Part 2

Official Challenges to the DC Freeways

Table of Contents 

Mass Transportation Survey ........................................................................................................... 3

Transportation Plan for the National Capital Region-1959 ............................................................ 6

Highways and Transit ................................................................................................................... 11

Introducing Peter S. Craig............................................................................................................. 23

The I-70S Hearing......................................................................................................................... 25

National Capital Transportation Act of 1960 ................................................................................ 33

NCTA Gets Underway .................................................................................................................. 41

President Kennedy’s Interest ......................................................................................................... 42

Thinking About the Future............................................................................................................ 45

Defining the District’s Freeway Network ..................................................................................... 49

Transition at NCTA ...................................................................................................................... 50

The Cost of Right-of-way ............................................................................................................. 54

Awaiting NCTA’s Report ............................................................................................................. 58

Battle over the Inner Loop Freeway .............................................................................................. 60

Trying to Get Started ..................................................................................................................... 66

The Switch .................................................................................................................................... 73

Enter Chairman Natcher................................................................................................................ 85

A Blistering Report ....................................................................................................................... 89

A Matter of Jurisdiction ................................................................................................................ 91

National Capital Transportation Agency Submits Its Report ..................................................... 126

Trying to Sort Out the Freeway Battles ...................................................................................... 131

Implementing the Year 2000 Plan .............................................................................................. 135

The Darwinian Theory of Transportation ................................................................................... 137

In the Wake of the NCTA Report ............................................................................................... 139

Debating the NCTA Data ............................................................................................................ 143

Responding to NCTA ................................................................................................................. 146

President Kennedy’s Decisions - Delayed .................................................................................. 154

The President’s Recommendations ............................................................................................. 159

Congress Considers the President’s Report ................................................................................ 162

The Commissioners’ Views ........................................................................................................ 166

Chairman Natcher Takes a Stand ................................................................................................ 168

Chairman Fallon – To The Rescue?............................................................................................ 178

The New Engineer Commissioner .............................................................................................. 199

Searching for a Solution .............................................................................................................. 200

Appropriations 1964 ................................................................................................................... 208

Senate Considers the Appropriation Act, 1964 ........................................................................... 211

Waiting For Hearings on NCTA’s Transit Plan.......................................................................... 216

Transit Program for the Capital Region ...................................................................................... 220

While Whitener Considers the Options ...................................................................................... 250

The Freeway-Transit Link........................................................................................................... 257

D.C. Freeway Revolt and the Coming of Metro
The Bobtail Plan ......................................................................................................................... 260

The House Debates the Bobtail Plan........................................................................................... 267

In the Aftermath .......................................................................................................................... 275

Locating the Three Sisters Bridge ............................................................................................... 279

The North Central Corridor ........................................................................................................ 285
Part 2

Official Challenges to the DC Freeways

During the 1940s and 1950s, District officials, BPR, and National, Maryland, and Virginia road 

and planning officials struggled among themselves to plan a freeway network that would address 

the city’s chronic and growing traffic congestion while minimizing impacts on parks, historic 

sites, homes, and businesses. Maryland and Virginia highway officials had their own problems 

developing highway plans, but their concerns often were directly affected by the District’s everchanging plans. Citizens expressed their views, generally to protect their homes, businesses, and 

communities.

Highway officials believed they must try to minimize harm, but the road network was too 

important to be blocked. In the interest of the greater good, as they saw it, they continued with 

their plans. 

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, many officials and government organizations turned against 

the highway plans in favor of transit, especially rail rapid transit. In many cases, the issue was no 

longer where to build Interstate expressways but whether to build them at all. 

Mass Transportation Survey

NCPC and the National Capital Regional Planning Council established a Joint Steering 

Committee for the survey. The committee identified four major study areas: (1) planning the 

future region, including land use, the economy, population, and employment; (2) the region’s 

future travel demands; (3) design of physical facilities to meet the projected requirements; and 

(4) design of machinery for financing and administering the proposed transportation system. For 

this work, the committee engaged several consulting firms and undertook a traffic survey with 

the cooperation of Maryland, Virginia, and District of Columbia highway authorities and BPR. 

In 1955, BPR had completed studies, based on home interviews, of employees’ place of 

residence and mode of travel to work as affected by the decentralization of government 

employment centers in the Washington area. The study found that the residents who were 

employed in the central area lived throughout the city and region “in the same proportion as 

general population distribution”: 

However, as agencies are relocated at increased distances from a central point, a larger 

number of employees have residences in the area of the new office location, with a 

secondary group having residence in the area of greatest population density near the 

central business district. When place of employment is removed approximately 8 to 

10 miles from the central business district, most of the employees live in the vicinity of 

employment or in the semirural area beyond. As the distance from the central business 

district increases, there is a corresponding increase in the proportion of the work trips 

made by automobile. [Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1954, Bureau of Public Roads, 

Department of Commerce, page 35]
The traffic surveys helped BPR and State and local officials develop the initial plan for Interstate 

highways in the metropolitan area. In General Location of National System of Interstate 

Highways, released in 1955 and referred to as the Yellow Book because of the color its cover, 

BPR displayed a map of the Washington area showing an extensive Interstate network similar to 

the plan outlined in the Comprehensive Plan of 1950. An inner belt surrounded the White House 

and central core, with the Potomac River occupying one segment. A second, outer belt, later 

named the Capital Beltway, was shown entirely outside the city except where it crossed the 

District at its southernmost tip on what would be named the Woodrow Wilson Memorial Bridge. 

Neither the third outer beltway shown in the 1950 plan not the intermediate beltway known as 

Fort Drive was included in the Interstate System.

Radial Interstates linked the two circumferentials:

• One of the radial left the western leg of the inner beltway and continued on the District 

side of the Potomac River to the outer beltway on its way to Frederick, Maryland (loosely 

I-270 in today’s numbering plan). 

• Where the Potomac River served as a quadrant of the inner belt, the eastern and western 

legs of the inner belt continued into Virginia (loosely I-66 and I-395/95). 

• A route entering the area from the northeast crossed the outer beltway and split in the 

vicinity of Bladensburg, Maryland, north of the District line:

1. One route continued east of the Anacostia River (I-295) and ended on 

the outer beltway near what is now the Woodrow Wilson Memorial 

Bridge.

2. The other route coming from the northeast continued through the city, 

 roughly in the New York Avenue corridor, to the inner belt (part of I-95). 

• A short route linked the Anacostia Interstate with the inner belt (I-295 linked with I-395). 

The map did not show any Interstate routes in northern Washington other than the Potomac River 

route in northwest and the New York Avenue corridor in northeast. 

The Post described the routes in terms of existing roads that readers were familiar with: 

Sanctioned was the north leg of the Inner Belt which general runs along Q and R sts. nw. 

and down 24th st. nw. to the proposed Constitution ave. bridge. Third st., which connects 

the north and south legs of the Inner Belt, also was approved. 

New York ave., linking the Inner Belt with the Washington-Baltimore parkway, was 

designated an interstate highway. Also included were the Kenilworth-Anacostia Freeway 

and the Southwest Freeway which links the 14th st. bridge and the Anacostia Freeway 

. . . . 

The final road project inside the District made part of the interstate system was Canal 

Road which will connect the Inner and Outer Beltways. It generally will follow the north 

bank of the Potomac. 
Maryland’s Interstate System included the outer beltway, the roads connecting to Canal Road and 

New York Avenue, and a short stretch of the Kenilworth-Anacostia Freeway connecting to the 

outer beltway.

Virginia’s network included the outer beltway, Shirley Highway and U.S. 50. 

The District portion of the network totaled 22 miles (the District had requested 28 miles).

(The Interstate numbers employed here did not exist in 1955; they are intended to help with 

visualization of the Yellow Book map of the Washington area.) 

Bartholomew appeared before the Joint Committee of Congress on Washington Metropolitan 

Problems, chaired by Senator Bible, in May 1958 to discuss the mass transportation survey. 

Transportation, Bartholomew said, “is the lifeblood of the community.” An appropriate plan 

would “be of inestimable significance and benefit,” while an “an inadequate or haltingly 

ineffective approach will be extremely costly and will be damaging to the community welfare.” 

The key was to gather accurate information:

Mass transportation has been undergoing such a profound change in character in all 

American cities, particularly since World War II, that there is evident need for 

clarification of where we are heading and what should be the specific form of plan to be 

adopted and enforced. We must know whether or not individual automobile 

transportation can take over the full burden of transportation in a large metropolitan area 

such as Washington. If so, we will need many new expressways.

If not, we need to know what traditional forms of mass transportation such as the streetcar 

or the motorbus should be retained, and what particular function either or both should 

play in any new comprehensive plan. In addition to this, considering the demands of our 

1980 community, which will be greatly enlarged both in total population and in area 

development, we need to know whether any new forms of mass transportation would be 

justified. And likewise, considering both total demand and alternate types of physical 

facilities, what is the most economical and effective means of providing the standard of 

service that will be required.

He emphasized three points. First, he said that as yet, “no American city has devised and 

constructed a mass transportation system geared to the needs and requirements of the modern 

metropolitan community now in process of formulation.” That was why the “exhaustive survey” 

then underway on population and employment, and the dispersal of both was vitally necessary.

Second, the study was “the first profound attempt to ascertain the relative scope and function of 

the automobile, the bus, the streetcar, rapid transit, and other newer concepts of transportation.” 

The result would be an areawide transportation plan showing the approximate location of 

highways and high-speed transit, “particularly any which may be located on separated ways 

either on the highway network or elsewhere.” The report also would discuss parking needs, the 

cost of needed facilities, and basic plans for financing them. 
Finally, he told the Joint Committee of Congress that, “There will be no quick or simple solution 

adequate to the need.” Transportation was as important to the community as “an adequate water 

supply and proper sanitation.” Creating the needed network would “be a most difficult 

undertaking, requiring extraordinary effort and cooperative endeavor.” [Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transportation Problems, Hearings Before the Joint Committee on 

Washington Metropolitan Problems, Congress of the United States, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 

1958, pages 15, 18] 

While the surveys were undertaken mainly for mass transportation, BPR’s release of the Yellow 

Book established the first version of the area’s Interstate freeway network. Subsequent passage 

of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 provided the funds that Maryland, Virginia, and the 

District would need to begin planning, designing, and constructing the Interstate network. 

Transportation Plan for the National Capital Region-1959 

On July 11, 1959, as noted earlier, President Eisenhower sent Transportation Plan for the 

National Capital Region: The Mass Transportation Survey Report—1959 to Congress. His brief 

transmittal letter, dated July 10 and addressed to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of 

the House of Representatives, said: 

Sir,

I herewith transmit for the consideration of the Congress the report of the National 

Capital Planning Commission and the National Capital Regional Planning Council on the 

Mass Transportation Survey of the Washington Region. 

The report, the end result of several years of intensive study and research by the Planning 

Commission and Council, aided by experts drawn from public agencies and private 

concerns, points out the present and future problems of transportation of people and 

goods in the Region. The report also proposes a plan to meet the transportation problem 

and makes recommendations for organizing and financing the creation of the proposed 

transportation system.

The actions which may be taken in the years ahead to meet the problems of transportation 

will have a profound effect on the economy of the entire area, the welfare of its people, 

and the status of Washington as the Nation’s Capital. Accordingly, I am requesting the 

various Government agencies to make a detailed study of the Mass Transportation Survey 

report and the Planning Commission and Council’s recommendations. Such 

recommendations as are warranted will then be made to the Congress.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower 
On July 15, President Eisenhower designated Maurice H. Stans, Director of the Bureau of the 

Budget, to screen the comments and recommendations received from other Federal Agencies. In 

effect, the bureau would serve as a clearinghouse for the ideas that might be submitted to 

Congress. [“Stans Is Designated For Transit Review,” The Evening Star, July 15, 1959] 

The $500,000 plan was based on predictions about the region’s development through 1980: 

1. Population would increase from 2 million in 1959 to 3 million in 1980. “This increase in 

the number of persons to be served is the most important single factor in creating the need 

for new transportation facilities.”

2. The outer spread of population would continue. “More than 80 per cent of the added 

population will be outside the original 10-mile square (the District of Columbia, 

Arlington County and part of Alexandria).” This dispersal would spread more in some 

directions than others, based on terrain, water availability, sewer services, and zoning. 

An especially large population will lie to the north and northwest of Washington in 

Montgomery County. Since suburban residents will make more and longer trips than at 

present, total daily person-miles will triple by 1980.

3. The downtown area (the area bordered by the Inner Loop Freeway) would remain the 

largest employment center in the area, with jobs increasing “moderately” by 1980. Work 

trips to downtown would increase by about 20 percent by then. 

4. Most new jobs, however, would be located outside of downtown and, in fact, outside the 

District. “The large increase in trips to dispersed places of work will lead to a 

tremendous growth in peak hour trips through, around, or just short of the downtown 

area.” Home-to-work movement across the 10-mile-square will increase more than 200 

percent by 1980, but 24-hour travel volume into downtown will increase only a little 

more than 25 percent. “This type of dispersed traffic flow will place new demands on the 

transportation system, of a much different sort from the radial flow in and out of the 

downtown area that is so prominent today.” 

5. Automobile ownership and use throughout the region would increase as people “rely 

more and more on the private automobile for most kinds of travel,” especially shopping, 

recreation, and social trips, as well as trips outside of downtown. “More than 80 per cent 

of the total regional travel will be in automobiles even with the proposed transit system in 

operation.” Truck traffic also was expected to increase.

6. About half of the travelers during peak periods would be able to choose between the 

automobile and transit. They will base their choice on “the relative speed, cost, 

convenience and comfort of these two modes of travel.” Of the other half, about onefourth will have to use their automobile because they need it for work or for some other 

reason. In addition, one fourth will use transit, “many of them because they will not have 

automobiles available.” 

7. Peak volumes of travel (nearly half of all travel in a 24-hour period) in 1980 would occur 

during morning and afternoon weekday peaks. “These are the critical volumes that the 

transportation system must be designed to accommodate.” Radial routes leading into the 

District will carry the heaviest peak-hour volumes. 

8. Many key segments of the existing highway network “are rapidly nearing capacity, and 

some are already carrying more traffic than their rated capacities.” Improving existing 
roads and streets would “accommodate only a small part of the anticipated traffic 

increase.”

Because of these factors, the area’s transportation system must have greater capacities on all 

main routes of travel, including: 

• Increased highway capacity throughout the region “since public transit can only serve 

economically a small proportion of the trips originating in the suburbs;” 

• Larger capacities on the main radial routes; 

• Emphasis on circumferential highways; 

• Increased capacity serving areas north and northwest of the District;

• And “many new highways [that] must be built promptly” as well as high-capacity transit 

service to meet peak demand.

The Mass Transportation Survey considered three alternatives: 

1. Auto-dominant with little change in transit – This alternative was “infeasible” because 

officials could not provide the number of freeway lanes needed to carry all the 

automobiles. 

2. Express bus system – Providing express bus service on radial freeways would reduce the 

number of lanes needed by encouraging commuters to leave their automobiles, but more 

highways would be needed to accommodate the inevitable increase in automobiles and 

trucks, as well as the new express buses. Further, providing lanes for express buses 

would run into the same problem as freeway construction within the District’s built-up 

areas to accommodate traffic from the north and northwest. 

3. Rail transit system – Rail transit could accommodate large volumes of passengers where 

express bus service would be inadequate, but construction of rail lines in the District 

would be very expensive, in contrast with buses that can be accommodated on existing 

freeways at little additional cost. Buses, therefore, had the advantage where they can 

accommodate all potential transit riders.

Because none of these alternatives was altogether satisfactory, the survey settled on a fourth 

alternative that combined the best features of the other three:

The most important conclusion to be drawn from the evaluation of the three alternatives 

and the recommended system may be stated as follows: An adequate transportation 

system for the National Capital Region must include a new form of express transit 

service, capable of attracting a large number of riders who would otherwise travel by 

private automobile from the suburbs to points in or near downtown Washington during 

the rush hours. Only if many of these people are induced to use public transit can the 

highway system within the 10-mile square accommodate the people who are not in a 

position to travel by transit.

Therefore, the recommended system consisted of an express system of rapid transit rail lines, 

express bus lines, and an extensive freeway and parkway network. Initially, express buses would 

serve the rapid rail corridors while the rail lines were under construction. Local bus lines would 
serve as feeders for rail and bus lines and as distributors within the central business district. 

Buses also would serve areas in the District and the suburbs where express service could not be 

justified. Other streets and highways would need additional capacity to supplement the 

freeway/parkway system for shorter trips and to provide capacity beyond the limits of freeway 

construction. 

Rail rapid transit lines would serve as radials linking downtown to points in Maryland and 

Virginia:

• Wheaton, Maryland, to Alexandria, Virginia; and 

• Pooks Hill north of Bethesda to a point just beyond the Anacostia River, southeast of the 

central business district, to a feeder bus transfer station and parking lot. 

To the extent possible, the trains would operate in the median of the new freeways. Within the 

center city, the rail lines would be built in cut-and-cover tunnels that, when covered by a deck 

would resume carrying surface traffic. Officials considered technological alternatives such as 

monorail, moving belts, automated buses, helicopters, and greater use of existing railroad service 

or right-of-way, but none was satisfactory. 

The recommended network included 33 miles of rail rapid transit, 66 miles of express bus routes, 

and parking for the rail and bus passengers at an estimated cost of $564 million. 

However, transit could not serve commuters who needed their vehicles during the day and those 

beyond the range of feasible transit lines. It also could not serve traffic passing through the 

region or the movement of commercial vehicles. (The survey estimated that in 1980, trucks 

would constitute one-sixth of all trips.) Therefore, even with this mass transit network, the area 

would need freeways and parkways. 

The report on the Mass Transportation Survey called for a freeway component of 326 miles at a 

cost of $1.8 billion and $119 million for related downtown parking facilities. To supplement 

existing freeways, area highway agencies were planning 179 miles of freeways and parkways in 

the next 10 years, but another 66 miles would be needed. Existing freeways would have to be 

widened to accommodate growth in population and, therefore, traffic. In addition to the planned 

inner and outer beltways, the report included the Northwest Freeway in the Wisconsin Avenue 

corridor.

Creating the area’s modern transportation system should proceed in three steps. First, existing 

public transit should be improved. It should be organized on a regional instead of jurisdictional 

basis as at present, to eliminate barriers to crossing State, District, and county lines. Traffic 

controls and regulations should be employed to increase speeds, while detailed planning for new 

express transit facilities should get underway. Efforts should include reserving right-of-way on 

new freeways for transit service, with freeway construction completed well ahead of the present 

schedule. Quick opening of freeways would increase service by express bus lines. 

Second, express bus service should be included in new radial freeways, beginning in the early 

1960s. The accelerated highway construction should continue even as construction of subways 
gets underway in the mid 1960s. Radial freeways should be built with increased demand in mind 

by building wide medians where additional lanes can be provided as needed. Alternatively, the 

wide medians could be used as reversible one-way freeways.

Finally, rail transit should begin service no later than 1970. 

The survey also considered downtown parking needs. About the same number of downtown allday parking spaces would be needed in 1980 as at present. However, many current spaces on 

temporary parking lots and on-street parking would be lost. About 22,000 new spaces would be 

needed for all-day spaces, mostly in multi-level structures, with 27,000 new short-time spaces to 

replace existing spaces and meet new demand downtown.

The survey estimated the cost of the recommended system would be approximately $2.5 billion: 

• $1.8 billion for highways 

• $664 million for express transit facilities

• $119 million for parking facilities in the downtown area 

About three-fourths of the funding should be spent in the first 10 years. More than half of the 

funds (or $1.3 billion) would be expended on transportation facilities in the District of Columbia. 

Some funds could be expected under current laws but, for example, about $500 million that 

would be needed for highway construction was not covered by present arrangements. New 

sources, such as 30-year bonds, would have to be considered. 

The survey’s assumption about transit costs and revenue indicated that “revenues would be 

sufficient—when the region’s population reached 3 million and the transit and freeway systems 

are in full operation—to cover operating costs and a substantial part of the yearly payments of 

interest and principal [estimated: $26.7 million a year] on the initial investment.” The deficit 

would be about $16.1 million in 1980. 

The two most likely sources of added revenue for costs beyond present projections were 

increased Federal contributions and taxes and charges imposed within the region. Examples of 

taxes and charges included a regional motor fuel tax, motor vehicle license fees, special parking 

fees, payroll taxes, and real estate taxes. The best option would “probably consist of a 

combination of several of them.” Governing bodies in the area would have to decide on the best 

mix, but serious doubts existed on whether they could provide the entire amount of additional 

revenue needed.

Considering the strong Federal interest in improved transportation within the area, the survey 

found that strong arguments could be made to support Federal loans and contributions. At the 

time, the Federal Government did not have a transit-aid program, but should contribute toward 

the planning and design of the rapid rail system, as well as the early construction stages 

undertaken by an interstate agency capable of raising funds within the region. The Federal 

Government also should identify a way of providing the necessary added revenue to pay for the 

additional highway mileage needed by 1980. 
To carry out the plans, the survey projected several organizational stages. First, Congress should 

ratify the interstate compact approved by Maryland and Virginia to establish an agency to 

regulate transit throughout the area. This compact would allow for integration of transit lines 

across jurisdictional borders. 

Second, Congress should authorize a temporary public corporation to begin planning, design, 

right-of-way acquisition, construction, and even operation of transit facilities. The corporation 

also would review ways of linking highway and transit service. 

Third, the first two steps should end when local jurisdictions agree to an interstate compact to 

form an organization that would carry out all activities, including the financing, construction, 

operation, and maintenance of transit facilities. This organization would be in charge of the rail 

rapid transit system, including the subway segments. [“Summary of Mass Transit Program for 

Capital Area,” The Sunday Star, July 12, 1959; the summary provided the text of the summary in 

the Mass Transportation Survey report] 

Harland Bartholomew said the report resulted from an “evolution of successive studies and 

steps” involving the top transportation, traffic, and urban development experts in the country. It 

was, he believed, the first such study based on widespread consultation with experts.

Gingery, chairman of the regional council, said the study had “developed the answers to any pet 

theory that anyone wants to throw at us.” 

Engineer Commissioner Welling, however, was concerned that the funding goals would be 

impossible without substantial Federal assistance. “For the future, I foresee an increase in 

District tax rates and a heavier distribution to the Highway Fund of available revenues. Even so, 

it is reasonable to assume that the residents and business enterprises in the District cannot afford 

the cost of constructing the recommended system in the District, or even a major portion 

thereof.” 

Senator Bible indicated that his Joint Committee on Washington Metropolitan Problems would 

hold hearings on the survey report in the fall. [Beveridge, George, “Subway and Road Needs for 

1980 Outlined in Survey,” The Sunday Star, July 12, 1959] 

Highways and Transit

Chairman Bible’s joint committee held hearings on November 9-14, 1959, on the transportation 

plan. Overall, witnesses supported the proposed mass transit network, although they differed in 

some aspects of it. Witnesses were generally concerned about the inclusion of freeways, such as 

the Inner Loop and Northwest Freeway, in the plan. 

On November 9, Elmer B. Staats, Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget, was the first 

witness. He recalled that in transmitting the survey report to Congress, President Eisenhower 

had indicated he would ask government agencies to review the survey and submit 

recommendations, which he would then send to Congress as warranted. Staats reported that the 

results of agency reviews indicated that the proposed comprehensive transportation system was 
“a constructive approach,” with highest priority to be given to the proposed rail transit facilities. 

He emphasized that this support was general, not linked to any specific transit line or highway. 

Staats encouraged Congress to ratify the interstate compact approved by Maryland and Virginia 

to regulate fares and determine routes of private carriers. Beyond that, Staats supported the 

proposed temporary Federal corporation to plan the express transit facilities, acquire right-ofway, and begin building the system. After the groundwork was in place, a permanent interstate 

agency should be established by compact among the jurisdictions to succeed the regulatory 

agencies and transit corporation. 

He acknowledged the call for substantial Federal contributions to the capital costs of the new 

system. “As a general rule, the Federal Government does not assume responsibility for financing 

highways designed primarily to meet mass transportation or other predominantly local traffic 

requirements.” However, additional aid, especially for the rail rapid transit system “may be 

justified by the special Federal interest in the Nation’s Capital.” He cautioned that “long-term 

reliance on Federal financing should be avoided.” 

He emphasized:

The objective would be furthered by making every effort by Federal and local agencies to 

emphasize or encourage the use of rail transit, express buses and outlying terminal 

parking, rather than emphasizing additional highways which tend to encourage 

automobile commuting.

In the absence of detailed plans, Staats could not talk dollar amounts, but agreed that initial 

Federal financing of the corporation for rapid transit would be necessary. “At the same time we 

believe that the scheduling of capital outlays for rapid transit services and the development of 

fare schedules should proceed on the basis that the corporation will ultimately be selfsupporting.” He also wanted to ensure that “every opportunity” was given to employing private 

enterprise in operating and financing the integrated mass transportation system, “especially the 

express bus service and downtown parking facilities.” [pages 14-15] 

As the Star’s George Beveridge explained, the Eisenhower administration was developing 

legislation providing for Federal aid to the corporation: 

“The bill simply would authorize the Treasury to loan to the corporation,” Mr. Staats said, 

in answer to questions. “That is why we say the transportation system eventually must be 

self-supporting—so that receipts can repay the Federal loan.”

Budget Bureau aides explained they envision the set-up here as a parallel to financing the 

St. Lawrence Seaway. [Beveridge, George, “White House Backs Rapid Rail Plan Here,” 

The Evening Star, November 9, 1959] 

(The St. Lawrence Seaway Bill (the Wiley-Donero Act, P.L. 83-358), approved by President 

Eisenhower on May 13, 1954, established the United States St. Lawrence Seaway Development 

Corporation to construct the seaway on United States territory. The project was to be selfliquidating in that the corporation would sell up to $105 million in interest-bearing revenue 
bonds to the U.S. Treasury to be paid back within 50 years through the collection of tolls, 

negotiated with Canada, for shipments on the seaway.) 

As Beveridge pointed out, the first 2 days of the hearing were devoted to the planners’ 

recommendations, “and some differing opinions are likely from planning and transportation 

experts who did not participate in the four-year study.” 

These differences were apparently on Bartholomew’s mind when he testified after Staats 

concluded his presentation. He summarized the history of the survey, the “high caliber of 

technical competence engaged” in preparing the plan, and how the consultants and professional 

firms involved “exceed in their qualifications any group ever assembled for such an 

undertaking.” They were mindful that: 

Providing for a good transportation system in a great, growing, dynamic community such 

as this is, at best, a most complex undertaking. There is no patent readymade solution 

that can be pulled out of the hat, nor created by a single legislative or administrative edict. 

The result of 4 years of work involved “an infinite number of meetings, as well as laborious staff 

work,” and an “areawide cooperative endeavor”:

Furthermore, we would call to your attention that this is a balanced transportation plan, 

wherein, probably for the first time, experts and qualified authorities in the fields of 

transit and automotive transportation both endeavored seriously to determine where, in 

this changing urban scene, these two forms of transportation meet and overlap. 

The plan, he said, anticipated regional growth to 3 million people in 20 years, and possibly 

5 million in 40 years. Traffic estimates based on those increases were realistic. “It takes no 

expert to demonstrate that, with an approximate 65-percent increase in total population, 

provision for the added traffic load necessitates bolder measures than have yet been taken, both 

in the new highways and in adequate rights-of-way for some form of rapid transit.” The 

proposed plan, in short, “is conservative, especially since we cannot assume that future growth 

will cease by 1980, the target date of this plan.” 

NCPC and the Regional Planning Commission concluded that “our first obligation was to devise 

an adequate metropolitan areawide mass transportation plan.” As shown by experience 

elsewhere, public financing would be required, especially in acquiring right-of-way. He thought 

that operation of the express bus system, and possibly the rail system, “might conceivably, and 

profitably, be by private enterprise.” 

The proposed rail system was “based on the use of the latest technological developments.” 

Bartholomew said, “It is our firm position that only subways would be acceptable in the central 

city and that no so-called modern elevated structure should be used.” 

He emphasized jurisdictional cooperation, supported the idea of an interim agency referred to as 

a Federal Corporation to keep things moving as rapidly as possible until a permanent 

metropolitan agency could be created by compact. [pages 18-20] 
As mentioned earlier ACTION’s Roy W. Johnson was concerned by the superhighway elements 

of the comprehensive plan. He emphasized the importance of using science to find answers in 

“an era of great technological change.” Transportation had been “revolutionized by the internal 

combustion engine,” but society had not explored all applications of electricity, nuclear energy, 

computer technology, and new fuels. “Vistas of automation in transportation, offering dramatic 

advances in safety, comfort and economy, stretch out before us.” He added, “We shall not solve 

the problems of metropolitan transportation by denying ourselves the resources we are employing 

to do the many modern scientific tests.” 

The worsening transportation situation in the metropolitan area was steadily “creeping along.” 

Every day, people adjusted to it: “mostly bad adjustments,” as reflected in the flight of people, 

businesses, and industry out of the city: 

The city cripples itself. It limps more and more. Its capacity to recover, to combat further 

deterioration weakens. The very adjustments it made further complicate the disease as 

everyone who had grappled with financing the full range of Government services for 

sprawling suburbs knows. We are traveling a road to metropolitan disorganization and 

disaster.

As for building more superhighways, people should ask “whether it is wise to destroy many 

values of our Capital City” to accommodate commuters:

Is there an alternative to building expressways into the heart of Washington? Surely, it is 

the simple, obvious one of rapid transit. With all the possibility of developing 

transportation technology . . . we have in our hands today the means to build efficient, 

attractive, economical rapid transit that can be augmented as time goes on to an even 

greater degree.

Rail rapid transit should be not seen only as a means of transportation, but rather “as a means of 

organizing the future growth of the Washington metropolitan area, not merely the millions new 

population of the report—but far more in the future.” With rail rapid transit beginning to solve 

urban transportation problems, “the city will build from strength to strength.” In so doing, 

officials will halt suburban sprawl, build communities, reverse the decay of the center city, and 

“substitute for an uneconomic and hopelessly frustrating illusion of personal freedom on the 

highway the reality of comfortable and convenient journeys to work by mass transportation.” 

[pages 27-30] 

Other witnesses on this first day questioned some of the survey’s projections of population and 

traffic, including the number of transit passengers, and the methodology used to arrive at them. 

The second day saw additional attacks on estimates and projections. For example, Stanley D. 

Forsythe, general superintendent of engineering for the Chicago Transit Authority, questioned 

predictions of passenger numbers, the use of private rights-of-way, and the schedule for building 

the rail rapid transit system. The Mass Transportation Survey estimated that by 1980, with full 

implementation of the plan, “only 45 percent of the people coming into the central district” 

would use mass transit. He was surprised by the “pessimism of the report on that phase.” 
Experience elsewhere, including Chicago, suggested the percentage would be much higher – 

79 percent in Chicago during peak hours and even higher, 87 percent in the Loop (the city’s 

central business district). Other cities were experiencing similar percentages. Forsythe cited 

Philadelphia (between 66 and 75 percent) and Boston (66 percent), as well as increases in 

Cleveland and Toronto. Even in Los Angeles, “where there is no rapid transit . . . today 

54 percent of the people come in by mass transit.” [pages 137-138] 

Forsythe stressed the value of putting rail rapid transit in the median of superhighways. As 

experience in Chicago with the Congress Street Expressway demonstrated, it was “an ideal 

combination, and no one is more enthusiastic about it in Chicago than the highway planners 

themselves, who see in that combination of rapid transit in the median strip and the terrifically

expensive expressways an opportunity to increase the capacity of the highway, particularly in the 

last few miles as you come into the center area.”

He knew that debates occurred over whether to include rail rapid transit at the start of a 

transportation plan or the end. However, “any sort of prudent planning” would include rail rapid 

transit, or at least part of it, in the “very earliest part . . . and let it demonstrate itself.” It would 

prove to be a municipal asset, but he cautioned the joint committee:

You are going to find nobody operating rapid transit that will make any money out of it. 

You will have to subsidize it, the same as you subsidize your highways, but it is a 

municipal asset that is quite valuable, in my judgment. [pages 141-142] 

Chairman Finley of the Commission of Fine Arts also testified, indicating that members of the 

commission “firmly believe that a rapid transit system is the most logical means of meeting these 

traffic needs.” The central area’s ability to absorb more vehicles had long since “gone beyond 

the saturation point.” One option that Finley said should be considered is “to organize the 

centers of employment and at the same time to retain the unique features of the Washington 

plan.” As for the centers of employment, he said:

For instance, if Government buildings were erected east of the Capitol, outside of the 

Mall, with residential areas adjacent to them, much could be accomplished to avoid 

congestion that results when all these employment centers are located in one general area 

far from adequate housing. 

The city, Finley said, “was made by Washington, Jefferson, and L’Enfant, and further developed 

by their successors for a special purpose.” He continued: 

It reflects our early aspirations that our Capital City should be worthy of this great Nation; 

and to this end it provides a harmonious relationship of streets, buildings, and parks to 

give to Washington the beauty and dignity so admired by visitors. This plan should be 

treated with the utmost respect. Washington, himself, said with reference to it:

. . . no departure from the engraved plan of the city ought to be allowed unless 

imperious necessity should require it or some great public good is to be promoted 

thereby.
The Mass Transportation Survey had applied to the District “the factors used in planning for the 

average city where commercial rather than governmental factors are dominant.” In seeking 

solutions to the area’s transportation problems, special emphasis should be given to a “solution to 

traffic problems which would preserve the unique character of Washington as the Nation’s 

Capital.” Fortunately, “a rapid underground transit system is excellent, so far as it goes, and 

should receive the first consideration.” As noted earlier, he added that the freeways planned for 

the area, such as the Inner Belt Freeway, would change the city to reflect the considerations of 

highway engineers, not the vision of the Washington plan. [pages 120-122] 

On November 11, Virginia State Senator Fenwick told the joint committee that Virginia wanted 

to ensure that the Federal Corporation envisioned by the bill would be an interim agency. 

Virginia had reluctantly gone along with the idea on that basis alone. The Federal Corporation 

could work in the District, but he said that during meetings on the plan, “representatives from 

Maryland and Virginia were emphatic in their position that, under no circumstances, would they 

be willing to give to the Federal corporation the necessary powers to carry out the mass 

transportation plan which probably would include acquisition of rights-of-way by eminent 

domain, the levying of taxes, and control of such highways.” 

They believed that “a compact with representatives from the jurisdictions involved was workable 

and acceptable.” Further:

In recommending the establishment of a Federal corporation it was their understanding 

that such a corporation would recognize the establishment of a compact and would go out 

of existence upon such compact being formed. 

Any attempt to supplant such a compact would result in “vigorous opposition” not only from the 

local jurisdictions but the States:

The very idea of giving to a Federal agency the right to come into thickly populated areas 

and construct great barriers of concrete irrespective of property rights in zoning and 

residential areas would create such resistance that the whole concept of a mass 

transportation plan would be defeated. [pages 382-383] 

On the same day, representatives of two private bus lines operating between Virginia and 

Washington testified that private companies should retain their rights. Attorney Manual J. Davis 

said on their behalf, “We are opposed to the rapid transit plan as it is not only infeasible, but will 

ultimately destroy existing private enterprise.” He added:

We are in general agreement to a plan of expressways with a privately owned transit 

system providing an expressway bus system and continuing the existing transit service. 

We cannot support parts of the proposed plan which do not support themselves. 

He recommended that the plan include measures to discourage unlimited automobile use by 

removing free off-the-street parking. By staggering work hours in downtown government 

buildings, and including space in Interstate medians to operate transit, the plan would go a long 

way to relieving congestion. [pages 276, 289, 293-294] 
Representative Howard Smith, a member of the Joint Committee, said during the question period 

that he wanted to comment on rail transportation: 

I make [this comment] out of a long experience and from long observation from the time 

of the horse-and-buggy days with respect to rail transportation from Alexandria to 

Washington. 

(Representative Smith had been born in 1883 and was in his mid-70s at the time.)

Now, I recall the days when the horse and buggy were fading, and the automobile was 

coming along, when an automobile was so rare in Alexandria that everybody would go to 

the window when there was one rattling down the street. 

The Washington, Alexandria & Mount Vernon Railroad back then “was a gold mine.” He 

recalled the first bus he ever saw, which carried about 10 passengers on King Street and they had 

the “thrill for the first time of riding on a vehicle that did not have a horse attached to it.” The 

buses “began to prosper, and that has been history all over the country of these rail lines, as I 

understand it, particularly the suburban lines, and everyone of them around here went broke 

when the bus started.” 

The reason he was recalling these experiences was:

If that has been the experience with rail transportation in the suburban areas and they 

failed and went completely broke, what has happened since [then] that will make anybody 

think that they can prosper again? I just do not see it. That is all. [pages 303-304] 

The following day, November 12, O. Roy Chalk, the owner of the D.C. Transit System, Inc., was 

the primary witness. His predecessors, the four Wolfson brothers, had earned a fortune buying 

and selling surplus Florida shipyards. In 1949, they purchased a controlling interest in the D.C. 

transit company because they considered it another under-valued property. They spent much of 

the company’s profits in large dividends. Professor Zachary M. Schrag, in his history of the 

Metro System, explained that these payments were legal, but “were regarded by the public and 

many politicians as the plunder of what had been a prudent, conservative company.” 

When operators went on a 7-week strike in 1955, Congress terminated the franchise, which the 

District sold to Chalk, an airline entrepreneur. Congress approved the transfer in the Washington 

Metropolitan Transit Authority Act (P. L. 84-757), which granted a franchise to D.C. Transit 

System, Inc., to operate a mass transportation system for passengers within the District of 

Columbia and between the District and points within the area. President Eisenhower signed the 

legislation on July 24, 1956. The law required Chalk to replace the system’s streetcars with 

buses: 

Getting rid of Washington’s streetcars had been a top priority for the District 

commissioners as soon as they decided to revoke the Capital Transit franchise. 

Streetcars, they believed, were in the way of automobiles. A street with two-way 

streetcar tracks could not be converted to auto-friendly, one-way operation, and streetcar 

boarding platforms occupied traffic lanes. With congressional approval, the 
commissioners required that any new franchise promise to sell off Washington’s 

streetcars and remove the tracks. Within two years, Chalk would fight to keep his 

sTreetcars, but the District government and Congress were adamant. It seemed as though 

the era of rail transit in Washington was over. [Schrag, Zachary M., The Great Society 

Subway: A History of the Washington Metro, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006, 

pages 29-30] 

Officials had been glad to see the Wolfsons go, but they soon came to regret the arrival of Chalk, 

whom Schrag called “the infamous transit baron.” He said, “Many in Washington speculated 

that his true interest in D.C. Transit lay in selling off its valuable real estate: streetcar barns that 

could be converted to offices, shops, and even apartment buildings.” The usual mix of declining 

ridership, increasing fares, and deteriorating service that many other cities had experienced 

undermined the company’s finances. [Schrag, page 175] 

In his testimony, Chalk rejected the Mass Transportation Survey’s $2.5 billion transportation 

plan for the area. He was “shocked and amazed” that the survey had placed overriding emphasis 

on public ownership, which he said was “inconsistent with American traditions of free 

enterprise.” The assumption behind it, that “private industry either cannot, or will not, supply the 

mass transit needs of this area,” reflected a “complete lack of faith in the ability, capacity, and 

ingenuity of American business.” He was, he said, “alarmed by the ease with which the sponsors 

of this plan have departed from the fundamental principles of our national heritage.” 

He contrasted public ownership, as in New York City, with its “ever-increasing annual deficits, 

and their lack of imagination, efficiency, and ability,” with the job done by private enterprise. 

“Throughout the country privately owned transit facilities have been operated profitably, while 

the municipally owned systems have averaged a loss of 16.3 percent on their operation.” 

Chairman Bible interrupted to point out that other witnesses had testified to the struggles of the 

private companies. When Chalk said he was referring only to cities comparable to Washington, 

Chairman Bible suggested that staff might examine operations in the 17 or so comparable 

metropolitan areas. Chalk suggested they had only to look at the District of Columbia, where the 

transit experience was “a record of progress and achievement—a subject of great interest and 

encouragement to the industry throughout the nation.” [pages 595-597] 

In any event, D.C. Transit’s franchise was “a binding contractual obligation.” Public operation 

of mass transit in the metropolitan area “would be a breach of this contract. It would be 

confiscatory and unconstitutional.” This reality had been “ignored by the pending proposal.” 

Beyond the legal issue, he said, “we consider the total plan lacking in imagination.” The 

planners appeared “to adopt a theory of status quo, so far as facilities are concerned” and were 

“still tied to the cast-iron age.” He added, “it is inescapable, that, contrary to long-standing 

American tradition, the report with one fast brush stroke has pushed aside all thought of progress, 

innovation, and pioneering, and has gone forward on the assumption that the automobile is the 

ultimate, most desirable means of transportation.” In fact, 72 percent of the recommended 

expenditures under the plan were for highway construction, and a “mere 28 percent” for all 
public transportation. “In reality, a more appropriate name for the survey,” he said, would be 

“Superhighway Planning in and Around the Washington Metropolitan Area.” [pages 598-599] 

He offered two alternatives. The first was to “exclude all but public transportation traffic from 

the central portion of the city during the rush hours of 7 to 10 a.m. and 4 to 7 p.m., when the 

mass transit job must be done.” Downtown street parking must be eliminated, fringe parking 

should be provided, work hours staggered, and commercial loading and unloading restricted 

during the peak hours. With those conditions, “D.C. Transit could, without question, provide 

really effective rapid transit throughout the metropolitan area, and not wait for 1980.” 

He acknowledged that “such a project would be far from painless.” Doubtless, it would be met 

by “violent objections from the automobile and petroleum industries, their suppliers, and the 

automobile associations.” Still, considering the cost of the survey’s plan, he said, “I suggest 

trading $2.5 billion for some guts.” 

If Congress preferred to spend the money the survey suggested, he had a better alternative. In the 

spirit of innovation, he proposed to operate a monorail system: 

We are not talking about the monorail system investigated by the survey’s engineers and 

found to be unsuitable for Washington. We present instead a system which has been 

designed, engineered, and perfected by one of the Nation’s leading aircraft manufacturers, 

the Lockheed Aircraft Corp. D.C. Transit is prepared, with appropriate Government 

assistance, to go forward with the installation of the system. With such aid, the first line 

could be constructed and in operation within 2 years following the acquisition of the 

necessary rights-of-way.

He displayed a scale model of the monorail and presented a brochure on the plan to the 

committee for review. The brochure outlined a 116-mile monorail system with cars riding about 

20 feet above ground, 2 miles in tunnels through downtown, and another 2.7 miles in an 

uncovered cut below ground. Two lines intersected in downtown. One from Viers Mill in 

Montgomery County passed along 7th Street, NW., with branches to Andrews Air Force Base and 

Jones Point, the new CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and Dulles International Airport. 

This route passed by the Pentagon and Falls Church and was the first priority in Chalk’s plan. A 

second U-shaped route ran between Rockville via a route west of the 7th Street line to Fort Meade 

and Friendship International Airport in Maryland: 

Included in our proposal would be approximately 2 miles of tunneling through the heart 

of the city to avoid the necessity of having the monorail on the pillars in the center of the 

city.

He estimated the system would cost $250 million.

Representative Broyhill asked if Chalk had checked with the Commission of Fine Arts about the 

aesthetics of a monorail in Washington. Chalk said the plan was so new, he had not yet checked 

with the commission, but would do so after the plan was completed. He was certain “they may 
have some very fine suggestions for, possibly, beautifying various aspects of our proposal.” 

[pages 600-604] 

Harvey Speak, counsel for D.C. Transit System, appeared on the panel with Chalk to attack the 

prospect of an interstate compact to operate the transit system. A tri-State commission would be 

“unconstitutional and an improper delegation, even if Congress retained approval authority. D.C. 

Transit System had an exclusive franchise for at least 20 years, running to 1976. The Mass 

Transportation Survey plan “represents a breach of contract, a breach of franchise, and hence a 

violation of the terms of the contract to which Congress is committed.” In the absence of a 

remedy for D.C. Transit System, the plan would give “cause of action for damages in the eyes of 

the law.”

Aside from the legal issues surrounding violation of the franchise contract, Speak argued that the 

District’s unique constitutional status was another issue. The Constitution created the District 

“for the benefit of the 50 States, and the Supreme Court . . . has in several opinions held that the 

District . . . must be operated for the benefit of all 50 States, not to the advantage of any one or 

two and, in particular, that Congress could not delegate to the control of one or more of the States 

control over the District at the expense of the other of the 50 States.” A compact authorized by 

Congress among the District, Maryland, and Virginia “would then be unconstitutional.” 

He referred to State Senator Fenwick’s testimony that Virginia would not yield its sovereignty to 

a Federal agency or the other jurisdictions that would be party to the compact. As a result, the 

compact “is already a dead duck, because it serves no purpose . . . . It is a waste of time which 

creates legal complications, which will only delay the next stage, and I would suggest that in 

terms of the legality of this, if the committee were to take the entire project, grapple with it and 

come up with one solution, the legal problems raised, the unconstitutional problems, would be 

significantly diminished.” [pages 622-625] 

Under Secretary of Commerce John J. Allen, Jr., testified later in the day, accompanied by 

Commissioner of Public Roads Ellis L. Armstrong and Garland E. Marple, Chief of BPR’s 

Planning Operations Branch, Division of Highway Planning. (During this period, the title 

Commissioner of Public Roads, once held by the BPR head, was a secondary title below 

Administrator Tallamy.) Allen had served in the House representing Oakland, California, from 

January 3, 1947-January 3, 1959 (R-Ca.), before taking the sub-Cabinet post after losing his 

reelection bid. The Commerce Department’s interest in the survey’s plan stemmed from BPR’s 

role in highway planning and financing for the road elements “and through our general 

responsibility for a coordinated national transportation policy to meet the needs of our Nation for 

effective and economical transportation.

His personal interest stemmed from his service on the House District Committee “and from being 

a citizen and representative of another great metropolitan center with similar transportation 

problems.” (He lived in the District’s Capitol Hill neighborhood at 110 Fourth Street, NE.) 

He was impressed that the District, Maryland, and Virginia had agreed “to pool their power . . . 

to continue a common program of transport planning and regulation.” He urged Congress to 
follow the example of the District and State officials “and also ratify the compact in behalf of the 

District of Columbia”:

So far the transportation plan is an outstanding accomplishment in intergovernmental 

relations. An act of the Congress can now make it a landmark in metropolitan regional 

government; a system of common planning and administration will be created among 

three independent jurisdictions and the Federal Government itself.

The proposed regional transportation plan was “an outstanding example of the art of city 

planning, a worthy successor to L’Enfant and the other great plans that have shaped the Nation’s 

Capital.”

That highways constituted 72 percent of the cost of the plan was appropriate because the survey 

predicted that by 1980, about 80 percent of all travel in the metropolitan area would be by motor 

vehicle on roads. “Anyway you look at the highway phase of the plan it is a large undertaking, 

considering both the volume of construction and the financial requirements.” 

Under Secretary Allen praised the rail and transit elements of the plan, calling the rapid transit 

system “the boldest conception yet by advanced officials for solving the Washington commuting 

problem.” For rapid transit to succeed, the community must stay united even though patronage 

of transit would be concentrated in the few peak hours during the week, “a fact which defies the 

economics of most business enterprises and throws some of the cost on the community 

generally.” Beyond cost, “The community must furthermore cooperate by encouraging rapid 

transit use by coordinating traffic regulations, other transit operations, parking facilities, and in 

some instances zoning.” 

Senator Bible asked if the panel could comment on the general feeling of many other witnesses 

that “we are overemphasizing the highway program, putting all this emphasis on a highway 

dominant program and we will end up with something like the Los Angeles situation which they 

point to as a horrible example.” 

Under Secretary Allen replied that the Commerce Department did not have a preference among 

transportation modes. Instead, the objective was to promote “those transportation facilities 

which best serve the need for which they are made available.” He deferred to Commissioner 

Armstrong and Marple. 

Armstrong explained that in trying to move people, “we in the highway field have been up 

against the very real problem of trying to do that in a way that will solve the problem, that is, it is 

one of trying to provide what people want.” The automobile age had introduced something to the 

American way of life “that all of us like quite well, and that is the freedom of movement of the 

individual.” He said: 

And if we provide facilities that people won’t use, it doesn’t solve our problem. So in 

this plan the approach has been to try to realistically analyze what we are up against, what 

we think people will do if they have facilities, what their choice might be. And I don’t 

think we are going to, by any means, end up with a big sea of concrete. 
The plan provided “a reasonable balance” for the region: 

I think the approach has been quite sound, approaching it from the standpoint of first the 

travel that is done in automobiles by folks who will not be living within any reasonable 

distance of a mass transit system, they would still have to drive considerable distances in 

their automobiles, and they would probably prefer after they start, to come on downtown, 

if there are reasonable facilities available.

In addition, the plan considered people who used their automobiles during the day, such as 

salesmen. “Then the remainder was analyzed on the basis of a choice between driving an 

automobile and riding the rapid transit.” He emphasized: 

There is no magic in this thing. You can’t say here is a better way to do it for the 

downtown area, and expect people automatically to agree.

We are quite independent, I think, in our individual thinking, and the growth of the 

automobile use in America has resulted because of that. So I think it is a realistic 

approach and one that is in the realm of a solution to the problem. 

Marple, speaking briefly, said BPR did not have any basis for improving the methods used by the 

Mass Transportation Survey for projecting travel. He noted: 

The report shows that the estimated volume that would be handled by mass transit 

coming to the downtown area in the peak hour will increase considerably between 1955 

and 1980. That is somewhat contrary to the trend that we have experienced before.

I would think that we might well expect a lower percentage of traffic to be handled by 

mass transit in the Washington area than in some of the other cities because of the nature 

of the proposed land utilization. [pages 695-699] 

On November 13, Darwin Stolzenbach represented the Interfederation Council of the Greater 

Washington Area, a group comprising 361 local citizens organizations. The council endorsed the 

rapid transit system, including plans for a Federal Corporation to get work underway. He said 

the council was worried that negotiating the interstate compact could take 5 to 10 years and felt 

that “such a delay in getting on with the planning and development of an integrated 

transportation system would adversely affect the welfare of all the citizens of this area.”

The council wanted the agency resulting from the compact to “have the power to make decisions 

on the establishment and operation of specific regional highway and transit facilities, whether or 

not all the local authorities agree.” The members were concerned that the survey had “placed a 

disproportionate emphasis on private auto transport as opposed to other forms of transportation, 

and failed to consider seriously public policies that would tend to increase the utility of mass 

transit relative to the automobile.” [pages 774-780] 

Former District Director J. N. Robertson, now chairman of the Transportation Committee of the 

Metropolitan Washington Board of Trade, testified in support of the survey, the mass transit 
plans, and the corporation-compact sequence of development. However, given projected 

population increases, “it is obvious that both highways and transit facilities will be inadequate”: 

Therefore the board of directors urges that the present highway program in its entirety be 

vigorously pushed to completion before the 1980 date, if possible, and that none of the 

highway funds be diverted either directly or indirectly for any purpose other than that of 

highway construction. [pages 786-787] 

Engineer Commissioner Welling opened the afternoon testimony. The District commissioners 

supported the mass transit elements of the survey plan and creation of a compact to establish an 

organization to build it. Given the time needed to create such a compact, the commissioners 

suggested that the District or the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers might serve as the construction 

agency. The commissioners emphasized that “payment therefore shall be predominantly with 

Federal funds in relation to the full financial obligation imposed by the survey as a whole.” The 

benefits of the system were “grossly disproportionate to the relative benefits which could accrue 

to the District,” considering real estate to be consumed by the facilities and disruption to 

established communities and community facilities.

The District could not commit to the entire plan, which the commissioners believed represented 

“the outer limits of a regional transportation system from which there will evolve practical action 

programs of lesser magnitude.” The commissioners supported the rail rapid transit plan, but “if 

the Federal Government—or the region—does not intend to make massive financial 

contributions toward providing transportation facilities in the District,” the area should consider 

more modest alternatives. [pages 833-834] 

[The discussion of the Joint Committee hearings was informed by daily articles by George 

Beveridge and Grace Bassett in The Evening Star: “White House Backs Rapid Rail Plan Here” 

(November 9), “Rapid Transit Estimates Too Low, Hearing Told” (November 10), “Limit Transit 

Agency to D.C., Virginia Asks” (November 11), “Chalk’s Transit Plans Stress Private Funds” 

(November 12), “Regional Unit Backs Rapid Transit Idea” (November 13), “Metropolitan Area 

Transit System Cost Upheld by Planner” (November 14)] 

Introducing Peter S. Craig

Professor Schrag explained that the reaction to the report revealed that District residents, 

particularly those in the path of the suggested freeways, “were having second thoughts about 

highways, only a short time after the passage of” the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956: 

If the Inner Loop was designed to save the center of the city by building a wall around it, 

it necessarily abandoned those neighborhoods outside the wall to the ravages of the 

automobile. 

As an example, he cited residents of Cleveland Park, located in northwest Washington along 

Connecticut Avenue near Rock Creek Park: 

First developed in the late nineteenth century and named after President Grover 

Cleveland, who kept a summer residence there during his first term as president [March 
4, 1885 to March 4, 1889], the neighborhood had been largely built up by the end of the 

1920s. In the 1950s, it was home to white professionals—lawyers, doctors, journalists, 

and not a few members of Congress—and their families, whose large, detached houses 

were dwarfed by thick oaks and punctuated by private schools. Bartholomew saw in 

these houses the straightest path between the booming suburbs of western Montgomery 

County and downtown, just the place for the six-lane southern spur of Interstate 70, to be 

called the Northwest Freeway. Cleveland Park disagreed.

One concerned Cleveland Park resident was Peter S. Craig, who would become one of the 

District’s most persistent anti-freeway fighters. A graduate of Yale Law School, he had moved 

to Washington in 1953 as a junior attorney in Covington and Burling, then and now one of the 

city’s most powerful law firms. He lived in Georgetown for a year, and in Fairfax County after 

that, but moved to Cleveland Park, “attracted by the ease of getting downtown via the Wisconsin 

Avenue streetcar,” according to Professor Schrag:

After seeing a map of Bartholomew’s plan in the Washington Star [sic], David Sanders 

Clark of Tilden Street began pounding doors, warning neighbors of the multilane 

highway. One of his knocks was answered by Peter Craig . . . . Horrified by the prospect 

of a freeway ripping through his neighborhood, he quickly agreed to help Clark fight it. 

Residents banded together to fight the proposed freeway by forming the Committee to Oppose 

the Cross-Park Freeway, later renamed the Northwest Committee for Transportation Planning: 

In 1959 such a group was quite novel; not until 1962 and 1963 would such freeway 

complaints become widespread nationwide. But the professionals of Cleveland Park 

knew how to make themselves heard, and at the hearings on the Mass Transportation 

Survey in 1959, Craig castigated the Highway Act of 1956 for forcing cities to choose 

between 90 percent federal funding for highways or no aid at all for transit. “[I]n my 

heart, I feel certain that Congress never intended that the Federal-aid highway act would 

be used as a device for burying our cities in concrete.” 

Chairman Bible acknowledged that “the impact of superhighways on many of the city’s best 

residential areas and parks has brought many thoughtful citizens to the appreciation that such 

improvements are not an unmixed blessing.” 

The rapid transit element of the new plan proved far more popular than the expressways and 

parkways, especially if subways were included to minimize surface disruption: 

Typical was the reaction of District commissioner Robert McLaughlin, who worried 

about both the construction cost and collateral effects. He pointed out that the District 

would lose land to the freeways, which would then abet the flight to the suburbs by 

“middle and high income families,” leaving the District with a greater proportion of poor 

people. A subway would be preferable, he suggested, and in any case, if the federal 

government wanted to cut freeways through the District, it should expect to pay for them. 

The city would not fund its own destruction. [Schrag, pages 40-41] 
The I-70S Hearing 

On June 14, 1960, the Subcommittee on Public Roads, Senate Committee on Public Works, held 

a hearing on the location of Interstate Route 70 South (U.S. 240) in Maryland and the District of 

Columbia. Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D-Me.) chaired the hearing. Chairman Muskie 

explained the purpose of the hearing: 

This subcommittee is concerned principally with two points: First, whether the selection 

as recently announced by the Bureau of Public Roads was made in accordance with the 

procedure set up by the cooperation between departments, and I am referring particularly 

to the language in section 103(d), reading as follows:

The routes of this system shall be selected by joint action of the State highway 

departments of each State and the adjoining States, subject to approval by the 

Secretary as provided in subsection (e) of this section. 

We are interested also in determining whether or not there is a statutory obstacle to the 

selection of what might otherwise be the best route in terms of the best interests of the 

area and the people concerned.

He asked the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, Senator Case, for his comments. Senator 

Case said he had called for the hearing after reading news reports saying BPR had approved a 

route for I-70S to the inner loop that “would injure the tax base of the city.” The subcommittee 

wanted to be certain that BPR had followed the statutory requirement that route selection for 

multi-State routes was to be by the joint action of the State highway agencies of adjoining States 

and the Secretary of Commerce, represented by BPR.

He also wanted to know if the deadline for submitting the next ICE to Congress should be 

extended to allow more time to consider the route. 

Federal Highway Administrator Tallamy was the first witness. Since 1956, he said, BPR had 

made considerable progress in establishing locations for most Interstate highways, including 

those crossing State lines:

However, there are a few cases where such detailed locations have not yet been 

established. The Interstate System concept was developed with a corridor area as being 

the consideration for a highway between principal points of origin and destination of 

traffic . . . . The law, as we interpret it, indicates that in selection of a route within a 

corridor we shall determine it in the most direct manner practicable – which is practical – 

and we do have a corridor for the area between Frederick, Md., and downtown 

Washington which is generally called the route 240 location. There is no detailed 

agreement as to the specific location of this highway as it extends from Pooks Hill into 

downtown Washington. 

The two jurisdictions had agreed on a route between the two points and the most direct corridor 

should be established under the legislation: 
However, we recognize that there may be a deviations [sic] in physical location of the 

detailed route within that corridor or even extending outside of a most direct corridor if 

detailed engineering studies reveal that it is impossible or not practicable to go in the 

most direct manner.

One force driving the discussion was the next ICE. While working on the next ICE, BPR had not 

received any indication from either jurisdiction that “there is no practical, reasonable way of 

following a direct corridor between Frederick and downtown Washington.” For apportioning 

Interstate construction funds, the ICE would estimate the cost of the route that followed “the 

direct corridor in view of the fact that it is not demonstrated that it is impractical physically and 

otherwise to develop a route along the direct corridor.” 

Tallamy had met with highway officials from Maryland and the District as well as NCPC about 

the route. He told the subcommittee that the meeting included “general discussions . . . as to the 

possibility of moving the corridor to the east of Rock Creek Park location, running more or less 

directly from downtown Washington to Silver Spring and thereby connecting with an outer loop, 

and through the outer loop going westerly to the Route 240 corridor.” 

However, Tallamy did not want to let local needs preempt the national purpose of the Interstate 

program. The basic purpose was “to provide for expeditious and efficient movement of people 

and goods from one region to another.” In doing so, “the law recognizes that to the extent that it 

is practical and feasible, we should give equal attention to local needs . . . but we should not, in 

our interpretation of the law, give primary consideration to local needs and make the Interstate 

System movement of traffic secondary to local needs.” He added:

I advised them that so far as the estimate of cost is concerned that I saw no reason for 

them not to follow an alinement in the general Wisconsin Avenue corridor because that is 

the more direct one; it is the one which will move interstate system traffic most directly 

from Frederick to downtown Washington, to connect with the inner loop and nothing was 

presented which would indicate that there was not a practical way of accomplishing that. 

There appeared to be a practical way of accomplishing it, although I made it very clear 

that adjustments in any specific location within the Wisconsin Avenue corridor could 

certainly be done in the future. 

He recognized that future engineering studies, deliberations, or considerations might demonstrate 

that the Wisconsin Avenue corridor was impracticable: 

But until such time as a decision can be made on sound engineering and economic 

considerations, as the planning basis, until we are convinced on such a basis, we feel we 

have to follow the most practical and direct, as we see it, route.

He concluded: 

I would like to say in closing, Senator, that in my opinion the law is adequately flexible 

now to permit proper engineering and city planning and economic judgments on the 

location of highways. The problem that we have now is that still further engineering and 
economic and city planning studies would have to be submitted to us to demonstrate that 

it is not practical and by using the word “practical,” I mean in a broad sense, to follow the 

direct route which is the route which we feel under the law should be built if practicable. 

So far no evidence has been indicated to us that it is not practicable. But I do think the 

law as it is written now is liberal enough to permit adequate consideration of all the 

engineering and economic factors in making the location. [Location of Interstate Route 

70 South (Maryland and District of Columbia), Hearing before a Subcommittee of the 

Committee on Public Works, United States Senate, 86th Congress, 2nd session, June 14, 

1960, pages 1-11] 

John B. Funk, the new Chairman-Director of the Maryland State Roads Commission, testified 

next before the committee. Following Bonnell’s resignation on February 15, Governor Tawes 

had appointed Funk in May 1959; he took office on June 1. A Virginia native, Funk was a civil 

engineer who had served in the Maryland State Senate (1939-1946) and as Secretary of State in 

1947 under Governor Lane. He was chief engineer of the State Department of Public 

Improvements, a department he had helped organize, until 1950. At the time of his appointment 

as chairman of the Maryland State Roads Commission, he was Director of Public Works in 

Baltimore County. [“Tawes Appoints Funk As Highway Director,” The Sunday Star, May 3, 

1959] 

Funk testified that his agency was primarily interested in the Wisconsin Avenue corridor, but he 

recognized that Montgomery County “by its zoning, by its land use, by . . . policy has 

concentrated its people in a Wheaton-Silver Spring corridor to a great extent and as they move 

westward, that particular segment west of Wisconsin Avenue, zoned and established a land use 

density which is very light.” Generation of traffic west of Wisconsin Avenue, therefore, would 

probably remain light. The county’s policy would be undermined by construction of I-70S in the 

Wisconsin Avenue corridor. 

The State was leaning toward the Silver Spring alignment because the county was directing 

development into that corridor. Funk wanted to resolve the disagreement to avoid confusion that 

would occur if the State had to protect right-of-way in the Wisconsin Avenue corridor “and then 

a determination is made at a later date for some other corridor.” Time remained to study the best 

location because the State’s 5-year highway construction program did not include the extension 

of I-70S beyond Pooks Hill. [pages 11-16] 

Director Aitken of the District’s Department of Highways and Traffic testified that in 1956, the 

city had employed a consultant to study the location of an Interstate highway between the 

Potomac River and Rock Creek. The best location from Maryland was along the river “and 

coming into the inner loop down near where Rock Creek flows into the Potomac River.” 

Following a public hearing, the District commissioners adopted that route. It was not necessarily 

the most direct route, but it was the best alignment considering “grades, cost, the impact on the 

area it traverses, esthetics, and the relationship of such facilities to the areas to which they 

extend.” 

BPR accepted the river alignment for the first ICE in 1958. However, during a meeting with 

Tallamy, NPS, and District and Maryland highway officials in April 1958, the NPS objected to 
the alignment because it was planning the George Washington Memorial Parkway along the 

Potomac River. The District then began studying other alignments as far east as the North 

Capitol Street corridor, but also the Wisconsin Avenue corridor in the city. One line followed 

Wisconsin Avenue “clear down to Glover-Archbold Park,” while another “came across around 

White Haven,” but the department settled on “a line just to the west of Wisconsin Avenue, and in 

back of Observatory Circle and into the inner loop.” 

The North Capitol Street corridor, which better matched Maryland’s apparent interests, was 

being considered for an eight-lane roadway, but only four lanes were under consideration for 

Wisconsin Avenue because of the expense of building through this affluent, heavily developed 

area. In the end, the District commissioners rejected the Wisconsin Avenue corridor, prompting 

Aitken to pursue the North Capitol Street corridor for I-70S. 

Asked why BPR was counting the Wisconsin Avenue corridor as the route of I-70S, Aitken said 

the meeting Tallamy had mentioned took place on March 17, 1958: 

I proposed this North Capitol Street corridor and indicated in a summary sense . . . the 

length, the cost, the traffic needs, and I had pictures showing a comparison between the 

properties affected on the two lines . . . . Despite this presentation and my 

recommendation, I still received the decision for the direct line.

That was the basis for the District’s alignment in the ICE. Aitken did not feel bound by 

Tallamy’s decision for the ICE and was continuing to consider the North Capitol Street corridor 

while Maryland, he said, did the same. However, the District had not budgeted funds for a 

detailed study of the North Capitol Street freeway, in part because of uncertainty about whether 

BPR would approve it. He believed that if Maryland joined with the District in recommending 

the North Capitol Street corridor, BPR would consider it. He added: 

Well, sir, from my discussions with many people in Northwest Washington, I think that 

they would feel very much relieved if the estimate did not include an estimate on a line 

through their property or through their neighborhood. I suspect that they would feel that 

the prospect, then, of the interstate going somewhere else would be much better. 

Joseph Barnett, who was now BPR’s Assistant Deputy Commissioner, Division of Engineering, 

attempted to clarify what Tallamy had said:

Sir, the important point of Mr. Tallamy’s testimony has been overlooked in your question 

to Mr. Aitken about how long it will take to make the North Central estimate. He has got 

to get the North Central estimate location approved by the Bureau first and to do that Mr. 

Tallamy would expect to have some evidence that the Wisconsin Avenue corridor 

location is not feasible. That doesn’t just include costs. It includes a lot of other things. 

We have requested the Highway Department to make that study for a long time and they 

have just not made it. [pages 16-34] 

Chairman Gingery of the National Capital Regional Planning Commission testified along with 

commission members from both States and the District. Harland Bartholomew, NCPC chairman, 
and Engineer Commissioner Welling participated in the panel. Asked whether, if forced to 

choose one, the commission would select the Wisconsin Avenue or North Capitol Street corridor, 

Bartholomew said: 

Our commission believes that in the public interest, both routes need to be built and both 

are going to be needed very badly, so that it is not a question of either or, but a question 

of whether we can get both. 

He conceded that both could not be included in the ICE (i.e., be eligible for Interstate 

construction funds). The heaviest traffic demand, he said, would be in the north-central corridor, 

slightly less in the Northwest corridor. In that case, he was asked, why not select the northcentral route for I-70S. He replied: 

Because you have to understand the entire mass transportation plan, to understand our 

recommendation in that regard. We do not consider that it is feasible to cross up various 

of these routes in a helter-skelter pattern merely because there happens to be some 

particular funds under a program available at this time. 

He thought shifting the northeast Interstate (I-95) to the north-central corridor made more sense 

than shifting the Northwest route to north-central. “It does not involve such a great deviation. It 

would serve relatively the same area where the northwest route does not serve a similar area.”

Bartholomew explained that with 3 million people in the metropolitan area, “there will be full 

warrant for express highways.” He was concerned that as population increased between Rock 

Creek Park and the Potomac River, “this proposed deviation to the north [via North Capitol 

Street] will not satisfy that traffic demand and as the population increases and buildings come, 

the traffic will attempt to come down to the central part of the city.” He was not concerned about 

the term “direct” as discussed by Administrator Tallamy earlier in the day. “I am concerned 

however with the satisfaction of the traffic demand between Rock Creek Park and the Potomac 

River”:

Now, the satisfaction of the traffic demand for this entire area is not going to be satisfied 

by a distorted deviation of this route, 70-S, over through the Silver Spring district. 

Nobody in their right mind here—that is, to the west of the National Health Institute for 

instance, is going to go out Wisconsin Avenue, to the outer belt, clear over to Silver 

Spring and then endeavor to come down via the north central route. 

There is a tremendous local demand as well as the through traffic, that comes on the 

interstate route from Frederick. There is going to be a tremendous local demand 

generated in this entire Northwest section which can only be satisfied by a route which 

comes approximately through the center of that area. The demand is not going to be 

satisfied by any rapid transit line, even though we have a good interstate highway with a 

subway, which will operate in an open cut from Tenley Circle, let us say, to the north. 

This is the age of the automobile and we cannot ignore it. People are going to have cars 

and they are going to wish to drive them. 
He hoped to encourage some people to shift to transit, but as the population grew, an Interstate in 

the Wisconsin Avenue corridor was needed. The traffic in Northwest bound for the central city 

“is not going . . . clear out to the outer belt and over around Silver Spring in order to come down 

the north central corridor.” 

The Northwest routing had been selected “by necessity.” Given the inevitable population 

increase, not building I-70S through Northwest “is going to have a much more severe effect on 

the development of the Northwest area than any damage that may be done by the proposed 70-S.” 

Opponents, he said, say, “Please push this off on to somebody else; just so long as you leave it 

out of our area.” The complaint was not fair because it ignored the public interest. “I don’t think 

they themselves are aware of the fact that if their district gets more and more crowded with traffic 

on their local streets, that it is going to have an adverse effect upon their housing.” 

A change in Federal law was not needed, Bartholomew said. He had worked on route selection 

in enough cities to know any thought of a statutory change was based on a “misconception of 

what can be done.” He concluded his remarks by saying: 

I do not believe that you can solve this problem in the Northwest area by ignoring it and 

attempting to push it off on somebody else. The problem is there and it must be solved 

by direct action and not by trying to ignore it. 

Gingery said he was against extending the ICE deadline. Maryland and the District had been 

working for 2 and a half years on the location of I-70S, which he referred to as Highway 240. He 

recalled the meeting in July 1959 when President Eisenhower asked, at the start, why officials 

could not do something to improve the route. A year and a half later, they still had not reached 

agreement on a connection. [pages 34-52] 

The final witness was Peter Craig, representing the Northwest Committee for Transportation 

Planning. He said the committee “represents 3,500 residents of the District who are both 

concerned and distressed over what we believe to be an overemphasis on freeways in the 

Nation’s Capital.” Some members would be affected by the Northwest Freeway, but most would 

not. They objected to what they “believed to be a terrible error in transportation planning.” 

In a move that would be characteristic of Craig’s anti-freeway work, he submitted several 

lengthy, legalistic, detailed statements for the record. “I believe the committee will find them 

instructive on the issues posed by this hearing.” The statements covered: 

The Northwest Freeway Controversy 

Statement of Peter S. Craig

Comments and Proposed Amendments to S 3193 Submitted by Northwest Committee 

 For Transportation Planning 

Legal Memorandum on the Proposed Northwest Interstate Highway 

Report on Location of Interstate Route 70-S, June 1, 1960 

In the committee report, the statements began on page 62 and ended on page 98. 
In his oral statement, Craig said the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 Act “not only authorizes 

but indeed properly requires that the Bureau of Public Roads give controlling weight to the 

decision of the local Maryland and District authorities that Route 70-S should be located in the 

north central rather than Wisconsin Avenue corridor.” Both jurisdictions favored the north 

central corridor.

He pointed out that the Wisconsin Avenue corridor would take over 2 miles of public lands, 

including portions of Rock Creek and Hazen Parks. It would “result in a severe loss not only of 

the property taxes also of income and sales taxes to the District of Columbia, since it would mean 

taking a wide belt of land now beneficially used for residential areas and successful business 

areas.” It also would undermine rapid transit: 

A subway line is also planned in the North Central Corridor but because of the demand in 

the central area, which is twice as great, if any corridor can support the competing 

services of subway and arterial freeway, it would appear that it would be the north central 

area.

He objected to earlier statements that Northwest residents were only trying to move the freeway 

to somebody’s else’s backyard. “This is wrong and it is also unfair” since Maryland and the 

District agreed that a freeway in the north central corridor “has to be built to meet the present 

needs in the area.” They all had rejected the Wisconsin Avenue corridor:

The real question, therefore, is whether there should be just the North-Central Freeway in 

which case it would be 70-S, or whether there be two huge freeways, both the North 

Central and the Northwest and on this Maryland and the District residents appear agreed 

there should be only one. In our judgment, a Wisconsin [Avenue] Freeway would be a 

monument to waste and destruction. At a time when Washington needs urban renewal 

and prevention of any new blight to halt the flight to the suburbs, it would subject the one 

major area of the District that has escaped decay to the destruction of parks, playgrounds, 

schools, hospitals, churches, and private homes that only an auto and truck highway can 

cause . . . . 

If, in this instance, the combined judgment of Maryland and the District cannot stop the 

construction of a freeway that is neither needed nor wanted, then, most certainly, the 

Federal-Aid Highways [sic] Act should be amended to clarify the intent of Congress. 

[pages 99-102] 

A few days after the hearing, Tallamy relented. Reportedly with encouragement from the White 

House, he dropped his insistence on the Wisconsin Avenue corridor and indicated that BPR 

would consider a routing east of Rock Creek Park – the so-called North Central corridor. For 

purposes of the ICE, the city would estimate the cost of building I-70S/U.S. 240 in the Wisconsin 

Avenue corridor, but that was only for purposes of establishing the apportionment formula for 

Interstate construction funds. The ultimate corridor would be determined after further study. 

In view of the shift, Senator Case said that he would not pursue a change in Federal-aid law to 

clarify that directness was not the only criteria for locating an Interstate route. At the same time, 
Tallamy knew that Senator Case and Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D-Me.) were working on a 

proviso to ensure BPR kept open the location of the U.S. 240 entrance to the city, even though 

they did not favor a specific routing. Director Aitken said the District would employ a consultant 

to study alternative locations. He also promised to work with Maryland and BPR officials to 

settle on a plan. [“U.S. Ends Fight On 240 Route,” The Evening Star, June 19, 1960] 

On June 22, the Committee on Public Works inserted Senator Case’s language into the report on 

the Federal Highway Act of 1960. The language explained that as a result of the recent hearing 

on the location of I-70S, the committee became aware that BPR and State highway officials 

appeared to believe that the provision directing them to use “direct routes where practicable” 

might be interpreted to mean “where possible” – that is, where a road could be built, regardless 

of any other factors. 

In the case of Maryland and the District of Columbia, this interpretation appeared to prevent 

consideration “of the best route from the standpoint of traffic service, minimum cost for rightsof-way and minimal disruption to property use and value.” However, the language about 

directness “where practicable” should be interpreted in light of language in Section 116(b) of the 

1956 Act. Section 116(d) explained the policy of ensuring prompt and early completion of the 

Interstate System within 13 years, “and that the entire system of all States be brought to 

simultaneous completion.” This language was followed by: 

Insofar as possible in consonance with this objective, existing highways located on an 

interstate route shall be used to the extent that such use is practicable, suitable, and 

feasible, it being the intent that local needs to the extent practicable, suitable and feasible, 

shall be given equal consideration with the needs of interstate commerce.

In view of this existing statutory language, the committee did not recommend a change in law to 

address the “directness” issue in Maryland the District of Columbia, “but does recommend to the 

attention of the responsible and respective agencies that full consideration be given to the 

provision cited.” 

To make the point as clear as possible, Senator Muskie added language referring directly to the 

controversy about the Wisconsin Avenue corridor as discussed during the hearing. The language 

stated that the committee was aware that BPR, NCPC, and the two highway agencies were 

compiling data for the next ICE: 

The tentative use of the Wisconsin Avenue corridor for the making of the cost estimate 

for completion of the Interstate System, to be submitted to the Congress in January 1961 

as required by law, does not and should not in any manner preclude the eventual 

consideration of some other location for this section of interstate highway should further 

studies indicate that another location would be more in accord with the general directives 

of the law, and the public interest. The committee is further advised that the hearings 

resulted in clearing up some uncertainties on procedure and in producing a spirit of 

cooperation that, it is believed, will bring about earlier selection of a fixed route than had 

seemed likely. [Federal Highway Act of 1960, United States Senate, 86th Congress, 
2d Session, Report No. 1725, June 24, 1960; “Senators Back Corridor Foes In Road 

Fight,” The Evening Star, June 23, 1960] 

(Senator Muskie, who was known as an environmentalist, lived in Bethesda at 5404 Ridgefield 

Road. Thus, the outcome of the debate over routing would affect his daily commute while 

Congress was in session.) 

National Capital Transportation Act of 1960 

On March 14, 1960, Chairman Bible and Representative Broyhill introduced identical bills, 

drafted by the Bureau of the Budget, to aid in development of a unified and integrated system of 

transportation for the national capital region. The Declaration of Policy and Purpose stated: 

Sec. 102. The Congress finds that an improved transportation system for the National 

Capital region is essential for the continued and effective performance of the functions of 

the Government of the United States and of the District of Columbia, for the orderly 

growth and development of the National Capital region, and for the preservation of the 

beauty and dignity of the Nation’s Capital. The Congress further finds that improved 

transportation of persons requires coordination of the planning, financing, construction 

and administration of highways and public transit and railroad facilities; and that 

improved transportation also requires coordination with other public facilities and with 

the use of land, public and private. 

The Congress, therefore, declared that the Federal Government had a responsibility to work with 

State and local officials in the region to develop “a unified and integrated system of 

transportation of persons in the National Capital region.”

The National Capital Transportation Act of 1960 called for creation of a Federal agency called 

the National Capital Transportation Agency (NCTA) to determine routes for a rapid rail transit 

system. NCTA would be headed by an Administrator (salary: $20,000) and Deputy 

Administrator ($19,000), both to be nominated by the President subject to Senate confirmation. 

Neither was to engage in any other business, “but shall devote himself to the work of the 

Agency.” The President also was to appoint a five-member Advisory Board, with the advice and 

consent of the Senate, to advise the Administrator on general policies; policies in connection 

with acquisition, design, and construction of facilities; fees for use of facilities; planning and 

administration; and such other matters as the Administrator may refer to the board. 

NCTA was to develop a Transit Development Plan “indicating the specific location and extent of 

facilities in which the Agency will participate for the transportation of persons within the 

National Capital region, a timetable for the provision of such facilities[,] and comprehensive 

financial reports including costs, revenues, and benefits.” The agency also could contribute 

funding for construction of freeways, parkways, and other arterials to allow room on the right-ofway for transit facilities.

In addition, the agency: 
. . . shall cooperate with government agencies to facilitate coordination of location, 

design, and construction of freeways, parkways, and other arterial highway facilities with 

the Transit Development Program. The purpose of such coordination is to assure the 

comprehensive development of transportation facilities best suited to meet the objectives 

of this Act and to achieve maximum benefits from moneys available for such purposes. 

The responsibility and authority for location, design, construction, and operation of 

freeways, parkways, and other arterial highway facilities shall remain with the 

government agencies having jurisdiction thereof, but all Federal agencies’ plans for 

location and design of highway facilities shall be forwarded to the Agency, and all State 

and local agencies’ plans for location and design of highway facilities may be requested 

by the Agency for its review and comment. The Agency shall cooperate with all planning 

agencies of the National Capital region and the appropriate government transportation 

regulatory agencies including the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission in 

the development of transportation facilities and, wherever feasible and desirable, develop 

joint plans with such agencies . . . . 

(Maryland, Virginia, and the District had joined the cities of Alexandria and Falls Church in 

Virginia and the adjacent counties in the two States in a compact establishing the transit 

commission to regulate the area bus companies’ fares, routes, and connections. The Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Commission began operation in March 1961.) 

The agency could initiate proposals “for regulating and coordinating the flow of traffic . . . to 

promote the optimum use of the highway network and other transportation facilities.” 

With the consent of the governors of Maryland and Virginia, the agency could begin construction 

of transit facilities, pending creation of an interstate compact for a successor agency to take over 

and complete the work. 

Chairman Bible, in introducing the White House bill, said, “I hope Congress, before the end of 

this session, will act on the transportation legislation . . . . It is likely there will be many 

differences of opinion. So it is up to Congress to develop these ideas fully through hearings.” 

Representative Broyhill called the bill a “very sound approach.” 

After conferring with Chairman Bible and Chairman McMillan, Engineer Commissioner Welling

said, “The draft legislation represents a masterful job of reconciling many of the divergent points 

of view expressed in recent months. At the same time, it offers an effective, well-founded 

proposal for a greatly augmented transit service.” He added, “There may be legal and 

jurisdictional angles which will be debated. But the need for improving transit facilities in the 

area is so great that I would like to see the essentials of this latest proposition moved promptly 

forward.” [H.R. 11135, March 14, 1960; S. 3193, March 14, 1960; Bassett, Grace, “Transit 

Agency Bill Filed in Both Houses,” The Evening Star, March 14, 1960; Lindsay, John J., “Sen. 

Bible Urges ‘Prompt Action’ On Area Rapid Transit Proposal,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, March 15, 1960] 

On June 14, 1960, the Joint Committee on Washington Metropolitan Problems approved the 

National Capital Transportation Act of 1960. The committee report explained that the Mass 
Transportation Survey “produced abundant evidence that a new system of high-speed express 

transit service is essential to preserve the District of Columbia and its environs as a good place in 

which to live and do business, and as a beautiful and dignified Capital City of our great Nation.” 

Moreover, the Joint Committee found “well-nigh universal support for a rapid transit system.” 

This support spanned all Federal, State, and local governments, business and civic groups, labor 

unions, planners, transportation experts, and average citizens. 

The day when private enterprise could provide a modern rapid transit system and operate it at a 

profit “has long since passed.” The District of Columbia, which did not have the authority to 

issue bonds, could not take the necessary steps. “It is squarely up to the Federal Government, the 

largest employer and landowner in the metropolitan area, to take the first step.” 

Members of the Joint Committee did not mean to imply that the Federal Government should 

subsidize transit in the area:

There is reason to expect that, if the Federal Government will make its credit available to 

create such a system, it will receive its money back, with full interest. It is true that the 

Transportation Plan predicted that annual operating revenues of a rapid transit system, 

while they would be sufficient to pay all operating costs and some principal and interest, 

would not cover all capital costs. But the prospective deficit might be turned to a surplus 

if a somewhat more modest system were built initially, or if a somewhat higher fare were 

charged.

The Bureau of the Budget, recognizing this fact, told the joint committee that, over a 

period of 50 years, a rapid transit system would not only pay its operating costs, but 

would repay a large part of its capital costs, and perhaps eventually all of them. [National 

Capital Transportation Act of 1960, United States Senate, 86th Congress, 2d Session, 

Committee Print, Joint Committee on Washington Metropolitan Problems, June 15, 1960, 

pages 5-6] 

The bill established a “National Capital Transportation Agency” (NCTA), headed by an 

Administrator and Deputy Administrator, to review the Mass Transportation Survey, make any 

needed changes, and carry out the detailed engineering and design work to identify the best 

locations for the rail lines. It would submit a transit development program to the President and 

Congress, and begin building and operating the transit facilities until the local jurisdictions 

complete an interstate compact to set up an agency to replace NCTA.

The measure established a prohibition on freeway construction in northeast Washington: 

A proviso prohibits the construction of any new freeway or major parkway in a large 

sector of Northwest Washington until the use of railroads and subways has had a full trial. 

This proviso would prohibit the construction on Interstate Route 70-S along the 

Wisconsin Avenue corridor, or along any alinement west of 12th Street NW. It would 

also prohibit the construction of the closely connected Glover-Archbold Parkway. Such 

highways might offer serious competition to the use of subways and railroads to carry 
people between downtown Washington and the western portions of the outer District of 

Columbia and Montgomery County . . . . 

The joint committee believes that the use of existing railroads and new rapid transit lines 

to carry people between downtown Washington and the suburbs may permit a substantial 

reduction in the number of highways that must be built into the city, leading to a 

substantial saving in public funds and avoiding the harmful effects often attendant on the 

construction of freeways through residential areas. In any case, any additional highways 

that will eventually be built should be deferred until the railroads and rapid transit lines 

have had an opportunity to develop their full patronage, since experience has shown that a 

new highway provides competition that no rail line can meet. 

This provision did not specify an end-date for the moratorium, but was not a permanent ban on 

freeway construction in northwest Washington. “Once the use of rail transportation has had a 

fair trial, the prohibition terminates.” If rail transportation proved successful, “the highway 

agencies will no doubt prefer to spend their money elsewhere.” If, however, a new freeway is 

needed, “they will be free to request appropriations and, if these are granted, to build under the 

usual procedures.” If a subway is not built to serve the northwest quadrant, rail transportation 

“will still have had a ‘fair trial’ within the meaning of the provision, and the highway agencies 

should be free to proceed with their own plans for the area.” 

One reason for the ban was BPR’s decision that, under its interpretation of Federal-aid law, I-70S 

must be routed west of Rock Creek Park: 

Since revised cost estimates on the Interstate System, based on the latest ruling, are to be 

submitted to the Bureau in August, the freeway might become immovably fixed in the 

so-called Wisconsin Avenue corridor before the new Agency has even had a chance to 

consider the use of rail transportation to serve that area, unless Congress intervenes. 

The bill also called for the use of freeway medians for rail transportation. The Joint Committee’s 

report cited three freeways that were “now under construction or in the advanced planning 

stage”:

• I-66 in Virginia from the Potomac River to the Capital Beltway – “This freeway should 

be designed to incorporate express transit facilities in a wide median strip, and to include 

bus stations and other facilities for high-speed, high-volume transit service.” 

• Anacostia Expressway in the District south of the South Capitol Street Bridge – “This 

highway also should be designed and built with median strips wide enough for express 

transit service, and with provision for bus stations.” 

• George Washington Memorial Parkway in Montgomery County, Maryland – “The 

transportation plan calls for express bus service on the parkway, requiring not median 

strips but bus stations off the parkway.” 

In the case of the Anacostia Expressway and the George Washington Memorial Parkway, the 

report continued, construction was about to begin. Officials needed to know as soon as possible 

whether transit lines would be included within the right-of-way. “While the joint committee 
believes that no land acquisition or construction should be authorized until it has been well 

substantiated and Congress has approved it, these three highways do pose a special problem.” 

The bill, when enacted, “should be taken as an indication of an intent by the Federal Government 

to aid in the provision of express transit facilities in conjunction with freeways and parkways, 

and those agencies should allow for such facilities in their current planning and design work, so 

far as may be possible.” [National Capital Transportation Act of 1960, pages 9-10] 

The Joint Committee was concerned about construction of a 12th Street expressway tunnel across 

the National Mall from Constitution Avenue to Independence Avenue. This corridor was an 

ideal location for a subway line, but the expressway tunnel may block construction of a subway 

tunnel under the National Mall at this location. Alternatively, building the expressway tunnel 

now and the subway tunnel later would mean this area of the National Mall would be “dug up not 

once but twice, thereby causing an additional disruption of traffic and delaying the time when the 

Mall will be free of obstructions.” Some construction of the expressway tunnel was underway, 

the Joint Committee recommended that the District of Columbia and NPS “give serious 

consideration to rescheduling the completion of the Expressway, taking temporary measures to 

restore the flow of traffic, and the appearance of the Mall, and working with the new Agency in 

the preparation of a plan for any subway to be built in the 12th Street alinement.” [National 

Capital Transportation Act of 1960, pages 10-11] 

The House and Senate considered the bill on June 27, each considering somewhat different 

versions of the bill. The House took up the bill first. It included the prohibition of freeway or 

parkway construction in northwest Washington: 

Provided, That no freeway, or new parkway more than two lanes in width, shall be built 

within the District of Columbia west of Twelfth Street, Northwest, and north of either the 

north or the west legs of the proposed Inner Loop Freeway, the proposed Potomac River 

Expressway, or the proposed Palisades Parkway, until after the Agency shall have 

reported to the President that the use of rail transportation to carry passenger traffic to 

points northwest of downtown Washington has had a fair trial. 

Representative George H. Fallon (D-Md.), chairman of the Subcommittee on Roads of the Public 

Works Committee and one of the primary authors of the 1956 Act, questioned the moratorium, 

asking how long it would be in effect. Chairman McMillan of the House Committee on the 

District of Columbia explained that the Joint Committee had spent a great deal of time on this 

point. The committee had been advised that construction of U.S. 240 in the Wisconsin Avenue 

corridor was not contemplated for at least 5 years. “I notice the Senate amendment to a similar 

bill provides for a 2-year freeze and, so far as I am concerned, I have no objection to it being 

2 years.” 

Chairman Fallon suggested that the delay meant that the freeway, if needed, “is going to cost 

more than $100 million. It will cost double that.” Chairman McMillan said that because 

Maryland and the District could begin planning the freeway, but were not planning to build it in 

the next 5 years. Therefore, a 2- to 5-year delay in construction pending a decision would not 

affect the cost. Chairman Fallon responded that since Maryland and the District had rejected the 
Wisconsin Avenue corridor as the proper place for the freeway, they would not be doing any 

planning for it. 

He also objected to the assumption that the results of rail and rapid transit in the corridor would 

be known in 2 years. “It will be many years before the railroad and the subway will be 

completed, so that there will not be any highway built in the northwest section of Washington 

and Maryland, probably one of the most difficult traffic problems as anywhere in the country; so 

that there will be no highway construction for at least 10 years.” He added: 

I might say further, I hope that this does not set a precedent for all urban areas of the 

Nation, and that they give up the idea of bringing traffic in and out of the city by 

automobile. I hope that it does not set a pattern for all other urban areas. 

Chairman McMillan agreed, but added, “I also hope that the people of the cities will discontinue 

trying to build freeways in the metropolitan areas that cost $10 million a mile.

Representative Gross objected to the bill. He listed the officials the bill called for and their 

proposed salaries. “I will say to my colleagues that if you vote for this bill you are voting to 

spend $500,000 of the taxpayers’ money gathered from all over the country to set up 

administrative agencies that will serve the interests of the District of Columbia and the States of 

Virginia and Maryland. This is another cute little raid on the taxpayers of all the country.” 

Despite his concern, the House passed the bill by a vote of 72 to 42. [National Capital 

Transportation Act of 1960, Congressional Record-House, June 27, 2960, pages 14561-14576] 

Less than 2 hours later, Chairman Bible introduced S. 3193 on the Senate floor. As Chairman 

McMillan had stated, the bill’s moratorium on freeway and parkway construction in northwest 

Washington had been amended: 

Provided, That no freeway, or new parkway more than two lanes in width, shall be built 

within the District of Columbia west of Twelfth Street, Northwest, and north of either the 

north or the west legs of the proposed Inner Loop Freeway, the proposed Potomac River 

Expressway, or the proposed Palisades Parkway, before July 1, 1962; and the Agency 

shall not later than January 10, 1962, submit to the President for transmittal to Congress, 

its recommendation as to whether any such freeway or parkway should thereafter be built. 

The only objection to the bill came from Senator Morse, who objected to the absence of a 

provision in the bill covering labor relations. He warned:

If the Senate today passes the bill without laying down at least the framework of a labor 

policy which is going to exist once operating personnel start to be hired by any operating 

system which may result from passage of such a measure as this, we shall be sowing the 

seeds today, for labor unrest in the Capital Transit System . . . . 

He offered an amendment to reassure workers and their unions that worker protections were in 

the law:
Provided, Before the Agency moves into the operating stage, Congress shall establish for 

the Agency a labor relations policy, defining labor’s right to organize, to bargain 

collectively, to arbitrate disputes, and to safeguard job rights.” 

He explained the rationale for the amendment:

It will make it perfectly clear that the operating Agency cannot use the law as a subterfuge 

to adopt what could become a union-busting bill, if a situation arose, in a future Congress, 

under which some operating facility might want to use it so. I think it is necessary to 

include such a check in the law . . . . 

The amendment simply provides that the transit development program to be developed by 

the Agency shall be referred not only to the transit companies but to the unions 

representing the workers as well.

Chairman Bible agreed to the amendment.

With that one change, the Senate approved the bill by standing vote. [National Capital 

Transportation Act of 1960, Congressional Record-Senate, June 27, 1960, pages 14486-14505] 

Conferees appointed to resolve differences between the two bills reached agreement on June 30. 

Regarding the moratorium on freeway or parkway construction, the conference committee 

retained the moratorium but extended it until July 1, 1965, adding that “the Agency shall not later 

than January 10, 1965, submit to the President, for transmittal to Congress, its recommendation 

as to whether any such freeway or parkway should thereafter be built.” The committee also 

retained the Morse amendment on labor relations. [Conference Report, National Capital 

Transportation Act of 1960, U.S. House of Representatives, 86th Congress, 2d Session, Report 

No. 2061, June 30, 1960] 

The House and Senate approved the conference committee report on July 1. In the House, 

Chairman McMillan introduced the conference report in the routine manner often used for a 

noncontroversial bill. The only dialogue was with Representative Gross, who requested a brief 

explanation of the differences between the House-passed version of the bill and the conference 

committee report. Representative Broyhill replied:

Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, in conference the Senate receded from 

practically all of its amendments and accepted the House version almost in toto. The 

main amendment that was adopted by the Senate was to eliminate the feature of the 

House bill that required further authorization on the part of Congress for any construction 

that took place; merely requiring an appropriation. They receded from that amendment 

and agreed to the original House version. That was the main difference between the two 

bodies. Another difference was in the House version we restricted the construction of 

freeways and expressways in Northwest Washington until the subway system had 

received a fair trial. The Senate required a 2-year waiting period, and we compromised 

and made it a 5-year waiting period. The rest of the changes are minor.
Representative Gross asked if the conference committee retained the same appropriations in the 

bill “for the commission or whatever it was, the advisory board,” an apparent reference to the 

salaries he had criticized during the June 27 debate. Representative Broyhill replied that, “There 

was no difference between the versions of the two bodies in that regard.” As a result, the 

conference committee did not change the language.

Representative Gross asked, “So far as expenditures are concerned?” Representative Broyhill 

replied:

Well, the main difference, as I tried to explain was that we required further authorization 

before any land acquisition or construction could be commenced. The Senate just struck 

that portion and just required an appropriation. The Senate receded from that and 

adopted the House version, which was far more restrictive.

With that lone colloquy, the House approved the conference report without a recorded vote. 

In the Senate, Senator Case raised concerns about the moratorium. “I personally regret the freeze 

on highway construction in the northwest part of the city is made as long as it is.” He was 

concerned that until the matter was resolved, “there will be some uncertainty in the minds of 

property owners, developers, business interests, schools, hospitals, and churches centering upon 

just where the connection for Interstate route 70-S will come into the city.” He recognized that 

compromise was needed on the issue, and that the compromise in the bill was reasonable; he was 

speaking only for the legislative record. 

He also was concerned that the moratorium would block the Glover-Archbold Parkway. Because 

the fate of the parkway was in the courts, he wanted to go on record in support of the parkway. If 

it emerged from the trial, he hoped that “a resolution of the legal points involved . . . would be 

noted by the agency in its study, and that matter might receive separate and special attention.”

With Senator Case on the record, the Senate agreed to the conference report without a vote. 

[National Capital Transportation Act of 1960, Congressional Record-House, July 1, 1960, pages 

15493-15496; Coordinated System of Transportation for National Capital Area-Conference 

Report, Congressional Record-Senate, July 1, 1960, pages 15379-15380] 

The final bill included the language from Section 102 on the congressional finding that an 

improved transportation system for the area “requires the planning on a regional basis of a 

unified system of freeways, parkways, express transit service on exclusive rights-of-way, and 

other major transportation facilities.” It included language urging NCTA to give “special 

consideration” to, among other things: 

Early development of a subway from Union Station capable of rapid dispersal of 

passengers from the railhead to the principal employment centers in the District of 

Columbia and its immediate environs and capable of being extended to serve other parts 

of the region. 

This language was immediately followed by the “Provided” language imposing a moratorium on 

freeway and parkway construction in northwest Washington. 
The bill also retained the Morse amendment on labor policy. 

NCTA Gets Underway

On August 17, 1960, President Eisenhower asked Congress to appropriate $500,000 for NCTA in 

a planned supplemental appropriations act for fiscal year 1961. The funds were needed before he 

could name an Administrator and Deputy Administrator to begin operations. 

On August 26, the House of Representatives approved a bill that cut the NCTA appropriation in 

half, largely because Chairman Albert Thomas (D-Tx.) of the subcommittee of the Committee on 

Appropriations considered the planned expenditures wasteful. The bill also limited NCTA to a 

25-employee ceiling, instead of the 54 employees included in the White House plan for getting 

the agency up and running quickly. Chairman Thomas was concerned that NCTA would use the 

funds to undo the work of the joint committee that prepared the Mass Transportation Survey. 

[Deane, James G., “Transit Agency Fund Chopped To $250,000,” The Evening Star, August 26, 

1960] 

Federal officials and mass transit advocates urged restoration of the full amount, which the 

Senate did when it passed its version of the bill on August 28. However, the House measure 

prevailed in conference committee. Congress completed work on the supplemental 

appropriations bill on August 31, then adjourned on September 1. 

With funds assured, the White House announced the appointment of H. Holmes Vogel as the 

NCTA administrator. The President sent the nomination to the Senate for confirmation along 

with the names of the members of the advisory board, including Harland Bartholomew. With 

Congress having left town to campaign, confirmation of the nominees would not be possible; 

they would act on the basis of recess appointments. 

Vogel, 62 years old, was a vice president of the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company. 

A Republican with a long history of involvement in civic affairs, he had been on the board of 

directors of such organizations as United Givers Fund, Maryland Utilities Association, 

Washington Criminal Justice Association, the Salvation Army, and the Better Business Bureau. 

His salary at NCTA would be $19,000 a year. [Pierce, Charles D., “Vogel May Get Transit 

Post,” The Evening Star, August 18, 1960] 

He told reporters, “This job is more than just a challenge to those of us who will be connected 

with it. It is going to be a model for mass transportation planning for communities throughout 

the entire Nation.” NCTA’s primary job was to send Congress recommendations on the 

proposed transit program. “I do not intend to prejudge any of this. Making these decisions will 

be the job of the agency in the months ahead.” NCTA would begin, he said, by updating the 

Mass Transportation Survey. “What we have to do is take an objective look at the entire report 

from the standpoint of transportation.” [Gimble, Gilbert, “New Agency Head Sees Transit Plans 

as Model,” The Evening Star, September 1, 1960] 

President Eisenhower signed the supplemental appropriations act on September 8 (P.L. 86-722). 

On September 15, he signed a Joint Resolution granting “the consent and approval of Congress 
for the States of Virginia and Maryland and the District of Columbia to enter into a compact 

related to the regulation of mass transit in the Washington, District of Columbia metropolitan 

area, and for other purposes” (P.L. 86-794). As noted earlier, the Washington Metropolitan Area 

Transit Commission began operations in March 1961. 

Vogel took his oath of office on September 16 in the District Building. 

On November 1, Vogel met with the advisory board to discuss ways to get NCTA off to a 

running start. They agreed on:

• Purchase of 50-foot median strips for use by express buses on I-66 and I-95 in Virginia, 

as well the proposed third route to Baltimore. 

• NCTA would purchase land along the Anacostia Freeway and the George Washington 

Memorial Parkway in Maryland for “pretty fancy” bus stations. 

• Determine how to improve and expand existing bus and commuter railroad service. 

• Identify subway lines that, optimistically, begun operating in 1968. As directed by 

Congress in the National Capital Transportation Agency Act, NCTA would study a 

subway between Union Station and downtown Washington. [Landauer, Jerry, “Transport 

Unit Goes Into Action,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, November 2, 1960; 

“Mass Transit Plan Backed by Agency,” The Evening Star, November 2, 1960] 

At the time, NCTA did not have funds for the first two goals. 

President Eisenhower, with only a few weeks remaining in office, formally nominated Vogel and 

the members of the advisory board to Congress at the start of 1961. With President-elect John F. 

Kennedy awaiting inauguration, Congress chose to await the new President. 

President Kennedy’s Interest

Presidents have traditionally not focused on District matters, but President Kennedy took an 

interest in the city’s affairs. As a member of Congress beginning in 1947, he had lived in 

Georgetown at 3307 N Street, NW.; he and his family departed from there for his inauguration on 

January 20, 1961. The house is located a few blocks from Wisconsin Avenue on the east, 

Georgetown University on the west, and several blocks north of Canal Road, M Street, the 

elevated Whitehurst Freeway, and the Georgetown waterfront.

One of his best-known initiatives was revitalization of Pennsylvania Avenue. By the time of his 

inauguration on January 20, 1961, the avenue connecting the Capitol and the White House had 

become a shabby street lined by pawnshops, souvenir stores, and boarded up buildings. The 

result was the Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation, which strived to restore the 

avenue to a "grand and majestic avenue." 

Less well known is President Kennedy’s role in the transportation life of the District and other 

elements of its daily life. As Professor Schrag explained:

Under previous administrations, and at the start of Kennedy’s term, matters concerning 

the District of Columbia had been passed to whichever White House aide was available. 
Area residents had long wanted one person to handle such questions, and in 1962 

Kennedy agreed, naming Charles Horsky adviser for national capital affairs. [Schrag, 

page 45] 

Horsky, a Montana native, had graduated from Harvard Law School, moved to Washington 

during the New Deal of the 1930s, and then joined the influential law firm, Covington and 

Burling, where Peter Craig became an associate many years later. During the 1950s, Horsky was 

president of the Washington Housing Association, where he lobbied for relocation assistance for 

residents displaced by government projects, including freeways: 

He had been alarmed to learn that the D.C. Highway Department was planning to displace 

thousands of people to build the Inner Loop without provision for relocation, and further 

alarmed by the release of the Mass Transportation Survey in November [1959], though 

his testimony before Congress consisted of a quiet plea for more emphasis on rapid transit 

that was easy to ignore.

President Kennedy attended Horsky’s swearing in ceremony on September 28, 1962, for his 

$20,000 a year post. The President said, “I don’t think we have paid enough attention to the 

District.” The new position was not intended to supplant the District Commissioners, but to 

assist them. The President hoped Horsky would “bring to my constant attention” local problems 

requiring Federal action. As an example, he cited school dropouts and said that in a 

nonindustrial city such as Washington, he wanted to be sure schools provided the necessary 

skills, including vocational skills for dropouts. The District’s three commissioners attended the 

ceremony for Horsky. 

Horsky, who lived at 1227 Pinecrest Circle in Silver Spring, Maryland, replied that with the 

support of the President and the three District commissioners, “we can and will make this a 

Nation’s Capital of which you can be proud and all of us can be proud.” After the ceremony, he 

told reporters that his duties would involve the entire region, not just the District of Columbia.

Horsky’s office was in the Executive Office Building where, as Schrag explained, “his White 

House letterhead brought him more notice.” [Schrag, page 45; “Kennedy Aide Takes Office,” 

The Evening Star, September 28, 1962; Clopton, Willard, “Horsky Sworn in a JFK D.C. 

Adviser,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, September 29, 1962] 

On March 3, President Kennedy nominated C. Darwin Stolzenbach as NCTA administrator and 

Joseph G. Matthews as deputy administrator, a post that President Eisenhower had never filled. 

Stolzenbach, who had lived in the Washington area since 1934, had a degree from George 

Washington University and had served in the Federal Government as an economist and an Asia 

expert. At the time, he was an economist and senior staff member of the Johns Hopkins 

University Operations Research Office in Silver Spring. As Schrag explained, “At a time when 

operations research and systems analysis were being adapted from their military origins to 

civilian problems, Stolzenbach’s economic credentials qualified him to manage a major 

engineering project.” Stolzenbach lived with his wife and three children in a two-story brick 

home at 10515 Meredith Avenue in Kensington, 
He was a controversial choice. As a resident of Montgomery County and president of the 

Montgomery County Planning Association, he had opposed the Northwest Freeway in 1958. A 

year later, Stolzenbach testified before the Joint Committee on behalf of multiple citizens 

associations, saying as Schrag summarized:

[The] region needed more than “a system that merely superimposes mass transit on top of 

an already preconceived regional highway plan,” and, in words that would be later used 

against him, that “highways and mass transit are and will always be competing facilities 

for mass transportation.” In other words, more transit meant fewer freeways. This was 

enough to earn Stolzenbach the lasting enmity of the highway lobby, as well as the 

Montgomery County political establishment.

According to Schrag, Stolzenbach’s Cleveland Park allies recommended him to the Kennedy 

Administration and he was nominated “over the objection of the Democratic Central Committee 

of Montgomery County, but with the endorsement of D.C. Democrats.” [Schrag, pages 45-47] 

The Cleveland Park residents who had lobbied to include a moratorium on the Northwest 

Freeway in the 1960 Act also had tried to give NCTA a veto over local freeway plans. The 

legislation watered the veto down by providing only that NCTA should evaluate transportation 

plans, alternative facilities, and kinds of service, a requirement that Stolzenbach interpreted as 

giving him veto power. 

Matthews was assistant to the vice president of the Association of American Railroads, a post he 

had assumed in 1957. He was born in Sheffield, Alabama, held a law degree from Blackstone 

College of Law in Chicago, and had served in the Army’s Transportation Corps during World 

War II before joining the Southern Railroad System. Matthews was an active leader of the 

Democratic Party in Virginia; he lived in Alexandria at 417 Wake Forest Drive. His position

came with an annual salary of $18,500. 

Administrator Vogel announced his resignation the same day as the nominations. 

The Kennedy Administration also had plans for Peter Craig, as Professor Schrag described:

Peter Craig, one of the loudest voices against expressways in 1958-1960, declined a job 

in the new administration, but he did gain listeners. Turning down the chance to become 

NCTA general counsel, he suggested his Covington and Burling colleague, Ed Seeger, for 

the job and kept in touch with Seeger as he continued the highway fight. Horsky, at the 

White House, was equally easy to get on the phone. For example, when the District of 

Columbia Highway Department officials tried to withhold data from Craig, Craig simply 

contacted Horsky, who scolded the engineer commissioner for denying Craig’s rights “as 

a citizen of the District. [Schrag, page 47]

Seeger was sworn in on May 31, 1961. 

At BPR, President Kennedy appointed Rex M. Whitton to the post of Federal Highway 

Administrator. Whitton was born on a farm in Jackson County, Missouri, worked his way 

through the University of Missouri, graduated in April 1920 with a bachelor of science degree in 
engineering, and began working for the Missouri Highway Department 11 days after graduation. 

His initial salary was $110 a month as a levelman on a 15-mile stretch of road in Johnson 

County, but he rose through the ranks to become Chief Engineer in 1951. He was president of 

AASHO in 1955, a post that occasionally brought him to Washington to testify before Congress 

in support of what became the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. 

In Missouri and as head of BPR, he was dedicated to building the Interstate System by its 

scheduled completion date in the early 1970s, but by the time he took office in 1961, freeway 

revolts were common in the country’s big cities. Whitton initially took the point of view, shared 

by many long-time highway engineers, that the reason for the opposition was that the critics did 

not understand the benefits their cities would receive when the Interstate System was completed. 

He joined with the highway community in public relations initiatives to promote the benefits of 

highways while countering what referred to as the myths and misinformation about the freeways; 

in this role, he probably attended more opening ceremonies of Interstate highways than anyone in 

history, each opening an opportunity to speak glowingly about the Interstate System. [Larson, 

Thomas D., “The Man Who Saved the Interstate System,” Highway History Web site, 

https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/whitton.cfm] 

While in Washington, Whitton and his wife lived in an apartment building at 4201 Cathedral 

Avenue, NW., in the Cathedral Heights neighborhood of alongside Glover-Archbold Park. (The 

building is now called the Towers Condominium.) Despite his freeway advocacy, he and his 

wife used freeways only when he was in a hurry. "We take the back roads," he explained. 

"That's the finest way to travel unless you're in a big hurry to get somewhere." He and his wife 

collected antique glass and, as he told a reporter in 1964, ". . . you don't find antique shops on the 

big new interstate highways."

That same year, President Kennedy also appointed a new chairman to the NCPC. Elizabeth 

Rowe, who had grown up in the District’s Adams-Morgan neighborhood and now lived in 

Cleveland Park, had been on the commission she would now lead. Her views had been formed 

in part by her service on the D.C. Auditorium Commission after her friend, since the 1930s, 

Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson had appointed her in 1954. While on the Auditorium 

Commission, according to Gutheim and Lee, “she noticed the ‘spaghetti’ of bridges and 

approaches planned to span the city and affect many settled areas.” Professor Schrag said, “she 

had been horrified by three-dimensional models of proposed highways in downtown 

Washington.” She joined NCPC with “an idyllic view of the city as a collection of 

neighborhoods, defined by tree-lined streets and handsome buildings.” This vision was in 

contrast with NCPC’s highway-oriented concepts of the Bartholomew era. [Gutheim and Lee, 

page 296; Schrag, page 45] 

Thinking About the Future

On June 11, 1961, NCPC and the National Capital Regional Planning Council released the 

Year 2000 Plan. It was intended to provide a framework for change over the next 40 years. 

The report projected the basics of the region in 2000, and described how to plan for the inevitable 

changes. Population would expand from the present 2 million people to 5 million. Employment 
would increase to 2.2 million jobs, from the current 940,000. Already, 350 square miles had 

been consumed by development, but by 2000, the growth will have expanded to 1,700 square 

miles.

The region was the 10th largest in the country, and a good place to live: 

But, like every metropolis, it has problems – traffic congestion, water pollution, vanishing 

open spaces, crowded schools, rising taxes, obsolescence, blight. 

The main reason is growth. People keep coming to Washington, and the people who are 

already here keep having children. The region’s population will double within a 

generation through natural increase alone. Growth means more people making more 

demands on a limited amount of land, on limited amounts of water and air, on public 

facilities that can only be expanded slowly and at considerable cost, and on public 

revenues that never seem to grow as fast as the need for them . . . . 

Our future depends, in a word, on the design of the region – on the creation of a pattern 

that will produce the next possible environment for ourselves and future generations. 

Good design will reduce traffic congestion, protect water supplies, provide adequate 

space for parks and recreation, create efficient commercial centers and livable residential 

neighborhoods produce a suitable setting for the Nation’s Capital, meet the needs of new 

industry, and reduce the costs of local government . . . . 

The guiding policies for development must look far beyond the near future, which will 

largely be shaped by decisions already made, to a time when needs and conditions are 

different from today. The 40-year period has been chosen because great changes are sure 

to take place, and these changes can be very greatly influenced by public policies.

One thing was clear. “The need for action is urgent.” 

To achieve the goals in a diverse region with overlapping jurisdictions, officials and planners had 

two levers. Jack Eisen described them in the Post as:

The construction or withholding of the transit routes, and the location of outlying Federal 

office centers.

The Year 2000 Plan called for:

• Shift of Federal “employment centers” to city-like communities along the corridors or 

spokes. The centers would have apartments and other features to justify construction of 

transit.

• Local governments would use zoning, acquisition of land, and other ways to restrain 

residential development within the “wedges” between the spokes. 

• Federal offices in the central core – Capitol Hill, the Mall, the Federal Triangle – should 

be completed. Additional Federal office space should be put in clusters of buildings 

around what the plan called MetroCenter, “the heart of the Nation’s Capital City.” New 

buildings housing agencies with “purely operational functions” should avoid the 
“monumental” style of recent additions. Locating these buildings in “clusters” in the 

central business are would create “prestige centers” that would encourage increased 

density to contain the commercial area within current boundaries. 

• Central Washington would decline in importance but still provide offices for 50 percent 

of the area’s government employees. Use “large-scale public and private” urban renewal 

techniques to support redevelopment. 

• Encourage “small urban open spaces” around new government, institutional, commercial 

and apartment buildings. 

• Build public rail transportation parallel to highways in spoke-like patterns. The four lines 

described in the Mass Transportation Survey should be built along with two additional 

routes. 

• Freeways now planned should be built, but no more except for a freeway into southern 

Prince George’s County, Maryland. 

Uncontrolled sprawl was the biggest danger. As development spread outward, transit would not 

be able to serve the less densely populated areas. “Someone has called this the Los Angelization 

of the Washington area,” NCPC Executive Director Finley said. “I don’t think this is intended to 

be a compliment.” 

He said that in presenting the Year 2000 Plan, “Our role is to clarify the issue, and let the 

politicians and the people make the decisions. But the report will make it more difficult for the 

politician not to face the future and make the decisions.” 

He anticipated that as planners and area officials studied the plan, they would see it as a basis, 

first, for discussion, but eventually for “a concert of policies” that they could adopt. 

Gutheim and Lee explained the wedges and corridors concept: 

Drawn along the proposed rapid transit routes and a parallel highway system, the radial 

corridor policy plan expressed the concept [that] the central city should be the primary 

focus or hub of the metropolitan region. The corridors were to be created by linking 

major development centers; each corridor or spoke would be separated by wedges of open 

countryside. In design this would produce something similar to the idealized nineteenthcentury radial transit city, a snowflake pattern where open space was readily accessible to 

the urban and suburban population . . . . 

Diagrams of the radial corridor plan showed more specifically how the radials would 

embrace clusters of public buildings and services, private office buildings, shopping 

centers, various housing and apartment types, industrial complexes, schools, and 

community centers, all of them linked by the kind of urban “greenways” popularized in 

Philadelphia’s redevelopment planning. 

Wedges of open space on undeveloped Federal tracts, such as the Agricultural Research Center 

in Beltsville, Maryland, should be preserved through acquisition or other means. 
The Year 2000 Plan abandoned the idea of shifting government offices to the east of the Capitol, 

a concept that had been included in the Mass Transportation Survey and other planning 

documents. The plan recommended, instead, construction of apartment buildings for about 10 

blocks between the Capitol and Lincoln Park. 

[“Year 2000 Plan Sets Area’s Growth Aims,” The Sunday Star, June 11, 1961; Gutheim and 

Lee, page 289; Eisen, Jack, “Sprawl Growth Perils District of 2000 A.D.,” The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, June 11, 1961; “Planning Ahead For 2000 A.D.,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, June 22, 1961; italics in original] 

Not everyone liked the Year 2000 Plan. At the second annual Community Appearance 

Conference of the Metropolitan Washington Board of Trade, speaker Victor Gruen, an influential 

architect best known for systemizing the shopping center to the possibilities of the Interstate era, 

was asked about the plan. He called it “a little plan, full of inherent contradiction, and 

schizophrenic.” The “radial corridors” were “nothing but a schematic drawing of the growth 

pattern which our metropolitan areas have followed in the past.” The 40-year plan was “killing, 

from the outset, any chance of reshaping the metro center into a truly compact organism.” 

Gruen questioned some of the plan’s assertions about transportation, as the Star summarized:

He said the National Capital Planning Commission’s plan “professes” that only public 

transportation can fully serve the central area, but added that it “proposes new 

superhighways from the corridor towns, thus putting the two modes of transportation into 

direct competition.

Quoting the plan as saying most automobile users will be converted to a transit system 

“only after congestion on the highways reaches intolerable levels,” Mr. Gruen 

commented:

It seems to follow that if the highways would not be built at all, then the rapid 

transit system would have a chance to exist economically before intolerable levels 

of traffic on the highways are reached.

General Clarke, also on the program, was asked to comment on Gruen’s views. “I did not hear 

all that Mr. Gruen said, but I am afraid that he and I do not see eye to eye on this. I am prepared 

to support the concepts outlined in the Year 2000 Plan.” 

General Clarke, in his presentation, defended the city’s highway plans in the context of 

improving the city’s appearance:

In my opinion, traffic is more unsightly in congested streets of a neighborhood than it is 

on expressways screened from the eye and ear. [“40-Year Plan Denounced as 

Schizophrenic,” The Evening Star, January 5, 1962] 
Defining the District’s Freeway Network

An extensive freeway network had evolved from Bartholomew’s earliest projections. In a letter 

dated June 30, 1960, to Aitken, from BPR Commissioner Armstrong confirmed the descriptions 

and numbers of the designated Interstate System routes in the District for purposes of compiling 

the next ICE. The District’s routes were:

66 – From the D.C.-Virginia line at the west end of the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge to a 

 junction with FAI Route 95 in Washington. 

70S – From the D.C.-Maryland line en route from Frederick, Maryland to the inner belt 

 in Washington. 

95 – From the D.C.-Virginia line at the south end of the 14th Street Bridge to the 

 D.C.-Maryland line en route to Baltimore.

266 – Extending from a junction with Interstate Route 66 in the District of Columbia 

 to the D.C.-Virginia line en route to a junction with Route 66 in Arlington County, 

 Virginia.

295 – From the D.C.-Maryland line at the vicinity of Oxon Run to a junction with FAI 

 Route 95 in Washington. 

495 – On the Woodrow Wilson Bridge from the D.C.-Virginia line to the D.C.-Maryland

 Line. 

695 – Portion of south leg of inner belt from FAI Route 95 to FAI Route 295. 

The letter added a paragraph about I-266: 

There is hereby designated Interstate Route 266 extending from a junction with Interstate 

Route 66 in the District of Columbia to the D.C.-Virginia line en route to a junction with 

Route 66 in Arlington County, Virginia. The general location is shown on the map dated 

May 25, 1960, prepared by the District of Columbia, except that for purposes of 

preparation of the estimate of cost to complete the Interstate System in accordance with 

Section 104(b)5 of Title 23, U.S.C., the location to be estimated shall be via Key Bridge. 

Later that year, on October 21, Federal Highway Administrator Tallamy wrote to Aitken 

approving the city’s request to modify the I-295 description to read: 

We approve, effective this date, the removal of the Anacostia Freeway between the 

Anacostia Bridge (11th Street) and the District of Columbia-Maryland line, as the location 

of Interstate Route 295. This approval will permit transfer of Interstate funds previously 

authorized for projects on the Anacostia Freeway, as requested in your letter of 

September 16 to Division Engineer Hanson. 

On June 20, 1961, Administrator Whitton approved a modified description of I-695. His letter to 

Aitken provided that: 
695. South leg of Inner Belt from FAI Route 66 at the east end of the Theodore 

Roosevelt Bridge to FAI Route 295 in the vicinity of 11th Street, S.E., excluding the 

coincident section of FAI Route 95. 

These were general descriptions, rather than precise definitions. For example, the description of 

I-70S could apply to a link along the Potomac River, along the Wisconsin Avenue corridor, or 

east of Rock Creek Park in the North Central corridor.

Transition at NCTA 

Shortly after being nominated as NCTA Administrator, Stozenbach talked with reporters. He 

considered the Mass Transportation Survey to be the framework for NCTA’s studies, but did not 

consider it “to be a fully detailed blueprint.” In particular, he questioned the survey’s balance 

between freeways and rapid rail transit. NCTA, he said, should be “the voice of those who favor 

mass transit as a means of funneling off” the heavy traffic on the roads. 

He emphasized that he is not against highways. He worried, however, that too many highways 

would create a series of “Chinese walls” dividing the city. Moreover, an over-emphasis on 

freeways would turn the Washington area into a vision of Los Angeles, which has many freeways 

but “still the cars move bumper to bumper.” As a result, freeways would be part of the 

transportation system, but the system would not rely on them. “A highway system,” he said, is 

like a bottomless pit.” The Star summarized his view:

The more highways built, the more traffic they generate; the more traffic, the greater the 

need for parking facilities, be believes. And as a consequence of highway construction, 

the city “gets more and more chopped up,” he said. 

At any rate, Mr. Stolzenbach stressed, the various alternatives will be examined in 

developing a balanced transportation system and these factors will constantly be placed 

before all the planning agencies and governing bodies in the Washington region. 

In developing that balance, he said, “I would like to try some experiments,” as the Star described:

Convince the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad to try running more commuter trains in the 

Maryland area and have O. Roy Chalk put D.C. Transit buses at the stations to wait for 

incoming trains and take commuters to designated Government building centers. 

“I don’t know if it would work or not, but I think some things should be given a try at 

least,” he said. [Gimble, Gilbert, “’Chinese Walls’ Feared In Highway Building,” The 

Sunday Star, March 5, 1961] 

These remarks prompted the District’s Aitken to tell reporters that solving congestion would 

“vary from city to city,” but in every case, freeways must play an important role. While 

“highways cannot do the total job,” modern freeways carrying buses and automobiles “can go a 

long way toward meeting mass transportation needs.” He stressed that already, freeways had 

helped eliminate unsightly slums and blighted areas in the southwest quadrant and other parts of 
the District. That was because highway engineers design freeways to be “functional and still 

attractive.”

In response to a question on WWDC radio’s Report to the People program, he said he lamented 

the “unfortunate” use of “catch phrases” such as “Chinese Walls.” Such phrases could harm the 

vital Interstate freeway program that should “not be tilted or warped by catch phrases.” 

Unlike Stolzenbach, Aitken was not concerned that the Washington area would turn into another 

Los Angeles. The two cities were different, with centralized employment in Washington while 

most employment in the Los Angeles area was decentralized.

Aitken had never met Stolzenbach, but looked forward to getting together with him soon to 

discuss “broad policies” for mass transit planning. [“Aitken Stresses Role Of Freeways For 

Area,” The Sunday Star, March 12, 1961; “Aitken Hits Attacks on Freeways,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, March 12, 1961] 

The Kennedy Administration would not file the NCTA nominations with Congress until April 

27, but the Senate District Committee held a hearing and approved both on March 24. The goal 

in the speedy approval was to get NCTA, with its new leadership, moving as fast as possible. 

Chairman Bible told Stolzenbach that his job would be difficult, as the Post summarized:

The agency is charged with planning, winning approval of and finding means to finance a 

suitable mass transportation system for the Washington area. 

Bible also agreed that the major part of the problem will be finding the money to build the 

transportation system for the expanding metropolitan area.

Bible, who helped draft the legislation establishing the Agency, said he expected it to 

“move ahead with top speed” despite the admitted complexities of the job. 

Senator Beall illustrated one of the complexities:

Beall told Stolzenbach that he had some misgiving about maintaining a 5-year “freeze” 

on parkway construction in Northwest Washington because of the undesirable – 

particularly uncertainty – it is causing in the future of the Glover-Archbold Parkway and 

related highway construction. 

Beall said he was interested in taking a “new look” at the Northwest highway freeze and 

would ask the District Committee staff to determine whether new legislation is needed to 

“end or change it.” 

Stolzenbach replied that he did not consider the ban to be permanent and “it is far from being a 

ban on all highway construction.” NCTA would review the moratorium as part of its 

coordination with other highway and planning organizations to find the best solution to the area’s 

transportation problems. 
Having approved the two nominees, the committee would have to wait until receiving their 

formal nominations to take them before the Senate for confirmation. [Lindsay, John J., “2 Chiefs 

of Area Transit Agency Win Senate District Unit Backing,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, March 25, 1961] 

Even before the paperwork arrived in the Senate, Matthews asked that his name be withdrawn. 

Jack Eisen reported in the Post that Stolzenbach and Matthews had been under consideration for 

the top spot in NCTA “until a few hours before the President made his announcement on 

March 3”:

Stolzenbach, a Marylander, won his main support from District Democrats. Matthews, a 

Virginian, had broader political support, including backing from both Virginia and 

Maryland political figures.

According to the Star: 

Mr. Matthews . . . was understood to have agreed to take the second spot in the agency if 

he could veto any major decisions made by Mr. Stolzenbach. Mr. Stolzenbach reportedly 

accepted the arrangement.

The plan apparently fell through, however, when Mr. Stolzenbach sought to name an 

individual employed at the Johns Hopkins University Research Office in Bethesda as his 

special assistant. Mr. Stolzenbach had been a senior staff member at the research wing of 

the university prior to his nomination by President Kennedy. 

Eisen reported that the White House was “acutely embarrassed over the incident.” Further, 

Matthews’ resignation “revived efforts by some of Stolzenbach’s foes in Montgomery County to 

head off the nomination.” Stolzenbach was unperturbed, telling Eisen that the plan was to move 

as fast as possible to complete the tasks that Congress set before NCTA, without seeking 

deadline extensions. As Eisen added, time was “beginning to run out” on deadlines such as the 

requirement that NCTA submit “recommendations for organization and financial arrangement” 

to the President by November 1, 1962. “Already seven of those 28 months have slipped past.” 

Any delaying in forwarding the recommendation “could mean that hopes for getting the area’s 

first subway line running by 1968 also may be set back.” [McKelway, John, “Transit Agency 

Aid Quits in Row Before He’s Officially Nominated,” The Evening Star, March 29, 1961; Eisen, 

Jack, “Matthews Quits Rapid Transit Job,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, March 30, 

1961; Eisen, Jack, “Problems of New Transit Agency May Mean Delay in Subway Plan,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, March 31, 1961] 

The White House finally forwarded Stolzenbach’s nomination to the Senate on April 27. The 

Senate confirmed his appointment on May 4 without discussion or debate. [National Capital 

Transportation Agency, Congressional Record-Senate, May 4, 1961, page 7302] 

On May 12, 1961, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas administered the oath of office for 

Administrator Stolzenbach at NCTA’s headquarters at 926 Jackson Place, NW. 
At a press conference after the swearing in, Stolzenbach said he planned to visit other cities that 

had or were planning rapid transit systems. He would visit San Francisco in the following week 

and then travel to Philadelphia and Toronto. He also would meet with area officials, including 

the governors of Maryland and Virginia. 

He said that NCTA was not simply a mass transit agency. “We have to create a practical plan for 

a metro form of organization so that all the beneficiaries . . . can participate both in its 

management and paying for it.” 

He also planned to visit Seattle in 1962 to see the monorail that was being erected from 

downtown to the entrance to the 1962 World’s Fair. Stolzenbach said that whenever he talked to 

people who were not in the transit field, they ask about monorail. Thus far, it had seen used 

mainly as an amusement ride, as in Disneyland. He wanted to know all about it. NCTA 

“certainly” had not ruled out monorail as an option for the Washington area. “I think we ought to 

become the world’s expert on monorail as fast as possible. 

In the immediate future, NCTA would initially seek authority to acquire median strips in 

freeways for transit, with I-66 in Virginia and I-95 between Baltimore and Washington being 

prime candidates because officials had not yet agreed on their routing. 

Stolzenbach predicted that construction of a downtown subway could get underway as early as 

1964, with operation beginning in 1968 or 1969. He acknowledged that there was “still some 

question” whether a subway is needed, but he planned to give special attention to the subject. 

The goal was a “balanced system,” with the difficult question being how to decide where balance 

existed. [Gimble, Gilbert, “Transit Unit Seeks New Right-of-Ways,” The Evening Star, May 12, 

1961; “Transit Chief Sworn, Plans Monorail Study,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

May 13, 1961] 

On June 16, the White House announced that Warren D. Quenstedt was the President’s choice to 

be Deputy Administrator of NCTA. The 50-year old Quenstedt was an attorney with the firm of 

Smith, Hennessey and McDonald. Since 1946, he also had been an independent insurance broker 

and agent. The Virginia native lived with his wife and two children at 1319 Park Terrace Drive 

in Alexandria.

Quenstedt was a transit booster. The Post quoted him as saying, “Even if the Potomac River 

were roofed over with bridges,” highways could not do the whole job. 

Stolzenbach was “most pleased” with the nomination. “I know him and I like him.” [“Quenstedt 

Is Chosen As Transport Deputy,” The Evening Star, June 16, 1961; “Quenstedt Gets Post in 

Transport,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, June 17, 1961] 

Following a routine June 27 confirmation hearing, the Senate District Committee sent the 

nomination to the Senate floor on July 10. He was confirmed in a brief colloquy the following 

day by unanimous consent of the few people on the Senate floor at the time. [National Capital 

Transportation Agency, Congressional Record-Senate, July 10, 1961, page 12256] 
(Quenstedt had been the Democratic challenger to Representative Broyhill in the 1956 election. 

The race turned on many issues, including civil rights and schools. However, Quenstedt also 

charged Representative Broyhill with being ineffective in Congress, as the Star reported: 

In a separate television appearance over Station WMAL last night, Mr. Quenstedt 

continued his attack on the legislative record of his opponent. 

Mr. Quenstedt recalled that “more Potomac River Bridges” were part of Representative 

Broyhill’s campaign platform four years ago. 

“Well, what do we have?” asked Mr. Quenstedt. “We have the same number of bridges 

as we had in 1952, but we have more people using them . . . . How long does it take to 

plan a bridge? How long does it take to build one?” 

He was particularly critical of Representative Broyhill’s role in the central area – or 

Roosevelt Island – bridge. “Here Joe Broyhill’s record is one of inconsistency and 

confusion,” said Mr. Quenstedt. “Repeated attempts to get action here have failed mainly 

because Joe Broyhill first opposed a tunnel in favor of a bridge and after it looked like 

this would become a reality, he suddenly threw the whole matter into a turmoil by 

advocating construction of a tunnel. How long must people of the 10th district put up 

with this failure to produce? We have no new bridges and we have no tunnels despite Joe 

Broyhill’s four long years in Congress.” [“Broyhill Cites Democrats to Defend Record,” 

The Evening Star, October 13, 1956] 

(In November, Representative Broyhill defeated Quenstedt – 53,148 to 40,553.) 

The Cost of Right-of-way 

By the early 1960s, the District’s extensive freeway network was facing problems, including 

what to do with people displaced by the planned highways. The 1950s urban renewal plan had 

nearly wiped out southwest’s African-American and low-income neighborhoods, leaving room 

for Zeckendorf’s vision of the area. Because virtually the entire area had been leveled for urban 

renewal, the Southwest Freeway was an exception to the revolt against freeways that was 

underway around the country. No one was left to object to the destruction of their homes or 

businesses.

By contrast, other Interstates in the Washington area and around the country were proposed to be 

built in the midst of neighborhoods and business development that had not been cleared. The 

desire to protect homes and businesses was at the heart of the freeway revolt.

From the earliest years of the Federal-aid highway program, States had been responsible for 

providing right-of-way. The Federal Highway Act of 1921 explicitly exempted the “rights-ofway” from Federal-aid highway fund reimbursement. Because Federal-aid funds could not be 

used in cities, State highway agencies often relied on adjacent property owners to donate the land 

in exchange for access to the new or improved road. 
During World War II, Congress began to modify the Federal role in highway right-of-way 

acquisition. The Defense Highway Act of 1941, enacted just before the attack on Pearl Harbor, 

authorized Federal reimbursement up to 100 percent for acquisition of right-of-way for defense 

access roads and up to three-fourths of the cost for acquisition on projects on the strategic 

highway network. Where States could not provide the right-of-way due to restrictions in their 

constitution, PRA was authorized to acquire the land. For regular Federal-aid highway projects, 

Federal law in 1943 and again in 1944 modified the definition of “construction” to include the 

cost of right-of-way, with the restriction to one-third of the cost. Provisions were not made to 

help home owners or businesses relocate. [America’s Highways, 1776-1976, page 357] 

When construction of the Interstate System began, old ways of right-of-way acquisition no longer 

worked. Full control of access meant that adjacent property owners were no longer willing to 

donate property. Under the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, BPR would pay 90 percent of the 

cost of right-of-way acquisition, but not the cost of relocation or help to displaces to find new 

homes or locations of businesses. 

On February 28, 1961, just 5 weeks after taking office, President Kennedy sent a Message to 

Congress on the Federal Highway Program. It began, "Our Federal pay-as-you-go highway 

program is in peril" and focused on funding options for putting the program back on a sound 

financial footing. Completing the Interstate System "at least as fast as originally scheduled is 

essential to our economy." He opposed "stretching out or cutting back" the program, two options 

that critics had suggested. Instead, he recommended making a temporary 1-cent increase in the 

3-cent gas tax permanent. 

The President’s message also addressed urban development issues. He directed Secretary of 

Commerce Luther H. Hodges, whose department included BPR, and Housing and Home Finance 

Administrator Robert C. Weaver "to increase their joint planning at every level, to improve 

coordination of urban renewal and freeway construction plans in the same area, and to invite the 

cooperative efforts of State and local highway and housing officials and private experts." 

Moreover, Federal urban renewal law, enacted in 1949, required that every contract for Federal 

assistance include provisions assuring the availability of decent, safe, and sanitary housing at 

reasonable prices in suitable locations for all families displaced by urban renewal projects. This 

law did not apply to the Federal-aid highway program. President Kennedy recommended 

legislation to help families displaced by highway construction find "reasonable housing at 

reasonable costs, a problem that he said "has been largely overlooked." 

Secretary Hodges and Administrator Weaver submitted their recommendations to the President 

on March 28, 1962. “Transportation,” they said in the transmittal letter, “is one of the key factors 

in shaping our cities.” Their report covered many topics, including the need for Federal aid for 

mass transit. The report included several recommendations for urban highway programs, the 

most important of which involved planning: 

Beginning not later than July 1, 1965, approval of Federal-aid highway programs for 

projects in any metropolitan area should be made contingent upon a finding by the 

Secretary of Commerce that such projects are consistent with adequate, comprehensive 
development plans for the metropolitan area or are based on results of a continuing 

process carried on cooperatively by the States and local communities and that the Federalaid system so developed will be an integral part of a soundly based, balanced 

transportation system for the area involved. 

Secretary Hodges and Administrator Weaver also recommended relocation assistance for those 

displaced by highway or mass transit projects. They wrote that according to BPR, 15,000 

families and 1,500 businesses will be displaced each year in the next 6 to 8 years by Interstate 

construction: 

Under the federally assisted urban renewal program, families must be assured the 

availability of decent, safe, and sanitary housing when they are displaced by demolition, 

code enforcement, and other urban renewal activities. Also the moving expenses of 

families and businesses are paid from Federal urban renewal program funds. For families 

needing such assistance, the average payment is about $65. The average payment to 

businesses is about $1,150. 

In order to alleviate hardship caused by public action and to provide equity in treatment, 

provisions similar to those for urban renewal should be made in the Federal-aid highway 

program and also in other federally assisted programs causing displacements.

Hodges and Weaver also recommended additional funds for research and demonstration projects 

in urban transportation and especially mass transportation. “It is essential to stimulate and 

support experimentation with new equipment and systems to test their practicality and 

demonstrate their effectiveness in improving and reducing the total cost of urban transportation.” 

 [“Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1962,” Congressional Record-Senate, September 13, 1962, 

p. 19339-19343] 

On April 5, 1962, President Kennedy submitted a message to Congress on "The Transportation 

System of our Nation." The message began:

An efficient and dynamic transportation system is vital to our domestic economic growth, 

productivity, and progress. 

The message was a broad statement that covered a wide range of topics, including freight 

shipments by land, air and water; international aviation and maritime issues; and labor relations 

for transportation workers. Among many recommendations, however, the President reiterated his 

concern about "the problems of families displaced by new highway construction." He cited 

Secretary Hodges' estimate that 15,000 families and 1,500 businesses were being displaced by 

Interstate construction each year.

In the interest of equity, President Kennedy recommended that "assistance and requirements 

similar to those now applicable to the urban renewal program be authorized for the Federal-aid 

highway program and the urban mass transportation program." The White House would submit 

legislation "to authorize payments not to exceed $200 in the case of individuals and families and 

$3,000 . . . in the case of business concerns or nonprofit organizations displaced as a result of 
land acquisitions under these programs." (The payment for businesses could be higher based on 

moving costs.) 

The President’s message continued the pressure to find decent, safe, and sanitary homes for those 

displaced by highways. A June 1962 Post editorial illustrated the problem affecting the District’s 

planned expressways:

After having waved off warnings for years the District Building, to its great surprise, is 

faced with a crisis. It cannot build further expressways until it is able to relocate the 

families displaced. And it has no very clear idea how to accomplish that feat. 

The District had another problem: 

Several new officials with a dislike in principle for highways took office just as the 

threatened neighborhoods were beginning to seek political spokesmen. Two of the three 

[District] Commissioners now decline to defend even their own highway budget requests, 

as though relocation were a hopeless task. 

Horsky, not yet in his White House post, did not see the issue as impossible of solution. The 

editorial quoted a statement he had made a few days earlier:

I do not believe, that the relocation and housing problems to which government has 

suddenly waked up are insoluble—I do not believe we need abandon any of our 

fundamental plans—for the Inner Loop or anything else. The relocation and housing 

problems are ever so much more difficult than they should have been, but they can be met 

and solved. We can relocate and rehouse people displaced by government action, 

including highway building, if we are willing to recognize what has to be done, and then 

get together to do it.

The editorial concluded that, “there is no reason either to postpone highway planning or to delay 

a comprehensive housing program.” [“No Excuse for Delay,” The Washington Post, June 15, 

1962] 

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-866), which President Kennedy signed on 

October 23, included two important provisions his message had requested. Section 5 addressed 

the growing concern, cited by the President and many critical articles, about relocated individuals 

and businesses. Before approving a project, the Secretary would have to receive assurances that 

the State highway agency would provide advisory assistance for displaced families. He also was 

required to approve Federal-aid participation in relocation payments by the State to displaced 

individuals, families, business concerns, farms, and nonprofit organizations. The new law 

adopted the $200 limit for individuals and families and $3,000 for business or nonprofits that the 

President had proposed. 

Even more important was Section 9, “Transportation Planning in Certain Urban Areas.” It 

addressed the President’s call for a means of ensuring that Federal-aid highway and mass 

transportation projects were part of a comprehensive and balanced urban transportation plan. 

The provision added Section 134 to Title 23, United States Code: 
It is declared to be in the national interest to encourage and promote the development of 

transportation systems, embracing various modes of transport in a manner that will serve 

the States and local communities efficiently and effectively. To accomplish this objective 

the Secretary shall cooperate with the States, as authorized in this title, in the 

development of long-range highway plans and programs which are properly coordinated 

with plans for improvements in other affected forms of transportation and which are 

formulated with due consideration to their probable effect on the future development of 

urban areas of more than fifty thousand population. After July 1, 1965, the Secretary 

shall not approve under section 105 of this title any program for projects in any urban 

area of more than fifty thousand population unless he finds that such projects are based on 

a continuing comprehensive transportation planning process carried on cooperatively by 

States and local communities in conformance with the objectives stated in this section.

This section launched modern transportation planning by calling for what became known as the 

“3C” process (for continuing, comprehensive, and cooperative). The 3C process remains the 

core of Section 134, which now contains nearly 20 subsections. 

This emphasis on metropolitan planning was one outgrowth of changes in attitudes toward the 

Interstate System. Once the impact on cities became real in the 1950s, city officials and others 

began calling for a moratorium to rethink the idea of urban expressway or consider canceling the 

controversial segments. The 3C planning process was seen as a way of rethinking the urban 

transportation network. 

The problem local official faced was that aside from the 3C process, they would lose the 

Interstate funds if they did not use them to build unwanted Interstate segments. The funds would 

simply be shifted to other areas, including rural areas, where Interstate highways could be built. 

Congress returned to the subject of relocations in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 (P.L. 86-

657). The legislation included the first mandatory payment program for those who must relocate 

because of a Federal-aid highway project. The goal was to provide every citizen with decent, 

safe, and sanitary housing and to reduce the inequities of a strict application of the fair market 

value concept to right-of-way acquisitions. The 1968 changes were at the heart of the landmark 

Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-646, 

Uniform Act), which covered all Federal agencies involved in right-of-way acquisition. 

Awaiting NCTA’s Report

The District, BPR, and Members of Congress proceeded with confidence that the freeway plans 

could be modified to mollify critics and then would be built. They thought the critics, as the Post

editorial suggested, were misguided and misinformed. 

This view was reflected in comments by Senator Jennings Randolph (D-WV), chairman of the 

Committee on Public Works, and a longtime road supporter dating to his days in the House of 

Representatives, during consideration of the proposed Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1962. 

(As discussed earlier, while in the House of Representatives in the 1940s, Randolph had played a 

key role in the debate over replacement of the Highway Bridge.) The proposed legislation would 
provide a permanent program under the Housing and Home Finance Administration for aid to 

mass transit. He was responding to a NCTA request to delay action on the East Leg of the Inner 

Loop, the Northeast Freeway, a massive interchange “C” linking the Inner Loop with the 

Southeast Freeway via the East Leg, and the Three Sisters Bridge until NCTA completed studies

due on November 1, 1962. 

Senator Randolph said he was “much concerned about the consequences and disputes growing 

out of the quest for a utopian ‘balanced’ transportation system in urban areas.” Instead of 

“striving for so-called balance,” planners should be focusing on “an all-modes and all-facilities 

system based on progress, adequacy, and ability to meet needs.” He stressed that when he said 

“adequacy to meet needs,” he did not mean only rail and bus transit. The term also embraced 

accommodating the automobiles and commercial trucks that “will continue to virtually clog the 

highways of urban areas, no matter what is done in the field of mass transit by bus or rail.” 

He strongly opposed halting planned freeways “while there is a search for a transportation system 

with a magical term,” namely balance. Instead of searching “for a will-o’-the-wisp ‘balanced 

transportation system embracing all appropriate modes of transport,’” they should be searching 

for “something practical.”

He had to agree with a Post article that morning that described the Nation’s Capital as a place 

“where highway and transit partisans have been locked in a bitter dispute that has brought the 

city’s freeway program to a near standstill.” More so than any other urban area, the District was 

plagued by “the vexing problem growing out of exercises in semantics and of highway stagnation 

as a consequence of the efforts of mass transit advocates of delay.”

That very day, in fact, he had discussed the subject in a letter to Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WV), 

chairman of the Subcommittee on District of Columbia, Committee on Appropriations. 

Referring to NCTA’s request for delay of the four projects, Senator Randolph said those trying to 

delay the District’s freeway program “apparently are obscuring a number of facts which should 

be brought into focus”: 

The program was based on the balanced transportation system called for by the Mass 

Transit Survey Report, 1959, and approved by the National Capital Regional Planning 

Council. The proposed freeway network for the District of Columbia has been designed 

as part of a transportation system that is expected to include rapid transit by rail and 

nonrail. Actually, if there should not be brought into being a rapid transit program, the 

proposed freeway planning will of necessity have to be much enlarged. 

Those who sought delays in highway development on the premise that “there is a question of 

highway versus nonhighway facilities” were subject to “an unfortunate mistake” because their 

view now threatened freeway construction and could threaten the rapid transit program. In 

establishing NCTA and directing it to study transit needs, Congress was calling for “the second 

part of the overall transport plan” because the highway phase had already begun. 

Another misunderstanding was that transit could substitute for highways. Rail transit was being 

planned to accommodate commuters, but that was only one aspect of modern transportation. 
Chairman Randolph said “an ever-growing volume of motor vehicle traffic of all types” must be 

served, and unless it was, the Washington area “will be faced with a staggering problem of traffic 

congestion.” Delaying the highway program until Congress decided on a subway system would 

mean that “no provisions will have been made for ever-mounting motor vehicle traffic that is not 

and never will be susceptible to subway travel.” 

He urged Senator Byrd to ensure that the District’s highway program is “kept on schedule” in 

legislation appropriating the District’s matching share for Interstate and other Federal-aid 

highway projects: 

Delays doubtless will lead to ultimate added costs rather than savings. Another probable 

byproduct of delays doubtless will be further deterioration of the downtown section and a 

resultant loss in revenues. And there should be avoidance of the possible loss of 

Interstate Highway System funds. [“Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1962,” 

Congressional Record-Senate, September 13, 1962, p. 19380-19381] 

(Congress adjourned without approving the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1962. It was 

revived in the next Congress and, with some modifications, approved by President Lyndon B. 

Johnson on July 9, 1964. The landmark Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-365) 

provided the foundation for all subsequent Federal-aid for transit.] 

Congress did not take Senator Randolph’s advice. The House had deleted FY 1963 funds in 

compliance with a last-minute split among the District commissioners, two of whom had asked 

for delay until the housing issue could be resolved. The Senate, according to Senator Byrd, went 

along with the House because the commissioners had not asked his subcommittee to restore the 

funds. The subcommittee retained $300,000 for the Three Sisters Bridge, contingent on NCTA’s 

support for the bridge. 

Battle over the Inner Loop Freeway

The National Capital Transportation Act of 1960 had called on NCTA to continue the work 

begun by NCPC and the National Capital Regional Planning Council in the Mass Transportation 

Survey: 

 . . . and shall include further studies as may be necessitated by changed conditions, the 

availability of new techniques, and the response of Government agencies and the public 

to the transportation plan adopted by the Commission and Council. The Agency’s studies 

shall also include evaluation of the transportation system recommended in the 

transportation plan, and of alternative facilities and kinds of services. 

In addition, NCTA was to complete a report to the President by November 1, 1962, containing 

“recommendations for organization and financial arrangements for transportation in the National 

Capital region”: 

Provided, That any recommendations submitted by the Agency shall provide as far as 

possible for the payment of all costs by persons using or benefiting from regional 
transportation facilities and services, and shall provide for the equitable sharing of any 

remaining costs among the Federal, State, and local governments. 

In early 1960s, opposition to the Inner Loop began to grow as the District prepared to move 

forward. And Inner Loop had been part of the city’s thoroughfare/freeway plans since the mid1940s – a way of keeping through traffic out of downtown. The 1959 Mass Transportation 

Survey confirmed the concept by not only endorsing the Inner Loop but expanding it into a 

double loop as shown in BPR’s September 1955 Yellow Book. 

By then, however, cities around the country were experiencing protests against urban Interstates 

as well as the demand for mass transit as a substitute. In Washington, opponents could look to 

the pending NCTA report as grounds for delaying action on the freeways. 

On October 5, 1961, NCPC took the surprise action of voting 4 to 2 to defer approval of four 

projects connected with the Inner Loop until NCPC’s next meeting: 

• East Leg running north-south between 10th and 11th Streets, SE.;

• Interchange “C” connecting the Southeast Freeway, the East Leg, and the 11th Street 

Bridge; 

• Center Leg, a north-south route under the National Mall just west of the Capitol; and 

• South Leg of the Inner Loop between the Lincoln Memorial and the Southwest Freeway.

Commissioner Alexander C. Robinson III, an architect who lived in Cleveland, Ohio, and had 

joined NCPC in fall of 1959, had proposed the delay: 

I’ve watched the damage done in other cities and I’m wondering whether there aren’t 

better ways. I believe we are justified in taking another look at this, in the light of what is 

happening elsewhere, and finding out whether we really need all the Inner Loop projects 

that have been proposed, and whether we may not be spoiling the City of Washington. 

NCPC staff had recommended approval of the four projects, but the majority of NCPC members 

decided to withhold action. 

Lt. Colonel H. O. Webb, the District’s Assistant Engineer Commissioner, voted against 

Robinson’s motion. “If these projects are recommended to be cut out, this just further delays the 

planning of the work.” He was confident NCPC would approve the projects for inclusion in the 

District’s budget. By the time of NCPC’s next meeting, he added, the four links would have 

been considered during a planned public hearing on the District’s 1963 budget proposal to 

Congress (Colonel Carl H. Bronn of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was the other “no” vote.) 

While deferring action on the Inner Loop, NCPC approved including $3 million in the District’s 

1963 budget request for the start of construction of the Three Sisters Bridges. [Lewis, Roger J., 

“Damage by Inner Loop Feared by Planners,” The Evening Star, October 6, 1961] 

Shortly after NCPC’s decision to delay action, other groups expressed their views on highway 

projects versus other needs in the city. The Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) and others 

attending the budget public hearing on October 10 urged the District to shift money from the 
Highway Department’s “hog-wild” construction program to school construction. District funds 

for highways came from its highway fund, but these commenters observed that the city used 

general revenue to supplement the highway fund to pay for items such as street lighting and 

traffic police. They wanted the city to use the general funds for schools and for the highway fund 

to repay the city for general revenues used for highway purposes. 

The PTA’s Dr. Ellis Haworth told the District commissioners that if the Highway Department 

were allowed to continue with its plans, they would “leave the District with no land privately 

owned.” He said, “The whole question reduces to a matter of relative values: People versus 

highways.” Mrs. Rolland G. Lemensdorf, legislative chairman of the Ben Murch Home and 

School Association, added that, “the fight for our civilization will not take place in new cars on 

new highways; it will take place in the minds of men.”

Arnold Sternberg of the District Democratic Central Committee suggested that some sewer 

projects the city was financing with general revenue should be charged to the highway funds. He 

cited the sewer work that would be included in the four Inner Loop freeway projects included in 

the budget. 

The Star’s coverage of the hearing added: 

At the end of the day-long hearing, a weary Engineer Commissioner Frederick J. Clarke, 

who has jurisdiction over the Highway Department, rose and remarked wryly: “Well, 

back to the drawing board.” 

Speaking seriously, Gen. Clarke said he believes that the highway program recommended 

is “properly balanced.” [“Roads Funds Transfer Sought for D.C. Schools,” The Evening 

Star, October 11, 1961; “Divert Funds For Schools, District Urged,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, October 11, 1961] 

The Fine Arts Commission issued a statement saying the Inner Loop system would cause 

“irreparable damage to the city’s appearance.” The commission appreciated NCPC’s decision to 

defer action. Chairman Finley said:

The Commission of Fine Arts has never approved the Inner Loop . . . which we feel will 

be destructive to the beauty of the city. The commission has advocated instead, an 

underground rapid transit system which, if adopted, we feel would meet our traffic needs 

without irreparable damage to the city’s appearance. [Lewis, Robert J., “Fine Arts Unit 

Hits Plan for Inner Loop,” The Evening Star, October 18, 1961] 

The American Institute of Architects also urged the city to adopt rapid-transit instead of the Inner 

Loop. “If we adopt the rapid-transit solution as a first resort—instead of as a last resort—we may 

never have to go ahead with any part of the Inner Loop system that is not now under 

construction.” [“AIA Asks Rapid Transit Priority, Opposes Loop,” The Evening Star, 

October 21, 1961] 

The Committee of 100 on the Federal City called for “a thorough evaluation of the probable 

impact of the Inner Loop on the appearance of the National Capital and the lives and property of 
its inhabitants.” At the same time, the Northwest Committee for Transportation Planning issued 

a 50-page study opposing the Inner Loop and calling for a “complete re-evaluation” of the 

District’s highway program. “The Inner Loop and related street widenings and arterial freeways 

would not solve traffic congestion problems, but would create an even worse strangulation of 

automobile traffic,” according to the report. [“3 Groups Join Protest Of Inner Loop Plans,” The 

Evening Star, October 27, 1961] 

In reaction to NCPC’s deferral of a decision, the Star described “a chain reaction among groups 

who have opposed freeway construction.” Nevertheless, the District commissioners voted on 

October 28 to include funds in the 1963 budget for freeway construction. The request included 

$700,000 for the Inner Loop. A District highway official said, “Our highway program faces its 

most critical period.” Engineer Commissioner Clarke hoped that the “swelling of sentiment” 

against freeways would not block construction of the Inner Loop. [Gimble, Gilbert, “Funds for 

Inner Loop Are Sought by D.C.,” The Sunday Star, October 29, 1961] 

NCPC met on November 9 to consider the deferred highway projects. Engineer Commissioner 

Clarke defended the Inner Loop, saying its critics lacked facts. “I do not know of any facts or 

studies which are available today upon which one could logically base a request for 

reconsideration.” Opposition by NCPC “would be a renunciation” of its responsibility to provide 

sound planning guidance. “It would create an atmosphere of uncertainty throughout the region 

and a loss of faith in the guidance of the National Capital Planning Commission and the Regional 

Planning Council,” as reflected in the Mass Transportation Survey. 

He responded to those who objected to the Inner Loop on aesthetic grounds by saying that the 

District had appointed an advisory board of architects to review all designs. He also supported 

rapid transit:

In this manner, we can provide, on a timely basis, the highways that are needed in 

addition to rapid transit. At best rapid transit is a substantial number of years away but 

also needs to be energetically planned and developed. 

He continued, “The fact that freeways are designed to correct ugliness and congestion should in 

the long run tend to overcome most, if not all, the short run disadvantages so often cited by those 

directly affected.”

If NCPC approved the delay, the same groups pressing for delay now would “press for continual 

delay or abandonment.” He added, “Delay, once initiated, could well be prolonged until the 

crisis in transportation dictated that a crash program be undertaken.” Failure to build the 

freeways would “make the city a less desirable place to live and visit in and thereby reduce 

business activity, property values, and offer further encouragement to the growth of slum areas.” 

Testifying during the hearing, NCTA’s Stolzenbach called for a 1-year delay in new freeway 

construction to allow his agency to re-evaluate all transportation planning for the region. 

Delaying the Three Sisters Bridge was “absolutely essential if any serious re-evaluation is to be 

made” of the 1959 Mass Transportation Survey. The Year 2000 Plan “postulates a whole new 
set of assumptions as to the future growth of the region,” requiring NCTA to rethink all 

decisions: 

Do we want a strong central city? Do we want to limit urban sprawl? If we do, we have 

to design a transportation system to accomplish these goals. The 1959 transportation plan 

made no such effort. It is merely a stepping stone. 

The studies NCTA was undertaking would determine which freeway projects should continue: 

The important point is that the agency and others concerned with regional planning 

should have a year’s time in which to develop recommendations. There is no pressing 

need for either of these projects [the Three Sisters Bridge or interchange “C”]. Both are 

links connecting roads whose construction will not begin until fiscal year 1966 – four 

years from now.

On the other hand, construction of these two projects will mean that the 1959 

transportation plan has become a reality.

BPR’s Joseph Barnett, an alternate member of NCPC, said that failure to complete the Inner 

Loop would mean that the Three Sisters Bridge and the Potomac River Freeway leading into the 

K Street Expressway would no longer qualify as part of the Interstate System – they would not be 

connected to it. Without them, the District faced the “horrible prospect” that trucks would have 

to be allowed on the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Bridge and the roadways around the Lincoln 

Memorial. Without the North and West Legs of the Inner Loop, I-66 would not have an entrance 

into the city. Barnett said NCPC had a responsibility “to support, rather than hinder, the agencies 

now executing the very plan we ourselves helped to create and which we approved” in the Mass 

Transportation Survey. Not doing so would be “sheer folly and a waste of funds.” 

Downtown Progress, formally the National Capital Downtown Committee when established by 

downtown businesses in July 1959, supported the Inner Loop, saying that failure to build it could 

mean the death of downtown. The freeways would “identify clearly the boundaries of the urban 

renewal areas in the downtown” and help finance the cost of renewal. (Established over 2 years 

earlier, Downtown Progress was an organization of businessmen working under the auspices of 

the Federal City Council and NCPC.)

Finley of the Fine Arts Commission told NCPC that, “The city is being changed to fit the 

standard pattern of highway engineers, rather than to conform to the Washington plan – so long 

established.” He felt that Congress had given NCTA a “mandate” to re-evaluate the “entire 

transportation plan for Washington and the surrounding area.” He said, “That mandate should be 

carried out.” As for the Inner Loop, it would “not only mar the beauty of Washington but will be 

destructive of the L’Enfant Plan.” Rapid transit would be “the most effective and least damaging 

means of providing access to those parts of the city where Government buildings or commercial 

interests are located.”

Finley said that the beauty of the National capital “should not be sacrificed by cutting the city 

into islands in an effort to meet the traffic needs of local inhabitants or those who live in nearby 
suburban areas.” He urged the District Highway Department to submit a scale model of the Inner 

Loop “showing the full extent of the proposed changes and citing also the number of houses and 

families to be displaced, the loss in taxable property and the added expense to the city in 

maintaining these freeways.” These were facts the public and the Congress deserved to have 

when “faced with such vast changes in the city’s appearance, accomplished piecemeal.”

NCPC voted unanimously on October 10 to approve the Inner Loop projects. The vote on the 

Center Leg was unanimous, but the new NCPC chairman, Mrs. Rowe, abstained; she later said 

she opposed the Center Leg. (The White House had announced her elevation from member to 

chairman on October 9 while NCPC’s all-day hearing was underway.) The vote for interchange 

“C” was tied to three stipulations. Before NCPC would approve advertising for bids, NCPC 

wanted to see a model of the interchange and the East Leg to ensure it would “enhance the beauty 

and livability” of the city. The architectural treatment also would be subject to NCPC approval. 

With NCPC’s approval, the District was free to include funds for the projects in its 1963 budget 

proposal. The District had intended to do so in any event, since NCPC’s views were only 

advisory, but its support was helpful during congressional review of the budget requests. 

Commission members Robinson, who had requested the deferral of a decision, C. McKim 

Norton, and A.M. Woodruff issued a statement saying, “No fresh evidence has been presented 

yet which casts any doubt on the validity of the general concept of the Inner Loop.” However, 

Robinson said that planners would “watch very carefully just what the impact of the loop is going 

to be on the city.” He appreciated the opportunity to reconsider the plan. “It has been a most 

useful timeout.” 

NCPC took no action on the Three Sisters Bridge, leaving in place its October approval of the 

District’s budget request to begin construction in place. [Gimble, Gilbert, “Clarke Assails Effort 

to Delay Loop Freeway,” The Evening Star, November 9, 1961; Gimble, Gilbert, “Planners 

Approve Inner Loop Projects,” The Evening Star, November 10, 1961] 

(On November 9, in the midst of the hectic NCPC hearing, a letter designating Mrs. Rowe as 

chairman arrived around 2 p.m. Daniel H. Shear, NCPC’s general counsel, read the letter to the 

record-breaking crowd, which applauded the announcement that she now was chairman. Later, 

she told reporters, “I was shaking in my shoes but I tried not to show it.” The Star reported: 

Her first day as chairman was one of the busiest and most controversy-filled commission 

meetings of recent years. It took up the much-debated Inner Loop expressway issue, and 

was forced by the wealth of testimony to postpone a final decision until a second-day 

session this morning. 

“In spite of the differences of opinion expressed on the Inner Loop question, there was 

not any name-calling or wrangling—and for this I was very glad,” Mrs. Rowe said. “I 

would hate to have to gavel anyone down.” [Lewis, Robert J., “Mrs. Rowe Presides Over 

Planners On Hectic Day, But Keeps Aplomb,” The Evening Star, November 10, 1961]) 
In an editorial, the Star concluded that the flareup of opposition between the October and 

November NCPC meetings “has done more good than harm.” That was because NCPC had 

approved inclusion of the Inner Loop projects in the 1963 budget request: 

Had the commission suddenly turned about-face and asked pointlessly for delay in what it 

long since had tacitly approved, it would have invited a storm of protest capable of doing 

great injury to the commission’s own prestige and lessening its influence at a time when it 

should be strengthened. 

One advantage of the month-long delay was that the highway planners now “have been made 

fully aware that a considerable body of public opinion is increasingly skeptical” of their claims 

for urban freeways.” Highway engineers had “doubtless” explored and disposed of, to their own 

satisfaction, criticisms about displaced families, the land to be seized, aesthetic impacts, and the 

“huge expenditure required.” However, the engineers need to seek better understanding by the 

public. The editorial concluded: 

What is done in Washington must be the best that can be done. If the many agencies 

involved, including the Planning Commission and the Fine Arts Commission, work 

together with that end in view, there is considerable assurance that only the best will be 

acceptable. [“Wise Decision on the Loop,” The Evening Star, November 11, 1961] 

Trying to Get Started

With the NCPC clearance, the District commissioners approved the routes for the East Leg of the 

Inner Loop and the Northeast Freeway on November 14. The Star reported: 

The route of the east leg, which includes a massive interchange near its southern end, will 

run between Tenth and Eleventh streets S.E. from the Anacostia River to Tenth street and 

Florida avenue N.E. 

The Northeast Freeway shoots northward from the east leg to tie-in with the third route to 

Baltimore. It will run just east of Gallaudet College and then run parallel to the Baltimore 

& Ohio Railroad tracks in Brookland before reaching the District line. 

The approved budget proposal for 1963 included $1.5 million for engineering work on the 

Northeast Freeway as well as $3 million for right-of-way acquisition. It also included $700,000 

for engineering work on the East Leg, $1 million for acquisition of right-of-way, and over 

$2 million to acquire right-of-way for interchange “C” as well as $3 million for its construction. 

With this funding, the city expected to begin construction of the East Leg and the Northeast 

Freeway in July 1964, subject to congressional approval of the District matching funds. Aitken 

promised “we will make a sincere attempt to make them esthetically acceptable. They will be 

designed to make surrounding areas livable.” [“City Heads Approve Two Highway Links,” The 

Evening Star, November 14, 1961] 

Despite these actions, Stolzenbach took his request for a delay on the Three Sisters Bridge and 

interchange “C” to the Budget Bureau. He met on December 11 with the bureau’s Phillip S. 
Hughes, District commissioners Walter N. Tobriner and General Clarke, and NCPC chairman 

Rowe. However, the bureau rejected the request to remove funding for the projects from the 

District’s 1963 budget request. [“U.S. Insists On Highway Projects Here,” The Evening Star, 

November 15, 1961] 

The Committee of 100 on the Federal City also refused to give up. Late in December, the 

committee’s chairman, Neill Phillips, wrote to Rowe urging NCPC to withdraw approval of “all 

pending highway projects” in the District, particularly the four Inner Loop projects included in 

the District’s 1963 budget proposal. NCPC, Phillips wrote, should direct its staff to study landuse in the District and how transportation projects of the past 20 years had affected the city’s 

fiscal affairs. The Inner Loop and all future projects should be evaluated based on their total 

impact on the District and surrounding communities. This would be in contrast with the District 

Highway Department, which “expedited” projects by “several years” and considered them only 

based on impacts on motor vehicles. In addition, NCPC should consider planned highway 

projects in consultation with NCTA. 

The committee’s road committee had drafted the letter. Peter Craig, a member of the committee, 

said the Committee of 100 would discuss the issue in January. [“Planning Unit Asked to Halt 

Loop Backing,” The Evening Star, December 29, 1961] 

On January 15, 1962, the Committee of 100 held a special meeting to reconsider its letter to 

NCPC. Harland Bartholomew told the 50 members in attendance that the letter to Mrs. Rowe 

contained what he called “misinterpretation” and “mis-statements.” He said NCTA was not 

created to develop a new transportation plan but only to proceed with the transit development 

program. NCPC’s William Finley agreed with committee members who were concerned about 

the beauty of the city. He urged the committee to remain concerned with the “beautification and 

design” of freeway and rapid transit projects. However, NCPC was not reconsidering its decision 

to approve inclusion of Inner Loop projects in the 1963 budget proposal. 

Toward the end of the 2 and a half hour debate, Bartholomew offered a motion urging close 

cooperation among NCPC, NCTA, and BPR in developing a transit program. In the end, the 

committee adjourned soon after, leaving the motion without a vote and leaving the letter to 

NCPC as the Committee of 100’s position. [“Road Stand Unchanged By Federal City Unit,” The 

Evening Star, January 16, 1962] 

On February 16, the Committee of 100 adopted a resolution urging NCPC, NCTA, and BPR to 

make “every concerted effort to work out” a transportation plan for the area. [Lewis, Roger J., 

“Biddle Urges Support Of Roosevelt Memorial,” The Evening Star, February 17, 1962] 

On January 25, Downtown Progress released its plan, “Downtown Streets and Places,” for 

transforming central Washington’s downtown core. Doxiadis Associates, headed by 

internationally known city planner Constantine Doxiadis of Greece, had developed the plan. 

As Gutheim and Lee explained:
Downtown Progress was prompted by what ailed the downtown. Not only was retail 

activity leaving the downtown, but also the downtown was expanding to the northwest, 

from the White House westward to Rock Creek Park. In 1963 Architecture Forum 

reported that although $228 million of new construction occurred west of 15th Street, 

only $32 million was invested east of 15th Street. Corporations and trade associations 

facilitated the shift of downtown along K Street, Connecticut Avenue, and Farragut 

Square, where land was cheaper and easier to assemble.

The plan, developed at a cost of $500,000, called for a subway and expressways, the use of rapid 

transit buses, and a system of 10-seat jitneys operating every minute. Several streets would be 

rebuilt in tunnels (14th, 13th, 9th and 6th Streets) between E and H Streets below the central 

shopping district. The area would be reserved for pedestrians and jitneys. Other streets would be 

combined in one-way pairs that, along with the Center Leg, would free the central area of through 

traffic. The plan supported the Inner Loop in its entirety. 

The plan went beyond transportation in calling for a Massachusetts Avenue visitors’ center near 

Union Station and a new central library, convention hall and exhibit space, law school, churches, 

and an apartment complex in Mount Vernon Square East and South. 

In January 1963, one small part of the plan was launched. D.C. Transit Systems, the city’s bus 

company, began operating a jitney or minibus on F Street, NW., with 14 more due to extend the 

route to G Street in midsummer. The company planned to operate them in a loop on the two 

streets between 6th and 15th Streets. The fare was 5 cents.

Downtown Progress’s plan called for F and G Streets to be predominantly for pedestrians and 

minibuses. Parking garages would be built on E and H Streets to accommodate the vehicles that 

would no longer be permitted on F and G Streets. The sizable passageways or arcades between 

F and G Streets would provide easier access for shoppers. Downtown Progress saw the 

pedestrian zone as a demonstration for full-scale implementation of the idea in other parts of the 

city. Expansion was dependent on construction of subway lines along F and 12th Streets, 

construction of the Center Leg Freeway along 3rd Street, adoption of one-way streets, provision 

of underpasses for streets in the downtown core at 6th, 9th, 14th, and 13th Streets, and tunnels for 

truck deliveries to F and G Street stores.

In the organization’s third annual meeting at the Statler Hilton Hotel on January 31, 1963, 

Executive Director Knox Banner said “the key requirement” for further elements of the plan was 

congressional action to declare the downtown core an urban renewal area:

Only under an urban renewal plan will it be possible to construct the public 

improvements, to accomplish the needed zoning changes and to provide positive guides 

for the co-ordination of public action and for the development of private property that 

will be required to accomplish the revitalization of downtown. 

According to Gutheim and Lee, the plan was more descriptive than effective:
Although no direct result can be ascribed to the action plan, it consolidated many 

recommendations and observations of the early 1960s and described the downtown at the 

time: a place with waning businesses, declining property values, and a poor appearance. 

The action plan also made the case for designating the downtown an urban renewal area 

so that public powers could bring about land acquisition and clearance. 

[Lewis, Robert J., “Plans Drafted To Modernize Business Area,” and Gimble, Gilbert, “One-Way 

Street Plans To Get Prompt Action,” The Evening Star, January 25, 1962; Lewis, Robert J., 

“Minibus Test Begins Change for Downtown, The Evening Star, January 31, 1963; Gutheim and 

Lee, pages 293-294] 

On January 31, Miss May Craig, a reporter known for asking tough and oddball questions at 

presidential press conferences since the early days of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, asked 

President Kennedy: 

Mr. President, visitors who go out to visit Lincoln Park on East Capitol Street are 

dismayed to find it a slum. Congress has authorized and the National Council of Negro 

Women will erect there a memorial stadium and a statue of the great woman educator, 

Mary Bethune. Now the transit company [sic] proposes to put an eight lane freeway 

between the park and the Capitol, cutting it off. Could you inquire into that, and see if 

the freeway could be put further out beyond the park? 

President Kennedy replied, “Yes, I will,” with the transcript noting: “[Laughter].” He added, 

“You're very gentle today, Mrs. Craig.” 

The President’s aides asked the District Highway Department for information on the issue. The 

District provided the information comparing the costs and impacts on homes of the three East 

Leg routes that had been studied. The chosen route was the least costly and disruptive of the 

three. [“White House Gets Loop East Leg Data,” The Evening Star, February 21, 1962] 

Miss Craig’s question also prompted the Capitol Hill Community Council to follow up with a 

letter to the President opposing the planned location of the East Leg, which would eliminate 

Lincoln Park. In addition, J. Richard Earle, the president of the Capitol Hill Southeast Citizens 

Association sent a telegram to the President on February 23 asking him to turn down the East 

Leg route proposed by the District commissioners. No decision, Earle said, should be made 

before NCTA releases its report. The chosen Eleventh Street route “fails to provide for the 

convenience of patrons and relief of heavy street traffic” from motorists using the National Guard 

Armory, D.C. Stadium, and the roads to Annapolis and Baltimore. The route should be moved 

east to service these facilities and freeways. [“Capitol Group Hits Road Plan,” The Evening Star, 

February 22, 1962; “Kennedy Receives East Leg Route Citizen Protest,” The Evening Star, 

February 23, 1962] 

On March 13, those two associations met with three others to unite in opposition to the East Leg 

of the Inner Loop. Their initial goal was to delay planning, right-of-way acquisition, and 

construction of the East Leg, including interchange “C,” until NCTA released its report. The 

Star reported: 
Last night’s discussion brought out agreement on the need for an Inner Loop system, but 

the proposed Eleventh street route was unanimously rejected. A majority felt a route 

along the Anacostia River to the East Capitol Street Bridge would cause less tax loss, 

property depreciation and rehousing difficulty. However, the group decided not to seek a 

specific route now. 

The Public Interest Civic Association, the Dupont Circle Citizens Association, and the Southeast 

Kiwanis Club also joined the fight. [“Inner Loop Route Opposed by Citizen Delegates,” The 

Evening Star, March 14, 1962] 

District highway officials reached out to the groups to counter the criticism of the East Leg 

routing. On March 13, Lloyd A. Rivard, assistant chief engineer for planning and programs, 

addressed the Southeast Business’s Association and Southeast Council of Citizens Association. 

The East Leg, he said, would be depressed 20 feet for much of its length. “This will minimize 

noise and unsightliness.” He added that the highway system would “benefit everyone in the 

D.C. area.”

On March 21, General Clarke went to St. Luke’s Church to address 300 Capitol Hill residents, 

mostly members of the Capitol Hill Community Council. The Star described his presentation: 

Brandishing a pointer at charts of the loop, the Commissioner indicated a black line 

stretching between Tenth and Eleventh streets, seven blocks from where he stood. 

“This area is comprised of property which has less value historically and financially than 

the alternate nineteenth street route.”

He added, “It’s cheaper”: 

Gen. Clarke outlined the history of the plans for the loop, showing color slides of 

property on the Eleventh and Nineteenth street locations. The slides, said Gen. Clarke, 

were shown to the Commissioners as evidence to support the property value theory which 

in part influenced their decision. 

The Commissioner faced an hour-long question period in which citizens claimed that the 

current trend of restoration on Capitol Hill, if allowed to continue eastward, would 

increase general property value in the neighborhood. 

Residents had been encouraged by the White House review that Miss Craig’s question to 

President Kennedy had prompted: 

The President directed an inquiry, but a letter from the White House to the council read to 

the group last night, indorsed the Commissioners’ plans for the east leg. [“East Leg Held 

Not Disruptive,” The Evening Star, March 14, 1962; “Hill Community Hears Clarke 

Defend East Leg,” The Evening Star, March 22, 1962] 

General Clarke did not convince the Capitol Hill Community Council. On April 2, its president, 

Paul Beatley, asked the Public Interest Civic Group to join its efforts to shift the route of the East 
Leg. He told the group that only a concerted effort could stop the planned path. The group 

accepted the invitation unanimously. [“United Effort On Loop Advised,” The Evening Star, 

April 3, 1962] 

The Committee of 100 on the Federal City continued its opposition on April 25, again urging 

NCPC to reject acceleration of construction plans for I-266 (the Potomac River Freeway 

including the Three Sisters Bridge) and I-95, “which would include the East Leg of the Inner 

Loop and the Northeast Freeway [extending] from the proposed Interchange ‘C’ at the foot of 

Eleventh street N.E. north through the eastern part of the city and provide a third route to 

Baltimore.” The plans were, the committee stated, “completely premature.” [“Committee of 100 

Hits Expressways Speedup,” The Evening Star, April 26, 1962] 

As the House District Appropriations Subcommittee prepared to open three days of hearings on 

the District highway budget on May 22, District officials received an advance warning about 

what to expect. Representative Frank W. Burke (D-Ky.) inserted a 30-minute colloquy into the 

Congressional Record on May 21 with Representative Basil L. Whitener (D-NC), a lawyer from 

Gastonia and a State legislator who had been elected to the House in 1956. According to Schrag: 

He was a freeway skeptic, having represented law clients displaced by highway 

construction. Moreover, his administrative assistant was a train buff who urged his boss 

to support rail transit. [Schrag, page 48] 

Representative Burke was a member of the District Committee’s Subcommitee on Traffic, 

Streets, and Highways, of which Representative Whitener was chairman. “At this moment,” 

Representative Burke said, “proposals are pending in the Congress which will determine the 

future of the Capital City for generations.” He wanted to take this time “to make abundantly 

clear exactly what is involved” in the District commissioners’ request for financing of highway 

construction. 

He summarized the District’s highway proposals. In January 1961, the commissioners asked for 

$9.8 million for highway expenditures in FY 1963, to match $13 million in Federal-aid highway 

funds for a total expenditure of $22.8 million. In January 1962, the commissioners asked for 

$10,723,000 of District funds to combine with Federal-aid highway funds for a total of 

$64,758,000 for 1963. “The striking fact” is that in 12 months, the District commissioners had 

increased their request for 1963 by nearly $23 million, “and the important factor to note about 

this frantic effort is that a similar increase is proposed for each of the next 5 fiscal years.” He 

added, “There is a great deal more involved here than expenditures of large sums of money.” 

As Representative Burke began discussing NCTA’s legislative mandate, Chairman Whitener 

asked him to yield. He recognized that Representative Burke was “sounding a warning here 

about a matter which can have serious repercussions in the District of Columbia,” especially in 

view of the “many unresolved issues with reference to the mass transportation policies which we 

shall follow in the future.” From discussions with NCTA, Chairman Whitener understood “they 

are ambitious to have a program which will move great masses of people with great speed in and 

out of the District of Columbia.” Details were yet to be worked out:
It seems to me, however, that until we have a fixed policy established as to what mass 

transportation steps will be taken, it is rather difficult for anyone to project his mind into 

the future and determine just how many of these expressways or superhighways, which 

swallow up so much valuable taxable property and displace so many people, should be 

adopted as a policy with reference to vehicular traffic.

Representative Burke agreed. With NCTA not scheduled to report on the balance of transit and 

highway needs and present a mass transit program until November, “I think the gentleman has 

put his finger right on the key matter involved here in this greatly accelerated proposal for 

highway construction.” 

Chairman Whitener said:

I think it is no secret that the chairman of our committee has suggested to the 

subcommittee that within the next few weeks we commence a study of the street and 

highway problem here in the District. No one can seriously question that some changes 

and some improvements need to be made. 

He was not taking a position on whether Congress should stand completely by, but rather urging 

that Congress make haste “with judgment and with discretion.” Proceeding in the haste of the 

District commissioners and other governing authorities in the city might lead to “things which 

would not be in the best interests of the public and things which we would hope [the city] would 

not do which would prove to be inordinately expensive and not bring about the results which we 

all, I am sure, join with the Commissioners in hoping they will bring about.” 

Returning to congressional intent with NCTA, Representative Burke explained that Congress 

“stated that an improved transportation system for the National Capital requires, with planning 

on a regional basis, a unified system of freeways, parkways, express transit service, and other 

major transportation facilities.” Implicit in this mandate was that “additional highways should be 

built in accordance with a program which would allow the National Capital Transportation 

Agency to perform effectively the job which Congress gave it”:

Under the accelerated highway program which would be undertaken if the Congress 

approves the current District budget request, construction would very likely make 

obsolete the November report of the National Capital Transportation Agency even before 

it is completed.

The request for interchange “C” was an example. The District requested $3.2 million to begin 

construction in 1963: 

Once this key interchange is committed, the whole interloop pattern is established to a 

degree which would be beyond reasonable adaptation no matter what might be discovered 

by virtue of the transit study which the law requires be delivered to Congress in less than 

6 months. To take 40 acres of completely urban, intensely developed, densely occupied 

land in southeast Washington at this time is a step which should not be taken until 

everyone is completely certain that it is a proper step.
The result would be the displacement of large numbers of families and loss of valuable properties 

from the tax rolls – all so interchange “C” can “be built ahead of its originally proposed date for 

suggested reasons which are wholly inadequate.” 

Displacement of people was a serious problem: 

Those who have been forced from their homes by highway construction, by the 

construction of public buildings and by urban renewal programs present one of local 

government’s most vexing problems, and yet in a pell mell rush to accelerate the highway 

program[,] multiplication of the problem of relocation is obviously done for no adequate 

reason.

He emphasized that he was not opposed to the District’s highway program; he was saying only 

that “the proposed acceleration which would be brought about by the budget requests is poorly 

timed and extremely unwise.” He cited the expressways to be built just west of the Capitol 

grounds and between the Tidal Basin and the Washington Monument: 

It may be necessary to build every one of these roads; it may be necessary to displace the 

additional thousands of families who would be involved; it may be necessary to remove 

these millions and millions of dollars worth of property from the tax rolls; it may be 

necessary to surround and bisect the very heart of Washington with highways, but it is not 

necessary to commit the District government to these specific plans from which deviation 

would be almost impossible, in advance of the submission to the Congress of the report 

of the National Capital Transportation Agency next November. One is tempted to say to 

the Commissioners, “What’s the big hurry?” 

When the District’s budget for 1963 was considered, the Members of the House should 

understand that the proposed acceleration of highway expenditures involved “obviously the tying 

down of future major roads.” Not approving the accelerated funding would allow “full benefit to 

be taken of “NCTA’s report “so that all of the planning for every means of moving persons and 

goods in the District be used to its fullest benefit.” [Governing the District of Columbia, 

Congressional Record-House, May 21, 1962, pages 8836-8828] 

The Switch

On May 22, the District Appropriations Subcommittee, headed by Representative William H. 

Natcher (D-Ky.), began public hearings on the full range of the District budget. On this first day, 

however, most of the 33 witnesses addressed the freeway debate. Subcommittee members did 

not reveal their views or even question the witnesses. The Star summarized the witnesses, such 

as:

F. Joseph Donohue, Citizens Traffic Board—If the program for freeways is destroyed it 

will destroy the core of the city. Don’t slow it down. 

Peter Glickert, Capitol Hill Southeast Citizens Association—Traffic problems have been 

created by poor planning. The east leg of the Inner Loop should be placed on the west 

bank of the Anacostia River. 
Eugene I. Kane, D.C. Trucking Association—Expeditious construction of the proposed 

freeway system in the District is essential to the continued growth and development of the 

Metropolitan Area, and most important to the preservation of the downtown section of 

the city.

Arthur E. Miller, American Automobile Association—Both freeways and subways are 

needed. But I cannot stress too strongly the importance of completing the Inner Loop 

without any period of delay. 

Mrs. Harold Hinton, Georgetown Progressive Citizens Association—The Three Sisters 

Bridge should not be built. It would only serve to draw more traffic into Georgetown and 

we’ve got all we can take now.

Peter S. Craig, Northwest Committee for Transportation—We support the city-wide 

revolt against the hasty construction of freeways. Recommendations by NCTA should be 

awaited. By moving ahead, tax revenues for schools and public welfare will be diverted. 

James H. Flanagan, Vice President, D.C. Transit—Highway plans should be approved. 

Rapid bus service over freeways is a prime requisite if more people are to be persuaded to 

leave their automobiles at home and use transit. 

Among the divided voices, the Star’s Lee Flor highlighted two first-day witnesses. One was 

Mrs. Polly Shackleton, a member of the executive committee of the Democratic Central 

Committee. During testimony on May 23, she made clear to the District Appropriations 

Subcommittee that her group was not simply waiting for a balanced system:

Not only are we deeply concerned about the overall dollar cost—which is way out of 

proportion to the funds proposed for the education, welfare, recreational, and health needs 

of the District—but we are shocked by the inhumanity and utter ruthlessness of this 

highway program.

Because of the impact on displacees, she urged the subcommittee not to fund five projects: 

1. Interchange “C”

2. Potomac River Freeway

3. Three Sisters Bridge

4. Northeast Freeway

5. East Leg, Inner Loop Freeway

She added: 

I do wish to make clear that we are not opposing these expenditures because we are 

against progress, or, as has been bruited about, that philosophically we just are ‘agin 

highways.” 

Clearly a solution must be found for the area’s transportation problems. “Certainly this is what 

Congress had in mind when it created the National Capital Transportation Agency and directed it 

to establish and coordinate a balanced transportation program.” In defiance of this congressional 

intent, the District proposed to accelerate these projects. She speculated that “one of the tricks of 

the trade when massive long-range highway programs are projected is for the roadbuilders to get 
certain key elements such as interchanges and bridges into place as quickly as possible, thereby 

commiting [sic] irrevocably the overall program.” But whatever the motivation, she said: 

I think there is far too much at stake, in human terms, to assume at this juncture that the 

Highway Department’s solution to the area’s transportation problems is correct, much 

less that it is the only solution. 

If the Highway Department was correct, why did Congress go to the trouble of creating NCTA; 

was it “a useless gesture”?

Although NCTA was not going to report until November, NCTA had already publicly opposed 

the Three Sisters Bridge and interchange “C.” In a statement on November 9, 1961, to NCPC, 

NCTA said, “delay of these two projects is absolutely essential if any serious reevaluation is to 

be made of the 1959 transportation plan.” 

Mrs. Shackleton applied the same reasoning to the Potomac River Freeway, which was so closely 

linked to the Three Sisters Bridge. The District Highway Department, she said, was “quite 

responsive to the assumed needs of automobiles,” but exhibited “no concern over the effects of 

its program on one of the Nation’s Capital [sic] most compelling human needs—the need for 

decent, safe, and sanitary housing for its residents.” At a time when housing for low-income 

families was “at crisis stage,” the District already planned to evict 90 families from the Ellen 

Wilson public housing project to make way for the Southeast Expressway. It was too late to stop 

that project, but not too late to delay the East Leg and Northeast Freeway. 

She said the District had not revealed how many people would be displaced by the East Leg, but 

the Washington Urban League’s block-by-block analysis based on the 1960 census reveals that 

the East Leg and Northeast Freeway would displace about 10,680 people. “Where will these 

people go to find decent and sanitary housing in the District of Columbia?” [District of 

Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1963, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of 

Representatives, 87th Congress, 2d Session, Report No. 1906, June 22, 1962, pages 1325-1328] 

Flor also cited Harland Bartholomemew, once again primarily an urban consultant. He said that 

postponing the freeway projects until NCTA reports its findings in November would be “the 

height of absurdity.” He did not believe NCTA would devise a radically new plan, and any 

differences between that plan and the Mass Transportation Survey’s plan could easily be settled. 

The District, Bartholomew added, should take advantage of the additional appropriations 

Congress had authorized for the Interstate System. L’Enfant’s 1800 street plan stands as a 

monument, but must be updated to meet modern needs. Doing so would inevitably disrupt some 

aesthetic values, families, and businesses, but good design can enhance appearances and 

relocation initiatives can help families and businesses. He added that the Inner Loop will not be 

the disruptive force its critics claim. [District of Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1963, pages 1385-

1389; “House D.C. Unit to Explore Potential of 1-Way Streets,” The Evening Star, May 23, 

1962; Flor, Lee, “Debate on D.C. Roads Flares at Budget Airing,” The Evening Star, May 23, 

1962] 
During the evening public hearing on May 23, citizens offered views on a variety of subjects. A 

few speakers addressed the freeway program, with most supportive, while a few urged delay. 

However, the big freeway news was a shocking reversal reported on May 24 on page one of the 

Star and on page one of the Post on May 25. The District’s Board of Commissioners had 

attended a closed session of the Appropriations subcommittee on May 21 to discuss the 1963 

budget. Reporters saw General Clarke arrive carrying rolled highway maps he planned to use to 

defend the 11th Street routing of the East Leg.

As reported on May 24 based on an anonymous subcommittee source, Commissioner Tobriner 

told the District Appropriations Subcommittee that he had changed his mind. He now wanted to 

halt plans to build the East Leg of the Inner Loop in the 11th Street corridor. He wanted to shift 

the freeway to a location west of the Anacostia River. Such a shift would require major 

rethinking on the design of interchange “C,” which the Post called “the massive interchange 

which would be the capstone of the Inner Loop.” 

The following excerpts of the discussion, released in June, is from the three District 

commissioners’ testimony before Chairman Natcher and Representative John J. Rhodes (D-Az.):

Commissioner Tobriner: I do feel that some pause ought to be given to the location of 

the east leg. Of two routes considered, the Eleventh street route is the best. There is a 

third choice which would dislocate fewer families. This would go along the [Anacostia] 

parkway, past the stadium, into the Arboretum and back to the other line of the Inner 

Loop. 

Chairman Natcher: Do you want the $546,700 for interchange “C” and $170,000 for the 

east leg held in abeyance?

Tobriner: I would have to say so, sir. 

Representative Rhodes (R-Az.): How many families will be displaced by the two 

projects?

General Clarke: About 350 families 

Tobriner: That is only part. 

General Clarke: Mr. Tobriner speaks, of course, as only one member of the Board of 

Commissioners.

Tobriner: The possibility that the National Capital Housing Authority will catch up with 

the dislocatees is very remote.

General Clarke: Very frankly, we are talking of a three-year delay as a minimum in the 

highway program, with much disadvantage to our neighboring States who are building to 

meet us at the District line. While Mr. Tobriner has discussed his concern about the 

displaced families with me, I must admit I am caught by surprise by his recommendation 

that we abandon the program completely.

Commissioner John B. Duncan: Being unprepared, the only thing I could ask at this time 

is an opportunity to think it through further and submit a statement for the record. 

He later informed the subcommittee, “After giving this matter a great deal of thought, I agree 

with Mr. Tobriner”: 
Representative Rhodes: To clarify the disagreement, is Mr. Tobriner opposed to 

interchange “C.” [sic]

Tobriner: No. I am in favor of a redesign so it will be a T-shape interchange. The 

original interchange would take about 38 acres, and the redesign about 22 acres. 

Representative Rhodes: Mr. Tobriner, this makes me wonder what you are for. I know 

what you are against. Tell us what you are for. 

Tobriner: I am for a redesign of interchange “C” and the running of the east leg up the 

parkway along the Anacostia River.

Representative Rhodes: Mr. Duncan, what is your stand? 

Duncan: I do not look toward discontinuing a total highway program which we all have 

believed is a good program. There should be a temporary delay while a restudy goes on. 

Representative Rhodes: How long has the Inner Loop been under study? 

Director Aitken: The Inner Loop study was released in 1959. 

Representative Rhodes: Mr. Tobriner, are you in favor of the center leg of the Inner 

Loop? 

Tobriner: Deep down in my heart, I am considering the possibility of abandoning the 

center leg.

Later, Representative Rhodes asked when the budget proposal was prepared: 

Duncan: In November. 

Representative Rhodes: I guess all three of you supported the budget. 

Tobriner: We did. 

Representative Rhodes: Have those people just recently moved in there? 

Tobriner: No, sir. I was not aware of the extent of the dislocation last November. 

Representative Rhodes: Is your change in position political?

Tobriner: No. It is the greater part of my duty to reflect the opinion of a substantial and 

respected part of the population of the city. 

Representative Rhodes: This plan was prepared in 1959. The opposition should have 

known the routes. You should have known, Mr. Tobriner. I think you have lived here all 

your life. You should have known the number of people in the area. I, for one, do not 

appreciate having the problem shifted to the shoulders of the committee at this late hour. 

The action was not called for. We are entitled to feel, when a budget is submitted to us 

the budget is final as far as the Commissioners are concerned. [District of Columbia 

Appropriation Bill, 1963, pages 1081-1144] 

This reversal was especially shocking since the Board of Commissioners had endorsed the 

11th Street corridor for the East Leg many times. The commissioners requested funds for the 

corridor in their January budget request for 1963, defended it in public comments ever since, and 

had endorsed the routing as recently as April 18 in a letter to the White House. The letter stated 

that the Anacostia River location would take the freeway through park lands, adding, “you must 

be aware of how carefully the National Park Service guards against encroachment, especially by 

highways.” As a result, the city was not likely to secure NPS approval to build the East Leg 

along the river. 
This surprise was, the source said, the first time in recent years that the commissioners had not 

presented a united front on any issue before the subcommittee.

Because Tobriner apparently had not discussed his reversal with the two other commissioners 

before the closed session, the subcommittee asked the commissioners to report back on their 

formal position on the matter. [“District Heads Ask Delay in Loop East Leg,” The Evening 

News, May 24, 1962; Eastman, Sam, “’East Leg’ Freeway Facing Long Delay,” The Evening 

Star, May 25, 1962; “Why the Switch?” The Evening Star, May 25, 1962; Stern, Laurence, 

“Commissioners Split by 2-1 to Scrap 11th st. Route for Inner Loop East Leg,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, May 25, 1962; Flor, Lee, “House Unit Shuns Key Role In D.C. Road 

Controversy,” The Evening Star, June 13, 1962] 

The editors of the Star were among the many people surprised by the turnabout. The same 

edition carrying the article about Commissioner Tobriner’s change of heart contained an 

editorial, “Attack on Highways,” written before the editors knew of the change. The editors 

warned readers:

There should be no misunderstanding about the intentions of those who are asking the 

House District Appropriations Subcommittee for a “delay” in the District freeway 

program. Their true goal is not to seek a brief postponement, but for a variety of reasons 

to scuttle as many as possible of the major radial and circumferential freeways which are 

essential—along with an effective system of rapid transit—to the growth and well-being 

of the Washington community. 

The attacks were not new. The District commissioners had heard them all before and “wisely 

rejected” them. The criticism about the lack of funds to assist those who must be relocated was 

valid: 

Fortunately, this conclusion has been reached by the Commissioners, who on April 14 

ordered the development of a central relocation service. Since these expenditures are 

legitimately a part of the cost of highways, they should be borne in part by Federal 

highway aid funds, as President Kennedy has proposed for the Nation as a whole, and as 

already is provided by law for urban renewal. 

Other than that, delaying the East Leg pending the NCTA report was not acceptable:

There is nothing on the record to suggest that the rapid-transit proposals to be submitted 

to Congress in November will affect the need for the inner loop. On the other hand, a 

delay in those portions of the inner loop which have come under such strong attack, 

including the so-called “Interchange C” in Southeast Washington, would disrupt the 

entire program of freeways. Of course the opponents of major highway construction in 

Washington know this. That is why they have selected their targets so carefully. 

[“Attack on Highways,” The Evening Star, May 24, 1962] 

The next day, the editors reacted to the news of the two commissioners’ switch. In “Why The 

Switch?” the editors called the reversal “astonishing in view of their record with respect to this 
project . . . especially in the case of Mr. Tobriner.” The issues today, the editors pointed out, “are 

the same as those that existed” at every point where they endorsed the location of the East Leg. 

The editorial asked: “What led Mr. Tobriner last Monday, without consulting his fellow 

Commissioners, to suddenly ask the House District Appropriations Subcommittee to kill the 

project?”

In view of Mr. Tobriner’s sudden concern about displacees, “we think the better course would 

have been to accept the appropriation, and simultaneously to make its expenditure dependent on 

development of an effective relocation program . . . .” As for the Anacostia River location, the 

fact that the route would be located almost entirely on park land raised real concerns about its 

prospects: 

It is all very well to say that Congress by law could make these parks available for the freeway. 

But in view of the park-highway controversies of the past, we will be convinced that such a route 

is available when the legislation is signed and sealed—not before. [“Why the Switch?” The 

Evening Star, May 25, 1962] 

The equally surprised Post editors called their editorial “An Error Compounded.” The decision 

was a “serious setback” that would delay the East Leg for “many years.” Although the plight of 

displaced families was the basic objection to the 11th Street routing, the change of position “does 

nothing to provide new houses for the families to be evicted by the hundreds.” District highway

officials had “shown disregard” for these families, but “it is not the Highway Department that 

will suffer the consequences of further delay and indecision in the completion of a badly needed 

highway. The penalty will be inflicted upon the economic and cultural health of the city.” 

While the 11th Street routing would displace about 930 houses, an Anacostia River routing would 

displace about 500 houses. The city’s public housing agency already had 8,000 families on its 

waiting list, suggesting the city would be able to make no provision for housing highway 

displacees, regardless of the final routing. “If this city wants to build roads, it is going to have to 

build houses.” 

Further, the Anacostia River route should be “hastily abandoned” because it “constitutes a 

massive intrusion on park land”: 

It must be observed that the Commissioners, who decline to run highways through a 

prosperous neighborhood park, like Glover-Archbold, seem distressingly ready to lay 

concrete through the parks available to the poor of eastern Washington. 

The proper course of action for Congress was to provide regular appropriations for the East Leg, 

“but with the addition of a statutory requirement that no house may be taken until its inhabitants 

have been decently relocation, and their moving expenses paid, by the District. [“An Error 

Compounded,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, May 26, 1962] 

City highway officials estimated that the Board of Commissioners’ decision would put plans 

back by 3 to 5 years before construction of the East Leg could begin. The engineering study the 

commissioners requested for the Anacostia River route was only one step in the process. They
would have to hold a public hearing and secure approval from NCPC, BPR, and NPS. They also 

might have to secure congressional action to overcome NPS reluctance to grant right-of-way 

through park land for the freeway. [Eastman, Sam, “‘East Leg’ Freeway Facing Long Delay,” 

The Evening Star, May 25, 1962] 

On May 28, the Star’s editors were still looking for answers. The editorial pointed out that 

private citizens who oppose a project often propose an alternative, although usually without 

providing information to support the feasibility of the suggested location. “But for a District 

Commissioner to follow this procedure, as Walter Tobriner has done in the case of the east leg of 

the inner loop freeway, is unusual indeed.” He apparently conceded that legislation would be 

needed to overcome NPS reluctance to allow access to park land. Any assumption that such 

legislation could be obtained without the concurrence and support of NPS was “questionable”: 

Anyone remotely familiar with the history of highway disputes in the Nation’s Capital 

can attest to the traditional opposition of the Park Service to highway encroachment, and, 

for the most part, to the success of these positions. 

Thus far, “we have been aware of no shouts of joy from the Interior Department at the prospect 

of an eight-lane freeway . . . coursing through the west-side parks of the Anacostia.”

The editors recommended that the Appropriations Subcommittee order the commissioners to 

present “firm evidence” that the river route could use park lands “without objection from park 

officials” and would meet Interstate standards. This evidence would be “essential . . . if the 

subcommittee has any thought of sustaining the Tobriner position.” 

As for the concern about displaced families, previous studies of the river route found that about 

60 [sic] families would be displaced if the Anacostia River routing were chosen. Thus, “the 

District government would have to develop precisely the same kind of relocation machinery to 

assist these displacees as it would to help those on the Eleventh street route.” The subcommittee 

should appropriate the funds requested in January for the 11th Street route of the East Leg, but 

condition it on a program of “adequate relocation procedures before any families are displaced.” 

The editorial concluded, “Fortunately, such a program is now in the process of development.” 

[“More Facts, Please,” The Evening Star, May 28, 1962] 

(On May 25, Chloethiel Woodard Smith (“the city’s foremost redevelopment architect”) called 

for demolition of the Whitehurst Freeway as the “necessary key to renewal of the Georgetown 

waterfront.” Her proposal was in a plan the Georgetown Canal and Riverside Council submitted 

to NCPC seeking renewal of the area. The council’s report called the Whitehurst Freeway an 

“enormous obstacle” and “unattractive.” Smith also rejected the suggested four-lane addition to 

the elevated freeway. The report said that “Efforts to live with this major scar . . . are 

misguided.” Further, efforts to “minimize its impact” would be ineffectual or cost far more than 

demolition of the existing freeway:

An elevated 8-lane structure will eat up at least a tenth of the Georgetown waterfront area 

and will blight at least twice that amount.
She added, “There is no use talking about urban renewal of Georgetown’s waterfront so long as 

this obsolete elevated structure remains to blight the area permanently.” [Lewis, Robert J., 

“Georgetown Unit Asks Razing of Whitehurst,” The Evening Star, May 25, 1962]) 

As might be expected, the groups opposing the East Leg were pleased by the Board of 

Commissioners’ reversal. One of them was the Democratic Central Committee, which supported 

transit over freeways. Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., the committee’s vice chairman, said, “We’re 

delighted. Our position has been that the entire acceleration of the District Road program should 

be held up until we get the mass transit report. Then the two programs can be made to work 

together.” 

He made clear that the Democratic Central Committee also opposed the Anacostia River route 

for the East Leg:

We fought the freeway for Glover-Archbald [sic] Park, and will fight harder against a 

freeway through Anacostia Park.

The neighborhood around Glover-Archbald [sic] is a high-income area. It’s much more 

important to preserve Anacostia Park for its low-income neighborhood. 

NPS Director Wirth did not want to say whether he would oppose or support use of the park 

land. He said, “Sound planning requires looking at any proposal.” But he added: 

I don’t see how they can get it through the John Philip Sousa bridge area, or by the 

Stadium and parking lot. Maybe they’ll put it on pontoons and float it up the river. 

[“Anacostia Park Route Opposed for Inner Loop,” The Evening Star, May 26, 1962] 

Commissioner Tobriner relented in his opposition to the extent of saying that if safe, sanitary, 

and decent housing could be found for displaced families, he would join with General Clarke in 

approving interchange “C” and the routing of the East Leg in the 11th Street corridor, SE. On 

May 29, Tobriner and General Clarke met with Walter Washington, executive director of the 

National Capital Housing Authority. They learned that finding homes in the city for displaced 

families was not going to be easy. They said they were working on meshing highway 

construction with public housing availability, as well as “finding new sites for public housing.” 

They also wanted to encourage private enterprise to supply housing for low-income families.

They could not say when the highway projects might be resumed, but the Star reported on a 

report by the District Department of General Administration that shed light on the difficulties of 

coordinating highways and housing: 

The report states that there is a waiting list of around 8,000 families for public housing. 

Around 515 of these families have first priority for vacancies because they have been 

displaced by Government action. The critical need is for three, four and five bedroom 

units. The rate of placement and waiting time for public housing for some of these high 

priority families is five years or more.
The report then states that an additional 10,611 families will be displaced by Government 

action in the next five years. [Flor, Lee, “D.C. Seeks to Dovetail Housing and 

Highways,” The Evening Star, May 29, 1962] 

On June 5 and 6, Chairman Whitener’s House District subcommittee held hearings on the 

highway program. The subcommittee included Representatives Burke, Broyhill, and Charles 

McC. Mathias (R-Md.). (The fifth member, Representative Fernand J. St. Germain (D-RI), did 

not attend the hearings.) 

Edwin Seeger, NCTA’s general counsel, and Director Aitken were among the witnesses on 

June 5. Seeger asked the committee to delay Interstate projects until NCTA released its report in 

November. As an example of how the analysis might change since the Mass Transportation 

Survey, he pointed out that the 1959 recommendations had not considered maintenance costs or 

tax losses from highway construction. NCTA was working on a comparison of these costs for 

highways and transit. 

With the recent acceleration of highway plans in the District, NCTA could not be sure which 

decisions were final. However, he estimated that highways would remove 400 of the 2,000 acres 

currently on the District’s tax rolls, while the subway, being underground, would not remove any 

property. Highway maintenance would cost between $2 and $3 million a year, but the subway 

would be able to pay for maintenance from farebox receipts. He added, in response to a question 

from Chairman Whitener, that NCTA believed the rapid transit system could pay for its 

construction costs from fare revenue over a 50-year period.

Representative Broyhill told Seeger that his comments on the role of NCTA on highway 

development were inaccurate. Congress, Broyhill said, had spent $500,000 for the Mass 

Transportation Survey, then passed a law to develop the mass transit program. NCTA’s role was 

not to rethink the highway program. 

Aitken quoted from the National Capital Transportation Act of 1960 to show that NCTA was not 

responsible for highway planning or development. The 1960 Act was focused on creation of a 

Transit Development Program and, as noted earlier, language extending its mandate to planning 

freeways had been dropped from Senator Bible’s early version of the legislation. It now stated, 

Aitken reminded the subcommittee, that in planning the Transit Development Program, NCTA 

could acquire or construct transit facilities, including right-of-way for joint use with freeways:

The Agency may contribute funds for the acquisition of rights-of-way for, and the 

construction of limited amounts of freeway, parkway, and other arterial highway 

facilities, including construction incidental to the use and protection of such rights-of-way 

for transit facilities, to the government agencies having jurisdiction thereof if, in the 

opinion of the Agency, such contributions are necessary to the fulfillment of the 

objectives of this Act . . . . 

The legislation also stated:
The responsibility and authority for location, design, construction, and operation of 

freeways, parkways, and other arterial highway facilities shall remain with the 

government agencies having jurisdiction thereof, but all Federal agencies’ plans for 

location and design of highway facilities shall be forwarded to the Agency, and all State 

and local agencies’ plans for location and design of highway facilities may be requested 

by the Agency for its review and comment. The Agency shall cooperate with all planning 

agencies of the National Capital region and the appropriate government transportation 

regulatory agencies including the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission in 

the development of transportation facilities and, wherever feasible and desirable, develop 

joint plans for such agencies. 

Aitken said his staff was refining traffic forecasts, but that NCTA staff had made some 

“assumptions” that might require minor changes in the 1959 plan. “The nub of the new 

assumptions do [sic] not require any major changes in the recommendations for highways.” 

He also addressed the claim that the District was accelerating the freeway program to get 

construction underway before the NCTA report. To complete the Interstate program on schedule, 

Congress had recently increased authorizations for Interstate construction, along with an increase 

in the excise tax on gas. The District’s budget recommendations reflected the increased funds. 

[“Officials Trade Transit Arguments At Congressional Hearing on D.C.,” The Evening Star, 

June 5, 1962] 

On the second day of hearings, General Clarke discussed opponents of the highway program. 

Some wanted a delay until NCTA released its report in November while others wanted to delay 

the freeway program until the subway was in operation in the 1970s. “It will take a long time for 

rapid transit plans to be approved by all the reviewing agencies and by Congress.” 

The relocation problem came down to moving an average of 700 families a year between 1962 

and 1974. Of these, about 350 families will need relocation assistance and of these, about 240 

will need public housing. By keeping the problem in perspective, the city can solve it. 

General Clarke also addressed the allegation about speeding up the program. Like Aitken the 

day before, General Clarke said the District was using the increased congressional authorizations 

to make up for earlier delays. The District’s program was far behind the States, he said, and the 

city was trying to do what Congress indicated it wanted done when it increased Interstate 

funding. 

Chairman Whitener said that delaying freeway work until November was “a very definite 

possibility.” He explained that, “What worries me is what do you do with 28,000 people 

displaced by these highways.” He added that, “We may try some gentle persuasion after talking 

with the House District Appropriations subcommittee, to hold up the projects.” [Flor, Lee, 

“Road Jobs Delay By Congress Seen Definite Possibility,” The Evening Star, June 6, 1962] 

Chairman Whitener wrote to NCPC on June 12 to request clarification of its position on the Inner 

Loop, particularly regarding the availability of housing for families displaced by the project. On 
June 14, after what the Star’s Robert J. Lewis called “a two-hour wrangle,” NCPC unanimously 

adopted a resolution: 

Every action we take necessarily has an impact on people, and when we are asked to 

approve a plan that will displace thousands of people from their homes, we must be sure 

that our decision is taken only after we have had an opportunity to examine alternatives to 

the solution of the transportation. 

NCPC, the resolution continued, had approved the Inner Loop “in principle,” but not specific 

locations for its segments. In view of “changing conditions,” namely the housing issue, NCPC 

decided more time was needed before completing review of the Inner Loop. In short, NCPC 

wanted to wait for NCTA’s November report. At the same time, the resolution conceded that 

“the east and south legs of the inner loop would be needed whether the rest of the inner loop was 

constructed or not . . . .” 

The resolution directed Mrs. Rowe to inform Chairman Whitener that NCPC “recognizes that its 

responsibilities for comprehensive planning transcend consideration of traffic projects and 

transportation alone, and require dedication to both definition and achieve of desirable goals for 

the Nation’s Capital and residents.” 

According to the Star, the “anti-expressway members of the National Capital Planning 

Commission won a battle.” [Lewis, Robert J., “Inner Loop Delay Urged by Planners,” The 

Evening Star, June 14, 1962] 

The Star editors described the resolution as “a masterpiece of gobbledygook,” but at least it made 

clear that the East Leg was needed. Now, the editors suggested, if Chairman Whitener wanted to 

be constructive, he would help the city develop the relocation machinery needed before 

advancing the freeway. [“Chance to Help,” The Sunday Star, June 17, 1962] 

On June 22, the Committee on Appropriations approved a report on the District of Columbia 

Appropriation Bill, 1963. It covered, of course, many subjects, but in discussing the Inner Loop 

Highway System, the committee’s annoyance came through stemming from the Board of 

Commissioners’ reversal of position: 

During the hearings the partisans of rapid transit and the proponents of the highway 

program used every political issue and every possible source of opposition to bring about 

confusion and disorder—all to the detriment of the Capital City. The rivalry between 

these two groups is dangerous to the future development of the city. 

To add to the confusion, the National Capital Planning Commission decided recently that 

more time is needed before a final decision can be made on the Inner Loop highway 

system . . . . 

During the hearings two of the [District] Commissioners requested that certain sections of 

the Inner Loop be held in abeyance at this time. This action of course was unexpected. 

Since the Committee is not a policymaking Committee, it does not intend to decide this 

issue at this time. However, to expedite this matter, following the report from the 
National Capital Transportation Agency and the additional studies pertaining to routing 

and a proper removal of people displaced, if any, there will be an adequate amount in the 

[District] highway fund to solve this and other important problems which will confront 

the District highway officials in the near future.

Due to the indecision noted above, the Committee recommends the deletion of $170,000 

for the East Leg; $450,000 for the Northeast Freeway, and $546,700 for Interchange C. 

The committee recognized the need for “every precaution” to be taken before freeway 

construction begins to protect people forced out of their homes. 

Simply making the city more convenient for automobiles, as some critics charged, would be a 

mistake. “District officials must not place themselves in a position of being accused of 

attempting to handle traffic without any concern for the forces generating the traffic or for the 

manifold purposes that transportation, private and public, should serve.” Further, “Those who 

are opposed to highways and hope the temporary delay in the Inner Loop program will destroy 

the Freeway system should be disappointed.” The committee hoped that NCTA’s report in 

November “will assist in the solution of this problem.” [District of Columbia Appropriation Bill, 

1963, pages 3-4] 

Despite deleting funds for the East Leg, interchange “C,” and the Northeast Freeway, the 

Committee approved appropriations for the Three Sisters Bridge, the Potomac River Freeway, 

the Center Leg, the Southeast Freeway, and the 11th Street Bridge.

Commissioners Tobriner and Clarke issued a statement on deletion of funding for the East Legrelated projects. (Commissioner Duncan was on vacation.) They understood the committee to 

make two key points, namely that the NCTA report may help solve the problem and that 

Congress wanted adequate provision to be made for those displaced by freeway construction. If 

Congress did not pass the legislation under consideration for relocation help, the commissioners 

would continue “their efforts to provide legislation to furnish administrative machinery and 

moving allowances and to insure that adequate housing will be available for persons displaced.” 

These efforts would include a central relocation service and encouraging of private investment in 

low-incoming housing: 

The commissioners feel confident that it will be possible to provide for these people while 

maintaining required progress in the highway system. [McKelway, John, “District Budget Cut 

$9 million By House Unit,” The Evening Star, June 22, 1962] 

Enter Chairman Natcher

One of those concerned about the District’s freeway problems was Representative Natcher, who 

had become chairman of the Subcommittee on District of Columbia Appropriations, Committee 

on Appropriations, after the death of Chairman Louis C. Rabaut (D-Mi.) on November 12, 1961. 

While in Washington, he lived in the Berkshire Apartments at 4201 Massachusetts Avenue, NW. 
Schrag described Chairman Natcher as “obsessive, stubborn, suspicious, and vain,” a former 

prosecutor “who grouched privately about left-wingers, beatniks, and the Warren Court.” One 

of his obsessions was his voting record:

Most famously, from his arrival in Washington in 1953, he never missed a single roll-call 

vote, eventually making it into the Guinness Book of World Records with 18,401 

consecutive roll-call and quorum votes cast. 

Representative Natcher, who had been born in Bowling Green in 1909, served in the House from 

August 1, 1953, until his death on March 29, 1994. He was buried in Bowling Green “with his 

voting card after serving more than forty years in the House.” 

The chairman of the subcommittee was in “a position of essentially autocratic power.” This 

power was based in the constitutional requirement that all appropriations must originate in the 

House, but the District’s lack of congressional representation amplified the Natcher 

subcommittee’s power: 

Natcher so dominated his subcommittee that it often dispensed with formal votes. The 

full appropriations committee rarely overturned decisions of a subcommittee, which was 

presumed to have the most expertise, and Natcher’s southern courtesy and loyalty to 

House norms made him popular throughout the House, further insulating him from fear of 

being overturned on the floor. A Natcher decision could be expected to stick, so without 

his approval, the District could not spend a dime. 

He would play a critical role in the District’s freeway battles, but even opponents conceded he 

“was no stooge of the highway lobby.” He had initially opposed the Interstate System because he 

feared it “would give the Federal Government dictatorial control over roads in the States for all 

time to come,” and had voted against the House bill on its final day of consideration in 1955 on 

July 27. However, he had voted for the House version of the 1956 Act on April 27, 1956, when 

the bill passed 388-19. (The final version of the bill after conference with the Senate passed the 

House by voice vote). 

He had a good reason beyond public policy for supporting highway construction in the District 

and elsewhere:

His popularity at home depended on his delivering tens of millions of dollars’ worth of 

river projects for Kentucky each year. He had gained that power by cultivating an 

alliance with the House Public Works Committee, the same committee that had ordered 

the freeways built. Any threat to that committee’s sovereignty challenged his own ability 

to provide for his constituents. [Schrag, pages 122-124] 

On June 26, Chairman Natcher brought the District Appropriation Act, 1963, to the House floor. 

In discussing the Inner Loop plans, his introductory remarks went further than the committee 

report:

The rivalry between the partisans of rapid transit and the proponents of the highway 

program is dangerous to the future development of the city. The proposed freeway 
system for the District is not a political issue and those who believe this to be the 

situation are in for a rude awakening. The confusion and disorder attempted by the 

pressure groups during the last few weeks will not accomplish the desired results. 

The committee was concerned about the displaced families, an issue that must be addressed

before the Commissioners can move forward with the highway system: 

Again we most emphatically state that those who are opposed to highways and hope the 

temporary delay in the inner loop program will destroy the freeway system should be 

disappointed. 

Representative Gross pointed out that the Jones Point Bridge was supposed to be a bypass for 

through traffic, but it had opened “and yet we find Independence Avenue still carrying the same 

truck traffic from New York and other points along the eastern seaboard on south, and no relief 

from the heavy traffic in Washington.” (The Jones Point Bridge, renamed the Woodrow Wilson 

Memorial Bridge, opened on December 28, 1961) “What is wrong?” 

Chairman Natcher had to concede that Independence Avenue had “two traffic jams” the past 

week. “As soon as this freeway system is resolved, I can say to the gentleman that that heavy 

traffic will come off Independence Avenue.” 

Perhaps, Representative Gross suggested, “somebody is fumbling the ball somewhere,” and he 

wondered if the problem was that “they do not have the roads in Maryland in anticipation of 

which the bridge was built.” Chairman Natcher replied, “I would certainly agree with my 

friend.” 

Regarding the Inner Loop system, Representative Rhodes told his colleagues that NCTA’s study 

would be released in November, but that was not the only reason for withholding funds for the 

East Leg, Northeast Freeway, and interchange “C.” The committee also was concerned about the 

displaced families. “We feel the interim period can be utilized by the legislative committee and 

by the District Commissioners in an attempt to provide legislation to take care of the burdens 

which will fall on those people whose lives will be dislocated as a result of the construction.” 

Representative William L. Springer (R-Il.) asked if the two legs of the Inner Loop were 

indefinitely put off. Representative Rhodes explained that the appropriations committee was not 

a policymaking committee. However, when two of the three commissioners who approved the 

budget request for the Inner Loop segments changed their mind, it “caused the red light to go on 

as far as we were concerned.” The committee concluded that the best idea was to give “those 

who are engaged in the business of studying plans like this a chance to restudy the whole 

situation.” He pointed out that routing the East Leg along the Anacostia River might save money 

and reduce dislocations “if the National Park Service will go along with it.” 

Representative Rhodes had one other topic he wanted to discuss even though the bill did not 

address it. Another problem that “has been rather conveniently swept under the table for the last 

few years” was the link between the Inner Loop and Montgomery County, Maryland: 
The Wisconsin Ave. corridor has been well closed and locked by action of Congress. As 

far as I can tell, there have been no plans brought forth, and none contemplated, for 

connecting with the rather extensive system of roadways being built by the State of 

Maryland in Montgomery County. 

He hoped that “this problem will be the subject of study, and that the District Commissioners and 

the Highway Department will address themselves to these problems in the very near future.” 

(Representative Rhodes would have a personal interest in the issue; he lived at 5502 Pollard 

Road in Bethesda.) 

The House approved the bill without a recorded vote. [District of Columbia Appropriation Bill, 

1963, Congressional Record-House, June 26, 1962, pages 11721-11732] 

As the District prepared to solicit for bids to begin construction of the Southeast Freeway (along 

Virginia Avenue from South Capitol Street to the start of the proposed interchange “C” at 7th

Street, SE.), city officials were trying to find ways to accommodate the families that had received 

notices to move out of their homes by the end of September. A team of private real estate firms 

and social workers was searching for housing, especially for low-income families. The team was 

focused on large families because enough housing was available for small families. W. Donald 

Calomiris of William Calomiris Investment Corporation, chair of the committee, said, “If we put 

our heads together, we can find homes for those people.” The committee could postpone 

searching for homes for residents of the 68 units at the Ellen Wilson Housing project that were to 

be removed; they would not be touched for several years. [Flor, Lee, “Bids Open This Month on 

First Contract For $13.3 Million Southeast Freeway,” The Sunday Star, July 1, 1962] 

Senator Clifford P. Case (R-NJ), the ranking Republican on the Senate District Appropriations 

Subcommittee, was meeting with officials to examine transportation planning in preparation for 

the subcommittee’s hearings on the District budget. Senator Case, described by the Star as “a 

veteran of disputes over transportation issues in the New Jersey-New York City area,” wanted to 

ensure transportation planning was coordinated for the Washington area. Over the course of a 

week, he talked with General Clarke and Aitken. Separately, he met with Stolzenbach of NCTA 

and William Finley of NCPC.

After reviewing a draft of the NCTA report, he revealed that it called for elimination of two 

thirds of the Inner Loop. The segments were the East Leg, interchange “C,” the Northeast 

Freeway, and the Potomac River Freeway. It also indicated that the Three Sisters Bridge “may be 

unnecessary.” Stolzenbach, the previous November, had asked the District to postpone these 

projects until NCTA released its report.

General Clarke was surprised by the report of Stolzenbach’s continued opposition to Inner Loop 

segments:

Mr. Stolzenbach has about 10 different transportation plans, some with and some without 

the Inner Loop, General Clarke said. “The only thing I know is that he has said that he 

knew ‘intuitively’ that highways would not be required.” 
Five agencies, including the District, Maryland, and Virginia highway agencies and BPR, had 

been feeding information to NCTA’s computers. “This is the basis,” the Star summarized, for 

statement by highway planners that they know about the preliminary transportation agency 

report, and that preliminary traffic forecasts bear out the need for the Inner Loop.” 

Senator Case thought the area needed an “umpire” to cut through contradictory claims to protect 

property and prevent highway alignments that might serve traffic but harm the community. He 

pointed to urban renewal projects where communities had to develop a “workable plan” showing 

impacts not only on the affected neighborhood, but the whole community. Road builders and 

their powerful backers, in effect, dictated community planning by their selection of roads and 

alignments. He planned to introduce a bill that would give an agency, possibly the Housing and 

Home Financing Agency, the authority to withhold Federal funds until conflicts among highway, 

transit, sewer projects, and other projects are resolved. [“Study to Curb Road Projects,” The 

Sunday Star, July 8, 1962; Lindsay, John J., “Sen. Case Sees Need for Planning ‘Umpire,’” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, July 8, 1962] 

A Blistering Report

On August 3, 1962, the House Committee on the District of Columbia released a report titled 

“Accelerated D.C. Highway Program and One-Way Street Plan.” The Star and Post used the 

word “blistering” to describe the report in which the committee demanded that the District halt 

several Interstate projects immediately and accused the District commissioners of 

“circumventing” congressional policy “by not, in the interim, deferring action, as requested by 

the NCTA on certain projects,” and failing to give Members of Congress the information they 

need.

The report did not name the freeways, but appeared to be demanding a halt to the Potomac River 

Freeway, the Three Sisters Bridge, the East Leg of the Inner Loop, the Northeast Freeway, and 

interchange “C.” In response to the District commissioners’ change of position, the House had 

already voted to cut 1963 spending for three of the freeways, but funding remained in the 

appropriations bill for the Three Sisters Bridge and Potomac Freeway. 

Chairman Whitener wrote that by accelerating highway building, the District commissioners 

were in direct contradiction of congressional intent for a balanced highway and transit system as 

called for in the National Capital Transportation Act of 1960. The committee demanded that the 

commissioners delay freeway construction not already begun until NCTA releases its report. For 

Congress “to permit the District to act precipitously on its accelerated program” would be sheer 

folly since the NCTA report will be available for review when the second session begins in 

January. The goal was to avoid freeway construction that might preclude subway construction or 

be unnecessary if a subway were built. With the freeze, the only freeway construction that would 

be underway would be along the southern rim of the city from the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge to 

6th Street, SE.

The report also criticized District officials for not providing accurate estimates of highway 

spending. The estimates provided left out the cost of operation, tax losses from land 
acquisitions, and the cost of relocating approximately 28,000 people. Evaluations of impacts had 

been “vague and incomplete,” with only “rough calculations” of properties that would be needed. 

Traffic forecasts came in for particular criticism:

One of the most appalling revelations at the hearing [June 5 and 6] was the fact that no 

recent all-inclusive surveys have been made on which reliable forecasts of future 

requirements of the National capital region can be hinged. 

Projections were made without estimating total trips or dividing those trips among bus, rapid rail 

transit, and automobiles. Estimates also did not calculate the number of occupants in each car. 

The District Highway Department’s explanation was “totally unbelievable.” 

The report maintained that District traffic forecasters had not coordinated with NCTA despite the 

agency’s role in developing a balanced transportation system. The report pointed out that the 

Senate and House reports on the 1960 Act had said, “any attempt to meet the area’s 

transportation needs by highways and private automobiles alone will wreck the city.” 

The subcommittee asked NCPC to stop acting on disputed freeway projects until NCTA released 

its report and the projects could be put in context. “The subcommittee wants to make it clear that 

it is neither anti-highway nor anti-rapid transit, not pro-highway nor pro-transit. It stands for a 

balanced transportation system.” At the same time, the report stated:

Unfortunately and sadly, it must be admitted that little or no heed has been paid to the 

adverse esthetic effect of this whole highway program, going as it does into the beauty of 

our lovely Capital, nor to the attendant loss of parks and recreational areas in the Nation’s 

Capital. 

The report commented that General Clarke had “candidly admitted that highway planning has far 

outdistanced . . . relocation.” With 40,000 people waiting for public housing, the freeway 

program would add 28,000 more. The District was playing a form of musical chairs with 

relocatees by moving them into buildings scheduled to be demolished. This plan had “an Alice 

in Wonderland quality.” The idea “would be amusing were it not for the fact that it is to be 

inflicted on people who are least capable of caring for themselves.”

The subcommittee estimated that the city would lose between 300 and 400 acres of the 2,000 

acres of taxable land remaining in the old Federal city. The District would lose $1 million in tax 

revenue each year just from land that had been appraised for acquisition; the entire acquisition 

program would result in even more losses. These figures alone suggest that the highway 

acceleration program was a “decision made hastily, prompted by the unexpected availability of 

Federal highway funds.” 

Further, the report strongly criticized a proposal to convert 16 miles of downtown streets to oneway pairs. The goal was to increase the current 21 miles of one-way streets by 80 percent, 

according to Aitken. “This is startling,” the report said of the proposal. 

The Star summarized:
Washington is not Pompeii, House subcommittee men said. In old Pompeii, before A.D. 

79, narrow streets demanded one-way restrictions. But subcommittee members said 

Washington, abundantly blessed with wide avenues, does not need the same plan. 

General Clarke told reporters he was “most concerned that a subcommittee of Congress believed 

the District Commissioners were circumventing the will of Congress. This never was intended. 

As I conceive our job, it is to carry out the intent of Congress.” He promised to “study in great 

detail” the findings of the report. 

In view of the House’s actions, General Clarke said the Senate would have to be the arbiter. 

Reporter Grace Bassett reached Chairman Whitener by telephone at his home in North Carolina. 

He emphasized that the report was a deferral, not an end to the freeway projects. “It is not my 

intention to stop progress. But we want to progress in an orderly way.” He said the other 

members of the subcommittee agreed with him that highway-transit coordination was lacking 

here. They also shared his concern about dislocation of people. 

Bassett pointed out that the “stinging criticism of highway builders” was the latest in a series of 

developments that appeared to doom, at least temporarily, the Inner Loop: 

The House lifted $1.1 million out of the city budget for Interchange C, the east leg and 

the northeast freeway, after Commissioners, 2 to 1, reversed themselves and urged 

deferral.

Then, Senator Case, Republican of New Jersey, announced he would make sure at Senate 

budget hearings, probably next week, that highways will not overbalance proposed rapid 

rail lines for the area . . . .

This view supports the National Capital Transportation Agency concern that accelerated 

highway building will jeopardize rail transit before its [sic] off the agency drawing 

boards. 

All things considered, a delay or sharp cutback “seemed certain today.” [Bassett, Grace, “House 

Unit Demands Area Road Work Halt,” The Evening Star, August 3, 1962; Bassett, Grace, “Delay 

or Cutback Seen In D.C. Loop System,” The Evening Star, August 4, 1962; Carper, Elsie, “Hill 

Scores City’s Road Program,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, August 4, 1962] 

A Matter of Jurisdiction

The District commissioners and highway officials were convinced that the National Capital 

Transportation Act of 1960 left highway responsibilities with “the governmental agencies having 

jurisdiction thereof.” However, the subcommittee’s report appeared to take the side of NCTA 

and the anti-highway forces who claimed NCTA had veto power over the highway program. 

NCTA’s attorneys cited a provision they claimed conveyed veto power to the agency: 
The Agency’s studies include a continuation of the work begun in the mass transportation 

survey conducted by the National Capital Planning Commission and the National Capital 

Regional Planning Council . . . and shall include further studies as may be necessitated by 

changed conditions, the availability of new techniques, and the response of Government 

agencies and the public to the transportation plan adopted by the Commission and the 

Council. The Agency’s studies shall also include evaluations of the transportation 

recommended in the transportation plan, and of alternative facilities and kinds of services. 

The dispute left the “expressed intent” of Congress uncertain, as was the question of which 

projects the subcommittee wanted the District to halt immediately. Although lobbyists and 

citizens’ groups were attacking five projects, NCTA had called for a halt only to the Three 

Sisters Bridge and interchange “C.” Congress had authorized funds for the interchange in 1962, 

and had not opposed the project in 1963 – it withheld funds only at the request of the Board of 

Commissioners following its reversal of position.

The fate of the $38 million Potomac River Freeway was uncertain. The freeway began at about 

the intersection of 25th and G Streets, NW., was to go through a tunnel at New Hampshire and 

Virginia Avenues, northwesterly through the interchange at 27th and K Streets, and along the 

Potomac River on an elevated structure parallel to the Whitehurst Freeway to just west of 

Wisconsin Avenue. From there it would cross under the Whitehurst Freeway and Key Bridge 

onto the bluff in front of Georgetown University. The western half was linked to the Three 

Sisters Bridge, but the freeway would have to be built, with or without the bridge, to connect to 

the Potomac Palisades Parkway, which NPS was planning between Georgetown University and 

Chain Bridge. 

The District had received and opened bids for construction of the eastern half of the Potomac 

River Freeway (27th to 31 Street, NW.). The design for the western half was dependent on the 

fate of the Three Sisters bridge. General Clarke said, “I don’t think the subcommittee is against 

the Potomac River Freeway.”

The issue of which projects would be funded would have to be considered by the Senate 

Appropriations Committee [Flor, Lee, “Freeway Fate Uncertain,” The Sunday Star, August 5, 

1962] 

On July 10, the Subcommittee on the District of Columbia, Senate Committee on Appropriations 

began hearings on the District’s 1963 appropriations act, with Chairman Byrd and Senators Beall 

and Case present. The District’s Board of Commissioners, along with other city officials, 

presented the budget proposal to the subcommittee. It covered all District activities, but their 

presentation did not prompt a discussion of the freeway impasses the city was experiencing. 

However, as the first day ended, Senator Case made a suggestion that reflected his recent 

discussions with parties to the dispute. Addressing Chairman Byrd, he said: 

At an appropriate time I would like to ask your permission to ask Mr. Stolzenbach of the 

National Capital Transportation Agency to make any comments that might be helpful to

us in regard to the whole highway and transportation program. I understand that his 
Agency is not within the jurisdiction of our committee directly, but I think his testimony 

on the developments within the jurisdiction might be helpful to us. 

Senator Byrd agreed. “I am sure we can arrange to do that.” [District of Columbia 

Appropriations for 1963, Hearings on H.R. 12276 before the Subcommittee of the Committee on 

Appropriations, United States Senate, 87th Congress, 2d Session, part 1, page 116] 

The Star said of Senator Case’s request:

Mr. Stolzenbach, as a presidential appointee, and his agency as a congressionally created 

unit, do not fall under the jurisdiction of the District Appropriations Subcommittees. But 

Senator Case is determined to co-ordinate city highway programs with master 

development plans due to be given President Kennedy in November by Mr. Stolzenbach. 

[“Sharp Queries by Byrd Hit District Budget,” The Evening Star, July 10, 1962] 

Two days later, Stolzenbach met with President Kennedy at the White House for a half hour to 

provide a progress report on NCTA’s work. Stolzenbach said that his report will recommend 

highways and rapid transit facilities. He and the President also discussed the idea of a subway 

from Union Station to downtown employment centers, a concept that was included in the 

National Capital Transportation Act of 1960. “Stolzenbach told reporters, “it was a very 

delightful meeting.”

President Kennedy said, “I am much encouraged by the progress being made by the agency in 

finding solutions to the region’s critical transportation problems.” He also indicated that 

NCTA’s balanced transportation approach might provide ideas for other urban areas with similar 

transportation problems. [Flor, Lee, “President Pleased by Transit Progress,” The Evening Star, 

July 12, 1962] 

The Star’s editors were pleased that President Kennedy was “much encouraged,” but regretted he 

did not disclose what he was encouraged about. “It should be encouraging to everyone, however, 

that the President apparently has dealt himself a personal hand in the confused and controversial 

Washington area transportation game.” The real curiosity about the pending report was not the 

rapid transit element but the expectation, “most recently expressed by Senator Case of New 

Jersey, that the report will state that a number of Washington area highways, including portions 

of the inner loop, ‘may not be necessary.’” 

If Stolzenbach “has discovered new data” that justifies trimming back the planned freeways, the 

case “will be relatively simple.” What would happen, the editors asked, “if his 

recommendations, rather than being persuasive, [would] merely add fuel to the ridiculous feud 

between the proponents of highways and the proponents of mass transit, which already has 

severely damaged both of these essential programs?”

The editors agreed with Senator Case about the “crying need for someone to co-ordinate these 

two programs after the NCTA report is issued.” The White House might be a good place for that 

coordination. “A good place to begin is to insure that the November report will not simply 
precipitate a divisive and harmful donnybrook.” [“Timely Intervention,” The Sunday Star, 

July 15, 1962] 

On July 19, the Senate’s District appropriations subcommittee held a single day of testimony 

from outside witnesses, many of whom wanted to discuss the District’s Interstate freeway plans. 

The Star summarized:

Bitter denunciation of the District’s highway program broke loose again today as a Senate 

subcommittee continued its study of the District budget. Most witnesses applauded the 

House for postponing action on three key projects in the Inner Loop system. Others went 

so far as to request a moratorium on any new highway construction, even street widening. 

In most cases, the witnesses presented their statements with limited or no questioning by the 

Senators Byrd, Case, or Norris H. Cotton (R-NH).

The first few witnesses urged the subcommittee to keep the freeway program moving forward. 

Charles E. Phillips of the Washington Board of Trade emphasized that, “Careful and competent 

engineering studies indicate the need for the inner loop plus radial highways, even with the full 

utilization of the contemplated mass transportation facilities.” The board supported the Inner 

Loop, which “would improve business conditions in this section of the city” and make downtown 

“more attractively accessible for doing business,” as Downtown Progress had said. Lionel 

Kaplan of the Automotive Trade Association, National Capital Area, and AAA’s Miller also 

spoke in support of the freeway network. [pages 495-501] 

The first anti-highway witness was Hilliard H. Goodman of the Citizens Transit Improvement 

Association. His organization had been promoting rapid transit for the area for the past 71⁄2 years. 

“By rapid transit, we mean rail rapid transit, which in our view is real rapid transit.” His group 

was concerned about freeways that would interfere with rapid transit development. The nearly 

complete Southwest Freeway, for example, would not, but the following would: Anacostia 

Freeway between South Capitol Street and the proposed new 11th Street Bridge; Southeast 

Freeway from South Capitol Street to 7th Avenue, NE.; interchange “C”; Potomac River 

Freeway; Three Sisters Bridge; Northeast Freeway; and East Leg of the Inner Loop. [pages 501-

504] 

Polly Shackleton, the Democratic National Committeewoman, said the committee was 

“gratified” that the House had deleted funds from the 1963 budget for interchange “C,” the 

Northeast Freeway, and the East Leg. “We opposed those projects primarily because of the 

tremendous unresolved housing and relocation problems that would have been created for more 

than 10,000 District of Columbia residents.” 

She urged the subcommittee to delete funds as well for the Three Sisters Bridge and the Potomac 

River Freeway. Her organization’s opposition to these projects “stems not from philosophical 

opposition to highways.” In general, the highways were needed to help people move across the 

city. However, Congress had created NCTA in 1960 to coordinate a balanced transportation 

system and submit its recommendations to the President by November 1, 1962. 
She was particularly concerned about the District’s accelerated schedule for the Three Sisters 

Bridge. As recently as September 1960, the District scheduled the bridge for construction in 

1966. Suddenly, in 1961, the bridge “was accelerated to top-priority status.” Last November, 

NCTA had informed NCPC that the bridge should not be constructed in 1963 because, as NCTA 

put it, its construction “will inevitably create pressure for construction of the north and west legs 

of the inner loop, of Route 66, and a parkway through Glover-Archbold Park.” 

Delaying the Three Sisters Bridge and interchange “C” was “absolutely essential if any serious 

reevaluation is to be made of the 1959 transportation plan.” She added that after the District 

submitted its budget including freeway matching funds, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield 

(D-Mt.) had introduced S. 2436 to transfer the District’s road right-of-way through the park to 

the Department of the Interior, which she implied would not approve the necessary extension of 

the freeway from the bridge.

She said that alternative ways to link I-66 to the Interstate System in the District “may prove 

more feasible and less disruptive than the projected Three Sisters Bridge, Potomac Freeway, 

north leg route.” Spending millions of dollars to begin building a bridge “on an undeniably 

accelerated basis,” would force the expenditure of many millions of dollars on other freeway 

links to the bridge “just 3 months before Congress received the report which it directed NCTA to 

prepare, especially in view of the fact that NCTA has already clearly opposed the construction of 

Three Sisters during fiscal 1963”: 

We see no reason for Congress to tie its hands by making a judgment before all the facts 

are in. And the cart which the Highway Department is asking Congress to put before the 

horse is enormously expensive – $3 million for Three Sisters Bridge and $18,768,000 for 

the Potomac River Freeway.

The District’s money could better be spent “where the need is both clear and acute—on this 

city’s children, who need and deserve more and better schools, teachers, and textbooks.” [pages 

518-521] 

Throughout the day, witnesses opposed specific freeways, favored transit, expressed concern 

about displaced families, and urged the subcommittee to delay the District’s plans until NCTA 

released its report in November. Supporters of the freeway system, such as Harold E. Wirth of 

the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company in Washington and Eugene I. Kane representing the 

District Trucking Association, appeared to have a vested interest in automobile transportation. 

[The complete day’s testimony from outside witnesses can be found in the hearing report, pages 

489-600; also see “McKelway, John, “Speakers Disagree On Highway Plans,” The Evening Star, 

July 19, 1962, for a summary of testimony] 

On July 19, Acting Secretary of the Interior John A. Carver, Jr., withdrew NPS approval for use 

of park lands for the Three Sisters Bridge or its approaches. He was replying to a letter from 

Majority Leader Mansfield, regarding the bridge’s impact on park values associated with Spout 

Run Park, the George Washington Memorial Parkway, and Glover-Archbold Park. NPS, Carver 

wrote, had agreed to allow District highway officials to use the Spout Run access to the George 

Washington Memorial Parkway for the approaches to the Three Sisters Bridge, but on the 
District side, the bridge abutment at the foot of Glover-Archbold Park would lead to construction 

of a parkway through the park. “The Three Sisters Bridge proposal is unique [because] this 

single highway proposal would wipe out the scenic treasure of the Potomac Palisades on one side 

of the river and point like a loaded pistol through the center of a critically needed park on the 

other.” 

The Interior Department’s responsibility was “to preserve the park areas under its jurisdiction 

within the National Capital region.” In the absence of direction by Congress to the contrary, 

“there is no disposition on my part to consider that the standards to be applied here should be any 

different or any lower than those set forth for national parks and parkways generally”: 

For this reason, the Department is opposed to the construction of the Three Sisters Bridge 

which so vitally involves important units in the park system of the National Capital and 

the palisades of the Potomac River.

He did not want the Department’s opposition to be “misunderstood as callous disregard for the 

very serious and vexatious traffic problems confronting this metropolitan area.” Virginia 

commuters were exposed to delays and safety hazards:

But the Three Sisters proposal represents only a makeshift attempt to secure relief with no 

apparent relationship to a coordinated master plan. Congress has provided for such longrange planning through creation of the National Capital Transportation Agency. Until 

that Agency presents its program, we cannot be certain that the Three Sisters Bridge is the 

compelling necessity that its advocates claim. Conceivably, premature commitment to 

that structure might be an impediment to a more comprehensive solution. It would seem 

inconceivable that, on such expedient grounds, we should consent to the destruction of 

the irreplaceable community assets represented by these park areas.

In closing, he acknowledged that a bridge at virtually any location along the Potomac River in the 

Washington area would involve park lands. “We believe, however, that the Three Sisters Bridge 

crossing involves the greatest potential destruction of park property of any site along the Potomac 

River in this area, and that alternatives can be selected with a minimal effect upon the park 

lands.” 

On July 25, NPS Director Wirth informed Virginia Highway Commissioner H. H. Harris of 

Assistant Secretary Carver’s decision. Based on Carver’s letter, “I find it necessary to rescind the 

tentative approval I had heretofore given you for the use of park lands for the approaches to the 

proposed Three Sisters Bridge.”

The Star reported on the denials on July 27, indicating that Wirth had read Assistant Secretary 

Carver’s letter into the record during a hearing on July 23 before Chairman Whitener’s 

subcommittee. [“Interior Bars Three Sisters Span, Road,” The Evening Star, July 27, 1962; the 

letters will be found at: District of Columbia Appropriations for 1963, Hearings on H.R. 12276 

before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 87th

Congress, 2d Session, part 2, pages 1675-1677] 
On July 31, as mentioned earlier, the District opened three segments of the Inner Loop Freeway 

system: The 12th Street expressway, the Washington Channel Bridge, and part of the Southwest 

Freeway.

Representative Gerald R. Ford, Jr. (R-Mi.) was one Member of Congress who did not agree with 

waiting for the NCTA report was. On August 6, the House was considering a resolution 

consenting to amendments to the Washington area’s metropolitan transit regulation compact 

agreed to by Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. As debate on the resolution 

began, Representative Ford rose to discuss a related but different issue: 

I think it is about time someone said that all the transportation problems of the 

metropolitan area of the District of Columbia are not going to be solved by this transit 

report that we are all waiting for with bated breath.

Mr. Speaker, I happen to think that there are at least some people in that organization who 

are not the ultimate and final authority on how some of us are to get from our home to our 

office and back again. I happen to believe that there are some people who have worked 

long and faithfully on highway and traffic problems in the District of Columbia who, in 

my opinion, have done a pretty good job under difficult circumstances.

Mr. Speaker, I am getting a little sick and tired of everything being held in abeyance in 

this area, waiting with bated breath for this great report which is about to be forthcoming . 

. . . I just want to be on record right here and now to the effect that as soon as this report 

is made we are not all going to roll over and play dead waiting for Mr. Stolzenbach—I 

guess that is his name—to tell us what we are supposed to do . . . . 

I do not like a lot of Johnny-come-lately’s stepping in the picture and deciding that 

everything which has been done in the past is wrong and everything they propose is going 

to be right. I have said my piece, but if I am here next year I am going to look with a 

very, very skeptical eye at some of these long-haired ideas which I understand may be 

contained in the report. [Washington Metropolitan Transit Compact Amendments, 

Congressional Record-House, August 6, 1962, page 15600] 

None of his colleagues reacted to his comments during the debate, which resulted in approval of 

the resolution in support of the amendments. 

(Representative Ford and his family lived in Alexandria, Virginia, at 514 Crown View Drive. 

His daily commute when Congress was in session benefited from improvements to Shirl in 

southwest and southeast Washington. He still lived at 514 Crown View Drive when he became 

Vice President on December 6, 1973, and drove from there with a Secret Service escort to the 

White House to take his oath of office as President on August 9, 1974.) 

Although Representative Ford’s comment did not provoke his colleagues, Donald Gingery shared 

the contempt of Stolzenbach. During a meeting of the Maryland-National Capital Park and 

Planning Commission, he accused NCTA of not cooperating with the area’s planning bodies. He 
said that Stolzenbach had “preconceived notions” about the area’s transit needs and had 

“absolute disregard” for the views of the jurisdictions involved. 

NCTA, Gingery said, was “run with no intent to co-operate with the States.” When planners 

asked NCTA about area transit plans, they receive “nothing but the most miserable gobbledygook” in reply. 

He introduced a resolution calling for a meeting with the Governors of Maryland and Virginia to 

request they file suit in Federal court to require NCTA to spell out its plans; seek congressional 

action to amend the 1960 Act to add two administrators to NCTA who would be appointed by 

the Governors; and ask Congress to deny funds to NCTA until it cooperated with the surrounding 

jurisdictions.

As Vice Chairman Brewer pointed out, “We have complete control where it affects the State of 

Maryland.” He added that Stolzenbach “has tried to keep us informed the best he could” and 

hoped to give the commission a look at the transit plans before September 25. The Gingery 

resolution failed for lack of a second. [“Transportation Agency Hit as Unco-operative,” The 

Evening Star, August 9, 1962] 

On August 10, the Senate subcommittee on District appropriations held an afternoon session on 

the Department of Highways and Traffic. Among those representing the District were: Aitken 

and his deputy director, Thomas F. Airis, along with Commissioners Tobriner and Clarke. As 

requested by Senators Case and Byrd, Stolzenbach joined the panel along with Seeger, NCTA’s 

general counsel, and E. Sherman Perlman, special assistant to the Administrator.

Stolzenbach was the first to address the panel. “Transportation facilities, whether one is talking 

about highways or subway systems, have a profound impact on the growth and health of our 

urban areas.” He discussed the history of transportation studies in recent years, leading to the 

Mass Transportation Survey. Instead of adopting the survey’s plan, Congress passed the 

National Capital Transportation Act of 1960, which directed NCTA to evaluate the survey’s plan 

and consider alternative facilities and services. As stated in Section 102, the key requirement 

was for planning, on a regional basis, “a unified system of freeway, parkways, express transit 

service on exclusive rights-of-way and other major transportation facilities.”

Stolzenbach said that if that language “were not clear enough,” the House and Senate reports on 

the legislation spelled out the congressional intent. For example, the Senate report stated: 

It is becoming increasingly evident that any attempt to meet the area’s transportation 

needs by highways and private automobiles alone will wreck the city—it will demolish 

residential neighborhoods, violate parks and playgounds, desecrate the monumental 

portions of the Nation’s capital, and remove much valuable property from the tax rolls. 

NCTA had not scrapped the Mass Transportation Survey, but had embarked on analysis of 

alternative rapid transit and highway systems “in an effort to develop a combined system which 

will best meet the future needs of the region at the least cost.”
As for freeways, NCTA had to consider the elements that were committed and those still open to 

review. “A year ago it appeared that much of the system, including the proposed inner loop and 

radials in north Washington, was uncommitted.” That changed when the District commissioners 

proposed “a sharply accelerated highway program” for FY 1963 that moved interchange “C” up 

by 1 year and the Three Sisters Bridge by 4 years. “Construction of these key projects would 

have the effect of forcing construction of much of the highway system proposed in the mass 

transportation survey.” As a result, allowing these accelerated projects to proceed in 1963 

“would contradict the directive given the Agency by Congress.” It also would “prejudge the 

issue of what shall be the future transportation system in the National Capital region—the very 

issue which Congress reserved for its decision by the passage of the National Capital 

Transportation Act of 1960.” 

In response to questions from Senator Gale W. McGee (D-Wy.), Stolzenbach said NCTA had 

been working with highway agencies in the District, Maryland, and Virginia to estimate future 

traffic. This work had been underway for 2 years, but just recently a member of his staff had said 

the highway planners they were working with “were in complete agreement on all of the factors 

that were going into these traffic forecasts.” These factors would affect the balance of highway 

and transit proposed in the November report. “Quite obviously now, with the inferior transit 

service we have here, for many rides it takes twice as long to take the bus as it does to ride your 

car.” With a rail rapid transit system, that would not be the case. “We will relate it to the cost, 

the relative costs of riding public transportation versus driving an automobile, paying parking 

fees downtown.” 

One of Senator McGee’s questions grew out of a study by Wilbur Smith and Associates that 

projected only a small percentage of traffic in outlying areas was downtown-oriented, thus 

reducing the value of rail rapid transit. Stolzenbach did not consider that a valid conclusion: 

I cannot believe that if we have a rapid transit system it will not reduce the requirements 

for freeways because if you are going to get between 60 and 80 percent of the people who 

ride from suburbs to downtown peak hours [to] ride transit, you are . . . going to need the 

number of freeways that have been predicted.

The type of freeways under consideration “are not the kind of freeways required for the vast 

number of daily movements that are involved in a total daily county,” even though they were the 

type that BPR endorses for peak hour needs: 

We certainly need more freeways, more highways. No question about it . . . I have been 

saying this ever since I have been in office. The question here is of the balance, and the 

balance has to be struck in relation to a large number of considerations: Costs, the 

disruption of the city, and meeting the peak hour requirements. 

Senator McGee wondered about the role of buses if “we would have a rather well integrated 

freeway system and a minimal, maybe a minimal subway system downtown.” Would not buses 

on freeways make sense? Stolzenbach replied that NCTA would recommend many arteries to 

include bus transport, but buses entering the center “cannot do the job of distributing people in 

the downtown area rapidly and efficiently and if you require them to make too many transfers in 
order to do this, they [commuters] are simply not going to ride transit and . . . solve the basic 

problem, which is to relieve congestion and to provide a more effective transit system.” 

He was not prepared to unveil all the details that would be in the November report, but he said: 

Buses have a role. Rapid transit has a role and the automobile has a role and the 

highways have a role. And I assure you that there is going to be a very substantial 

highway program recommended in our overall plan . . . . 

We are zeroing in on it. We have some ideas as to the direction in which it is going . . . . 

Many of the major things are clear. We are trying to present a system that will stand up 

under a rigorous examination in terms of its economics, in terms of the things that it will 

do for this city. 

When Senator Case’s question time came, he asked about the Three Sisters Bridge, “one of the 

things that have been concerning you as possibly prejudicing the results of your study if they are 

allowed to proceed.” He asked Stolzenbach if the bridge was the only project he wants the 

subcommittee to de-fund for 1963. Stolzenbach replied, “That would be my recommendation, 

yes, sir.” 

Senator Case asked why NCTA objected to the bridge. Stolzenbach replied that as best he had 

been able to determine, “the principal justification for it is to provide a route for trucks to get into 

the District of Columbia from Route 66,” because they would not be able to use the Theodore 

Roosevelt Bridge. The question, therefore, was how trucks would get into the District: 

If the traffic figures don’t show the need for another bridge, it seems to me that we ought 

to examine very seriously whether we are just building this bridge for the sole reason of 

bringing trucks into the District of Columbia.

He assumed alternatives existed, such as directing trucks from I-66 via Jefferson Davis Highway 

to the 14th Street Bridge on Shirley Highway, a distance of about 2 miles. “This highway exists; 

with a very minimum of modification [Jefferson Davis Highway] could be brought up to 

interstate standard and provide a perfectly adequate interstate truck route connecting with 66.” 

(In this area, the Jefferson Davis Highway parallels the Potomac River from Crystal City to 

Rosslyn. It was built in the 1940s as part of the Pentagon Road Network. On December 17, 

1964, the State took over ownership and maintenance responsibility from BPR for the Pentagon 

Road Network. The highway was then designated State Route 110.) 

Another factor was the Mansfield bill regarding the Glover-Archbold Park. If that bill becomes 

law, “I think that that rather effectively closes out that as one of the major circumferential 

highways in the region. 

What about the Potomac River Freeway, which the House had funded. Stozenbach replied, “I 

think whatever funds were in there for the Potomac River freeway we could not comment.” It 

was essentially an extension of the George Washington Memorial Parkway “and we have had no 

question with this as a major freeway artery along the river there.” It was probably needed, 
especially since Congress allowed funding for bus stations and parking lots along the memorial 

parkway. The Three Sisters Bridge was another matter. “We see nothing in the traffic estimates 

as far as we have gone that indicate the need for it and we feel again that there is no reason to 

make the decision now that you have to have Three Sisters Bridge.” [District of Columbia 

Appropriations for 1963, Hearings on H.R. 12276 before the Subcommittee of the Committee on 

Appropriations, United States Senate, 87th Congress, 2d Session, part 2, pages 1651-1667] 

Senator Case invited Aitken to respond. Aitken said the Three Sisters Bridge was not 

exclusively for trucks. It “has formed a vital link in [the] proposed regional highway system ever 

since the publication of the 1959 mass transportation plan.” The need was solid since traffic 

across the river had increased from 100,000 in 1942 to 300,000 in the early 1960s. The river was 

a limitation on capacity directly affecting Virginia. Without additional bridge capacity, 

development of northern Virginia would be held back, but with it, would continue to attract 

Federal offices: “More Pentagons, more CIA’s, and so forth.” He continued: 

The District might consider taking a completely indifferent attitude with reference to the 

needs and requirements of nearby Virginia, but there seems to be little doubt that a proper 

appraisal warrants action on a total metropolitan basis.

Insofar as practical, such action should be based on logic and practicality. The overall 

plan: It is ironic that some of the agencies contesting the Three Sisters Bridge are at the 

same time planning and advancing projects which require the Three Sisters Bridge, 

specifically, the National Park Service desires to close the East Drive between Lincoln 

Memorial and Reflecting Pool.

NPS wanted to get as much traffic as possible from the Lincoln Memorial. “With this reduction 

in traffic, it becomes all the more apparent that the construction of the Three Sisters Bridge must 

be accelerated.”

The Cabin John Bridge and the Woodrow Wilson Memorial Bridge were part of the Capital 

Beltway and would carry through traffic, but “only 3 percent of the passenger cars approaching 

this metropolitan area were interested in going past Washington.” The rest of the traffic 

remained within the metropolitan area. With those two bypass bridges on the fringes of the 

metropolitan area . . . we have a doubt at the moment as to whether these bridges will have a full 

capacity or will serve a full volume during peak hours, at any early date.” More information 

would be gathered when they both were in full service, “but the Three Sisters Bridge is a key 

element in the provision of this additional capacity.” 

Senator Case asked Aitken what harm would occur if construction of the bridge were delayed 

until 1964. After all, by then, the District would have a better idea of how much traffic would 

use the Cabin John Bridge and the Woodrow Wilson Bridge. 

Aitken replied that traffic would increase regardless. “I could not honestly say that if we didn’t 

build a bridge this year or next year that the area or the traffic situation would be totally 

impossible.” For example, the Washington Channel Bridge, which had opened on July 31, was 

already carrying 25,000 vehicles a day. Aitken could not predict “an absolute disaster” if the 
Three Sisters Bridge were delayed for 6 months or a year, but “I think it would be unfortunate 

because I think that the built-up demands for highways in this area, as elsewhere in the Nation, 

are tremendous, and even if you work at it constantly it is difficult to catch up.” [pages 1667-

1673] 

General Clarke said he was concerned that those who were advocating delay of the bridge until 

after the NCTA report was released “would regard a deferral action on the part of Congress as 

tantamount to a disapproval of the particular bridge.” He observed that Senator Mansfield had 

already said he would oppose the Three Sisters Bridge and that the House District Committee 

also had recommended deferral, “so I am a little reluctant to fly in the face of both of those.” 

However, “I feel I should tell you my feelings on it.” 

In addition to what Aitken had said, General Clarke pointed out: 

Ever since I came here I was concerned that we build usable segments of our highway 

system, that we not build pieces here and there, but we start in the center and build out. If 

you will look at the pattern of our highway development program we are tackling the 

most difficult areas in which to build in the heart of the city and then are trying to take it 

out so that it will be usable as it is completed.

As noted earlier, NPS was building the parkway to the District line. The next link was the 

Potomac River Freeway, which would require a bridge in the vicinity of Three Sisters Islands. 

Therefore, “we should begin the Potomac Freeway to make allowance for that bridge to be built, 

and should actually build some of the structures of that bridge. This is what these appropriations 

would do this year; they would allow us to get started on that.” The situation, he acknowledged, 

was complicated by the fact that NPS had withdrawn its concurrence in the use of park lands for 

the bridge on July 19 in response to a question from Senator Mansfield. 

Senator Byrd asked about the views of Arlington County, Virginia. General Clarke said he had 

not received any direct contacts from the county but understood from news reports that the 

county wanted to defer action on the Three Sisters Bridge until after NCTA released its report.

When Senator Case pointed out that the use of Glover-Archbold Park for a parkway was in doubt 

in view of the Mansfield bill and NPS opposition, General Clarke replied, “We have had three 

separate agreements with the Park Service on how this land might be used, and they have 

withdrawn on each one of them, sir.” 

Aitken added: 

The 1959 MTS plan included Three Sisters and Glover-Archbold as part of what they 

called the intermediate loop [Fort Drive]. We subsequently dropped that . . . 

The current plan, he said, did not “contemplate anything in regard to the Glover-Archbold 

Parkway. He explained the current plan, known as M-7, that avoided Glover-Archbold Park: 

Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, for background this plan is identified in our records as 

"M-7." We started out with plan A, and this is indicative of how many plans we have 
drawn to get to this point. [Referring to a map] This indicates the present Whitehurst 

Freeway. It crosses under Key Bridge, ties into Canal Road and Key Bridge and into M 

Street. This lower red line shows the location of the second proposed freeway. At this 

point, that is at about 31st Street, it would be about at the same level as the present 

Whitehurst, continuing westerly it loses elevation and curves under Whitehurst at 

approximately 33d Street. By the time the new freeway gets to Key Bridge it is under the 

present Whitehurst Freeway. Continuing to the west, the present connections to Key 

Bridge would be removed. Outbound, that is Whitehurst Freeway, would be extended on 

to the northwesterly – above the canal, above Canal Road, up on the bluff in front of 

Georgetown University . . . 

Inbound traffic would come off Three Sisters Bridge. This is up in the air above Canal 

Road, curving to the right, and continue in an easterly direction on the bluff, below the 

outbound roadway, and extend easterly to this point just about south of Georgetown 

University. Canal Road would have only inbound traffic on it at this point, and such 

traffic would have an opportunity to get on the freeway, or stay on M. Street. 

Old Canal Road likely will be an extension of one roadway to serve the George 

Washington Memorial Parkway, and it ties in directly with this freeway, and with 

M Street in Georgetown, so the traffic has a choice. Prospect Street would be extended to 

the west, and tie into a parking area at Georgetown University. This has been worked out 

with the university, and they support this plan. In the vicinity of the lower end of GloverArchbold Parkway – I should back up and pick up M Street about a block west of Key 

Bridge. At this point traffic westbound on M Street would curve to the right and go up on 

the bluff to the right of the freeway, that is, between the freeway and the Georgetown 

University road, continuing westerly on the bluff and above the freeway, tying in at a 

point out just southwest of the intersection of MacArthur Boulevard and Foxhall Road. 

At that point, traffic again would have a choice. It could either continue up the parkway 

or curving to the right it could go to MacArthur Boulevard or Foxhall Road. 

Senator CASE. Even if you do not run a parkway or freeway up through the park, you do 

plan to take quite a piece of the park . . . for use in this traffic pattern, do you not? 

Mr. AITKEN. Well, sir, that is a one-lane loop, and I think the impact would be very 

minor. 

Senator CASE. Is it elevated or is it ground level or what? 

Mr. AITKEN. Well, no, sir; it is on fill and at ground level. These contours indicate the 

nature of the ground. That is 100 feet. This is 125 just west of the gym at Georgetown. 

It drops to 50, that is a total drop of 75 feet in a very short distance. While this would use 

some of the park, Senator, it also would get rid of somethings they would like to get rid 

of. The old transit bridge, and certain other undesirable things and the resultant facility 

would be landscaped and attractively improved. [pages 1673-1679] 

Aitken said he wanted to make an important point, namely that “unless we can build, somehow, 

an integrated freeway system in the city, and in the metropolitan area, we cannot meet, we cannot 

adequately serve, our transportation needs in the future”:
There is no city in the land today which has a completed freeway system. Some cities are 

quite well along, but none of them have a completed system, and I think it is quite 

obvious if the Interstate System, for example, is built elsewhere, and it is not built here, I 

think we face some nice problems and nice predicaments.

He described the issues concerning the link between I-70S, which was built to Pooks Hill, and 

the District; the connection between the Baltimore-Washington Parkway and downtown 

Washington; how to get I-95 traffic from the District line to downtown, and I-66 moving from 

Virginia to the city:

Now, here we have an Interstate Highway System coming along . . . . I think there is a 

great deal of pressure for the reconstruction and modernization of that part of the 

Interstate Highway System . . . . We have these things coming toward the city. Are we 

going to say we will stop them out here, the beltway, or here some place at the river, at 

the District line? [pages 1685-1686] 

Senator Byrd asked Stolzenbach about his coordination with District highway officials as they 

prepared the 1963 budget. Stolzenbach acknowledged that “it is evident that there is 

disagreement between the Agency and the District of Columbia Highway Department on what 

should be done next year.” However, they had established what he regarded “as probably the 

most important example of joint highway transit planning, in other words, total urban 

transportation planning,” that had ever occurred in the Washington area: 

I was talking to the Federal Highway Administrator yesterday and he said he was terribly 

excited about it. That is one of the reasons why they have assigned five of their people, 

their technicians, to help us and observed it because they want to apply this joint 

technique to other cities where they have comparable problems. 

He did not think any substantive or even procedural issue existed on planning: 

It is sort of a question of whether you want to take a plan, essentially that was based on an 

all-highway solution that is 5 years old, and say that we are going to go ahead with this 

because money is available, or whether you want to wait just a little bit because we are 

not for a 5-year study or even a 1-year study. This is all in the mill, and next January 

Congress is going to have the most up to date and, I think, the best plan from the point of 

view of application, using the best professional planning techniques that we have 

available in a plan for this region. It will not be just an integrated highway plan, but an 

integrated transportation plan. [page 1687] 

Officials continued sparring over the planned freeway network, then returned on August 10 to 

continue the discussion. General Clarke, after discussing his background and role, summarized 

what he saw as the transportation goal: 

I think our major objective in all of these discussions is to provide a transportation system 

for the city that will be effective, that will meet the needs of the people, and will to some 

extent meet the desires of the people. And this is what all of our discussions are trying to 
resolve, to come down to an effective, reasonable, desirable transportation system. And I 

think we are all agreed on this as our objective. 

The Mass Transportation Survey recommended creation of a coordinating agency to get a mass 

transit program underway while area jurisdictions worked out a compact for a replacement 

organization to complete the job. The result, General Clarke said, was NCTA. He referred to 

views that NCTA was to take over transportation planning, including highway planning, and 

Chairman Whitener’s report accusing the District commissioners of circumventing the will of 

Congress by not holding off on certain projects until NCTA released its report. 

The intent of Congress in creating NCTA had become unclear. “There is language in there 

which has been cited by people who feel that there is a mandate, that there is a requirement that 

NCTA evaluate this study, and then presumably decide whether it is good or bad and then go on 

and do something.” At the same time, Congress had expressed its will in other ways:

As I see it, the intent of Congress is expressed in the legislative history, the act itself, and 

in the actions of Congress subsequent to the passage of the act, and by certain things that 

were not said in the act that created the Agency.

For example, Congress had continued appropriating funds for highway development after passing 

the National Capital Transportation Act of 1960. In that legislation, Congress had included a 

prohibition on freeway construction in a part of the city as an outgrowth of the U.S. 240-I-70 

controversy: 

And it has always been my feeling that since Congress specifically forbade this particular 

item, and was silent on the other items, that the intent of Congress was that the remainder 

of the program continue. And this seems to be supported by the continuing actions of 

Congress in appropriating money as we went along. 

He also referred to the language in the 1960 Act referring to highway development by the 

agencies with jurisdiction. In his view, NCPC was the overall transportation planning 

organization for the area and particularly the city – “all the aspects of life in the District of 

Columbia, the planning of that falls to their organization.” He continued: 

So that I think the intent of Congress was that the highway program as developed 

continue and that there be developed an accompanying transit plan. In the act Congress 

included what I would consider boilerplate language, which said that the Agency was to 

evaluate the transportation plan. 

This does not mean to tear it apart or hold it up, but to evaluate it and work along with it. 

 And it talks about cooperation and coordination of all these programs as we move along. 

 [pages 1692-1694] 

Senator Case said he understood the difficulties involved in transportation planning, particularly 

in a city where Members of Congress were involved in details that were handled without 

congressional involvement in other cities. “I express my own sympathy to you,” he told General 

Clarke, adding: 
The fact that you have disagreement as to what these things mean doesn’t disturb me in 

the least. This is a contribution to us who have some responsibility on this subcommittee 

and to the Congress, and I am sure to the President, with whom I suppose the ultimate 

decisions for recommendations at least must lie, in the absence of any other machinery 

that is set up to make final decisions here. 

Meaning, he said, no disrespect to the District commissioners, highway officials, or General 

Clarke, Senator Case said he was convinced that some form of mass transit was essential for the 

Washington area:

This to me suggests the desirability of attempting before we do much more—in fact, I 

think anything more—in the way of major projects, that we do know a little bit better 

what the answer to that problem may be. 

He thought, for example, that some freeway projects might incorporate rapid rail transit and, 

therefore, should be wider than currently planned: 

And perhaps it would be wise to wait until we get this particular plan before us before we 

go ahead with other projects, which I think it is true may by their own momentum or the 

logic of their existence require further things—for example, the building of Three Sisters 

bridge it seem to me would logically suggest—you have got this great project here, which 

could, if extended through a northwest loop, be much more valuable than it is sitting here. 

And perhaps it is desirable at this point to wait for the 2 or 3 months that we would wait 

until we have the whole picture, not only among you, because I think you all probably 

know what each other’s thinking is pretty much according to law, but we can’t know 

more than that, and the public can’t know. 

General Clarke said that as far as the projects NCTA wanted to defer (Three Sisters Bridge and 

interchange “C”), none of the agencies “had contemplated that they would try there to make dual 

use of those particular structures for transit. By contrast, for a radial facility such as the 

Northeast Freeway, “every consideration should be given there to the use of the median strip.” 

Senator Case replied by referring to the report Chairman Bible’s committee had issued on June 

21, 1960, regarding the legislation that established NCTA. The language discussed the Mass 

Transportation Survey, saying it was “a valuable starting point,” but accepting it without further 

study “would be a mistake.” The report stated: 

In particular it appears that the highway agencies will not be able to build new freeways 

nearly as fast as called for in the plan. Since it is a balanced plan and the elimination of 

any one facility calls for an elimination of the other or a change in the location of major 

traffic arteries, the failure to build all the highways will call for a reassessment of all the 

parts of the plan . . . . 

Senator Case admitted that trying to figure out the intent of Congress “is more than I know.” He 

believed the 1960 Act was not intended simply to develop a transit plan, but rather to take “an 

overall relook at the transit problem in the District and in the metropolitan area.” He understood 
the desire of the District commissioners and highway officials to proceed as fast as they can to 

overcome “the layers and layers of approvals that they have to obtain in all the agencies,” but 

Senator Case still believed that this language reflected “what Congress really meant when they 

set up this agency, and it would be well for the subcommittee, as I see it, now to take that as a 

general guide.” [pages 1699-1701] 

Later that day, the headline in The Evening Star read: “Case Would Delay Three Sisters Span.”

The hearings continued on the morning of Saturday, August 11, this time with only city officials 

on the panel. The day’s hearing covered many of the topics discussed the previous 2 days, but 

two items made news.

General Clarke, referring to Chairman Whitener’s highly critical report, asked for help from the 

Senators in understanding the congressional intent in creating NCTA: 

I do not enjoy the position of advancing a position which seems to be counter to the 

position which a subcommittee of the House has adopted . . . . I would be hopeful that 

there would be some way of clarifying once and for all what is the intent of Congress. I 

had thought that the intent had been portrayed and shown by Congress over the past years 

in making continual appropriations to carry on our program. I thought this was a clear 

indication—but perhaps I was wrong. 

But I suppose that, in a way, we are here asking your subcommittee to help determine for 

us what is the true intent of Congress in carrying out this program. I do not wish to pass 

the buck to your subcommittee, but I think it is clear that my position is not the position 

that the subcommittee of the House District Committee adopted.

Aitken pointed out that the House appropriated funds for the Three Sisters Bridge; “in the event 

the Senate should do likewise, these two actions might be indicative of the will of the whole 

Congress.” 

Senator Byrd asked how the District would react if the Senate were to delete the $300,000 in 

view of the House District subcommittee’s report. “Would you proceed, do you think?” he 

asked.

General Clarke replied, “No, sir; I do not think we would. I think we would regard this, then as a 

clear indication that Congress at the moment does not want a bridge there.” 

Senator McGee suggested that such an action might mean simply that the Congress wants the 

District to wait for the NCTA report, not that Congress opposed the bridge. [pages 1757-1758] 

The second point was that Senator McGee was upset about a front page story in the Post that 

morning. According to the article, a spokesman said BPR was “deeply concerned” about the 

disputes between District highway officials and other officials who want to hold off on 

construction until a mass transit system is developed:
“By law, we make the 90 per cent funds available for certain specific purposes—namely 

an interstate road system, a spokesman for the Federal agency said yesterday.

“If we find that the projects we are supporting are not going to be part of the interstate 

system, then we will have no alternative other than to request the return of the funds. The 

consequences for the District could be rather serious.” 

Even if the District were required to return Interstate construction funds, the city would still be 

obligated to pay for its long-term highway construction contracts: 

To do so, the District presumably would have to divert many millions of dollars away 

from schools, health facilities and other services which the city is already hard-pressed to 

provide. 

A cutback could even affect completed projects that had been built with 90-percent Interstate 

funds, such as the 14th Street Bridge, the Washington Channel Bridge, portions of the Southwest 

Freeway, and even the District’s short section of the Capital Beltway on the Woodrow Wilson 

Memorial Bridge: 

“They are all part of the overall plan for the region,” the Bureau official said. “If we are 

now going to start pulling pieces out of the plan, then we may have to abandon the plan 

and start all over again.”

If this were to happen, the roads now completed would be considered local roads and a 

new interstate system would have to be planned, he said. 

BPR had been considering the issue for some time and had discussed it with District officials: 

He said the Bureau will make its decision soon, possibly in the next few weeks. “We are 

at a crossroads and we have to act pretty quickly,” he said. [Clopton, Willard, “D.C. 

Facing Cutoff of Road Cash,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, August 11, 1962] 

An angry Senator McGee said:

I think it would be of interest to the committee, Mr. Chairman, to know if this was 

released at this point in order to threaten the committee in trying to make an honest 

deliberation on this question. 

If that is the case, who cocked the gun, I think we ought to know that. 

I personally resented the appearance of the story at this time, when we are making our 

attempt to get the facts on this question.

And if this is an attempt to do that, then I think the committee ought to know how far they 

really can go in the cutting off of the funds while the Congress is trying honestly to 

consider all the information that is involved in reaching a decision that is in the interest of 

the Nation’s Capital and the surrounding areas. 
And I would hope that we might have a little light shed on that, because I assume that it is 

the hesitancy over Three Sisters and over the circles [Inner Loop] in the east part of town, 

the suspension of those for the time being, that is really what has provoked this and 

brought it to the surface. 

General Clarke quickly replied:

May I comment first on the point of a release timed with the hearings, and state in all 

honesty and sincerely that I had nothing to do with the timing of the release or the 

substance of the matter which was in the release.

I would like the record to show that clearly. 

Senator McGee wanted to know the name of the BPR spokesman who released the statement to 

the Post. General Clarke said he did not know the name. “I was called out of bed this morning 

by other newspapers trying to find out the same information.” He promised to try to find out in 

time for the afternoon session. 

General Clarke added that the article was fairly accurate but not entirely so. He had met with the 

NPS Director within the past week along with BPR officials. Participants discussed the 

possibility that funds might be withheld. “But I assure the committee that this is not in the form 

of a threat--.” 

When the hearing resumed on Saturday afternoon, Federal Highway Administrator Whitton had 

joined the District panel. By then, the Star had published a similar article about the threat to 

withhold funds. The article quoted Whitton: 

“We discussed this with the District,” Mr. Whitton said, “but there was no ultimatum. 

We set no date for them. We also cannot roll up the highways that are already there. 

“We just said to them: Here are some things you ought to think about. Some day you 

just have to finish your planning and start to work. If we can’t get a highway through the 

District, I don’t know if we should build roads into the District.” 

Referring to the work on the South Leg of the Inner Loop, he continued: 

“The Inner Loop was agreed to as part of the interstate highway system,” Mr. Whitton 

said. “If we build the South Leg and can’t complete the other ones, then the South Leg is 

not properly designed. We have to have a balanced road system.” 

General Clarke told the reporter that he could not imagine BPR filing suit for a refund, which 

would require the District to go to Congress to appropriate the money “to pay up.” The District, 

in short, would be hard put to refund Interstate funds. General Clarke made clear, however, that 

no one was discussing reducing funds for schools or other city services to repay BPR. 

Regardless, Whitton said, “We have had no falling out with the District. We’ll continue to work 

together”:
But he made it clear that the Federal funds are available for use only in interstate systems, 

not local spurs, and if a road network turns out to be not a part of an interstate system, the 

bureau has to request the return of its funds. 

Because the local roads would be eligible for BPR’s usual 50-percent reimbursement under the 

non-Interstate program, BPR would not require a full refund. I would seek repayment only for 

the difference between 50 and 90 percent reimbursements. [“Road Bureau Prods D.C. on Slow 

Pace,” The Evening Star, August 11, 1962] 

Senator McGee asked Whitton to “shed any light on” why the two articles appeared while the 

subcommittee was debating whether to delay appropriations for several freeway projects.

Whitton replied: 

The story, the timing of the story is absolutely coincidental. We make no release of it. A 

reporter called us and asked the questions, and we answered them. We had no ulterior 

motive whatever, other than to answer questions . . . . We did not initiate the story, nor 

did we plant any questions anyplace to cause the story to be brought up. 

Senator McGee expressed the “sensitivity” of the timing because the subcommittee had been 

deliberating for 2 days “on this question of trying to resolve, if possible, this at least quasiimpasse that has arisen with the District on this question.” He asked Whitton to comment on 

whether delaying the projects until NCTA releases its report in November would affect Federal 

funds for the District. 

Whitton explained that the Federal-aid highway program was funded through highway user taxes 

that could be used for no other purpose. If a State or District does not use the funds made 

available to it, “the people are not getting the benefit” they paid for. The District of Columbia 

was in “a peculiar position” regarding the use of Interstate construction funds because it was 

entirely urban: 

Now, any other State highway department has rural interstate routes. And if they get tied 

up in a city, and it is not uncommon to be tied up on construction work in a city, they can 

spend their money outside, in rural areas, and keep the money at work, or keep it going, 

and get the highways built. 

But the District is in this peculiar position where they have no rural area to spend the 

money. And that is the reason we hate to see it tied up. 

I think they probably have $40 million or so interstate funds now available to be spent on 

construction projects. 

He also explained the circumstances that might prompt BPR to cut off Interstate funds for the 

District:
We would cut off no funds to the District until we had been told, or had found out 

definitely that some of the interstate routes within the District had been removed from the 

Interstate System.

And then, when we made the next estimate of cost to the Interstate System, which I think 

is in 1966, our estimate would then be based on the Interstate System as in effect at that 

time.

Just to clarify, Senator McGee asked whether delaying interchange “C” or the Three Sisters 

Bridge would provoke BPR to cut off funds. Whitton replied, “It would not.” 

Whitton said that a number of routes had been designated in the District, including the Inner 

Loop, a connection to Baltimore, and so on: 

Well, if some of that inner loop is taken out, then it is not a part of the Interstate System. 

Or if so much of it is taken out, that we do not have a connected highway through the 

District, then much of the now interstate routes in the District might not qualify to be in 

the Interstate System, because the Interstate System has to be a connected system, as we 

see it.

Senator McGee wanted to confirm that simply delaying action would not result in a funding 

penalty for the District. Whitton replied: 

That is right.

But let me be honest—we do regret delays, because we are anxious to get the money 

working. 

Senator McGee summarized:

Well, I think that is what the real meat of this particular element in the controversy is. I 

do not think anybody on the subcommittee would have in mind using delay as a trick to 

defeat or destroy. Because the only question that has been raised here in this hearing, I 

believe, in all fairness to all sides, was the wisdom of trying to delay until the report was 

submitted which the President has requested for the 1st of November. 

And if it became clear that, subsequently, this would be used only as a tactic to delay 

further, I think that would require a very sober assessment by the subcommittee. 

Senator Case wanted to know if BPR could pay for a wider median to accommodate transit. 

Whitton replied, “I do not think there is any legal objection to that” if the expenditures were 

limited to restoring a disrupted rail line. He cited Congress Street in Chicago where the Interstate

followed the alignment of a railroad that had to be restored. 

Senate Case asked if BPR also could pay for construction of a new rail line. Whitton said that 

BPR could not pay for the rail line or the right-of-way to accommodate it. “I think the rail 

system ought to pay that cost.” 
When the Senator asked if the distinction Whitton was making was stated in law, Whitton replied 

that he could not repeat the language of the law. “But I think that the money that comes into the 

trust fund is reserved solely for the building a highway, or for the engineering of a highway, or 

for the right-of-way for a highway.” 

Next, Senator Case asked about the use of Federal-aid funds for bus lanes. He quoted a report by 

the Housing and Home Finance Agency to the President enunciating a policy that would allow 

the use of Federal-aid highway funds for exclusive bus lanes “when comprehensive 

transportation plans indicate this to be desirable.” Whitton explained: 

We are anticipating that it will be legally possible for us to provide lanes for the exclusive 

use of buses if the volume of bus traffic justifies it. We might even provide lanes for 

buses that can use it from 7 until 9 o’clock in the morning, and from 4 until 6 o’clock in 

the afternoon. We would have to have policing of such an arrangement.

What was clear was that Federal-aid highway funds might be spent to provide lanes for buses, if 

Federal law were changed to permit it, but not for rail transit.

Senator Case returned to the Post article, asking how it came out. Whitton repeated the 

explanation that a reporter “called 2 or 3 days [ago] and talked to our public relations people.” 

BPR had nothing to do with the timing of the article. “It is not premeditated whatever. I hate to 

tell you, but I did not even know you were in session.” 

Senator Case asked if the timing had anything to do with the NPS decision to withhold approval 

of the Three Sisters Bridge. Whitton acknowledged that BPR was “disturbed” by the NPS 

action. “But our release had nothing to do with it”: 

Senator Case. You can understand, of course, our concern, that an agency of the Federal 

Government should be attempting to make propaganda. 

Mr. Whitton. No, sir. We definitely did not intend it as such. 

Senator Case. It always backfires, and it especially backfires on Members of Congress. 

Mr. Whitton: We would be the last one to do that. 

Although Senators Case and McGee appeared satisfied, Whitton wanted to clarify one point: 

The south leg that is now being built, and is designed, it is designed with the thought that it 

would comprise part of an inner loop. If all of that inner loop is not built, it could well be that 

the south leg . . . will not be designed correctly. 

Senator Case wanted to discuss another issue, namely whether Interstate routes entering the city 

had to go all the way through. “Cannot interstate roads end in a metropolitan city?” 

Whitton did not think so: 

I just do not think that the Shirley Highway could come into, say, the downtown part of 

Washington and stop there, without going on and making a connection to the road going 
to Baltimore, and still be part of the Interstate System. It could be an urban expressway. 

But not interstate.

The key was that the routes must be part of a connected system. A route “could flow around [a 

metropolitan area]. But if it started in, I think it has to flow on through.” 

Senator Case asked about tunnels, and Whitton replied: 

We can pay for a tunnel where that turns out to be the cheapest and most effective and 

efficient way of handling the traffic.

Whitton cited examples such as the tunnel west of Denver, adding that if “people still want a 

tunnel, then I think it is our duty and responsibility, unless Congress decides otherwise, to pay 

only the cost of the open cut type of highways . . . . 

Senator Case asked about building tunnels under the Washington monument. Whitton replied, 

“Along with the District people, we are dedicated to doing the best job with the least disturbance 

to the established homes and businesses possible.” That included monuments. 

With that, Whitton’s testimony ended, and the subcommittee returned to other subjects related to 

the District’s transportation needs. [pages 1805-1818] 

The committee report on the hearings included many letters from others who did not testify, 

including a September 13 letter from Senator Randolph, then writing as a member of the 

Subcommittee on Roads of the Committee on Public Works. Attacks, he wrote, on the District’s 

capital outlay budget for highways had “created much confusion.” Referring to NCTA’s request 

to delay the East Leg, interchange “C,” and the Three Sisters Bridge, he said that those seeking 

delays “apparently are obscuring a number of facts which should be brought into focus.” The 

1963 budget represents “the minimum highway needs” if the District “is to keep pace with 

regional and national highway development.” The budget, he wrote, was based on the Mass 

Transportation Survey of 1959 and approved by NCPC. 

Moreover, the freeway network was designed to include rapid transit, whether by rail or nonrail. 

“Actually, if there should not be brought into being a rapid transit program, the proposed freeway 

planning will of necessity have to be much enlarged.” 

Those seeking delays apparently did so “on the premise that there is a question of highway versus 

nonhighway facilities” for the area. This was “an unfortunate mistake” that threatened the 

highway program now and may threaten the transit program later. 

Further, the charge that the District had accelerated its program to get ahead of NCTA was 

mistaken. Following the 1959 Mass Transportation Survey, Congress in 1961 had increased 

funds for the Interstate program, which “made it possible to proceed with the original program at 

a more rapid pace.” Congress created NCTA to study the rapid transit aspect of the 1959 

transportation plan, including the possibility of a subway. “This meant that the second part of the 

overall transport plan was underway; the highway phase already had begun.” 
Senator Randolph also addressed NCTA’s role, which he said was subject to “additional 

misunderstanding.” In studying mass transit, NCTA was concerned primarily with “home-towork movement while the highway program is being designed to handle the everyday demands 

of modern motor vehicle traffic,” which he pointed out was “only partly involved in the home-towork movement.” The truth was that “there is an ever-growing volume of motor vehicle traffic 

of all types that must be served,” including trucks serving the area’s commercial needs. “Unless 

these demands are met, this area will be faced with a staggering problem of traffic congestion.” 

Delay in the freeway program will “only multiply the many serious problems that ultimately must 

be solved.” 

If the freeway system was delayed until a decision is made on a subway system, the city will be 

unable to do anything to address growing traffic demand, including visitors: 

More than 90 percent of visitors travel in their own automobiles. It would be tragic if 

Washington’s highway condition became such that the city would be classed as a place to 

avoid. 

The date of NCTA report, November 1, 1962, was going to be only a starting point, to be 

followed by intensive hearings in 1963 to determine if its recommendations are physically 

possible and financially reasonable. Congressional review could take a year or more, while 

“highway traffic volume increases almost daily, endangering the commerce of the city and posing 

a serious problem of public safety.” He agreed that if the area embarked on a rail rapid transit 

system, including a subway, some freeway plans might have to be changed, but “if the highway 

program is stopped until the subway plan is fully evaluated, the time lost can never be regained.” 

Senator Randolph also pointed out the District’s freeway network, including its controversial 

parts, were part of a metropolitan area network within the Interstate System. The freeways must 

be coordinated with their links in Maryland and Virginia. “Changes in the vital parts of the plan 

could result in these roads being considered ineligible for inclusion in the interstate program.”

In closing, he urged the committee to appropriate funds to keep the District’s freeway program 

on schedule. Not doing so would mean costs would increase, downtown commerce would 

continue to deteriorate with a resultant loss in revenues, and Interstate funds might be lost. 

[pages 2476-2477] 

That same day, August 11, Thomas W. Richards, vice-chairman of the Arlington County Board, 

accused the District of Columbia of plotting to spoil the county’s residential areas so it can get 

more Federal-aid highway funds. He was referring to the Three Sisters Bridge: 

To get 90 per cent Federal financing for the Potomac Freeway it wants to build, the 

District has got to connect it to an Interstate System which accommodates trucks. So it 

proposes to link it to a new bridge and then spoil our residential areas by ramming heavy 

truck traffic through. This is expediency rather than planning. It is a thinly veiled 

attempt to bail the District out of paying for the Potomac Freeway.
He indicated that the District’s request for $300,000 for the bridge in its 1963 budget was just a 

ruse to begin minimal construction before NCTA releases its report: 

We feel that this fine park on the Virginia shore should not be destroyed simply to 

accommodate the District of Columbia’s freeway schemes. [“Arlington Charges ‘Plot’ In 

District Road Plans,” The Sunday Star, August 12, 1962; “Member of Board Opposes 

Bridge Link,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, August 12, 1962] 

The District, fighting to save its highway program, released a half-hour color film called 

“Freeway” pointing out how an up-to-date freeway system could eliminate congestion. At the 

end of the film, General Clarke said:

The alternates are clear: completion of the freeway system, with people and goods 

moving and community life flourishing—or construction stopped, goods and people 

slowed down, with the accompanying blight and decay . . . .” 

WMAL-TV was to debut the $2,000 film on Wednesday, August 15, at 9 p.m. It would then be 

made available to community organizations for showings with speakers available to discuss the 

District’s Interstate program. [“D.C. Movie On Freeways Is Released,” The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, August 12, 1962] 

As part of the public relations effort to gain support for the freeways, Aitken, appearing on 

WWDC’s “Report to the People” on September 1, said he wished the public would express the 

same support for highways that it expressed for automobiles. The District, he said, had the 

highest per capita income in the country, with automobile sales rising steadily. At the same time, 

the public expressed “no particular interest” in the freeway network those cars needed. “It makes 

me wonder philosophically, why.” 

After all, the purchase of cars was “an implied endorsement of automobility.” He wondered if 

the lack of public support resulted from “a feeling of people that the debate about freeways is 

academic, something that they feel they personally can’t do anything about.” Even the harshest 

critics, he suggested, preferred their automobile to rapid transit, despite their desire to delay 

freeway construction until the mass transit system was worked out. [“Aitkin [sic] Seeks Public 

Help on Freeways,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, September 2, 1962] 

On September 25, Robert Moses was in Washington for a presentation to the 11th Annual 

Commissioners’ and Governors’ Conference on Metropolitan Washington Traffic Problems. 

(The Governors’ Conference was the forerunner of the National Governors Association.) In his 

remarks, he discussed the congressional delays in the freeway program:

It is not in the public interest to delay this program on the theory that an as yet 

undisclosed and undetermined rapid transit system will make such highway arterials 

unnecessary, or materially alter the proposed network. 

Washington was, he said, “a car and bus town,” resulting in a need to improve transportation for 

these vehicles. He did not completely discount the need for mass transit: 
There are locations where rapid transit can be combined with vehicular lanes with the 

same right-of-way, but not many. No doubt commuter subsidies of some kind are 

inevitable, but they should depend on superior rail service after the relative roles of the 

train, bus, car, and aircraft have been determined by experts concerned only with the 

truth. [“Moses Fears Transit May Delay Highways,” The Evening Star, September 26, 

1962] 

On September 27, 1962, the Committee on Appropriations completed work on the District of 

Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1963. Regarding freeways, the committee’s reported stated: 

Funds for the interchange C project, together with the Northeast Freeway and the east leg, 

were disapproved by the House, and this committee concurs in this action. 

The committee also deleted $760,000 for the Southeast Freeway (13th Street, SE, to Barney 

Circle) because Director Aitken had testified on August 9 that although the House had 

appropriated funds for the project, “I am going to suggest to you, sir, that there is no need for this 

appropriation in 1962 with interchange C out because I cannot use it.” [page 1688] 

Without mentioning the proposal to shift the East Leg to cross park lands along the Anacostia 

River, the committee addressed the idea by citing a provision of the law, signed on June 2, 1950 

(Public Law 81-534), authorizing construction of the East Capitol Street Bridge across the 

Anacostia River:

That neither the bridge, approaches, nor connecting roads provided for herein shall be 

planned or constructed through the National Arboretum on the west bank of the 

Anacostia River.

The report continued: 

District officials are reminded that over 12 years ago Congress thus expressly precluded 

any plans for the construction of highways or parkways through the National Arboretum, 

which has since been improved at a cost of over $8 million. In view of the longstanding 

legislative history on this matter, the committee expects that District officials will make 

no further use of planning or other funds available to them for developing future 

proposals which contemplate the use of the National Arboretum for highway or parkway 

purposes. 

In short, the District was free to consider shifting the East Leg to a river alignment as long as it 

did not encroach on the National Arboretum. 

(Like so many other projects in Washington, the East Capitol Street Bridge was the subject of 

extensive controversy in the late 1940s. District officials wanted to construct the new bridge at 

East Capitol Street. The National Capital Park and Planning Commission favored a bridge at 

Massachusetts Avenue. For example, General Grant, testifying as an official of the American 

Planning and Civic Association, said the District’s preferred location would do “irreparable 

damage” to the area and result in such “intolerable” traffic congestion around the Capitol that 

Congress might have to appropriate funds for tunnels to carry the overflow on Independence 
Avenue and Constitution Avenue. During the debate, Acting Secretary of Agriculture K. T. 

Hutchinson submitted an amendment to a bridge bill that resulted in the provision protecting the 

National Arboretum from intrusion by a highway or parkway. The Star called the fight between 

the city and critics the “battle of the bridges.” [Rogers, Harold B., “Grant Criticizes City Heads’ 

Effort On Bridge Site,” The Evening Star, March 14, 1950] 

(President Truman approved Public Law 81-534 on June 2, 1950. The bridge opened on 

November 10, 1955, following dedication ceremonies presided over by District Commissioner 

Spencer. On a rainy day, he told the crowd of about 300 that opening the $16 million bridge was 

a “pleasant task.” It was, he said, “a monument to the skill, energy and vision of the city’s 

engineers and planners.” Miss Tippy Stringer, the "Weather Girl" on WRC-TV who also hosted 

cooking and homemaking shows on the station, cut the ribbon: 

Miss Tippy Stringer, television star, came bareheaded to cut the red satin ribbon . . . . As 

her scissors parted the satin, Miss Stringer said, “I dedicate this new bridge to the 

motorists of the Nation.” 

Samuel Spencer, president of the Board of Commissioners, handed the blonde television 

personality a bouquet of chrysanthemums. Nine-year-old Don Sennott, of 1712 D st. ne., 

clamored for her autograph, which he got on a wet matchbook. 

(Eventually, the bridge was expected to carry 90,000 vehicles a day. [Bassett, Grace, “E. Capitol 

St. Span Opened In the Rain,” The Washington Post and Times-Herald, November 11, 1955] 

(In a ceremony on June 13, 1974, the bridge was renamed the Whitney M. Young Jr. Memorial 

Bridge in honor of the former leader of the National Urban League who had died in 1971. 

[“Bridge Honors Whitney Young,” The Washington Star-News, June 13, 1974] In 1992, the 

Post’s Alan Bisbort described the “steel-plate girder bridge” as “lean and streamlined.” [Bisbort, 

page 9])

Regarding one of the most controversial projects on the District’s agenda, the committee 

approved $300,000 to begin construction of the Three Sisters Bridge. However, it did so “with 

the understanding that the District of Columbia Highway Department will not proceed with the 

project until the report of the National Capital Transportation Agency has been submitted in 

November 1962.” Further, “if that report is against the Three Sisters Bridge, the Commissioners 

shall proceed with the construction of the bridge unless before March 1, 1963, action to negate 

such construction shall have been taken by either the Senate Committee on Appropriations or the 

House Committee on Appropriations.” 

Finally, the committee stated:

Furthermore, it is the view of the committee that no funds allocated to the District of 

Columbia’s highway program shall be used for the construction of the Glover-Archbold 

Parkway. The committee further recommends that the District of Columbia cooperate in 

the preservation of this natural park. [District of Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1963, 
Report of the Committee on Appropriations to accompany H.R. 12276, United States 

Senate, 87th Congress, 2d Session, Report No. 2170, September 27, 1962, page 12] 

The Senate considered the bill on September 28. After the Senate had considered many other 

provisions, Senator Byrd discussed the highway provisions. He said that the District 

appropriations subcommittee had provided in its report that if NCTA’s report was against the 

Three Sisters Bridge, the District “shall not proceed” to construction. The Senator explained 

why the committee changed the subcommittee wording: 

It was the feeling of those of us who wished to strike out such language that if it were to 

remain, it would, practically speaking, give the National Capital Transportation Agency a 

veto over the location and construction of the Three Sisters Bridge and, indirectly, over 

the design and construction of the Potomac River Freeway . . . . 

We believe that the action taken by the full committee yesterday in striking out the earlier 

language removes a straitjacket which had been applied to the freeway program in the 

District of Columbia . . . . 

In one of the few discussions of the freeway plans during consideration of the bill, Senator 

Randolph asked Senator Byrd to confirm that the NCTA report was due on November 1, 1962. 

With that in mind, he hoped that neither the Senate nor the House Committee on Appropriations 

would delay construction of the Three Sisters Bridge. Having been a member of the House 

District Committee for 14 years, and chairman for 7 years, he understood the difficulty of 

resolving the contentious issues Senator Byrd faced. He said nothing had happened since he 

wrote his September 13 letter to the Committee on Appropriations to change his mind: 

I continue to believe it would be a mistake to create roadblocks against a consistent 

moving forward with the freeway program for the District of Columbia and adjoining 

areas of the Metropolitan Washington complex. I feel that, to a degree, some recognized 

errors have been made—not by the subcommittee, not by the Appropriations Committee, 

but I feel there has been a slowing down of the highway and bridge and freeway 

program—at least by some persons. 

He understood that the critics’ positions “were well taken but, I repeat, they have argued it almost 

to a complete standstill.” He was concerned that delays and postponements of possible solutions, 

both commercial and passenger, were becoming “snarled in the web of confusion here.” 

He cited the statement by Robert Moses that delay was “against the public interest,” a comment 

coming from “an expert, a knowledgeable person in this transit field.” Senator Randolph also 

cited recent Star and Post editorials. The Star’s September 23 editorial, “Highway Disruption,” 

quoted Senator Randolph’s letter. “These are meaningful words,” the editorial stated, because 

“no evidence has been produced by anyone to contradict the assertion of District officials that, 

regardless of transit proposals, more bridge capacity across the Potomac is essential for motor 

vehicular traffic.” 
Similarly, no one had produced evidence that any location other than Three Sisters Island “would 

be as suitable from the viewpoints of topography, traffic service, residential dislocation, or cost.” 

Relatively few freeway projects were underway, but motorists were well aware of “the 

frustrating and time-consuming traffic jams they create.” Delays meant that the District would 

have to build the freeways in a shorter period, resulting in an “intolerable mess.” The editorial 

expressed the hope that the Senate committee would “expedite the unduly delayed freeway 

construction program.” 

The Post’s September 22 editorial, “Roads and the Budget,” stated that any basic highway system 

for the Washington area required the Three Sisters Bridge and the Potomac River Freeway, as 

well as interchange “C” and the East Leg. The growth of the suburbs was one reason why 

another bridge was needed to supplement the Key Bridge. “Neither the District nor, for that 

matter, Congress, can control the pattern of population in the suburbs.” Transit might “reduce 

the pressure on the roads,” but traffic that could not adapt to rail travel would increase in any 

event. The “economic viability” of the city depended on addressing the transportation problem. 

The Senate Appropriations Committee should have restored the funds the House committee had 

withheld for interchange “C,” the East Leg, and the Northeast Freeway in the face of a divided 

Board of Commissioners. In that case, the House-Senate conference committee could retain 

them in the final bill. The editorial concluded with a reference to NCTA’s report, still 6 weeks 

off:

To hold up all decisions on highway construction for another year, particularly on such 

insubstantial grounds, would do the city genuine damage. If Congress wishes to insure 

coordination between transit and highway builders, the committees certainly have the 

authority to require it. 

After securing approval from his colleagues to reprint the Moses article and the two editorials in 

the record, Senator Jennings concluded: 

We must all realize this is a growing city. The number of visitors to this city will increase 

by the millions in the years ahead. I have spoken because I felt there could not be a 

disregard of the needs of the city, particularly highway construction. 

Without further discussion of the freeway controversy, the Senate approved the bill, which would 

have to be reconciled with the House version. [District of Columbia Appropriations, 1963, 

Congressional Record-Senate, September 28, 1962, pages 21188, 21238-21241] 

The Star, in an editorial about the “needless” restriction on the Three Sisters Bridge, commended 

Senator Byrd for securing the compromise language that would allow construction to begin 

unless either Committee on Appropriations takes affirmative action by March 1, 1963, to halt the 

project. Because General Clarke indicated the city would not be ready to begin construction 

before then, the restriction was “confusing as well as unnecessary”:

No Commissioner in his right mind would proceed to spend money if an Appropriations 

Committee, even on an informal basis, told him to stop . . . . In the unlikely event that 
some persuasive argument against the bridge should turn up within the next few months, 

Congress would have ample time to step in—with only a modest amount of money 

having been spent in the meantime on the bridge design. 

The confusion over the language, the editorial said, “can best be cleared up by eliminating its 

source.” [“Needless ‘Restriction,’” The Evening Star, September 29, 1962] 

When conferees met, they soon found themselves deadlocked on one issue: the Three Sisters 

Bridge. By October 4, the Star was reporting that conferees were “stuck fast over the city’s 

controversial highway program.” According to reports, House conferees were “holding out for 

removal of the restriction and will take nothing else.” Referring to the more restrictive language 

in the Senate subcommittee’s report, the article said that Senator Byrd has “succeeded in 

modifying the language and removing the virtual veto power the NCTA held over highway 

plans.” 

Senator Case, the newspaper reported, was leading Senate conferees who wanted to retain the 

language from the Senate report. The Senators were split, 4-4, on the issue. One House conferee 

said his delegation would remove the Senate restriction if “we have to stay until the snow falls.” 

[McKelway, John, “Highway Controversy Stalls District Budget,” The Evening Star, October 4, 

1962] 

The stalemate over the issue continued until October 10 when Senator Hayden, chairman of the 

Committee on Appropriations, took an unusual step, initiated by Senator Byrd, to complete the 

conference. On the Senate floor, Senator Hayden said: 

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Presiding Officer appoint an additional 

conferee on the part of the Senate in regard to the District of Columbia appropriation bill 

for 1963, H.R. 12276. 

Without objection, it was so ordered. [District of Columbia Appropriation Bill – Additional 

Conferee, Congressional Record-Senate, October 10, 1962, page 22933] 

With this authority, Senator Byrd added Senator Absalom W. Robertson (D-Va.) to the 

conference, with assurance that he would break the tie among Senate conferees in support of the 

bridge project and allow the conference to conclude its work. [McKelway, John, “Congress Ends 

Deadlock Over District Budget,” The Evening Star, October 10, 1962] 

The Star praised Senator Robertson for coming to the rescue to overcome “the dogged 

determination of four Senate conferees to impose some kind of condition” on the District’s plans 

for the Three Sisters Bridge:

Their feeling, as nearly as we can make it out, is that contrary to all traffic estimates and 

the best judgment of the District Highway Department, the National Capital Planning 

Commission, the Federal Bureau of Public Roads and most of the experts in Virginia, 

maybe the bridge is not needed. 
The “whole silly business” was ironic since the restrictive language “had very little meaning 

anyway.” [“Robertson to the Rescue,” The Evening Star, October 11, 1962] 

With Senator Robertson’s tie-breaking vote, the conference committee completed its work on 

October 10. Regarding capital outlays, the conference report stated:

The committee of conference is agreed that construction of the Three Sisters Bridge 

should proceed according to the plan set forth in the budget in the amount of $300,000 as 

provided in the bill. Furthermore, it is the view of the committee of conference that no 

funds allocated to the District of Columbia’s highway program shall be used for the 

construction of the Glover-Archbold Parkway. The committee of conference further 

recommends that the District of Columbia cooperate in the preservation of this natural 

park. [District of Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1963, Conference Report to accompany 

H.R. 12276, U.S. House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 2d Session, October 10, 1962, 

Report no. 2548, pages 4-5] 

When the House took up the conference report on October 11, Chairman Natcher discussed the 

conferees’ decisions on freeways. During the House hearings, he said, pro-transit and prohighway advocates “used every political issue and every possible source of opposition to bring 

about confusion and disorder.” This rivalry was “dangerous and certainly not [in] the best 

interests of the future development of our Capital City.” He explained how the two District 

commissioners had asked his committee to withhold funds for the East Leg, interchange “C,” and 

the Northeast Freeway:

Our committee believes that, where thousands of people will be displaced, every 

precaution should be taken prior to construction to protect these people before they are 

forced out of their homes. We have been assured by the Commissioners that, before 

funds are requested for the deleted items, some solution will be reached solving this 

major problem. 

He described the stalemate during the conference. “Under no circumstances would we agree to 

such language and so informed the conferees on the other side. They refused to yield and a 

stalemate resulted.” With Senator Byrd’s maneuver to add a pro-bridge Senator to the 

conference, Chairman Natcher said, his compromise language was added to the report and the 

conferees were able to complete their work. “The action insisted upon by the House assures the 

city of Washington that the freeway program will proceed and there is a place in our Capital City 

for both freeways and rapid transit.” 

Representative William H. Avery (R-Ks.) told his colleagues that he had no “particular interest” 

in the Three Sisters Bridge, “but I think it is about time that the House took a firm position in 

support of continued progress on a highway program for the District.” He continued: 

It appears that anyone who has an objection to one particular connection or one particular 

interchange can object and immediately a “hold” is put on that increment. The result is to 

destroy the usefulness of the whole circumferential system or the inner and the outer loop 

as well.
He praised the House District appropriations committee for holding firm.

Representative Rhodes agreed that the bridge would “go a long way toward helping solve the 

dilemma of the District of Columbia highway system.” The committee’s action went “a long 

way” toward a solution, but “believe me, this problem is not solved and it will not be solved for 

quite some time.”

Representative Broyhill recalled the Senate’s attempt to include language giving the 

Appropriations Committee’s veto power over the Three Sisters Bridge. He had fought hard for 

the bridge: 

However, we must recognize that in recent months objections have developed, some of 

which are from people in my congressional district, to the construction of the bridge, 

since there is a possibility that a pending rapid transit program may eliminate the 

necessity for this construction . . . . 

There is speculation that this [NCTA] report, which is due on November 1, may well 

show that the Three Sisters Island Bridge is not needed. Furthermore, a subcommittee of 

the House District of Columbia Committee has expressed the desirability of holding up 

any further highway construction of this type which might be proven unnecessary in the 

report I just referred to.

Under the circumstances, he thought the District Commissioners should “proceed very slowly 

with developing their plans for this facility during the next 5-months period, until Congress has 

had an opportunity to consider and act on the National Capital Transportation Agency report.” 

The House agreed to the conference report without further discussion of highway issues. 

[District of Columbia Appropriations, 1963, Congressional Record-House, October 11, 1962, 

pages 23212-23215] 

The Senate also considered the conference report on October 11. After the formalities of 

introducing the bill were over, Senator Leverett Saltonstall (R-Ma.) rose to discuss the Three 

Sisters Bridge. After recounting how conferees broke the stalemate, be said:

My purpose in rising today is to point out that that vote represents the views of only five 

members of the Senate committee. The remainder of the committee, so far as I know, are 

still in favor of the language in the Senate report. 

He introduced an October 10 letter from Commissioner Tobriner informing Chairman Hayden 

that “before the Commissioners proceed with the construction of the Three Sisters bridge, they 

will give more careful consideration to any recommendations pertaining thereto that may appear 

in the report of the National Capital Transportation Agency . . . .” 

Senator Saltonstall expressed the hope that the commissioners “will bear carefully in mind” the 

NCTA report before proceeding. 
Senator Robertson pointed out that “it would have been utterly absurd to have held the Congress 

here until Thanksgiving or later to pass only on language in a report, the only purpose of which 

was to prevent the building of a necessary bridge.” The highway agencies in the District and 

Virginia favored the Three Sisters Bridge:

But we have a Commission [NCTA] indulging in a pipedream of a proposed subway to 

cost $300 to $600 million, that will go under the river and into a highway to relieve traffic 

congestion. We are to wait and spend millions of dollars in building U.S. Highway 

[Interstate] 66, and when it gets to the river, people will either have to swim across or stay 

on the Virginia side. 

He dismissed the objections of “a few citizens who did not want any more traffic,” as well as the 

allegation that the project would interfere with the Lincoln Memorial or connect with the George 

Washington Memorial Parkway. NCTA, he said, had neither plans nor money for a subway 

system “and it will be many years before they have either.” Nothing was involved “but an effort 

to stop the building of a necessary bridge.” 

Senator Mansfield referred to the language in the conference report regarding Glover-Archbold 

Park. “I hope this admonition will be considered.” 

Senator Morse wanted a more definite statement on the issue. He said, “I serve notice on the 

District of Columbia Commissioners” that he would be in the Senate in January 1963 after the 

November election and “I strongly recommend that they take note of this colloquy”:

I strongly advise the District of Columbia Commissioners to see to it that this park 

remains untouched, either from the standpoint of building a highway through it or 

sacrificing it to selfish commercial interests in the District of Columbia. I suggest to the 

District of Columbia Commissioners that they not attempt any end run play, because if 

they do, they will be breaking faith with our committee, in my judgment, and with the 

Senate, and they will be breaking faith with a majority of the House of Representatives, if 

we can ever get an issue such as this to the floor of the House of Representatives for a 

vote. 

Senator Mansfield thanked Senator Morse. “I am sure the Commissioners will read every word 

that has been said on the floor of the Senate about this matter.” 

(Senator Morse was reelected.)

Senator Humphrey, in a statement that may have been inserted into the record rather than 

delivered on the floor, said he supported the reservations the Senate had initially approved 

regarding the Three Sisters Bridge. He acknowledged “honest differences of opinion,” but felt 

that Congress should have the benefit of NCTA’s report on mass transit “before giving a final 

decision as to construction of the Three Sisters Bridge.” Given the importance of the issue, “we 

can afford a delay of no longer than 5 months,” as the Senate had initially approved. Because the 

bridge committed the District to the Inner Loop system, Congress needed “an objective 

assessment of the transportation needs of the area until the entire highway system is evaluated in 
light of the forthcoming mass transit proposals.” He regretted that the conferees decided not to 

approve the Senate language.

The Senate approved the conference report. [District of Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1963-

Conference Report, Congressional Record-Senate, October 11, 1962, pages 23162-23165] 

President Kennedy, then in the middle of the Cuban Missile Crisis, approved the legislation on 

October 23, 1962 (P.L. 87-867), without comment. 

That same day, General Clarke delivered a speech to the American Society of Civil Engineers in 

an attempt to resolve clashes between highway and transit supporters. He said, “the curse of 

Washington is the endless controversy about the solutions to the problems of the future which 

involve continuing delay with restudy after restudy of problems on which agreement may have 

long since been reached.” 

The modes served different needs: 

The mass transportation problem is concerned primarily with the movement of people 

into and out of the downtown section of the region. The highway problem is concerned 

primarily with moving those people who are not going downtown but who are moving 

diffused patterns throughout the region. 

To break through the competitive spirit among the partisans, he said: 

My proposal is quite simple. Let us attempt to arrive at agreed total volumes or 

percentages of the total travel . . . for which we will plan each mode of transportation. 

Let us allow each agency to determine and plan an adequate system to provide for the 

agreed-upon loads. In this way we could at least get progress without the planners’ 

competing for traffic loads to justify individual broad plans. 

If this first step could be agreed upon, the remaining steps are relatively simple. They 

consist of co-ordinating the detailed planning and construction of the various facilities to 

be built so that each new system provides for the other without undue waste and for 

mutual support. 

He said that following his suggestion “would allow the shoemaker to stick to his last and the 

tailor to the cutting of the cloth so that the whole person will be clothed.” He favored 

acceleration of the highway program as well as mass transportation to create a balanced 

transportation system:

We must avoid action on the part of any of the official agencies which attempts to restrict 

unduly the programs of others to insure that a pre-determined solution will be justified. It 

would be possible by design to restrict a program on either side to a point that it would 

fail.
He believed that “we can secure among all the agencies a remarkable degree of unanimity of the 

numbers of people for whom adequate mass transportation should be provided and the numbers 

who should be provided with adequate facilities for travel by car.” 

As for groups such as the American Institute of Architects, General Clarke thought they “could 

render a much more constructive public service by using their many talents to advise and consult 

on the ways by which highways may be skillfully threaded into the fabric of the Nation’s 

Capital.”

The area’s population, he said, would double over the next 18 years, which meant more highways 

were needed. He expected that sufficient housing would be available for those relocated by the 

program, and the board of architects would assist highway officials on matters of “esthetics and 

general livability.” He was “willing and anxious” to work with NPS on replacing any park land 

taken for the city’s public works program: 

If we can avoid negativism, timidity and sheer obstruction along with cross-accusations 

of competing agencies, I believe we can move the city along. [Pierce, Charles D., 

“Clarke Proposes to End Highways-Transit Feud,” The Evening Star, October 23, 1962; 

“Clarke Tells Bickering Transit Foes to Get Back to Work,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, October 24, 1962] 

Although the President signed the District appropriation act, 1963, without ceremony or 

comment – typical for such a bill – he did send a letter to Commissioner Tobriner regarding the 

Three Sisters Bridge. Administrator Stolzenbach, in his first appearance after a law was passed 

designating him an ex-officio member of NCPC, read the letter when Engineer Commissioner 

Clarke asked to have an item on the bridge removed from the agenda. The letter was in reference 

to Commissioner Tobriner’s October 10 letter to Senator Hayden: 

Dear Mr. Tobriner:

I am advised that on October 10th you informed the chairman of the Senate Committee on 

Appropriations, in connection with the conference on the appropriations bill for the 

District of Columbia, that the Commissioners will give careful consideration to the 

forthcoming report of the National Capital Transportation Agency on the transportation 

needs of the region before proceeding with the construction of the Three Sisters Bridge. 

I believe that this was a wise decision and that the agency’s recommendations should be 

studied and evaluated before a decision to proceed with construction of the bridge is 

reached.

I should appreciate it if you would keep me advised through Mr. Horsky of future 

developments with respect to this matter.

 Sincerely,

 John F. Kennedy. 
[Flor, Lee, “Kennedy Note Upholds Wait on Sisters Bridge,” The Evening Star, October 26, 

1962; “JFK Backs Delay On Bridge Project For Transit Report,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, October 25, 1962] 

With action on the FY 1963 budget completed, the District Highway Department submitted its 

1964 budget request to the District commissioners. The department asked for $88.8 million, a 

$30 million increase, for a budget that included several controversial freeway proposals. The 

budget sought funds for the projects Congress had delayed, namely interchange “C,” East Leg, 

Northeast Freeway, and the Southeast Freeway between 11th Street and Barney Circle, SE., as 

well as two projects NCTA had opposed unsuccessfully (Three Sisters Bridge and Potomac River 

Freeway).

New items referred to construction of: 

• North Leg of the Inner Loop along Florida Avenue between 3rd Avenue, NW., and 11th

Street, SE.;

• Center Leg between the Southwest Freeway, along 2nd Street to the North Leg along 

Florida Avenue; 

• Intermediate Loop between East Capitol and 41st Street, SE., and Missouri and Georgia 

Avenues, NW.; 

• Ninth Street Expressway between Constitution Avenue and the Southwest Freeway. 

The budget, Engineer Commissioner Clarke said, presented a clear choice for the agencies 

considering the budget. As for one of the chief objections to freeway construction, he was 

“confident the relocation problem caused by the projects can be solved.” [Flor, Lee, “Roads 

Budget Request Rises by $30 Million,” The Evening Star, October 25, 1962; Clopton, Willard, 

“Funds Allowed To Build Most of Intermediate Loop,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

October 25, 1962] 

National Capital Transportation Agency Submits Its Report 

As directed by the 1960 Act, NCTA submitted its report, Transportation in the National Capital 

Region: Finance and Organization, to President Kennedy on November 1, 1962. In a 

transmittal letter, Stolzenbach told the President:

The programs recommended in this report strike a sound balance between highways and 

mass transportation for this region. The Agency proposes a continuing program for the 

construction of a regional highway system and a ten-year program for the construction of 

a modern high-speed rapid transit system. These facilities are essential to solving the 

region’s severe transportation problem and to preserving and enhancing the vitality and 

appearance of the Nation’s Capital.

The plan focused on the express transit system, which called for two subway routes within 

downtown. The routes totaled 19 miles and crossed twice for distribution and collection. “This 

will provide fast service throughout downtown, speeding rush hour trips and improving 

circulation of downtown traffic in off-peak hours.” The downtown lines would be extended 
through the District and suburban areas along seven rapid rail transit routes and one commuter 

railroad route. Stations and parking areas would serve as local distribution and collection centers 

linking automobiles with the transit lines. 

The plan included express and local bus service in the District and throughout the suburbs with 

convenient connections to the high-speed trains. The report summarized: 

The rail rapid transit system will be 83 miles long and will be served by 65 stations. 

Nearly 19 miles will be underground. Some 26 miles of freeway median strips and 24 

miles of existing railroad rights-of-way will be used for the rail rapid transit system. The 

Pennsylvania Railroad line [from Bowie to Cheverly in Prince George’s County, 

Maryland] will be 15 miles long and will have seven suburban stations. Express bus 

operations will be provided on 52 miles of freeway and parkway. [Transportation in the 

National Capital Region: Finance and Organization, National Capital Transportation 

Agency, 1962, pages 31-32] 

The report identified the location of each route and station as well as the time a trip between 

them would take. 

NCTA estimated that a capital outlay of $793 million would be needed for the rapid transit 

system. Of the projected cost of $793 million, the report estimated that $681 million would be 

needed for construction (including engineering, acquisition of right-of-way, and contingencies), 

with the balance of $112 million to acquire rail rolling stock. [page 48] 

The plan called for a basic fare of 25 cents for all trips within the 10-mile square of the original 

District of Columbia. The suburban areas were divided into zones, with fares increasing 10 cents 

per zone. Concessions, advertising, and other sources of non-operating income were projected to 

generate about $5 million annually by 1980. 

Funding for the transit plan would be a problem since the Federal Government did not have a 

transit-aid program. The recommended plan called for the issuance and sale of $530 million in 

federally guaranteed loans on the private money market during 1971-1974. Proceeds would be 

used for capital outlays and to refinance $415.6 million of interim Treasury borrowing. The 

Federal guarantee would encourage more private borrowing than would otherwise be possible 

and keep the interest at a possible level of 4.5 percent. In addition, the plan proposed $180 

million in government equity from the local governments, $20 million of capital outlays from 

system revenue, and new Treasury loans of $63 million to be repaid from surplus revenue after 

the system is on a revenue-producing basis. 

The plan included $180 million in government equity, with the Federal Government providing 

$120 million of this amount. Government equity would be repaid after retirement of debt within 

30 years of system completion. The recommended breakdown of the local contribution among 

jurisdictions was:

• District of Columbia: $21,720,000 

• Maryland counties: $18,690,000 
• Virginia suburban districts: $19,590,000 

Construction debt would be retired within 30 years mainly from farebox revenue, after which the 

government debt would be repaid: 

Whether or not repaid, the equity paid in by local jurisdictions represents an average 

annual per capita burden during this period of less than 50 cents for each resident of the 

National Capital region. [pages 80-81] 

Construction would begin in 1964, with downtown service to begin in 1968. 

As for highways, the report explained that auto ownership was steadily increasing, with many 

people moving through downtown in the future either unable or unwilling to use public 

transportation.” The movement of trucks was another consideration. Still, the region had a 

substantial network of freeways and parkways, totaling 140 miles, but “more roads will be 

needed if the residents of the region are to have a substantial degree of mobility.” Current plans 

included another 65 miles of freeways or parkways. NCTA recommended another 50 miles of 

freeways by 1980. 

In the Washington area, as elsewhere, “the public has also shown that it is troubled by 

overextensive highway construction and regards rapid transit facilities as a less disruptive means 

of transporting people to and from downtown.” This preference was shown in the Washington 

area where virtually every citizens association was “in favor of more emphasis on new rapid 

transit facilities and relatively less emphasis on new highways.” [pages 10-11, 42-43] 

The recommended highway plan retained the key features of the Mass Transportation Survey 

plan: 

The Capital Beltway is the framework for future regional industrial and commercial as 

well as residential development, and the major heavy-duty route bypassing central 

Washington and connecting its outer suburbs. From a dozen points along the Beltway, 

radial expressways lead inward to serve the suburbs and the District. 

The new transit system would reduce traffic in certain corridors, necessitating changes. [page 

43] 

The key problem was downtown where no practicable highway system could accommodate the 

traffic to and through downtown as forecast for 1980. Coupled with the downtown subway, 

NCTA recommended a downtown freeway system in the form of an inverted “T” connecting the 

central bridges (15th Street, Arlington Memorial, Theodore Roosevelt, and Key) with freeways to 

Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties: 

The “T” includes major elements of the inner loop proposed in the 1959 plan. However, 

the North Leg of the previously proposed loop is replaced by an express street system that 

would provide adequately for traffic requirements and at the same time preserve desirable 

neighborhood characteristics and fit in with any future plans for neighborhood 
improvements. The Agency’s studies show that such improved street facilities would be 

adequate for traffic movements in the area which the North Leg would serve . . . . 

The Agency’s studies similarly show that the East Leg of the previously proposed loop is 

not required since it can be satisfactorily replaced by a high-speed route through Fort 

Drive.

Instead of the East Leg, NCTA favored a route that crossed the Anacostia River on the 11st 

Street Bridge, then ran north on the Anacostia Freeway and Kenilworth Avenue, both of which 

would be widened and swing northwest onto Fort Drive. The rationale was that much of the 

traffic originates or ends in Washington and Montgomery County or in southern Prince George’s 

County. Under NCTA’s plan, much of this traffic would remain on the east bank freeways, 

unlike the District plan which encouraged motorists to cross the river, crowding the bridges and 

the area between the river and downtown. 

With those elements out, the “T” consisted of: 

(a) Extending the Southeast Leg to 11th Street and across the Anacostia River to Route 295; 

and

(b) Constructing an underground freeway below the Mall from Third and C Street, S.W., to 

the vicinity of Third and C Streets, N.W., and a depressed freeway from there to New 

York and Florida Avenues. This Third Street leg will not require use of any part of the 

Capitol grounds. In the vicinity of New Jersey Avenue it will be integrated with proposed 

urban renewal projects. [pages 43-44] 

NCTA also proposed to combine I-95 and I-70S in the District and Maryland: 

The Third Street Leg will be extended along New York Avenue to 9th Street, N.E. From 

there the route will turn and follow the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad tracks toward Silver 

Spring. This will be the means of bringing Interstate Routes 70-S and 95 into the city 

from Maryland and of serving the central and eastern portions of Montgomery County 

and the western portions of Prince George’s County. 

I-95 diverted from I-70S in the vicinity of Michigan Avenue/Queen’s Chapel Road and continued 

to a link with I-95 at the Capital Beltway.

For western Montgomery County, traffic service to downtown “will be provided by the George 

Washington Memorial Parkway and the Potomac Freeway.”

The use of the railroad corridor was “the key to meeting” highway needs by providing additional 

capacity while “avoiding the substantial relocation of persons, loss of taxable property and 

disruption of neighborhoods that would result from construction of the Northeast, North Central 

and Northwest Freeway proposed in the 1959 plan.” A rapid transit line between Silver Spring 

and Queen’s Chapel, Maryland, would be located in the I-70S corridor. [page 44] 

The new plan also called for changes in I-66 in Virginia. The State was building I-66 outside the 

Capital Beltway and acquiring right-of-way within the circumferencial. Under the plan:
Route 66 will have six lanes except between the Airport Access Road junction and Four Mile 

Run. Between these two points the capacity will be increased to eight lanes. From Route 66 to 

Arlington Boulevard a short spur through Four Mile Run will be needed as will improvements of 

the Boulevard. 

The reason for the reduction was that trucks could not cross the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge; they 

would be diverted to the Shirley Highway’s 14th Street bridges. [pages 44-45] 

NCTA also rejected the Three Sisters Bridge. The report explained that the only reason for the 

Three Sisters Bridge was “to bring trucks and additional auto traffic from Fairfax and Arlington 

Counties into downtown.” That service is not required. With 22 bridge lanes open in 1957, 19 

more lanes recently opened or under construction, and mass transit reducing automobile traffic, 

“central area bridge capacity will be adequate for the needs of motorists in 1980 without Three 

Sisters Bridge.

Further, building the Three Sisters Bridge would “create traffic pressure that would tend to force 

construction of highways that would otherwise be unnecessary.” The report cited the Northwest 

Freeway, the Glover-Archbold Parkway, the North Leg of the Inner Loop Freeway, and portions 

of the Intermediate Loop in Arlington. [pages 25-28] 

The report also called for two projects that were essential to the operation of the downtown 

freeway plan. One was construction of a highway on Fort Drive between the combined I-70S/95 

and the Kenilworth Avenue Expressway, a project that would require little new right-of-way 

because the city had acquired most that would be needed. The widening of Kenilworth Avenue 

and the Anacostia Freeway would be needed in later years. [page 45]

Finally, NCTA considered advanced vehicle concepts, such as monorail, but concluded that “the 

standard-gauge, dual-rail system has distinct advantages over the monorail vehicle system.” The 

report considered D.C. Transit System’s monorail proposal in an appendix, limiting its review to 

a line from Georgetown to Dulles International Airport. A transit line was needed in the densely 

populated Wisconsin Avenue-Chevy Chase-Bethesda corridor, but the line to the airport “would 

depend almost entirely on airport and tourist patronage; it would carry virtually no commuter 

traffic and therefore make no contribution to the solution of the peak hour congestion problem.” 

Rapid transit service to the airport “may well be desirable,” but the most logical route would be 

an extension of the proposed rapid transit line serving, and deriving revenue from, Arlington and 

Fairfax. Moreover, if rail service were provided to the airport, travelers should be linked to 

downtown and “not force him to transfer to a bus or taxi several miles short of downtown as 

would the Superrail proposal.” 

Further, the monorail would be “too costly to become part of a rapid transit system whose heart is 

a downtown subway.” Tunnels, for example, “would have to be about one and half feet higher” 

to accommodate the elevated line. [pages 66, 91] 

Professor Schrag summarized the NCTA plan:
Gone, in the NCTA plan, was Bartholomew’s intermediate loop. Gone was the northern 

half of the Inner Loop, the so-called North Leg and East Leg, except for enhancement of 

existing streets. Gone was Bartholomew’s pet Northwest Freeway. Gone too was the 

Three Sisters Bridge. The NCTA acknowledged the need for some new highways, but 

only where they could be built with the minimum impact on established neighborhoods. 

Thus, it combined the North Central and Northeast Freeways of the 1959 plan with a 

version of the East Leg to create a Y-shaped freeway whose stem would run alongside the 

B&O railroad tracks leading north from Union Station. Because these tracks had been in 

place since the beginning of the century, a highway alongside them would not divide 

neighborhoods any more than they already were divided, “avoiding the substantial 

relocation of persons, loss of taxable property, and disruption of neighborhoods” that 

would result from the 1959 plan. [Schrag, page 54] 

The new plan, with its reduced highway component, would cost less than the 1959 proposal: 

It confidently asserted that its program offered a plan in which “each type of 

transportation is assigned to do the work for which it is best suited and in the sense that 

people will have a reasonable choice of how to travel.” [Schrag, page 54, quote is from 

the NCTA report, page xi]

Trying to Sort Out the Freeway Battles

Upon receipt of the NCTA report, President Kennedy released a statement in which he 

“expressed his hope that the report and recommendations of the transportation agency would be a 

significant contribution to the solution of the transportation problems of the National Capital.” 

The plan was to be reviewed by District, Federal, and other officials before the President 

submitted recommendations to Congress. 

Representative Broyhill, after scanning the report, said it “looks like a real step forward.” He 

said he would contact Chairman McMillan of the House District Committee to urge hearings by 

the Joint Committee in early January 1963. “I am sure the chairman will agree with me.” In 

addition, Representative Broyhill said, “I hope it will be shown that the Three Sisters bridge will 

not be needed.” 

The District’s Aitken was skeptical of the funding aspects of the mass transit plan. He would not 

be able to comment in detail until NCTA released appendices on planning, engineering, finance, 

and organization. “If Mr. Stolzenbach can build a transit system for 60 per cent of the persons 

going down town in rush hour, let him.” He added, “But why can’t he let highways alone?” 

Virtually every other agency or jurisdiction that was asked to review NCTA’s report made the 

same observation regarding the absence of the appendices. Without them, officials could not 

understand the basis for NCTA’s assertions. 

Donald Gingery was critical, as he had been of Stolzenbach and NCTA all along: 

It’s perfectly obvious there was no control or checks and balances over the agency’s 

procedures. I think the agency should not get any more funds until Virginia and 
Maryland get some representation on the agency. I recommended some time ago that 

Congress give the State Governors the right to appoint a chairman who would rank with 

Mr. Stolzenbach. 

This was an undercover study without checks and balances and it throws planning in both 

States into chaos.

Chairman Wells of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission said he 

thought NCTA, with its focus on the District, had not considered the 800,000 residents of 

Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties. 

Arthur K. Stellhorn, planning director of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning 

Commissioner, was concerned that NCTA had proposed rail service along most of the routes 

where Maryland planners favored highways. He said that Stolzenbach was “taking the same 

routes that we are but he is taking off the highways.” Gingery agreed, saying NCTA’s plan 

would stop the commission “dead in its tracks.” NCTA’s report had “cast a real legal shadow on 

all regional planning for years to come.” 

State Senator Fenwick of Virginia thought NCTA had performed a service. “I feel, however, that 

there may be overemphasis on mass transit at the expense of the highway program.” He was 

concerned that if the plan were used to delay highway construction “in hopes that within the next 

10 years we will have a rapid transit system, we might never recover from the delay of these 

programs.” 

John E. Harwood, the Virginia Highway Department’s location and design engineer, disagreed 

with NCTA’s conclusion about the Three Sisters Bridge. “Adding more trucks to the 14th Street 

Bridge would only add to the congestion there. There is going to be a need for many more 

bridges, no matter how much rapid transit you have.” 

Ernest D. Wilt, who chaired the Arlington County Board, said the area needed “something like” 

NCTA’s rail transit plan. “We may find we don’t need the Three Sisters Bridge,” which the 

board had long opposed. [Flor, Lee, “Broyhill Vows Early Transit Plan Action,” The Evening 

Star, November 2, 1962; Clopton, Willard, “Area Politicians Favor Transit Plan Plus Roads,” 

The Washington Post and Times Herald, November 3, 1962] 

The Bureau of the Budget sent the report to the Departments of the Treasury, the Interior, and 

Commerce, home of BPR, and the Housing and Home Finance Agency for review. Comments 

were expected by the end of the year, although full review might not be possible until NCTA 

released the appendices. Horsky said that given the amount of information yet to be released, “It 

could be that the budget and legislation will be in a supplemental request to Congress.” 

BPR’s Barnett was concerned about the NCTA’s proposal on freeways, which was “certainly not 

the program” BPR had approved for the region. While all officials should give “a new look” at 

the program, he said “the Bureau expects an integrated system.” [“Transit Reviews Seen 

Awaiting Added Data,” The Sunday Star, November 4, 1962; Clopton, Willard, “Transit Scheme 

Still Must Clear Many Hurdles,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, November 4, 1962] 
The Star, meanwhile, was skeptical. An editorial stated that NCTA’s report “does not suffer 

from any lack of confidence.” A subway was needed, but NCTA’s assertion that it would carry 

enough riders “to pay its entire capital and operating costs over the next 40 years is an astounding 

claim.” Quite simply, “There is no precedent in experience elsewhere to support it.” 

As for the highway element of NCTA’s report, it did more “than simply curtail certain parts of 

the regional freeway system which has been carefully developed and generally approved for 

years.” Instead, it had “cut the heart out of this system—to such a degree, in fact, that the 

question arises as to whether the true intent might not be to make automobile congestion so 

clearly intolerable, through inadequate highways, that commuters would have no alternative but 

to seek other forms of transportation that exist only on paper.” What would be left was a 

“skeleton highway system” that officials might be able to finance “under existing policies 

underlying Federal aid in highway construction.” 

The editorial cited the report’s position on the Three Sisters Bridge as an example:

[It was] unnecessary because a rail-transit line would extend into the Arlington-Fairfax 

region and that, in its considered judgment, existing Potomac bridges alone would have 

sufficient capacity in 1980 to accommodate vehicular traffic. Here we go again! What is 

the source of traffic estimates which allegedly support this assumption?

Until NCTA released appendices explaining the basis for such assumptions, “the public would be 

wise to reserve judgment on much of the report.” [“Transportation Plan,” The Sunday Star, 

November 4, 1962] 

How trucks would cross the Potomac River if the Three Sisters Bridge were not built was another 

question. On November 13, the District Commissioners committed to building the Three Sisters 

Bridge by approving an extension of the Potomac River Freeway from 31st and K Streets to 

Georgetown University. Director Aitken said the city had little choice but to build the Three 

Sisters Bridge. Key Bridge, which carried U.S. 29 between Rosslyn in Virginia and Georgetown 

in the District, could not handle truck traffic. Only the middle of the structure, built originally to 

accommodate streetcars, was structurally able to accommodate truck loadingsa If Key Bridge 

had to carry trucks, it would have to be reconstructed: 

Reconstruction would require closing Key Bridge to traffic while this work was done. 

This bridge now carries 66,000 vehicles a day and I am not about to propose that it be 

closed.

Moreover, when the District Commissioners approved the Potomac River Freeway plan earlier in 

the day, they had deleted two ramps connecting Key Bridge with the Whitehurst Freeway. 

Aitken said the ramps were “not compatible” with the planned freeway system and were not 

economically feasible.

As a result of these decisions, Key Bridge was no longer a possible link in the freeway network 

for traffic crossing the Potomac River. In addition, the Eisenhower Administration had requested 

that the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge, still under construction, not carry trucks. Aitken said the 
plan was for Interstate traffic to cross the river on the Three Sisters Bridge as part of the Potomac 

River Freeway. The four-lane Whitehurst Freeway would carry westbound traffic while the fourlane Potomac River Freeway would carry eastbound traffic. [“Pierce, Charles D., “Key Bridge is 

Ruled Out as Truck Link,” The Evening Star, November 14, 1962] 

The District commissioners held a public hearing on the 1964 budget for road construction. The 

hearing was sparsely attended, with only about 50 people in attendance. The Star’s opening 

paragraph summarized the result:

Charges of “blackmail” and “unadulterated arrogance” and warnings of “irreparable 

harm” and “disaster” were sounded today as highway supporters and opponents collided 

at a public hearing. 

Polly Shackleton said that by including the East Leg, Northeast Freeway, and interchange “C” in 

the budget, District officials displayed “unbelievable gall.” These freeways could result in the 

“ruthless destruction of countless homes and communities . . . .” This action on these projects 

represented “pure unadulterated arrogance.” She also criticized District highway officials for 

their plan to remove the ramps connecting Key Bridge and the Whitehurst Freeway, which she 

thought was a form of “blackmail” to force construction of the Three Sisters Bridge.

Chairman Neil Phillips of the Committee of 100 on the Federal City called the District highway 

budget “ideal” for the truck and highway lobby, but “a blueprint for disaster for the District of 

Columbia”: 

Washington has drifted to an ever-increasing auto-dominant transportation system in 

which the interest of motor vehicles reigned dominant and the interests of the people—

concerned with their neighborhoods, institutions, and fiscal soundness of their 

government—stood neglected. 

Clifford C. Ham of Neighbors, Inc., called the highway proposals “opportunistic, costly and . . . 

destructive of human values.” His group favored NCTA’s transit proposals: 

For the first time some emphasis is placed on solutions involving more than automobile 

transportation. For the first time we recognize considerations of such factors as home, 

communities, the potential displacement of families and businesses, and the elimination 

of needed public and private community facilities.”

Some witnesses favored the highway plans. J. C. Turner, president of the Greater Washington 

Central Labor Council, reminded the commissioners that thousands of construction workers 

depended on the highway program for their jobs. He said that, “unless the highway program goes 

forward month by month, there will be severe unemployment this winter as well as in the winters 

to follow.” He was convinced the relocation problem would be solved so that “no one in this 

community will suffer and the highway program will go forward.” 

AAA’s Miller said the board endorsed the highway program: 
Even if the most modern and advanced rapid transit facilities which have yet been 

devised were to be provided the Washington Metropolitan Area tomorrow, it would not 

and in the foreseeable future take care of only a fraction of the area’s transportation 

requirements and at an appalling deficit.

He disputed NCTA’s estimate that its proposed rapid rail system would pay for itself. It would, 

he said, run deficits “vastly greater” than the annual deficits of $16 million predicted for the more 

modest rail system proposed by the Mass Transportation Survey: 

One can only imagine what the deficit would be for the proposed eight-lane rail rapid 

transit system proposed by the National Capital Transportation Agency. 

Overall, according to the Post, “the proposed highway program drew more cheers than jeers at 

the lightly-attended hearing.” [Pierce, Charles D., “D.C. Highway Plan Termed ‘Blackmail,’” 

The Evening Star, November 16, 1962; Schuette, Paul A., “Freeway Plans Stir Debate at Public 

Hearing,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, November 17, 1962] 

Given the interest in shifting the East Leg Freeway from the 11st Street corridor to the west bank 

of the Anacostia River, District officials opened discussions with NPS officials in hopes of a 

compromise regarding the use of park lands. Wirth told reporters that he had not seen details of a 

proposal. “I don’t want to take a stand one way or the other without looking at it.” He indicated, 

however, he had “an open mind” on the question. One concern he cited was that the freeway 

would cut off a portion of a public golf course. District officials responded that the golf course 

could be extended north onto land created by proposed dredging and reclamation around 

Kingman Lake. Further, they contended, most of the park land needed for the freeway was 

undeveloped and, in general, not suitable for park facilities. [“Wirth Keeps ‘Open Mind’ on East 

Leg,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, November 18, 1962] 

Implementing the Year 2000 Plan 

On November 27, 1962, President Kennedy released a memorandum on the Year 2000 Plan for 

the National Capital Region. Building on the Year 2000 Plan, President Kennedy said that in 

view of the Federal interest in the region, he wanted “the greatest possible coordination of 

planning and action among the Federal agencies in developing plans or making decisions which 

affect the Region.” To facilitate planning, he established “development policies” as guidelines. 

For example, all agencies were to base their decisions on the prospect that regional population 

would be 5 million by 2000. Further, the Federal Government would “limit the concentration of 

Federal employees within Metro-Center . . . over the next four decades to an increase of 

approximately 75,000.” Federal office development should follow the corridor cities concept 

recommended in the Year 2000 Plan: 

The success of the corridor cities concept depends on the reservation of substantial areas 

of open countryside from urban development. It shall be the policy of the executive 

branch to seek to preserve for the benefit of the National Capital Region strategic open 

spaces, including existing park, woodland, and scenic resources. 
The memorandum advocated non-monumental government buildings in clusters within the 

central business district that “will have a dignity and strength to establish their public identity.”

As for transportation, President Kennedy’s memorandum said: 

Planning to meet future transportation requirements for the Region shall assume the need 

for a coordinated system including both efficient highway and mass transit facilities, and 

making full use of the advantages of each mode of transportation. 

With these and other guidelines, he asked all department and agency heads “to give full 

consideration to these policies in all activities relating to the planning and development of the 

National Capital Region, and to work closely with the planning bodies which have 

responsibilities for the sound and orderly development of the entire area.” 

The Star welcomed President Kennedy’s call for coordination, saying it “logically complements 

his earlier appointment of Charles A. Horsky as special White House advisor on Washington area 

affairs.” Horsky was in a unique position to resolve roadblocks, especially those involving 

conflicts involvimg previous administration policy: 

Action is more difficult, however, when the proper policy is not clearly defined, as is the 

case with the most pressing area problem—transportation. 

The Star’s editors saw the memorandum in the context of the President’s recommendations to 

Congress on mass transit and highway proposals in NCTA’s report: 

Here also, however, the new memorandum should prove beneficial. For its issuance at 

this point obviously is intended to enlist the co-operation of all agencies in carefully 

studying the controversial NCTA report, and in submitting recommendations which will 

help the White House arrive at a sensible conclusion. [“Goal: Co-ordination,” The 

Evening Star, November 28, 1962] 

In part because of President Kennedy’s support, the Year 2000 Plan was more influential than the 

Downtown Progress action plan. Gutheim and Lee summarized the impact: 

A fruitful debate began to define common interests. Large portions of the wedges and 

corridors plan were embraced in Maryland and, with modifications due mainly to 

topography, in Virginia as well. The bold and simple diagram planted itself in the 

popular imagination and, widely supported by civic groups, survived many challenges by 

the Council of Governments for as long as fifteen years. 

In downtown Washington, redevelopment and the location of federal buildings received 

support from the plan but were less consistently responsive to it. Nevertheless, the plan 

influenced the design of the Metro rail system and special project planning for 

Pennsylvania Avenue and other development centers. Most of all, the Year 2000 Policies 

Plan also affected the future planning of the National Capital Planning Commission. 
The impact of the Year 2000 Policies Plan was most pronounced in the metropolitan 

region where rural land still existed. For the first time, a structure was suggested that 

combined the much-desired qualities of order, open space, and mobility. 

The Year 2000 Plan affected the scope of planning in the area: 

To realize the vast wedges and corridors design, regional planning organizations clearly 

had to include all planning elements: zoning, regulation of new subdivisions of land, 

transportation networks, public works, and the allocation of funds. The regional growth 

configuration of the Year 2000 Policies Plan also required more immediate action to 

regulate development of heavily populated corridors, including the new town centers, 

highways, the completion of the mass transportation system, and the preservation of three 

hundred thousand acres of open space required to separate the corridors. Policies worked 

out jointly between the National Capital Planning Commission and the National Capital 

Regional Planning Council additionally involved economic analyses; development plans; 

and studies of legal, administrative, and fiscal arrangements. In this way, new forms of 

development planning were superseding the older and simpler regulations of land use that 

had constituted planning for the past half century. [Gutheim and Lee, pages 291-293] 

The Darwinian Theory of Transportation 

Despite NCTA’s objection to several freeway proposals, the District commissioners had 

committed to the Three Sisters Bridge on November 13 by approving an extension of the 

Potomac River Freeway from 31st and K Streets to Georgetown University. Director Aitken said 

the city had little choice but to build the Three Sisters Bridge. The Key Bridge, which carried 

U.S. 29 between Rosslyn and Georgetown, could not handle truck traffic. Only the middle of the 

structure, built originally to accommodate heavy streetcars, was structurally able to accommodate 

trucks. If Key Bridge had to carry trucks, it would have to be reconstructed. Aitken said:

Reconstruction would require closing Key Bridge to traffic while this work was done. 

This bridge now carries 66,000 vehicles a day and I am not about to propose that it be 

closed.

Moreover, when the District commissioners approved the Potomac River Freeway plan earlier in 

the day, they had deleted two ramps connecting Key Bridge with the Whitehurst Freeway. 

Aitken said the ramps were “not compatible” with the planned freeway system and were not 

economically feasible.

As a result of these decisions, Key Bridge was no longer a possible link in the freeway network 

for traffic crossing the Potomac River. In addition, the Eisenhower Administration had requested 

that the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge, still under construction, not carry trucks. Aitken said the 

plan was for Interstate traffic to cross the river on the Three Sisters Bridge as part of the Potomac 

River Freeway. The four-lane Whitehurst Freeway would carry westbound traffic while the fourlane Potomac River Freeway would carry eastbound traffic. [Pierce, Charles D., “Key Bridge is 

Ruled Out as Truck Link,” The Evening Star, November 14, 1962] 
The plan for the Potomac River Freeway seemed uncontroversial because the District and NCPC 

had approved it and Congress had appropriated funds for it. However, whether the new freeway 

would extend ramps to Key Bridge did prove controversial. As NCPC Chairman Rowe pointed 

out, the absence of connections with the bridge created the need for the Three Sisters Bridge, 

making the absence controversial. She indicated that the District’s action was taking liberties 

with NCPC’s approval. Although NCPC had approved the Three Sisters Bridge, she contended 

the approval was only in principle, without approval of plans for approaches in the District. She 

also disputed the District’s plan to link the freeway to Georgetown University via Prospect 

Street, a plan NCPC had never approved. Further, NCPC’s associate director, Charles H. 

Conrad, disagreed with Aitken about the feasibility of the link to Key Bridge. “There is no 

physical reason why it cannot be done.” [Schuette, Paul A., “River Highway Runs Into New 

Controversies,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, November 19, 1962] 

NCPC Executive Director Finley was about to leave his post to take a position with a Baltimore 

mortgage and development firm. On November 21, he addressed the Washington section of the 

Institute of Traffic Engineers on “Reflections on Leaving the Nation’s Capital.” 

Finley praised the Bible Committee for its 1959 recommendations for a regional development 

agency and other recommendations that had been gathering dust ever since. “The 

recommendations should be dusted off and studied—they were years ahead of their time.” He 

told the professional engineers, “No matter what anybody says here, the future transportation 

system will result from decisions made in the halls of Congress on non-technical basis resulting 

from the emotional reactions of Congressmen.” 

He praised the District Highway Department, saying it had the most enlightened approach of any 

State highway agency for designing attractive freeways in cities. “The District has had the most 

creative response to the problem of urban design, a problem which more traffic engineers are 

going to have to consider as time goes by.” He complimented the District for its cooperation 

with city planners and for its hiring of architectural consultants for help in designing highways 

that fit in the Nation’s capital. “Hal Aitken, District highway director, deserves a great amount 

of credit for this,” he said.

Finley included “a few jovial comments,” as the Star put it, on the District’s “friendly rival,” 

NCTA. He noted that Darwin Stolzenbach was not in attendance, possibly because he feared 

Finley “would reveal his Darwinian theories of transportation [namely that] if you delay 

highways long enough, you really need transit.” 

Mr. Finley said people also were saying that the initials NCTA stand for “Never collate the 

appendices.” As the Star explained:

This was in reference to the growing number of requests by agencies for several 

appendices which the NCTA said would be published soon after its November 1 report to 

President Kennedy on financing and organization for transportation. Agencies have been 

told that the NCTA had all of the material ready for the appendices by October 1, but has 

never been able to write the material in what it felt was acceptable form, officials said.
Finley also suggested that strengthening a regional planning agency would be like sending an 

ambassador to a country that doesn’t exist. “We need a better metropolitan organization, and 

would be much better off with some centralized type of government.” At present, NCPC had a 

say in many areas, but its function was largely advisory, which he called “an old-fashioned idea” 

in planning:

A competent agency ought to be established which is big enough and strong enough to 

prepare a development plan for the city, say for 20 years. It ought to be able to see that 

decisions are made according to that plan.

If the commission were under the direction of the White House, he speculated, it would be able 

to deal with Federal agencies across the board with authority. He hoped that appointment of 

Charles Horsky was an indication that “this is where we are headed.”

He said of his current NCPC post, with its annual salary of $19,000, “it has been thrilling to work 

in the community. I look forward to coming back with my pockets filled with money.” [“D.C. 

Freeway Designs Lauded By Parting NCPC Chief Finley,” The Evening Star, November 22, 

1962; Whitten, Leslie H., “Finley, in Parting Short, Blasts Inaction Here,” The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, November 22, 1962] 

A Star editorial complimented Finley for saying “publicly what others are saying behind the 

scenes” regarding Stolzenbach’s efforts to delay highway construction. Stolzenbach denied any 

such intention, claiming he simply thought highway development should be delayed until 

decisions are reached on the rail rapid transit system NCTA had proposed: 

There should be no need to say that the NCTA proposals will have to stand or fall on their 

merits. Any thought (by Mr. Stolzenbach or by anyone else) that the prospects for an 

elaborate rail-transit system might be enhanced by delaying highway construction until 

automobile congestion becomes intolerable is childishly ridiculous. [“’Darwinian’ 

Theory,” The Evening Star, November 30, 1962] 

In the Wake of the NCTA Report

In response to the Bureau of the Budget’s request to agencies to review NCTA’s plan, NCPC 

unanimously approved the $793-million rail transit system in principle on December 6, urging 

that “construction proceed as rapidly as possible in the interest of economics and service to the 

public.” During debate, NCPC modified the endorsement that originally recommended “that the 

[transit] system be fully implemented at the earliest possible time.” This phrasing seemed to 

broad an endorsement of the NCTA plan. After discussing the question during a recess, the 

members agreed to call for construction of the transit system “as rapidly as possible” after 

general approval.

As for NCTA’s proposed highway cutbacks, NCPC decided to withhold judgment until NCTA 

published the appendices of supporting data. [Lewis, Robert J., “Planners Back Rail System,” 

The Evening Star, December 6, 1962] 
In addition to the commissioners’ approval of the Potomac River Freeway plan, the year ended 

with further good news for the highway builders when NPS, the District Department of 

Highways and Traffic, and BPR announced agreement on December 13, 1962, on the South Leg 

of the Inner Loop. The plan was to build the freeway through a 1,400-foot tunnel under the 

Lincoln Memorial grounds between the Potomac River and 14th Street, NW. Officials had been 

negotiating since 1960 when NPS had proposed the plan, and reached general agreement about 

6 months earlier. 

On December 14, 1962, all parties signed the agreement. Wirth signed for the Department of the 

Interior, saying: 

This section of Washington—the Lincoln Memorial, the Reflecting Pool, the Washington 

Monument, the Tidal Basin, and the Jefferson Memorial—is the real heart of beautiful 

Washington. I know that you are as much interested as we are in retaining this 

atmosphere to the greatest extent possible.

Consultants employed by NPS had partially designed the tunnel. 

The agreement included removal of the driveway between the Lincoln Memorial and the 

Reflecting Pool, plus removal of the temporary buildings on both sides of the Reflecting Pool, 

with park roads and parking areas to be built in their place. 

The NPS would be in charge of the first segment, between Constitution Avenue and a midpoint 

between the Memorial and the Tidal Basin. BPR would be involved in approval of the 

consultants’ work and final approval of the plans. 

The second segment ended west of 15th Street and included part of the road network for the area 

around the Tidal Basin where the Japanese cherry trees were a popular tourist attraction each 

spring. BPR would be the contracting agency for this section and oversee construction. 

District highway officials would be in charge of the final segment, which involved construction 

of an interchange between 14th and 15th Streets.

The project was estimated to cost $18 million, with construction to begin in 1963 and completion 

scheduled for late 1965. Engineer Commissioner Clarke said, “We really don’t expect any 

trouble. We all understand each other’s problems.” 

The plan satisfied all parties. The District received the Interstate highway it wanted, while NPS 

was finally able to improve the memorial plaza and the area around the Reflecting Pool. [Flor, 

Lee, “Lincoln Memorial Inner Loop Tunnel to be Begun in ’63,” The Evening Star, December 

14, 1962] 

A Star editorial expressed surprise that there “seemingly is no end to the studies, negotiations 

and compacts” needed to build the Inner Loop. The fact that the agreement gave each party veto 

power was an arrangement that “to say the least, opens the door to future delays and 

disagreement.” General Clarke’s comments were reassuring, but the key was simple:
In the final analysis, however, the success of the new agreement will depend upon 

whether each of the principals who signed it . . . continues to work together with a 

reasonable amount of good faith and mutual trust. [“‘In Accord’—Again,” The Evening 

Star, December 18, 1962] 

On December 23, Lee Flor reported that the District Highway Department had sent a 13-page list 

of questions to NCTA about its November 1 report. Engineer Commissioner Clarke, who 

referred to the list as a “white paper,” said the city wanted NCTA to know and check all the 

District Highway Department’s assumptions. “We want to be as objective as possible.” 

Department officials also planned to “sit down with the NCTA officials” to go over the white 

paper. The paper questioned each action NCTA had proposed, including its traffic forecasts for 

decisions by individuals about the use of an automobile or transit. The department also 

questioned NCTA’s modal split forecasts about corridor cities. In addition, District highway 

officials questioned NCTA’s assertion that the $793 million system could be financed from 

passenger fares. “The highway officials,” Flor wrote, “said this is the first time such a claim has 

been made, since transit systems in all other American cities do not pay for themselves.”

Further, the District explored the history of the National Capital Transportation Act of 1960 to 

determine whether NCTA had any legislative basis for making highway planning 

recommendations. Stolzenbach had wanted this authority, including veto power, but it was not 

included in the 1960 Act. The highway staff thought that the November 1 report’s assertion of 

such authority was based on partial quotes from the legislation. [Flor, Lee, “13 Pages of 

Questions Asked on Transit Report,” The Sunday Star, December 23, 1962] 

On December 24, the Star reported that construction crews had begun work on a four-lane 

section of the Potomac River Freeway across Rock Creek Park between 26th and 31st Street, 

NW.:

The freeway section will be built on piers just south of Whitehurst freeway. The piers 

were put up several years ago, immediately after the District Highway Department 

received a permit from the National Park Service.

The project included extensive landscaping to restore the park atmosphere, while the District 

agreed to transfer land from a former school to NPS to increase the size of Rock Creek Park 

slightly:

The new freeway section is to carry eastbound traffic from the Three Sisters Bridge. In 

the Rock Creek area, the four lanes will separate into two ramps, to connect to the 

northbound and southbound lanes of the West leg of the Inner Loop. 

The $2.8 million project is to be finished by July, 1965, when it will serve as a temporary 

detour while the Whitehurst freeway is altered and while K street is torn up for 

construction of the Inner Loop. 
West of 31st Street, the city’s plans for the freeway were held up while the fate of the Three 

Sisters Bridge was decided. [Flor, Lee, “Work Starts on Freeway Over Rock Creek,” The 

Evening Star, December 24, 1962] 

As agencies awaited the appendices to NCTA’s November 1 report, they continued their reviews 

to comply with the Bureau of the Budget’s deadline of January 31. With that deadline in mind, 

NCPC set up a committee to study the location of the East Leg Freeway. NCTA recommended it 

be built on the east side of the Anacostia River while the District favored the west side because it 

would reduce the number of families displaced. Officials had sought a compromise, but 

Stolzenbach had not been willing to change a decision he had submitted to the President. 

NCPC also wanted to study the ramp connections from the Potomac River Freeway to Key 

Bridge and the need for the Three Sisters Bridge. Studies for the freeway omitted the connection 

to Key Bridge and called for removing present ramps from the Whitehurst Freeway to the bridge. 

Instead, the new freeway would pass under Key Bridge and connect with the Three Sisters 

bridge. [Flor, Lee, “East Leg Freeway Review Is Ordered,” The Evening Star, December 25, 

1962] 

The year ended with an important road opening on December 31. The Maryland State Road 

Commission opened the Cabin John Bridge across the Potomac River. At the same time, an 

8-mile stretch of the Capital Beltway spanning the bridge opened linking the River Road 

interchange in Montgomery County to the State Route 7 interchange in Virginia. In addition, 

NPS opened a short segment of the George Washington Memorial Parking linking the CIA’s new 

headquarters (and BPR’s research facility) to the Capital Beltway.

The Star described the opening: “The 1,400-foot, $3 million Cabin John Bridge across the 

Potomac . . . was opened some time today with absolutely no fanfare.” With the temperature at 

13 degrees, the Star explained, “a ribbon-snipping ceremony would not be appealing.” Maryland 

had scheduled the opening for 10 a.m., but cars reportedly began driving across the river as early 

as 8 a.m. [“Cabin John Opens on Cold, Quiet Note,” The Evening Star, December 31, 1962] 

(As mentioned earlier, the Cabin John Bridge was renamed the American Legion Memorial 

Bridge on May 30, 1969.) 
Debating the NCTA Data

In view of NCTA’s rejection of the Three Sisters Bridge, Engineer Commissioner Clarke said in 

early January that the District Highway Department would study whether an improved Key 

Bridge could serve as a substitute. “It is under study, but it is not in the recommendation stage. 

We did feel obligated, though, to consider all the various alternatives.” [Pierce, Charles B., 

“Highway Unit Weighs Key Bridge Widening,” The Evening Star, January 3, 1963 

NCTA finally began releasing the appendices on January 10, 1963, ultimately six reports with a 

total of nearly 1,000 pages of text and maps. The reports released on that day predicted that 60 

percent of commuters entering downtown Washington in 1980 would use mass transportation 

facilities (not broken down by rail or bus). This figure compared with 40 percent at present, and 

56 percent in 1980 as forecast by the Mass Transportation Survey. The District Highway 

Department, in preparing its estimates for the ICE, had predicted steady transit use estimated at 

only 25 percent in 1980. 

In discussing the projections, NCTA said that in 1959, no transit agency was in operation. Now, 

with NCTA planning a network, it projected higher mass transit use based on experience in other 

American cities with a rapid transit system. [Flor, Lee, “Heavy Use of Mass Transit Seen In 

Reports Issued by NCTA,” The Evening Star, January 10, 1963] 

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, the bus regulatory agency that favored 

expanded use of buses, had complained to the White House that NCTA had not discussed its 

proposal with the commission. The appendix on “System Planning” included five pages 

explaining why NCTA had rejected the express bus alternative to the November 1 plan. To 

attract commuters out of their cars, a much better level of transit service would be needed than 

the express bus system. “Without providing a very high level of new transit service, those 

50,000 potentially new riders and some of today’s transit riders will be coming to downtown by 

auto. Then automobile congestion in downtown would continue, and more freeways would be 

required.” 

NCTA had considered laying out a downtown routing plan for buses on city streets, but the plan 

“was found to be inadequate.” Wilbur Smith and Associates had studied a downtown bus 

subway system that could accommodate 120 buses an hour. However, this plan would handle 

only 7,500 passengers per hour in return for construction costs of $4.5 million greater than for a 

rail transit system:

In sum increasing bus-subway capacity either by adding tunnel lanes or by widening 

stations would add substantially to the cost of a system that even without these changes 

would cost more than rail transit.

No one has ever operated a comprehensive express bus system, let alone a comprehensive 

bus subway system. It has yet to be established that a bus-subway system could be 

scheduled and operated in a fashion that would attract a large volume of patronage. [Flor 

Lee, “NCTA Explains Alternative of Express Buses,” The Evening Star, January 12, 

1963] 
On January 12, the White House asked 16 local, Federal, and county organizations to complete 

their reviews and submit them to NCTA by January 26: 

The President has asked that the views of the District of Columbia Commissioners, 

Federal departments and agencies, and State and local governments and other responsible 

organizations be considered in developing the administration’s recommendations to the 

Congress on both the report and the Transit Development program. 

NCTA was to submit all the comments and NCTA’s recommendations after review of the 

comments to the Bureau of the Budget. 

In a statement, NCTA indicated it would make the same recommendations to the bureau that 

were contained in its November 1 report, including completion of two-thirds of the downtown 

subway loop and rail rapid transit and commuter lines by 1969. The statement quoted 

Stolzenbach as saying, “From informal comments we have received on the back-up material 

already provided the co-operating agencies, I am confident we will be able to ask Congress to 

move ahead on this basic schedule.” [“Transit Agency Seeking Views of 16 Groups,” The 

Sunday Star, January 13, 1963] 

On January 18, President Kennedy transmitted the annual message to Congress on the District of 

Columbia’s budget. In the section on “Highways and Traffic,” President Kennedy expressed 

concern about the District’s highway fund, which would “face critical deficiencies after 1965.” 

How large the deficiency was would depend on the scope of the highway program: 

Those decisions will be made promptly. The National Capital Transportation Agency has 

prepared and transmitted to me a report recommending a system of highway and modern 

rail transit facilities for the National Capital region. This report is being reviewed by 

appropriate Federal and local agencies. When that review has been completed I will 

forward the report of the National Capital Transportation Agency to the Congress with 

my recommendations. Therefore, I am withholding from the fiscal year 1964 budget 

those highway projects which do not conform to the highway recommendations of that 

Agency - the east leg of the Inner Loop Freeway, the Intermediate Loop, the Potomac 

River Freeway and the Three Sisters Bridge. At the completion of the review, appropriate 

budget amendments will be submitted with respect to both the mass transit and highway 

programs of the District. The projects which are not in question in the current review, 

particularly the center leg of the Inner Loop and its continuation to the north, as well as 

the modified Interchange C, represent a major and important highway program. 

Although President Kennedy withheld $21 million requested by District highway officials 

pending completion of the NCTA review, Administration officials made clear that he was “very 

definitely” keeping the door open on the highway versus transit debate. [Flor, Lee, “Road Funds 

Held Up for More Data,” The Evening Star, January 18, 1963] 

The District commissioners submitted their response to NCTA. On January 29, the Star

reported: 
Administration attempts to keep the strongly worded Commissioner report confidential 

failed today. Into the open emerged an almost unprecedented public dispute between the 

considered views of the Commissioners and the Agency Director C. Darwin Stolzenbach, 

all appointed by the President. 

The commissioners sharply criticized NCTA’s procedures and statistics, particularly in contrast 

with the 1959 Mass Transportation Survey: 

The 1959 study was based on frequent and open discussions with all agencies and groups 

interested in transportation in the region. The resultant plan was responsible to the 

clientele it would serve.

The . . . agency plan was prepared unilaterally.

In contrast with the survey, NCTA based its recommendations on assumptions, not scientific 

analysis of traffic:

The Board of Commissioners should not push aside lightly the thoughtful studies and 

investigations which have been made over the years, as well as some of the solid, 

established trends. 

Furthermore, in the absence of conclusive evidence concerning assumptions, methods and 

other relevant factors, the Board of Commissioners must be reluctant to accept at face 

value the data presented by the . . . agency. 

In rejecting NCTA’s estimate of 21,500 peak-hour trips across central Washington bridges, the 

board pointed out that NCTA had ignored the corridor plan that was central to the Year 2000 

Plan. President Kennedy had called on all agencies to support the Year 2000 Plan, but NCTA 

had not done so. 

The commissioners also said that NCTA had minimized factors that altered the view of 

highways: 

For example, the NCTA based estimates for transit needs on the a.m. peak hour traffic. 

However, experience has demonstrated that peak hour for highway traffic is in the p.m. 

period. 

President Kennedy, the commissioners pointed out, had called for “efficient highway and mass 

transit facilities” to make “full use of the advantages of each mode.” (The commissioners 

underlined this quote.) Instead, NCTA appeared to “resolve questionable areas in favor of 

transit, tending to create a paper need for transit at the expense of highway travelers.”

The board took particular exception to NCTA’s opposition to the Three Sisters Bridge. Based on 

the conference report on the District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1963, the District held off 

work on the bridge until officials could review the NCTA report. They found that NCTA’s 

analysis of Potomac River crossings “lacks flexibility,” with the commissioners questioning the 

“apparent neat balance between capacity and demand from a technical standpoint.” They could 
not find any “solid data in the NCTA publication on which to justify further deferral of the 

project.” Expert consultants over the years had verified the need for additional capacity, but no 

other bridge would provide adequate service. 

Without the bridge, the Potomac River Freeway, which NCTA did not oppose, would be killed 

because it would not be eligible for 90-percent Interstate funds. Trying to convert Key Bridge to 

serve the purposes the Three Sisters Bridge was intended to fill would require “major surgery” 

and would be “too costly and disruptive of values in Georgetown.” [“D.C. Hits Transit Report, 

Backs 3 Sisters Bridge,” The Evening Star, January 29, 1963; “D.C. Bars 3 Sisters Span Delay,” 

The Washington Post and Times Herald, January 29, 1963] 

On January 30, Special Advisor Horsky promised that the commissioners’ report would receive 

“careful consideration.” He thought that within the next month, President Kennedy would send 

his recommendations to Congress on freeway and transit proposals. As for the Three Sisters 

Bridge, Horsky said the commissioners’ report was “very comprehensive and gives a lot of 

reasons for building the bridge.” However, White House officials had only just received it. He 

did not think the District would start construction until the White House decided how to resolve 

the conflicting views on the bridge. 

General Clarke informed reporters that he could not comment on the report, which had not been 

released officially, but he indicated that the city was not negotiating with a consultant for a 

design contract. [“White House May Review Sisters Span,” The Evening Star, January 30, 1963; 

“Three Sisters Operation Is Shelved for Awhile,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

January 31, 1963] 

A Post editorial said that the White House’s policy on the area’s transportation system would be 

tested by the city’s desire to move forward with the Three Sisters Bridge. A White House veto 

would provide “an unwarranted triumph for bad figures and high emotions.” The bridge was 

needed partly because the opening of Dulles International Airport in 1962 had stimulated a “very 

rapid rate of development.” The resulting traffic would use I-66 for District access, but “if there 

is no Three Sisters Bridge, it will unavoidably be funneled through the parks and the monumental 

areas downstream.”

NCTA had proposed the unattractive alternative of Interstate trucks running in front of Arlington 

Cemetery [on Jefferson Davis Highway] and debouching into the overloaded 14th Street 

Bridges.” Further, “the Key Bridge must then be connected to the Potomac River Freeway by a 

grotesque clover-leaf suspended out over the river, and traffic would flow directly onto the local 

streets of Georgetown.” If the White House relied on NCTA’s “wildly optimistic” plan to extend 

rail rapid transit to Falls Church in 1970 and Fairfax City in 1973, “it will risk all of the dangers 

that may be expected to flow from the steady constriction of the newest suburbs’ access to 

downtown Washington.” [“The Case for Three Sisters,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, January 31, 1963] 

Responding to NCTA
The Northern Virginia Regional Planning Commission passed a resolution that did not endorse 

the transit aspects of NCTA’s plan. The commission wanted assurances “that the rail program 

proposed by the NCTA will be feasible in conjunction with a comprehensive, co-ordinated 

highway program.” Arlington County’s representative to the commission, John Lohman, 

objected to the resolution, saying that the county would be transformed by a “sea of concrete” 

until ample rail transit facilities supplemented highways. Prince William County’s Francis M. 

Coffey countered, “Highways are the backbone of this Nation and they always have been.” 

Although the commission approved the resolution, it modified an earlier version that accused 

NCTA of “drastically cutting back the proposed highway program. [“Virginia Group Balks at 

Mass Transit Plan,” The Evening Star, February 1, 1963] 

NCTA missed its self-imposed deadline of January 26 for submitting its final recommendations 

to the White House. Some agencies had not yet provided their comments, in part because of the 

late release of appendices. Some jurisdictions had approved the “general principle” of rapid 

transit but not NCTA’s recommendations on freeways. 

The Bureau of the Budget wanted the recommendations before drafting the Kennedy 

Administration’s proposals to Congress. Horsky, referring to the District’s comments, wanted to 

ensure the White House had NCTA’s comments on the highly important report. “The Bureau of 

the Budget will want as much light on this as possible.” [“NCTA Misses Deadline On Final 

Transit Plan,” The Sunday Star, February 3, 1963] 

Senator Mansfield reintroduced his bill, now S. 651, on February 4 transferring District right-ofway in Glover-Archbold Park, to the Department of the Interior, and made clear his opposition to 

the Three Sisters Bridge. It was identical to the bill he had introduced in the 87th congress. “That 

bill was passed by the Senate, after extensive hearings; but no action beyond public hearings was 

taken in the House.” 

He summarized the history of the park, which he said was not large but was very important to 

those who knew it. If the District had its way, an expressway would be built through the park, 

“not this year or in 3 or 4 years, but I am certain it will in the not too distant future.” Further, if 

the District built the Three Sisters Bridge, “it is inevitable that a highway will be built through 

the park because the approaches from the bridge have no other place to go.” 

He was skeptical that “new fancy highways and expressways” were the answer to the city’s 

congestion problems; they would “only increase it.” He said:

Unless we preserve some of the natural beauty of our Nation’s Capital and develop the 

city with these things in mind, we are going to end up with a very costly city of 

expressways, arterial highways, and unsightly parking lots. There must be other ways to 

resolve these difficulties.

He praised NCTA for identifying “more reasonable solutions.” [Glover-Archbold Parkway, 

Congressional Record-Senate, February 4, 1963, pages 1685-1686] 
The Joint Transportation Commission (JTC) released a report on February 8 that was skeptical of 

NCTA’s claims. The JTC grew out of growing concern in the area about how the expanding 

suburbs in Maryland and Virginia affected the area’s transportation mix, including bus transfers 

among jurisdictions. District Commissioner McLaughlin and State Senator Northrop proposed a 

presidential commission to help regulate the area’s private transit companies. Representatives 

Hyde of Maryland and Broyhill of Virginia secured congressional approval, but President 

Eisenhower vetoed the bill after Virginia indicated it would not join. McLaughlin, Northrop, and 

State Senator Fenwick then convinced the two State legislatures and the District Board of 

Commissioners to authorize the JTC. 

By March 1961, the new Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission had taken over 

regulation of transit services from the area’s public utility commissions. Next on JTC’s agenda 

was a compact for building and operation a rail transit system as called for by the Mass 

Transportation Survey and the National Capital Transportation Act of 1960. However, NCTA 

and the JTC were suspicious of each other, as Schrag explained: 

On one side were the NCTA Advisory Board and staff and their allies. By early 1961 this 

meant the Stolzenbach crowd: a group of people who opposed freeways, favored home 

rule for the District of Columbia, and owed their power to President Kennedy. Members 

of this group were suspicious of the Joint Transportation Commission, which included 

the District’s engineer commissioner (the NCTA’s opponent in the freeway fight) as well 

as suburban politicians who had dubious sympathy for the disfranchised people of D.C. 

On the other side was the JTC, which, after 1961, was dominated by suburban voices. 

The JTC, consisting of politicians, “regarded appointed experts of any stripe—Bartholomew, 

Stolzenbach, and Gutheim included—as impractical dilettantes” who might give a Federal transit 

corporation for the area “terrifying powers, such as the ability to push trunk lines through 

jurisdictions without consent.” [Schrag, pages 96-99] 

The distrust surfaced in the JTC’s response to NCTA’s November 1 report and recently released 

appendices. On February 8, JTC’s report rejected NCTA’s idea of a Federal corporation to build 

and control the rapid rail system. JTC urged regional officials to agree on an interstate compact 

to replace NCTA as soon as possible: 

An interstate compact agency inherently would provide a greater degree of 

responsiveness to the plans and needs of the local areas and would insulate the Federal 

Government from becoming directly involved in a matter as purely local as community 

planning. 

Although NCTA had predicted negotiations on a compact would be difficult, JTC reported 

“substantial progress” on the compact. It expected to have a draft ready for review by the end of 

the year.

The report also questioned NCTA’s claim that the rapid transit system could pay for itself out of 

the farebox:
The financing plan makes no provision for meeting any deficits which may be 

experienced in the construction or operation budgets. 

In such a long-term project, the estimates of construction are subject to changes due to 

unpredictable variations in the price of labor, material and equipment and the net revenue 

projections are subject even to a great variety of complex factors, none of which may be 

predicted with any certainty.

Further, NCTA had greatly underestimated how the rail system would affect the area’s private 

bus companies. While expecting express bus and feeder lines to provide “substantial” service in 

1980, NCTA estimated that by then, buses would carry about 88 million passengers (28 million 

on express bus lines and 60 million on feeder lines), compared with 209 million in 1961. The 

private companies would take in fares of $4.7 million in 1980, compared with $37.7 million at 

present, and require operating subsidies from local jurisdictions of only $7.5 million, bringing 

total revenue to $12 million. In view of this “substantial curtailment” in private bus operations, 

“full attention should be directed to the development of satisfactory arrangements to keep the 

private segment of the system in a state of necessary economic well-being.” [Flor, Lee, “3-State 

Transit Agency To Replace NCTA Urged,” The Evening Star, February 8, 1965; Clopton, 

Willard, “NCTA’s Rail System Plans Attacked by Parent Agency,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, February 8, 1963] 

Professor Schrag summarized the result:

The rift between the NCTA and the JTC widened after the November Report and 

Stolzenbach’s antihighway proposals. In February 1963 [JTC counsel Jerome] Alper 

complained that the NCTA had failed to consult the JTC “on system design or in the 

formation of any of its plans.” Fenwick wrote to President Kennedy to condemn 

Stolzenbach’s meddling in highway matters and to support the Three Sisters Bridge. 

[Schrag, page 99] 

On February 20, the District commissioners sent a preliminary report on the NCTA 

recommendations to the Bureau of the Budget. The Washington Post began its description of the 

report by writing: 

The District Commissioners ripped into the National Capital Transportation Agency’s 

highway and rail transit proposals for the Washington region. 

In a 99-page critique bristling with such uncomplimentary phrases as “paper solution,” 

“unsupported optimism,” “unexplained neglect” and “poor planning,” the Commissioners 

charged that NCTA would “decimate” the city’s presently planned freeway system and 

cause choked rush-hour traffic congestion for decades to come. 

They ended up recommending that the planned freeway system be completed, that 

commuter service be started on three existing railroad lines, that express bus service be 

given more consideration and that a start be made on NCTA’s proposed downtown 

subway . . . . 
The Commissioners’ charge that NCTA failed to cooperate with the city in preparing its 

plan, miscalculated future demand for highways, manipulated its figures to show the 

desirability of rapid transit and failed to consider factors that could derail its financial 

estimates.

In not seeking advice from the area’s highway agencies, “NCTA has followed a procedure 

contrary to all modern urban transportation studies.” The result of this “unilateral control of 

input assumptions and adjustment” was “a paper solution which shows all transportation 

demands and capacities nearly in balance.” The commissioners pointed out that under those 

circumstances, NCTA could forecast any balanced solution it desired. For example, NCTA 

predicted that 95 percent of increased daily trips by 1980 would be via highways, but NCTA 

recommended $793 million for its rapid rail transit plan, almost as much as for added highways: 

Apparently the “balance” criteria used by NCTA is the proposed expenditure of estimated 

similar sums of money on fixed transit and on highways. 

The commissioners rejected virtually all of NCTA’s recommendations on the regional freeway 

system, including the projects President Kennedy had withheld from the District budget. They 

also challenged NCTA’s claim that even with deletion of several Interstate projects, its plan 

“includes a continuous interstate highway system.” This claim was “a mythical conclusion” 

because NCTA did not check with State or Federal roads officials to see if the network complied 

with Interstate standards. Had they done so, they would have learned that the network was not in 

compliance, jeopardizing 90-percent Federal construction funding. The loss of funds for the 

Potomac River Freeway, which would be of little value if the Three Sisters Bridge were not built, 

would be $25 million. Further, NCTA’s projected savings of $428.4 million in reduced freeway 

construction should have been only $84.3 million, and even that lower figure might be countered 

by the cost of improving city streets.

NCTA’s conclusion that the rapid rail network could pay for itself out of the farebox was 

“dramatically overstated.” NCTA, the commissioners explained, was caught in a two-way bind 

because its construction estimates are too low and its revenue estimates are too high. If those 

estimates were realistic, NCTA would have had to state that Congress and the local jurisdictions 

would need to subsidize the subway, and that prospect could undercut support. Between likely 

increases in construction costs and conservative revenue forecasts, the combined deficit would 

add up to about $400 million in 25 years. 

The commissioners agreed that the District “unequivocably” needed improved mass transit as 

part of a balance transportation system. They endorsed JTC’s efforts to develop a tri-State 

compact agency that would replace NCTA as soon as possible. They also endorsed rail lines 

along Wisconsin Avenue (Northwest to Bethesda), Rockville-Silver Spring along the Baltimore 

and Ohio Railroad, along the Pennsylvania Railroad to Lanham in Prince George’s County, 

Maryland, and one through Alexandria to Springfield, Virginia. Beyond those lines, more study 

was needed, especially in the absence of “data necessary to equitably and adequately compare the 

merits of the Mass Transportation Survey Plan of 1959 and the NCTA Plan of 1962.” 

[“Commissioners Rip Into NCTA Transit Report,” The Washington Post, February 20, 1963; 
Flor, Lee, “Only 4 Lines of Rail Transit To Get D.C. Chiefs’ Backing,” The Evening Star, 

February 20, 1963] 

The Department of Commerce, home of BPR, submitted its comments to the Budget Bureau on 

February 20. According to Schrag, Martin Wohl wrote the report. He was working in the office 

of Secretary Luther H. Hodges, but was a rapid rail transit skeptic and coauthor in 1965 of The 

Urban Transportation Problem (with John R. Meyer and John F. Kain, published by Harvard 

University Press.) [Schrag, pages 4-5, 55]. Commerce favored a downtown subway as the “only 

practical means in which essential volumes of traffic can be moved while maintaining the dignity 

and beauty of the Nation’s Capital,” but did not specify whether it should be a subway for buses 

or rail transit. 

The report “particularly complimented” NCTA for trying to develop new ways of forecasting 

preferences for transit or highways. However, NCTA “has used a substantial number of 

assumptions that are highly questionable.” NCTA had not cooperated with planning and 

highway agencies, and had “substantially over-stated” transit ridership and revenues. Because 

NCTA had not completed enough basic engineering and planning work, its preliminary estimates 

were “hardly comparable in completeness and accuracy to cost estimates which should be 

submitted to Congress for project authorization.” The estimates for the cost of the tunnel 

segments “might require as much as 50 percent upward revision.” 

Commerce recommended prompt construction of the Three Sisters Bridge and key parts of the 

Inner Loop Freeway. At the same time, Commerce believed the North Leg, Center Leg, and East 

Leg should be restudied to determine location and number of lanes in view of the impact of the 

rail transit system.

Further, the 1960 Act had directed NCTA to evaluate the 1959 Mass Transportation Survey plan 

and consider alternatives. The NCTA report stated that the agency had done so, but according to 

the Commerce Department, “neither the report nor the six published appendices show any 

indication that a thorough analysis of these alternatives were made.” [“Federal Study Favors 

Inner Loop Start Now,” The Sunday Star, February 24, 1963; “Commerce Urges Sisters Span, 

Loop,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, February 25, 1963] 

Other agencies also had commented on the NCTA report and documentation. As the Post’s 

Willard Clopton put it:

The transit plan has been accepted in principle by a majority of political leaders and 

planners throughout the area. But the agency’s corollary proposal that freeway 

construction be cut back had flown into a hornet’s nest of criticism. 

Some of the agencies questioned NCTA’s assumptions on engineering and contingencies as 

being too low, while its assumptions on income were off by about two-thirds. Nevertheless, 

according to Lee Flor in the Star, agencies recommended a start on the rail transit system “on the 

basis that forecasting is not definite enough to prove that a transit system will fail to attract 

travelers away from their automobiles. The only real way to find out [is] to build a subway and 

then see if people use it, the analyses say.”
Clopton reported that the White House was preparing its recommendations to Congress, but 

officials “are keeping as mum as if they were hatching another Manhattan project.” His sources 

at the Bureau of the Budget indicated that “a dual submission to Congress is likely,” with will 

“contain something for everybody.” [Clopton, Willard, “JFK Drafting Transit Plan,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, February 17, 1963; Flor, Lee, “Rail Transit System Is 

Recommended Despite Doubts on Agency’s Estimates,” The Sunday Star, February 17, 1963] 

Donald Gingery of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, continuing 

his crusade to restructure NCTA, informed his colleagues that Stolzenbach was exercising 

“dictatorial power” in the absence of Maryland and Virginia officials who could provide “checks 

and balances that are so necessary so we can’t be hurt as we are being hurt.” He added:

We have not been consulted anywhere along the line about this plan. We need protection. 

Time has been wasted on this transportation plan because of incompetence. 

He said the District commissioners’ comments had “repudiated with finality the factual basis of 

the NCTA plan and cast doubt on the ability of Maryland and Virginia to get 90 per cent Federal 

aid in building interstate highways.” NCTA’s present veto over the States’ transit plans was “not 

acceptable.” He said:

What’s the use of spending two years working on a plan and then vetoing it? Maryland 

and Virginia should have a voice in drafting these plans on a day to day basis so that there 

will be support for the proposals when they are released.

To provide the needed protection, Gingery again introduced a resolution calling for establishment 

of a three-man leadership of NCTA, with a representative from Maryland and one from Virginia 

joining Stolzenbach. The resolution asked the Maryland General Assembly to work through the 

State’s congressional delegation to secure a change in the National Capital Transportation Act of 

1960 to create the new leadership troika. 

This time the commission approved the resolution unanimously, despite concerns that J. Newton 

Brewer, Jr., expressed that, “we’re going to sabotage completely the possibility of ever getting 

funds from Congress to build a rapid transit system in this area.” [Dessoff, Alan L., “NCTA 

Head Attacked by Plans Body,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, February 21, 1963; 

Duke, William, “Maryland Seeking a Voice In Area Transit Planning,” The Evening Star, 

February 21, 1963] 

The Star, in an editorial, agreed with much of the District commissioners’ report. The result was 

“the chaos which now envelops the Washington area transportation picture,” an outcome that 

was “as predictable as the rising sun.” Even before finishing its studies, NCTA had “made 

known its intention to propose a regional rail-transit system so attractive and so economically 

feasible that large portions of the long-planned area freeway program could be scrapped.” It 

drafted the report unilaterally on the assumption that its plan would be “so universally acceptable 

that the outcome would be virtually unchallengeable.” Unfortunately, no such mathematical 

precision was available to NCTA or anyone else.
The District commissioners’ “devastating” analysis charged that using NCTA’s own data, “the 

estimates of transit costs are too low, the revenues too high, and the means of predicting future 

transit use subject to ‘incredible’ and ‘ridiculous’ error.” 

The commissioners’ report, “as might be expected,” challenged NCTA’s assumption on 

highways: 

It accuses the agency of assigning traffic volumes to freeways far in excess of their 

capacity, of undervaluing the desire of motorists to use their cars, of shattering the 

concept of the interstate highway system, of downgrading the potentials of express buses 

on freeways.

The editorial rejected the tendency “to throw up one’s hands over the transit situation,” but faced 

with the evidence, the White House might be unable to send its comprehensive transit-highway 

proposals to Congress in the near future as planned: 

The administration possesses both the authority and the information it needs, however, to 

end the unwise restraints now imposed on the freeway system, and to get on with the job 

of resolving differences over the transit proposals. It will not be the first time that such a 

dispute has been settled at that level. [“Inevitable Response,” The Evening Star, 

February 22, 1963] 

Senator Douglas, a long-time critic of the Three Sisters Bridge, wrote to President Kennedy to 

advise him that its construction would lead to highway construction through Glover-Archbold 

Park and the conversion of Spout Run Parkway into an eight-lane expressway. Noting that 

Arlington County opposed the plan, Senator Douglas asked, “Are we to go ahead on the advice 

of the D.C. Commissioners and the D.C. Highway [sic] to build a bridge and connecting truck 

routes against the other jurisdiction most concerned, when it is overwhelmingly opposed to such 

actions?” [“Douglas Asks 3-Sisters Bridge Ban,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

February 26, 1963] 

While waiting for President Kennedy’s recommendations, the Committee of 100 on the Federal 

City made clear its continued opposition to the Three Sisters Bridge. In late February, the 

committee wrote to the President, the Bureau of the Budget, and the House and Senate 

Appropriations Committee to express its opposition:

For good or ill, the traffic forces which would be generated and in turn, unleashed by the 

proposed Three Sisters Bridge would be such that no one, not even the Highway 

Department, dares foretell its eventual consequences. 

The bridge would “force construction of the proposed northern and northwestern portions of the 

Inner Loop . . . no freeway yet conceived for Washington would be more destructive of cultural 

and tangible values.” 

NCTA’s report offered a “soundly based, balanced transportation system.” By contrast: 
As if in a footrace to put down a highway network which would foreclose an economic 

transit system, the District Highway Department and the Engineer Commissioner have 

relentlessly pursued an all-highway planning objective which even the 1959 

Transportation Plan had rejected. 

The Committee of 100 rejected the argument that the bridge was needed to carry trucks. This 

justification was “without substance” because, the committee stated, the Eisenhower 

Administration’s restriction of truck traffic on the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge could be changed 

by an executive order. Moreover, the committee claimed that:

All available traffic forecasts, including the forecasts of the D.C. Highway Department 

itself, verify the NCTA’s conclusions that the proposed Three Sisters Bridge is not 

warranted if, as is planned, a rail rapid transit line is constructed to Arlington and Fairfax 

Counties. 

This statement contradicted the District’s interpretation of its data. [Flor, Lee, “Federal City 

Committee Would Bar Sisters Span,” The Evening Star, February 27, 1963] 

One member of the Committee of 100 took exception to its views. AAA’s Washington I. 

Cleveland had written a letter requesting contributions “to combat the efforts [of NCTA] to 

emasculate the highway program in the Nation’s Capital.” The District area’s Highway Users 

Conference was planning “an intensive public relations campaign to keep the area road program 

from being drastically curtailed.” The Committee of 100 “disassociated” itself from these views. 

[“Three Sisters Bridge Meets New Attack,” The Evening Star, March 30, 1963] 

President Kennedy’s Decisions - Delayed

Although the White House had promised prompt decisions following agency review of the 

NCTA report and documentation, the Administration plan was stalled. While waiting for the 

report, interests continued expressing their views in hopes of influencing the outcome. 

The Star understood the problem, stating in an April 11 editorial: 

It is not surprising that the White House is already far behind its original schedule for 

proposing specific expenditures to Congress for rapid transit and freeway construction in 

Washington. The elaborate technical claims of the National Capital Transportation 

Agency in defense of its rail transit proposals, at the expense of freeway construction, 

have generated controversy which the White House could neither ignore nor easily 

resolve.

The editorial said that in recent remarks, General Clarke had “summarized the dilemma in words 

which the politicians now grappling with the problem would be wise to heed.” He said: 

What I get from all the studies to date and from the statistics that we have is that we 

should be proceeding at a great rate with both a highway system and a transit system. We 

should not be bickering about a few percentage points of difference in estimates about 

what will happen in 1977 or 1980. Our crystal ball is not that clear, nor is our rate of 
progress going to be so great that we cannot keep our goals under constant scrutiny and 

make changes in them as we go along. If we were to miss the estimate by 10 per cent – 

and past experience tells us that we will probably not be that close – a difference of two 

or three years of natural growth will take up the capacity. If past experience is of any 

value, we appear more likely to underestimate our needs, so that the need for the facilities 

will come sooner than we plan. 

The editorial agreed with this “sound advice”: 

A decision to curtail highway building now would not make people stop driving 

automobiles; it would merely compound the traffic jams and wreck an orderly program of 

construction which will have to be carried out eventually in any case. At the same time, 

the transit portion of the total load should be handled largely by a subway transit system 

which, in the interests of the Nation’s Capital, should be started now. [“Cloudy Crystal 

Ball,” The Evening Star, April 1, 1963] 

In early April, NCPC was working on a “compromise proposal” that had been in development for 

several months to resolve the I-266/Three Sisters Bridge controversy. The concept would reduce 

the number of lanes on the bridge from eight to six and eliminate some approach roadways. The 

District would give its 100-foot right-of-way through Glover-Archbold Park to NPS. In return, 

NPS would allow construction of I-266 through Spout Run Park to serve trucks. [“3 Sisters, 

Spout Run Deal Pends,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, March 18, 1963; Lewis, 

Robert J., “Simultaneous Renewal of Two Areas Is Urged,” The Evening Star, April 4, 1963] 

D.C. Trucking Association sent a telegram to President Kennedy urging him not to put the North 

Leg or the Three Sisters Bridge on the shelf. Deletions of the “key segments” of the Interstate 

System “would ignore the importance of these segments both as a part of the interstate system 

and as integral elements of an effective freeway system for the movement of people and goods in 

the city.”

Director Aitken, in an interview, said the two projects would be needed in years to come. Failure 

to complete the Inner Loop would “scuttle” the District’s Interstate System and cause the loss of 

many millions of dollars in Interstate construction funds. 

AAA’s Cleveland worried about the implications of the freeway battles in the District for the 

Nation. If the argument that mass transit could reduce the need for freeways prevailed in the 

District, similar arguments elsewhere would lead to a “general slowdown” in urban freeway 

construction. [“Keep Loop, Truckmen Urge JFK,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

April 17, 1963] 

Later in the month, staff of the National Capital Regional Planning Council issued a report 

backing the basic rapid transit system, but suggesting a need for more highways to meet growing 

demand. Staff suggestions included a Potomac Freeway through Alexandria, the Northwest 

Freeway in the Wisconsin Avenue corridor, and the North and West Legs of the Inner Loop. The 

Three Sisters Bridge and Spout Run connections should be advanced because “no adequate 
design has yet been presented for any other route for the connection of Interstate 66 with the 

Inner Loop.” 

Even with those freeways, highway congestion could increase in ways that would force the 

imposition of tolls to discourage peak period use by private automobiles: 

The most equitable mechanism for rationing the use of the highway system is through 

charging a fee for a trip made during the peak hours. This would assure that the use of 

scarce highway capacity would be made by those to whom it was of greatest value.

Staff endorsed most aspects of the NCTA transit proposal, putting the cost at what they 

considered a realistic estimate of “around a billion” dollars, considerably more than NCTA’s 

estimate. The report recommended a series of public hearings in the local jurisdictions to test the 

extent of support. 

The staff report, a response to the Bureau of the Budget’s request for comments by the end of 

January, was long overdue. The council, however, put the report on hold for further review by 

NCPC and the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission. [Flor, Lee, “Planners 

OK Rapid Rail, More Area Freeways,” The Evening Star, April 23, 1963; “District May Have to 

Charge Tolls to Restrict Highway Use,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, April 24, 1963] 

General Clarke wrote to his NCPC colleagues urging them to adopt a “basic highway system for 

the District and the region that can withstand the annual onslaught of dissension.” In view of the 

3C planning process the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 had required be in place by July 1, 

1965, General Clarke wrote, “it is essential that immediate steps be taken to assure the 

establishment of a formal planning process for this region, including the District, Maryland and 

Virginia.”

Charles H. Conrad, NCPC’s acting staff director following Finley’s departure, told the panel that 

work had been underway for 6 months on a comprehensive highway plan, but that it required 

agreement on a thoroughfare plan for the District and its neighboring jurisdictions. He expected 

the plan would be completed in 1964. Chairman Rowe said that many decisions would depend 

on that report. [“Clarke Seeks Speedup On Area Highway Plans,” The Evening Star, May 3, 

1963] 

Meanwhile, District highway officials, in response to a request from BPR, were considering a 

new route for the Three Sisters Bridge. The new location, about an eighth of a mile to the east of 

the original location, would be about halfway between Key Bridge and the planned Three Sisters 

Islands location, linking to the exit of Spout Run Parkway. Another option was to change the 

angle of the Three Sisters Bridge so it would not point directly toward Glover-Archbold Park, the 

issue that was at the heart of much of the opposition. [“D.C. Studies New Site For 3 Sisters 

Bridge,” The Evening Star, May 3, 1963; “Shift in Bridge Site Asked by U.S. Bureau,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, May 4, 1963] 

The White House delay could be attributed, at least in part, to disagreements among NCTA’s 

advisors. Neil J. Curry, a Los Angeles trucking executive and a member of President Kennedy’s 
Committee for Traffic Safety, had served on NCTA’s advisory committee on finance. The 

committee had endorsed NCTA’s financing plan, including its freeway cutbacks. When 

members of the California congressional delegation informed Curry of the implications of the 

endorsement, he wrote to Stolzenbach in protest. Curry, the trucking official, referred to the 

critiques submitted by the District and the Commerce Department:

I am concerned that there be a complete understanding on the part of all concerned of the 

limited role played by the Advisory Committee on Finance, particularly from the 

standpoint of any recommendations relative to cutting back or delaying the District 

highway program . . . . 

I wish to express unequivocally my opposition to the philosophy and proposals in the 

NCTA report which would cut back the highway program. I would appreciate your 

making every effort to see that there is no misunderstanding regarding my position on this 

matter. [“Transport Advisor Balks At Plan Sent to Kennedy,” The Evening Star, May 3, 

1953] 

Lee Flor discussed the reason for the White House delay on May 5: 

Washington area transportation recommendations are stalled in the White House because 

administration officials fear their effect on pending national transit legislation, officials 

said yesterday.

Legislation to establish a $375 million transit grant program for the 214 metropolitan 

areas throughout the Nation has been passed by the Senate. Similar legislation, reported 

out by the House Banking and Currency Committee, is awaiting clearance by the Rules 

Committee before coming before the House. 

The Washington area rail transit program calls for a $120 million grant program and 

$731 million in guarantees for bonds. Administration officials are reportedly afraid the 

local measure will overshadow the House action on the national legislation. 

When the 87th Congress had come to an end on January 3, 1963, the legislation had passed the 

Senate, but not the House. In the 88th Congress, the legislation had been revived. On April 4, the 

Senate approved the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1963 by a vote of 52 to 41. House action 

was pending. 

(Congress would not complete action on the urban mass transportation bill in 1963. As noted 

earlier, President Johnson approved the landmark Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 on 

July 9, 1964, during a signing ceremony in the Cabinet Room of the White House.) 

Downtown Progress, saying “there is no record of a city having an overabundance of good 

transportation,” voiced its support for the freeway network as well as the rail transit system: 

The freeway plan of the District of Columbia Highway Department . . . is a reasonable 

program . . . and it should be carried out as rapidly as possible. Deferral or deletion of 

major segments of the freeway plan will result in a highway system that will be 
inadequate to meet the needs of the area, even with a comprehensive rail rapid transit 

system.

To sacrifice a portion of this freeway network on the vague claim that it might not be 

needed could well result in economic losses and sociological damage which would far 

outweigh the present costs of these new roads. 

Completing the network was essential “for the dynamic growth which lies ahead.” A 

“satisfactory solution” for part of the Inner Loop had “not yet been designed, particularly the 

north leg,” but must be found. Regarding the Three Sisters Bridge, the organization wrote: 

No reasonable solution has been presented which would enable Key Bridge, and its 

approaches, to properly serve the traffic needs of this area.

The statement continued, “The time for study, though well spent, is behind us. The time has now 

come for action.” 

As for NCTA’s transit proposals, the statement said: 

There is no dispute over the need for a modern, efficient high capacity rail rapid transit 

system. This is essential, and every effort should be taken to expedite its construction. 

. . . . The transportation system which will serve the rapidly growing metropolitan region

must provide a high degree of accessibility between the central business area and the 

communities which depend on downtown and upon which downtown is dependent. 

Only a balanced transportation system, comprised of adequate highways and rapid transit 

facilities, both rail and bus, can meet the needs of the Nation’s Capital. [“Downtown 

Group Backs Rail Transit,” The Evening Star, May 11, 1963; “Business Unit Backs Road, 

Rail Systems,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, May 12, 1963] 

With the President’s report on hold, the Federal City Council released a report on May 4 calling 

for an immediate start on the 98-mile rail transit system as well as the freeway network. The 

report indicated that projections of a regional population of 5 million by 2000 “warrant an 

assumption that the National Capital region will require both the amount of mass transit 

proposed in the NCTA’s 1962 report, and a system of freeways largely in accord with that 

proposed by the District Commissioners.” NCTA’s assumption of financial independence should 

not be the sole basis for advancing the transit option; the area “must have an efficient, modern, 

rapid rail transit system, including the best equipment available, whether or not complete 

financial self-sufficiency is attainable.”

The council urged Congress to authorize NCTA to proceed with construction rather than waiting 

for an interstate compact or a Federal corporation. Further, “in face of the uniqueness of a 

jurisdiction where the legislative and taxing power rest solely in the Congress, both the Congress 

and the Executive must accept a special obligation either to provide or to guarantee the financing 

of the enterprise.” Specifically, the council recommended that construction on the downtown 

subway and some radials begin in FY 1964. 
The council recommended construction the Three Sisters Bridge near its island site, construction 

of the East Leg on the west side of the Anacostia River, and a modified freeway along the 

northwest downtown boundary. Saying the city “should be integrally related to the Federal 

interstate highway system,” the council nevertheless suggested that BPR consider easing its 

standards for segments such as the North Leg and the Potomac River Freeway through built-up 

areas. 

The report cited the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge, with its restriction on truck traffic, as an 

example of an Interstate freeway that did not meet full standards. Council president Gordon 

Gray told reporters, “I’m not sure who has the ultimate power in this thing, but I think the 

President of the United States could influence the standards if he wants to.” [Flor, Lee, “Area’s 

Rail Transit Plan Stalled in White House,” The Sunday Star, May 5, 1963; Clopton, Willard, 

“Put Downtown Subway First, Council Urges,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, May 5, 

1963] 

The President’s Recommendations

Finally, on May 27, 1963, President Kennedy sent a letter to congressional leaders on the 

transportation needs of the Washington area. He explained that NCTA’s report of November 1, 

1962, recommended a 10-year Transit Development Program, which would “provide the 

National Capital region an extensive rail rapid transit, commuter rail and express bus system,” 

including commuter rail and express bus service within the right-of-way of several freeways and 

express parkways. This plan was, “in my judgment, both sound and necessary.” 

He submitted a bill to authorize NCTA to proceed with construction of the system. “I hope that 

this proposed legislation will receive both prompt and favorable Congressional action.” There 

was, he said, no questioning the need for improving the Washington area’s transportation 

network. “Nor can it be doubted that improved transportation must include a major rapid transit 

system.” He explained:

The alternatives would be steadily worsening congestion with all that congestion means 

in losses of time and money, or an enlarged highway and freeway program entailing 

additional expense, major disruption of persons and businesses, and substantial 

impairment of the appearance and attractiveness of the city.

As for NCTA’s estimate that the rapid transit system would cost $793 million over 10-years, 

“any estimate is subject to modification upon the completion of more detailed engineering.” 

Nevertheless, he thought NCTA’s estimate provided “a reasonable basis for authorization of the 

program.” He continued: 

In accordance with the directives given it in the 1960 Act, the Agency has provided as far 

as possible for payment of system costs by users, with the remaining costs to be 

distributed among the Federal and local governments of the region. The bulk of the 

capital costs, which would be ultimately payable from system revenues, would be 

financed by borrowing from the capital market. The remainder of those costs would be 

financed by Federal and local grants in the same proportion as that proposed in the 
national mass transportation program which I have recommended. The Agency has 

concluded that necessary borrowing can be repaid from fare box revenues within 

36 years. Even under adverse circumstances, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 

borrowing could be repaid within a period of 50 years. 

He supported the intention of Congress in passing the 1960 Act that a regional compact agency 

take over construction. “I am hopeful that the compact negotiations which are now in progress 

will reach a successful conclusion.”

President Kennedy recognized that rapid transit was not the sole answer. “Rapid transit must be 

related to, and coordinated with, the movement of people and goods by freeways and parkways, 

roads and streets.” He did not know a “single touchstone” for balancing the roles of transit and 

highways in meeting the area’s “total regional transportation needs.” 

He acknowledged the “wide differences of opinion” on the specific highway and bridge 

proposals. He was convinced, however, that the differences could be resolved by “a careful reexamination of the highway program of the District of Columbia in light of the Transit 

Development Program, and the social, economic and esthetic impact of highways in the Nation’s 

Capital.” He asked the District’s Board of Commissioners to work with appropriate Federal 

Agencies on this reexamination.

As for the projects he withheld in his FY 1964 budget proposal for the District, he now 

recommended proceeding with the East Leg of the Inner Loop and Fort Drive Parkway. Funds 

were available for these projects. Horsky clarified for reporters that the President advocated the 

west bank alignment for the Anacostia River segment of the East Leg.

President Kennedy continued: 

Decisions on the appropriate highway facility for the North Leg of the Inner Loop, 

particularly whether it should be built to Interstate standards, should await the outcome of 

the re-examination which I have outlined above. Since the construction of the Three 

Sisters Bridge as an interstate facility appears to depend upon the decisions which must 

be made with respect to the North Leg, its construction should likewise be deferred until 

all the alternatives have been fully re-examined. For similar reasons, no further 

commitments at this time should be made with respect to the Potomac River Freeway.

In the end, he said, “an intelligent decision” on the area’s transportation should encompass 

highways and mass transit. Until now, transit plans were tentative and lacked sure knowledge 

they would be carried out: 

The time has now come to answer that question. The Transit Development Program of 

the National Capital Transportation Agency presents a carefully conceived and attractive 

plan. It has commended itself to me, and I hope it will commend itself to the Congress.

President Kennedy’s letter was accompanied by a five-paragraph of legislation authorizing 

NCTA to begin construction of the rail transit system “subject to the availability of 
appropriations and other funds.” He also enclosed a 42-page Summary Report on the Transit 

Development Program. 

The Star and Post provided readers with a sampling of reaction to the President’s letter. The 

delays in the Three Sisters Bridge, Potomac River Freeway, and North Leg for more study 

prompted Chairman Natcher to say that “any effort to bring to a complete halt important highway 

projects is a serious mistake.” He added that “the approved freeways which have been 

considered by our committee from time to time, with funds appropriated, are a vital part of the 

future development of the District.” 

Chairman McMillan of the House District Committee said:

In my judgment it is going to take both modern highways and a modern rapid transit 

system to haul the traffic coming into the District daily. I hope the program can be 

worked out and we can get it started. 

Chairman Bible of the Senate District Committee pointed out that the District’s downtown had 

the fourth highest daytime population in the country. “I hope that Congress may make its 

decision this year or no later than next.” 

Stolzenbach was, as might expected, delighted with the letter. As for the subway system, “If we 

get the breaks, we can start digging in 1964.” 

By contrast, the letter “brought gloom” to the District Building, according to the Post. General 

Clarke said, “I think the best thing I can say is nothing.” The commissioners had sent their views 

to the President for consideration. “The Commissioners will begin the studies that the President 

has requested that we make.”

H. E. Humphreys, Jr., chairman of the National Highway Users Conference, was “stunned that 

the President has urged further delay to the interstate and defense highway system.” The only 

bright spot for highway supporters was President Kennedy’s recommendation on the East Leg, a 

position that Stolzenbach opposed. [Flor, Lee, “Kennedy Calls on Congress to Vote Area Rail 

System,” The Evening Star, May 27, 1963; Clopton, Willard, “Rail Transit Plan Sent To 

Congress,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, May 28, 1963] 

On June 1, President Kennedy sent a special letter to Commissioner Tobriner, president of the 

Board of Commissioners, outlining how to conduct the reexamination of the freeways. It 

“should be started immediately and concluded as promptly as possible.” He continued: 

A re-examination should focus on the sections of the highway plan which have from the 

beginning been the most uncertain and the most controversial—the north leg of the inner 

loop and the Three Sisters Bridge, both of which involve the manner in which traffic is to 

be moved across the near Northwest of the District. 

This will necessarily involve a restudy of those additional portions of the plan which are 

directly affected by the conclusions reached in the re-examination. 
The reexamination of the highway program “should assume a full mass transit system 

approximating that proposed in the transportation development program, and should make full 

use of all data which have been accumulated by the National Capital Transportation Agency.” 

President Kennedy also advised Tobriner “to insure that economic, social and aesthetic 

considerations are fully taken into account and related to broader community development 

plans.” To do that, the commissioners should work with the Departments of Commerce and the 

Interior, the Housing and Home Financing Agency, the Commission of Fine Arts, NCPC, and 

NCTA:

Regional and local authorities in Maryland and Virginia should, of course, be consulted to 

the extent necessary to insure co-ordination of transportation plans and policies within the 

entire National Capital area.

He asked Tobriner to let Horsky know the “appropriate timetable” for the reexamination and to 

provide “periodic reports” to Horsky on the review. 

Despite the “wide differences of opinion” on the controversial freeway segments, “a major 

objective of the re-examination should be a consensus which can command general support.” 

District officials had mixed reactions to the letter. The implication was that if the reexamination 

confirmed the need for the North Leg and the Three Sisters Bridge, the White House would 

approve them and allow the Potomac River Freeway to go forward. However, NCTA, NCPC, 

and the agencies that President Kennedy wanted the city to work with had expressed wide 

differences on the freeways. The Post observed that, “One top city official considers it patently 

impossible, and believes the re-examination will end in the same old conflicts.” Albert A. Grant, 

the chief highway planner, thought the city might be able to convince technical staff based on 

data, but convincing policymakers was uncertain. 

Director Aitken said the city did not have the “substantial amount of money” that would be 

needed for the reexamination, but was working with the House and Senate on the matter. He 

expected the review to include a re-check of traffic estimates, preparation of alternate plans, 

preparation of models, and exploration of the use of airspace above the freeways for office or 

apartment buildings. [Pierce, Charles D., “Kennedy Asks New Study of D.C. Highways,” The 

Evening Star, June 5, 1963; Schuette, Paul, “Community Accord On Freeway Plans Sought by 

Kennedy,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, June 6, 1963] 

Congress Considers the President’s Report

Within days, Congress began examining the President’s recommendations. The chairmen of the 

House and Senate District Committees wanted to hold joint hearings. Chairman Bible thought 

the President’s recommendations “provide a working base for Congressional consideration and, 

hopefully, action on the growing problems of metropolitan Washington.” Chairman McMillan 

said he would be pleased to co-chair joint hearings. In addition, Chairman Natcher had hearings 

on the District appropriations bill coming up in June. 
As it happened, though, the Subcommittee on Roads, House of Representatives, had begun 

holding hearings on May 27 to consider several bills amending Federal-aid law. On May 29, 

General Prentiss, the former District Engineer, appeared before the subcommittee to testify on

behalf of the American Road Builders Association (ARBA). After discussing ARBA’s views on 

each of the pending bills, he brought up President Kennedy’s call for “a delay and re-study of 

certain segments of the planned Interstate System within the District of Columbia on the premise 

that the provision of a suitable rail transit system might make the construction of these freeway 

links unnecessary”:

The great weakness in this premise is that it overlooks the fact that the rail transit system 

will effectively serve only certain portions of the commuter traffic load, while the planned 

freeway system is needed to serve not only commuters but also the 24-hour needs of 

freight transportation and passenger automobile traffic of all kinds, including tourist 

traffic, the diffuse patterns of local traffic, substantial amounts of through traffic, and the 

requirements of the national defense. 

He was certain that the restudy would confirm the need for the freeways, but the “tragedy of the 

situation” was that people would be deprived of the freeway service for several years, “much to 

the detriment of the national capital region.”

Because the District transportation system was not the subject of the hearing, Representative 

William C. Cramer (R-Fl.) began the questioning on the pending bills. After doing so, he 

expressed interest in General Prentiss’s discussion of the District issues. Representative Cramer, 

who lived at 6714 Joallen Drive in Falls Church, Virginia, while Congress was in session, 

explained his interest:

I still can’t get to Congress over decent highways coming to work in the morning over 

14th Street Bridge, for one example. There is still a missing link in the expressway to the 

South here connecting with even the Capitol. How long do you think such a delay and 

such a restudy would take, do you have any idea? 

Prentiss did not know, but said all the data necessary for the restudy “has already been collected” 

by the highway department, NCPC, and the other planning agencies in the area. 

Representative Cramer thought General Prentiss’s reasons for not delaying the freeways were 

“very sound,” adding: 

I don’t think there are many cities in the United States that have a worse traffic problem 

than the District of Columbia . . . . [It] appears to be that the highway situation in the 

District of Columbia is about as botched up, hodgepodge and slipshod as any in the 

United States of America. As a matter of fact, I had a study made with regard to delays 

on present projects and out of 31 projects underway now 21 of them have been delayed 

for periods ranging from 16 days to 9 months beyond the termination date of 

construction. As I say, there is no way to get to the U.S. Capitol over 14th Street Bridge 

and Shirley Highway on the expressways system even though the system is now 

constructed. It is not connected up. 
With another “indefinite delay” on tap, “when are we going to get any relief for the District of 

Columbia highway traffic?” Highway traffic, he said, was going to increase “regardless of what 

type of a rail transit system may be devised.” He agreed with General Prentiss about the variety 

of traffic in the city. The high number of trucks passing through the city was inevitable because 

“there is no other way for them to get to the Northeastern United States except through the 

District of Columbia on U.S. 1, and so forth.” 

General Prentiss pointed out that tourists did not want to ride into the city on a rapid transit 

system. “Most of them will come in here in their own automobiles or by buses.” 

Representative Cramer agreed that tourists did not “want to leave their automobiles some distant 

place when they want to visit the District of Columbia.” He also wondered how “the Defense 

Establishment [is] going to move over rapid transit system.”

General Prentiss pointed out that 10 years ago, when he represented the District as Engineer 

Commissioner on NCPC, staff conducted “a very comprehensive origin-destination survey,” with 

the finding that 50 percent of people who drove into the area inside the proposed Inner Belt 

Freeway “did not have a destination inside the inner belt.” The 50 percent of vehicles that were 

causing the congestion within in the downtown area inside the Inner Belt “were not there because 

they wanted to be there, they were there because it was the only way to get to where they wanted 

to go.” The point of the Inner Belt Freeway and its connecting radials was to let people “get to 

their destination without going into the central city.”

Referring to the Potomac River Freeway and the Three Sisters Bridge, Representative Cramer 

asked if the Inner Belt Freeway would connect without these missing links. General Prentiss said 

that “no section of this belt can carry out its function until the belt is closed.” True, the rapid rail 

system would reduce traffic within downtown, “but the great majority of people are very 

probably like you and me, we want to see other people using that rapid transit so we can drive 

downtown in comfort because it happens to be more convenient for us to drive our automobile.” 

Representative Cramer thought the question related to “the basic psychology of American 

independence, even in getting to town.” He was not opposed to rapid transit for commuters who 

want to use it “but I don’t think you can substitute it entirely for the highway system.”

General Prentiss said ARBA was not opposed to rapid transit, either, but “rapid transit has to 

stand on its own legs and not stand on legs that are supported by taking away what careful studies 

by experts have indicated is absolutely essential to the solution of the transportation problems of 

this city.”

Chairman Fallon, who chaired the subcommittee, also was concerned by the President’s message, 

pointing out that one editorial he had seen from another city suggested that its officials also take 

a “stop and look” attitude about its planned expressways: 

This could spread all over the country in a very short while and change the thinking of a 

lot of people, and it might impede and certainly will hinder the construction of a much 

needed Interstate System in those cities.
Representative Cramer suggested “it appears to me that might be the objective of making 

Washington the guinea pig or test case and thus the focal point of this whole mass rapid transit 

program which is to some extent faltering in other areas, as justification for the rapid transit, 

mass transportation bill now pending . . . to try to give great emphasis and push behind that 

program.” His personal opinion was that doing so “to the detriment of the Interstate System is 

not the proper approach.” 

Chairman Fallon, who told one interviewer that he disliked driving, especially freeway driving 

and commuted daily by rail between his Baltimore home and Washington, said that was his 

personal opinion, too: 

Certainly if the press is in some instances going to recommend that nothing be done in 

other cities until they see what happens to the Washington study or action, this will 

obstruct the building of these highways in most of the large cities of the United States.

General Prentiss reminded the subcommittee that Congress had accelerated the Interstate System 

in 1956 to complete the network, including the routes into Washington, within about 13 years, 

“and we are certainly not going to be able to do that if we stop the construction of our interstate 

highways out on the border some place and look at rapid transit.” 

Representative Cramer acknowledged that some changes in Interstate routes around the country 

were justified, “but a lot of changes have been made which couldn’t be justified, in my opinion, 

and uncertainty of it is very unfair to people who own property in these areas.” 

After some additional discussion of the pending bills, Chairman Fallon thanked General Prentiss 

for his testimony. The chairman assured General Prentiss that the subcommittee was “interested 

in seeing the program initiated by Congress in 1956 go forward to completion by 1972.” From 

the testimony “it certainly seems this is going to be one of the greatest obstacles to the 

completion of the system if these delays are carried out, not only in Washington but throughout 

the Nation.” [Federal-Aid Highway Act Amendments of 1963, Hearings before the 

Subcommittee on Roads, Committee on Public Works, U.S. House of Representatives, 

88th Congress, 1st Session, Report 88-6, pages 65-76; reference to Chairman Fallon’s dislike of 

driving based on interview reported in: Schwartz, Gary T., “Urban Interstates and the Interstate 

System,” Southern California Law Review, March 1976, pages 433-434, footnote 195] 

Representative Cramer wrote to Chairman Fallon on June 7 to call for hearings “at the earliest 

possible date” on the President’s proposal to delay the Three Sisters Bridge, the North Leg, and 

the Potomac River Freeway. After summarizing recent developments, he wrote:

I do not believe that the construction of critically important parts of the National System 

of Interstate and Defense Highways should be further delayed on the basis of 

recommendations which do not take into account the purpose and objectives of the 

Interstate System.

The District was already 30 percent behind schedule, ranking below 32 States. The studies 

ordered by the President would only put the city further behind. Further, if they resulted in a 
decision not to complete the Potomac River Freeway, the segment under construction “will not 

serve the purpose for which it was designed” and it “will almost certainly be taken off the 

Interstate System so that the Federal Government would bear only 50 percent of the construction 

cost.” 

He called for hearings, but emphasized that “I don’t think such hearings could or should be 

construed as opposing a justified and properly financed mass rapid transit program that may be 

needed but would serve notice that any such planning should not be permitted to destroy the 

effectiveness or unduly delay completion of the Interstate and Defense Highway System—be it in 

Washington, D.C., or elsewhere.” [“House Asked to Air Road Delay Plan,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, June 8, 1963] 

(The Subcommittee on Roads hearings were part of the review leading to the Federal-Aid 

Highway Amendments Act of 1963 (P.L. 88-157), which President Kennedy approved on 

October 23, 1963. Among its provisions was a revision of the timing of ICEs and a change in the 

1956 statutory requirement that Interstate standards “shall be adequate to accommodate the types 

and volumes of traffic forecast for the year 1975.” The new requirement was that standards 

“shall be adequate to enable such project to accommodate the types and volumes of traffic 

anticipated for such project for the twenty-year period commencing on the date of approval by 

the Secretary . . . of the plans, specifications, and estimates for actual construction of such 

project.” As Lee Flor pointed out in the Star, this change could affect the Three Sisters Bridge 

because meeting traffic demand in 1975 might require only a six-lane bridge while meeting 

demand in, say, 1984, might require eight lanes. [Flor, Lee, “Forecast of More Traffic To Alter 

Design of Bridges,” The Sunday Star, October 13, 1963]) 

The Commissioners’ Views

Chairman Natcher, preparing for hearings on the District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1964, 

also wanted to explore President Kennedy’s transportation letter. The Congressman was, 

according to Lee Flor, “indignant” that the Bureau of the Budget had not made public the views 

of the District commissioners as expressed in an analysis dated April 8, 1963, and sent to the 

White House. Chairman Natcher was upset because he had not realized until late May that the 

Budget Bureau had not released the commissioners’ final analysis. Had he known, he would 

have released it in April. Now, he gave copies to the press, which saw it for the first time. 

The commissioners endorsed a downtown subway, half the proposed rail-transit lines, and study 

of express bus routes, but they also wanted to build the Three Sisters Bridge and the Potomac 

River Freeway. The commissioners were still “concerned that certain studies . . . used by the 

transportation agency . . . have not been made available.” 

Although the analysis was similar to their earlier views, the commissioners added a section on 

the decline in the use of subways and rail transit in New York City. In 1940, the subway carried 

1.8 million trips; in 1960, the total was 1.3 million even though the city’s population had 

increased by 2 million people. Transit riding per person since 1940 had declined by 40.6 percent 

in New York City, 33.1 percent in Chicago, and 41.2 percent in Philadelphia. Flor summarized: 
The transit system, proposed for 1980, will carry only 117,000 more passenger trips than 

the bus and streetcar system in 1955, while the number of trips on highways will increase 

by 2.5 million, the report states. 

Service to present bus riders may be severely hurt because the number of bus stops may 

change, the report indicates. The proposed 98-mile rail transit system would have only 30 

stations in the District, while D.C. Transit now has more than 3,000 stops in the District, 

the report says.

The commissioners also informed President Kennedy that the District’s highway plans would 

displace 25,200 fewer people than originally estimated. NCTA had estimated displacement of 

33,000 people under the highway and transit plan the Mass Transportation Survey had 

recommended in 1959. This figure, NCTA calculated, could be reduced by 5,400 people because 

fewer highways would be needed under the transit proposal. NCTA said its plan “would save the 

homes and relocation costs of 27,000 persons in the District.” 

The District commissioners disagreed, as Flor summarized:

The District Commissioners, however, in their official evaluation of the transit proposals 

said that around 7,800 persons would be displaced, provided two freeways are built along 

the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad tracks through the north part of the District, it was 

disclosed yesterday.

The NCTA transit plan would have little effect on relocations because they would be about the 

same under the 1959 or 1962 plans: 

But a more realistic appraisal shows the agency’s transit system would “save the homes” 

of only around 144 persons, or around 35 families. This is based on the District’s official 

report, a presidential decision on the East Leg freeway, and the pending decision on the 

combined freeway [along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad tracks in the northern part of 

the District].

The wide difference in figures is because the transportation agency used the relocation 

estimates for the Wisconsin Avenue corridor and the Intermediate Loop. 

The District Commissioners use relocation figures for the projects financed by interstate 

funds because they already have junked several controversial projects. 

Critics had used relocation issues as a “key weapon” in their attacks on the highway plan, saying 

displaced families were “social dynamite.” They were, Flor concluded, likely to dispute the 

District commissioners’ new displacement figures.

Chairman Natcher also released the Department of Commerce’s 39-page February report on the 

NCTA plan. It had called the Three Sisters Bridge and the Potomac River Freeway a “necessary 

part of the highway network and detailed engineering and construction of it should be pursued 

vigorously.” The report accused NCTA of failing to “cooperate with agencies responsible” for 
transit development, adding that the agency did not “fully analyze the cost or service potentials” 

of the transportation alternative.” In addition: 

The NCTA study failed to complete a sufficient amount of basic engineering work for all 

sections, including subsurface exploration, evaluation of construction methods, the 

preparation of preliminary plans and profiles, etc., in order to realistically develop sound 

cost estimates for the rapid transit system recommended.

The White House and Bureau of the Budget were concerned that Chairman Natcher’s release of 

the Commerce Department’s report would give ammunition to opponents of President Kennedy’s 

decision. He had neglected to release a letter from Under Secretary of Commerce for 

Transportation Clarence D. Martin, Jr., transmitting the report to Members of Congress, 

including Chairman Natcher. On orders from the Budget Bureau, Martin had written: 

This report was one of several submitted to the President from various agencies on this 

matter. Understandably, conflicting opinions were represented in the various reports he 

received. 

The President has now made his decision after considering all relevant advice and I 

would like to emphasize that the Department of Commerce fully supports the 

recommendations of the President . . . . 

As Flor pointed out: 

But the department has not changed one word in its transit analysis made last February, 

which is almost the exact reverse of the presidential recommendations. [Flor, Lee, “D.C. 

Transport Plan Balked by Kennedy,” The Evening Star, June 1, 1963; Flor, Lee, “Roads’ 

Displacement Toll Seen Reduced by 25,200,” The Sunday Star, June 9, 1963; Flor, Lee, 

“Commerce Says It Favors Rail Plan Though Formal Report Is Critical,” The Evening 

Star, June 11, 1963; “Foes of Kennedy Rail Transit Proposal Cite Critical Commerce 

Department Note,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, June 12, 1963] 

Chairman Natcher Takes a Stand

Chairman Natcher began hearings on June 3 to consider the District’s appropriations for 

FY 1964. Serious discussion of the District’s highway construction plans did not begin until 

June 11 when the three District commissioners joined Director Aitken and Deputy Director Airis 

on the witness panel. The chairman decided to reverse the usual order by offering his own 

statement before the city officials spoke because, he said, “This committee is deeply concerned 

with the highway and freeway problem.” Any effort to halt the highway projects was “a serious 

mistake.” Given the nearly daily growth of traffic, “we must carry our highway program along 

with any and all proposals concerning a rapid transit system.”

Congress, after years of deliberation, had initiated the Interstate System in 1956, and required it 

to extend through important metropolitan areas. In 1961, Congress had increased taxes to pay for 

the increased cost of the program. Despite all that, “a new party” (NCTA) had been introduced 
into the Washington area’s highway planning process. “Because of intercessions by various 

interests, the advancement of the freeway system has been dramatically curtailed.”

By FY 1964, half of the time Congress allotted for construction of the Interstate System will have 

elapsed. He asked Aitken, in his opening statement, to discuss the percentage of the city’s 

Interstate System that was open or under construction to help the committee understand the 

relationship between elapsed time and completed work. 

He wanted to identify “what constructive steps the Congress can or should take to either get this 

program underway,” as mandated by Congress, “or whether it should be stopped entirely until 

basic policy decisions are made”:

The Congress does not intend to sit idly by and permit this important public works 

program to be placed in jeopardy by irresponsible intruders . . . . 

The freeway system is critically needed to ease our transportation requirements. It will 

stabilize confidence in the construction of office buildings, both private and Government. 

It will create taxes. It will save thousands of dollars by the elimination of costly traffic 

delay, and it will save lives. [District of Columbia Appropriations, 1964, Hearings before 

a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 

88th Congress, 1st Session, on H.R. 7431, pages 619-620] 

When the hearing resumed on June 12, General Clarke explained that after much controversy, the 

Kennedy Administration had “supported certain projects and requested other projects be delayed 

for further study.” He said that, “This is the position that we have adopted in formulating our 

budget” for FY 1964. As a part of the Kennedy Administration, District officials naturally 

followed the President’s direction. [page 622] 

Aitken summarized Interstate projects underway and their status before Chairman Natcher 

interrupted to recall the events leading to the Appropriations Act for FY 1963, including the 

stalemate during the House-Senate conference. The result, largely because of the chairman’s 

efforts, was that the law included funds for the Three Sisters Bridge and the Potomac River 

Freeway. The House Committee on Appropriations believed these projects were important and 

“under no circumstances would we agree to bring to a halt the highway system.” 

Then President Kennedy halted those two projects and the Northwest Leg, which was not even 

under consideration during deliberation of the FY 1963 appropriations. Nevertheless, on June 1, 

the President had asked the District to study those freeways based on the concerns raised by 

NCTA. The District’s request for FY 1964 reflected these actions. 

Chairman Natcher just wanted to confirm that up to June 1, the District thought the projects 

should proceed. General Clarke replied, “That is correct, sir.” [pages 628-629] 

Aitken said that to complete the Interstate System on schedule, the District would have to 

obligate $51 million a year. In FY 1964, the District expected to have between $65 and 
$75 million of unobligated funds. “Optimistically, as things now stand, we doubt that we can 

obligate more than about $30 million in fiscal year 1964.” That was because the District could 

not “advance a project to design or construction until we get past the planning hurdle.” They 

were able to proceed only on projects “on which there is agreement between some of the 

planning factions, shall we say.” 

He cited a problem with the Center Leg, which “has been on the freeway plan since 1955.” The 

problem was that the Center Leg would pass under two pieces of property under the jurisdiction 

of the Architect of the Capitol, J. George Stewart. The District did not need title to the land, only 

permission, but it had not secured clearance from the Architect. Aitken was confident that the 

Center Leg would “have a terrific effect in clearing up traffic confusion around the Capitol Hill 

area” because no motorist would “use the city streets if he can get on a freeway system for a part 

of his trip.” 

Chairman Natcher said the committee would not support any project that would damage the 

Capitol or any section of the National Mall.” He added, “I do not believe you gentlemen would 

recommend any proposal that would fall in that category.”

Aitken assured him, “That is absolutely right.” He explained: 

The center leg, then, is the next logical place to get a heavy movement of traffic off the 

surface of the Mall, so that when you are standing on the westerly terrace of the Capitol 

and looking toward the monument, you will not see this traffic. It will be landscaped and 

have more of a park type appearance and it can be reserved for local traffic movements. 

[pages 630-634] 

Chairman Natcher wanted to discuss the Three Sisters Bridge and the Potomac River Freeway. 

In view of the President’s call for a study, the city had not requested additional funds for these 

projects. Aitken told him that the Three Sisters Bridge was “a good one to pick out as an 

example of what goes on in our planning process.” He went through the history of the bridge as 

far back as 1953 and its inclusion in the Mass Transportation Survey. Overall, he said, NCPC 

had “acted on the item, directly, or indirectly, at least five times. But as of today, the 

Commission has not signed off on some elements of the Three Sisters Bridge.” The problem was 

not planning, but “the business of replanning over and over.” [pages 633-634] 

General Clarke said that based on discussions with District highway staff and BPR, “this type of 

restudy would take about 9 months to do. It will be a most thorough and comprehensive study.” 

The city needed to shift money around for the study, but did not need additional money for it. 

[page 636] 

Chairman Natcher wanted to confirm what the city had requested for the North Leg. The budget, 

Aitken replied, asked for $900,000 for study and right-of-way acquisition on the section that was 

not in controversy. The White House, the chairman wanted to confirm, did not object. Aitken 

and General Clarke confirmed that the White House did not object to the request. [page 643] 
As Chairman Natcher directed the discussion to the planning process, he asked about NCTA’s 

role in planning highways. Aitken replied that the National Capital Transportation Act of 1960 

“says that the responsibility for planning shall continue in those agencies that already had it.” As 

“the best way” to indicate NCTA’s work, he cited its “proposal with reference to the north leg of 

the inner loop where they would build in a serious deficiency in a part of the inner loop freeway.” 

In response to Chairman Natcher’s inquiry about the concept of a 3C planning process for the 

Washington area, General Clarke replied that the planning process, involving NCPC and the 

National Capital Regional Planning Council, from 1955 to 1959 was “an excellent example then 

of a cooperative planning process.” Since then, “the cooperative planning process seems to have 

fallen apart to some extent.” Since the Mass Transportation Survey had been completed, the 

major actions “seem to have been a downgrading of the plan that was arrived at in 1959.” 

What was needed was for the area’s two official planning bodies, NCPC and the Regional 

Planning Council, to get everybody involved from the start of the plan. “You talk out everything 

in a long time-consuming process. But you would have to keep that—you have to go through 

this so that at the end, the plan will be supported by the people who have to carry out the plan.” 

That type of cooperative planning process “has been missing the past 3 or 4 years.” [pages 645-

646] 

Chairman Natcher asked about funds in the budget for the South Leg Freeway. The city’s budget 

for 1963 indicated that the freeway would cost about $18 million. Aitken said, “During the past 

year, we have reached, I think, what might be termed a gentlemen’s agreement with the National 

Park Service and the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads as to a method for proceeding.” Details were 

still being worked out with NPS and BPR, “but it looks like the estimated cost now might be in 

the order of $30 to $40 million.” The main reason for the increase was the desire on the part of 

NPS for a tunnel “so that this freeway will not disrupt the park features in this part of the city.” 

[page 649] 

Regarding NCTA’s report and the commissioners’ formal response to it, Chairman Natcher 

wanted to know if they still supported completion of the District’s proposed Interstate System. 

Tobriner replied: 

Sir, that is the recorded position of the Board of Commissioners. But our effectiveness is 

controlled by the President’s request that some of these items—namely, the Potomac 

Freeway and the Three Sisters Bridge—be deferred for further study.

Chairman Natcher asked if the commissioners had any comments on organization, finance, or 

phasing of the mass transit portions of NCTA’s report. General Clarke said he was part of a 

10-member group of District, Maryland, Virginia, and Federal representatives negotiating an 

interstate compact as Congress had called for in the National Capital Transportation Act. With 

details to be worked out, the members were unanimous in recommending that “the ultimate 

organization for the . . . rapid transit in this area should be a compact type of organization in 

which each of the States and the Federal Government would have some voice.” 
Maryland and Virginia, he said, were concerned about “whether or not the same financial terms 

would be available to a compact agency as would be available to a Federal corporation.” The 

understanding was that the risks to the States “would be no greater under a compact agency than 

they would be under a Federal corporation.” [pages 650-651] 

The panel discussed the relocation issue. General Clarke said the city had asked Congress to 

approve the use of Federal-aid highway funds for relocation costs on the same basis as under the 

urban renewal program. “This amounts to $200 per family and up to $3,000 for commercial 

establishments.” The city also had requested legislation allowing it to coordinate with the 

Redevelopment Land Agency on a Centralized Relocation Service to handle all relocations in the 

District. “This, I think, would go a long way toward satisfying some of the critics of relocation.” 

He estimated that the highway program would displace about 7,000 people over 10 years, or 

700 people or 200 families a year: 

While it is a problem, it does not seem to be an impossible load. I think it has to be put in 

a reasonable context, because if you say 7,000 people that is a lot, but it is 7,000 people 

over a period of 10 years. [pages 669-670] 

Chairman Natcher asked how the commissioners were going to comply with President 

Kennedy’s request to reexamine the Three Sisters Bridge and the North Leg. General Clarke said 

the best way to reply was to submit, for the record, a memorandum, dated June 11, he had 

received from Director Aitken. The city proposed to hire “a firm with outstanding and nationally 

recognized ability in the field of traffic forecasting, and, if possible, with some knowledge of 

transportation problems in the National Capital region.” The firm would develop traffic 

estimates for highway facilities to serve “the study corridor extending from the Three Sisters 

Bridge site on the west to a connection of the north leg extended to the Baltimore-Washington 

Parkway on the east, with emphasis on a continuous route for the entire length of the study area.” 

At the same time, the District planned to continue developing geometric studies and architectural 

sketches of alternate locations for a crossing above Key Bridge, including the Three Sisters 

Bridge. As for the Potomac River Freeway, the city would continue developing geometric 

studies and architectural sketches from the Three Sisters Bridge and alternative river crossings.

The District also planned to retain “a nationally recognized firm to consider aesthetic treatments 

and develop appropriate sketches and models” for the North Leg from the Potomac River 

Freeway to the Center Leg. A study of the social and economic impacts of the North Leg would 

include impacts on tax base, relocation, use of air rights, and other factors. 

General Clarke estimated that the studies would take about 9 months and cost approximately 

$500,000. [pages 672-673] 

Closing out this portion of the hearing, Chairman Natcher said he had “often wondered just how 

those people feel who believe that this program should be brought to an abrupt halt, and how the 

people feel who believe we do not need any highways.” He believed the city should proceed 
with rapid transit and the highway system. “I see no reason to penalize the District of Columbia 

by stopping the highway program, and in my opinion that is what is being done.” 

He had talked with those who wanted to halt the program and now he wanted to go through their 

arguments. They argued that the freeways would affect the appearance of the city; would affect 

the city’s ability to pay its share of the highway program; reduce District revenues by taking 

taxable property; and, of course, displace many people. He asked the panel to comment on those 

objections to the highway program. 

General Clarke had heard aesthetic arguments from the American Institute of Architects, the

Commission of Fine Arts, and others. “All I can say in answer to that is that we have attempted 

to employ the finest architects we can find.” The city had added local architects to the staff. As 

he had told the institute, “if they desire to help us they could tell us how to get a highway through 

a city esthetically instead of just saying it cannot be done.” For example, “Miss Smith” had 

examined the E Street Expressway “and I think she came up with a very fine treatment.” (This is 

a reference to Chloethiel Woodard Smith, the influential District-based architect who had been 

involved in the new Southwest among many other projects.) 

Aitken pointed out that architects also criticized buildings in Washington and elsewhere, but he 

referred to an article in Architectural Record of May 6, 1961, in which architect Edmond Bacon 

said, in regard to Philadelphia, “That the decision was made not to try to fight the automobile, a 

losing battle at best, but to treat it as an honored guest and cater to its needs.” The article 

included a map of an inner loop for Philadelphia. The article reinforced what General Clarke had 

said. “In other words, here is a problem. Help us make it as attractive as we can.”

General Clarke admitted that the city had reduced, overall, the amount of parkland in the city. 

Based on a study of how much had been taken and how much given back, he said “they balanced 

out to about 250 acres each way.” In the case of the East Leg Freeway on the west side of the 

Anacostia River, for example, “The city will end up with more parkland” than before. 

The effect on tax rolls, General Clarke said, was debatable. “You have to evaluate the question 

of taking land off the tax rolls and perhaps if you can reduce the volume of traffic on the street 

you can add a little to the tax rolls.”

He was aware of the complaint that traffic reduces the value of adjacent property. “I don’t have 

any total picture on it . . . . If we could remove the traffic all of us would agree that a piece of 

residential property without traffic running by it all day long, is more valuable without that.” 

However, he questioned “whether the economic aspects of the freeways are, as these people 

phrase it, a simple removal of land from the tax rolls.” He thought the freeways brought more 

business into the city. 

Aitken also considered the argument to be based on a fallacy. The “economic equation” is more 

complicated than simply adding up the property take from tax rolls for freeway right-of-way. For 

example, such an equation does not take air rights into consideration. He said, “we have 

proposals, sincere proposals by men that want to build office buildings that will cost $30 to 
40 million over the center leg of the freeway system.” Other freeways had similar, valuable air 

space that would add to the tax rolls. 

Aitken agreed that the city was going to have a problem providing the 10-percent match for the 

accelerated Interstate program, but the commissioners had not, as some asserted, decided to 

divert general funds from other needs, such as schools or welfare, to the highway program. 

“Well, to my knowledge, the general funds haven’t contributed in the past to the financing of the 

highway program.” In fact, the reverse had been true recently, with the city shifting District 

highway funds to general needs, namely policing. [pages 673-679] 

On June 14, the subcommittee welcomed Federal Highway Administrator Whitton and other 

BPR officials along with General Clarke. “Mr. Whitton,” Chairman Natcher told subcommittee 

members, “appears before our committee at my request.”

Whitton began by saying that he appeared in support of the District commissioners’ request for 

budget revisions for 1964 to conduct the studies of certain highway projects as recommended by 

President Kennedy in his letter of June 1, 1963. The recommended studies of the Three Sisters 

Bridge and the North Leg of the Inner Loop also involved “a look at those portions of the 

Interstate System plan within the District of Columbia and the connections thereto in the 

immediately adjacent areas of Maryland and Virginia.”

Prompt action on the studies was essential because the region’s Interstate System was 

“interrelated and must be completely integrated into an overall transportation plan.” Given the 

time limit on completion of the Interstate System, the time was fast approaching when final 

decisions would have to be made to confirm the network in the District and its links to routes in 

Maryland and Virginia. In view of this urgency, he was appearing before the subcommittee in 

support of the District’s budget needs for the studies. 

Chairman Natcher asked Whitton a few questions about the history of the Interstate System, 

including its urban segments. Whitton explained that the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 had 

directed PRA to work with the State highway agencies to designate a 40,000-mile Interstate 

System, including Interstate routes “into and within urban areas.” The chairman asked about 

designation in the District of Columbia. Whitton presented a copy of the Yellow Book map of 

the District saying it depicted “the Interstate System you speak of.” 

The chairman asked what changes had occurred in the District’s network since the original 

designation in 1955. Whitton cited the addition of: 

• The Three Sisters Bridge in 1957, 

• The connection between Theodore Roosevelt Bridge and the 14th Street Bridge about

 2 years earlier, 

• The Lincoln Memorial connection, 

• Shift of the East Leg from the 11th Street corridor to a route along the west side of the 

Anacostia River, 

• The Center Leg, which was not yet formally approved, although Whitton said BPR would 

approve it, and 
• The North Central route, still under study. 

Responding to questions from Representative Edward R. Finnegan (D-Il.), Whitton explained 

that under the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, the “last dollar has to be out of the trust fund 

by October 1, 1972.” 

Representative Finnegan, whose district was based in Chicago, asked if he correctly understood 

that under the President’s June 1 letter, the North Leg of the Inner Loop and the Three Sisters 

Bridge were being “held up until such time as he formulates some plan that has to do with mass 

transit.” Whitton clarified the status:

I do not believe you are quite right in saying it is being held up. I think we must make 

these studies of the Three Sisters Bridge and the north leg of the inner loop to obtain the 

necessary information to make a proper presentation for the public hearing which is 

required by the [1956] statute . . . . 

I am in favor of proceeding as fast as possible in accordance with the request by the 

President to the Commissioners.

He said some preliminary studies had been made, but not final studies. That was true, for 

example, of the North Leg. Studies thus far had not been “made in sufficient detail properly to 

acquire information that would enable the District to have the public hearing which is required by 

the statute.”

Whitton added that after the studies were completed, BPR would have to decide whether to 

approve the segments. He and General Clarke also clarified that part of the Potomac River 

Freeway was under construction, but the portion near the Three Sisters Bridge was subject to the 

study of that structure. 

Representative Finnegan wanted to explore Whitton’s earlier comment about connections in the 

adjacent States, citing I-66 as an example. Whitton confirmed that I-66 was needed. “There is 

no question in our minds about Route 66, which crosses the Potomac on the Theodore Roosevelt 

Bridge and then swings west into Virginia.” He continued: 

In a relatively short time, by which I mean probably this calendar year the State of 

Virginia will be awarding a contract for Route 66 from the west end of the Theodore 

Roosevelt Bridge up and past the point where the Three Sisters Bridge connection would 

join to it. If we do not know between now and then whether or not there is to be a Three 

Sisters Bridge, then we will not know whether to provide for an interchange between 

Route 66 and Three Sisters Bridge [the I-266 link]. So, therefore we need to know as 

quickly as possible so we can tell Virginia, “Yes, there is going to be a Three Sisters 

Bridge and, yes, you must provide for an interchange and buy the necessary right-of-way 

and design the highway in accordance with that.” 

With Representative Finnegan departing for another commitment, Chairman Natcher took over 

the questioning. He wanted to know if the 1961 ICE covered the entire Interstate System in the 

District as currently designated. Whitton confirmed that it covered “the designation as we have 
approved it at this time.” If BPR designated additional routes, such as the Center Leg, “it then 

would not agree.” However, Congress was considering legislation calling for another estimate 

for 1965 that would update the costs based on all designated routes at that time. (The FederalAid Highway Amendments Act of 1963, as noted earlier, required the new ICE.) 

Chairman Natcher wanted to know if BPR could approve the use of Interstate funds “where the 

system was not properly worked out and agreed upon.” Perhaps not understanding the question, 

Whitton said BPR could approve projects only on routes that were part of the approved Interstate 

System.

The chairman asked about the standards for the North Leg Freeway. “Specifically, would oneway streets with intersections at grade meet the requirements with reference to standards?” 

Whitton replied, “No, sir.” (He did not explain his answer, but Interstate standards called for full 

control of access; one-way pair streets with at-grade intersections would not qualify.) How, then, 

would the number of lanes be determined? Whitton said the number would be based on 

predicted traffic volumes as of 1975, adding that he was hoping Congress would change the year 

of traffic design, as it would do in the 1963 Amendments Act. 

Asked to comment on the reexamination of the North Leg Freeway, Whitton said that it would 

focus on how much traffic would use the freeway “with the premise that a transit system would 

be built as has been proposed in the President’s recent message to the Congress.” The amount of 

traffic that could be expected on the freeway would determine the standards for its construction, 

adding, “not only the standard that will be used, but whether it should be a depressed or an 

elevated section or a section at grade.” Further, the study would consider the social effects of the 

North Leg Freeway on the area, the aesthetic effects, and the economic effects:

We shall make as complete a study, if the Bureau of Roads has anything to do with 

encouraging the District, as ever was made on an urban expressway, because this is the 

Capital of our country, and we are all good citizens and are proud of our Capital, and we 

want it to continue to be a place where people can enjoy it. 

The chairman asked if the rest of the Inner Loop would be eligible for Interstate funds if the 

North Leg were not built to Interstate standards. That, Whitton said, would depend on the results 

of the study, but I believe as of now if the north leg is not built, then the south leg as now built or 

under construction will be overloaded.” 

What, Chairman Natcher wanted to know, was the purpose of the Three Sisters Bridge and the 

Potomac River Freeway. Whitton explained: 

We think that more bridge capacity is needed across the Potomac, and the Three Sisters 

Bridge will provide that capacity. The Potomac Freeway would connect the Three Sisters 

Bridge to both the south leg, and the north leg. In brief these two projects are key 

components of Interstate Route 266 which serves to connect Route 66 in Virginia with 

Route 95 leading to Baltimore. 

He added:
There is another thing the Three Sisters Bridge does, Mr. Chairman, if I may say so. The 

Three Sisters Bridge provides a way for the truck traffic to get into Washington and still 

comply with an agreement somebody made not to run any truck traffic through the 

Lincoln Memorial area.

Was it reasonable for Virginia to design I-66 in Arlington County without knowing where it will 

connect to the Three Sisters Bridge? Yes, it was reasonable, but the design could not be 

completed until State officials know whether the Three Sisters Bridge would be built as part of 

the I-266 connection: 

That is the reason we are in a hurry now, because we do not want to hold up Route 66. If 

we get that Theodore Roosevelt Bridge completed without a way to go off the west end, 

somebody up here will ask us, “How come?” 

Because the reexamination could delay the Three Sisters Bridge for 2 or possibly 5 years, will 

Virginia have to delay I-66 for the same time. No, Whitton said, Virginia could proceed with 

construction. The question would be whether to include design of the I-266 interchange or build 

it without the link.

How long would it take to design and build I-66 in Arlington County and the Three Sisters 

Bridge and the Potomac River Freeway in the District? Whitton and General Clarke estimated 

4 or 5 years. Chairman Natcher said of those timelines, “I would like to say, on the record, too 

long.” Whitton responded that I-66 might be faster since Virginia had conducted the survey for 

the route through Arlington County, but that would present a problem: 

Truck traffic cannot go through the Lincoln Memorial tunnel, and truck traffic would 

have to get off at the present Key Bridge and just across the Key Bridge and on to 

M Street, and downtown the best way they could. 

(The record attributed this statement to Whitton, but General Clarke may have provided the 

clarification.)

When Chairman Natcher asked about the Federal-aid Interstate funds apportioned to the District 

($113 million obligated for projects and $60 million apportioned but not obligated), Whitton 

wanted to make a point: 

The District situation is peculiar. There is no other condition like it in the United States. 

Every other State has a rural area on which they can spend their interstate money if they 

get tied up in an urban area. Here the District has no similar place to go.

The chairman wanted to know if Whitton had any information showing that construction of 

freeways in metropolitan areas “has been detrimental from an economic standpoint in the area 

into which they extend?” Whitton told him, “No, sir. I think it is just the opposite.” The 

chairman agreed. “I say as a matter of record, I think you are correct.”

With the session nearing an end, Chairman Natcher asked what would happen if the District, 

“because of delays of one kind or another, cannot complete its Interstate Highway System on 
schedule.” Would BPR be justified in approving construction of Interstate freeways in Maryland 

and Virginia leading to the District boundary? 

Whitton said BPR’s commitment “is to build a connected system of interstate highways, and 

I think we are dutybound [sic] to be very careful in seeing that that mandate is carried out.” If the 

situation the chairman described were to occur, “then it will be up to us to cut those stub ends 

back to where they do form an interconnected system, cut back the work in the District and the 

adjoining States or any other section.” 

Chairman Natcher thanked Whitton for his testimony, closing the session by repeating what he 

had often said “during the past 7 months,” that he did not oppose a rapid transit system for the 

District, “but under no circumstances do we believe that the highway program in the District of 

Columbia should be killed off to advance or bring about the construction of the rapid transit 

system.” There was room for both. Anything that delayed or set aside “the fine system” BPR 

and the District had designated would be “a serious mistake.” He did not believe “there should 

be any interruption here in the District of Columbia of the approved overall plan.” [pages 723-

737] 

When the House Committee on Appropriations completed its bill on July 8, for the District of 

Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1964, the report included a long section on the District’s highway 

program reflecting Chairman Natcher’s views. Any attempt to bring Interstate highway projects 

to “a complete halt is a serious mistake.” To meet day-to-day growth in traffic, “we must carry 

the highway program along with any and all proposals concerning a rapid transit system.” Citing 

the history of the Interstate System through legislation in 1944 and 1956, the report stated that 

“Congress has insisted on its original policy that this nation including the District of Columbia 

shall have an interstate system.” It must be “continuous and . . . properly designated.” 

Beginning with FY 1959, Congress had appropriated funds for the Potomac River Freeway and 

the Three Sisters Bridge, both of which were “consistent with and a part of the national program 

and have been reviewed repeatedly by the Congress.” The District had sufficient appropriations 

for those projects. The Committee on Appropriations approved the District’s request for 

$900,000 for the North Leg Freeway in FY 1964. “The Three Sisters Bridge, Potomac River 

Freeway and North leg of the Inner Loop should proceed without further delay.” [District of 

Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1964, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of 

Representatives, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 499, July 8, 1963, pages 2-3] 

Chairman Fallon – To The Rescue?

On June 25, Chairman Fallon began Subcommittee on Roads hearings under the title 

“Transportation Planning in Certain Urban Areas.” He said that “satisfactory progress” was 

being made on construction of the Interstate System, but “it is evident that most of the progress 

to date has been accomplished in rural areas.” The urban segments constituted “the most 

difficult phase of interstate highway construction,” in part prompting Congress to approve the 

3C planning process for projects in metropolitan areas effective July 1, 1965. 
Given the importance of completing the Interstate System on schedule, he called the hearings to 

determine “as definitely as possible” whether compliance with the 3C requirement would prevent 

the States from meeting that goal and whether amendments might be needed. [Transportation 

Planning in Certain Urban Areas, Hearing Before Subcommittee on Roads, Committee on Public 

Works, U.S. House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Committee Serial 88-9, 1963, 

pages 1-2] 

Representative Cramer, in his opening statement, explained that in approving the 3C planning 

process, “it was not the intention of the Congress, and the section was specifically worded to 

make certain it was evidence of that intention that this section should not result in undue delay in 

the completion of the Interstate System of which urban extensions are a vital and integral part.” 

The urban sections, like the rural segments, must be completed by 1972. 

“As a matter of fact, it is my opinion that this section was put in partially, so far as Congress is 

concerned, to expedite these constructions, to avoid conflicts, to permit planning that would 

avoid those conflicts, with the result that urban extensions and construction would be expedited 

rather than delayed, and that any construction of this section to the contrary is subverting rather 

than carrying out the intent and purpose of the Congress.” In that regard, he introduced his letter 

to Chairman Fallon calling for a hearing on the freeway program in the District of Columbia. 

[pages 2-3] 

The testimony overall was aimed at the impact of the 3C planning process around the country, 

not the District of Columbia, but the District came up at times. Administrator Whitton,the first 

witness, discussed the evolution of urban transportation planning and how the highway 

community had addressed objections to the urban segments of the Interstate System. His 

statement did not address the District of Columbia’s freeway network, but when questioning 

began, Chairman Fallon brought up the subject almost immediately. He asked if highway 

officials were receiving “full cooperation of all of those that are charged with the study of mass 

transportation in the cities.”

When Whitton replied noncommittally that most areas were experiencing full cooperation, 

Chairman Fallon asked if there were any areas where such cooperation was not forthcoming. 

Whitton agreed that difficulties were occurring in some areas, but did not specify where. 

Chairman Fallon got to the point: “I am, of course, referring to the report of the National Capital 

Transportation Agency”: 

Mr. Whitton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Fallon. Do you know by whom this report was prepared? 

Mr. Whitton. By that agency, so far as I know. 

Mr. Fallon. In your knowledge, do you consider these people qualified to evaluate the 

transportation planning studies in the District of Columbia? 

Mr. Whitton. With due respect, Mr. Chairman, I do not believe I am qualified to pass on 

their qualifications. I have made no study of their qualifications. 

Whitton added that he was aware of NCTA’s report, but had not studied it. Chairman Fallon 

pointed out that the Department of Commerce had reviewed the report and “concluded that their 
plan does violence to the efficient flow of motor vehicle traffic within and through the District.” 

Further, as far as the chairman knew, “there was no cooperation on the part of the mass transit 

people to find out just exactly the thoughts of the people who are charged with the building of the 

Interstate System in and about Washington.” They wanted, he said, some Interstate segments 

held up until their study was completed. He asked Whitton, “Do you have any knowledge of 

how long it will be before their study is completed?” 

The administrator did not. “They were established some time ago, but, in view of the recent 

developments, we feel that a more detailed study should be made of particularly some sections of 

the inner loop.” He hoped the study could be completed in 6 months. He did not want to 

speculate on the result, but said he wanted the subcommittee to know “I am completely in accord 

with the study being made, because it had to be made” before officials determined the location 

and design of the legs. 

When the chairman asked about the Three Sisters Bridge and the Potomac River Freeway, 

Whitton replied only that they were part of the study. The chairman asked whether Whitton 

agreed that every time someone objected to a segment and called for yet another study, “it is a 

delay in the possibility of completing this Interstate System at our target date?”

Whitton replied, “Mr. Chairman, I think this study needs to be made. That is my firm opinion.” 

Representative Cramer interrupted to point out that the study President Kennedy called for was 

different from a project study of location and design. He wanted a study of the proposals “in 

relationship to all other types of transportation” not only now but in the future. 

Whitton replied, “Mr. Cramer, I think any urban highway study should take into account the 

other types of transportation that are imminent.” When Representative Cramer asked if all this 

planning justified delaying the Three Sisters Bridge and the North Leg for 5 or 6 years, Whitton 

replied that the studies were justified, especially since the shape of the planned transit system 

could affect the outlines of the highway network needed to meet future traffic demands.

Representative Cramer, seemingly exasperated, asked if Whitton had been involved in preparing 

the report, dated February 20, 1963, from Under Secretary of Commerce Martin on the NCTA 

proposal that stated: 

Interstate Route 266, which includes . . .Three Sisters Bridge and Potomac Freeway, is a 

necessary part of the highway network and detailed engineering and construction of it 

should be pursued vigorously. 

Whitton told the Congressman, “We are pursuing it vigorously.” They were beginning the study 

and would complete it “as quickly as possible.” 

Whitton’s position, Representative Cramer pointed out, was “quite different” from the position in 

the February 20 report about pursuing the bridge vigorously. Whitton disagrees. “Mr. Cramer, 

I think we are. I think this study had to be made.” 
Representative Cramer pointed out that Congress was divided on the type of transit system the 

Washington area needed, and resolving the differences could take some time. Should the Three 

Sisters Bridge and North Leg be delayed while Congress debated transit issues? Whitton did not 

think so; officials should proceed with whatever the study President Kennedy had requested 

determined.

Representative Cramer agreed, but said the President wanted to delay the segments “indefinitely 

until the basic decision as to all types of mass transportation in Washington in the future be 

determined.” 

Whitton questioned the word “indefinitely,” but Chairman Fallon intervened to ask how BPR 

cooperated with NCTA on its report. Whitton said BPR furnished technical personnel to NCTA 

but added that in doing so, “we did not necessarily agree to their findings.” In other words, BPR 

did not furnish opinions; “it was just work.” 

Chairman Fallon tried to clarify whether any cooperation had occurred in NCTA’s planning with 

BPR or the District Highway Department. Whitton was hesitant to “call it cooperation.” BPR 

simply furnished help. 

Apparently still exasperated, Representative Cramer pointed out the statement in the Commerce 

Department’s report that NCTA “failed to cooperate with the agencies responsible for freeway, 

parkway, and arterial highway development” and the statement on page 1 of the report that 

agencies of the Commerce Department had cooperated in previous studies, including the Mass 

Transportation Survey and would have cooperated in the same way with NCTA “if the services 

had been requested.” The Congressman said bluntly that the Commerce Department had clearly 

stated that NCTA “did fail to cooperate.”

Whitton, presumably not wanting to imply criticism of President Kennedy, replied:

They did not ask us where to put the rails or where to leave out the highways. The only 

help we gave them was a couple of people.

He stated that BPR’s three or four transportation engineers “were furnishing their technical 

knowledge, and not of a nature that would call for recommendation.” 

In other words, Representative Cramer summarized, NCTA did not consult BPR about its area of 

jurisdiction, the District’s freeways. Whitton replied, “I was not asked to make a 

recommendation.” In response, Representative Cramer read from the 1960 legislation calling for 

NCTA to cooperate with agencies involved in highway development. NCTA, he suggested “did 

not conform to the basic law that authorized this study.” 

Whitton told the Congressman that, “I attended two conferences with the NCTA in which they 

outlined the program of their own that they were considering.” He added, “I would like the 

record to show that.” [pages 23-27] 

On June 26, General Prentiss was the next witness, again representing ARBA. Speaking 

generally, he said that highway construction in urban areas was “the most urgently needed part of 
our national highway program and the most difficult.” The problem wasn’t the lack of “technical 

competence” to plan the freeways:

The real bottleneck in urban planning lies in gaining concurrence and approval of plans 

. . . . This condition is especially true in urban areas encompassing multiple jurisdictions 

. . . . These governmental approvals are either extremely difficult or impossible to obtain 

without the support of public-spirited citizens. Many citizens’ organizations are for the 

highway program until a specific highway proposal appears to adversely affect their own 

immediate interests.

After commenting on aspects of the 3C planning process, he summarized: 

Efficiency in planning, engineering, and construction requires that there be a continuous 

and orderly flow of work from the planning stage through all of the preliminary steps and 

the actual construction of the highway facilities.

The proper implementation of section 134 [the planning provision of the 1962 Act] will 

encourage this orderly and efficient process.

He pointed out that a 3C process does not “guarantee that the plans which are developed will 

ever be implemented.” He hoped no one thought the 3C process would lead inevitably to 

construction of the urban Interstate freeways. 

The District of Columbia, General Prentiss said, was “an excellent illustration of the fallacy in 

this thinking.” For years, the District had a planning process similar to the new 3C requirements, 

“but the difficulties of implementation have been enormous.” The District, as a result, may have 

little difficulty complying with section 134, but would still face “tremendous difficulties in 

getting actual construction started, and these difficulties in implementation are related to the 

planning process.” 

He summarized the history of the District’s freeway network, a subject he was fully familiar with 

as a result of his tenure as the District’s engineer commissioner. He said that NCTA was entitled 

to its opinion, but the Commerce Department and the District commissioners had pointed out the 

deficiencies in NCTA’s conclusions and how the agency reached them. NCTA made unrealistic 

assumptions, bent figures several times to get desired results, and manipulated “questionable 

assumptions by a method of analysis of unproven reliability.” 

General Prentiss wanted a restudy of the transit needs NCTA had recommended while the 

District proceeded promptly with the Interstate network. Funds had been appropriated to 

complete design of the Three Sisters Bridge and the remaining segments of the Potomac River 

Freeway. As for the North Leg, he was fully familiar with “the sociological and esthetic 

condition of the area,” since he had been born “a few hundred yards” from the proposed 

alignment. Deferring this key link would only “defer the economic dividends which the District 

and the metropolitan area will reap from the linking up of the inner loop.” It will help keep 

people out of the central area who do not want to go there. [pages 63-72] 
Chairman Fallon asked General Prentiss if he thought the NCTA report contained “any new 

information” that justified restudying the District freeway network. No, General Prentiss said, he 

had not seen anything that would indicate that such a study “would do anything more than waste 

time and money.” 

The chairman asked why the North Leg was so important. “Cannot the traffic east and west be 

accommodated on the south leg?” General Prentiss explained that the Inner Loop would never 

serve its full purpose until it was a complete circle that permitted traffic from all directions to 

bypass the central business area. “I feel that the key, the absolute key, to solving the traffic 

problems of Washington depends upon the earliest possible completion of the entire inner belt.” 

Would not the proposed subway loop advocated by NCTA serve the same purpose as the Inner 

Loop? General Prentiss said the subway loop would serve “exactly the opposite purpose.” The 

subway loop was intended to get people close to their destination in the central area so they could 

conclude the trip on foot. By contrast, the Inner Loop was intended for people who wanted to get 

somewhere other than the central area.

Representative John A. Blatnik (D-Mn.) asked about the many examples around the county “that 

cooperation is more of a continuing process rather than a stop-and-go proposition.” He asked 

why coordination among all the District agencies was so difficult. Did other large metropolitan 

areas have the same problem? General Prentiss agreed that around the country, “the planning 

agencies are going to have to work closely together, they are going to have to not only cooperate 

but coordinate their planning so that they do not come up at the end of a long session of 

developing a planning process with diametrically opposed ideas.” 

NCTA’s report illustrated the problem because of the agency’s “unilateral planning” in 

developing recommendations for mass transit and freeways:

In other words, instead of being sure that they were going forward, utilizing the same 

accepted data as has been used in the preparation of all of these plans, they used other 

data and came up with a different answer.

Representative Blatnik wondered if another agency, above BPR, was needed as a coordinating 

agency to resolve disputes. General Prentiss thought BPR was the right agency to give the go 

ahead when the planning process resulted in a decision to proceed with a highway project. 

However, in a democracy, nothing “is going to replace selling the public on what is good for the 

public.” Faced with 10 years to get the planning process implemented, “My idea is that we have 

got to start right now” in selling the community on the need for freeways so “the newspapers and 

all of the other citizens organizations are educated and understand why these engineers say this, 

that, and the other ought to be done.” In the District, for example, most people had no idea why 

the Inner Loop was needed: 

What we ought to be thinking about is how much it is going to help the whole 

metropolitan area and the big section downtown, instead of worrying about a small strip 

across Northwest Washington, which, as I said before, is where I was born. 
Representative Blatnik admitted he was puzzled. How do you get groups with divergent points 

of view to “finally come to a workable, reasonable compromise arrangement, and then come out 

and proceed with implementing the agreed upon program.” 

General Prentiss indicated that usually when people or groups object to a segment of a 

comprehensive program, “they seldom, if ever, have an alternative”: 

What we have got to do is have officials who have enough intestinal fortitude, after 

having evaluated all of the benefits as well as all of the objections, and they find, as they 

will, that the benefits are much on the plus side, to go ahead and say, “Well, we are sorry, 

ladies and gentlemen, but the few must be inconvenienced so that the many may benefit; 

and this is going to benefit the many, and we are going to go ahead with it.” 

Representative Blatnik, who lived at 2900 North Kensington Street in Arlington, Virginia, 

provided an example of the stop-and-go method of road construction: 

I am thinking, for instance, of the Washington 14th Street Bridge, with a complex of 

mazes, overpasses, underpasses, and loops. I am just waiting until that is fully 

operational. I want to see four lanes on one side merge with four lanes on the other side 

at relatively high speed, approximately 40 miles an hour, and suddenly merging in four 

lanes. It is going to be a honey. You will have a real pileup on this side. 

On the other side of the river, coming from Dulles Airport, you come down to the 

[George] Washington Parkway, and again you have suddenly and abruptly four lanes 

merging into two lanes at speeds of 40 miles an hour and more, and six blocks down the 

hill the two lanes become one, and on one side you have a whole chain of cars at a dead 

stop waiting one by one to get onto a six-lane bridge, and when you come to the other end 

you stop, you cannot get off. I do not know who in the world is responsible for that. 

General Prentiss agreed that these examples were the result of how projects in the area were 

planned. On the District side, the Potomac River Freeway was part of the solution, but it was 

partly on hold. Representative 

Mr. Blatnik. Who can break this deadlock, or how should it be broken in this area? 

General Prentiss. I do not have the answer to that. I am sorry. 

Representative Blatnik wondered if BPR could do so, or perhaps Commerce Department 

officials. General Prentiss replied:

I am of the opinion that the only way we are going to get this deadlock broken is by the 

public rising up and saying, “We want this to go forward now.” And then those in 

authority will pay attention. I do not know any other way. I do not know of any 

organization that has the authority right this minute to say go ahead. 

If the solution was waiting for the public to rise up, Representative Blatnik said, “We are going 

to wait a long time.” General Prentiss said, “That is right.” [pages 72-78] 
Other witnesses on June 26 were from highway-oriented associations and were supportive of 

highway development (Automobile Manufacturers Association and American Trucking 

Associations). 

General Clarke and Director Aitken were the lead witnesses on June 27. Pointing out that he 

would be leaving office in 2 weeks, General Clarke said he hoped his 3 years in the post would 

allow him to offer constructive evaluations and suggestions. 

First, though, he said he hoped that Section 134 of the 1962 Act would stir the “fire under the 

pot” that would “consume the embers of inaction and indecision.” The time had come for 

planning agencies to “halt costly piecemeal consideration of transportation segments whether it 

be for highways or rapid transit.” The “slow progress” on the Inner Loop in the District was an 

example of piecemeal planning and implementation:

In contrast, the concept of the National Capital Beltway which soon will completely 

encircle the metropolitan area has been adhered to and typified the benefits of farsighted 

system planning and implementation.

He told the subcommittee that based on his 3 years of service, he had sent identical letters to 

NCPC and the National Capital Regional Planning Council that read in part: 

. . . that the future growth and economic stability of the region depends in a large measure 

upon the development of an effective and efficient urban transportation system in 

harmony with the overall comprehensive plan. 

The two groups “have the basic responsibility for the establishment of a comprehensive planning 

process.” Their “acceptance of that responsibility can only be measured by the firmness and 

resolve exhibited by the Planning Commission and the Regional Planning Council in adopting 

thoroughfare plans without undue reservations to the labyrinth of detail.” 

The period of the Mass Transportation Survey from 1955 to 1959 reflected a cooperative and 

comprehensive planning process. Since then, “new factors have entered the situation.” NCTA’s 

plans “raised serious questions about the need for several elements in the currently programed 

highway plan.” Acknowledging that responsible elements existed on both sides of the resulting 

controversy, “the very fact that there are responsible elements on both sides of this controversy 

has required further study of those elements in controversy.” 

NCPC was responsible for planning and orderly development of the Nation’s capital, but 

planning must not only be long-range but take on a regional scope. The National Capital 

Transportation Act of 1960 had reiterated the congressional requirement “for planning on a 

regional basis of a unified system of freeways, parkways, express transit service on exclusive 

rights-of-way and other major transportation facilities.” Section 134 of the 1962 Act had 

reiterated this concept for the District and elsewhere:

Factors of esthetics, sociological, and economic considerations must receive great 

attention and must be related to the broader community development plan. Public 

improvements are rarely sought by those whose privacy may be invaded. We must seek 
to minimize this invasion keeping in mind, however, the common good and overall 

benefits to the region at large. 

If the area’s planning agencies “cannot do the job, we will have to devise some other method.” 

He emphasized, however, that the planning of transportation systems “cannot wait until the ink is 

dry on the final detailed comprehensive plan for the area.” General Clarke concluded:

Nevertheless, we must be assured that the transportation plan itself takes into account all 

significant factors. Transportation systems are the arteries of the region and will shape or 

be adjusted to shape the land use pattern. The life flow in these arteries must be kept 

current if we are to have healthy growth in the area. [pages 135-138] 

Chairman Fallon began the questioning by referring to General Clarke’s reference to the 

difference between planning through 1959 and since then. “To what extend did the National 

Capital Transportation Agency cooperate with you in the preparation of the NCTA report?” 

General Clarke answered that “this is somewhat a difficult question to answer.” The city had 

shared the expertise of its metropolitan planning study group with NCTA, the group that “runs 

computers to see what the various programs . . . would produce in the way of traffic loadings 

under certain assumptions.” However, the programs fed into NCTA’s computers were entirely 

NCTA’s, as well as the decisions on which systems to study.” He compared it with “loaning 

someone a typing pool.” The group members loaned to NCTA “exercised very little in the way 

of policy coordination.” 

As for policy coordination, Aitken explained that he had a meeting with NCTA’s Stolzenbach on 

October 10, 1962, but it “was simply a briefing, and there was no question of exchange of ideas, 

or thoughts, or principles, or policy.” 

Chairman Fallon observed that this did not sound like a cooperative planning process. Aitken 

began, “This is true.” Normally, when a freeway idea was raised, the District worked with BPR, 

Maryland, or Virginia in “a free exchange of ideas and discussions during all stages of 

development of a project from the concept to the final finished plan.” 

Asked if he agreed with the NCTA report, Aitken said he was “in accord with the philosophy that 

we need improved mass transit,” but had a “considerable difference of opinion” on the highway 

system. He cited the example of design standards for the Interstate System, which Congress 

specified should be adequate for a design year. BPR and highway departments across the country 

had devised a means of forecasting that traffic.

“Contrarywise, the NCTA limited traffic requirements by one device or another.” On the North 

Leg, NCTA “made a predetermination as to the amount of traffic that would be permitted on the 

facility.” Aitken based his claim of predetermination on a statement “in the back of the front 

page of their consultant’s report on this particular item, [where] the consultant was careful to say 

that NCTA told them to design it for a certain volume of traffic.” In short, instead of following 

the direction of Congress in authorizing the Interstate System and using the method employed by 

every State highway agency in forecasting traffic volumes, NCTA “went at it in a different way.”
In response to followup questions from Representative Cramer, Aitken said: 

And the facility which was recommended by the Agency, which consisted of one-way 

streets between sections of freeway, is like building a country road in the middle of the 

New Jersey Turnpike. 

And, as Representative Cramer pointed out, such a feature would not quality for Interstate funds. 

Aitken explained another consequence of recent developments. The District had asked BPR to 

approve preliminary design of interchange “C” and the Center Leg, but just that morning, BPR 

told him it would not act on the requests until reexamination of the North Leg, Three Sisters 

Bridge, and Potomac River Freeway was completed. BPR wanted to be satisfied that the District 

would have a properly integrated Interstate System:

So when you talk about the north leg of the inner loop system, this is like a block that 

holds up the house: with[out] this one everything is in doubt. [pages 138-141] 

Representative Cramer, who had been absent for General Prentiss’s testimony on these subjects, 

picked up on Aitken’s comment. “That concept would destroy the fundamental purpose of the 

interstate highways, would it not?” Aitken agreed and said the District Highway Department 

“does not propose such a plan.” 

Representative Cramer wanted to be sure he understood the testimony. BPR was holding up 

approvals on segments not under study per President Kennedy’s instructions. Aitken confirmed 

that this was his understanding based on his conversation with BPR that morning. 

They discussed what would happen if BPR would not approve 90-percent Interstate funds for the 

Center Leg. The estimated cost was $60 million, with BPR providing $54 million in Interstate 

funds. If the Center Leg were dropped from the Interstate System because of a failure of 

connectivity, the Federal share would drop to $30 million on a 50-50 basis. With the Interstate 

System, the city would receive all the Federal dollars needed to complete the route to full 

standards by 1972, but would have to draw the 50-50 funds from annual apportionments of 

$5 million for the ABC program. The District’s annual allocation of Interstate funds for 1963 

was $34.5 million. 

Representative Cramer asked if Virginia officials are designing I-266 in view of the uncertainty 

about the Three Sisters Bridge connection to the District. Aitken said Virginia highway officials 

had asked him what they could do to resolve the issue. “Virginia cannot settle the question of 

design in this area west of Key Bridge any more than we can settle the design of the Potomac 

River Freeway until we know where that river crossing is going to be.” 

Representative Blatnik asked who would make that determination. Aitken replied that “we have 

had a lot of help,” with the transcript noting: “[laughter].” Aitken added that the city “had 

determinations several times in the past but they get changed.” The city had developed a plan 

based on the Mass Transportation Survey, but “all at once it appears we do not have a plan to 

follow.” 
Chairman Fallon wanted to know if “any new factors” have come to light on the North Leg, 

Three Sisters Bridge, or the Potomac River Freeway that would alter decisions. Aitken said that 

some homes would be taken for the bridge approaches, but right-of-way needs had been taken 

into account in planning the bridge. He thought the real issue was that if the bridge and freeway 

were built, the District would have to provide a connection via the North Leg. When 

Representative Cramer asked what the objection was to the North Leg, Aitken replied: 

Well, sir, I do not know. I know that housing will be involved, but I also know that we 

can recreate housing over the freeway to replace a substantial part of that which would be 

affected.

Representative Cramer said that on April 8, 1963, the District commissioners had approved a 

transportation plan that included the facilities. He asked if anything had happened since then that 

would change this support. When Aitken replied that the District’s views had not changed, 

Representative Cramer immediately pointed out that “the one salient difference is the President’s 

message.” Aitken replied, “Yes, sir.”

Representative Cramer began reading from the President’s June 1 letter. The President called for 

“careful reexamination” of the highway program in light of the transit plans. The Congressman 

asked if the city had considered transit in developing the highway program. Aitken and General 

Clarke assured him the city had done so. 

President Kennedy called for consideration of the social, economic, and esthetic impacts of the 

highways. He allowed some projects to go forward, such as the East Leg and Fort Drive 

Parkway, but put others on hold pending the studies he outlined. What, the Congressman asked, 

were the social, economic, and esthetic impacts the President was referring to.

General Clarke was fairly certain the President was referring to the homes that would be taken 

for the North Leg and the resulting disruption to families. As for esthetics, the North Leg would 

go through some sensitive areas, such as Embassy Row; it was “a very important area of the city 

and must be treated very carefully.” If the Three Sisters Bridge were not built, traffic volumes on 

the North Leg would be reduced somewhat, and that would have a bearing on the design. 

Representative Cramer wondered if these factors had been considered before release of the Mass 

Transportation Survey in 1959. The survey considered only the need for the facilities, General 

Clarke said. “Now the problem of how it was to be built, precisely where it was to be built, and 

just how it was to be treated, was a matter that was deferred for later consideration.” The city 

had not planned to build the North Leg until 1969, so time remained to consider these factors. 

Representative Cramer asked if President Kennedy wanted the city to study how to build the 

facilities. No, General Clarke told him, the study was to determine whether the facilities would 

be built to “interstate or some lesser standard.”

Representative Cramer pointed out that everyone expected a freeway, with limited control of 

access, to be built in the North Leg corridor and had been planning accordingly. “And now that 
whole thing may be changed and it may not be.” He added, “And that is not the decision of you 

people.” General Clarke confirmed that it was President Kennedy’s decision.

In response to a question from Chairman Fallon about whether the facilities in question were 

needed, Aitken said, “Absolutely, yes, sir; there is no question about it.” [pages 144-150] 

Representative Blatnik said he was experiencing “very severe, if not extreme, puzzlement.” He 

referred to the comment that, “If the planning agencies cannot do the job, we will have to devise 

some other method.” After the 1959 survey and the 1962 NCTA report, this was “a very peculiar 

statement, or admission,” but it reflected the “befuddled mess” that transportation planning in the 

area had become. The District began with the enlighted planning of Pierre L’Enfant, but “I think 

today it is perhaps one of the worst in the country.” He did not think the District’s problems 

were any different from the issues facing any major city:

By contrast, we have this bounding [sic] around to conferences, consulting with agencies, 

and Good Lord, not knowing quite sure who makes the final decision or determination, 

no one charged with the responsibility of executing this huge program. 

The planning function seems to have “become an end in itself, and you are running around and 

around and not getting anywhere.” 

General Clarke said, “you have described the situation very well as to the confusion that exists.” 

Unlike all those other cities, part of the District’s problem arose from “the somewhat exclusive

jurisdiction of various Federal agencies over pieces of property in the District of Columbia and in 

the region.” He cited NPS, the planning agencies, the Architect of the Capitol, the Smithsonian 

Institution, and all the other bodies that must agree to plans for “any type of facilities, be it 

highway, sewer, or anything else.” In other cities, officials can develop a plan and proceed. “But 

this is not always possible in Washington.” 

The District began work on the freeway plan outlined in the 1959 Mass Transportation Survey, 

but the intervention of planning bodies and NCTA was “very disruptive to the orderly operation 

of the Highway Department.” As a result, the department did not have any plans on the shelf to 

build anything. “They are just devoid of plans” that would allow the city to meet the 1972 

deadline for completing the Interstate System.

Referring to his comment about devising some other method of planning, General Clarke told 

Representative Blatnik:

What I had in mind is that it seems to me that over the past year or so the planning 

agencies were not able to agree really on anything in the highway program; and, if the 

District of Columbia and the State of Maryland and the State of Virginia are to meet this 

1972 deadline, if the planning agencies cannot bring this all back into a package so we 

can make orderly progress, I think we are going to have to come back to the President or 

to the Congress and say we have got to find another way to do it outside of the planning 

agencies. 
Maybe an ad hoc group that would have enough authority to agree on a concept, and we 

would feel sufficiently confident of the concept that we could go ahead and do our 

programing and getting this program underway again. 

Mr. Fallon. In the meantime, we are doing nothing. 

Mr. Blatnik. That is exactly it. [pages 150-152] 

General Clarke said the city was advancing the Interstate projects in its current budget, such as 

the Center Leg and East Leg, and would complete the reexamination under the President’s 

instruction as quickly as possible. When Representative Cramer recalled the earlier statement 

that BPR would not approve planning funds for the Center Leg, General Clarke clarified that the 

city would do what it could: 

Mr. Cramer. You cannot do much if they do not give clearance for Federal money.

General Clarke. You are absolutely correct on that.

Mr. Cramer. So for all practical purposes, that is stymied, and that is a necessary link no 

matter what happens to the north leg, is it not? 

General Clarke. I believe so.

Representative Cramer summarized his view that Washington was “becoming a national example 

of the hodge-podge that results from lack of long-range planning and programing and actual 

construction, when you apparently get involved in a fight for prestige position between mass 

transit proposals and highway proposals.” The Interstate System in the District was “now being 

bogged down and is likely to be more so in the future,” with other cities experiencing similar 

problems “as the result of this overriding consideration now of municipal planning in general, 

and mass [transit] planning in specific.” 

He added that he became concerned about this issue during the hearings on the miscellaneous 

bills because if these problems spread around the country, the Interstate System “conceivably 

would not, and probably would not, be completed by 1972 in the most critical areas, meaning the 

urban areas.”

General Clarke agreed that in the District, “an effort far beyond that we have been able to put 

forth” would be required to meet the deadline: 

Mr. Cramer. I would hate for any other city in the country to use what is happening in 

Washington as an example of what they should do on extensions in their communities. 

General Clarke. I would agree with that. [page 152] 

Representative Blatnik was “amazed by this type of thing . . . completely perplexed.” Here was 

the very important engineering program with decisions to be made. “The whole thing is 

suspended—suspended animation.” He asked if General Clarke agreed that, “The Congress or 

the executive branch are the ones that can move and break the deadlock.” General Clarke agreed. 

The Congressman said: 
I do not think we should be a party to sitting here and standing by and hoping someone 

sometime in the future is going to break the deadlock. These men know what has to be 

done, and they know how to cooperate with the agencies . . . . 

You have a continuous flow of operation and not just a jerky, stop-and-go, “don’t go 

through the tulip bed operation.” But here it is the north leg, the east leg, the inner loop, 

the Three Sisters Bridge—and you go on the bridge and cannot get off. It is not your 

fault, but this type of operation is serious enough and inexcusable enough to warrant 

going right into it and seeing if we cannot get the logjam broken and get the show on the 

road. 

Chairman Fallon agreed that city officials had been undermined. They were planning in 

accordance with congressional direction and the 1959 plan. “And then another agency is added 

to the Government . . . and they say that the engineers and the people with the responsibility of 

location and design did not know what they were talking about.” The NCTA report implied the 

incompetence of the very people whose experience “shows you have one of the best records for 

this type of work in the country.” 

As far as he was concerned, NCTA officials might know something about mass transit, but “I do 

not consider them experts on the Interstate System or the design of an interstate system.” The 

District’s highway officials were the experts in that area:

And to have a garden club or somebody else come in and say that you are wrong because 

you are going through a tulip bed . . . . 

Representative Blatnik pointed out he had referred to “tulip bed” only as “shadowboxing and 

sparring around,” but did not mind “this tiptoeing around the edge of it.” 

Chairman Fallon told the Congressman, “I did not tiptoe . . . . I think we should find the answer 

and find it soon.” [pages 153-154] 

Representative Cramer asked about the people being displaced. General Clarke replied:

In the past 2 years I have not felt any particular objections from the property owners in 

any area.

I recognize that part of the north leg goes through an area of a lot of people of low income 

and low-cost housing, and they are not the type of people--

Representative Cramer interrupted to say, “If some is slums, you will be just as well out of 

there.” General Clarke continued:

Some is slums, and some of it above that category, and with a little more attention to the 

housing code and all it could be usable housing. These are not the type of people you 

hear from individually. Collectively on this problem we have heard many objections. 
Under current plans, relocations per week were about three to five. “To me this is not an 

insurmountable problem.” The city was seeking congressional approval to use Federal funds 

authorized for urban renewal for relocating those displaced by highway projects. 

Chairman Fallon pointed out that the Committee on Public Works also approved dams that could 

flood out farmers and towns upstream for the greater good. “That is going on every day, and you 

find that in almost every public works project.” General Clarke agreed but clarified: 

I think perhaps the difference involved in relocation in the city as compared to many of 

the flood-control projects, Mr. Chairman, is, of course, the low-income status of the 

people and the difficulties they have in relocating. [pages 153-155] 

Representative John F. Baldwin, Jr. (R-Ca.) commented that NCTA clearly had violated its 

authorizing legislation and the will of Congress: 

Certainly it is not the intention of Congress to authorize a program of this magnitude and 

have some individual independent agency have the right to veto and block the intention of 

Congress. 

NCTA, he said, had “acted in a completely arbitrary manner” and had not cooperated, as 

Congress directed it to do, with other planning agencies that “had a far greater history in 

planning.” Section 134 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 called for a 3C planning 

process in metropolitan areas around the country. That NCTA violated this concept by acting 

arbitrarily and ignoring the reliable planning agencies “is even more reason for us not to allow 

this to continue.” He told Chairman Fallon that “this committee should make it [sic] views 

known in the strongest manner possible.” 

Chairman Fallon closed out the testimony by saying he hoped to have NCTA officials appear 

before the subcommittee to explain why they did not feel they had to comply with “the wishes of 

the Congress and our legislative process.” [pages 156-159] 

Testimony continued on July 9 with the appearance of Vice Chairman Brewer and Donald 

Gingery of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission. In a brief opening 

statement, Brewer made clear that the commission was “unanimous” in support of the District’s 

freeway plans, including the Three Sisters Bridge, the North Leg, and the Potomac River 

Freeway. It may seem odd, he said, that Maryland supported the Three Sisters Bridge, which was 

to be built between the District and Virginia, but “our people will use the facilities, and we feel 

they are vitally needed, and the sooner the better.” 

The commission also supported rapid transit “and, if the Congress, in their wisdom and judgment 

decides that they wish to provide a billion dollars for rapid transit in this area, we welcome it.” 

He continued: 

But we do feel very strongly about the need for the highways, and we do not think that the 

highways should be sabotaged in order to provide future rapid transit at a date which we 

feel is sometime in the future, and we feel that the highways are needed now.
Gingery supported construction of NCTA’s rail transit system by 1969, but could not agree with 

the omissions of the freeways NCTA opposed. “Without them, the hundreds of thousands of 

vehicles going to and from and through Washington daily will aggravate existing traffic 

congestion by jamming local streets, increasing bottlenecks and deteriorating property values.” 

He said the moratorium or freeze on freeway construction in northwest Washington west of 

12th Street had “far-reaching effects” and had “made a bad situation worse in the most heavily 

congested section of Washington.” It blocked extension of freeways to serve workers and 

professionals who lived in Montgomery County but worked in the District. “It has, in effect, 

placed a Chinese wall around the Northwest section of the Nation’s Capital by denying easy, 

convenient access to thousands of Marylanders who must work in downtown Washington.” 

Trying to solve the area’s transportation problems without the three freeways NCTA had rejected 

would be “foolhardy.” On a map, he showed the vast area of Montgomery County that had “no 

radial road plan programed or approved by any agency in the State or in the District of 

Columbia” to serve “this vast human mass of people to get in or out of the District of Columbia.” 

And yet, under the freeze, “there cannot be any planning or building of highways in the whole 

Northwest section of Washington.” 

Gingery said that when Maryland and Virginia agreed to the National Capital Transportation Act 

of 1960, officials believed they would have veto power over NCTA’s plans. “There was written 

into the act that we would have complete cooperation of the NCTA. This cooperation has never 

occurred.” As a result, the veto the two States thought would work has not worked. “It has not 

worked, and it will not work as long as this one Administrator, who really appoints his own 

administrative body, runs the Transportation Agency.” He thought NCTA would run better with 

three Administrators, one from each of the main jurisdictions in the area. 

Without such a change, “we are in real trouble, real trouble.” Because of the way NCTA has 

operated, Maryland and Virginia lost 2 full years in highway planning. “And mind you, 

gentleman, the Transportation Agency has little or nothing to do with highways, yet has 

succeeded in blocking the consideration of the inner loop where all Maryland roads must connect 

in the District of Columbia.”

Every agency, except NCTA, thought the 1959 plan was sound. “And who came along and 

changed it? The very Agency we set up under that 1959 plan.” 

Chairman Fallon observed that the National Capital Transportation Act was under the 

jurisdiction of another committee. He asked if NCTA had cooperated with the Maryland 

commission. Gingery replied that NCTA had, but “the cooperation was almost silly; it was 

childish.” He explained: 

We would go down to the meetings, and we would be shown a plan—no backup 

statement. And that is what the Department says. We have never yet been able, on a 

reasonable basis, to get in and meet with the Transportation Agency and work out our 

various problems. 
Cooperation, Gingery said, had been “failing from the word go.” 

Brewer agreed. “I have had innumerable meetings with Mr. Stolzenbach, and I think the 

difficulty is the fact that we are not a party to the development of those plans.” His impression 

was that NCTA officials wanted to defer freeway construction “in order that they might make 

feasible the statistics they furnished for rail rapid transit.” [pages 167-173] 

Chairman Fallon asked how the freeze on the Three Sisters Bridge and North Leg affected 

planning in Maryland. Brewer reply that with the 5-year freeze on the northwest quadrant and 

the NCTA-inspired reexamination, “we cannot really plan.” Trying to plan “might be just 

throwing the taxpayers’ money down the drain.” Unless the District can plan its network with 

certainty, “we certainly cannot do any planning.” 

Brewer added that the commission supported mass transit, but was opposed “if it means our 

highways are going to be sabotaged and we are not going to be able to move our people.” [pages 

173-174] 

Representative Cramer asked about progress on the 1959 plan. Gingery pointed out that 

highways and transit were interrelated, but NCTA came along and “left the 1959 plan and 

embarked on this idea that they would do away with highways, they would freeze them, and they 

would fool around with transit to supplement highways, stop all the highway building.” And 

they were successful in “stopping every bit of highway planning and construction from the 

Baltimore Expressway to the Potomac River.” Maryland could not acquire property or program 

a road from the Outer Belt Freeway until the District settled issues related to the Inner Loop 

“with finality.” Things were moving along nicely:

And the Transportation Agency comes in and says, “We are not going to have an inner 

loop. We are not going to let you connect this road, or connect that road, or connect this 

road to the inner loop. We are knocking the whole top off it. It is going away. It is going 

to be served by a subway. 

So here was “poor old Maryland” unable to provide links in accordance with the 1959 plan. And 

here was Virginia “bringing this tremendous Route 66 in, and they suddenly find this six-lane 

road has to be dissipated into the existing bridge crossing [Key Bridge], which cannot even 

comply with interstate roads.” Unless Congress did something drastic about NCTA, the two 

States and the District were going to lose millions of dollars in Interstate funds–and probably had 

spent $20 to $30 million “illegally because they cannot comply with the interstate regulations.” 

Representative Cramer said that as far as he was concerned, highways were being “put into 

second place in order to try to accommodate mass transit facilities, and so you wind up with the 

tail wagging the dog.” [pages 176-177] 

Representative Fred Schwengel (R-Ia.) wanted to know if NCTA imposed the freeze on freeways 

in the northwest quadrant. No, Brewer told him, it was “put on, unfortunately, by the Congress 

of the United States on the recommendations of certain people who favored the idea of a freeze.” 

Asked to be specific about the people involved, Brewer replied:
I think there were certain people then associated with the staff of Senator Bible. I think 

Mr. Fritz Gutheim was the leader in it. I think Mr. Stolzenbach . . . was probably a party 

to some of this freeze . . . . 

The Congress was convinced to put this freeze on because they were afraid of the socalled Wisconsin Avenue corridor . . . . Somebody told me there had been a map 

prepared, a map held by an official agency of Government . . . which shows the homes of 

every Congressman, every Senator, every administrative assistant, every legislative 

assistant, who lives in Northwest Washington, and that they were hoping to freeze and 

prevent any roads from going through this area which would disturb these homes, and 

they encouraged people to oppose the construction of any corridor in that area to put a 

freeze on.

He could not verify his statement about the map, but that was what he had heard. Representative 

Schwengel, who lived at 4005 Nellie Custis Drive in Arlington, asked to see the map, but Brewer 

did not know where it was or even if it existed. [page 205] 

Representative Schwengel asked who in NCTA was “most responsible for this problem, do you 

think?” Gingery replied, “There is one Administrator who is virtually a dictator,” namely 

Stolzenbach. He had advisers “who come from all over the country, some of them.” The 

Congressman asked if any of them lived in the District, but Gingery did not know. 

(Of the eight NCTA officials listed in the 1963 Congressional Directory, Stolzenbach lived at 

10515 Meredith Avenue in Kensington, Maryland, while J. Neal Tomey, Director of the Office 

of Administration, lived at 6004 Osceola Road in Bethesda. All but one of the other officials 

lived in Arlington or Alexandria. The exception was Richard R. Haratine, Director of the Office 

of Public Information and Community Services, who lived 1634 I Street, NW. [Congressional 

Directory, 1963, Government Printing Office, 88th Congress 1st Session, page 591]) 

Discussing the Department of Commerce’s report on NCTA’s recommendations, Representative 

Cramer said he had asked Administrator Whitton several questions regarding “why he should 

now change his position.” The Congressman was “not satisfied with those reasons” because “the 

facts are the same today as they were before [in 1959].” The only thing he could think of that 

had changed was the new President.

Gingery said, “Well, there has been a lot of pressure put on these Government agencies by 

somebody.” The pressure, Representative Cramer agreed, “is obviously going to have a 

deleterious effect on highways throughout the District of Columbia.” 

Brewer pointed out that Governor Tawes had designated the Maryland-National Capital Park and 

Planning Commission to be the coordinating agency with NCTA. Even so, Stolzenbach insisted 

on seeing the Governor. Brewer recalled the discussion: 

Governor Tawes: Have John Funk and Mr. Brewer seen this? 

Stolzenbach: They have looked at the maps. 
Governor Tawes: It is a problem which I am sure they are capable of dealing with, and 

they are the approving authorities. 

It was a short meeting, but that was what NCTA considered cooperation. All the commission 

wanted was to be represented when planning is underway so they know what was being 

considered for their community. “We do not feel this is true today.”

Representative Cramer read the language in the law calling on NCTA to cooperate with other 

agencies and the States:

I am very disturbed by the fact that apparently the provisions written into the National 

Capital Transportation Agency Act of 1960, with the specific intention that all other 

planning groups and the States of Maryland and Virginia should be specifically consulted, 

and, as a matter of fact, the Governors of the States – I am reading from section 204, 

subsection (d), which begins: 

In order to facilitate the transition from a Federal agency to an interstate 

proprietary agency and to further coordination within the National Capital Region 

(the NCTA) shall submit the transit development program and any revision 

thereof . . . (5) to the Governors of Maryland and Virginia or such government 

agencies as they may designate for approval of the location and extent of proposed 

agency facilities and the time table for the provision of such facilities within 

Maryland and Virginia, respectively – 

We have been advised in these hearings before that the NCTA did not bother to consult 

hardly with any other agency, even though so instructed by the Congress. 

I am reading now from subsection (f) of the same section 204 – 

that the NCTA shall conduct research, surveys[,] experimentation, evaluation, 

design, and development, in cooperation with other Government agencies and 

private organizations when appropriate, on the needs of the region for 

transportation. 

And time after time in the act are references to cooperation, consultation. 

Again in section 205, subsection (a), paragraph 7, the NCTA – 

shall cooperate with Government agencies to facilitate cooperation with 

coordination of location, design, and construction of freeways, parkways, and 

other arterial highway facilities with the transit development program. [for 

clarity, ellipsis not used]

Representative Cramer continued: 

So, Congress wrote into this transit authority, in section after section, the requirement that 

they consult with the Governors . . . . I understand now that that was not done, in direct 
violation of the instruction of the Congress of the United States, a complete usurpation of 

authority by the NCTA. 

Brewer assured him that if Congress would amend the law to provide equal representation from 

Maryland and Virginia, “that kind of cooperation is going to occur.” 

Representative Cramer, referring again to language in the National Capital Transportation Act of 

1960 imposing the northwest freeze, asked why the communities couldn’t plan for a freeway 

through the area since planning was not prohibited. Brewer answered that “we do not want to be 

planning unless we know we are going to be able to build it.” The District could not plan; 

therefore, neither could Maryland. He added that the freeze was put on “to serve the selfish 

interests of people who were concerned about the construction of a road which might disturb 

their home or some other building . . . or other thing that they own. This is not the way to do 

business.” 

The Congressman then read the language in “freeze” provision stating that “the Agency shall not 

later than January 10, 1965, submit to the President, for transmittal to Congress its 

recommendation as to whether any such freeway or parkway should thereafter be built.” Brewer 

responded that he could not understand why NCTA “should be the ones to make this 

determination,” instead of organizations such as his that had been in cooperation with the District 

since 1928. Asked if he thought NCTA had the sole authority to determine whether freeways or 

parkways should be built through the northwest quadrant, Brewer responded: “That is the way it 

appears, sir, and that is what has been happening, and that is the effect of it.” [pages 207-210] 

Representative Baldwin explained his view that under the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, 

every motorist in the country was paying the gas tax to build the Interstate System. Anyone who 

deliberately blocked construction of that system in the District of Columbia was “barring 

2 million people, directly and indirectly, from getting their proper returns on the Federal gasoline 

tax and barring all the rest of the tourists in the United States from getting their proper return 

. . . .” Brewer said of the Congressman’s entire statement, “this is the finest statement I have ever 

heard.” [pages 210-211] 

Representative Schwengel asked about Presidential adviser Charles Horsky. “He is presumably 

interested in the development of this whole area, including the District of Columbia.” Had he 

been in touch with the planning commission or involved in any way? Brewer pointed out that 

Horsky lived in Maryland. Brewer knew him, but not well. “As far as I know, he has not 

injected himself into the picture too strongly.” He added: 

He may have been working with Mr. Stolzenbach. I do not know. But they are good 

friends, and I guess they might be working together. I do not know. I think he did have 

some meetings with General Clarke before he departed as Engineer Commissioner.

I cannot figure it out exactly. There seems to be something, a veil some place, that we 

just do not seem to get through. And somebody—I really must say I cannot understand 

how this information gets to certain places.
Representative Schwengel concluded that Horsky had “shown no great interest in this very, very 

serious problem.” [page 211] 

(According to Professor Schrag:

The most important defender [of NCTA’s plan] was President Kennedy, whose 

enthusiasm . . . Stolzenbach later attributed to Kennedy’s being the only president to grow 

up in a city with a subway. 

(In late March 1963, after the Commerce Department and the District released their 

denunciations of the NCTA recommendations: 

Horsky – the president’s gatekeeper on all matters affecting the capital – reluctantly 

realized that the White House and the Bureau of the Budget would have to referee this 

dispute. Though he “recoil[ed] at the idea of another study,” he suggested that some 

pressure from the top was needed. 

(The result was President Kennedy’s June 1 letter to Tobriner calling for studies of the Three 

Sisters Bridge and the North Leg based on the assumption that the NCTA transit system would 

be built. [Schrag, page 57]) 

Representative Cramer read from NCPC’s conclusion that despite the extensive rapid transit 

system NCTA had proposed, “most of the travel in the National Capital region in the year 2000 

will take place in automobiles.” NCPC called for completion of the Center Leg, Northeast 

Freeway, and continuation of the Southwest Expressway. “It seems to me that the highways in 

the District of Columbia are . . . suffering from strangulation of overplanning [sic].” He 

wondered how often transit systems for the District of Columbia was going to be planned, 

recalling the 1959 plan, the 1962 plan, the Year 2000 Plan, and now the District needed funds to 

conduct studies on sociological, economic, and aesthetic aspects. Gingery said: 

I can tell you that if this idea of bringing in another study and another study continues—

and this is an age-old device to stop a project. You fellows have been around too long 

not to realize, if you want to stop something—let’s get another study going and spend a 

million more. This is precisely what is taking place.

He urged Congress to “get the thing back on the even keel” or “we will all be old men before we 

have the highways built or the transit, either one.” 

Asked to provide an example of NCTA’s invalid estimates, Brewer described his concerns about 

NCTA’s ridership estimates for the subway. NCTA expected it to be at full capacity during the 

morning and afternoon weekday peak periods. Possibly, Brewer said, the subway might be at full 

capacity downtown, but in the suburbs, he had serious doubts about ridership of the rail transit 

lines. He did not want to wait until the transit facilities were built to see if NCTA’s estimates of 

ridership and income were accurate before freeways could be built. With cooperation and the 

lifting of the freeze, local officials were ready to build those highways now: 
The Congress can do it if they want to. We know that, if the Congress stand up [sic] and 

says, “We want it, we have got to have it, and the people are entitled to it,” we will get it, 

and not have a lot of little people rubbing around town here stopping it. 

Representative Cramer said Brewer had “put your finger on what the philosophy is.” The mass 

transit planners thought, “We will force people to ride mass transit by simply not building 

highways.” That, he said, is what the NCTA proposal “amounts to.” 

The Congressman was concerned that transit advocates were urging “that all other cities should 

do as Washington is doing—delay the highways in order to give consideration to mass transit.” 

If that was the case, “the completion of the Interstate System in the urban areas by 1973 . . . will 

be impossible.” He pointed out that he did not usually agree with editorials in The Washington 

Post, but an editorial about the Three Sisters Bridge made a “pretty sound observation”: 

The eventual builders of the bridge will be able to make their cofferdams with the baled 

volumes of the consultants’ reports . . . . As long as our system of government pushes all 

political issues off onto the technicians in the weak hope that eventually someone will 

devise a computer to solve them, precisely that long will the city remain trapped in its 

circle of expensive, redundant, and vulnerable engineering studies. [pages 212-216] 

(The title of the July 9 editorial was “In Lieu of a Decision.”) 

Other witnesses concluded the hearing, also in support of building the freeways. However, the 

Subcommittee on Roads did not hear from Stolzenbach or other NCTA officials. 

The New Engineer Commissioner

General Clarke left office on July 8 to become chief of military construction for the Chief 

Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. He was, as he admitted, leaving many unsolved 

problems, and not just on the freeway disputes. Given the number of agencies involved in 

decisionmaking, disarray was a normal condition, he told WWDC’s “Report to the People” on 

May 25. 

The transportation controversy, he said, was the most challenging problem he had faced as 

engineer commissioner. He hoped Congress would break the deadlock later in the year by 

authorizing funds for rapid transit while giving the go-ahead for freeway construction.

His successor was Colonel Charles M. Duke, a Texas native. Among the posts he held before 

President Kennedy chose him to be the new engineer commissioner, Colonel Duke had been 

district engineer for the New York district of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. His most recent 

assignment was as chief of supply and logistics for the Army’s 1st Corps Group in Korea. 

On July 8, with about 100 city officials and guests in attendance at the District Building, 

Commissioner Tobriner gave the departing General Clarke a key to the city. “With this key go 

the thanks of the District for a job done with extraordinary fairness, honesty and effectiveness. 

You have brought to us your wisdom, strength and example. And you take from all of us our 

respect, our love and our unqualified admiration.”
Colonel Duke took his oath of office during the ceremony. Tobriner said, “he comes at a time in 

the city’s history when a technical skill, balanced judgment, seasoned experience and, most 

importantly, human goodness and compassion and understanding are critically needed.” [“Clarke 

Leaves His Office In Usual Confused State,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, May 27, 

1963; “Col. Duke Sworn In As D.C. Commissioner,” The Evening Star, July 8, 1963; “Duke Is 

Welcomed To District Board As Clarks Gets Key,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, July 

9, 1963] 

Colonel Duke moved with his family to 5712 26th Street, NW., in the District’s Chevy Chase 

neighborhood, a short distance from Rock Creek Park. 

A few weeks later, on “Report to the People,” Colonel Duke explained that as a former “straphanger” on the New York City subway, he understood the value of rail rapid transit. “It is no 

secret that I and the Board of Commissioners support the principle of rapid transit.” The 

question was how to balance highways and transit. The proper blend, he explained, was the key 

to reexamining the North Leg Freeway and the Three Sisters Bridge, as President Kennedy had 

ordered. He hoped the report on the reexamination would be completed in December, in time for 

its recommendations to be reflected in the President’s message to Congress on the District’s 

budget. [“$19,000 Family Income Seen For D.C. Area in 40 Years,” The Sunday Star, August 

18, 1963; “Road Restudy Finish Slated In December,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

August 18, 1963] 

Searching for a Solution 

Area officials continued struggling with what to do. The Montgomery County Council, for 

example, decided not to vote on a request by NCTA that it support the agency’s transit plan. The 

problem was that officials could not be sure what transit facilities would be provided to the 

county. As County Manager Mason A. Butcher explained, “Whatever is built to Tenley Circle 

and on to the District line is sure to come into Montgomery County, but we don’t know what it 

will be.” Council members also were upset that the NCTA plan opposed construction of the 

North Leg, the Three Sisters Bridge, and the related Potomac River Freeway, all vital arteries as 

far as county officials were concerned. [“Rapid Transit and Dam Fail in County Council,” The 

Evening Star, June 19, 1963] 

On June 18, Chairman Natcher held a public hearing on the District’s Appropriations Act, 1964, 

for non-government groups and individuals. Witnesses discussed a range of topics, including 

highways. Peter Glickert of the Capitol Hill-Southeast Citizens Association was pleased that 

unlike in previous years, he did not have to urge the committee to shift the location of the East 

Leg. “Logic has finally prevailed in this matter and even the Highway Department has decided to 

be sensible in locating this road along the Anacostia River.” 

Still, the association was concerned that highway officials “failed to grasp all the opportunities 

given them for easing the harm which this road can do to the city.” He hoped the committee 

would remind the District Highway Department that if it is more careful “with its right-of-way 

and its programing, the closer the District can be to having some sort of freeway system when the 

District’s freeway money runs out.” 
Glickert pointed out that many witnesses talked about the shortage of funds for building schools: 

We wish to remind this committee that it is, to a great extent, responsible for this 

situation.

The committee had reduced the Federal payment to the city in lieu of Federal taxes and used 

general funds for police services. In addition, “in the last 3 or 4 years, $8 million to $12 million 

of school money has been put into freeways.” In view of the furor erupting at the time about 

school funding, he asked, “will this immoral diversion of funds be reinstituted or will the money 

be used to promote the welfare of the District’s people?” In short, the city had a “shabby school 

system . . . partly because District road plan [sic] are so enormous.” [District of Columbia 

Appropriations, 1964, Hearings on H.R. 7431 Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 

Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963, pages 1089-

1090] 

(In the rapid turnover of witnesses, the subcommittee did not comment on Glickert’s assertion 

regarding diversion of funds from schools to freeways.) 

Polly Shackleton, District Democratic Committeewoman, said her group firmly supported 

President Kennedy’s decisions on the transit and freeway debate. The committee was committed 

to balanced transportation, and recognized the importance of the Interstate System, but “we 

seriously question the necessity of providing a blockwide, high-speed truck route through the 

very heart of the city”:

The ruthless destruction of countless homes, schools, churches, playgrounds, the tearing 

asunder of entire neighborhoods, and the cruel uprotting [sic] of thousands of people 

unfortunately are included in the price that must be paid to let the trucks roar through in 

safety at speeds of at least 50 miles an hour. 

In view of the “extensive human suffering” that was inevitable, she urged the committee “to 

stand firm and not be swayed by the self-interested, well-heeled and highly organized lobby 

which had chosen to make Washington its battleground and openly fight the President.” 

Representative Robert N. Giaimo (D-Ct.) of the committee asked if she was saying that highway 

projects should be halted only because of the disruption to homes, churches, and schools and 

other facilities. When she said that was “a very good reason” for reviewing the program as the 

President suggested, Representative Giaimo pointed out that highway and urban renewal 

programs throughout the country involved the taking home, businesses, and other structures. 

“There are many Federal programs we have to do just that in order to obtain a good result.” 

Shackleton was not persuaded. She cited one unspecified route that would involve 13,000 people 

being uprooted. “It would involve whole neighborhoods and communities.” She definitely

thought that officials should “stop and look this over and see whether it is trucks or people in this 

city.”

Representative Giaimo pointed out that Congress had approved funds for the program. “And you 

are now saying Congress is wrong?” When she replied that she was supporting President 
Kennedy, he wondered what would happen if the President changed his mind. Shackleton 

replied, “I am very glad President Kennedy and I happen to be on the same on this issue, as we 

are on most other issues.” 

In view of the Democratic Committee’s overriding concern about housing displacement, 

Representative Finnegan pointed out General Clarke’s testimony that never more than 7,000 

families would be dislocated and that relocation arrangements could be made week by week. 

Shackleton said, “That is very doubtful. I think some of us are still to be convinced by the 

allegations of General Clarke.”

She reminded Chairman Natcher that she had testified the year before on basically the same 

points. Her committee was very concerned about the people of the District: 

They have not proved to us, General Clarke, or anyone else, that they are going to be able 

to relocate these 13,000 or 15,000 individuals. I think you are aware of what is a very 

explosive situation . . . . I do not think it would help it by throwing people out of their 

homes and disrupting neighborhoods. 

Representative Giaimo again made the point that people were being dislocated around the 

country for the Interstate System. “This is a problem in all our urban areas.”

Mrs. Shackleton pointed out that she was for the highway program, “but I do not know why they 

should go right through the heart of residential sections of cities.” In San Francisco the previous 

fall, she said, there was a bond issue “which they passed for a subway because they were sick and 

tired of these freeways destroying the city.”

Representative Giaimo said:

I do not find much merit in the argument about the fact that you have to build a highway 

through an area where there are homes. You have to build a highway through places 

where there are people. That is nothing new to us. 

Chairman Natcher thanked her for “your splendid statement,” and moved on to the next witness. 

[District of Columbia Appropriations, 1964, pages 1104-1107] 

The following day, June 19, one of the witnesses was Moe Lerner of Air Transport, Inc., 

testifying on behalf of the Citizens’ Traffic Board of the District of Columbia. (Air 

Transportation, Inc., was involving in providing ground transportation to and from airports in the 

area.) After introducing himself as chairman of the subcommittee on mass transit, he began: 

Progress in the development of the Washington highway program, including portions of 

the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, has virtually ground to a halt 

and the Nation’s Capital is threatened with strangulation unless planned highway 

improvements are permitted to go ahead on schedule. 

The Mass Transportation Survey proposed “an effective system of freeway and highway 

improvements,” but NCTA recommended “a severe $600 million cutback” in those plans. 
The Citizens’ Traffic Board agreed with the District commissioners’ analysis of NCTA’s report. 

In particular, “highways are of prime importance to the efficient conduct of our major industry—

the Federal Government.” The Washington area’s second largest industry, tourism, required 

“good highway facilities to bring him and his dollars to our city,” given America’s preference for 

traveling by cars for vacation travel. Further, the business community could not transport goods 

without good roads: 

In short, we need freeways and improved streets and I recommend that this committee 

give its wholehearted support to the District of Columbia highway program. If there is a 

need for a rail transit program, let it be considered on its merits, but not at the expense of 

badly needed highways. 

In 1950, the National Capital Park and Planning Commission agreed on a plan for freeway 

development “that had the wholehearted approval of the engineers and officials.” The Mass 

Transportation Survey “again emphasized its freeway plans as essential no matter what other 

types of transporttion [sic] would be needed: 

Now, new faces are attempting to turn back the highway clock and have succeeded in 

freezing many of the projects—even some that have already been started.

Officials should encourage and support development of a good transit system. “It should be 

attractive and handle our rush-hour traffic efficiently in air-conditioned comfort.” It should be “a 

show window for the rest of the world.” But, Lerner wondered, why hold up the Three Sisters 

Bridge, the North Leg, and the Inner Loop concept? He concluded: 

For a balanced transportation program we need both the freeways planned to meet the 

highway needs of the District of Columbia and a mass transit system; therefore, we 

should not allow the traffic problem to be ground to death in an argument between 

highway and transit. 

During public hearings, with many witnesses to speak, Chairman Natcher and his colleagues 

often had little to say after each presentation. Lerner’s presentation was an exception. Chairman 

Natcher said, “I want you to know that as just one member of this subcommittee I could not agree 

with you more.” He was convinced the area needed rapid transit and a highway system. The 

idea of killing off the highway system to promote rapid transit “is a serious mistake.”

He had been in the House, he told Lerner, for 9 years. During that time he voted for a bill that 

resulted in construction of District of Columbia Stadium that “is a beautiful stadium, probably 

the most modern stadium in the United States.” At the time, he was told it would cost between 

$6 million and $7 million. Instead, it cost $19,800,000, with the District having to borrow about 

$800,000 a year to pay the interest. “It was a white elephant when it was completed. It is a white 

elephant today.” 

As this example of unreliable cost estimates demonstrated, taxpayers should be “informed 

carefully and thoroughly about any mass transit system”: 
If it is going to cost $1,150 million, to be paid for over a period of 30 to 40 years, with 

bonds to be guaranteed by the Federal Government or a great portion of them, we want to 

know what the share of the District is going to be. The burden is to be placed upon the 

taxpayers here in the city of Washington . . . . I am not in favor of killing off the highway 

program here in the District in order to obtain a rapid transit system. That is my feeling 

about this matter and I believe I am right.

Before we have any rapid transit system or any other program in the District, I think the 

people ought to have all of the facts because it is people like you who are going to have to 

pay for it.

He added:

I am not against rapid transit. I never have been, but I say to you that I am not in favor of 

a rapid transit system here in the District of Columbia that is brought about as a result of 

killing off and destroying the highway program here in the city of Washington. 

[pages 1152-1154] 

On the evening of June 20, the committee heard from additional witnesses, including David 

Sanders Clark of the Committee of 100 on the Federal City. He said the committee strongly 

supported President Kennedy’s position on the District’s highway plans, particularly his call for a 

careful reexamination of the highway program and a delay in funding for the North Leg, Three 

Sisters Bridge, and the related Potomac River Freeway until the outcome of the review was 

known: 

We firmly believe that any new freeways and bridges planned for Washington should be 

so located, designed, and constructed as to uproot as few people as possible from their 

homes and places of business, and do the absolute minimum of damage to the appearance 

of this city. These three ill-considered projects clearly do not meet the criteria.

Instead of appreciating the President’s support for the rest of the highway program, highway 

advocates had “taken to lambasting the President for daring to suggest that certain parts of the 

program warrant further study.” Clark added, “the most vociferous and intemperate criticism 

seems to come from individuals who are definitely not residents and taxpayers of the District of 

Columbia.” Members of Congress were receiving letters from all over the country in support of 

the projects, with truckers particularly solid in support for the Three Sisters Bridges. 

[pages 1221-1222] 

When Chairman Natcher asked about the cost of the NCTA transit proposal that the Committee 

of 100 supported, Clark could only restate NCTA’s estimate. The chairman asked if he was 

including interest on the bonds over a 30- or 40-year period. Clark hoped the system would 

make money, as NCTA believed: 

We do not think that is the really important thing. We feel that a transit system is a public 

service, just like a fire department or the post office, or the highway department. It is 
something that people in a major metropolitan area have to have and people in the area 

are going to have to pay for in one way or another. 

Chairman Natcher restated his view that killing off the highway program to bring about a rapid 

transit system was “a serious mistake.” He asked Clark if he believed Congress would 

appropriate $20.5 million in the first year, $50 million in the second year, and underwrite and 

guarantee $600 million worth of bonds in the third year. Clark replied that he hoped so because 

every major city had similar problems.

The chairman said, “That would set a precedent from the standpoint of guaranteeing the bonds.” 

Clark said if so, it would be “desirable to set a precedent for the Federal Government supporting 

mass transit for cities just the way that the Federal Highway Act . . . set the precedent for the 

Federal Government helping out with highways.” [pages 1222-1224] 

The subcommittee also heard from Peter Craig of the Northwest Committee for Transportation. 

Discussing the history of transportation planning, he explained that in the 1950s, planners acted 

on the assumption that highways would have to carry the primary transportation load. In 1955, 

automobiles carried 57 of peak-hour travel; planners assumed this trend would continue for 

decades. In 1980, 66 percent of all peak-hour trips would be in an automobile, with only 

34 percent by transit, namely buses. NCTA wanted to reverse those percentages. “Numerically, 

the difference is about 50,000 peak-hour auto trips – enough to fill five eight-lane freeways to 

capacity.”

Unfortunately, debate over transportation “at times has been highly emotional, complicated by 

false issues and by erroneous or irrelevant factual claims.” In short, the debate should not be 

about subways or no subways. The issue was not highways or no highways. Both were needed. 

“The issue is one of degree: how much more highway capacity, where, for what purpose, and 

with what capacity.” He commended the Whitener committee hearings in 1962 and its 

unanimous report that was highly critical of the highway plan. 

NCTA had proposed “a workable transportation system” that had been endorsed by NCPC, NPS, 

the Commission of Fine Arts, and President Kennedy. Craig’s committee also endorsed the plan, 

as well as President Kennedy’s call for reexamination of several freeways in view of the NCTA 

plan. “It is important to emphasize, however, that this pending reexamination of the District’s 

highway program need not, and will not, stop highway construction activity.” If the Committee 

on Appropriations approved the District’s proposed budget for FY 1964 of over $60 million, it 

would be “by far the largest highway appropriation in the history of the Nation’s Capital.” 

Craig offered several reasons why the reexamination was needed. First, he cited planning 

realities. The assumption behind the original freeway network was that the city would not have 

rapid rail transit. “It makes no sense to build a subway system to handle over half of 

Washington’s commuter needs to the central city, and also superimpose a highway system 

designed to carry 100 percent of such traffic.” Such needless overbuilding could hurt everybody, 

“placing both the subway and highway systems in financial jeopardy.”
Second, Craig cited fiscal concerns. It was, he said, a “demonstrable fact” that the District could 

not expect to receive enough funds to complete more than a fraction of its freeway program. 

President Kennedy, in his budget message, had made the same point about the District’s highway 

fund: “The highway fund . . . will face critical deficiencies after 1965.” Craig estimated that in 

the District, the deficiency would be about $88 million. “There will not be funds available to pay 

for any of the eight freeway projects still under study – even those upon which the NCTA and the 

Highway Department are in complete agreement, such as the center leg and the Northeast 

freeway.” NCTA had provided “full justification” for its financing plan, but District officials had 

not provided any such justification for their plans. 

Finally, Craig said the District’s highway program should be appraised to determine the degree of 

highway construction the city could physically tolerate. The full network would make the city 

even more dependent on the automobile than it already was, while requiring a 45-percent 

increase in parking spaces:

A freeway once built is permanent. Before any new commitments are made, the planners, 

the public, and the Congress must be certain that the irrevocable step is required. That 

proof does not exist today. 

During the question period, Craig said he had some reason for hope that the District’s highway 

planners were rethinking their ideas: 

For example, on two of these projects, the Northeast Freeway and the North-Central 

Freeway, we have seen a change in the attitude of the District Highway Department since 

a year ago and it now seems to be seriously considering the NCTA’s recommendation 

that those two freeways be combined as a single freeway facility, utilizing the right-ofway of the B. & O. Railroad. Such a combination of interstate routes, NCTA believes, 

would meet the truck and auto needs in conjunction with rapid transit and if so, the 

District is the gainer.

That was encouraging, but for “some reason,” the District highway department “adamantly stuck 

by its original plan” for the Three Sisters Bridge, “even though the assumptions which underlay 

those plans have now been shelved.” There was, he said “no conceivable need for that bridge, 

for autos, for trucks, even for bicycles, and it is only if you want to assume that rapid transit 

won’t carry anybody or that sometime beyond 1980 there may be some horrendous traffic 

increase, that there could conceivably be a traffic justification for the bridge.” 

In 1960, Congress had faced a similar situation where freeway construction was planned in the 

northwest quadrant that would parallel and compete with a likely location for rail rapid transit. 

Congress concluded “that if there is any doubt, let’s build the subway first and see if it works and 

defer a parallel and competitive freeway for consideration at a later time.” The result was the 

5-year moratorium included in the National Capital Transportation Act of 1960. 

Craig was not opposed to all freeways, citing his support for the Southeast Freeway, the 

combined freeways in northeast, and the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge. The Three Sisters Bridge 

was “one of the most frivolous highway proposals.” He asked, “There are such essential freeway 
requirements—why can’t we proceed on those in which there is full agreement, particularly given 

the critical fund shortage in the District highway funds?” 

When Representative Giaimo pointed out that given the problem of suburbanization, highways 

were needed to get people into and out of the cities, Craig explained that he was not arguing that 

highways, automobiles, and trucks were not needed: 

The problem is how do you alleviate the congestion. One subway line can carry as much 

traffic as four eight-lane freeways. In other words, in terms of traffic congestion 

alleviation, one subway line can do as much as four eight-lane freeways . . . . Yet if you 

build the freeways, you have only compounded the problem in terms of a central city 

because you must park those cars at the other end and each of those cars takes 300 square 

feet. [pages 1244-1248] 

Not all witnesses who discussed transportation opposed the District’s freeway plan. The Evening 

Star report on the hearing pointed out: 

Indorsement of the District’s highway program was voiced by spokesmen for five 

business groups—the area’s Automotive Trade Association, a new car group; Eastern 

Greyhound Lines; the Oil Heat Institute of Greater Washington; the area’s Tire Dealers 

and Retreaders Association, and the area’s Laundry-Dry Cleaning Association. [“Hearing 

Brings Clash On Highway Cutback,” The Evening Star, June 21, 1963] 

With District officials concerned that the reexamination President Kennedy had ordered would 

affect the schedule for the Center Leg, Administrator Whitton told reporters on June 28 that he 

saw “some possibility” that engineering studies for the project could start during the year. 

Clearly, the White House-ordered study “will affect what we do on the Center Leg,” and that 

might result in delay. “A restudy of the North Leg is a good idea and is needed regardless of any 

controversy,” but whether it was built would affect the location of the Center Leg. 

The other problem was a dispute with Maryland over how the Center Leg would be linked to 

Maryland’s segment of I-95 at the District line. While the dispute was unresolved, he thought the 

District could work on the southern half of the Center Leg, which would be unaffected by the 

later decisions on where the “troublesome northern section” would link with I-95 in Maryland. 

As for the East Leg, BPR was “willing to consider” its relocation along the west bank of the 

Anacostia River, as favored by President Kennedy. [“Studies on D.C. Center Leg Freeway May 

Start This Year, Official Reports,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, June 29, 1963] 

As June 1963 ended, Star editors took a look at the situation: 

It was inevitable from the beginning that the bitter dispute over Washington area 

transportation would end in the lap of Congress. And the need now is for cool heads to 

resolve the feud—not perpetuate it. 

The only way they could do so was if committee leaders accepted a simple premise:
That the controversy over highways and the controversy over rapid transit are separate 

issues, not competing solutions to the problem of moving people in and out of 

Washington. 

Rapid transit was absolutely necessary. “The most extensive system of freeways alone would not 

suffice.” Congress should approve legislation to begin work on the transit system. 

At the same time, the editors blamed NCTA for the current crisis. The agency’s “unjustified 

attacks on the freeway program” invited retaliation by highway advocates. However, NCTA’s 

“major blunder” should not jeopardize the needed transit system. 

Chairman Fallon had been correct in calling NCTA “the bottleneck” blocking decisions on 

freeways, but the White House “took the NCTA off the hook” when President Kennedy called 

for reexamination of the Three Sisters Bridge/Potomac River Freeway and the North Leg. 

Further, BPR was the agency threatening to withhold funds for the Center Leg until the 

controversy is resolved. 

The editors offered a “clear” course of action. The Center Leg should proceed because it was 

“needed regardless of other decisions on the road system.” Similarly, if Congress can convince 

the Kennedy Administration to relax its order, the Three Sisters Bridge and the Potomac River 

Freeway “should move ahead immediately.” These actions would leave questions only about the 

North Leg: 

The engineering, esthetic and relocation problems involved in this project all are difficult. But 

we are confident that they can be solved. The studies to provide the necessary answers should be 

undertaken immediately. [“Transportation Crisis,” The Sunday Star, June 30, 1963] 

Appropriations 1964 

On July 8, the House Committee on Appropriations completed work on the District of Columbia 

Appropriation Bill, 1964. The committee’s report on the bill included a section on the city’s 

highway program. The committee had “very thoroughly” examined the District’s highway 

program with officials of the District and BPR. Bringing important highway projects to “a 

complete halt is a serious mistake.” Highways and rapid transit were both needed to meet the 

city’s transportation needs. The report traced the history of the Interstate System to the FederalAid Highway Act of 1944, which authorized designation of the System, and the Federal-Aid 

Highway Act of 1956 which authorized funds to build the network around the country, including 

in the District.

For FY 1959 through FY 1963, Congress had appropriated funds for the Potomac River Freeway 

totaling over $17 million. “Additional obligations in the sum of $11 million are imminent.” In 

FYs 1962 and 1963, Congress appropriated funds for the design and partial construction of the 

Three Sisters Bridge. “These two projects are not in the embryonic stage.” Further, they were 

consistent with the national program “and have been reviewed repeatedly by the Congress. “The 

District now has $330,000 available for the Three Sisters Bridge and $1,248,000 is remaining 

available from prior year appropriations for the Potomac River Freeway.” 
In addition, the committee’s bill appropriated $900,000 for the North Leg in FY 1964. The 

section concluded: 

The Three Sisters Bridge, Potomac River Freeway and North Leg of the Inner Loop 

should proceed without further delay. 

The committee recommended appropriations for the North Leg (Center Leg to Northeast 

Freeway, $900,000), the East Leg ($450,000), 11th Street Bridge and approaches ($400,000), the 

Center Leg ($1,294,000), and the Northeast Freeway ($903,000). It did not appropriate funds for 

interchange “C,” with the city’s consent, because it had funds from previous appropriations that 

were sufficient for needs in 1964. [District of Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1964, Report to 

Accompany H.R. 7431, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 88th

Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 499, July 8, 1963, pages 2-3, 11] 

The House considered the bill on July 11. In introducing the measure, Chairman Natcher 

discussed the many aspects of District activities the bill covered. When he came to the freeway 

controversy, he expanded on the report language. With many other controversial issues to be 

debated on funding for schools, welfare, and other aspects of the District, the freeway portion of 

the appropriation bill did not generate debate. 

Nevertheless, several members of the subcommittee commented on the freeways. Representative 

Giaimo, saying that he was new to the committee, told his colleagues that he was not opposed to 

a rapid transit system for the District. “I am, however, opposed to a philosophy that says that 

rapid transit should and could exist without highways.” He had cosponsored legislation in 

support of rapid transit, including a bill that would establish a rapid transit system linking the 

eight States in the northeastern megalopolis. “But never did I anticipate that such a system 

would preclude the use of highways.” 

Of the projects that President Kennedy had asked the city to reexamine, he said, “it would be 

extremely damaging and wasteful to abandon these projects.” These projects could be completed 

in 4 years while the rapid transit system was, according to some estimates he had heard, as much 

as 10 years off. The transit system would undoubtedly have an effect on the highway planning 

that would be conducted after it was built. “But this does not mean that the construction of a 

rapid transit system precludes any highway program whatsoever.” He added:

In the event that Congress authorizes a rapid transit system for the District of Columbia, I 

have little doubt that it will receive sympathetic attention from our committee. Until such 

time, however, I would like to echo the feeling that the projects presently underway 

should be completed. [District of Columbia Appropriation Bill, Congressional RecordHouse, July 11, 1963, pages 12453-12454] 

Representative Finnegan told his colleagues that President Kennedy, “on advice that we members 

of the Committee considered to be in error,” had delayed several projects for reexamination until 

the NCTA plan “could be further implemented.” The District commissioners, Administrator 

Whitton, and the subcommittee supported continuing these projects, “not, of course, to the 

exclusion of any transit plans.” Both highways and transit were the answer to the District’s 
transportation problems, but rapid transit would not be completed for 10 years. Therefore, he 

“unequivocally” recommended construction of the Three Sisters Bridge, Potomac River Freeway, 

and North Leg. The first two projects did not need funds at this time, but he supported the 

$900,000 in the bill for the North Leg. He hoped “all proceed with such speed as is proper.” 

[pages 12454-12455] 

Representative Baldwin also expressed his views. He referenced the Subcommittee on Roads 

hearings that had been completed the day before. His colleagues, he thought, would like to think 

that Washington was leading the Nation in the construction of Interstate highways through 

metropolitan areas. “Unfortunately, this is not the case.” On the contrary, the Roads 

Subcommittee’s hearings demonstrated that:

. . . the Washington situation was a sea of confusion and when we got into the meat of it, 

to find out why this sea of confusion existed, we found despite the recommendations in 

1959 of every responsible planning agency in Washington, D.C. . . . that the 

recommendation of one agency which has come into the picture in the last few months, 

for all practical purposes had brought the Federal interstate highway program in the 

Washington area to a standstill.

All other responsible agencies and officials who testified, he said, “were united that this program 

must go forward.” 

Representative Baldwin explained his concern that the taxpayers of the District and the 

surrounding area were not getting the highways their highway user taxes were intended to 

provide. “The reason they are not getting them is primarily because of the obstructiveness of the 

National Capital Transportation Agency.” This blockage must be broken. Everyone in the 

country was receiving the benefits of the Interstate System they were paying for, except for 

District residents who were “being penalized by a theory that apparently the National Capital 

Transportation Agency has that if they can bar any improvement in the highway system in the 

Washington, D.C., area, they can force sufficient support for a mass transit program.” 

If NCTA thought that obstructing a program Congress overwhelmingly supported was how to 

gain support for rapid transit, its officials were going to “find that some of us who would 

otherwise support it will probably oppose it until the NCTA withdraws its opposition to 

completion of the program for Federal interstate highway construction in the Washington area as 

contemplated when we enacted the Highway Act of 1956.” [pages 12455-12456] 

The House approved the bill on a voice vote, forwarding it to the Senate for consideration. 
Senate Considers the Appropriation Act, 1964 

On September 23, the District Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations began 

hearings on the District’s FY 1964 budget. City agencies testified about the usual wide range of 

city business, including the Department of Highways and Traffic. The department’s tables 

showed that the House bill had approved all requested funds for freeway projects except the 

$330,000 requested for interchange “C.” Neither the Senators nor the District officials discussed 

the freeway issues beyond a brief reference by city officials. [District of Columbia 

Appropriations for 1964, Hearings on H.R. 7431 before the Subcommittee of the Committee on 

Appropriations, United States Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session, pages 20, 31] 

On September 25, Senator Byrd opened the subcommittee’s public hearing on the District’s 

appropriations bill for FY 1964. Over 150 witnesses and spectators filled the hearing room. Of 

course, they were interested in a variety of subjects, but several wanted to talk about the freeway 

controversy. For example, Polly Shackleton expressed her concern about the relocation of 

District residents. She favored a central relocation service. “Urgent efforts by public agencies 

and private groups already are underway to increase the supply of much needed low- and middleincome housing.” She was “particularly gratified” by President Kennedy’s decision to order a 

restudy of the social, economic, and esthetic impacts of the North Leg, Three Sisters Bridge, and 

Potomac River Freeway.

She was hopeful that officials could find a way to “largely eliminate or at least minimize the loss 

of homes and destruction of neighborhoods and community facilities.” Along those lines, she 

favored the Center Leg in general, but was not satisfied with the proposed route that resulted in 

the “entirely unnecessary destruction of homes and church and neighborhood facilities.” 

[pages 793-794] 

Similarly, Grosvenor Chapman, chairman of the Transportation Committee of the Washington 

Planning and Housing Association, testified that his group did not question parts of the Inner 

Loop, but had serious questions about the need for the North Leg, Potomac River Freeway, and 

Three Sisters Bridge. “We believe that construction of these facilities to interstate standards 

would result not only in a waste of public funds but also in the destruction of properties, 

neighborhoods, and scenic and traditional values of uncountable value.” [page 798] 

Several witnesses spoke in favor of the freeways. Harold Wirth of Firestone Tire and Rubber 

Company appeared on behalf of the Washington Representatives of Rubber and Tire 

Manufacturers:

Gentlemen, we should honestly face up to the urgent requirements of this situation from 

the viewpoint of the harassed motorists in the northwest quadrant of our metropolitan 

area. My own humble experience is merely one [that is] similar to thousands upon 

thousands of motorists who must traverse this quadrant daily on their way to and from 

their homes and offices. 

In response to a question, Wirth said he lived in Rock Creek Hills, Montgomery County, and 

worked at 1001 Connecticut Avenue, NW. Since moving to the Washington area in 1938, he 
found that traffic had grown, but “not one thing has been done to ease traffic congestion and its 

accompanying driving hazards during these past 24 years, with the exception of allowing 

Wisconsin and Connecticut Avenues to carry four lanes in place of three going north in the 

afternoon.” They both were, he said, “death highways.” 

In his view, the Three Sisters Bridge and Potomac River Parkway were “the most important part 

of the entire freeway system”:

It should be built first before any other portions of the inner loop in view of the 

tremendous congestion existing in this northwest area caused by constant postponement 

of relief freeway construction . . . . 

The early approval of the appropriation for the Three Sisters Bridge would assist in easing 

some of our congestion by permitting motorists from the western, middle, and northern 

areas of Montgomery County now crowding the only remaining streets [that] they can use 

to come into town, to approach the District through the George Washington Memorial 

Parkway now under construction on the east side of the Potomac River. 

The east-side parkway, to be located entirely in Maryland, could not link with downtown 

Washington until the Potomac River Freeway was completed, “and this freeway cannot be 

completed until our highway engineers know where they may cross the river.” This relief was 

urgently needed. “Senator, it is all well and good to talk about esthetics and beauty, but when we 

have human lives at stake we should forget the beauty and get down to basic facts.” [pages 789-

792] 

AAA’s Miller testified about the “urgent need” for the Three Sisters Bridge. He described 

Virginia’s plans for I-66 and I-266, with eight-lane I-66 crossing into the District on the six-lane 

Theodore Roosevelt Bridge, which is restricted to passenger vehicles. He said, “Unless the 

Three Sisters Bridge is built to accommodate trucks, and the additional two lanes of vehicular 

traffic, there will be a traffic jam of collosal [sic] dimensions at the approaches to the Roosevelt 

Memorial bridge.” Trucks would have to cross at the 14th Street Bridge. “So far as the Key 

Bridge is concerned it is presently loaded to capacity and is not capable of handling the 

additional traffic which will be approaching on Route 66.” 

Miller supported the entire proposed Interstate System. “The freeway system in the National 

Capital region is one entity and you cannot remove sections of it, as the NCTA is recommending, 

and still have an integrated system.” Without the Three Sisters Bridge and with the North Leg 

reduced to a “junior freeway,” as NCTA recommended, BPR might not be able to provide the 

full 90-percent Interstate funding promised for the full network. 

He emphasized that AAA did not oppose the rapid transit system; if Congress decided to 

appropriate funds for its construction, “we will raise no objection.” However, AAA favored the 

full system the Mass Transportation Survey identified in 1959, including its transit component. 

AAA had “tried desperately” to avoid the conflict between highway and rail transit proponents. 

The association had urged NCTA to limit its recommendations to transit. “We even took our 
recommendation to Charles A. Horsky, Advisor to the President on National Capital Affairs, but 

all to no avail.” 

Instead, NCTA recommended cutting the highway program “by $600 million, including a 

reduction of 70 miles of freeways,” bringing the highway and rapid transit plans “to a grinding 

halt in the form of a stalemate.” On behalf of the “overwhelming majority of the motoring 

public,” he said: 

It is now quite obvious, as a result of what has transpired during the past 3 months, the 

quickest way to move ahead with all our transportation plans is to get the freeway 

program back on schedule at once . . . . 

We believe that the people have been deliberately misled into believing that the rail rapid 

transit system would do away with the need for any further highway building in the 

District. Gentlemen, this is totally inaccurate. [pages 795-798] 

Director Aitken, Deputy Director Airis, and their colleagues appeared before Senator Byrd’s 

subcommittee on September 28. Aitken summarized projects completed in the past year: 

We have completed Anacostia Freeway from East Capitol Street to Pennsylvania Avenue [and] 

opened to traffic the 12th Street Expressway, from the Southwest Freeway to Constitution 

Avenue. We have opened to traffic the Washington Channel Bridge [and] the Southwest 

Freeway from Washington Channel Bridge to the center leg. This latter section of freeway was 

opened to traffic on August 26, and within 2 days it was carrying approximately 32,000 vehicles 

per day. We expect to complete the freeway between the center leg and South Capitol Street

about May 1964. 

Several projects were underway. The Southeast Freeway from South Capitol Street to Sixth 

Street, SW., was to be completed by June 1965. The city expected to complete the Potomac 

River Freeway from E Street to the K Street interchange in late 1965. The Theodore Roosevelt 

Bridge was to be opened to traffic in early 1964, the 11th Street Bridge (east structure) early in 

1965, the E Street Expressway from 23rd Street to 19th Street in late 1965. 

He told Senator Byrd that the location for the Three Sisters Bridge might be shifted to an 

alternate location. Senator Byrd said that in the previous year, “we marched up this hill in the 

face of considerable fire. Why was it you permitted your troops to go up the hill and get shot 

at?” He was referring to the original location and wondered why talk had emerged of moving the 

bridge. Aitken, saying he did not want to argue with the Senator, explained that if the bridge 

could be built somewhere else, the city had to consider it. Perhaps a bridge at another location 

would provide better service for the area. 

The city had requested funds for engineering and right-of-way for the East Leg along the western 

bank of the Anacostia River. Aitken said the Center Leg was the “next major project,” extending 

from the interchange near 2nd and D Streets, SW., northerly to a connection with the North Leg. 

The city also wanted funds for engineering and right-of-way for the Northeast Freeway.
Engineer Commissioner Duke, who had been promoted to Brigadier General, joined the panel to 

discuss the newly formed Policy Advisory Committee. President Kennedy’s advisor, Charles 

Horsky, had recommended formation of the committee to coordinate the reexamination of the 

Three Sisters Bridge and North Leg. The committee held its first working session on July 19. It 

included: 

• C. Darwin Stolzenbach, NCTA Administrator; 

• David E. Finley, chairman, Commission of Fine Arts; 

• Mrs. James H. Rowe, chairman, NCPC; 

• Conrad L. Wirth, Director, NPS; 

• Colonel Charles Duke, District Engineer Commissioner;

• Rex Whitton, Federal Highway Administrator; and

• John Kohl, Assistant Administrator for Transportation, Housing and Home Finance 

Agency.

The committee designated Duke to be coordinator. 

The committee, after a 2-hour organizational meeting, issued a statement saying the members 

“agreed to adopt objective re-examination procedures to insure results which would command 

general support.” The statement added that the members agreed to “accept the responsibility to 

support the subsequent task of designing transportation facilities which would evolve from the 

re-examination.” As the Star pointed out, four of the seven members “previously have opposed 

building the two projects.” The committee had not decided whether to hire an outside consultant 

to conduct the study, as the District had planned to do. [“Policy Advisers Named On Highway 

Restudy,” The Evening Star, July 20, 1963; “Group Set Up to Advise City on Freeway Plans,” 

The Washington Post and Times Herald, July 20, 1963] 

General Duke told the subcommittee:

We have held several meetings to date and at the moment we are involved in two 

simultaneous studies, one having to do with the possibility of relocating the Three Sisters 

Bridge. This is postponing, in effect, the discussion or consideration of the requirement 

for the bridge because we feel that, to a certain degree, the requirement would be tied in 

to the decision on the north leg itself. But we recognize full well that considerations 

other than strictly engineering considerations play a vital role in the decision on this 

project and . . . two alternate sites are being considered in an endeavor to try to resolve 

what one might call the other-than-engineering considerations. 

As for the North Leg, the committee was considering proposals that fell into three categories:

At one end of the spectrum, having to do with the class of project that would carry the 

most traffic, we are considering eight-lane freeways—two different proposals, in fact. 

One has a minimum of right-of-way taking, and the other what the planners consider to be 

an “optimum” taking of right-of-way. This would be an eight-lane freeway and would 

have a sizable capacity for handling traffic.
At the other end of the spectrum we are considering a couple of proposals having to do 

with advancement of one-way streets only, with grade separations at various streets to 

enhance the carrying capacity as much as possible . . . .

Then in the middle, which amounts to somewhat of a compromise between these two 

solutions, the Committee is reviewing a proposal which has to do with the separation of 

the two types of traffic involved. The through traffic would be passed underneath the 

streets in a tunnel-type arrangement and the local traffic would be carried above the 

tunnel in a one-way street with controlled lighting. This would separate the local traffic, 

in other words, from the route traffic [sic]. 

Based on the Policy Advisory Committee review, the Board of Commissioners intended to send 

its report to President Kennedy by the end of December 1963. 

Senator Byrd recalled that in 1962, the District was lagging behind the rest of the country in 

completion of its Interstate network. He asked about progress since then. Aitken replied: 

I will comment on it but I do not like to, because I have to admit that whether it is my 

fault or someone else’s, we are further behind now than we were a year ago.

Based on the latest ICE, “we have roughly 6 years to carry out roughly two-thirds of our 

program.” He added, “It is going to be a very difficult picture and a difficult program because 

there are practical limitations on how much work you can do.” [part 3, pages 2462-2496] 

On November 6, the Committee on Appropriations completed work on its District of Columbia 

Appropriation Bill, 1964. The committee’s report did not discuss the freeway issues, but did 

include a chart indicating that appropriations for the freeways were the same as in the approved 

House bill. [District of Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1964, Committee on Appropriations, 

United States Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 632 to accompany H.R. 7431, 

November6, 1963, page 20] 

The Senate approved the bill on November 19, 42 to 35. During the debate on the bill, Senators 

were primarily concerned about schools and Federal public welfare aid, not freeways or transit. 

These other issues would delay the conference committee’s agreement on a unified bill. The 

conferees continued to meet through mid-December even as the country adjusted to the 

November 22 assassination of President Kennedy and the transition to President Lyndon B. 

Johnson. Finally, on December 17, conferees resolved differences on the hiring of additional 

teachers and welfare workers.

On December 18, the House considered the conference committee report. Chairman Natcher, in 

summarizing the final bill discussed the rivalry between advocates of highways and rapid transit 

(“Rivalry between these two groups is dangerous and certainly not in the best interest of our 

Capital City.”), but the House approved the bill without debate. The Senate also approved the 

bill on December 18 without discussion of the freeway controversies. [District of Columbia 

Appropriation Bill, Congressional Record-House, December 18, 1963, pages 24905-24910; 
District of Columbia Appropriation Bill, 1964—Conference Report, Congressional RecordSenate, December 18, 1963, pages 24999-25003] 

President Johnson approved the legislation on December 30, 1963 (Public Law 88-252). 

Waiting For Hearings on NCTA’s Transit Plan 

While officials debated the freeway network for the Washington area, NCTA and transit 

advocates were trying to secure congressional support for the plan. On January 11, 1963, NCTA 

released a 124-page appendix on System Planning. 

NCTA estimated that during peak periods Monday through Friday in 1980, 19,600 vehicles an 

hour, at most, would want to cross the four Potomac River bridges (14th Street, Arlington 

Memorial, Theodore Roosevelt, and Key), which collectively would have a capacity of 21, 500 

vehicles. “This means that central area bridge capacity will exceed demand by nearly 10 per 

cent, even without the Three Sisters Bridge.” If the forecast was wrong, additional capacity 

could be provided by building ramps connecting the Key Bridge with the George Washington 

Memorial Parkway in Virginia and the Palisades Parkway and Canal Road in the District. These 

changes would increase the bridge’s capacity by 40 percent. The Three Sisters Bridge would be 

redundant. 

As pressure had grown around the country for increased rapid transit, Washington officials tried 

to divert metropolitan areas from considering expensive fixed-rail or subway systems to 

developing less expensive express bus systems. The White House had made the suggestion for 

the Washington area in the fall of 1962, but NCTA’s November 1962 report had rejected the idea 

in only one paragraph. 

Now, in an appendix, NCTA explained why an express bus system would be impractical. Buses 

operating on city streets would be caught in the same congestion as the automobiles, possibly 

even making it worse because of stops. A subway for express buses would cost $4.5 million 

more than a rail subway because of additional ventilation that would be needed. Finally, NCTA 

argued that an express bus system would be subject to weather. “During a recent blizzard in 

Cleveland, rail operations had a single two-hour delay; bus operations of the same transit 

company remained chaotic for a week.” The report stated:

In sum increasing bus-subway capacity either by adding tunnel lanes or by widening 

stations would add substantially to the cost of a system that even without these changes 

would cost more than rail transit.

No one has ever operated a comprehensive express bus system, let alone a comprehensive 

bus subway system. It has to be established that a bus-subway system could be scheduled 

and operated in a fashion that would attract a large volume of patronage. 

Skeptics had questioned NCTA’s expectation that a rapid rail system would operate at a profit. 

The new report predicted that the rail system would lose money for 5 years, but would be net 

profitable due to increased patronage. By 1980, fares would bring in $79.2 million, while 

another $4.8 million would be raised from advertisements, vendors, and other sources. With 
deductions for subsidies to feeder bus operators ($7.5 million), and depreciation ($5.2), the 

system would have a net income of $43.4 million. 

The report also summarized NCTA’s views on the District’s remaining freeway network. The 

East Leg, the report explained, was not needed and would be disruptive of homes and families, 

especially in the 11th Street corridor where District officials planned to build it. NCTA 

recommended a route that crossed the Anacostia River on the 11th Street Bridge and continued 

north on the east side of the river via the Anacostia Freeway and Kenilworth Avenue, both of 

which would be widened. 

As for the District’s consideration of running the East Leg on the west side of the river, NCTA 

pointed out that “much of the traffic that would use an eastern bypass originates or terminates in 

Washington and Montgomery County, on one hand, and southern Prince Georges on the other.” 

Under NCTA’s proposal, this bypass traffic would not have to cross the river on the crowded 

bridges in the 11th Street area. Putting the East Leg on the west bank would “encourage portions 

of such traffic to cross to the west, thereby further crowding these bridges.” 

The District initially had proposed extending I-70S in the Wisconsin Avenue corridor, but in 

1959 had changed preferences to the North Central corridor for I-70S along Florida Avenue 

between Pennsylvania Avenue and 1st Street, NW. The Montgomery County traffic that would 

have used I-70S in the Wisconsin Avenue corridor would instead use a parkway/freeway 

combination along the Potomac River. NCTA proposed to replace the city’s planned eight-lane 

North Leg Freeway with a four-lane “express street system” in the Wisconsin Avenue corridor. 

The system would include grade separations at major intersections on Wisconsin Avenue or a 

parallel street. “The route would be designed for higher capacity at the points where it joins the 

freeway system and where traffic will be heavier.”

The express street system could carry 3,000 vehicles an hour, but NCTA projected actual traffic 

in 1980 as between 2,500 and 3,000 vehicles an hour. The expanded western end, moreover, 

could carry 3,600 vehicles an hour 

With construction of the express street system, NCTA concluded that a freeway in the North 

Central corridor as proposed by the District was not needed. Much of the traffic expected to use 

the North-Central Freeway would instead use the express street system in the Wisconsin Avenue 

corridor or the routes along the Potomac River. Eventually, a depressed four-lane facility would 

be needed in the North Leg corridor. However, this facility was not planned for construction for 

several years; planners did not have decide on it now. 

NCTA had compared its projected highway system with a mathematical model to predict transit 

use:

The recommended highway system, together with the refined rapid transit system, will 

permit motorists to travel even in the peak hours at speeds substantially greater than is 

possible on today’s congested highways . . . . 
What the results showed was that—given the agency’s recommended transportation 

system—1977 peak-hour speeds would be 30 per cent faster than 1959 speeds. [Clopton, 

“NCTA Plan Is Defended In Report,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, January 

12, 1963; Flor, Lee, “NCTA Explains Alternative of Express Buses,” The Evening Star, 

January 12, 1963; “Transport Agency Would Separate Traffic at Wisconsin Crossings,” 

The Evening Star, January 12, 1963] 

On January 25, the Prince George’s County Commissioners sent a telegram to Stolzenbach 

letting him know they approved NCTA’s $793-million rail rapid transit system “in principle.” 

The commissioners joined Fairfax and Arlington Counties in Virginia in support of the plan. 

The District, Montgomery County in Maryland, and Alexandria in Virginia had not taken a 

formal position. [Clopton, William, “Prince Georges Backs Plan for Rapid Transit,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, January 26, 1963] 

As explained earlier, the District and Montgomery County would express many reservations 

about NCTA’s plan. On March 28, the District Commissioners’ Planning Advisory Council 

called for progress to complete the Inner Loop and the proposed subway. The council, which the 

commissioners had reactivated in 1957 to advise them on planning matters, said construction of 

the downtown subway should begin immediately. “Feeder lines using existing rail lines, should 

be fed into this inner loop as early as possible. Further study can then be made of the 

controversial sections of the subway system.” The council’s head, Frank Wolfsheim, said: 

Considerable doubt has been thrown on the accuracy of some of the cost and revenue 

figures of the NCTA report. These doubts should be cleared up before final authorization 

of construction funds is made by Congress. 

In addition, the council recommended construction of the Three Sisters Bridge and Potomac 

River Freeway “at the earliest possible date.” [“Early Start On Transit Plan Urged,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, March 29, 1963; “Speed in Building Urged for Road and 

Rail Transit,” The Evening Star, March 28, 1963] 

A month before President Kennedy released his recommendations, the Department of the 

Treasury sent an advisory letter to the Bureau of the Budget on April 16 indicating that it should 

not make direct loans to NCTA. Treasury might be willing to make loans to the District 

government or guarantee bonds sold to the public to pay for the rail network, but direct loans to 

NCTA would set a dangerous precedent for the Federal role in transit systems in other cities. 

Even a loan to the District was problematic because such loans ordinarily go to the agency with 

sufficient taxing power to “stand in front of the Federal guarantee.” The special situation in the 

District “may warrant waiver of this requirement,” but only if it did not set a precedent:

Some extraordinary handling of the National Capital area mass transportation system is 

warranted by the peculiar status of the area relative to the Federal government. Such 

special treatment, however, should be provided in a form that will not place the Federal 

government in an untenable position in regard to the overall mass transportation program. 
The other issue was whether the District, if it borrowed the funds from the Treasury at interest, 

would be willing to pass the funds on to NCTA. General Clarke told reporters the 

commissioners “do not know enough about the import of this to be able to comment.” 

The Treasury Department’s decision would increase the cost of the rail rapid transit plan by as 

much as $135 million. NCTA had expected to receive loans at 4-percent interest, along with 

guaranteed loans from private investors at 4.5 percent. If the entire amount had to come from 

private investors at 4.5 percent interest, the total cost would be $911 million instead of $776 

million. [Clopton, Willard, “Treasury Dashes Hopes For Transit Loans Here,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, April 17, 1963; Doolittle, Jerry, “Estimated Cost Of Subway Up By 

$135 Million,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, April 22, 1963] 

As discussed earlier, President Kennedy announced his decisions regarding the Washington area 

transportation network on May 27, 1963, and sent a bill to Capitol Hill for “prompt and 

favorable” action. The President’s letter was consistent with the Treasury Department’s decision 

in relying on private investors. The three-page bill, which Representative Broyhill introduced as 

H.R. 6633, did not address financing issues. 

Except for the financing issue, President Kennedy had given NCTA and Stolzenbach virtually 

everything requested. As noted earlier, Stolzenbach was optimistic that construction could begin 

in 1964. 

While waiting for the hearings, officials and organizations announced their views. On June 3, 

the National Capital Regional Planning Council, after an intense 3-hour discussion, reversed its 

support of the 1959 plan to endorse rapid transit and a downtown subway. The council’s 

resolution was carefully worded in view of the divided views of the representatives of area 

jurisdictions. It did not endorse “rail,” which meant its resolution could refer to express buses 

rather than a rail network. The resolution had been drafted in part by Mrs. Rowe who, according 

to Lee Flor, was “an ardent rail transit supporter who has become known for her opposition to 

freeways.” The resolution did not mention highways. [Flor, Lee, “Planning Council Backs 

Downtown Subway Plan,” The Evening Star, June 4, 1963] 

The Fine Arts Commission praised President Kennedy on June 18 for his “leadership . . . in 

requesting the Congress for authorization to proceed with plans for the rapid transit program 

formulated by the National Capital Transportation Agency.” The system was “urgently needed to 

prevent further seizure of parklands for highways.” The resolution, approved unanimously, also 

said the rail transit system would “curb the proliferation of car parking lots in important areas to 

the detriment of the appearance of the city.” [Lewis, Robert J., “President Wins Praise For 

Supporting Subway,” The Evening Star, June 18, 1963] 

On July 3, Senator Byrd took a 2-hour tour of the sites of the new and proposed highways and 

bridges in the District, including the Three Sisters Bridge, the Potomac River Freeway, the 

Theodore Roosevelt Bridge, the Washington Channel Bridge, and the interchange, under 

construction, between the Southwest Freeway and the proposed Center Leg of the Inner Loop. 

At the Roosevelt Bridge construction site, he put on a hard hat and climbed up a 30-foot ladder to 

the bridge floor. The Post reported: 
Byrd, a onetime welder . . . showed that he still knew how to work with his hands. After 

a one-minute lesson, he fastened some reinforcing rods together with wire. Could he be 

made into a competent rodman? “Oh, we could do it eventually,” said rodman foreman 

John Casteel.

After the tour, Senator Byrd met with reporters in his office. He said the “consensus in the 

Congress” was that the area needed a rapid transit system as well as the freeway system sought 

by the area’s highway departments. He was concerned about the delay in completing the 

Interstate System in the city. “I don’t see why [the Interstate System] should stop here in the 

District of Columbia.” He thought the Three Sisters Bridge was the best approach to improved 

trans-Potomac travel while the Potomac River Freeway and North Leg were essential. (Aitken 

had told him that not building the North Leg would be “like having half a wheel on a vehicle.”) 

He also was concerned that J. George Stewart, the Architect of the Capitol, had not issued a 

permit for construction of the Center Leg under the Capitol grounds. Aiken had told the Senator 

that after 6 years of negotiations, Stewart had still not issued the permit. Senator Byrd said he 

might summon Stewart to the hearing “so that we can go into the matter with him.” 

Senator Byrd also was concerned that the study requested by the President had not yet begun. “I 

certainly hope this reexamination and decisions are reached with reasonable dispatch.” It should 

be started as soon as possible so that “we can find out where we are going with our freeways.” 

[Mintz, Morton, “Both Freeways, Transit Needed Here, Byrd Says,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, July 4, 1963; Flor, Lee, “Road, Rail Backing Seen in Congress,” The Evening 

Star, July 4, 1963]

Transit Program for the Capital Region 

On July 9, 1963, Chairman Whitener of the District Subcommittee opened hearings titled 

“Transit Program for the National Capital Region.” Stolzenbach was the first witness, but before 

his presentation, Representative Broyhill wanted to introduce a prepared statement and raise 

some questions he wanted the NCTA Administrator to address. The brief statement indicated, “I 

recognize a definite need for a rapid transit system for this area,” but also was convinced “that no 

such system will eliminate the need for an expanded highway system to service the region, 

particularly for through traffic.”

Representative Broyhill recalled the history behind the National Capital Transportation Act of 

1960. The Mass Transportation Survey had indicated a need for a transit system to complement 

the highway system. That was why Congress created NCTA. The purpose was to create an 

agency “to develop a program, study the financial feasibility of a mass transit system, and then to 

come back to Congress and get the authority to go ahead with it.” Not much was said during the 

Joint Committee’s hearings and deliberations about the new agency conducting a new study of 

the needed highway facilities. The survey had already projected the highway and bridge system 

needed:

So it comes as somewhat of a surprise, and to a degree a disappointment to some, that one 

of the major points in your recommendations is the holdup or postponement or delay or 
abandonment of some of the highway projects. Many of the people in the area feel that 

we are going to need all of the highway freeway projects that are in the pipeline right now 

before we come to any real solution to our problems here. What we are doing here now is 

just delaying something that is inevitable.

The District was not taking advantage of the 90-10 Federal program for constructing the 

Interstate System, and the city’s delay was affecting the ability of Maryland and Virginia to use 

their funds to the best effect. Given the need for the “up-to-date highway and freeway program,” 

he would “like to have that point developed quite extensively during your statement, Mr. 

Stolzenbach, as to why we need to hold up on these highway programs which have been 

approved and are in the pipeline.” He also hoped that nothing in the committee’s proceedings 

would indicate support for the delay resulting from NCTA’s report. 

He complimented NCTA for calling for a $60 million contribution from the local jurisdictions. 

“I do not believe we have much chance of getting this program approved by the Congress unless 

there is some willingness on the part of the local community to pay a portion of the cost.” He 

wanted Stolzenbach to address whether the local communities have indicated support for their 

participation in the cost. In view of the questions about ridership, Representative Broyhill 

thought that local contributions would result in more participation by the riding public. 

His third point was “the most serious one.” He wanted to know if NCTA had “taken full 

cognizance in their study and in their recommendations of all of the existing transportation 

facilities, such as the existing rail lines, but more important, the existing transportation system.” 

During deliberations on the 1960 Act, he said: 

The committee expressed deep and grave concern as to whether the creation of any mass 

transit system would destroy or injure private enterprise, and the committee did express 

its intention, its desire, its determination to see that these privately owned and operated 

transportation companies were not injured and certainly not destroyed, but, on the 

contrary, took the view that these privately owned transportation companies should be 

exploited, expanded, and improved as a part of an overall improvement of transportation 

services here in the metropolitan area.

Chairman Whitener, in something of a rebuke, pointed out to Representative Broyhill that 

NCTA’s report of November 1, 1962, had addressed the issue of existing mass transportation 

facilities in chapter 2 and also went into the highway situation: 

I would hope that in the hearings that we can approach this matter as a serious study of 

the need for a rapid transit facility in the District of Columbia and in the metropolitan 

area, and not as a battle between advocates of one form of transportation and advocates of 

another. 

Some, he said, thought the Whitener subcommittee “was opposed to the highway program. Of 

course, there is no basis for that allegation.” He made his view “as one member of the 

committee” clear:
I am not in favor of a highway program or any other program which would uproot 

thousands of people from their residences without some plan to relocate those people. I 

think it is one of the bigger problems here in the District of Columbia. It is nice to be 

able to bring folks in from outside of Washington on highways, but I think it is even nicer 

to have places for people who are living in the District of Columbia to go to bed at night. 

He added that someone from Washington had been calling people in his North Carolina district 

and providing “completely erroneous information as to the purpose of these hearings.” As far as 

he was concerned, “anyone who has any views on this matter can set them forth here in the 

record and give their testimony.” [Transit Program for the National Capital Region, Hearings 

before Subcommittee No. 6 of the Committee on the District of Columbia, U.S. House of 

Representatives, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963, pages 9-13] 

The chairman did not speculate on who was calling his constituents, but the Post and Star 

speculated that he was referring to pro-highway lobbies. 

Stolzenbach said he wanted to explain how NCTA had carried out its mission under the 1960 Act 

and to seek favorable congressional action on the President’s bill seeking authority for NCTA to 

begin construction of the proposed rapid transit system. “The Agency’s recommendations with 

respect to highways have been taken under advisement by the President and the other agencies 

concerned and the bills presently before this committee do not concern these recommendations.” 

He summarized the first stage of NCTA’s review, namely “forecasts of future travel within the 

region.” He told the subcommittee: 

The key conclusion of the Agency’s traffic analysis is that without a rapid transit system, 

and even assuming a highway system larger than that proposed by the District 

Commissioners, congestion will increase. But with a rapid transit system, and vigorous 

freeway program, not only can we accommodate the additional traffic that will develop, 

we can substantially improve today’s conditions and give the city a real measure of relief.

The NCTA proposal embodied in the White House bill, would create “a truly regional mass 

transportation system consisting of more than 80 miles of rapid transit service, an additional 15 

miles of commuter railroad service, and over 50 miles of express bus service on freeways.” 

He emphasized that in developing the proposal, he, Deputy Administrator Quenstedt, and their 

staff had held “countless meetings” with the public, private organizations, and “a wide variety of 

other agencies and governmental bodies,” as directed by Section 204(g) of the 1960 Act. 

The legislation also had directed NCTA to study a subway from Union Station capable of 

dispersing passengers “to the principal employment centers of the District of Columbia and its 

immediate environs.” NCTA “literally examined dozens” of plans and settled on “the one that 

we decided was the best one.” He displayed a map showing the expected concentration of 

employment centers in 1980. On a second map he highlighted the downtown subway system, 

with its 15 stations that he said were “so located as to bring 80 percent of the prospective 

downtown employees to within a 5-minute walking distance of their offices, and that some 92 
percent will be within an 8-minute walk of their office . . . .” The system also would be “an 

efficient economical means of bringing shoppers into town during the middle of the day,” as well 

as “a means of internal circulation within the downtown area that will greatly relieve the 

congestion we now find on downtown streets all during the day.” 

The 1960 Act also called on NCTA to design a downtown subway that could be extended to 

serve other parts of the region. Using space already dedicated to transportation service would 

minimize disruption to the community as would avoiding residential areas: 

The program before you involves no defacing of the city, little interference with the life 

and homes of our people, and, at the same time, provides the city and the region with a 

system capable of handling the traffic volumes expected in 1980 and beyond. 

In planning the system’s eight transit radials, “the Agency closely adhered to the congressional 

requirement that railroad and highway rights-of-way be used wherever possible.” Six used 

railroad or highway rights-of-way. As a result, the proposed transit system would provide 

areawide coverage “while at the same time minimizing construction costs.” He identified the 

radials in clockwise order:

• The line from Rockville to downtown “utilizing the right-of-way of the Baltimore & Ohio 

Railroad.” The trains “would, without interruption, stopping at Union Station, go right on 

through into the downtown distribution system.” 

• To serve the northeast, NCTA proposed a rapid transit line in the median strip of 

proposed I-95. “This line would merge with the B. & O. line” before going into the 

downtown distributor. 

• Continuing to the east, NCTA proposed to establish a commuter railroad along the 

Pennsylvania Railroad’s main line from as far as Bowie, Maryland. “Trains on this line 

would come into Union Station where the people could get off and by an over-theplatform transfer board the subway system and thereby get anywhere in the downtown 

area.” 

• In the southeast, NCTA would place a rapid transit line in the median strip of the 

proposed expressway going to the Henson Creek area of Prince George’s County. 

• For the southwest, NCTA would place a line in the right-of-way of the RichmondFredericksburg & Potomac Railroad “from Springfield into Alexandria, serving the city 

of Alexandria, serving Pentagon City, a large office building and apartment development 

complex now going up there, serving the Pentagon, going under the river and into the 

downtown subway distribution system.” 

• A rapid transit line to the west would run in the median of I-66 serving Arlington and 

Fairfax Counties. It, too, would connect with the subway distribution system by crossing 

the Potomac River in a tunnel. 

• NCTA could not find an existing right-of-way in northwest, but proposed a subway line 

“going out Connecticut Avenue, eventually over to Wisconsin and out through the 

Bethesda business district past NIH [National Institutes of Health] to Pooks Hill.” The 

subway would be carried at least to Tenley Circle. 
• Finally, NCTA proposed another subway line that “originates in the vicinity of Quincy 

Street and Georgia Avenue, and joins this Northwest route near Florida Avenue and 19th

Street, bringing people here into the downtown distribution system.” 

He added:

In addition, the dotted lines on the map show the various locations of the 50 miles of 

express bus service . . . . We propose express bus service running on the George 

Washington Memorial Parkway from Cabin John in Montgomery County, Md., direct to 

downtown Washington. 

The rapid transit line on Route 95, would be served by express buses operating on the 

highway between the transit terminal and points further out. 

In the southeast, express bus service on the existing Suitland Parkway, and on the 

Anacostia Freeway, would bring passengers into the rail rapid transit line serving that 

sector.

Similarly in the southwest, express bus service on the proposed expanded Shirley 

Highway would bring people to the Pentagon where they could transfer to the downtown 

subway. 

Eventually the program contemplates express bus service on the access road to Dulles 

International Airport. The FAA, incidentally, is interested in the ultimate possibility of 

having a spur of the train line serve the airport, but I think that is some time in the future. 

He summarized:

Here then is an express rapid transit system that truly covers all quadrants of the region, 

and provides far better service for bringing our people into downtown than can be 

accomplished by any other means. 

NCTA’s rapid transit system “represents the most modern, up-to-date system that American 

technology can devise.” The system, in short, “represents as much of an advancement over the 

older subway systems in this country as the Thunderbird does over the model ‘T’ Ford.” The 

system would operate twice as fast as the New York City and Philadelphia systems:

In addition to their high speed, the rapid transit trains will have modern styling, they will 

be air conditioned, seating will be comfortable, and the cars will be attractively appointed 

and well lighted.

Stolzenbach summarized some the advantages of the system within the District. A trip from the 

State Department to Capitol Hill now took 25 minutes; it would take 51⁄2 minutes by subway. 

When the subway was completed, 77 percent of all downtown jobs would be within 5 minutes of 

a station and 90 percent would be within an 8-minute walk. “As a result, the rapid transit system 

will provide excellent service during the off-peak, as well as the peak, hours and it will serve 

throughout the day as a fast means of traveling around the city.” 
Suburban stations had been designed “to provide some 50,000 parking spaces so that a very large 

percentage of the passengers will be able to use their cars to get to the rapid transit lines.” 

Special bays would be made for passengers arriving at the station on feeder buses: 

In short, this is an auto-age rapid transit system designed to provide an attractive 

alternative to driving all the way to town.

In considering cost, Stolzenbach pointed out that the committee creating the 1960 Act “refused to 

accept the proposition that a regional rail rapid transit system here in Washington must be a 

deficit operation. Neither do we.” Nothing was to be gained, he said, by looking at operations in 

other areas, except to use the experience elsewhere to make the Washington system more 

efficient. “We have a new slate to write on,” and NCTA had applied “a hardheaded, businesslike 

manner” to finances:

We have done this, Mr. Chairman, and it is abundantly clear that given the conditions 

now existing in the National Capital region and the dramatic growth expected in the years 

ahead, the transit development program before you today will be largely self-supporting, 

and over a period of some 35 years, will repay all borrowing for capital requirements. 

And not withstanding the comment this conclusion has excited in some quarters, it is not 

concocted of legerdemain and wishful thinking. It is based on the facts. 

The key ingredient for success exists here in Washington, but not in any other rapid 

transit city; namely, a history of realistic, economical transit fares. Unlike these other 

cities, where transit fares have been kept artificially low, with the municipality making up 

the deficits out of general public funds, fares in the Washington area have kept pace with 

the cost of providing transportation service. 

The idea that the transit development program would be “largely self-supporting is the 

cornerstone of the financial plan” NCTA had proposed. The capital outlay of $793 million was 

to be raised “through a combination of private borrowing and Government grants.” NCTA had 

assembled an advisory committee on finance consisting of businessmen from around the country. 

“The recommended plan satisfies all the tests.” It would have “a minimal impact on Federal 

budget expenditures, and calls for equitable participation by the local governments.” 

Stolzenbach agreed with President Kennedy’s observation that establishing an interstate compact 

agency, with its own financing powers, was the appropriate form of organization. Establishing 

the compact was going to be a difficult task “beset with complex constitutional, legal, and 

political considerations.” While negotiations are underway, the President believed, “work on the 

transit development program should go forward vigorously.” If the compact had not been 

approved at the point where private borrowing was necessary, Congress should establish a 

corporation with borrowing authority to carry the program forward. 

During this testimony, Stolzenbach did not address Representative Broyhill’s three questions. 

Committee questioning was postponed to allow out-of-town officials associated with NCTA to 

testify before leaving the area. [pages 13-24] 
Testimony resumed on July 10, with Deputy Administrator Quenstedt and Chief Counsel Seeger 

presenting statements. Quenstedt discussed the schedule for construction of the rapid transit 

segments, while Seeger addressed several issues, including how the proposed network would be 

able to pay for itself out of the farebox. He cited examples from other parts of the country. 

Chicago, Cleveland, and Philadelphia “meet operating expenses plus a share but not all of the 

capital costs.” New York met its operating costs, but made only a “a minor insignificant 

contribution to capital cost.” Boston “doesn’t even meet operating expenses.” Some commuter 

railroads, such as the Long Island Railroad, were profitable, while others lost money. 

The reason the District system could rely on the farebox was that it would charge a zone fare. 

“So the man who is traveling a longer distance, and who costs you more to carry him, pays a 

proportionately larger fare.” By using zone fares, “not only will this system meet its operating 

expenses but it can meet its capital charges as well.”

Representative William H. Harsha (R-Oh.), a longtime highway supporter who also served on the 

Committee on Public Works, interrupted Seeger’s testimony. With the House considering 

national urban mass transportation legislation, already approved by the Senate, at the same time 

as the NCTA bill, he wanted to know if Seeger was saying that the national financing problem 

requiring Federal funds could be “solved by a realistic rate.” 

When Seeger would not go that far, Representative Harsha asked, “if your theory is accurate, it 

would apply in any situation, wouldn’t it, as long as you raised the rate to meet the demand of 

operating costs and capital reduction?” 

Seeger replied, “Yes, I would say yes.”

Representative Harsha concluded, “In other words, we don’t need this [national] mass transit bill 

they are trying to shove down our---“ 

Seeger tried to divert Representative Harsha by explaining that the mass transportation bill 

included a provision for loan guarantees to help cities that wanted to charge higher fares to 

finance their systems out of the fare box. “But I think the administration’s position . . . is that 

what you charge is properly a matter of city policy, and is not to be a matter of Federal policy.” 

Representative Harsha was not convinced. Under Seeger’s theory, “you could finance the bonds 

anywhere in the country,” without Federal assistance.

Allowed to continue his statement, Seeger concluded with a discussion of a survey to measure 

potential ridership. “The final conclusion of the survey was that a potential market as high as 85 

to 90 percent of the downtown employment in Washington exists for rapid transit.” [pages 57-

70] 

Stolzenbach returned to the stand for the question period. Chairman Whitener began by saying 

that based on questions he had received from other Members of Congress, the biggest concern 

about the plan was the cost; “some of them are a little leery about supporting such a system here 

in Washington.” They also thought the two States and local jurisdictions should contribute more 

than presently planned. 
Stolzenbach said the estimated cost was the minimum necessary for a regional rapid transit 

system. The overall cost should be “weighed against the value to the community that is going to 

result.” However, NCTA was not asking for a cash gift from the Federal Government to pay for 

the system. “What we are asking for is underwriting of a project which we are convinced will be 

self-liquidating in the long run.” He added that in deciding on an appropriate State and local 

share, NCTA was using the formula in the Senate-passed national mass transit legislation.

NCTA, Stolzenbach said, had consulted with the governing bodies of regional governments 

about the financing plan. “The invariable response was, ‘Well, that seems reasonable.’” 

Representative Broyhill wanted to know who made these commitments. Stolzenbach was vague, 

referring to elected officials. “It varied.” Since the plans were not yet approved by Congress, the 

officials could not put it before their local bodies for a formal vote. 

Representative Broyhill thought the issue would come up on the floor of the House. He wanted a 

more formal commitment from the suburban communities stating they were ready to participate 

in the cost. Stolzenbach said, “I don’t think these people are in a position to make anything that 

could possibly be considered as a legal commitment at this point.” The NCTA bill had been 

written so that construction would not proceed without the required contribution. “In Virginia, 

for example, we don’t go beyond Pentagon City until they do make a commitment.” 

Chairman Whitener wondered if those communities would be willing to contribute more if the 

feeling in Congress was that they were not doing enough. Stolzenbach thought that when 

communities saw the system in operation, they would be willing to contribute to ensure it 

reached their territory.

The chairman asked for NCTA’s answer to the many concerns raised about the agency’s impact 

on the area’s Interstate network and on networks elsewhere in the country. (As described earlier, 

Chairman Fallon was conducting hearings that were considering this point at the same time as the 

NCTA hearings.) Stolzenbach said NCTA proposed “a tremendous freeway system” for the area, 

with the differences between NCTA and area highway agencies “actually quite small.” The

studies directed by President Kennedy were intended “to resolve some very practical problems of 

seeing just how you can meet the highway requirements in certain sectors of the city, where . . . 

the proposal is to build an interstate freeway of eight lanes, which is going to be very disruptive.” 

Stolzenbach agreed that cities around the country were objecting to freeways:

The desire to have those needs met by alternative means, such as rapid transit is a 

phenomenon that has occurred in many other cities before it ever happened in 

Washington. I am thinking of San Francisco, New York, Boston, and Chicago. 

And I think actually the refusal to go along with certain freeways in the heart of some of 

these other cities is of greater magnitude than anything that we have proposed. 

The highway people in Maryland and Virginia wanted the Interstate network as planned, but 

NCTA felt “under a mandate to evaluate the plan put forth in 1959,” a view that Chairman 

Whitener’s report in 1962 confirmed. NCTA consulted with many highway officials, he said. 
The fact that they may not agree with the recommendations “doesn’t imply any lack of 

cooperation.” 

Chairman Whitener asked about a concern by highway officials around the country that highway 

user revenue would be used to build rapid transit. Stolzenbach replied, “We have never 

entertained such a thought nor in any of our studies, reports or recommendations will you find 

the slightest hint of that idea.

Perhaps mindful of Chairman Natcher’s off-stated concern about cost increases, Chairman 

Whitener asked if “you are confident that this transit system will do better in paying off its bonds 

than the D.C. Stadium has done.” Stolzenbach replied, “Yes.” 

Chairman Whitener asked how NCTA could be so certain that construction of the rapid transit 

system would cause “a minimum of difficulties in the everyday life of the community.” Based 

on soil conditions, NCTA and its consultants had determined that most of the subway 

construction could be accomplished by tunneling “which involves no disruption at the city street 

level except at stations.” Some disruption might occur in a few sections where, due to soil 

conditions, cut-and-cover construction might be best. The disruption, even in those cases, would 

be “minimal.”

Representative Broyhill’s question period was next. He asked about consultation with area 

highway departments. Stolzenbach told him, “we consulted with them to the greatest degree that 

was possible.” Did the District or State highway officials, the Congressman asked, agree with 

NCTA’s recommendations. Stolzenbach replied, “No.” 

Representative Broyhill saw this issue as a problem because those highway agencies had experts 

who had made the technical decisions on which projects to advance, but given the conflict 

between those officials and NCTA, Congress was being asked to do something it was usually 

reluctant to do, namely “sit in judgment between experts on various technical proposals.” He 

was “most reluctant” to hold up freeway projects already approved by engineers, and yet NCTA 

was proposing to delay freeway construction “for quite a number of years,” and that was based on 

the assumption that Congress would complete legislation and that subway construction could 

begin in 1964. “I do regret that you haven’t been able to work out that particular problem and 

have come to this committee with that unresolved.” 

Before Stolzenbach could reply, Representative Harsha had a question about cooperation with 

highway officials. He pointed out the highway officials, including Administrator Whitton, who 

had testified recently before the Subcommittee on Roads, Committee on Public Works, that 

consultation was absent or “silly.” Moreover, the Commerce Department’s formal comments to 

the White House on NCTA’s report said “NCTA failed to cooperate.”

Stolzenbach summarized the consultation efforts, stating that BPR and the three highway 

agencies were fully aware of what NCTA was doing. They all wanted the Interstate System to 

proceed as planned, claiming NCTA did not have authority to review the highway plans. They 

implied, “Just go along with our highway plans and maybe we will go along with your rapid 
transit.” He said that he did not think the 1960 Act “contemplated the requirements that this 

Agency get the agreement of all these highway departments.” 

Chairman Whitener pointed out that President Kennedy, the highest authority of all, had 

reviewed NCTA’s report and gone along with it. Representative Harsha said the President did 

not have the opportunity to review the report as thoroughly as BPR, but the chairman replied, “I 

believe the buck stops right down at the White House, doesn’t it?” 

When Stolzenbach referred to the NCTA study as a “truly joint project” and that the personnel 

borrowed from BPR had contributed to the technical review, Representative Harsha countered 

that, “If it was such a joint project and so well coordinated and cooperation was the utmost, why 

would they [the Commerce Department] come out with a stinging report like this?” Stolzenbach 

answered:

I can only presume they didn’t agree with our conclusions. It was understood in this joint 

project that this Agency has a responsibility for making recommendations. 

Representative Broyhill, whose district included several privately owned commuter bus 

companies, returned to one of the questions he had raised the day before: 

Mr. Broyhill. Did you consult with the operators of privately owned transportation 

companies in coming up with this report? 

Mr. Stolzenbach. We made every effort to, Mr. Broyhill. 

Mr. Broyhill. You made every effort. You mean, they refused to consult with you? 

Mr. Stolzenbach. Yes. 

Mr. Broyhill. The private companies refused to consult with you? 

Mr. Stolzenbach. Yes. 

He clarified that he initiated cordial consultation with D.C. Transit’s Mr. Chalk. In 1961, Chalk 

asked if NCTA would support his concept for a super-rail-transit system from the car barns in 

Georgetown to Dulles International Airport. Stolzenbach said he could not; NCTA had not 

completed its evaluation of the type of system the area needed. Moreover, Chalk did not have 

engineering specifications NCTA could consider. “I am sorry to report that his immediate 

response was, and I quote, ‘This is the end of all cooperation between us. Period.’” 

The area’s other bus companies rejected overtures from NCTA. However, NCTA’s plan was 

based on providing facilities for bus service, such as stations and parking lots, but the bus 

companies would own the buses. 

Representative Broyhill was concerned that the rapid rail lines would “take the cream” of traffic 

and leave the privately owned companies with “the feeder service, that in many instances . . . 

might not be profitable.” 

Seeger responded that NCTA included $7 million a year in its plan “to pay for feeder bus service 

that, in our judgment, would not be profitable, but would be important to the rapid transit 

system.” In addition, the plan included private bus service on trunklines such as the Shirley 

Highway and George Washington Memorial Parkway. 
Representative Broyhill was not completely satisfied that the private companies in northern 

Virginia were being treated fairly, but his question period ended. [pages 72-88] 

Representative Harsha was next. He was not, he said, opposed to NCTA’s rapid rail system, 

which he thought was “certainly needed.” He was less concerned than Representative Broyhill 

about the private commuter bus companies: 

I am sure no one needs to hold their hand. They will look after themselves. I don’t think 

you have to get down on your hands and knees and beg them to meet with you. 

He was, however, vitally concerned about the “curtailment of the highway program.” He said 

that apparently Chairman Whitener and Stolzenbach “think that the last word on what is to be 

done here does rest with the White House.” He asked for Stolzenbach’s reaction to the fact that 

the Appropriations Committee of the House has said, “We must carry the highway program along 

with any and all proposals concerning a rapid transit system,” and have, for 5 consecutive years 

beginning in 1959, appropriated funds for the Potomac River Freeway and the Three Sisters 

Bridge. For FY 1964, the committee included $900,000 for the North leg. “What is your 

reaction to that? Do you care to comment?” 

Stolzenbach began, “May we start backward?” The $900,000 was for the portion of the North 

Leg that was not in dispute. It was what the District wanted, NCTA “went along with” it, and the 

President included it in his budget. “It has never been in dispute at all.” The rest of the North 

Leg, the part in dispute, “hasn’t even been planned.” 

NCTA also did not oppose the Potomac River Freeway: 

The only reason that is being held up is because until you know whether there is going to 

be a Three Sisters Bridge, it affects the design, and they were actually ready to start 

constructing parts of the Potomac River Freeway. That is not in dispute. 

The only thing that is in dispute is one bridge, and the design of a highway corridor 

through the north leg, which was not contemplated to be built for another 6 years. 

Representative Harsha wanted to confirm that NCTA did not object to the Potomac River 

Freeway. “That is right,” Stolzenbach told him. What about the Three Sisters Bridge? 

Stolzenbach replied: 

Our findings show that for a long time to come, even without a rapid transit system, you 

don’t need the Three Sisters Bridge to handle the river traffic, and these are using the 

D.C. Highway Department’s own figures. 

NCTA, he said, was “not fighting this problem.” It was simply one agency of the executive 

branch that had made a recommendation to the White House. 

Representative Harsha turned to a NCTA brochure that referred to Washington as “a model 

area.” Therefore, its mass transportation must be a model system. “The 212 metropolitan areas 

of the country will look upon the National Capital Transportation Agency and its work as a 
model from which they can draw knowledge to help them in their growing problems of mass 

transportation.” The Congressman wanted to know if the advance of NCTA’s plans would be 

“the cue for the cities all over the United States to curtail their interstate highway development 

program within their community area?”

Stolzenbach replied that NCTA hoped to “build a model transit system here.” At this point, the 

mechanics of an integrated transportation system left “something to be desired,” but “this is just 

one of the facts of life in a complicated jurisdictional area in which there is great disagreement as 

between localities as to what the highway system should be.” Maryland and the District of 

Columbia, he said, were “further apart as to what highways should be running between the 

District and Maryland than any of the differences that lie between us and the D.C. Highway 

Department, for example.” All NCTA could do is “consult and cooperate” as well as making 

recommendations. 

Representative Harsha commented that if NCTA wanted to be a model system, it would in his 

view not encourage other cities to change or curtail their highway programs.” Stolzenbach 

disagreed, saying, “Long before this Agency was created, highways . . . were being curtailed by 

action of city governing bodies in innumerable cities throughout the country. This is nothing 

new. It didn’t start here.” 

What, Representative Harsha wanted to know, would happen to the Interstate System if cities 

decided to curtail freeways and use rapid transit instead? Stolzenbach replied that NCTA had 

proposed “a continuous interstate system” for the District: 

I think it is reasonable to expect that if you are going to have a regional rapid transit 

system that is going to move twice as many people by public transportation than you 

would otherwise have, that this might call for some modifications in a highway system 

that was planned before 1955. This is literally what we are faced with here. The inner 

loop was designed in 1955. 

Representative Harsha understood that NCTA was primarily concerned with moving people. 

Had NCTA given any consideration to national defense? Seeger, using a map, explained that 

“there isn’t any question about having a complete interstate system in the District of Columbia.” 

The map included I-66 from the west, I-95 from the south, and I-70S from the northwest to the 

Center Leg “of the loop and providing a continuous interstate system with trucks from Route 66 

coming across the Jefferson Davis Highway over onto Route 95.” 

The Congressman asked how NCTA’s map differed from the Mass Transportation Survey’s map 

of Interstate freeways. Seeger said the District proposed separate lines for the North-Central 

Freeway (I-70S) and the Northeast Freeway (I-95). NCTA recommended combining the two 

“and the great advantage of this was that you could, instead of going through the heart of north 

central Washington with tremendous displacements, you could follow the railroad right-of-way 

and get the highway in easily and smoothly without a big public fuss.” The District has said it 

could not see any “insuperable obstacles to this proposal.” In addition, NCTA recommended 

building the East Leg of the Inner Belt on the east side of the Anacostia River, but that idea was 

not adopted; the plan for construction on the west side was going ahead. 
The only real issues, Seeger continued, were the Three Sisters Bridge and a portion of the North 

Leg:

My only point at this moment is that whatever may be said about the desirability of 

having Three Sisters bridge or the north leg of the loop, given this tremendous interstate 

system that is really agreed upon for all practical purposes, there need be no delay 

whatever in the District’s highway program.

There are projects to keep them going for a good number of years to come. 

The District, he said, had “a great deal of highway” ahead of it without worrying about the Three 

Sisters Bridge, “and no one was even proposing to build the north leg of the loop until 1969, 

anyway.” The District’s real problem was not whether to build a bridge or a portion of the Inner 

Loop, but how to pay its share of the cost for the Interstate highways that everyone approved. “It 

will take every cent the District has to do them, and there is no reason at all why the Three Sisters 

Bridge question should delay the completion of an interstate system.” 

Representative Harsha, recalling Stolzenbach’s testimony before the Joint Committee that, 

“Highways and mass transit are and will always be competing facilities for mass transportation,” 

asked what that meant. Stolzenbach said the modes competed for public choice, “but if the 

public has no alternative but highways, there can’t be any competition.” If government agencies 

want to establish a balanced system, they were not competing but were complementary.

When Representative Harsha again said the highway program was being held up, Stolzenbach 

told him that the Three Sisters Bridge was not even in the District’s highway program when 

NCTA was created. The bridge, despite appropriations for it, was being held up by President 

Kennedy’s call for a reexamination. At this point, agencies were trying to put together a 

balanced system that would give the individual traveler the choice of whether to use public 

transportation or the highways. 

Representative Harsha changed directions by asking about Stolzenbach’s activities, before 

becoming NCTA Administrator, as chair of a civic committee that promoted rapid transit and 

curtailment of the automobile. Stolzenbach said he was reflecting the views of the 

Interfederation Council of the Greater Washington area, which believed that the 1959 Mass 

Transportation Survey put too much emphasis on highways. “That was the simple view and this 

is what we expressed to the Congress at the time.”

Representative Harsha asked if the council recommended “that certain police restrictions should 

be employed restricting the use of private automobiles in the area.” Stolzenbach did not recall 

everything he may have said, but “one way of being sure that our highways are adequate to 

handle peak-hour traffic is to provide some means of controlling it”: 

When I talked to the traffic director of the city of Los Angeles last year, I asked him what 

is the solution to Los Angeles freeway problem [sic]. He said, “I am hopeful that we can 

eventually get some means of keeping the number of people who get onto these highways 

down to the limit that the highways can handle at a reasonable speed.” 
The Federal Highway Administrator told me, not long ago, that they are working on and 

doing research on means of controlling traffic so that the freeway systems in cities will 

work, instead of having freeway traffic come to a grinding halt as it does in Los Angeles 

twice a day.

Did the council advocate, Representative Harsha wanted to know, that the highway departments 

of Maryland and Virginia come under a regional agency’s control. Stolzenbach said he was 

speaking for a group, but “I haven’t taken any position on this question.” But had he not 

advocated, the Congressman asked, that the regional transportation agency have the power to 

establish and operate a regional highway system “whether or not the local authorities agree.” 

Stolzenbach did not recall saying that, but he pointed out that if each jurisdiction has a veto, “this 

may cause some problems.”

Representative Harsha summarized that if Federal agencies were going to usurp State and local 

authority and control people, “where are going to go? Everything is going to be dictated from 

here in Washington as to what these people are going to do with their roads and how they are 

going to . . . .” Stolzenbach interrupted to say he did not think a central bureaucracy in 

downtown Washington should dictate decisions. “The real tough problem here is how do you 

organize this region to not only do regional planning but to get regional decisions.” 

What would happen, Representative Harsha asked, if local jurisdictions decided not to go along 

with NCTA’s transit plan. Stolzenbach said NCTA planned to build, first, an economically 

viable system in the District. It would be self-sustaining, but would not provide regional service 

if other jurisdictions rejected the plan.

Representative Harsha asked about the difference between NCTA’s November 1962 report and 

the transit development program released in the summary report of May 1963 and cited in the 

White House bill. Seeger said they were identical except in dropping interim-Federal loans that 

the Treasury Department had opposed earlier in the year.

The Congressman was concerned that if Congress approved the bill adopting the May 1963 

report, Congress would “block ourselves by curtailing the Three Sisters Bridge, accepting your 

recommendations and these others.” 

Seeger said the bill did no such thing; it did not even mention the highway program. “It simply 

sets forth the engineering details with respect to the transit program, and the bills that have been 

introduced would do no more than that.” The summary report did not mention NCTA’s highway 

recommendations or the Three Sisters Bridge. 

Representative Harsha said he had additional questions, but the House was in session, and the 

committee adjourned. [pages 88-96] 

On July 9, O. Roy Chalk was in the Mediterranean on vacation. However, his office sent his 

letter to President Kennedy transmitting a “preliminary report on transportation” in the 

Washington area. The area should take advantage of “the maximum efficient application of the 
most advanced technological developments in mass transit” to create the best transit system in 

the world. 

The enclosed report explained that D.C. Transit System’s “exhaustive, critical analysis” of 

NCTA’s report revealed weaknesses that undermined the “very foundation” of its 

recommendations. A “vast wealth” of information and resources “was ignored, wholly or 

substantially,” while transit innovations, some in the experimental stage, were never mentioned 

or “glossed over briefly and dismissed summarily.” By ignoring “rudimentary principles of 

sound transportation planning,” NCTA made “many theoretical and dubious basic 

presumptions,” the result being “an inadequate definition of the present and future transportation 

problems of the area, thus preliminarily casting considerable doubt upon the proposed solutions.” 

The problem with subways was that they were “a permanent fixture” that could not be “moved 

from place to place as the demands upon it may require.” Building such a network “could have 

drastic consequences,” especially if based only on “a mere 2-year study.” 

The Washington area, the letter said, was familiar with the streetcar, motorbus, and surface 

railway. Now, however, Congress had appropriated $25 million for the Housing and Home 

Finance Agency to study alternate methods of transit. Research included: 

1. Pneumatic tube systems.

2. Ground effect machines.

3. Superrail.

4. Monorail. 

5. Monobeam (an elevated beam that can carry transit vehicles in both directions).

6. Hydrofoil. 

7. Carveyor (a “people mover”).

D.C. Transit suggested that a combination monorail-subway was another option worth studying, 

as was an underground automobile highway. 

The company was not simply opposing construction of a rail rapid transit system; it was simply 

suggesting that the area wait until the recently financed research was completed before 

committing more than $1 billion for “a permanent, inflexible subway system.” In the absence of 

“a panacea for the mass transportation ills,” officials should employ patience and careful 

planning, “as opposed to panic,” in deciding what to do. 

The company, under its franchise approved by Congress, had the right to operate any mass transit 

system in the area. D.C. Transit was “ready, willing, and able” to incorporate the rapid transit 

system into current operations. The company was continuing its research “into the transportation 

needs of tomorrow” and was “redoubling our efforts to develop media to meet those needs.” The 

report concluded: 

We respectfully submit that our efforts should not be thwarted even before we have had 

an opportunity to experiment with and to develop the fresh, embryonic concepts which 

have emerged as a result of these efforts.
The 16-page report contained drawings of futuristic modes of transit such as monorail and 

“ground effect machines” riding on air cushions. 

The Post contacted Dr. John H. Kohl, who was in charge of the housing agency’s transit 

experiments authorized by Congress. He did not recommend delaying the Washington area 

system. “The problem is too urgent,” he said. “Various approaches can be taken and the 

decision as to the type of approach is essentially a local one.” He thought that NCTA’s plan 

“was pretty well engineered.”

Charles Horsky acknowledged that the White House had received several copies of the report, 

but thought that Congress was “the proper forum” for considering Chalk’s views in the course of 

its hearings on the NCTA bill. “I imagine that Congress will invite Mr. Chalk to discuss his 

proposals. The transportation agency probably will have its chance to reply to the Chalk charges 

at that time.” [Eisen, Jack, “Chalk Raps Transit Plan As Dubious,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, July 12, 1963; Flor, Lee, “Chalk Urges Delay on Area Rail Transit,” The Evening 

Star, July 12, 1963; the report, minus illustrations, was included the hearing record, pages 296-

299] 

Stolzenbach and his NCTA aides returned to the hearing on July 16. Representative Harsha 

began the questioning by trying to get Stolzenbach to admit that the views about curtailing 

highway construction he had expressed on behalf of the Interfederation Council were his own 

views. He had, for example, chaired the committee that drafted the report to this subcommittee. 

Stolzenbach was cautious. The report reflected the views of the council; he would not “entirely 

disassociate myself” from the conclusions. He did not “seriously disagree” with the conclusions, 

but they were a result “a drafting committee.”

Representative Harsha said that if Stolzenbach was on the drafting committee that prepared the 

report, “then it did reflect your personal opinion and your personal views” on curtailing highways 

use, did it not. Stolzenbach replied, “Certainly,” but as NCTA administrator, “I have not found it 

necessary to take a position . . . on a lot of the questions that were involved at that time.” 

Representative Harsha pointed out he was not asking about Stolzenbach’s NCTA tenure. In his 

previous role, had he not recommended that the highway departments of Maryland and Virginia 

should come under the control of the agency that became NCTA? No, Stolzenbach said, “I never 

recommended that.” What about curtailment of the automobile? That was the council’s position 

and he “certainly felt at the time and the vast majority of the people who testified felt . . . that 

there was overemphasis on highways in the 1959 plan.” 

Upon questioning about the Interstate System in the District, Stolzenbach was hesitant even to 

admit that he had seen a map of the network since the D.C. Highway Department had not 

published one. “It is difficult to say, for example, that our recommendation that the center leg of 

the inner loop be an interstate facility is in conflict with the plans for the highway people because 

the Bureau of Public Roads and the District of Columbia Highway Department have been in 

agreement on that problem.” 
Would construction of the Three Sisters Bridge, Potomac River Freeway, and the North Leg have 

any effect on NCTA’s plans? Stolzenbach replied, “They would have practically no effect.” 

The 1960 Act called on NCTA to research facilities, equipment, and services to meet the area’s 

transportation needs. Had NCTA studied anything besides conventional subways? A NCTA 

consultant, Operations Research, Inc., had studied “the whole range of possible vehicle systems, 

ranging from the conventional things we have today into the most esoteric type of systems, such 

as ground effect machines.” At one point or another, he said, NCTA had considered “every 

conceivable combination.” 

Referring to D.C. Transit System’s report to President Kennedy, Representative Harsha asked 

about the flexibility of the NCTA proposal. Stolzenbach replied, “Considering the economics of 

the whole problem of urban mass transportation, I think it is the most flexible system that I have 

ever seen.” He added the NCTA proposal was “essentially a radial system and the rail portion of 

it does not attempt to provide crosstown suburban transportation.” 

Representative Harsha questioned NCTA’s assumption that costs related to the automobile, 

including parking fees, would increase substantially by 1980, but transit fares would remain 

constant and possibly decrease. Stolzenbach based his assumptions on the law of supply and 

demand. “There will be a greater demand and the price will have to go up.” Seeger added that 

parking costs would continue to increase “faster than other costs, including the operating costs of 

the transit system and the fares paid into the transit system.”

The NCTA officials agreed when Representative Harsha said they had not considered the 

movement of goods or services or materials. He suggested that NCTA had recommended “the 

so-called Junior Expressway or one-way street system” for the North Leg in the vicinity of S 

Street, NW. Stolzenbach denied that NCTA had made such a recommendation. Instead, it had 

recommended studies of alternatives to an eight-lane freeway in that corridor.

He did not recall how many people would be displaced by an express street system. But he 

agreed that NCTA’s proposal would displace 5,400 people, with 20 percent displaced by the 

transit plan and the remainder by the highway program. No, NCTA had not made any plans for 

relocating people. “That is not our job.” 

How many people would be displaced by the Three Sisters Bridge? Stolzenbach replied that 

none would be displaced by the bridge itself. What about the Potomac River Freeway? Not very 

many.

Representative Harsha asked about NCTA’s modal-split conclusions. Stolzenbach agreed with 

the Congressman that the Department of Commerce considered its forecasting procedures to be 

still in the developmental stage. He added that, “all the techniques in this whole business” were 

still being developed. 

Representative Harsha asked Stolzenbach to confirm that the rapid rail system would carry about 

20 percent of trips during peak hours, while the rest would be on highways. Yes, Stolzenbach 

said, adding that the breakdown was based on a joint traffic forecasting project conducted with 
personnel of NCTA, the D.C. Highway Department, and BPR. Many of the decisions leading to 

the forecasts “were made by the Highway people. [sic]”

Stolzenbach answered a question about the Junior Expressway in the North Leg corridor by 

saying it would have about half the capacity of an eight-lane freeway. He did not have an 

estimate of the difference in safety.

Representative Harsha asked if it was possible that NCTA’s estimate of the cost of building the 

subway might “be very low.” Stolzenbach replied, “It is always possible that estimates can be 

off.” Finding that NCTA had done few test borings, with many coming after the report on 

November 1, 1962, Representative Harsha suggested that NCTA “just gambled and took a 

chance that it would show up as it did.” Seeger did not think the three engineering firms 

employed for the purpose “would consider themselves as ‘gambling.’” 

Was not the 10-percent contingency included in the cost estimate “way below the normal 

practice”? Seeger explained that other systems had used 30 percent, but the additional 

percentages reflected anticipated inflation. NCTA had not projected inflation in its capital cost 

estimates.

Representative Harsha found through questioning that the estimate did not take into account the 

increase if personnel costs or the cost of construction went up about 14 percent. Did the estimate 

of $793 million include interest on loans? No, it covered only capital outlay. NCTA projected it 

would borrow about $800 million at 4.5 percent interest. The total cost, counting interest, would 

be about $1.5 billion. 

Representative Harsha concluded his 11⁄2 hours of questioning by summarizing that the cost was 

$793 million “if we do not have any increased costs.” [pages 118-132] 

Representative Frank J. Horton (R-NY), whose district included Rochester, wanted to understand 

the philosophy of NCTA’s highway studies. Stolzenbach said that the philosophy was “to 

develop a balanced system,” and that also was the philosophy of highway officials who had 

endorsed NCTA overall transit plan. “The area of disagreement is quite small.” The 1959 Mass 

Transportation Survey had been the starting point for the highway studies. 

Was the highway program in direct competition with the rapid transit program? Was NCTA 

trying to eliminate competition? Stolzenbach said, “That was never the intention.” Seeger added 

that the NCTA plan included a highway network costing well over $800 million, “and we would 

not have recommended a highway system anywhere near that figure if our intent was to eliminate 

competition.” 

What if NCTA had been directed only to study the highway network without a rapid rail system. 

According to the 1959 survey, Seeger replied, even with a $500 million rapid transit system, the 

area would need $2 billion worth of highways. Without transit, the area would need even more. 

“Now, I am talking about a highway program that is vastly beyond anything that is contemplated 

by the District of Columbia Highway Department.” [pages 132-134] 
Representative Broyhill was next. He wanted to clarify that NCTA contemplated operating only 

the subway system, not bus lines. “That is right.” Could free enterprise survive with 

development of NCTA’s transit plan. “Yes.” Would a subsidy be needed? “Some of the lesser 

feeder lines that will be necessary possibly would not be profitable, and we have provided in our 

financial estimates for a certain amount to be paid.” NCTA would pay about $7 million a year in 

subsidies out of annual operating revenues. 

NCTA had not checked these figures with the existing companies, which had refused to 

cooperate. The subsidy might have to be considerably larger. 

Did NCTA consider restricting the subway to the District and letting bus lines bring passengers 

from Maryland and Virginia into the city. Yes, NCTA had considered the idea, using I-66 as an 

example. Seeger said, “The conclusion was that it would be cheaper in the long run, taking into 

account operating costs and capital costs, to provide the rail service. There was also the fact that 

we felt that the rail service in that corridor would attract more passengers than would buses, 

largely because of the transfer problem.”

Representative Broyhill wanted to confirm that the system within the city could survive if the 

surrounding jurisdictions did not go along with their projected contributions. Stolzenbach 

agreed. Without suburban extensions of the rail line, the bus lines could continue providing 

radial service. In that event, Stolzenbach said, NCTA had proposed short extensions to 

Woodside and Silver Spring in Maryland and Pentagon City in Virginia, “which we feel are 

appropriate terminal points.” But Representative Broyhill emphasized the point that the subway 

could be kept within the District and that NCTA should explore letting “other types of 

transportation” bring people to the subway. 

Did NCTA consider an all-bus system, without a subway? The 1959 survey concluded it was 

impractical. NCTA took another look at the idea, but decided that “as far as flexibility is 

concerned, we feel you get the greatest amount of flexibility and service, bringing everything 

together, by having these rail lines go as far into the suburbs as there are people to ride them.” 

Representative Broyhill emphasized that his questions did not necessarily reflect his opinion. 

They were questions he thought would be asked on the House floor. 

He asked about NCTA’s conclusion that three times as many people would ride rapid rail transit 

as buses. “How in the Sam Hill could a person know which he would prefer and how could you 

rely on his answer and, the second part of question is, Is that your sole source of information as to 

predicting the habits of people, what people do in riding rapid rail versus buslines?” 

Warren Wittereich of National Analysts, Inc., explained the survey. The idea was to ask the 

question in as unbiased a way as possible to convey equal options. Of those who expressed a 

preference, 48 percent said they preferred rail because it avoided traffic and weather problems. 

Others thought rail was more comfortable or safer. Of those who preferred buses, 27 percent said 

their reason was greater mobility, while 24 percent thought buses provided greater comfort, and 

15 percent said the bus would get them closer to their destination.
Had NCTA contacted the Housing and Home Finance Agency about its $25 million research 

study? Yes, NCTA had been “in frequent contact” with the agency’s John Kohl. The housing 

agency “endorsed our program very heartily.” [pages 135-139] 

Chairman Whitener asked if NCTA had considered D.C. Transit System’s assertion that it would 

have the right to operate the system? Seeger replied, “We were satisfied, Mr. Chairman, that 

under the D.C. Transit Franchise Act there is no right to operate the system. This is wholly a 

matter for Congress to decide. We have made no recommendations on that point.” The 

chairman read language in the 1960 Act that said NCTA should encourage private transit 

companies to provide needed services and that NCTA should not operate competing services, but 

may make agreements with private transit companies to provide services.

Seeger said he understood that language to keep NCTA out of the bus business, but the language 

is silent “on the question of who should operate the rapid transit system.” 

Would NCTA operate the rapid rail system? NCTA proposed to construct the system but had not 

made any proposal on operation. A Federal corporation or an interstate compact agency were 

two alternatives for operating the system or Congress could provide for contracting operation to a 

private operator. 

A private operator could run the system at a profit? Yes, although the bond period might have to 

be extended. The profit could come out of the farebox? “There is nothing profitable about this 

system,” Seeger replied. “All we have ever said is that it would pay its capital cost which isn’t 

very exciting to an investor.” A management contract might be possible, with the operator paid 

out of the farebox, if the bond period were extended. 

What did the language in the 1960 Act mean: “shall encourage private transit companies to 

provide needed services in a manner consistent with the transit development program”? Seeger 

said NCTA interpreted that language to encourage maximum use of private operators, 

particularly for buses, “but I interpret the whole act as being a hedge on the question of operation 

of the rapid transit system.”

Chairman Whitener said that he and Representative Broyhill were raising the question “as to 

whether or not it was not the intent of Congress at the outset to first preserve existing 

transportation facilities, and secondly, to encourage existing, taxpaying, transit operators to 

operate a system required to meet the public convenience and necessity here in this area.” Seeger 

suggested that if the committee interpreted the language in that way, “that is dispositive.”

Chairman Whitener asked about the claim in D.C. Transit System’s recent report to the President 

that NCTA had overlooked new developments in the transit field. For example, NCTA thought 

the transit company’s proposal to operate a monorail, partly in tunnel, to Dulles International 

Airport was not feasible. Seeger said that NCTA’s engineering studies indicated that the tube for 

monorail would have to be larger than for a subway. “You would be spending more money and 

you wouldn’t get anything back in exchange for the additional money that you are spending.” 
Did NCTA consider the new modes listed in the D.C. Transit System report? Yes, and NCTA 

had provided the study to the committee for the record. 

How does NCTA respond to D.C. Transit System’s claim that the NCTA report cited other 

transit systems in the country in support of the proposed system, but they are “deficit operations 

and are publicly owned and operated?” Seeger said he had addressed that point the previous day: 

Our point is that in other cities rapid transit fares are kept low as a matter of city policy, that in 

this city there already exists a zone fare, that the policy established by the Congress was not to 

keep fares low but to charge a fair price for service and that the result is that we will be different 

from the other cities.

The system would have a 25-cent fare within the central zone, plus a 15-cent fare outside that 

zone. 

As for ambiguous language in laws, NCTA thought transit usage would increase, and D.C. 

Transit System apparently thought so, too, as reflected in its recent acquisition of one of the 

Virginia bus companies. “So, conceivably they agree with this idea that there will be stimulation 

and it will occur in the suburbs and they are placing themselves in a position to profit from it.” 

Representative Harsha asked if NCTA was projecting more transit patronage because of the 

curtailment of the highway program. Quenstedt said, “There is an unfortunate identification of 

this agency with regards to the highway program.” NCTA did propose a smaller freeway 

network than the 1959 survey, but so did the D.C. Highway Department. NCTA did not think 

the Three Sisters Bridge was necessary, but even if the entire highway program were built, “there 

is a need for transit. I believe everybody is agreed on that.” During peak hours, NCTA projected 

that 60 percent of people coming into the District’s central area would do so by the proposed 

transit facility. District highway officials said that at present 40 percent of people came into the 

central area by public transportation. “They say that that same absolute number will come in.” 

This was a disagreement among responsible groups. 

Representative Harsha asked if NCTA could sit down with the area’s highway agencies and 

planning commissions “and come up with an acceptable compromise that will meet the needs of 

this community and correlate this program with the highway people and the other interested 

groups.” Quenstedt said that all the groups were subject to President Kennedy’s direction, and he 

had called for reexamination of the Three Sisters Bridge and North Leg. BPR’s Whitton had told 

the Subcommittee on Roads that he thought the reexamination was necessary, as did General 

Clarke. Quenstedt said he had read Aitken’s testimony, but he had “ducked it every time they 

tried to him down.” [pages 140-146] 

On July 18, Deputy Director Staats of the Bureau of the Budget appeared before the 

subcommittee in support of the legislation. The Federal interest in this issue, he said, was clear. 

Aside from the fact that the Federal Government employs nearly half of the workforce in the 

area, “the entire Nation has an interest in preserving the beauty and dignity of the National 

Capital region.” Mass transportation “has a direct relevance to the future appearance and dignity 

of the Nation’s Capital.” 
NCTA’s plan “should meet both present and long-range needs of the region.” It was based on 

the legislative mandate of the 1960 Act, could get underway with a minimum of delay, and its 

transportation development program was “essential to the achievement of long-range regional 

development plans.” The Federal contribution to the project was consistent with the national 

legislation the White House had endorsed based on a two-thirds/one-third ratio for a national 

mass transportation program. As a result, a Federal contribution of $120 million for a system 

that would cost nearly $800 million “is not out of line.” 

Chairman Whitener asked if the plan was financially sound if jurisdictions outside the District 

refused to contribute their share. Staats was confident that area jurisdictions would agree to 

participate, but if not, “the total system might be less, or the fare structure adjusted but I think, so 

far as the payoff period is concerned, I think that the answer would be ‘Yes.’” 

Would it be financially sound if the system were extended only to Woodside and Friendship 

Heights in Montgomery County, Bowie in Prince George’s County, and Pentagon City in 

Virginia? Staats thought so, but emphasized he wasn’t suggesting that the system be limited in 

that way.

Representative Harsha asked if Staats thought the farebox could support the program. Staats 

thought “the assumptions here are reasonable.” Many assumptions had to prove valid, but he 

cited two reasons why this system would be self-sustaining when many other systems were not. 

First, the fare would be higher than in areas such as New York City where people were used to 

paying a lower fare that did not equal costs. Second, by building a new system from scratch, 

“obviously you are going to be able to take advantage of what the manufacturers have learned in 

research and development of the most efficient system and the most comfortable system for 

transportation.” That would make it more attractive to the public. Admittedly, the assumptions 

could prove wrong, in part “because we are dealing with human psychology,” but based on 

review of the financial plan by several agencies, “we think they are not out of line.” 

When Representative Harsha asked about subsidies to local jurisdictions outside the District, 

Staats explained that those subsidies came out of operating revenues, not the Federal 

contribution. 

Staats realized that President Kennedy’s call for reexamination of the Three Sisters Bridge and 

North Leg had prompted controversy. “We are willing to take our share on this one.” The two 

projects had “generated much controversy in the community.” The White House concluded that 

“a careful analysis and statement of the alternatives—in terms of benefits and costs to the 

community—is required to resolve this controversy and produce a clear community consensus”: 

It should be emphasized that the issues surrounding these highway projects would have 

required resolution regardless of the NCTA report. That report reinforces reasons already 

present.

He cited Administrator Whitton’s statement before the Subcommittee on Roads that “this study 

needs to be made.” Further, the District was continuing a very large highway program of projects 

not in dispute. However, the District did not have all the funds needed to complete these 
ongoing projects. Meanwhile, the District scheduled the Three Sisters Bridge and a portion of 

the Potomac River Freeway for early construction, but included the North Leg in a much later 

program:

Therefore, we see no basis to the contention that the highway program has been 

damaged. On the contrary, we believe that the proposed review will enhance its 

soundness by insuring that the program will meet in the best possible way both the needs 

and the desires of the entire community. Hasty action on parts of the program which are 

in dispute could seriously damage the future of this program in terms of community 

acceptance.

The decision to reexamine the two projects was consistent with the committee’s 1962 report. 

“That report clearly reflects the philosophy that transportation facilities are provided as a service 

to the entire community and should be consistent with and maximize desired community 

development objects.” He did not see any reason why the reexamination should be “a longdrawn-out affair.” Contrary to statements in the press, the reexamination did not mean “an 

indefinite delay. This is not true at all. It is not contemplated.” With cooperation from all 

parties, Staats expected the reexamination to be completed “in a very few months.” If Congress 

approved the national mass transit bill, the White House would be ready to submit 

recommendations on the highway program in 1964. “We think that this kind of time would 

enable Congress before it commits itself to the appropriations to have the results of this review.” 

Representative Broyhill said the controversy about the highways was jeopardizing the mass 

transit legislation. “One of the things that the so-called highway people object to is the fact that 

they feel that this thing has been pretty well studied for a number of years.” Other committees of 

Congress were concerned that the studies were called for only to make way for mass 

transportation: 

In fact, I was told by a member of the House Public Works Committee the day before 

yesterday that if this bill comes to the floor this session, he predicts every member of the 

House Committee on Public Works will oppose it.

Staats wanted to dispel the idea that deferral of the three highway units had anything to do with 

whether the region would have highways or mass transit. “We need both. And I think that these 

three units would have been held out even if there had not been such a program.” For example, 

the Three Sisters Bridge had been studied for years, but area officials still didn’t agree on where 

it should be built, if at all.

Representative Harsha, a member of both committees, said his Public Works colleagues were 

concerned that NCTA was “recommending the curtailment of the highway program and, as such, 

may be attempting to have a captive market for this rapid transit system in an effort to make it 

pay off.” They were concerned as well by the notion that the District system would be a model 

for all other communities to curtail development of the Interstate System in favor of mass transit.
Staats thought that an adequate mass transportation system would reduce pressure for additional 

Interstate routes in cities. It also would reduce pressure for additional Interstate highways to 

meet purely local needs. [pages 153-169; Staats’ formal statement is on pages 171-176] 

Architect of the Capitol Stewart appeared before the committee on July 24. He was concerned 

about NCTA’s transit proposals that affected the Capitol grounds. The subway tunnels would 

have to be constructed “far underground” to avoid interference with the existing subway 

connecting the House and Senate wings of the Capitol. The plans would require “costly and 

extensive underpinning” for the Capitol. He was concerned the transit plans would interfere with 

extension of the Capitol to include a large underground garage and other facilities under the east 

plaza where NCTA proposed to place its station. 

Further, NCTA had never consulted with him, his office, or congressional leaders. The only 

contact by NCTA that he was aware of was a request for information, such as on soil borings 

taken for the proposed extension; the Speaker of the House, as chairman of the Commission for 

Extension of the Capitol, had granted permission to provide that information to NCTA. 

Stewart had been aware of NCTA’s study, but the first he knew of how it would affect the 

U.S. Capitol grounds was when he saw the map in the newspapers covering NCTA’s report. In 

response to questions from Representative Harsha, Stewart said he had no specifications, no 

detailed drawings, and no information on the planned depth of the line, the width of the tunnels, 

or what they would displace. The Congressman asked: 

How could they, as responsible engineers, arrive at a cost of this thing, if they haven’t 

progressed enough in their plans to determine the depth of their tunneling and the 

displacements and all the additional shoring they may have to do when they go into these 

other buildings or highways? 

Stewart replied, “I don’t know how they do it. He added, “I am not here to censure what they 

have done or what they haven’t done.” He was there only “to make a plea” that Congress not 

approve construction of transit facilities under the U.S. Capitol Grounds until NCTA joined in a 

study with his office, the Commission for Extension of the U.S. Capitol, and other congressional 

leaders. Speaking only as one member of the extension commission, “I would like to see it a 

little further away, near enough to service the building, but not underneath it, practically.” In 

reply to questions from Representative Harsha, Stewart could not estimate how long coordination 

would take, how much it would cost, or whether it would affect NCTA’s overall cost estimate. 

Representative Broyhill pointed out that Stewart’s testimony provided another example where 

NCTA failed to carry out the intent of Congress by not coordinating with other agencies and 

organizations affected by the proposed rapid transit system:

I think that this is most regrettable. I just think that we are spending a lot of time here and 

we are just not going to get anywhere; $793 million in itself is a really difficult 

appropriation to get through this Congress. Certainly, with the Speaker and the Architect 

of the Capitol feeling the way they do about this matter, I think these are pitfalls that the 

Agency could well have avoided. [pages 202-211] 
Polly Shackleton was the next witness. She said that a Member of Congress told her that some 

people considered her “merely a lobbyist or tool for transit interests.” She denied it: 

I wish to state in no uncertain terms that I am not employed for money or other 

consideration by any transit equipment manufacturer or supplier, commercial interest, or 

business or professional group which stands to profit financially from any type of 

transportation program or related activity. Nor am I a stooge, paid or unpaid, for either 

D.C. Transit, the railroads, the roadbuilders, the National Capitol Transportation Agency, 

or the Bureau of Public Roads. 

Chairman Whitener reassured her by saying, “Mrs. Shackleton, if you stick around here, you will 

be accused of a lot of things.” 

The Democratic Central Committee favored the bill under consideration “because we are 

convinced that a rail rapid transit system for this area is absolutely essential.” She and her 

committee were not qualified to judge costs or methods of financing. “But we do suggest that 

any alternative to an efficient subway, rail transit system will be far more costly in human terms, 

as well as in terms of the viability of the city.” She also praised Chairman Whitener’s report of 

the Special Subcommittee on Traffic, Streets, and Highways. [pages 211-213] 

She was followed by Dr. Kohl of the Housing and Home Finance Agency. The agency’s Office 

of Transportation had reviewed NCTA’s report, including its appendices. “We have found no 

objections to the NCTA transit proposals as they relate to the national program” that Congress 

was considering. The national program had a dual role of stimulating local transit development 

and of assisting regional efforts to meet transportation demand. NCTA’s plan was consistent 

with these goals.

Without naming D.C. Transit System, Dr. Kohl also addressed “disappointment and criticism” 

that someone had expressed because NCTA had not embraced more advanced technology. Some 

had said, he recalled, the transit program should be delayed pending the results of the agency’s 

research program:

While apparently appealing claims are made for new transit media, few can be found to 

have real substance when analyzed in the cold light of fact. Most of the HHFA 

demonstration projects, even those dealing with new equipment potentials, are actually 

refinements of the conventional rapid transit system. Only one project is underwriting the 

development of a radically different system, and this may be some years in the 

experimental stage before its practical application can be assured. 

Other systems, such as the monorail, have been thoroughly explored with due regard to 

the statutory obligation that any recommendation be capable of early implementation. In 

view of all the circumstances with which NCTA was faced in preparing its 

recommendations, its selection of a modern rail facility of established capabilities seems 

reasonable. It may be regarded as a progressive, but not a “way out” solution. 
Chairman Whitener asked specifically about D.C. Transit System’s view that NCTA had not 

adequately considered pneumatic tube systems, ground effect machines, superrail, monorail, 

moonbeam, hydrofoil, and carveyor. Dr. Kohl believed that NCTA had studied these 

alternatives:

A number of these systems have specialized application, and in the light of the 

requirements of an areawide rapid transit system would not be suitable. Many are still in 

the early promotional stages and have not been proved either as physically feasible or as 

acceptable to the riding public, and therefore, I think many stages of development 

[remain] to be accomplished before most of these systems can be regarded as practical for 

urban mass transportation. 

With the research funds authorized by Congress, the Housing and Home Finance Agency was 

encouraging new looks and hoped to identify some substantially new technology. “But at this 

particular time the conventional system is the one of established capability.” 

Representative Harsha asked if by the time the conventional system proposed by NCTA was 

completed, it would be obsolete? “No,” Dr. Kohl replied, “I don’t think so.” He cited the 

monobeam as an example. It was “nothing more than a narrow gage bus on elevated concrete 

roadway.” It might be helpful in some specific applications, “but where you are dealing with a 

major urban area, with peak-hour volumes of the magnitude that are likely to occur here in 

Washington, where you have to have interchangeable parts of an areawide system,” a 

conventional system was the best option. He added that nothing was likely to result from his 

agency’s study that “would justify altering the kind of conclusion that was reached. [pages 217-

224] 

O. Roy Chalk testified on July 25. He began by saying that his company favored a modern rapid 

transit system in the range of $300 million to $400 million. Only the newest, most advanced 

modes of transportation should be employed. The company favored “a greatly expanded and 

integrated highway system capable of piercing the bottleneck in the heart of the city.” Further, 

“we are in favor of private enterprise being continued indefinitely as the exclusive operator of 

any transit system in our Nation’s Capital pursuant to the mandate of Congress” as expressed in 

S. 3073 in 1956. (Chalk was referring to the Senate bill that became the Washington 

Metropolitan Transit Authority Act granting a franchise to D.C. Transit System, Inc.) Finally, 

Chalk said, “we are violently opposed to the extravagance of public ownership and operation, 

and the illegal violation of S. 3073.” 

He said his testimony was intended to “fill the obvious vacuums” in Stolzenbach’s testimony and 

correct “any erroneous impressions” he left with the committee. “The deliberate exaggerations 

replete throughout the NCTA testimony are only exceeded by the bald minimization of truth 

which appears in the Administrator’s plan.” Many of NCTA’s recommendations were “the result 

of a subtle technique of fallacious inverse argument” to reach a predetermined conclusion based 

on “alleged imaginary facts” lined up to fit that conclusion. 

He endorsed the ideas in the evaluation that Martin Wohl had prepared for the Commerce 

Department but that had not yet been included in the committee’s record. He had identified 
numerous “grossly inaccurate and incorrect estimates and calculations.” Besides inaccuracies, 

NCTA’s report favored an inflexible “corridor” concept that “is completely shortsighted and long 

ago outmoded.” Chalk pointed out that, “Today’s main ‘corridor’ becomes tomorrow’s little 

used branch line.” Instead of simply eliminating the bottlenecks, NCTA proposed to solve 

transportation woes “by unnecessary and costly substitution of the entire bottle.” 

He stated that as noted in his report to President Kennedy, NCTA gave no credence to the idea 

that the results of the transit experiments were worth waiting for. Instead, it was trying to “panic 

Congress” into approving its supposedly $793 million proposal. “To be realistic and honest, the 

plans of the NCTA, if brought to fruition, would undoubtedly cost in excess of $1.5 billion and 

could set a pattern for similar wasteful spending in many other cities of the United States.”

Chalk also discussed his claim that D.C. Transit System had the franchise, under S. 3073, “to 

operate a mass transportation system of passengers for hire.” No street railway or busline that 

would compete with his franchise company was to be established in the District. NCTA had 

ignored this statutory restriction. True, NCTA referred to feeder bus systems and subsidies, but 

“Who in his right mind would expect private enterprise to hang on, losing money, and accept the 

crumbs of service which fall from the table of a publicly operated major service line?” 

(Section 3 of the 1956 Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority Act read:

No competitive street railway or bus line, that is, bus or railway line for the transportation 

of passengers of the character which runs over a given route on a fixed schedule, shall be 

established to operate in the District of Columbia without the prior issuance of a 

certificate by the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia (referred to in 

this part as the “Commission”) to the effect that the competitive line is necessary for the 

convenience of the public.) 

D.C. Transit was providing excellent service, at no cost to the Federal Government, with “the 

largest fleet of new air-conditioned buses in the world, of which we are particularly proud.” 

Even so, NCTA’s plan was “to disregard and to violate the rights of private ownership and 

operation of transportation facilities in the metropolitan area.” NCTA paid lip service to the 

congressional mandate that private enterprise be used wherever possible, but its 

recommendations presume government-operated transit lines “and that its expenditures should be 

of such astronomical proportions as to forever preclude the likelihood of economic operations 

with profit.” 

Chalk recommended that Congress reject NCTA’s proposal and reaffirm D.C. Transit System’s 

existing franchise under S. 3073. Costs should be limited to not exceed $400 million, with no 

more than 5 miles of subsurface tunnels if needed. Selection of technology should be delayed at 

least 2 years to allow the results of ongoing experimental projects to be known. 

Representative Harsha asked if D.C. Transit System had cooperated with NCTA. Chalk said the 

company had tried to work with Stolzenbach virtually from the day he was appointed. Nothing 

happened for a long while, but the company eventually submitted its proposal to NCTA. NCTA 

“refused and ignored even to consider this proposal.” At their last meeting, Stolzenbach made 
clear he would support a fixed-rail subway system “and that there wasn’t much point to discuss 

what he, I think, described as newfangled ideas.” Since his mind was completely closed, “there 

wasn’t any point in our assisting him, and that was the last time that I had the privilege and 

pleasure of meeting with Mr. Stolzenbach.” 

Chalk denied the precise wording that Stolzenbach had said ended their discussion and that it had 

anything to do with a line to Dulles International Airport. “The point is that he said he had 

already made up his mind and there was no point in discussing any other ideas. There is a big 

difference.”

Asked about Dr. Kohl’s testimony on new technologies, Chalk said he hadn’t heard the exact 

wording, but said that Dr. Kohl had “indicated to our organization that he is most enthusiastic 

about this type equipment, and that it offers possibilities for the solution of certain phases of the 

problem.” He thought officials should wait for the results before going “off the deep end in 

expending in excess of $1 billion.” He suggested, for example, a tunnel might be built for a 

monorail suspended high enough that automobiles could use the tunnel as well. Another 

alternative was a tunnel for mass transit during peak hours that automobiles could use at other 

times.

With “a little courage,” officials could establish regulations to control traffic by keeping certain 

vehicles out of bottleneck areas during peak hours. In that case, “you would have no need for 

subways. You wouldn’t even have a problem.” 

As it was, if Congress adopted the NCTA plan, D.C. Transit System would gradually go out of 

business by about 1970. Meanwhile, the company was in the process of unifying bus service in 

Maryland, Virginia, and the District. Passengers would be able to travel around the region 

without changing vehicles. “Now this is a very convenient matter . . . . We are living in an age 

of convenience, and this is a great convenience.” [pages 263-269, 299-304] 

Louis Justement was one of the witnesses on July 29, this time as chairman of the Transportation 

Committee of the Washington Building Congress, Inc. The congress, he said, considered a rapid 

transit system “desirable and necessary for Washington and this is the time to try and get it.” The 

fact that NCTA’s calculations suggested the system would be self-liquidating was pleasing, but 

“we do not believe that the acceptance of the rapid transit plan should be conditioned on this fact 

or its irrefutable substantiation by supporting data.” He asked, “Freeways are not expected to be 

self-liquidating; why should we expect more from rapid transit?” Although the Federal 

Government paid 90 percent of the cost of Interstate construction, the District’s 10-percent share 

was only “a first installment [because] a freeway requires continued maintenance and results in 

extensive and permanent loss of taxable real estate, costs which must be borne by the District of 

Columbia and adjoining counties.” 

Rapid transit questions could “not be resolved by computing machines which, depending upon 

the data which is fed into them, could favor an all-automobile or an all-rapid transit solution.” 

What was certain was that if the city [the metropolitan area] was going to grow to 3.5 million 

people, “it must have a rapid transit system, and the sooner the better.” The NCTA transit plan 

was better than the plan proposed by the Mass Transportation Survey, but too many concessions 
had been made to reduce the total cost. “We believe an adequate downtown distribution system 

must be provided with a center loop with local service and frequent stations.” The downtown 

section was the key, because whatever it consisted of was “just about final.” 

Freeway controversies could be left to the future. Once the regional transit system was in place, 

it would create “an ideal framework for all other planning.” Flexibility might be excellent in 

some cases, but not for transit. “Rail rapid transit, by its very rigidity, will serve as the 

framework for all other planning, the body structure around which the living city grows and 

develops.” As others had said during the hearings, buses were more flexible, but they had some 

disadvantages, particularly the need to stop at virtually every corner in a congested city. Unlike a 

rapid rail system, a bus that can go anywhere does not provide a basis for sound city planning. 

By contrast, as a rapid rail system spreads around the area, the tendency would be “to erect a vast 

majority of the new, important traffic generator structures in the immediate vicinity of the 

stations as they were planned.” Instead of uncontrolled sprawl, the growth of population “would 

be largely served by these new centers.”

Speaking only for himself, not the Washington Business Congress, he reacted to earlier 

suggestions that instead of incurring the enormous expenditure proposed by NCTA, the area 

should experiment with a small expenditure by building a trial line, such as one from Rockville 

to Union Station along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad tracks, expanding from there with 

special bus routes. He was referring to testimony earlier in the day by Delmer Ison, Executive 

Director of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, who had said: 

We feel, though, that before we rule out an all-bus system that perhaps a study should be 

made, an engineering study and passenger study, but in the meantime, rather than delay 

this program, we recommend that we experiment with a rail system, say running from 

Rockville down to Union Station. [page 322] 

Justement did not consider such a proposal a “fair test in any sense whatever.” He compared 

such a trial with “expecting an arm to function by itself out in midair, as a trial.” He continued:

[It] violates the main function that a transportation, a rail transportation, system can use 

from the point of view of planning, in that it is labeled a “trial”; it is labeled something 

that may or may not be permanent, and it develops no stations along its way; there are no 

new stations developed. 

Further, a trial would push off a final decision to some “indefinite future” based on experience in 

the absence of the “most important part” of a rail rapid transit system, namely the downtown 

distribution loop: 

Now, if you had to do something that was just a partial system I would much rather start 

with the body and have the downtown distribution system to which you could always add 

arms, but I would never try to make an arm function without a body. [pages 361-367] 

As the hearings were moving to a conclusion on July 31, the Post carried an analysis by reporter 

Jack Eisen. He had been the newspaper’s principal reporter on city and metropolitan planning 
(1957-1961), but had spent the previous year as associate editor of The Los Angeles Times, where 

he got to see a “wholly automobile-oriented city,” which he described as “a monstrous example” 

of the type. Eisen began: 

Washington’s rapid transit program is getting more and more to resemble a ghost train 

shuttling eternally to and fro on a shadowy side track. Is it not about time somebody got 

it out onto the main line?

He would like to report that “after all these years,” plus 3 weeks of hearings, the city was ready to 

move forward. “But the course of the hearings had been just the opposite.” The solid ground 

transit advocates had expected to find “had been churned into vast clouds of dust . . . obscuring 

the main issues.” The subcommittee members were “baffled, perhaps even a bit angry.”

The question came down to what kind of city people wanted. A transit-oriented city was closely 

tied to its downtown. A highway-oriented city, such as Los Angeles, “tends to explode ever 

farther across the landscape.” In Washington, the argument was being carried to extremes, “and 

being flaunted, often in scary half-truths, by the highway lobbies.” 

The debate between highways and transit should not occur. Everyone agreed an adequate 

freeway network was needed. The question was “how wide, how well-located, how welldesigned and how well-adapted they should be in the special character we want to keep for the 

Nation’s Capital.” Surely even the most “dedicated mover of earth, pourer of concrete,” agreed 

that the area needed “an adequate, fast, safe, heavy-duty means of mass transportation.” 

Stolzenbach had concluded, reasonably so according to Eisen, that a conventional subway was 

needed at least in downtown. However, another section of the 1960 Act “provided NCTA with 

its unhappy status as a lightning rod” by calling on NCTA to “evaluate” the 1959 Mass 

Transportation Survey. NCTA’s conclusion that the Three Sisters Bridge and North Leg should 

be dropped and the White House’s call for their reexamination “brought the highway lobbies into 

the arena in a howling fury.” The highway people already were concerned about interest in mass 

transportation in other cities and the legislation the Senate had passed authorizing a national 

transit program. If the NCTA plan could be defeated, the highway people thought it would be 

“an omen of victory for the highway forces.” 

Even without the national implications, Eisen thought “the transit bill would have a rough time,” 

as reflected in the testimony before the concurrent hearings of the Whitener subcommittee and 

the Subcommittee on Roads. The primary purpose of some of the testimony before both 

subcommittees was “to clobber NCTA and all its works.” Stolzenbach had been accused of 

having an anti-freeway bias, of rigging statistics, of ignoring agencies that disagreed with him, 

and being unrealistic in thinking his system could pay for itself. “And so the charges go, all 

emphatically denied but each leaving a residue of doubt in the minds of the District 

committeemen.”

Chairman Whitener had been “the most neutral member” during the hearings. He appeared to be 

most concerned about the displacement of families by construction projects. “Clearly, if he had 
his druthers on this issue, Whitener would choose the subway. It displaces fewer people than 

freeways.”

Representative Harsha was on the opposite side, having been the most vocal member of the 

subcommittee “in his insistence against any highway curtailment.” He favored mass transit, “but 

his interest is focused on buses.” He had “bored the hardest on Stolzenbach’s anti-freeway 

statements.”

Representative Broyhill, the only member of the subcommittee from the area, “followed a 

familiar tactic by suggesting a retreat before the outer ramparts of the transit defenses had been 

breached.” He suggested limiting the subway to the District,” a view that “squares with his 

lamentations over the harm that might befall the present bus companies.” 

As for what the subcommittee might do, “the choice will be politically and intellectually tough.” 

If it approved the legislation, it will be accused of ignoring the evidence. The possibility of 

rejecting the plan “seems unthinkable to those with the city’s welfare in mind; a start must be 

made toward solving a problem that isn’t getting any easier.” 

Eisen wondered if “a middle ground” existed. “Is there something—part of the commuter 

railroad line, facilities for express buses, a section of downtown subway, perhaps a station or 

terminal—that could be started soon.” In the meantime, commuters could be sure “that the ad 

writer wasn’t talking about his daily journeys when he wrote that seductive line: ‘Getting there is 

half the fun.’” [Eisen Jack, “A City Must have a Heart and Arteries,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, July 28, 1963; the ad line was for Cunard Lines’ luxury ships] 

The Whitener hearings ended on July 31 with citizen groups endorsing NCTA’s transit plans. 

Edward J. MacClane said his group, the District Federation of Civic Associations, still opposed 

the Three Sisters Bridge and North Leg, suggesting that commercial interests were behind 

support for the District’s freeway program. Peter Glickert of the federation did not want the 

dispute over the transit organization to delay its plan. Representing the Fairfax Federation of 

Civic Associations, John Ellicott criticized “persons or groups who because of their own selfish 

interests deliberately or unwittingly delay or defeat” the proposed rapid transit plan. John Hoke, 

chairman of the Interfederation Council representing 400 civic associations in the area, said his 

organization was enthusiastic about the NCTA rail rapid transit system.

The only opposition on the final day, and it was mild, was from Arthur Miller of AAA’s district 

branch. “While we have no opposition to a rapid transit rail system,” he said, his group was 

concerned that the rapid transit plan was being presented as the one answer to the area’s 

transportation problems. “We are deeply concerned by the unjustified sabotaging of the highway 

program by the NCTA report.” [Flor, Lee, “Citizen Groups Testify For Rail Transit System,” 

The Evening Star, July 31, 1963] 

While Whitener Considers the Options

While the two subcommittees held nearly simultaneous hearings on related issues, the debate in 

the public arena continued. 
In early July 1963, a meeting at the New Bethel Baptist Church resulted in formation of the 

Citizens Committee on Homes and Highways to fight “all who place the selfish interests of 

highway users above the needs of human beings.” The chairman, Eugene Davidson, was a 

member of the D.C. advisory committee to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission and a vice 

president of the Washington Real Estate Brokers Association. The new group, determined to 

represent displaced families, called on District residents to engage in President Kennedy’s 

“careful reexamination” of the freeways. Davidson said the committee would “give voice to the 

feelings of the community about the effect the proposed Three Sisters Bridge-North Leg Inner 

Loop truck highway complex would have on countless homes and community facilities.” He 

said:

The proposed freeways would take the homes of at least 19,000 residents and require 

condemnation of homes, churches, businesses and schools valued at some $190 million. 

A special committee had concluded that 19,000 residents, many within the Northwest Urban 

Renewal area, would be displaced, although the District placed the figure between 7,000 and 

12,000. [Flor, Lee, “Foes of Loop Fear Ousting Of 19,000,” The Evening Star, July 3, 1963; 

“Citizens Join In Attack on Freeways,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, July 3, 1963] 

On July 10, the Maryland State Roads Commission met with a delegation of citizens from North 

Chevy Chase about the impact of the Capital Beltway through Rock Creek Park between 

Kensington Parkway and Edgemoor Drive. The Star explained:

More than 100 North Chevy Chase citizens complained to State road builders and 

Maryland members of Congress last month that the half-mile stretch of planned roadway 

would uproot a large number of trees, cut across five or six homesides and adversely 

affect 50 other residences.

State road officials, who planned to award a construction contract later in the month, said they 

could not route the highway through a marshland north of Rock Creek, but would consider small 

realignments to save more trees to lessen the impact on homes. Maurice Donegan, representing 

the citizens, told reporters after the 21⁄2-hour meeting, that he was “optimistic and hopeful.” He 

said, “Mr. Funk cannot guarantee or commit himself to changes but we feel he will do all he can 

to help us.” [“Beltway Route Revision Due,” The Evening Star, July 11, 1963] 

Eugene Davidson told District Commissioner John B. Duncan on July 12 that the Citizen 

Committee on Homes and Highways wanted to participate in the reexamination requested by 

President Kennedy. Davidson thought that instead of spending additional funds, the District 

should rely on the studies NCTA had already compiled. Further, he wanted the study to not be 

limited to families displaced by freeways; it should be expanded to all government actions 

resulting in displacements. [Schuette, Paul A., “New Group Would Join Road Study,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, July 13, 1963] 

(Commissioner Duncan had taken office on July 24, 1961. He was the city’s Recorder of Deeds 

when President Kennedy nominated him for the position. He was, as newspapers put it at the 

time, “the District’s first Negro Commissioner.” Judge David L. Bazelon of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals administered the oath of office “before an overflow crowd in the public hearing room at 

the District Building.” During an organizational meeting after the ceremony, Duncan was named 

to oversee the city’s health and welfare activities previously handled by outgoing Commissioner 

McLaughlin. Duncan said: 

I believe that the only way that we can win the goals we seek at home and abroad is for all 

of us to work together on a united front, irrespective of any personal interests we may 

have by reason of our different circumstances. 

If this feeling of togetherness is adequately developed, I see the possibility of the greatest 

degree of progress that our city has ever witnessed. 

(The appointment was for 3 years with an annual salary of $19,000. Duncan, a graduate of 

Howard University, lived with his wife and two children at 5330 Second Street, NW. in the 

Petworth neighborhood. [“Duncan Gets Commissioner Nomination,” The Evening Star, July 11, 

1961; Pierce, Charles D., “Duncan, ‘Taking Oath, Asks ‘Togetherness,’” The Evening Star, July 

24, 1961]) 

By mid-month, NCPC had approved a route “in principle” for the East Leg along the west bank 

of the Anacostia River from an interchange with the Northeast Freeway above New York Avenue 

and the Southeast Freeway on Virginia Avenue near the Navy Yard. At the urging of T. Sutton 

Jett, NPS district area chief, NCPC insisted that any park land taken for the road be replaced.

The planners also retained final say on “precise alignment, grades, connections, landscaping and 

replacement of parkland.” Joseph Barnett, representing Administrator Whitton, voted against 

this retention of authority. “That’s the trouble with this commission,” Barnett said, “it spends too 

much of the staff’s time on detail.” This practice was “insulting” to highway agencies. Barnett 

thought construction could begin in 1964, with completion in 1965. [“NCPC Approved Route 

for Inner Loop,” The Washington Daily News, July 19, 1963; Lewis, Robert J., “Anacostia 

Renewal Boundaries Fixed,” The Evening Star, July 18, 1963] 

On July 27, Aitken appeared on WWDC’s “Report to the People.” Freeway construction, he 

said, had come “quite near” to a halt in the city because of the reexamination, negotiations with 

the Architect of the Capitol on the Center Leg, and additional approvals needed on the East Leg. 

Although NCPC had approved the East Leg in principle, Aitken said the District would need 

“several months” to work out details. He estimated that construction would not begin for a year 

to a year and a half.

Asked if he could “conceive of anything” that would make the Three Sisters Bridge and the 

North Leg unneeded, he said highway builders were “never short of customers.” Transit could 

meet some needs, but the “bulk of the trips” will still be on freeways and streets. [“Near Halt 

Seen in D.C. Freeways,” The Sunday Star, July 28, 1963] 

In early August, Lee Flor reported that Virginia highway officials were in no doubt about the 

need for the Three Sisters Bridge. In a January letter never officially released, Governor Albertis 

S. Harrison, Jr., had said that Virginia was “not opposed to rapid transit,” but he objected to 
NCTA’s claim that rapid transit would seriously cut the need for highways. More recently, F. A. 

Davis, deputy commissioner of the Virginia Highway Department, had written to Chairman 

Fallon, with copies for the State’s congressional delegation, in support of the bridge. Not 

building the Three Sisters Bridge would be “an almost intolerable situation.” Davis sincerely 

hoped Chairman Fallon’s subcommittee would recommend construction of the bridge. “It is our 

feeling that all of the highways now planned will be needed, particularly those on the interstate 

system, regardless of any mass transit system as now proposed.” 

The uncertainty about the bridge was delaying completion of plans for I-66 “because we have no 

way of knowing the number of lanes that will be required.” The planned freeway was to be eight 

lanes through suburban areas, but an interchange was to separate six lanes to cross the Potomac 

River on the six-lane Theodore Roosevelt Bridge while other lanes were diverted to the Three 

Sisters Bridge. [Flor, Lee, “Virginia Will Press For Sisters Bridge,” The Evening Star, August 2, 

1963; “State Halts Planning on River Route,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, August 3, 

1963] 

Colonel Duke, in an August 17 appearance on “Report to the People,” said officials had still not 

decided whether the city would hire expert consultants for the reexamination. The concern was 

that the resulting report would be just another expert report to be piled atop other, conflicting 

reports on the same subject. Instead of resolving the dispute, it might simply prolong it. 

Nevertheless, the District expected to complete the reexamination in mid-December. [“Road 

Restudy Finish Slated In December,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, August 18, 1963] 

As Congress returned from its August recess, the District of Columbia was awaiting action on 

measures affecting such subjects as crime, urban renewal, home rule, and transportation. 

NCTA’s proposal for a $793 million subway and rapid rail system was among them. Chairman

Bible was delaying action until the House completed its work on the proposal. However, 

Representative Broyhill thought that passage of legislation was “highly improbable” in the first 

session of the 88th Congress. The national bill to establish a national urban transit program was 

in trouble in the economy-minded House: 

Since the local bill calls for twice as much total expenditures as the national bill, it would 

be premature to try to push through the local bill, Mr. Broyhill said. 

He did not see any evidence of “a vicious highway lobby opposing the transit program,” but he 

recognized that highway supporters were defending freeways from cutbacks that NCTA had 

recommended.

Meanwhile, O. Roy Chalk continued seeking legislation that would ensure a private role in the 

transit plan. He promoted a bill calling for a Senate study of D.C. Transit’s profits. A House bill 

would establish a 6.5-percent rate of return as a floor rather than a ceiling. He favored a bill that 

would transfer decisions on the company’s fuel and real estate tax exemptions from the D.C. 

Public Utilities Commission to the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission. [“Sheaf 

of D.C. Bills Waits in Congress,” The Sunday Star, September 1, 1963] 
On September 3, the District commissioners held a public hearing to consider the Center Leg and 

South Leg of the Inner Loop Freeway. The hearing began with discussions of the Center Leg by 

Albert A. Grant, chief engineer of the District’s Office of Planning and Programming, and the 

South Leg by NPS Director Wirth.

Grant said the Central Leg Freeway, from the Southwest Freeway to New York Avenue, would 

be built in a tunnel under the Mall on the west side of the Capitol. In all, it would displace an 

estimated 630 housing units with 1,600 occupants, and 105 businesses. However, by using the 

airspace over the freeway, the District could completely replace the housing. (Congress had 

approved air-rights legislation nationally, but Grant said that Congress would have to pass 

legislation allowing the District to build over the freeways.)

BPR had questioned the eligibility of the Center Leg for Interstate 90-10 funds because it was too 

close to another Interstate route. Recently, however, BPR had informed the city that the Center 

Leg Freeway was eligible for Interstate funds. As a result, the District’s 10-percent share 

amounted to $4.6 million instead of $23.3 million if built on the 50-50 matching ratio of nonInterstate Federal-aid projects.

Regarding the Center Leg Freeway, Wirth recommended that the city shift it west to avoid trees 

near the Ulysses S. Grant Memorial at the foot of Capitol Hill. Jack Eisen pointed out: 

The project’s biggest single stumbling block was not even mentioned—the refusal of the 

House Office Building Commission to back legislation that would permit a freeway 

tunnel beneath a small corner of the Capitol grounds at Independence ave. and Canal st., 

sw.

This action, apparently reflecting the views of the late House Speaker Sam Rayburn, 

would block the freeway or distort its design. Rayburn didn’t want the freeway to run 

close to the new House Office Building that now bears his name. 

Despite such concerns, he summarized the statements during the hearing: 

Almost everybody who appeared before the District Commissioners either agreed the 

Center Leg of the Inner Loop Freeway is needed or that its construction is a foregone 

conclusion. The big question was what route it should take once it leaves the foot of 

Capitol Hill and heads toward its north end near Jersey and Florida aves. nw. 

Referring to the citizen speakers, he said:

The main freeway critics were young men who are old hands at such appearances—Peter 

Glickert, representing the Federal of Citizens Associations, and Peter S. Craig, 

spokesman for the Committee of 100 on the Federal City. 

Glickert suggested building the Center Leg under 3rd Street north of Pennsylvania Avenue, NW. 

He also said that the plan to limit east-west crossings to five streets (Pennsylvania, Constitution, 

New York, E and K) would hamper crosstown traffic and bus service. He also recommended 
enlarging the northwest urban renewal area to make renewal funds available for relocation of 

those displaced by the freeway.

Craig said that in planning freeways, the city had disregarded the L’Enfant plan, but he 

acknowledged that it was too late to do anything about that. He commended the South Leg 

plans, but said the Center Leg Freeway represented a “shocking failure” in highway planning. It 

was “a parody on planning . . . an ugly gash . . . an impenetrable motor vehicle sewer . . . a 

moat.” As for using freeway airspace for housing, Craig said that highway officials were 

showing “absolutely nothing” to prove its claims. He also recommended shifting the Center Leg 

to a location between 3rd and 4th Streets, NW., with vertical walls.

(Aitken responded to Craig by writing to Neill Phillips, chairman of the Committee of 100, to say 

that “your spokesman was unaware of or chose to ignore, other proposals for structures over the 

center leg. Recognizing your own objectivity and your sense of fair plan, I urge you to call these 

facts to the attention of the members of your committee.”) 

Bishop Smallwood E. Williams of the Bible Way Church located at 1130 New Jersey Avenue, 

NW., insisted on two recommendations. First, the Center Leg must not disturb his church. 

Second, he urged the District commissioners to “see to it that adequate housing be provided 

before one bulldozer or steam shovel demolishes any housing in the area” of the Center Leg: 

The city’s Negro residents, he said, “look upon the bulldozer as the people in Europe 

looked upon the Panzer tanks, demolishing our homes.” 

He also questioned the city’s estimate of the number of people who would be displaced by the 

Center Leg.

Several witnesses were concerned about the impact on specific properties:

Similarly, other critics assailed the highway’s taking of the Esso Building, the McShain 

Building, Holy Rosary Catholic Church and a soon-to-be-started 10-story apartment 

house, to cost $2.5 million, at 3d and E sts. nw. 

Other witnesses were more supportive. Robert H. Levi of Downtown Progress told the 

commissioners that the Center Leg was necessary to complement the “action plan” for 

revitalizing a 148-block downtown area through use of urban renewal powers. Groups such as 

the D.C. Advisory Board of AAA, the Metropolitan Washington Board of Trade, and the Federal 

City Council supported the plans. (Harold Wirth of the board of trade urged the city to allow 

enough clearance in the South Leg tunnels (141⁄2 feet instead of the planned 121⁄2 feet) to permit 

their use by military vehicles in the event of a national emergency.)

Overall, as The Washington Daily News summarized, “The District Plans for the South and 

Center Legs of the Inner Loop highway system met with surprisingly little opposition at the 

Commissioners’ public hearing today.” 

The South Leg segment of the public hearing will be discussed separately. [Eisen, Jack, “Width 

and Design of Freeway Draw Criticism at D.C. Hearing,” The Washington and Times Herald, 
September 4, 1963; “Inner Loop Plans Are Praised,” The Washington Daily News, September 3, 

1963; “Center Leg Freeway to Evict 1,600 Persons, 105 Firms,” The Evening Star, September 3, 

1963; “Officials Answer Highway Critics,” The Sunday Star, September 8, 1963] 

City officials, and the editors at the Star, were encouraged by the public hearing. The editors 

wrote:

There was high praise from almost every witness for the carefully planned south leg, 

which will route traffic through park areas around the Lincoln Memorial and the 

Washington Monument. And while there were understandable protests from property 

owners in the direct path of the center leg, virtually no one challenged the need for the 

central freeway.

This is a tribute to the good sense of the community. 

The only negative was the dispute with the Architect of the Capitol. “It is high time that 

someone in Congress, with a little more authority than Mr. Stewart, and a little more willingness 

to act, should stop it.” [“Support for the Loop,” The Evening Star, September 9, 1963] 

General Duke held a press conference on September 11 to discuss the Policy Advisory 

Committee reexamination of the Three Sisters Bridge and the North Leg. The review was 

proceeding smoothly. The committee, which he said was “not even considering” dropping either 

proposal, had identified four alternatives for the North Leg as Lee Flor described them in the 

Star: 

1. A pair of one-way streets, similar to the NCTA proposal;

2. Two westbound and two eastbound one-way streets;

3. Two three-lane tunnels beneath surface streets; and

4. Interstate freeways with 200- and 300-foot rights of way.

Jack Eisen provided a different summary in the Post: 

In planning for the North Leg of the Inner Loop Freeway, a crosstown route somewhere 

near T st. nw., Duke said one entirely new approach is being considered. 

A pair of double-deck roads would be built along existing streets. The bottom decks 

would be 3-lane tunnels, 11⁄2 to 2 miles long, for freeway traffic. The top decks would be 

on the surface, permitting access to cross streets and with signals timed for swift traffic 

movement. 

The other four proposals are two variations on standard 8-lane freeways–one of a narrow 

right-of-way, the other of “optimum” width–and two combinations of express one-way 

streets.

The committee had assigned staff subcommittees to study each alternative. The result would be 

multiple reports on possible transportation corridors for the freeway. 
The committee also was studying two alternative sites for the bridge (one upstream from Key 

Bridge and one downstream). 

In reexamining the two proposals, General Duke said, the committee was covering four areas: 

the social and economic impact of the Three Sisters Bridge and the North Leg, estimates of costs 

for the alternatives, the aesthetic designs for the projects, and traffic estimates.

He acknowledged that the agencies represented on the committee had feuded in the past. “I am 

particularly pleased with the spirit of the group . . . it has been a conscientious group.” 

The key was that the resulting projects must be eligible for inclusion in the Interstate System 

because financing was “very important.” Fortunately, he said, “the man who has a great deal [to 

do] with making the decision is on the committee.” He was referring to Federal Highway 

Administrator Whitton.

General Duke told reporters that committee members hoped to get their report to the District 

commissioners in early November. They would, he thought, be able to reply to President 

Kennedy “by the end of December.” [Flor, Lee, “Road, Bridge Restudy Progressing, Duke 

Says,” The Evening Star, September 11, 1963; Eisen, Jack, “3 Sisters Span Shift Is Studied,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, September 11, 1963] 

The Freeway-Transit Link

By the time of the press conferences, officials and observers recognized a link between resolution 

of the freeway debate and initiation of legislation to launch the rapid rail transit plan. “The 

committee,” General Duke told reporters, “is conscious that there may be a relationship 

developing between the re-examination and the transit bill.” The schedule he outlined meant that 

Congress would adjourn before President Kennedy reacted to the city’s recommendations. In 

that case, action on NCTA’s rail rapid transit plan would be postponed until 1964, an election 

year where action might be harder.

Eisen had reported the link as early as September 7 following Chairman Whitener’s statement 

making clear that the transit legislation would have to wait until the freeway fight is over:

His statement, made from his home-town office in Gastonia five weeks after transit 

hearings ended, was no surprise. The highway lobby and its allies in Congress have made 

it clear they will fight the Washington transit measure unless a green light is flashed for 

the city’s freeway program.

The villain of the situation, as the highway groups—and even some transit advocates—

see it, is Administrator C. Darwin Stolzenbach of the National Capital Transportation 

Agency.

The White House had reportedly tried to get Chairman Whitener to move on the bill and to get 

the Senate District Committee to hold hearings, but neither was budging. Chairman Whitener 

explained, “There is not much sense setting out on a collision course if the chances are good of 
having our craft destroyed.” Meanwhile, Senators wanted to use a House-passed bill as the basis 

for their hearings.

Chairman Fallon’s Subcommittee on Roads was the heart of support for the freeways: 

Fallon made it clear to a reporter that he regards completion of the freeway system here as 

vastly more important than a rail rapid transit system. If transit fails, it would be 

Stolzenbach’s own fault. [Eisen, Jack, “Subway Bill Derailed By Freeway Advocates,” 

The Washington Post and Times Herald, September 7, 1963] 

Or, as the Post editors put it:

The political impasse is clear enough. Until the subway authorization is guaranteed, the 

road program will be blocked in the Administration. And until there is a guarantee of the 

road program, the subway bill will be blocked in Congress. 

General Duke’s encouraging words suggested that if the impasse could not be broken until 1964, 

at least the intervening “time will have been well invested.” [“Hint of a Compromise,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, September 13, 1963] 

Horsky had spoken with Chairman Whitener and Senator Bible about getting the transit bill 

moving, but they saw two major problems, namely the cost of the District portion of the plan and 

the opposition from the Committee on Public Works. The White House had suggested that they 

separate transit and freeways, but the politicians did not think such a divided plan, no matter how 

carefully drawn, would last through even 1 day of hearings. Chairman Whitener said, “I think it 

might be very helpful if the ad hoc committee made its recommendation. It would deflate the 

highway-transit fight, which is an exaggerated controversy in that we need both rail and highway 

systems.” [Bassett, Grace, “White House Prods For Transit Action,” The Sunday Star, 

September 8, 1963] 

The city was, in the Post’s opinion, “paying the predictable price for the grievous political error 

made two years ago by Mr. Stolzenbach . . . who succeeding in elevating two projects, the Three 

Sisters Bridge and the Inner Loop’s North Leg, into symbols of the whole expressway system.” 

After the White House supported his views, “the partisans of the highway, convinced that the 

White House means to hold up the entire road construction program, are retaliating against the 

subway bill with vehemence and effect.” If the White House did not decide in favor of the 

freeways in the next few weeks, Congress would not act on the transit bill this year. Success in 

1964 was even “less likely.” Failure to begin the transit program “would constitute an 

unmitigated misfortune to this city.” [“Symbolism and the Subway,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, September 10, 1963] 

A hint of compromise came from an unlikely source: Polly Shackleton. In brief testimony 

before the Senate District Subcommittee on September 25, she “offered the olive branch,” as the 

Post put it. On public witness day, she acknowledged that her committee had “opposed 

vigorously several Highway Department proposals because they involved wholesale destruction 

of homes, schools, churches, parks, and playgrounds.” Other groups shared the committee’s 
“deep concern” about the impacts the freeways would have on “the thousands of families who 

would be uprooted.” Their combined voices had “been effective.” The East Leg Freeway had 

been shifted to the sparsely populated Anacostia River bank. Public agencies and private groups 

were attempting to increase the supply of low- and middle-income housing. 

Her committee was “particularly gratified” by President Kennedy’s call for reexamination of the 

North Leg Freeway, the Three Sisters Bridge, and the associated segment of the Potomac River 

Freeway. “We are hopeful that the committee chaired by General Duke and representing the 

various Federal and District agencies involved will be able to come up with a solution which, 

unlike the Highway Department plans, will largely eliminate or at least minimize the loss of 

homes and destruction of neighborhoods and community facilities.” 

Members of her committee were “much encouraged” by press accounts of the Policy Advisory 

Committee’s “completely new approach to the problem.” Because this new approach might help 

break the impasses, “I intend to propose to the Democratic central committee that we give careful 

and sympathetic study to the possibility, which has been suggested by General Duke, of utilizing 

tunnels under existing streets for freeway traffic, and await with interest further details of the 

plan.” 

Briefly, she said her committee was “in favor generally of a center leg,” but not the current 

location. She urged the District to restudy the location “to eliminate what we believe to be 

entirely unnecessary destruction of homes and church and neighborhood facilities.” [District of 

Columbia Appropriations for 1964, Hearings on H.R. 7431 Before the Subcommittee of the 

Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session, pages 793-794] 

The Post saw her brief testimony as suggesting that a truce was “rapidly taking form between the 

highway men and the subway men.” The Democratic Central Committee was, the editors 

suggested, dropping their campaign against the freeway segments, but had succeeded in focusing 

attention on the housing problem the bulldozers would cause: 

Our future historians will find it odd that the city, in this time of great urgency, chose to 

waste a year in shrill wrangling over these particular projects. The Three Sisters Bridge 

has nothing whatever to do with either the future transit system or with relocation. The 

north leg of the Inner Loop will not be built in this decade. 

The long debate was near a conclusion: 

Washington can afford to build expressways where they do not cause a net reduction in 

the housing supply. Where houses must be knocked down, they must be replaced. On 

that firm ground the whole city can meet. [“A Negotiated Peace,” The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, September 27, 1963] 

The Star referred to Shackleton’s statement as a “Ray of Hope” in an editorial, but added that it 

was too soon “to start tossing our hats in the air.” Nevertheless, her comments “offer strong hope 

that there may yet be a settlement of this nonsensical dispute.” Quoting several of her hopeful 

phrases, the editors did not want to underestimate “the job of reaching a ‘reasonable’ 
compromise.” Still, if the impasse could be settled “amicably,” the editorial said, “the chance for 

the Washington area to get to work on an equally essential rapid transit program will be increased 

immeasurably.” Perhaps, the editors mused, Mrs. Shackleton realized this: 

If so, she is wiser than a number of others in Washington, who apparently would rather 

see the transit program go down the drain, too, than to see any major freeways built. 

[“Ray of Hope,” The Evening Star, September 28, 1963] 

The Bobtail Plan 

Even as freeway advocates began to feel hopeful, NCTA’s rapid transit plan continued to lose 

momentum. Chalk continued to bash the plan. On October 9, the newly formed D.C. Committee 

for Balanced Transportation held a well-attended $100-a-plate testimonial for Chalk in the 

banquet hall of the Shoreham Hotel. The committee’s invitation stated that the purpose was to 

recognize the “many accomplishments for the area’s mass transportation system” by Chalk and 

his D.C. Transit System. F. Joseph (Jiggs) Donohue, a former District Commissioner under 

President Truman and currently with the District Democratic Central Committee, had created the 

organization. 

The Star referred to the committee’s name in quotes because it was organized by D.C. Transit 

System’s advertising agency. In the Post, Jack Eisen added, “So loaded is Donohue’s letterhead 

with the names of Chalk colleagues and business associates that no great mental effort is needed 

for a quick assumption that Chalk is giving himself a party.” He added that the committee’s 

address, where guests were to send their checks, was in the building housing the headquarters of 

AAA, which also opposed the rail transit plan.

In brief remarks, Chalk recommended that NCTA’s transit and highway program be turned over 

to established agencies and his private company. At present, NCTA’s proposal was impractical. 

The agency had proposed halting highway projects without consulting highway officials, and 

developed transit proposals without consulting privately owned bus companies. 

Donohue, an attorney who had lived in the District for 45 years, said his committee supported the 

Three Sisters Bridge and the rest of the District’s planned freeway system. He said the 

committee would take a position on NCTA’s transit proposal at a later date. [Eisen, Jack, 

“‘Balanced Transportation’ Interests Slate $100-a-Plate Dinner for Chalk,” The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, September 29, 1963; “Chalk at Testimonial Hits Transit, Road Plans,” The 

Evening Star, October 10, 1963] 

While Chalk was enjoying the testimonial, Chairman Whitener had still not advanced a transit 

bill for review by the subcommittee. At one point, he suggested the problem was that as a 

member of the Judiciary Committee, he was deeply involved in the committee’s consideration of 

the Kennedy Administration’s Civil Rights Act of 1963. As an opponent of the bill, he was 

attending as many as three committee meetings a week on the subject. He thought the next step 

in the transit bill would be hearings in the Senate by the Bible subcommittee, but Senator Bible 

indicated he was waiting for the House to act. [“Civil Rights Debate Perils Subway Bill,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, October 15, 1963] 
While continuing his efforts to halt the Civil Rights Act, Chairman Whitener had been 

considering the transit measure. He had concluded that the NCTA plan could never pass the 

House in view of its high cost. He also was concerned by opposition from the highway forces on 

the Subcommittee on Roads. Further, he was concerned that Stolzenbach had been unable to 

rally support in Maryland and Virginia. 

According to Professor Schrag, Chairman Whitener recalled Louis Justement’s suggestion during 

the hearings that, “I would much rather start with the body and have the downtown distribution 

system to which you could always add arms.” On October 16, the chairman surprised 

subcommittee members by summoning them for a meeting on October 23 to consider a scaled 

down transit system. Jack Eisen described it in the Post: 

The network omits most long hauls into the suburbs, with two lines stopped just inside 

Maryland and Virginia. Silver Spring would be served, but not Bethesda. Other 

suburban extensions would come later. 

As revised, the system would entail 23.3 miles of track costing nearly $401 million, 

contrasted with the 83 miles costing $793 million proposed last November by the 

National Capital Transportation Agency. 

Instead of a subway loop encircling the Mall with lines crossing at 12th and G sts, nw., the 

reduced system would be built around a single downtown subway along G st. 

Its general shape would be a lopsided X, with lines radiating to Anacostia, Silver SpringWoodside, Van Ness st., and Connecticut ave. nw. and Pentagon City. Short branches 

would go to the Rosslyn gateway to Arlington and to 17th st. and Columbia rd. nw. 

. . . . The new plan contemplates an investment of $141.7 million and borrowing of $259 

million.

From the start, the proposed network was known as the “bobtail” system. Eisen pointed out that 

it “bears a strong similarity to the total network proposed by the Mass Transportation Survey of 

1959.” 

Chairman Whitener said he worked out the system following talks with NCTA and “the Public 

Works Committee and the highway people.” The White House, which had been NCTA’s 

strongest backer, supported the plan. The Star reported that, “Specifically, the proposal by 

Mr. Whitener has the strong indorsement of Charles A. Horsky . . . .” 

The bobtail plan was silent on highway routes and bridges, a feature the chairman hoped would 

help it advance on the House floor. He said there would be “no elimination of needed outlying 

highways, at least.” [Eisen, Jack, “Shorter Subway System Here Weighed,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, October 17, 1963; Eastman, Sam, “White House Backs Shorter Rail 

Plan,” The Evening Star, October 17, 1963; Schrag, pages 57-58] 

The early reaction to the bobtail plan was largely favorable. Edwin Seeger of NCTA, which had 

drafted the bobtail plan at Chairman Whitener’s request, said officials were satisfied with the 
abbreviated plan because it might lead to faster congressional action. Engineer Commissioner 

Duke said the District commissioners had endorsed the original NCTA plan, but liked the bobtail 

plan even better, in part because it might help resolve the freeway controversies. John Kohl of 

the Housing and Home Finance Agency also endorsed the bobtail plan, saying the proposals 

“seem to be consistent with the long-range plan” for the area. The Metropolitan Area Highway 

Users Conference endorsed the plan as “far more realistic” than the original NCTA proposal, 

telling Chairman Whitener in a letter that, “the proposal is worthy of serious consideration, but it 

must be kept in mind that the freeway program is still stalled.”

The Star concluded that the plan “makes good sense,” especially since the broader NCTA plan 

“does not have a chance of passing this year.” [From The Evening Star, “Scaled-Down Transit 

Plan Meets Favor” (October 18, 1963), “Transit-State One” (October 18, 1963), “Highway Users 

Back New Transit Proposal (October 20, 1963), and “Transit Aide Indorses 23.3-Mile Rail 

System” (October 21, 1963); “Subway Plan Hailed as ‘Realistic,’” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, October 20, 1963] 

On October 23, the District Subcommittee met in executive session to consider the new plan. 

The chairman was hoping for a quick okay, but members anticipated the questions that would be 

raised during floor consideration – and they wanted answers the chairman did not have. In 

particular, they wanted to be sure the financing plan for the bobtail system was sound. 

Instead of voting for the plan, the subcommittee decided to ask more than 20 government 

agencies and organizations, including civic, transportation, labor, and special interest groups, to 

review and comment on it by November 12. The request made clear that the subcommittee was 

looking for comments on the financial details and estimates that were made public only on the 

day of the meeting. Lee Flor summarized the plan: 

According to the single financial table made public today, here is how the system would 

be financed and constructed: 

The transportation agency would need $120 million in Federal grants, plus 

$21.7 million from the District, by 1967. The financial table shows no provision 

for repayment of these funds. 

Then between 1967 and 1973, the transportation agency of the Federal Treasury would 

issue the $310 million in Federally guaranteed bonds to pay for construction. 

As Jack Eisen put it, “Washington’s bobtailed subway bill began to nose off its congressional 

sidetrack yesterday at the speed of a bus caught in a traffic jam.” He added that the chairman had 

already received one response without even asking for it. Chalk called the bobtail plan 

“wasteful” and “archaic,” reiterating his view that the private sector should build and run the 

subway. According to Eisen, Whitener replied with a “polite thank you.” [Flor, Lee, “Rail 

Transit Comment Asked of 20 Agencies,” The Evening Star, October 24, 1963; Eisen, Jack, 

“Congress Calling for Citizens’ Views on Budging Sidetracked Subway Bill,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, October 24, 1963] 
Chairman Whitener discussed the bobtail plan on television station WTTG-TV’s “Community 

Dialogue” program on October 27. He said highway and transit supporters should “fall in line” 

with the bobtail plan “because of the great need of some solution for our traffic and 

transportation problems here in the District.” He added, “Certainly those who commute daily 

should look forward with great pleasure to having a rapid transit system.” He anticipated that the 

bill would pass the House before adjournment. The Senate District Committee, he predicted, 

would then “move with dispatch” to complete Senate work on the bill. 

Polly Shackleton, also on the program, told viewers, “We could never build enough highways to 

accommodate all the commuters and all the people who use them.” Therefore, it was “absolutely 

imperative to get started on a rail rapid transit system in order to accommodate thousands of 

commuters . . . .” 

Executive Director Delmer Ison of the transit commission raised a concern relating to the fact 

that the current bus system had 640 downtown stops while the bobtail rail system would have 

only 14 stops. He said the transit commission had “considerable doubt as to whether 14 stops 

can adequately replace 640 stops.” [“Subway Transit Action Seen Soon in House,” The Evening 

Star, October 28, 1963] 

The White House endorsed the plan in a November 4 letter from Phillip S. Hughes, Assistant 

Director for Legislative Reference, Bureau of the Budget. Hughes wrote:

Since the proposed schedule for the longer transit regional development program 

extended in any event over the period 1964-73, it would not be inappropriate for the 

Congress at this time to authorize construction of parts of that program which are 

consistent with, and at the same time essential elements of, the longer range regional 

development plan. Indeed, the knowledge gained in the development of the limited 

system will provide factual data upon which to base future decisions to expand the system 

into the regional transit program originally proposed by the Agency. 

Hughes observed that the proposed bill “would not interfere with negotiations currently 

underway looking to the establishment of a regional compact agency with authority for 

development and administration of a regional transportation program.” 

The White House continued to believe the original NCTA plan was “the most desirable transit 

system from the standpoint of service, downtown distribution, and maximum contribution to a 

balanced regional transportation system.” Any shorter-range program should be advanced with 

the understanding that a large plan was awaiting implementation. However, Hughes concluded: 

The system outlined in H.R. 8929 is the essential core of a long-range transit 

development program and is in line with recognized broad regional developmental 

objectives. Accordingly, its enactment would be consistent with the administration’s 

objectives.

Also on November 4, Commissioner Tobriner wrote to Chairman McMillan of the District 

Committee on behalf of the District commissioners. Development of mass transit facilities was 
“a critical need,” Tobriner wrote. After years of intensive study, the time had come for “positive 

action,” with an early start “a matter of vital concern to the District, as well as to the Federal 

Government.” 

Tobriner commented that the original NCTA plan called for 25 miles of rail-transit facilities in 

the District, with a local contribution of $21.7 million. The bobtail plan called for only 16.5 

miles of rail-transit facilities, but the District’s contribution was the same amount as for the 

larger system:

Thus, in the substituted version, the taxpayers of the District contribute the same sum for 

a reduced rapid transit system. Nevertheless, the Commissioners are confident that this 

contribution is a reasonable one. However, the Commissioners are hopeful that no 

additional contribution beyond the contemplated $27.1 million will be required of the 

District in the event that the system is subsequently expanded to that originally planned. 

In view of the serious need to improve mass transportation facilities in the District, the 

Commissioners recommend approval of H.R. 8929. 

The District subcommittee published the more than 50 comments received on the bobtail 

legislation in: Transportation Program for the National Capital Region (Supplement to Hearings 

before Subcommittee No. 6 of the Committee on the District of Columbia, U.S. House of 

Representatives, 88th Congress, 1st Session (Hughes letter, pages 16-17, Tobriner letter 18-19). 

On November 13, the Whitener subcommittee approved the bill authorizing the bobtail plan. 

The chairman told reporters after the closed session that the members approved the plan without 

controversy. He added, “It’s fair to say that there are some members who wanted to approve the 

83-mile system.” However, as Representative Broyhill told reporters, the bobtail plan was “all 

we thought we could sell to Congress.” He was satisfied that the bobtail plan would not harm the 

private bus companies with lines into Maryland and Virginia because passengers would have to 

use the buses to reach the rail system.

The House District Committee approved the bill authorizing the bobtail plan on December 5, 

1963, by an 11-2 vote. The committee adopted only one amendment, requested by Architect of 

the Capitol Stewart. The amendment provided that any construction through the Capitol grounds 

would be prohibited unless approved by the Congressional Commission for Extension of the U.S. 

Capitol.

Representatives Abraham J. Multer (D-NY) and Richard L. Roudebush (R-In.) were the negative 

votes. The committee had rejected Representative Multer’s two amendments. One, in line with 

D.C. Transit System’s views, would have required that private enterprise build and operate the 

transit network. The other amendment would have protected labor interests. Representative 

Broyhill said committee members thought those issues should not be written into a bill that 

merely authorizes the system. [Eastman, Sam, “D.C. Subway Bill Advances,” The Evening Star, 

December 5, 1963; Carper, Elsie, “House Unit Approves D.C. Subway,” The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, December 6, 1963] 
The committee issued a report on the bill on December 6. The report emphasized the urgency of 

the need:

The National Capital region faces a transportation crisis. Its streets and highways are 

burdened with ever-increasing volumes of traffic creating a congestion problem that has 

grave consequences for the District and the suburbs alike. Traffic congestion limits 

mobility within the District and the region. It results in excessive amounts of premium 

land, particularly in downtown Washington, being used for surface parking facilities. The 

daily crush of commuters moving between their homes and places of employment entails 

costly losses in time and money . . . . 

There is universal agreement that it is impossible to meet this growing demand for 

transportation, or to ease today’s traffic problems, by means of highways alone . . . . In 

other words, the people of the National Capital region must be provided a real choice 

between using public transportation, or using their private automobiles for trips to and 

from their places of employment.

Commuters did not have that choice “in any meaningful sense” because of the inadequacies of 

bus service:

The conclusion is inescapable that if Washington is to achieve a higher percentage of 

public transportation – as it must do if the traffic congestion problem is to be solved – 

nothing short of a rail rapid transit system operating in subway and on exclusive rights-ofway can do the job. [Transit Development Program for the National Capital Region, U.S. 

House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 1005 to accompany 

H.R, 8929, December 6, 1963, pages 7-8] 

The report also addressed union concerns. Unions wanted the bill to make clear that the DavisBacon Act, approved in the 1930s to ensure prevailing wages, applied to construction of the 

system. Unions also wanted the bill to establish a labor relations policy for employees after the 

system began operating. Because the Davis-Bacon Act applied to every contract with Federal 

funds exceeding $2,000, the report said that since NCTA was a Federal Agency, the committee 

concluded that explicitly applying the law to the project was unnecessary. 

As for the second issue, the bill provided for construction, but left open whether the system 

would be operated by NCTA, another Federal Agency, or an agency created by compact among 

local jurisdictions. With operations possibly not beginning until 1970, “the proposal for 

immediate establishment of a labor relations policy is premature.” Further, the provision of the 

National Capital Transportation Act of 1960 on labor relations remained in effect. Under the 

provision, NCTA could not establish a labor relations policy until Congress established a policy 

on the right to organize, to bargain collectively, to arbitrate disputes, and safeguard job rights. 

This provision, in the committee’s view, “provides adequate protection for transit workers during 

the construction phase.” [pages 14-15] 

On the day before the House was to consider the bill, opposition forces made their plans clear. 

Chalk accused the White House’s District advisor, Horsky, of plotting to put D.C. Transit System 
out of business. Horsky, according to Chalk, had applied “terrific pressure” behind the bill. 

Chalk said he spoke with Horsky on December 6 to ask if private enterprise would be allowed to 

operate the system. Horsky provided only “evasive answers.” 

Chalk sent a night telegram to all 435 Representatives saying the legislation “provides for a 

minimum addition of $400 million to the national debt to build an outmoded, stopgap subway 

system for the District of Columbia with no provision protecting private enterprise against public 

operation.” The bill would “saddle the government with public ownership of this system and 

create a governmental Frankenstein without any experience in the transit field to run it.” Chalk 

urged the House to amend the bill to “provide for experienced private operation by D.C. Transit 

System, Inc., pursuant to the act of Congress granting its franchise.” [Flor, Lee, “D.C. Transit’s 

Head Attacks City Rail Plan,” The Sunday Star, December 8, 1963] 

As debate began on December 9, Chalk arrived in the House gallery around noon. “I’m very 

confident it will go my way,” he told reporters. 

Meanwhile, Representative Multer, who represented a district in New York City, was mapping 

out his strategy for the floor debate. He intended to introduce his two rejected amendments 

during the debate. The National Transit Workers Union was canvassing House members urging 

them to reject the bill. The union also sent telegrams to all Representatives.

Nevertheless, Chairman Whitener was cautiously optimistic. “I don’t think it’s in the bag, but I 

could see no reason why we shouldn’t go on and make our decision. I hope it will be favorable.” 

 [“House Fight on Subway Mapped Out by Multer,” The Evening Star, December 9, 1963] 

Post editors were worried about the labor issues, which posed the “most immediate danger to the 

bill.” The editors referred to the 1960 Act’s provision calling on Congress to establish a labor 

relations policy:

If the unions force a debate now on labor standards, they will jeopardize the whole system 

upon which their members’ future jobs depend. They will only invite the opponents of 

the subway to strike up an alliance with the antagonists of organized labor. 

If the unions were wise, they would “wholeheartedly support” the bill now and defer subsidiary 

issues such as labor relations “until the system with its promise of jobs is securely authorized.” 

After 5 years of planning, the bill offered an alternative to sprawl and “unimaginable traffic 

congestion everywhere.” The editorial concluded that, “A vote for this bill is a vote for a more 

comfortable and convenient life for the city’s people.” [“Subway and Sanity,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, December 9, 1963] 
The House Debates the Bobtail Plan

On the House floor, Chairman Whitener asked that the House resolve itself into a Committee of 

the Whole and that debate be limited to 2 hours and divided equally between Representative 

Broyhill and himself.

The chairman began by saying he had heard a great deal of discussion of the bill already and had 

“observed there is a great deal of misunderstanding about some of the content of this legislation, 

as well as the effect of some of the amendments which I understand will be offered.” He 

discussed the area’s congestion and the long battle to achieve balance among highways and 

transit. The bill, he said, called for a total Federal contribution of $120 million compared with 

Federal expenditures of about $75 million a year on highway construction in the region. 

Considering all the highways the area’s highway departments want to build in the absence of a 

transit system, “and that these additional highways still won’t provide the answer, it seems clear 

to me that the proposed Federal contribution to the rapid transit system is entirely reasonable.” 

He emphasized that this bill was completely separate from the Urban Transportation Act of 1963, 

still pending in Congress. That bill created a national program, while the present bill was limited 

to the Washington area. Without Federal involvement, the District would never build a subway 

or the extended rail rapid transit system:

I, for one, consider the national mass transit bill to raise issues of Federal financial and 

administrative involvement in local matters that are completely unrelated to the issue at 

hand. In contrast, under the Constitution, the Federal Government is very deeply 

involved in the affairs of the Nation’s Capital, for these affairs were rightly considered by 

the framers of the Constitution to be matters of national concern. 

Therefore, he supported the present bill for the Washington area while the national bill remained 

to be decided on its merits later.

In closing his opening statement, he addressed the two issues that had caused the most concern in 

recent days. First was the proposal to amend the bill to allow private enterprise to construct and 

operate the rapid transit system. A proposed project of this magnitude “requires the constant 

scrutiny of the Congress,” a goal that could best be achieved by allowing a Federal Agency, 

namely NCTA, to build it. By the time the system becomes operational in 4 or 5 years, 

“Congress will have ample opportunity to consider the question of how the system should be 

operated.” He did not see any reason to delay construction while Congress debated how the 

system will be operated.

Second was the proposal to include “a rather complicated labor relations policy” in the bill. He 

pointed out that in passing the National Capital Transportation Act of 1960, Congress had 

considered a similar provision. “Congress included in the act a provision stating in the clearest 

of terms that before an operation could begin, Congress would enact a bill establishing such a 

labor relations policy.” The thinking at the time was that such a policy would be premature until 

Congress decided what entity would operate the system. In the meantime, labor is fully protected 

throughout construction by the 1960 Act and other existing Federal laws. 
During the 10 years that Congress had been considering transit options for the area, “the very 

problem that this program is designed to solve . . . has grown worse and worse. The time for 

action to solve the problem has arrived, if it is not in fact overdue.” [Transit Development 

Program for the National Capital Region, Congressional Record-House, December 9, 1963, 

pages 23854-23855] 

Representative Broyhill, the ranking Republican on the House District Committee, told his 

colleagues that he considered the bill “absolutely essential to the health, well-being, and beauty 

of our Nation’s Capital.” It involved bringing “a major innovation” to the area in the form of “a 

modern, high-speed, high-capacity rail rapid transit system.” He discussed the history leading to 

this bill, including the Mass Transportation Survey and the 1960 Act. 

He assured his colleagues that the Federal cost for the bill’s bobtail plan would be $120 million, 

while the District’s share would be $21.7 million: 

The balance of $258.9 million plus interest requirements during construction will be 

repaid out of the revenues of the system. It is anticipated that the system will repay its 

bonded debt over a period of 36 years, and that we may reasonably expect a refunding of 

government grants during later years. 

These projections were based on a 25-cent base fare within the 10-mile square of the original 

District of Columbia and a maximum of 55 cents to the farthest point, which was Bowie, 

Maryland. 

The bill left “many important questions unanswered.” It was designed to begin construction of 

needed facilities, “a time-consuming proposition.” With construction underway, additional 

legislation would be introduced to authorize bond financing and determine how the system would 

be operated. The operational issue involved “complex questions concerning the nature of the 

organization which is to control and operate the system, the rights of the private transportation 

companies that are presently serving the region, labor relations, and many others.” These 

questions needed to be answered, but the answers can come after construction is underway. 

Representative Charles R. Jonas (R-NC) said he was undecided about the bill, but wanted to 

know why the taxpayers of every State should pay 30 percent of the cost of the system while 

District residents paid only 5 percent. Representative Broyhill replied that the percentages were 

based on the national urban transit bill under consideration in Congress, where the Federal 

Government would contribute two-thirds of the cost of Federal-aid transit projects. Further, the 

taxing authority of the District was limited. “We could tax the District of Columbia to a point of 

diminishing returns but this would accomplish no useful purpose.” He added, “I do not think we 

can shirk our responsibility to see that the Nation’s Capital is properly financed or properly run.” 

 [pages 23856-23857] 

Representative B. F. Sisk (D-Ca.), a member of the House District Committee, discussed the 

importance of the bill, which would get construction underway: 
In the meantime the rights of the private transportation companies in the area and the 

interests of my good friends in the labor movement will be undisturbed. In fact . . . the 

bill by providing new jobs here . . . will be a very great help to labor. 

Transit labor’s concerns would be met before operation began, while the 1960 Act expressly 

prohibits NCTA from acquiring “facilities, property, or rights-of-way of private motorbus 

companies” and operate buses or similar motor vehicles “or make agreements for the provision 

of motorbus service competitive with private transit companies.” While construction was 

underway, Congress would decide whether the system would be operated by a public agency or 

private company. In closing, he said, “Transportation relief in Washington can come about only 

if the Federal Government commits itself to the task and takes the first step.” [pages 23857-

23859] 

Representative Roudebush said that he had voted against the bill in committee. “For the life of 

me I am unable to differentiate between a system of this type as proposed by this legislation and 

those systems to be proposed in the so-called mass transportation legislation.” He intended to 

oppose the national legislation and the current bill for the Washington area. He questioned the 

projection that the bobtail rapid transit system would pay for itself. “What if this curtailed 

system does not pay off financially.” He continued: 

It looks to me as though the Federal Government will not only lose its $121 million 

contribution but will be saddled with [the] requirement that we make good the $258.9 

million in bonds and possibly be on the hook for the $21.7 million for the District 

contribution. 

He was opposed not just to the Washington plan but to Federal involvement in mass transit 

anywhere in the country “if the Federal Government is required to pay for it.” He planned to 

support the planned motion to recommit the bill to committee. [page 23859] 

Representative William B. Widnall (R-NJ) said it was time “to start talking sense.” He was 

referring to “the apparently useless debate over the so-called highway transit issue.” He used the 

phrase “so-called” because everybody agreed the area needed its Interstate highways as soon as 

possible and felt the same way about the rapid transit system. Only two portions of the Interstate 

System were in doubt, but they were “temporarily deferred to see if there is not a way to 

construct them so as to avoid injury to parklands and undue displacement of people.” He 

understood that rapid progress was being made and that President Johnson would soon announce 

the results.

Constructing the rapid transit system was essential. “Indeed, the usefulness of the Interstate 

Highway System depends to a very large extent on the existence of a companion rapid transit 

system.” He was concerned that without the transit system, the area’s Interstate highways “will 

suffer the fate of so many other urban freeways around the country which are intolerably 

congested with automobiles almost from the moment the ribbon is cut.” Congress owed it to the 

citizens of the Nation’s Capital to “maintain an efficient transportation system.” He would vote 

for the bill. [page 23860] 
Representative Multer discussed his objections to the bill. First, he thought Congress should 

start with the highest District priorities. If Congress had only $20 million to spend in the 

District, spending it on “education and educational facilities” should come first. As for the $400 

million cost of the bobtail system, anyone reading the bill will “find this is a blank check.” The 

bill does not limit how much NCTA will spend, but it does guarantee that whether the money 

comes from the Federal Government or the District, “every dollar will be Government money or 

Government guaranteed.” 

Second, the bill “completely ignores the rights of labor.” As a member of the Committee on 

Banking and Currency, he was “a little amused by the irony” that the same people who often 

accused him “of driving private enterprise out of our system . . . and replacing it with 

Government” were now “advocating public ownership and operation of a new transit system in 

the District of Columbia.”

Third, “the planners who came in with the plan are utterly incompetent as planners, and if they 

are incompetent as planners, they are more incompetent as builders and operators of a subway 

system.” He explained this charge by saying that the best way to relieve congestion in the center 

city was to provide parking lots in the suburbs so people can leave their cars and take transit into 

the city, “as we do in New York City”:

These planners are going to compound the difficulty by building a subway first, the 

experimental part right in the heart of the city. How are you going to get there except by 

bringing the automobiles to the heart of the city in order to use the subway? That is why I 

say the planners were incompetent.

The bill should be returned to committee to develop “a proper plan . . . so that we can get a rapid 

transit system that will do the job.”

Representative Multer also took exception to a colloquy between Chairman Whitener and 

Representative Horton about whether anyone had testified during subcommittee hearings that 

private interests would construct the subway system. The chairman had replied, “I remember no 

such testimony.” Representative Multer pointed out that the supplemental hearing record 

included proposals by private enterprise to build the transit network. “They tell you they can do a 

job of improving transportation in the District of Columbia by spending $103 million of their 

own money.” They also said that after doing so, they would “provide for a realistic test project, a 

rail rapid transportation system, in an area most suitable for such a system.” 

The Congressman was referring to a letter dated October 31, 1963, that Chalk submitted to 

Chairman McMillan. Chalk said that “even to the untrained eye,” the only difference between 

the NCTA and bobtail plans was that “the suburban arteries, originally declared to be vital, have 

been eliminated.” The result was “an otherwise impractical and inadequate system is rendered 

even more impractical and inadequate.” He proposed the construction of 160 additional miles of 

express busways on separate lanes, reserved for buses during peak periods, along with a minibus 

service in the downtown area, all for $103 million. Once that service was in operation, he would 

test the Lockheed monorail technology on 5 miles of elevated, suspended railway – all before the 
area spent $1 billion on a subway system. (Supplement to Hearings before Subcommittee No. 6 

of the Committee on the District of Columbia, pages 41-44] 

Representative Multer summarized his point by saying the job “must be done” to provide transit 

in the Washington area, but “whenever private enterprise can do the job, the Government should 

not do it.” He concluded: 

Sure you have a lot of clamor from all around the city and all the agencies to do 

something about transit. I want to do it now, but I want to do it correctly. 

Chairman Whitener pointed out that Chalk had sent a telegram to every member of the House “in 

which he said the proposal was a proposal of an outmoded system, but he wound up saying he 

wanted to operate it.” Representative Multer said he had not seen it, but would offer an 

amendment that would invite D.C. Transit System or anyone else in the private sector to take 

over the job. [pages 23860-23861] 

Representative Mathias talked about the urgency of getting started:

We have reserved to the Congress virtually all of the authority contemplated by the 

Constitution to control practically everything that happens within the District of 

Columbia. With that authority goes responsibility. It is that responsibility which we are 

being called upon to discharge today. 

He planned to vote for the bill “because it is a sheer necessity.”

Representative Frank T. Bow (R-Oh.) suggested to Representative Mathias that much of the 

congestion could be relieved if federal agencies were dispersed out of the Washington area 

instead of concentrating them in the District. Representative Mathias replied that the reason so 

many agencies are located in the Washington area is that the District of Columbia is the seat of 

the national government designated under the Constitution. Nevertheless, Representative 

Mathias said, “90 percent of the Federal Government employees today are located in places other 

than the Washington metropolitan area.” He added that with the expected population increases 

over the next 30 years, “we have to make an urgent decision now.” [page 23862] 

Representative Alvin E. O’Konski (R-Wi.) wanted to put the bill in “its true perspective.” The 

Senate, he said, had passed the Urban Mass Transportation Act authorizing grants and loans 

totaling $325 million. The House, “in its wisdom,” had refused to take up the bill. And yet: 

Here you have a bill that calls upon the taxpayers of the United States of America to 

underwrite in one way or another $406 million for just one little speck on the map of the 

United States; namely, the District of Columbia.

True, the District would contribute $22 million, but “when the District of Columbia in its great 

feeling of good will says that they will donate $22 million they will just come to us and ask for 

$22 million of the taxpayers’ money as that share because they are using that money for this 

purpose.” 
He also questioned the revenue estimates that assured repayment of the Federal contribution and 

payment of expenses out of the farebox. Everyone knew that every transit system in the country 

is “operating in the red.” Moreover, the fact that the bill calls for the bonds to be guaranteed by 

the Federal Government “is an admission of the fact that the bonds could not be sold on the open 

market; nobody would buy a dollar’s worth” otherwise. 

The House had recent experience with such revenue projections in the congressional experience 

with the District Stadium. “The stadium is operating at a deficit, the bonds are in default, and the 

Government which guaranteed those bonds . . . are paying off those bonds.” 

He added that no one should think “that I am naïve enough to swallow the notion that this $259 

million is going to be paid back.” In his 22 years in the House, he had never seen a single 

proposal where a revenue-proposal involving Federal funds resulted in the Federal Government 

recouping “any of its money.” 

And this bobtail plan is just a start. “This is just the first bite, my friends, and remember that, 

when I propose a motion to recommit the bill back to the District Committee for further study.” 

[pages 23862-23863] 

Representative Everett G. Burkholter (D-Ca.), representing a district based in Los Angeles 

County, said that no matter how many city streets, highways, and freeways are built, “that is not 

the answer to the traffic problems in the urbanized cities today.” People suggest that private 

enterprise would become interested in mass transportation given that over 200 communities have 

populations over 50,000 people. However, all statistics and reports proved that mass 

transportation pays its own way, with public subsidy, in only three cities. They are Cleveland, 

San Diego, and Chicago, “and some of them are going in the red, I have been told recently.” 

That was why private enterprise was not interested in financing urban mass transportation. 

The number of vehicles on the roads must be reduced: 

Therefore, you are going to have to go overhead or underground by either subway or 

elevated, such as the monorail, or any kind of mass transportation, as long as it is elevated 

or underground. You are going to have to provide off-street parking facilities in all of the 

urbanized cities.

In sum, experts said let private industry do the job; no need for public funds. “We have been 

talking about that for 25 or 30 years, but we are no further ahead than at the beginning.” It was 

time to pass this bill for the Washington area. [page 23863] 

Representative Carlton R. Sickles (D-Md.) expressed concern that one of the problems with 

NCTA was its inadequate coordination with local jurisdictions. He wanted to be sure that once 

the bobtail plan was underway, NCTA would coordinate with Maryland and Virginia before 

decisionmaking. 

Regarding the labor issue, local jurisdictions were in negotiation on an interstate compact agency 

for operating the transit system. As a member of Maryland’s negotiating team, Representative 

Sickles could tell his colleagues that, “We are just at the point of considering the issue of the 
labor policy with respect to the operational employees of the system.” The negotiators would be 

helped greatly if they knew the congressional policy. He had reviewed the labor policy proposed 

in 1960, “and for the life of me, I cannot see the reason for the delay in their consideration.” His 

constituents who worked for the transit company were “concerned, deeply concerned, about their 

seniority rights, and pension benefits, and they are concerned now.” He intended to vote in 

support of the labor amendment. [page 23765] 

Representative Harsha questioned passenger predictions based on surveys that he considered 

inadequate. Only 2,005 commuters had been surveyed. They had been asked: 

Considering bus and rail vehicles, with no difference in cost, time, or convenience, which 

would you prefer?

The Congressman emphasized the word “convenience” because the bobtail system would be less 

convenient than NCTA’s original system, if only because of needed transfers or having to drive 

somewhere, park, and board a transit vehicle. “Now, in this age of convenience, this is not 

equivalent to the convenience of a commuter’s automobile.” As a result, patronage would 

decline, meaning that the financing plan is not sound – “and the taxpayers have to subsidize the 

program.” He wondered how anyone could vote for this bill but against the national bill. He 

urged the House to reject the bill. [pages 23865-23866] 

The time had come for amendments. First was Representative Multer’s amendment prohibiting 

NCTA from beginning construction until it had “given private enterprise at least 6 months to 

submit offers to build, own and/or operate a transit system.” Similarly, once the system is built, 

NCTA must give private enterprise the opportunity to operate it. 

Representative Gross wanted to know if the amendment meant that private enterprise would pay 

for the system. Representative Multer replied, “This is the intent of my amendment,” adding: 

I have in mind we have a mass transportation bill pending in the Rules Committee which 

calls for money for the entire country, grants and loans, including the District of 

Columbia. If private industry comes forward after that bill is enacted into law, and is law, 

we should not exclude private enterprise from coming in and qualifying if they can. 

Chairman Whitener asked if Representative Multer was referring to D.C. Transit System, which 

the chairman indicated “is now receiving substantial subsidies from the Federal and District 

taxpayers.” Representative Multer denied he was referring to the company, but said the company 

did not receive a subsidy. “They get a certain tax exemption if their net income does not give 

them a 6-percent return. They have never yet earned that 6 percent. They get no subsidy from 

the Government.” He urged adoption of his amendment. 

The chairman admitted that a certain aspect of the amendment appealed to him since “I am a 

strong advocate of private enterprise and an opponent of excessive Government intervention.” 

He continued: 

But the hard, cold fact is that no private enterprise in the 7 or 8 days of the hearings we 

had appeared to talk on this situation here in the District of Columbia.
They knew, he said, “it is not feasible.” A private operator would have trouble with financing 

and acquiring right-of-way. He added that Representative Multer is fully familiar with the New 

York City subway and, therefore, “knows that no private operator could operate that system nor 

could they have built it originally.” He recommended the House defeat the amendment. 

The House agreed to the amendment, 82 to 37. 

Representative Multer offered his lengthy amendment containing labor provisions. He stated that 

the AFL-CIO prepared the amendment, but it had been rejected by the subcommittee and the 

committee:

Mr. Chairman, this amendment will preserve for the workers of the District of Columbia 

the right to bargain but not to strike. It will preserve for them the right to bargain as to 

wages, fringe benefits, and all of the other things that a worker should be entitled to 

bargain for. It contains this further provision that in any dispute—and I emphasize “any 

dispute”—the matter must be submitted to arbitration and the determination of the 

arbitrators is final and binding on all concerned. 

The amendment, if adopted, would affect what would happen after the system is built, but to 

those who suggested waiting until then to consider the amendment as provided for in the 1960 

Act, he said, “it also goes to what will happen the day after this bill is enacted into law. It will 

apply to anybody and everybody who is working in connection with the construction of this 

system.” True, the Davis-Bacon Act guarantees construction workers will be paid the prevailing 

wage. But beyond the prevailing wage, the amendment would “guarantee to them the fringe 

benefits and also the right to go in and bargain and present their grievances and obtain whatever 

remedy they may be entitled to.”

Representative Charles A. Halleck (R-In.) asked if the amendment provided for compulsory 

arbitration. Representative Multer replied that he did not “want to quibble about words.” If after 

negotiating in good faith, the sides could not agree, “they must submit to arbitration.” 

Arbitrators appointed by both sides would listen to their arguments and make a determination 

that would be “binding on both sides.” That, he added, is what the unions recommended for this 

bill.

Mr. Halleck. If the gentleman will yield further, is not that compulsory arbitration?

Mr. Multer. I suppose it is. 

After some further questions and discussion of the amendment, the House rejected it, with 61 

votes for and 91 opposed. 

Representative Barratt O’Hara (D-Il.), a journalist, editor, and commentator in Chicago, 

introduced an amendment that would prohibit the acquisition of any occupied home until the 

residents had been relocated. The House rejected the amendment.

With debate and consideration of amendments concluded, Chairman Whitener called for a vote 

on the bill. Before that vote could take place, Representative O’Konski offered a motion to 
recommit the bill to committee. The House voted in favor of the amendment to recommit the 

bill, 278 to 76. [pages 23872-23873] 

After 4 hours of debate, the House, in this way, rejected the bobtail plan and the bill to 

implement it.

In the Aftermath

After the House overwhelmingly defeated the bobtail plan, Commissioner Tobriner was bitter: 

I say a pox on both their houses. One thing is certain, unless the transportation problem is 

solved and effectuated shortly, the city and its environs face a dismal future. 

He added:

I am not biased in favor of subways or highways but I am definitely biased in favor of the 

people of the District and surrounding area having adequate transportation to and from 

their homes and places of employment in vehicles of their choice at costs commensurate 

with their means and with minimal dislocation of homes and businesses. 

The highway work currently authorized or shortly to be, must continue. 

He was particularly angry at NCTA:

The arrogant, unilateral approach of NCTA to this problem has done much to create the 

impasse which, if no solution is found, will doom the city’s economic future. 

What was needed, he said, was a presidential commission consisting of Members of Congress, 

representatives of the District and surrounding jurisdictions, citizens, governmental, business and 

labor groups. With support from a technical advisory group, the commission would be directed 

to reach decisions by a firm deadline.

Horsky, the White House aide who had strongly supported the bobtail plan, discussed options 

with Chairman Whitener, who was “not at all optimistic.” If the $400 million plan was too 

expensive for the House, he doubted a less costly plan could be developed that would be 

economically feasible.

Stolzenbach, who had watched the debate from the House gallery, told reporters he was “quite 

disappointed,” but the “basic idea is sound. We’ve got to keep going.” He remained determined: 

I didn’t become administrator of the National Capital Transportation Agency to preside 

over its dissolution. I presume this is not the last word of Congress.” 

NCTA’s staff was determined to find out why the House vote as it did: 

Part of the opposition, they found, resulted from complaints by the AFL-CIO that federal 

operation of transit would deny labor unions either binding arbitration or a right to strike, 

leaving them in an even worse position than under the Wolfsons [Chalk’s predecessors in 
operating the District’s bus service]. But the real reason for recommital [sic, to the 

District Committee] was that the House as a whole had paid little attention, and many 

members had no idea what the vote was about. When Deputy Administrator Quenstedt 

talked to some congressmen and their staffs, they assured him that the vote for 

recommital had been made out of caution, confusion, and a reluctance to make a big 

decision near the end of a session. Try again, they said. 

That was fine as a legislative strategy, but what was the NCTA staff to do? The agency 

was humbled by its initial defeat. Stolzenbach morosely canceled his earlier request for 

tens of millions of dollars for land acquisition and construction. More seriously, the 

agency’s staff was cut in half. [Thomas] Deen left for a consulting job, leaving 

transportation planning in the hands of William Herman, who was trained in finance, not 

engineering. [Schrag, pages 58-59] 

By contrast, Chalk was delighted. “The House acted wisely,” he said. “The vote indicated that 

Congress felt the Stolzenbach-Horsky plan is not the right plan.” In addition, he said, the House 

had “reasserted the right of private enterprise. Stolzenbach was discredited—or, at least, his plan 

is discredited.” 

Engineer Commissioner Duke was “very disappointed. I was hopeful . . . . That short version 

seemed to fit in with the balanced system we have all been trying to arrive at.” He was not sure 

what the next step was. “The District really needed it,” he said, but “we’ll have to withdraw and 

regroup.” 

Walter Bierwagen, the local union chief, had been disappointed when the House rejected the 

labor policy. Although defeat of the bill would cost union jobs in the area, he said, “Without the 

labor guarantees, I’d rather the bill was rejected.”

Jack Eisen in the Post and Grace Bassett in the Star analyzed the debate to determine how the 

vote ended up so lopsided. Eisen wrote: 

There was no clear pattern in the House debate. Opponents attacked the cost, expressed 

doubt that its financing plan was workable and said Government decentralization would 

be preferable to paying for rapid transit. 

One thing surprised him. “Washington’s noisy freeways-transit dispute was hardly mentioned.” 

Bassett said of the “stunning” defeat:

Administration planners could calculate in adverse votes the cost of failing to 

compromise their differences with business, labor and some suburban jurisdictions. The 

most perfect plans could not have convinced the House yesterday to accept a $400 million 

network opposed by three such politically potent factions. 

Opposition to the bill teamed such unlikely allies as pro-labor Representative Roosevelt, 

Democrat of California, with anti-spending Republican Gross of Iowa, and Democrat 
Multer of New York, a spokesman for small business, with Judge Smith of Virginia, 

guardian of suburban independence. 

They discussed turning points. One such event was a quorum call requested by Representative 

Harsha just before Representative Roudebush spoke. With only 69 Representatives responding, 

the Speaker briefly resumed the chair to summon the other members, 345 of whom responded. 

Bassett wrote, “They had not expected to be summoned for the local debate and began mumbling 

about the cost of the unfamiliar project,” the very point Representative Roudebush made when 

debate resumed.

Eisen and Bassett singled out Representative O’Konski’s comments as helping to focus the 

opposition on cost issues, and Bassett cited Representative Roudebush for the same reason. 

“House Members,” Eisen wrote, “obviously were wary of the legislation as soon as they realized 

its magnitude.”

Defeat of the Multer amendment on labor was a turning point as well. Bassett thought the labor 

provisions were “doomed after Minority Leader Halleck of Indiana drew from their author, Mr. 

Multer, an acknowledgement that they included compulsory arbitration.” After that, 

“Republicans voted in a bloc against guaranteeing rights [that] workers now have under private 

contracts should union members be shifted to a public operation.” She concluded: 

More than any other single factor, the labor argument probably defeated the bill. Once it 

was rejected, labor champions, who otherwise were for the administration program, voted 

to bury it. 

As for the future, Eisen wrote: 

Recommittal could be a death sentence. But the District Committee is free to rewrite the 

measure and send it back to the floor for a second try. Or a rescue attempt could be made 

in the Senate, which generally is regarded as friendlier to the District.

However, Bassett wrote, “Chances are slim that the Senate can reshape a transit bill to suit the 

House next year.” She added that “this is almost sure to be tested.” [Bassett, Grace, “Bitter 

Tobriner Asks Solution In Rail Defeat,” The Evening Star, December 10, 1963; Eisen, Jack, 

“Bobtailed Subway Plan Overwhelmed by House,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

December 10, 1963] 

On December 11, Representative O’Okonski explained his motion to recommit the bill to 

committee:

If the bill had been defeated, which it would have been, it would have been dead for at 

least 10 years. By referring it back to committee, there is time for a real hardcore look at 

another proposal.

He did not believe that highway supporters or Chalk were factors in the recommittal vote. The 

$400 million price tag was a key factor in the defeat, a fate that would meet any similar high-cost 

proposal. He was sure that Congress would give a transit bill for the District another look if 
NCTA could address the financing and private enterprise issues. He also thought that a subwayrail transit network with an underground system was “a thing of the past.” Officials should 

consider innovative transit technology. 

Representative Broyhill agreed that recommittal, which he voted against, offered some hope. He 

added, however, that, “Unless something is done pretty quickly, the justification for the agency’s 

existence will terminate.” Some alternative such as express bus service might be considered, but 

prospects for an alternative subway plan “look dim.” 

Chairman Whitener was not planning any immediate action. “We’ll take a good serious look” at 

what to do, but he saw little support for Commissioner Tobriner’s suggested presidential 

commission. [Flor, Lee, “Transit Bill Vote Cited As Keeping Issue Alive,” The Evening Star, 

December 11, 1963] 

In editorials, the Post and Star made clear who was at the heart of the defeat. No one, the Post

editors wrote, thought it would be easy. The “shocking vote” was a setback, “but not a final 

disaster.” The need had not changed. All the conditions leading to the bill, such as a 

transportation crisis and support for a rapid transit system, were still in place. However, 

“Congress never supports major improvements for Washington unless they enjoy very nearly 

unanimous local support.” The House vote was “a sharp and explicit personal repudiation of 

Mr. Stolzenbach”: 

Mr. Stolzenbach committed three errors of political judgment. He believed that he could 

build the subway only by vehemently attacking the Inner Loop. He believed that he could 

build the subway only if revenue estimates promised to pay its whole cost; the figures 

were demonstrably incredible. He believed that he could build the subway only by 

refusing to answer questions, however legitimate. He offered no reassurance whatever to 

the bus companies that he proposed to displace, or to their employes [sic]. They worked 

hard, and successfully, to beat the bill. It is now time to replace Mr. Stolzenbach. 

In view of the House rejection, Stolzenbach could “serve the city best by promptly resigning.” If 

he stays, the Post doubted that in view of the wide distrust he had engendered, “any bill can 

succeed while he retains office.”

His successor would not have it easy: 

A new administrator will have to work out, in detail, the relationship between the bus 

companies and the transit system, protecting the interests of the companies and of their 

employes [sic]. He will have to meet and dispose of the absurd proposal for private 

ownership; one might as well talk of private ownership of the post office, or of the 

sewers.

With all that accomplished, the President should send a rewritten bill back to Congress. “The 

need for action is urgent” because Congress “cannot hold back the steady waves of citizens 

coming to live and work in Washington.” [“The Next Step,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, December 11, 1963] 
In “The Transit Fiasco,” Star editors understood Commissioner Tobriner’s “bitterness about the 

highway-transit controversy,” but that “silly feud” was not responsible for the defeat in the 

House. The editors attributed the House defeat of the bobtail bill to several factors, including 

labor opposition, Chalk, the “inadequacy of the arguments” by NCTA and other supporters, the 

lack of defense by House leaders for Federal expenditures, and the Washington community’s 

failure “to exert itself as strongly in behalf of the bill as the spokesmen for special interests 

exerted themselves in the fight to kill it.” But make no mistake:

It was derailed by the pipsqueak arrogance of C. Darwin Stolzenbach, the NCTA director, 

who, over a long period of time, has managed to generate nothing but ill will toward the 

agency. Drawing himself up to his best Churchillian stance after the vote on Monday, 

Mr. Stolzenbach typically announced that he had not become the NCTA head “to preside 

over its dissolution,” and that he presumed “this is not the last word of Congress.” 

It must not be the last word, not because Stolzenbach said so, but because “a rail-transit system is 

absolutely essential to the health and well-being of the Washington area and of the Nation’s 

Capital itself.” To achieve that goal, NCTA and “others within the administration are going to 

have to correct a number of faults before the next effort is made.” 

Those faults were correctable. Freeway construction should proceed. Except where a freeway 

should provide right-of-way for a rapid transit line, NCTA “should keep its nose out of highway 

business.” NCTA also must reach accord with labor, private enterprise, and area jurisdictions 

outside the District. “Most of all the vital importance of an effective rail-transit system to the 

Nation’s Capital must be made apparent to everyone.” 

The editors thought Chairman Whitener summed it up best. “The cost to the Federal 

Government of not building a rapid-transit system will be far greater than the cost of building 

one.” That was “the essential truth” that Congress must come to accept. [“The Transit Fiasco,” 

The Evening Star, December 11, 1963] 

Locating the Three Sisters Bridge

By late 1963, the Three Sisters Bridge was the most controversial of several controversial 

Interstate projects. As Post editors had put it in the July 9 editorial cited by Representative 

Cramer:

Bridges seem to bring out the worst in Washington’s government. Nothing could 

illustrate more sadly its constitutional state of indecision than the announcement that we 

are now to have still another study of the future Three Sisters Bridge, at a cost of another 

half million dollars. The city wasted seven years wrangling over the designs for the 

Theodore Roosevelt Bridge, and the questions raised by Three Sisters are far broader. 

As for the “economic, social and aesthetic considerations” the reexamination was to explore, they 

were “precisely the kind of value judgments that most Americans consider to be political issues.” 

[“In Lieu of a Decision,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, July 9, 1963] 
Virginia highway officials supported the bridge. As Deputy Commissioner F. A. Davis of the 

Virginia Highway Department had told Chairman Fallon in a letter, failure to build the bridge 

would result in “an almost intolerable situation.” He added, “It is our feeling that all of the 

highways now planned will be needed, particularly those on the Interstate system, regardless of 

any mass transit system as now proposed.” 

Meanwhile, Virginia had halted design of I-66 approaching the river “because we have no way of 

knowing the number of lanes that will be required.” The current plan was for I-66 to have six 

lanes north of the Capital Beltway to the Dulles access road. Between the Capital Beltway and 

the Potomac River, I-66 would have eight lanes to the junction with I-266 to the Three Sisters 

Bridge. Beyond the I-266 interchange, I-66 would continue with six lanes to the six-lane 

Theodore Roosevelt Bridge. If the bridge were not built, I-66 would have to be rethought to find 

a way to carry eight lanes of traffic instead of six lanes. [Flor, Lee, “Virginia Will Press For 

Sisters Bridge,” The Evening Star, August 2, 1963; “State Halts Planning on River Route,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, August 3, 1963] 

On November 7, 1963, the White House released Commissioner Tobriner’s letter stating that the 

seven-member Policy Advisory Committee had agreed on a compromise location for the bridge. 

“The committee recommends against the proposed location at the Three Sisters Island site.” 

Instead, the bridge would be built between Roosevelt Island and Key Bridge. 

This new location meant that the bridge would touch down in the District near the foot of 

Wisconsin Avenue, NW., on the Georgetown waterfront. It would connect with the Potomac 

River Freeway parallel to the Whitehurst Freeway. This location had “distinct aesthetic 

advantages” and, with “appropriate design will insure essential service to highway users.” 

One result of this new location was that it might affect the number of lanes on I-66 through 

Rosslyn. Instead of a six-lane freeway leading to the six-lane Roosevelt Bridge, Virginia would 

have to plan for additional lanes through a community that was expanding with new apartment 

and office buildings. That development would make locating the freeway even more challenging 

than it already was. The interim report stated that, “The committee trusts that this agreement will 

have the concurrence of the Commonwealth of Virginia.” (Horsky told reporters that this 

reference to Virginia’s position was “stronger than hope but weaker than a no.”) 

The committee also endorsed construction of the North Leg, but said that in its design, 

“maximum consideration should be given to the concept of tunneling within the bounds of 

engineering feasibility to assure minimum disturbance during construction and to minimize 

displacement and esthetic impact.” The bridge and North Leg were to be built to Interstate 

standards with six or eight lanes. 

Precise locations were yet to be determined, but Lee Flor summarized the general location of the 

North Leg:

[The] north leg would connect to the inner loop freeway around Pennsylvania avenue near 

Rock Creek park and then would curve north and eastward, running a few blocks south of 
Florida avenue. The route most usually mentioned is along R and S streets N.W. until the 

freeway connects to a center leg freeway around Third street and New York avenue N.W.

The decisions described in Tobriner’s letter were general and tentative. The Policy Advisory 

Committee would not make final decisions until a public hearing was held after the members 

reviewed additional design and alignment alternatives. [Flor, Lee, “Three Sisters Out, Span 

Downstream,” The Evening Star, November 7, 1963; Eisen, Jack, “Modification Of Highway 

Links Urged,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, November 8, 1963] 

One thing the committee had not done was consult with the Arlington County Board or Virginia 

highway officials. As Roye Lowry, a member of the board who would become its chairman in 

1964, pointed out, “A bridge has two ends.” Virginia and county officials were analyzing the 

decision, with the most difficult issue being the impact on Rosslyn. Board Chairman Thomas 

Richards thought the problem might be manageable, but “such lack of cooperation when the 

planning is under way is no way to handle a metropolitan-wide-area problem.”

Representative Broyhill, by contrast, called the Policy Advisory Committee’s decision “a perfect 

solution.” He thought homeowners in the Arlington Palisades would agree with the decision. 

[Eisen, Jack, “Bridge Project Action Angers Arlingtonians,” The Washington Post and Times 

Herald, November 9, 1963] 

Rosslyn, cited earlier as the site of an oil terminal, was a 100-acre unincorporated village in the 

northeast corner of Arlington County across the Potomac River from Georgetown. The opening 

of the Aqueduct Bridge had spurred development of a lawless community at its base. The 

coming of the electric trolley in the 1890s spurred a civic cleanup, but Schrag described the 

area’s evolution: 

Though named for a farm, the area had been home to breweries, slaughterhouses, and 

saloons since the late nineteenth century. As the New Deal and World War II inflated 

Washington’s construction industry, Rosslyn became the city’s staging area, with storage 

yards and firms dealing in lumber, millwork, and asphalt. Then in April 1957, the 

Marriott company took a 99-year lease on a former brewery to use as a hotel, and in 

November county planner Dorothy Muncy suggested redeveloping Rosslyn with office 

buildings and tourist hotels. With the expansion of federal government employment in 

the early 1960s, investors thought this a fine idea, and by 1963 four office buildings were 

under construction, with plans approved for ten more. [Schrag, page 222] 

The coming of the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge spurred the development. 

Post editors praised the decision, not for “the genius of its engineering or the brilliance of its 

planning [but] by the unanimity of its support.” Everyone—highway people, transit people, park 

people, city-beautiful people—had signed “the terse little statement.” The committee should be 

renamed the Road and Rail Truce Commission” because it had “restored the balance of the city’s 

intricate transportation politics.”
By shifting the bridge downstream, the “Truce Commission” had reassured several Senators that 

the bridge would not harm Glover-Archbold Park. The new location had its drawbacks, 

particularly the need to shift I-66 through Rosslyn, possibly in a tunnel. “But the political values 

here clearly outweigh the planning considerations.” [“Declaration of Truce,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, November 9, 1963] 

Engineer Commissioner Duke, who headed the advisory committee, said officials would 

coordinate with Arlington County and Virginia officials after they received President Kennedy’s 

response to Tobriner’s letter. Appearing on WWDC’s “Report to the People,” Duke conceded 

that the reaction in Virginia and particularly Arlington County had not been “extremely 

enthusiastic.” Nevertheless, he thought that solutions, particularly for the routing of I-66 through 

Rosslyn, would be reached jointly. He also thought that once the precise location of the bridge 

was set, “the Potomac River Freeway I don’t think will pose any particular problem” for 

Georgetown residents. [“Duke to Seek Arlington Views on New Bridge,” The Sunday Star, 

November 10, 1963; Eisen, Jack, “Decision Awaited on Next Bridge Site, The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, November 10, 1963] 

President Kennedy replied to Tobriner on November 12, 1963. The President was pleased to 

have the letter informing him that the District Board of Commissioners concurred in the Policy 

Advisory Committee’s decisions. “The recommendations are likewise acceptable to me, and will 

be included in my budget recommendations to the Congress in January.” He added: 

The Policy Advisory Committee is an example of the possibilities for cooperative action 

among Federal and District agencies in resolving difficult problems, and the fact that its 

recommendations are unanimous is particularly gratifying. The concurrence of the Board 

of Commissioners in those recommendations should assure that the entire District 

Highway Program can now move forward. 

He added, “the fact that its recommendations are unanimous is particularly gratifying.” 

With release of President Kennedy’s letter, Chairman Whitener’s subcommittee took time from 

developing the bobtail legislation to approve a resolution drafted by Representative Broyhill 

calling upon the District commissioners to “proceed forthwith to implement the construction” of 

the bridge and North Leg. Chairman Whitener, who said the vote was unanimous, was hopeful 

that the agreement would diminish opposition by highway supporters to his transit bill. [Flor, 

Lee, “Kennedy backs Georgetown Bridge Plans,” The Evening Star, November 12, 1963; Eisen, 

Jack, “Georgetown-Rosslyn Bridge Gets Kennedy Endorsement,” The Washington Post and 

Times Herald, November 13, 1963] 

Star editors thought that in saying the projects could move forward, President Kennedy had 

“struck precisely the right note.” Many details needed to be worked out to determine whether the 

new bridge location was feasible or the disruptive impacts of the North Leg really could be 

minimized:

The important thing is that the agencies represented on the committee, which previously 

were fighting over the need for both these projects, now agree they should be built. We 
trust that the President will make sure there is no backsliding on that crucial point. 

[“Forward, March!” The Evening Star, November 15, 1963] 

By November 16, the first sign of a problem with the new location of the bridge was evident. 

Members of the Arlington County Board were “outraged” that they had not been consulted, 

criticized the plan unanimously, and urged consideration of alternate sites. The board had 

received the plan only on November 5, without a chance to comment on it before Commissioner 

Tobriner’s letter to President Kennedy. The board was concerned that the uncertainty would 

affect their development decisions. Chairman Richards said, “This Fairfax Drive-Route 66 area 

can be another real good hot area where we can develop a high yield tax base,” similar to 

Rosslyn. Board member Leo Urbanske, Jr., denounced the plan, pointing out that, in contrast to 

the prior upstream location, the bridge in its new location would compound congestion in 

Rosslyn. 

The board advised County Manager Bert W. Johnson to write to the Virginia Highway 

Department to express the county’s disapproval of the new plan. He also was authorized to send 

a copy of the letter to the White House. [“Arlington Board Scores Bridge Site,” The Washington 

Post and Times Herald, November 17, 1963; Kelly, Brian, “Not Consulted on Bridge, Arlington 

to Tell Kennedy,” The Sunday Star, November 17, 1963] 

Reacting to the dispute in Virginia, Engineer Commissioner Duke met with Virginia highway 

officials and representatives of the Arlington Board for a strategy session. Deputy Federal 

Highway Administrator D. Grant Mickle represented BPR. “As of this moment,” he said, “there 

appears to be an impasse between the District and Virginia.” The city wanted the District 

terminus of the new bridge to be as near as possible to 31st Street, NW., because that was the end 

of the present Potomac River Freeway project, the District’s portion of I-266. The District was 

open to any Virginia terminus for I-266 as long as it ended at the desired location in the city. 

On December 4, General Duke announced the results of the meeting. Officials had agreed on a 

joint study. Virginia officials were to study a site upstream from Key Bridge and a tunnel-bridge 

crossing near Three Sisters Islands. As described by Jack Eisen in the Post, the two alternatives 

were:

• Rte. 266 to branch off near N. Kirkwood st., Arlington, tunnel beneath the Palisades near 

the upper end of Spout Run Parkway, then cross the river on a diagonal bridge about onequarter mile downstream from Three Sisters.

• The route to cross the river about on line with Arlington Oak st., one-quarter mile 

upstream from Key Bridge and roughly parallel to it. 

At the same time, the District would conduct engineering studies of a site downstream from Key 

Bridge, the site the Policy Advisory Committee and President Kennedy had endorsed. They all 

agreed not to study the original Three Sisters Islands location, thus seemingly killing the idea of a 

bridge named Three Sisters Bridge.
General Duke told reporters he was confident the differences could be resolved. Chairman 

Richards said he was “quite heartened by the spirit of co-operation and the desire on the part of 

the District to undertake a joint study.” 

In short, as Eisen put it, “Virginia and Arlington County officials yesterday torpedoed the 

Rosslyn-Georgetown bridge plan that was supposed to end Washington’s freeway warfare.” 

Unaware of the strategy session, Representative Broyhill decided to intervene. At his request, the 

House District Committee named him a special peacemaker. Having previously called the 

location approved by the Policy Advisory Committee “a perfect solution,” he now called it “bad 

and costly” in view of the Virginia opposition. He wanted to set up an emergency committee to 

identify a location for the bridge that all parties could accept. The committee would include the 

District, Virginia, Arlington County, NPS, and BPR, as well as citizens from both sides of the 

river. He also intended to invite Horsky to participate. They would, he said, “sit down and 

thresh out all objections.” 

Reaction to Representative Broyhill’s initiative was mixed. Chairman Richards, saying that 

officials in the strategy session had developed “a fine working rapport,” said of this additional 

initiative:

Further expansion of the decision-making process by Mr. Broyhill’s intrusion is going to 

further complicate the situation and muddy the water. We would reach a reasonable 

decision without his entry. 

General Duke, by contrast, said he would “cooperate with the Congressman and look forward to 

helping in any way we can.” [“Eisen, Jack, “Rosslyn Bridge Plan Is Scuttled By Virginians,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, December 5, 1963; “Broyhill Proposed New Bridge Group,” 

The Evening Star, December 5, 1963; “Broyhill Named Peacemaker in Bridge Wrangle,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, December 6, 1963] 

Despite the mixed reaction, officials met in the House District hearing room at 2 p.m. on 

December 11, 1963, just 2 days after the House rejected Chairman Whitener’s bobtail plan. 

Participants included Jett of the NPS, Lowry of the Arlington County Board, Acting District 

Highway Director Thomas F. Airis, and Engineer Commissioner Duke. Representatives of 

Arlington County and Georgetown civic associations were present in the hearing room. 

Participants agreed to hire a consultant to conduct a 4-6 month study of the options as soon as 

Congress granted the funds. If the conference committee on the District’s appropriations act, 

1964, included $330,000 for the Three Sisters Bridge, the funds would be used for the study. 

The study, to be financed by the District and Virginia, would cover two layouts, one upstream 

and one downstream of Key Bridge. Participants explicitly excluded the original Three Sisters 

Bridge location from the study. Jett was very pleased by that decision, but was neutral on the 

remaining options. [“Outside Consultant Called to Referee Battle Over Three Sisters NoBridge,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 12, 1963; Flor, Lee, “D.C., Virginia 

In Accord on Bridge Study,” The Evening Star, December 12, 1963] 
With approval from the House and Senate appropriations committees, the District committed 

$5,000 for the study of two alternative sites for the bridge, with Virginia committing an equal 

amount. BPR provided the 90-percent match of $90,000. The New York firm of Howard, 

Needles, Tammen and Bergendoff received the contract to conduct the study. [“Consultants to 

Study Two Sites for Bridge,” The Sunday Star, January 12, 1964] 

The North Central Corridor

Following the assassination of President Kennedy, the Kennedy family remained in the White 

House for several days before moving out. On December 7, President Johnson and his family 

were ready to move in.

During that period, the country did not have a Vice Presidential residence as at present. The new 

President had come to Washington after winning a special House election in 1937. In 1943, the 

Johnsons purchased a red-brick colonial at 4921 Thirtieth Place, NW., in the District’s Forest 

Hills neighborhood. As Vice President, Johnson and his family moved to a three-story mansion 

named Les Ormes (The Elms) that they purchased in May 1961 at 4040 52nd Street, NW., in the 

Spring Valley section of the city. Perle Mesta, a fixture on the Washington social scene for 

years, had been the previous owner. (Her lavish parties for Washington’s social and political 

leaders had earned her the nickname: “the hostess with the mostest.”) 

On moving day, the new President decided to take a walk around his soon-to-be former 

neighborhood, accompanied only by his friend and adviser, Jack Valenti, the Secret Service, a 

limousine, and a motorcycle escort. Hatless and in a light raincoat, he walked south on 52nd

Street to a cul-de-sac where a dog in one of the yards barked at him. “Down, down,” he told the 

dog. At that moment, Alvin Howard Thompson, a stone mason from Cabin John who had 

worked on the Johnsons’ home, pulled up. “Good morning, Mr. President,” he said, from his 

pickup truck. After they shook hands, the President continued his walk. A neighbor rushed out 

to take a picture of the President. They shook hands. 

He continued onto Rockwood Parkway until it intersected Glenbrook Parkway. Part of the way, 

he could walk in the middle of the street because of light traffic and the Secret Service waving 

cars to the side. In all, he walked a little over a mile before traveling by limousine to the White 

House to begin his official day. 

One of the events on that day was a ceremony honoring 31 distinguished men and women with a 

President Medal of Freedom. In a surprise climax, President Johnson added President Kennedy 

and Pope John XXIII, who had died on June 3, 1963, to the list of recipients. Of the former 

President, Johnson said, “we are the lesser for his death . . . but each is somehow larger because 

he lived.” Not visible to the attendees, Mrs. Jacqueline B. Kennedy watched the ceremony 

before leaving with her children for a Georgetown home made available to her by Undersecretary 

of State W. Averell Harriman. [“Johnsons Buy Mesta Mansion,” The Evening Star, May 20, 

1961; “Johnsons Plan To Spend Night In White House,” The Evening Star, December 7, 1963] 

For years, the new President had been a frantic commuter in the Connecticut Avenue corridor, as 

biographer Robert A. Caro described based on a 1951 article in the Saturday Evening Post: 
He was the old Lyndon Johnson driving to work in the morning from his home, a twostory, white-painted brick colonial at 4921 Thirtieth Place in a quiet residential area in 

northwest Washington—driving down Connecticut Avenue with one hand on the wheel, 

the other frenziedly twisting the dial on the car’s radio back and forth from one station to 

another searching for news broadcasts, shouting obscenities at broadcasters who said 

something with which he didn’t agree. He was constantly sounding his horn to get other 

drivers out of his way—if they didn’t move aside quickly enough, he would lean out the 

window and curse them; passing them on their right, he would bang his big left hand 

down on the outside of his car to startle them. [Caro, Robert A., Master of the Senate: 

The Years of Lyndon B. Johnson, Alfred A. Knopf, 2002, page 140. His source was: 

Healy, Patrick F., “The Frantic Gentleman from Texas,” Saturday Evening Post, May 19, 

1951] 

Now, his commuting years were over. The Secret Service and police would keep his limousine 

moving. 

Still unresolved in December 1963 was how Montgomery County motorists would commute 

between home and their jobs in the District. The congressional freeze on freeway construction in 

the District’s northwest quadrant was to be in effect for another 2 years, so time remained to find 

a solution. 

For many motorists, the planned I-70S western leg entrance along the Potomac River was 

impractical because it involved an indirect route between suburban homes and jobs in the 

District. Officials were still considering the Wisconsin Avenue corridor for the North Leg of the 

Inner Loop to carry the eastern leg of I-70S, but the affluent, heavily populated area seemed an 

unlikely place for an eight-lane freeway. Even so, NCTA had identified the corridor for 

upgrading with grade separated intersections to speed traffic.

The North Capitol Street corridor east of Rock Creek Park appeared to have fewer negatives. 

NCTA endorsed the corridor for a freeway and rail line from Silver Spring because the road 

could be built along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad tracks to minimize disruption of 

neighborhoods already separated by the trains. In January 1963, Donald Gingery of the 

Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission called this idea “impractical 

nonsense.” He said, “You simply can’t funnel all traffic down one corridor. If it has to carry 

traffic from Rte. 70-S, the proposed northern parkway and other main arteries, it will take 28 

lanes to get it through Silver Spring.” Moreover, the plan to merge I-95 traffic within the District 

with the corridor would add to the traffic volumes. [Kendrick, Thomas R., “Planners Critical of 

NCTA Idea,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, January 24, 1963] 

In April, BPR Deputy Administrator Mickle called for “a work session” among Maryland, 

District, and BPR officials to resolve location issues. Chairman Funk sent a telegram to 

Maryland planning officials urging them not to take any action on the Wisconsin Avenue 

corridor before the meeting: 

It is my opinion that these meetings will clear up the questions involved in Route 

Interstate 95, the north central corridor and the Wisconsin avenue corridor as they affect 
Montgomery and Prince Georges’ Counties and the District of Columbia. [“Parley Called 

On Maryland Road Routes,” The Evening Star, April 4, 1963] 

During the meeting, BPR asked Aitken to consider a change in the District’s plan to build I-95 to 

intersect I-70S in the vicinity of Catholic University. From there, the joint freeways would 

follow the Center Leg. BPR suggested considering an intersection of I-70S and I-95 in the 

Montgomery County suburbs before entering the District from Silver Spring. According to the 

Post: 

Aitken is not receptive to the Bureau’s suggestion. He pointed out that it has been almost 

five years since the city began laying out the Northeast Freeway and that the route has 

been endorsed by the National Capital Planning Commission and also fits in with the plan 

of the National Capital Transportation Agency. 

“It doesn’t make much difference to us what they do in Maryland,” Aitken said. “But any 

change here in the District would mean we’d have to throw away five years of planning.” 

Maryland highway officials were considering whether a shift of I-95 to the west would be 

advisable. Chief Engineer David H. Fisher said, “we are wondering if we could better serve 

some of the growth taking place further west.” [Clopton, Willard, “Maryland Planners Weigh 

Relocation of Interstate Route,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, April 22, 1963] 

As will be discussed, Funk negotiated with BPR and NPS to designate the Baltimore-Washington 

Parkway as I-95. He would reconstruct the NPS portion for truck use and provide a link to New 

York Avenue in the District. This plan, which had the advantage of limiting the taking of homes 

and businesses, was abandoned in mid-1963, leaving Maryland and District officials to continue 

debating how to get I-95 traffic between the Capital Beltway and the Inner Loop. 

In November 1963, the Maryland State Roads Commission issued its preliminary 5-year 

construction program. It omitted the North Central Freeway south from the Silver SpringWheaton area, a link between I-70S at Pooks Hill and the District, and the first leg of the planned 

Outer Belt connecting I-70S to the North Central Freeway. No routes had yet been selected for 

the expressways, but the Maryland State Roads Commission had included them in August in a 

list of 48 critically needed projects.

After seeing the omissions, the Montgomery County Council voted unanimously to ask Governor 

Tawes to intercede with the legislative council, meeting in Baltimore, to defer action until the 

three “vitally needed” expressways were reconsidered. County Public Works Director Joseph C. 

Kordella said that Chairman Funk “repeatedly supported the 1959 Transportation Plan,” but had 

“virtually ignored its major elements” by dropping the three expressways from the 5-year plan. 

[Kendrick, Thomas R., “State Road Plan Omits 3 Major Area Highways,” The Washington Post 

and Times Herald, November 17, 1963; Christmas, Anne, “County Urges Tawes to Save Road 

Projects,” The Evening Star, November 27, 1963] 

During the meeting on November 27, Delegate James R. Miller, Jr., of the county’s delegation, 

told Funk, “If these roads were needed in August, they certainly are needed now.” Funk 
explained that he dropped the three expressways because District officials had not yet pinpointed 

where I-70S or the North Central Corridor would enter the city. He offered to include them in 

the plan as “footnote items” to be revived pending District decisions and the availability of funds 

for future work. Miller replied, “This seems reasonable and I hope it will speed up action in the 

District.” [Rowland, James B., “Road Projects Put on ‘Critical’ List,” The Evening Star, 

November 18, 1963] 

Star editors agreed with “the howls of protest from county officials,” saying they were “entirely 

justified.” Leaving the projects out of the 5-year plan had “shortchanged the citizens of 

Montgomery unconscionably.” No project in the State was “more urgently needed than the 

north-central route.” True, the alignment had not been determined. However, Maryland, the 

District, and BPR had funded a $350,000 consultant study on the issue, with the results due in 

January. If agreement could be reached, construction might begin sooner than 5 years if, that is, 

Funk was determined to do so. Relegating the items to footnotes raised questions about how 

hard Funk would fight to secure agreement on an alignment and get construction underway. 

What was needed was for Maryland, the District, and BPR “to drum up enough courage to face 

jointly difficult problems involved in locating freeways which cross jurisdictional lines in the 

Washington area. [“‘Footnote Items,’” The Sunday Star, December 1, 1963] 

Reacting to the dispute, Senator Beall called a meeting in his office on August 10 to discuss the 

issue just 2 hours before the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission held a 

public hearing on the I-70S western leg along the Potomac River Palisades. In addition to Funk, 

Governor Tawes’ representative, and State legislators, Senator Beall had invited BPR and 

District representatives to the meeting.

Following defeat of the bobtail plan the day before, Senators Beall and Daniel B. Brewster (D) 

asked participants what Congress could do to resolve the disputes between Maryland and the 

District over freeway links. Funk, Engineer Commissioner Duke, and Administrator Whitton 

suggested repealing the freeze on freeway construction in the northwest quadrant. The two 

Senators and Representatives in the meeting said they would consider legislation to reverse the 

freeze.

The highway officials also expressed doubts about the proposed Palisades Freeway, subject to the 

freeze, that would be the presented to a public hearing later in the day. Whitton offered “a 

personal opinion” that he did not think that building an expressway would be possible parallel to 

the George Washington Parkway that NPS had under construction. [“Attack Considered On 

Freeway Freeze,” The Evening Star, December 10, 1963; Eisen, Jack, “House Vote Stirs Plans 

For Roads,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 11, 1963] 

The Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission had only recently begun 

considering the Palisades Freeway. Three weeks after ordering a study, the commission released 

a report on November 11 explaining that the county needed more than one entrance (North 

Central Freeway) to the District. The report said the $11.4 million freeway would run from the 

Capital Beltway along the Potomac River from Cabin John Creek Valley west of Bannockburn, 

under MacArthur Boulevard, through and virtually erasing the old community of Glen Echo west 
of the Glen Echo Amusement Park. The freeway would connect to the proposed RosslynGeorgetown bridge downstream from Key Bridge before linking with the Inner Loop. 

Because the freeway would carry trucks, the route would be eligible for Interstate designation and 

90-10 Federal-State funding. It also would remove the need for a freeway in the Wisconsin 

Avenue corridor. Funk, who had not read the report, said that J. E. Greiner, already studying the 

routing of the North Central Freeway, would also study the new proposal for a Potomac River 

entrance. [“Consultants to Review Palisades Freeway Plan,” The Evening Star, November 12, 

1963; Eisen, Jack, “$11.3 Million Palisades Freeway Outlined by Maryland Planners,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, November 12, 1963] 

The Post summarized the December 10 public hearing by saying, “Montgomery County citizens, 

who have been building up steam against the proposed Palisades Freeway, gave the plan a tongue 

lashing yesterday.” The central criticism was that the freeway was not needed because it would 

parallel the George Washington Parkway. The critics rejected the commissioners’ explanation 

that the freeway was needed to carry the trucks that were banned from the parkway. The 

Potomac Valley League representing 14 civic groups pointed out that on the existing I-70S, 

trucks comprised 11 percent of traffic, but only 3 percent of the trucks would use the Palisades 

Freeway according to studies by the planning commission’s staff. Further, the freeway, if built, 

would result in “unthinkable congestion at the intersection where the Potomac Freeway will join 

the inner loop in the District.” A letter from NPS Director Wirth, introduced into the record, 

criticized the plan and favored the Wisconsin Avenue corridor. 

The result, the Star indicated, was that the Palisades Freeway “appears to be scuttled.” 

Commission Vice Chairman Brewer said after the public hearing that he was “bloody and 

bowed.” He said he would support a proposal by Commissioner Caroline Freeland to revive 

plans for a routing along the western fringe of Rock Creek Park. [Tuck, Lon, “Palisades 

Citizenry In Arms Over Road,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 11, 1963; 

Segraves, John, “Palisades Interstate Route Appears to Be Scuttled,” The Evening Star, 

December 11, 1963] 

On December 18, the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission adopted the 

Freeland resolution dropping the Palisades Freeway from its plans. To find an alternative route, 

the commission planned to work with the Maryland congressional delegation to end the freeze on 

freeway construction in the northwest quadrant. The resolution also urged President Johnson to 

ask for Stolzenbach’s resignation as NCTA Administrator. [“Major Planning Shifts Faced in 

Montgomery,” The Evening Star, December 18, 1963; Tuck, Lon, “Planners Drop Palisades 

Route,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 19, 1963] 

The Maryland congressional delegation introduced legislation on December 18 to lift the 

northwest freeway freeze. It had been put in place in the expectation that construction of rail 

rapid transit would begin during that period and reduce or eliminate the need for freeways in the 

area. Citing House rejection of the bobtail plan, Senator Beall said, “Recent events 

foreshadowed great difficulty for any attempt to construct a rapid rail transit system in the 

District. We must therefore re-examine the effects of this freeze on highway planning.” With 

the Palisades Freeway rejected, the focus was on the North Central Freeway to carry I-70S traffic 
into the District, but Senator Beall emphasized he was not specifically supporting that alternative, 

or even the lifting of the freeze. They wanted early hearings on the bill “to reevaluate the results 

of this highway construction ban, both in the District of Columbia and in our own State of 

Maryland.” 

The Washington area, he said, faced critical transportation problems. As population and traffic 

increased, “the situation will worsen unless we have imaginative traffic and transit research and 

planning now.” He continued: 

We need rapid mass transit and we need an expanded but sensible highway program. We 

are not likely to get either by restricting the highway and transit experts and denying them 

the tools they need to meet present and future transportation needs. [Eisen, Jack, “Bill 

Would Lift Freeze on D.C. Highway Jobs,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 

December 19, 1963; “Bill Proposed to Lift N.W. Freeway Ban,” The Evening Star, 

December 18, 1963; Amendment of National Capital Transportation Act of 1960, 

Congressional Record-Senate, December 18, 1963, page 24949] 

With a Potomac River entrance for the I-70S western leg remaining in doubt, those hoping for an 

eastern leg along the North Central Freeway faced doubts. BPR’s chief engineer, Francis C. 

“Frank” Turner, pointed out that BPR had not approved the North Central Freeway for I-70S. 

The decision on Interstate status depended on a study underway by the J. E. Greiner Company for 

the District and Maryland highway departments. Eisen wrote of Turner’s statement: 

From the standpoint of Federal officials, one big question is whether interstate truck and 

auto traffic approaching Washington from the northwest [on I-70S in Maryland] ought to 

be diverted over the Capital Beltway from Pooks Hill, Bethesda, eastward to Silver 

Spring before heading southward into Washington. [Eisen, Jack, “Long Delay for 

Freeway Seen in Stalled Approval of 70-S,” The Washington Post, December 26, 1963] 

As reflected in the Policy Advisory Committee’s report, the District was planning to mitigate 

freeway impacts by building some segments in tunnels, trenches, or elevated designs with joint 

use of the air rights above or below them for other desired community assets, such as buildings, 

playgrounds, plazas, and arcades. By year’s end, the District was working on such a plan for the 

Center Leg, although the city had not yet decided on the best occupants for the air rights. [Eisen, 

Jack, “Up in the Air,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 26, 1963] 

The District received good news on December 30, 1963, when Representative Carl Vinson (DGa.) of the House Office Building Committee, agreed to a plan for building the Center Leg 

Freeway in the Third Street corridor in a tunnel further west of the Capitol and one block longer 

than originally planned. Representative Vinson said he would recommend the plan to the other 

members of the committee: Speaker of the House John W. McCormack (D-Ma.) and 

Representative James C. Auchincloss (R-NJ). With their support, they would introduce a bill 

authorizing the tunnel. 

According to General Duke, Representative Vinson agreed to the plan the Sunday before 

Christmas after touring the site. The Engineer Commissioner said the agreement was “very 
encouraging,” but several steps, including congressional approval, remained before design and 

construction could begin. [Flor, Lee, “Mall Freeway Tunnel Gets Vinson Approval,” The 

Evening Star, December 31, 1963; Eisen, Jack, “Inner Loop Mall Tunnel is Approved,” The 

Washington Post and Times Herald, December 21, 1963]