides the Court with the authority

“... to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless theory, but also the unusual power to

pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual

contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). In fact, the

statue not only empowers the Court to screen out frivolous cases before the complaint is served,

it actually encourages it. Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1990).

A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to

state a claim if it appears “<beyond a doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-

521(1972), quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. If the court can reasonably read pleadings to

state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should be done so despite failure to cite

proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or

litigant’s unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Smith v. U.S. District Court, 956 F.2d 295

(D.C.Cir. 1992); Freeman v. Department of Corrections, 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991); Boag v.

MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); Haines. Under our liberal pleading rules, during the initial

stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the

complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997). See, e.g., Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d

63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Company, 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir.

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This doctrine arises out of the decisions in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149 (1923) and

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (1983).

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1990). 

Succinctly stated, Plaintiff claims that he has been falsely imprisoned as a result of an

improper conviction and, thus, he is entitled to receive monetary damages. In order to recover

damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused

by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff

must prove that “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or

called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). “A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a

conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.” 512

U.S. at 487 (emphasis in the original).

Plaintiff’s complaint clearly implicates the validity of his conviction; yet, Plaintiff has

made no showing that the conviction has been declared invalid. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims for

monetary damages against the Defendants should be dismissed.

Moreover, under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine,1 federal courts are prohibited “from

exercising ‘subject matter jurisdiction to review final adjudications of a state’s highest court or

to evaluate constitutional claims that are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s

[decision] in a judicial proceeding.’” Ernst v. Child and Youth Services of Chester County, 108

F.3d 486, 491 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850, 118 S.Ct. 139 (1997)(quoting FOCUS

v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996))(internal

citations omitted). For the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine to be applicable here this Court must

either “determine that the state court judgment was erroneously entered” or “take action that

would render that judgment ineffectual” in order to grant Plaintiff the relief he requests. Rooker 

v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150 (1923). 

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Plaintiff claims that his constitutional rights were violated during trial before the Erie

County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff is essentially asking this Court to conduct a de novo

review of all state court proceedings related to his conviction and sentence in an effort to have

the state court judgment vacated. In order to grant such relief, a determination that the state

court judgment was erroneous must occur, and in particular, such relief would render the state

court decision “ineffectual.” This he cannot do under the guise of a civil rights claim.

Furthermore, the Court notes that suits for damages by individuals against state

governments or state agencies are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Chittister v. Dep’t of

Community and Economic Development, 226 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2000). See also Bey v.

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 98 F.Supp.2d 650, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2000) wherein the

court summarized well-established law, observing that:

[t]he Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the

United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,

commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another

State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI.

Thus, under the Eleventh Amendment, absent express consent by the state in

question or a clear and unequivocal waiver by Congress, states are immune from

suit in federal court. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54

(1996).

Id.; see also Koslow v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2002).

No exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment immunity are applicable here. The

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not consented to be sued. Wilson v. Vaughn, No. 93-C.V.-

6020, 1996 WL 426538, *1 n.2 (E.D.Pa. July 30, 1996)(citing, 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann.

§8521(b)). Congress has not expressly abrogated Pennsylvania’s Eleventh Amendment

immunity from civil rights suits for damages. Smith v. Luciani, No. 97-3613, 1998 WL 151803,

*4 (E.D.Pa. March 31, 1998), aff’d, 178 F.3d 1280 (3d Cir. 1999)(Table). Thus, Plaintiff is

precluded from seeking monetary damages against Defendant State of Pennsylvania.

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff’s Complaint may be construed as a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, it must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his state court

remedies, and his claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 2244(d)(1).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this complaint should be dismissed as frivolous in accordance

with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

In accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule

72.1.4(B) of the Local Rules for Magistrates, the parties are allowed ten days from the date of

service to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. 

S/Susan Paradise Baxter 

SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER

Chief U.S. Magistrate Judge

Dated: November 29, 2005

cc: The Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin

United States District Judge 

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