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THE TERRORIST THREAT IN NORTH AFRICA:

BEFORE AND AFTER BENGHAZI

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 10, 2013

Serial No. 113–33

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, director, Center for the Study of Terrorist 

Radicalization, Foundation for Defense of Democracies ................................... 9

Mr. Aaron Zelin, Richard Borow fellow, The Washington Institute for Near 

East Policy ............................................................................................................ 21

Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D., professor, Security Studies Program, Georgetown 

University ............................................................................................................. 30

Mr. Mike Lovelady, brother of Algerian gas plant terrorist attack victim, 

Victor Lovelady ..................................................................................................... 42

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross: Prepared statement ............................................. 12

Mr. Aaron Zelin: Prepared statement .................................................................... 23

Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ....................................................... 32

Mr. Mike Lovelady: Prepared statement ............................................................... 44

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 66

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 67

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 68

Question submitted for the record by the Honorable Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and response 

from Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D. .............................................................................. 70

Question submitted for the record by the Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a 

Representative in Congress from the State of California, and responses 

from: 

Mr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross ............................................................................. 71

Mr. Aaron Zelin .................................................................................................... 76

Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D. ....................................................................................... 77

(1)

THE TERRORIST THREAT IN NORTH AFRICA: 

BEFORE AND AFTER BENGHAZI 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 10, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. Subcommittees will come to order. Without objection, 

all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and 

extraneous materials for the record subject to the length of the limitation rules of the subcommittee. I will proceed with my opening 

statement and then we will have the ranking member and the 

other committee members make comments as well. 

There are a lot of things we don’t know about the Benghazi attack that killed Americans including our Ambassador Chris Stevens. During her testimony before Congress earlier this year, Secretary Clinton responded to a question over the cause of the attack 

of Benghazi by saying, ‘‘What difference at this point does it 

make?’’

It does make a difference. It makes a difference to the victims’ 

families who want justice, and it also makes a difference to the 

United States. Understanding why the attack happened does matter. We must respond to any type of violent attack that occurs 

against Americans no matter where it is when it is a terrorist attack. 

The morning after the Benghazi attack, I said it on the House 

floor that this was a terrorist attack. Everyone including the administration now knows and recognizes that this was a terrorist attack. I do look forward to hearing from the witnesses today about 

what the security environment in Libya was like, what it was like 

before the attack, and what terrorist groups in Libya were there at 

the time. Was there any indication that a terrorist attack was probable against Americans? What was the response of other governments with Embassies in Libya to the threat of the terrorist group? 

And what is the American response and has it been any different 

since the days of the attack? 

The security environment in Libya after the attack is also important to understand. An FBI team was on the ground in Libya investigating, but supposedly it wasn’t even safe for them to spend 

2

much time in Benghazi to determine what happened. I don’t know 

how they plan to capture those responsible if they can’t go to the 

area where the perpetrators acted. 

At this late date, with all the intelligence that the United States 

has at its disposal, do we know the persons that committed these 

murders? If we do know who they are, why aren’t they in custody? 

I have heard from journalists who have traveled to Benghazi that 

the identities of at least some of the attackers are known as are 

their whereabouts. One of them openly drank coffee every morning 

in the same cafe after the attack, so why has no one been brought 

to justice not even at this date? 

The idea that four Americans can die on sovereign U.S. soil and 

almost a year later no one has been held accountable is contrary 

to what we stand for in this nation. The United States is the most 

powerful nation in the world. Are we afraid to arrest those who 

commit terrorist acts against the United States? There must be 

consequences for killing Americans. If there aren’t consequences 

that just encourages terrorists to act even more. Terrorists will 

grow more daring in their attacks and put more Americans in danger if no consequences from the United States occur. They should 

know, all terrorists should know that they cannot kill Americans 

and get away with it. As a former judge, I believe that at the courthouse there should be justice, and justice should continue, and the 

long arm of American justice should reach to areas where Americans are murdered by terrorists. 

We know what happened in Libya did not stay in Libya. In May, 

this subcommittee held a joint hearing on the growing crisis in the 

African region. Arms which the administration apparently allowed 

to be smuggled to extremists’ hands during the Libyan revolution 

found their way into terrorists’ hands throughout the region in 

North Africa. It wasn’t long before Mali was overrun with terrorists 

and the French had to come in and prevent the whole country from 

collapsing. It soon spread to Algeria, when on January 16, 2013, an 

al-Qaeda linked Islamic militant group called ‘‘Those Who Signed 

in Blood’’ took nearly 800 people hostage at the gas plant in Algeria. After a tense, 4-day hostage standoff, Algerian special forces 

raided the facility in an effort to free the hostages, and more than 

80 people including three Americans were killed. These Americans 

were killed for who they were, because they were Americans. 

There are many unanswered questions that remain. Why did the 

United States not take direct action to protect American interests 

and American citizens? Three Americans died. I have been told 

that American forces were within a few miles of the facility ready 

to assist in the rescue but were told to stand down. Is this true? 

And if so, why? Why did we allow the safety of our citizens to depend on the acts of another country, and why haven’t we responded 

or held anyone accountable for these murders that took place in 

January? 

Today we have with us the brother of one of those victims. Mike 

Lovelady is here with his family, including his wife Wanda and 

Victor’s wife Maureen, and their family as well. I want to thank 

the Lovelady family for being here today, and we are all sorry for 

the loss of a loved one, and let you know that Victor and the other 

victims from the Algerian attack will not be forgotten, and it is our 

3

hope that we find out who committed these murders and hold them 

accountable. But I do want to thank the Lovelady family for coming 

in from Texas to be here today. 

The mastermind behind the deadly attack was allegedly an Algerian militant named Mokhtar Belmokhtar. He claimed the attack 

was in retaliation for Algeria’s support of the French military offensive against Islamist insurgents in neighboring Mali. So from Libya 

to Mali to Algeria it is obvious that terrorism is running loose in 

North Africa. We need to learn from our lessons about these terrorist attacks. We should not push these attacks behind closed 

doors and pretend just to move on down the road. The families of 

the four American victims in Benghazi have not moved on. The 

Loveladys have not moved on. The FBI investigation has not moved 

on at all. And the United States Congress should not move on until 

we have answers about what happened in Benghazi and what happened in Algeria, not until we have justice. 

I will now turn it over to the ranking member Mr. Sherman for 

his opening statements. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you Mr. Chairman. If I can digress one 

country to the east and talk about Egypt for just a second, If we 

had a functioning democracy and government here in the United 

States, the administration would be conferring with Congress as to 

what would be the best policy and how quickly we could modify our 

statutes in order to have those statutes call for the best policy, particularly with regard to our aid under these circumstances. Instead 

we have got White House lawyers trying to figure out how to say 

what happened in Egypt isn’t a coup. And the entire country will 

accept that because the entire country has reached the conclusion 

that Congress is so dysfunctional that the idea of conferring with 

Congress and having Congress change the statute seems silly when 

a statute can simply be ignored or twisted out of all shape. 

As we work for democracy in the Middle East I look forward to 

focusing on our institutions here. That is why with regard to Libya 

I was so concerned about the enforcement of the War Powers Act, 

which, in an effort to bring democracy to Libya was not actually 

adhered to, which is always a good idea with regard to statutes. 

Focusing again on the past in Libya, we had a chance then to demand that the rebels purge from their midst the worst elements 

amongst them. We did not. We were all too anxious to see a collection of the best and worst forces of Libya overthrow Ghadafi, and 

now those worst forces exercise substantial power particularly in 

eastern Libya. 

It is thought to be a proof of one’s dull-headedness if you worry 

about a few billion dollars here or there when there is the great 

issues of war and peace whereas you can always get a few more 

billion dollars from the American taxpayer. But the fact is, we 

should have insisted that the Libyans pay for the overthrow of 

Ghadafi, the costs that we incurred. We could have asked for that 

pledge early. I met with some of the top people during the rebellion, and they said, the message we have is don’t worry about reimbursing the U.S. taxpayer, just make sure you give good deals to 

U.S. oil companies. At the time I thought this gentleman from the 

Middle East misunderstood my government and its objectives. It 

appears to me now that he understood my government better than 

4

I do. I look forward to a government that focuses on billions of dollars for American taxpayers. 

This also focuses our attention on the cost of aid to the Iraqi 

Government, a government which is using billions of dollars to pay 

its debts to Kuwait because Kuwait lent money to Saddam Hussein 

to wage his war against Iran. So we have to give money to the 

Iraqis so they can give money to the Kuwaitis, a country that still 

exists just because we defended them from Saddam Hussein, also 

at our own cost. 

There is substantial argument here in this city about why there 

would seem to be a misstatement of what motivated those who attacked our Embassy in Benghazi. I want to put to rest, if it can—

I don’t think it can be put to rest, but at least expose the silliness 

of the idea that this was some sort of grand political plan. Because 

if one says that terrorists hit our Embassy in Benghazi, it proves 

that our foreign policy in the Middle East failed to totally defang 

the terrorists. That was always known to be true anyway whether 

organized terrorism was behind Benghazi or not. 

And if there was a spontaneous demonstration touched off by a 

silly YouTube, and offensive YouTube posting, then our public diplomacy in the Middle East has failed to the point where a 

YouTube posting can lead to the deaths of Americans, even respected Americans. So I would say in either case the Benghazi attack demonstrates that our policies in the Middle East have not 

been entirely successful, which does not mean that any other policies could have been more successful. It is simply a difficult area, 

and both our public diplomacy efforts and our efforts to destroy alQaeda are still works in process. 

I look forward to focusing not only on Libya, but on Mali and the 

Tuareg independence movement there, as misguided as it is for 

such a small group, population-wise, to seek independence, and the 

terrorists’ exploitation of that. And as the chairman pointed out, we 

need to focus on the Algerian attacks. We should look at the security situation in Libya and whether the perpetrators of the 

Benghazi attack will ever be brought to justice by either the Libyan 

Government or American drones. And I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The Chair will now recognize the chairwoman of the 

Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, Ms. Ileana RosLehtinen from Florida, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Thank you, Judge Poe. 

I am pleased that both of our subcommittees are convening this important hearing. And I would also like to express my deepest condolences to Michael Lovelady for the loss of his brother Victor 

Lovelady who was killed during the horrendous attack by alQaeda-linked terrorists in Algeria earlier this year. Our thoughts 

and prayers are with you and with your family, as they are with 

Victor’s wife Maureen and their two children Erin and Grant. 

With growing instability in North Africa, it is necessary to examine the security threats posed by rising extremism and deteriorating stability in the Middle East and North Africa region, how we 

got there and where we are going. Sadly, this threat is not new. 

For nearly 20 years I have been trying to raise awareness of this 

very real and growing threat to the United States. In April 1995, 

I was at the time chairman of the Africa subcommittee, and I conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:56 Aug 15, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\071013J\81870 HFA PsN: SHIRL
5

vened a hearing entitled, ‘‘The Threat of Islamic Extremism in Africa’’ and stated that Islamic extremism was on the rise and that 

militant groups posed a growing threat to regional stability, to the 

fragile democracies in the region, and to U.S. national security interests. April 1995. 

Almost two decades later not much has changed. The wave of 

radical Islam continues to spread, and the threat posed by alQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other foreign terrorist organizations is due to the establishment of a base of operations in North 

Africa by taking advantage of the lack of security, political will, 

and the capability of the governments in the region. 

To illustrate the expansion of narcoterrorism activities in the region, this year we learned that the DEA-led investigation leading 

to the arrest of individuals connected to Guinea-Bissau and the 

FARC were indicted for narcotrafficking and terrorism offenses. It 

is alarming that these individuals indicted were charged with conspiring to sell weapons including surface-to-air missiles which 

could be used against U.S. military personnel in the region. This 

is why I believe that the DEA should have a larger footprint in 

North Africa to help dismantle linkages between drug traffickers 

and terrorist organizations that promote and finance these nefarious activities. However, we cannot concentrate only on the security 

front. We must also commit resources and attention to help build 

civil society and strengthen institutions in North Africa. 

The Arab Spring began in Tunisia with the self-immolation of a 

disparaged street vendor and Tunisia was believed to be the most 

likely to undergo democratic change. Unfortunately, the assassination of one of Tunisia’s opposition leader was a detrimental blow 

to the moderate and secular forces in that country. In Egypt, the 

Muslim Brotherhood-led government under Morsi failed to demonstrate a commitment to democratic principles and hopes for a 

truly democratic society that respected human rights remains in 

jeopardy. In Libya, the Obama administration has yet to hold anyone accountable for the terrorist attacks on September 11th. The 

individuals at the State Department who were responsible for the 

security failures in Benghazi continue to operate in different capacities without any real consequences, and the terrorist perpetrators 

who were behind the Benghazi attack are still at large. What is 

being done to capture them? 

Prior to the September 11, 2012 attacks in Benghazi which left 

four brave Americans dead, it was already clear that the security 

situation in Libya had been far from secure. The administration 

should have been more aware of these threats and taken the proper steps to increase security measures to ensure the safety of our 

Embassy personnel. They did not. Unfortunately, it is clear that 

these steps were not taken. We also know that Libya was used as 

a staging ground for the January 16, 2013 hostage standoff in the 

gas plant attack in Algeria which resulted in the deaths of more 

than 80 people. 

As Secretary Clinton said when she testified in Congress in January, there is no doubt that the Algerian terrorists had weapons 

from Libya. There is no doubt that the remnants of AQIM in Mali 

had weapons from Libya. Yet, we seem to not learn from our mistakes as the administration seeks to inject even more arms into the 

6

region by arming the Syrian rebels. Our strategy in the region 

needs to be aimed at disrupting extremist networks and denying 

safe havens to these groups. However, in order to do that we must 

first get a real understanding of the nature of the problem and increase our attention to these threats because so far we have been 

woefully lacking in our understanding of these threats, and I think 

that it is evident in our lack of a coherent foreign policy to these 

issues. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this timely hearing. 

Mr. POE. The Chair will now recognize the ranking member of 

the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, Mr. Deutch from 

Florida, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you Chairman Poe and Chairman RosLehtinen for holding today’s hearing. The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine the threats to U.S. interests and security in 

North Africa from extremist groups because that is how we are 

going to prevent tragedies like Benghazi from occurring again. 

I hope that we will uphold the purpose of this hearing rather 

than furthering baseless political witch hunts. I hope as well that 

we can use today as an important opportunity to look at ways to 

better ensure our security and stability in the region. And I hope 

that today doesn’t devolve into another opportunity to try to score 

political points by suggesting that there was some kind of massive 

government cover-up or that the administration chose to ignore 

threats leading up to Benghazi, when as we now know that is simply untrue. 

And it doesn’t change the fact that four courageous Americans 

died in the attack on Benghazi. The attack on Benghazi was a tragedy, a tragedy perpetuated by terrorists that are fundamentally at 

odds with everything the United States and our allies stand for. So 

instead of continuing to lay false blame, I am hopeful that today 

we will be able to use this hearing to ensure that we are doing everything we can to protect our interests from extremist threats. 

The spread of extremism in North Africa is of increasing concern 

as groups like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb take advantage of 

political and economic instability and the free flow of weapons and 

cash. In post-revolutionary Libya, the democratically elected Libyan National Congress remains under constant threat of armed terrorist groups. For the young men in Libya who fought for freedom 

from Ghadafi’s rule, watching a paralyzed government achieve very 

little really doesn’t equate to tangible change in their daily lives. 

Ghadafi’s vast weapons cache is making its way across the region, 

trickling down to terrorists in Mali and into the hands of extremist 

fighters in Syria. 

I am increasingly concerned that in Egypt’s current tenuous political situation, extremists may look for a window of opportunity 

to broaden support and turn to violence there. AQIM has become 

quite adept at making a fortune off of kidnappings across North Africa. While AQIM has long been viewed as possessing little threat 

to the U.S. homeland, it has been emboldened by its increasing 

numbers and power in the lawless vacuum of post-rebellion states. 

We have far too many strategic interests in the region as we saw 

with the brazen attack on U.S. and other workers in an Algerian 

gas field earlier this year that left 23 dead. And my sincerest conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:56 Aug 15, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\071013J\81870 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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dolences to you and your family, Mr. Lovelady, on the loss of your 

brother. Thank you for being with us today and to share his story 

and your family’s story. 

So how do we combat the growing presence of these extremist 

elements? We have got to continue to strengthen the state institutions of our allies in North Africa. The Libyan and Tunisian Governments are struggling to rebuild. Libya remains without a legitimate and functioning police force to stem the rogue militias operating throughout the country. Libya’s oil production is starting to 

rebound but there is serious concern over the management of this 

oil revenue. Tunisia, an economy long dependent on tourism, is 

slowly beginning to attract foreign investment. A strong economy, 

and increasing education and job opportunities for youth makes the 

allure of fighting for AQIM less desirable. 

But the French intervention in Mali has sparked increasing violence toward Western targets. An al-Qaeda-affiliated group 

launched a suicide attack on a French uranium mine in Niger in 

May. And we have got to refocus efforts on border control. Libya’s 

poorly patrolled southern border is a gateway for Islamic extremists into Mali and Niger and Chad. And without a strong national 

army or a security force, Libya is relying on various militias to patrol the border. Weapons flow freely from Sudan into Egypt and 

into the hands of Hamas and al-Qaeda affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula. 

I am heartened by the announcement in May that Libya, Sudan 

and Egypt agreed to work together to develop the border triangle 

and to establish free trade zones that would help improve the economic lives of those living in that area. A lack of basic infrastructure has stunted economic development in many areas of the Sahara. U.S. investment in roads and electrical grids will help shore 

up these underdeveloped areas. 

And with much of our attention focused on Syria, Egypt, and the 

threat of Hezbollah and Iran, we cannot allow North Africa to become a terrorist Wild West. Strong support from the U.S. and our 

allies for counterterrorism cooperation through programs like the 

Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership, is an interagency 

partnership that focuses on improving individual country and regional capabilities in the Sahel and Maghreb to defeat terrorist organizations. Focusing on that is a must. Active cooperation on border control and intelligence sharing can restrict the movement and 

diminish the presence of these terrorist groups. 

I appreciate the witnesses being here today and I look forward 

to continuing this discussion with all of you. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. Thank the gentleman from Florida. We will now recognize other members for 1 minute, who have an opening statement. 

Mr. Chabot from Ohio, you are recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I think Libya is an example of what you get when the United States leads from behind. 

And there is a saying that ‘‘nature abhors a vacuum,’’ and that is 

what we had in Libya after this conflict took place and the United 

States was leading from behind in the conflict itself, but then especially after the war was over we now see jihadists exercising considerable power there. We have seen four brave Americans killed, 

8

and it is just a tragedy and we all express our sympathy to the 

Lovelady family. It is a horrible thing. 

Unfortunately, I think we saw the same thing in Iraq where we 

saw—you talk about seizing defeat from the jaws of victory, we basically had the country stabilized, a potential ally. There was always a plan to leave troops there. We have pulled troops out. The 

country is now coming apart at the seams and we are going to see 

that repeated in Afghanistan, I am afraid. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. Thank the gentleman. The Chair will now recognize 

Mr. Schneider from Illinois for 1 minute. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you Mr. Chair, and I want to thank the 

witnesses for joining us today, and to the Lovelady family, please 

accept my sincerest condolences as well. 

Following the end of the Ghadafi regime in Libya we have observed a weak central government which has been relatively unable to police vast swaths of territory within the country. This has 

resulted in a proliferation of militant groups carving out areas of 

influence and protection, a situation which does not generally contribute positively to the goals of the central government. Personally, I am extremely concerned with the rise of groups such as 

Ansar al-Sharia and their growing influence across the Islamic 

Maghreb. I am also concerned that portions of Libya may be used 

as training grounds for foreign fighters and a conduit for transporting weapons and equipment for terrorist organizations not only 

in North Africa but also throughout the Middle East. 

Mr. Zelin, you mentioned in your prepared remarks that one of 

the worst kept secrets locally, but only reported on within the past 

month, is the large amount of weapons that Libyans have sent to 

Syria via Benghazi and Misrata through Lebanon and Turkey. I 

look forward to hearing your thoughts and the thoughts of the 

panel on how we can address these potential regional destabilizing 

efforts by groups affiliated with al-Qaeda. Thank you, and I yield 

back my time. 

Mr. POE. Thank the gentleman. The Chair will now recognize 

Mr. Yoho from Florida for 1 minute. 

Mr. YOHO. I thank the chairs and ranking members for holding 

this hearing today. The fact that we still have not brought to justice those who attacked us is a travesty. Terrorists have spilled 

American blood and we must do everything we can to bring the 

perpetrators to justice. As famously said, ‘‘Justice delayed is justice 

denied.’’ And I give my regards to Mr. Lovelady and your family 

on the loss of your brother and son, and all others who have lost 

loved ones in a cowardly attack against the United States and its 

citizens. And I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses 

today, and I thank you for being here. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. Does any other member wish to make an opening statement? I will now proceed with the introduction of our four witnesses and then they will testify. A brief introduction of each. 

Mr. Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He studies challenges posed by violent, nonstate actors. He is the author or volume editor of 12 books including ‘‘Bin Laden’s Legacy’’ and is published widely in the popular 

and academic press. 

9

Mr. Aaron Zelin is the Richard Borow fellow at the Washington 

Institute for Near East Policy. His research focuses on how jihadist 

groups are adjusting to the new political environment of the Arab 

uprisings and politics in countries transitioning into democracy. 

Mr. Zelin also maintains a Web site, jihadology.net, which is an archive for jihadi primary source materials. 

Dr. Daniel Byman is a professor in the Security Studies Program 

at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and a research director at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the 

Brookings Institution. Dr. Byman has served as a professional staff 

member with both the 9/11 Commission and the joint 9/11 inquiry 

staff of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. He has 

worked as a research director of the Center for Middle East Public 

Policy in the RAND Corporation as an analyst of the Middle East 

for the United States intelligence community. 

Mike Lovelady, born in Port Arthur, Texas, that is southeast 

Texas, was a firefighter for the City of Nederland for over 30 years. 

He has been married for 35 years to his wife Wanda and has three 

children, Kevin, Jason and Ashley. His brother Victor Lovelady—

and Victor’s widow and wife, Maureen, is here today—Victor 

Lovelady was killed by terrorists who attacked the gas plant where 

he was working in Algeria in January of this year. 

I want to thank all four of the witnesses for being here. The 

Chair would recognize each of you for 5 minutes. Keep your testimony to 5 minutes or you may get gaveled. And you will find out 

what that means if you don’t figure it out. So after each witness 

testifies then the people on both subcommittees will ask questions. 

First, we will hear from Mr. Gartenstein-Ross for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVEED GARTENSTEIN–ROSS, DIRECTOR, 

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORIST RADICALIZATION, 

FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Chairman Poe and Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Members Sherman and Deutch, distinguished members of the 

subcommittees, it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss 

the threat of jihadist terrorism in North Africa. 

In my view, the most important facet of understanding the regional threat is how the Arab uprisings have fundamentally 

changed the shape of jihadism. Al-Qaeda and other like-minded 

militants possess a defined regional strategy that began to take 

shape even as Hosni Mubarak’s regime was drawing its very last 

breaths. The rough consensus that jihadist strategists reached 

about developments produced some simple principles for action on 

their part. 

These strategists agreed that the political upheaval helped their 

movement in several ways. One of the most significant was that 

they foresaw unprecedented opportunities to undertake dawa, or 

missionary work, to propagate their particularized version of the 

Islamic faith. The new and democratically elected regimes would be 

less likely to suppress jihadist groups’ dawa efforts so long as they 

didn’t explicitly engage in violence against the state. And indeed, 

in this new environment groups like Ansar al Sharia Tunisia have 

been quite effective at expanding both their numbers and influence. 

10

That being said, the jihadist movement, as we all know, has 

never been satisfied with constraining itself to nonviolent advocacy. 

Some of their post-uprisings’ militant activity in countries like Tunisia and Egypt has taken the form of vigilante violence aimed at 

such perceived foes of the movement as artists, civil society activists, educators, and also religious minorities. But another aspect of 

their work has involved jihad, which these groups understand as 

warfare against other competitors for power. 

There is currently a mutually reinforcing interaction between 

countries in the region in which jihadists are primarily engaged in 

dawa, countries like Tunisia and Egypt, and those where a weak 

or disintegrating state makes violence more feasible, in places like 

Libya or Mali. The fact that jihadist groups currently engaged in 

dawa efforts have not given up on using violence to eventually 

seize power, makes a regional approach important to them. Having 

steep variations in how these groups relate to violence allows 

groups like Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia or Egypt’s Salafi jihadist 

groups to propagate their ideology, but at the same time to refrain 

from the kind of large scale involvement in either violence or preparations for violence that could trigger a state crackdown. At the 

same time, these groups can also take advantage of regional developments to quietly arm themselves and also undertake militant 

training. 

So I would like to note how Libya in particular fits into the 

broader regional picture, and the fact that Libya’s central government is incredibly weak and the country increasingly chaotic at 

this point cannot be denied by any reasonable observer. Militant 

groups have taken advantage of this environment. One way is 

training, with camps operating in southern Libya. The impact of 

these camps can be seen, for example, in the tragic January attack 

at the In Amenas gas complex in Algeria. Some of the attackers reportedly trained in Libya before undertaking that attack. In addition, they also used Libyan soil as a staging ground before undertaking that attack. Al-Qaeda and Emir Ayman Al-Zawahiri has 

also established connections to militant camps in Libya, which, for 

example, include training for suicide missions. 

A second issue is the flow of arms to neighboring countries, as 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen pointed to. Libyan arms have played a role 

in the Malian conflict, they played a role in the In Amenas attack 

in Algeria, and they have also been moved across Algeria into Tunisia where they have helped strengthen Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia. 

Right now we are also focused on Egypt, and Libyan arms have 

poured into Egypt’s North Sinai which has seen over the past few 

days an escalation in attacks on security forces following the ouster 

of Mohamed Morsi. 

A third issue is how Libya can serve as a safe haven. Following 

the French intervention in Mali, fighters from Ansar al-Din and alQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb made their way into southwest 

Libya where they blended with local militant groups. This is also 

an important part of the jihadist regional strategy. Rather than 

standing and fighting, the militants who are occupying North Mali 

melted away. Such a tactic helps to keep the movement’s capabilities alive and prevent significant attrition. 

11

Overall, the relationship between countries where dawa is the 

predominant strategy and countries where violence is dominant is 

vital to understanding the threat on a regional scale. The region 

should be understood as a whole, and countries where violence is 

more feasible can also make violence more likely in places where 

dawa is predominant. A very dangerous game is currently being 

played in Egypt, and if that situation escalates look for Libya to 

be an increasingly important part of that dynamic. 

The jihadist regional strategy overall is coherent. The U.S. 

doesn’t have to be at the forefront of a response. Over the past few 

years we have seen partner nations take the lead against militant 

groups and it is sensible for the U.S. to minimize its expenditure 

when feasible and wise. But we should understand that jihadist 

strategy is designed for the long term, rather than tricking ourselves into thinking that these groups will inevitably moderate. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gartenstein-Ross follows:]

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Salafi Jihadism in the North African 

Regional Context 

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross 

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies 

Director, Center for the Study of Terrorist Radicalization 

Hearing before the 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

Washington, DC 

July 10,2013 
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Daveed Gartenstein-Ross July 10, 2013 

Chairmen Poe and Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Members Sherman and Deutch, distinguished 

members of the subcommittees, it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss the threat of 

jihadist terrorism in North Africa.' The Arab Uprisings have significantly altered the shape of 

jihadism in the region. This is not just a country-to-country phenomenon rather, al-Qaeda and 

other salafi jihadist groups possess a defined regional strategy. Indeed, leading salafi jihadist 

strategists have been intensely debating the implications of the changes gripping the region, and 

how the movement should respond, essentially from the very outset. 

The U.S. has been at a disadvantage when it has failed to understand the enemy's 

perceptions of the world and the strategies that arise from them. This was true in our general 

inability to understand the economic dimensions of al-Qaeda' s strategy for fighting the United 

States2 It was also true for the Arab Uprisings specitically, when many analysts let their 

optimism drive their analysis, and concluded that the Uprisings were the death knell for salafi 

jihadism3 Though the argument that al-Qaeda and aligned groups have been rendered largely 

impotent has not completely faded from the scene, the position is increasingly untenable---and it 

seems we have made some strategic errors in the interim due to overreliance on that analytic line. 

I will begin this testimony by examining salati jihadist perspectives of what the Arab 

Uprisings mean for the region and will then turn to how Libya fits into that picture specifically. I 

will conclude with some thoughts on the region beyond Libya and how the US. can best shape 

its policies to address this changed environment. 

The Arab Uprisings and Salafi Jihadist Strategy 

As the Arab Uprisings intensified, major salafi jihadist strategists quickly reached a 

rough consensus about what the developments meant They agreed that the political upheavals 

gripping the region were good for the movement for a variety of reasons. With respect to the 

impact on the movement, these strategists thought they would enjoy three primary advantages in 

the post-Uprisings world, two of which are operational and one of which will help them to 

propagate their understanding of Islam. 

The two major operational advantages are the amount of jihadists who have escaped or 

been released from prison and the ability of jihadist groups to control territory. As to the former, 

1 This testimony employs the telTI1S jihadisrn and Jihadist to describe the militant movement "\yith global ambitions 

that claims 1tS inspiration from salat! Islam. This terminology is controversial amongst terrorism researchers, 311d 

also I,vithin govcmm(.'nt, in large part hecause it is dC'fivcd from the rchgious LCfmjihad. T choose lo employ this 

language in large pmi hecause it has the henefit of heing organic, the \vay that those \vithin the movement refer to 

themselves. 1'hat makes it superior to altenlatlves that also have their own limitations. Moreover, as Jarret Brachman 

noles, the labels phadisl1l and phadist have "bec~l validakd as the leasl vliorst option across the Arabic-speaking 

world," mcludmg bemg employed mArable-language pnnt and broadcast medJa. Janet M. T1raehman, (f/ohal 

Jihadism: Theor.,v and Practice (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 5 

2 This poinl is discussed al h.:ngth in my most n::ccnl mass-m<lrk.ct book., lJavecd Garknskin-Ross, Din Laden's 

T.egac.v: Wh.v We Ore ..','lill T,osing the Wur on Ten"or (New York: \\Tiley, 20 [1) 

., For such conclusions, see Fa\vaz Gerges, -'The Rlse mld Fall of al Qaeda: Debunking the TelTorism Narrative." 

lluffington Post, Jun. 3 2012: Neal Conul1, "Bc'fgen Correctly Predicted bin Laden's Loo:.;ation," intcrvicvv with Pcto:.;r 

Bergen, .!.Vatiollal Public Radio, May 3, 2011; Dan Murphy, -'Bin Laden's Death Puts Exclamation Mark on alQw,:-:da"s Demise,'" Christian Science J,jonitor, Muy 3,2011 

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Daveed Gartenstein-Ross July 10, 2013 

the jihadist thinker Hani al-Siba'i has released multiple lists of violent Islamists who have been 

released from Egyptian prisons 4 The same phenomenon also occurred in Libya, where 

Muammar Qaddafi's government actually used prisoner releases as an offensive tactic against 

the rebellion it faced, believing that freeing prisoners would create strife in rebellious areas. But 

as the anti-regime uprising escalated, Qaddafi was no longer able to control these prisoner 

releases. Some prison governors decided for their own reasons (perhaps as a way of defecting) to 

empty prisons they were charged with guarding. Chaos allowed some escapes, as guards afraid 

of reprisals fled their posts; and in other cases gunmen attacked prisons in order to release the 

inmates. While those released ranged from political prisoners to violent criminals and were not 

exclusively jihadists, the resulting increase in liberatedjihadist manpower has profoundly altered 

the dynamics of the movement in the region. 

The second operational advantage, control of territories, was attainable before the 

Uprisings, but the rebellions presented the movement with some new opportunities that did not 

previously exist. Instability gripped Libya, a country whose harsh crackdowns had previously 

made it nearly impervious to a jihadist foothold. Jihadist groups also made significant gains in 

Mali (recently reversed by the French intervention) and also in Yemen (where Al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has also seen its advances reversed). In an interview with the 

London-based AI-Qllds AI-Arabi, AQAP's Fahd al-Qasa portrayed these gains as naturally 

stemming from the Arab Uprisings. "We are an integral part of the people's project toward 

dignity and freedom under the banner of Isi<uTI," he said.' There are a few important points to 

draw from this perception. Salatl j ihadists view territory where they can train and plan operations 

as an important part of their regional strategy. Mali served that role until the French intervention 

changed dynamics on the ground; and today Libya is at the forefront in serving these needs of 

the movement. But conversely, al-Qaeda and aligned groups have had great difficulty in 

maintaining control over the territory they capture. This inability to maintain control is a 

structural problem with the movement that should factor into the U.S. 's strategy. 

A third advantage jihadists have identified is that the fall of established regimes would 

lead to an era of greater openness that would create unprecedented opportunities to undertake 

dcr",a (missionary work)6 In addition to this freedom, jihadist strategists thought the movement 

would be well positioned to gain new adherents after the regimes' falls. For one thing, they 

-1 Sec the follmving Open Source Center translations: Hani al-Siba \ -'The Release of Prisoners After Nearly Tyvcnty' 

Years of Injustice," Ansa,. Duwlaf aI-Iraq al-Islalni,vah. feb. 23. 201l: Hani al-Siba"i. -'The Release of a Ne\y Datch 

after Long Years Behind Bars." AI Jahafal, Feb. 27,201 L llani al-Siba'i, "Urgent: Ihe Release of a New Batch of 

Those Charged \\1th Military Verdicts," Ansa,. Daw/af al Iraq al Islam(vah, Mar. 4. 20ll: AI Maqrizi Center for 

llistorical Studies, --Names of the Released Detainees from the al Aqrab, al lstiqbal, al Wadi, and Burj al Arab 

Pn~()n~," Shumukh al lslam ,7'./et11'ol'k, Mar. 18. 2011. For an in-depth di~cLLs~i()n or carly ~alari jihadisl pcrception~ 

of the Arah Uprisings, see Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Tara Vas~efi, "Perceptions of the -Arah Spring' V.,lithin the 

Salafi-Jihadi Movement, Studies in Conjliet & Terrorism 35 (2012), pp. 831-48 

5 ""lhird on U.S. '0/antcd Ll~t Intcrvic\ved on ClI-QClcdCl Operations in Yemen, u.S. Sland,-- _Jl Qud~ _11 _'irabi 

(London), Sept. 20. 2011, trans. Open Source Center 

oSee Ayman al-Za\\"ahiri, "And be Neither Weakened nor Saddened," Al-Sahab Jfedia, Aug. 15,2011, trans. Open 

Sourc(; C(;nler: H,ullLah bin Muhml1mad ClI-BCI~~am. "H(;eding lh(; AdvClntClg(;~ m1d Le~son~ or the 1wo Upri~ing~ in 

Egypt and Tunisia," /1nsar TJmvlul al-Truq ul-lslamiyah, reh. 25, 2011, trans. Open Source Center; Hamid hin 

Abdallah aI-Ali, "The Joy Lies in the IIarvest of the Two Revolutions," posted on al Ali's official website, Feb. 15, 

2011, tnms. Open Source Cenler: Aliyatallah Abd ul-Ruhman. --The Peoplc'~ R(;voll Ihe Fall of Corrupl Arab 

Regimes The Demolition of the Idol of Stability and the New Beginning:' distributed bv the Global Islamic 

Media Front. Feb. 16,2011 

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Daveed Gartenstein-Ross July 10, 2013 

thought they would gain from the revolutions because they were a part of the revolutions. 

Looking at the situation in Libya, for example, Abu Sa'ad al-Amili opined that AI-Qaeda in the 

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was well positioned to gain after Qaddafi's fall because the 

"mujahedin" included Libyans, and they fought beside other rebels 7 

Of course, the salafi jihadist movement has never been satisfied in constraining itself to 

nonviolent dawa. It thus has a staged plan which one can discern trom the earl y theoretical work. 

Even while undertaking dawa peacefully, in ways it could not under the old regimes, the 

movement has been preparing to later engage in large-scale violence.' There is also a median 

step, which can be seen clearly in Tunisia, of hisba violence--a concept denoting "forbidding 

wrong," which is not warfare directed at enemies of the faith, but rather is designed to internally 

cleanse the Muslim community'" In Tunisia, this hisba violence carried out by hardline salafists 

has been aimed at such adversaries of the movement as artists, civil society activists, and 

educators. 10 

Countries like Tunisia and Egypt saw relatively smooth successions because their 

dictators either fled (Ben Ali) or were forced from power (Mubarak) early in the process rather 

than following a protracted military controntation, as in Libya or Syria. These countries can be 

largely characterized by continuity in terms of the institutions of the old regimes: since the state 

was not destroyed in the process of regime change, neither Tunisia nor Egypt had to re-establish 

a central government or, for the most part, rebuild their security services. Thus, these relatively 

stable countries have been lands of dawa for salafi jihadist groups. On the other hand, unstable 

countries like Libya or Syria have been lands of jihad-but it is important to note the synthesis 

between these lands of d(TWa and lands of jihad. The lands of jihad have been used to train and 

arm jihadists living in the lands of dawa, and thus to prepare them for what the movement sees 

as an impending military controntation. They have also been used as a launching pad for 

attacks-something that can be seen in how Libya was a staging ground for the In Amenas attack 

in Algeria that occurred in January 2013 

Libya: A Land of Jihad 

For these movements, Libya is clearly a land of jihad The revolution has left Libya's 

central government weak and unable to extend its writ throughout the country. Armed militias 

have been able to fill this power vacuum. In some cases, these militias have been able to keep the 

areas under their control stable, but they have also left a situation where the Libyan government 

has been unable to effectively address threats to its own stability, threats to its neighbors, or 

threats to such allies as the United States. 

~ Abu S,:!'ad <:II-Amili, "Sharia Claril1calion~ and Highlights on the T\'vo Rcvollllion~ in Libya and Syria Hpisodc 

One (the T _lhyan RevolutIon)," posted on ,qnsar al Ah~jahedin Velwork, Aug. 26,20 [ [, trans. Open Source Center 

x AI-Bassam, "IIeeding the Advantages and Lessons of the Ty\'o Uprisings" 

9 For a good discussion of hisba, SC(; Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in islamic Thought 

(Cambridge University Press, 2010) 

l(l See "Tunisie: Lycee de Menzel Bouzelfa-Un directeur des salafistes;· All Ajdca, Apr. 11, 2013: 

Ale:\.<lmkT Smoltczyk. ··lslamist lntimidation: Ihe Battle for of Tuni:::;ia," 1)er Spiegel, Dec. 5. 201L 

Sarah Leah \'iwThitson, IIuman Rlghts \\Tatch, ·"Letter to Tunisim1 Minister of Interior and Minister of Justice." posted 

online Ocl. 14,2012 

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Daveed Gartenstein-Ross July 10, 2013 

The weakness of Jjhya 's cel1lral [iOl'emmel1l. There are numerous glaring examples of 

the general weakness of Libya's government. A preeminent recent example occurred in April to 

May of this year, when armed militias undertook a two-week siege of the foreign and justice 

ministries in Tripoli as a means of pressuring the parliament to pass a "political isolation" law 

that would place restrictions on what positions within government Qaddafi-era officials could 

hold." Regardless of the merits of this law, the fact that a siege could occur for such an extended 

period within the country's capital is powerful evidence of a struggling central government. 

Several recent terrorist attacks have further illustrated this point. The most recent of these 

incidents was a car bomb attack intended for two Italian diplomats that fortunately claimed no 

lives.'2 Even though the bomb attempt failed, it illustrated the limitations of the Libyan security 

services: they could claim no credit in foiling the attack, as the diplomats were warned by alert 

citizens. Before that, the French embassy was struck by a car bomb at the end of April, in "the 

most significant attack against a Western interest in the country" since U. S. ambassador J. 

Christopher Stevens and two other Americans were killed on September 11, 201213 Though that 

attack occurred before most embassy employees had arri ved that morning, it inj ured two guards, 

one of them critically. In March, five British humanitarian activists were kidnapped in eastern 

Libya, at least two of whom were "women who had been sexually assaulted."'4 

These are just a few indications of the weakness of Libya's central government. The 

weakness is systemic in nature. Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, the prolonged civil war in Libya 

destroyed the old structures of Qaddafi' s centralized government and made an orderly transition 

impossible. The central government is limited to Tripoli while the country's means of oil 

production are in the east. This means that Tripoli does not profit tram all of the oil revenues that 

could otherwise be used to grow the central government and gradually stabilize the country. 

Further, Libya's borders are porous and difficult to secure, which allows foreign nationals to 

enter and leave basically at will 

The porousness of Libya's borders has helped the salafi jihadist movement take full 

advantage of the chaos in Libya, but the problems related to this are far broader than that singular 

problem. Libya's porous borders have also been used for arms smuggling, human trafficking, 

and the movement of illegal goods throughout the region. This has contributed to instability in 

the region of Africa known as the Sahel,15 including Mali T will speak further about the flow of 

arms to jihadist factions shortly. 

AI-Qaeda's presence ill Lihya. Before examining how al-Qaeda and salafi jihadists may 

take advantage of the chaotic situation in Libya, it is worth examining the extent of al-Qaeda's 

presence within the country. The most comprehensive report in this regard, entitled AI-Qaeda ill 

11 "Deal "with Former Rebels Ends Libya Siege," Al Jazeera, May 12,2013 

I::: E8s<:un Mohmllinad. "Lib~'a: Tripoli C(JT Bomb T(Jrgcts ltaliml Diplomats." ~J1I.'~frica, Jlll1L: 12,2013 

13 DaVId D. Kirkpatrick, "Car P,(plodes Outside rrench Emba:..sy in T ,ihya," Vew ror/( Times, Apr. 2J, 20 [J 

1-1- Kareem Fahim, -"Libya arrests T\\'o Men in Attack on Five British Aid Activists:' .. Vew York Times, Mar 29. 

2013 

1 ~ The Sahel is the geographic region bordered by the Sahara deselt in the nOlih, the Sudanian Savannas in the south, 

the Atlantic Ocean in the we::iL lind the Red Sea in the eU'jt 

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Daveed Gartenstein-Ross July 10, 2013 

Uhya: A Profile, was published in August 2012 by the Library of Congress's Federal Research 

division.!6 

The report notes that in Libya, al-Qaeda's senior leadership is attempting to create a 

clandestine network. The clandestine nature of its efJorts in Libya is consistent with the salafi 

jihadist regional strategy: there is complementarity between dawa and jihad, but too overt an alQaeda presence could prompt foreign intervention, and thus erase whatever advantages the 

network was enjoying. This fear is illustrated by the French-led intervention in Mali to clear out 

a jihadist stronghold in the north, as well as the intervention in Somalia that was undertal<en by 

several countries (including Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Burundi, with the U. S. playing more 

of a supporting role). 

There are several organizations within Libya through which al-Qaeda may enjoy 

influence, or which could perhaps even be regarded as new faces ofal-Qaeda. One of these is the 

Ansar al-Sharia group in Libya. Like Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia (AST), the Libyan Ansar al-Sharia 

has a prominent social media presence that highlights its "goodwill and civic activities" to 

further its dawa efforts17 A second possibility is some remnants of the Libyan Islamic Fighting 

Group (LIFG). Though some former LIFG members now align themselves with the government, 

the report notes that "some former members of LIFG may be among those helping to create the 

al-Qaeda network."l8 There are further katibas (battalions or militia groups) that are aligned with 

Ansar al-Sharia and may assist in strengthening a network for al-Qaeda 

Other emissaries have been dispatched directly by al-Qaeda's senior leadership. The 

report mentions an operative known as "AA," whom Ayman al-Zawahiri sent to Libya in the 

middle of2011. This is almost certainly a reference to Abdul Baset Azzouz, who had managed to 

mobilize more than 200 fighters by the end of2012. 

Overall, while it is not clear how many al-Qaeda aligned groups and individuals are 

present in Libya, the Library of Congress report concludes that "a few hundred al-Qaeda 

members" are operating there and that salafi jihadists aligned with al-Qaeda ideologically have 

also come to control "dozens of mosques and prayer halls in the country."l9 This core presence is 

in addition to militias who are aligned with al-Qaeda but apparently not part of its command 

structure. That provides enough presence to attempt to capitalize on Libya's chaos. 

Even as of August 2012, the Library of Congress report concluded that "al-Qaeda appears 

to constitute a significant threat to the state-building process in Libya.,,20 This is one reason that I 

don't think the terrorist threat has changed significantly since the Benghazi attack: rather, a preexisting trajectory continued. Salafi jihadism was a problem in Libya prior to September II, 

2012. Unlike Tunisia, where the September 14, 2012 attack on the U.S. embassy in Tunis was 

followed by the state's crackdown on the country's largest jihadist group, no such reprisals 

occurred after the Benghazi attack. Thus, the Libyan state missed an opportunity to counter this 

16 federal Research Diyisioll. Librarv of COllaress, 11-Qucdu in Uhya: a Prc?file. (Aug. 2012) 

P Ibid. p. 3 ., 

18 Ibid 

"Ibid. pp. 18,25 

20 Ibid p.40 

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Daveed Gartenstein-Ross July 10, 2013 

violent presence that could impede Libya's rebuilding efforts (although whether it had the 

capacity to counter the salafi jihadist threat at the time can certainly be debated) . 

.!ihadist elji)rts. Salafi jihadist groups have taken advantage of the new Libya in several 

ways. One is training for militant activities. The Library of Congress report notes that al-Qaeda 

has operated training camps in Libya,21 which exist in large part because the central government 

has been unable to control southern Libya. In fact, some of the impact of the southern Libya 

camps may be seen in the January attack on the In Amenas gas complex attack in Algeria, for 

which some of the attackers reportedly trained in camps in southern Libya 22 More than 800 

people were taken hostage in that attack, in which at least thirty-nine foreign hostages were 

killed. 

Muhammad al-Zawahiri has connected his brother, al-Qaeda emir Ayman al-Zawahiri, 

with Egyptian militant Muhammad Jamal Abu Ahmad, who has used this safe haven in Libya to 

establish his own enclave there. As the Wall Street Journal has reported, the Jamal network 

operates camps in Libya that include training for suicide missions, has demonstrated proficiency 

in smuggling fighters, and also has connections to European jihadists23 In addition to 

Muhammad al-Zawahiri, another connection the Jamal network has to militancy in Et,'ypt is 

Marjan Salim, a militant who was released from prison following Mubarak's fall, and who 

served as the head of Et,'yptian Islamic Jihad's sharia committee when Ayman al-Zawahiri led 

the group in the late 1990s24 This network demonstrates the manner in which a country in which 

jihad is the predominant mode for militant groups can strengthen networks where daH'a is 

predominant: unsurprisingly, given Jamal's connections to Egypt, Egyptian recruits have been 

training there. This arrangement thus helps to bolster the military capabilities of the Et,'yptian 

networks even at a time that they are not engaged in combat against the state 

A second distinct issue is the flow of arms from Libya into neighboring countries. As 

previously mentioned, the flow of Libyan anns had a role in the Malian conflict, although the 

extent of their role is a matter of debate amongst regional scholars. In addition to making use of 

training camps in Libya, the In Amenas attackers also made use of Libyan anns when attacking 

that facility25 There has also been a flow of anns from Libya across Algeria and into Tunisia26 

There, these weapons have helped to strengthen AST's military capabilities. The weapons 

smuggling into Tunisia was also at the center of recent clashes (beginning in late April) between 

Tunisian security forces and an AQIM-linked group called Katibat Ugbah Ibn Nafi on the 

Tunisia-Algeria border. In these incidents, two Tunisian soldiers were killed and at least twenty 

wounded by improvised explosive devices. Libyan anns have also poured into Egypt's northern 

Sinai 27 Thus, the flow of arms out of Libya also has been strengthening jihadist movements' 

long-term military capabilities in countries where the movement is currently focused on dawa. 

'1 Tlnd., p. 23 

"Paul Cmickshank & Tim Lister. "Algeria Attack May IIave Link to Libya Camps," (,:VN, Jan. 23, 2013 

23 Slobhan (]-Ollnan & M<lll Bradley. "Mililani Link to Libya 1\llao:.;L" Wall SfreN JOlfrnal, Oct. 1. 2012 

~4 Muhammad Salah, -'Jihad's Organizational Stmcture," 'll-Hayah, feb. [2,1999, p. h, Open Source Center trans 

" Richard Spencer, ''Libvan Arms That Went Missing Under Aaddafi 'Fueling Multiple Conflicts,'" Telegraph 

(London), Apr. 10,2013 

~() .A.ndre"\v Lebovich, ''Confi:onting Tunisla 's Jihadists," Foreign Policy, May IG, 2013 

2' Soruya Sarhaddi Nelsoll, "LibyUll Arms Fknv into bgypt Across Northern SillUi:- -,-VJlR, Od. 13,2011 

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Daveed Gartenstein-Ross July 10, 2013 

A third distinct issue is how Libya can serve as a safe haven for jihadists. I have 

mentioned the French intervention into Mali: following that military operation, Islamic fighters 

from both Ansar al Dine and AQIM made their way into southwest Libya, where they "are 

blending with local militant groupS.,,2' This is also an important part of the salafi jihadist 

regional strategy: rather than standing and fighting in Mali (where they would lose badly in a 

conventional fight), jihadists who were occupying the north melted away. Being able to move to 

across porous borders and into areas where they can find safe haven is an important part of 

keeping the movement's militant capabilities alive and preventing significant attrition within the 

ranks. 

A fourth and final issue is that the safe haven within Libya, coupled with the country's 

porous borders, means that it can be used as a staging ground for future attacks. This was 

certainly the case for the In Amenas attack in Algeria. Other neighboring countries will continue 

to be concerned about Libyan soil being used as a staging ground for attacks in their borders, and 

Europe will similarly have concerns in this regard, especially given the links between Libyan 

militant groups and those in Europe. 

Lack of state reprisals. The advantages that jihadist groups currently enjoy from the 

situation in Libya should be understood in the context of a government that is either unable or 

unwilling to respond to provocations from jihadist groups within its soil. The September II 

attack in Benghazi that killed Ambassador Stevens was an enormous embarrassment for Libya, 

yet it did not mount a crackdown against militant groups. Salafi attacks have targeted Sufis, a 

sect particularly disfavored by hardline salafists, with dozens of attacks on sufi shrines. For 

example, in March a bomb blew up the Sidi AI-Andalusi mausoleum in Tripoli, which is a shrine 

to a fifteenth century theologian and is regarded as a national monument29 

Christians have also been targeted by salafists. In March, the Coptic church in Benghazi 

was ransacked and set on fire. Christian graves have also been attacked and defaced.'o These 

attacks on minority groups-whether minority Islamic sects or Christians-are not representative 

of Libyan society as a whole, but rather are the work of a distinct group of hard line salafists. And 

yet after all of these incidents we have not seen a vigorous state response The net result is the 

perception that salafi militants have free reign within Libya. 

Conclusion 

This testimony has outlined salafi jihadist regional strategy in North Africa, and has 

shown the relationship between countries where daH'a is the dominant jihadist strategy and 

countries where jihad is the dominant strategy. The latter countries can thus make the former 

more dangerous, and help to usher jihadist groups located there from the stage of dawa to the 

stage of jihad. Libya provides several examples of this symbiotic relationship. This relationship 

between lands of dCMCl and jihad is further illustrated by the symbiotic relationship between 

~~ Adam Entous, Dre\y IIinshaw, & David Gauthier-Villars. '-Militants, Chased From Mali. Pose Ne,,, TIu"eats." 

Wall ,Street Jou171a/, Ma\ 24.2013 

~'J -'Sufi Shrine BIO\vn Up in Latest Religious Attack in Libya." Reuters. Mar. 29. 2013 

30 Mohamed Eljarh, "Libya's Copls Under Attack?," Foreign Jlolicy, Mar. 19,2013 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 

7 
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Daveed Gartenstein-Ross July 10, 2013 

AQIM (which benefits from its presence in Libya and from Libyan anTIS) and AST. AQIM has 

publicly urged AST to de-escalate its confrontations with the Tunisian state, so as to preserve the 

ability to undertake dml'Cl in Tunisia. But at the same time AQIM has been bolstering AST 

militarily and also threatening the Tunisian state-maintaining the threat ofviolence so that AST 

has less of a need to do so. 

The salai'i jihadist regional strategy is coherent, and working well. The U.S. does not 

have to be at the forefront of a response-indeed, one of the trends of the past few years has been 

local actors or partner nations taking the lead against jihadist groups where possible, and it is 

sensible for the U. S. to minimize its expenditure of resources when feasible and wise. However, 

the U.S. should understand that the jihadist strategy is designed for the longer term. Rather than 

tricking ourselves into thinking that groups like AST will naturally become part of the political 

system and moderate, we should listen to what these groups are saying, and understand what 

their plan is. 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 

8 
21

Mr. POE. Thank the gentleman. 

Five minutes from Mr. Zelin. Thank you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF MR. AARON ZELIN, RICHARD BOROW FELLOW, 

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. ZELIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mrs. Chairman, and 

members of the two subcommittees for giving me the opportunity 

to testify today on the threat emanating from Libya. I will be summarizing my written testimony. 

Currently one can identify three interrelated but unique threats 

within Libya. One that is local with Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, one 

that is regional with Libyans going to fight in Syria, and the third 

is transnational related to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. I will 

be focusing on the first two since my colleague Daveed just spoke 

about AQIM. Before discussing this it is important to note that 

Libya has all types of violence and most is actually not related to 

jihadi organizations or those sympathetic to them. A large portion 

of it is militia based, a legacy of the revolution against the Ghadafi 

regime and related to local economic or political grievances. This 

should be kept in mind when contextualizing jihadi violence within 

the broader picture of Libya. 

Ansar al-Sharia in Libya is an organization that was established 

in February 2012, and has steadily grown over time over the last 

11⁄2 years. We have been able to see this based off of the two annual conferences they held. At the first one in June 2012, there 

were less than 1,000 individuals that were present, but at the one 

that occurred 2 weeks ago there were more than 2,000 individuals. 

So what explains this? Dawa, as Daveed mentioned, missionary 

work, has been at the forefront of their activities within 

Benghazi—cleaning streets, holding lectures, opening up medical 

clinics. But their most successful actions have been their anti-drug 

campaign within Benghazi, and it has actually gotten local buy-in 

from the psych ward in Benghazi, the local soccer club, the telecommunications company, as well as other actors there, and it has 

also allowed them to expand their operations outside of Benghazi 

for the first time with one event and lecture in Tripoli and the capital. 

This also highlights a false narrative that was heard in the 

media following the attack last year that they were essentially 

kicked out of the city. This is not true. They were just kicked out 

of the base that they were in, but the members of the organization 

stayed within Benghazi, and within a few days after the attack you 

actually heard from doctors and nurses at the hospital that they 

had been guarding that they wanted them back there to help out. 

In addition, we also see a growth in terms of their connections with 

some tribesmen in the southern city of Ubari, as well as the fact 

that they opened up a second branch of the organization just 1 

week ago in the city of Sirte. 

On a regional level we see Libyans going over in droves to Syria 

right now to fight against the Assad regime, and Libyan nationals 

are actually the largest number of foreign nationals fighting in 

Syria against the regime as well as the largest number of foreign 

nationals who have died. And the worry is, what happens when 

they go home? Is it going to be a repeat of what we saw in the 

22

1980s in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan when you saw Libyans going home and then going to fight against the government 

there? 

The difference now though is, unlike in the 1990s, the central 

government is very weak. We could see this with the different militia groups being able to blackmail the central government in terms 

of legislation, in terms of individuals in different ministries. Additionally, even though there have been attempts to integrate militias into the police force and military, because of the way Ghadafi 

ruled, we saw there are potential issues because of regionalism and 

localism there. So let us say you have somebody from Zintan trying 

to do police work in Dharna. There might be potential issues there 

because of this sort of localized xenophobia in some respects. 

So what can the United States and its allies do? I think one of 

the things is we can’t just be holed up in Embassies and staying 

in the capital. We need to have individuals go out to the cities, get 

in touch with the local businessmen, the local civil society actors, 

as well as even the local militiamen to better understand the mosaic in these local communities. Another area where the United 

States can help out is promoting entrepreneurship. This is what 

America does best and it is also a way to combat against the community organizing that groups like Ansar al-Sharia in Libya do, 

since we should be using globalization to our advantage just as 

they do. 

A third aspect is that we should continue our robust intelligence 

gathering with our local and regional allies as well as our allies in 

Western Europe who are a lot closer to this. And finally, I think 

one of the things that should be on the table as long as it is okay 

with the Libyan Government is that we should think about potentially using drones in southern Libya on the training camps of alQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. This of course could be controversial just because of the debate on drones, but I think it is important. But I would advise against using it in the northeast and west 

of the country where there are larger population centers. But using 

it in the south could be legitimate since it is sparsely populated, 

so collateral damage could potentially be low, and the fact that that 

is where AQIM is hosting its training camps. Thank you very 

much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Zelin follows:]

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THE TERRORIST THREAT IN NORTH AFRICA 

Before and After Beghazi 

Aaron Zelin 

Richard Sorew Fellow 

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 

Written Testimony before House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade and the 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

July 10, 2013 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the two committees for giving me the 

opportunity to testify today on the terrorist threat within and emanating from Libya. 

Currently, one can identify three interrelated, but unique threats: 

Local: Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, 

Regional: foreign fighter flows to Syria, and 

Transnational: al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib 

Before discussing this, it is important to note that Libya has all types of violence and most is 

not related to jihadi organizations or those sympathetic to them. A large portion of it is 

militia-based, a legacy of the revolution against the Muammar Qadhafi regime, and related 

to local, economic, or political grievances.1 This should be kept in mind when 

contextualizing jihadi violence in Libya, but is beyond the scope of this particular discussion. 

Current State of Affairs 

iiltsar al-Sharia ill Libya 

Even as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (L1FG) put down its arms after the war and 

joined the political process, new jihadi groups began to emerge.' The premier one has been 

Katibat Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi, which first announced itself in February 2012 and is led 

by Muhammad al-Zahawi, who had previously been an imnate of Qaddafi's infamous Abu 

Salim prison.' The organization has since changed its name to Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL) 

to try and signify it is a national movement as well as no longer primarily a fighting force, 

though most of its activities are still confined to Benghazi. 

ASL has loose ties to several smaller Salafi-jihadi katibas (battalions) in Libya, including the 

shadowy Ansar al-Sharia in Darnah (ASD), led by fonner Guantanamo Bay inmate Abu 

1 GeoffD. Porter, "The Attack on the U.S. Consulate: Emerging Signs of Jih.'ldist Sentilnent in libya,/I eTC Sentinel, 

Volume 5 Issue 9, SeptE'lnber 2012. Available at: httP:!;-"'''''-'"'oN\V.ctc.Llsma.edu/postsjthe-attack-on-the-Ll-S-consulateemerging-signs-of-jihadist-sentirnent-in-libya 

2 For more on this see the section on the LIFe in: Aaron Y. Zclin, uIslmnism in Libya," in The 1tVorld Almanac of 

I..,lamism, American Poreibm Polic~' Council 2013. Available at: http://ahnanac.afpc.org;Libya 

"Mary Fit/,gerald, uTt \Na<,n't Us/' Foreign Policy, September 18, 2012, 

htt}I://wwv,,·.forcilPl.pohcv.com(artidc~,!2012!09/18/it wa~n t us. 
24


81870b-2.eps

Sufyan bin Qumu. However, there is not much public record on Qumu's activities in the past 

two years or if he is even still in Darnah or hiding out in the mountains. ASL also has ties to 

Katibat Abu Ubaydah al-Jarah, and Saraya Raf Allah al-Sahati. Many of these katibas among 

others participated in ASL's first "annual conference" on June 6, 2012 4 Based on photos from 

the event, as many as a thousand individuals attended. At that time, it was believed that 

ASL had about few hundred members.' Currently, the group has expanded and at its second 

annual conference two weeks ago, there were around two thousand people present, though 

ASL claimed "\2,000 came. 

The main reason ASL has grown is due primarily to its focus on dawa (missionary) activities. 

While many analysts view jihadism only through the prism of violence, it misses the 

influence of independent jihadi religious scholars. Since the excesses of Abu Musab alZarqawi and al-Qaeda in !raq last decade, J'vlinbar al-Tawhid wa-I-Jihad (the Pulpit of 

Monotheism and Jihad) - a library of jihadi primary source material founded by Sheikh Abu 

Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who is currently imprisoned in Jordan-has attempted to steer the 

jihadi community to a more "pure" jihad. To do this, Maqdisi established a sharia committee 

of like-minded scholars in 2009 for Minbar that provide fatwas answering questions along a 

range of topics from the mundane to political to jihad f . 

One of the main critiques Maqdisi presents, and hopes to create a course correction within 

the jihadi movement, is his differentiation between the idea of qital al-nikayya (fighting to 

hurt or damage the enemy) and qital al-tamkin (fighting to consolidate one's power), which 

he expounds upon in his book Waqafat ma Thamrat ai-Jihad (Stances on the Fruit of Jihad) in 

2004. Maqdisi argues the fonner provides only short-tenn tactical victories that in many 

cases do not amount to much in the long-term whereas the latter provides a framework for 

consolidating an Islamic state. In this way, Maqdisi highlights the importance of planning, 

organization, education, as well as dawa (calling individuals to Islam) activities. As 

Wagemakers has noted, the creation of the Minbar sharia cOlmnittee was to forw·ard these 

views to "protect" the jihad and to better advance the pursuit of a true Islamic state based on 

the sanctity of the tawhid (monotheism) of God. 

The formation of Ansar al-Sharia in Libya is likely a logical conclusion and implementation 

of Maqdisi's ideas, changing emphasis on the groups' actions. One of the main avenues for 

advancing ASL's ideas has been through their social services programs. This provides an 

outlet for advancing the consolidation of a future Islamic state that cultivates followers in a 

broader fashion than the more vanguard-oriented organi7ations that have been involved in 

jihadism in a local, regional, or global capacity over the past 30 years. Since the beginning of 

the Arab uprisings, it appears that al-Qaeda and its associated ideologues have taken note 

4 The others that "vere at the conference included, the Islamic Foundation for Davva and hlah, The Supreme 

Comn1ission for the Protection of Revolution of Fl'bIuary 17, Livva Dara Libya, Katibat Shuhada Libya aI-Hurrah! 

Katibat Faruq (Misrata), Katibat Thu"i-var Sirte, Katibat Shuhada al-Khalij al-Na"\'Tfaliya, Katibat An"ar al-Huriyya, 

Katibat Shuhada al-Clm·varsha, Katibat al-Shahld Muhammad al-Harni, Katibat aI-Jabal, Katlbat ai-Nul', Katibat 

Shuh.ada Abu Salinl, Katibat Shuh.<'lda Benghazi, The Preventative Security Apparatus, Katibat al-Shahid Salih alNas, and other brigades from Darnah, Sabratha, J,mzur, and Ajdabiya. You can vie'iv pictures ofthe conference 

here: http5:llw""v.facebook.com/media/5et;75e~a.373188266078865.86838.156312127766481 &type~ 1 

~, Aaron Y. ZdiIl, uKnovv Your All.sar .al-Shmia," Fureign Pulicy, September 21,2012, 

htl}':;ill'~'\\,.fl..m,:ik"I1I'o~omJartid('qfZ012LQ2i)1/kno\v VUl1f ;:msar al ~haria. 

~ Joas \IVagemakers, "Protecting Jihad: The Sharia Council of the Minbar al-Tawhid vva-l-Jihad," lVfiddle Fa::.t Policy, 

Volume 18 ]s;ue 2, Summer 2011, 14&-162. 
25


81870b-3.eps

and also pushed for a robust use of dawa in the transitioning countries of North Africa that 

have had unprecedented freedom of expression.' 

One of the most successful projects that ASL has undertaken is a vigorous anti-drug 

campaign in cooperation with the Rehab Clinic at the Psychiatric Hospital of Benghazi, the 

Ahli Club (soccer), Libya Company (Telecom and Technology), and the Technical Company. 

This suggests that there is buy-in at a town-level. It also highlights the goodwill and positive 

force some see in ASL for society. Additionally, ASL has been involved with cleaning roads, 

religious lectures, competitions for children, security patrols, and opening medical clinics 

and religious schools. 

While dawa has been their main focus, what is more concerning is that they have also taken 

part in hisba (enjoining right and forbidding wrong; usually connotates vigilante activities) 

and jihad as well.s With regard to hisba, al-Zahawi has admitted that his group has been 

involved in the demolition of Sufi shrines and places of worship.' Further, ASL stonned the 

European School in Benghazi and took books on the human body because it saw it as 

contrary to Islam since it was "pornographic" in ASL's viewlll After being intimidated, 

teachers at the European school then blacked out the sections, which depicted the human 

body. There is also a video where members of Ansar al-Sharia in Sirte meted out a 

punishmmt by whipping some individuals tens of times." 

Beyond threats to local stability and actors, the most well known act of jihad for ASL is when 

members of the group are believed to have been behind the attack on the U.S. Consulate in 

Benghazi on September 11, 2012. There was no formal claim of responsibility, but the 

language used in the initial statement from ASL' s spokesman Ham al-Mansuri suggests that 

some individuals in ASL were part of the attack: "Katibat Ansar al-Sharia [in Bengha7i] as a 

military did not participate formally/officially and not by direct orders."!2 The ideological 

language used and posting of content unrelated to Libya on ASL's official Facebook suggest 

its affinity with al-Qaeda's worldview. 

As ASL has grown it has been able to expand its scope from beyond Benghazi. Only until 

this past spring have there been signs of the movement becoming more national. On March 

19, ASL's leaders had a meeting with the Ubari tribe, which is located in southern LibyaP 

Two months later, ASL coordinated its first event outside of Benghazi in Tripoli as part of its 

anti-drug campaign lecture series.!" Most recently, on June 28, ASL announced the creation 

-; Davccd CartL'nstl'in-Ros~ and Tara Vasscfi, ""Perceptions of the "Arab Spring" Within the Salafi-Jihadi 

Movement," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, VolLUne J5 Issue 12, 2012, 8Tl-848. 

8 This thrce-pronged ~tratq,'y ha~ also bccn utiliL.ed by Aru,ar al-Sharia in Tlmi~ia.l'or morc on it sec: Davccd 

Galtt:!nstein-Ros~, "Allsar al-Sharia Tuni~ia's Long Game: Davva, Hisba, and Jihad," International Centre for Counterterrm1bnl - The Hague, leeT Research Paper, May 2013. 

" Ahmed Maher, "Meeting Mohammad Ali al-7.aha\vi of T .ibyan Ansar al-Sharia," RRe Nc'WS, September 18, 2012. 

111 Ansar al-Shatia;l1 l.ibya, "Statement tt7: About the Cun;culum of the I-<.uropean School ;11 Kenghaz;," al-{~rq/a 

Media Toundation, March 3,2013. 

11 You C,ill vie,.,.' the video here: http://vV'NW.youtube.comh.v'atch?feature=player_E'lllbedded&v=DGJSM2eXaaU 

12 I lani al-Man~uri, "Statement from Katibat An~ar al-Sharia," al-Raya Media Foundation, Septcrnocr 12, 2012. 

13 An.sar al-Sharia in. Libya, "Libyan Tribe of the South 'Ubari' is in. I3enghazi to get to know Ansar al-Sharia," Raya 

Media Fuundatiun, March 19, 2013. 

14 Ansar al-Sharia in J .ibya, "Campaih'll \<Vith TIengha:;,i Against Drugs Joined by the Faduti Foundation in a Youth 

Conference in Tripoli," Raya frIedia Foundation, May 12, 2013. 
26


81870b-4.eps

of a new branch in Sirte. ls All of this points to the group expanding in capacity and influence 

contradicting some analysis that it was discredited and destroyed in the demonstrations in 

Benghazi in the aftermath of the US Consulate attack. 

lvluhajirin (Emigrants) in Syria 

On the regional level, Libyans' involvement in Syria in terms of weapons, training, and 

foreign fighters is another aspect of potential regional destabilization. One of the biggest 

problems related to this issue is the complete passivity and agnostic reaction by Libya's 

leaders. For instance, in February 2012, the head of Libyan foreign affairs Ashour Bin Khayal 

told the Financial Times, "Actually we cannot stop anyone from going to Syria. People want 

to go and fight ,,~th the Syrians; no one is going prevent them. Officially we do not have this 

stance but we cannot control the desire of the people."l6 

One of the worst kept secrets locally, but only reported on within the past month is the large 

amount of weapons that Libyans have sent to Syria via Benghazi and Misrata through 

Lebanon and Turkey.17 In addition, similar to the Iraq jihad, Libya has become a transfer 

point for fighters in the Maghreb headed to Syria. News reports and jihadi sources suggest 

that some of these individuals have attended training camps in Misratah, Benghazi, the 

desert area near Hon, and the Green Mountains in the east prior to heading off for the fight 

in Syria,lS 

Even more worrisome is what happens with the Libyan foreign fighters when they come 

home after fighting in Syria. Many Libyan alumni of the 19805 anti-Soviet jihad came home 

to overthrow the Qadhafi regime and install an Islamic State. They of course failed, but we 

could see a repeat of this phenomenon and unlike in the 1990s, Libya is a weak state where 

much of its territory is not truly controlled by the central government. 

In the past decade, Libyans have consistently been among the nationalities that have sent 

fighters to jihads abroad. For example, in October 2007, coalition forces in Iraq captured 

records in a raid near Sinjar along the Iraqi-Syrian border that contained a list of foreign 

fighters that joined al-Qaeda in Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007.19 Libyan fighters 

were estimated to constitute 18.8 percent of foreign fighters in Iraq, second only to Saudi 

Arabia's 4'1 percent.'" As for the current conflict in Syria, based on a personal archive 

collected via primary and secondary sources, there have been more than 400 Libyans that 

15 Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, "Founding Statemel1t For Ansar al-Sharia in Sirte," Rrlyl1 Medif1Toundntion, Jun_E' 28, 

2013. 

16 BaILon Daragahi, "Libya Can't Stop l'ightl'r~ Joining Syria Rcbd~/' Financial Time!:>, l'cbruary 12~ 2012. Available 

at: http://''~''w.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0976ef5e-5248-11el-a155-00144feabdcO.html~axzzllLl5aY3Sr; Also see this 

statement from the NTC: https://v.;ww.faccbookcorn/NationalT ransitionalCouncil.Libya/po~t~/433095960053399 

17 Jenan Moussa, "Sur Islahah libiyyah Thaqilah min dhiIninaha Sam 7 bi-yad al-Muardhah al-Suliyyah/' Akhbm 

ai-An, Jtilll'16! 2013. Available' at: http://akhbar.alaan.tv/news/post/15136/syria-frl·l·-anny-libya-hcavy-,·veaponssam-opp0'Jition-exclusive-jenan 

lH Hearer of the S,\vord, "Is a tran'Jnational rival nehvork of AI Claaidah emerging?," Islamic IIwakening I-orum, May 

30,2012. Available at: http://forunls.islamicawakening.com/f18/is-tTansnational-rival-nehvork-al-qaaidab_-

emerging-59127/ 

19 Por more on thi~, ~cc Brian Pishrnan and Joslph fldter, H AI-Qaida' s Porcign fightl'r~ in Iraq: A Pirst Look at the 

Sinjar Records/' I larmony Projed, Combating TerrorislII Center at West Point, January 2008, 

http;/i\\'\.\'" .... ,' .ctc.llsma.l'du!vvp-contcnt !urload~/201 Of06!aq:,- fOrClk'11- fi{?htcrs lD ire!\!.. pd f. 

20 Christopher TIoucek, HJ .ibyan State-Sponsored Terrorism: An Historical Perspective," Jamestown Foundation 

Tcrrori~rn Alonitor 3, i~s. 6, May 5, 2005, http /!\,,"·VVW.j;:lIlH:~towlu;r!ff:'iI1g1c/?It(J cachl'--l&tx ttrK'\V~[tt news] -305. 
27


81870b-5.eps

have gone to fight in Syria.'l Among this group, not all are jihadis, but in the past year most 

have been affiliated with Jabhat al-Nusra or other jihadi outfits. In a separate archive that 

collates jihadi martyrdom notices, more than 100 Libyans have died while fighting in Syria." 

al-Qaeda and Libya 

There are alleged claims of al-Qaeda Central directed presence in Libya. Most recently, in 

August 2012, the Library of Congress published an unclassified report about the growing 

presence of al-Qaeda cells in Libya.'J al-Qaeda's leader Ayman al-Zawahlri as well as Abu 

Yahya and Atiyatullah prior to both of their deaths planned to create a base for jihad in 

Libya. The report identified Abu Anas as the "builder of al-Qaeda's network in Libya" and 

referred to him as an intermediate between al-Qaeda senior leadership in Pakistan and the 

group's leaders on the ground in Libya. The report also maintains that al-Qaeda is using the 

name Ansar al-Sharia as a front, though, scant evidence has been provided at this juncture 

regarding this claim. Further, much of the report provides circumstantial evidence, 

assertions, and hearsay. Therefore, more information is needed regarding the nature of alQaeda Central's presence in Libya prior to assessing its true strength. 

A better way one can learn and try and piece together the nature of AQ's presence and aims 

in Libya is via AQC and AQlIvYs media releases. Prior to the anti-Qadhafi uprising, al-Qaeda 

in the Islamic Maghrib had never released any statements focusing specifically on Libya.'" 

Four statements issued following the outbreak of violence focused on warning Libyans not 

to trust NATO, appeals to Libyans to become involved in jihadist activities, and calls to 

create an Islamic state and establish sharia. But the group was vague on how to enact such 

change, and AQIM has not put forth specific objectives or an agenda for Libya. 

AQIM has also made it a point of emphasizing, praising, and congratulating Libyans for 

overthrowing Muamar Qadhafi. The organization's statements repeatedly referred to 

Libyans as the "descendants" and "grandsons" of the anti-colonial leader Umar al-Mukhtar, 

attempting to link the organization to Libyan nationalist narratives.25 Yet the group did not 

produce any Libyans to deliver these messages, unlike AQC, whose messages on Libya 

featured Abu Yahya al-Libi as well as Attiyatullah al-Libi, revealed for the first time in 

March 2011 to have been from the Libyan city of Misrata.26 

21 Aaron Zelin-' 5 personal archive titled "ForeigrL Fighters Flock to Syria," last updated May 27, 2013. 

22 Aaron Zelin's personal archive titled "Jihadi Martyrdom Notices/' last updated J Llne 5, 2013. 

23 "al-Qacda in Lib!,a: A Profile." 

24 Aaron Y. Zdin, "ls aI-Qaida in the Islamic Maghrib Gaining Influence in Libya?,", al-Wa~llt, Novl!mbcl' L 2011. 

A v ailablc at: http://thc\-\'usat wordprcss.com/2011!11/01/is-al-qaida-in-the-islamic-maghrib-gaining-infiuence-inlibya/ 

2" For AQI M'smessages related to the l.ibyan uprising see: al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghrib, nSupport and Hacking 

for the rJ ,ibyanl Revolution of our Family, the Free, Descendants of Umar al-Mukhtar," al-!\ndalus kfedia, February 

24,21111; Abu Musab Abd al-VVadud (Abd ai-Malik J)rukdil), "SUPPOTt fOT the ~Tee, I lescendants of UmaT alMukhtar." al-Andillus Media. March 18, 2011; Abu Musab Abd al-Wadud (Abd al-Malik Drukdill. "Congratulations 

on the Victory of the Descenci.mts of Umar al-Mukhtar/' al-Andalus Ale(:fja, October 2, 2011; Shaykh ,11-1 lasan 

Rashid al-Bulaydi, HOren Letter to the Muslims in libya," al-Anda}us Media, October 27, 2011; Shaykh Abu ijayy,m 

Aslin: HKhutbah Id al Aclha r;or The Year 1432 I V' a/-Andalus Aledia, November 18, 201L 

lb Christopher AnLalone, HAI-Qaeda lo~es it~ 'renaissance man'," Foreign Pulicy, September 9, 2011. Available at: 

http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/po'>t,>/2011/09/09/al_qaeciaJo'>es_its_renaissance_man; For the ,>tatements see: Abu 

Yahya al-Libi: '10 Our People in Libya," A,-Sahab Media, March 12, 2011; Atiyyatullah Abu Abd ar-Ralunan: 
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In March 2011, both Attiyatullah and Abu Yahya issued statements "congratulating" 

Libyans on shaking off Qadhafi's rule, focusing on the primacy of instituting sharia as the 

sole source of legislation in the new Libya, and warning against the potential that the United 

States or Libyans with links to Qadhafi's regime could usurp the rebels' victory. Attiyatullah, 

however, called for reconciliation if possible with those who "made mistakes and wrong 

choices in the previous era." 

In December 2011, though, Abu Yahyas message was more forthcoming on specific 

suggestions to Libyans, induding recommendations for: the "formation of a board ... to 

oversee the realization of the revolution's demands"; a call for rebels not to give up their 

weapons; an invitation for Islamic scholars to form an independent committee that would 

have a direct role in formulating Libya's constitution; and the severing of any ties the rebels 

had with Western governments. Indeed, this statement is one of the more substantive points 

made by an AQC senior leader regarding the Arab Spring. Despite passing mention from 

other leaders like Zawahiri, it seems that AQC left Libyan messaging to the group's Libyans, 

though we do not know who within al-Qaeda actually formulated the group's messaging on 

Libya. 

The most recent message from AQC or AQIM on Libya carne ten months ago when AQIM 

lauded the attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi and encouraging more such actions from 

the mujahidin in the region.-7 The lack of messaging highlights that although jihadis find 

Libya important it dwarfs compared with issues like Syria or Egypt. More troublesome is the 

current low profile that AQIM is keeping in southern Libya after elements of the 

organization were ejected from Northern Mali following the French invasion earlier this 

year. 

Due to the lack of state control and secrecy of an organization like AQIM, it is difficult to 

know exactly the nature of where in southern Libya they are located and what they are 

specifically doing. That said, it is likely that they are using this new base to recruit, train, and 

plan attacks. Both attacks by Mukhtar Bilinukhtar's Katibat al-Mulatharnun, fonnerly of 

AQIM, but still loyal to AQC, are believed to have bc'Cn planned or emanated originally 

from a Libyan safe haven.o, At this point, there is no indication that groups like AQIM are 

planning attacks in the West beyond rhetorical points in messaging. That said, it is not 

inconcei v able that they would in the future, though if the opportunity presented itself. 

n I'ribute '1'0 Our IJeople;n l.ibya," !\s-Sahab Media, March 18,2011; Abu Yahya al-l.ibi: "What Is Intended ~'or 

libya?," As-Sahnb Media, December 5, 2011. 

r al-Qaeda in the IsLunic Maghrib, 'IExcept the Beloved Oh Worshipers of the Cross," ru-Andall.ls Ale/Va, September 

17,2012. 

28 Paul Cruickshank and Tiln List~r, II Algeria attack may have link to Libya camps," CNN, January 23, 2013. 

Available at: http://cdition.crm.com/2013/0l/18!v,;orld!africa!algeria-attacker~; "Niger attacks lalllched from 

southern J ,ibya - Niger's president," Reuters, May 25, 2013. Available at: 

http://www.rcutcrs.com/articlc/2013/05/25/nigcr-attack>-libya-idUSL5NOE60DD20130525 
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Conclusion 

The case of a threat emanating from Libya locally, regionally, and internationally is very real. 

It should not be overstated, though. Most jihadis are far more interested and focused on 

Syria and likely to be on Egypt in light of the coup d'etat and subsequent arrests and 

violence by the military. Libya will still be a challenge, though. Militia actors and the 

periphery is stronger than the central government. The integration of militias into a 

legitimate police force and military has opened regional fissures among different cities in 

Libya due to the mistrust of regional outsiders by locals (which is a legacy of Qadhafi's 

divide and rule). Further, the blackmailing of the government by militias has eroded 

legitimacy in the new system, which hinders the ability to check emerging violent trends 

within the country. The United States therefore cannot rely on the government for help, it 

must work outside of the capital and get to know local actors since that is where the battles 

will occur. Containment with regional and Western European allies is likely the best one can 

hope for at this juncture. The situation is not ripe for a quick and easy fix or a short battle. 

This will be something that should continue to be monitored. 
30

Mr. POE. Dr. Byman, I recognize you for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. BYMAN, PH.D., PROFESSOR, 

SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 

Mr. BYMAN. Chairman Poe, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking 

Members Sherman and Deutch, distinguished members of the subcommittees, thank you for this opportunity to testify today. I am 

humbled to be here on the panel with Michael Lovelady. Please 

know that my thoughts go out to him, his family, and the other relatives of those Americans who have died in Algeria and from other 

terrorist attacks. 

There is a bit of good news, which is that the al-Qaeda core is 

weaker, in part, due to the American drone campaign. But the bad 

news is that affiliate groups like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 

or groups or individuals that have no formal relationship with alQaeda but share many of its goals are filling the void. They are 

taking advantage of greater state weakness in the Middle East 

which is likely to increase in the years to come. 

We have seen terrorism spread to new areas since the Arab 

Spring, and several African countries have also become more dangerous. In recent weeks, Egypt has become markedly less stable so 

similar plots in chaotic areas are likely to be in our future. The 

only strong regime in the North Africa region is Algeria, and the 

United States has at best a lukewarm relationship with the Algerian Government. 

Algerians are at the core of AQIM, and the Algerian Government 

runs the most extensive spying network in the region. So we must 

look to Algeria to get at both the problem and the solution. However, the Algerian Government has a history of manipulating opposition groups including violent terrorist groups, making it difficult 

to trust the information it provides. I believe that the U.S. reaction 

to the Benghazi attack may leave us less prepared for terrorism in 

the future. 

During my time as a staff member of the 9/11 Commission and 

for the House and Senate joint committee investigating 9/11, we 

consistently pushed for a CIA and a State Department that were 

more expeditionary and willing to take risks. In short, we wanted 

more people with the courage, experience, skill and mindset of Ambassador Stevens. His loss was a great tragedy for our country. Unfortunately, the political and bureaucratic lesson of Benghazi is 

clear. Avoid taking risks at all costs. 

American diplomats will be more confined to well-guarded parts 

of capital cities and more removed from local populations. This will 

keep them safer, but U.S. intelligence is likely to decline and U.S. 

statecraft to diminish. Better intelligence and good relations are 

important for keeping Americans safe in different parts of the 

world and in the U.S. homeland. It is impossible to quantify the 

benefits derived, but better intelligence allows numerous plots to be 

disrupted and better relations reduce hostility to the United States 

and improve cooperation when trying to disrupt attacks or manage 

their consequences. Trying to improve intelligence and relations, 

however, will put those Americans charged with gathering intelligence and those State Department officials charged with improving relations at more risk. 

31

The United States should bolster not draw down its presence in 

North Africa. America has important interests in the region, and 

in any case the threats will not disappear simply because the 

United States chooses to ignore them. Jihadists may point to any 

U.S. retreat after Benghazi as proof of U.S. cowardice. The region 

is now a growing arena for jihadists and the size of their area is 

growing. In addition, jihadists from the region as well as weapons 

from Libya are showing up in places like Syria and Sinai, and here 

I commend a recent report authored by my colleague here, Mr. 

Zelin. 

In short, the region’s problems are no longer regional. We should 

seek to understand and engage regional governments to counter 

the threats that emanate from North Africa. To this end we need 

a robust intelligence and diplomatic presence even in dangerous 

countries or ones that suffer from governments that reject democratic practices. Because the operating environment is risky, the 

United States should augment and systematize its rapid response 

capabilities and post-attack procedures. The United States must 

also work more with allies like France to prepare for contingencies. 

In addition, U.S. bureaucracies should adopt a more regional response to the terrorism threat. Unfortunately, U.S. bureaucracies 

still face difficulty working in a regional way. 

Finally, it is particularly important to hedge as we expand ties 

to undemocratic regimes. This involves expanding the range of 

American contacts across government and society and trying to 

find alternative solutions to dependence on troubling countries like 

Algeria. Such hedging allows the United States to protect its interests yet make clear to regime figures that the United States is not 

completely dependent on them. This both makes U.S. pressure 

more credible and leaves the United States in a better position to 

deal with the aftermath of revolution. Thank you again for this opportunity to present my views. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Byman follows:]

32


81870c-1.eps

Terrorism in North Africa: Before and After Benghazi 

Prepared Testimony before the joint hearing of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Subcommittee and the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee of the House Committee on 

F orei gn A ffai rs 

July 10, 2013 

Daniel Byman 

Professor, Security Studies Program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of 

Foreign Service at Georgetown University 

Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution 

Chairmen Poe and Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Members Sherman and Deutch, distinguished 

members of the subcommittees and staff, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 1 am 

honored to be here to express my views. I am also humbled to be here on the panel with Michael 

Lovelady. Please know that my thoughts go out to him and the other relatives of those 

Americans who have died in Algeria and from other terrorist attacks. 

The terrorist attacks in Benghazi that killed Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three 

other Americans have received exhaustive coverage, yet many of the long-term implications 

have not been fully considered. Future attacks, particularly those in North Africa, are likely to 

involve a Benghazi-style mix ofjihadists of different nationalities, making it difficult to 

determine exactly who is responsible. Libya remains troubled, and the broader Maghreb and 

Sahel areas are unstable. Greater state weakness, not more stability, is likely in the years to 

come. So similar plots may be in our future. 

I believe the U.S. reaction to the Benghazi attack, however, is likely to leave us less 

prepared for future terrorism. U.S. knowledge of Libya and the region has always been limited. 

Unfortunately, the political and bureaucratic lesson of Benghazi is c1ear- avoid risks at all costs. 

American diplomats and spies will be more confined to well-guarded parts of capital cities and 

more removed from local populations. This will keep them safer, but US. intelligence is likely 

to decline, and U.S. statecraft to diminish. In the long-run, diminishing U.S. capabilities could 

pose a grave danger to US. security, increasing the risk ofa surprise attack or a regional 

development that catches the United States unawares. In addition, jihadists may point to any 

US. retreat after Benghazi as proof of US. cowardice. 

The United States should bolster, not draw down, its presence in North Africa. America 

has important interests in the region and in any case the threats will not disappear simply because 

the U.S. chooses to ignore them. The region is now an important arena for jihadists, and the size 
33


81870c-2.eps

of their area of operation is growing. In addition, jihadists from the region and weapons from 

Libya are showing up in places like Syria and Sinai. 

We should seek to understand and engage regional governments and peoples to counter 

the threats that emanate from North Africa. To this end, Washington should maintain a robust 

and energetic intelligence and diplomatic presence, even in dangerous countries or ones that 

suffer from governments that reject democratic practices. Because the operating environment is 

risky, the United States should augment and systematize its rapid response capabilities and its 

post-attack procedures. In addition, Washington should adopt a more regional response to the 

terrorism threat, work more with allies like France to prepare for contingencies, and increase 

overall intelligence and diplomatic attention to the Maghreb and surrounding areas. 

The remainder of my testimony has three parts. First, I briefly discuss the attack on the 

U.S. consulate in Benghazi and assess what it means for the state of AI Qaeda today. Second, I 

discuss future challenges in the Maghreb, including Algeria as well as Libya, from a 

counterterrorism point of view. Third, I present implications and recommendations for the 

United States. 

I. The Benghazi Attack and the State of AI Qaeda 

The Benghazi attack exhibited several characteristics that are likely to manifest in future 

terrorist attacks in the Maghreb region. The attacks were: 

• Of Limited Sophistication. In contrast to the years of planning that went into the 9/ II 

attacks and other terrorism "spectaculars," the attackers in Benghazi used military 

methods suggesting basic coordination and training but not more cutting-edge methods. 

The weapons used - RPGs, AK-47s, heavy machine guns and artillery mounted on 

trucks, and so on - are not advanced and are widely available. Many fighters from Al 

Qaeda, associated movements, and jihadist local organizations have these skills and 

similar weapons. 

• Not Tied to Particular Events. Although some initial reports suggested that the attackers 

used the "Innocence of Muslims" video and associated demonstrations as justification, 

subsequent information makes clear this was at most a pretext. The United States was 

supporting efforts of the government of Libya to consolidate control over the eastern part 

of the country, but there was no single identifiable U.S. government action at the time 

that drew the ire of local terrorists: rather local jihadists simply wanted to attack U.S. 

personnel and facilities and did so. Even assuming the video in question mattered, there 

will always be similar pretexts that terrorist groups can cite to justify their attacks. 

• Continued Vulnerability of Diplomatic Facilitie.5. Diplomatic facilities, like military 

forces and civil aviation, remain a constant source of targeting interest for jihadist 

attackers. Betweenl998 and 2011 there were 13 deadly attacks on U.S. diplomatic 

facilities, most of which were linked to AI Qaeda, associated movements, or those who 

share aspects of its ideology. There were also innumerable attempted attacks and plots 

that were abandoned because of effective intelligence and defensive measures. 

2 
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81870c-3.eps

• Not a Reflection of Al Qaeda Popularity. Extremist Islamist movements are not 

particularly strong and popular in the Maghreb. In Algeria in particular they are less 

popular than they were in the 1990s. Rather, as discussed below, these groups take 

advantage of weak governments and a chaotic operating environment more than they 

depend on public support. 

Not Linked to U.S. Popularity. Some polls showed Libyans in general to be the most 

pro-American of all Arab states, with eastern Libya in particularly having a favorable 

view of Americans due to the prominent American role in helping the Libyan revolution 

defeat Qaddafi's forces.' Although foreigners and foreign intluence are unpopular in 

parts of Libya and the United States is seen as supporting some factions over others, only 

a minority of Libyans supported the attacks, and only a minority of a minority was 

actively involved. 

A Mix of Groups and Individuals. It does not appear that the AI Qaeda core orchestrated 

the Benghazi attack, and the assault shows how the core has spawned a variety of lesser 

but lethal movements. The attack involved individuals trom multiple groups, making it 

difficult to narrow responsibility even months after the attack. In addition to Libya itself 

groups and factions trom Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia, and Algeria all seem to have been 

involved2 This sort of networked coordination, where like-minded individuals from 

ditferent organizations cooperate in limited ways, is typical of Al Qaeda and associated 

movements as well as individuals who share no formal affiliation with the mother 

movement but embrace parts of its ideology. 

The Nature and Limits of AI Qaeda-Type Groups in the Maghreb 

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other groups in the region are capable of 

massive violence, even by the standards of the broader Al Qaeda-linked movements. During the 

1990s, the Algerian civil war saw unspeal<able horrors against civilians. According to Canadian 

diplomat Robert Fowler, who was kidnapped by AQIM, the terrorists whom he came to know 

were far more impressed with the late Iraqi leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who personally 

beheaded captives and favored bloody attacks on fellow Muslims who would not support his 

leadership, over the (relatively) more muted and anti-Western approach favored by Al Qaeda 

leader Ayman al-Zawahiri 3 

The various organizations in the Maghreb are divided but not necessarily hostile to one 

another. Many are linked in one way or another to AQIM, whose key leaders are Algerian but 

whose membership includes a wider range of individuals from around the region. Although 

AQIM has many splinters, the splinters often work together, cooperating on attacks, kidnappings, 

and other operations. 

I Jay T.oschky, "Opinion Briefing: Lihyans eye New RLiations v .. 'i1h the \Vcst," J\LLgLL~t [R, 2012. 

\\\y\y:gglliill.:.£91..1JL1.:0.Jl/1565:\9/0tiIlion-Drit~~lli:}~s-rYc-Y"::lv-Rclation"-~"t.f:sp"\:: Dan MmVhy, "Eastenl 

Libya poll indicates political Islam will closely follow democracy," December 26, 2011, Chnsttan Selene? .Alollltor. 

::: Pald CnLickshanl., Tim Listc'f, Nic Robertson, and Fran Tovoillshcnd. 'Sources: 3 al Qacda opcrati\'cs lOOk. parl in 

Denghazl attack." CNN. May 4. 2013 

, Robel1 Fowler. A Seasoll ill Hell (Ilarper Collins. 2011). 

3 
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81870c-4.eps

AI Qaeda affiliates and local organizations, like Ansar al-Sharia embrace some of AI 

Qaeda's rhetoric, but they are not under Zawahiri 's thumb and many have little direct 

organizational relationship. The core organization under Bin Ladin, and now Zawahiri, used to 

bring people under its banner because it could offer money and useful services like training 

camps. Both these incentives have been diminished4 Affiliates and local groups often disagree 

with core leadership on a wide variety ofissues, ranging from target prioritization to the degree 

and types of civilians who might be attacked. To the disappointment of al-Qaeda' score 

leadership, AQIM leaders have not tried hard to mobilize supporters in Europe on behalf of 

global jihad and have not brought the "war" to the Continent.' As Jean-Pierre Filiu comments, 

AQIM "is the branch of the global jihad that has most clearly failed to follow its founding 

guidelines."6 

In addition, the highly effective U.S. drone campaign has not only removed key AI Qaeda 

core leaders but has also made it far harder for them to communicate with one another and 

exercise command over the broader jihadist movement. A tip sheet found amongjihadists in 

Mali advised militants to avoid drones by maintaining "complete silence of all wireless 

contacts," to "avoid gathering in open areas," noting that leaders "should not use 

communications equipment," and taking strenuous measures to root out spies, among other 

suggestions 7 The implications for group effectiveness are staggering. Tn essence group leaders 

cannot lead as they must hide or remain incommunicado. Training on a large-scale is hard if not 

impossible, as large gatherings can be lethal. Tn combat, they cannot mass or bring in significant 

reinforcements. In other words, the drones tum al-Qa'ida's command and control structure into 

a liability, forcing it to have no leaders or risk dead leaders. 

The bad news is that affiliates themselves are filling the void created by the weakness of 

the core. For years AI Qaeda in Traq (AQT) was a strong and powerful force that influenced other 

jihadist groups. AQIM is trying to play that role in the Maghreb, working as we have seen with 

groups in Libya and Mali, and expanding ties to Nigeria's Boko Haram. 

Al Qaeda and its allies are likely to see the US response to the Benghazi attack as a 

victory and proof of America's cowardice. Bin Ladin had long claimed that the United States 

hid behind defenses and technology and pointed to US withdrawals from Lebanon and Somalia 

after terrorist attacks as "proof' that the United States will fold ifhit hard. The US retreat from 

Benghazi and the handwringing in the United States risk encouraging the jihadist perception that 

the United States has not changed even after 9111 

ll. Future Counterterrorism Challenges in the Maghreb 

Beyond the specific implications for AI Qaeda and associated movements in the 

Maghreb, the United States is likely to find counterterrorism more ditlicult because ofthe high 

level of instability in the region and the difficulty of working with key partners like Algeria. 

4 Daniel Dyman. "Breaking the 

Broukings Analysis Paper 27 (Augusl2012), 

h\'lllan 

5 Jason I3urke, The 911 Wars (Allen Lane, 2011), p. 417. 

o Jean-PietTe Filiu, --AI-Q.n'lda in the lslmnic Maghreb: A Case Study in the Opportllllsm ofGlobal.hhad.-- erc Semine!3 (1\priI201O): p. 14. 

-; A~socIated Press, "The Al Qalda Papers: Drones," (no date), 

http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/ _international! -IJdfs/al-qaida-papers-drones.pdf 

4 
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81870c-5.eps

The Spread of Instability 

A functional Libyan state has never really existed. Qaddaft, rather than building one, 

ruled through fear and vision. Enabled by its vast hydrocarbon wealth, the Libyan economy was 

top-down, never allowing the private sector and an independent middle class to develop. 

The stability of Libya today has not fundamentally changed since the September 11,2012 

attacks: anarchy does not reign complete, but neither has the government consolidated power. 

Since the revolution the country has had successful elections, and its economy has recovered 

reasonably though oil exports still remain less than pre-revolutionary levels. Islam and some 

sense of Libyan identity are unifying forces. In addition, Libya's neighbors - in contrast, to say, 

Syria's - have not actively intervened to back one faction over another. 

On the other hand, the state still does not function: the army, the police, the judiciary, 

and other basic security institutions are weak and politicized8 Armed gangs and militias, some 

of which reflect tribal or regional forces and others leftovers from the revolution, remain active 

almost two years of the revolution. The militias vary in type, legitimacy, and size: some have 

revolutionary legitimacy and local support; others are criminals masquerading as community 

defenders. The country lacks an effective judicial system, so militias rather than the police or 

authorized officials arrest those suspected of crimes, run prisons, and otherwise offer a form of 

rough justice9 When powerful sub-state actors oppose any particular government action, they 

simply seize the ministry or surround the Congress and force the government to acquiesce. 

These militias are both the source of many problems, particularly the lack of government 

authority and legitimacy, and a reflection of them. Libyan institutions and security forces remain 

weak and discredited, so people tum to militias; because militias are strong, Libya's state 

remains weak. On balance conflicts in Libya are limited, but they are not moving toward 

resolution. Because of this weakness, the Libyan state has not consolidated power in much of 

the country and is unable to disarm or crush groups like Ansar al-Sharia. This includes much of 

eastern Libya, but also much of the southern desert regions. 

Libya is ripe for homegrown terrorists and foreign terrorist penetration. The Al Qaeda 

core has long included Libyans in its ranks and reportedly dispatched operatives to build an 

organization in the post-Qaddaft era. Jihadists ofvarious stripes were released from jail, and 

some returned to Libya from exile. Homegrown groups like Ansar Al-Sharia have found room to 

operate. Tn addition, the Libyan civil war has opened up Qaddaft's vast arsenals to Libyan 

groups, and Libyan weapons have found their way not only to its neighbors like Mali but also to 

Gaza, Sinai, and even Syria. 'O 

More broadly, the Maghreb and the Sahel region are highly unstable. Two of Libya's 

neighbors, Egypt and Tunisia, have undergone dramatic regime changes in recent years, and at 

the date of this testimony Egypt's future course is anyone's guess. Sudan recently saw the 

secession of its southern region while other parts of the country clamor for independence. 

Nigeria and Mali suffer civil wars. Chad is poor, corrupt, and plagued by coups and has suflered 

several dramatic terrorist attacks in recent months. Borders in the Maghreb are porous. Part of 

"Lib; un Oil Production Slows as World Looks .I:::lsevvhere for Fuel, ,- Christian Science Alonifor, 

Intern.ntional CriSIS G-roup, --Trial by 1::rror: Justice in Post-Qadhafi LibY3," Aprill7, 2013. 

to Phoebe Gn.'cm"o(xL "Looted Libyan Arms Flmving Inlo Gaza:" The Telegraph, August 23, 2011 

http://wy'v\Y . telegraph. co.uk/ne\ys!\vorldnews! afncaandlndl anocean/ll hya/87 [ '8.7 04/T. ooted -T ,1 byan -arms-tloodlnginto-Gaza.html 

5 
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81870c-6.eps

this is geographic and historical - various tribes have long had economic and kinship ties that 

transcend borders - but the biggest problem is government weakness. So even if one country is 

adopting policies that make it stronger, it can still suffer violence emanating from its neighbors. 

Not only does instability in one regional state affect its neighbors, but the Maghreb in 

general is an exporter of radicalism A recent Washington Institute for Near East Policy study 

found Tunisia and Libya - more even than traditional producers of radicals like Saudi Arabiawas a source of suicide bombers for the Syrian conflict. 11 So the United States cannot write off 

this region in the hope that its trouble will remain geographically confined. 

Algerian Dilemmas 

The only strong regime in the region is Algeria - and the United States knows relatively 

little about this country and has at best a lukewarm relationship with its government. Algerians 

are the core of AQTM, and the government runs the most extensive spy network in the region: so 

we must look to Algeria to get at both the problem and the solution. Algeria was more proSoviet than pro-American in the Cold War, and it is prickly about its independence. Part of this 

is because of the secretive nature of the Algerian regime. However, Algeria has not been an 

intelligence or diplomatic priority. Algeria has long bristled at many cooperation requests, 

though intelligence cooperation did improve after 9111 and is now far better. However, from an 

intelligence point of view, the Algerian government has a history of manipulating opposition 

groups, including violent terrorists, making it difficult to trust the information it provides. In 

particular, there are rumors that Algerian intelligence has worked with Iyad Ag Ghali, the head 

of Ansar ai-Dine in Mali, and also with Mukhtar Belmukhtar. The Algerian government seeks to 

divert these groups against other targets and divide the movement, but in doing so it is playing 

with fire. 12 

Despite its relative strength, Algeria's own stability is in question. Predicting social 

revolution is notoriously difficult, but Algeria seems ripe for dramatic change. Algeria has 

resisted the Arab spring so far: the regime's ruthless and effective repression, its ability to coopt 

potential rivals, and the memory of a horrific civil war that left an estimated 200,000 dead in the 

1990s have dissuaded citizens from taking to the streets in large numbers. However, with 

neighbors like Tunisia and Libya in the throes of change, a stagnant economy, a large youth 

population, and a government with weak legitimacy, mass protests could sweep Algeria In 

particular, the recent stroke of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, though his role was largely to 

offer a fa<;ade for military rule, could foster a succession question that leads Algerians to demand 

more serious change - this may occur even before the scheduled 2014 Presidential elections. 

What the future holds is unclear the United States must be prepared for revolution, instability, or 

continued rule by the military and security services. 

Ill. Implications and Recommendations for the United States 

The aftermath ofthe Benghazi attack and subsequent events in North Africa suggest four 

areas in which the United States must improve: bolstering local intelligence and diplomacy, 

11 Aaron Lelin, 1::va11 Kohlmann, and Laith aI-Khouri, --Convoy 

Ncar Ea,[ Policy (Ilmc 2013) hllir!l.~~~illlIlill'-llii!!'illWl\:2[wl.2illfuk:!llc'Ql!~1l12iQQ~{g:lill;;QjJQ<SQ].::. 

fla:-.hpnll!tRepon-~ 

12 Bmce RIedel, "Algeria a Complex Ally in the War against al Qaeda: AL MOllitor. Febmary 3, 2013. 

6 
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81870c-7.eps

augmenting apid reaction capabilities, making foreign policy reflect regional as well as statefocused concerns, and increasing overall attention to the Maghreb and surrounding areas. 

Local Intelligence and Diplomacy 

Better intelligence and good local relations are important for keeping Americans safe in 

different parts in the world and in the US. homeland. It is impossible to quantify the benefits 

derived, but better intelligence allows numerous plots to be disrupted, and better relations 

reduces hostility to the United States and improves cooperation when trying to disrupt attacks or 

manage their consequences. Trying to improve intelligence and relations, however, will put 

those Americans charged with gathering intelligence and improving relations at more risk. 

That Benghazi was dangerous was well-known to all. Before the September II attack, an 

IED breached the US. consulate in Benghazi's perimeter. The International Committee of the 

Red Cross, in general a bold organization, had suspended operations there before the attack that 

killed Ambassador Stevens. There had been attacks on the British ambassador and on the 

Tunisian embassy. Other diplomats and foreign citizens were kidnapped or attacked. Indeed, 

the presence of terrorism was the reason for such a large intelligence presence in Benghazi. 

Ambassador Stevens knew Libya and Benghazi well. He was popular among Libyans 

and his worry about the dangerous security environment in Benghazi stemmed in part from this 

knowledge. During my time as a staff member of the 9111 Commission and for the House and 

Senate joint committee investigating 9111, we constantly pushed for a CIA and a State 

Department that was more expeditionary and willing to take risks - in short, we wanted more 

people with the courage, experience, skill, and mindset of Ambassador Stevens. His loss was a 

great tragedy for our country. 

The US. reaction to his death, however, risks putting undue constraints on American 

intelligence and diplomacy. These will ultimately undermine rather than protect US. interests 

abroad and safety at home. The bureaucratic and political lesson of Benghazi is to further 

confine American diplomats and spies in well-guarded parts of a capital city and remove them 

even more from the local population. This will keep them safer, but it will also make them less 

effective They will not mingle with the local population and learn their concerns and gain their 

support (indeed, a recent attempted attack on Italian diplomats in Libya was foiled by an alert 

and supportive Libyan citizen).13 They will be less able to gather intelligence on local groups 

They will not take risks. And America will be less able to stop terrorism and secure its interests. 

The United States will also become more dependent on foreign governments to provide 

intelligence. At times, reliance on foreign governments is beneficial- even ideal. In Morocco, 

for example, the local intelligence service is skilled and an important partner of the United 

States. In Algeria, however, the intelligence service is often suspicious of close cooperation with 

the United States. In countries like Libya and Mali, the intelligence services are weak and do not 

have access to or extensive sources in much of their countries. In such cases the United States 

needs to develop its own sources. 

In Sudan, the United States closed its embassy in 1996 due to the high risk of a terrorist 

attack. From a force protection perspective, this made sense: the danger was quite real. It also 

meant, however, the United States lost valuable intelligence on a nascent Al Qaeda and was 

unable to recognize important shifts in the attitude of the government of Sudan toward 

13 Fssam Mohammad, "TnpoiJ Car Domh Targets Ttahan DIplomatS:' June [2, 2013, J fagharehiu, 

http://magharebia.com/ell_ GB/m1icles/awi/features/20 13!06/12/feature-O 1 

7 
39


81870c-8.eps

counterterrorism cooperation. In the long-term the loss of this information may have cost 

American lives. Cutting and running from places like Benghazi may lead to similar losses. 

The United States still needs to deploy diplomats and spies in danger zones. In many 

ways, they are America's first line of defense, learning about problems before they are apparent 

in Washington and cultivating assets to handle them. In addition, the United States needs local 

access after any attack. As the problems the FBI has incurred in its Benghazi investigation 

suggest, the government in Tripoli cannot ensure access to the scene of the attack and other 

important investigative needs. Washington also needs local sources to learn more about the 

identity of the attackers and possible follow-on attacks. 

The Obama administration and the U.S. Congress - including the leadership of both 

parties - should make it clear that "failures" like Benghazi will be scrutinized, but also that we 

should expect losses when diplomats and spies operate in remote parts of unstable countries 

about which we know little where terrorist groups are also active. Surprise, mistakes, and 

bureaucratic confusion will be inevitable, and risk-taking should be rewarded over a caution that 

leaves the United States blinded, uninformed, and with few local friends as trouble develops. 

Rapid Reaction Standardization 

It would have been difficult for outside forces to have rescued Ambassador Stevens and 

his colleagues given the ferocity and rapid nature ofthe attack. And, in general, tactical warning 

is usually absent when it comes to terrorist attacks. One of the responses to this lack of tactical 

warning was to improve the defenses at US. embassies - the so-called "Inman guidelines.,,'4 

Although US. defenses are far from foolproof, they have saved many lives as terrorist groups 

have been foiled or have moved on to other targets. 

The United States must improve its ability to respond rapidly to unexpected terrorist 

attacks like the Benghazi assault. Anticipating the type ofmotJey medley of groups and 

individuals involved in Benghazi is difficult Moreover, given the unsure security situation in 

Libya - and problems facing the United States elsewhere in the region given government 

weakness and limits on intelligence - we should expect regular surprises from groups and cells 

of which we were previously unaware. 

In some cases even careful advanced preparation will matter little, but in others it may 

prove the difference between life and death. In April 2013, the Pentagon announced that the 

US. Marines had developed a rapid reaction force for North Africa that could quickly deploy 

500 Marines within 12 hours.'5 Thi sis impressive progress, but the time window needs to be 

smaller. This may involve deploying a smaller force - again, which means incurring more risk -

but this could save many lives while enabling more expeditionary US intelligence and 

diplomacy. Nevertheless, we must move away trom the idea that spies and diplomats will have 

absolute protection. Even spending vast amounts of money to improve rapid reaction will still 

leave US. officials vulnerable ifthey are aggressively gathering information and trying to win 

over locals as they should be. 

A Regional Response 

H SL'C "Reporl of the SL'crctClTY of StCllc' ':> Ad\,isory Pand on Embassy Securily"" (The "111111<:111 Pand"), 1985. 

http:,,://v,-w\Y.fns.on:/!wilIlC£..J.161J)llan/p81t(J2.h1l:l 

l'i Barbara Starr, -'After Benghazi, Marines approved for crisis response force," CNN, April 2, 2013. 

8 
40


81870c-9.eps

US diplomacy in North Africa and the Sahel area is still divided by country, and in 

some cases by geographic divisions ("Near East" vs. "Africa"). There is no ideal bureaucratic 

organization that perfectly balances state-specific concerns with ones that cross borders like 

terrorism, but in general U.S. bureaucracies are not well coordinated across regional lines. But 

terrorist groups from Algeria operate in Libya, what happens in Libya shapes Mali, and what 

happened in Mali contributed to terrorist attacks in Algeria and Niger. Although the terrorism 

problem crosses borders, different ambassadors have different policies regarding 

counterterrorism efforts. North Africa and the Sahel region tend to be separate bureaucratically 

even though many of their problems are linked. The US military has steadily developed and 

expanded regional bodies like AFRICOM to meet this challenge. Intelligence and diplomatic 

structures need to follow suit. 

Prioritizing the Maghreb and Surrounding Areas 

Often with justification, the United States has not made Algeria, Libya, Mali, and other 

states in the region priorities. Historic ties are limited, their energy supplies were not under 

threat, and their role in issues such as the Arab-Israeli dispute was marginal. 

With the spread of Al Qaeda-focused international terrorism, however, the balance of 

interests has changed. The region itself is now an important theater of jihad, with AQIM playing 

a regional role and numerous smaller groups showing up elsewhere in the several countries. 

Even worse, as the Syrian civil war indicates, the region is now an exporter of terror, with 

volunteers from the Maghreb and weapons from Libya showing up many miles away. 

Part of what is required is simply beefing up the US diplomatic and intelligence 

presence in the region. This is a long-term effort, requiring training, rewards for deployment, 

and promotion of officers with expertise in this area. The military's effort with AFRICOM is 

one valuable step, and this should be encouraged. So too should similar efforts by the Joint 

Special Operations Command to work more with local officials. However, it is often cheaper 

and wins more friends if intelligence officials and diplomats, not soldiers, take the lead on many 

Issues. 

One tricky issue concerns the Algerian government. It is corrupt and brutal - and it is a 

strong candidate for revolution. Moreover, its intelligence services are shadowy and duplicitous. 

Despite all these problems, greater engagement is necessary because of Algeria's importance and 

the knowledge of the security services there. In addition, the United States is not likely to have a 

significant impact on the nature of the Algerian regime: because we have little leverage, an 

aggressive democracy promotion strategy could lose us cooperation but at the same time do little 

to help those who want better government in Algeria. However, the United States should lay the 

groundwork for better politics over time - supporting NGOs that seek to advance democracy and 

liberal values, promoting vocational education, and trying to bring Algerian society and its youth 

in particular in contact with the broader world. 

Particularly important is hedging as we expand ties to the regime. This involves 

expanding the range of American contacts across government and society, consulting more with 

allies on j oint policies, and trying to find alternative solutions to dependence on Algeria for key 

security issues (such as bases for US. drones) Such hedging allows the United States to protect 

its interests yet make clear to regime figures that the United States is not completely dependent 

on them. This both makes US. pressure more credible and leaves the United States in a better 

position to deal with the aftermath of succession or revolution. 

9 
41


81870c-10.eps

More broadly, the United States will be working with weak governments like Mali and 

Libya as well as more established and stable ones like Morocco. Some of these governments, 

like Mali, will suffer coups or otherwise have unacceptable and anti-democratic practices. The 

United States, however, cannot simply drop its relations with regional states and then resume 

them a few years later when the dust settles. Although principled abstention plays well at home, 

in that interim we lose valuable intelligence and relationships. Steady contact and pressure to 

improve governance is often more useful than dramatic gestures that bum bridges but do little to 

help foster democracy. 

Often the United States will need to rely more on regional allies, particularly France. US 

support for French military efforts in Mali, though grudging at first, was a valuable step given 

both France's historical ties and associated knowledge of the region and Paris' willingness to act 

as the Mali problem metastasized. Given France's ties to other hotspots like Mali and Algeria, 

the United States should engage in serious contingency planning with France for the region to 

identify ways to burden share and otherwise take advantage of what each country has to offer. 

**************************** 

Terrorism in and emanating from the Maghreb and Sahel regions, both of which threaten 

American Ii ves and interests, will continue and may even grow in the years to come. The tragic 

attack in Benghazi and other subsequent terrorism in North Africa is not a reason to retreat. An 

effective response will require more local and regional partners, more cooperation with allies, 

more resources, and most of all a willingness to accept risk. 

10 
42

Mr. POE. Mr. Lovelady for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MIKE LOVELADY, BROTHER OF ALGERIAN 

GAS PLANT TERRORIST ATTACK VICTIM, VICTOR LOVELADY 

Mr. LOVELADY. Good morning. 

Thank you, Mr. Poe, for the opportunity, and the rest of the committee members, to come testify on behalf of my brother. I have 

just got a story I put together on how this went down, and I think 

it would be very, very helpful for you to understand the hurt that 

my family feels. 

On the morning of January 16, 2013, at approximately 3:30 a.m., 

my home phone rang. As usual, a call at this time in the morning 

does not bring good news. When my wife answered the phone, a 

strange voice asked, who is speaking? When my wife refused to 

give her name she heard Victor state, ‘‘Wanda, I am in trouble. I 

need Mike.’’

When I answered the phone Victor stated, ‘‘I am in trouble. I 

have been captured by al-Qaeda and we are tied up.’’ Then Victor 

asked me to tell his wife Maureen about his situation in person, 

because he did not want her to be alone when she got the news 

about him. Victor then said, ‘‘You will know what to do.’’ I told him 

that I would notify his wife, contact the FBI and the U.S. State Department. I attempted to ask questions about his situation, but he 

stated that the captors were next to him and he could not answer 

any questions. Then we told each other bye. That was the last I 

have ever heard from my brother. Victor was only 57 years old and 

my only sibling. 

Victor and I grew up in Nederland, Texas, with wonderful parents that raised us with traditional and solid values that would 

help us throughout our lives. We were the type of family that did 

everything together such as going to the beach or the lake. As we 

grew up and went in different career paths we did not get to see 

each other as much as I would have liked. However, we still talked 

on the phone a lot. I always considered Victor the genius of the 

family. I admired his ingenuity and I was in awe of his knowledge 

about electricity and electronics. 

Victor had two degrees from Lamar University in Beaumont, 

Texas. His Bachelor of Science was in Industrial Engineering and 

his Associates Degree was in Electricity and Electronics. Victor was 

a great brother, husband and father. Victor, married to his wife 

Maureen for 33 years, he had two children he loved so much. Erin, 

28, and Grant, 21 years old. 

At this time I would like to introduce Victor’s wife Maureen, his 

son Grant, and my family. Wanda is my wife, and my children, 

Kevin, Jason and Ashley. His daughter Erin would have liked to 

have been here today. She had to have emergency back surgery 

over this past Saturday. 

Victor had a heart of gold and would do anything for anyone, especially the elderly. He was a kind and gentle man. Victor was an 

industrial engineer by trade and designed system buildings to control industry operations. He was also a master electrician and could 

almost do anything. Most of Victor’s life was spent in Nederland, 

only recently moving to Houston after his children graduated from 

Nederland High School. 

43

When work in our area slowed down, Victor traveled back and 

forth to Houston, 170-mile round trip, for about 3 years so his children could graduate from Nederland High School. His son Grant 

was a star football player and his daughter Erin was assistant softball coach at Nederland High School. Victor never had a pension 

plan and always had to pay his family’s insurance with no input 

from the company he worked for. He never had more than 2 weeks 

off in a year. However, he longed to be able to retire and spend 

more time with his wife and children while he was still a relatively 

young man. 

When the opportunity came up for Victor to go to work overseas, 

Victor weighed the pros and the cons. He was told that he could 

only work overseas until he was 60 years old. He knew that if he 

could do this job for 3 years he would be able to make enough 

money to retire and be with his family. He was assured that it was 

a safe place to work. He told his family and me that he would be 

safe. He said the plant was in the middle of the desert and no one 

would go there. 

After speaking with my brother, I called the State Department’s 

Washington number to see if they could provide me with more information about his situation. After explaining it to them that I 

just received a call from Victor, they said they would look into the 

matter and call me back. The State Department called me back 

later that morning to confirm that there was an attack on the 

plant. I continued to receive regular calls from both the State Department and the FBI after that. They kept us well informed of 

Victor’s situation on a daily basis and were very respectful. In addition to that we were visited by agents from New York, Beaumont, 

and the New York City offices. 

On January the 19th, the FBI came to a family member’s house 

where we had gathered and told us that Victor had died on January 17th. On January 21st at 3 o’clock a.m., the State Department 

and the FBI called again asking if there was any identifying marks 

that could be used to identify Victor. I told them that Victor had 

a tattoo of a lightning bolt on his upper left arm. A half hour later 

they called me back and confirmed that they had positively identified his body. 

About 2 months later, in March, we got more details of Victor’s 

death. The FBI’s Special Agent Jessica Ulmer informed us that Victor was killed as the hostages were being moved from one side of 

the compound to the other and the Algerian forces had launched 

a raid. I don’t know if the Algerian forces took out the cars or the 

terrorists blew up the vehicles, but Victor’s cause of death was listed as blast injuries. Agent Ulmer has kept in contact with me over 

the last few months regarding Victor’s personal effects that we 

hope to recover. Jessica is a compassionate agent that works hard 

to complete a task such as this investigation, and truly understands the feeling of our family regarding our loss. 

I personally want to thank Congressman Ted Poe and his staff 

for their care and diligence on having Victor’s personal effects returned from Algeria. Congressman Poe never forgot our family and 

continues to seek justice for the people that lost their lives on that 

fateful day. Congressman Poe is a true patriot and he makes me 

proud to be from Texas. I also want to thank Congressman Randy 

44

Weber for making sure our every need was met throughout this entire ordeal. 

Finally, on behalf of the Lovelady, Buttaccio and Rowan families, 

I want to thank Congressman Poe, Congressman Weber, and all 

the House Committee on Foreign Affairs members for continuing to 

fight terrorism and keeping Americans safe and at home. Thank 

you for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lovelady follows:]


81870d-1.eps
45


81870d-2.eps

Victor was only 57 years old and was my only sibling. Victor and I grew up in 

Nederland, Texas with wonderful parents that raised us with traditional and solid values 

that would help us throughout our lives. Our family was the type that did everything 

together such as going to the beach or the lake. As we grew up and went in different 

career paths, we did not get to see each other as much as I would have liked. 

However, we still talked on the phone a lot. 

I always considered Victor the genius of the family. I admired his ingenuity and was in 

awe of his knowledge about electricity and electronics. Victor had two degrees from 

Lamar University in Beaumont, Texas. His Bachelor of Science was in "Industrial 

Engineering" and his Associate's Degree was in "Electricity and Electronics." Victor was 

a great brother, husband and father. Victor was married to his wife, Maureen, for 33 

years. He had two children that he loved so much, Erin, 28 years old and Grant, 21 

years old. At this time I'd like to introduce Victor's wife Maureen and his son Grant, my 

wife Wanda, and my children, Kevin, Jason, and Ashley. Victor's daughter Erin would 

have liked to have been here today as well but had to have emergency back surgery. 

Victor had a heart of gold and would do anything for anyone, especially the elderly. He 

was a kind and gentle man. Victor was an Industrial Engineer by trade and designed 

system buildings to control industry operations. He was also a Master Electrician and 

could do most anything. Most of Victor's life was spent in Nederland, only recently 

moving to Houston after his children graduated from Nederland High School. 

When work in our area slowed down, Victor traveled back and forth to Houston, a 170 

mile roundtrip daily for about 3 years so his children could graduate from Nederland 

High School which was the same school he graduated from in 1973. His son, Grant 

was a star football player and his daughter, Erin was an assistant softball coach at 

Nederland High School. 

Victor never had a pension plan and always had to pay all of his family's insurance with 

no input from the company he worked for. He never had more than two weeks off in a 

2 
46


81870d-3.eps

year. However, he longed to be able to retire and spend more time with his wife and 

children while he was still a relatively young man. When the opportunity to go to work 

overseas arose, Victor weighed the pro and cons. He was told that he could only work 

overseas until he was 60 years old. He knew that if he could do this job for 3 years, he 

would be able to make enough money to retire and be with his family. 

He was assured that it was a safe place to work. He told his family and me that he 

would be safe. He said his plant was in the middle of the desert where no one would 

go. 

After speaking with my brother, I called the State Department's Washington number, to 

see if they could provide me with more information about his situation. After explaining 

to them that I had just received a call from Victor, they said they would look into the 

matter and call me back. The State Department called me back later that morning to 

confirm that there was an attack. I continued to receive regular calls from both the State 

Department and the FBI after that. They kept us well informed on Victor's situation on a 

daily basis and were very respectful. In addition to that, we were visited by agents from 

Houston, Beaumont, and the New York City offices. 

On Saturday, January 19, the FBI came to a family member's house where we had all 

gathered and told us that Victor had died on January 17. On January 21, at 3:00 am, the 

State Department and FBI called again asking if there were any identifying marks that 

could be used to confirm that Victor had passed. I told them Victor had a tattoo of a 

lightning bolt on his upper left arm. Half an hour after that call we received another call 

confirming that they had positively identified his body. 

About 2 months later in March we got more details of Victor's death. FBI Special Agent, 

Jessica Ulmer informed us that Victor was killed as the hostages were being moved 

from one side of the compound to another and Algerian forces launched a raid. I don't 

know if the Algerian forces took the cars out or if the terrorists blew their vehicles up, but 

Victor's cause of death was blast injuries. Agent Ulmer has kept in contact with me over 

the last few months regarding Victor's personnel effects that we hope to recover. 

3 
47


81870d-4.eps

Jessica is a compassionate agent that works hard to complete a task such as this 

investigation and truly understands the feeling of the family regarding our loss. 

I personally want to thank Congressman Ted Poe and his staff for their care and 

diligence on having Victor's personal effects returned from Algeria. Congressman Poe 

never forgot our family and he continues to seek justice for the people that lost their 

lives on that fateful day. Congressman Poe is a true patriot and he makes me proud to 

be from Texas. 

Also, I want to thank Congressman Randy Weber for making sure our needs were met 

throughout this entire ordeal. 

Finally, on behalf of the Lovelady, Buttaccio, and Rowan families, I want to thank 

Congressman Poe, Congressman Weber and all of the House Committee on Foreign 

Affairs members for continuing to fight terrorism and keeping Americans safe at home 

and abroad. 

4 
48

Mr. POE. Thank you Mr. Lovelady. 

And once again on behalf of both of the committees that are here, 

I want to extend our sympathy to you, Maureen, and the families 

of Victor. 

I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions and then 

we will proceed through each committee member. I am going to 

ask, start with the basics regarding both Benghazi and the attack 

in Algeria. Did we know before the attack in Benghazi, did we 

know before the attack in Algeria that it was going to occur? After 

the attacks are over with, do we know who committed the attack 

in Benghazi and Algeria? If we do know, where are those people 

that committed those attacks? 

So those are three questions, and I will throw that out to all of 

the committee members. Mr. Byman, do you want to start first? 

Mr. BYMAN. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I should stress that my 

knowledge of this comes from unclassified sources and I am sure 

that much of value is in the classified realm. My understanding, 

certainly, of the Benghazi attack was that it was widely known 

that it was a very dangerous threat environment before the attack. 

In terms of the specifics of the plot, to my knowledge, that was not 

anticipated by the U.S. Government from almost everything I have 

seen including the reported actions of Ambassador Stevens. 

In Algeria, I believe it slightly differently. Algeria, including the 

energy sector, had historically been a relatively safe area. Now we 

need some real caveats when we say that because Algeria itself has 

had huge terrorism problems especially in the 1990s. Another thing 

to remark on is Algeria’s role, albeit limited, in supporting the 

French effort in Mali. 

Mr. POE. Excuse me, Dr. Byman. Can you cut to the chase? Did 

we know about the attack in Algeria before it occurred? I am talking about the United States. And the second question is, do we 

know who committed it, and if so, have those people been apprehended? That is the three questions regarding both places, since 

the time is limited. 

Mr. BYMAN. I would say, in Algeria, sir, that we knew there was 

a dangerous threat environment but again did not anticipate the 

attack. Afterwards we know some of the individuals involved, to 

my knowledge, but I don’t believe we know all of them. There is 

still some uncertainty. And to my knowledge they have not been 

apprehended. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Zelin, do you want to weigh in on those three questions? 

Mr. ZELIN. Sure. In both cases I am unsure that the U.S. Government was aware that they were going to occur at that specific 

time. In terms of who did what in Benghazi, there was a statement 

put out by Ansar al-Sharia in Libya within about 12 hours of the 

attack saying that they themselves did not order anything, but the 

way it was worded suggested that members of the group were involved. So it could have been some type of freelancing. 

And then in terms of the In Amenas attack, Mokhtar 

Belmokhtar’s group claimed responsibility for it and it is believed 

that some of the members in his group with him were a part of it. 

And currently it is believed that Mokhtar Belmokhtar is either in 

49

northern Niger or in southern Libya, but this is unsure, and then 

the members of Ansar al-Sharia are still in Benghazi. 

Mr. POE. So has anybody in either attack been apprehended, to 

your knowledge? 

Mr. ZELIN. I am not aware of that. And in the case of Mokhtar 

Belmokhtar we have seen that he has conducted other operations 

in northern Niger a couple of months ago, or maybe a month ago. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Gartenstein? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. So as to preserve your time, Mr. Chairman, I don’t have anything to add to my colleagues. I agree with 

them. 

Mr. POE. You made a comment, Dr. Byman, that kind of irritated 

me in that you said that the terrorists in North Africa look at the 

United States’ policies since both of these actions, Algeria, and 

then first, Benghazi, as a retreat from the area, and that the 

United States, if I got your comments correctly, has cowardice regarding this issue. So that irritates me. Do you want to explain 

that word ‘‘cowardice’’ and what you mean by that? 

Mr. BYMAN. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for irritating you. 

Mr. POE. Oh, it is okay. It is not the first time. 

Mr. BYMAN. It is the first time I have done it, I hope. Sir, in the 

past, Bin Laden would point specifically to the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon and also to Somalia as proof that if you 

hit the United States hard it will leave a country. In Benghazi in 

particular, my fear is that if what happened in Benghazi leads to 

a drawdown of the broader U.S. diplomatic and intelligence presence in North Africa, that 5 years from now, 10 years from now we 

will be hearing Benghazi added to this list. And it is a way of encouraging his followers, sir, that he says that. Hit the United 

States and they run. I hope that is not so, sir. 

Mr. POE. My last question to all of you, do any of you know 

whether it is true or not that regarding Algeria, the United States 

had forces in the general area before the attack and right after the 

attack? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. I have no knowledge of that sir. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Zelin? 

Mr. ZELIN. Neither do I. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Byman? 

Mr. BYMAN. Nor I, sir. 

Mr. POE. And lastly, Mr. Lovelady, do you have any other thing 

that your brother told you that you haven’t already told us, before 

he was killed in the plant in Algeria? 

Mr. LOVELADY. No, sir, I don’t. I just, pretty much I spoke with 

him very little, and the information I have got was from the FBI 

on how he died and what was happening when he died. 

Mr. POE. And he told you he was already captured by what group 

or what——

Mr. LOVELADY. He told me he was captured by al-Qaeda. 

Mr. POE. All right. Thank you very much. Five minutes for the 

ranking member. Mr. Sherman? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Lovelady, thank you for your testimony, and 

I would like to thank your entire family for being here to put a 

human face on what we are talking about. There are those who 

blame America any time anything bad happens anywhere in the 

50

world. That we are the world hegemon and that therefore anything 

bad that happens is a sign of American weakness or American 

error. 

The fact of the matter is, with some crises we need to watch and 

not get involved, with some we need to influence and put only some 

of our prestige, money, and in some cases, troops, on the line. And 

only in a very few cases do we need to actually be sure to control 

the outcome and assume ownership of the crisis and make a full 

commitment. We should not retreat from all involvement in the 

world, nor should we try to take responsibility for the outcome of 

any crisis. The phrase ‘‘lead from behind’’ has been disparaged and 

as a turn of phrase it deserves to be disparaged, but as a concept, 

that is to say, be involved but not necessarily take the leadership 

role, it has to play a role in American foreign policy. 

In Niger we helped France but France took the lead. Would we 

have had it any other way? Is there anyone in this room that 

wants American troops in Niger? And in Libya it was a combination of the United States, NATO and the rebels on the ground that 

overthrew Ghadafi. We did not put our troops on the ground or try 

to control the outcome. We got an outcome that was far from perfect. Would we have preferred to see American troops dominate 

Libya? There is also the Pottery Barn rule put forward by Colin 

Powell that says if we do get involved we have to take ownership 

and we are responsible for rebuilding. I will point out that history 

proves that wrong. 

In World War I we played a critical role in breaking the German, 

Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires. No one in America 

dreamed that we had the responsibility to rebuild or that we owned 

that which had been broken. And while some of our more imperialist friends who were with us in World War I took advantage of 

opportunities, no one asserted that they had the obligation to rebuild every society that was destroyed. We have a right to defend 

ourselves without assuming the obligation to make sure that every 

country that harbors terrorists ends up as prosperous and as democratic as our World War II adversaries. And we have to be humble 

enough to realize that sometimes we will influence but not control. 

Now I would like to turn our attention to Morocco, which is one 

area we haven’t focused on yet. I am concerned that the AQIM, the 

al-Qaeda and Islamic Maghreb, has reportedly established ties with 

the Polisario militants in Algeria. Algeria provides material support and land for the Polisario, and some of the members seem to 

have been involved in the terrorist operations in northern Mali. I 

don’t know which of our experts to ask, but what are the links between AQIM and the Polisario? What are we doing to disrupt those 

links, and what should we be doing to help allies like Morocco deal 

with AQIM-aided organizations? 

Mr. ZELIN. Based off of what I know in the open source reporting, it appears that there is a lot of rumors related to potential connections but there is no hard evidence as of now, at least based off 

the open source reporting. And in terms of any connections at all, 

I would assume that our allies in Morocco would help out in arresting individuals as the Moroccans have in other cases where there 

have been different terrorist cells within Morocco that we have 

seen over the past 10 years. 

51

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, the Polisario is being sheltered by Algeria. 

What should we do there? 

Mr. ZELIN. I don’t really focus on Algeria that much in terms of 

my research, so I don’t know the nature of what the United States’ 

relation is there, but I assume that the United States can speak 

with Algeria. But we also have to understand in this context that 

there is a rivalry between Morocco and Algeria and we can’t necessarily influence it that much. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I am going to try to sneak in one more question. 

Is Libya—we turned over tens of billions of dollars of Ghadafi’s reserves to the Libyan Government. Is that money being used to establish security on the ground, is it being hoarded, or is it being 

stolen? Anybody have a one-word answer? 

Mr. BYMAN. I would say primarily hoarded and stolen, but a portion of it is being used to try to develop some governance, but not 

enough, sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. Thank the gentleman. Chair recognizes the chairman 

of the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, Ms. RosLehtinen from Florida. Five minutes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you Judge Poe. The threat of radical 

Islamists as we all know is not a new phenomenon, and we know 

that the problem is not just localized in one country. It is spread 

across an entire region. Radical Islamic militants are opportunists. 

They seek out areas of weak governance to establish bases of operation, and from there they go out and wage war against anyone 

who doesn’t comport to their interpretation of Islam. 

And since the Arab Spring we have seen this opportunistic wave 

of Islamic militants move across the region from Libya to Tunisia 

to Algeria to Mali and beyond. And now we are seeing thousands 

of radical Islamists and al-Qaeda-linked terrorists flocking to Syria 

to join the fight there. If and when Assad falls and the Islamists 

manage to control Syria, what further implications would that have 

for the rest of the region, and what can the U.S. do to prevent an 

even further spread of this Islamist wave? 

And when looking at the administration’s policy when it comes 

to this region, it is difficult to define any clear or decisive agenda. 

In order to tackle this problem it is imperative that we support our 

African partners’ efforts to disrupt the operations of terrorist networks, deny safe havens to extremist groups, prevent an escalation 

of emerging threats through greater mutual cooperation and constant vigilance. 

So Dr. Byman, I would like to ask you, in your testimony you 

state that North Africa and the Sahel tend to be separate bureaucratically even though many of their problems are linked. How effective can programs like the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism 

Partnership be in bolstering our partners in the region and fighting 

these threats, if funded and run properly, and what governments, 

whether it is local or national, can the United States work with in 

this region? Where have we seen any host nation buy in on these 

issues? 

And Mr. Zelin, yesterday the British Defense Ministry announced that it would train up to 2,000 Libyan troops which is part 

of a broader package of defense and security assistance developed 

52

with the U.S., with France, and Italy. In your testimony you state 

that the U.S. should work with regional and Western European allies. Will this help stabilize the deteriorating situation in Libya? 

Should the U.S. do more to help the Libyan Government? 

Dr. Byman? 

Mr. BYMAN. The regional versus state-focused issue is a very difficult one for any bureaucracy. Almost any approach you take is 

going to have problems one way or another. But when you do something cross-regional, having state-focused bureaucracies makes it 

far more difficult. Each Ambassador is going to have his or her own 

little fiefdom that is operated in a different way. You are going to 

have analysts not talk to one another. You are going to have programs that are implemented in different ways. And unfortunately, 

at times, the bad guys are more regional than we are. 

Mr. ZELIN. I think that the steps that the U.K. is taking with 

training Libyan troops is a great idea. I think it should be done in 

addition to whatever else the United States is doing and our allies 

in Western Europe. But as I mentioned, I think we have to be careful also about the regionalism that we do see in Libya and the potential strife that could happen if you have individuals from different parts of the country trying to secure other parts. So that is 

something to think about as well. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Gartenstein-Ross? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. I will speak to the initial point that you 

made about Syria. I think that at the end of the day jihadists will 

not control Syria, but they will control enough territory and have 

enough influence that it is going to create a lot of problems within 

the region. I would specifically look at the interplay between Syria 

and the developing situation in both Egypt and also Iraq. In terms 

of what we can do, I think there are three things that we can do 

right now. One is I do support engagement with Syrian factions in 

order to both map the factions and also to gain influence with 

whomever ends up being the eventual winner. 

But I think it is extremely important, and you already pointed 

to the dangers of arming Syrian factions, there has been some talk 

of sending them anti-tank weapons or anti-aircraft weaponry. I 

think especially given that groups like Jabhat al-Nusra, which are 

linked to al-Qaeda, have not been shunned by other Syrian factions 

and also that we can’t control the flow of this weaponry, we absolutely should not undertake it in that it will be used against the 

United States or else our allies. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you Mr. Poe. 

And our deepest condolences to the entire Lovelady family. Thank 

you. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, the 

ranking member of the Middle East and Africa Subcommittee, Mr. 

Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I have some questions 

for the panel, but first, Mr. Lovelady, there are a lot of discussions 

that take place here that are, suffice it to say, dry, sometimes 

uninteresting to people who happen to pay attention to what we do. 

There are not enough opportunities for the members of this committee, and I would suggest not enough opportunities, I think, unVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:56 Aug 15, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\071013J\81870 HFA PsN: SHIRL
53

fortunately too often for the American people to be reminded of 

why what we do here really matters so much. And your being here 

today with your wife Wanda and your kids, and Maureen, your 

being here with Grant really does remind us of that. 

When your brother was killed in the middle, as you put it, in the 

middle of the desert in Algeria, this matters to us and this matters 

to this country. And the battle that we have against terror and our 

fight against terrorists in what for many is seen as some remote 

part of the world, is all the more important when we are reminded 

of the impact that this has on peoples’ lives here in this country. 

So we do offer our condolences, but I also want to offer our profound thanks. 

It is not, I am quite certain, it is not something that you ever 

thought that you would do to come to testify at the United States 

House of Representatives. It means a lot to us. I appreciate you 

being here. And to your family and Maureen and Grant, thank you 

very much for being here. I know that we have taken something 

significant from your presence here, and if you would pass our condolences to Erin, I hope her surgery went well also. 

Now Dr. Byman, if you could speak to your assessment of alQaeda in the Maghreb and specifically chain of command issues, 

cooperation, how structured is it, or are we just talking about hundreds of offshoot extremist groups that are loosely affiliated with 

these principles? 

Mr. BYMAN. It is an organization that is less structured than the 

other al-Qaeda affiliates. There are a few main branchings but a 

lot of divisions within, and then divisions within the divisions. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And you focused on Nigeria in your testimony, Dr. 

Byman. How do we encourage Morocco and Algeria as North Africa’s two most stable countries, to not only work together on greater 

intelligence, but how do we encourage them to take the lead on 

these issues? 

Mr. BYMAN. The good news is Morocco is already a very close 

American partner on counterterrorism issues. Algeria is extremely 

tricky. There is a history of suspicion and it is really an intelligence-led regime in a very nasty way. This requires, to me, a 

much greater awareness on the U.S. part of the different players 

in Algeria. U.S. efforts to cultivate different parts of the regime especially as a transition is possible there. Regular pressure, and also 

high level pressure. But all that said, much of that will only get 

us so far and we may have to live with what is going to be a very 

uneasy relationship. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And Mr. Zelin, should the United States be providing greater training on counterterrorism border control? The 

French had offered to send 100 military trainers to help the Libyans. Should the U.S. be more involved in that as well? 

Mr. ZELIN. Yes, I think so. I think the U.S., France, the U.K. and 

some of our other allies who have been dealing with some of these 

issues over the past decade or so, have a lot of experience in how 

to deal with some of these problems in different countries. And the 

fact that especially the French, they have historic connections with 

North Africa and the Sahel region, so they have a good cultural understanding in a lot of the different players in the region too so 

54

they can maybe help take a lead in this, but we can also augment 

it based off of our own expertise in these types of trainings. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I appreciate it. And Mr. Chairman, before I yield 

back, Michael, I think I inadvertently confused your and Victor’s 

names. Let me clarify that again we are moved by your presence 

here, and to you and the family thank you very much. And I yield 

back. 

Mr. POE. Thank the gentleman from Florida. The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Weber, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that. 

Loveladys, thank you all for being here. We appreciate you guys. 

Dr. Byman, I think it was you who said maybe Algeria had the 

best spy network. Was that you? 

Mr. BYMAN. Yes, it was, sir. 

Mr. WEBER. Could you elaborate on that? 

Mr. BYMAN. The Algerian State has been an intelligence and 

military state for several decades now. And because they faced a 

massive civil war and Islamist uprising in the 1990s, they had to 

develop very good sources and networks simply to survive. And so 

since many of the groups they were fighting, or individuals, were 

regional, their networks became regional. And also I will say, in a 

very nasty way they were trained by the Soviets, and the Soviet 

approach in order to defeat the opposition you become the opposition. So they brought a lot of groups under the government’s banner, directly or indirectly, and as a result were able to manipulate 

and control them, and gave them extensive intelligence and influence over the opposition but also implicated the government in several of the jihadists’ worst attacks as well. 

Mr. WEBER. So would you say that extends to al-Qaeda and the 

jihadists and forces outside of Algeria that they would have extensive knowledge about those groups? 

Mr. BYMAN. Yes, I would. 

Mr. WEBER. Is it safe to say then, in your opinion that perhaps 

they might have had information about this attack before it occurred on the BP plant in Algeria? 

Mr. BYMAN. I believe the answer is no. The attack on the Algerian plant was quite bad for the Algerian Government in the sense 

of its most important resource and its reputation. So I think they 

would have tried to stop that had they known about it. 

Mr. WEBER. So you have obviously been involved and you have 

been studying this group for a while, this country, so it is your 

opinion that had they known then they would have taken the necessary steps to stop it, or would they have notified us? 

Mr. BYMAN. I believe they would have taken the necessary steps 

to stop it, and there is a good chance they would not have notified 

us because they prefer to keep many of these things secret. 

Mr. WEBER. You don’t think they would have enlisted our aid or 

notified BP? They would have just intervened militarily to stop the 

attack itself? 

Mr. BYMAN. I think that they believe they could handle it themselves. They believe they have handled worst in the past and that 

they don’t need superpower support. 

Mr. WEBER. So they would have been willing to spill blood to protect American, well, foreign workers on their soil? 

55

Mr. BYMAN. I think they would phrase it as, we are willing to 

spill blood to kill terrorists who are going after Algeria’s natural resources. The presence of foreigners I don’t think mattered terribly 

to them. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Don’t turn your mic off. I am not done with 

you. I think you also named the gentleman that may have instrumental in this, Ayman al-Zawahiri? 

Mr. BYMAN. The al-Qaeda leader. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. And we know where he is. We have seen him 

at different places, put it that way. 

Mr. BYMAN. Sir, Ayman al-Zawahiri is the al-Qaeda leader in 

Pakistan who——

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Mr. BYMAN. I don’t think we know where he is. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Is it your professional opinion, since you study 

this stuff and keep up with it, maybe we ought to assign one drone 

to him? 

Mr. BYMAN. I think right now, sir, there are many drones with 

his name on it. I just don’t think we can find him. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Were you the one in earlier testimony that 

mentioned the use of drones, or was that——

Mr. BYMAN. That was me, sir. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Do you think if the—so you are saying that 

you don’t believe that the Algerian Government saw this coming. 

So in essence, does that sort of vindicate our own State Department in not only Algeria but in Benghazi that maybe they couldn’t 

have seen it coming, or do you think the State Department should 

have seen the attack in Benghazi coming? 

Mr. BYMAN. I would say that they should have known it was a 

much higher risk environment than what they prepared for. I think 

anticipating any specific attack is going to be exceptionally difficult, but I think that the risk environment was treated as lower 

than they should have treated it. 

Mr. WEBER. Would you compare that to other areas that we have 

Embassies in, for example, Syria, or any of the other Middle Eastern states, where would you have put Benghazi on that list? 

Mr. BYMAN. I would say, well, near the top in terms of danger, 

sir. 

Mr. WEBER. So when there was a request for more security then 

that should have been heeded very seriously. 

Mr. BYMAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Is there a way, to your knowledge—and I 

agree with my colleague Mr. Poe when he says what has been 

done. Is there a way for us to track the movement of these terrorists short of just a satellite assigned to them? 

Mr. BYMAN. Part of it depends on cultivating local sources. Part 

of it is identifying their communications methods. That is often the 

best way. And so what you want is a mix of methods. Often the 

local governments have the best information, and that may be the 

Government of Algeria, or in some cases it may be sub-state groups 

and you want to work with them as well. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay, I am out of time. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

56

Mr. POE. Thank the gentleman. Just a point of clarification 

there, Dr. Byman. Is it Algeria’s policy when it comes to terrorists 

just to go in with guns blazing? I mean is that really their policy? 

Mr. BYMAN. They do a variety of things. They will try to arrest 

and disrupt in advance. They will try at times to co-opt people they 

can co-opt. They at times bribe them to go in different directions. 

And at times they have killed them in large numbers. So it is a 

mixer. 

Mr. POE. Thank you. The Chair will recognize my good friend 

and chief irritant from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. Just a paid advertisement before my 

time gets started, Mr. Chairman. Ted Poe and I both believe it is 

time for transparency in the Supreme Court. We want cameras in 

the Supreme Court. So I thank the judge for his passion on that 

subject. 

And Mr. Lovelady, let me add my voice of sympathy to you and 

your family for your loss. It is a terrible thing. 

Dr. Byman, in listening to your answers to questions put to you, 

I assume one could conclude that this whole region of North Africa 

is maybe inherently unstable or certainly less secure than some 

other parts of the world one might want to visit. 

Mr. BYMAN. I think that is a safe assumption, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. There are active insurgencies throughout the region? 

Mr. BYMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. There are armed militias throughout the region? 

Mr. BYMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. There are jihadists throughout the region? 

Mr. BYMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. There are al-Qaeda elements throughout the region? 

Mr. BYMAN. I would say there are al-Qaeda sympathizers and 

like-minded groups throughout the region. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. And then there are just, what the heck, 

why not put on a bandolier and enjoy terrorism or insurgency or 

there could be local grievances that fuel local indigenous militias 

and insurgencies as well? 

Mr. BYMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And then there are independence fighters like 

Polisario who have been fighting for a long time for what was formally Spanish Morocco, is that correct? 

Mr. BYMAN. It is a long list, sir, yes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So given all of that and given limitations of our 

intelligence and intelligence sharing, you cited Algeria as an example, should the United States withdraw or retreat? Should we close 

Embassies and consulates throughout the region? 

Mr. BYMAN. My view is a strong no. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Why? 

Mr. BYMAN. The United States has interests in North Africa, and 

also as my colleagues have testified what is happening in North Africa is not staying in North Africa. So we have to deal with it one 

way or another. It is not something we can simply turn our back 

on. 

57

Mr. CONNOLLY. So we knowingly want to stay engaged and we 

want to minimize risks and try to understand it but we can’t eliminate it. Is that what you are saying? 

Mr. BYMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And therefore sometimes we understand that diplomacy can be dangerous when you go into areas of instability or 

insecurity. 

Mr. BYMAN. Many diplomats I know, sir, very much believe that 

part of their job is to take on such risks. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Gartenstein-Ross, I was intrigued by your 

fairly definitive answer about arming rebels in Syria, and I wanted 

to spend a little bit of time with you on that. Because the concern 

I have is, I don’t know, do the good guys wear white hats and the 

bad guys wear black hats? We just go right in and say, you we will 

arm and you we won’t? Is that how it works? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Well, I think that as you said, it is not 

as though the bad guys are wearing black. It is difficult to distinguish between the factions. There is a lot of mobility between them. 

That is why providing arms that would be a great danger to the 

U.S. or our allies is such a very dangerous game. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Do you believe that the United States therefore 

should not be arming any of the insurgents, any of the rebels, in 

Syria? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. I am very skeptical of arming them in 

any way. But the administration has said that that is their intention. Thus I think that preventing arms that could be of most danger such as anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft weapons is the thing 

that I would focus on. But yes, I am skeptical of the entire endeavor. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You made another point about that which is in 

an odd way arms are fungible. The fact that you give arms to somebody you have certified as a good guy does not mean he doesn’t 

turn around and sell it, or the arms are stolen or just meander over 

time into the hands we would rather they not be. Is that correct? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Absolutely. And also in many ways the 

good guys and bad guys there, to use kind of a colloquial way to 

refer to them, are in many ways brothers-in-arms. Look at when 

the U.S. designated Jabhat al-Nusra for its linkages to al-Qaeda. 

All of the factions in Syria were outraged that we did so. There was 

no faction that came in and said, oh, it is a great thing that they 

were designated. Instead the designation was extremely controversial across the board. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. One of the concerns I have—and I would ask you 

and Mr. Byman to address this in what little time I have remaining. But that is, what worries me always about our plans, I mean 

what is Plan B? What happens next? So Ghadafi goes, Mubarak 

goes. Now what? And it is my view that we have actually limited 

leverage in shaping outcomes. And by the way I will just throw it 

in here. I was in Libya and Egypt last year, post-revolution both 

countries. I actually was more hopeful for Libya than I was for 

Egypt and I remain so. Your comment on that in the little time we 

have got left. 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Sir, I very much agree with where you 

are coming from, and would say in addition to that we should also 

58

be thinking about what our strategic interests are. For me particularly when we went into Libya, it wasn’t clear what strategic interest was being served. It served to hasten events in the region 

which we already did not have a good handle on in terms of the 

effect on Islamic militancy. And I think as a result, if you look at 

the intervention in Libya it actually made that particular problem 

set deeper. I don’t think we put a lot of thought into that, and likewise in Syria given how confusing the situation is, I think there is 

a great deal of danger and a lot of great potential for second order 

consequences that we will regret. 

Mr. BYMAN. I tend to have a slightly different view on this. I am 

pessimistic we can shape what is going to happen in Syria now 

through a program of arming the rebels, but I do believe that a 

long-term program that does involve arms, but especially training, 

will at least give us some local capacity should Assad fall or should 

Syria fall apart. And that is not much, sir. I don’t want to say that 

is something we can take to the bank, but it is better than nothing. 

Syria, the instability there is going to emanate throughout the region and we are going to have to play a role and having some presence there will be helpful. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your indulgence, 

and what I take away from that is we have to stay engaged. There 

are some options but they are limited options, and we need to get 

used to the idea—well, sometimes our rhetoric up here you would 

think otherwise—we are neither omnipotent nor omniscient. Thank 

you. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Yoho from Florida for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I appreciate 

your testimony. Mr. Lovelady, thank you and your family for being 

here and sharing that compelling and moving story, and we sympathize with your loss, all of you. And also as Mr. Weber brought 

out, how it brings home the importance of what we do here, and 

I think you have heard that across the board here. 

My questions go back to what we did in Libya, what have we 

learned on Libya? We did the flyovers. We got in, we got out. 

Weapons were left there by other forces, whether it was the U.N. 

or NATO, and we know those weapons wound up leaving Libya, 

going to Algeria, and now we have got the situation where we have 

got to face in Syria, I mean this is coming up, decisions are going 

to have to be made and we don’t want to repeat mistakes of the 

past. 

And I am hearing from Mr. Gartenstein-Ross, you were talking 

about we need to arm the people over there, but we have done that 

again and again, and the way I understand it there are over 1,000 

different groups in Syria. Which one do you arm? And if we do that 

when do you pull out? When is there a line that you say, all right, 

we have done enough, we need to back out? I would just like to 

hear from all three of you what you think we should do in that situation so that we don’t repeat the mistakes. And again going back 

to Libya, what have we learned there that we don’t want to repeat? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. To be very clear, sir, I am not advocating arming the Syrian rebels. I am actually advocating the opposite. 

59

Mr. YOHO. Okay. I misunderstood you then in your testimony. 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. I think that doing so would be extremely 

dangerous. 

Mr. YOHO. I am glad to hear that. 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. And the point that I would make, the 

overarching point I would make is simply that the most dangerous 

thing would be giving them arms like anti-aircraft weapons and 

anti-tank weapons. Those are the kind of weapons that I think we 

would most regret sending to the rebel factions. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay, I misunderstood you then. Because I thought 

you said that we should do that and I am thinking I don’t want 

to do that again. 

Mr. Zelin? 

Mr. ZELIN. I think one of the important things that the United 

States needs to do is show a lot of leadership on Syria at this point. 

We are essentially ceding the ground to some of our allies in the 

Gulf, but the problem is, is our allies in the Gulf do not have the 

same interests as us in Syria. We have seen many private citizens 

in these Gulf nations who have been providing weapons and a lot 

of money to a bunch of different Salafist organizations within Syria 

as well as the jihadi groups. 

And even when there was sort of this trial run in December 

when there were Croatian weapons that went into Syria via Jordan, even though they were supposedly going to the good guys they 

actually ended up in the hands of Jabhat al-Nusra within a month. 

So I am skeptical about providing arms, but I do think there are 

other options in terms of leadership with centralizing the opposition in Syria as well as also potentially using some type of no-fly 

zone activity as well. And then from there, because you have this 

centralized military capability in Syria that we have relations with, 

then potentially we could work with them after the Assad regime 

falls, if it does, to then deal with some of the other elements 

like——

Mr. YOHO. Let me interrupt you there. You are talking about a 

no-fly zone. I mean what gives us the authority to do that? I mean 

do we do that unilaterally? Do we go through the U.N., NATO? I 

mean constitutionally we are attacking a nation that has not attacked us. 

Mr. ZELIN. Sure. I think we would try the U.N. but I think that 

Russia and China would block this. One other area could be 

through the Arab League since this is sort of their jurisdiction. And 

if they want that we could——

Mr. YOHO. How much effort has the Arab League come out in 

support of this or how much involvement do they have to help calm 

that strife over there? 

Mr. ZELIN. Well, we have seen Arab states calling for help the 

past 2 years, even though they themselves probably don’t want to 

themselves be involved in the no-fly zone they can potentially help 

fund it since they do have the money, in a similar way that happened in the Kuwait war. 

Mr. YOHO. Let me ask you guys this. Does China have interest 

in that area where the attacks were, where Mr. Lovelady died, as 

far as petroleum? 

60

Mr. ZELIN. China has, I would say, two interests, sir. One is it 

is becoming a major importer of petroleum, and of course the Middle East is a key area. The second is, it has tried to secure contracts in areas where it has——

Mr. YOHO. All right, so they have a presence there? 

Mr. ZELIN. I don’t know about that particular part of Algeria. 

Mr. YOHO. Are they being attacked, have terrorist attacks 

against their interests? 

Mr. ZELIN. They have had kidnappings and attacks in parts of 

Africa, but not what we would call terrorist attacks from al-Qaeda. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay, why do you think that is? 

Mr. ZELIN. The United States, sir, is opposed by al-Qaeda for a 

whole variety of reasons. Some of it includes our policies in the 

Middle East. Some of it is our values. Some of it is simply because 

we are the face of modernity. It is a mix. 

Mr. YOHO. Do you think it has something to do that China just 

stands—I mean we heard you say something about the cowardice. 

When we show up we don’t follow through and so they look at us 

as being weak, maybe, and China not. Do you think that has something to do with that? 

Mr. ZELIN. I think it is more that China stands on the sidelines, 

sir, and——

Mr. YOHO. Okay. 

Mr. ZELIN [continuing]. And that is main. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. 

DeSantis, 5 minutes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lovelady, thank 

you for coming. Sorry for your loss. I definitely believe that when 

Americans are killed people need to be brought to justice. 

This could be for anyone who wants to weigh in. With respect to 

the Benghazi terrorist attack, why has there been in your judgment so much trouble bringing the perpetrators of that to justice? 

Mr. ZELIN. I think part of it has to do with the weakness of the 

central government. They have had a hard time having a writ over 

a lot of the periphery, and actually the periphery has been able to 

blackmail the central government into doing a variety of things related to this isolation law that happened in their Parliament as 

well as sacking different ministers. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And what about U.S. actions? 

Mr. ZELIN. Sure. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Why have our actions not borne any fruit thus 

far, given that four Americans were killed? It is not as if these 

were just Americans who just kind of happened to be traveling. I 

mean this was an Ambassador. This was U.S. territory in some 

ways, and yet here we are. I mean we are coming up, it is almost 

a year later and nothing. 

Mr. ZELIN. I think part of it just has to do with the weakness 

of the central government and their inability to be able to really 

control what is going on in some parts of the country. And therefore, even if the United States would go in and go from Tripoli to 

Benghazi as has been noted by the FBI and we have seen in the 

media, that there is a potential that you might have elements then 

try and attack them. So I think you have that issue——

61

Mr. DESANTIS. No, I understand that. And it is interesting when 

we have the State Department folks in front of Oversight. The Libyan leadership said it was terrorism, initially, and they got really 

upset when we said it was because of a YouTube video. So I think 

our administration hurt the cause in that respect. The fact that we 

haven’t brought anybody to justice, is that something that is going 

to likely deter future terrorist attacks? It seems to me that they 

figure that they have gotten away with it. It is likely to embolden 

more people to want to attack U.S. interests abroad. Does anyone 

disagree with that? 

Mr. ZELIN. No, I fully agree. 

Mr. DESANTIS. With respect to the Algerian attack, how did the 

overthrow of Ghadafi, the revolution in Libya, did it play any role 

in that? I know that there a lot of jihadists that were able to get 

weapons and operate more freely. So was there a linkage, in your 

judgment, to those Islamic fighters and the attack that happened? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Absolutely. One linkage is through 

arms. The other linkage is that Libya was used as a staging ground 

for the Algeria attack. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Do all the witnesses concur with that? 

Mr. ZELIN. I also think part of it had to do with the French intervention of northern Mali as well, since a lot of the individuals melted away, as Dr. Byman mentioned, and went into northern Niger 

as well as southern Libya, so then they were able to use that as 

another different type of base for this attack. And one could argue 

that the attack on the In Amenas base was in retaliation to the 

French intervention in northern Mali. 

Mr. DESANTIS. With Afghanistan there was this concern, I mean 

it is still there, but al-Qaeda used that as a training, training fighters as a base of operations. And if you look across northern Africa, 

I mean it just seems to me that you could easily have parts of 

northern Africa end up with al-Qaeda type fighters, Islamic fighters using that. Is that something that we should be concerned 

about? 

Mr. BYMAN. In my view, absolutely. It is harder than the past 

because of the drone program because of greater U.S. attention, but 

when you have these ungoverned areas, these become extremely 

dangerous if they are exploited by al-Qaeda. 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. And I would add that another area of 

concern is not just training but also places where people can actually engage in live action fighting. Syria is one example. Mali has 

been one example. And let us watch the situation in Egypt. That 

could end up a very chaotic situation. I don’t think that jihadists 

will be at the forefront of any sort of confrontation, but they certainly could end up one of the major beneficiaries. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And with Syria, this has been going on for a long 

time. As this has dragged on longer and longer that is actually, you 

have seen more and more of the foreign fighters go. So to the extent to which this turmoil in Egypt lasts longer and you have fighting, it seems to me that that would be a magnet for a lot of these 

fighters in northern Africa. So it is a very, very dicey situation. 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. I agree that it is. Like I said, I don’t 

think that jihadists will be at the forefront in Egypt. They simply 

don’t have the incentive to do so. If you have clashes between 

62

Brotherhood supporters and supporters of the military, that is a 

great chaotic situation where they can quietly build up their capabilities without being at the forefront of violence on the streets. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, I thank the witnesses. Thank you, Mr. 

Lovelady, for your appearance, and I yield back to the chairman. 

Mr. POE. Thank the gentleman. The Chair will recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the record a blog article 

by Walid Shoebat who claims to be a former member of the Muslim 

Brotherhood and has some intelligence information that I think 

would be very valuable to this hearing. 

Mr. POE. Without objection, be made part of this hearing’s 

record. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

I would like to ask the witnesses, do you know, is there any evidence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s involvement in the attack that resulted in the death of our Ambassador in Benghazi? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. No, sir. I know of absolutely no information suggesting that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Anybody? 

Mr. ZELIN. No. 

Mr. BYMAN. Not that I have seen, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, so do you folks, or are you aware of a 

terrorist organization called Ansar al-Sharia? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Yes, sir. There are multiple branches in 

multiple countries. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. And so this is a known terrorist organization. Is it Sharia? I am sorry, al-Sharia, is that how you pronounce it? So this is a known terrorist organization? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Sir, it is a known jihadist organization 

in a number of countries. They are not actually engaged in terrorism on the ground, but they make clear that they are aligned 

with Salafist jihad ideals such as the ideals of al-Qaeda. This is 

something that is very clear from the social media that the group 

puts out in countries like Tunisia and Libya. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Were any of the members of that cell 

to your knowledge arrested for the attack that took our Ambassador’s life in Benghazi? 

Mr. ZELIN. I believe there have been one or two individuals who 

have been detained in Tunisia as well as in Libya, but both have 

then been released based off of lack of information. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Shoebat reports that six members of 

Ansar al-Sharia were arrested in Libya, and presents a document 

that indicates that they were involved and that they are Egyptians 

of course and not Libyans. Have any of you heard anything about 

that at all? 

Mr. BYMAN. I have seen some press reports about Egyptians involved in the attack, sir, but as far as their affiliation I do not 

know. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So Mr. Shoebat who claims to have 

been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and may well have been 

a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, I just haven’t verified it yet, 

63

suggests that this terrorist organization has direct ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Is that something you know about? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Sir, I wouldn’t infer that just from the 

national origin of individuals involved. We know for a fact that 

there is a large stream of Egyptian extremists who have gone into 

Libya. There are camps, for example, one set of camps is known as 

the Jamal Network. And the individual who runs them is himself 

Egyptian. That also is a camp that has been connected directly to 

al-Qaeda. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, in terms of this position, this is that it 

was not al-Qaeda but this Ansar al-Sharia terrorist cell that was 

involved in the attack, and that they were Egyptian and that they 

are—in fact, part of his report which I read and looked at the other 

night is a news clip that is taken from a camera that one of the 

terrorists, or people who were involved in the terrorist attack, or 

at least that is what they say. You could see armed people going 

back and forth, shooting going on, and some of the terrorists suggesting that they had been sent by Morsi, meaning the President 

of Egypt. Is the President of Egypt, he has a long close ties with 

the Muslim Brotherhood, does he not? 

Mr. ZELIN. Yes, Mohamed Morsi was the President of Egypt before he was dispatched the other week, though I find these claims 

not that credible. There is no evidence to suggest based off of anything I have seen that the Muslim Brotherhood is linked to Ansar 

al-Sharia in Libya or that any members of the Muslim Brotherhood 

were involved or that Mohamed Morsi told members of the Brotherhood to go to Libya to conduct an——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, so you don’t know of any evidence that 

suggests that. 

Mr. ZELIN. No, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. And I would appreciate it if you guys 

would read this report and give me your personal analysis of it. 

Did President Morsi ever, during recent years, talk about the return of the Blind Sheikh—is that how you pronounce it?—the Blind 

Sheikh that we have here in custody in the United States? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Yes, sir. That was one of the demands 

that he made to the U.S. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But he was, President Morsi himself has 

made statements that this is important to him, I would say, and 

that it is a priority. 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Yes, sir. It is something that he asked 

the U.S. to do. In Egypt this is a rather big political issue which 

he was clearly tapping into. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Or leading. Or leading. Sometimes it is hard 

to tell whether a political leader is tapping into something in the 

population or if someone is creating it. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for this hearing, and I 

think that the information that we were just discussing may well 

deserve a lot closer attention. And I would like the opinion of your 

witnesses today on this report. And if indeed Mr. Shoebat has the 

documentation which he seems to be presenting here, unless this 

is—by the way what I made part of the hearing is a document that 

suggests it is from Libya, about the six prisoners who are Egyptian 

admitting that they were part of this terrorist unit and that it was 

64

connected with the Muslim Brotherhood, unless that is a forged 

document. I think we should pay close attention and get to the bottom of this. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing 

today and perhaps opening up an area or directing our attention 

to something that could help explain what the hell happened in 

Benghazi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. Ask the witnesses to respond in writing to the request 

by Mr. Rohrabacher from California. 

And one last question, Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. You alluded to the 

fact the United States may have a policy regarding the people who 

committed the Benghazi attack. What is the policy of the U.S. for 

the future? To take those people out or to capture those people and 

bring them back? What is the policy, if you know what it is? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Sir, I don’t know what our policy is with 

respect to the perpetrators. 

Mr. POE. All right. And the Chair, without objection, will enter 

into the record an article out today in Vanity Fair regarding the 

timeline on the 40 minutes in Benghazi. 

All members have 5 days to submit statements with questions 

and extraneous materials for the record subject to the length limitation of the rules. I thank all the witnesses for being here, the 

Lovelady family especially for being here today. This subcommittee 

meeting is over. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(65)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATiVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Ted Poe (R-TX), Chairman 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You arc n,:spL:clfully n.:quL:stL:d to attend an OPEN hcmi.ng of the COl1unitkc on Fon.;ign AITairs [0 be held 

jointly hy the Subcommittee on T eTTorislll, Nonproliferation, and Trade and the Suhcommittee on the Middle East 

and NOlih .A.frica in Room 2172 of the Rayburn IIouse Office Building (and available live on the Committee "website 

<l[ v,\Vn fl)I(;igllalTJir...;.11UU8C.goV): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday. Julv 10,2013 

10:00 a.m. 

The T cITorist Threat in North Arrica: Rerorc and J\rtLI Rcngha:;j 

1v1r. Daveed Galienstein-Ross 

Dm::clor 

Center for the Study of T e1Ton~t RadlcailzatlOtl 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 

Me Aaron 7,elin 

Richard Bormy Fellow 

lhe \\/ ashington InstitutG for Ncar .tasl PoliGY 

D(Jniel L Byman, Ph.D. 

Professor 

Security Studies Program 

Georgetmvn University 

Mr Mike T "ove1ady 

Brother of Algerian gas plant tenorist attack victim, Victor Lovelady 

B~' Direction of the Chairman 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON Tl1rroriMIJ. NO~ljJroIIJer(flioJJJ rmd Tr(l(/I!wu! MiMI!! Earl ami Nardi Africa TTEAR1NG 

Day Wedmsd{/jI Date ___ ",0,-,7/~'j-"01,-,'j,,,3 ___ Room, ___ -=2,,1-,-,72,,-__ _ 

Starting Time 10'05 (( m Ending Tim~ 11:50 (I,m. 

Recesses kl L-to __ ) L-to __ l ( __ to __ ) L-to __ )( __ to __ ) L-to ____ ) 

P,'esiding Mcmbcl'(s) 

CIUlimll1lr Poe mul C/ltIiJ'II'01IUI1I Ros~L('hfin1'11 

Clteel, 1111 ujille jiJliulVing IIIIIIIIPP(I': 

Open Session [Z] 

Exceuti\'c (closed) Session D Televised [2J 

T1TI.B OF HEARING: 

Ele-cfl'OIlicnlly Reconled (tnped) [{] 

Stcnogl'ftpllic Record [Z] 

The Tel'/'otisI1l,,'",,! ill Norlh A/rica: Be/m'e (lilt' Aftel' Beflg"{/zi 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Rep.'!. Poe, RoswLehfillen, Chabol, CottOIl, IVeberJ DesaI/lb., Cnllin'f, YollO, Delltclt, COIlIlOll)" Schneider, 

Frankel, Cook, Pe}'ry, ShenJUlJI, Lowenthal 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an * if they are nat members ~rrull cOlI/millee,) 

Rep, Rolll'llbllclrer 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same AS meeting lI~tlce AttAched? Yes m No 0 

(If "no ", please list below and include litle, agency, depal't/llml, 0/' organizatIOn.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submilledfor the record.) 

SFR- Cormolfy 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

OJ' 

TIME ADJOURNED 11 :50 (1,111, 
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The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly (VA-ll) 

TNT /MENA Joint Subcommittee Hearing: Benghazi 

Wednesday, July 10, 2013 

lOam 

Today's hearing is the sixth time House Republicans have convened a congressional committee to 

"examine" the attack on the American consulate in Benghazi; if one includes all the briefings on this 

issue, it is the ninth such meeting on the House side alone. The latest development is the publication of 

a partisan Interim Progress Report by five House Republican Chairmen. The systematic exclusion of the 

minority membership in the report is unprecedented. At the other full Committee on which I serve, 

Ranking Member Cummings expressed discontent in a letter to Speaker Boehner at the "decision to 

abandon regular order and exclude Democratic Members from the process.'" 

The report attempts to fault then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for the Benghazi terrorist attack 

because a State Department cable to Tripoli regarding additional security included Secretary Clinton's 

signature. Glenn Kessler, author of the Fact Checker blog on The Washington Post, called the signature 

allegation a whopper and awarded it IIFour Pinocchios." The Fact Checker went on to say that one 

House Chairman's claim that "Clinton's 'signature' means she personally approved" the cable is 

"absurd," as every single cable from the State Department includes the Secretary's signature, 

regardless of content or gravity.' 

The reaction to the Benghazi attack differs from the reaction to past attacks on our people and soil. For 

example, I recall the sorrowful events of October 1983, when a truck filled with 2,500 pounds of TNT 

slammed into the United States Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, killing 241 U.S. service members. I was 

a staffer on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time and had just visited the barracks in 

Beirut, and I recall President Reagan and his Cabinet responding to substantive questions about the 

security of our foreign service personnel rather than to partisan attacks that should stop at the water's 

edge. 

The Pickering-Mullen Accountability Review Board (ARB) report clearly states, "Responsibility for the 

tragic loss of life, injuries, and damage to U.S. facilities and property rests solely and completely with 

the terrorists who perpetrated the attacks.,,3 The report also paints a clearer picture of the context of 

post-Revolution Libya and the enemy that our people are facing in the region-a "growing, diffuse 

range of terrorist and hostile actors" who "[pose] an additional challenge to American security officers, 

diplomats, development professionals and decision-makers seeking to mitigate risk and remain active 

in high threat environments without resorting to an unacceptable total fortress and stay-at-home 

approach to U.S. diplomacy.,,4 Such an enemy would be challenging to face under normal 

circumstances, and a post-Revolution environment exacerbates the situation. In Libya, the day-to-day 

situation was characterized by the "security vacuum left by Qaddafi's departure"S and a "general 

1 Han. Elijah Cummings, "Letter to Han. John Boehner," 25 April 2013. 

2 Glenn Kessler, "Issa's absurd claim that Clinton's 'signature' means she personally approved it," The Washington Post Fact 

Checker blog, 26 April 2013. 

e Ibid., 4. 

'lbid.,2. 

5 Ibid., 15. 
69

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The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly (VA-ll) 

backdrop of political violence, assassinations .... , lawlessness, and an overarching absence of central 

government authority in eastern Libya.,,6 

With the benefit of hindsight, the ARB report pinpoints management and system failures that resulted 

in inadequate security on the ground in Benghazi, but it also details growing challenges State has faced 

lito obtain the resources necessary to carry out its work.,,7 Based on this finding} it is clear the 

availability of resources was, and continues to be, a major issue for our missions abroad, but you 

wouldn't know that based on the Republican rhetoric surrounding this subject. 

Ambassador Pickering and Admiral Mullen were brutally honest about the sacrifice that our personnel 

knowingly face when serving overseas in hostile environments: 

"No diplomatic presence is without risk ... And the total elimination of risk is a non-starter for 

U.S. diplomacy, given the need for the U.S. government to be present in places where stability 

and security are often most profoundly lacking and host government support is sometimes 

minimal to non-existent."8 

Let's not lose sight of the fact that America's foreign aid and diplomatic posts are not just nice things to 

do. They are important and sometimes dangerous jobs and critical components of our national security 

policy. These public servants put themselves on the line every single day to advance America's 

economic and humanitarian interests across the globe, and we must ensure they have the tools and 

security necessary to achieve this mission. 

o Ibid., 16. 

'lbid.,3. 

8 Ibid., 2. 

### 
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Page 1 of 1 

RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION FOR THE RECORD OF THE HONORABLE SCOTT PERRY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, U.S. HOllSE OF 

REPRESENTA TlVES 

"THE TERRORlST THREAT IN NORTH AfRlCA: BEfORE AND AfTER BENGHAZI" 

July 10, 2013 

The following question was directed to Dr. Daniel L. Byman, Professor in the Security Studies 

Program at Georgetown University and Senior Fellow and Director of Research at the Saban 

Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution: 

1. Given post-colonial cultural sensitivities in Algeria with an emphasis on national 

sovereignty and non-intervention, do you believe it is possible to develop a coherent 

transnational counterterrorism policy in cooperation with a nation that clearly has 

misgivings in contributing to a transnational solution? 

Dr. Byman' s response is: 

Algeria's historical sensitivities are quite real and often confusing. On the one hand its elite 

retains an admiration for countries like France and for Western culture in general. On the other 

hand, there is often bitterness over the colonial legacy and a defensiveness that makes good 

relations hard. The anti-colonial sentiment has faded over time, but there remain broader 

suspicions of the West, including the United States. The biggest problem is Algeria's secretive 

and dictatorial regime, which is at times hostile to its neighbors and has shadowy policies toward 

terrori st groups. 

Any cooperation - bilateral or regional - must grapple with this historical legacy and the 

troubled nature of the Algerian regime. We cannot hope for perfection or even close to it, but we 

may be able to avoid the worst problems and facilitate transnational cooperation on some of the 

most pressing issues, particularly if there is a shared threat. 
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QUESTION FOR THE RECORD OF THE HONORABLE DANA ROHRABACHER 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATlON,AND TRADE, U.S. HOllSE OF 

REPRESENTATIVES 

"THE TERRORIST THREAT IN NORTH AFRICA: BEFORE AND AFTER BENGHAZI" 

July 10,2013 

The following question was directed to Mr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Director of the Center for 

the Study of Terrorist Radicalization at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies: 

1. I would appreciate it if you guys would read this report and give me your personal 

analysis of it 

The following written submission is from Mr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Director of the Center 

for the Study of Terrorist Radicalization at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies: 

I have caretully reviewed the report written by Walid Shoebat and two co-authors claiming that 

both Mohamed Morsi and Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood were directly involved in the September 

II, 2012, attack on the US. consulate in Benghazi.! It fails to persuade me of Egyptian 

involvement, especially when one considers the context in which one of the major pieces of 

evidence (a Libyan intelligence document) was drafted, and the wide array of evidence regarding 

the incident that has certainly been generated, but is not publicly available to allow us to 

critically evaluate that document's conclusions. I am particularly suspicious of the conclusions 

that Shoebat's report presents because much of the relevant evidence aligns with pre-existing 

theories about Egyptian involvement in the Benghazi attack that we should not readily discard. 

Information previously known about Egyptian involvement at Benghazi 

Egyptian involvement in the Benghazi attack had been reported within three weeks of the tragic 

incident, notably in the Wall Street JOllrnaJ2 The Journal detailed the role played by fighters 

connected to an Egyptian militant named Muhammad Jamal Abu Ahmad, who has established 

his own enclave in Libya. Jamal was a part of Egyptian Islamic Jihad at the time al-Qaeda emir 

Ayman al-Zawahiri commanded that group, and may even have been its chief of operations. 

Today, the "Jamal network" operates camps in Libya that provide training for suicide missions 

1 The reporl in question is Walid Shoebal. Ben Barrack & Keilh Davies. "Ironclad: 

Attacks," Shoebat.coln. J1me 30. 2013. available 

thc-blind-shcikll'. 

, Siobhan Gorman & Matt Bradley. "Militant Link to Libya Attack." Wall StreetJoltrnal. Oct. 1. 2012. 

I 
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81870g-2.eps

and other militant actlVlt1es, and-unsurprisingly, given Jamal's national origin and 

background-the network has especially close ties to Egyptian militancy 

Two of these connections are Muhammad al-Zawahiri, the brother of al-Qaeda's emir, who had 

been imprisoned with Jamal; and Marjan Salim, a militant who also was released from prison 

following Mubarak's fall, and served as the head of Egyptian Islamic Jihad's sharia committee 

when Ayman al-Zawahiri led the group3 Further, Egyptians are known to train in the Jamal 

network's camps; and the Wall ,')'treet Journal reported that "US. officials working with Libyans 

to investigate the consulate assault in Benghazi have identified some of the attackers and believe 

some are associates of [Jamal]." 

Thus, Egyptian involvement in the Benghazi attack had been known long before Shoebat's 

report, through the incident's connection to the Jamal network. Further, the likely involvement of 

Egyptian operatives was reported less than two months after it occurred. CNN noted on October 

24 that some of the attackers "are suspected of having ties to the Libyan group Ansar al-Sharia, 

and many of them are believed to be Egyptian jihadis."4 Other prominent media outlets have 

subsequently reported the presence of Egyptian fighters in the Benghazi attack.s 

So the claim in Shoebat's report of Egyptian involvement in the Benghazi attack is not new 

What is new is his contention that the attack was executed (in whole or part) by the Egyptian 

Muslim Brotherhood, and that Morsi himself had dispatched the attackers. This claimimprobable on its face because of how little strategic sense it would make for the actors 

involved-relies, essentially, on two pieces of evidence: a cell phone video allegedly taken at the 

scene of the Benghazi attack and a Libyan intelligence document detailing what six accused 

perpetrators said during their interrogation. Neither of these data points establishes that either 

Morsi or the Muslim Brotherhood had a role in Benghazi in the conclusive manner that Shoebat 

claims 

The cell phone video 

Shoebat explains his first piece of evidence: "EXHIBIT A is a video shot from a cell phone at 

the scene of the attacks. In this video, gunmen are seen running toward the camera, toward other 

gunmen. At one point-in Arabic which we have confirmed-one approaching gunman says, 

'Don't Shoot usl We were sent by Mursi I'. Even though the video is in Arabic, you can discern 

the word 'Mursi'." 

3 Muhanmmd Salah. "Jihad's Organizatioml Stmeture." .~I-Hayah, Feb. 12, 1999, p. 6 

4 SULalllle Kelly. Pam Benson & Elisa Labott. "U.S. Intel Believes Some BengllllLi Attackers Tied to AI-Qaeda in 

Imq," CSN Oct 2~. 2012 

5 See Adam Nossiter. "Some Algeria Attackers Arc Placed at BenglmLi," New York limes, Jan. 22. 2013; Catherine 

Herridge, "Benghazi Attack Suspect List Expands to Include Egvptians:' Fox News, Nov. 8, 2012. 

2 
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Assuming the video is authentic, there are two problems with Shoebat's analysis of it. First, the 

translation is questionable. Though the audio quality is poor, the individual speaking appears to 

be saying: "I said nobody run, Dr. Morsi sent a car. !tjust arrived." The Arabic is: 

sayam doklOr mllrsi ba-al-ha law waslah 

Now, as mentioned, the audio is difficult to understand; but one can clearly discern the word 

sayara (car) before the phrase doktor mursi. Shoebat failed to note the mention of a car in his 

translation; and the fact that a car is the object of the sentence significantly changes the meaning 

of the statement. 

Second, it is not clear that the "Dr. Morsi" referred to in the cell phone video is in fact Mohamed 

Morsi. Because Morsi is a common surname in Egypt, this could be (and the odds are that it is) a 

reference to somebody else. 

The Libyan intelligence document 

The Libyan intelligence document is more interesting than the cell phone video, and appears at 

first blush to do far more to advance Shoebat's case. I believe that it (unlike the cell phone video) 

is translated accurately; and in itself the document provides reason that one would desire further 

information to better understand the allegations within it. However, the intelligence document 

falls far short of being conclusive proof, especially when one considers how it was produced, the 

other reams of data that Libyan intelligence generated in the wake of the Benghazi attack, and 

the fact that the U.S. intelligence community almost certainly has had the document in its 

possession since it was produced. Shoebat explains this document 

A Libyan Intelligence document (EXHIBIT B) has now been brought forward by 

credible Arabic translator Raymond Ibrahim. This document discusses the 

confessions of six members of an Egyptian Ansar al-Shana cell who were arrested 

and found to be involved in the Benghazi attacks. Ibrahim reported the following 

about this document: 

It discusses the preliminary findings of the investigation, specifically concerning 

an "Et,'yptian cell" which was involved in the consulate attack. "Based on 

confessions derived from some of those arrested at the scene" six people, "all of 

them Egyptians" from the jihad group Ansar aI-Sharia ("Supporters of 

Islamic Law), were arrested. 
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According to the report, during interrogations, these Egyptian jihadi cell members 

"confessed to very serious and important infonnation concerning the financial 

sources of the group and the planners of the event and the storming and burning 

of the U. S. consulate in Benghazi ... And among the more prominent figures 

whose names were mentioned by cell members during confessions were: 

Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi .. 

should note at the outset that the authenticity of this particular leaked report is not firmly 

established. It is possible, for example, that the document Shoebat relies upon represents a draft 

rather than a finished version of the preliminary report; but there is no specific reason to believe 

that this document is fraudulent. 

lbahim's translation correctly notes that the Libyan document provides only preliminary findings 

of an investigation. It represents a set of conclusions drawn from the initial interrogations of 

alleged attackers. The interrogation transcripts themselves are not publicly available. What did 

the suspects actually say during the interrogation? What were their specific allegations 

concerning Morsi? A small error can easily be magnified if we cannot see the actual words 

spoken during the interrogations. For example, what if Morsi and other Egyptian Muslim 

Brotherhood leaders were mentioned as some sort of "gateway drug" to salafi jihadist militancy, 

but those statements became transmogrified during the process of drafting the document into 

"the financial sources of the group and the planners of the event"? Or what if these attackers 

were salafi jihadists traveling under Ikhwan cover? We are relying on a summary, and without 

access to the original interrogation transcripts, we can neither rule out a variance between the 

primary source and secondary conclusion, nor the possibility that the conclusions in the report do 

represent statements made during the interrogation, but the statements themselves are unreliable. 

This latter possibility is bolstered by the possibility that the interrogators used torture, a 

technique that-to put it delicately-can bias the subjects toward accepting the interrogators' 

conclusions. 

The possibility that Libyan analysts may have misinterpreted the interrogation evidence is 

bolstered by the fact that the Libyan intelligence services are extremely disorganized. Libya's 

civil war was long and bloody: not only were the old institutions of the state significantly 

degraded, but also the intelligence services had to be specifically rebuilt (former members would 

be distrusted in this new environment, given the arbitrariness and brutality of Qaddafi' s 

services). Many of the people now in intelligence positions previously served the same role in 

militias. Some of them are quite good at their jobs, but others are not. Since the intelligence 

services are being rebuilt out of necessity, Libyan intelligence does not display the kind of 

professionalization that might give us confidence in the accuracy of the preliminary intelligence 

report. 

4 
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A second problem with relying on this document as conclusive is that other kinds of evidence 

would also be generated at the same time. What kind of external evidence could be gleaned from 

the alleged attackers' possessions? What kind of contacts were on their cell phones? Did their 

personal networks match those of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood members, or members of 

another network (such as the Jamal network)? Further, it is standard practice for suspects to be 

re-interrogated, which would generate follow-up reports. We lack access to those. 

But this points to a third problem with Shoebat's argument: some Americans almost certainly do 

have access to the other kinds of evidence generated around the time these Egyptians were 

captured. The Americans who have access to this evidence are members of the U.S. intelligence 

community, with whom Libya has shared information generated during the course of its 

investigation of Benghazi. Thus, the odds are that either the U.S intelligence community is 

engaged in a massive cover-up designed to protect Morsi and the Egyptian Brotherhood, or else 

the other data points that we are unable to access undercut the conclusion Shoebat is drawing 

from this document 

Conclusion 

In my view, Shoebat's report does not signiticantly move the dial on this issue The cell phone 

video is not particularly probative; the Libyan intelligence document is interesting, but extreme 

caution is in order before concluding that it actually answers our questions about who bears the 

ultimate responsibility for the Benghazi attack. 

One lesson of the past dozen years, and the Iraq war in particular, is that it is dangerous to overinterpret a limited set of data points. Indeed, on June 27, Shoebat urged the U.S. Congress to 

declare war on Egypt on the basis of the two data points I have analyzed6 Had politicians heeded 

Shoebat's advice, it would have easily been the gravest mistake the U.S. has made in the past 

dozen years. Unfortunately, Shoebat displays a recurring tendency to over-interpret data in 

reaching his conclusions. On July 10, the day of this hearing, Shoebat penned a blog entry that 

opened with the statement: "If you're a Democrat, you belong to the Party of Satan."7 Yet the 

data points he deploys fall short of demonstrating that the Democrats are in fact "Luciferians" 

In conclusion, many negative things can be said about the Egyptian Brotherhood and Morsi, and 

the Brotherhood's actions in September 2012 can be singled out for particular condemnation. But 

that does not mean that the Brotherhood was involved in the Benghazi attack. The alternative 

hypothesis, that the Egyptians involved in the Benghazi attack were connected to the Jamal 

network. still appears to be the most plausible explanation. 

"Should Congress Declare War on Egypt?" Shoebal.com. June 27. 2013. available at 

l1!1;nJ/shoeb~!tcom/20 13/06/2 7 !should -cOl~-d.edme-'v<!f -on-egY,'ptJ 

- "Democrats Belong to Party of Satan," Shoebal.com, July 10, 2013. available at 

bl~5hoeb<lt .com/~n 1 ~ IQJLl O!de mocmts-pe lO.l}g:h9_:Th1 rh-:Qf-s3tn u/. 

S 
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QUESTION FOR THE RECORD OF THE HONORABLE DANA ROHRABACHER 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION,AND TRADE, U.S. HOllSE OF 

REPRESENTATIVES 

"THE TERRORIST THREAT IN NORTH AFRICA: BEFORE AND AFTER BENGHAZI" 

July 10,2013 

The following question was directed to Mr. Aaron Zelin, Richard Borow Fellow at the 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy: 

I. I would appreciate it if you guys would read this report and gi ve me your personal 

analysis of it. 

The following written submission is from Mr. Aaron Zelin, Richard Borow Fellow at the 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy: 

I am unconvinced by this report for a couple reasons: 1. credibly of it and 2. the logic of it. 

Regarding the credibility factor, the Libyan intelligence document was leaked to a Kuwaiti 

newspaper. Kuwaiti newspapers are notorious for being unreliable. Further to that, how can the 

document even be veritied as legitimate and not a fake. As for the video, it was aired by alKarma TV, which is a Coptic Christian satellite channel. They clearly have political reasons for 

wanting to put forward a narrative that Morsi and the Ikhwan were involved in the Benghazi 

attack since it tits into their worldview that the Ikhwan are terrorists. Additionally, there are 

basic translation mistakes the report claims that speakers on the video state, "Dr. Morsi sent us," 

but in fact it says " ... a car Dr. Morsi sent." Further, the individuals speaking in the video are 

speaking in the Libyan dialect not in the Egyptian dialect. In terms of the logic of it, as I noted in 

my testimony, there is no evidence that there are any links whatsoever between Ansar al-Sharia 

in Libya and the Ikhwan. Historically, the Ikhwan and jihadis are rivals with one another and do 

not like each other. I suggest reading Marc Lynch's "Islam Divided Between Salati Jihad and the 

Ikhwan" (http://www.marclynch.com/wp-content/uploads/20 11/03/SCT _Lynch _ MBvsSJ. pdf). 

Additionally, I would also suggest reading the leader of al-Qaeda's take on the Ikhwan Ayman 

al-Zawahiri who wrote a scathing polemic against the Ikhwan called "The Bitter Harvest". 

Putting this together, I tind a lot of credibility and logic holes in this report. There are far more 

questions than actual conclusions I think one can make as it relates to it. 
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