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DEMOCRACY HELD HOSTAGE IN NICARAGUA:

PART I

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 1, 2011

Serial No. 112–111

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Robert Callahan, former U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua .......... 7

The Honorable Jaime Daremblum, former Costa Rican Ambassador to the 

United States, Hudson Institute ......................................................................... 11

Jennifer Lynn McCoy, Ph.D., director of Americas Program, The Carter Center .......................................................................................................................... 17

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Robert Callahan: Prepared statement ......................................... 9

The Honorable Jaime Daremblum: Prepared statement ...................................... 13

Jennifer Lynn McCoy, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................... 19

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 40

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 41

(1)

DEMOCRACY HELD HOSTAGE IN NICARAGUA: 

PART I 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:14 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The committee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr. Berman, for 

7 minutes each for our opening statements, I will recognize the 

chair and the ranking member of the Subcommittee on the Western 

Hemisphere for 3 minutes each for their opening statements, and 

1 minute for any other member seeking recognition. 

We will then hear from our witnesses, and without objection, the 

witnesses’ prepared statements will be made a part of the record, 

and members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions 

for the record, subject to length limitations in the rules. The chair 

now recognizes herself for 7 minutes. 

Twenty-five years ago President Ronald Reagan assisted freedom 

fighters in pushing back the cancer of communism that Daniel Ortega and the Sandinistas were spreading into Nicaragua. At that 

time another Florida Member was chairing the Foreign Affairs 

Committee, the distinguished Dante Fascell, my friend and mentor, 

who had witnessed and heard firsthand from his constituents fleeing communism about what was taking place in Nicaragua. 

Dante Fascell decided, as he always did, to stand for freedom and 

democracy against the oppressive tactics employed by the likes of 

Daniel Ortega. Today I am proud to carry the torch and do the 

same for the people of Nicaragua, although not as well nor as valiantly as Chairman Fascell did. I am standing for U.S. interests 

against Ortega’s new assault on Nicaragua’s democratic process 

and institutions. 

Some may ask, why is Nicaragua important at all? As one of our 

fellow witnesses, Ambassador Callahan, wrote before the elections, 

‘‘Nicaragua matters because Nicaraguans, like people everywhere, 

matter. They deserve to live in freedom and with dignity.’’

In 2008 Ortega orchestrated massive electoral fraud during the 

municipal elections. This caused the Millennium Challenge Corporation to terminate the remainder of the compact with Nicaragua 

in 2009, totaling $62 million. It therefore should come as no surprise that Ortega would pursue the same approach to the recent 

Presidential elections. 

2

But what did we do to prevent this latest affront on the rule of 

law and constitutional authority? In hopes of receiving cooperation 

to fight drug trafficking in Central America, the Obama administration appeared to do nothing. A very small sector within the Nicaraguan military is assisting U.S. counternarcotics operations. U.S. 

foreign policy can neither be restricted to such narrow objectives in 

Latin America nor can we disregard democratic freedoms starting 

with the fundamental freedom to elect government leaders. Broader U.S. interests, such as ensuring long-term stability in Nicaragua 

and the entire region, are being threatened by Ortega’s actions in 

conjunction with those of Chavez, Morales, Correa, and others. We 

cannot afford to let these injustices continue without any consequences. 

In October I sent a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 

urging that the administration not recognize the Nicaraguan elections if Daniel Ortega was on the ballot. Why? According to Article 

147 of the Nicaraguan Constitution, a candidate cannot serve consecutive terms as President and cannot be President for more than 

two terms total, yet this election would serve as the second consecutive term for Ortega and the third time that he is President 

of Nicaragua, all in clear violation of the country’s Constitution. 

If the election results stand, the consequences will prove detrimental to democracy in Nicaragua. Ortega will be able to change 

the Constitution at will and expand his absolute control over the 

legislative, judicial, and electoral branches of government. 

Leading up to the election, Ortega sympathizers in the Supreme 

Electoral Council distributed voting identity cards to Ortega sympathizers and denied others the right to vote. The electoral mission, led by the European Union and the Organization of American 

States, noted irregularities in the electoral process and said that 

this election caused a severe setback to democracy in Nicaragua. 

According to the Nicaraguan Episcopal Conference, ‘‘The legitimacy 

of the electoral process and the respect for the will of the people 

have been seriously questioned.’’

There are clear indications of fraud in the electoral process in 

Nicaragua. The Department of State appears to agree that the elections were not transparent and that the Supreme Electoral Council 

did not operate impartially nor transparently. Thus, the U.S. must 

not recognize Daniel Ortega as Nicaragua’s leader and should call 

for new, free, fair, and transparent elections to be held that are in 

keeping with Nicaragua’s Constitution and reflect the will of the 

Nicaraguan people. The administration also should hold on any 

nomination for a new U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua until this 

issue is resolved. 

Similarly, the OAS should look to its own charter and reaffirm 

in the preamble to the Inter-American Democratic Charter which 

clearly states that ‘‘Representative democracy is indispensable to 

the stability, peace, and development in the region.’’ Rather than 

putting its efforts in reintegrating the Cuban regime into the OAS, 

for example, the OAS must act quickly to reinstitute democratic 

order in Nicaragua. 

September 2011 marked the 10-year anniversary of the InterAmerican Democratic Charter. In light of recent developments in 

Nicaragua and the OAS and regional inaction, we need to evaluate 

3

the charter and determine if it needs to be reformed to ensure that 

it is living up to its mandated defense of democracy and prevention 

of democratic demise as has taken place in Nicaragua. 

Daniel Ortega is also trying to silence his critics by blocking the 

major local newspaper, La Prensa, from distributing its newspaper 

to a wide circulation. Threatening the freedom of the press is just 

another tactic by Ortega to prevent the Nicaraguan people and the 

whole outside world from learning the realities of his dictatorship, 

but Nicaraguans will not be deterred. This Saturday thousands of 

courageous Nicaraguans will once again march down the streets of 

Managua to peacefully protest Ortega’s power grab. 

As the famous Nicaraguan poet Ruben Dario once said, ‘‘If the 

nation is small, one dreams it great.’’ The Nicaraguan people 

dream of a day that they will be free from tyrants and from the 

control of these tyrants, so it is our moral obligation to uphold the 

rule of law and democratic order in order to help them fulfill this 

dream. 

And with that I am pleased to turn to my ranking member, my 

friend, Mr. Berman, for his statement. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I 

was thinking about Mr. Fascell and your earlier comments because 

he was both a mentor to me and a friend, and I have fond memories. 

On November 6, 2011, elections were held in Nicaragua. As the 

dust settles around the results, there are at least two things that 

are clear. First, this was a real setback for democracy in that country; and, second, Daniel Ortega will most likely be President for another 5-year term. 

The problems with the election were numerous and will get a full 

airing here today. But before we get to those I do want to thank 

the Organization of American States, the OAS, the European 

Union, and The Carter Center for being present on the ground on 

Election Day despite significant efforts by Ortega to keep them out. 

All three organizations thought long and hard about participating 

at all under these difficult conditions, worried that they might become enablers of a fraud. Although the scope of their reports was 

somewhat limited by the fact that they did not have complete access, they are nevertheless critical for our understanding of the situation, and we are thankful for their voice in this debate. 

In a briefing held before this hearing, the head of the OAS observer mission, Dante Caputo, reported on the election’s significant 

irregularities, the indefensible results, and the efforts to impede observer access. It is worth recalling that this committee recently 

voted to defund the OAS, with some of my colleagues on the other 

side of the aisle claiming that it was an ‘‘enemy of democracy.’’ The 

organization’s participation in the Nicaraguan elections and its 

subsequent hard-hitting report is a stark indication of the kind of 

benefits that the OAS brings to the regional table. 

Why has the Nicaraguan Government chosen to bitterly smear 

the OAS and its report and not the two other organizations that 

said essentially the same thing? I think the answer is that Ortega 

believes the OAS has few friends and many foes, foes led by Hugo 

Chavez. It is critical that we line up behind the people and the orVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:55 Mar 01, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\120111\71401 HFA PsN: SHIRL
4

ganizations doing the tough work on behalf of democracy in this 

hemisphere, including the OAS. 

Even before these elections were held, the Nicaraguan political 

opposition was forced to decide if they should participate at all. 

Many people, and I include myself among them, saw Ortega’s candidacy as unconstitutional from the series of questionable maneuvers from institutions he controls and the constitutional provisions 

cited by our chairman. 

The vexing policy issue that I believe stands before us right now 

and that I hope to explore with our witnesses is: What should the 

United States do now? In the short term I believe we should resist 

the temptation to collect our marbles in a huff and go home. We 

have a long history with and commitment to the Nicaraguan people, and the values we hold dear suggest we remain engaged, just 

as the Nicaraguans themselves are remaining engaged. And we 

continue to have important interests in Nicaragua and in Central 

America, not the least of which is the worsening drug problem. By 

and large the United States Government, in my opinion, has deftly 

navigated very turbulent waters in the Nicaragua-U.S. bilateral relationship. We have called Ortega out when we needed to and held 

our fire when that was the better move. 

Recently our Embassy fought very hard behind the scenes for the 

rights of election observers to do their job. While the Embassy itself 

was not invited to participate as an observer, I am told they did 

so anyway. Regionally, however, we are getting less traction. During last week’s meeting at the OAS, the U.S. was very tough on 

Ortega, who is clearly running afoul of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, but we didn’t get much support from other countries. 

One of our witnesses today, Ambassador Callahan, served on the 

front lines in Managua in both the Bush and Obama administrations and can give us some perspective on these issues. I would ask 

the panel directly what measures they would recommend for dealing with the Ortega government over the long term. Should we consider visa restrictions? Removing the waivers on assistance to Nicaragua, which amounts to about $24 million annually? What effect 

would that have on the counternarcotics programs that are in our 

self-interest, on the poorest of the poor in Nicaragua, and on the 

civil society actors that we want to help? And does it make sense 

to cut off our aid when it is dwarfed by the $500 million provided 

by Hugo Chavez which, among other things, keeps the local business community quiescent? What about loans to Nicaragua and the 

Inter-American Development Bank? Last year these loans, which 

cover everything from direct help to government ministries to 

health aid, came to about $384 million. This year there are about 

$194 million worth of projects in the pipeline. This is, as they say, 

real money. Assuming we even can, should the U.S. try to interfere 

with these? What are the costs and what are the benefits? 

It is easy to see that Ortega is no democrat. Right now he doesn’t 

appear to see much downside in behaving undemocratically. If 

questionable results in the congressional races are confirmed, they 

would grant Ortega a supermajority to change the Nicaraguan 

Constitution at will, including to allow his indefinite reelection. 

5

The waters that the United States has navigated for years in 

Nicaragua are about to get more turbulent, all the more important 

for the U.S. to define its strategic objectives and start on the path 

to achieve them. I look forward to the discussion with the panel on 

these issues. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Berman. 

I am very pleased to yield 3 minutes to the chairman of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, my Florida colleague, Connie 

Mack. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for this hearing, and I also want to associate myself with your opening remarks. 

I thought they were excellent and right on target, and so thank you 

for that. And I also want to thank my friend on the other side of 

the aisle for his comments because I know he believes them, and 

that is what this process needs is people who believe in what they 

believe in and are willing to make the case. I happen to disagree. 

The question is, you know, what should we do? Well, how about 

this? How about we tell Nicaragua that if you want the support of 

the United States, if you want support of the international community, then you must stand for freedom and democracy, you must 

have free and fair elections, and you must believe in the citizens 

of Nicaragua instead of the self-interests of one man. If we do that, 

all of the things that the ranking member talked about, the United 

States can engage in. 

I believe that the OAS is a hindrance to democracy in Latin 

America. The OAS has become an organization that has on every 

turn supported the wrong side, and let me give you just a recent 

example. In Honduras the people of Honduras stood up. The government, the institution, they stood up and said that we want to 

follow the rule of law, we believe in our Constitution. And what 

happened? The OAS and the United States forced our will on the 

people of Honduras against their rule of law and their Constitution. 

Now what do we have in Nicaragua? We have the President of 

Nicaragua working against his own Constitution in violation of law 

and the Constitution, and then the OAS and apparently the United 

States Government is standing on the wrong side again. You know, 

it is not really—this is not difficult, I don’t think, that what people 

are looking for not only here in the United States but around the 

world is leadership. And leadership, as I said before in this committee, comes from recognizing what it is that you believe in and 

standing for what it is you believe in. 

I don’t believe that this administration has set a clear path for 

freedom and democracy in Latin America. I don’t believe that the 

OAS is capable of ensuring that we get democracy and free and fair 

elections and freedom in Latin America. We should withdraw from 

the OAS, we should stop funding the OAS, we should create stronger alliances with our allies in Latin America. We should work together to put down the thugocrats like Hugo Chavez and others 

and let it be clear that in Latin America and, frankly, anywhere 

around the world, that if you stand for freedom, security, and prosperity, if you believe in democracy and the rule of law, then the 

United States will stand shoulder to shoulder with you. Right now, 

we don’t see that leadership. We don’t have that leadership here 

6

in the United States and the OAS is as much of a problem as anyone else. 

With that, Madam Chair, thank you very much for the hearing, 

and I do—whatever—with my 1 second. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Chairman Mack, 

for your eloquent statement. And another eloquent speaker, Mr. 

Meeks, the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Europe and 

Eurasia, is recognized for a 1-minute opening statement. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Where I do want to 

agree with the distinguished chairman of the Western Hemisphere 

Subcommittee, Mr. Mack, is we do need passion. I think that, and 

I know that he believes what he believes, although I believe that 

he is wrong, and I want to associate myself very strongly with the 

opening remarks of the ranking member, Mr. Berman, because it 

is clear to me that the OAS has done exemplary work in this election with dealing with Nicaragua. It is a way to move to try to 

make sure that we assure ourselves of democracy. 

The fact of the matter is what Mr. Mack said, you know, leadership. I have talked to a number of our allies in the Western Hemisphere and South America, they don’t want us to disengage. They 

want us to engage. In fact, in talking to one of our closest allies 

just recently in Colombia, what he is trying to do is engage and to 

make a difference and to benefit all of the people. We should not 

take a side. That is almost like taking a side here in one of our 

Presidential elections. We don’t want people from the outside to 

come and take a side, Democrat or Republican. What we want to 

do is to try to make sure we are impartial but try to make sure 

that democracy is spread for all of the people, not one side or the 

other side, but for all of the people of Nicaragua, and I look forward to asking questions of the witnesses, and I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Turner of 

New York is recognized. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have nothing. Yield 

back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Bilirakis. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. I am fine, Madam Chair. I would like to listen to 

the testimony. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Mr. Sires of New 

Jersey. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this hearing, 

and, you know, here we go again. Another great, one of these great 

Communist liberators turns out to be a bigger thief than the people 

that were there before. Now he is taking from the people of Nicaragua the ability to have a democracy and perpetuate himself in 

power for as many years as he can. It is very unfortunate that the 

people of Nicaragua have to go through this, but we must act 

strong. We must certainly do whatever we can to promote democracy in some of these countries. This is just unacceptable that for 

many years the press played these people as great liberators and 

then they turn out to be bigger bums than the people that were 

there before. So I am looking forward to your hearing. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Ms. Bass of California is recognized. 

7

And with that I will introduce our excellent panelists. We welcome our witnesses. First, Ambassador Robert Callahan, who 

served as a Foreign Service officer with the Department of State 

for 32 years and as U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua from 2008 to 

2011. In addition to Nicaragua, Ambassador Callahan spent time 

with the State Department in Costa Rica, Honduras, Bolivia, U.K., 

Greece, Italy, and Iraq. Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador. 

Another Ambassador we welcome tonight, Ambassador Jaime 

Daremblum. He joined the Hudson Institute as a senior fellow and 

director of the Hudson Center for Latin American Studies in 2005. 

The Ambassador served as the Ambassador of Costa Rica to the 

United States for 6 years, from 1998 to 2004. We welcome you as 

well, Jaime. 

I would also like to welcome Dr. Jennifer McCoy. She is currently 

the director of The Carter Center’s Americas program and is a professor of political science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy 

has directed election monitoring activities for The Carter Center in 

Nicaragua, Bolivia, Panama, and Venezuela among numerous other 

countries in the hemisphere. 

We welcome all three of you. Your prepared statements will be 

made an official part of the record, and we kindly ask that you 

summarize your statements to no more than 5 minutes. And we 

will begin with you, Ambassador Callahan. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT CALLAHAN, 

FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO NICARAGUA 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. Madam Chairman, Mr. Berman, Ranking Member, members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you to discuss the recent Nicaraguan elections 

and the future of democracy in that country, a place and a people 

that I came to like and admire during my 3 years as the United 

States Ambassador there. 

I continue to cherish that experience and remain committed to 

those Nicaraguans who, against formidable opposition, persist in 

their dream of creating a truly democratic country and who, at 

great personal risk, work to bring that dream to fruition. 

Today in these brief opening remarks, I want to make four 

points: First, that Daniel Ortega’s candidacy was illegal, illegitimate, and unconstitutional; second, that the period leading to the 

elections and the elections themselves were marred by serious 

fraud; third, that Daniel Ortega and his Sandinista party have systematically undermined the country’s fragile governmental institutions; fourth, and despite the foregoing, that we Americans must 

remain engaged in order to support those Nicaraguans who share 

our vision of individual freedoms, representative government, rule 

of law, due process, and respect for human rights. 

First, Ortega’s candidacy. As many here know and as we have 

heard, Sandinista members of the Supreme Court overnight, on the 

weekend, and in the absence of opposition magistrates, decided 

that the constitutional ban on consecutive Presidential terms and 

more than two terms for any individual, both of which disqualified 

Daniel Ortega, violated Ortega’s human rights. In effect, they declared the Constitution unconstitutional. No serious objective jurist 

in Nicaragua or elsewhere regarded this decision as anything but 

8

a travesty, an insult to jurisprudence, an embarrassment to the 

country, and a stain on the reputations of the judges who rendered 

it. But it was all that Mr. Ortega needed to justify his candidacy, 

no matter how absurd it looked to the rest of the world. 

Then, during the campaign, the Sandinistas, who control the Supreme Electoral Council, the fourth coequal branch of government, 

manipulated the voter rolls, managed the issuance of voter cards 

to the detriment of the political opposition, and used state property 

to conduct their electoral activities, among other abuses, and on the 

very day of the election, and according to credible observers, they 

stole many thousands of votes. 

Allow me to cite one telling figure. The published results show 

that Nicaraguans cast over 100,000 more votes for Assembly candidates than for President, although all candidates appeared on the 

same ballot. In my judgment, and if we could credit these results, 

it would seem very odd indeed that so many more people cast a 

vote for legislators than for President in the same election. 

Next, the question of institutionality. Under the government of 

Ortega’s predecessor, Enrique Bolaos, a decent, honest, and able 

man, Nicaragua slowly began to develop those independent and robust institutions that ensure true democracy and provide a check 

and balance on government excess, but Ortega has reversed these 

modest gains. As I have mentioned, the Supreme Court and the 

Electoral Council are involved with the Sandinistas. Ortega and his 

party have used, for their own purposes, these institutions and 

many others, including, increasingly and sadly, the national police. 

Nicaraguans now know that they have nowhere to turn for a redress of grievances, for the protection and preservation of their individual rights. Of all the damage that the Sandinistas have done 

to democracy in Nicaragua, their systematic co-optation of those 

governmental institutions is the most consequential and insidious. 

I come now to my last point: What, if anything, the United 

States can and should do with the next Ortega government. The dilemma is obvious. We maintain our current relations with an illegitimate and at times odious government in order to remain there 

to encourage and bear witness for those Nicaraguans who share 

our political values, or we reduce our diplomatic presence and our 

aid, thereby leaving these valiant Nicaraguans without the support 

and presence of the hemisphere’s most powerful and active democracy. For the moment, at least, I think we should stay. We should 

continue to promote economic development, especially through our 

programs in health and education, which both benefit poor Nicaraguans and demonstrate our Nation’s commitment to them. We 

should continue to champion good governance openly in every appropriate way and with everyone, including young Sandinistas who 

want to create a genuinely democratic future for their country. If, 

however, the next Ortega administration becomes ever more authoritarian, if it places intolerable conditions on our activities, we 

must be prepared to reduce or eliminate aid and reconsider the size 

and level of our diplomatic presence. 

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee, 

I thank you for your attention. In discussing this complex issues, 

I have been brief. If you have any questions, I will gladly try to 

answer them at the appropriate time. 

9

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ambassador. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Callahan follows:]


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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Ambassador? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAIME DAREMBLUM, 

FORMER COSTA RICAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED 

STATES, HUDSON INSTITUTE 

Ambassador DAREMBLUM. Thank you. Madam Chair, Congressman Berman, distinguished members of the committee, I am honored and pleased to be here today to discuss the future of democracy in one of Latin America’s poorest countries. Over a century 

ago a wise political leader in my country observed that instead of 

the two usual seasons common in Central America, summer, followed by rainy winter, Costa Rica had a third season, the season 

of wars with Nicaragua. In spite of the traditional friendship between Costa Ricans and Nicaraguans, dictators and other unsavory 

leaders in Nicaragua have long ratcheted up border conflicts with 

Costa Rica in order to divert attention from their domestic mischief. The Somozas did it, Arnoldo Aleman did it, and now Daniel 

Ortega is doing it, and from Ortega’s perspective, it is working just 

as planned. 

After Ortega and his ruling Sandinista party blatantly stole municipal elections in November 2008, United States and Europe suspended Nicaragua’s economic aid. On November 6th, earlier this 

month, Nicaragua held another election and witnessed another example of Sandinista malfeasance. Government authorities deliberately made it hard for voters to acquire their ID cards, they 

sought to limit the number of election observers and poll watchers, 

and the Supreme Electoral Council once again operated with a disturbing lack of transparency. 

The disputed election results sparked a wave of protests and violence. Several Nicaraguans were killed and many more were injured. Such is the intensely polarized atmosphere that Ortega has 

fostered. By rigging the elections, trampling the Constitution, persecuting his political opponents, bullying journalists, he has laid 

the foundation for another Sandinista dictatorship. Indeed, the 

only reason Ortega was eligible to stand for reelection is that his 

judicial allies used legal thuggery to abolish Presidential term limits. 

Sandinista attacks on democracy at home have been complemented by aggressive behavior abroad. In the fall of 2010 amid 

a river dredging project, Nicaraguan military forces effectively invaded and occupied an island, Isla Calero, that has always been 

considered Costa Rican territory, thereby sparking a major diplomatic crisis. When the Organization of American States demanded 

that Managua withdraw troops from Calero Island, Ortega refused, 

after multiple rulings from the OAS, the International Court of 

Justice in The Hague got involved, too. It ordered also Nicaragua 

to remove all military personnel from Calero Island. Ortega is still 

disobeying this order. He has been sending Sandinista youth brigades to the island along with soldiers, under the guise of environmental missions. 

Throughout the border dispute Nicaragua has shown a flagrant 

disregard for international law, not to mention Costa Rican sovereignty. It is the type of behavior one normally associates with 

rogue states and tin-pot dictators. 

12

Ortega has used the Calero Island conflict to stir up nationalist 

passions and boost his popularity. It has also become an excuse for 

yet another Presidential power grab, with the Nicaraguan leader 

expanding his control over the army and claiming broad new authority. 

Not surprisingly for an erstwhile Soviet client and a long-time 

friend of Moammar Qadhafi—as a matter of fact Qadhafi’s nephew 

is a personal secretary in Managua for Ortega—Ortega has aligned 

his regime with authoritarian governments in Iran, all over the 

world. Meanwhile, foreign investment numbers have been inflated 

by assistance from Hugo Chavez that has been mentioned here. 

Ortega is also benefiting from international loans and high commodity prices. While we should not confuse his economic moderation with a genuine commitment to democratic pluralism, Nicaraguan democracy is gradually being asphyxiated. Corruption is 

rampant, and the country is rapidly becoming a one-party state. If 

or when the business community finally does turn against Ortega, 

it may be too late. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Ambassador. 

[The statement Ambassador Daremblum follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Dr. McCoy. 

STATEMENT OF JENNIFER LYNN MCCOY, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF 

AMERICAS PROGRAM, THE CARTER CENTER 

Ms. MCCOY. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and Congressman 

Berman. I am pleased to be here today. I was in Nicaragua for the 

elections on November 6th, as I have been for every election beginning with 1990. Normally I have led election observer missions to 

the national elections in Nicaragua. This year The Carter Center 

declined to send a mission because of restrictions in the regulations 

on international and national observation. However, we did take a 

small unofficial delegation and consulted with the observers on the 

ground, Nicaraguan citizens, and the international diplomatic community. So we have a pretty good picture of what happened. 

Indeed, my view is the elections were not verifiable; that is, it 

is nearly impossible to independently corroborate the official results because there were insufficient independent observers present 

on voting day and because the National Election Council declined 

to post the results precinct by precinct to allow the comparison by 

the political party poll watchers and independent observers of those 

results. This is a departure from past practice in Nicaragua. 

Nevertheless, by most indicators, polls prior and the partial results that are known, Daniel Ortega won the Presidency. The question is by how much and by how many legislators. 

I agree with most of the characterizations that we have heard 

today about the problems, the deficiencies, and the flaws in the 

elections and won’t repeat that, but I will say that these problems 

are not new. Nicaragua has been unable to develop strong and 

independent institutions since the populace toppled a dictatorial 

dynasty in 1979. Every election after 1990 has suffered from disputes, irregularities or ineptness, and repeated suggestions for electoral reform from election observers have been ignored. But this 

election was the worst in terms of the obstacles created by the National Electoral Council for citizens, political parties, and international organizations to verify the integrity of the process. 

So what can and should the United States and the larger international community do to strengthen and encourage democratic 

governance in the wake of these weaknesses? 

First, we should recognize that Nicaragua is a poor country, the 

second poorest in the hemisphere, with a long history of 

authoritarianism and U.S. intervention. Civil society is weak, the 

current political opposition is perpetually divided, political parties 

are dominated by ambitious personalities rather than strong organization, and the political culture is one of negotiation and 

clientelism. Thus the conditions are not propitious for strong democratic institutions at the moment. 

The news isn’t all bad. Despite its limitations, the country does 

have still one of the best security and counternarcotics records in 

Central America, which is a region plagued with violence, gangs, 

and drug trafficking. And as we have heard, the Ortega administration does have a fairly strong macroeconomic track record sufficient to receive IMF approval, and it consults regularly with the 

private sector. 

18

So we have a mixed context. What should we do? We should criticize the lack of electoral credibility, we should encourage the opposition to present whatever evidence it can about the exclusion of its 

poll watchers and the irregularities in the count, and we should 

offer assistance to carry out desperately needed electoral reform. 

But I would say that assistance should be on the condition that the 

current Electoral Council be changed in its membership. 

We should also point out that a politicized judiciary and electoral 

authority and lack of accountability mechanisms threaten the sustainability of the economic gains achieved thus far, as investors 

will inevitably shy away from contexts lacking in juridical security. 

Now, it is also tempting to consider sanctions to highlight the 

unacceptability of this behavior. But I believe that efforts to unilaterally isolate and punish Nicaragua are likely to be counterproductive on several counts: First, the Nicaraguan Government 

will predictably characterize U.S. sanctions as imperialist dominance, and this is likely to resonate with a population or much of 

the population imbued with a history of U.S. intervention and 

choosing sides in the past as recently as the last election. 

Second, isolation imposed by one country simply does not work, 

as we have seen with other attempts in the hemisphere. 

Third, harming an economy that is just getting back on its feet 

is more likely to hasten a return to authoritarianism than to 

strengthen democracy. 

And, finally, unfortunately the U.S. has far less leverage over 

this poor country, traditionally dependent on U.S. aid and trade, 

than in the past. 

So withdrawing from Nicaragua and other perceived adversaries 

in Latin America I think will simply isolate the United States and 

leave a vacuum for others. The real question is how can we engage 

Latin America to support democracy? 

I want to conclude with saying that the way forward, I think, is 

to avoid personalizing politics, identifying friends and foes. It is to 

engage in pragmatic talks, to address the transnational issues of 

national interest to us all and that none of us can solve alone, and 

it is to recognize and appreciate the benefits of living in a relatively 

stable, democratic, and friendly neighborhood. 

Remaining silent about this election sets dangerous precedents 

for other countries and for Nicaragua’s next elections, the municipal elections coming in 2012. Without change, many citizens will 

be alienated and won’t vote in that process and will thus have no 

voice, but the problem is pressure for change needs to come first 

and foremost from inside Nicaragua. It is a long-term process, it 

won’t change overnight. It takes education, information, public debate over proposed constitutional changes that may be coming and 

over the values and mechanisms of the fundamentals of democracy, 

which are first and foremost how can citizens hold their governments accountable. So I propose that universities and NGOs in the 

U.S. work with Latin American counterparts to hold these public 

discussions in Nicaragua and the hemisphere. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. McCoy follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I thank all three panelists for excellent testimony. 

Dr. McCoy, The Carter Center, as you pointed out, declined to 

observe the elections in Nicaragua and released a statement on November 9th stating, ‘‘We are troubled by the reports of significant 

deficiencies in the 2011 electoral process in Nicaragua and their 

implications for democratic governance.’’

Further, in your prepared testimony you argue that Ortega 

should not be isolated as, in your assessment, ‘‘such attempts to 

change behavior in Cuba and Venezuela have not worked.’’

I can’t say that I am surprised, given that it was the Carter administration that enabled Ortega and the Sandinistas to take Nicaragua hostage in the first place decades ago. However, how can you 

justify accepting Daniel Ortega as President while recognizing electoral fraud in Nicaragua at the same time? How can The Carter 

Center argue that it is advancing human rights while supporting 

violators of fundamental liberties in Nicaragua and throughout the 

Western Hemisphere? You say that we need to get away from personalities, but we are talking about the person who orchestrated 

massive electoral fraud, and yet you think that he should be recognized as the President. 

In 2006 President Jimmy Carter observed the Presidential elections in Nicaragua. And after the elections he stated, ‘‘They have 

a very competent election commission that has so far proven to be 

fairly well balanced.’’ This commission, the commission that he 

praised in 2006, has resulted in two corrupt elections in 2008 and 

2011. Was President Carter wrong in his original assessment, and 

is it the view of The Carter Center to ignore electoral fraud when 

it likes the winner? 

And you mentioned that municipal elections are coming up. Certainly Daniel Ortega and Co have nothing to fear from The Carter 

Center when they were able to perpetuate fraud, when the Ortega 

government was able to perpetuate fraud and all that The Carter 

Center said is, Well, let’s not personalize the problem. If you could 

address these seeming inconsistencies. 

Ms. MCCOY. Certainly, I would be glad to. I think if you read our 

election reports, after every election you will see that we said that 

most of the elections that have been held have had serious flaws 

and irregularities, and we have made strong recommendations for 

reform after each of the elections. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. And since those reforms have not been 

made and there is another one coming up, what does it matter to 

Daniel Ortega? 

Ms. MCCOY. And we have also made statements after, though 

not present to observe, but after the 2008 elections and the issues 

in 2010, strongly criticizing the fraud and the other actions that 

have occurred. I think that questions here——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. With no consequences? 

Ms. MCCOY. Well, the question, as you will see if you read those 

statements, as earlier statements, we did indeed urge a cut in aid, 

which happened after the 2008 municipal elections when fraud was 

proven. I think the dilemma here, as Ambassador Callahan noted, 

is what to do in a situation like this, particularly one where it is 

very difficult to prove or not prove the election results. And in a 

23

poor country like Nicaragua, do we cut off our engagement completely and punish the people, or do we continue some form of engagement with that country? And I think we have seen some agreement——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Do you believe that the electoral fraud 

has not been proven? 

Ms. MCCOY [continuing]. In the panelists. I am sorry. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Sorry. Are you saying, since we don’t 

know if the fraud took place more or less—is that what you are 

saying, you are not convinced that there was electoral fraud in this 

election? 

Ms. MCCOY. In this case, as I said, the elections are not 

verifiable, and the political parties and the national observers have 

been attempting to gather as much information as they can. The 

problem was they were not present in most of the voting sites, and 

therefore it is very difficult for them to present the evidence required. That is the difficulty with this situation. I think we have 

all agreed in this room today that these elections were seriously 

flawed and unacceptable in their lack of transparency and in the 

partiality. I don’t think there is any disagreement on that. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. And do you know—we had had a briefing before this hearing where we had one of the folks who was involved in the electoral monitoring who told us they were not able 

to go to the places. They were denied access. So they were denied 

access to the voting places, there were so many irregularities. So 

if we see that there were so many deficiencies in this election, what 

is the proper response of the United States? 

Ms. MCCOY. I think that is exactly the dilemma and the challenge for the committee and for the administration to address. 

Criticizing the results——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, my time is up. Thank you 

so much. Thank you. Mr. Berman. 

Mr. BERMAN. Just before I ask a question, just an observation 

that when the government and the council do all the things to prevent you from gathering the information to ascertain whether fraud 

took place, perhaps not in a court of law, but certainly for us and 

for the public, one has to assume there was an intention to commit 

the fraud. I don’t know that that is an unreasonable leap of faith, 

given the conduct of the government in the conduct of the election. 

But I guess, Ambassador Callahan, I would like you to elaborate 

a little bit. As I understood what you testified to, you are essentially saying Ortega is going to be the President, there is nothing 

within our arsenal that is going to stop that from happening, he 

is not going to rerun this election. 

For now, for the reasons you outlined, we should probably nominate and send an Ambassador and continue to staff our Embassy 

and do the things to connect with the Nicaraguan people. We 

should probably not immediately do everything we can to stop any 

assistance from going to Nicaragua, but there comes a point in the 

future where one may want to reassess that policy. 

So I guess my two questions, and if any of you else want to comment, are: One, describe a little more what that point might be. 

Secondly, in some ways you are in an interesting situation because 

of your time as Ambassador. The previous administration for the 

24

first 4 years tried a policy of nonengagement and isolation, and 

then it decided to change its approach and got more engaged and 

more involved. Are you—I don’t remember whether your tenure 

passed through those two points, but can you tell us what the previous administration’s calculation was in sort of changing its approach toward Nicaragua between the first term and the second 

term? 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Berman. Your summary 

captured my position very accurately. I do think that for the moment we should stay. I do think it is important to give the kind 

of material and moral support to the opposition. After all, we did 

remain in Nicaragua throughout the 1980s, and I have got to believe that that, at least in a small measure, contributed to the victory of the opposition in 1990. They desperately need our help, including our moral support, and for that reason I think it is symbolically important to have an Ambassador there, although the 

functioning of an Embassy really doesn’t change. Our Charge ́ d’Affaires are very competent people and run the Embassy as well as 

Ambassadors; however, it is important symbolically for the Nicaraguan people to see that the Americans do have an Ambassador 

there. 

I would add, however, that I found it somewhat odd, the timing 

on the naming of our new Ambassador. A week or two after our 

Deputy Assistant Secretary condemned the elections in the OAS, 

we made public our request for agrment for the new Ambassador. 

I probably would have held off on that at least until the New Year. 

But, yes, I think it is important that we have an Ambassador and 

that we remain engaged. 

The point to leave? I can speculate that if Ortega decides to close 

down the newspapers, if he again begins to imprison people for political reasons, if he acts rashly or against our national interests——

Mr. BERMAN. In my 36 remaining seconds, why aren’t the other 

Latin American countries, not the Venezuelas, but the ones that 

have a commitment to democracy, speaking out more clearly at the 

OAS and other places about what happened? Why are we and Canada and I think Peru the only countries that are saying anything 

publicly? 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. I wish I knew the answer to that question. But you are correct in that assessment. Privately, because I 

was dealing with them all the time, they express their serious 

doubts about the direction of the Nicaraguan Government, but publicly they seem to be very reluctant to express that, either individually as Ambassadors or through international fora such as the 

OAS and the U.N. I think it is unfortunate. I think that that kind 

of pressure would be beneficial to our desires to see a more democratic Nicaragua. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. 

Berman. Mr. Mack, chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, is recognized. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much, and I just want to follow up 

on some of those questions. And you were going through a list of 

things of when we might want to take some other action, reduce 

25

the—would you also include in that list stealing an election and hijacking the dreams and hopes of the people of Nicaragua? 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. No. I know exactly—again, I think I 

tried to lay out as succinctly as I could the dilemma, but if we pull 

out, if we take drastic action, I am afraid this will have a greater 

effect on the political opposition, on the democratic opposition in 

Nicaragua than it will on Ortega. After all, Ortega receives $500 

million a year from Hugo Chavez. 

Mr. MACK. So are you suggesting we should match that? Will 

that make everything all better? 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. No, I mean, it is unrealistic. We are not 

going to match that, and I don’t think it would. I think Daniel Ortega has almost a visceral dislike of the United States and what 

we represent. I am convinced of that after being down there for 3 

years. So I don’t think we can buy our way into his good favor. We 

will never do that. He doesn’t like us, he doesn’t like what we represent. 

But the opposition and many Nicaraguans—and I will point out 

that there were many polls done during my time down there. In 

every poll, somewhere between 75 and 80 percent of Nicaraguans 

expressed a favorable opinion of the United States. So one of our 

challenges, Mr. Mack, is to hold onto that affection that the Nicaraguans seem to have instinctively for the United States and for 

Americans, and I am afraid that we will alienate them if we take 

these drastic measures. 

Mr. MACK. And I understand that, and in a country, in the 

United States where we have public relations firms and advertising 

firms in New York and everywhere else who can get people to run 

out and buy pet rocks, I think certainly we can go and spread the 

word in Latin America, in any country, that the United States 

stands for those who are fighting for their freedom and their democracy. 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. Agreed. 

Mr. MACK. I think this all goes back—what I am hearing from, 

and there is a lot that I can agree with with everyone, with all of 

the testimony, but what I am hearing is we are going to continue 

to do the same thing. So we are going to continue to, you know, 

the next layer of, if they—we don’t like what they are doing, and 

we are going to do something if they do this, and we keep pushing 

that down the road; and I think what, you know, the question that 

keeps—that was asked, I think, is a legitimate one: Why aren’t 

other countries standing either with the United States or standing 

against Nicaragua? And the reason is because there is no leadership. It is so muddled. You have got the Organization of American 

States, who has no clear direction. They can hold up something and 

say this is what our charter says, yet they are in violation of it 

every day. So there is no leader, and there is no leadership coming 

from the United States. 

What the people, the people that we are talking about in Nicaragua, what they are looking for is someone to stand strong with 

them, and that means opposing what Ortega is doing to them. And 

they understand that if we are clear in our mission and we do it 

in such a way that it is—with the same judgment, whether it is 

Nicaragua, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, you name it—

26

what they are seeing, though, is on one hand we go after Honduras, and then on the other hand we allow, we don’t take the 

same strong position against Nicaragua. So on one hand we are not 

supporting a country who is fighting for their democracy and their 

Constitution, but we seem to be a little more passive when it comes 

to Nicaragua. And so that creates this muddled world in Latin 

America where there is no leadership. 

And, you know, this administration has failed, has failed on that 

mission. People in Latin America don’t know where the United 

States stands, and that is why I think we ought to disengage from 

the OAS, directly engage with our friends and allies. We should be 

standing with Colombia and Panama, we should be standing with 

other countries that want to see freedom and democracy in Latin 

America. That will allow other countries who believe in those same 

ideals, who want to be friends and partners with the United States, 

it will give them the opportunity to do so. Right now it is so muddled that it is easier to sit on the sidelines, and that comes from 

a lack of leadership in the United States. 

And the last thing I would like to say is this. Dr. McCoy, you 

talked about no verifiable evidence and I think the ranking member talked about this too. Duh. They don’t want us to see what 

happened. I mean they have intentionally created a process for 

fraud to steal an election. What more evidence do you need? Thank 

you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much Mr. Mack. Mr. 

Meeks, the ranking member on Europe, is recognized. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you Madam Chair. I want to thank all three 

of you for your testimony, because I thought all of the testimonies 

were very, very good. And I want to build upon I think where the 

ranking member left off, because I too—we were just talking up 

here—have strong questions in why no one else spoke up. Even 

when we were at the hearing before this, the meeting before this 

with Dr. Caputo, he said that he was all prepared for other member states to ask questions, et cetera, and no one did. 

And so, you know, because to me that if we are going to have 

democracy, it is not something that the United States does on a 

unilateral basis, because on a unilateral basis we are leading our 

allies, it is something that we have to do on a multilateral basis 

with our allies, et cetera. 

In your testimony, Ambassador Callahan, if it came to that point, 

I would hope that we do not say, just the United States, we are 

going to do this; because oftentimes people look the at United 

States and say we tell them what to do without working with anyone else and, you know, and we don’t even look at ourselves. Because no matter where I go, some people still are talking about the 

2000 election in the United States, especially in Florida. So I mean, 

we have got to be careful. 

So tell me how do we then work more in a multilateral situation, 

using the guidelines that you laid out saying that we can’t withdraw now, but let’s put the pressure on so that the people of Nicaragua does have a democracy and we do have better elections going 

forth and build upon what the OAS has done or stated, and even 

the EU and what I think I hear The Carter Center talking about. 

27

Where is that foundation being laid now so that whatever we have 

to do in the future we can do collectively together? 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. You make a number of very good points, 

Congressman Meeks. To get back to why especially other Latin 

American countries do not comment publicly on such things as the 

fraudulent Nicaraguan elections, there is a tradition of that, frankly, in Latin America. I spent a lot of time in Latin America. Countries do not like to criticize each other publicly and they normally 

refrain from doing that. 

In regards to the multilateral approach, we tried it. We tried it 

in Managua certainly, dealing especially with my European, Canadian colleagues, Japanese, certain of the Latin Americans. But it 

just seems to be very difficult to coordinate our statements and our 

actions on Nicaragua. 

We were unquestionably the most outspoken, the most aggressive. Congressman Mack has left, but I would point out as Dr. 

McCoy did, after the 2008 elections we did eliminate the remainder 

of our Millennium Challenge Account aid to Nicaragua which 

amounted to about $63 million. We did it at great cost. The Embassy was attacked. I was attacked personally as a result of that. 

And I must say in my 3 years there, I never shied away from expressing our values and our intentions in Nicaragua. And sometimes, I must confess, I felt somewhat lonely out there doing so. 

And I thought there could have been better coordination between 

the Embassy in Nicaragua and Washington. 

I think had Washington spoken out a bit more vociferously on 

some of the issues in Nicaragua, it would have helped us and 

would have sent a clearer message. I think we should continue to 

work. To the extent we can work multilaterally, we should. It is 

much more effective. But to the extent we have to act alone and 

speak alone, well, we should do that as well. That is our only alternative. 

Mr. MEEKS. And the other concern I want to make sure that we 

talk about, because there has been some issues with reference to 

the success Nicaragua has had with drugs. And as a result, also 

Colombia and what role Colombia may play, because I recently was 

down to Colombia and talked to President Santos who is trying to 

play a bigger role, a leadership role in South and Central America, 

and whether or not he is cooperating because he has mentioned to 

me of having dialogue and talking and engagement. I was wondering whether any of that has any effect to it. 

And lastly let me just say this. I am concerned, what I don’t 

want to go back to, as Professor Robert Pastor has said, though we 

all agree that we think it was a mistake and a setback to democracy with the election of Mr. Ortega, but he said it would be a mistake for the United States to return to the battles of the Cold War. 

I want to make sure we are not doing what we did in the Cold War 

and have those hostilities again, because that will be a setback for 

all of us in the Western Hemisphere and for democracy to be 

spread throughout this hemisphere. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. Turner of New York is recognized. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you Madam Chair. I thank the panelists. 

28

Ambassador Callahan, I just heard that Venezuela has put $500 

million into the Nicaraguan economy. Are they getting direct aid—

and how important is it as a percent of their budget even—from 

Iran? Is Cuba a factor providing military or intelligence work? And 

the same with Iran? Monetarily and other phases. Do you have any 

special knowledge of this or—I would appreciate that, thanks. 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. Thank you, Congressman Turner. Venezuelan aid is indispensable to Daniel Ortega and the Sandinista 

party and very important to Nicaragua. Nicaragua’s gross domestic 

product is about $6.5 billion. So you can imagine $500 million in 

unattached aid is 7 or 8 percent of their GDP, and so it is extremely important. 

We really don’t know where it goes. There is no transparency in 

the use of that money. It has clearly been used for political purposes. It has been used for some social purposes as well. It has 

been used for familial purposes. The Ortega family is acquiring and 

senior Sandinistas are acquiring businesses, ranches, property, and 

you have got to assume that that in part is coming from the Venezuelan money. 

The Cubans do regularly send medical brigades to Nicaragua. 

Daniel Ortega endlessly expresses his solidarity with and appreciation of Fidel Castro. There is an ideological affinity there. There is 

no question of that. Cuba is not in a position to provide a lot of 

aid, especially financially, to Nicaragua. But clearly Ortega wants 

to maintain very close relations with Castro and admires Castro for 

a lot of reasons. 

Iran, this is something we paid a lot of attention to, Congressman, and we have seen very little evidence of any Iranian aid going 

to Nicaragua. In fact, it is mostly rhetorical. The Iranians would 

come and say they are going to build a deepwater port on the Caribbean, a multibillion-dollar project, but nothing ever comes of it. 

Their Embassy is very small. To the best of my knowledge there 

are two diplomats in the Iranian Embassy. Again, there is a certain rhetorical support on the part of Ortega. Their revolutions occurred in the same year and they like to make a big deal of that, 

1979, and express solidarity. But in practical terms I have seen 

very little come from Iran. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. And final question: Is the U.N., either 

directly or indirectly, and U.S. Aid going currently this year or next 

to Nicaragua? What percent or size is that? 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. Yes, we maintain a bilateral aid program. It is focused on health, education. It is a modest program to 

support the Nicaraguan police and navy with the positive results 

that Congressman Meeks just mentioned. 

But it has been over my years there, especially once we lost the 

Millennium Challenge Account, it went from roughly $70- or $80 

million a year. My guess now would be in the neighborhood of $20- 

or $25 million a year. It is a fairly modest program and the Nicaraguans have lost a lot of it by their behavior. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner. 

Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Madam Chairperson. 

29

Ambassador, you said that it is obvious that Ortega hates this 

country. Obviously we stand for honesty and we stand for freedom 

of expression and those are the worst enemies that communism 

has. So I am not shocked by that. And it is always amazing to me 

how these Communists become capitalists so quickly, able to acquire all of these things. It is amazing. 

So you know, I guess my question is, what is your impression of 

the support for Ortega in Nicaragua? You know, just like all—can 

you comment on that? Because some people have said, and I read 

someplace where had he run an honest election he would have won. 

Obviously, changed the Constitution. But some people said—is that 

true? Untrue? Can you give me an impression? 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. Yes, Congressman. I think I said he viscerally dislikes us. I am not sure I said hate. He doesn’t like us 

by any means. 

Mr. SIRES. Well, I just extended it a bit. 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. Well, Ortega’s support for many, many 

years hovered around 35 percent. That is what he tended to attract 

in elections, 35–40 percent. He obviously has a constituency that 

supports him. It is more and more less ideological and more and 

more political and economic. 

And you are correct, the Ortega family has benefited tremendously over the last few years economically from the kind of aid 

that is coming in. So have many of the senior Sandanistas. They 

came to power as Marxists, and today those who are still around 

are still unquestionably at least capitalists in the way they live, 

but they don’t express that. 

Would Ortega have won a free, fair, and transparent election? He 

may have. The opposition was fragmented, underfunded. Ortega 

has maintained somewhat prudent macroeconomic policies. Inflation is under control. The economy is growing modestly, 3 or 4 percent a year, but it is growing. There are social and educational programs for the poorest of the poor and they would likely support Ortega. 

But I find it fanciful indeed to think that Ortega could have won 

over 60 percent of the vote. It is inconceivable that he could have 

won that. Because there are—the opponents are again passionately 

anti-Ortega and anti-Sandinista. And to think that their numbers 

have suddenly been reduced to 38 percent from what was traditionally 55, 60 percent? I find that hard to believe. 

But Ortega could have, I think personally, could have won a free 

and fair and open election, but not by the margin he did. 

Mr. SIRES. Ambassador, would you care to comment on that? 

Ambassador DAREMBLUM. I only have one point that I would like 

to underline. Ortega is a hardened autocrat and by now he is an 

expert in stealing elections. Recommendations for electoral purity 

in Nicaragua will fall into deaf ears. 

Yesterday I read in La Prensa, which is the daily in Managua, 

that it was announced that the European Union was going to provide some recommendations to fix the electoral system in Nicaragua. The Foreign Minister disqualified the European Union to 

provide any advice, because they have their own problems so they 

cannot provide advice on electoral purity to them, Nicaragua. 

30

On the other hand, Ortega yearns for legitimacy. Even though he 

doesn’t care about elections he wants to navigate international waters with the legitimacy of having been elected democratically. And 

in this respect I think the United States should follow a line of 

clearer and more resounding criticism of what is going on in Nicaragua. The United States should be exerting leadership with the 

Latin American countries. The thing to do that—it is not a matter 

of one day—is continuously to engage more democracies in Latin 

American that are not friends really, politically, of Nicaragua. 

But it is a constant fight for engagement that needs to be led by 

a State Department that is willing to do that. And so far, unfortunately, I have to say I haven’t seen that either at the bilateral level 

or in the OAS. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you very much. Dr. McCoy, in a few seconds? 

Ms. MCCOY. In terms of—your question is why does Ortega have 

support? Two reasons why his support has increased from the historic levels of 35–40 percent. One is that people fear that with him 

in the Presidency would return hyperinflation and war, and so they 

have seen over the last 6 years that basically the economy was 

mostly stable and there was no war as in the past. So I think that 

helps. 

His ability to distribute benefits financed by the Venezuelan aid 

helps. But I agree, and as I said in my testimony, and I agree with 

Ambassador Callahan, the question is by how much did he win? 

We don’t really know because it is is not verifiable. But probably, 

yes, all the indications are that he had enough support to have 

won. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BURTON [presiding]. I thank the gentleman for his comments 

and questions, and I’m sorry I was late. I had to go to another 

hearing. You mentioned that there was no prospect of inflation. Is 

it still that way down there now? 

Ms. MCCOY. What I said was that people feared a repetition of 

the hyperinflation from the 1980s. Right now the macroeconomic 

situation is pretty stable and has been approved by——

Mr. BURTON. So they don’t have an inflationary problem at the 

present time? 

Ms. MCCOY. Not at the present. I can’t predict the future. 

Mr. BURTON. And he needed a two-thirds majority in order to 

change the Constitution. I guess he got that. 

Ms. MCCOY. Only 60 percent. 

Mr. BURTON. Only 60 percent? 

Ms. MCCOY. Yes. 

Mr. BURTON. But there was great fear that there was not a legitimate count. 

Ms. MCCOY. That is the suspicion. That is the doubt. 

Mr. BURTON. That is the suspicion. After having known Ortega 

since 1982 or 1983 when I first came to Congress, that doesn’t surprise me a bit. The Communist Sandinista regime has always been 

willing to do whatever it takes in order to gain their ends. 

I think you have probably already answered this but I would like 

to ask this question anyhow. The status of Iran in Nicaragua. Chavez in Venezuela has had regular flights and connections with Iran 

for some time. In fact it is rumored that he has even been trying 

31

to get nuclear capability, and Chavez has been very supportive and 

friendly with Ortega. 

Now we see that Iran is dealing with Nicaragua and see they are 

giving them tractors and $350 million ocean port and 10,000 

houses. That ought to help the economy a little bit as well. But 

what kind of relationship do they have? Can you just give me a 

thumbnail sketch of it? How about you, Ambassador? 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. Congressman, I answered briefly that 

question earlier, but we are obviously very concerned with Iran’s 

presence in Nicaragua and, frankly, keep a very close eye on it. 

And there is very little indication that there is anything more than 

a rhetorical relationship there. 

Mr. BURTON. Excuse me, Ambassador. It just seems to me that 

you don’t give away $350 million for an ocean port and give them 

4,000 tractors or 10,000 houses unless there is something. And they 

are also backing a $120 million hydroelectric project. So there has 

got to be some reason for it. I know there is a lot of coffee down 

there and meat and bananas, but that is an awful lot of meat and 

bananas. 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. I spent 3 years there and repeatedly 

heard of the deepwater port on the Caribbean. Nothing has ever 

come of it. I rather doubt that anything will come of it. I don’t 

know where—those are things that are said. An Iranian trade delegation comes through and says we are going to build this deepwater port, we are going to build a railroad. It is all of these grandiose projects that frankly never come to fruition, we never saw. 

I really do think that it is greatly inflated and Iran’s—let me say 

one thing. Iran is one of the few countries that has refused to forgive Nicaragua’s debt. They haven’t even forgiven the debt that 

Nicaragua owes them from the 1980s. So their contributions to the 

Nicaraguan economy I think are quite, quite modest, and if these 

things come to pass it would, frankly, surprise me. 

Mr. BURTON. Do they allow Iranians to come in without visas? 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. I think they do, yes. But there are not 

many there. 

Mr. BURTON. Nothing to worry about? 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. Well, of course you do, and we keep our 

eyes open. But I think that their diplomatic presence is two. I 

think they have an Ambassador and he has an assistant. 

Mr. BURTON. But you don’t think there is a threat to the United 

States’ security from the Iranians and their involvement down 

there? 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. Not in Nicaragua at this moment. It is 

something that clearly we all have to pay attention to. 

Mr. BURTON. Just south of there, just across, they have got Venezuela; and Venezuela is tied in with Nicaragua supporting the 

Communist movement down there. But you don’t think there is 

any——

Ambassador CALLAHAN. To date, no. Not with Iran. And you are 

absolutely correct and I agree with you. It is extremely worrisome, 

Venezuela’s relationship with Iran. But that has not yet penetrated 

Nicaragua. 

32

Mr. BURTON. Have they provided any kind of transit support 

through Nicaragua up into North America and the United States? 

Has there been any indication of that? 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. For Iranians coming through Venezuela, 

for example? 

Mr. BURTON. Yes. 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. No, we have no indication of that at all. 

Nothing that would suggest that. I think, frankly, Ortega would be 

extremely concerned about that. And he wouldn’t want to give the 

United States an opportunity to reveal that or condemn him for 

doing that. The FARC is there. He does play loose with some terrorist groups, there is no question about it. But I haven’t seen any 

indication at all that he would have allowed them or facilitated 

their transit to the United States. No, I haven’t. 

Mr. BURTON. Do you have any comments, Ambassador, my old 

friend? 

Ambassador DAREMBLUM. Yes, thank you. All the projects that 

they keep presenting and announcing is really a facade, because 

what counts is the strategic type or the strategic link between 

Ortega’s thinking and Ahmadinejad in Iran. The Embassy for them 

is not the same thing an Embassy is in Western eyes. It is true 

physically, the Embassy in terms of how many people are in the 

Embassy is small. But Iranians can come into Nicaragua without 

a visa. There is no record of how many Iranians are in Nicaragua. 

And Nicaragua is needed not to present flourishing projects, but as 

a strategic presence of Iran vis-a`-vis the United States. Inasmuch 

as the United States has troops in Iraq or has bases in those countries, which are close to Iran, Iran wants to do exactly the same 

thing or parallel thing with a presence in Venezuela—in Nicaragua. 

Mr. BURTON. Before I yield to my colleague, does that in your 

opinion pose any threat to the United States? 

Ambassador DAREMBLUM. Yes, of course. 

Mr. BURTON. Can you elaborate really quickly? 

Ambassador DAREMBLUM. Yes, of course. You pointed to one of 

them, the type of relationships that Ortega has with subversive 

groups all over the hemisphere and also in terms of the gangs that 

control very much the flow of illegals toward the United States. We 

don’t know about how many people are going through the Maras, 

Salvatruchas, from the south to the United States. The concept of 

Embassy that they have is what produced in Buenos Aires in 1992 

or 1994 the two greatest bombings and episodes where many people were killed. Everything was controlled from the Embassy, by 

the Embassy. 

Mr. BURTON. My time has expired, I have gone over. Mr. 

Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And like you, I also 

met Mr. Ortega in 1982, when I led a Senate trip with the late 

Senator Pell and Senator Leahy to Central America to look at the 

whole issue of the wars going on there and illicit funneling of assistance to the contras, then operating in and around Nicaragua. 

Let me first ask, Ambassador Daremblum, picking up on your 

answer to my colleague Mr. Sires, I heard you criticize the United 

States for not exercising sufficient leadership and—my words, not 

33

yours—kind of being squishy on the whole issue of Ortega and the 

Sandanistas and what is going on in Nicaragua. Have I got that 

roughly right? 

Ambassador DAREMBLUM. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You were the Costa Rican Ambassador to the 

United States. Do you believe that your government was sufficiently outspoken with respect to what is going on in Nicaragua 

and Mr. Ortega? 

Ambassador DAREMBLUM. Definitely. We had problems with Mr. 

Aleman and the border. We had problems with Ortega. We have 

had problems with most Nicaraguan leaders, with very few exceptions. And Costa Rica tried to take up some of those complaints to 

the OAS and to other forums and requested the aid of the United 

States. In many cases it was forthcoming. In other cases it was not 

forthcoming. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. The United States? You mean the United States 

was not forthcoming? 

Ambassador DAREMBLUM. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. But let me ask you, my colleague Mr. Mack 

from Florida recommends that the United States pull out of the 

OAS and substitute bilateral one-on-one diplomacy for multilateral 

forums such as the OAS. Do you share that view? 

Ambassador DAREMBLUM. I would not abandon the OAS, anyhow. I think the United States is going to be facing another OAS 

without the United States if Venezuela—if Chavez fulfills his organizational zeal of having an OAS without the United States. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Professor, if I could stay with you for a minute. 

And your observation of not pulling out of the OAS is very valuable. Thank you. 

What is it from your perspective, given your role here now, and 

as an Ambassador and representing a very important country, 

Costa Rica, what is it do you think that Ortega and his government 

are out to achieve? What is it that they really want to accomplish 

in Nicaragua? 

Ambassador DAREMBLUM. Well, the number one rule for the 

ALBA countries or the axis of Venezuela with Ecuador, Bolivia, 

and Nicaragua, is to hang onto power as long as possible, a lengthy 

stay in power, and eviscerate democracy and create an authoritarian state that they can use for their single purposes. And that 

is the objective. They wanted to do something like that in Honduras with Zelaya, but the Honduran people put an end to that, 

thank God. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. Ambassador Callahan, I think you 

wanted to comment on that as well and I welcome your view. 

Same question. What is it that you think Ortega and the Sandinistas want to achieve in Nicaragua today? 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. I would agree with Ambassador 

Daremblum. I think power. I don’t think they are motivated by ideology. I think what they want is power and the wealth and influence that comes along with that. Many Nicaraguans now refer to 

it as Somozismo sine Somozo, or Somozism without Somoza. It is 

hauntingly reminiscent of what Somoza did. The intimidation, the 

crony capitalism, nepotism. A lot of Ortega’s large family, a lot of 

his children are now in positions of power. And as I often said, if 

34

your intention is to rule in Nicaragua for half a century, what better model to use than Somoza because Somoza succeeded in doing 

that. And I am convinced that is their motivation: To remain in 

power, with all the attributes that brings, for as long as it is possible. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I find it interesting and I am sure 

you do too, that when I think back to my visit to Nicaragua and 

meeting with Sandinista leadership including Mr. Ortega, the revolutionary fervor was powerful and real. To hear Ambassador Callahan say, Well that is gone, this is just about raw power and holding onto it, as the Ambassador from Costa Rica also says, I think 

it is quite an interesting statement. And it kind of takes the nobility out of everything and just makes it sort of garden-variety autocratic dictatorship, not wanting to give up power once achieved. 

And at least in saying that it is not of direct strategic concern to 

the United States, other than human rights get violated, obviously, 

in our backyard, and the promotion of democracy is retarded and 

we certainly do not want the virus of autocracy to spread any further in the region, but the threat perceived in the eighties is not 

what we are talking about today. I thank you. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Rivera of Florida, my good friend. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

all of you, for being here today on this panel. I represent many, 

many Nicaraguan Americans now in South Florida, perhaps more 

so than any other Member of Congress. And I say Nicaraguan 

Americans now, but many of them originally were Nicaraguan exiles, political exiles, that fled the Sandinista dictatorship. And 

many of them—they are now contributing, productive, positive 

members of society, many of them citizens and have become Nicaraguan Americans—have expressed dismay to me at the disturbing 

approach that we have seen from this administration vis-a`-vis U.S. 

policy toward Nicaragua, particularly in its lack of outspokenness 

regarding what it sees as undemocratic—what many see as undemocratic measures that have been taken by Ortega and his regime from Nicaragua, starting with the mechanisms that were utilized to approach this election and to be able to run again in this 

election, the antidemocratic means that the Ortega regime manipulated the judiciary in order to be able to invoke his qualifications 

for this election. And it brings to mind what, again, many of these 

Nicaraguan Americans have told me that they see from this administration as a lack of support for those—for the forces of democracy 

in the region and silence toward the forces of dictatorship in the 

region, such as Mr. Ortega and his dictatorial actions. 

And I wonder if that silence from this administration, from the 

Obama administration, in not strongly objecting to the mechanisms 

utilized to implement this election, as well as the results, the dubious results of these elections. Do you believe that helps legitimize 

Ortega’s regime or legitimize has Presidency, and what should be 

the consequences against the Ortega regime after these dubious 

elections? 

Ambassador Callahan, I will start with you. 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. Thank you, Congressman. This administration has been far more outspoken recently over what is hapVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:55 Mar 01, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\120111\71401 HFA PsN: SHIRL
35

pening in Nicaragua than through the previous couple of years. I 

would to a certain extent agree with you. I was down there, I 

would have appreciated more rhetorical support from Washington. 

I would have appreciated a more explicit condemnation of what the 

Sandinistas were doing. I am afraid that the relative silence of 

Washington over a period of years led them to believe that there 

was a difference in the approach between the Embassy, which I 

was leading, and the State Department. And in fact, I was told by 

senior Sandinistas that I was not acting consistent with the policy 

of Washington. I was taking a harder line. So I think that would 

have clarified matters had we been a bit more outspoken. 

We are, frankly, very limited in what we can do down there. The 

$500 million a year that Daniel Ortega receives in unconditional 

aid from Hugo Chavez allows him to thumb his nose not only at 

the United States but at the Europeans and at the Japanese, and 

he has done that. 

I think it is important that we remain engaged, as I said in my 

testimony, to provide the kind of moral support that the opposition 

really needs. I am convinced that by staying down there through 

the 1980s, the United States contributed to the victory of Dona 

Violeta de Chamorro in 1990, and I think that ultimately the kind 

of government that Daniel Ortega is forming—crony capitalism, 

nepotism, corruption—ultimately will implode. It has to. There is 

enough pressure these days, international pressure, and it is no 

longer a bipolar world as it was in the 1980s. 

And obviously if Venezuelan aid were to dry up for any reason, 

Daniel Ortega would find himself in a very serious predicament, 

because he has alienated a lot of the traditional donors, ourselves 

included. So I do think that the best approach is to continue to put 

pressure on him, work with the opposition, but to stay engaged. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much. I yield back. Mr. Chair. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you. Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I am interested in this view of Somozism without 

Somoza. With Somoza, he was in alliance with the oligarchs that 

preexisted his personal rise to power. Has Ortega co-opted or replaced the wealthy in Nicaragua? Has he put—has he been able to 

decimate the old wealthy and put in his own people, or has he coopted or both? 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. Good question, Congressman. The question is the large entrepreneurs in Nicaragua have been fairly content with Somoza—with Ortega’s economic policies. As we mentioned, his macroeconomic policies have produced modest growth in 

the economy, controlled inflation. And what is extremely important 

is in my 3 years, there was not one serious labor strike because the 

Sandanistas control the labor unions. And this obviously redounds 

to the benefit of the big entrepreneurs. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So the individuals who are entrepreneurs, it is not 

like everybody who was in the jungle with Ortega last century now 

is a billionaire. The 100 millionaires and the billionaires that existed before Ortega’s new rise to power are still there, and he is 

just keeping them happy? 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. Yes, they are still there. But there is a 

new class of wealthy and they are the Sandanistas. 

36

Mr. SHERMAN. So the current wealthy class in Nicaragua is a 

combination of those who have been co-opted and those who have 

benefited. Speaking of benefits, of course Ortega himself is one of 

the most wealthy individuals in Central America. Does that undermine him with his own political base? 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. You know, I am not certain he is one of 

the wealthiest in Latin America, although he is far, far wealthier 

than he was 10 years ago. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I want to move on to another question for both 

yourself and the other Ambassador. And that is, you know, I know 

what it takes to try to sell people on foreign aid. And I am part 

of a government of what is still the wealthiest government in the 

world. How does Chavez sell the Venezuelan people on $0.5 billion 

of aid to Nicaragua, plus the other foreign aid he is providing 

throughout Latin America? Ambassador Daremblum? 

Ambassador DAREMBLUM. PDVSA, the national petroleum company of Venezuela, has become the source for all sorts of goodies 

throughout Latin America. They are fairly restricted now and they 

are incurring very high debts, the Venezuelans, in order to keep up 

with the level of expenditures that Chavez is carrying on. By now 

I have heard—I read reports, in a sense, that they have mortgaged 

their petroleum reserves for a century already. They have been——

Mr. SHERMAN. Why would any sane capitalist lend money 

against the oil that Chavez’s regime will extract from the ground 

20 years from now? 

Ambassador DAREMBLUM. I’m sorry, the number one lender is 

China. 

Mr. SHERMAN. China? 

Ambassador DAREMBLUM. China, yeah. 

Mr. SHERMAN. China may or may not be paid. They are lending 

money to an illegitimate, repressive government, and when China 

pays the bonds issued by Sun Yat-sen and the last Emperor of 

China, that is when they should get their money from the Venezuelan people. Do the Venezuelan people know about the foreign 

aid, or is it something that is hidden from them? 

Ambassador DAREMBLUM. It is very well-known. Very wellknown. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And finally the Ortega family is buying up the 

media outlets. What is the implication of that? 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. I think it is very clear. The electronic 

media, because they are the ones that reach the masses of the people, especially the poor—and, again, it is reminiscent of what 

Somoza did. Somoza controlled television and radio, and pretty 

much—there were periods where he suppressed the newspapers—

but those who are reading the newspapers were largely opposed to 

Somoza’s government, are largely opposed to Ortega’s government. 

So he can allow them to continue reading their papers, and when 

he is accused of interfering with freedom of the press he says, 

‘‘How can you say that? Don’t you read these papers?’’ Which are 

highly critical of him. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Let me see if I can squeeze in one more question. 

The one enormous difference between Somoza and Ortega—they 

both seem dedicated to power and wealth—is Somoza found it in 

his interest to be pro-America and Ortega finds it in his interest 

37

to be anti-America. Is that because of the half billion from Venezuela or is that out of genuine conviction? 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. I think it is the latter. Daniel Ortega 

dislikes the United States. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And finds it useful in holding power to have that 

be part of his ideology? 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. I don’t think it is that useful frankly. 

Because as I mentioned before you came in, poll after poll indicates 

that 70–80 percent of the Nicaraguans, which means some Sandanistas, hold a favorable opinion of the United States. It obviously 

has not hurt him, because he remains President. But nevertheless 

I don’t see that as an aid to him other than, of course, getting the 

money from Chavez. But he feels much more comfortable with Chavez, with Castro, with that ilk. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. Thank you. I thank the chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. I just have one quick question or comment. When 

I was down there in 1983 when the conflict was going on, I met 

with their—I can’t remember his name, the guy that was the public 

relations, if you want to call him that, of the Sandinistas, and I 

went into his office. And he had a big picture of Mao Tse Tung 

right behind his desk. I would think that that might indicate he 

believed in communism. Just a wild guess. 

But I asked him, I said—this is just kind of an aside—I said, you 

went to school in the United States. He said, yes. And I said, in 

fact you did graduate work. He said, yes. I said, how can you be 

a Communist after being in the free enterprise system? And he 

said, everything I am or I have learned, I learned at Harvard. 

I just thought I would tell you that little funny aside. I am sure 

Harvard doesn’t need that. But you don’t believe that they are 

Communist or Communist-motivated anymore? It is just a power 

issue? 

Ambassador CALLAHAN. Yes, I do. He pays lip service to socialism and proletariat, but it is entirely insincere as far as I can see. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, there is another place that they 

pay some lip service to Mao Tse Tung but are in fact pretty damn 

capitalist, and that is the home of Mao Tse Tung, China. 

Mr. BURTON. Yes, I understand. The whole world has changed. 

Thank you very much. We really appreciate it, and on behalf of 

our chairman. We really appreciate your testimony. The hearing is 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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