alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 23 (Tuesday, February 4, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 5233]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-2722]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delegations of 
Authority

    Part N, National Institutes of Health, of the Statement of 
Organization, Functions, and Delegations of Authority for the 
Department of Health and Human Services (40 FR 22859, May 27, 1975, as 
amended most recently at 61 FR 54451, October 18, 1996, and 
redesignated from Part HN as Part N at 60 FR 56605, November 9, 1995), 
is amended as set forth below to reflect the reorganization of the 
National Institute of Mental Health as follows: In the Office of the 
Director, transfer the program analysis function from the Office of 
Resource Management (ORM) to the Office of Science Policy and Program 
Planning, and revise ORM's functional statement.
    Section N-B, Organization and Functions, under the heading National 
Institute of Mental Health (N7, formerly HN7), Office of the Director 
(N71, formerly HN71), insert the following:
    Office of Resource Management (N719, formerly HN719). Directs and 
coordinates the Institute's resource allocation, management 
improvement, and technical services processes by overseeing: (a) 
program planning and financial management; (b) grant and acquisition 
activities; (c) information resource management; (d) management policy 
and procedure development, interpretation, and implementation; (e) the 
provision of general administration services throughout the Institute; 
(f) personnel operations; and (g) visual and audiovisual information 
services and technical guidance.

    Dated: January 22, 1997.
Harold Varmus,
Director, National Institutes of Health.
[FR Doc. 97-2722 Filed 2-3-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M
#### Charles ESPOSITO, Appellant, v. The UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 272.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Feb. 15, 1937.

John A. Danaher, of Hartford, Conn., and Louis Sperandeo, of New Haven, Conn., for appellant.

Robert P. Butler, U. S. Atty., of Hartford, Conn., and Arthur T. Gorman, Asst. U. S. Atty., of New Haven, Conn.

Before MANTON, AUGUSTUS N. HAND, and CHASE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Judgment affirmed.
No. 99-9995.

No. 99-10273.

#### Bautista Rivera *v.*Greene, Anderson *v.*General Motors Corp., *1120Russo, dba Jay Brokers *v.*Department of Agriculture, Adkins et ux. *v.*Uncle Bart's Inc., dba Uncle Bart’s Club, et al., Kissi *v.*Small Business Administration et al., In re Stephens, Burns-Bey *v.*Commissioner, Department of Corrections of Minnesota, Richards *v.*Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, Sampson *v.*Citibank, F. S. B., et al., White *v.*Porter, Wallace *v.*North Carolina, Malekzadeh *v.*Texas Tech University et al., Jones *v.*Hubbard, Warden, Johnson *v.*Kemna, Superintendent, Crossroads Correctional Center, Langworthy *v.*Maryland,

*1119
      *ante,*p. 992;

*ante,*p. 870;

*1120No. 00-244.

No. 00-313.

No. 00-368.

No. 00-5468.

No. 00-6031.

No. 00-6094.

No. 00-6146.

No. 00-6183.

No. 00-6281.

No. 00-6323.

No. 00-6423.

No. 00-6618.

No. 00-6825.

*ante,*p. 928;

*ante,*p. 1011;

*ante,*p. 960;

*ante,*p. 809;

*ante,*p. 981;

*ante,*p. 982;

*ante,*p. 970;

*ante,*p. 997;

*ante,*p. 1018;

*ante,*p. 1020;

*ante,*p. 1021;

*ante,*p. 1023; and

*ante,*p. 1056. Petitions for rehearing denied.
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1010 TP 11-00600 PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND GORSKI, JJ.

IN THE MATTER OF TRACY E. SCOTT, PETITIONER,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BETH BERLIN, EXECUTIVE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF TEMPORARY AND DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, AND LAURA CEROW, COMMISSIONER, JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, RESPONDENTS.

LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF MID-NEW YORK, INC., WATERTOWN (TERRENCE J. WHELAN OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER.

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (KATE H. NEPVEU OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT BETH BERLIN, EXECUTIVE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF TEMPORARY AND DISABILITY ASSISTANCE.
CARACCIOLI & NELSON, PLLC, WATERTOWN (KEVIN C. CARACCIOLI OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT LAURA CEROW, COMMISSIONER, JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department by order of the Supreme Court, Jefferson County [Hugh A. Gilbert, J.], entered March 11, 2011) to review a determination of respondents. The determination discontinued petitioner’s Public Assistance and Food Stamps.
It is hereby ORDERED that the determination is unanimously confirmed without costs and the petition is dismissed.
Memorandum: The determination sanctioning petitioner for failure to comply with the job search requirements of a work experience program without good cause is supported by substantial evidence ( see Matter of Gokey v Berlin , 73 AD3d 1472; Matter of LaSalle v Wing , 256 AD2d 1243; Matter of Bishop v New York State Dept. of Social Servs. , 246 AD2d 391, lv denied 91 NY2d 813). Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the sanctions imposed for her failure to comply with those requirements were proper ( see Social Services Law § 131 [5]). We have considered petitioner’s remaining contentions and conclude that they are without merit.
Entered: September 30, 2011 Patricia L. Morgan Clerk of the Court
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 199 (Wednesday, October 15, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 53613-53614]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-27200]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[Docket No. RP97-443-002]


Northern Border Pipeline Company; Notice of Compliance Filing

October 8, 1997.
    Take notice that on October 3, 1997, Northern Border Pipeline 
Company (Northern Border) tendered for filing as part of its FERC Gas 
Tariff, First Revised Volume No. 1, the following tariff sheet to 
become effective October 3, 1997:

Substitute First Revised Sheet Number 123

    Northern Border asserts that the purpose of this filing is to 
comply with Order No. 636-C, issued February 27, 1997, in Docket Nos. 
RM91-11-006 and RM87-34-072 and the Commission's letter order issued 
September 24, 1997. In Order No. 636-C, the Commission required that 
any pipeline with a right-of-first refusal tariff provision containing 
a contract term longer than five years revise its tariff to reflect the 
new five year cap. Northern Border has now included a provision which 
allows a shipper to retain its capacity for a term of five years at the 
rate contained in the Best Bid.
    Any person desiring to protest this filing should file a protest 
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with Section 385.211 of the 
Commission's Rules and Regulations. All such protests must be filed as 
provided in Section 154.210 of the Commission's Regulations. Protests 
will be considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate 
action to be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to 
the proceeding. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission 
and are available for public

[[Page 53614]]

inspection in the Public Reference Room.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 97-27200 Filed 10-14-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
#### BANKHEAD WELDING SERVICE, INC., a Florida corporation, Petitioner, v. Thomas G. LAWRENCE, Respondent.

No. 40398.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Dec. 14, 1970.

Certiorari denied. 239 So.2d 886.

ROBERTS, Acting C. J., and DREW, CARLTON, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.
#### Curtis YOUNG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-690.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

June 27, 1973.

James A. Gardner, Public Defender, and W. Daniel Kearney, Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles Corees, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

BOARDMAN, Judge.

Appellant, Curtis Young, brings this timely appeal from the judgment and sentence pursuant to a jury verdict of guilty of the crime of grand larceny in violation of Section 811.021, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.

Appellant poses three points for our determination; in view of our holding on Point III, we do not deem it necessary to discuss Points I and II. Point III is as follows:

THE PROSECUTOR IN HIS FINAL ARGUMENT IMPROPERLY COMMENTED ON DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO TESTIFY.

The assistant state attorney in his argument to the jury stated:

> I also spoke to you in opening argument about the strength of circumstantial evidence. Because the Defendant has not presented a defense today— there’s only one thing that we know about this case, and that is that nobody saw him take the money. We heard testimony from Mrs. Garrett who said it was there when she left and it was gone when she returned.

The statement “. . . [bjecause the Defendant has not presented a defense today. . . .’’is clearly a comment upon the failure of appellant to testify as a defendant in a criminal cause. It is, therefore, prejudicial. The record discloses that when the above statement was made the assistant public defender timely objected. The trial judge requested that the statement be read back. The jury heard the statement repeated a second time. The motion for mistrial was denied by the trial judge.

The conviction of appellant was obtained primarily on circumstantial evidence. In our opinion the evidence presented by the state was not overwhelming nor all conclusive. While the statement of the prosecutor as to the failure of appellant to present a defense is not considered to be fundamental error, we do believe it prejudicial in the view of the totality of the circumstances in this case. We do not consider the harmless error statute to be applicable in the light of the record.

*14Accordingly, on the authority of Griffin v. California, 1965, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106; Carter v. State, Fla.App.1967, 199 So.2d 324, reh. den., May 26, 1967; and Singleton v. State, Fla.App.1966, 183 So.2d 245, this cause is hereby

Reversed and remanded for new trial.

MANN, C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur.
#### Richard L. DuPASS v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 50233.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Feb. 1, 1978.

Thomas A. Coleman, Ackerman, for appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Wayne Snuggs, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Choctaw County; Clarence E. Morgan, Jr., Judge.

Before SMITH, P. J., and ROBERTSON and LEE, JJ.

AFFIRMED.
#### In the Matter of Joseph A. HARRIS and Sophia Harris, Debtors.

No. 5896.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Nov. 6, 1936.

Bruce E. Brown, of Chicago, 111., for appellant.

Ben I. Greenebaum, Jr., of Chicago, 111., for appellee.

Before EVANS, Circuit Judge, and LINDLEY and BRIGGLE, District Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Now this day come the parties by their counsel and this cause now comes on to be heard on the printed record and briefs of counsel and on oral arguments.

On consideration whereof it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court that the order or decree of the' said District Court in this cause appealed from be; and the same is hereby, affirmed, with costs.
<PAGE>
<PAGE>     E-16
                             CHATWINS GROUP, INC.
                      RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
              (In thousands, except ratios and interest factor)

                                             YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31,
                                  -------------------------------------------
                                     1994     1995     1996     1997     1998
                                  -------  -------  -------  -------  -------
     EARNINGS:
Income before income taxes, 
  equity loss of affiliate and 
  extraordinary item              $ 1,531  $ 5,334  $    25  $ 3,172  $ 2,718
Interest expense                    8,123    9,236    8,927    9,226    9,428
Equity in loss of affiliate (2)       (90)       -        -        -        -
Amortization of debt issuance 
  expense                             444      564      632      550      671
Interest portion of rent 
  expense (1)                         378      418      469      763      894
                                  -------  -------  -------  -------  -------
     Earnings                     $10,386  $15,552  $10,053  $13,711  $13,711
                                  =======  =======  =======  =======  =======

     FIXED CHARGES:
Interest expense                  $ 8,123  $ 9,236  $ 8,927  $ 9,226  $ 9,428
Amortization of debt issuance 
  expense                             444      564      632      550      671
Interest portion of rent 
  expense (1)                         378      418      469      763      894
                                  -------  -------  -------  -------  -------
     Fixed charges                $ 8,945  $10,218  $10,028  $10,539  $10,993
                                  =======  =======  =======  =======  =======

RATIO (2)                            1.16     1.52     1.00     1.30     1.25
                                  =======  =======  =======  =======  =======

(1) - Interest portion of rent expense is calculated as follows: 

Rent expense                      $ 1,135  $ 1,254  $ 1,407  $ 2,290  $ 2,685
Portion deemed representative
   of interest                       33.3%    33.3%    33.3%    33.3%    33.3%
                                  -------  -------  -------  -------  -------
Interest portion of rent expense  $   378  $   418  $   469  $   763  $   894
                                  =======  =======  =======  =======  =======

(2) - Equity in loss of affiliate in 1994 relates to the Company's 49%
investment in CGII.  During its existence, the Company indirectly serviced
CGII's debt as its debt was owed to the Company.  Accordingly, the Company's
share of CGII's results are deducted from earnings for the purpose of
determining the ratio of earnings to fixed charges.
#### A. Jay CRISTOL, an individual and A. Jay Cristol, on behalf of himself and all those persons similarly situated, Appellants, v. The CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a municipal corporation, Appellee.

No. 70-1261.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 16, 1971.

Rehearing Denied March 26, 1971.

Cristol, Rose & Aldrich, Miami, for appellants.

Joseph A. Wanick, City Atty., and Lionel Barnet, Asst. City Atty., for appellee.

*133Before PEARSON, C. J, and CHARLES CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed upon authority of the rule stated in Charles Sales Corp. v. Rovenger, Fla. 1956, 88 So.2d 551; RCP 1.310(b), 30 F.S.A.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order
Lansing, Michigan

July 29, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver 136390 Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 136390 COA: 283431 Calhoun CC: 07-001910-FH GARY ROBERT WILLAVIZE, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal the March 14, 2008 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

K ELLY , J., would grant leave to appeal for th e reasons set forth in her dissenting statement in People v Conway , 474 Mich 1140 (2006).

d0721 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

July 29, 2008

Clerk
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan



### January 8, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice


### 134974 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan 

### PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices



### v SC: 134974 COA: 279052 Ingham CC: 06-000384-FH DERRICK SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, th e application for leave to appeal the August 21, 2007 order of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

p1217 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

January 8, 2008

Clerk
#### Gilbert A. CABOT et al., Appellants, v. Jack B. SIGLER, Sr., et al., Appellees.

No. 70-615.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

June 4, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL  INFORMATION  EXTRACTED FROM APPLICABLE
1997 INTERIM FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF NTL INCORPORATED. THE SCHEDULE IS QUALIFIED
IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                   JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                     JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                           513,065,000
<SECURITIES>                                      87,250,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                     94,912,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (4,915,000)
<INVENTORY>                                                0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                  29,371,000
<PP&E>                                         1,767,949,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                  (177,300,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 2,760,814,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            262,154,000
<BONDS>                                        2,192,219,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            105,039,000
<PREFERRED>                                                0
<COMMON>                                             321,000
<OTHER-SE>                                       113,117,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   2,760,814,000
<SALES>                                                    0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 221,639,000
<CGS>                                                      0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    141,251,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  82,210,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                           0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                99,117,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (178,104,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       4,669,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (173,435,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                             0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                            0
<CHANGES>                                                  0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (173,435,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                          (5.56)<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          (5.56)<F1>

<FN>
<F1>RESTATED TO REFLECT THE ADOPTION OF STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
    STANDARDS NO.128, "EARNINGS PER SHARE"
</FN>

</TABLE>
255 La. 811

#### Marie Sapha Lee Miller BERGERON v. Louise Castille MILLER, individually and as tutrix of Alma Marie Miller.

No. 50428.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 3, 1970.

In re: Louise Castiile Miller applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Acadia. 230 So.2d 417.

Writ refused. We find no error of law in the judgment complained of.
#### Lonnie Joe KELLUM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 77-955.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Oct. 7, 1977.

Jack O. Johnson, Public Defender, Bar-tow, and Wayne Chalu, Asst. Public Defender, Tampa, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Davis G. Anderson, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

*565PER CURIAM.

The order revoking appellant’s probation and the judgment are affirmed but this case is remanded for resentencing of appellant. The present sentence does not specifically set forth the period of credit time to be allowed as required by Section 921.-161(1), Florida Statutes (1975). *Smith v. State,*310 So.2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). The appellant does not have to be present for resentencing.

SCHEB, Acting C. J., and OTT and RYDER, JJ., concur.
State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: May 12, 2016 521512 

________________________________

In the Matter of HENRY BENITEZ,

Petitioner,

v

MEMORANDUM AND JUDGMENT

ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI, as Acting 

Commissioner of Corrections

and Community Supervision,

Respondent.

________________________________

Calendar Date: March 29, 2016

Before: Peters, P.J., McCarthy, Egan Jr., Devine and Mulvey, JJ.

__________

Henry Benitez, Romulus, petitioner pro se.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Marcus J.

Mastracco of counsel), for respondent.

__________

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this

Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to

review a determination of respondent finding petitioner guilty of

violating a prison disciplinary rule. 

After a sample of his urine twice tested positive for the

presence of cannabinoids, petitioner was charged in a misbehavior

report with using a controlled substance. Following a tier III

disciplinary hearing, petitioner was found guilty of the charge,

and the determination was later affirmed on administrative

appeal. Petitioner thereafter commenced this CPLR article 78

proceeding. 

Initially, we note that petitioner's challenge to the

sufficiency of the urinalysis test results raises a question of
-2- 521512 

substantial evidence and, therefore, the matter was properly

transferred to this Court (see Matter of Crosby v Goord, 38 AD3d

1110, 1110 [2007]). Turning to the merits, the misbehavior

report, positive urinalysis test results and related

documentation, together with the testimony adduced at the

hearing, provide substantial evidence supporting the

determination of guilt (see Matter of Williams v Prack, 130 AD3d

1123, 1123 [2015]; Matter of Walker v Annucci, 129 AD3d 1414,

1415 [2015]). Petitioner's contentions that he did not provide a

urine specimen because he suffers from shy bladder syndrome and

that the correction officer who collected petitioner's specimen

allegedly poured an unknown liquid substance into the container

created credibility issues for the Hearing Officer to resolve

(see Matter of Jones v Venettozzi, 114 AD3d 980, 981 [2014];

Matter of White v Fischer, 108 AD3d 891, 892 [2013], lv denied 22

NY3d 853 [2013]). Petitioner's claim that he was improperly

denied a videotape of the production and collection of his

specimen is without merit as the record reveals that no such

videotape existed, and the Hearing Officer cannot be faulted for

failing to produce a videotape that did not exist (see Matter of

Hand v Gardner, 114 AD3d 988, 989 [2014]; Matter of Chavis v

Goord, 58 AD3d 954, 955 [2009]). Petitioner's remaining

contentions are either unpreserved for our review or are lacking

in merit.

Peters, P.J., McCarthy, Egan Jr., Devine and Mulvey, JJ.,

concur.

ADJUDGED that the determination is confirmed, without

costs, and petition dismissed.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court