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UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

© USIP 2012 • All rights reserved.

“Politically, the international community can do 

much to encourage both 

sides to honor and maintain 

the gains they have made 

at the negotiating table, 

and pressure both to manage their spoilers.”

November 29, 2012

A Diplomatic Milestone for 

Mindanao?

Summary

•	 A recent framework agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic

Liberation Front (MILF) leaves much yet to do in building peace in Mindanao, but does offer an

opportunity for careful progress.

•	 Many of the problemsthat have plagued previous agreementsin Mindanao’s 40-year conflict

still exist.

•	 The international community has an opportunity to support progress and avoid a repeat of

previous agreements’disappointments.

•	 Careful foreign aid policiesthat empower locals and do not foster competition can be critical

in building peace in Mindanao.

Introduction 

The historic October 15th agreement between the government of the Philippines(GRP) and the

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) will require a new level of interest and commitment from

domestic and international playersto result in a lasting and stable peace. Both sides have negotiated hard to put thisframework on the table, and the signed document is cause for calibrated

celebration.

The framework agreement comes after more than four decades of fighting in Mindanao (southern Philippines). The conflict’srootslie in the economic and political marginalization of indigenous

peoples(the largest of which isthe predominantly Muslim Moros) by centuries of colonialism and

decades of central government policies encouraging the migration of northern Filipinosto the

southern island of Mindanao. The self-determinationist aims have been claimed by three rebel

organizations, including the MILF, currently the largest; the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF),

which hassigned several previous agreements with the GRP; and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG),

which refuses negotiations.

The framework acknowledgesthe Bangsamoro identity, and pavesthe way for an autonomous

entity with powers of law, taxation and justice under broad outlines. This entity would replace

the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)—an earlier, but widely unsatisfactory,

attempt to assuage the conflict. Many details of the new arrangement, however, are left to a set of

yet-to-be-written annexesto the agreement: on powersharing, wealth sharing, and transitional

arrangements and modalities.

Jennifer M. Keister

E-mail: Jennifer.M.Keister.4@nd.edu

PEACEBRIEF136
© USIP 2012 • All rights reserved.

A Diplomatic Milestone for Mindanao?

page 2 • PB 136 • November 29, 2012

A Step Forward

The framework agreement is a rare window of opportunity in one of the world’slongest-running

conflicts, and one marked by cycles of combat and negotiation. These opportunities extend

beyond the obvious benefitsto combatants and civilians who call Mindanao home. Moving into

the Pacific Century, the Philippinesis a key U.S. ally. While its military managestwo conflicts at

home (against both the Morosin the south, and a nationwide challenge posed by the Communist

New People’s Army), the archipelago also facesrising tensions with China. The Philippine government and its allies have an interest in domestic resolution that would allow the Philippinesto turn

additional attention and resources outward.

Furthermore, Mindanao is home to significant oil, natural gas, mineral wealth and rich farmland

outside of Southeast Asia’styphoon belt. All of these resources have been underdeveloped amid

the ongoing conflict, which has also exacerbated maritime insecurity in an area through which

approximately half of the world’sshipping passes.1

October’sframework agreement isthe latest in a string of documents—none of which, obviously, has been able to quell the conflict. The MILF has been negotiating with the GRP since 1997,

after a 1996 agreement with the MNLF that proved widely unsatisfactory.

Challenges Ahead

While the framework agreement is an importantstep in moving Mindanao toward peace, the

process moving forward facesseveral challenges. First, the agreement is a framework—not a

comprehensive and self-implementing peace deal. The challenge now liesin hammering out

detailsin the series of annexes, casting them into law, passing thislegislation and enacting it.

Prior dealsinked by the GRP and MNLF in 1976, 1986, and 1996 underscore the devil in details

of powersharing and dividing Mindanao’s wealth. The political and legal wrangling that accompaniesthe details of these agreements can be, and historically has been, a forum forspoilers.

Thisis particularly so asthis agreement faces a shifting political landscape: a new president will be

elected in 2016, and the legislation needed to draft the agreement into law faces politicians up for

election in 2013.

The violence following the non-signing of the lastsubstantive GRP-MILF agreement in 2008 is

an unfortunate reminder of the difficulties both sidesface in bringing their constituenciesto the

table—and keeping them there. On the governmentside, 2008 highlighted the clout of politically

and economically powerful non-Morosin Mindanao, and constitutional conservativesin Manila

concerned about national dismemberment. On the rebelside, 2008 highlighted the risk of fractionalization. Going forward, the MILF must manage both senior ideologues and youth frustrated

by what they could view as decades of ineffectual negotiation. Both sides must also deal with a

motley crew of clans and warlords(Moro and non-Moro) enfranchised by limited political control

and by the government’s decades-long effortsto rule Mindanao by proxy.

Both sides may be accused of ìselling outî in signing the framework agreement and both sides

face significant costsif negotiations break down and conflict resumes. The MILF’s current leadership facesthe challenge of retaining credibility and the possibility of fragmentation should the

agreement fail, or if leaders concede too much at the negotiating table. The GRP, too, faces a loss of

credibility as a negotiating partner, and both the government and international community would

also face any violent fallout of fragmentation, and would lose the working relationshipsthey have

built with the current MILF leadership.
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A Diplomatic Milestone for Mindanao?

page 3 • PB 136 • November 29, 2012

Cause for Hope

Still, the situation offerssome points of optimism. First, President Aquino enjoyssufficientsupport

to lend weight to hissupport of the framework and the peace process more broadly. If he remains

willing to spend political capital on thisthat willsignificantly improve the agreement’s chances

of maintaining support and integrity through the detail and implementation phases. Second, key

players who dissented in 2008 have voiced support for the current pact,seemingly weighing the

electoral consequences of countering the moves of a president with grassroots popularity.

Third, the MILF comesto the negotiating table better equipped to transform themselvesfrom

rebelsto rulers. Thistransition proved difficult for the MNLF, whose political wing had historically

been underdeveloped. My own research suggeststhe MILF brings with it personnel who adjudicate disputes, administersocial programs, and organize village improvement projects—in a word,

bureaucrats. These resources and experience may serve the transition well.

Fourth, history suggests coordination between the government and the MILF can work, and

has been remarkably successful in recent years. Except for the 2008 breakdown, the ceasefire has

largely held—due in part to fairly solid mid-level coordination between the two sides. Moreover,

my own research suggeststhat, at the grassroots,some communities have already wedded the

official Filipino administration to elements of MILF’s own governance apparatusin a functional

fashion. An agreement could give such efforts broader cover.

Finally, civilsociety isfar more developed than it has been under previous agreements. To be

sure, Mindanao civilsociety includessome holding political loyaltiesto one side or the other, but

an emerging strand is willing and able to stand on its own for Moro civilians.

Opportunity for the International Community

The international community has a tremendous opportunity to play a constructive role in building

a peaceful and prosperous Mindanao. Decades of war have begot widespread underdevelopment,

but also a complicated political topography. The international community may be leery of repeating the frustrationsthat attended aid programsfollowing the GRP-MNLF agreement in 1996, but

can both learn from those lessons and leverage changessince 1996.

Politically, the international community can do much to encourage both sidesto honor and

maintain the gainsthey have made at the negotiating table, and pressure both to manage their

spoilers.

International attention has proven remarkably effective even in the small, unarmed footprint

of the International Monitoring Team (IMT), which has monitored the GRP-MILF ceasefire since

2001. The addition of the International Contact Group (ICG) in 2009—adding fourstates and four

international NGOsto the peace process—hasshown some efficacy behind the scenesin facilitating negotiation.

Moreover, international aid can be a tremendous asset in moving the peace processforward.

However,such aid must be carefully calibrated. My own research suggestslocals have been

frustrated by being locked out of the decision making in many aid programs and in receiving assistance they find lessthan helpful. Allowing indigenousinput on both what types of aid are most

needed and where they should be sent can ameliorate these issues. However, the international

community must walk a difficult line between enfranchising local populationsto determine the

type and placement of programs while avoiding fostering competition among localstakeholders.

Coordination among aid agenciesthemselves can help—competition between agencies has

historically pulled in both unwilling localstakeholders and opportunists.
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A Diplomatic Milestone for Mindanao?

page 4 • PB 136 • November 29, 2012

About This Brief

Dr. Jennifer M. Keister is a 

political scientist and a former 

USIP Randolph-Jennings Peace 

Scholar (2010-2011). She is a 

visiting research fellow at the Kroc 

Institute for International Peace 

Studies at the University of Notre 

Dame, where she is finishing a 

book on Mindanao. This report is 

based on her own research—during which she has spent more than 

21 months in the field, traveling 

extensively in conflict-affected 

areas of Mindanao (2008-2011)—

and on recent discussions with 

contacts still in-country.

Even so, navigating a political topography complicated by conflict can be difficult for international actors. The community can be aided here by leveraging existing structures on the ground—

structuresthat have already garnered some experience in processing foreign aid, have legitimacy,

and local ties. The Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), a joint product of previous GRP-MILF

negotiations, hassome experience here, as do local elements of the MILF apparatus. The framework agreement acknowledgesthe MILF’s political wing in addition to its military and provides

broader political cover for the international community to engage these structures.

The international community can foster the MILF’sincentivesto see this agreementsucceed,

and can draw from Mindanao’s civilsociety. Overall, the international community can strengthen

the framework and its attendant agreements by working with the mechanismsthe two parties

set forth for foreign assistance. Parallelstructures can undermine the agreement’s credibility, and

create additional confusion and competition rather than harmony.2

Conclusion

The potential payoff from a GRP-MILF agreement is very high for thousands of Mindanao

residents who could rebuild shattered lives. The framework offers an opportunity to both sides,

which, despite enduring decades of conflict, have demonstrated a willingness and ability to

move forward. The international community, too, has an opportunity to positively participate in

this process—helping both sides and civilians cement gains with real humanitarian impact and

security improvement in a geopolitically strategic part of the world.

Notes

1.	 Mindanao sits at the confluence of four of the world’s busiestshipping lanes. See John H.

Noer and David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia (Washington,

DC: National Defense University Press, 1996).

2.	 For a discussion on the dangers of aid provision in fostering competition between combatants,see Benjamin Crost and Patrick Johnston,“Aid Under Fire”(Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center

Discussion Paper Series, 2010). The authorssuggest coordination with the stakeholders can

minimize the incentivesfor violent competition.