DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

ALBERT PRICE,

Appellant,

v.

REBECCA TAYLOR,

Appellee.

No. 4D19-2427

[June 10, 2020]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Fabienne Fahnestock, Judge; L.T. Case No. DVCE 18-

005667.

Stephen Allen of The Law Office of Stephen Allen, P.A., Coral Springs, 

for appellant.

Rebecca S. Taylor of the Taylor Law Firm, P.A., Coral Springs, for 

appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Albert Price appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion to 

dissolve an injunction entered pursuant to this court’s directive in Taylor 

v. Price, 273 So. 3d 24 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019). The injunction entered 

pursuant to our ruling in that case was essentially ex parte, because Price 

was not afforded a contested hearing before the entry of the injunction. 

Therefore, he was entitled to present evidence on a motion to dissolve 

regarding the facts surrounding the initial injunction. Accordingly, we 

reverse the denial of Price’s motion to dissolve and remand for the trial 

court to hold another evidentiary hearing at which Price may present his 

side of the events.

On August 6, 2018, Rebecca Taylor filed a petition for an injunction for 

protection against domestic violence. She alleged that Price had been 

violent with her on August 4, 2018 and requested that the court grant a 

temporary injunction until it could hold a hearing to determine whether it 

should grant a permanent injunction. The trial court granted the 

temporary injunction and scheduled the hearing for August 22, 2018.
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At the hearing, both Taylor and Price appeared with counsel and 

indicated that they would be the only witnesses testifying. Then, Taylor 

testified regarding the alleged incident of domestic violence. After hearing 

Taylor’s testimony and the brief cross-examination, the trial court opined 

that Taylor did not present a prima facie case to satisfy the burden to 

obtain a permanent injunction and dismissed her petition. As a result, 

the court did not request to hear Price’s side of the story before dismissing 

the petition, so Price did not testify. Once the hearing concluded, the court 

also dismissed the temporary injunction it previously entered.

Taylor appealed the trial court’s dismissal of her petition to this court. 

She argued that her allegations of domestic abuse were not only sufficient 

to obtain an injunction, but also uncontradicted by Price. In light of her 

uncontradicted testimony, Taylor argued that this court should reverse 

and remand and direct the trial court to enter an injunction. This court 

agreed and directed the trial court to enter a final judgment of injunction 

for protection against domestic violence on behalf of Taylor and against 

Price. See Taylor, 273 So. 3d at 26-27. Price did not respond to the appeal 

and this court issued its mandate on June 7, 2019. Bound by this court’s 

directive, the trial court entered the injunction on June 12, 2019.

On the same day the trial court entered the injunction, Price moved to 

have the injunction dissolved. In his motion, Price argued that he was 

never given the opportunity to testify at the August 22 hearing even though 

he was willing to do so. Price also argued that the injunction should be 

dissolved on its merits because the parties had been living together from 

the date of the August 2018 injunction hearing until he was removed from 

the marital home after the trial court entered final injunction.

The trial court held a hearing on Price’s motion. At the hearing, Price 

argued that he should be afforded an opportunity to testify about the 

August 4, 2018, incident that prompted Taylor to file for the injunction. 

Taylor argued that this would be improper and prejudicial because the 

case law on motions to dissolve injunctions did not allow challenges to the 

underlying basis of an injunction. Although the court acknowledged 

Price’s position, it agreed with Taylor and opined that any challenge to the 

underlying basis of the injunction was barred by res judicata. After 

hearing testimony from both parties, the court found that Price had not 

proven that there was change in circumstances and denied Price’s motion 

to dissolve the injunction. This appeal follows.

“The standard of review of a court’s ruling on a motion to dissolve an 

injunction is abuse of discretion if the order is based on factual matters, 

and de novo if based on legal matters.” Burtoff v. Tauber, 85 So. 3d 1182, 

1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). Section 741.30(6)(c), Florida Statutes (2019), 
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provides that after a domestic violence in junction has been issued, 

“[e]ither party may move at any time to modify or dissolve the injunction.”

Generally, “a movant can[not] obtain modification or dissolution of a 

domestic violence injunction based on a challenge to its initial 

procurement.” See Reyes v. Reyes, 104 So. 3d 1206 1207 (Fla. 5th DCA 

2012) (alteration added). This is based on the reasoning that such 

challenges should have been made at the contested hearing before the 

injunction was granted or in a direct appeal of the order granting the 

injunction. See Spaulding v. Estate of Frey, 666 So. 2d 935, 936-37 (Fla. 

5th DCA 1995). But this reasoning does not apply when an injunction is 

entered ex parte. See Palma Plaza Owners’ Ass’n, v. Cummings & 

Lockwood, 706 So. 2d 1376, 1377 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“Although 

challenges to the sufficiency of an injunction are generally not allowed on 

a motion to dissolve, where the injunction was issued ex parte, this rule 

would not apply.”); see also Agemy v. Health Bus. Sols., LLC, 117 So. 3d 

896, 899 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (same).

This court’s previous ruling in Taylor effectively directed the entry of an 

ex parte injunction because Price was not afforded the opportunity to 

testify at the initial injunction hearing on August 22, 2018. 273 So. 3d at 

26-27. Based on our review of the record, Price’s failure to testify was due 

to no fault of his own. Cf. U.S. Mfg. & Galvanizing Corp. v. Renfrow, 592 

So. 2d 1216, 1217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (stating that the party who agreed 

to the terms of a temporary injunction could not attack the underlying 

basis of that injunction in their motion to dissolve).

Rather than direct the trial court to enter the injunction, the proper 

course should have been to remand for the trial court to hold another 

hearing. See Rudel v. Rudel, 111 So. 3d 285, 292 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) 

(reversing the dismissal of an injunction petition but remanding for a new 

hearing because the husband did not have the opportunity to present 

evidence on the issue); see also Burtoff, 85 So. 3d at 1184 (stating that 

“the opposing party must have an opportunity to demonstrate that the 

allegations relied on by the court are not true”).

Due to the unique circumstances of this case, we hold that Price should 

be allowed to attack the initial grant of the injunction on his motion to 

dissolve—this includes allowing testimony regarding the events that took 

place on August 4, 2018—as well as the circumstances through the time 

a new hearing on the motion to dissolve is held. Therefore, we reverse the 

trial court’s denial of Price’s motion and remand for the court to hold an 

evidentiary hearing at which he may challenge the initial grant of his 

injunction.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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WARNER, CIKLIN and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.