November 2009 Defense Horizons 1

Defense

Psychological Stress Factors in Modern 

Military Operations

The military occupation exposes its members to a wide range of 

stressors. Combat-related stressors are the most obvious and extreme 

ones and garner the most attention,1 but military operations in the 

post–Cold War era entail a wide range of challenges and potential 

stress factors.2 The numbers of peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian, and other kinds of operations have increased dramatically, 

while military force levels have not kept pace with demand.3 Partly as 

a result of substantial 1990s force reductions, deployments are more 

frequent and longer in duration than in times past, especially for U.S. 

Army personnel. This in turn has brought other changes in military 

units, including more training exercises, planning sessions, and equipment inspections in preparation for deployment. All these factors 

add to the workload and pace of operations on the home front.4 More 

intense work schedules and frequent deployments also force more family separations, a well-documented stressor for Servicemembers.5

One possible avenue for reducing the stress associated with 

military operations is to lessen the frequency and duration of deployments. Unfortunately, strategic imperatives and troop shortages may 

prevent this. The military is not alone in this regard; the same is true 

(at least at times) in other occupations and contexts. For example, 

following the 9/11 terrorist strike on the World Trade Center, fire, 

police, and other emergency personnel maintained continuous operations around the clock with the goal of locating possible survivors, as 

well as restoring essential services to the affected areas. In another 

example, thousands of disaster response workers were involved in rescuing victims and restoring basic services in New Orleans following 

Hurricane Katrina in August 2005. In such crisis situations, continuous operations and extreme efforts are necessary to save lives; easing 

the pace of work may be considered unacceptable or even unethical. 

However, when operations become long-term, workload requirements 

Overview

The military profession is inherently stressful and is 

getting more so for U.S. troops, who are deploying more 

often and for longer periods of time on missions that are 

multifaceted, changeable, and ambiguous. Such stressful 

conditions can lead to a range of health problems and performance decrements even among leaders. But not everyone 

reacts in negative ways to environmental stress. Most people 

remain healthy and continue to perform well even in the face 

of high stress levels. While much attention in recent years 

has focused on identifying and treating stress-related breakdowns such as post-traumatic stress disorder, scant investment has gone toward the study of healthy, resilient response 

patterns in people.

This paper focuses attention on mental hardiness, an 

important pathway to resilience. Research over the past 25 

years has confirmed that psychological hardiness is a key 

stress-resilience factor. People who show high levels of psychological hardiness exhibit greater commitment (the abiding 

sense that life is meaningful and worth living), control (the 

belief that one chooses and influences his or her own future), 

and acceptance of challenge (a perspective on change in life 

as something that is interesting and valuable). We begin with 

an essential first step: clarifying the major stress factors that 

are salient in modern military operations. Next, we give a brief 

summary of the theory and research behind the hardiness 

construct. Finally, we provide a number of suggestions for how 

to increase hardiness and stress resilience in organizations, 

primarily through leader actions and policies. By setting the 

conditions that increase mental hardiness, leaders at all levels 

can enhance human health and performance, while preventing 

many stress-related problems before they occur.

To Build Resilience: Leader 

Influence on Mental Hardiness

by Paul T. Bartone, Charles L. Barry, and Robert E. Armstrong

A publication of the

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Defense University

N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 9

Number 69

Horizons
2 Defense Horizons November 2009

war” in reference to the need for Marines (and Soldiers) to be able 

to conduct full-scale military action, peacekeeping operations, and 

humanitarian relief within the space of three contiguous city blocks, 

sometimes engaging in two or all three roles on the same day.7 It can 

be hard for soldiers to quickly shift to different rules of engagement 

(Do I knock on the door, or kick it down?). Mental judgment cannot 

be instantly reprogrammed or fully divorced from emotions. The role 

and purpose of military personnel can be ambiguous in these conditions. Also, the command structure is not always clear, a situation that 

arises, for example, when support units are realigned to different combat units because of changing operational conditions. Another factor 

adding to ambiguity is insufficient knowledge of host nation language 

and cultural practices, although predeployment training may provide 

should be realigned with what the existing workforce can reasonably 

sustain. Though what forces can sustain is a lot—perhaps much more 

than they know—leaders should still be aware of limits and know 

how to preserve their forces as they approach the outer thresholds of 

mental endurance.

What can be done to mitigate or counter the stressors associated 

with military operations? To answer this question, it is important to 

begin with a clear picture of the nature of the stressors encountered 

by military personnel on modern deployments. This understanding 

requires going beyond simple lists of items or events that may be perceived as stressful to get to more basic underlying dimensions. Extensive field research with deployed U.S. military units led to the identification of five primary psychological stress dimensions associated 

with modern military operations: isolation, ambiguity, powerlessness, 

boredom, and danger.6 Today, with the greatly increased frequency and 

pace of deployments for U.S. forces and the long work periods involved, 

an additional significant stress factor should be added to the list: workload or operations tempo. These dimensions are summarized in table 1.

Isolation

Operational deployments typically are to remote areas, far from 

home and families. Reliable methods for communicating with home are 

often lacking. Email is usually unavailable, and traditional mail can be 

sporadic and take weeks to deliver. Most of the usual stress-relieving 

activities, such as exercise, athletics, sports, television, movies, and 

games are not available. Although most deployed soldiers will know each 

other because of the Army’s current reliance on unit rotation policies, 

there will still be some individual replacements due to casualties and 

other unexpected depletions of essential unit strength. For these individuals, the initial stress of social isolation can be more acute as they 

attempt to fit into an established group of friends. Also, in many cases 

a deploying unit is configured as a task force tailored for a specific mission, which means many members are strangers who have not worked 

together previously. Security and operational concerns often generate 

movement restrictions (for example, when troops are restricted from 

leaving their base camp). Troops may also be banned from interacting 

with the local populace and prevented from participating in such familiar activities as jogging for exercise or displaying the American flag. 

Frequently, there are also multiple constraints on dress and activities. 

Troops have few choices in their daily existence. Movement and communication restrictions also deter troops from learning about local culture 

and language and about resources that might be available locally. All of 

these factors contribute to a sense of social isolation.

Ambiguity

In modern military operations, a unit’s mission, rules of engagement, and situation are often unclear to the Servicemember and can 

require rapid role changes. In the late 1990s, Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak described this mix as a “three-block 

Dr. Paul T. Bartone and Dr. Charles L. Barry are Senior Research Fellows in the 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) at the National 

Defense University. The late Dr. Robert E. Armstrong was a Senior Research 

Fellow at CTNSP. Comments and questions can be addressed to bartonep@ndu.

edu or barryc@ndu.edu.

Stressor Characteristics

Isolation

Remote location 

Foreign culture and language 

Far from family/friends 

Unreliable communication tools 

Newly configured units with unfamiliar coworkers

Ambiguity

Unclear/changing mission 

Unclear rules of engagement (ROE) 

Unclear command/leadership structure 

Role confusion 

Unclear norms, standards of behavior 

Powerlessness

Movement restrictions

ROE constraints on response options

Policies prevent intervening, providing help

Forced separation from local culture, people, events, places

Unresponsive supply chain—trouble getting needed supplies/

repair parts

Differing standards of pay, movement, behavior for different 

units in area

Indeterminate deployment length

Do not know/cannot influence what is happening with family 

at home 

Boredom

(alienation)

Long periods of repetitive work activities without variety

Lack of work that can be construed as meaningful, important

Overall mission/purpose not understood as worthwhile 

or important

Few options for play, entertainment

Danger

(threat)

Real risk of serious injury or death from:

■ enemy fire, bullets, mortars, mines, explosive devices

■ accidents, including “friendly fire”

■ disease, infection, toxins in the environment

■ chemical, biological, or nuclear materials used as weapons

Workload

High frequency, duration, and pace of deployments

Long work hours/days during the deployments

Long work hours/days before and after deployments

Table 1. Primary Stressor Dimensions in 

Modern Military Operations
November 2009 Defense Horizons 3

some basic information in this area. Furthermore, there may be a lack 

of knowledge regarding the military contingents of allies, as well as the 

status and authority of contractors (in particular, paramilitary security forces or private security contractors) in a multinational coalition 

force. In counterinsurgency operations, troops often face continuing 

uncertainty regarding who is an enemy and who is an innocent civilian. All of this contributes to a highly ambiguous environment.

Powerlessness

Related to ambiguity is the sense of powerlessness to bring 

clarity or to exercise control over one’s own destiny on a day-to-day 

basis. Troops may wonder, for example, “When will we be back from 

patrol?” “When will we move out again?” “Will I be able to meet my 

wife on leave when I was told (and told her)?” “Will our unit go home 

when we were told we would?” Soldiers and small unit leaders are 

often equally powerless to alter the mission conditions. In hierarchical military organizations, there is always some sense of powerlessness that increases the farther down the institutional hierarchy 

one goes. Limitations on soldiers’ movements and activities, already 

noted as a stress factor in terms of accentuating isolation, may not 

be readily understandable if the local situation appears benign and 

soldiers from other coalition countries, or even U.S. civilians, are not 

so restricted. Servicemembers have little power to change the rules 

under which they are governed.

Another contributing element can be the soldiers’ sense of being 

helpless to assist or improve the lot of the local population. They may 

see local people in need of help—wounded, ill, hungry—but be unable 

to provide needed assistance due to restrictive rules of engagement, 

lack of supplies, or operational or political considerations. For example, operational requirements to keep the unit moving can interfere 

with establishing relationships of trust with the local population and 

community leaders. Returning time and again to the same location to 

reestablish security or perform some other mission such as interdicting or destroying illicit drugs further adds to the sense of being unable 

to solve the problem or complete the mission. All of this contributes 

to a potentially damaging sense of powerlessness—that one has little 

control over the surrounding environment.8

Boredom

Modern military missions frequently involve long periods of 

“staying in place” without much real work to do. A related situation is long periods of strenuous patrolling in areas where there 

is no enemy activity and no civilian population. As the weeks 

and months crawl by, a feeling of boredom grows. At a superficial 

level, boredom can be countered with more entertainment and 

sports activities. But the real problem of boredom is due not to 

a lack of activities, but to the perceived lack of meaningful work 

or constructive activities to engage in. Daily tasks can take on a 

repetitive dullness, with a sense that nothing important is being 

accomplished. This can be especially disturbing when the daily 

tasks are arduous, sustained, and unpleasant, such as patrolling 

in rugged terrain and bad weather with heavy combat loads, and 

without any evidence of recent enemy presence. Troops can easily 

regress from a high state of alertness to rote marching, daydreaming of home, or focusing on their current discomforts. When enemy 

action does come, such troops are often caught by surprise and 

experience higher casualties. Yet keeping troops alert for days, 

weeks, or even months without enemy contact is a very difficult 

leadership challenge.9

Danger

This dimension encompasses the real physical dangers and 

threats that can result in injury or death that are often present in the 

deployed environment. Bullets, mines, bombs, or other hazards in the 

deployed setting are included, as well as the risk of accidents, disease, 

and exposure to toxic substances. One of the most troublesome threats 

has long been what is known as indirect fire from aircraft, artillery, or 

mortars—the inability to see the enemy and therefore be able to take 

some action to stop the attack adds to the problem. Often troops are 

not even sure whether moving away merely makes them a more likely 

target. In current U.S. and coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, similar hidden dangers take the form of suicide bombers, snipers, 

and improvised explosive devices. The danger can be direct, posing a 

threat to the individual soldier, or indirect, representing a threat to his 

or her comrades. Exposure to or attending to severely injured or dead 

people, and the psychological distress this can bring, also adds to the 

sense of danger.

Workload

At the macro level, this factor represents the increasing frequency and duration of deployments that many military units are 

experiencing. Even as units redeploy home, they are already scheduled for their next deployment, sometimes 1 or 2 years into the 

future. At a more immediate level, most deployments are characterized by a 24/7 work schedule, on which soldiers are always on duty, 

with little or no time off. Work-related sleep deprivation is common in 

the deployed environment. Training and preparation activities in the 

period leading up to a deployment also usually entail a heavy workload and extremely long days. The same is generally true for military 

units returning home from a deployment, who must work overtime to 

assure that all vehicles and equipment are properly cleaned, maintained, and accounted for. Often, this means that anticipated family 

time gets truncated or sacrificed altogether.

Understanding these key sources of stress makes it possible to 

develop more focused and effective mitigation approaches. While 

training at the individual level to increase stress resilience is possible 

and can certainly help, it is important to remember that many other 

factors at various levels also influence resilient responding to workrelated stress.10 Figure 1 lists some of these factors at the individual, 

organizational policy, and organizational structure levels.

Individual factors that are relevant for selection and training 

include social background, personality (including psychopathology), 

previous experience and education, maturity, intelligence, physical fitness, and family circumstances.

Organizational policies, or how the organization and its members 

respond to challenging or stressful events, also can exert an important 

influence on resilience. Here it is useful to distinguish between macrolevel policies, such as agency rules, regulations, and directives, mission 

statements, deployment and rotation policies, and rules of engagement, 

and micro-level policies, such as small unit policies, leader directives 

and communications, and training schedules and policies. At the same 

time, it is important to recognize that some (but not all) micro-level 
4 Defense Horizons November 2009

policies and procedures are influenced rather directly by macro-level 

policies and standards.

Organizational structural factors have an influence on how 

the military organization responds to challenges as well. The size, 

type, and configuration of units may be more or less appropriate for 

the demands of the environment at a particular time. Other structural considerations include where units are based and how they 

are staffed or manned, the ratio of leaders to troops, and the integration of National Guard and Reserve forces, as well as joint and 

coalition forces. The integration issue applies in the context of both 

specific missions and extended alliances (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization International Security Assistance Force in 

Afghanistan). The arrows in figure 1 serve as a reminder that these 

different major factors interact and influence each other as well. 

For example, organizational policies clearly influence (and in some 

cases determine) structures, while existing structures, force levels, and types have an influence on policies that are developed and 

implemented regarding their utilization. Structures and policies 

have an influence on individuals in myriad ways—as, for example, 

when force structures and rotation policies determine when and for 

how long an individual will be deployed. The line labeled resources

at the bottom of figure 1 is meant to indicate that all of these factors—individual, organizational policies, and organizational structures—are influenced importantly by resource considerations. 

Budgets are limited, and what is done in any area depends to some 

degree on available time and money.

What tools, strategies, or coping mechanisms can be applied 

in order to increase resilience or resistance to these stressors, both 

at the individual and unit levels? We focus below on the psychological style known as mental hardiness and discuss how leaders can 

leverage this construct to increase individual and group resilience 

under stress.

Mental Hardiness

The “hardiness” construct, first described by Suzanne Kobasa 

in 1979, provides valuable insight for understanding highly resilient 

stress response patterns in individuals and groups. Conceptually, 

hardiness was originally seen as a personality trait or style that distinguishes people who remain healthy under stress from those who 

develop symptoms and health problems.11 Hardy persons have a high 

sense of life and work commitment and a greater expectation of control, and are more open to change and challenges in life. They tend to 

interpret stressful and painful experiences as a normal aspect of existence, a part of life that is overall interesting and worthwhile. While 

early tools for measuring hardiness had a number of problems,12 these 

have been addressed, and there are now several excellent, reliable, and 

valid instruments for assessing the hardiness construct.13

Although hardiness is relatively stable over time and across 

situations, there is good evidence that hardiness levels can be 

increased as a result of experiences and training.14 So it is better to 

think about hardiness not as an immutable trait, but rather as a generalized style of functioning that continues to be shaped by experience and social context. It includes cognitive, emotional, and behavioral features, and characterizes people who stay healthy under 

stress in contrast to those who develop stress-related problems. The 

hardy-style person is courageous in the face of new experiences 

as well as disappointments, and tends also to have a strong sense 

of self-efficacy or personal competence.15 The high hardy person, 

while not immune to the ill effects of stress, is robust and resilient 

in responding to stressful conditions.

The concept of hardiness is theoretically grounded in the work 

of existential philosophers and psychologists, including Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Binswanger, and Viktor Frankl. It involves the creation of meaning in life, even life that is sometimes painful or absurd, 

and having the courage to live life fully despite its inherent pain and 

futility.16 It is a generalized cognitive framework that affects how one 

views the self, others, work, and even the physical world. In existential terms, this is the Eigenwelt, the self or “I” world, the Mitwelt, the 

“with” or social world, and Umwelt, the “around” or physical world. In 

1967, Salvatore Maddi outlined an early form of the hardy personality 

type and contrasted it with the nonhardy “existential neurotic.”17 He 

used the term ideal identity to describe the person who lives a vigorous and proactive life, with an abiding sense of meaning and purpose, 

and a belief in his own ability to influence things. 

Since the appearance of Kobasa’s original 1979 report on hardiness and health in executives, an extensive body of research has accumulated supporting the hypothesis that hardiness protects against the 

ill effects of stress on health and performance. Studies with a variety 

of occupational groups have found that hardiness operates as a significant moderator or buffer of stress.18 Hardiness has also been identified 

as a moderator of combat exposure stress in Gulf War soldiers.19 Psychological hardiness has emerged as a stress buffer in other military 

groups as well, including Army casualty assistance workers,20 peacekeeping soldiers,21 Israeli soldiers in combat training,22 Israeli officer 

candidates,23 and Norwegian navy cadets.24 Studies have found that 

troops who develop post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms 

following exposure to combat stressors are significantly lower in harMacro level:

National priorities

Laws

Presidential directives

DOD and agency regulations

Uniform Code of Military Justice

Mission denition

Rules of engagement

Deployment policies

Pay and benets

Micro level:

Unit policies

Leader communications

Denition of work-mission

Handling of losses

Discipline

Uniform and training standards

Deployment policies, stop-loss

Unit cohesion, social support

Factors include:

Unit size/conguration

Unit basing

Force manning–

Ratio: leaders to troops

Types of units

Size of units

Separate or joint forces

Place of Reserve/Guard

C2 relations

Factors include:

Education level

Social background

Personality

Work/life experience

Previous training

Maturity

Intelligence

Fitness

Family circumstances

RESOURCES

Selection

Training and

education

Organizational

structure Individual

Organizational

policies,

procedures,

culture

Figure 1. Factors That Influence Resiliency
November 2009 Defense Horizons 5

diness than those who do not develop PTSD.25 Under low-stress conditions, troops high in hardiness report about the same level of PTSD 

symptoms as those low in hardiness. However, under high-stress conditions, those high in hardiness report significantly fewer PTSD symptoms than those low in hardiness (see figure 2). These results provide 

additional evidence that those who are high in the qualities of hardiness are more resistant to the ill effects of operational stress.

Leader Influence on Mental Hardiness

How does hardiness increase resilience to stress? While the 

underlying mechanisms are still not fully understood, a key aspect 

of the hardiness resilience process involves the meaning that individuals attach to events around them and to their own place in the 

world of experience. High hardy people typically interpret life experience as overall interesting and worthwhile, something they can 

exert control over, and challenging, that is, presenting opportunities to learn and grow.

The power of hardiness to mitigate stressful experiences is 

related to the positive interpretations or framings of such experiences 

the hardy person typically makes. If a stressful or painful experience can be cognitively framed and made sense of within a broader 

perspective that holds that all of existence is essentially interesting, 

worthwhile, fun, a matter of personal choice, and providing valuable 

opportunities to learn and grow, then the stressful experience can 

have beneficial psychological effects instead of harmful ones.26 Additionally, the high hardy person is more accepting or “forgiving” of a 

certain amount of disruption or pain as part of existence, and prefers 

to look to the future rather than dwell on the past.

In organized work groups such as military units, this “meaning-making” process is something that can very likely be influenced 

by leader actions and policies. Military units by their nature are 

group-oriented and highly interdependent. Common tasks and missions are group actions, and the hierarchical authority structure 

frequently puts leaders in a position to exercise substantial control and influence over subordinates. By the policies and priorities 

they establish, the directives they provide, the advice and counsel 

they offer, the stories they tell, the amount of accurate and timely 

information they disseminate, and perhaps most importantly the 

examples they set, leaders can alter the manner in which their subordinates interpret and make sense of experiences. In these ways 

leaders may, for example, better prepare subordinates—perhaps 

subordinate leaders in particular—for their first combat engagement. Such leader policies and actions may also better protect 

against the buildup of postengagement stress or even PTSD.

Many authors have commented on how social processes can 

influence the creation of meaning by individuals, in positive or negative directions. For example, Irving Janis coined the term groupthink 

to describe how people in groups can come to premature closure on 

issues, with multiple individuals conforming to whatever is the dominant viewpoint in the group.27 Similarly, Karl Weick discusses the process by which organizational policies and programs can influence how 

individuals within the organization “make sense” of or interpret their 

experiences, particularly at work.28 For example, meetings and discussions at work provide key opportunities for shared “framing” of experience and sensemaking. Peers, leaders, and entire work units or organizational cultures can influence how experiences get interpreted. But 

leaders are particularly influential. 

Leaders who are high in hardiness and understand the value 

of the kinds of frames they use for making sense of experience can 

encourage those around them to process stressful experiences in ways 

characteristic of high hardy persons. In a small group context, leaders 

are in a unique position to shape how stressful experiences are understood by members of the group. Leaders who are high in hardiness likely 

have a greater impact in their groups under high-stress conditions, 

when by their example, as well as by the explanations they give to the 

group, they encourage others to interpret stressful events as interesting challenges that can be met, and in any case provide opportunities to 

learn. This process itself, as well as the positive result (a shared understanding of the stressful event as something worthwhile and beneficial) 

could be expected to also generate an increased sense of shared values, 

mutual respect, and cohesion. Further support for this interpretation 

comes from a study showing that hardiness and leadership interact to 

affect small group cohesion levels following a rigorous military training 

exercise.29 This interaction effect signifies that the positive influence of 

leaders on the growth of unit cohesion is greater when hardiness levels 

in the unit are high. This suggests that effective leaders increase group 

solidarity or cohesion at least in part by encouraging positive shared 

interpretations of stressful events when they occur.

As an example of the kind of leadership that can foster hardyresilient response patterns throughout a unit, consider the case of 

a U.S. Army company commander of a Patriot missile–air defense 

artillery unit in Southwest Asia that was nearing the end of a 

6-month deployment shortly after the first Gulf War.30 The mission 

was to be prepared to shoot down any Scud missiles that might be 

launched from Iraq. There had been no missiles, and the mission 

had become rather dull and boring. A research team found that 

morale and cohesion levels were quite low throughout the battalion. But surprisingly, one company/battery stood out as different from the rest, reporting very high morale and cohesion levels. 

This was the Headquarters and Maintenance Company. Further 

investigation revealed that shortly after arriving in theater, the 

company commander had set a major task for the unit, one that 

provided a common goal and a tangible mission to work on during their 6 months in the desert. He had heard about a large area 

nearby that had been used as an equipment dump after the Gulf 

War. There, several tons of discarded equipment and parts were 

buried in the sand, rusted and dirty. The commander set for his 

Figure 2. Gulf War Combat Stress Exposure in 

Low and High Hardy Soldiers*

* Displays Hardy x CSE interaction (p. <.001) in regression model,

N=824 Active duty, unstandardized betas used to map regression lines

LOW STRESS HIGH STRESS

Combat Stress Exposure (CSE)

High Hardy

Low Hardy

Impact of Events Scale

0

10

20

30

40
6 Defense Horizons November 2009

unit the task of excavating the dump and recovering, cleaning, 

and repairing as much equipment as possible over the course of 

their deployment. Five months later, they had salvaged over $1 

million worth of equipment that was returned to the Army supply 

system in good working order. Prominently displayed on the walls 

of their company work area and meeting room were large beforeand-after photographs of the equipment dump, which the Soldiers 

had also rebuilt into a multisport athletic field. In interviews, all 

unit members spoke with great pride about this feat and of having 

saved considerable taxpayer dollars.

This illustrates how a proactive, committed, high hardy leader 

can mobilize an entire work group in the direction of greater hardiness and stress resilience. The company commander asserted 

creative control under ambiguous conditions and sought out and 

found a meaningful, albeit secondary, mission for his unit. Without 

compromising the primary mission (maintaining the equipment and 

resources of the battalion), he created a major meaningful task, 

one that was challenging, that they could “get their arms around” 

and exercise control over. He was enthusiastic and worked right 

alongside his Soldiers in the dump, helping them develop a shared 

sense of commitment to the task. Soldiers were also involved in 

planning the job, building a sense of commitment and control. The 

task was challenging, but with a clear goal, and one that could be 

accomplished within the 6-month deployment period. The commander also understood the importance of recognition and made 

sure that Soldiers received awards as well as military media attention for their accomplishments. Recognition in media such as the 

Stars and Stripes newspaper, as well as from senior leaders such 

as the Sergeant Major of the Army, further reinforced the sense of 

commitment and positive meaning within the unit, a shared belief 

that what they had done was important and valuable. While other 

units in the same battalion grew more alienated, bored, and powerless over the course of the deployment, one insightful and resilient 

leader showed how psychological hardiness—commitment, control, 

and challenge—could be increased within his part of the organization. This example shows how a high hardy leader can influence the 

entire unit toward more hardy interpretations of experience, and 

the positive, resilient reactions that can follow.

Summary and Recommendations

The military is a high-risk, high-stress occupation. To reduce 

stress-related performance and health problems, it is important to 

work preventively to build up resilience and stress resistance of 

individuals and groups. This paper identifies the key underlying 

stress factors in complex military operations, and utilizes the concept of psychological hardiness to show how leaders can foster positive, resilient responding throughout their organizations. Efforts to 

increase resilience should span leader actions as well as organizational policies and programs.

Recommendations for Leaders

In work groups such as the military, where individuals are regularly exposed to a range of stressors and hazards, leaders are in a 

unique position to shape how stressful experiences are processed, 

interpreted, and understood by members of the group. The leader who 

by example, discussion, and established policies communicates a positive construction of shared stressful experiences exerts a positive influence on the entire group in the direction of his or her interpretation of 

experience—toward more resilient and hardy sensemaking. Leaders 

can increase mental hardiness and resilient responding in several ways:

■ Set a clear example, providing subordinates with a role model 

of the hardy approach to life, work, and reactions to stressful experiences. Through actions and words, demonstrate a 

strong sense of commitment (see table 2), control (see table 

3), and challenge (see table 4), responding to stressful circumstances with an attitude that says stress can be valuable, 

and that stressful events always at least provide the opportunity to learn and grow.

■ Facilitate positive group sensemaking of experience, in how 

tasks and missions are planned, discussed, and executed, and 

also as to how mistakes, failures, and casualties are spoken 

How to 

Build Commitment

How to 

Destroy Commitment

■ Support troops’ attempts to give 

their own ideas; use their skills and 

talents to get tasks accomplished 

■ Give recognition, awards, praise for 

accomplishments

■ Plan teamwork-/cohesion-building 

activities 

■ Provide meaningful tasks where 

progress is visible

■ Support individual development 

(such as schools, distance learning)

■ Be fair; do not show favoritism

■ Spend time with troops

■ Share hardships with troops

■ Provide information about what 

you are doing and why

■ Do not look for feedback, input

■ Criticize and denegrate initiative

■ Be self-absorbed and self-promoting

■ Live apart and take special 

privileges for yourself

■ Be unfair or stingy with rewards, 

recognition, benefits

■ Avoid direct interactions with troops

■ Provide information to only a 

limited few

■ Show favoritism

■ Show no interest in troops’ 

individual aspirations

■ Impose undue travel and local 

contact restrictions

Table 2. Leader Actions to Foster Mental 

Hardiness: Commitment

How to 

Build Control

How to 

Destroy Control

■ Provide tasks that are challenging 

but within soldiers’ capabilities to 

achieve

■ Establish graduated training programs: crawl—walk—run

■ Provide resources and time needed 

to accomplish goals

■ Set achievable standards

■ Build on success; seek short-term 

wins to build on

■ Give too many tasks for available time

■ Give too difficult tasks for skill levels

■ Criticize and punish for failure

■ Do not listen to feedback

■ Do not provide needed resources

Table 3. Leader Actions to Foster Mental

Hardiness: Control
November 2009 Defense Horizons 7

about and interpreted. For example, do we accept responsibility for mistakes and seek to learn from them, or do we blame 

others and avoid responsibility (and learning)? Leaders build 

resilience by setting high standards, while addressing shortfalls and failures as opportunities to learn and improve. While 

most of this “sensemaking” influence occurs through normal 

day-to-day interactions and communications, it can also happen in the context of more formal after-action reviews, or 

debriefings that focus attention on events as learning opportunities, and create shared positive constructions of events 

and responses around events.31

■ Seek out (and create if necessary) meaningful and challenging group tasks, and then capitalize on group accomplishments by providing recognition, awards, and opportunities to 

reflect on and magnify positive results (such as photographs, 

news accounts, and other tangible mementos).

■ Through example and policies, communicate a high level of 

respect and commitment for unit members. This fosters a 

strong sense of commitment to the surrounding social world, 

or Mitwelt.

■ Anticipate high-stress events such as deployments and combat, taking opportunities beforehand to build mental hardiness among subordinates, especially subordinate leaders, 

by sharing experiences, imparting sensemaking skills, and 

focusing on organizational cohesion.

Recommendations for Organizations

While leadership is important, other factors also influence how 

individuals make sense of experiences, as well as what leaders can 

realistically do in this regard. Organizational policies and regulations can not only increase or decrease stress levels, but can also 

influence commitment, control, and challenge aspects of the hardyresilient response pattern. Organizations wishing to increase resilience should consider the following:

■ Given the importance of leadership in reducing stress among 

military personnel of all Services, steps should be taken to 

identify and select high hardy leaders as well as provide 

optimal reinforcement of hardiness in all leaders. The result 

should be leaders, especially at lower echelons where operational stress is a more persistent factor, who understand how 

to better maintain their own personal mental hardiness as 

well as how to enhance the hardiness of their subordinates 

for handling operational stress.

■ All commissioned, warrant, and noncommissioned officer 

training and education programs should be reviewed to 

determine how they contribute to resilience under the stress 

of complex operations. If there are gaps in this area, and there 

likely are, they should be closed. Relevant institutions (such 

as the National Defense University) could collaborate on best 

practices and teaching materials with the goal of including 

the most effective programs in the curricula of all leader 

education institutions. 

■ Military services should develop policies that emphasize the 

importance of mental hardiness in leaders as well as those 

being led. Such policies would assist current leaders at all levels 

in maintaining the hardiness of their units under stress. This 

would be most critical for forces engaged in land operations—

mainly the Army, Marines, and special operations forces. Command information programs are one means to rapidly address 

this key topic. The use of awards and public recognition are 

other tools commanders can use to reinforce hardiness.

In addition to these leader actions, organizational policies, and 

training and education efforts, a critical part of the solution over the 

long term must be to reduce the workload or operations tempo stressors that are now straining the response capability of both leader and 

led. That means reducing the number of deployments and finding a 

more sustainable length-of-tour standard. These solutions will require 

a better balance of force structure to missions and a closer look at the 

adequacy of high demand force strength. It also means pondering the 

future role of Reserve and Guard forces in terms of the added stress 

factor of leaving an entirely separate professional life when called to 

Active duty. 

Immediate steps to improve the resilience of individuals can 

help in the near term, and better education and training will help in 

the mid term. However, the longer term solution for a volunteer force 

must include adjusting the mission demands on our human capital to 

levels that allow for sustained resilient responses and performance 

over time. It is only by addressing the challenge at multiple levels, 

including the system level, that we can build a force with the needed 

psychological strength to withstand the varied stressors of current and 

future complex operations.

Notes

1

 As, for example, in David H. Marlowe, “The Human Dimensions of Battle and 

Combat Breakdown,” in Military Psychiatry, ed. R. Gabriel (Westport, CT: Greenwood 

Press, 1986), 7–24. More recently, the same emphasis on combat exposure as the primary factor influencing symptoms is seen in Charles W. Hoge et al., “Combat Duty in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, Mental Health Problems, and Barriers to Care,” New England 

Journal of Medicine 351 (July 1, 2004), 13–22. While exposure to combat stressors no 

doubt contributes to the range of negative reactions, it still leaves most of the variance 

in symptoms unexplained. See Mark Miller et al., “Structural Equation Modeling of 

Associations among Combat Exposure, PTSD Symptom Factors, and Global Assessment 

of Functioning,” Journal of Rehabilitation Research and Development 45 (2008), 

359–370. Clearly, then, other factors besides combat exposure must be influencing 

PTSD symptoms. 2

 See Gerald P. Krueger, “Contemporary and Future Battlefields: Soldier Stresses 

and Performance,” in Performance under Stress, ed. Peter A. Hancock and James L. 

Szalma (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2008), 19–44. 3

 For an excellent discussion of the range of demands placed on modern military 

forces engaged in operations such as in Afghanistan, and the need for rapid and flexible adaptation, see Julian D. Alford and Scott A. Cuomo, “Operational Design for ISAF 

in Afghanistan: A Primer,” Joint Force Quarterly 53 (2d Quarter 2009), 92–98. See 

Table 4. Leader Actions to Foster Mental 

Hardiness: Challenge

How to 

Build Challenge

How to 

Destroy Challenge

■ Always emphasize value of change 

for learning

■ Incorporate surprises and variation 

into schedules

■ Model enjoyment, fun in variety

■ Be willing to change the plan to 

meet changing circumstances

■ Treat failures as chance to learn

■ Avoid change or surprises at all cost

■ Never take a risk

■ Restrict innovation and experimentation by requiring rules and permission for everything

■ Never change the schedule

■ Blame others for mistakes and failure

■ Denigrate others for failure
8 Defense Horizons November 2009

also Terry J. Pudas and Catherine Theohary, “Reconsidering the Defense Department 

Mission,” in Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations, ed. Hans Binnendijk and 

Patrick M. Cronin (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2009), 65–92. 4

 Carl Castro and Amy Adler, “OPTEMPO: Effects on Soldier and Unit Readiness,” 

Parameters 29 (1999), 86–95. 5

 Bruce Bell et al., “USAREUR Family Support during Operation Joint Endeavor: 

Summary Report,” Special Report 34 (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for 

the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1997). 6

 While these are identified as primary stress dimensions in modern military 

operations, they are not unique to the military. The same factors have been found in 

other fields. However, research confirms they are the fundamental stress dimensions 

seen among those engaged in recent military actions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. These dimensions were originally identified based on field research with U.S. 

soldiers deployed to Croatia, Bosnia, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia from 1993 through 1996. 

Research included extensive field interviews, observations, and questionnaires. See 

Paul T. Bartone, “Psychosocial Stressors in Future Military Operations,” paper presented 

at the Cantigny Conference Series on Future of Armed Conflict, Wheaton, IL, June 2001; 

also Paul T. Bartone, Amy Adler, and Mark A. Vaitkus, “Dimensions of Psychological 

Stress in Peacekeeping Operations,” Military Medicine 163 (1998), 587–593. 7

 See Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block 

War,” Marine Magazine (January 1999). 8

 Other studies have also identified powerlessness as a damaging influence for soldiers on peacekeeping operations. For example, Lars Weisaeth and A. Sund found that 

in Norwegian soldiers serving in Lebanon under the United Nations Interim Force in 

Lebanon peacekeeping mission, the feeling of being powerless to act or intervene when 

witnessing some atrocity was a main contributor to post-traumatic stress symptoms. 

See Lars Weisaeth and A. Sund, “Psychiatric Problems in UNIFIL and the U.N. Soldier’s 

Stress Syndrome,” International Review of the Army, Navy, and Air Force Medical 

Services 55 (1982), 109–116.

9

 This challenge for leaders is addressed at greater length by Peter A. Hancock 

and Gerald P. Krueger, “Hours of Boredom—Moments of Terror: The Issue of Temporal 

Desynchrony in Military Operations” (forthcoming). 10 See George A. Bonanno, “Loss, Trauma and Human Resilience: Have We Underestimated the Human Capacity to Thrive after Extremely Aversive Events?” American 

Psychologist 59 (2004), 20–28; also E. Cameron Ritchie et al., “Improving Individual 

Resiliency and Hardiness,” in Interventions Following Mass Violence and Disasters: 

Strategies for Mental Health Practice, ed. E.C. Ritchie, M.J. Friedman, and P.J. Watson 

(New York: Guilford, 2006). 11 Suzanne C. Kobasa, “Stressful Life Events, Personality, and Health: An Inquiry 

into Hardiness,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37 (1979), 1–11; Salvatore R. Maddi and Suzanne C. Kobasa, The Hardy Executive (Homewood, IL: Dow 

Jones-Irwin, 1984). 12 See Steven C. Funk and B. Kent Houston, “A Critical Analysis of the Hardiness 

Scales’ Validity and Utility,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 53 (1987), 

572–578; Steven C. Funk, “Hardiness: A Review of Theory and Research,” Health Psychology 11 (1992), 335–345.

13 See Paul T. Bartone et al., “Personality Hardiness Predicts Success in U.S. Army 

Special Forces Candidates,” International Journal of Selection and Assessment 16 

(2008), 78–81; Paul T. Bartone, “Test-Retest Reliability of the Dispositional Resilience 

Scale-15, a Brief Hardiness Scale,” Psychological Reports 101 (2007), 943–944; Paul T. 

Bartone, “A short hardiness scale,” presented at American Psychological Society Annual 

Convention, New York, 1995, available at <www.hardiness-resilience.com>. 14 See, for example, Salvatore Maddi et al., “Hardiness Training Facilitates Performance in College,” Journal of Positive Psychology (forthcoming); and Sima Zach, Shula 

Raviv, and Reuven Inbar, “The Benefits of a Graduated Training Program for Security 

Officers on Physical Performance in Stressful Situations,” International Journal of 

Stress Management 14, no. 4 (2007), 350–369. 15 For example, a study of Iranian women found that hardiness appears to increase 

self-efficacy, and that both are related to higher life satisfaction. See Irandokht Asadi 

Sadeghi Azar, Promila Vasudeva, and Abdolghani Abdollahi, “Relationship between Quality of Life, Hardiness, Self-efficacy and Self-esteem amongst Employed and Unemployed 

Married Women in Zabol,” Iran Journal of Psychiatry 1 (2006), 104–111. 16 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1986); 

Ludwig Binswanger, Being in the world: Selected papers of Ludwig Binswanger (New 

York: Basic Books, 1963); Viktor Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul (New York: Knopf, 

1960).17 Salvatore Maddi, “The Existential Neurosis,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology

72 (1967), 311–325. 18 See Richard Contrada, “Type A Behavior, Personality Hardiness, and Cardiovascular Responses to Stress,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57 

(1989), 895–903; Suzanne Kobasa, Salvatore Maddi, and Stephen Kahn, “Hardiness 

and Health: A Prospective Study,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 42 

(1982), 168–177; Deborah Roth et al., “Life Events, Fitness, Hardiness, and Health: A 

Simultaneous Analysis of Proposed Stress-resistance Effects,” Journal of Personality 

and Social Psychology 57 (1989), 136–142; Deborah J. Wiebe, “Hardiness and Stress 

Moderation: A Test of Proposed Mechanisms,” Journal of Personality and Social 

Psychology 60 (1991), 89–99.

19 Paul T. Bartone, “Hardiness as a Resiliency Factor for United States Forces in 

the Gulf War,” in Posttraumatic Stress Intervention: Challenges, Issues, and Perspectives, ed. J.M. Violanti, D. Paton, and C. Dunning (Springfield, IL: C. Thomas, 2000), 

115–133; Paul T. Bartone, “Hardiness Protects against War-related Stress in Army 

Reserve Forces,” Consulting Psychology Journal 51 (1999), 72–82; Paul T. Bartone, 

“Psychosocial Predictors of Soldier Adjustment to Combat Stress,” Third European 

Conference on Traumatic Stress, Bergen, Norway, June 1993. 20 Paul T. Bartone et al., “The Impact of a Military Air Disaster on the Health of 

Assistance Workers: A Prospective Study,” Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 177 

(1989), 317–328. 21 Paul T. Bartone, “Stress and Hardiness in U.S. Peacekeeping Soldiers,” presented at the American Psychological Association Annual Convention, Toronto, 1996; 

see also Thomas Britt, Amy Adler, and Paul T. Bartone, “Deriving Benefits from Stressful 

Events: The Role of Engagement in Meaningful Work and Hardiness,” Journal of Occupational Health Psychology 6 (2001), 53–63. 22 V. Florian, Mario Mikulincer, and O. Taubman, “Does Hardiness Contribute to 

Mental Health during a Stressful Real Life Situation? The Role of Appraisal and Coping,” 

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 68 (1995), 687–695. 23 Mina Westman, “The Relationship between Stress and Performance: The Moderating Effect of Hardiness,” Human Performance 3 (1990), 141–155. 24 Paul T. Bartone et al., “Factors Influencing Small-unit Cohesion in Norwegian 

Navy Officer Cadets,” Military Psychology 14 (2002), 1–22. 25 Bartone, “Hardiness Protects against War-related Stress in Army Reserve 

Forces,” 72–82. 26 In a study of U.S. Army Soldiers deployed to Bosnia, those high in hardiness were 

more likely to perceive their work as meaningful. See Britt, Adler, and Bartone, 53–63. 27 Irving Janis, Groupthink, 2d

 ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972). 28 See Karl E. Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 

1995). Related to this, Berger and Luckmann argue that “reality” or perceptions of 

individuals reflect “social constructions,” an incorporation into the individual mind of 

social definitions of the world (see Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social 

Construction of Reality [Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966]). Even Gordon Allport, 

noted American personality psychologist, viewed individual meaning as often largely 

the result of social influence processes. Gordon W. Allport, “The Historical Background 

of Social Psychology,” in Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. G. Lindzey and E. Aronson, 

3d ed., vol. 1 (New York: Random House, 1985), 1–46. 29 Bartone et al., “Factors Influencing Small-unit Cohesion in Norwegian Navy 

Officer Cadets,” 1–22. 30 The case was identified during research conducted in 1995 with a U.S. Army unit 

deployed to Saudi Arabia as part of a deterrent or peace enforcement operation. The 

first author had the opportunity to visit this unit as part of a study of deployment stress, 

morale, and cohesion in U.S. Army air defense artillery (ADA) battalions. After the Gulf 

War ended in 1991, ADA battalions were stationed in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to guard 

against possible Iraqi Scud missile attacks. Units deployed for about 6 months, and then 

were replaced by other ADA units. The unit under study was about 4.5 months into the 

mission when the research was conducted. Methods included observations, interviews, 

and surveys administered throughout the battalion. 31 A National Institute of Mental Health report on best practices for early psychological interventions following mass violence events noted great confusion regarding 

the term debriefing. The authors recommend that the term be reserved for operational 

after-action reviews and not be applied to psychological treatment interventions such 

as critical incident stress debriefing. See National Institute of Mental Health, “Mental 

Health and Mass Violence: Evidence-Based Early Psychological Intervention for Victims/Survivors of Mass Violence. A Workshop to Reach Consensus on Best Practices,” 

National Institutes of Health Publication no. 02–5138 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), available at <www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/massviolence.pdf>. For groups such as the military, after-action group debriefings, properly 

timed and conducted and focused on events rather than emotions and reactions, can 

have great therapeutic value for many participants by helping them to place potentially 

traumatizing events in a broader context of positive meaning. See Paul T. Bartone, 

“Predictors and Moderators of PTSD in American Bosnia Forces,” Fifth European Conference on Traumatic Stress, Maastricht, The Netherlands, June 1997.

Defense Horizons is published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. CTNSP 

publications are available online at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other 

department or agency of the Federal Government.

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Hans Binnendijk

Director