### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE

JA M ES L. M O O R E v. K EVI N M Y ER S, W A R D EN

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Wayne County

No. 13753 Robert

Hollow ay, Judge

No. M2005- 01855-CCA -R3-HC - F iled Dece m ber 16, 2005

Petitioner, J ames L . Moore, ha s appea led from t h e t rial court’s summary dismiss al of the pe tition for writ of habea s corpus filed by Petitioner. The State has filed a motion, pursuant to Rule 20 of theRul e s o f the Te nn e sse e Cou rt of Cr imi na l App e a ls, fo r a ff ir ma nc e of

the tria l c ou rt ’s jud g me nt. Petitioner opposes the motion. After a thorough review of the record, we g rant the State’ s motion
a nda c c or din g ly

a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Affir m e d P ur sua nt

to Rul e 20 of t he Te nne sse e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

T H O M A S T. W OOD A LL , J

. , delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

J ames L . Moore, Clifton, Tenne ssee, pro s e
.
Paul G . Summe rs , Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; B e njamin A. B a ll, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; and T. Miche l Bottoms, District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, the State of Tenne ssee.

M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION

On J une 2, 1993, Petitioner pled g uiltyto first deg ree murder i n C as e No

. 2 7 230 in the Circuit Court of Rutherford County

. The plea wa s entere d pursuant to a ne g otiated plea a g ree ment and P etitioner receive d a sentence of life i mprisonment. The judgment er roneously desig nated that Petitioner was being sentenc ed as a “Standa rd 30% Rang e 1” of

fende r. This was c aused by the wrong box being chec ked on the judgme nt. The judgme nt should have had the “1 Deg ree Murder ” st box chec ked instead.
Appar ently , the Depa

rtment of Correc tion would not honor that portion of t h e j u d gment which re flec ted that Petitioner was a “Standar d 30% Rang e 1” o ff ender . Acc ording ly , Petitioner f i l e d a c o m p l a i n ts e e k i n g d e c l ar a t o r y j u d g m e n ti n t h e C h a n c e r y C o u r to f D a v i d s o n C o u n t y, reque sting that the c ourt ord er t h e De partment of Corr ection to maintain in its recor ds that Petitioner’s parole rele ase e ligibility would be as a

“Standar d 30% Rang e 1” of fende r.-2-

Subsequently , on October 18, 1999, the Circuit Court of Rutherfor d Co u n t y en tere d an
am en d ed judg ment in Case No. 27230, Petitioner’s fir st deg ree murder c ase, and the amende d judgme nt corre ctly

ref lected that Petiti oner w as sentenc ed pursuant to the S entenc e Reform Act of 1989 for a conviction of 1 Deg reeMurder , rathe r than the inc orre ct desig nation of being sentenc ed st as a “ Standard 30% Ra ng e 1” of fende r.
The Chanc ery

C o u rt o f D av i d s o n C o u n t y s u b s eq u en t l y

dismiss ed, with pre

judice, Petitioner’s complaint for de clar atory judgme nt. Acc ording to Petiti oner in this appea l, neither pa rty appea led from the Chancery Court’s judgme nt. On April 15, 2005, Petitioner filed the “ Petition for Writ of Ha be as Co rpus” wh ic h is thesu bje c t of thi s a pp e a l. In h is p e tit ionfo r w ri t of ha be a s c or pu s, P eti ti on er alle g e s th a t th e orig ina l ju dg me nt e nte re d inJune 19 93 wa s n ull a ndvo id b y be ing in direc t contrave ntion of Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-35-501( h)(1) (2001). He a lso alleg es that he is e nti tle d to re lie f b e c aus e theCir c uit Cou rt of Ru the rf

or d Co un ty

la c ke d ju ri sd ic tio n to amend the judgme nt afte r i t became final, a nd that the writ of ha beas c orpus is an appr opriate r emedy for a revie w for “ such a jurisdictional de fec t in an illega l judgment.”

I n T e n n e s s e e , “ [a ]n y

p e r s o n i m p r i s o n e d o r

r e s tr a i n e d o f

h i s l i b e r t y , u n d e r

a n y p r e te ns e wha ts o e v e r , . . . may

p r o s e c u tea

w r it o f h ab e a s c o rp u s , to in q u ir e in to th e c au s e o f s u ch imprisonment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 21-101. Howe ver, it i s well-e stablished law that the r emedy of habeas corpus is limit ed in both scope a nd relief

. Po tts v . S tate , 833 S.W .2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992)

. Th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt ha s e xpla ine d t he very

lim ite d s c op e of

ha be a s c or pu s r e lie f i n Te nn e sse e a s f

oll ow s:
Habe as cor

pus relief is available in Tennessee only when “it appear s upon the fac e of thejud g me nt o r there c or d o f the pr oc e e dings upon wh ic h th e jud g me nt i s rende red” that a convic ting c ourt was without j urisdiction or authority to sentence a defe ndant, or that a

defe ndant’s sente nce of imprisonment or o t her r estraint has expired.

Arc he r v . S tate , 851 S.W .2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993) (c itation omit ted). Additionally , this Court has stated:

I f the c ourt rende ring a judgment has jurisdiction of the pe rson, the subjec t-matter, and has the authority to ma ke the cha lleng ed judg ment, the judg ment is voidable, not void; and the judg ment may not be collater ally

attacke d in a suit for

habea s corpus relief

.
Pa sse ra lla v . S tate , 891 S.W .2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) , superc eded by statute as stated in State v. Stev en S. Newman , N o. 02 C01 -9 70 7- CC- 00 26 6, 19 98 WL 10 44 92 , at *1 n. 2 ( Te nn . Crim. App. at Jackson, Mar. 11, 1998).. The burden is on the petitioner to establish by a pre ponderance of the e vidence that the judg ment he attac ks is void or t h at his term of imprisonment has expired.-3-

State ex rel. Kuntz v. B omar , 2 14 Te nn . 5 00 , 5 04 , 3 81 S.W. 2d29 0, 29 1- 92 (1 96 4) ; Pa sse re lla , 891 S.W .2d at 627.

A t ri a l c ou rt is n ot r e qu ir e d as a ma tte r of la w to g rant the writ andc on du c t a n in qu iry int o thea lle g a tio ns c on ta ine d in the pe tit ion

. Te nn

. Cod e An n. § 29 -2 1- 10 9. I f the pe tit ionfails on its fa c e to s tate a

c og niza ble c la im fo r writ of ha

be a s cor pu s, the n the tr ia l cou rt

ma y su mma ri ly dis mis s the petition. See State e

x. Re l. Byrd v. Bom ar , 2 1 4 T e n n

. 4 7 6 , 4 8 3 , 3 8 1 S. W. 2 d 2 8 0, 283 (1964). Un de r T e nn . Co de An n. § 2 9- 21 -1 09 , “[i]f fr om the sh ow ing of the de fe nd a nt, the plaint if f w ou ld not be entitled to any

relief , the writ may

be re fused.”

I n a c ri min a l ca se , a judg me nt in dir e c t con tr a ve nti on of the e xpre sse d pro vis ion s of a s ta tut e is an illega l judgment a nd conseque ntly , a nullity

. Sta te v . B ur k ha rt , 566 S.W .2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978). In Bu rk

ha rt , our supre me court further stated that “[a]s a gen er al rul e, a trial judge may c or re c t a n il le g a l, a s o pp os e d to a me re ly e rr on e ou s, se nte nc e , at a ny tim e , e ve n if it h a s b e c ome f in a l. ” Id

. I n cluded within t he tec hnical re cord of this case is a transcript of the g uiltyplea p ro ce ed i n gs

. T h e P et i t i o n ercl ea rl y s t at ed o n t h e r ec o rd d u ri n g t h e gu i l t y p l ea s u b m i s s i o n h ea ri n g, that he cor

rec tly understood that he w ould have to serve six ty (60%) perc ent of the sentenc e bef ore becoming eli gi b l e fo r parole rather than thirty (30%) perc ent as a

Standard, Rang e I

offe nder. There fore , the situation in Petitioner’s case is not that he pled g uiltyunder a misconception of the law. Obviously , this wa s a clerical err or, which can be cor rec ted at any

time. The Circuit Court of Rutherford County

properly fi l ed an amended judg ment which cor rec ted the cle rica l error . The judgme nt under whic h Petitioner is now sentence d is not void, and th e sentenc e has not e x pired. Acc ording ly , the trial court properly dismiss ed his pe tition for ha beas c orpus re lief. Petitioner is not
e nti tle d to re lie f i n th is a

pp e a l.

CO NC LU SION

T h e j u d g m e n t r e n d e r e d i n t h i s m a t t e r w a s i n a p r o c e e d i n g b e f

o r e t h e tr i a l c o u r tw i t h o u ta j u r y, thejud g me nt w a s n ot a de te rm inatio n of g uil t, andthee vid e nc e in the re c or d d oe s n ot p re po nd e rate
a g a ins t th e fi nd ing s o f the tr ia l c ou rt . N o e rr or of la w r e qu ir in g a re ve rs a l of thejud g me nt i s appar ent on t he record. Acc ording ly , the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20 of theRul e s o f the Te nn e sse e Cou rt of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls.

_________________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL

L , J UDGE