See T EX
. P EN AL C OD E A NN
. § 4 3.23 ( c) ( 1) ( Ver non 2003)

. T hi s off ense const i t ut es a C l ass A 1 m i s d e m e a n o r. S e e id

. § 4 3.23 (d) ( V ern on 20 03 ).



### NUM BERS 13-0 5-12 3-CR & 13-05-1 24-CR 

## COURT OF A PP EA LS T H I R T E E N T H D I S T R I C T O F T E X AS C OR P U S C H R I S T I -E D I N B U R G
BEA TR ICE VILLA RR EA L, A pp ellan t,
v . TH E STA

TE OF T EXAS, A pp ellee.
On ap pe al f rom th e C ou nty C ou rt atL aw N o. 4 of N ue ces Co un ty , T exas . 

## O P I N I O N B efo re J u st ic es Y añ ez , R o d rig u ez , a n d G arza

Opin ion b y

Ju stice Ya ñe z A j ur y found appel lan t, Beatr ic e Vil la rre a l, g uil ty of offendi ng ( 1) a s tate law prohi bit ing the sal e o f

obscene dev ic es, and (2 ) a muni ci pal ordin ance prohi bit ing the 1See C OR PUS C H R I STI , T EX ., C O D E O F O RD I NAN CES ch. 48, ar t

. I , § 48- 18( b) ( 1996)

. T hi s off ense 2 c o n s ti tu te s a C l a s s A m i s d e m e a n o r. S e e id

. at § 4 8-3 (b) ( 19 96 ).

A p p e l l a t e c a u s e n u m b e r1 3
- 0 5
- 1 2 4
- CR. 3 See T EX
. P EN AL C OD E A NN
. § 4 3.23 (c)(1). 4 2 operati on of a s ex ual ly

or ien ted b usi ness w it hout a per mit. The tr ial co urt t hen i mposed 2 $1,500 in fines and ter ms of impri sonmentamounting to one y ear i n c ounty

j ail

. Appel lan t ap pe al s h er

c on v i c ti on t hrou g h s i x

i s s ue s . W e affi r m. I. Back ground On J une 25, 2004, C or pus Chr is ti Pol ic e Officer Adr ian D oming uezw as w or ki ng undercov er

w hen he v is it ed a busi ness , cal led Fr ien ds 4 Ev er , to deter mine if i t was sel li ng obsc ene mate ri als or

dev ic es. D oming uezw as aw are tha t la w e n forcementag ents had previously

informe d the busine ss ow ner tha t the busine ss nee ded to cease selling certain item s thatw ere con sider e d o bscen e un der stat e law . Appe llant w as at th e bu siness
w or ki ng as a c ashi er

and sal es cl er k. D ur ing the v is it , D oming uezpurchas ed a v ibrator from appel lan t; the v ibrator w a s c all ed “ Lic k i t Lov er” and resembl ed th e mal e s ex ual organ. A few hou rs af

ter Dom inguez’s purch ase , p olice of f icers arriv ed a t the busine ss, w here the y

ex ecut ed a search w ar ra nt an d pl aced appel lan t und er ar re st. In t ri al cour

t c ause number

04- CR -6 215- 4 ( herein after “c ause one” ), appell ant was 3 charg ed by

co mplai nt w it h hav ing co mmit te d an offense under se cti on 43. 23( a) of the penal co de. U nder

thi s c ause, i t was all eg ed th at “ [o]n or about1:30 p.m. on J une 25, 4 200 4 . . . in Nueces Cou nty,” appellan t, “knowing th e c o n t e n ta n d cha racter of a certain dev ic e, t o- w it : a di ldo and v ibrator , k now ing lypromote[ d] or pos ses s[e d] w it h i ntenttoSee id. 5 A p p e l l a t e c a u s e n u m b e r1 3
- 0 5
- 1 2 3
- CR. 6 See C OR PUS C H R I STI , T EX ., C O D E O F O RD I NAN CES c h . 4 8 , a rt. I , § 4 8 -1 8 (b ); T EX
. P EN AL C OD E A NN
. 7 § 4 3.23 (c)(1).

See C OR PUS C H R I STI , T EX ., C O D E O F O RD I NAN CES c h. 48 , art

. I , § 4 8-1 8(b ). 8 See T EX
. P EN AL C OD E A NN
. § 4 3.23 (c)(1). 9 3 promote s aid dev ic e, w hic h w as obsc ene.” 5 In t ri al cour

t c ause number 04- CR -6 197- 4 (h erein after “c ause two” ), appel lan t was 6 charg ed by

i nformati on w it h hav ing co mmitt ed offenses u nder se cti ons 48- 18( b ) of the Cor pus Chr is ti C ode of Ordin ances ( “t he C ode” ) and 43. 23( c) (1 ) of t he penal code. U nder 7 this cau se, ap pellan t w as a ll eged to have “unlawf ully inten tiona lly

and knowi ngly cond uct[e d] a bu siness as a se x ually orie n t e d b usine ss w ithin th e cityof Corpus Christi, Tex as, w ithout hav ing se cured a per mit is sued by the Cor pus Chr is ti C hie f of Pol ic e to condu ct suc h a b usi ness .” The c ause further all eg ed that “[ o]n o r about 6:14 p.m. o n J une 8 25, 200 4 . . . in Nueces Cou nty,” appellan t, “knowing the cont enta nd chara cter of a certain dev ic e, t o w it : erect ion makers ( sti mulat ors) , di ldo ty pe dev ic es, anal beads , peni s p umps and s imul ated v ag ina s, poss ess [ed] w it h i ntentto promote s aid dev ic e, w hich w as obsc ene.” 9 App ellantplead ed n ot guilty to the S tate ’s allegations in bo th cau ses, w hich w ere the n tried joint ly

before a jury. Th e jury foun d ap pellan t guilty

on all coun ts. W ith respe ct to cau se tw o, the trial court impose d a $50 0 f ine an d a six -mon th te rm of imprison me nt in
coun ty jail. As to cause o n e , t h e trial court imp osed a $1,0 00 f ine an d a six -mon th te rm of impr is onment i n c ounty j ail , w hic h w as to ru n cons ecut iv ely w it h the se ntenc e i mposed51 7 F

. 3d 73 8 (5th C i r. 20 08 ). 10 Id

. at 740

. 11 See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 38. 7 ( “ A br i efm aybe am ended orsupp l em ent ed when ev erj ust i ce r equi res, 12 on w ha t eve r r ea s on ab l e t erm s t he co urt m ay pres c ri be

. ”)

.

L a p a s n i c kv . S ta te , 78 4 S

. W

. 2d 36 6, 36 8 (T ex . C ri m . A pp . 19 90 ). 13 4 in caus e two. App ellant ’s orig inal ap pellat e brief challen ged her con v ictions th rough four issues. After t h e p a rt i e s i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e s u b mi t t e d t h e i r b r i e fs , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C ourt of Appeal s for the Fi fth Ci rc uiti ss ued i ts opi nio n i n Reliable Con sultan ts, Inc. v. Earle

. I n 10 that opi nio n, t he F ifth C ircui t hel d tha t prov is ion s o f p e n a l co de s ect ion 43.2 3—c ri minal iz ing the p ro moti on of obs cene dev ic es—v iol ated the F our teent h Amendmentof the U nit ed Stat es Con sti tuti on. I n the i ntere st of jus ti ce, w e afforded app ell ant a n oppor tuni ty to 11
rai s e an y

a dd i ti ona l a rg um en t s he ma y d er i v e from Reliable

. Appe llant sub sequen tly 12 submi tted a suppl emental br ief that ra is ed two new i ss ues. The S tate filed a s uppl emental br ief i n respon se. II. C on st it ut io nal ity o f Sect io n 43.23 The g eneral ru le conc er nin g pas sag e of an uncon sti tuti onal sta tute is that the l aw is v oid from it s inc epti on and canno t prov ide a ba si s for any r ig ht or reli ef. Ap pel lan t t hus

13 argues tha t her con v ictions unde r section 43 .23 (a) of the pe nal cod e can notstand beca use that sta tute is faci all y

unc onst it uti onal i n l ig ht of the F ifth C ircui t’ s h old ing i n Rel iab le. In ar ri v ing at i ts hol din g i n Reliable , t he F ifth C ircui t first soug ht t o det er mine the r ig ht p la ce d atst a ke by se ct io n 43 .2 3 ’s c rim in a liza ti o n of ob sc e n e de vice s, st a ti n g: Pl ain ti ffs c lai m thatthe ri g ht atst ake is the ind ivid u a l’s sub sta nti v e due proces s r ig ht t o eng ag e i n pr iv ate i nti mate c onduct free from g ov er nmentR e lia b l e C o n s u lta n ts , 517 F. 3d a t 743

. 14 69 0 S

. W

. 2d 26 0, 26 3-6 6 (T ex . C ri m . A pp . 19 85 ). 15 R e lia b l e C o n s u lta n ts , 517 F. 3d a t 744

. 16 R e g a la d o v . S ta te , 8 7 2 S .W .2 d 7 , 1 1 (T e x . A p p .– H o u s to n [1 4 th D i s t.] 1 9 9 4 , p e t. re f’d ) (B ro w n , C .J ., 17 c on c urri ng ).

B ut s ee Vark o n y i

v . S ta te , N o. 08- 06- 00255
- C R , 200 8 T ex. App. LEX I S 3353, at * 21- 26 ( T ex. 18 App. –El Paso M ay8, 200 8, no pet

. h. ) ( cr i t i ci z i ng R e lia b le ’ s l eg al reas on i ng ). 5 int ru si on. The Stat e propose s a di fferent r ig ht for the Pl ain ti ffs: “ the r ig ht t o sti mulat e one’ s g eni tal s for non- medic al pur poses unrela ted t o procreati on or outs ide of an i nter personal rela ti onshi p.” 14 Un li k e t h e T e xa s Co u rto f Cr im in a l A p p e a ls , wh ic h e n ga ge d in t h e s a m e d is c u s s io n twe n tythree y ears e ar li er

i n Y o r k o v . State , the Fi fth Ci rc uitfound thatthe is sue before i t was

15 “w het her the Te x as stat ute im perm issibly b urde ns the indiv idua l’s substan tiv e du e proce ss ri g ht t o eng ag e i n pr iv ate i nti mate c onduct of hi s o r her ch oosi ng ,” and conc lud ed th at “ the Tex as law

burdens thi s c onst it uti onal r ig ht.” 16 The two j ust ic es compos ing the panel maj or ity i n Rel iab le are not the firs t jur is ts to take i ss ue w it h s ect ion 43.2 3. In Reg ala do v . St ate , w h e re i n t h e F o u rt e e n t h Cou rtof Appeal s a ff ir med a de fendant’s co nv icti on for sel li ng an o bsc ene d e vice in v iol ati on of
secti on 43. 23, C hie f Just ic e J . C urti ss Brow n s ucc inctl y ex press ed hi s dis ple asure w it h the statu te i n a c oncur ri ng opi nio n, s tati ng : “H ere w e g o rais ing the pr ic e of di ldo s a g ain

. Since th i s ap pe ars to be th e l aw i n Texas I mu s t c on c ur .” W e s ha re C hi ef Justice 17 Brow n’s sent iment s; moreo v er , w e ag re e w it h the l eg al re asoni ng se t outby the Reliable
majority

. And t h o u gh we emb race the Fifth Circuit’s decision , w e are un fortun ate ly

18
cons train ed from fol low ing i t. Fi fth Ci rc uit

precede nt i s n ot bi ndi ng on Tex as cour ts, and it s c onst it u ti onalS e e S h p ik u la v . S ta te , 68 S. W

. 3d 212, 225 (T ex. App. –H oust on [ 1st D i st

. ] 200 2, pet

. r ef ' d) ( ci t i ng 19 Va u g h n v . S ta te , 8 8 8 S .W .2 d 6 2 , 7 4 (T e x . A p p .– H o u s to n [1 s t D i s t.] 1 9 9 4 ), a f f’d , 9 3 1 S .W .2 d 5 6 4 ( T e x . C r im

. A p p . 1 9 9 6 )) ; see a lso W oodw ard v . T ex . D ep’ t of H um an Res. , 5 7 3 S .W .2 d 5 9 6 , 5 9 8 (T e x . 1 9 7 8 ). I n W oo dw ard , t he T exas Supr em e Cour t st at ed: [I] n th e a b s e n c e o f a c o n tro l l i n g d e c i s i o n b y th e U n i te d S ta te s S u p re m e C o u rt, T e x a s c o u rts of c i v i l a pp ea l s ar e bo un d by t he p r on ou nc em en t s of t he Texa s Sup r em e C ou r t o n t he l aw . ‘ Af t e r a p r i n c i p l e , r u l e o r p r o p o s i t i o n o f l a w h a s b e e n s q u a r e l y d e c i d e d b y t he ( T exas) Supr em e Cour t

. . . t he d ec i s i on i s a c c ep t ed a s a bi ndi ng p r eceden t byt he sa m e cou r t or o th e rc o u r ts o flo w e rr a n k w h e n th e v e r y p o in t is a g a in p r e s e n te d in a s u b s e q u e n t s u it b e tw e e n d i ff e re n t p a rti e s .’ A n d , u n ti l th e S u p re m e C o u r t s ta te s to th e c o n tra ry, i ts pr onoun cem ent i s t he l aw on an e xpr essed i ssue. Id

. (c i ta ti o n s o m i tte d ); see g ener al l y S tu a r t B u c k & M a rk L . R i e n zi , Feder al C ourts, O ver

breadth, and Vagueness: G uiding Pr inci ples f or C onsti t utional C hal

l enges t o Unint er

pret ed Stat e St at ut es , 200 2 U T A H L. R EV
. 38 1, 42 7-3 5 (20 02 ).

43 2 F

. 2d 10 72 (7t h C i r. 19 70 ). 20 Id

. at 107 3. 21 I d. 22 Id

. at 107 4- 75. 23 6 pronounc ements are hi g hly persuas iv e at best

. An ex pla nati on for w hy Tex as cour

ts and 19 oth er state courts are not bou nd by the const itution al pron oun cem ent s of the fede ral district and circui t cour

ts can be found i n United S tates ex r el. Lawr ence v. W

oods

. I n tha t c ase,

20 Law re nce w as found g uil ty of v iol ati ng an ordin ance thatcri minal iz ed inter feri ng w it h the du ti es o f a po l i c e offi c er . W hi l e La w ren c e’ s a pp ea l w as p en di ng b efo re th e Su prem e 21 Court of Illinois, a fede ral district court, in an u nrelat ed d eclarat oryjudgmen t action , held that the i nter

ferenc e ordin ance w as uncon sti tuti onal and v oid on i ts face as re pug nant to the fede ral Constitut ion. The Supre me Court of Illinois later af

f irmed Lawrence ’s 22
conv icti on, and Law re nce ev entual ly appeal ed to t he Sev enth Ci rc uit , c ontendi ng “ that the Sup reme Court of

Illinois failed to follow, un der the su prem acy clause , the fede ral district
cour t’ s r uli ng . . . thatthe int er ferenc e ordin ance is co nst it uti onal ly v oid on it s face.” The 23 Se ven th Circ u itrej e ct e d La wren ce ’s c o n te n ti o n , e xpla in in g:Id

. at 107 5- 76. 24 Ex part e Young , 20 9 U

. S

. 12 3, 16 3 (19 08 ). 25 See Yor

ko , 690 S. W

. 2d a t 261
- 266. W e ha v e l i t t l e r eason t o bel i eve tha t t he co ur t of cr i m i nal 26 appea l s now t akes i ssue wi t h i t s hol di ng i n Yor ko

. I n Ex par

t e Dave , 22 0 S

. W

. 3d 15 4, 15 9-6 0 ( T ex . A pp . –F ort W or t h 20 07, pet

. r ef ’ d) , t he Secon d Cour t of A ppeal s re j ect ed t he appel l ant ’ s ar gum ent t hat sect i on 43. 23 o f 7 Th e S u p re me C o u rto f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s a p p e l l a t e j u r i s dic ti on ov er federal q uest ion s a ri si ng eit her in sta te or federal proceed ing s, and by re ason of the s upremacy cl ause the deci si ons of t hat cour t on nati onal l aw hav e bi ndi ng effecton a ll l ow er co urts w hether sta te or federal

. On the o ther hand, becau se lower

federal co urts ex erci se no appe ll ate jur is dicti on ov er sta te t ri bunal s, deci si ons of l ow er federal co urts are notco ncl usi v e on sta te courts. Of co u rse in a g iv en factua l setti ng w hen a lower federal co urt has jur is dicti on ov er the subj ect matter and the par ti es, it s a dju dic ati on i s t he l aw of the c ase and i ts jud g ment i s b ind ing on all other cour ts, subject only

to the app ellate process. Bu t tha t is not the situatio n he re. Th e district court’s decla ration thatthe inte rferen ce ordina nce is unco nstitu tiona l w as ma de in an unrela ted c ase and at a ti me w hen peti ti oner ’s appeal from hi s c onv icti on wa s p e n d in g i n t h e S u p re m e Co u rto f I ll in o is

. In t h e s e ci rc u m s t a n c e s , we hol d tha t t he federa l court’ s r uli ng w as not b ind ing on t he s tate appel lat e tribun al. 24 Just as sta te cou rts a re n ot bou nd by de clarato ry ju dgme nts, a low er fede ral court’s is suanc e of an i nju nct ion —as done b y t h e F if th C ircui t i n Reliable —also fails to directly bind state courts. As expressed by the United Sta tes Su prem e Court in Ex par te Y oung : “I t i s p ro per

to add t hat t he r ig ht t o enj oin an i ndi v idu al, ev en throug h a s tate off ic ial , from
commenc ing su it s u nder circ u m stances al re ady st ated, does not inc lud e the pow er to restrain a cou rt fro m act ing i n an y case brou ght before it, eith er of a civ il or criminal na ture

. . . .” 25 This C our

t t hus re mains duty-b ound, for better or w orse, to follo w the ru li ng s o f the
cour t of cr imi nal appeal s, w hic h has hel d—i n c ontrastto the F ifth C ircui t—t h a t s ect ion 43. 23 d oes n ot v iolate the du e proce ss clause of the Fou rteen th Am end me nt. Becau se 26t he p enal code v i ol at ed t he d ue p r ocess cl ause oft he Four t eent h Am endm ent , and t he co ur t of cr i m i nal a p p e a l s re fu s e d a p p e l l a n t’ s s u b s e q u e n t p e ti ti o n fo r d i s c re ti o n a ry re v i e w .

S e e H e rn a n d e z v . S ta te , 16 1 S

. W

. 3d 49 1, 49 7 (T ex . C ri m . A pp . 20 05 ). 27See id. 28 S e e id

. at498

. 29 8 w e mu st follow the co u rto f criminal app eals’ ho lding that sect ion 43 .23 is constitutio nal,
w e reje ct the a rg ument i n appel lan t’ s s uppl emental br ief tha t c ontes ts her co nv icti ons for promoti ng an o bsc ene dev ic e. For the same reason , w e al so rej ect appel lan t’ s c ontent ion that the h old ing i n Rel

iab le w arrants a rev ersal of her conviction for op e rating a sex ually orient ed b usine ss w ithou t a perm it. Th e tw o issues in ap pellan t’s supp lem ent al brief are therefore ov er ru led

. III. Entra pment A . A pp licab le L aw W hen app ell ant rais ed th e defense of entrapment a t t ri al, sh e had th e burden of produci ng ev ide nce to establi sh ev er y el ement of tha t defense

. Sh e had to presenta 27 pr ima facie cas e tha t ( 1) sh e eng ag ed i n the c o n d u ct charg ed; ( 2) bec ause she w as indu ced to do so by a law enforcem entagent; (3) w ho u sed p ersua sion or oth er me ans; and ( 4) thos e means w ere l ik ely to caus e persons to commi t t he offense. O nce she 28 made a p ri ma faci e show ing of each element, the Stat e the n had the b urden of persuas ion to di sprov e ent ra pment be y ond a re asona ble doubt. In rev iew ing a c hal len g e to the l eg al 29 suf f iciency of

the ev iden ce to sup port a jury’s rejection of a defense to prose cution , w e use the sam e stan dard used in rev iew ing the suf f iciency of

the evidence to supp ort a v erdict of gu il t, loo ki ng at the s uff ic ien cy of the e v ide nce to s uppor t both the ve rd ict as w ell as theS e e S a x to n v . S ta te , 804 S. W

. 2d 9 10, 914 ( T ex. C r i m . App. 199 1)

. W e r ev i ew a ch al l enge t o t he 30 le g a l s u ff ic ie n c y o fth e e v id e n c e to s u p p o r t a v e r d ic t o fg u ilt b y v ie w in g t h e e v id e n c e in th e lig h t m o s t f a v o r a b le t o t he v er di c t to d eterm i ne i fanyr at i onal t r i erof f act coul d ha v e f ound bey ond a r easona bl e do ubt t he e s s e n ti a l e l e m e n ts o f th e o ff e n s e . W i ls o n v . S ta te , 7 S .W .3 d 1 3 6 , 1 4 1 ( T e x . C r im . A p p . 1 9 9 9 ) . U n d e rth is st andar d , t h e f a c t
- f i n d e ri s t h e e x c l u s i v e j u d g e o ft h e w i t n e s s e s ’ c r e d i b i l i t y a n d t h e w e i g h t g i v e n t o t he e v i d e n c e , m a y d ra w re a s o n a b l e i n fe re n c e s fr o m b a s i c to u l ti m a te fa c ts , a n d i s e n ti tl e d to re s o l v e a n y c o n fli c ts i n te s ti m o n y a n d re je c t o r a c c e p t a n y o r a l l o f th e e v i d e n c e p re s e n te d b y e i th e r s i d e . J o n e s v . S ta te , 944 S

. W

. 2d 64 2, 64 7 (T ex . C ri m . A pp . 19 96 ).

H er nande z , 161 S. W

. 3d a t 500

. 31 I d. 32 I d. 33 See id. at 501

. 34 9 re jecti on of the defense. 30 W hen an entrapment d efense i s p re sent ed attr ial, the fact -fin der i s a uthor iz ed to
w eig h the ev ide nce and draw a c oncl usi on as to w hether thatev ide nce est abl ishes entrap m e n t as a matter of fact or

l aw . I n rev iew ing a j ur y ’s reje cti on of an en trapment 31 defense, w e det er mine w hether , v iew ing the ev ide nce in the l ig ht m o stf a vorabl e to the prosec uti on, a ny

rati onal tr ier

of fa ctcould hav e found the es sent ial el ements of the
cr imi nal offense bey ond a re asona ble doubtand als o c oul d hav e found ag ain st the defend anton the issue of entrap me nt bey ond a reaso nab le dou bt. T his rev iew mu st take 32 int o ac count that the tr ier of fact , not the appel lat e cour t, w as free to acc ept o r re ject al l or any portion o f

any w itness’s te stimo ny. In cases w here the en trapm entdefense is 33
ass erted, the fact -fin der may di sbel iev e s ome or all of a w it ness ’s testi mony , ev en w hen that tes ti mony

i s u ncont ra dicted. 34 B. Discuss ion Appel lan t t est ified sh e tol d D oming uezthatsh e c oul d notse ll any of the o bscene dev ic es he w as browsi ng , but that he ult imat ely ind uced her to sel l the v ibrator

. Acc ordin gS e e id

. at500

. 35 10 to he r testimo ny, the indu cem entoccurred in th e followi ng man ner: W hen [ Domi ng uez ] g ot [ the v ibrator ] out of the cont ain er

he sai d, ag ain , t hat he di dn’ t t hin k i t was cons ide re d s omethi ng thatI coul dn’ t s ell t o h im and si nce he w as a reg ula r cus tomer he did n’tf ind that there w as anythi ng w ro ng w it h it and w hy

w oul d I ri sk

sell ing anythi ng to a custo mer w ho had shopp ed t h e re f re qu e n t ly. Base d on thi s tes ti mony , appel lan t as ser ts on appe al that she made a p ri ma facie sh ow ing of ev er y el ement of the entrapment defense. She f urther contends that the State di d not carry its burden to disprove t he ent rapm entd efense b eyond a reaso nab le dou bt be cause itfail ed to rebut the aforementi oned tes ti mony . Appel lan t t hus arg ues that entrapment was e s t a b li s h e d a s a m a t t e r o f la w. Listen ing to appe llant’s test imo ny f rom the w itness stand , a reaso nab le trier of fact could have either (1) conclud ed th at this w as “an appalling examp le of police m iscond uct and law enforcem enttrickery

run ramp ant ,” o r (2 ) c o nclud ed “f rom a ppe llant’s w ords, appearance, demeanor , and tone that[s he] was ind ulg ing i n post hoc creati v ity .” 35 Dom inguez provided testim ony th at raised credibility conce rns and created a disput ed fact issue w ith regards to ap pellan t and h er t estim ony, presen ting matt ers thatw ere for the jury to resol v e. Domi ng ueztes ti fied th at ap pel lan t i nv it ed hi m to b ro w se th ro ug h obs cene dev ic es. H e al so sta ted t hat w hen he ini ti all y b e gan l ooki ng at the v ibrator , app ell ant commented , “ Hey , w hoev er y ou buy thatfor t h e y ’re real ly

g oin g to li ke it .” Ac cordin g to Domi ng uez , he nev er

tol d appel lan t t hat s he s houl d s ell the v ibrator to him becau se he w as a re gu la r c u s t o m e r. Ba s e d o n t h is t e s t im o n y a n d t h e re a s o n a b le in fe r e n c e s d ra wn the ref rom, the jury had reaso n to disbelieve app ellant ’s claim tha t she was i ndu ced to sellC OR PUS C H R I STI , T EX ., C O D E O F O RD I NAN CES c h. 48 , art

. I , § 4 8-1 (a) ( 19 96 ). 36 T EX
. L OC
. G OV ’ T C OD E A NN
. § 2 43

. 00 3(a ) ( V ern on 20 05 ). 37 C OR PUS C H R I STI , T EX ., C O D E O F O RD I NAN CES c h. 48, ar t

. I V, § 48- 18( b) ( O r d. N o. 225 96, § 2, 38 6- 11- 1996) ( em phasi s add ed)

. Chapt er48 st at es t hat a per son “ conduct s busi ness” i f t hat per son “ [ o] per at es a cash r egi st er , cash dr aweror ot her deposi t or y on busi ness pr em i ses” or “ [ d] i spl ay s ort akes or der s f r om any pe rso n fo r any m erc ha nd i s e, go od s , en t ert ai nm en t or ot he r se rvi c es offere d o n t he bu s i ne s s prem i s es . ” Id

. c h. 48 , art

. I , § 4 8-2 (199 6). 11 the v ibrator

. Gi v en the re cord before us , w e c oncl ude t he ev ide nce is l eg all y su ff ic ien t t o suppo rtboth the v erdict of g uil t and the re jecti on of appel lan t’s e ntrapment d efense. Appel lan t’ s e ntrapment i ss ue i s o v er ru led

. IV. Mu ni cip al O rd in ance Cha pter 48 o f the C ode reg ula tes “ sex ual ly or ien ted b usi ness es to p ro m ote t he pub lic health , safety and w elfare of the citizens of

Corpus Christi, a n d to est ablish
re asona ble and uni form reg ula ti ons to prev ent t he c oncen trati on of sex ual ly or ien ted busi ness es in the c ity .” A munic ipa li ty ’s auth or ity to create suc h reg ula ti ons is der iv ed 36 from chapt er 243 of t he loc al g ov er nment code (“ Cha pter 243” ), w hic h sta tes that “ [a] munic ipa li ty

by ordin ance . . . mayadoptreg ula ti ons re g ardin g se x ual ly or ien ted busi ness es as the munici pal ity or county

consi ders neces sar

y to promote the publi c h eal th, safety , or

w elfare.” Appel lan t w as conv icted of of fending se cti on 48- 18( b) of the C ode, 37
w hich sta tes th at “[a] perso n com mits an of fense if t hatperson cond ucts a bu siness as a
sexua lly oriented

busine ss w it hin the Ci ty of Cor pus Chr is ti unl ess a per mit isiss ued bythe chief of police for the co ndu ct of such bu siness.” The term “sexually oriente d bu siness” 38 is d e f in e d in th e Co d e an d Ch a p te r 24 3 . Un d e r th e C o d e , th e t e rm m e a n s th e fo llo wing: An adu ltcab aret , a dultlo un ge, n u d e st u d io , a d u ltm o d e li n g s t u d io , lo ve parlor, ad ult bo oksto re, adu lt m ovie th eat er, adu lt video arcad e, adu lt movie arcade, adul t v ide o s tore, ad ultmotel , adult n ovelty sh op , ad ul t arcad e,I d. c h. 48 , art

. I , § 4 8-2 (em ph as i s ad de d). 39 See T EX
. L OC
. G OV ’ T C OD E A NN
. § 243. 002 (V ern on 2 00 5)

. T hi s C our t ’ s und er st andi ng o ft he 40 C ode’ s def i ni t i on— wi t h r espect t o ho w t er m s m odi fy o rqua l i fy ot hert er m s— i s expr essed t hr ough t he f ol l owi ng out l i ne: A n a d u lt c a b a r e t, a d u lt lo u n g e , n u d e s tu d io , a d u lt m o d e lin g s tu d io , lo v e p a r lo r , a d u lt

bookst or e, ad ul t m ov i e t heat er , adu l t v i deo ar cade, adu l t m ov i e ar cade, adu l t v i deo st or e, adul t m ot el , adu l t nov el t y shop , adu l t ar cade, adu l t enco unt erpar l or , escor t agency , orot her com m er ci al ent er pr i se ( 1) t he p r i m ar y busi ness o fwhi ch i s t he r egul ar ( a) off er i ng o fa ser v i ce or ( b) t he se l l i ng, r ent i ng, orexhi bi t i ng o fdev i ces oranyot heri t em s i n te n d e d to p ro v i d e s e x u a l s ti m u l a ti o n o r s e x u a l g ra ti fic a ti o n to th e c u s to m e r; O R ( 2 ) w h ic h r e g u la r ly (a) s el l s , rents o r ex hi bi t s pi c t ure s , w he t he r m oti on or sti l l , or ( b) sel l s, r ent s orexhi bi t s dev i ces oranyot heri t em s di st i ngui shed orchar act er i z ed b y an em phasi s on m at t erdep i c t i ng, descr i bi ng, or re l a ti n g to "s p e c i fie d s e x u a l a c ti v i ti e s " o r "s p e c i fie d a n a to m i c a l a re a s ." See C OR PUS C H R I STI , T EX ., C O D E O F O RD I NAN CES ch. 48, ar t

. I , § 48- 2. T he r el ev ant di ff er ence bet ween t he C ode and t he l ocal gov er nm ent code i s t hat t he l ocal gove r nm ent code cont ai ns t he f i r st pr ong, butnott he second. 12 adu ltencou nt er par lo r, esco rtag ency , or other commerci al enter pr is e the p rim a ry bu sin e ss of

w h ich is t h e regu la r o f fe rin g o f a se rvice or t h e se lli n g, re nti ng , or

ex hib it ing of de v ic es or any othe r it ems i ntended to prov ide se x ual stimu lation or se x ual gratif ication t o the custom er or w hi ch reg ul arly

sell s, rent s or exhibits pictures, w hether motion or still, or sells , rents or exhi bits dev ice s or any other items distinguishe d or charac terized by an emp hasi s o n matte r d epi ct in g, d escri bi ng , o r relat in g to “s peci fi ed sexu al ac ti v it ies” o r “ spec if ied an at om ical areas. ” 39 The ter m, as defined in Cha pter 243, does not inc lud e the bol ded l ang uag e. Cha pter 243 thu s app lies only to comm ercial ent erprises tha t sell, rent, o r ex hibit certa in item s as part of their prima ry

busine ss, w hile the Co de a pplies to these ente rprises in additio n to th ose tha t regularly

sell, rent or exhibit, certain item s. 40 Appel lan t c hal len g es the l e gal it y o f sect ion 48- 18( b) by co ntendi ng thatthe Cod e conf licts w ith the le gisl ative int ento f Ch apt er 2 43. She st ate s that“[the Cod e] at tem pt[s] to d o t h a t w h i c h [ C h a p t e r 2 4 3 ] d i d n o t i n t e n d fo r i t t o d o : t o b r i n g u n der i ts purv iewG o rd o n v . S ta te , 757 S. W

. 2d 496, 502 ( T ex. App. –H oust on [ 1st D i st

. ] 198 8, pet

. r ef ’ d) ( ci t i ng U t t er 41 v . S ta te , 57 1 S

. W

. 2d 93 4, 93 7 (T ex . C ri m . A pp . 19 78 ))

.

I d. 42 I d. 43 I d. 44 13 com me rcial establishm ent s w hich did not sell

. . . particu lar item s or devices as its primary busi ness .” Thoug h appel lan t recog niz es that the C ode’ s d efini ti on of a s ex ual ly or ien ted b u s in e s s b ri n gs m o re co m m e rc ia l e s t a b li s h m e n t s wit h in it s p u rvi e w th a n t h e re wo u ld h a ve bee n un der Chap ter 243 's def initio n , she ne v er argues thatsection 48-18 (b) is
uncon sti tuti onal ly

ov er broad or

v ag ue as a res ult . Appel lan t’ s b ri ef si mply co ntends that the o rd ina nce’ s w ide r re ach ev ide nces its confli ct w it h the leg is lat iv e intentof Chapter 243, and s tates that“ [t] o the extent a ci ty ordin ance is in confli ct w it h the g eneral sta tute, IT IS VOID .” Li mite d to thi s a rg ument on appeal , we find ag ain st appel lan t. There is a presumpt ion thata c ity ordin ance is v ali d, and the par ty attack ing i t has the b urden of

show ing inv ali dity . An ordi nance that is inc onsi ste nt w it h s tate leg is lat ion 41 is imperm issible. How ever, the fact th at the re is state legi slation on a pa rticular subject 42 does not a utomati cal ly preempt t hat s ubje ct from c ity reg ula ti on. Loc al re g ula ti on,

43 anci ll ar y to and i n har mony

w it h the Sta te’ s l eg is lat ion , i s a cc eptabl e. 44 T h e o rd i n a n c e i n t h e i n s t a n tc a s e i s n o ti n c o n s i s t e n tw i t h t h e l a w o f t h i s S t a t e . W e f irst note th at C hap ter 243 doe s not cont ain a series of State -enforced regulations; rath er, itco ntai ns a s er ies of re g ula tor y proposa ls thatl ocal g ov er nments may co py sh oul d the y w is h to promulg ate t hei r ow n reg ula ti ons g ov er nin g se x ual ly or ien ted b usi ness es. Se cond, the C ode doe s n ot confli ct w it h the leg is lat iv e int ent of Chapt er 243— itdoes not impedeSee T EX
. L OC
. G OV ’ T C OD E A NN
. § 2 43

. 00 1(a ) ( V ern on 20 05 ). 45 See id. § 243. 003. 46See Ci t

y of W eslaco v. Mel t on , 158 T ex. 61, 308 S. W

. 2d 1 8, 21- 22 ( 1957) ( uphol di ng a n or di nance 47 p r o h ib itin g th e s a le o f r a w m ilk , e v e n th o u g h it w a s c o n c e d e d th a t th e p r o h ib ite d m ilk c o m p lie d w ith a ll f e d e r a l, st at e, and count y r egul at i ons, was whol esom e f or hum an consum pt i on, and t he r espond ent hel d t he ne c es s ary pe rm i t s ).

See G ordon , 757 S. W

. 2d a t 502 ( ci t i ng C i t y of Sw eet w at er

v. G er on , 380 S

. W

. 2d 550, 552 ( T ex. 48 19 64 ))

. 14 loc a l gove rn ments from ( 1) remedy ing probl ems ar is ing from “ the u nrest ri cte d operati on of c er ta i n s ex ua l l y or i en te d bu s i ne s s es ” or ( 2) ad op ti ng reg ul at i on s to g ov er n such 45 busin esses. Fi nally, the fact th at a bu siness owner may be required to obtain a perm it

46 under the Cod e’sdefini ti on of a s ex ual ly or ien ted bu sin e ss , b ut woul d nothav e been
re q uired to do s o under the mo re l imi ted s cope of Chapt er 243’ s d efini ti on, d oes not aut om atically w arrant th e con clusion th at a con f lict ex ists. 47 It is possible th at ap pellan t inten ds to asse rt that th e Code ’s def inition o f a sex ually orient ed b usine ss is pr eem pted by Chap ter 243 ’s d ef inition. In oth er w ords, ap pellan t is
ass erti ng thatthe Stat e has defined “ sex ual ly or ien ted b usi ness ” and C or pus Chr is ti may n o tch a n ge t h e t e rm ’s m e a n in g b y a d d in g l a n gu a ge t h a tb ro a d e n s it s re a c h

. Co u rt s h a ve held , howev er, tha t any leg islativ e inte ntion to limit the p ower of lo cal gov ernm ent s must
a ppear w it h unmi sta kabl e c lar ity , and a rev iew of Cha pter

243 does not rev eal , w it h 48 unmis tak abl e c lar ity , an int ent t o prohi bitlocal gov er nments f ro m alt er ing the defini ti on of
a s ex ual ly

or ien ted b usi ness . It is co ncei v abl e tha t s uch an intentw as not e sta bli shed becau se the leg is lat ure foresaw the poss ibi li ty

thata muni ci pal ity

woul d c hoose to ex pandS e e g e n e r a lly T EX
. L OC
. G OV ’ T C OD E A NN
. § 243. 0075 ( Ver non 2005) ( “ T he m uni ci pal i t y m ayl i cense 49 a n y la w fu l b u s i n e s s o r o c c u p a ti o n th a t i s s u b je c t t o th e p o l i c e p o w e r o f th e m u n i c i p a l i ty .”); Exp a rte W o o d a ll , 1 5 4 S .W .3 d 6 9 8 , 7 0 2 ( T e x . A p p .– E l P a s o 2 0 0 4 , p e t. r e f ’d ) ( s ta tin g th a t “ a c ity m a y e n a c t r e a s o n a b le r egul at i ons t o pr om ot e t he h eal t h, saf et y , and gen er al wel f ar e of i t s peo pl e as a v al i d exe r ci se of i t s pol i ce po w er”). See St ansber r y v. H olm es , 61 3 F

. 2d 12 85 , 12 89 (5t h C i r. 19 80 ). 50 See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 38. 1( h) ( st at i ng t hat a “ br i efm ust cont ai n a cl earand conci se ar gum ent f ort he 51 c on t en t i on s m ad e”). 15 Chap ter 243 ’s def inition in ord er to mo re ef fecti ve ly e xercise its police po w ers. 49 Determ ining if an alteratio n is constitu tiona lly perm issible is a ma t t e r that is ultima tely predi cat ed upon w hether it is “ ar bit ra ry

and capr ic iou s, hav ing no subs tanti al rela ti on to the g eneral w elfare.” N othi ng i n appel lan t’ s b ri ef, how ev er , per mits us to enter tai n thi s l atter 50 in qu iry. W e find that appel lan t has not sat is fied her burden to prov e the i nv ali dity of secti on 48-1 8(b). Furtherm ore, be cause app ellanthas failed to sh ow w hy this Court sho uld reject th e Co d e ’s d e f in it io n of a sexu a lly o rie n te d b u sin e ss , we n e e d no t a d d re ss he r ch a lle n ge to t he s uff ic ien cy

of the e v ide nce that she operated a “sex ual ly ori ented busi ness ” as that ter m is defined by

C hapter 243. Ap pel lan t’ s s econd i ss ue i s t herefore ov er ru led

. V. Double Jeopa rdy In he r third i ssue, app ellant cont end s thather Fift h Am end me nt guaran tee against d o u b le je o p a rd y wa s vio la te d w h e n sh e w a s ch a rge d an d co n vict e d fo r (1 ) op e r a t i n g a sex ual ly or ien ted b usi ness w it hout a permit and (2 ) promoti ng an o bsc ene dev ic e. She fails to prov ide , howev er , any arg ument on appeal ex pla ini ng how the Dou ble Je opardy Clause was v iolate d

. As a conseque nce, w e f ind th at ap pellan t has waiv ed h er third is sue. 51P o n c e v . S ta te , 89 S

. W

. 3d 11 0, 11 7 (T ex . A pp . –C orp us C hri s t i 20 02 , no pe t

. ). 52 16

VI. Lega l Sufficienc y

Challenge Appel lan t re ce ived one conv icti on for promoti ng , or i ntendi ng to promote, an obsc ene dev ic e at 1:30 p.m., and a sec ond conv icti on for co mmitt ing the same o ffense at 6:1 4 p . m. B o t h o ffe n s e s w e re s a i d t o h a v e o c c u r re d o n J u n e 2 5 , 2 0 0 4

. Ap pel lan t challen ges the legal suf f iciency of

t he evidence supp orting th e latte r convi ction o n the basis tha t the re was n o evidence tha t she prom ote d, or in ten ded t o prom ote , an obsce ne d evice on June 25, 2004, at 6:14 p.m. The Stat e resp onds by di re cti ng our

att enti on to Pon ce v. State , wh e re in t h is Co u rts t a t e d t h a t“ [ t ] h e ‘ o n o r a b o u t ’ la n gu a ge o f a n i n d ic t m e n ta ll o ws the S tate to prov e a d ate o ther than the one all eg ed in t he i ndi ctmentas l ong as the date is ante ri or

to the p re sent ment of

the in dictment and w it hin the sta tutor y l imi tati ons per iod .” 52 T he St ate thus con ten ds tha t “althou gh th e j urycharge w as un nece ssarily specif ic
conc er ning the ti me of the offense as ‘ [o]n or about6:14 p.m. on J une 25, 2004, ’ the
ev ide nce measured ag ain st the hy pothet ic all y cor re ct jur y ch arg e adeq uatel y

prov ed th at the o ffense occ ur re d before the present ment of the ind ictment and w it h in the l imi tati ons per iod .” Thoug h the Sta te’ s b ri ef accu ra tel y present s t he l aw

to th is Cou rt , w e s ti ll find
oursel v es pla g ued by

the fact th at t he St ate’ s b ri ef does n ot as ser t t hat a ppel lan t prom ote d, or inte nde d to pro mo te, a n ob scene device on mo re than one o c c a s io n or in
mo re than one man ner. T he brief o nly discusse s t he one in stan ce in w hich ap pellan t sold the v ibrato r to Domingue z at 2:00 p.m. Presum ing tha t app ellantw as prose cute d for this actunder

ca u se one, w hic h c harg ed her w it h promoti ng an o bsc ene dev ic e on or aboutT he j ur y char ge i ncl uded t he f ol l owi ng i nst r uct i on: “ A per son who possesses si x or m or e ob scene 53 d e v i c e s o r i d e n ti c a l o r s i m i l a r o b s c e n e a rti c l e s is p re s u m e d to p o s s e s s th e m w i th i n te n t t o p ro m o te th e s a m e .” See T EX
. P EN AL C OD E A NN
. § 4 3.23 (f) (Ve rno n 2 00 3).

See Regalado , 872 S. W

. 2d a t 11 ( f i ndi ng t hat app el l ant , as sal es cl er k of an adul t boo k st or e, was 54 i n p o s s e s s i o n o f d i l d o s w i th i n s to re ); M y e rs v . S ta te , 781 S. W

. 2d 7 30, 732 ( T ex. App. –For t W or t h 19 89, no pet

. ) ( f i ndi ng t hat t he j ur y coul d f i nd bey ond a r easona bl e doubt t hat appel l ant k nowi ngl y possessed o bscene dev i ces wi t h t he i nt ent t o pr om ot e t hem beca use t he St at e “ est abl i shed t hat app el l ant , as t he so l e em pl oy ee on du t y , w as i n cha r ge o ft he st or e, had posse ssi on o fand cont r ol ov erdi l dos a nd o t hersexua l l y - or i ent ed dev i ces, knew t he o bscene char act erof t he d ev i ces, and w as pr om ot i ng t he di l dos and o t heri t em s byoff er i ng th e m fo r s a l e ”) ; K e n n e dy v . S ta te , 7 7 4 S .W .2 d 8 2 2 , 8 2 5 ( T e x . A p p .– E l P a s o 1 9 8 9 , n o p e t. ) ( “ T h e ju r y in th is c a s e c o u l d re a s o n a b l y c o n c l u d e th a t t h e A p p e l l a n t, a s s o l e e m p l o y e e o n d u ty , s ta ti o n e d a t a n o v e rlo o k p o s t, r esponsi bl e f orm aki ng sa l es f aci l i t at ed b y t he m er chandi se di spl ay s, was i n cha r ge o fand re sponsi bl e f ort he s ta tic e x h ib itio n o fth e s e o b s c e n e d e v ic e s . A s a r e s u lt, th e r e w a s s u ff ic ie n t e v id e n c e th a t A p p e lla n t w a s in possessi on o ft hese dev i ces an d i n keepi ng wi t h hi s j ob r esponsi bi l i t i es, i nt ended t o pr om ot e t hem v i a t he u se o f th e s e s ta ti c e x h i b i ts .”); s e e a ls o H a ll v . S ta te , 64 6 S

. W

. 2d 48 9, 49 1 (T ex . A pp . –H ou s t on [ 1s t D i s t

. ] 19 82 ), rev’ d on other

gr ounds , 66 1 S

. W

. 2d 10 1 (T ex . C ri m . A pp . 19 83 ). T EX
. P EN AL C OD E A NN
. § 4 3.21 (c)(1). 55 17 1:3 0 p.m ., w e ha v e search ed the record for evidence of a secon d un lawf ul act tha t w ould justif y her conviction for prom oting an obscen e device on or abou t 6:1 4 p.m ., as set o ut in
caus e two. T hou gh not asse rted by the Sta te, a reading of the St ate ’s comp laint an d the jury charg e l eads us to be li ev e tha t app ell a n t—in addi ti on to bei ng prosec uted for promoti ng an obs cene d e v ic e by se ll ing to Domi ng uez—w as prosec uted for a sec ond act of prom otion stem min g f rom h er p ossessio n of six or mo re obsce ne d evices. Under cause 53 two, t he St ate a ss erted t hat a ppel la n t poss ess ed, w it h the i ntentto promote, “e re cti on makers ( sti mulat ors) , di ldo ty pe dev ic es, anal beads , pen is pumps and si mulat ed v ag ina s.” Other than the “d il do ty pe dev ic e” thatappel lan t s old to Do m in gue z, there w as no proof tha t app ellantp romo ted , throu gh th e act of selling, any

of the ot her aforem ent ione d item s. There w as ev ide nce , h o wever , t hat a ppel lan t, as a s ale s c ler k, poss ess ed numerous am oun ts of

the ot her un so ld i t e ms (far mo re than six ). W e con clude thatsuch 54 posse ssion m ay const itute a secon d act of prom otion und er section 43.2 3(c)(1), beca use 55T EX
. P EN AL C OD E A NN
. § 4 3.23 (f)

. 56 S e e g e n e r

a lly J a c k s o n v . Vir

g in ia , 44 3 U

. S

. 30 7, 31 9 (19 79 ). 57 18 secti on 43. 23( f) s tates t hat “ [a] person w ho pos ses ses si x or more obs cene dev ic es or ide nti cal or

si mil ar obs cene a rt icl e s i s p re sumed to po ss ess them w it h i ntentto promote the s a me . ” A c c o rd i n g l y , b e c a u s e t h e re i s l e g a l l y s u ffi c i e n te v i d e n c e t h a ta p pel lan t 56 57 poss ess ed more tha n s ix obs cene dev ic es on a date ant e rio r to the present ment of the ind ict ment and w it hin the sta tutor y l imi tati ons per iod , w e ov er ru le appel lan t’ s l eg al suffici ency

ch all eng e. VII. Conclusion W e af f irm the trial court’s judgmen ts.

LINDA REYNA Y AÑEZ, J u s t i c e

Publ is h. T EX . R. A PP . P. 47 .2(b). Opinio n de liv ered and f iled this the 3 rd day

of Jul y , 200 8.