1

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Alexis Basham ) Docket No. 2023-05-0474

)

v. ) State File No. 50877-2021

)

SPB Hospitality, LLC, d/b/a Logan’s )

Roadhouse, et al. )

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) Heard October 5, 2023 

Compensation Claims ) at Knoxville

Dale A. Tipps, Judge )

Affirmed and Remanded

This is an appeal of the trial court’s order denying the employee’s motion to compel 

compliance with an earlier order for ongoing temporary disability benefits. While at work, 

the employee was physically assaulted by a customer who then struck the employee with

a vehicle and dragged her several feet when attempting to leave the employer’s parking lot. 

The employee suffered an injury to her back and received workers’ compensation benefits. 

Upon reaching maximum medical improvement for her back injury, the employer stopped 

paying temporary disability benefits. Thereafter, the employer authorized a psychiatric

evaluation, and the employee was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and 

restricted from work. The employee requested an expedited hearing to reinstate temporary 

total disability benefits, and the trial court determined that although the employee suffered

physical injuries, her mental injury did not arise primarily from the physical injuries, 

rendering Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(1)(E) inapplicable. Accordingly, 

the court ordered the employer to pay past and ongoing temporary total disability benefits, 

and that order was not appealed. Subsequently, 104 weeks after the accident, the employer 

ceased payment of temporary benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-

6-207(1)(D)(ii), which limits such benefits to a maximum of 104 weeks “after the date of 

injury” for mental injuries “where there is no underlying physical injury.” The employee 

filed a motion to compel the employer’s compliance with the prior order, asserting she was 

entitled to continuing temporary benefits. The employer argued that the employee was 

conclusively presumed to be at maximum medical improvement pursuant to the applicable 

statute. In a decision on the record, the trial court denied the employee’s motion, and the 

employee has appealed. Upon careful consideration of the record and arguments of 

counsel, we affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.

FILED

Nov 02, 2023

12:25 PM(CT)

TENNESSEE

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

APPEALS BOARD
2

Judge Pele I. Godkin delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding Judge 

Timothy W. Conner and Judge Meredith B. Weaver joined.

Michael P. Fisher, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Alexis Basham

Taylor R. Pruitt, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, SPB Hospitality, LLC, d/b/a 

Logan’s Roadhouse

Factual and Procedural Background

Alexis Basham (“Employee”) was working as a manager for SPB Hospitality, LLC, 

d/b/a Logan’s Roadhouse (“Employer”) when she was physically assaulted by customers 

on June 28, 2021. The assailants pulled Employee’s necklace off, punched her in the face, 

scratched her, and pushed her outside of the restaurant. Then, in an attempt to flee the 

scene, the assailants backed into Employee with their vehicle. Upon realizing the parking 

lot had just one exit, the assailants turned their vehicle around and struck Employee again, 

dragging her several feet before Employee eventually fell against the curb, striking her 

head and back. She was transported by ambulance to a hospital emergency room where 

she received treatment for her injuries, including a head wound and abrasions, before being 

discharged.

Thereafter, Employee began experiencing back symptoms and Employer provided 

a panel of orthopedic physicians from which she selected Dr. James Wiesman. Dr. 

Wiesman then referred Employee to a neurosurgeon, and she selected Dr. George Lien 

from a panel of specialists. Employee eventually underwent lumbar surgery and was 

released at maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) on August 15, 2022. Upon Dr. 

Lien’s placing Employee at maximum medical improvement, Employer terminated 

temporary total disability benefits.

During this time, Employee, who had a prior history of anxiety and depression, 

treated on her own with her mental health provider for complaints of increased fear and 

anxiety she believed arose from the work-related assault.

1

 Employee subsequently 

requested a panel of physicians for her alleged mental injury. Employer authorized a 

psychiatric evaluation with Dr. Greg Kyser, who diagnosed Employee with post-traumatic 

stress disorder (“PTSD”) and restricted her from work “until further notice.”

Employee filed a request for an expedited hearing seeking additional temporary 

disability benefits and submitted an affidavit in which she contended that her psychological 

injury arose “from the attack itself and not the physical injury sustained.” At the expedited 

1 Employee asserted that although she was provided panels of orthopedic and neurosurgical physicians, she 

did not originally receive a panel of specialists for her alleged mental injury. Instead, she claimed she was 

advised by a nurse case manager to seek treatment on her own for her alleged mental injury.
3

hearing, Employee asserted she was able to perform daily life activities prior to this 

incident but was now unable to work because of her increased fear and anxiety. She also 

argued that she was also entitled to temporary disability benefits based on the work 

restrictions assigned by her authorized psychiatrist, Dr. Kyser.

Conversely, Employer argued that Employee was not entitled to any additional 

temporary disability benefits because she had reached MMI for her physical injury and 

temporary benefits were properly terminated pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated 

section 50-6-207(1)(E), which states that an employee is conclusively presumed to have 

reached MMI “when the treating physician ends all active medical treatment and the only 

care provided is for a mental injury that arose primarily out of a compensable physical 

injury.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(1)(E) (emphasis added). Thus, the issue before the 

court was how to apply section 50-6-207(1)(E) when the compensable incident caused both 

physical injuries and a mental injury arising from a sudden or unusual stimulus. 

Ultimately, the court concluded that subsection 207(1)(E) does not apply to a mental injury 

occurring contemporaneously with, but not arising primarily out of, a physical injury. The 

trial court reasoned that although Employee sustained physical injuries as a result of the 

work accident, she also sustained a separate mental injury arising from the same event and,

thus, Employee was entitled to additional temporary total disability benefits based on the 

work restrictions of Dr. Kyser. That order was not appealed.

In June 2023, 104 weeks after the date of injury, Employer ceased payments of

temporary disability benefits to Employee despite the court’s earlier order. Thereafter, on

July 11, Employee filed a motion to compel compliance with the May 11, 2023 expedited 

hearing order and for sanctions. In response, Employer asserted it properly terminated 

Employee’s temporary benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-

207(1)(D), which provides:

An employee claiming a mental injury . . . shall be conclusively presumed to 

be at maximum medical improvement upon the earliest occurrence of the 

following:

(i) At the time the treating psychiatrist concludes the employee 

has reached maximum medical improvement; or

(ii) One hundred four (104) weeks after the date of injury in the 

case of mental injuries where there is no underlying physical 

injury.

In her reply brief, Employee argued that section 50-6-207(1)(D)(ii) is inapplicable 

in this case because there was an “underlying physical injury” accompanying her mental 

injury. In Employee’s view, the statute’s use of the term “underlying” in this subsection 

must necessarily mean something different than the phrase “arising primarily out of” as 
4

used in subsection 207(1)(E). Thus, Employee argued she was not precluded from 

receiving additional temporary disability benefits in the first instance because her mental 

injury did not “arise primarily out of” her physical injury, and she is not precluded from 

receiving additional benefits in the second instance because she suffered an “underlying 

physical injury” in additional to her mental injury.

After considering the arguments of both parties, the trial court concluded the natural 

and ordinary meaning of the word “underlying” as used in section 50-6-207(1)(D) is “a 

cause or foundation of something else.” Here, because it had earlier concluded that 

Employee’s mental injury did not “arise primarily out of” the physical injury, it determined 

it would be incongruous to find that Employee’s back injury constituted an “underlying 

physical injury.” Thus, the court concluded Employee is subject to the conclusive 

presumption of MMI as set out in 50-6-207(1)(D)(ii) and denied Employee’s motion to 

compel. Employee has appealed.

Standard of Review

The standard we apply in reviewing the trial court’s decision presumes that the 

court’s factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. 

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2022). However, we need not give deference to a 

trial court’s findings “based upon documentary evidence such as depositions.” Goodman 

v. Schwarz Paper Co., No. W2016-02594-SC-R3-WC, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 8, at *6 (Tenn. 

Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 18, 2018). The interpretation and application of statutes and 

regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with no presumption of 

correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions. See Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone N. 

Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013). We are also mindful of our obligation 

to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly, impartially, and in accordance with 

basic principles of statutory construction” and in a way that does not favor either the 

employee or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2022).

Analysis

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(15) defines a compensable mental 

injury as

a loss of mental faculties or a mental or behavioral disorder, arising primarily 

out of a compensable physical injury or an identifiable work[-]related event 

resulting in a sudden or unusual stimulus, and shall not include a 

psychological or psychiatric response due to the loss of employment or 

employment opportunities[.]
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Thus, there are two categories of compensable mental injuries: (1) those arising primarily 

out of a compensable physical injury; and (2) those arising primarily out of an identifiable 

incident causing a sudden or unusual stimulus.

The Workers’ Compensation Law includes several conclusive presumptions 

impacting an injured worker’s entitlement to temporary disability benefits. Pursuant to 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(1)(D), an employee claiming a mental injury 

on or after July 1, 2009, is conclusively presumed to be at maximum medical improvement 

upon the earliest occurrence of either the treating psychiatrist’s concluding the employee 

has reached maximum medical improvement or 104 weeks after the date of injury “where 

there is no underlying physical injury.” Section 50-6-207(1)(E) states, in relevant part, that

[a]n employee claiming an injury as defined in § 50-6-102, when the date of 

injury is on or after July 1, 2014, shall be conclusively presumed to be at 

maximum medical improvement when the treating physician ends all active 

medical treatment and the only care provided is for the treatment of pain or 

for a mental injury that arose primarily out of a compensable injury.

(Emphasis added.) Hence, if the mental injury occurred as the result of a work-related 

stimulus independent of any physical injury, subsection 207(1)(D)(ii) creates a conclusive 

presumption of MMI, but if the mental injury arose primarily from a compensable physical 

injury, then subsection 207(1)(E) creates a conclusive presumption of MMI.

In the present case, Employee asserts the trial court erred by denying her request for 

continuing temporary disability benefits after concluding that Employee was conclusively 

presumed to be at MMI pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(1)(D)(ii). 

Specifically, during oral argument, Employee asserted that subsection 207(1)(D)(ii) is 

inapplicable because Employee’s physical injuries “accompanied and contributed” to her 

mental injuries and constitute an underlying physical injury.

2 In support of her position, 

Employee relies on an earlier decision of the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims in

Benson v. Jones Bros. Contractors LLC, No. 2021-08-0148, 2022 TN Wrk. Comp. LEXIS

14, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. Wrk. Comp. Claims Feb. 22, 2022). There, the trial court concluded 

that the existence of an underlying physical injury rendered section 50-6-207(1)(D)(ii)

inapplicable. In essence, Employee asserts the trial court in the present case “broadened 

the statute in holding that ‘the physical injury must be the primary cause of the mental 

injury to negate section 50-6-207(1)(D)(ii).’”

In its brief on appeal, Employer contends the trial court was correct in denying 

Employee’s motion, noting that Employee previously took the position at the expedited 

hearing that her physical injuries were not causally related to her mental injury and that she 

2 For purposes of this appeal, it is undisputed that Employee sustained both physical and mental injuries as 

a result of the work-related assault.
6 

would still be suffering from PTSD even if she had sustained no physical injuries in the 

work incident.

3

 Yet, she is now taking the position that there is an “underlying” physical 

injury that makes subsection 207(1)(D) inapplicable. Employer further asserts the word 

“underlying” as used in section 50-6-207(1)(D)(ii) is unambiguous and “refers to 

causation.” Moreover, Employer argues that a reasonable definition derived from the plain 

and ordinary language of the word “underlying” is the “cause or basis of something else.” 

Thus, if the mental injury was not caused by the physical injuries, then subsection 

207(1)(D)(ii) limits Employee’s temporary benefits to a maximum of 104 weeks after the 

date of injury.

Employer further contends that Employee’s proposed interpretation of section 50-

6-207(1)(D)(ii) would result in an unjust and unequal application of the Workers’ 

Compensation Law. For example, in cases where the injured employee’s mental injury 

occurred contemporaneously with, but was not causally related to, the physical injury, that 

employee would be limited to a maximum of 104 weeks of temporary disability benefits. 

However, an employee with a mental injury who is deemed to have an “underlying” 

physical injury (but one which was not the “primary” cause of the mental injury) could 

receive temporary disability benefits for an undefined period of time greater than 104 

weeks. In Employer’s view, such a result would be illogical and contrary to the 

legislature’s intent.

In addition, Employer notes this interpretation would effectively change the 

meaning of section 207(1)(D)(i) because it would add a third category of mental injury 

cases not addressed by the two options listed in subsection 207(1)(D). In other words, in 

all cases where an employee alleges a mental injury, subsection 207(1)(D) provides a 

conclusive presumption of MMI at the earlier of two defined events, but Employee’s 

interpretation would create a third category of mental injury cases not addressed by either 

of those two possibilities. Finally, Employer asserts the trial court was correct in its 

analysis of section 207(1)(D)(ii) within the framework of the statute as written and in

consideration of the legislative intent of the statute as a whole, which was to impose a cap 

on an employee’s receipt of temporary disability benefits for a mental injury.

In addressing the principles of statutory construction, the Tennessee Supreme Court 

has provided the following guidance: 

The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to carry out legislative intent 

without expanding or restricting the intended scope of the statute. In

determining legislative intent, we first must look to the text of the statute and

give the words of the statute “their natural and ordinary meaning in the

context in which they appear and in light of the statute’s general purpose.” 

3 Employee testified that her mental injury arose “from the attack itself and not the physical injury 

sustained.”
7 

When a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we enforce the statute

as written; we need not consider other sources of information. We apply the

plain meaning of a statute’s words in normal and accepted usage without a 

forced interpretation. We do not alter or amend statutes or substitute our

policy judgment for that of the Legislature.

Coleman v. Olson, 551 S.W.3d 686, 694 (Tenn. 2018) (internal citations omitted). In

addition, the Supreme Court has explained: 

In construing legislative enactments, we presume that every word in a statute

has meaning and purpose and should be given full effect if the obvious

intention of the General Assembly is not violated by doing so. . . . It is only

when a statute is ambiguous that we may reference the broader statutory

scheme, the history of the legislation, or other sources. Further, the language

of a statute cannot be considered in a vacuum, but “should be construed, if

practicable, so that its component parts are consistent and reasonable.” Any

interpretation of the statute that “would render one section of the act

repugnant to another” should be avoided. We also must presume that the

General Assembly was aware of any prior enactments at the time the

legislation passed.

In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 613-14 (Tenn. 2009) (internal citations omitted). 

In applying these principles, we have explained previously that “we must construe a statute

so that no part will be inoperative, superfluous, void, or insignificant. We are required to

give effect to every word, phrase, clause, and sentence of the act in order to achieve the

Legislature’s intent and we must construe a statute so that no section will destroy another.” 

Thompson v. Comcast Corp., No. 2017-05-0639, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS

1, at *25 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Jan. 30, 2018) (emphasis added) (internal

citations omitted).

Here, the plain language of the section 50-6-207(D)(1) provides that in all cases 

where an employee alleges a mental injury, the earliest occurrence of two defined events 

triggers a conclusive presumption of MMI. The first possibility is when the treating

psychiatrist places the employee at MMI. Here, there is no evidence in the record that 

Employee has been placed at MMI by Dr. Kyser; accordingly, subsection 207(D)(1)(i) does 

not apply. The second possibility is the expiration of 104 weeks after the date of injury 

when there is no underlying physical injury. The question then becomes: what constitutes 

an “underlying” physical injury?

During oral argument, Employee’s counsel first argued that “underlying,” within 

the context of this section, simply means “accompanying.” Employee’s counsel later 

acknowledged, however, that the term may include some degree of contribution by the 

physical injury to the mental injury, although not to the extent that the mental injury arose 
8

primarily from the physical injury. Conversely, Employer maintains that “underlying” 

refers to causation, not merely a temporal connection. Thus, in Employer’s view, if a 

mental injury is independent of any physical injury, then subsection 207(1)(D) defines 

when MMI occurs. However, if the mental injury arose later due to the effects of the 

physical injury, subsection 207(1)(E) defines when MMI occurs.

In its order, the trial court concluded that “[c]onsideration of the legislative intent 

behind section 207(1)(D)(ii) is unnecessary because the provision is not ambiguous.” The 

court further noted that the natural and ordinary meaning of “underlying” is “a cause or 

foundation of something else” and “[h]ad the legislature wished to exclude mental injuries 

occurring concurrently or incidentally with physical injuries, it could have said so.”

We conclude Employee’s proposed interpretation of these statutory provisions is 

untenable. Employee asks us, in essence, to recognize a category of mental injury cases 

not addressed by the General Assembly and declare there is no conclusive presumption of 

MMI for that one category of mental injuries, even when all other mental injury cases are 

subject to a conclusive presumption of MMI. This we decline to do. In considering 

Employee’s motion, the trial court properly considered the text of the statute to determine

the natural and ordinary meaning of the word “underlying” within the context in which it

appeared and in light of the statute’s general purpose. After doing so, the court concluded

this language is clear and unambiguous. If, as in the present case, an employee suffers a

mental injury arising primarily from a work-related incident and independent of any

physical injury, subsection 207(1)(D) governs when MMI occurs as the earliest of two

defined events. If, on the other hand, the mental injury arose primarily from the effects of

the physical injury, subsection 207(1)(E) defines when MMI occurs. Thus, we discern no

error in the trial court’s interpretation of this statutory language and in its order denying

Employee’s motion to compel the payment of additional temporary disability benefits.

Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court and remand the case. Costs on 

appeal are taxed to Employee.
 

 

 

 TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

 WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Alexis Basham ) Docket No. 2023-05-0474 

) 

v. ) State File No. 50877-2021 

)

SPB Hospitality, LLC, d/b/a Logan’s ) 

Roadhouse, et al. ) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) Heard October 5, 2023 

Compensation Claims ) at Knoxville 

Dale A. Tipps, Judge ) 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced 

case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 2nd day 

of November, 2023. 

Name Certified 

Mail 

First Class 

Mail 

Via 

Fax 

Via 

Email 

Sent to: 

Michael P. Fisher X michael@rockylawfirm.com

gina@rockylawfirm.com

Taylor R. Pruitt X trp@feeneymurray.com

catherynelgrant@feeneymurray.com

Dale A. Tipps, Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of 

Workers’ Compensation Claims

X penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov

 

Olivia Yearwood

Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B 

Nashville, TN 37243 

Telephone: 615-253-1606 

Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov