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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INVESTIGATION

OF THE MURDER OF HUMAN RIGHTS

ATTORNEY PATRICK FINUCANE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 15, 2013

Serial No. 113–59

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

KAREN BASS, California 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Michael Finucane, son of slain human rights attorney Patrick Finucane .. 5

Brigadier General James P. Cullen, USA, Retired, human rights attorney ....... 19

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Michael Finucane: Prepared statement .......................................................... 10

Brigadier General James P. Cullen, USA, Retired: Prepared statement ........... 23

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 40

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 41

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations: 

Submission by Jane Winter, former director of British Irish Rights Watch ... 42

Patrick Finucane: The Fight for Justice ............................................................ 50

Statement on the publication of the De Silva Report into the murder 

of Pat Finucane ................................................................................................. 54

(1)

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 

INVESTIGATION OF THE MURDER OF 

HUMAN RIGHTS ATTORNEY PATRICK 

FINUCANE 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 15, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will come to order. Good morning 

to everyone. 

I would like to extend a special welcome to our witnesses and everyone joining us here today. I do see many old and close friends 

in the room today, and I want to welcome you to this hearing. 

Our purpose today is to assess progress on the unfulfilled British 

commitment, a broken commitment, unless the British Government 

reverses its current course, in the Pat Finucane collusion case and 

how this affects the peace process in Northern Ireland. 

In connection with the Good Friday Agreement, the British Government promised to conduct public inquiries into the Finucane 

and three other cases where government collusion in a paramilitary murder was suspected. 

Subsequently, the British Government backtracked in regard to 

the Finucane case, the 1989 murder of human rights lawyer Patrick Finucane. The British backtracking came despite the recommendation to hold an inquiry, which again the British Government agreed to abide by, of the internationally respected jurist and 

former Canadian Supreme Court Justice Peter Cory in 2004. 

At this point, I would like to thank Judge Cory again, who testified about his recommendation at a congressional hearing that I 

chaired in May 2004. That is now 9 years ago, and we are still trying to get the British Government to live up to its commitment. 

The Finucane family has testified at many hearings. Geraldine, 

Patrick’s widow, and his son, John-Michael Finucane, who is testifying today, first testified before Congress on this in 1997 in a 

hearing before this subcommittee, so that is now 16 years ago. And, 

of course, there have been many others. And all of these witnesses 

advocates and experts have advocated a full, independent, and pubVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:39 Sep 25, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\051513\80938 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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lic judicial inquiry into the police collusion with Loyalist 

paramilitaries responsible for brutally murdering Patrick Finucane. 

Over these years, the dedicated human rights activists and experts have established much of what has happened, and after facts 

have been established, the British Government has acknowledged 

many of them. In 2011, the British Government admitted that it 

did collude in the Finucane murder and apologized for it. 

Much of the credit for this admission goes to the many of you 

who have done the work, the hard work, on all the reports that 

documented collusion until it was pointless for the British Government to continue denying it. 

So that is progress. But the work is not done because the British 

Government has reserved one final yet massive injustice. It continues to protect those responsible for the murder of Patrick 

Finucane. Prime Minister Cameron told the Finucane family that 

the government would not conduct the promised public inquiry into 

the collusion. 

The deliberate decision not to proceed with the public inquiry is 

a glaring public breach of faith. It is the source of enormous frustration to Patrick Finucane’s family and friends. It resonates 

throughout Northern Ireland, calling into question the British Government’s commitment to peace, reconciliation, and, above all, justice. This is particularly sad because the British Government has 

taken so many other positive truly honorable steps, many of them 

more painful for large sectors of the British public and public opinion, such as the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, released in 2010. To call 

of that into question by reneging on the promised Finucane inquiry 

is a tragedy. It is a preventable tragedy, however. 

Most recently, in December 2012, Sir Desmond de Silva released 

a new report on collusion in the Finucane murder, really a review 

of existing case files rather than a gathering of new evidence that 

the promised inquiry would produce. The de Silva report detailed 

what Prime Minister Cameron admitted were shocking levels of 

state collusion. Let me repeat that: The de Silva report detailed 

what Prime Minister Cameron admitted were shocking levels of 

state collusion in the murder, including that it was RUC officers 

who proposed the killing of Finucane, passed information to his 

killers, obstructed the investigation, and that British domestic security and intelligence knew of the murder threats months before 

the actual crime, yet took no steps to protect him. 

It is admirable that the Prime Minister has admitted collusion 

and apologized for it, but it is really too much to admit a government crime and then say it will not be investigated, particularly 

when the government has undertaken a commitment to do so. 

The question asks itself: After so many positive steps, is the British Government really going to diminish the good it has done since 

1998 in order to protect the identity of people who share responsibility for a brutal murder? 

At this moment, I would like to say that I will be asking Members of Congress to sign a letter to the Prime Minister urging him 

to conduct the promised inquiry. Many Members of Congress have 

repeatedly called for this, including the passage of two of my congressional resolutions, H. Res. 740 in the 109th Congress and H. 

Con. Res. 20 in the 110th Congress. 

3

I now would like to yield to my friend, Mr. Weber, for any comments that he might have. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate your holding this hearing. In the interest of time, I 

am going to limit my remarks and say let’s get going. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. I would like to yield to my friend and colleague, Richard Neal. 

Mr. NEAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for using your 

committee assignment to keep this issue in front of the American 

people. I have, as you know, for decades pursued many of these 

cases, a reminder today of how we have been vindicated in many 

of these instances: Guilford, Birmingham, Joe Doherty, the deportees, and, of course, Bloody Sunday. 

For those that question the efforts that many of us have made 

over these years, I would remind all of a conversation I had with 

those families when Prime Minister Cameron took to the floor of 

Commons and apologized for what had happened on Bloody Sunday. I talked to those families within hours of that apology. The joy 

that overcame them, the tears with which they greeted me on the 

phone, indicating that but for America’s interest many of those 

cases perhaps would not have been brought to light, those families 

knew full well that none of their loved ones had been involved in 

triggering the events of Bloody Sunday, as was the case with the 

other examples I have already noted. 

I have known the Finucane family for a long, long period of time, 

and Geraldine Finucane deserves the full inquiry that was once 

promised by the British Government. I have spoken with various 

British Prime Ministers, Secretaries of State and other senior officials for many years. A full inquiry would bring about justice. And 

let me also say so do the families of Rosemary Nelson, Raymond 

McCord, Robert Hamill, and Billy Wright. 

We note today that there has been great progress, as I heard 

from you on the way in. Various British Prime Ministers have certainly changed the tone of the conversation over these years, and 

indeed, we should all be very grateful. But much of the incentive 

came from the American people, who demanded that these inquiries be fully accepted and introduced. 

But the Finucane family deserves more than an apology. They 

deserve the full and independent inquiry that was promised earlier 

by Prime Minister Blair and what we thought was going to be a 

position adopted by Prime Minister Cameron. Recent evidence indicates that this inquiry is needed now more than ever. Prime Minister Cameron and many of his advisers have recently disclosed 

correspondence that certainly makes clear what should be taking 

place. Jeremy Heywood has described the killing as ‘‘far worse than 

anything alleged in Iraq or Afghanistan.’’

And I have offered a letter that I know my colleagues will sign 

urging Prime Minister Cameron to hold a full inquiry that was 

once promised. 

We know there was collusion in this case. Now we have to find 

out who was responsible. The changes that we have all had a 

chance to witness in these ‘‘it will never happen moments’’ have 

been extraordinary, but much of that impetus has come from Members of the United States Congress as we have pursued these inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:39 Sep 25, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\051513\80938 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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quiries. These were sectarian, brutal assassinations, and in particular, the Finucane case is in my mind one of the most egregious, 

largely because of the manner in which it was undertaken, in full 

view of his family on a quiet day, when all security forces and 

members of the RUC at the time were removed so that this assassination could take place. 

And I appreciate the fact, Mr. Chairman, that you have used 

again your committee assignment to keep this matter in full view 

of the American people. 

I am currently co-chairing a get-together at the Ways and Means 

Select Committee on Revenue, so I departed there to get over here. 

And I did want to thank two of my friends here from the 

Finucane family and General Cullen, who has been a great, great 

advocate on our behalf all of these years. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Neal, thank you very much for joining us. I 

thank you for your fine work over these many years. 

Mr. Crowley. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you, Chairman Smith, for holding this 

hearing. You have been a stalwart wall and someone who has not 

let rhetoric get in the way of justice on so many issues, but particularly on this particular issue. I have had my own experience, many 

years of following this case, in particular. I know it is also an issue 

that Mr. Neal has dedicated a great deal of time to as well. So this 

has been very, very bipartisan. 

What happened to the Finucane family is something that never 

should have happened. It wasn’t right then, and it is not right to 

cover up what took place now. The fact is we are here today because of unfulfilled promises by the British Government. The British Government committed to a full and independent inquiry into 

cases of collusion, but that promise was not and has not been kept. 

This is a problem for many people, including those of us who supported wholeheartedly the Good Friday Agreement. 

I am very much a believer in the Agreement. I have praised all 

parties for taking risks to make that agreement a reality, and that 

included and does include the British Government. That was a 

landmark agreement because it was one that has worked, and I 

want to do everything possible to protect the agreement and keep 

the peace. 

I believe there can be no turning back from the Good Friday 

Agreement, although there are many who would like to do just 

that. Part of that, however, is honoring the commitments of Good 

Friday as well as the follow-up agreements at Weston Park and 

elsewhere. When the British Government committed at Weston 

Park to carry out a full inquiry, we believed that they meant it. 

They shouldn’t back away from it now. 

I don’t have real questions today for the panel. I am here for the 

Finucane family, and I am here in the search of justice. I agree 

that Prime Minister Cameron needs to call for a thorough, full, and 

independent inquiry into the murder of Patrick Finucane. Nothing 

short of that will be acceptable to people who are seeking justice 

in the North of Ireland and, quite frankly, around the world. 

5

So, Mr. Chairman, once again, thank you for your dedication to 

this particular issue, and to the ranking member as well, thank 

you for inviting me to be here. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Crowley, thank you very much for your statement, for your leadership over these many years. 

As you pointed out, this is an issue on which there is total bipartisanship and agreement that this is a matter of justice, and justice 

delayed is justice denied, but my deepest concern is justice delayed 

in perpetuity is an outrage. 

Ms. Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Chairman Smith, for holding today’s hearing on the recent developments in the murder of human rights lawyer Patrick Finucane. 

I understand that you and a number of our colleagues have continued to advocate for greater accountability and a sincere public 

apology in the days and years after Mr. Finucane’s death. I hope 

that today’s hearing increases awareness among our colleagues and 

leads to a truthful accounting of that fatal evening. 

To Mr. Finucane, let me over my deep appreciation to your commitment to participate in this hearing and to your tireless efforts 

to keep the memory of your father alive and in the public eye. Your 

courage and strength are apparent, and you make your family and 

the memory of father proud. 

I yield back my time. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Bass. 

I would like to now introduce our two very distinguished witnesses. First, we will hear from Michael Finucane, the son of Patrick Finucane. Michael was there, along was his mom and two siblings, and I would note parenthetically, we all know his mom Geraldine was wounded in that horrific attack when assassins entered 

the Finucane home and took his father’s life. 

Today Michael is a solicitor in Dublin with his own legal practice. He has been deeply involved in the Finucane family’s efforts 

to secure the full independent public judicial inquiry that was 

promised in 2001 by the British Government. 

We are grateful for your presence here today, Michael, to tell us 

about where we are in the quest for justice in your father’s case, 

which of course has a direct impact on the quest for peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland. 

We will then hear from Brigadier General, retired, Jim Cullen of 

the U.S. Army Judge Advocate’s General Corps. 

In addition to his military career and career in private law practice, Mr. Cullen has been involved for many years with human 

rights groups focusing on Northern Ireland, including the Brehon 

Law Society of New York of which he served as the first president. 

Welcome to you, General. 

Mr. Finucane. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL FINUCANE, SON OF SLAIN 

HUMAN RIGHTS ATTORNEY PATRICK FINUCANE 

Mr. FINUCANE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to offer my sincerest thanks to you and to all members of the committee and Members of Congress who have supported my family this many years. I have submitted a longer stateVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:39 Sep 25, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\051513\80938 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ment, which I ask be read into the record, but I am going to make 

a shorter statement for the purposes of this hearing. 

As is now a matter of public record throughout the world, Pat 

Finucane, my father, was a lawyer practicing in Northern Ireland 

during the period of civil conflict. He specialized in criminal defense law and developed particular expertise in defending people 

charged with offenses under the emergency laws. As a result of his 

innovative approach to his work and the successes that flowed from 

it, he became a target for Loyalist paramilitary elements who perceived him as partisan and an enemy of the British State. This 

much has been known for some time as a result of incidents that 

took place during Pat’s lifetime and some of the evidence that has 

been revealed since his murder. 

We now know that this perception of Pat Finucane as being sympathetic to his client’s beliefs and even that he engaged in unlawful 

activity on their behalf was fostered actively by the British Security Service, MI5, encouraged by the Royal Ulster Constabulary’s 

Special Branch and known about by the British Army’s undercover 

unit, the Force Research Unit. These agencies of state sought to besmirch Pat’s name and professional reputation, to encourage support for the claim that he was a member of the Provisional IRA or 

working on their behalf and to encourage the notion that he should 

be assassinated. 

We know beyond any doubt that all of these agencies were aware 

that Pat’s life was in serious danger on at least three occasions before he was murdered, but they decide not to warn him. We know 

this and much else besides as a result of the review recently conducted by Sir Desmond de Silva, Q.C., who was appointed by the 

British Government in 2011. It is this review that provides the impetus for this hearing, although the work of de Silva is not what 

was originally promised. 

A comprehensive mechanism was promised by the British Government to investigate the case of Pat Finucane, but it has not yet 

been delivered. The case was supposed to be the subject of a public 

judicial inquiry, but the British Government has declined to establish one, despite agreeing to do so during negotiations as part of 

the Northern Ireland peace process in 2001. 

In the 24 years since the murder, my family and I have campaigned relentlessly for a public judicial inquiry into the circumstances. In the earliest years, we were met with denial and refusal by the government and were told that accusations of collusion 

between the state and Loyalist paramilitaries in the murder were 

without foundation. 

For example, in January 1993, the Northern Ireland Office went 

so far as to write in response to a draft report prepared by the U.S. 

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights that their analysis ‘‘scarcely 

justifies your conclusion that there is sufficient evidence of the Security Forces’ prior knowledge of the murder plot and encouragement of it to justify an independent public inquiry.’’ They went on 

to say, ‘‘The shortcomings of the draft report are such that in its 

present form it is not capable of being constructively amended.’’ 

The RUC responded similarly by saying, ‘‘A particularly serious 

disservice is done to the agencies responsible for the administration 

of justice and law enforcement.’’

7

It is now clear that these responses from the various agencies, 

police, intelligence, government, and army, were nothing less than 

blatant lies. The State was clearly culpable in the murder of Pat 

Finucane. Documentary evidence exists to prove this. The State 

simply could not afford to admit to its involvement in a crime as 

heinous as the murder of one of its own citizens who was at the 

same time an officer of its own courts. 

We now know this so definitively, partly as a result of the review 

carried out by Sir Desmond de Silva and the material he caused 

to be published and the work of many others. It is clear now that 

the British State agencies knew Pat Finucane was a target for 

many years before he was killed but decided not to do anything to 

warn or protect him. 

Although Pat was murdered in 1989, his life had clearly been in 

serious danger as far back as 1981. Various agencies were aware 

of the threat, including the police, the intelligence services and 

British Army Intelligence. Documents have been published to reveal meetings took place to discuss the threat against his life and 

an official decision was taken not to warn him that a murder attempt was imminent on more than one occasion because it would 

have exposed an informant to an unacceptable level of risk. 

These are just some of the facts behind the murder of Pat 

Finucane. Until now, they have not come to light. But the strength 

of suspicion over the case, a suspicion that was proven to be completely justified, despite official denials, demands a comprehensive 

response. 

In the absence of any other appropriate mechanism, a public judicial inquiry became the demand my family made. It was resisted 

for many years until, in 2001, during peace negotiations the British 

and Irish Governments agreed to establish an inquiry into the case 

if an independent judge of international standing recommended 

that there should be one. That judge was former Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada Peter Cory. He recommended a public inquiry in 2004, following the publication of a lengthy and comprehensive report. Thus began a long process of delay and further 

denial by the government, as faced with the honoring of their 

promise of an inquiry they welched. 

Much time passed, but then, in 2011, a decision was taken by the 

current government as the manner in which Britain would finally 

address the case of Patrick Finucane. It would not be through the 

mechanism of a public inquiry, despite the earlier promise so hold 

one. Instead, a review of the papers in the case would take place 

and a government-appointed lawyer would be installed to scrutinize official documents and produce a report. My family would not 

be permitted and was not permitted to see any of these documents 

prior to publication nor would we be allowed to hear witnesses 

called to give evidence or ask any questions. In short, we would be 

allowed to do nothing more than accept the findings of the reviewer 

without be able to assess any of the evidence for ourselves. 

My family was invited to 10 Downing Street in October 2011 to 

be told that this review process was to be established. We had been 

in discussions, which we had entered into in good faith, with the 

government for over a year prior to this visit. When we were invited by the Prime Minister to come to Downing Street we expected 

8

to be told that the commitment given previously would be honored 

and that a public judicial inquiry would be established without further delay. 

We had always known that the promises of the government 

should not be regarded as gospel. However, we dared to believe in 

the possibility that with the onset of peace in Ireland, the British 

Government might make good on its commitment. Not only were 

we proved wrong in this, we were forced to endure a process of 

public embarrassment that was cruel and unnecessary. 

It has been long believed that the issue of British State collusion 

with Loyalist paramilitaries was a deep-rooted and officially sanctioned policy of selecting targets based on their degree of opposition 

to the state. The more troublesome the individual, the more likely 

the state was to deploy its killers by proxy to erase the problem. 

If the report of de Silva has any value at all, it is to be found 

in the extent to which it confirms beyond any doubt that this was 

the approach of the British State in Northern Ireland, certainly 

throughout the 1980s and possibly beyond. A lawyer like Pat 

Finucane, who was much too effective at his job for the State’s liking, would make himself a target for reprisal. The extent of collusion was therefore such that the State could kill anyone it wanted 

to with complete and absolute deniability. This was the policy of 

collusion, a modern Irish holocaust. The one question that has not 

yet been answered is, how much perished as a result of it? Certainly, Pat Finucane was not the only victim. 

Perhaps the most succinct description of the case to emerge in 

recent years was contained in a letter written by a senior British 

Security Advisor to the current Prime Minister David Cameron. 

This has only just been made public as a result of court proceedings, and it was written July 2011. The advisor said, ‘‘Even by 

Northern Ireland standards, the facts are grisly. Moreover, in 

terms of allegations of British State ‘collusion’ with Loyalist 

paramilitaries, this is the big one . . . exhaustive previous examinations have laid bare some uncomfortable truths. Paid agents 

were directly involved in the killing, including the only man ever 

convicted of involvement in it . . . of Lord [John] Stevens’ conclusions paint a picture of a system of agent running by the RUC’s 

Special Branch and the [British] Army’s Force Research Unit that 

was out of control.’’ He went on to say, ‘‘Some of the evidence available only internally could be read to suggest that within government at a high level this systematic problem with Loyalist agents 

was known, but nothing was done about it. It’s also potentially the 

case that credible suspicions of agent involvement in Mr. 

Finucane’s murder were made known at senior levels after it and 

nothing was done; the agents remained in place.’’ He concluded in 

a follow-up letter by saying, ‘‘This was an awful case and as bad 

as it gets and was far worse than any post-9/11 allegation.’’

This is the summary of a security advisor from within the British 

establishment. The contents of his letters were not public until a 

recent court hearing in Belfast brought them to light. We have had 

to resort to litigation against the government in order to force them 

to reveal information of this nature and to establish the public inquiry we were promised. We should not have to do this. We should 

be reading the material in the context of a public inquiry, the one 

9

that was promised in 2001 and the one that has been required 

since 1989. 

On behalf of my family, Mr. Chairman, I ask for the support of 

this committee, the support of the House and all of Congress, to 

use its influence and to persuade the British Government to honor 

its longstanding promise to establish a public judicial inquiry into 

the murder of Patrick Finucane. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Finucane follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Mr. Finucane, thank you very much for your extraordinary work over these many years on behalf of your father and 

that of your entire family. Not only are you seeking justice for an 

individual brutally slain, assassinated right in front of your own 

eyes, but this is also a very important symbol for peace, reconciliation, and, above all, justice. You have done an incredible credit to 

your father’s memory and your other family members as well for 

keeping this front and center before the world. So thank you so 

much. 

General Cullen. 

STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES P. CULLEN, USA, 

RETIRED, HUMAN RIGHTS ATTORNEY 

General CULLEN. Thank you, Chairman Smith and also members 

of the subcommittee, for this opportunity to appear before you 

today. My name is Jim Cullen. As the chairman mentioned, I am 

a retired Brigadier General of the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps and last served as Chief Judge IMA of the U.S. Army 

Court of Criminal Appeals. 

I first met Pat Finucane when he came to the United States to 

serve as an expert witness in a political asylum case, and I just 

wanted to mention today my interaction with one of the men involved in the murder of Pat Finucane. 

An interested group in New York put an ad in the Belfast Telegraph, the main Unionist newspaper, offering a reward for information about Pat’s murder. To my surprise and their surprise, we 

received a call within a day after the reward notice was posted. 

And we arranged to meet the following weekend in a hotel outside 

of Dundalk near the border in Northern Ireland with the person 

who was represented to be part of the team that killed Pat. 

When we met, the person who called me introduced me to William Stobie, otherwise known as Billy. There was a preliminary 

discussion about the confidentiality of the meeting and the terms 

of the reward, and I explained to them that we were not after information about the Loyalist killers themselves. We had fairly good 

indications about who they were. Rather, we had received information from the UK that the murder had been commissioned by two 

upper level officers in the Police Special Branch, and it was information about them that we sought. 

Mr. Stobie went on to speak to me for about 2 hours. He very 

credibly said at the outset that he would not have been trusted 

with information about the Special Branch, even though he knew 

that the terms of our reward offer was dependent upon that information. He explained that he had been recruited by the UDA, one 

of the Loyalist death squads, to be their armorer and quartermaster in a section of Belfast. 

He had served in the British Army for about 6 years and he had 

been trained as an armorer, that is a person who is trained to fix 

light weapons. He had run up a debt in a Loyalist drinking club, 

and they gave him a choice: He could either become their armorer 

and safeguard and store their weapons, and the other alternative 

wasn’t so pleasant. 

Now, not long after he was recruited by the UDA, he participated 

in the murder in 1987 of an innocent young Protestant student, 

20

Brian Lambert, who was mistaken for a Catholic. Soon after that 

murder, he was approached by the Special Branch and recruited to 

be their agent with the understanding that nothing would happen 

to him for Brian Lambert’s murder. A co-actor in the murder was 

prosecuted. 

Stobie was told about 2 years later, on or about February 6, 

1989, to have two pistols ready to deliver for an operation the following Sunday. He said the UDA told him that the target was a 

‘‘top Provo’’ living in north Belfast, but he was not told the identity 

of the target. 

He said he called his Special Branch handlers the very same day 

and related what he had been instructed to do by the UDA, including the location of where he was to deliver the weapons the following Sunday morning. He later contacted his Special Branch 

handlers in the week following, he thinks on Wednesday, and they 

confirmed that he was to go ahead as instructed by the UDA. 

The following Sunday morning, he went to a Loyalist drinking 

club quite early in the morning, and as he pulled up, he noticed 

parked across the street from the entrance to the drinking club an 

unmarked car, in which sat one of his handlers, and there was another man in the car whom he didn’t recognize. He went into the 

club and turned over two pistols to the hit team near the exit of 

the club. He emerged from the club, went to his car. He was followed out by the hit team. He waited until they left, and he followed them out. And then he noticed something quite strange. Instead of the unmarked police vehicle following the hit squad, they 

made a U-turn and went in the opposite direction. 

He went home. And then he had the radio on later that evening, 

and he heard about the murder of Pat Finucane. He knew immediately who had been the target for the operation for which he had 

been instructed to provide the weapons. 

Stobie was contacted by the UDA on the following Tuesday after 

the murder, and he was told to dispose of the weapons in accordance with some instructions he was given. He picked up the two 

weapons where they had been left for him. He called the Special 

Branch and told his handlers that he had the hot Browning, he 

misidentified it as a Heckler 9 millimeter, which was the principal 

weapon used in the murder. 

The Special Branch told him to follow the UDA’s instructions, 

and they sent an unmarked Land Rover to meet him. He and the 

Special Branch man drove to the Ardoyne area and were followed 

by a helicopter—he didn’t know whether it was army or police helicopter—who were watching the vehicle as it proceeded. When they 

arrived, Stobie gave the weapons to a man he called David Anderson. 

Stobie told me that he realized the UDA began to suspect he was 

an informer, and then, in 1992, he was shot several times. Inconveniently for the UDA, the Special Branch and the army, he survived. He was visited in the hospital by a UDA boss who told him 

it had all been a mistake. Well, Stobie had sufficient street smarts 

to know that it hadn’t been a mistake, and he decided he needed 

to acquire an unconventional life insurance policy. So he approached a newspaper reporter, told him his story with the expectation that the reporter wouldn’t say anything. But after he told 

21

his story, this particular reporter told him he had just accepted a 

position as the chief press officer of the Northern Ireland office. So 

Stobie then realized he needed a backup insurance policy, and he 

went to a second reporter, again related the story with the understanding that nothing was to be disclosed unless Stobie gave permission or unless something happened to Stobie. 

He then let it be known to some of his UDA acquaintances that 

he had made ‘‘arrangements’’ in case anything happened to him, 

and he thought he would be okay. It was that second reporter who 

contacted me in response to the reward notice. 

Thereafter, the police planted two pistols in his mother’s home. 

He realized that he was, to use his term, being stitched up or 

framed to get him out of the way. He also realized that if that effort wasn’t successful, he was likely to again be a target because 

Lord Stevens had begun his third inquiry in May 1999, and Stobie 

quite rightly figured that the Special Branch, the army intelligence 

unit known as the FRU, and the UDA saw him as a weak link. He 

did have a drinking problem, and they figured if an investigation 

began, he might talk. So Lord Stevens did confirm in his 2003 report that he did identify Stobie as a person of interest very early 

on in his investigation. 

Stobie saw our reward as an opportunity for him, his wife and 

his mother to start a new life in Canada, and that is why he wanted to talk to us. When I told him we could only pay the reward 

if we had the information about the Special Branch handlers, I suggested to him that if he knew somebody else who was involved who 

would have that knowledge, we would pay the reward. We didn’t 

care how they whacked it up among themselves. I gave him $2,000. 

I gave it to his attorney in his presence as a good faith demonstration that we were prepared to pay the money, as we were. 

Stobie was later arrested as a result of evidence gathered by the 

Stevens inquiry, but the case against him collapsed in November 

2001 when a key witness, that first reporter, claimed that he 

couldn’t testify because of problems in his own mental state. And 

I can just imagine what those problems were. 

Then on December 12, 2001, Stobie was murdered by the UDA. 

They were successful this time. And this was after he had made 

it known that he would be willing to testify in an inquiry into Pat 

Finucane’s murder. He stated that he would not name the Loyalists involved, but he was prepared to name the police handlers or 

at least their code names because he didn’t know even the real 

name of his own handler. 

In a statement made by a masked paramilitary after his killing, 

it was claimed by the paramilitary, ‘‘Billy Stobie could have stayed 

on the Shankhill and been left alone had he not spoken out on Ulster television and backed the public inquiry into Pat Finucane’s 

killing.’’ Clearly, it was the Police Special Branch and the Army 

Force Research Unit who were really worried about the possible 

impact of Stobie’s disclosures. The prior knowledge of the Special 

Branch and the FRU about the murder together with the unquestioned coordination of those two branches, because you cannot run 

multiple intelligence operations in the same theater without having 

coordination at the top—there is going to be turf wars; there are 

going to be issues over who controls what intelligence assets. So we 

22

know that the head of Special Branch and the head of Military Intelligence in Northern Ireland were members of a so-called Task 

Coordinating Group. They in turn reported to the Joint Intelligence 

Committee in London. These kind of operations just didn’t happen 

by some cowboy being out of control. It was coordinated. 

Today, we are faced with the situation in which faceless 

securocrats and their political protectors have successfully neutered 

of the rule of law in Northern Ireland and have sadly intimidated 

the current political leadership in the UK. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of committee. 

[The prepared statement of General Cullen follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. General, thank you very much for your very extensive work and testimony today. It is greatly appreciated by this 

subcommittee. 

I have a couple of questions I would like to start off with. You 

know, there is no statute of limitation, as we all know, on murder 

cases. Even in cases of Medgar Evers’ murder and the Birmingham 

girls that were firebombed, causing four girls to lose their lives, 

they were reopened, retried years later due to continued investigation. I would note parenthetically that Evers was murdered in front 

of his family in a way that is very similar to and parallel to Patrick 

Finucane’s murder. 

So this, it seems to me, is a very disturbing bit of unfinished 

business. The public inquiry certainly would bring a great deal of 

scrutiny and light to something that has suffered nothing but shadows and an occasional breakthrough. And it does beg the question 

as to why the coverup? Who are they protecting, as I think all of 

us are concerned about? 

My question to both of you would be in Judge Cory’s report on 

Patrick Finucane’s murder, he asserted that without public scrutiny, this is a quote, ‘‘doubts based solely on myth and suspicion 

will linger long, fester and spread their malignant infection 

throughout the Northern Ireland community.’’ Do you agree with 

his assessment, and is this ongoing coverup harming the British 

Government’s credibility? 

Mr. FINUCANE. Yes, I would agree with the assessment. Judge 

Cory concluded, as he did and others who have looked at the case, 

reached the conclusion that not only was the murder of my father 

as a result of the work that he was doing and the successes that 

he had, but also it was meant as a warning to other lawyers that 

if they attempted to replicate his successes or employ the same 

techniques or seek the same successes in the courts that he sought 

and achieved, then they might meet the same fate. 

Not only did it represent an attack on the rule of law and the 

position of lawyers as defenders of their clients, but it also compromised the ability of people to achieve their right to an effective 

legal defense because lawyers had to now consider, defense lawyers 

for the first time now had to consider whether they would be putting themselves and their families at risk by accepting work that 

was politically unpopular. 

My father was prepared to do this. My mother I think said it 

best in the immediate aftermath of the murder that Pat was a professional to such an extent that he would have represented the people who shot him, so fervently did he believe in the rule of law and 

the value of maintaining a commitment to the rule of law, even in 

the face of civil conflict. So I think the murder definitely had that 

dimension to it at the time. 

The ongoing effect of the killing, the surrounding circumstances, 

the evidence that has come to light and the broken promise given 

by the British Government at Weston Park is to elevate the case 

to a highly iconic status that is capable of being abused as a propaganda tool by people who might seek to continue the conflict. I do 

believe and fear that that is a risk. 

And it is also damaging to the British Government, because quite 

simply, they didn’t keep their word, and if a government is seen 

28

as not being capable of keeping its word or acting honorably, then 

it doesn’t deserve to be a government. 

It is clear from some of the information that has come to light 

as a result of the recent litigation in Belfast that the decision not 

to hold a public inquiry by the Cameron administration was one 

hotly debated within the Civil Service. So even within the British 

establishment, the danger of going back on their word, of breaking 

the commitment, of welching on the promise given in Weston Park, 

was recognized and understood, and many British civil servants, 

including the Cabinet Secretary at the time, argued against it and 

expressed a lot of surprise that the Prime Minister was going down 

this road. 

Mr. SMITH. General? 

General CULLEN. One of the surprises to me after witnessing 

that the Prime Minister went ahead in publicly addressing the 

Saville Inquiry—and I had occasion to speak to the Secretary of 

State of Northern Ireland about our experience with the My Lai 

Massacre, in which I represented the chaplain in the Peers Commission inquiry after the massacre, and how it was necessary to redeem ourselves as an institution, and I am talking military at that 

time. We had to reveal what went wrong, withhold nothing, and 

then entrust the American people to place their trust back in us 

again by coming clean on what went wrong and trying to make the 

institutional fixes. 

I suggested to them, and I am not suggesting for a moment that 

my input played any role in the Secretary of State’s view, but they 

did take that approach with the Saville Inquiry and the Prime 

Minister was applauded in the Guild Hall Square of Derry when 

he made the announcement acknowledging responsibility. 

I thought that he was heading toward that same kind of a conclusion in having an inquiry. I had suspected for years that there 

was deliberate delay until Mrs. Thatcher passed away or was not 

able to appear before an inquiry because it was her practice on occasion to sit in on the Joint Intelligence Committee, which had 

overall supervisory responsibility for the work of the Task Coordinating Group that ran things in Northern Ireland. That was a 

group made up of senior military and police officials. 

But I realize now that I was wrong in my assessment. I don’t 

think it was Mrs. Thatcher at all. I think it was the security people 

at the top end, MI5 and MI6, and the remnants of Special Branch 

that continue in the police today who, for whatever means that 

were at their disposal, whether it was some version of Mr. Hoover’s 

infamous private file cabinet or for some other reason, were able 

to effectively block what I think Mr. Cameron was prepared to do 

but couldn’t do. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. Finucane, in your written testimony, you say the review conducted by Desmond de Silva reveals a great of information for the 

first time, but it is nowhere near being a complete answer. It is 

based on a reading of documents without any questioning of the 

authors. Indeed, only 11 witnesses were spoken to by de Silva, and 

12 written submissions were received. No former politicians were 

interviewed, nor were a number of key intelligence personnel, inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:39 Sep 25, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\051513\80938 HFA PsN: SHIRL
29

cluding the former head of military intelligence in Northern Ireland, who was in charge at the time of your father’s murder. 

Then you point out, as if this is not bad enough, on the day that 

the de Silva report was published, Tom King, now Lord King, led 

the public response on behalf of the government. He was the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in 1989 when your father was 

murdered. 

You go on to say, not surprisingly, he rejected calls for a public 

inquiry, claiming that the matter had now been fully investigated. 

It is difficult to conceive, you go on to say, of someone with greater 

conflict of interest than the former Secretary for Northern Ireland 

in 1989. The dangerous suspicion that lingers around his defense 

of the government’s position is that those responsible for the policy 

of collusion remain in positions of significant influence and will 

continue to get away with it. As a key witness at any potential inquiry held, Lord King’s rejections of the calls for an inquiry merely 

add insult to injury. 

That is a very, very powerful statement. I know after the de 

Silva report, there were some in the Labor Party who suggested 

that there ought to be a public inquiry. Mind you, between 2003 

and 2010, during both the Blair and Brown governments, they refused a public inquiry, but they may be seeing things a bit differently. I am wondering if you might want to further elaborate on 

that statement, because it doesn’t get any more powerful than that, 

and your thought as to whether or not there might be a reevaluation going on in the House of Commons. 

Mr. FINUCANE. The position of the opposition in the House of 

Commons led by Ed Miliband is that an inquiry will be established 

if they are returned to government. The difficulty that arose when 

Labor was in power between 2003 and 2010 was the enactment of 

legislation that limited the manner in which inquiries would be 

carried out. Ministers would have control over the information that 

appeared before the inquiry and in public, and that control would 

be an absolute discretion, not subject to input from any of the parties, and would limit the ability of the inquiry to explore important 

issues publicly. 

Mr. SMITH. If I could interrupt, so are the Labor MPs suggesting 

that law would not be applicable in this case? I, too, read that law 

and thought it was unconscionable that the ability to veto information from becoming public would lay in the hands of the very people who would have the potential conflict of interest. 

Mr. FINUCANE. Well, that was indeed the fear. However, since 

the passing of that law, the Inquiries Act of 2005, and a precedent 

has developed since in relation to a case that arose from circumstances in Iraq where the Inquiries Act was not implemented 

in full for that particular inquiry in the case of a man called Baha 

Mousa who was killed by British soldiers, but instead the decision 

as to what material would be withheld and what material would 

be disclosed was left to the inquiry chairperson and only the chairperson, and that allowed an opportunity for representations to be 

made in public and some measure of debate to be had as to what 

information the public would see. It would not be taking place in 

a minister’s office in the way originally envisaged under the terms 

of the act. 

30

That precedent was the one we wanted the government to follow. 

That was the one we were discussing with them for about a year 

between 2010 and 2011, when the Cameron-Clegg administration 

took part. We expected when we went to Downing Street to be told 

that this precedent was going to be followed because, if for no other 

reason, we were not asking for something to be created for our 

case; we were simply asking them to give us the same as they had 

given somebody else. But that obviously was refused. 

The position of the opposition, as I say, is that they will establish 

an inquiry; they will live up to the promise of Weston Park. But 

until that happens, we have to endure this U-turn by the Cameron 

administration. And as if that wasn’t bad enough, on the day the 

de Silva report was released, I had to experience walking past Tom 

King in the BBC in London as he went into one studio saying I am 

satisfied no inquiry is necessary now, the matter has been fully investigated, and I went into another studio saying, well, it hasn’t 

been investigated, and the man in the studio next door is someone 

I would really like to ask a few questions of. 

This is just another example of how much damage is being done 

to the government’s credibility as a result of both its decision and 

its choice of spokesperson. I can’t think of anything more insulting 

than the person who was in charge at the time, who was getting 

briefings from the Force Research, Unit, who met some of the people in charge, who was aware of the extent of intelligence available 

to the State, and yet is able to get away without having to answer 

for his actions while in office. 

He said that he would have been available to the de Silva review 

if they had asked to speak to him, but it appears they did not. In 

fact, they didn’t ask to speak to any politicians. And it seems to me 

that is a glaring void in the process that de Silva was asked to undertake and underlines the need for a public inquiry, because there 

are people who should be spoken to and should be questioned, who 

simply have not been up until now. And we really have to start 

doing that before more time passes and those people become unavailable. 

Mr. SMITH. You referenced the impact that your father’s assassination had on other defense attorneys. I would just note that, on 

September 29, 1998, 15 years ago, a little under 15 years ago, sitting right where you sit, and where General Cullen sits, we had 

Rosemary Nelson tell her story, especially the death threats that 

she had received from the RUC, and within a year, 6 months really, she had been assassinated with collusion all over the place. So 

killing defense attorneys, human rights defenders like your father, 

had an impact. I am sure there are many attorneys who thought 

they might do this very noble work, who decided to take a different 

path because of what had happened to your dad and then what 

happened to Rosemary Nelson. 

So this committee, I can assure you, will stay focused until and 

when the British Government does the right thing, as they have 

promised to do, and that is to conduct a public inquiry, and they 

do need to hold people who allegedly have committed collusion to 

account in a proceeding that will bring justice, even at this late 

date. 

31

I would like to yield to vice chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. 

Weber. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To you, Michael, and to your mom, I want to say my deepest condolences. 

Of course, I am newly elected, so I am kind of getting up to speed 

here. And so a lot of the things you are discussing and you are testifying to I am not as knowledgeable about as our chairman here, 

who has done a fine job of keeping up and trying to keep the pressure on. 

But I have got some questions, so bear with me, if you will. And 

let me see if I can get some answers. 

You talked about the agreement, was it the West Park—the Weston Park——

Mr. FINUCANE. Weston Park. 

Mr. WEBER. Weston Park. Tell me who made the agreement 

and—tell me about that. 

Mr. FINUCANE. The original Belfast peace agreement that set out 

the broad structures to be put in place post-conflict were agreed in 

1998 and somewhat famously concluded on Good Friday, 1998. And 

but this was a framework document. It did not go into detail in a 

number of key areas. At that time, there were a number of quite 

fundamental structures of state and government under discussion, 

including reform of the police, the implementation of a new legislative assembly, and structures of local government. 

The Good Friday Agreement provided a blueprint for how that 

would be put together. But, like most blueprints, it was very broad 

in scope. And it became clear that further negotiations would be required several years later as difficulties were encountered. 

Mr. WEBER. Who was in power during that time? 

Mr. FINUCANE. At that time, Tony Blair’s government was in 

Britain. And Bertie Ahern was the Prime Minister in Dublin. And 

the subsequent—the negotiations subsequent to the Belfast agreement of 1998 were—took place in a location called Weston Park, 

and they happened in 2001. And a number of issues were discussed, including policing, local justice issues, the legislative assembly that would be set up, and so forth. 

Mr. WEBER. Including the assassination of your father. 

Mr. FINUCANE. Yes. And certain cases had become particularly 

prominent because of either suspicions of state collusion or failures 

of investigation by the police, allegations of police or army involvement, and so on and so forth. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, let me spring from that if I could maybe to 

General Cullen. 

And, again, I am just trying to come up to speed and catching 

these names and these events. You are describing a situation 

where there is an informant who was ultimately murdered. I think 

you said he had a drinking problem. So the collusion that Michael 

is describing by government at the highest levels here, there is 

going to be a circle, I am assuming, somebody has come in and put 

together a potential list of those who had knowledge or who were 

somehow either complicit or involved. How wide is that circle? Is 

it ten people? Five people? A hundred people? 

32

General CULLEN. I think the collusion that is probably several 

hundreds of people. I would say a good part of the Special Branch 

organization were involved. Certainly, the military intelligence unit 

who was rebranded from time to time, but at this particular point 

in history was innocuously called the Force Research Unit. I think 

they were all involved. And the question is, how far up the political 

chain to whom those people reported did it go? That is one of the 

unanswered questions. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, and my question is, so if there were several 

hundred back then, because of attrition or, you know, mortality or 

whatever, somehow that circle has narrowed. 

General CULLEN. It has narrowed through death, retirement. We 

don’t know how far it has been narrowed. The RUC, for example, 

the police were both downsized and rebranded. Now, the hope was, 

and we have gone through this in our own history, after a conflict, 

we have a reduction in force or a RIF. And we use those occasions, 

certainly post-Vietnam, to eliminate people who are not at the 

highest level of the ratings. So you get rid of a lot of problems that 

way. We were told that the government simply would not do that. 

They offered significant cash packages to people in the police if 

they wanted to retire in order to reduce the number down. But, unfortunately, what happened I think is some of the more capable 

and ambitious people saw lives beyond the police. They could take 

this cash package and go do what private enterprises want. Some 

of the bad apples I think stayed. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, I think you used the term ‘‘remnants’’ in some 

of your earlier remarks. 

General CULLEN. Yes. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, so how many—without giving me names, how 

many—if you could interview five or ten people, do you have a 

short list? 

General CULLEN. Oh, I would have a short list, certainly, Congressman. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. And how short is that short list? 

General CULLEN. Of the people still around, I would say it is 

probably 5 to 10 very, very key people who were in prime positions 

of authority then. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. So working—and you made the comments 

that you I think helped in the My Lai Massacre; you represented 

the chaplain, I think. 

General CULLEN. The division chaplain, that is right. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, the division chaplain. Okay. And you made the 

comment that said you felt at the time, for the American public, 

what needed to be done was all the truth needed to be out as to 

what went wrong. 

General CULLEN. Precisely. 

Mr. WEBER. And so for the American public to finally feel at 

peace, I guess—I don’t want to put words in your mouth—but to 

accept and to feel like progress was being made, justice was served, 

that you had to come clean, so to speak. 

General CULLEN. Exactly. 

Mr. WEBER. What impetus does the British Government have at 

this point to come clean? 

33

General CULLEN. I think the—the biggest thing that drives or 

should drive any government is to gain or to regain the confidence 

of its people and especially any disenfranchised elements in its society. That would describe a significant portion of Northern Ireland, who, during the course of the conflict, realized that the justice 

system was not administered fairly. The police system did not protect people in an equitable manner. 

There has been huge progress made since that time. And certainly even in the worst days of the conflict, there were heros in 

the police. A sergeant, Detective Sergeant Johnson Brown, who was 

one of the ones who did key work in investigating the murder of 

Pat Finucane, said at one point he feared far more the Special 

Branch, his own police people in the political branch, than he ever 

feared the IRA. And he acquired a key confession at one point that 

the Special Branch then tampered with, removing a part of the 

tape on which that confession was kept. So there were—the ordinary people——

Mr. WEBER. I am assuming he is not still around. 

General CULLEN. He is retired now, sir. And his partner had a 

mental breakdown because of the threats and the stress which he 

was under. He has recovered, I understand. But there were wonderful people like that who at least allowed ordinary folks to say, 

hey, there are some good cops there who want to do their job. 

Mr. WEBER. Right. 

General CULLEN. But then they were painfully aware, as ordinary people were painfully aware, there were cops who didn’t want 

to do their job. 

Mr. WEBER. So as a committee, as the House of Representatives, 

what can we do? This is probably not the right term, to tighten the 

screws, to bring a heightened awareness to help, what can we do 

from across the big pond to help make that a bit more of a—I don’t 

know what the right word is—a priority? What do you think we 

can do? 

General CULLEN. You have a tremendous moral voice, Congressman. You are listened to across the water. And what you in effect 

can do is empower the politicians who want to do the right thing, 

who want to regain the confidence of the people in England, in 

Northern Ireland, in all parts of the UK, to say to the securocrats, 

who are resisting a public inquiry, you must hold this public inquiry. One of the problems Michael just spoke about is there is always a danger that those who didn’t want to sign onto this peace 

agreement, who for their own reasons would want to see this collapse, on both sides, take oxygen from the failure to have this public inquiry. We have to cut off that oxygen. 

Mr. WEBER. One final question, Mr. Chairman, then I yield back, 

and thank you for your indulgence. 

Is there a window of time closing? Because obviously with mortality rates and attrition, whatever, 1 year? 3 years? 5 years? I 

mean, the sooner the better, obviously. The chairman said it, eloquently justice delayed is justice denied. What kind of a time frame 

are we on? 

General CULLEN. That is a tough question. I would say anybody 

in my age range who would have been around at that time is looking at his own mortality tables, and you begin to wonder. Stobie 

34

was murdered; Brian Nelson, a key actor, died under very mysterious circumstances. Other people have disappeared. The time is 

taking its toll on the justice system. And we may get to a point 

where even if the government were under a new government or 

this government in the UK decided to do the right thing, it may 

be too late. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FINUCANE. Could I just add one thing? Mr. Weber asked 

what could Congress do. By making this an issue that continues to 

be of concern to Congress and perhaps communicating that where 

you can but particularly to the White House, the continued contact 

that takes place between the administration here and that in Britain and the notion that Pat Finucane is always going to be a subject of conversation until the issue is resolved is the greatest moral 

force you can bring to bear, perhaps starting with a letter that the 

chairman is circulating for Members’ consideration and signature. 

And then why not the G8 summit? That is happening in Northern Ireland in the very short future. It may not be an issue that 

touches on every world leader’s agenda, but certainly the British 

and Irish—or the British and American premiers will be there. It 

should be a conversation happening between the President and the 

Prime Minister because it is important, and it is an unresolved 

issue. And amidst all the problems that people are trying to sort 

out in Northern Ireland in 2013, problems with unemployment and 

so on and so forth, they have got this historical problem, a hangover from the bad old days, that is not going away but could be 

made to go away if the British Government would simply do what 

it promised to do. 

So I think that is a real practical step that Congress can take. 

And it may yield great fruit. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

I think Mr. Weber makes a very good point about, you know, this 

could lead to a cold case, and by design, it could lead to a cold case. 

All the more reason why we need to continue our vigilance and our 

very energetic efforts so that it does not happen. But eventually, 

the truth does come out, over time. But it ought to come out in a 

way that is actionable, particularly with potential prosecutions, 

and certainly public inquiry will finally lay out the information. 

So can you tell me, Michael, more about the ongoing litigation in 

which you and your family are seeking a court order to the British 

Government requiring it to conduct the inquiry it committed to in 

2001? Where is the litigation now and how is that proceeding? 

Mr. FINUCANE. Proceedings were instituted after the decision of 

the British to appoint Desmond de Silva. 

Mr. SMITH. In what court, what venue? 

Mr. FINUCANE. In the Belfast High Court. 

The case essentially seeks an order of certiorari quashing the decision by the government not to hold an inquiry and an order of 

mandamus requiring them to establish one. 

The proceedings were instituted not long after de Silva was appointed to carry out his review. We initially gave some consideration to seeking a restraining order to stop de Silva from carrying 

35

out his work. But it was felt that de Silva might conceivably disclose material that could be helpful even though the process could 

never satisfy the requirements of a public examination. So the 

main proceedings have simply continued, and there has been the 

usual back and forth that you find in litigation between the government and our lawyers. But most recently, some interim hearings 

have taken place, where we have sought discovery of documents relating to the case, including previously classified intelligence documents dealing with the—dealing with the murder at the time itself. 

And a lot of those were revealed. Some of them were already public 

in one form or another, so they were collated during the course of 

the proceedings. But the government sought to withhold certain internal communications between security advisers and the Prime 

Minister. And the letter that I referred to in my testimony came 

to light only in April of this year. And the contents of it and the 

expressions of serious concern about the circumstances of the case 

and its comparison with events that have transpired post-9/11 and 

to Iraq and Afghanistan and how it compares on the scale with 

those. 

The hearing took place in April. The judge hearing the case decided he would review the documents himself. And so the government was ordered to supply whatever it wanted to hold back so 

that the judge would review them and make his decision. As I understand it, he has received those documents, and we are awaiting 

a date for his ruling. 

After that, it will proceed to a full hearing on the merits, where 

we hope we will achieve the orders that we are seeking. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, the testimony of Jane Winter, 

Former Director of British Irish Rights Watch will be made part 

of the record. Your full statements as well will be made part of the 

record. A submission from the Government of the Republic of Ireland will also be made part of the record. And they do in their testimony say quite emphatically, ‘‘The Irish Government will continue to seek a public inquiry into the murder of Pat Finucane as 

committed to in the agreements.’’

In her statement, Jane Winter points out that ‘‘the de Silva report missed three crucial aspects in the case. One, he has misunderstood the guidance available on agent handling and its adverse impact on the detection and prevention of a crime. He has 

omitted to investigate the fact that British Army intelligence tampered with evidence, and he underplays the role of the intelligence 

service in the case.’’ Would either of you like to comment on that? 

Mr. FINUCANE. I think in general terms de Silva is unsatisfactory 

because he lays too much blame at the door of defunct organizations, like the RUC, or individuals who are dead or no longer available. And that is—that is very unsatisfactory and, in our view, inaccurate. There are—there are people he could have spoken to but 

didn’t. And there are conclusions that could have been reached, but 

he chose not to do so, even within the terms of his very limited 

mandate. And I think the extent to which he was prepared to conclude that something didn’t happen because he could not see clear 

evidence of it is very unsatisfactory and glosses over the obvious 

technique of putting together various pieces of evidence and forming a reasonable conclusion based on them. 

36

And he also chose to reject the evidence of some people who were 

involved in the intelligence services who said they saw documents 

and additional materials that were no longer in existence, but they 

were quite clear did exist at one time, including targeting information and information about my father’s personal habits that was 

gained as a result of surveillance, surveillance which we suspect 

was carried out either by the police or the army. And the unwillingness to reach those conclusions and frustration with the process 

itself, that it is not public, that you can’t ask questions of the people involved, that you can’t assess all of the evidence and all of the 

documents for yourself, leaves de Silva in a very unsatisfactory 

condition insofar as the mechanism is concerned. And it is something of a starting point, but I don’t really think it can be seen as 

anything more than that, and it is certainly not a finished exercise. 

Mr. SMITH. Jane Winter makes the point in her statement that 

the report, the only real value it has, in her opinion, is that it confirms collusion, vindicates Patrick Finucane, and it in itself makes 

a compelling case for a public inquiry. One of the findings in the 

de Silva report that she amplifies in her statement is that he has 

confirmed that 85 percent of the UDA’s intelligence came from security forces. She also points out that he has shed light on the 

briefings given to a government minister prior to the murder; 85 

percent of intelligence coming from security forces. If that isn’t 

damning, I don’t know what is. 

General. 

General CULLEN. Well, it goes back to the point I was making 

before: When you have intelligence operations from different entities in the same theater, you have to have coordination at the top. 

And given the 85 percent number, which I read also, it did confirm 

to me that it was more than simple idle chat at the top; there was 

active coordination in not only Pat Finucane’s murder but in the 

murder of other innocent people. 

Mr. SMITH. We have one final question, and then if you would 

like to make any concluding remarks. 

What effect do you think the inquiry, according to the terms committed to in 2001, would have on the peace process in Northern 

Ireland? 

Mr. FINUCANE. I think—I think the final establishment of an effective, comprehensive, public judicial inquiry would address what 

has become the last great historical issue for the British Government in the Northern Ireland conflict, certainly the most substantial one remaining unaddressed. And there has been a great deal 

of improvement in investigative mechanisms locally. Inquests have 

been improved in terms of their capacity to examine killings in 

Northern Ireland. And there are controversial cases that have not 

been resolved. There are still campaigns by interest groups and relatives for a proper examination of the deaths of their loved ones. 

But they don’t have to go for a public inquiry anymore because the 

domestic mechanisms, the local mechanisms have been improved 

and strengthened. 

We are left with a public inquiry because so many state agencies 

are involved that no other mechanism seems capable of addressing 

the issues. And we are becoming, if you like, somewhat isolated in 

that category because we are the last remnants of the cases I highVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:39 Sep 25, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\051513\80938 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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lighted at Weston Park that required a public tribunal of inquiry 

type of mechanism. And that is really not good. 

This hearing, I know, is receiving a lot of attention in Ireland 

and Britain. It is an issue that when matters come to light it dominates the news headlines. When we were in London in 2012 for the 

release of the de Silva report and were in the House of Commons, 

the case was front page news. Anyone saying this has gone away 

or this is becoming less important or the people feel less strongly 

about it is clearly wrong. And that has to erode confidence in the 

rule of law in Ireland. And what obviously—well, perhaps not obviously, but I do believe the opposite is true. If the British can finally 

grasp the nettle in this one case, in the case of Pat Finucane above 

all others and really come clean and explain what went on and 

make the witnesses available and reveal the documents and just 

get it in all gone in one go finally, I think the boost to confidence 

would be immeasurable. Because I think the feeling of people on 

the ground is quite simple: They can’t bring themselves to admit 

it, even now. And it is hard to argue with that when you see the 

evidence in the case and the broken commitments. And I really 

think the commitments need to be lived up to. And I think the benefits, the potential benefits are very real, and they are there for all 

to see. 

General CULLEN. We had tragic examples in our own country 

back in the 1960s, where civil rights workers were murdered, and 

there was often collusion by local policemen. But we had the FBI. 

We had Federal courts. We had this Congress to investigate and 

set things straight and say that there is a rule of law and it is 

going to apply to everyone. That is not the case in Northern Ireland while there is a refusal of the government to have this promised inquiry. We are ultimately talking about a government who 

colluded in the murder of one of its own citizens and now refuses 

to reveal the extent of that collusion, who sanctioned it from above. 

Until there is a willingness to address this in a credible way, I am 

afraid there will not be the restoration of confidence in the rule of 

law and in the government itself. And it will give dissident factions 

on all sides an opportunity to say, how can you trust this government? If you have got connections with the top, you can do anything you want. There is no accountability. That is unsafe for any 

government. We don’t want to see that happen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

This committee, as you know, walks point on human rights. It 

is vested with the responsibility for the Foreign Affairs Committee 

and, by extension, the full House of Representatives to bring the 

light and scrutiny to human rights abuses anywhere and everywhere they occur and to hopefully craft legislation that meets the 

needs of those who are victimized. 

I can assure you, both of you, and, Michael, you as a son who 

has carried on your father’s tradition as a solicitor and has done 

so with great class and courage, that we will not rest until the public inquiry occurs, and we well do all within the—and I say this in 

a bipartisan way because there are people on both sides of the aisle 

who feel as passionately as I do, that justice delayed is justice denied, as I said earlier, and there needs to be a public inquiry and 

38

it needs to be done now. And we will keep bringing our voice as 

a committee and individually as an individual Members of Congress to bear until that day occurs. 

If you would like to make any final—although what you just said 

was a wonderful concluding statement—but if you have anything 

further you would like to say before we conclude. 

Mr. FINUCANE. No. Other than to thank you again, Chairman, 

and the committee members for your time and your support, I don’t 

have anything further to add. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

General CULLEN. I would just like to join in Michael’s thanks for 

your hospitality and your willingness to hear us today. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so much. The hearing is adjourned, and 

we will be convening momentarily to proceed to a markup of three 

pieces of legislation. But this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS


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