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Research Note RMRS-RN-55. 2013

Rocky Mountain Research Station

Research Note

United States Department of Agriculture

Forest Service

Rocky Mountain Research Station

Research Note RMRS-RN-55

September 2013

Assessing High Reliability Practices in Wildland Fire 

Management: An Exploration and Benchmarking of 

Organizational Culture

Anne E. Black and Brooke Baldauf McBride

Citation:

Black, Anne E.; McBride, Brooke Baldauf. 2013. Assessing high 

reliability practices in wildland fire management: an exploration 

and benchmarking of organizational culture. Res. Note RMRSRN-55. Fort Collins, CO: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest 

Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station. 17 p.

Authors:

Dr. Anne E. Black is a Social Science Analyst with the U.S. 

Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain 

Research Station, Human Factors and Risk Management RD&A, 

in Missoula, Montana. She can be reached via email at 

aeblack@fs.fed.us.

Dr. Brooke Baldauf McBride is a Research Associate at The 

University of Montana, College of Forestry and Conservation, in 

Missoula, Montana.

Introduction

In an effort to improve organizational outcomes, including 

safety, in wildland fire management, researchers and practitioners have turned to a domain of research on organizational 

performance known as High Reliability Organizing1 (HRO). 

The HRO paradigm emerged in the late 1980s in an effort to 

identify commonalities among organizations that function under hazardous conditions but experience fewer than their fair 

share of adverse events (see for instance: Klein and others 1995; 

Weick and others 1999; Weick and Sutcliffe 2001; Sutcliffe 

2011).

The concept of high reliability was introduced to the U.S. 

wildland fire community in 1995 as part of a five-day workshop 

with the goal of more fully understanding the role of human 

factors in organizational performance and outcomes (Putnam 

1995). Beginning in 2004, inter-agency fire management 

leadership, Federal fire research and the Wildland Fire Lessons 

Learned Center jointly sponsored three annual three-day workshops focused specifically on the principles of HRO (Keller 

2004). These were followed, in 2007, by a five-day “train-thetrainer” workshop and teaching guide (Wildland Fire Lessons 

Learned Center 2008).

Weick and colleagues have used wildland fire as a muse for 

theorizing (for example, Weick 1993, 1995, 2011; Weick and 

Sutcliffe 2007); and others have qualitatively evaluated wildland fire actions and events through the lens of high reliability 

(for example, Dether and Black 2006; Knotek and Watson 

2006; Thomas and others 2007). Yet, until this study, there 

was no quantitative assessment of high reliability in the wildland fire community. Linkages between HRO practices and 

related concepts (such as “upward voice,” Edmondson 1999; 

and “organizational learning,” Garvin 1993) have been widely 

theorized but, with the notable exception of Tim Vogus (Vogus 

and Wellbourne 2003; Vogus 2004; Vogus and Sutcliffe 2007a, 

2007b), little empirical work was conducted to situate HRO 

practices in the broader context of organizational and workgroup practices, and none was conducted in wildland fire. 

1

 Also known as High Reliability Organizations. Throughout, we use 

HRO to refer both to the theory and organizations.
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Research Note RMRS-RN-55. 2013

Thus, in 2007, the first author initiated a collaborative effort 

to empirically establish the status of HRO practices in Federal 

wildland fire operations. The purposes of this study were to:

•	 develop the first comprehensive portrait of HRO practices 

in wildland fire,

•	 understand the relationships between HRO practices 

and those of other theoretically related organizations and 

workgroups describing high performance, and

•	 consider the implications of these findings on HRO theory 

and wildland fire management.

Understanding how HRO behaviors and related practices 

are structured in this community may lead to a clearer understanding of how safe and reliable performance emerges and 

may inform the specific practices and behaviors needed for further improvement.

This project has progressed in a series of phases, beginning 

with qualitative study and brief descriptive analysis. Initial 

efforts were used for some theorizing (such as Barton and 

Sutcliffe 2008, 2009), but development and exploration of the 

benchmark, practical model building and discussion of theoretical implications was only recently undertaken.

The purpose of this Note is to present the conceptual basis 

of our effort, describe the survey instrument, and present resulting emergent constructs that form the basis of subsequent 

analysis. After defining high reliability, we situate wildland fire 

in the HRO cosmology; briefly review previously studied relationships among high reliability, human resource practices, 

and related organizational practices; and construct a conceptual model driving development of our survey instrument and 

analysis. We then present initial results of the structure of these 

practices in the Federal wildland fire community.

Defining High Reliability

Typical high reliability organizations operate in uncompromising environments in which even small errors, oversights, or 

deviations from expectations may quickly propagate into disasters of significant magnitude. HROs are commonly described 

as suffering “less than their fair share of accidents” (Weick and 

Sutcliffe 2001). Teams and organizations that operate with 

high reliability are able to quickly identify undesired developments and contain them. Weick and others (Weick and others 

1999; Weick and Sutcliffe 2001, 2007) described these functions as processes of anticipation and resilience, as mindfulness, 

and in terms of five principles (suites of practices) in which 

organizational members:

1. examine and track small failures as a window of health on 

the system (preoccupation with failure),

2. resist oversimplification and assumptions about what is 

faced (reluctance to simplify),

3. seek rich knowledge about current operations and their 

effects (sensitivity to operations),

4. develop a deep repertoire to manage unexpected events 

(commitment to resilience), and

5. take advantage of expertise wherever that lies, regardless of 

who holds it (deference to expertise).

(See Sutcliffe [2011] for an in-depth discussion of each of these 

attributes.)

HRO theorizing continues to evolve as researchers and practitioners explore the boundaries and features of HROs. Since 

the concept was initially articulated (in naval aircraft carriers, 

Rochlin and others 1987; air traffic control systems, LaPorte 

1988), researchers have sought to understand:

1. how HROs differ from other types of organizations or 

do not (for example, Vogus and Welbourne 2003; Weick 

2011);

2. how different industries structurally organize for high 

reliability (for example, space missions, Vaughan 1996; 

nuclear power plant operations, Marcus 1995, Bourrier 

1996; health care, Wilson and others 2005, Carroll and 

Rudolph 2006, Vogus and Sutcliffe 2007a); and

3. how HRO concepts relate to other organizational practices 

(for example, human resources, Vogus 2004, Baker and 

others 2006; mindfulness, Vogus and Sutcliffe 2012).

Amidst this diversity, tracking organizational conditions may 

provide clarity (Table 1), particularly regarding:

•	 work-risk environment, technologies, suites of actors, and 

types of interdependencies (coupling);

•	 measures of performance, focus of safety and reliability, and 

organizational structure; and

•	 whether certain HRO principles and/or practices are 

emphasized over others.

We briefly compare these conditions in previously reported organizations with wildland fire to situate this industry within 

the HRO cosmology.

Work-risk environment, technologies, suite of actors, 

types of coupling

Traditionally, HROs are thought to share particular workrisk environments that differ from other industries. The 

challenge of distinguishing behaviors developed by HROs to 

manage their specific work-risk environment has resulted in a 

rich diversity of theoretical and practical perspectives, including debate as to whether other industries can or should aspire 
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Research Note RMRS-RN-55. 2013

to emulate the practices of HROs (see for instance, Hopkins 

2007).

On naval aircraft carriers and in nuclear power plants, errors often cause significant loss of human life and property as 

well as ecological damage. These organizations grapple with 

complex but stable technology and a stable, consistent suite 

of actors. There is tight coupling (dependencies in time and 

process) between human actors and in human-technology and 

technology-technology interactions (see for instance, Roberts 

1990). Greatest risk tends to occur at the technology-human 

interface and in the dependencies among multiple actors.

In wildland fire, errors (missed signals or ineffective 

response, cascading misalignments or ineffective communications regarding goals, priorities, and/or existing and developing 

conditions) can quickly escalate into political, ecological, and/

or human safety catastrophes. Technology varies from simple, 

rudimentary, and stable (hand tools, bull dozers) to rapidly 

changing, sophisticated systems (communications systems, aircraft). The suite of actors varies from small and stable to large 

and dynamic. While smaller incidents are generally managed 

by local units with local personnel, the larger the incident the 

greater the number of actors, and the longer the incident the 

more hand-offs between sequential teams. On larger incidents, 

personnel must be called in from elsewhere for assignments of 

up to 14 days. Thus, the suite of actors may constantly change 

as temporary teams operating at various hierarchical levels 

come together and then disperse over the course of the event. 

Human-human and human-technology interactions also vary. 

Some are loose with considerable opportunity for redundancy 

and resiliency and considerable independence, such as interactions between similar workgroups at the same operational level. 

Others are tight with little to no room for resiliency, such as 

flight operations in which multiple relays/technologies are necessary to enable communications between field operations and 

central command. Greatest risk tends to emerge from several 

locations:

•	 less predictable and uncompromising physical environment 

in which there are often rapidly escalating interactions 

between fire, topography, and weather;

•	 severe topography that impairs communication and 

movement;

•	 wear-and-tear such an environment has on human actors; 

and

•	 social environment of complex, dynamic, sometimes 

conflicting and often fragile social and political relationships 

between the managing group and affected external parties.

Performance, Safety, and Reliability and 

Organizational Structure

Klein and others’ (1995) use of Schulman’s (1993) organizational culture typology to assess several HROs provides 

one way to organize such variability. The authors found differences in organizational structure and culture depending 

upon the structures and behaviors most critical to cultivate 

Table 1—Emerging matrix of Highly Reliable Organization types.

Naval aircraft carrier	 Software startup	 Health care	 Wildland fire

Work-risk environment:

Human life High Low High High

Property High Low Low High

Environment High Low Low Low-med

Organization Low High Low Mostly Low

Technology Stable, complex Emergent, complex Stable, complex Various, various

Actors: 

Number Stable, Dynamic, Stable, Dynamic,

Relationship - quality Stable, robust Fluid Stable Fluid, fragile

Relationship - type Many-to-one Many-to-one Many-to-many Many-to-many

 Many-to-one

 One-to-one

Coupling:

Human-human Tight Variable Tight Loose-tight

Human-technology Tight Variable Tight Loose-tight

Greatest risk Internal External Internal External, Internal

Tech-human environment Human-human environment,

Human-human Human-human

Schulman’s Typology Holistic Holistic Decomposable Both

Vogus & Welbourne High reliability Reliability-seeking High reliability Both 

(Sources: Rochlin 1993; Klein and others 1995; Schulman 1993; Vogus and Welbourne 2003)
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Research Note RMRS-RN-55. 2013

and maintain safety. Some were essentially “decomposable”—

“actions and analyses to ensure safety are localized”; others 

were “holistic”—“actions and analyses to ensure safety are 

system-wide” (1995:791). This necessitates understanding the 

foci of safety and reliability, their relationship to performance, 

and implications for organizational structure—holistic or decomposable. Taking performance first, although performance 

is, in its positive aspect, safe and the goal is reliable safety (as 

several researchers have pointed out), reliability and safety 

are not always analogous (for example, Carroll and Rudolph 

2006; Hopkins 2007). Similar to precision and accuracy, one 

may reliably produce unsafe results. Here, we equate high 

performance and high reliability and interpret this to mean 

the consistent (reliable) production of acceptable (safe) outcomes with only rare occurrences of unintended consequences 

amplifying into catastrophes (such as injury, death, or significant damage to ecological or real property or institutional 

relationships).

For nuclear power plants and naval aircraft carriers where 

the safety of all is achieved through the safety of tightly connected individual actors, the necessary organizational structure 

is holistic. Processes and practices are created to ensure broad, 

shared understanding of system function and loci of expertise. In nuclear power plants, for example, all work to ensure 

the safety of a single entity: the entire plant. On an aircraft 

carrier, many distributed systems must coordinate closely toward a single point of action: sequential take-off or landings 

of different, individual pilots and aircraft. Yet, it is not just 

strongly hierarchical organizations that need to be holistic. 

Software start-ups, the epitome of distributed decision making and localized innovation, also require holistic organization 

since the focus of protection is the organization, even as many 

individual members and teams may fail, frequently, without 

impairing organizational performance and survival. We might 

simplistically conceptualize these in terms of the number of 

actors in the system to the focus. As such, these all describe a 

many-to-one relationship.

Health care, in contrast, requires a decomposable structure: safety and performance is measured by the health of each 

patient, but this is a result of safe actions by multiple, interdependent individual actors and teams. We might characterize 

these as many-to-many relationships.

In wildland fire, safety is most often conceived of in terms 

of human well-being, although there are currently untracked 

performance objectives regarding ecology, finances, and organizational relationships. Each of these has a different scale of 

interest (that is, focus on safety and reliability): human catastrophes in wildland fire tend to be localized, (affecting a 

single unit—individual, aircraft, crew or division, or the public); political catastrophes tend to be general (affecting not just 

the incident management team and local unit, but the entire 

parent organization); and ecological catastrophes may be at 

any scale. A catastrophe may or may not impair incident-wide 

operations or alter other performance outcomes. In wildland 

fire, then, the risk of human mortality due to error or misidentification is high, the level of technology varies, the risk 

to programmatic stability varies with external opinion, and 

risk of organizational mortality is low (Table 1). The tasks at 

higher and mid-levels of the organization are to safely coordinate many personnel and resources at many ground locations 

simultaneously while maintaining productive external relationships. This situation indicates a need for holistic structure, 

but in many-to-one, many-to-many, and even some one-toone relationships. The tasks at a particular ground location 

are to safely conduct ground-based operations, some of which 

are entirely independent (digging line) of and some are entirely interdependent (coordinated ground-air operations) on 

other parts of the incident. These situations indicate a need 

for a decomposable structure characterized by many-to-many 

relationships. As such, wildland fire appears to require characteristics of both holistic and decomposable organizational 

structures, further highlighting questions around how these 

systems connect and switch and what supports reliability.

High Reliability Practices

Given the variability of the work-risk environment of 

HROs, the unit that must be highly reliable, and the associated organizational structures to support this unit, the most 

valuable practices to achieve reliability likely differ. Indeed, 

Vogus and Welbourne (2003) found that initial public offering (IPO) software firms required a somewhat narrower 

mix of practices than traditional HROs. The IPO software 

industry is one in which the greatest risk comes from the 

external organizational environment, as opposed to typical 

HROs in which risk most often emerges from internal operating environment. In start-ups working toward IPO, the 

risk of human mortality is low but organizational mortality is 

high. Again, this is different from typical HROs in which the 

risk of human mortality is high but the risk of organizational mortality is relatively low. Vogus and Welbourne (2003) 

characterized this new type of firm as “reliability-seeking” 

organizations in contrast to “high reliability” organizations. 

Vogus and Welbourne’s (2003) work indicated that these 

reliability-seeking organizations placed a premium on human resource practices that contribute to high levels of local 

innovation and resiliency. Organizational efforts to provide 
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Research Note RMRS-RN-55. 2013

cross-training, skill development, and communication stimulated an ability to be reluctant to simplify interpretations, 

build capacity for resilience, and be highly sensitive to internal and external operations. It should be noted, however, 

that this study did not evaluate possible practices to improve 

anticipation of failure or deference to expertise, thus the evidence is suggestive only.

Wildland fire management shares similarities with both 

traditional high reliability and reliability-seeking organizations: as much danger originates from the external operating 

environment (physical and social) as from internal humanhuman and human-technology interactions. Since coupling 

in wildland fire systems can vary from fairly loose with significant localized independence and decision-authority, to tight 

requiring very precise linkages in time, space, and expertise 

across large scales between individuals and between human 

and technology, sub-systems that take on holistic and decomposable structures may well reflect different combinations of 

high reliability principles. Holistic high reliability requires 

alignment of organizational parts (individuals and teams and 

their tasks) to the overall mission and strong linkages in communications (particularly development and maintenance of 

a collective awareness of the existing and developing situation). The ability to respond to emerging issues necessitates 

both decomposable and holistic capacity, depending upon 

the sub-system, and perhaps prioritizes the ability to select 

the appropriate balance of expertise and authority. That is, 

high reliability in wildland fire management may require all 

of the HRO principles, though with different emphasis under different scenarios and organizational positions. Placed in 

this frame, wildland fire appears to be both a potential bridge 

linking types of HROs and an arena for analyzing how these 

structures interact to achieve high reliability.

Assessing Performance—Components, 

Measures, and Related Concepts

A practical model of high performance in wildland fire 

must be capable of providing concrete suggestions, even prescriptions. This requires a shift in thinking from considering 

reliability solely as a descriptive characteristic to reliability as 

a performance indicator (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001; Ericksen 

and Dyer 2004). In subsequent analyses, we will address 

measures to assess human and organizational performance in 

wildland fire. Here, however, we assess the state of high reliability in the federal wildland fire community. For this, we take 

advantage of empirical work conducted elsewhere, including 

practices of high reliability as well as those of related human 

resource, leadership, and organizational learning practices.

High Reliability and Collective Mindfulness

Weick and Sutcliffe (2001, 2007) developed a series of audits 

(short questionnaires) to help organizations characterize their 

internal practices for each of the five principles. The authors 

described high reliability as mindfulness, a collective attribute 

shared among HRO members that brings to life a culture of 

safety and reliability. In a study of hospital nursing units, Vogus 

and Sutcliffe (2007) developed and validated a nine-item survey scale called the Safety Organizing Scale (SOS) that captures 

the behaviors of collective mindfulness. For at least the hospital 

environment, empirical evidence indicates that the five principles do not show up as discrete practices but can be described 

as a single, collective suite of practices. Conversely, Vogus and 

Welbourne’s (2003) study of software firms illuminated the 

value of measuring the five principles discretely.

As part of our assessment, one question we seek to answer 

is whether HRO practices in wildland fire community are best 

captured by the collective scale or by measures of individual 

principles. The answer has implications for future assessment 

work and training.

Related Concepts and Measures

Intuitively, HRO practices/collective mindfulness do 

not occur spontaneously. Previous research (see for instance, 

Campbell 1990; Weick and Roberts 1993; Edmondson 1999; 

Weick and others 1999; Weick and Sutcliffe 2001; Vogus 2004; 

Vogus and Sutcliffe 2007) suggests that enactment of the five 

principles of HRO/collective mindfulness depends to some degree on conditions for communication at the unit level. HRO 

practices also appear closely linked with concepts of learning 

organizations, high performance human resource practices, and 

high functioning teams. Baker and others (2006) drew connections between teamwork and the particular requirements of 

high reliability: “Teamwork is not an automatic consequence 

of co-locating people together and depends on a willingness to 

cooperate for a shared goal. ... Teamwork is distinct from taskwork... teamwork depends on each team member being able 

to anticipate the needs of others; adjust to each other’s actions, 

and have a shared understanding of how a procedure should 

happen.” (Baker and others 2006: 1579). Their enumeration of 

the characteristics of effective teams contains aspects of trust, 

leadership, and mutual valuation that are echoed in the attributes of collective mindfulness and the five principles. Specific 

constructs previously tested with respect to HROs are:

•	 Respectful interaction—Based on Asch’s moral imperatives 

(Campbell 1990; Weick 1993) of respecting both your own 

and others’ reports and being able to integrate these various 

perceptions without denigrating either. High Reliability 
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Research Note RMRS-RN-55. 2013

Organizing focuses on building a group and organizational 

culture where it is the norm for people to respectfully 

interact.

•	 Heedful interrelating—HRO fosters a culture where people 

interact to become more consciously aware of how their 

work fits in with the work of others and the goals of the 

system and are able to place the value of the overall goal above 

their own (Vogus 2004).

•	 Leadership—HRO recognizes that the tone set by a unit leader 

regarding openness to receiving differing perspectives, and 

how the leader handles subordinates’ comments influences 

whether or not someone is willing to voice their observations 

or ideas (Edmondson 1999; Thomas and others 2005).

•	 Learning—The ability to cultivate a deep individual and team 

understanding of the task process and dynamics is intuitively 

aided by a culture that values innovation, consistent reflection 

on outcomes, and incorporation of lessons learned into future 

operations (Senge 1990).

•	 Goal clarity—Scholars of organizational learning hypothesize 

that clarity and alignment around mission is a strategic 

building block (Yang and others 2004) and is intuitively 

linked to performance.

•	 Task complexity and task interdependence—Vogus (2004) 

hypothesized that the complexity of a task and the relative 

independence or interdependence of individual actions 

should be related to collective mindfulness.

Conceptual Model and 

Research Questions

Conceptual clarifications are needed in HRO theory to determine (a) whether practices that distinguish HROs from other 

organizations are distinct from attributes of high functioning, 

learning teams and organizations, and (b) if related, how. Our 

conceptual model (Fig. 1) proposes that collective mindfulness 

as measured by the SOS (Vogus and Sutcliffe 2007a) and five 

principles of high reliability (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001, 2007), 

are simply different names for the same construct. However, 

because it is difficult to explain, train, or measure progress on 

interrelated practices, it would be ideal if the five practices were 

distinct.

Further, our conceptual model indicates that the expression 

of HRO practices is distinct from constructs and practices for 

encouraging upward voice, building a strong group culture, 

and facilitating organizational learning. Upward voice, as initiated by leaders who are both open and responsive to the ideas 

of the team, intuitively supports the HRO practices (sensitivity 

to operations, deference to expertise, reluctance to simplify), 

which require that team members speak up and share their 

different perspectives. Such behaviors are also likely to create 

an atmosphere in which the interpersonal behaviors of high 

performing teams flourish (for example, trust, honesty, and respect that characterize strong group culture). An orientation 

to learning also seems essential to practices of high reliability, 

Figure 1—Survey constructs as identified in the literature.

 

Learning 

Orientation 

Reluctance to Simplify

Sensitivity to Operations

Commitment to Resilience

Preoccupation with failure

Deference to Expertise

Leadership 

Openness 

Responsiveness 

HRO Practices 

Mindfulness 

Group Culture 

Respect

Honesty

Trust

Nature of the Task 

Task interdependence

Task complexity

Goal Clarity 

Group Performance 
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Research Note RMRS-RN-55. 2013

particularly commitment to resilience and preoccupation with 

failure.

Finally, our conceptual model recognizes that several other features of the task context may influence HRO practices. 

These previously measured constructs include the nature of the 

work itself (task complexity, task interdependence) and direction as perceived by the group (goal clarity), which were found 

to be important in hospital nursing units (Vogus 2004).

Research questions flowing from this conceptual model are 

both theoretical and practical. Fundamentally, we want to describe HRO and related practices in the Federal wildland fire 

community. Theoretically, we are interested in whether the 

five practices can be measured and evaluated individually or 

whether collective mindfulness is a single construct on its own. 

We are also interested in whether theoretically related constructs describing organizational culture and high performance 

teams—group culture, leadership, and learning orientation—

are also functionally contained within collective mindfulness 

or are distinct constructs. Practically, we seek to establish a 

baseline measure for the fire community that can provide concrete suggestions for improving performance. In this paper, 

we present results of this first set of questions. In related work 

(Black and McBride 2013), we assessed similarities and differences among sub-groups of the survey. With these results, we 

will then probe further into the questions of how wildland fire 

does or can negotiate the apparent need for both holistic and 

decomposable organizational structures while achieving high 

levels of safety, reliability, and performance.

Methods

Survey

We began with a survey. It included measures described 

previously and new items developed during the initial phase 

of this study (Barton and Sutcliffe 2009). It was designed to 

measure:

•	 each of the five principles of high reliability as separate 

constructs (deference to expertise, sensitivity to operations, 

reluctance to simplify, preoccupation with failure, 

commitment to resilience);

•	 the SOS as a single construct of collective mindfulness;

•	 two constructs describing human resource practices 

that support strong group culture (heedful interrelating, 

respectful interaction);

•	 three facets of leadership (leadership openness, leadership 

response, and leader framing);

•	 a single construct for learning orientation;

•	 two constructs capturing the nature of the task (task 

interdependence, task complexity);

•	 a single construct to assess goal clarity; and

•	 a single construct to assess group performance (Tables 2 

and 3).

These were captured using 70 5-point Likert-scale items 

(statements that participants are asked to respond to).

We also captured respondent and incident demographic 

characteristics, including type and complexity of the incident, 

respondent’s agency, full-time job, incident position, age range, 

experience in fire management, and gender. For each incident, 

we asked respondents whether there were any injuries during 

their assignment, their perception of the group, and their perception of overall fire performance (See Black and McBride 

2013 for analysis of these demographic-related items).

The survey population included permanent seasonal and 

full-time employees filling primary fire positions (including 

fire, fuels, dispatch, and fire aviation) in the USDA Forest 

Service (USFS), and US DOI Bureau of Land Management 

(BLM) and National Park Service (NPS).2 Within each agency, 

these personnel fill ground-, middle-, and upper-level positions 

during an incident. All incident position qualifications and descriptions are managed by the interagency National Wildfire 

Coordinating Group. Ground-level (“boots-in-the-black”) 

positions include engine captain, crew foreman, hotshot superintendent, and helitack crewmembers who work directly on 

firelines. Mid-level positions include local staff such as fuels 

and fire management officers, fire education prevention specialists who provide local knowledge and support, and incident 

positions such as Division Supervisors, and Task Force Leaders 

whose work includes significant supervisory functions. Some, 

such as Division Supervisors and Task Force Leaders, are assigned to a fireline with responsibility for multiple tactical 

ground resources. Upper-level positions include managers for 

fire, fuels, aviation, and dispatch from the Forest Supervisor’s 

office, National Park Headquarters, and BLM State Offices, 

as well as command and general staff on Type 1 and Type 2 

Incident Management Teams.

2

 For all five Federal wildfire agencies (of which the three included 

here comprise the bulk of fire employees), internal agency 

calculations put the population of permanent employees who 

bill at least 51% of their time to fire at nearly 10,000, with 

approximately 7,000 in primary fire positions (Halbeurk pers. 

comm.). We estimate that we have surveyed approximately 10% 

of the population.
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Research Note RMRS-RN-55. 2013

Because incident positions are temporary, we necessarily conducted sampling based on normal organizational 

positions, defined our initial sampling frame by agency and 

permanent position (day job), and coded responses for analysis based on the incident position respondents provided as 

part of the survey.

A random stratified sample of administrative units was 

drawn from complete lists of USFS Forests, BLM State 

Offices, and NPS Parks with fire programs to reflect the relative proportions of Federal fire personnel. Major units (such 

as Parks, National Forests, and BLM State Offices) were 

randomly selected. Where multiple sub-units occurred for 

a given major unit (such as multiple Ranger Districts on a 

National Forest), these were again randomly sampled and 

complete telephone lists were obtained for the head office and 

selected local unit. With a target of 700 surveys, individual 

respondents were randomly selected from these lists to reflect 

the relative proportions of fire personnel in each administrative level (57% of surveys from ground-level, 29% from 

mid-level, and 14% from upper level positions), and agency 

(400 USFS—57%, 200 BLM—29%, and 100 NPS—14%).

The final random sample was drawn and the 15-minute 

telephone survey was administered by an independent polling 

organization (the University of Montana’s Bureau of Business 

and Economic Research) during October and November of 

2007. Individuals were asked to think back to their most 

recent fire event and answer with respect to the group they 

worked with most closely on that event. We accepted all fire 

events—suppression, wildland fire use (the designation at the 

time for managing fire for resource benefit), and prescribed 

fire. The dates of these events ranged from the day of the survey to six months earlier, with the majority occurring within 

two to three months of the interview.

Analysis

To condense the data yet discern underlying dimensions 

of the data structure, we used principal components analysis 

(PCA) with a varimax orthogonal rotation (using a sub-set of 

60 Likert-scale items from the full survey). This maximally 

distinguishes emerging constructs and yields clear, interpretable results (Hair and others 1998; Field 2009). Prior to 

conducting PCA, we visually examined the correlation matrix, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling 

adequacy, and Bartlett’s test of sphericity to assess the appropriateness for PCA (Field 2009; Hair and others 2009). 

Accordingly, we retained all 60 Likert-scale items.

We performed series of PCAs using a cut-off value of 0.40 

as our criterion for deciding which loadings were significantly 

associated with a given component (Hair and others 2009). 

This level delineates the higher from the lower loadings in the 

matrix (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). Non-significant and 

cross-loaded items in the initial PCA solution were excluded 

and the remainder were re-submitted. Iterations were conducted until a final PCA solution was obtained in which all 

Table 2—Survey items designed for theorized principles of High Reliability Organizing (see Vogus and Sutcliffe 2007a; Sutcliffe 2011).

Construct Survey item

Preoccupation with failure We actively looked for instances of small things going wrong to try to learn what was happening.

Leaders on the fire actively looked for problems.

People were rewarded or thanked for spotting potential trouble spots.

Reluctance to simplify We were encouraged to express differing points of view.

We assessed each situation on its own rather than assuming it would be similar to other situations we’d 

experienced.

When members had different opinions, we tried to understand one another’s views.

Sensitivity to operations There was always someone with authority to make decisions available and accessible in the event that 

something unexpected came up.

People were familiar with what was going own beyond their own part of the fire.

Leaders were constantly monitoring workload and span of control to reduce them when that became necessary.

We had access to sufficient resources when we needed them.

We constantly kept one another in the loop about our activities.

Our superiors checked in with us frequently.

We checked in with our superiors frequently.

Commitment to resilience Leaders involved in this fire were concerned with developing people’s skills and knowledge.

Leaders encouraged individuals to take on roles in this fire that challenged and stretched them.

Most people involved had the skills necessary to respond to any unexpected problems that arose.

Deference to expertise People most qualified to make decisions made them, regardless of hierarchical rank.

People in the group valued expertise and experience over hierarchical rank.

It was generally easy to obtain expert assistance when something came up that we didn’t know how to handle.

Less experienced members of my group brought up some important issues or ideas during the fire.
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Research Note RMRS-RN-55. 2013

retained variables had a significant loading on a single component (Hair and others 2009). The internal reliabilities of 

the final components were assessed using Cronbach’s α, ,the 

primary evaluation statistic.

To better interpret the resulting components, we conducted a single round of PCA on each of the five emergent 

components separately. All PCA analyses were performed 

using SPSS Statistics Gradpack 17.0 software (SPSS Inc., 

Chicago, Illinois).

Results and Discussion

Sampling Response and Statistical Adequacy

Total responses (n = 668) closely matched the proposed 

sampling scheme in terms of levels (15% upper-level, 27% 

mid-level, and 58% ground-level) but were more uniform in 

terms of agency proportions (40% USFS, 23% BLM, and 

37% NPS). Prior to analysis, we scrubbed the dataset by 

Table 3—Survey items for related constructs. [Items adapted from: collective mindfulness, Vogus and Sutcliffe 2007a; leadership and learning 

orientation, Edmondson 1999; goal clarity, task complexity, task interdependence, respectful interaction, and heedful interrelating, Vogus 

and Sutcliffe 2007b.] *Reverse-scored.

Construct Survey item

Collective Mindfulness We had a good understanding of each other’s talents and skills.

We talked about mistakes and ways to learn from them.

We discussed our unique skills with each other so we knew who on the fire had relevant specialized skills 

and knowledge.

We discussed alternatives as to how to go about our work activities.

We discussed what to look out for, when giving reports to new teams or units.

We took advantage of the unique skills of our colleagues, when attempting to solve a problem.

We spent time identifying activities that we did not want to go wrong.

When errors did happen, we discussed how we could have prevented them.

When something went wrong or a problem developed, we rapidly pooled our collective expertise to address it.

Leader openness My boss actively sought input from a broad range of folks when making decisions.

My boss actively encouraged subordinates to question decisions that didn’t make sense to them.

My boss encouraged people to bring up potential problems.

Leader response My boss listened to the less experienced members of my group when they brought up ideas or issues.

My boss actively listened when different views were presented.

My boss responded defensively to feedback from others.*

My boss rejected or ignored input from others.*

Leader framing My boss told us to pay attention to one another’s input or ideas.

My boss told us that our task required us to work well together.

My boss stated that he/she was confident in our group’s ability to do the work.

Goal clarity Our mission or objectives for each day were clear at the beginning of the day.

Our mission and objectives for each day were clear throughout the day.

The lack of clear mission/objectives made it difficult to do our work.*

Task complexity The tasks that my group was involved in were quite routine.

We knew what actions were required to achieve the outcomes we wanted.

The tasks we were involved with required a broad range of skills and functions.

The tasks we were involved with were quite complex.

Learning After the fire, we discussed what we learned.

After the fire, we discussed whether there were ways we could have predicted or prevented problems that arose.

Changes to procedures were recommended as a result of what we learned from our experiences on this incident.

Task interdependence Each person’s performance was dependent on others performing well.

Achieving our objectives required close coordination within our group.

The way each person performed their work had a significant impact on how others were able to perform their work.

Group performance Information flowed well within our group.

I felt uncomfortable with our approach to the work.*

Respectful interaction People showed a great deal of respect for each other.

The individuals I worked with were trustworthy.

We honestly reported what we perceived to each other.

Heedful interrelating Individuals paid attention to what others were doing.

Most of the individuals I worked with understood how their actions contributed to the functioning of the entire 

response team.

We actively looked out for one another.
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Research Note RMRS-RN-55. 2013

Table 4—Final 5-component solution. [Non-significant and cross-loading items identified in initial solution have been excluded. Component loadings 

<0.4 have been suppressed to allow for easier viewing of the matrix.] REV = reverse-scored.

Rotated component matrix

 Component

Survey item 1 2 3 4 5

Leaders encouraged individuals to take on roles in this fire that challenged and stretched them. .640

There was always someone with authority to make decisions available and accessible in the event that something .629

unexpected came up.

We checked in with our superiors frequently. .612

Leaders on the fire actively looked for problems. .611

Leaders involved in this fire were concerned with developing people’s skills and knowledge. .609

Leaders were constantly monitoring workload and span of control to reduce them when that became necessary. .607

People were familiar with what was going own beyond their own part of the fire. .598

Our superiors checked in with us frequently. .597

We constantly kept one another in the loop about our activities. .586

People most qualified to make decisions made them, regardless of hierarchical rank. .585

It was generally easy to obtain expert assistance when something came up that we didn’t know how to handle. .584

We were encouraged to express differing points of view. .560

Most people involved had the skills necessary to respond to any unexpected problems that arose. .516

People were rewarded or thanked for spotting potential trouble spots. .516

When members had different opinions, we tried to understand one another’s views. .473

People in the group valued expertise and experience over hierarchical rank. .457

We assessed each situation on its own rather than assuming it would be similar to other situations we’d .429

experienced.

We had access to sufficient resources when we needed them. .421

My boss actively listened when different views were presented. .767

My boss encouraged people to bring up potential problems. .728

REV_My boss rejected or ignored input from others. .728

My boss listened to the less experienced members of my group when they brought up ideas or issues. .724

My boss actively encouraged subordinates to question decisions that didn’t make sense to them. .687

My boss actively sought input from a broad range of folks when making decisions. .684

My boss told us to pay attention to one another’s input or ideas. .609

My boss told us that our task required us to work well together. .569

REV_My boss responded defensively to feedback from others. .557

My boss stated that he/she was confident in our group’s ability to do the work. .465

The individuals I worked with were trustworthy. .720

We actively looked out for one another. .657

We honestly reported what we perceived to each other. .621

Achieving our objectives required close coordination within our group. .618

People showed a great deal of respect for each other. .611

We took advantage of the unique skills of our colleagues, when attempting to solve 

a problem. .568

We had a good understanding of each other’s talents and skills. .536

The way each person performed their work had a significant impact on how others were able to perform their work. .523

We spent time identifying activities that we did not want to go wrong. .499

After the fire, we discussed whether there were ways we could have predicted or prevented problems that arose. .719

After the fire, we discussed what we learned. .665

Changes to procedures were recommended as a result of what we learned from our experiences on this incident. .541

We talked about mistakes and ways to learn from them. .532

The tasks we were involved with required a broad range of skills and functions. .518

We discussed what to look out for, when giving reports to new teams or units. .493

When errors did happen, we discussed how we could have prevented them. .486

The tasks we were involved with were quite complex. .469

We discussed alternatives as to how to go about our work activities. .452

We discussed our unique skills with each other so we knew who on the fire had relevant specialized skills .438

and knowledge.

Our mission and objectives for each day were clear throughout the day. .786

Our mission or objectives for each day were clear at the beginning of the day. .766

REV_The lack of clear mission/objectives made it difficult to do our work. .607

We knew what actions were required to achieve the outcomes we wanted. .601

Information flowed well within our group. .578

REV_I felt uncomfortable with our approach to the work. .546

Eigenvalues 15.43 3.00 2.77 2.25 1.88

% variance 29.1 5.7 5.2 4.2 3.5

Cronbach’s α .911 .886 .858 .803 .774

Total variance explained: 47.8%

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.
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Research Note RMRS-RN-55. 2013

eliminating all records with more than two missing values. For 

records with fewer than two missing values, we inserted the 

mean score for that item, resulting in a final dataset of 574 responses. Comparison of the demographics and scores of the 94 

excluded cases indicated no bias in non-respondents.

The KMO measure verified the sampling adequacy of the 

Likert-scale data for PCA (KMO = 0.941). Bartlett’s test of 

sphericity was significant (χ2 [1770] =16824.158, p<0.001), 

indicating that correlations between items were sufficiently 

large for PCA.

Emergent Dimensions of Organizational 

Safety Climate

Examination of the initial scree plot and trial iterations 

indicated that the extraction of five components achieved the 

most representative and parsimonious solution. The final PCA 

solution (53 items) explained 47.8% of the variance in the 

data; all components have high internal reliability (Table 4).

Component 1—HRO practices. The first component comprised all but two items that measure the five theorized 

principles of HRO (Table 4). The remaining two—one from 

the original preoccupation with failure scale and one from the 

original deference to expertise scale—did not load significantly 

on any component and were dropped from the analysis. None 

of the items measuring collective mindfulness from the SOS 

loaded on this component. No items from other a priori scales 

loaded onto this component.

Subsequent PCA suggested some support for three subdimensions around communications connecting the group 

to higher levels of the organization (roughly sensitivity to operations), developing and maintaining a rich understanding 

of the situation (roughly reluctance to simplify), and the ability to value expertise over hierarchy (deference to expertise). 

However, only deference to expertise loads uniquely (Table 5).

As in the medical community, HRO practices hang together, 

but in the wildland fire community this is captured, not by the 

SOS, but by the audit-based items capturing the five principles 

individually. Close examination of these seem to distinguish 

human interactions by group identity and communications-related from task-related functions. That is, the sub-components 

of the HRO scale suggest interactions among those within the 

work group differ from interactions with external entities. For 

instance, items related to communications between the work 

group and supervisors (largely those measuring sensitivity to 

operations) are distinguishable from communication-based 

items that concern inter-group functioning (reluctance to 

Table 5—Rotated component matrix for Component 1-HRO Practices with a priori construct.

A priori Component

construct Survey item 1 2 3

HRO_S2O Our superiors checked in with us frequently. .795

HRO_S2O We checked in with our superiors frequently. .755

HRO_S2O There was always someone with authority to make decisions available and accessible in the .678

event that something unexpected came up.

HRO_S2O Leaders were constantly monitoring workload and span of control to reduce them when that .658

became necessary.

HRO_D2E It was generally easy to obtain expert assistance when something came up that we didn’t know .573

how to handle.

HRO_S2O We constantly kept one another in the loop about our activities. .554 .500

HRO_C2R Leaders encouraged individuals to take on roles in this fire that challenged and stretched them. .509 .457

HRO_PwF Leaders on the fire actively looked for problems. .500

HRO_S2O People were familiar with what was going own beyond their own part of the fire. .498 .410

HRO_C2R Leaders involved in this fire were concerned with developing people’s skills and knowledge. .495 .416

HRO_C2R Most people involved had the skills necessary to respond to any unexpected problems that arose. .438 .521

HRO_R2S When members had different opinions, we tried to understand one another’s views. .730

HRO_R2S We were encouraged to express differing points of view. .719

HRO_PwF People were rewarded or thanked for spotting potential trouble spots. .705

HRO_R2S We assessed each situation on its own rather than assuming it would be similar to other situations .635

we’d experienced.

HRO_D2E People in the group valued expertise and experience over hierarchical rank. .810

HRO_D2E People most qualified to make decisions made them, regardless of hierarchical rank. .789

HRO_S2O We had access to sufficient resources when we needed them. -* - -

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.

HRO = High Reliability Organizing, S2O = Sensitivity to Operations, D2E = Deference to Expertise, C2R = Commitment to Resilience, PwF = 

Preoccupation with Failure, R2S = Reluctance to Simplify. * did not load significantly.
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Research Note RMRS-RN-55. 2013

simplify). Items originally proposed as describing commitment 

to resilience, preoccupation with failure, and deference to 

expertise tended to describe task-related rather than communications-related behaviors. Overall, we interpret the emergent 

HRO practices construct as describing practices that keep the 

group successfully integrated into the broader environment 

and encouraging a rich situational awareness.

Based on these results, we reject our initial expectation that 

the measures of the five HRO principles replicate those of the 

SOS (collective mindfulness). There is also evidence to partially 

accept and partially reject our expectation that the principles 

are distinct.

Component 2—Leadership. The second component comprised all items that measure our leadership construct (Table 

4). No other items loaded on this component. Subsequent 

analysis indicates a sub-component on task framing, but most 

other items indicate considerable cross-loading (Table 6).

The a priori Leadership construct hangs together well and 

focuses on behaviors that nurture upward voice, or speaking up 

in a team. While there was no evidence that the two constructs 

of openness/response are separate, there was a clear distinction 

between leader-group interactions and how the leader encouraged the group to work together.

Component 3—Group Culture. The third component 

comprised 10 items, including all three items of respectful interaction and one of the three items of heedful interrelating 

(Tables 4, 7). This component also comprised all three items 

of task interdependence and three of the nine SOS items. The 

remaining two items from the original heedful interrelating 

scale cross-loaded with Component 1 and were dropped from 

analysis.

Further analysis cleanly breaks this component into two 

distinct sub-components: task interdependence, which exactly 

replicates the a priori construct, and a new construct that incorporates the remaining items in this component (Table 7).

Previously theorized, and empirically found by Vogus 

(2004) to be separate constructs, we found that heedful interrelating and respectful interaction are part of broader construct 

describing Group Culture. This emergent component speaks 

about how the group interacts. It first describes the tone of 

inter-group dynamics (group interaction), which captures 

the knowledge of and social interactions between members 

of a team. Second, it provides insight into their mental models about their tasks (task interdependence), governing their 

awareness of how each member of the group is needed to successfully complete the group’s work.

Component 4—Learning Orientation. The fourth component also comprises 10 items, including all three items testing 

for a learning orientation, two of the four task complexity 

items, and four of the SOS items (Tables 4, 8).

Further analysis reveals three distinct sub-components 

(Table 8). The first sub-component groups four items of the 

SOS together, reflective of group sense-making. The second exactly replicates the a priori learning orientation construct and 

speaks to group actions to reflect upon and incorporate lessons 

learned. The final component, task complexity, incorporates 

two of three items of the a priori construct that concern the 

nature of the task itself.

The resulting Learning Orientation construct is found to 

be more comprehensive and nuanced than originally thought. 

Survey respondents said they perceive that learning is not simply about post-event reflection and integration but involves 

in-the-moment sense-making about tasks, approaches, and 

outcomes. The construct also suggests that the degree of complexity of a task is linked to learning behaviors.

Component 5—Mission Clarity. The fifth and final component comprises six items: all three of the goal clarity items, 

both of the group performance items, and the remaining item 

measuring task complexity (Table 4). Further analysis indicates 

this component is indivisible.

It appears that it is not simply clarity of the goal that is important, but that this clarity is linked to clarity of how the task 

may be achieved (within-group knowledge), to how well information flows within the group (within-group performance), 

and to comfort level with the assignment (safety perception). 

The emergent construct of Mission Clarity thus incorporates 

understanding of expectations, knowledge of how to achieve 

them, within group information flow, and perception of safety.

Conceptual Model—Revisited

The emergent components require us to revise our conceptual model, even before we address the strength or direction 

of linkages (Fig. 2). Some of our a priori constructs dissolve in 

the presence of a more complete suite of social and organizational practices. In addition to the breakdown of relationship 

between the mindfulness (SOS) and high reliability practices, 

we found that reflective aspects of mindfulness and the complexity of a task are part of a group’s learning orientation, while 

interactive aspects of mindfulness and degree of task interdependence are associated with group culture. We also found our 

measures of group performance are linked with communication flow and goal clarity in a way that creates a more coherent 

component around mission clarity. The emergent construct of 

high reliability practices seems to highlight sensitivity to operations, reluctance to simplify, and deference to expertise. Items 

pertaining to a preoccupation with failure diffuse, raising the 
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Research Note RMRS-RN-55. 2013

Table 6—Rotated component matrix for Component 2-Leadership showing a priori construct.

Component

A priori construct Survey item 1 2

LEADER Task Framing My boss told us that our task required us to work well together. .814

LEADER Task Framing My boss told us to pay attention to one another’s input or ideas. .811

LEADER Task Framing My boss stated that he/she was confident in our group’s ability to do the work. .637

LEADER Openness My boss actively encouraged subordinates to question decisions that didn’t 

make sense to them. .586 .528

LEADER Response My boss responded defensively to feedback from others. .776

LEADER Response REV_My boss rejected or ignored input from others.* .761

LEADER Response My boss actively listened when different views were presented. .483 .704

LEADER Response My boss listened to the less experienced members of my group when they 

brought up ideas or issues. .463 .642

LEADER Openness My boss encouraged people to bring up potential problems. .553 .609

LEADER Openness My boss actively sought input from a broad range of folks when making decisions. .503 .567

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 3 

iterations. * Reverse-scored.

Table 7—Rotated component matrix for Component 3–Group Culture showing a priori construct.

Component

A priori construct Survey item 1 2

RESPECT INTRXN The individuals I worked with were trustworthy. .843

RESPECT INTRXN People showed a great deal of respect for each other. .792

RESPECT INTRXN We honestly reported what we perceived to each other. .714

HEED INTERRELN We actively looked out for one another. .702

MINDFULNESS We had a good understanding of each other’s talents and skills. .627

MINDFULNESS We took advantage of the unique skills of our colleagues, when attempting to 

solve a problem. .567

MINDFULNESS We spent time identifying activities that we did not want to go wrong. .539

TASK INTERDEP The way each person performed their work had a significant impact on how others 

were able to perform their work. .816

TASK INTERDEP Each person’s performance was dependent on other’s performing well. .761

TASK INTERDEP Achieving our objectives required close coordination within our group. .683

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 3 

iterations.

Table 8—Rotated component matrix for Component 4–Learning Orientation with a priori construct.

Component

A priori construct Survey item 1 2 3

MINDFULNESS When errors did happen, we discussed how we could have prevented them. .771

MINDFULNESS We discussed alternatives as to how to go about our work activities. .749

MINDFULNESS We discussed what to look out for, when giving reports to new teams or units. .730

MINDFULNESS We talked about mistakes and ways to learn from them. .727

LEARNING After the fire, we discussed what we learned. .868

LEARNING After the fire, we discussed whether there were ways we could have predicted or 

prevented problems that arose. .852

LEARNING Changes to procedures were recommended as a result of what we learned from our 

experiences on this incident. .655

TASK COMPLEX The tasks we were involved with required a broad range of skills and functions. .840

TASK COMPLEX The tasks we were involved with were quite complex. .832

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 5 

iterations.
14

Research Note RMRS-RN-55. 2013

question of whether this is a strength or a weakness. Items 

related to commitment to resilience cross-load with (that is, 

relate to) both sensitivity to operations and reluctance to simplify, indicating a practical link.

Implications and Next Steps for 

HRO and Safety Culture in the 

Wildland Fire Community

Our findings suggest that the Federal wildland fire community currently functions in ways that support and extend prior 

theorizing about high reliability.

In the Introduction, we posited that wildland fire appeared to have structural, risk, and safety characteristics of 

highly reliable and reliability-seeking organizations (Vogus and 

Welbourne 2003) as well as holistic and decomposable organizations (for example, Schulman 1993; Klein and others 1995). 

Our statistical results support this. Results point to some 

suites of behaviors that seek to build internal group functioning and performance (Leadership, Group Culture, Learning 

Orientation, and some HRO Practices), which are attributes 

of both decomposable and reliability-seeking organizations. 

Others function to build and maintain connection to the 

broader system through communication (other HRO Practices 

and Mission Clarity), which are attributes of holistic and high 

reliability organizations. Attributes of the latter seek to achieve 

and maintain alignment with the broader mission and place 

a premium on alignment to ensure human safety; attributes 

of the former build strong, curious groups that foster learning 

and resiliency. Given that the wildland fire community places 

considerable responsibility for safety on individuals in local 

units, the presence of both of these features is reassuring.

These findings allow us to see the previously separate organizational spectrums and types in a single, broader frame—one 

that includes both formal and informal structures. Results also 

expand insight into how theoretically related formal and informal organizational behaviors interact with the classic behaviors 

and practices of high reliability. Although not providing results as to the connection between constructs (see Black and 

McBride 2013; Jahn and Black in prep.), by looking at the specific groupings within each construct, we gain insight into how 

high reliability practices are related to organizational learning, 

leadership, and human resource practices. In particular, for 

both theoretical and practical purposes, it now appears necessary to:

•	 consider the perceived level of task interdependence as part 

of the structure of group culture;

•	 recognize the distinct but complementary role of supervisory 

behaviors to model openness and help the group recognize 

its interrelatedness;

•	 acknowledge that team learning is more than simply 

engaging in post-incident practices but also includes inthe-moment practices to puzzle through, and the team is 

integrally linked to the complexity of the task it faces;

•	 recognize that perceptions of group performance may or 

may not be an outcome, but they are certainly linked to 

how clear and comfortable a group is with its assignment 

and in the wildland fire community;

Figure 2—Constructs and sub-constructs as they appear in the Federal wildland fire community.

 

Learning Orientation 

Sense-making 

Reflection and integration 

Task complexity

Reluctance to Simplify

Sensitivity to Operations

Deference to Expertise

Leadership 

Openness/Responsiveness 

Task Framing 

 HRO Practices 

Group Culture 

Group interaction 

Task 

interdependence 

Mission Clarity 

Group performance 

Task performance clarity 

Safety perception 
15

Research Note RMRS-RN-55. 2013

•	 explore the suggestion that sensitivity to operations, a 

reluctance to simplify, and deference to expertise are the 

most readily visible and distinguishable principles of high 

reliability.

Finally, results raise theoretical and practical questions about 

how these components relate structurally to each other and 

whether the relationships are stable across the entire system or 

among different hierarchical or functional sub-systems. Such 

information will further illuminate this relationship between 

holistic/decomposable structures and will likely provide some 

insight as to how these two types might successfully transition 

and interact. We will also explore further the relative weighting 

of high reliability/reliability seeking practices in this system. 

Future research is necessary into the linkages between these 

structures, their sub-components, and performance.

Further inquiry into how this community engages in a 

preoccupation with failure and commitment to resilience is 

also warranted. Our finding that these attributes are scattered 

among the components as opposed to grouping together raises 

the question of whether these are strengths of the system or 

cause for concern. In new work, we explore these questions 

(Jahn and Black, in prep).

Acknowledgments

We are indebted to Drs. Kathleen Sutcliffe and Michelle 

Barton who were instrumental in the development of the study 

and survey instrument and provided critical reviews. We also 

thank Dr. Alexis Lewis, Dr. Jody Jahn, and Mike DeGrosky for 

critical reviews. Funding provided by National Fire Plan.

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17

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