IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

JAMES L. MOORE v. KEVIN MYERS, WARDEN

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Wayne County

No. 13753 Robert Holloway, Judge

No. M2005-01855-CCA-R3-HC - Filed December 16, 2005

Petitioner, James L. Moore, has appealed from the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition

for writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner. The State has filed a motion, pursuant to Rule 20 of

the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, for affirmance of the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner opposes the motion. After a thorough review of the record, we grant the State’s motion

and accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court

Affirmed Pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals

THOMAS T. WOODALL, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID H. WELLES and

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JJ., joined.

James L. Moore, Clifton, Tennessee, pro se.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Assistant Attorney General;

and T. Michel Bottoms, District Attorney General, for the appellee, the State of Tennessee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On June 2, 1993, Petitioner pled guilty to first degree murder in Case No. 27230 in the

Circuit Court of Rutherford County. The plea was entered pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement

and Petitioner received a sentence of life imprisonment. The judgment erroneously designated that

Petitioner was being sentenced as a “Standard 30% Range 1” offender. This was caused by the

wrong box being checked on the judgment. The judgment should have had the “1 Degree Murder”

st

box checked instead.

Apparently, the Department of Correction would not honor that portion of the judgment

which reflected that Petitioner was a “Standard 30% Range 1” offender. Accordingly, Petitioner

filed a complaint seeking declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court of Davidson County,

requesting that the court order the Department of Correction to maintain in its records that

Petitioner’s parole release eligibility would be as a “Standard 30% Range 1” offender. 
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Subsequently, on October 18, 1999, the Circuit Court of Rutherford County entered an

amended judgment in Case No. 27230, Petitioner’s first degree murder case, and the amended

judgment correctly reflected that Petitioner was sentenced pursuant to the Sentence Reform Act of

1989 for a conviction of 1 Degree Murder, rather than the incorrect designation of being sentenced st

as a “Standard 30% Range 1” offender. 

The Chancery Court of Davidson County subsequently dismissed, with prejudice, Petitioner’s

complaint for declaratory judgment. According to Petitioner in this appeal, neither party appealed

from the Chancery Court’s judgment. On April 15, 2005, Petitioner filed the “Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus” which is the subject of this appeal. In his petition for writ of habeas corpus,

Petitioner alleges that the original judgment entered in June 1993 was null and void by being in

direct contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(h)(1) (2001). He also alleges

that he is entitled to relief because the Circuit Court of Rutherford County lacked jurisdiction to

amend the judgment after it became final, and that the writ of habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy

for a review for “such a jurisdictional defect in an illegal judgment.”

In Tennessee, “[a]ny person imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense

whatsoever, . . . may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such

imprisonment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101. However, it is well-established law that the remedy

of habeas corpus is limited in both scope and relief. Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992).

The Tennessee Supreme Court has explained the very limited scope of habeas corpus relief in

Tennessee as follows:

Habeas corpus relief is available in Tennessee only when “it appears upon the face

of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is

rendered” that a convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a

defendant, or that a defendant’s sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has

expired.

Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993) (citation omitted). Additionally, this Court has

stated:

If the court rendering a judgment has jurisdiction of the person, the subject-matter,

and has the authority to make the challenged judgment, the judgment is voidable, not

void; and the judgment may not be collaterally attacked in a suit for habeas corpus

relief. 

Passeralla v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), superceded by statute as stated

in State v. Steven S. Newman, No. 02C01-9707-CC-00266, 1998 WL 104492, at *1 n.2 (Tenn. Crim.

App. at Jackson, Mar. 11, 1998).. The burden is on the petitioner to establish by a preponderance

of the evidence that the judgment he attacks is void or that his term of imprisonment has expired.
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State ex rel. Kuntz v. Bomar, 214 Tenn. 500, 504, 381 S.W.2d 290, 291-92 (1964); Passerella, 891

S.W.2d at 627.

A trial court is not required as a matter of law to grant the writ and conduct an inquiry into

the allegations contained in the petition. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-109. If the petition fails on its

face to state a cognizable claim for writ of habeas corpus, then the trial court may summarily dismiss

the petition. See State ex. Rel. Byrd v. Bomar, 214 Tenn. 476, 483, 381 S.W.2d 280, 283 (1964).

Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-109, “[i]f from the showing of the defendant, the plaintiff would

not be entitled to any relief, the writ may be refused.” 

In a criminal case, a judgment in direct contravention of the expressed provisions of a statute

is an illegal judgment and consequently, a nullity. State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn.

1978). In Burkhart, our supreme court further stated that “[a]s a general rule, a trial judge may

correct an illegal, as opposed to a merely erroneous, sentence, at any time, even if it has become

final.” Id. Included within the technical record of this case is a transcript of the guilty plea

proceedings. The Petitioner clearly stated on the record during the guilty plea submission hearing,

that he correctly understood that he would have to serve sixty (60%) percent of the sentence before

becoming eligible for parole rather than thirty (30%) percent as a Standard, Range I offender.

Therefore, the situation in Petitioner’s case is not that he pled guilty under a misconception of the

law. Obviously, this was a clerical error, which can be corrected at any time. The Circuit Court of

Rutherford County properly filed an amended judgment which corrected the clerical error. The

judgment under which Petitioner is now sentenced is not void, and the sentence has not expired.

Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed his petition for habeas corpus relief. Petitioner is not

entitled to relief in this appeal.

CONCLUSION

The judgmentrendered in thismatter wasin a proceeding before the trial court without a jury,

the judgment was not a determination of guilt, and the evidence in the record does not preponderate

against the findings of the trial court. No error of law requiring a reversal of the judgment is

apparent on the record. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20

of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

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THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE