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CHINESE HACKING: IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 

AND COMMERCIAL RULE OF LAW 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE 

COMMISSION ON CHINA 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 25, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov 
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

Senate House 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

CHRIS SMITH, New Jersey, Cochairman 

FRANK WOLF, Virginia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina 

TIM WALZ, Minnesota 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

MICHAEL HONDA, California 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

SETH D. HARRIS, Department of Labor 

FRANCISCO J. SA ́ NCHEZ, Department of Commerce 

NISHA DESAI BISWAL, U.S. Agency for International Development 

LAWRENCE T. LIU, Staff Director 

PAUL B. PROTIC, Deputy Staff Director 

(II) 
(III) 

CO N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS 

Page 

Opening Statement of Hon. Sherrod Brown, a U.S. Senator from Ohio; Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China ...................................... 1 

Smith, Hon. Christopher H., a U.S. Representative from New Jersey; Cochairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China ...................................... 3 

Levin, Hon. Carl, a U.S. Senator from Michigan; Member, CongressionalExecutive Commission on China ........................................................................ 5 

Pittenger, Hon. Robert, a U.S. Representative from North Carolina; Member, 

Congressional-Executive Commission on China ................................................ 6 

Meadows, Hon. Mark, a U.S. Representative from North Carolina; Member, 

Congressional-Executive Commission on China ................................................ 1 

Gorton, Hon. Slade, former U.S. Senator from Washington State; Member, 

Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property ........................... 7 

Mulvenon, James, Vice-President, Intelligence Division, Director, Center for 

Intelligence Research and Analysis, Defense Group, Inc. ................................ 9 

Wen, Yunchao (Online Alias ‘‘Bei Feng’’), Independent Journalist and Blogger, 

Visiting Scholar, Institute for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University ................................................................................................................... 19 

Greve, Louisa, Vice President for Asia, Middle East, and North Africa, and 

Global Programs, National Endowment for Democracy ................................... 21 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS

Gorton, Hon. Slade .................................................................................................. 28 

Mulvenon, James ..................................................................................................... 29 

Wen, Yunchao .......................................................................................................... 38 

Greve, Louisa ........................................................................................................... 49 

Brown, Hon. Sherrod ............................................................................................... 52 

Smith, Hon. Christopher H. .................................................................................... 53 

(1) 

CHINESE HACKING: IMPACT ON HUMAN 

RIGHTS AND COMMERCIAL RULE OF LAW 

TUESDAY, JUNE 25, 2013 

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION ON CHINA, 

Washington, DC. 

The hearing was convened, pursuant to notice, at 2:41 p.m., in 

room 538, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Sherrod Brown, 

Chairman, presiding. 

Also present: Senator Carl Levin; Senator Jeff Merkley; Representative Christopher Smith; Representative Robert Pittenger; 

and Representative Mark Meadows. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SHERROD BROWN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO; CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL–EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

Chairman BROWN. The hearing will come to order. Thank you 

very much, Senator Gorton, for joining us, Cochairman Congressman Smith, and Senator Levin. I appreciate your being here, and 

especially your work on these issues and your legislation, which I 

know you will be talking about to hold China accountable for cyber 

theft. I thank the staff again for its tireless efforts and the work 

that they do on human rights and rule of law in this Commission. 

Congressman Smith and I have cochaired this Commission for a 

number of years now and appreciate the good working relationship 

there and with staff. 

We know—and Senator Gorton and I just spoke about this—how 

the public is not paying a lot of attention, and we here are not paying enough attention either, with the exception of Senator Levin 

and a few others, to the serious threat that China poses in terms 

of cyber attacks and how that threatens U.S.-China relations in 

some ways, so much so that President Obama raised the issue during his recent summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping. It will 

be a key topic, we know, at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic 

Dialogue to be held in Washington in a few weeks. 

Today’s hearing will focus on the aspects of cyber that fall within 

the Commission’s mandate, notably the impact on the rule of law 

and on human rights. Recent headlines have revived the debate 

over the appropriate balance between security and freedom, but we 

cannot overlook the enormous impact that cyber attacks from 

China have had, and continue to have, on American jobs and American companies. They seriously call into question the Chinese commitment to the rule of law. 
2 

We are talking about massive theft of valuable technology, commercial secrets from American companies. General Alexander, Director of the NSA, calls it the greatest transfer of wealth in history. 

The scale and scope are staggering. 

The Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, 

which is represented here today by former colleague Senator Gorton, released a comprehensive report identifying the People’s Republic of China as the world’s biggest violator of intellectual property [IP] rights. 

It estimates that China accounts for 50 to 80 percent of the IP 

theft in the United States and around the globe. It found that IP 

theft, including from China, costs the U.S. economy hundreds of 

billions of dollars a year and literally millions of jobs, dragging 

down our GDP and undermining our ability to innovate and to 

prosper. 

The IP Commission noted that a 2011 study by the U.S. International Trade Commission estimated that if China’s IP protection 

improved to a level comparable to ours it would add 2.1 million jobs 

to our economy, yet, the IP Commission acknowledges this figure 

underestimated the real cost to jobs in this country. 

The victims of IP theft include companies in my home State of 

Ohio, in Michigan, and in New Jersey. Those affected are hardworking Americans trying to make an honest living and trying to 

spur innovation, only to see their products, their services, and their 

technology stolen and handed over to state-owned enterprises and 

other businesses in China. 

With a growing prevalence of computer networks in America’s 

heavily wired economy, cyber attacks represent an increasingly 

growing threat alongside more traditional forms of intellectual 

property theft. China simply does not play by the same rules as we 

do. The Chinese Government denies these attacks, even though 

there is mounting evidence of Chinese state involvement. 

This evidence includes a February 2013 report by the cyber security firm Mandiant that linked attacks on 141 companies, including 

115 based in the United States, to a unit of the People’s Liberation 

Army, working from a building in Shanghai. 

The increase of attacks has coincided with the Chinese Government’s push for indigenous innovation and development of key industries, creating an environment where it is perfectly acceptable 

to cheat and steal your way to the top. 

As we have seen in the last few years, it is not only American 

companies that are the targets, it is media and it is human rights 

organizations, something particularly important to Congressman 

Smith and me. 

Journalists writing about corruption in China find their computer systems hacked and their passwords stolen. 

For human rights organizations and activists, dealing with hacking attacks from China is almost a daily fact of life. 

We cannot sit idly by. That is why I support a comprehensive, 

common sense, bipartisan approach to hold China accountable. 

I urge Congress and this administration to do everything it can 

to combat unfair trading practices, including another topic, the important bipartisan Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act 

of 2013, which passed the Senate two years ago and has not yet 
3 

gone to the House. We hope to reschedule it for a vote soon. I commend Senator Levin for his recent proposed legislation to hold 

China accountable for cyber theft. 

I will turn it over to Cochairman Smith. I have a vote at 2:45, 

as does Carl, but I think we will be able to keep this going. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER SMITH, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY; COCHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL–EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

Representative SMITH. Thank you very much, Chairman Brown. 

Thank you for calling this extraordinarily important hearing. 

In December 2006, and then again in March 2007, my Human 

Rights Subcommittee, the committee that I chaired, as well as the 

personal computers in my office, that of my chief of staff and myself, were attacked by a virus that, in the U.S. House Information 

Resource Office’s words, ‘‘intended to take control of our computers.’’ 

At that time the IT professionals cleaned the computers and informed my staff that the attacks seemed to come from the People’s 

Republic of China. They said it came through, or from, a Chinese 

IP address. The attackers hacked into files related to China. They 

contain legislative proposals directly related to Beijing, including a 

major bill that I was in the process of authoring called the Global 

Online Freedom Act. 

Also hacked were emails with human rights groups regarding 

strategy, information on hearings that I intended to chair on 

China, and the names of Chinese dissidents. While this absolutely 

does not prove that Beijing was behind the attack, it raises very 

serious concerns that it was. Certainly Chinese agents have not 

only attempted to target me or my offices, but many other Members of the House and Senate have also been the victim of that 

kind of attack. 

Cyber attacks on Congress are only a small, but not insignificant, 

part of a much larger pattern of attacks that have targeted the executive branch, the Pentagon, and American businesses. 

How do we know this? In recent months we have seen in-depth 

reports come out detailing this massive intrusion into our cyberspace and massive theft of our cyber data. Chinese agents have stolen our designs for helicopters, ships, fighter jets, and several missile defense systems. 

They have stolen our innovative technologies, from solar panel 

designs to biotech research. These thefts appear to have paid off for 

China. In recent years, the Chinese Government has made tremendous jumps in its military capabilities, while boosting the competitiveness of China’s ‘‘national champions.’’ 

While cyber thefts have existed for years, increasingly we can 

prove that many of these outrageous thefts deemed ‘‘the greatest 

transfer of wealth in history’’ originate in the People’s Republic of 

China, and these attacks are not random. We now know with some 

certainty that some thefts are being organized by the Chinese Government agencies. 

As we learn about the sources of these attacks and we are learning about their motivations, talented Chinese Internet users are 

working day and night to infiltrate our networks and to steal se-
4 

crets. Chinese actions are part of the larger coordinated state-sanctioned effort to increase China’s competitiveness militarily as well 

as commercially. 

Today we will hear about how the commercial rule of law system 

in China allows these types of attacks to occur and how these attacks disadvantage American businesses, innovators, contractors, 

and government agencies. We will hear about the size and scope 

of the attacks and we will hear how the U.S. Government remains 

largely unprepared for many of these challenges. 

We will also, however, hear about another side of this important 

topic, one that is often overlooked during recent discussions about 

China’s cyber attacks. The Chinese Government is not only targeting American businesses and military organizations, but it is 

also targeting ordinary Chinese citizens seeking to advance their 

most fundamental freedoms. 

Chinese hackers do not simply look beyond their borders to steal 

secrets. As we will hear today, Chinese citizens, including those advocating freedom and rights, free speech, and food safety, are also 

targeted by state-sponsored hackers. 

These courageous citizens are also monitored, their private information stolen. The brave pastors seeking to organize a service, the 

father seeking to raise awareness about toxic foods, the wife of an 

imprisoned activist, the mother who was made to undergo a forced 

abortion, all of these citizens realize that in any instance the government may, and probably is, watching. China, of course, also targets those outside of China who similarly wish and promote human 

rights and political reform. 

Today we know the system of surveillance and theft occurs. We 

know that China is organizing these cyber attacks, or at the very 

least is complicit in their existence. The question we must ask ourselves is why. Clearly China’s rise as a military power requires 

technology. China’s economy will no doubt benefit from the latest 

innovations from abroad. 

But why is China so obsessed, so concerned about its domestic 

citizenry, especially those who advocate peacefully for legal and political reforms? Why is China so worried about international NGOs 

[non-governmental organizations] that seek to highlight official 

abuses and wrongful imprisonments? 

Why is China so reluctant to provide a fair regulatory environment in China where commercial laws and regulations will eventually protect all businesses, domestic and foreign, seeking to provide 

the best services for these Chinese consumers? 

These may be difficult questions, but thankfully today we are fortunate to have four guests, four witnesses who are well versed on 

these issues. They are expert on how China is monitoring our cyber 

actions and how China is attacking targets globally. 

I do want to point out that I will have to leave, but I will read 

their testimonies. I am chairing a hearing at 3 o’clock over on the 

House side on the attack and the slaughter of Christians in Syria. 

It begins at 3 o’clock so I will have to leave, but I want to convey 

to our witnesses my sincere gratitude for your testimonies. I look 

forward to reading them and for the insight you provide. 

I yield back, and yield to Senator Levin. 
5 

STATEMENT OF HON. CARL LEVIN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

MICHIGAN; MEMBER, CONGRESSIONAL–EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Congressman Smith. First 

of all, I want to thank you and Senator Brown for organizing this 

very important hearing on Chinese hacking and its impact on 

human rights and on commercial rule of law. 

The hearing is timely. It is timely for many reasons. There have 

been many recent reports and indisputable evidence of large-scale 

cyber intrusions by the Government of China on a vast number of 

private, government, and nonprofit entities for the purpose of stealing valuable intellectual property or proprietary information. This 

is in addition to what is also well known, that China hacks the accounts of human rights activists in order to suppress human rights 

in China. 

American companies invest hundreds of billions of dollars every 

year in research and development. That innovation results from 

those investments. The innovation drives investments and drives, 

in turn, the growth of American companies and the U.S. economy. 

Unfortunately, our companies are having their intellectual property stolen and it is stolen right out from underneath them through 

cyberspace. Such theft threatens to undermine America’s global 

competitiveness. 

Both U.S. Government and private reports point to China as by 

far the worst offender. As far back as 2011, the National Counter 

Intelligence Executive said in its annual report to Congress that 

‘‘Chinese actors are the world’s most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage.’’ 

This May, the U.S. Trade Representative stated in its Special 

301 report that ‘‘obtaining effective enforcement of IPR in China remains a central challenge, as it has been for many years.’’ The report continued that ‘‘this situation has been made worse by cyber 

theft, as information suggests that actors located in China have 

been engaged in sophisticated, targeted efforts to steal intellectual 

property from U.S. corporate systems.’’ 

Today we will be hearing from Senator Slade Gorton, an old 

friend of mine, who is on the Commission on the Theft of American 

Intellectual Property. That report is just further powerful evidence 

of what the problem is. So, it is long overdue that we equip the 

American Government with the tools that it needs to fight back. 

I recently introduced Senate bill 884, the Detect Cyber Theft Act, 

with Senators McCain, Rockefeller, and Coburn. S. 884 requires 

the Director of National Intelligence to produce a report that includes a watchlist, and a priority watchlist, of foreign countries 

that engage in economic or industrial espionage against the United 

States in cyberspace. 

The bill also requires the President—and this is the action forcing mechanism and the remedy—if he determines that such action 

is warranted for the enforcement of intellectual property rights or 

to protect the Department of Defense supply chain, to block imports of goods in three categories: First, goods made with U.S. technology or proprietary information stolen in cyberspace; second, 

goods made by companies that engage in or benefit from such theft; 
6 

and third, goods produced by state-owned enterprises in countries 

designated as the worst cyber thieves. 

This is a powerful remedy. It is hitting countries that engage in 

cyber theft in the pocketbook and it is time that we fight back to 

protect American businesses and American innovation. We have to 

call out those who are responsible for cyber theft and empower the 

President to hit the thieves where it hurts most, in their wallets. 

Dennis Blair, former Director of National Intelligence and CoChair of the IP Commission report said recently, ‘‘Jaw-boning alone 

won’t work. Something has to change China’s calculus.’’ Well, we 

think our bill will do exactly that. Blocking imports of products 

that either incorporate intellectual property stolen from U.S. companies or are from companies otherwise that benefit from cyber 

theft will send the message that we have had enough. 

If foreign governments like the Chinese Government want to continue to deny their involvement in cyber theft despite the overwhelming proof that is one thing. We cannot stop Chinese denials. 

But we are not without remedies. We can prevent the companies 

that benefit from the theft, including state-owned companies, from 

getting away with it. 

Maybe once they understand that complicity will cost them access to the U.S. market, they are going to press their governments 

to end it. We have sent our bill to the administration. We await 

word from the White House and from the administration. 

Hopefully the word will be one of support. We have stood by for 

far too long while our intellectual property and proprietary information is plundered in cyberspace and used to undercut the very 

companies that developed it. In other words, it is time to act. 

I want to thank everybody who is a part of the effort to stop 

cyber theft for their efforts, many of whom are going to be testifying here today. Again, I want to thank our commission and our 

staff for all the great work that they are doing on this subject. 

Thank you. I have to leave for a vote too, so I will yield to whoever is next in line. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT PITTENGER, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NORTH CAROLINA; MEMBER, CONGRESSIONAL–EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

Representative PITTENGER. Thank you, Senator Levin. It is a 

privilege to serve with you on this important commission. I am 

Congressman Robert Pittenger. I am a new commissioner on this 

important effort. I do want to thank Chairman Brown and Cochairman Smith for leading this commission. 

The issue of human rights and the rule of law in China have 

been of great importance to me my entire adult life. These are 

issues I have been dedicated to since I graduated from college and 

spent 10 years in service with Campus Crusade for Christ. 

Chinese hacking is hurting the attempts by the people of China 

to advance their own human rights. Dedicated heroes are being 

subjected to relentless cyber attacks as they try to use the Internet 

to break the silence on continued persecutions of Chinese citizens. 

Allowing for freedom of expression via the Internet will be critical to advancing human rights in China. This will only happen if 

the cyber attacks cease to exist. Ironically, in light of the reported 
7 

issues related to corruption within China, individuals who are people of faith provide the best resources and assets for the continuation and the strength of the Chinese economy. 

Cyber attacks by the Chinese Government have a significant impact, both here at home as well as on the citizens of China. American businesses have been affected by these cyber attacks to the 

tune of hundreds of billions of dollars. 

As the Chinese Government is propping up national companies, 

it is doing so on the backs of American companies playing by the 

rules. The Chinese Government is responsible for 50 to 80 percent 

of global theft of intellectual property, hurting American businesses 

and costing American jobs. 

The United States must remain committed to monitoring the 

continued violation of the rule of law by the Chinese Government, 

not just to protect American jobs but to help stand with those committed to ending the persecution of Chinese citizens for practicing 

their religious beliefs. 

I yield to my fellow Congressman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK MEADOWS, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NORTH CAROLINA; MEMBER, CONGRESSIONAL– 

EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

Representative MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Pittenger. Thank you 

both for coming today and for your willingness to testify. I will 

keep this real brief so you can go ahead and share what you have 

for us. Most of what I have come to know has already been mentioned a number of times, but obviously in a global economy what 

we have to look at is the rule of law and the impacts that it has, 

either the respect for that or the lack of respect in what it does. 

So I have been fortunate enough to meet with a number of different people, both from the Chinese Government and also those 

that trade with our largest trading partner. In doing that, I think 

coming to real grips with a substantive way to address this problem is what we are all looking for. We cannot tolerate what we 

would not stand in our own backyard, and we have got to make 

sure that we address that, both from a policy standpoint and from 

a legislative standpoint. 

So with that I will yield to you, Mr. Gorton, and let you start off. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SLADE GORTON, FORMER U.S. SENATOR 

FROM WASHINGTON STATE; MEMBER, COMMISSION ON THE 

THEFT OF AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 

Senator GORTON. Chairman Brown not only summarized the report, but he summarized my opening statement which simply adds 

to the fact that when I was on your side of the bench I always wondered about people reading written statements that I already had, 

whether they were implying that I was illiterate. I will not insult 

you by any means in that fashion. I want to make only two or three 

of the major points of this commission report, which we have given 

copies to your staff and have more if you wish it. 

The first, is we have found ourselves sailing in uncharted seas. 

There were no other former commissions that had looked into this 

problem in the past. I think we did a good deal of fairly original 
8 

research to try to bring together both the scope and the breadth of 

intellectual property theft around the world. 

I think our conclusions are pretty cautious. We use a figure of over $300 billion a year. Personally, I think it is higher than that. 

That is what we could absolutely all be totally comfortable with. 

Fifty to eighty percent of it coming out of China is also a statement. We are quite confident, but we hope this will lead to more 

study, particularly on your part, of an important way in which our 

economy is being harmed. 

One example is on page 12. A software company, that we will not 

name, sold a single program in China for, say, roughly a hundred 

bucks. When there was an update on it, they got 30 million calls. 

One to 30 million. This may be the single most dramatic example 

we have but it is far from the only one. 

So what we have done is to try to gather together the nature of 

the problem, where it comes from, and set up policy responses that 

the Congress and the administration can come up with that, to a 

certain extent, cures it. 

Senator Levin’s bill is totally consistent with the recommendations that we make here because he gets to the central point, we 

will not really get command over this kind of intellectual theft in 

China until we have created internal incentives within China for 

abiding by rules with respect to intellectual property. 

At this point it is free theft. There are no consequences of doing 

so. The way to create that internal desire to do something better 

is to punish Chinese businesses and our government, which are 

making money out of doing it today. 

We have a large number of recommendations, some for Congress 

and some for the administration itself. Bluntly, I would say that if 

you did every one of them we would have started down the road 

but we would not have gotten all the way down the road to an honest and straightforward relationship. 

So on the very last page of the Commission report there are 

three subjects that came up during our deliberations which are not 

our formal recommendations but which are nevertheless ideas that 

we think you ought to consider. Each of them, I can say, is more 

radical than the formal recommendations of the Commission itself. 

But one is to allow cyber counter-attacks on the part of American 

interests that are hit by cyber attacks at the present time, something prohibited by the law at the present time. 

A second one has to do with requiring the United Nations World 

Health Organization to certify that when we give them things they 

are not going to be immediately stolen from them. Those two came 

from outside the Commission. 

The third was one on which I testified before a different Commission some time ago, and that is simply to say that every year the 

Secretary of Commerce will determine the losses we have talked 

about in here from all forms of intellectual property theft and that 

we there, for the next year, impose a tariff on all goods coming 

from China designed to produce 150 percent of that figure. 

I do not think we would get very much money from that but I 

think we would get action for the protection of our intellectual 

properties. In fact, it would violate the WTO [World Trade Organization] rules, but China cannot win a trade war against the United 
9 

States because of the huge amount of its trade surplus with us. It 

will also create within China itself a view that they ought to abide 

by the same rules that the rest of the world abides by. 

I will make only one final comment. When I look back on 18 

years in this body I think the single vote I most regret is permanent MFN [most-favored-nation status] for China. We gave up an 

ability to affect their policies by doing so and I wish I had that vote 

back over again. 

Chairman BROWN. Thank you, Senator Gorton, very much. 

Thank you, Congressman Pittenger for being here, Congressman 

Meadows, thank you. I know how, during the PNTR [permanent 

normal trade relations] with China, I was in the House and I remember working with the North Carolina delegation especially. 

Let me just properly introduce both, then Dr. Mulvenon, we will 

turn to you. Senator Gorton served 18 years in the Senate, a distinguished member of the Appropriations Committee when it was a 

different sort of committee than now, I would editorialize, and he 

was on the 9/11 Commission after leaving the Senate. He is here 

representing the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual 

Property and has been a real leader on the bipartisan initiative 

chaired by Governor Huntsman and Admiral Blair. So, thank you 

for your testimony. 

Dr. Mulvenon is vice president of Defense Group, Inc.’s Intelligence Division, director of DGI’s Center for Intelligence Research 

and Analysis. He runs teams of nearly 40 cleared Chinese, Russian, Arabic, Pashto, Erdu, and Farsi linguist-analysts performing 

open-source research for the U.S. Government. Thank you for joining us. He is also the author of ‘‘Chinese Industrial Espionage’’ and 

knows this issue very well. 

Dr. Mulvenon, thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Gorton appears in the appendix.] 

STATEMENT OF JAMES MULVENON, VICE PRESIDENT, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR INTELLIGENCE 

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, DEFENSE GROUP, INC. 

Mr. MULVENON. Thank you, sir. I would like to thank the Commission and I would also like to thank its excellent staff with 

whom I have worked for many years on some important and tractable problems, particularly on this issue. 

I bring a lot of perspectives to this issue, one being a Chinese linguist. As you said, 20 years of building teams of cleared linguist 

analysts doing open-source research for the U.S. Government, particularly on cyber issues, as early as the late 1990s, working on 

Chinese Internet censorship issues with this commission, and then 

finally the perspective of being a victim of these attacks given my 

own profile and my own writings and trying to expel Chinese 

attackers from the ramparts of my own corporate networks on a 

daily basis. 

We talked a lot in the last six or nine months about Chinese 

cyber espionage. I would say that it is a multi-faceted issue and 

there is not a one-size-fits-all answer to it. I would just like to 

highlight quickly five different areas of cyber espionage which are 

different in form and require slightly different strategies, and I 
10 

think it is important for us to not treat it as a monolith but to 

break it down into pieces. 

The first category, frankly, is the traditional government/military 

classified defense contractor espionage. We have very few options 

in this case. Countries will always spy on one another. We cannot 

legislate against espionage, we cannot impose treaties against espionage, but it is important to note that at least since 1996 I personally have watched Chinese intelligence preparation of the battlefield with regard to a Taiwan contingency, monitoring U.S. military 

asset movements, getting into unclassified Pentagon networks to be 

able to get into logistics databases, providing, now, strategic near 

real-time intelligence to Chinese leaders about our dialogues with 

them, stealing the talking points of our various meetings, and 

frankly getting into a lot of classified defense contractor companies, 

stealing critical classified technology about our newest weapons 

systems and then using that information to fine tune their own defensive systems and their offensive systems. 

In each of those three cases, they have almost immediate benefit 

from stealing that information, being able to immediately 

operationalize it. 

On the commercial espionage side it is a little bit more complicated. On the one hand, we have what we call sensitive business 

information. So you break into the sea suite of a major Western oil 

company, you steal the dollar number of what they are going to bid 

on a tract in the South China Sea, you hand it to your national offshore oil company, they bid $100 over that and they win the bid. 

So there is an immediate benefit. But the one that has been thorny 

to us, analytically at least within the system, has been this issue 

of intellectual property rights. 

One, a lot of companies do not self-report the intrusions so we 

do not really have as much data as we would like, particularly data 

that shows us intrusions that steal intellectual property, that has 

been exfiltrated back to China, that is then given to a national 

champion in that sector who then is successfully able to reverse engineer it, who can then productize it, marketize it, and then show 

a demonstrable, quantifiable loss of U.S. company market share in 

China and then when they compete with them globally. 

There are actually very few cases where we have enough data to 

make that change. It primarily is because there are not really the 

guidelines for many of these companies to self-report those problems. 

The Securities and Exchange Commission has tightened up some 

of their guidelines about reporting loss of shareholder value, but 

many of the companies I deal with feel that they are not properly 

indemnified from reporting that so in many ways many of them are 

looking to Congress for legislation that will provide them with the 

indemnification that they need to share information with the government without antitrust problems, or to even collude with one 

another and share intrusion data with one another so they can engage in collective defense without legal jeopardy. 

Now, we have begun to talk to the Chinese in a much more serious fashion about these issues, particularly in the last six months. 

I think the President at Sunnylands struck the right top-level tone 

with President Xi by pointing out the following fact, not to educate 
11 

them about whether this is happening, we are not going to insult 

their intelligence about that, but to point out that the real strong 

pillar in favor of cooperative Sino-U.S. relations, particularly past 

the PNTR era, has been the business and trade community. 

Yet, that is the community that you hear now the most complaining about how they cannot make money in China, how the 

Chinese Government has its thumb on the regulatory scale favoring national champions, and how the rampant cyber espionage is 

actually reducing their competitiveness and stealing their core 

technologies. 

And so to emphasize to President Xi as we are to senior Chinese 

leaders that this fundamentally threatens the bilateral trade relationship, which fundamentally threatens China’s overall economic 

development, which therefore threatens their social stability, which 

is the number-one priority of the Chinese Government. 

That is the message that is getting through to the top leadership 

and hopefully will incentivize them, along with a whole range of 

other measures that we are contemplating—naming and shaming, 

denied entities list, and all sorts of other measures we have— 

against Chinese companies and universities engaged in this behavior, that I think together could possibly stem the tide on this behavior which is, frankly, draining the American innovation economy. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mulvenon appears in the appendix.] 

Chairman BROWN. Thank you very much, Dr. Mulvenon. Those 

companies you mentioned that are now complaining are the same 

companies that really did the heavy lifting to push PNTR through 

the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives and have 

sort of played this bangle a lot of ways. But more on that later, perhaps. 

Let me start with Dr. Mulvenon on this question. I spend a lot 

of my time—my State makes more things, more products in terms 

of net worth than any State but California and Texas, States much 

larger, from aerospace, to autos, to food processing, to chemicals, 

to all kinds of things, wind turbines, solar panels. I spend a lot of 

time on shop floors. What you notice is that in terms of innovation, 

product innovation and process innovation so often take place on 

the shop floor. 

So when U.S. companies do the innovation in California, as 

Apple brags about often, or in Ohio, or anywhere else, or North 

Carolina, and then the production is done overseas, automatically 

that innovation is happening on those shop floors in terms of process and product both. 

How did this theft work beyond that? Talk that through, how 

that sort of exacerbates or enhances the opportunities these companies have for that kind of intellectual property theft when they do 

it from cyber attacks here, when they do it when our companies are 

actually overseas, producing overseas, if you would discuss that. 

Mr. MULVENON. I think first it is important to note why this is 

happening. For the first 25 years of Chinese economic modernization, in my view, China was content. We have all seen the dramatic 

numbers, the covers of the magazines, everything that emphasizes 

the tremendous gains that they have made. 
12 

But it was a very shallow modernization because there were enclaves in China, we would send our components over there, they 

would get reassembled and then re-exported out. 

In roughly the early 2000s, the Chinese Government looked at 

this issue and they said this is not the kind of deep economic modernization we want. We do not really feel that it is developing the 

national champions. 

We are not innovating within China, we are simply assembling 

other people’s stuff and re-exporting it. So in roughly the 2005– 

2006 time frame, they came up with this idea of indigenous innovation that was mentioned earlier and they put out a large number 

of state policies, the 2006–2020 Medium- to Long-Range S&T Plan, 

and they tried to emphasize that this was going to be a large-scale 

government effort, multi-billions of dollars. 

What they discovered, however, was state-driven R&D is an 

oxymoron, akin to jumbo shrimp and military intelligence. That is 

not how innovation happens and so they were failing in some key 

sectors to be able to do that. The only place they could turn, if they 

could not squeeze it out of the multinationals by forcing them to 

build R&D labs in China, if they could not squeeze the tech transfer out of the companies that were competing for market share and 

being increasingly forced by regulatory ministries who were 

partnered with those national champion companies to squeeze that 

technology transfer out, the remaining option that they had, frankly, was to steal it. 

Unlike 20 years earlier where you would have had to physically 

steal it from a plant, you would have had to smuggle the blueprints 

out of the shop, you would have had to take the part and run out 

the door with it, unfortunately our move toward connectivity and 

putting all this information online allowed them to steal that at 

great distances. 

So that would not have been true in a pre-Internet era, but unfortunately now many companies, for a lot of reasonable reasons, 

have been putting all that information online and unfortunately 

that made it all that much easier for people to steal it from them, 

particularly China. 

Chairman BROWN. Thank you. That was very helpful. 

Senator Gorton, talk about your experience and your report and 

give us thoughts on, including Senator Levin’s legislation, what you 

think we should do in this body and in the House of Representatives. 

Senator GORTON. Well, Dr. Mulvenon put it quite correctly when 

he said we are half-blind at least in determining how much it really is and what is going on because lots of companies either see no 

point in saying that they have been stolen from or think that it 

would make it worse, or that they would lose what markets they 

have in China. 

So I would say one of the first things that you want to do is to 

see to it that there is one department, one office in the United 

States that is in charge of finding out the total scope of the problem, all of the various elements that the doctor has spoken about, 

so that you as the policymakers know how big the problem is. 

As I say, we have given you a conservative estimate. I think that 

estimate is low. But to a certain extent, I am just guessing on that. 
13 

We need to know what is going on and no one is really in charge 

of this at the present time. But from the point of view of the cure, 

the cure is, again, as I think Senator Levin has at the heart of his 

bill, the cure is in creating internal lobbyists in China for obeying 

the law. 

There has got to be a group there that will say, ‘‘We will be better off if we follow a fair set of rules than we are now.’’ There is 

no one there who says that now because it simply is not true. 

Stealing our intellectual property is very largely risk free. 

But tying up the U.S. market, which is so important to them in 

one respect or another, will be very important in creating a group 

in China that will say yes rather than simply smile and nod their 

heads and go ahead down the same road. 

This is not a new problem. We were concerned about this a decade ago, and even more than a decade ago, but the Chinese economy has changed, its desires have changed and it is becoming 

worse, not better. 

Chairman BROWN. Senator Gorton, is Chinese cyber theft a 

greater threat to our national security or to our economic security? 

Senator GORTON. Well, I really will defer to Dr. Mulvenon on 

that. It is a major threat to our national security. Even the solutions that I have suggested and that Senator Levin has suggested 

only indirectly get at that. How you value in dollars the loss of intellectual property that is important to our national defense is not 

easy to determine and the degree to which you can punish them 

directly for that is hard to determine. 

But at one level, at least, that is the most important challenge, 

the challenge to our national security. But the challenge that may 

have cost us 2 million jobs or more is a major challenge and something that we should be attempting to cure right now. 

Chairman BROWN. Thank you. 

Dr. Mulvenon, would you like to comment? 

Mr. MULVENON. I do not think you can dissemble the two. They 

are inextricably linked. The Chinese see them as inextricably 

linked and we should as well. In other words, any decline in our 

economic security, any decline in our technological competitiveness 

has an automatic implication for a decline in our national security. 

Similarly, a decline in our national security with respect to the 

Chinese impacts our ability to enforce fairness on the Chinese side 

with regard to economic competitiveness, so for me they are pieces 

of a part. 

The Chinese themselves write about their own comprehensive 

national power in a way that does not even make the distinction 

between the two, so again, talking to senior Chinese leaders about 

their impact on economic development, they will automatically see 

the connection to their own national security and the defense of 

their own country, as we should as well. 

So I do not think anything is to be gained by separating the 

issues. In fact, I think we have a greater power to influence them 

by connecting them together and not allowing them to be treated 

separately. 

Chairman BROWN. Congressman Pittenger? 

Representative PITTENGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
14 

Dr. Mulvenon, as we look at the collaborative efforts among government agencies to address cyber, how are we doing, with DHS, 

the FBI, the U.S. Trade Representative and others? Are we working well together? Is there anything we could do to improve that? 

Mr. MULVENON. Well, we have some very important and difficult 

seams, if you will, in the system that continue to bedevil the way 

we do things. In other countries that do not have our particular 

legal and bureaucratic system frankly have us at an advantage. 

But the struggle between, for instance, domestic cyber security 

under DHS and where that boundary line is between that and foreign cyber security with respect to cyber at NSA, continues to be 

a point of friction. I will tell you, I have read multiple internal Chinese military sources in which they talk about exploiting those 

seams, exploiting those jurisdictional issues for their own advantage. 

I will give you one example. As early as 1996, internal Chinese 

military sources were talking about how they wanted to delay or 

disrupt our logistics deployment to a Taiwan contingency by disrupting the Pentagon’s unclassified logistics computer systems. 

But they said quite pointedly that they would initiate that attack 

from within the continental United States, knowing that that 

would activate a different bureaucracy, namely the FBI, and not 

the NSA and other people who would see it as a foreign intelligence 

operation, and in that window of us frankly being screwed up and 

not knowing what was going on, they would be able to seize that 

strategic advantage. So I do not think we are doing well on that 

front in particular, and I think even our adversaries are well aware 

of it. 

Representative PITTENGER. Given that understanding, I am not 

trying to get you out of your box in terms of your focus, but how 

would you remedy that? 

Mr. MULVENON. Well, to be honest, at many levels it is an indemnification issue because there are a lot of companies around 

the world that believe that there is sovereignty in cyberspace. 

In other words, that nations have boundaries and that those 

boundaries can be protected. We alone have been arguing for sort 

of an Internet freedom model that is sort of boundary-less. 

For the Chinese, the Russians, the Iranians, all they talk about 

is sovereignty. They are frankly more Westphalian than we are in 

many of these issues with regard to cyberspace. 

At the end of the day, we have to recognize that in fact our best 

assets for defending the country on the cyber side are the ones that 

are precluded from operating within the domestic United States. 

I realize that this may not be the best time to raise that issue 

given the news of the day, but ultimately we want to have our best 

capabilities in terms of defending the Nation and those capabilities 

often reside with organizations within the U.S. system that are not 

currently authorized to fully exercise those within the United 

States. So the only way that is going to get solved is to give people 

top cover at the Title 10, Title 50 level that does not currently 

exist. 

Representative PITTENGER. Thank you. 

Senator Gorton, thank you again for your tremendous perception 

on this issue. You believe as I do in free and fair markets, other 
15 

realistic market leverages that we have remaining today to try to 

stop the Chinese from the continued, what we believe is cheating, 

and continued theft of intellectual property. 

Senator GORTON. The leverage we have is our market, the fact 

that we have purchased far more from Chinese sources than they 

purchased for us. That is a tremendous leverage and in my view 

it is the highest leverage we have. By threatening that market in 

a straightforward fashion, we will at least get them to begin to 

hear about what our concerns are and have to respond to them. 

Representative PITTENGER. You said that American companies do 

not want to be public as much in coming out that they have been 

the recipient of cyber, what role still do they have in protecting 

themselves? 

Senator GORTON. Well, they have a tremendous role in protecting 

themselves. But I think one of the reasons that many of them are 

reluctant to talk publicly about it or to come to the government 

about it is they do not think anything is going to get done in any 

event. If we show the government that we are serious about the 

question I think we will get more cooperation from the private sector. 

Representative PITTENGER. Do you see a public/private partnership then? 

Senator GORTON. Of course it is. The fundamental defense of the 

United States is a public responsibility. 

Representative PITTENGER. Yes. Sure. 

Senator GORTON. But obviously every company wants to protect 

its own intellectual property and its markets. 

Representative PITTENGER. Sure. Thank you. 

Chairman BROWN. Mr. Meadows? Thank you, Mr. Pittenger. 

Representative MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I can see, 

Doctor, you wanted to go ahead and make a comment on that last 

question, so go ahead. 

Mr. MULVENON. Well, I think, frankly, this body has an important role to play because in the absence of strong government intervention on this issue I am sure many of you have seen the rise of 

certain companies that are now advertising as part of their services 

that they themselves will engage in aggressive defensive measures, 

shall we say, or even hack back on behalf of companies in the absence of the perception that the U.S. Government is going to do 

anything to help them. 

When I testified before the Huntsman-Blair Commission, we had 

a lengthy discussion about some of the outdated features of the 

1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the fact that, frankly, 

many companies right now are looking to Congress for clarification, 

and frankly the Department of Justice, as to where the legal 

boundaries are on this issue about hack back and being able to aggressively go after your own intellectual property. 

That act is 27 years old. I believe that many features of it are 

outdated and have been rendered obsolete by technology, and I 

think it really needs to be revisited. That was certainly one of the 

most interesting debates we had in the Commission hearing that 

I testified at. 

Representative MEADOWS. So as we look at the Commission, I 

think, Senator, your comments were that this will get us down the 
16 

road but it will not get us all the way. Again, I may be paraphrasing there, but how far down the road does it get us? I mean, 

is this a marathon of which we have gone one mile, are we doing 

a half marathon? I need to realize how far down the road we are 

going. 

Senator GORTON. Well, I think it is a marathon at which we are 

still at the starting line. 

Representative MEADOWS. But you were talking about, if all your 

recommendations are implemented. 

Senator GORTON. I do not think I can quantify that, except that 

I think it would be significant. It will be significant to exactly the 

extent that we have begun to create, within China itself, an interest group that is in favor of the protection of intellectual property 

rights. 

Representative MEADOWS. So how do we do that? How do we create within China this interest or this respect for the rule of law, 

because we see that in so many areas where there is not that? So 

how do we do that? 

Senator GORTON. By threatening the profitability of those Chinese companies, both public and private, that sell large amounts of 

their goods and products in the United States. 

Representative MEADOWS. All right. So you used the word 

‘‘threat.’’ I do not ever bluff, so let me ask you this. When does 

threaten and when does consequences to actions—because too 

many times we threaten without resolve. I guess what I am asking—— 

Senator GORTON. Congressman, I agree with you. Do not threaten unless you are willing to carry it out. 

Representative MEADOWS. Exactly. So what you are saying is to 

have real consequences that we are committed to, regardless of the 

circumstances of implementing. 

Senator GORTON. Yes. 

Representative MEADOWS. All right. 

Would you agree with that, Doctor? 

Mr. MULVENON. Well, first of all I would say, as a matter of principle, China and the Chinese economy and the Chinese Government will respect intellectual property when they have their own 

intellectual property to defend. 

Representative MEADOWS. I agree. 

Mr. MULVENON. I mean, one of the real dilemmas we have is I 

know that talking about patent trolling is very popular these days. 

Representative MEADOWS. Right. 

Mr. MULVENON. I see a tremendous upswing in patent trolling in 

China. In other words, Chinese doing patents of things that are 

registered with their own Patent and Trademark Office and then 

attempting to sue or coerce American companies that are in China 

by claiming that they have the Chinese patent for something that 

clearly is one of our patents. 

Now, the trends are going in the right direction, they are just not 

going there quickly enough in terms of China’s own intellectual 

property development and therefore its own desire for protections. 

In my view, on the cyber side in particular, what I have been 

pushing for internally is a focus on identifying a specific number 

of companies and, frankly, a number of civilian universities, very 
17 

large universities in China, that are known to have been engaged 

in this activity, have been supplying tools, have been supplying 

personnel, have been engaged in this activity and putting them on 

the denied entities list from the Commerce Department. 

That will deny them visas to the United States, professors will 

not get fellowships, graduate students will not be able to get fellowships over here. There will be a constituency, as Senator Gorton 

said, that all of a sudden is now feeling the pain of actions that 

they are not profiting from and it will create basically a constituency within China that will begin to say, ‘‘All right, this is no 

longer a consequence-free activity for us anymore.’’ 

Senator GORTON. I would just go on to say that I agree almost 

totally. What bothers me about at least a part of that statement 

is that when the Chinese have so much intellectual property that 

they have more to defend then they have to attack, we will have 

already lost the struggle. 

Representative MEADOWS. It would be too late, yes. When they 

become the consumer of their own products, it is game over. So 

when we look at this—and let us go on a little bit further if the 

Chairman will indulge—it used to be that investing in China, 

American companies or foreign companies got a better deal from a 

regulatory standpoint, from an incentives standpoint. 

My understanding is that that is no longer the case, that those 

regulations are being beefed up. So the regulations that companies 

fleeing from America to produce in a foreign country are not as, I 

guess, lucrative anymore. Would you concur with that, agree with 

that, or disagree? 

Senator GORTON. I think maybe it is slightly too broad a statement because I do not think every kind of company or every kind 

of investment in China is exactly the same. Some may not have 

much in the way of intellectual property, some obviously still find 

it profitable to do business there. Many others have found that it 

costs far more than it is worth. 

Representative MEADOWS. Doctor? 

Mr. MULVENON. I would probably disagree with the characterization that there was some sepia-toned better past where we actually 

were successful making money in China. My father did business in 

China for 20 years selling nuclear radiation detectors and always 

felt the deck was stacked against him. 

We used to watch people who came to China believing in the 

whole ‘‘if everyone bought one shoe we would sell a half a billion 

shoes’’ kind of philosophy repeatedly getting used. But I think the 

hope was always that the Chinese economy would mature to the 

point where it became a more level playing field and that there was 

more predictability in the regulatory system. 

In fact, what we are finding now is that the regulatory system 

is becoming even more predatory and more capricious as they are 

trying to force this indigenous innovation. They are no longer content to allow Western multinationals to have pride of place, but instead are trying to replace them with these national champions. 

That has created a very uneven playing field and a lot of, frankly, 

unfair activity that is in violation of their WTO commitments. 

Representative MEADOWS. And my last question is, how big does 

the problem need to get before there is a demand from the Amer-
18 

ican people to deal with it? We are estimating today a low estimate 

of $300 billion that could be $400 or $500 billion in terms of economic impact. How big does it have to get before you see a concerted effort on all parts to come together and to address it? 

Senator GORTON. It is big enough right now, and the fact of this 

hearing is an illustration of that fact. 

Representative MEADOWS. All right. Thank you. I yield back. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Meadows. 

I would even argue that a decade and a half ago, when some of 

these issues were decided in the House and Senate, that the public 

was kind of always a bit ahead of these two institutions, perhaps. 

I wanted to just—and then I will close for the next panel, but I 

appreciate very much Mr. Pittenger and Mr. Meadows’s comments. 

I have watched this over from my House days during PNTR and 

just watched the way that—American corporations and the relationships in China. 

At the time of the PNTR vote in the House of Representatives, 

I remember a friend of mine that worked at National Airport told 

me there were more corporate jets there that week leading up to 

the vote than at any time in his memory. 

At that point I am not sure that our companies, our large companies’ interests in China matched up with our national interests as 

a nation. I think perhaps it is more that way, but just a note of 

caution. 

As an increasing number of American companies come to the 

government and say we need help here because of cyber attacks, 

that we keep in mind—and we should be there for them—that it 

is important that our national interests match these companies’ interests there, because I remember being lobbied by one company in 

particular in my district who said this makes so much sense to 

pass PNTR, and then two years later he moved a lot of his production to China. He said I had to move because all my competitors 

are there because of this new set of rules through PNTR. That song 

was sung far too many times in North Carolina, in Ohio, and 

across the country. 

So thanks very much, Dr. Mulvenon, for your work, and Senator 

Gorton, for your lifetime and continued work and service for our 

country. 

I would call up the next panel, beginning with Wen Yunchao, 

known more commonly by his online alias, Bei Feng. He has 

launched a series of online campaigns in support of human rights 

and against Internet censorship. He was awarded the French Republic’s Human Rights Prize 2010 by the French National Consultative Commission on Human Rights in recognition of his efforts 

and contributions to promoting China’s human rights movement 

through social media. He is a graduate of Harbin Institute of Technology and is currently a visiting scholar at Columbia’s Institute 

for the Study of Human Rights in New York City. 

Louisa Greve is vice president for Asia, Middle East and North 

Africa, and Global Programs at the National Endowment for Democracy, where she served as director for East Asia. She has studied, worked, and traveled in Asia since 1980. She was a member 

of the AEI/Armitage International Taiwan Policy Working Group, 
19 

the Council of Foreign Relations Term Member Roundtable on U.S. 

National Security—New Threats in a Changing World. She served 

as a member of the board of directors of Amnesty International for 

five years and was a volunteer China and Mongolian specialist 

from 1990 to 1999. She served two terms as a member of the Virginia State Advisory Committee of the U.S. Commission on Civil 

Rights. If the two of you would join us, and thank you very much. 

Cao Yaxue will translate for Mr. Wen. Mr. Wen, please proceed. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF WEN YUNCHAO (ONLINE ALIAS ‘‘BEI FENG’’), 

INDEPENDENT JOURNALIST AND BLOGGER, VISITING 

SCHOLAR, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 

Mr. WEN. Thank you, dear Senator Brown and Congressman 

Pittenger and Congressman Meadows. My name is Wen Yunchao. 

I am here to testify about the cyber attacks against me that occurred over the last few years. 

In September 2009, I discovered that my Gmail account was set 

up for forwarding and that it would forward all my emails I received to another email account not under my control. This was the 

first time I realized that my email was attacked. 

In February 2011, the so-called Jasmine Revolution broke in 

China. It refers to anonymous online calls for mass gatherings in 

public venues in major cities across China. 

At the time I was working and living in Hong Kong. Starting at 

that time, all my electronic communications, including telephone 

and Internet products and services were under severe attack. 

On June 2, 2011, I discovered that rather sophisticated hacking 

was being used against my Gmail account. That day I received an 

email with the subject ‘‘Li Chengpeng Invites You to Participate in 

Voting.’’ The email provided a disguised link. On clicking it, a flash 

document opened up and the account would authorize other users 

to visit. When I reported this to Google, they responded that they 

were not even aware of such attacks. 

The content of the email had to do with well-known Chinese author Li Chengpeng’s campaign for election to the local Congress of 

the People’s Representatives and was sent two days before the anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre on June 4. I believe the 

hacking was politically motivated and most likely an act of the government. I reported the hacking process and published it on You 

Tube. 

In June 2011, I was attending the U.N. Human Rights Council’s 

meeting in Geneva as part of the Internet Freedom Fellows Program. I gave a speech to call for support for Chinese citizens who 

have been persecuted because of the Jasmine Revolution. On June 

8, the day before the speech, I received a text message warning. 

After I gave the speech and before I left Geneva, my phone began 

to receive a large volume of incoming calls. My phone was attacked 

in such a manner between June and August 2011. At its heaviest 

on July 31, I received 311 calls in one day. All the calls hung up 

after the ring. 

I did a statistic study of the calls between late July and early 

August and I found that attackers had a very regular time when 
20 

they start working and when they went off work. It was not a random person acting alone. 

In July 2011, personal information of my wife, my son, and other 

relatives were published online, including the numbers of my wife 

and my son’s Hong Kong/Macao travel permits. This is not information average people can easily access unless they are the police or 

authorities. 

For about a year starting April 2011, unidentified persons 

bombed me on Twitter with trash information. Using software 

called Twin to filter the trash, I found the heaviest attack took 

place on April 25, 2012; a staggering 590,000 spam posts within 24 

hours. Unidentified persons also posted viciously defaming information about me online at the rate of over 10,000 times per day. As 

far as I know, the artist Ai Wei Wei has also been similarly attacked. 

Starting August 24, 2011, my Gmail account was spammed with 

an astonishing number of messages. At its peak in mid-March 

2012, that flow was as high as five gigabytes per hour. If this were 

a personal attack it would take more than 20 users to attack my 

account simultaneously to reach that kind of volume. Therefore, I 

believe it was an organized attack. 

The attackers also put my name in garbage messages to make 

it harder for me to filter them. I reported the attacks to Google 

through a third party. A Google official contacted me subsequently 

and Google made specific efforts to deal with the attack on me, but 

the results were not that great. 

Around the same time, unidentified persons also published hundreds of articles online to denigrate me and I believe it was an organized campaign to destroy my personal reputation. 

At 4 p.m. on May 28, 2012, attacks on Twitter and Gmail 

stopped simultaneously. This also shows these were organized behaviors. 

Chairman BROWN. Ms. Cao, if you can try to wrap up in the next 

minute or two. 

Mr. WEN. We are just about done. Yes. Thanks. From April 2009 

to the present time I have received an untold number of phishing 

emails and Trojan emails from the one email attack system that I 

successfully broke into myself. I found 192 people who were the objects of attack and they included Chinese dissidents, rights lawyers, and foreign journalists reporting on China. 

From the sources of the pack, I was able to identify, and also 

from the Mandarin I heard in the background in the earlier stage 

of the telephone harassment, I believe all the attacks came from 

mainland China. 

I hope that the U.S. Congress and the government will recognize 

such cyber attacks against human rights defenders as human 

rights persecution and impose sanctions and visa restrictions on organizations, companies, and their employees who engage in such 

malicious activities. 

Thank you. 

Chairman BROWN. Thank you very much, Ms. Cao, and thank 

you, Mr. Wen. 

Ms. Greve, thank you for joining us. 
21 

STATEMENT OF LOUISA GREVE, VICE PRESIDENT FOR ASIA, 

MIDDLE EAST, AND NORTH AFRICA, AND GLOBAL PROGRAMS, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY 

Ms. GREVE. Thank you so much. For Chinese, Tibetan, and 

Uyghur human rights activists working from exile, cyber hacking 

is a form of repression that reaches across state boundaries to undermine their ability to exercise the fundamental political freedoms 

they should be enjoying in democratic countries. 

Being under sustained cyber attack means these groups are not, 

in practice, able to routinely access free communications media in 

the public square. The hackers’ success in hampering the ability of 

these groups to do their work normally results from a combination 

of specific targeting and the use of up-to-the-minute hacking skills. 

Some examples. First, the activists have to contend with realtime and preemptive interference with their communications. Increasingly, hackers are no longer having the misspelled emails we 

have all experienced; you know, when somebody sends you something and they misspell their own name it is a little bit of a giveaway. 

Now, the hackers are obtaining genuine emails and then sending 

them on within a malicious email within hours, which greatly increases their plausibility, especially when they are related to an ongoing conversation, upcoming event, or conference. I have an example from the Uyghur American Association. There was at least one 

incident when a staff member received an immediate reply from a 

colleague, which turned out to be the work of a hacker. 

Second, there is all-device harassment. Mr. Wen has talked 

about the jamming of his telephone. This happened in 2011 in a 

number of places. The World Uyghur Congress experienced, for a 

full week, continuous jamming of the land lines in Munich of the 

personal apartment and office telephone lines for a week. During 

the same time, which was the sensitive political anniversary of the 

July 5 riots in Urumchi, the Web site was down and there was the 

massive spam attack, 15,000 emails in one week. 

Then the third example has to do with the innovation. There is 

some innovation having to do with software for cyber attacking. 

This was the first-ever documented attack against Android devices. 

Now, this is getting to the Smartphones and the tablets. 

In fact, Kaspersky Lab, a research company, has issued a report 

saying that in March they discovered the first-ever use of spearphishing email that attacked and succeeded in damaging Android 

users’ equipment. The vehicle for this attack did have to do with 

the Uyghur, the World Uyghur Congress, having sent an email to 

speakers who had attended a conference. 

The sender of this copied text was purportedly a high-level Tibetan activist. The malware that was attached extracted data 

about the phone itself: the phone number, the OS version, the 

phone model, and the contacts stored both on the phone and on the 

sim card, and call logs, and their SMS messages, and their GO location. 

Now, the frequency and sophistication of all these attacks reveal 

a significant investment of resources. In fact, activists note an upgrading of the resources devoted to this campaign, including in-
22 

creased knowledge of the social networks that they are trying to attack, language proficiency, and the technical means. 

We should note another example, another piece of evidence of the 

nature of the political targeting, the attacks always surge before 

sensitive political anniversaries, June 4, July 5, and others. 

As we look at this kind of deliberate targeted hacking, why is it 

such a potent tactic for impeding the work of human rights activists? It is because of its numerous practical effects. It silences activists’ ability to communicate with the wider public when their Web 

sites are down for weeks at a time when they have something to 

say; it compromises the ability of research groups to keep information confidential, which is essential when doing human rights work 

and helping refugees. 

It diverts the energies of the activists because they have to deal 

with recovering from the cyber attacks and double-checking all 

their communications to ensure their authenticity. It raises the 

cost, the financial cost, by requiring expensive back-up systems, 

very expensive technical assistance, and so on. 

It undermines cooperation with the wider world. International 

organizations, the journalists, the media experts are also frustrated 

with these fake and malicious emails and other hacking interference. Finally, hacking, frankly, increases fear, again, even for 

those who are outside of China, even for those living in free countries. This is a great deterrent effect, making people afraid to be 

in touch with each other, to have solidarity. 

Again, while they are outside of China they do not want to compromise their strategies, as Congressman Smith mentioned, or 

their confidential information, and certainly in communicating with 

people inside China, given the potential for harassment and arrest. 

So this portfolio of effects, silencing critical voices, undermining 

credibility, undermining trust, increasing isolation, raising costs 

and inducing fear, this is the panoply of tactics of repression perfected by authoritarian regimes and it is now being globalized. It 

deserves our unqualified condemnation. 

Thank you. 

Chairman BROWN. Thank you very much, Ms. Greve. 

Mr. Wen, first of all, thank you for your courage in speaking out. 

I know that you are in New York, at least for a while. I also know 

you have a wife and a son. If your speaking out does endanger you 

in any way or expose you to any issues or problems, please let us 

know and we will help you in any way we can. I think that I can 

speak for all the members of this commission, and institutionally, 

too, if you would keep us informed about any potential retribution. 

So, thank you for that. 

My question is, why didn’t they just shut you down? 

Mr. WEN. In 2011, I was awarded a human rights award in 

France. Since then, I have not been able to return to China. I was 

working and living in Hong Kong until recently. That is why, 

today, I am able to sit here to tell you my story. Late last year, 

they refused to renew my Hong Kong Exit-and-Entry permit, so I 

could not stay in Hong Kong anymore. That is why I came to New 

York. 

Chairman BROWN. Thank you. 
23 

Ms. Greve, thank you for particularly your last comments about 

the draining resources, increasing costs, and instilling fear. It 

seems that a number of U.S. companies are reluctant to speak out 

because of fear of economic retribution that the Chinese Government or state-owned enterprises or others could levy against them. 

Do human rights and civil society organizations, both inside and 

outside China, feel—you talked about fear. Explore that a little 

more, the fear they may feel in speaking out or pointing fingers, 

or whatever they might want to do in response. 

Ms. GREVE. A number of groups report that it is very hard to 

even do the basic documentation because victims and witnesses are 

afraid to speak. This can be true before the cyber age, but it is true 

in spades now, as James Mulvenon said about stealing intellectual 

property. 

Once you reveal information about yourself it becomes known 

that you have spoken out and your family can suffer back home in 

China. So there is an effect of fear. It silences individual victims 

to speak up and it certainly makes it very hard for journalists and 

human rights groups to provide the data and the documentation so 

the world can know the extent of the problem. 

Chairman BROWN. So what do U.S. lawmakers do to help protect 

these civil organizations, civil society organizations and human 

rights groups and all? 

Ms. GREVE. I certainly believe that the work of the National Endowment for Democracy, my organization which is supported by an 

annual appropriation from the Congress, is one lifeline. We give 

grants to human rights groups outside China who are doing their 

best. Then they have money for server space and the ability to 

travel to meet each other. 

So some kind of offsetting of the financial cost is the very least 

that can be done and that is certainly being done through my organization. There are a number of programs that the State Department has done to help human rights defenders, and these are all 

worth doing even though they are at a very micro level. 

Then certainly the voices of those in China who are still in China 

and subject not only to harassment and impeding of their normal 

work, but of course under the thumb of the security apparatus of 

the state when they raise their voices, it is very gratifying for them 

to hear Members of the Congress echo their concerns and recognize 

the justice of their cause. 

Chairman BROWN. Does it always matter when—we sort of sometimes walk this line of judging others, of speaking out—does that 

sometimes jeopardize people whom we defend as American elected 

officials speaking out individually in support of a Chinese citizen? 

Does that cut both ways? Is that something we should always do? 

Does that always help them? 

Ms. GREVE. It is a good idea to ask the individual or advisors, 

but most of the time activists tell us that when they are ready to 

stand up and be counted it can only help them to have solidarity 

around the world based on universal values after all. 

Chairman BROWN. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. Pittenger? 

Representative PITTENGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
24 

Mr. Feng, thank you for your testimony. I would like to just get 

some idea of the penalties that are enforced against the Chinese 

citizens in their efforts to expose human rights and how they are 

targeted in China. 

Mr. WEN. Internet hacking and cyber security is only one problem they face. In real life, their security, their physical security is 

an issue. They could be disappeared, their Internet ability could be 

invaded and their telephones monitored, and so on and so forth. 

Representative PITTENGER. Thank you. 

Are these penalties pervasive throughout the country or are they 

different in different provinces? Does it matter where in China? 

Mr. WEN. The Internet attacks, the more prominent dissidents 

and activists are suffering more. But emails, like phishing, it is 

very common, very widespread. As for disappearance and detention, there might be little difference. In some provinces, like in 

Guangdong, it might be a little bit better than elsewhere, but it is 

also very common. 

Representative PITTENGER. Thank you. 

As it relates to religious freedoms and religious practices, do you 

see that there is greater openness and freedom in some provinces 

given than there are in others, and does the official church—is it 

demanded in some provinces—is the underground church able to 

live in greater freedom in some areas than in other areas? 

Mr. WEN. As far as I know, in the northeastern or the greater 

northern area in China, religious persecution is very serious. We 

all know, of course, about what’s happening in Xinjiang and Tibet. 

In the southern provinces, religious persecution might be a little 

milder but it depends on what is your standard. If your standard 

is universal values, the persecution, even in what we consider the 

milder provinces, are still very severe. 

Representative PITTENGER. Thank you for that. 

Ms. Greve, thank you also for your testimony. As it relates to 

these organizations, you said that you appreciated the support from 

our government. I find myself in a predicament sometimes when I 

am addressing, for example, the Chinese Chamber that I have spoken to and others, and how direct I am. I know Chairman Brown 

brought this up some, but I would like to get a better feel how you 

could counsel me on addressing the human rights issues and concerns that I could have the greatest impact. 

My challenge has been not to be overbearing, but to be real and 

understanding. I have 25 years of experience in terms of working 

with the underground church in that country and their deep appreciation for what they have gone through. I want to be as direct as 

I can without losing them in the discussion. 

My argument has been that people of faith are the most dependable, moral, ethical people, that they could be constructive inside 

their own government, given all the reports of pervasive problems 

with crime and other issues inside the government. So I just think 

I would like a bit more input in how you would help us as legislators bring better focus and light to this issue that could put pressure on the Chinese Government. 

Ms. GREVE. Even the work of this Commission proves that there 

is extensive, detailed, undeniable documentation—the annual re-
25 

port is just full—and yet merely the naming and shaming, merely 

the exposure does not bring the facts always to the forefront. 

When there are face-to-face encounters, there is always an opportunity. Sometimes people who are coming from China are not 

aware or sometimes believe active government propaganda about 

hostile forces outside China who want to needlessly smear the good 

name of China. I think the calm repetition of facts has to have a 

place in all of this. 

I think the investment in the work of documentation has a role, 

and there is also the question of the long term versus the short 

term. You may not get an immediate response but you have to 

stand for what is right for the long term. Maybe you are planting 

seeds. 

Representative PITTENGER. Thank you so much. 

Chairman BROWN. Thank you. 

Mr. Meadows? 

Representative MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The time 

is late so I will be very brief, but I have one question as a followup. I have been in a number of hearings where we have heard 

about human rights abuses in China and as it continues. Ms. 

Greve, if you could comment on this. 

We understand when Congress takes an active role, when under 

the guidance of the Chairman or others when we say we will not 

tolerate human rights abuses it does not necessarily change it, but 

those that are suffering suffer less when we highlight it. 

So is there a time coming where, instead of a threat, where we 

truly mean what we say and that we will not tolerate the human 

rights abuses that have become so really commonplace, is what I 

understand. But when we highlight it, does it become, indeed, less 

in China? 

Ms. GREVE. Numerous former prisoners report how important it 

was that political leaders and the people in charge of their detention institutions knew that other people were speaking up on their 

behalf, improved treatment, health, and so on. And of course the 

real hope has to come, as with the question of commercial rule of 

law, an internal transformation in Chinese society. This is where 

the long-term change will come. 

The American institutions and love for liberty and universal values cannot by itself change the situation on the ground in China. 

It has to come from within China. I believe the point should be to 

invest as much as possible in strengthening those who have the 

right principles, who are in a position to shape the institutions in 

the right direction and to have the greatest, strongest friendship 

for those kinds of people for the sake of the future of China. 

Representative MEADOWS. And with that, I will yield back. Let 

the message be one that we will not yield until this is dealt with. 

So I yield back, and I thank the Chairman. 

Chairman BROWN. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Meadows. 

Thank you all. The record will stay open for one week. If any of 

the three panelists, Ms. Cao, Mr. Wen, Ms. Greve, would have anything you would like to submit, and it is possible any of us may 

have questions for you, written questions, if you would answer 
26 

those as quickly as possible. Thank you for speaking out. Thanks 

for being here. Thank you. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m. the hearing was concluded.] 
(27) 

A P P E N D I X 
28 

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SLADE GORTON, A FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM

WASHINGTON

JUNE 25, 2013

Over the past year, I have served as a member on the Commission on the Theft 

of American Intellectual Property. The Commission, co-chaired by Governor Jon 

Huntsman, the former U.S. Ambassador to China, and Admiral Dennis Blair, the 

former Director of National Intelligence, is an independent and bipartisan initiative 

of leading Americans from the private sector, public service in national security and 

foreign affairs, academe, and politics. The three purposes of the Commission are to: 

(1) document and assess the causes, scale, and other major dimensions of international intellectual property theft as they affect the United States; (2) document 

and assess the role of China in international intellectual property theft; and (3) propose appropriate U.S. policy responses that would mitigate ongoing and future damage and obtain greater enforcement of intellectual property rights by China and 

other infringers. 

What we found during our research and due diligence was quite alarming but not 

all that surprising. Our findings suggest that the value of the total loss of American 

IP overseas to be over $300 billion per year, comparable to the current annual level 

of U.S. exports to Asia. Furthermore, we estimate that China is roughly 50–80 percent of the problem. Most tangibly, one study suggests that if China had the same 

level of IP protection as the U.S. or the U.K., there would be an increase of 2.2 million new jobs within the United States. Intellectual property rights are violated in 

a number of ways including violating copyright and trademark protections, infringing on patents, and stealing trade secrets. Trade secrets are stolen primarily 

through cyber espionage, or through traditional industrial and economic espionage. 

Cyber theft is one of the main avenues by which these ideas are stolen. While 

hackers stealing trade secrets, money, and personal information are a worldwide 

problem, quantitatively, China stands out in regard to attacks for IP. A confluence 

of factors, from government priorities to an underdeveloped legal system, causes 

China to be a massive source of cyber-enabled IP theft. Much of this theft stems 

from the undirected, uncoordinated actions of Chinese citizens and entities who see 

within a permissive domestic legal environment an opportunity to advance their 

own commercial interests. With rare penalties for offenders and large profits to be 

gained, Chinese businesses thrive on stolen technology. 

While our topic today is Chinese hackers and commercial rule of law, it is important to remember that cyber espionage is only part of the problem. The stories that 

most people hear or imagine when thinking about IP theft, economic espionage, or 

trade-secret theft are the grist of high-tech espionage thrillers. The mention of global IP thieves often conjures up images of a foreign enemy based somewhere on the 

other side of a vast ocean. State-sponsored efforts immediately leap to mind—for example, Shanghai-based PLA Unit 61398, which has been 

identified as the source of many recent cyber attacks. However, while it is true 

that the rise of personal computing has added a new dynamic to protecting intellectual property, it is important to remember that nearly all IP loss, no matter how 

high-tech, still requires a human component. Much of today’s IP theft still utilizes 

traditional economic espionage tactics. This is the apparent situation in the recent 

NYU case, where a Chinese government institution bribed researchers to disclose 

their valuable findings. 

Industrial espionage is nothing new. It is a classic business tactic used by less 

than reputable organizations to try and obtain a competitor’s secrets in order to 

gain an economic advantage in the marketplace. So, while members of Congress continue to work on solving the issue of cyber theft and Chinese hacking, we would 

encourage them to consider expanding policy proposals beyond cyber theft to international IP theft, generally. 

Policy responses to the problem of IP theft must start with defensive measures 

here at home, to protect what we have, but this is not nearly enough. I believe that 

until there is a change in the internal incentive structure within China, or until 

there exists in China an interest group in favor of eliminating IP theft, we will likely see little progress. This is perhaps the only road to long term success. Purely defensive measures will likely just create better, more sophisticated thieves. 

Along with my testimony today, I am submitting a copy of the IP Commission’s 

report that was released May 22, 2013. The final chapters lay out a series of policy 
29 

recommendations, organized as short, medium, and long-term recommendations. 

The recommendations vary and would likely fall under the jurisdiction of a number 

of Congressional committees including the Senate Banking and House Foreign Affairs Committees. The short-term recommendations suggest changing the way the 

U.S. government is internally organized to address IP theft and suggest new tools 

to create incentives overseas. These include allowing for targeted financial sanctions 

and quick response measures for seizing IP infringing goods at the border. The medium-term solutions suggest, among other things, amending the Economic Espionage Act and shifting the diplomatic priorities of our overseas attache ́s. Our long 

term solutions focus largely on continuing to work on establishing stronger rule of 

law in China and other IP infringing countries. Additionally, we offer a set of cyber 

recommendations that this commission will likely find interesting given the topic of 

today. 

It is our hope that this report will help to inform and strengthen the policy 

changes that come from Congress and the Administration. Thank you. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES C. MULVENON

JUNE 25, 2013

‘‘CHINESE CYBER ESPIONAGE’’ 

Introduction 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the other members of the Congressional-Executive 

Commission on China for the opportunity to take part in the hearings you are holding today on the topic of ‘‘Chinese Hacking: Impact on Human Rights and Commercial Rule of Law.’’ My remarks will focus on Chinese cyber espionage. 

Chinese cyber espionage has emerged as a top issue in Sino-US relations, primarily because of concerns about theft of intellectual property. As I discuss in Chapter 9 of my book, Chinese Industrial Espionage, there are many different features 

of Chinese cyber activity towards the United States and there is no ‘‘one size fits 

all’’ approach for all of them. 

THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM

Cyber espionage is the latest and perhaps most devastating form of Chinese espionage, striking at the heart of American military advantage and technological competitiveness. Without mentioning China, General Keith Alexander, NSA Director 

and Commander, USCYBERCOM, told an audience at the Aspen Security Forum 

on 26 July 2012 that cyber espionage represents the ‘‘greatest transfer of wealth in 

history.’’ Other government agencies are less circumspect about calling out Beijing 

for its cyber theft.1 The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive’s 2011 

report Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace boldly asserts 

‘‘Chinese actors are the world’s most active and persistent perpetrators of economic 

espionage.’’ 2 While the media began reporting rumors of large-scale intrusions in 

2005,3 U.S officials did not publicly acknowledge exfiltrations of data until August 

2006, when the Pentagon asserted that hostile civilian cyber units operating inside 

China had launched attacks against the NIPRNET and downloaded up to 20 

terabytes of data.4 In March 2007, then Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General 

Cartwright told the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission that 

China was engaged in cyber-reconnaissance, probing computer networks of US agencies and corporations.5 This view was seconded in the 2007 China Military Power 

Report, an annual Pentagon assessment mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act, which claimed ‘‘numerous computer networks around the world, including those owned by the US government, were subject to intrusions that appear to 

have originated within’’ the People’s Republic of China.6 Former White House and 

DHS cyber official Paul Kurtz told Business Week that the Chinese activity was ‘‘espionage on a massive scale’’ 7 A 2009 study by Northrup Grumman for the US-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission concluded ‘‘Chinese espionage in the 

United States now comprises the single greatest threat to US technology . . . and 

has the potential to erode the United States’ long-term position as a world leader 

in S&T [science and technology] innovation and competitiveness.’’ 8 And the problem 

appeared to be getting worse over time. Robert Jamison, the top cyber-security official at DHS, told reporters at a March 2008 briefing, ‘‘We’re concerned that the intrusions are more frequent, and they’re more targeted, and they’re more sophisticated.’’ 9 After the Operation Aurora intrusions against Google and other Silicon Valley companies in 2009 and 2010, officials worried that China was escalating its in-
30 

trusions. Whereas before the activities were targeted at government and military 

networks, threatening US military advantage and government policies, the new intrusions went beyond state-on-state espionage to threaten American technological 

competitiveness and economic prosperity. 

Because the underlying evidence was classified, government and military officials 

could not provide detailed evidence of these allegations against the Chinese government and military, which naturally led to scrutiny of the specific attribution to 

China. In his confirmation testimony questions, current CYBERCOM Commander 

General Alexander agreed that ‘‘attribution can be very difficult.’’ 10 Former senior 

DHS cybersecurity official Greg Garcia told the New York Times in March 2009 that 

‘‘attribution is a hall of mirrors.’’ 11 With respect to China, Amit Yoran, the first director of DHS’s National Cyber Security Division cautioned, ‘‘I think it’s a little bit 

naive to suggest that everything that says it comes from China comes from 

China.’’ 12 Yet other officials were more confident in the assessment of Chinese responsibility. Then Director of the DNI National Counterintelligence Executive, Joel 

Brenner, told the National Journal in 2008: 

Some [attacks], we have high confidence, are coming from government-sponsored sites . . . The Chinese operate both through government agencies, as we 

do, but they also operate through sponsoring other organizations that are engaging in this kind of international hacking, whether or not under specific direction. It’s a kind of cyber-militia . . . It’s coming in volumes that are just staggering.13

Other reports by non-governmental actors reach varying levels of confidence in 

their determination of Chinese government involvement.14 Given the technical challenges of attribution, however, a more fruitful approach might be to first understand 

the strategic context of Chinese cyber espionage, and then ask the question ‘‘who 

benefits? ’’ from the activities attributed to Chinese actors, specifically the possible 

means, motives and opportunities. 

STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF CHINESE CYBER ESPIONAGE: CHINA AND CYBER AS AN OVERT

TOOL OF STATE POWER

As a rising power, Chinese national interests have logically expanded with the 

growth in its economic, political, diplomatic and military power. Yet its rise has occurred within a world system still dominated by American unilateral authority. Because of these imbalances, China has naturally sought to find asymmetrical advantages, and cyberspace at first glance appears to be a dimension of national power 

in which the United States is asymmetrically vulnerable because of its greater dependence on information systems. Moreover, China seems much more comfortable 

with cyber power as an legitimate, overt tool of state power, especially compared 

with the United States, which still treats cyber operations as a highly classified, 

compartmented capability. What do we mean by overt? Countries like China and 

Russia seems more comfortable with the overt use of cyber conflict, even by nonstate proxies acting on their behalf, as we saw in numerous Chinese ‘‘patriotic hacker’’ events in the late 1990s and the Russian cyber conflicts in Estonia in 2007 and 

Georgia in 2008. When confronted with their potential involvement in these incidents, both Beijing and Moscow appeared to believe that the plausible deniability 

of the network was a sufficient fig leaf to cover their barely veiled affiliations and 

common cause with the attacks. By contrast, Washington does not even have a vocabulary for discussing these capabilities in public, as seen in the incoherence of official US comments about possible computer network exploit activities against 

Milosevic during ALLIED FORCE and the Stuxnet industrial control systems hack 

in 2011. 

WHY CYBER ESPIONAGE?

Within the rubric of the Chinese government’s view of cyber as a tool of national 

power, it is clear that this new dimension offers Beijing certain key strategic advantages, particularly with respect to intelligence collection, technological competitiveness, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and strategic intelligence to policymakers. 

Intelligence Collection Advantages 

Cyber espionage is now a favored mode of tradecraft for China, principally because of its logistical advantages and the promise of plausible deniability. On the 

first issue, Joel Brenner highlights the relative ease of cyber versus other traditional 

forms of espionage: ‘‘Cyber-networks are the new frontier of counterintelligence . . . 

If you can steal information or disrupt an organization by attacking its networks 

remotely, why go to the trouble of running a spy? ’’ 15 Take the case of Greg Dongfan 
31 

Chung, discussed in Chapter 8, as an example. Managing Chung required significant institutional resources, including case officers, covert communications, money 

transfers, and travel arrangements. In the end, Chung was caught, and his ‘‘perp 

walk’’ and public trial proved to be an embarrassment to the Chinese government. 

Now imagine a scenario in which the same volume of information can be exfiltrated 

out of Boeing or Rockwell’s computer networks in a single evening via an exquisite 

computer network exploitation operation, covered by the plausible deniability of network intrusions. Given the choice between the two modes, it is only natural that 

intelligence services would increasingly pick the less risky, cheaper, and faster way 

of doing business. 

Technological Competitiveness Advantages 

After more than thirty years of serving as the world’s assembly point and export 

processing zone, the Beijing government has clearly made the decision to transform 

Chinese economic development by encouraging ‘‘indigenous innovation.’’ 16 Since 

2006, James McGregor and others have highlighted ‘‘Chinese policies and initiatives 

aimed at building ’national champion’ companies through subsidies and preferential 

policies while using China’s market power to appropriate foreign technology, tweak 

it and create Chinese ’indigenous innovations’ that will come back at us globally.’’ 17

In the information technology sector, McGregor notes ‘‘Chinese government mandate 

to replace core foreign technology in critical infrastructure—such as chips, software 

and communications hardware—with Chinese technology within a decade.’’ Among 

the tools being actively used to achieve these goals are: 

A foreign-focused anti-monopoly law, mandatory technology transfers, compulsory technology licensing, rigged Chinese standards and testing rules, local content requirements, mandates to reveal encryption codes, excessive disclosure for 

scientific permits and technology patents, discriminatory government procurement policies, and the continued failure to adequately protect intellectual property rights.18

Missing from this excellent list, however, are traditional technical espionage and 

technical cyber espionage, which many companies believe are already eroding their 

technical advantage. The logic for these latter approaches is clearly outlined by 

David Szady, former head of the FBI’s counterintelligence unit: ‘‘If they can steal 

it and do it in five years, why [take longer] to develop it? ’’ 19 Rather than destroying 

US competitiveness through ‘‘cyberwar,’’ former DNI McConnell argues that Chinese 

entities ‘‘are exploiting our systems for information advantage—looking for the characteristics of a weapons system by a defense contractor or academic research on 

plasma physics, for example—not in order to destroy data and do damage.’’ 20

Examples of Chinese cyber espionage to obtain science and technology can be divided into two broad categories: external and insider. The 2011 NCIX report offers 

three illustrative examples of insider cyber threats: 

• David Yen Lee, a chemist with Valspar Corporation, used his access to internal computer networks between 2008 and 2009 to download approximately 160 

secret formulas for paints and coatings to removable storage media. He intended to parlay this proprietary information to obtain a new job with Nippon 

Paint in Shanghai, China. Lee was arrested in March 2009, pleaded guilty to 

one count of theft of trade secrets, and was sentenced in December 2010 to 15 

months in prison. 

• Meng Hong, a DuPont research chemist, downloaded proprietary information 

on organic light-emitting diodes (OLED) in mid-2009 to his personal email account and thumb drive. He intended to transfer this information to Peking University, where he had accepted a faculty position, and sought Chinese government funding to commercialize OLED research. Hong was arrested in October 

2009, pleaded guilty to one count of theft of trade secrets, and was sentenced 

in October 2010 to 14 months in prison. 

• Xiangdong Yu (aka Mike Yu), a product engineer with Ford Motor Company, 

copied approximately 4,000 For documents onto an external hard drive to help 

obtain a job with a Chinese automotive company. He was arrested in October 

2009, pleaded guilty to two counts of theft of trade secrets, and sentenced in 

April 2011 to 70 months in prison.21

External cyber threats to scientific and industrial data, believed to originate in 

China, have been well-documented in reports by outside vendors. Some examples include: 

• In its Night Dragon report, McAfee documented ‘‘coordinated covert and targeted cyberattacks have been conducted against global oil, energy, and petrochemical companies,’’ ‘‘targeting and harvesting sensitive competitive propri-
32 

etary operations and project-financing information with regard to oil and gas 

field bids and operations.’’ 22

• In his Shady Rat report, McAfee’s Dmitry Alperovitch identified 71 compromised organizations in one set of intrusions, including 13 defense contractors, 13 information technology companies, and 6 manufacturing companies.23

• In January 2010, Google reported a ‘‘highly sophisticated and targeted attack 

on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft 

of intellectual property,’’ including source code.24 Google claimed that the intrusion also targeted ‘‘at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of 

businesses—including the Internet, finance, technology, media and chemical 

sectors,’’ and was corroborated in separate admissions by Adobe.25

• In its GhostNet report, researchers at Information Warfare Monitor found 

1,295 infected computers in 103 countries, including a range of political, diplomatic and economic target organizations such as Deloitte and Touche’s New 

York office.26 The follow-on report, Shadows in the Cloud, identified additional 

targets, including Honeywell.27

Each of these reported intrusions were traced to IP addresses in China, and almost certainly represent only a fraction of the known hacks, given the reluctance 

of companies to report data breaches. 

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) 

It is also important to contextualize China’s interest in cyber espionage within 

Beijing’s threat perceptions of potential scenarios for military conflict. In the minds 

of the Chinese leadership, the available evidence suggests that the most important 

political-military challenges and the most likely flashpoints for Sino-US conflict involve Taiwan or the South China Sea. Should the late 1990s, the PLA has been 

hard at work bolstering the hedging options of the leadership, developing advanced 

campaign doctrines, testing the concepts in increasingly complex training and exercises, and integrating new indigenous and imported weapons systems. 

Yet cyber operations are also expected to play an important role in these scenarios, necessitating intelligence preparation of the cyber battlefield. At the strategic level, the writings of Chinese military authors suggest that there are two main 

centers of gravity in a Taiwan scenario, both of which can be attacked with computer network operations in concert with other kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities. 

The first of these is the will of the Taiwanese people, which they hope to undermine 

through exercises, cyber attacks against critical infrastructure, missile attacks, SOF 

operations, and other operations that have a psyop focus. Based on assessments 

from the 1995–1996 exercises, as well as public opinion polling in Taiwan, China 

appears to have concluded that the Taiwanese people do not have the stomach for 

conflict and will therefore sue for peace after suffering only a small amount of pain. 

The second center of gravity is the will and capability of the United States to intervene decisively in a cross-strait conflict. In a strategic sense, China has traditionally 

believed that its ICBM inventory, which is capable of striking CONUS, will serve 

as a deterrent to US intervention or at least a brake on escalation.28

Closer to its borders, the PLA has been engaged in an active program of equipment modernization, purchasing niche ‘‘counter-intervention’’ capabilities such as 

anti-ship ballistic missiles, long-range cruise missiles and submarines to shape the 

operational calculus of the American carrier strike group commander on station.29

According to the predictable cadre of ‘‘true believers,’’ both of the centers of gravity 

identified above can be attacked using computer network operations. In the first 

case, the Chinese IO community believes that CNO will play a useful psychological 

role in undermining the will of the Taiwanese people by attacking infrastructure 

and economic vitality. In the second case, the Chinese IO community envisions computer network attacks against unclassified NIPRNET and its automated logistics 

systems as an effective way to deter or delay US intervention into a military contingency and thereby permit Beijing to achieve its political objectives with a minimum 

of fighting. In both cases, China must conduct substantial computer network exploitation (the military term for cyber espionage) for intelligence preparation of this battlefield, and the alleged intrusion set into NIPRNET computer systems would appear 

to fulfill this military requirement. 

Why does the Chinese military believe that the deployment phase of US military 

operations, particularly the use of the unclassified NIPRNET for logistics deployments, is the primary focus of vulnerability? Since DESERT STORM in the early 

1990s, the PLA has expended significant resources analyzing the operations of what 

it often and euphemistically terms ‘‘the high-tech enemy.’’ 30 When Chinese strategists contemplate how to affect US deployments, they confront the limitations of 

their current conventional force, which does not have range sufficient to interdict 

US facilities or assets beyond the Japanese home islands.31 Nuclear options, while 
33 

theoretically available, are nonetheless far too escalatory to be used so early in the 

conflict.32 Theater missile systems, which are possibly moving to a mixture of conventional and nuclear warheads, could be used against Japan or Guam, but uncertainties about the nature of a given warhead would likely generate responses similar to the nuclear scenario.33 Instead, PLA analysts of US military operations presciently concluded that the key vulnerability was the mechanics of deployment 

itself. Specifically, Chinese authors highlight DoD’s need to use civilian backbone 

and unclassified computer networks (known as the NIPRNET), which is a function 

of the requirements of global power projection, as an ‘‘Achilles Heel.’’ There is also 

recognition of the fact that operations in the Pacific are especially reliant on precisely coordinated transportation, communications, and logistics networks, given 

what PACOM calls the ‘‘tyranny of distance’’ 34 in the theater. PLA strategists believe that a disruptive computer network attack against these systems or affiliated 

civilian systems could potentially delay or degrade US force deployment to the region while allowing the PRC to maintain a degree of plausible deniability. 

The Chinese are right to highlight the NIPRNET as an attractive and accessible 

target, unlike its classified counterparts. It is attractive because it contains and 

transmits critical deployment information in the all-important time-phased force deployment list (known as the ‘‘tip-fiddle’’), which is valuable for both intelligencegathering about US military operations but also a lucrative target for disruptive attacks. In terms of accessibility, it was relatively easy to gather data about the 

NIRPNET from open sources, at least before 9/11. Moreover, the very nature of the 

system is the source of its vulnerabilities, since the needs of global power project 

mandate that it has to be unclassified and connected to the greater global network, 

albeit through protected gateways.35

DoD’s classified networks, on the other hand, are an attractive but less accessible 

target for the Chinese. On the one hand, these networks would be an intelligence 

gold mine, and is likely a priority computer network exploit target. On the other 

hand, they are less attractive as a computer network attack target, thanks to the 

difficulty of penetrating its high defenses. Any overall Chinese military strategy 

predicated on a high degree of success in penetrating these networks during crisis 

or war is a high-risk venture, and increases the chances of failure of the overall effort to an unacceptable level. 

Chinese CNE or CNA operations against logistics networks could have a detrimental impact on US logistics support to operations. PRC computer network exploit 

activities directed against US military logistics networks could reveal force deployment information, such as the names of ships deployed, readiness status of various 

units, timing and destination of deployments, and rendezvous schedules. This is especially important for the Chinese in times of crisis, since the PRC in peacetime utilizes US military web sites and newspapers as a principal source for deployment information. An article in October 2001 in People’s Daily, for example, explicitly cited 

US Navy web sites for information about the origins, destination and purpose of two 

carrier battle groups exercising in the South China Sea.36 Since the quantity and 

quality of deployment information on open websites has been dramatically reduced 

after 9/11, the intelligence benefits (necessity?) of exploiting the NIPRNET have become even more paramount.37 Computer network attack could also delay re-supply 

to the theater by misdirecting stores, fuel, and munitions, corrupting or deleting inventory files, and thereby hindering mission capability. 

The advantages to this strategy are numerous: (1) it is available to the PLA in 

the near-term; (2) it does not require the PLA to be able to attack/invade Taiwan 

with air/sea assets; (3) it has a reasonable level of deniability, provided that the attack is sophisticated enough to prevent tracing; (4) it exploits perceived US casualty 

aversion, over-attention to force protection, the tyranny of distance in the Pacific, 

and US dependence on information systems; and (5) it could achieve the desired 

operational and psychological effects: deterrence of US response or degrading of deployments. Looking back over more than ten years of China-origin intrusions into the 

very NIPRNET systems identified by PLA analysts as a high-priority network attack 

target as early as 1995, the logic of the intrusion sets becomes much clearer. 

Strategic Intelligence 

An additional motivation for cyber espionage is strategic intelligence about the 

policies and intentions of civilian and military officials as well as the internals of 

debates within the US government and political parties: 

1. In June 2006, the State Department was victimized by a series of intrusions 

at its foreign posts and headquarters in Washington. According to the Associated Press, ‘‘hackers stole sensitive information and passwords, and implanted 

‘back doors’ in unclassified computers to allow them to return.’’ Employees told 

the AP that State’s East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau was particularly hard 
34 

hit by the intrusion, suggesting that the intruders had a special interest in 

Asia-related information.38 Two reporters from Business Week relate the story 

of what happened: 

‘‘The attack began in May, 2006, when an unwitting employee in the State Dept.’s 

East Asia Pacific region clicked on an attachment in a seemingly authentic e-mail. 

Malicious code was embedded in the Word document, a congressional speech, and 

opened a Trojan ‘‘back door’’ for the code’s creators to peer inside the State Dept.’s 

innermost networks. Soon, cyber security engineers began spotting more intrusions 

in State Dept. computers across the globe. The malware took advantage of previously unknown vulnerabilities in the Microsoft operating system. Unable to develop a patch quickly enough, engineers watched helplessly as streams of State 

Dept. data slipped through the back door and into the Internet ether. Although they 

were unable to fix the vulnerability, specialists came up with a temporary scheme 

to block further infections. They also yanked connections to the Internet. One member of the emergency team summoned to the scene recalls that each time cyber security professionals thought they had eliminated the source of a ‘‘beacon’’ reporting 

back to its master, another popped up. He compared the effort to the arcade game 

Whack-A-Mole. The State Dept. says it eradicated the infection, but only after sanitizing scores of infected computers and servers and changing passwords.’’ 39

2. In 2007, intruders broke into the e-mail system for Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s office, and the Pentagon shut down about 1,500 computers for more 

than a week while the attacks continued. Officials told the Financial Times ‘‘an 

internal investigation has revealed that the incursion came from the People’s 

Liberation Army. One senior US official said the Pentagon had pinpointed the 

exact origins of the attack. Another person familiar with the event said there 

was a ‘very high level of confidence . . . trending towards total certainty’ that 

the PLA was responsible.’’ 40

3. In the summer of 2008, the FBI informed both the Obama and McCain presidential campaigns that their computer systems had been infiltrated. Newsweek 

quoted an FBI agent as telling both teams: ‘‘You have a problem way bigger 

than what you understand . . . You have been compromised, and a serious 

amount of files have been loaded off your system.’’ 41 The Financial Times later 

cited investigators ‘‘had determined that the attacks originated from China, but 

cautioned that they had not ascertained whether they were government-sponsored, or just unaffiliated hackers.’’ 42 In a cybersecurity policy speech early in 

his Presidency, Obama referred to the incident: ‘‘I know how it feels to have privacy violated because it has happened to me and the people around me. It’s no 

secret that my presidential campaign harnessed the Internet and technology to 

transform our politics. What isn’t widely known is that during the general election hackers managed to penetrate our computer systems. To all of you who donated to our campaign, I want you to all rest assured, our fundraising website 

was untouched. So your confidential personal and financial information was 

protected. But between August and October, hackers gained access to emails 

and a range of campaign files, from policy position papers to travel plans. And 

we worked closely with the CIA—with the FBI and the Secret Service and hired 

security consultants to restore the security of our systems.’’ 43

These three sample cases show that Beijing clearly views cyber as a collection modality for obtaining strategic intelligence at the highest levels of the US Government. 

CHINESE GOVERNMENT DENIALS

‘‘The lady doth protest too much, methinks’’—Shakespeare, Macbeth 

In counterintelligence offices in Washington, one often sees the following sign: 

‘‘Admit Nothing, Deny Everything, Make Vigorous Counter-Accusations’’. This philosophy is also a deeply held conviction of the Chinese side when it comes to discussing their possible role in cyber intrusions. First, they admit nothing and deny 

everything. When asked about the China-origin intrusions into German Chancellor 

Angela Merkel’s office network, for example, ‘‘the Chinese Embassy in Berlin describing the accusation of state-controlled hacking as ‘‘irresponsible speculation 

without a shred of evidence.’’ 44 Chinese officials also point to Chinese laws as an 

ironclad defense of its own lack of involvement. Reacting to accusations from that 

Chinese hackers were responsible for the intrusions revealed by Google in January 

2010, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu countered that ‘‘Chinese law proscribes any form of hacking activity.’’ 45 After the release of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive’s 2011 ‘‘Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage,’’ Chinese officials denigrated the quality 
35 

of the analysis, asserting that ‘‘identifying the attackers without carrying out a comprehensive investigation and making inferences about the attackers is both unprofessional and irresponsible.’’ 46 Then, the Chinese government impugns the motives 

of the accusers, making its own counter-accusations. In his response to questions 

about GhostNet, Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang accused foreigners of having a ‘‘Cold War mentality’’: 

The problem now is that some people abroad are keen to fabricate the rumor 

of the so-called ‘Chinese cyber spy network.’ The allegation is utterly groundless...There is a ghost called Cold War and a virus called China’s threat theory 

overseas. Some people, possessed by this ghost and infected with this virus, fall 

ill from time to time. Their attempts of using rumors to disgrace China will 

never succeed. We should rightly expose these ghosts and viruses.47

Wang Baodong, a spokesman for the Chinese government at its embassy in Washington, darkly hinted that ‘‘anti-China forces’’ are behind the allegations.48 After the 

US-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s release of a Northrup-Grumman report on Chinese cyber espionage, Qin Gang railed: 

The report takes no regard of the true situation. It is full of prejudice, and out 

of ulterior motive. We urge the so-called commission not to see China through 

colored lens and not to do things that interfere with China’s internal affairs and 

undermine China-US relations.49

Finally, the Chinese government describes itself as the victim of cyber intrusions. 

After a detailed expose of Chinese cyber espionage appeared in Business Week, 

Wang Baodong emailed the magazine’s editors, claiming that China is ‘‘frequently 

intruded and attacked by hackers from certain countries.’’ 50 When asked in early 

2010 about Google’s complaint that it had been hacked from China, Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu said Chinese companies have also been hacked, adding 

that China resolutely opposes the practice.51 Other officials have cited the fact that 

most of the world’s botnets are controlled from servers in the United States, insinuating that Washington needed to get its own cybersecurity in order before accusing 

other countries of hacking. Finally, the Chinese government tries to paint itself as 

the patron of global cybersecurity, in contrast to the ‘‘militarized’’ US approach to 

cyber: ‘‘China is ready to build, together with other countries, a peaceful, secure and 

open cyberspace order.’’ 52 While Beijing’s style of strategic communications is not 

limited to cyber espionage, as seen in its rhetoric during crises (Belgrade Embassy 

bombing in 1999, EP–3A hostage crisis in 2001, etc.), the reaction of its officials has 

the unintended consequence of increasing suspicion. 

HOW GOOD ARE THEY? OR DOES IT MATTER?

Measuring Chinese cyber espionage capability also involves the assessment of a 

group or country’s ability to generate new attack tools or exploits. Outside analysts, 

many of whom are programmers themselves, tend to reify countries like Russia that 

abound with highly talented programmers, and look down upon countries or individuals that simply use off-the-shelf ‘‘script kiddie’’ tools or exploit known 

vulnerabilities, preferring to admire more advanced cyber operators who can discover their own ‘‘zero-day’’ vulnerabilities.53 Indeed, analysts who have examined 

Chinese intrusions in detail often comment on their relative lack of sophistication 

and especially their sloppy tradecraft,54 leaving behind clear evidence of the intrusion and sometimes even attribution-related information. For example, analysts who 

examined possible Chinese intrusions into energy companies concluded that Chinese 

hackers were ‘‘incredibly sloppy,’’ ‘‘very unsophisticated,’’ ‘‘made mistakes and left 

lots of evidence.’’ 55 Perhaps the Chinese cyber operators are so convinced of the 

plausible deniability afforded by the current global network architecture that they 

do not see the need to hide more effectively, or perhaps they believe that their communications are secure because they are using Chinese language. Both are true to 

some extent, especially the latter, as many Chinese correctly perceive that their difficult language is actually the country’s first line of defense, its first layer of cryptography, and there actually few foreigners with the skills or bandwidth to penetrate the veil. Most important, however, the Chinese probably perceive that they do 

not need to ‘‘up their game’’ because their relatively primitive and sloppy efforts 

have thus far been wildly successful and therefore see no need to change. In fact, 

one could argue that China’s cyber espionage successes to date are more a function 

of the vulnerability of US systems than any inherent capability on the Chinese side. 

As time passes, however, one would expect Chinese capability to improve, particularly as information about China-origin intrusions becomes more widespread and 

victims begin to take concrete measures to protect themselves. This view is endorsed 
36 

by former counterintelligence chief Joel Brenner, who told the National Journal in 

2008 that Chinese hackers are ‘‘very good and getting better all the time.’’ 56

* * * * * * * 

1 ‘‘General Warns of Dramatic Increase of Cyber-Attacks on US Firms,’’ Los Angeles Times, 

27 July 2012. 2Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic 

Secrets in Cyberspace: Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2009–2011, October 2011, http://www.dni.gov/reports/20111103lreportlfecie.pdf 3Tom Espiner, ‘‘Chinese Hackers US Military Defenses,’’ Silicon.com, November 2005; and 

Bradley Graham, ‘‘Hackers Attack Via Chinese Web Sites,’’ The Washington Post, August 2005. 4Dawn Onley, Dawn and Patience Wait, ‘‘Red Storm Rising: DoD’s Efforts to Stave Off 

Nation- State Cyber Attacks Begin with China,’’ Government Computer News, August 2006. 5See General James E. Cartwright, in hearing, China’s Military Modernization and Its Impact 

on the United States and the Asia-Pacific, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 

110th Cong, 1st Sess., March 29–30, 2007, p. 90, at www.uscc.gov/hearings/2007hearings/transcripts/marl29l30/marl29l30l07ltrans.pdf. 6Shane Harris, ‘‘China’s Cyber Militia,’’ National Journal, 31 May 2008. 7 Brian Grow, Keith Epstein and Chi-Chu Tschang, ‘‘The New E-spionage Threat,’’ Business 

Week, 21 April 2008, pp.32–41. 8 Bryan Krekel, Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and 

Computer Network Exploitation, published by the US-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission, 9 October 2009. 9 Harris, ‘‘China’s Cyber Militia.’’ 

10 ‘‘Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Keith Alexander USA, Nominee for Commander, United States Cyber Command,’’ published by Senate Armed Services Committee, 

accessed at: http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/04%20April/Alexander%2004–15– 

10.pdf 11Shaun Waterman, ‘‘Chinese Cyberspy Network Pervasive,’’ Washington Times, 30 March 

2009. 12 Harris ‘‘China’s Cyber Militia.’’ 13 Ibid. 14For a range of views on the attribution issue, see Krekel, Capability of the People’s Republic 

of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation; McAfee® Foundstone® 

Professional Services and McAfee LabsTM, Global Energy Cyberattacks: ‘Night Dragon’, 10 February 2011; Shishir Nagaraja and Ross Anderson, ‘‘The Snooping Dragon: Social-Malware Surveillance of the Tibetan Movement,’’ UCAM–CL–TR–746, University of Cambridge Computer 

Laboratory Technical Report 746, March 2009; Dmitri Alperovitch, Revealed: Operation Shady 

RAT, McAfee, August 2011; and Information Warfare Monitor, Tracking GhostNet: Investigating 

a Cyber Espionage Network, Toronto: SecDev and Citizen Lab, 29 March 2009. 15 Harris, ‘‘China’s Cyber Militia.’’ 16 James McGregor, ‘‘China’s Drive for ‘Indigenous Innovation’: A Web of Industrial Policies,’’ 

Washington, DC: US Chamber of Commerce, July 2010. 17 James McGregor, ‘‘Time to rethink US-China trade relations,’’ Washington Post, 19 May 

2010. See also McGregor, ‘‘China’s Drive for ‘Indigenous Innovation.’ ’’ 18 Ibid. 19 Nathan Thornburgh, ‘‘The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies (and the Man Who Tried to 

Stop Them),’’ Time, 29 August 2005. 20 Nathan Gardels, ‘‘China is Aiming at America’s Soft Underbelly: The Internet,’’ The Christian Science Monitor, 5 February 2010, accessed at: http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/ 

Global-Viewpoint/2010/0205/China-is-aiming-at-America-s-soft-underbelly-the-Internet 21Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic 

Secrets in Cyberspace. 22McAfee, Night Dragon. 23 Alperovitch, Operation Shady RAT. 24http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html 25http://blogs.adobe.com/conversations/2010/01/adobe—investigates—corporate—n.html 26 Information Warfare Monitor, Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network, 

Toronto: SecDev and Citizen Lab, 29 March 2009, accessed at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/ 

13731776/Tracking-GhostNet-Investigating-a-Cyber-Espionage-Network 27 Information Warfare Monitor and Shadowserver, Shadows in the Cloud: Investigating Cyber 

Espionage 2.0, Toronto: SecDec and Citizen Lab, 6 April 2010, found at www.shadows-in-thecloud.net 28Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011, p.3. 29 Ibid., pp.2–4, 28–29. 30 Ibid., p.22. 31 Ibid., p.31. 32 Ibid., p.34. 33 Ibid., pp.29,78. 34For a PACOM/J4 perspective on the issue, see http://www.navsup.navy.mil/scnewsletter/ 

2009/jan-feb/cover1 35For an unclassified summary, see http://www.disa.mil/Services/Network-Services/Data/SBU– 

IP. 36 ‘‘Whom, If Not China, Is US Aircraft Carriers’ Moving onto South China Sea Directed 

Against? ’’ Renmin Ribao, 24 August 2001. 
37 

37The Department of Defense’s revised web site administration guidance, which can be found 

here (http://www.defenselink.mil/webmasters/policy/dodlweblpolicyl12071998lwithl 

amendmentslandlcorrections.html), specifically prohibits the following: ‘‘3.5.3.2. Reference to 

unclassified information that would reveal sensitive movements of military assets or the location 

of units, installations, or personnel where uncertainty regarding location is an element of a military plan or program.’’ 38 ‘‘Computer Hackers Attack State Dept.,’’ Associated Press, 12 July 2006. 39Grow, Epstein and Tschang, ‘‘The New E-spionage Threat.’’ 40Sevastopluo, Demetri, ‘‘Chinese Hacked into Pentagon,’’ FT.com, 3 September 2007. 41 Evan Thomas, ‘‘Center Stage,’’ Newsweek, 6 November 2008; David Byers, Tom Baldwin 

and Tim Reid, ‘‘Obama computers ’hacked during election campaign,’ ’’ Times Online, 7 November 2008. 42Financial Times, November 2008. 43 ‘‘Remarks by the President on Securing our Nation’s Cyber Infrastructure,’’ Office of the 

Press Secretary, The White House, 29 May 2009. 44 ‘‘Merkel’s China Visit Marred by Hacking Allegations,’’ Spiegel Online International, 27 August 2007. 45 Helft, Miguel, and John Markoff, ‘‘Google Alerted Activists of Attacks,’’ New York Times, 

15 January 2010. 46 ‘‘China Rebuts US Accusation of Hacker Attacks,’’ China Daily, 31 October 2011. 47 ‘‘China Denies Allegations on ‘Cyber Spy Network’.’’ 48Grow, Epstein and Tschang, ‘‘The New E-spionage Threat.’’ 49 Clayton, Mark, ‘‘Google cyber attack: the evidence against China,’’ Christian Science Monitor, 13 January 2010. 50Grow, Epstein and Tschang, ‘‘The New E-spionage Threat.’’ 51 ‘‘China Says Google, Foreign Firms Must Respect Laws,’’ CIOL, 19 January 2010. 52 ‘‘China Rebuts US Accusation of Hacker Attacks,’’ China Daily, 31 October 2011. 53http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-daylattack 54Keizer, Gregg, ‘‘Chinese Hackers Called Sloppy but Persistent,’’ Computerworld, 12 February 2011. 55 Ibid. 56 Harris, ‘‘China’s Cyber Militia.’’ 
38 
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52 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SHERROD BROWN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO; 

CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

JUNE 25, 2013 

I thank Cochairman Chris Smith, the other Commissioners, and our esteemed 

panel for attending this important hearing. 

I also thank the staff for their tireless efforts in supporting the work of this bipartisan Commission and its important task of monitoring human rights and rule of 

law developments in China. 

Cyber attacks from China pose a serious threat to U.S.-China relations. 

So much so that President Obama raised the issue during his recent summit with 

President Xi Jinping. It will be a key topic at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue to be held in Washington in a few weeks. 

Today’s hearing will focus on the aspects of cyber that fall within the Commission’s mandate, namely the impact on the rule of law and human rights in China. 

While recent headlines have revived the debate over the appropriate balance between security and freedom, we must not overlook the enormous impact cyber attacks from China have had and continue to have on American jobs and companies. 

Indeed, they seriously call into question China’s commitment to the rule of law. 
53 

We are talking about the massive theft of valuable technology and commercial secrets from American companies—what General Keith Alexander, director of the National Security Agency and head of U.S. Cyber Command, calls the ‘‘greatest transfer of wealth in history.’’ 

The scale and scope is staggering. The Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, which is represented here today by our former colleague Senator 

Slade Gorton, released a comprehensive, report identifying China as the world’s biggest violator of intellectual property rights. 

It estimates that China accounts for some 50 to 80 percent of IP theft in the 

United States and around the globe. It found that international IP theft, including 

from China, costs the U.S. economy hundreds of billions of dollars per year and millions of jobs, dragging down our GDP and undermining our ability to innovate and 

prosper. 

The IP Commission noted that a 2011 study by the U.S. International Trade Commission estimated that if China’s IP protection improved to a level comparable to 

ours, it would add 2.1 million jobs to our economy. Yet, the IP Commission acknowledged this figure underestimated the real cost to American jobs. 

The victims of IP theft include companies in my state of Ohio and across the nation. Those affected are hard-working Americans trying to make an honest living 

and trying to spur innovation, only to see their products, services, and technology 

stolen and handed over to state-owned enterprises and businesses in China. 

And with the growing prevalence of computer networks and America’s heavilywired economy, cyber attacks represent an increasingly growing threat alongside 

more traditional forms of IP theft. 

China simply doesn’t play by the same rules as we do. The Chinese government 

has denied these attacks, even though there is mounting evidence of Chinese state 

involvement. This evidence includes a February 2013 report by the cyber security 

firm Mandiant that linked attacks on 141 companies, including 115 based in the 

United States, to a unit of the People’s Liberation Army working from a building 

in Shanghai. The increase in attacks has coincided with the Chinese government’s 

push for indigenous innovation and development of key industries, creating an environment where it’s perfectly acceptable to cheat and steal your way to the top. 

And as we’ve seen in the last few years, it’s not only American companies that 

are the target of cyber attacks. It’s also media and human rights organizations. 

Journalists writing about corruption in China find their computer systems hacked 

and passwords stolen. For human rights organizations and activists, dealing with 

hacking attacks from China is almost a daily fact of life. 

We can’t sit idly by while the Chinese government, either through active measures or by turning a blind eye, continues to perpetuate theft on a grand scale and 

to threaten the advance of human rights for the Chinese people, Tibetans, Uyghurs, 

democracy advocates, religious followers, and Falun Gong practitioners. 

That’s why I support a comprehensive, common sense, bipartisan approach that 

utilizes every tool in our arsenal to hold China accountable and to level the playing 

field. I urge Congress and this Administration to do everything it can—from 

leveraging access to our markets, trade negotiations, and WTO cases—to combat 

China’s unfair trading practices. That includes taking up the bipartisan Currency 

Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2013 which I introduced earlier this month. 

And I commend Senator Levin for his recent proposed legislation to hold China 

accountable for cyber theft. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on what 

more we can do to address this most pressing issue. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE

FROM NEW JERSEY; COCHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON

CHINA

JUNE 25, 2013

In December of 2006 and then again in March of 2007, my Human Rights Subcommittee’s computers were attacked by a virus that, in The U.S. House Information Resources Office’s words, ‘‘intended to take control of the computers.’’ At that 

time, the IT professionals cleaned the computers and informed my staff that the attacks seemed to come from the People’s Republic of China. They said it came 

through or from a Chinese IP address. The attackers hacked into files related to 

China. These contained legislative proposals directly related to Beijing, including a 

major bill I authored, the Global Online Freedom Act. Also hacked were e-mails 

with human rights groups regarding strategy, information on hearings on China 
54 

and the names of Chinese dissidents. While this absolutely doesn’t prove that Beijing was behind the attack, it raises very serious concern that it was. 

Certainly, Chinese agents have not only attempted to target me or my offices. 

Cyber attacks on Congress are only a small, but not insignificant, part of a much 

larger pattern of attacks that has targeted the executive branch, the Pentagon, and 

American businesses. 

How do we know this? In recent months, we have seen in-depth reports come out 

detailing this massive intrusion into our cyber space and massive theft of our cyber 

data. Chinese agents have stolen our designs for helicopters, ships, fighter jets, and 

several missile defense systems. They have stolen our innovative technologies, from 

solar panel designs to biotech research. These thefts appear to have paid off for 

China. In recent years, the Chinese government has made tremendous jumps in its 

military capabilities, while boosting the competitiveness of China’s ‘‘national champions.’’ 

While cyber thefts have existed for years, increasingly, we can prove that many 

of these outrageous thefts—deemed ‘‘the greatest transfer of wealth in history’’— 

originate in the People’s Republic of China. And these attacks are not random. We 

now know, with some certainty, that some thefts are being organized by Chinese 

government agencies. 

As we learn about the source of these attacks, we are also learning about the motivations. Talented Chinese Internet users are working day and night to infiltrate 

our networks and to steal secrets. China’s actions are part of a larger and coordinated state-sanctioned effort to increase China’s competitiveness, militarily and 

commercially. 

Today, we will hear more about how the commercial rule of law system in China 

allows these types of attacks to occur and how these attacks disadvantage American 

business, innovators, contractors, and government agencies. We will hear about the 

size and scope of the attacks. And, we will hear how the U.S. government remains 

unprepared for far too many of these challenges. 

We will, also, however, hear about another side of this important topic—one often 

overlooked during the recent discussions about China’s cyber attacks. The Chinese 

government is not only targeting American business and military organizations, but 

also targeting ordinary Chinese citizens seeking to advance their most fundamental 

freedoms. Chinese hackers do not simply look beyond their borders to steal secrets. 

As we will hear today, Chinese citizens—including those advocating for human 

rights, free speech and food safety—are also targeted by state-sponsored hackers. 

These courageous citizens are also monitored; their private information stolen. 

The brave pastor seeking to organize a service, the father seeking to raise awareness about toxic foods, the wife of an imprisoned activist, the mother who is made 

to undergo a forced abortion—all of these citizens realize that, in any instant, the 

government may be watching. China, of course, also targets those outside of China 

who similarly wish for human rights and political reform. 

Today, we know this system of surveillance and theft occurs. We know that China 

is organizing these cyber attacks—or is, in the very least, complicit to their existence. 

The question we must ask ourselves is why? Clearly, China’s rise as a military 

power requires technology, and China’s economy will, no doubt, benefit from the latest innovations from abroad. 

But, why is China so concerned about its domestic citizenry—especially those who 

advocate peacefully for legal and political reforms? Why is China so worried about 

international NGOs that seek to highlight official abuses and wrongful 

imprisonments? Why is China so reluctant to provide a fair regulatory environment 

in China, when commercial laws and regulations will eventually protect all businesses—domestic and foreign—seeking to provide the best services for Chinese consumers? 

These may be difficult questions. Thankfully, today we are fortunate to have four 

guests who are well versed in these issues. They are experts on how China is monitoring our cyber actions and how China is attacking targets globally. I would like 

to thank them for their participation here today, and I look forward to hearing their 

insights on these critical issues. 

Æ