2019 IL 122626

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 122626) 

AARON P. FILLMORE, Appellee, v. GLADYSE TAYLOR et al., Appellants. 

Opinion filed April 18, 2019.

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Kilbride, Garman, and Theis concurred in 

the judgment and opinion. 

 Justice Burke specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Justice Neville. 

OPINION

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Aaron P. Fillmore, is an inmate in the custody of the Illinois 

Department of Corrections (Department) at the Lawrence Correctional Center in 

Sumner, Illinois. Plaintiff sued three officers of the Department, defendants 

Gladyse C. Taylor, Leif M. McCarthy, and Eldon L. Cooper, for failing to follow 

mandatory legal procedures before imposing discipline upon him for violating 
- 2 - 

prison rules. Plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus, declaratory relief, and a 

common-law writ of certiorari. The circuit court of Sangamon County granted 

defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a 

cause of action, pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 

5/2-615 (West 2016)). The Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed in part and 

reversed in part the circuit court’s judgment, remanding the case for further 

proceedings. 2017 IL App (4th) 160309. This court then allowed the defendants’ 

petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Nov. 1, 2017). In his response 

brief, plaintiff seeks cross-relief.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On December 16, 2014, plaintiff was served with an inmate disciplinary report 

(IDR). The IDR indicated that plaintiff had violated Department regulation 205, 

“Security Threat Group or Unauthorized Organizational Activity,” and regulation 

206, “Intimidation or Threats.” See 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.Appendix A (Nos. 205, 

206), amended at 27 Ill. Reg. 6214 (eff. May 1, 2003). Number 205 defines 

“Security Threat Group or Unauthorized Organizational Activity” as 

 “[e]ngaging, pressuring, or authorizing others to engage in security threat 

group or unauthorized organizational activities, meetings, or criminal acts; 

displaying, wearing, possessing, or using security threat group or unauthorized 

organizational insignia or materials; or giving security threat group or 

unauthorized organizational signs.” Id.

Number 206 defines “Intimidation or Threats” as 

 “[e]xpressing by words, actions, or other behavior an intent to injure any 

person or property that creates the reasonable belief that physical, monetary, or 

economic harm to that person or to another will result.” Id. 

¶ 4 The IDR recited an accumulation of incidents involving plaintiff and his active 

involvement within the Latin Kings security threat group. The report noted that the 

information had been gathered through confidential informants, searches, and 

monitored mail and phone calls. Specifically, the report stated that the information 

was
- 3 - 

“evidence that [plaintiff] has assumed an active leadership role within the Latin 

King Nation, is actively communication [sic] with other High Ranking Latin 

King Leaders, and using that influence over other Latin King members. In 

February 2014 [plaintiff] was identified as Chairman for the Latin King Nation 

Regional Crown Council by a Confidential Informant.” 

¶ 5 The report indicated that plaintiff had several telephone calls with his brother, 

discussing numerous Latin King members at Department correctional centers and 

at correctional centers in other states. The IDR described the content of those phone 

calls in detail. Department officials also obtained three handwritten notes during 

cell searches that contained information regarding the Latin Kings and Latin King 

members. The Department officials compared the handwritten notes with 

handwriting samples in plaintiff’s master file and determined that the notes were 

written by plaintiff. The handwriting samples in plaintiff’s master file and the 

handwritten notes showed similarities in writing style and lettering.

¶ 6 The IDR set forth the contents of the handwritten notes. One of the handwritten 

notes stated that the investigative unit at Lawrence Correctional Center had been 

watching plaintiff and several other Latin King members closely and knew about 

the gang because an individual referred to as Kevin “told Springfield a lot.” The 

note also stated that “[t]hese people think that I’m going to kill [Kevin] or have him 

killed. I want to kick him down the steps but that isn’t good enough.” Another 

handwritten note included changes to the Latin Kings’ constitution and identified 

numerous inmates and their leadership positions within the Latin Kings. 

¶ 7 The disciplinary report concluded that plaintiff had violated regulation 206 

when he stated in his handwritten note that he wanted to “kick Kevin down the 

steps.” The report also concluded that plaintiff had violated regulation 205 when he 

engaged in the “overt act of accepting an active leadership position within the Latin 

Kings Security Threat Group” and that plaintiff’s active leadership position 

corroborated that plaintiff “continues to engage in unauthorized Security Threat 

Group Activity.” The report stated that confidential informants’ names were 

withheld due to safety and security concerns but that the confidential informants 

were deemed reliable “due to corroborating statements provided.” 

¶ 8 Plaintiff was served with the disciplinary report on December 16, 2014. 

Plaintiff sent a handwritten letter to the adjustment committee at Lawrence 
- 4 - 

Correctional Center that same day requesting review of the telephone logs for the 

dates of the conversations referenced in the report. Plaintiff claimed that the 

telephone logs would show that he did not use the telephone on those dates. 

Plaintiff also requested that he be shown the notes that were found during the cell 

searches. In addition, plaintiff requested that eight inmates, one of whom was 

incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, be called as witnesses. The eight 

inmates had been referenced in plaintiff’s telephone conversations with his brother, 

according to the summary of those conversations set forth in the IDR. Plaintiff 

stated that each inmate would testify that plaintiff never ordered or directed any 

security threat group activity within the Department. 

¶ 9 Plaintiff appeared before the adjustment committee on December 19, 2014.

Defendant McCarthy was the chairperson, and defendant Cooper was a committee 

member. The disciplinary report was read to plaintiff. Plaintiff pled not guilty and 

submitted a written statement. 

¶ 10 Plaintiff’s written statement asserted that the allegations in the disciplinary 

report failed to “substantiate some evidence” for the committee to be reasonably 

satisfied of defendant’s guilt. Plaintiff claimed that he did not use the telephone on 

some of the dates reported. Further, if there were any recordings of his telephone 

calls, those recordings would not substantiate the charges when those recordings 

were played in their entirety. Plaintiff also denied authoring the notes found during 

the cell searches and asserted that search records would show that the notes did not 

come from his “cell, property, or person.” Further, plaintiff pointed out that the 

officer who reviewed the handwritten notes was not a handwriting expert. 

Additionally, the disciplinary report failed to state what evidence was corroborated 

by the confidential informants. 

¶ 11 Plaintiff also asserted that the December 16, 2014, report violated section 

504.30(f) of Title 20 of the Illinois Administrative Code (20 Ill. Adm. Code 

504.30(f), amended at 27 Ill. Reg. 6214 (eff. May 1, 2003)) because the report was 

written more than eight days after the last date of the alleged violation. In addition, 

the report violated section 504.30(e) (20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.30(e), amended at 27 

Ill. Reg. 6214 (eff. May 1, 2003)) because plaintiff was not issued an investigative 

disciplinary report during the Department’s investigation. Plaintiff’s written 

statement concluded that he requested “to see the alleged confiscated ‘notes’ 
- 5 - 

regarding the 12-16-14 disciplinary report, and request[ed] that [his] December 16, 

2014[,] witness and document request be reviewed and considered as exculpatory 

evidence by the Committee.”

¶ 12 The adjustment committee’s final summary report noted that the IDR had been 

read and that plaintiff had pled not guilty and had submitted a written statement. 

With regard to witnesses, the report stated that no witness was requested. In the 

basis for decision section, the report stated that, based upon IDR reporting, plaintiff 

was actively participating in the Latin Kings security threat group. The report stated 

that information indicated that plaintiff had “assumed an active leadership role 

within the Latin King Nation and is actively communicating with other High 

Ranking Latin King Leaders.” The report stated that information was provided by 

confidential informants, who were deemed reliable due to corroborating 

information but who should remain anonymous for the safety and security of the 

institution. The report then recited the information set forth in the IDR. As 

disciplinary action, the committee recommended that plaintiff be given one year of 

C-grade status, one year in segregation, one year of contact visit restrictions, the 

loss of one year of good conduct credits, and one year of a $15 per month 

restriction.

¶ 13 The prison’s chief administrative officer concurred with the recommendation 

on December 29, 2014, and plaintiff was served with the final decision on January 

3, 2015. 

¶ 14 Plaintiff filed a grievance concerning the adjustment committee hearing on 

January 5, 2015. Plaintiff claimed that he received an IDR on December 16, 2014. 

Plaintiff then personally gave a witness and document review request to a prison 

counselor to give to the adjustment committee and also sent of a copy of the request 

to the adjustment committee via institutional mail. Plaintiff’s grievance claimed 

that, during the hearing, the adjustment committee members stated that they had 

plaintiff’s witness request but that corrections officer Harper, who wrote the 

disciplinary report, said that the witnesses would not be called. Plaintiff also 

claimed that defendant Cooper told plaintiff that Cooper and McCarthy were told to 

find him guilty and to give plaintiff “a year across the board.” Plaintiff stated that 

he made oral objections that the adjustment committee was not impartial and that 

he had requested to see the notes, the search records, and the telephone logs from 
- 6 - 

the dates reported but that the adjustment committee denied his request. Plaintiff set 

forth the specific Department regulations he claimed had been violated during his 

hearing. Plaintiff contended that the adjustment committee hearing did not comport 

with due process and that the committee’s final decision violated Department 

regulations. Plaintiff requested that the December 16, 2014, IDR be expunged, that 

the $15 per month restriction for one year be lifted, and that a new hearing be 

conducted in accordance with due process. 

¶ 15 The prison grievance officer reviewed the facts and concluded that disciplinary 

regulation procedures had been followed. The grievance officer found no ground to 

change the decision or the disciplinary action. The grievance officer recommended 

that the grievance be denied based upon a review of all available information. The 

chief administrative officer concurred with the grievance officer’s 

recommendation. Plaintiff then appealed to the Department’s director, and the 

matter was referred to its administrative review board (Board).

¶ 16 The Board recommended that the grievance be denied, finding no violation of 

plaintiff’s due process rights. The Board held that it was reasonably satisfied that 

plaintiff committed the offense cited in the report. Defendant Taylor, the acting 

director of the Department, concurred with the recommendation on August 13, 

2015. 

¶ 17 Having exhausted his administrative remedies, plaintiff filed his complaint in 

the circuit court. Count I of the complaint sought mandamus relief, alleging that 

defendants had a clear and ministerial duty to follow established federal, state, and 

administrative laws, rules, procedures, and regulations. Plaintiff’s specific 

allegations were that

(1) Defendants violated section 504.60(a), which provides that “[t]he Chief 

Administrative Officer shall appoint one or more Hearing Investigators who 

shall review all major disciplinary reports.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.60(a), 

amended at 27 Ill. Reg. 6214 (eff. May 1, 2003); 

(2) Defendants violated section 504.30(f), which provides that “[s]ervice of 

a disciplinary report upon the offender shall commence the disciplinary 

proceeding. In no event shall a disciplinary report *** be served upon an adult 

offender more than [eight] days *** after the commission of an offense or the 
- 7 - 

discovery thereof unless the offender is unavailable or unable to participate in 

the proceeding.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.30(f), amended at 27 Ill. Reg. 6214 (eff. 

May 1, 2003); 

(3) Defendants violated section 504.80(h)(4) by failing to provide a written 

reason for the denial of plaintiff’s request for the in-person testimony of 

witnesses at his disciplinary hearing. 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.80(h)(4), amended 

at 27 Ill. Reg. 6214 (eff. May 1, 2003); 

(4) Defendants violated section 504.30(e) because the Department never 

placed plaintiff under investigation. 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.30(e), amended at 

27 Ill. Reg. 6214 (eff. May 1, 2003); 

(5) Defendants violated section 504.80(g), which states that the 

“Committee shall consider all material presented that is relevant to the issue of 

whether or not the offender committed the offense,” by failing to independently 

review the notes and the telephone logs and recordings. 20 Ill. Adm. Code 

504.80(g), amended at 27 Ill. Reg. 6214 (eff. May 1, 2003); 

(6) Defendants violated section 504.80(f)(1), which states that the 

“offender may *** produce any relevant documents in his or her defense,” 

when defendants denied plaintiff’s requests, both before and during the 

disciplinary hearing, to see the notes he had allegedly written. 20 Ill. Adm. 

Code 504.80(f)(1), amended at 27 Ill. Reg. 6214 (eff. May 1, 2003); 

(7) Defendants lacked impartiality and improperly refused to recuse 

themselves from the adjustment committee after they were directed by higher 

up prison authorities to find plaintiff guilty and impose specified penalties; 

(8) Defendants violated section 504.80(d), which provides that when an 

offender objects to a member of the committee based on a lack of impartiality, 

the committee “shall document the basis of the objection and the decision in the 

Adjustment Committee summary.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.80(d), amended at 

27 Ill. Reg. 6214 (eff. May 1, 2003). Plaintiff alleged he made a timely 

objection to the committee members’ lack of impartiality, but the committee 

failed to document that objection; and 
- 8 - 

(9) Defendants failed to include a summary of plaintiff’s written statement 

in its final summary report, in violation of section 504.80(l)(1). 20 Ill. Adm. 

Code 504.80(l)(1), amended at 27 Ill. Reg. 6214 (eff. May 1, 2003). 

¶ 18 Plaintiff claimed that defendants McCarthy and Cooper violated Department 

regulations by “failing to disclose known exculpatory evidence, failing to review 

alleged ‘notes,’ failing to call [his] witnesses, failing to consider all relevant 

material before determining guilt, failing to state reasons for disregarding 

exculpatory evidence, [and] failing to review telephone logs and recordings.” With 

regard to defendant Taylor, plaintiff alleged that Taylor failed to investigate 

plaintiff’s grievance issues as mandated by sections 3-2-2(h) and 3-8-8 of the 

Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-2-2(h), 3-8-8 (West 2016)), as well as 

Department regulation 504.85(b)(f) (20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.85(b)(f), amended at 

27 Ill. Reg. 6214 (eff. May 1, 2003)).

¶ 19 Count II of plaintiff’s complaint raised a claim for a common-law writ of 

certiorari, contending that defendants McCarthy and Cooper violated Department 

regulations before, during, and after the IDR hearing. Plaintiff again complained of 

defendants’ failure, both before and during the disciplinary hearing, to produce the 

handwritten notes allegedly written by plaintiff, in violation of section 504.80(f)(1)

of the Department regulations. Plaintiff also complained of the refusal of 

committee members to recuse themselves for lack of impartiality, and again alleged 

that the Department violated section 504.30(f) of its regulations, on the basis that 

the IDR was written more than eight days after the final evidentiary incident listed 

in the IDR. Plaintiff further alleged that defendants McCarthy and Cooper violated 

plaintiff’s due process rights by relying on Offender Tracking System (OTS) 

evidence to determine guilt and to punish him when no such OTS evidence was 

alleged against him.

¶ 20 Count III of plaintiff’s complaint sought a declaratory judgment that defendants 

McCarthy and Cooper violated plaintiff’s due process rights in revoking plaintiff’s 

good conduct credits. 

¶ 21 As noted, the circuit court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to 

section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Defendants argued that plaintiff 

could not rely on violations of the Illinois Administrative Code to establish his clear 

right to relief, citing Ashley v. Snyder, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1252 (2000). Ashley held 
- 9 - 

that prison regulations were never intended to confer rights on inmates or to serve 

as a basis for constitutional claims. Id. at 1258. In support of its holding, Ashley

cited Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). The circuit court agreed with 

defendants and held that plaintiff had no right to the relief requested and that 

plaintiff had received all process that was due.

¶ 22 On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in part and 

reversed in part. The appellate court first addressed whether plaintiff stated a cause 

of action for mandamus, declaratory judgment, or common-law writ of certiorari. 

The appellate court found that plaintiff had stated a cause of action for mandamus

on two of his claims: that the adjustment committee had a clear, nondiscretionary 

duty to document plaintiff’s objection to the committee members’ lack of 

impartiality, but failed to do so in violation of section 504.80(d) of the Department 

regulations, and that the adjustment committee failed to include a summary of 

plaintiff’s written statement in its final summary report, in violation of section 

504.80(l)(1) of the Department regulations. 

¶ 23 With regard to declaratory judgment, the appellate court found that plaintiff 

failed to state a cause of action. The appellate court noted that it had held that an 

action for common-law writ of certiorari, rather than an action for declaratory 

judgment, was the correct means to seek review of the penalties imposed in a prison 

disciplinary proceeding. 

¶ 24 The appellate court then found that plaintiff had stated a claim for common-law

writ of certiorari with regard to two claims. First, plaintiff had alleged a violation 

of section 504.80(f)(1) of the Department regulations, which provides that an 

offender may produce any relevant documents in his or her defense. Plaintiff 

contended that he had twice requested to be shown the notes he had allegedly 

written, and which were cited as evidence against him, but the committee failed to 

produce those notes, without explanation. The appellate court held that the alleged 

violation of section 504.80(f)(1) of the Department regulations was significant and 

justified issuance of the common-law writ of certiorari. 

¶ 25 Second, plaintiff alleged that the committee members should have recused 

themselves because they had been directed by higher-up prison authorities to find 

plaintiff guilty and to impose particular penalties. The appellate court concluded 

that, given the factual allegations in the complaint, the impartiality of the 
- 10 - 

administrative tribunal was sufficiently in question that good cause existed for the 

issuance of a writ of certiorari. 

¶ 26 The appellate court then addressed the circuit court’s reliance on Ashley in 

dismissing plaintiff’s complaint. The appellate court agreed that the Ashley court 

had properly disposed of the constitutional and statutory claims before it in that 

case. However, the Ashley court added in an “epilogue” that 

“[p]rison regulations, such as those contained in the inmate orientation manual 

relied on here, were never intended to confer rights on inmates or serve as a 

basis for constitutional claims. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482 ***. Instead, Illinois 

[Department] regulations, as well as the Unified Code, were designed to 

provide guidance to prison officials in the administration of prisons. In 

addition, Illinois law creates no more rights for inmates than those which are 

constitutionally required.” (Emphases in original.) Ashley, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 

1258. 

¶ 27 The Ashley court then concluded inmates have “a constitutional right to 

adequate shelter, food, drinking water, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and 

personal safety,” as well as “a reasonable right of access to courts and a right to a 

reasonable opportunity to exercise religious freedom under the first amendment.” 

Id. at 1258-59. Beyond those rights, however, inmates possess no other rights, only 

privileges. Id. at 1259. 

¶ 28 The appellate court in the instant case declined to follow the epilogue in Ashley

to the extent Ashley suggested that inmates could not sue to compel correctional 

officers to perform nondiscretionary duties set forth in the Department’s 

regulations. 2017 IL App (4th) 160309, ¶ 98. The appellate court agreed with the 

Ashley court that prison regulations such as those represented by the inmate 

orientation manual in Ashley conferred no rights on inmates, as bulletins, 

handbooks, and similar materials were not the Illinois Administrative Code. Id.

However, while a procedural manual was designed to provide guidance, the Illinois 

Administrative Code was different. Id. The Illinois Administrative Code has the 

force and effect of law. Id. The appellate court stated that it had always been the law 

that the Department had to follow its own promulgated regulations in prison 

disciplinary proceedings. Id. 
- 11 - 

¶ 29 Plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing on July 19, 2017, contending that he had 

stated a claim for mandamus when he alleged that the Department violated section 

504.60(a) of its regulations, because the Department did not require a hearing 

investigator’s review of the IDR. The circuit court denied plaintiff’s petition on 

July 26, 2017. On August 2, 2017, within 21 days of the appellate court’s judgment, 

defendants electronically submitted their petition for rehearing. On August 8, 2017, 

defendants’ petition was rejected and not filed. The comment explaining the reason 

for the rejection was, “rejected pursuant to S. Ct. R. 367(e). Limitation on Petitions 

in the Appellate Court. When the Appellate Court has acted upon a petition for 

rehearing and entered judgment on rehearing no further petitions for rehearing shall 

be filed in that court.” 

¶ 30 As noted, this court subsequently allowed defendants’ petition for leave to 

appeal. In his response brief, plaintiff seeks cross-relief challenging the appellate 

court’s finding that he was not entitled to mandamus or a common-law writ of 

certiorari on several of his allegations.

¶ 31 ANALYSIS

¶ 32 As a preliminary matter, we note that defendants have appealed the appellate 

court’s order rejecting their petition for rehearing, contending that the petition was 

timely filed. Defendants argue that the appellate court misconstrued Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 367, which provides that “[w]hen the Appellate Court has 

acted upon a petition for rehearing and entered judgment on rehearing, no further 

petitions for rehearing shall be filed in that court.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 

367(e) (eff. Aug. 15, 2016). Defendants maintain that the appellate court 

erroneously rejected their timely petition for rehearing on the basis that it had 

already denied plaintiff’s petition for rehearing. According to defendants, the 

appellate court mistakenly believed that, in denying plaintiff’s petition, it had 

entered judgment on rehearing. Defendants disagree, contending that in denying 

plaintiff’s petition for rehearing, the appellate court did not thereby enter judgment 

on that petition. Accordingly, defendants were not precluded from filing their own 

petition for rehearing within 21 days of the court’s judgment. 

¶ 33 Although defendants raise this issue on appeal, they do not seek the relief that 

would be warranted should this court rule in their favor: a remand to the appellate 
- 12 - 

court with directions to file and rule on defendants’ petition for rehearing. 

Defendants maintain that an order remanding the case to the appellate court would 

be a waste of judicial resources, as defendants would again seek review of this case 

on the merits from this court should the appellate court deny the petition. 

Defendants suggest that because the case has been fully briefed, this court should 

instead proceed on the merits. 

¶ 34 Because defendants are not seeking the relief to which they would be entitled 

should this court rule in their favor on this issue, we decline to address the issue. As 

plaintiff points out, this court does not render advisory opinions or decide issues 

that would not result in appropriate relief. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois 

Commerce Comm’n, 2016 IL 118129, ¶ 10. We therefore limit our analysis to 

defendants’ second issue on appeal: whether the appellate court properly found that 

plaintiff had stated claims for mandamus and common-law writ of certiorari. 

¶ 35 The appeal in this case arises from the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint 

pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A section 2-615 motion to 

dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. The question on review is 

whether the allegations of the complaint, taken as true and viewed in a light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief 

can be granted. Cowper v. Nyberg, 2015 IL 117811, ¶ 12. A cause of action should 

not be dismissed pursuant to section 2-615 unless it is clearly apparent that no set of 

facts can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to recover. Id. The standard of 

review is de novo. Id.

¶ 36 As discussed, in addressing this case, the appellate court first considered 

whether plaintiff’s alleged violations of the Department’s regulations stated claims 

for mandamus, for declaratory judgment, and for common-law writ of certiorari. 

With regard to the mandamus count, the appellate court looked to each challenged 

regulation to determine whether the regulation required the exercise of judgment or 

discretion or if it was purely ministerial in nature. Likewise, with regard to the 

count seeking common-law writ of certiorari, the appellate court looked to 

regulations set forth in plaintiff’s complaint to determine whether defendants had 

failed to comply with those regulations, arguably causing substantial injury or 

injustice to plaintiff. As noted, the appellate court held that an action for 

common-law writ of certiorari, rather than an action for declaratory judgment, was 
- 13 - 

the correct means to seek review of the penalties imposed in a prison disciplinary 

hearing. Plaintiff does not seek review of the appellate court’s finding concerning 

his declaratory judgment action. 

¶ 37 After finding the plaintiff had stated claims for mandamus and for writ of 

certiorari, the appellate court then addressed the circuit court’s order granting 

defendants’ motion to dismiss based upon Ashley, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1252. As noted, 

the appellate court disagreed with Ashley to the extent that Ashley suggested that 

inmates could not sue to compel correctional officers to perform nondiscretionary 

duties set forth in the Department’s regulations. 

¶ 38 In contrast to the appellate court, we find that our analysis must begin with a 

determination of whether the Department regulations at issue create judicially 

enforceable rights for inmates. It is only if those regulations create judicially 

enforceable rights for inmates that we consider whether plaintiff was entitled to 

mandamus or writ of certiorari based upon defendants’ alleged failure to comply 

with those regulations. 

¶ 39 In Sandin, 515 U.S. 472, the Court reexamined the circumstances under which 

state prison regulations afforded inmates a liberty interest protected by the due 

process clause. Sandin noted that its decision in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 

(1974), had addressed state-created liberty interests and had contributed to “the 

landscape of prisoners’ due process” through “its intricate balancing of prison 

management concerns with prisoners’ liberty in determining the amount of process 

due.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 478. The inmates in Wolff challenged the decision of 

prison officials to revoke good time credits, earned pursuant to state statute, 

without adequate procedures. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 553. Wolff held that the due 

process clause itself did not create a liberty interest in credit for good behavior but 

that the statutory provision created a liberty interest in a shortened sentence that

resulted from the good time credits. Id. at 557. 

¶ 40 Subsequent to Wolff, the Court addressed a claim by inmates seeking injunctive 

relief, declaratory relief, and damages, by reason of transfer from a medium 

security prison to a maximum security facility. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 

(1976). The Meachum Court held that the due process clause does not protect every 

change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on a 

prisoner and that the due process clause itself did not create a liberty interest in 
- 14 - 

prisoners to be free from intrastate prison transfers. Id. at 224-25. Meachum

distinguished Wolff, noting that the protected liberty interest in good time credit in 

Wolff had been created by state law, while there was no comparable state law in the 

case before it that stripped officials of the discretion to transfer prisoners to 

alternative facilities. Id. at 228. 

¶ 41 Sandin observed that, because dictum in Meachum distinguished Wolff by 

focusing on whether state action was mandatory or discretionary, the Court in later 

cases began laying greater emphasis on a “somewhat mechanical dichotomy” that 

focused on whether state action was mandatory or discretionary, in defining state 

created liberty interests. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 479. This shift in analysis began in 

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 

(1979), and was made explicit in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983). Hewitt

found that inmates confined to administrative segregation had no right to remain in 

the general population by virtue of the due process clause. Id. at 468. However, the 

Hewitt Court examined whether the State had created a liberty interest by virtue of 

its prison regulations, asking whether the State had gone beyond issuing mere 

procedural guidelines and had used “language of an unmistakably mandatory 

character” such that the incursion on liberty would not occur “absent specified 

substantive predicates.” Id. at 471-72. 

¶ 42 As a result of the Greenholtz and Hewitt decisions, inmates no longer had to 

rely on a showing that they had suffered a “ ‘ “grievous loss” ’ of liberty retained 

even after sentenced to terms of imprisonment.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 480 (quoting 

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). The Court thereafter “wrestled 

with the language of intricate, often rather routine prison guidelines to determine 

whether mandatory language and substantive predicates created an enforceable 

expectation that the State would produce a particular outcome with respect to the 

prisoner’s conditions of confinement.” Id. at 480-81. Sandin explained that, in 

“shifting the focus of the liberty interest inquiry to one based on the language of a 

particular regulation, and not the nature of the deprivation, the Court encouraged 

prisoners to comb regulations in search of mandatory language on which to base 

entitlements to various state-conferred privileges.” Id. at 481. Moreover, in 

response, courts drew negative inferences from mandatory language in the text of 

prison regulations. Id. 
- 15 - 

¶ 43 Sandin recognized that such a conclusion might make sense in the ordinary 

course of construing a statute defining rights and remedies available to the general 

public but made a good deal less sense “in the case of a prison regulation primarily 

designed to guide correctional officials in the administration of a prison.” Id. at 

481-82. The Court recognized two undesirable effects of such an analysis. First, it 

created “disincentives for States to codify prison management procedures in the 

interest of uniform treatment.” Id. at 482. Second, it led to the involvement of the 

federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons, running counter to the 

view that “federal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to 

state officials trying to manage a volatile environment.” Id. 

¶ 44 Based upon those concerns and considerations, the Sandin court stated that it 

was appropriate to return to the due process principles established and applied in 

Wolff as well as Meachum. The Court therefore held that 

“States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are 

protected by the Due Process Clause. [Citation.] But these interests will be 

generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the 

sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due 

Process Clause of its own force [citations], nonetheless imposes atypical and 

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison 

life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. 

¶ 45 Following Sandin, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether 

assignment to the Ohio State Penitentiary, a supermaximum security prison, 

imposed an atypical and significant hardship on an inmate in relation to the 

ordinary incidents of prison life. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005). 

Wilkinson recognized that the Constitution itself did not give rise to a liberty 

interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement, but a 

liberty interest in avoiding particular conditions of confinement might arise from 

state policies or regulations, subject to the important limitations set forth in Sandin. 

Id. at 221-22. Wilkinson reiterated that

“[a]fter Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of 

a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of 

confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but 
- 16 - 

the nature of those conditions themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents 

of prison life.’ ” Id. at 223 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). 

¶ 46 With the preceding in mind, we look to the disciplinary actions the committee 

might recommend if it finds the offender did commit the offense or a lesser offense 

for which the elements were included in the original charge. The committee might:

“A) Reprimand the offender.

B) Suspend or restrict one or more privileges of the offender for a specific 

period of time. 

C) Reduce the offender’s grade or level.

D) Change the offender’s program.

E) Change the offender’s housing assignment or transfer the individual to 

another correctional facility.

 F) Revoke the offender’s statutory good time or good conduct credits. 

G) Increase the offender’s security classification.

H) Place the offender in segregation or confinement. *** 

I) Require the offender to make restitution.

 J) Revoke the offender from a transition center. *** 

K) Require forfeiture of items of contraband used in the offense or 

possessed in violation of this Part. 

L) Delay referral of a juvenile offender to the Prisoner Review Board for 

recommended parole.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.80(k)(4), amended at 27 Ill. Reg. 

6214 (eff. May 1, 2003). 

¶ 47 It is clear from the preceding that, with limited exceptions, none of the 

disciplinary actions set forth in the Department’s regulations impose atypical and 

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. 

It is the not the violation of the regulation itself that gives rise to the cause of action 
- 17 - 

but, rather, the interest affected by the discipline imposed. Consequently, we 

cannot say that the Department’s regulations create a right of action that allows 

inmates to file suit in state court to compel correctional officers to comply with the 

Department’s regulations. 

¶ 48 As Sandin recognized, in departing from an analysis that looked to the language 

of a particular regulation in order to determine a prisoner’s liberty interest, such an 

analysis was “a good deal less sensible in the case of a prison regulation primarily 

designed to guide correctional officials in the administration of a prison.” Sandin, 

515 U.S. at 481-82. Sandin explained that “such regulations [are] not designed to 

confer rights on inmates.” Id. at 482. Rather, in the context of prison disciplinary 

proceedings, a prisoner is entitled to due process protections, such as the procedural 

protections set forth in Wolff, 418 U.S. 539, only when the penalty faced by the 

prisoner implicates a liberty interest because it affects the nature or duration of his 

confinement. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87. 

¶ 49 We see no reason to depart from the Sandin analysis in our review of 

Department regulations. We need not look to the language of each regulation to 

determine whether that particular regulation creates a right of action. The concerns 

animating the Court in Sandin in rejecting such an analysis apply equally in this 

court. To depart from the Sandin analysis in this court would likewise create 

disincentives for the State to codify prison management procedures and would lead 

to the involvement of state courts in day-to-day management of prisons. For that 

reason, we find that the Ashley court was correct in stating that the Department 

regulations create no more rights for inmates than those that are constitutionally 

required. 

¶ 50 The appellate court in this case, in departing from Ashley, stated that 

“[i]t had always been the law that, in prison disciplinary proceedings, the 

Department had to follow its own promulgated regulations (Clayton-El v. Lane, 

203 Ill. App. 3d 895, 899 (1990); Thompson [v. Lane], 194 Ill. App. 3d [855], 

860 [(1990)]; People ex rel. Yoder v. Hardy, 116 Ill. App. 3d 489, 495 (1983)) 

and that inmates could sue to compel correctional officers to perform 

nondiscretionary duties set forth in the Department’s regulations (West [v. 

Gramley], 262 Ill. App. 3d [552], 557 [(1994)]; Shea [v. Edwards], 221 Ill. 
- 18 - 

App. 3d [219], 221 [(1991)]; Taylor [v. Franzen], 93 Ill. App. 3d [758], 765 

[(1981)].” 2017 IL App (4th) 160309, ¶ 98. 

¶ 51 The cases cited by the appellate court in support of its analysis departing from 

Ashley, however, all predate the Sandin decision. Moreover, five of the six cases 

cited by the appellate court concerned disciplinary proceedings where the inmate 

lost statutory good time or good conduct credits, which, as discussed infra, does 

implicate a constitutional liberty interest. See Shea, 221 Ill. App. 3d 219; 

Clayton-El, 203 Ill. App. 3d 895; Thompson, 194 Ill. App. 3d 855; Hardy, 116 Ill. 

App. 3d 489; Taylor, 93 Ill. App. 3d 758. Although the courts in those cases 

generally stated that the Department is bound to follow its own rules, those 

decisions did not specifically address whether any failure to follow Department 

regulations created an enforceable right.

¶ 52 The sixth case, West, held that the circuit court had erred in determining the 

merits of the plaintiff inmate’s complaint in deciding the defendants’ motion to 

dismiss. 262 Ill. App. 3d at 557-58. In so holding, the West court noted that 

prisoners may file a complaint for mandamus to compel Department officials to 

perform under the rules adopted by the Department but did not discuss whether the 

regulations at issue created an enforceable right. Id. at 557. Rather, the West court 

applied a Hewitt-type analysis, which focused on whether state action was 

mandatory or discretionary. 

¶ 53 It is worth noting that the appellate court in this case also applied a Hewitt-type 

analysis, looking to the language in each challenged regulation to determine 

whether the state action at issue was mandatory or discretionary. Sandin expressly 

disavowed that analysis and instead returned to an analysis that looked not to the 

language of the regulation concerning restrictive conditions of confinement but 

rather to the nature of those conditions in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison 

life. Having found that the same analysis applies in this court, we find that the 

appellate court erred in declining to follow the Ashley court on this issue. 

¶ 54 Our holding does not mean that prison officials have carte blanche to ignore 

Department regulations concerning disciplinary proceedings. The Department is 

required to follow its promulgated regulations, and an inmate may appeal the 

disciplinary proceedings through the grievance procedures set forth in subpart F of 

part 504. See 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.Subpart F, amended at 27 Ill. Reg. 6214 (eff. 
- 19 - 

May 1, 2003). However, as stated, it is not the violation of the Department 

regulations itself that gives rise to a cause of action but, rather, the interest affected 

by the discipline imposed for that violation. 

¶ 55 Consequently, to the extent that plaintiff bases his claims on violations of 

Department regulations governing his disciplinary proceedings, we find that 

plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cause of action. The appellate court’s order, 

finding that plaintiff stated a claim for mandamus based upon violations of sections 

504.80(d) and 504.80(l)(1) of the Department regulations and for common-law writ 

of certiorari based upon violations of section 504.80(f)(1), as well as defendants’ 

failure to recuse themselves from the proceedings, is therefore reversed.

¶ 56 We note, however, that plaintiff’s complaint does allege that defendants 

violated his due process rights when they revoked his good conduct credits. Since 

Sandin, “the right to litigate disciplinary confinements has become vanishingly 

small.” Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, “[a]s a 

general rule, only sanctions which result in loss of good conduct time credits for 

inmates who are eligible for release on mandatory supervision or which otherwise 

directly and adversely affect release on mandatory supervision will impose upon a 

liberty interest.” Spicer v. Collins, 9 F. Supp. 2d 673, 685 (E.D. Tex. 1998).1

¶ 57 When a prison disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of a prisoner’s good 

conduct credits, Wolff held that the inmate must receive (1) advance written notice 

of the disciplinary charges, (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional 

safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence 

in his defense, and (3) a written statement by the fact finder of the evidence relied 

on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. 418 U.S. at 563-67. In addition, the 

findings of the prison disciplinary board must be supported by some evidence in the 

record. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 

445, 454 (1985). Ascertaining whether that standard has been met does not require 

examination of the entire record, an independent assessment of the credibility of 

witnesses, or a weighing of the evidence. Id. at 455. Rather, the relevant question is 

 1

Plaintiff also contends that inmates have a right to require prison officials to comply with the 

Department’s regulations when officials are imposing serious punishment such as solitary 

confinement for a year. Plaintiff asserts in a footnote in his brief that his year of confinement in 

segregation implicated a federally protected liberty interest. Plaintiff, however, did not raise this 

allegation in his complaint, so it is not properly before us.
- 20 - 

whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the disciplinary 

board’s conclusion. Id. at 455-56. 

¶ 58 Upon review, we find that the plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing in this case failed 

to meet all of the due process requirements under Wolff. With regard to the first due 

process requirement, plaintiff was served with the IDR on December 15, 2014, and 

the adjustment committee hearing took place on December 19, 2014. The IDR 

consisted of five pages setting forth the charges and evidence against plaintiff. 

Plaintiff therefore did receive advanced written notice of the charges against him.

¶ 59 Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing also complied with the third due process 

requirement set forth in Wolff. The adjustment committee provided plaintiff with its 

written final summary report setting forth the basis for its decision, including the 

evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action imposed. 

¶ 60 Plaintiff, however, sufficiently pled that defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s 

witnesses and documentary evidence without an explanation violated plaintiff’s 

due process rights. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that he timely and properly 

submitted a witness request slip to the adjustment committee via institutional mail, 

requesting witnesses and exculpatory evidence. In addition, plaintiff alleged that he 

gave a duplicate witness request slip to correctional counselor Ray to give to the 

adjustment committee. At the disciplinary hearing, plaintiff again asked to see the 

notes described in the IDR. Plaintiff also asked the committee to review the notes, 

review the inmate telephone logs in question and listen to the telephone recordings, 

and call his witnesses. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that defendant Cooper 

responded that the prison official who wrote the IDR directed the committee not to 

call any of plaintiff’s witnesses.

¶ 61 The adjustment committee’s final summary report makes no reference to 

plaintiff’s request to review documents and states that no witness was requested. 

Wolff recognized that “[p]rison officials must have the necessary discretion to keep 

the hearing within reasonable limits and refuse to call witnesses that may create a 

risk of reprisal or undermine authority, as well as to limit access to other inmates to 

collect statements or to compile other documentary evidence.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 

566. The Court also recognized that “it would be useful for the Committee to state 

its reason for refusing to call a witness, whether it be for irrelevance, lack of 
- 21 - 

necessity, or the hazards presented in individual cases.” Id. However, the Court 

declined to prescribe that courts do so, recognizing that 

“[t]he operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily 

difficult undertaking. Many prison officials, on the spot and with the 

responsibility for the safety of inmates and staff, are reluctant to extend the 

unqualified right to call witnesses; and in our view, they must have the 

necessary discretion without being subject to unduly crippling constitutional 

impediments. There is this much play in the joints of the Due Process Clause, 

and we stop short of imposing a more demanding rule with respect to witnesses 

and documents.” Id. at 566-67. 

¶ 62 Eleven years after the Wolff decision, the Court again reiterated that there was 

no need for the Court to prescribe as constitutional doctrine that the disciplinary 

board must state in writing, at the time of the hearing, its reasons for refusing to call 

a witness, nor was the due process clause satisfied only when the administrative 

record contained support or reasons for the board’s refusal. Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 

491, 496 (1985). Nonetheless, the Court concluded that 

“prison officials may be required to explain, in a limited manner, the reason 

why witnesses were not allowed to testify, but that they may do so either by 

making the explanation a part of the ‘administrative record’ in the disciplinary 

proceeding, or by presenting testimony in court if the deprivation of a ‘liberty’ 

interest is challenged because of that claimed defect in the hearing. In other 

words, the prison officials may choose to explain their decision at the hearing, 

or they may choose to explain it ‘later.’ ” Id. at 497. 

¶ 63 Ponte recognized that the requirement that prison officials give 

contemporaneous reasons for denying witnesses and evidence might impose an 

additional administrative burden that would detract from the officials’ ability to 

perform the principal mission of the institution and that the officials might prefer to 

deal with later court challenges on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 497-98. Ponte

recognized that the constitution permits either approach. Nonetheless, the Court 

explained:

“[T]o hold that the Due Process Clause confers a circumscribed right on the 

inmate to call witnesses at a disciplinary hearing, and then conclude that no 
- 22 - 

explanation need ever be vouched for the denial of that right, either in the 

disciplinary proceeding itself or if that proceeding be later challenged in court, 

would change an admittedly circumscribed right into a privilege conferred in 

the unreviewable discretion of the disciplinary board. We think our holding in 

Wolff meant something more than that.” Id. at 498-99. 

Ponte allowed that in certain circumstances, given prison security or similar 

paramount interests, a court might in the first instance allow a prison official’s 

justification for refusal to call witnesses to be presented to the court in camera but 

found no reason for going further and requiring an inmate to produce evidence of 

which he would rarely be in possession. Id. at 499. 

¶ 64 In the instant case, defendants did not give reasons for denying plaintiff’s 

witnesses and evidence during the disciplinary proceeding, nor did defendants 

explain that decision “later.” In this court, defendants for the first time set forth 

reasons why plaintiff’s witnesses and document requests were denied. Those 

reasons may justify the denial of plaintiff’s request for witnesses and evidence at 

his disciplinary hearing and can be raised by defendants on remand. As currently 

before us, however, none of these reasons appear in the record, either at plaintiff’s 

disciplinary hearing or in the form of affidavits or other evidence submitted during 

plaintiff’s later court challenge to his disciplinary proceeding. Plaintiff, therefore, 

has sufficiently pled that defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s witness and evidence 

requests, without explanation, violated plaintiff’s right to due process. 

¶ 65 Plaintiff also points out that he has a due process right to appear before an 

impartial decision maker. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570-71. Plaintiff’s complaint 

alleged that the adjustment committee members had been told to find him guilty 

and to give him “a year across the board.” Plaintiff further alleged that he made an 

oral objection at his disciplinary hearing that the adjustment committee was not 

impartial. Defendants acknowledge that plaintiff has a due process right to appear 

before a disciplinary committee composed of impartial individuals but claim that 

plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption of impartiality. 

¶ 66 We disagree. Because this appeal arises from the dismissal of plaintiff’s 

complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the allegations 

of plaintiff’s complaint must be taken as true, and the complaint must be construed 

in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Cowper, 2015 IL 117811, ¶ 12. All the facts 
- 23 - 

apparent from the face of the pleadings, as well as the exhibits attached thereto, 

must be considered, and a cause of action should not be dismissed under section 

2-615 unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proven that would 

entitle plaintiff to recovery. Id. Based upon that standard of review, plaintiff’s 

allegation that he was denied his right to appear before a disciplinary committee 

composed of impartial individuals must be taken as true and is sufficient to state a 

claim for violation of plaintiff’s right to due process. 

¶ 67 Because plaintiff’s complaint has stated a claim for violation of his right to due 

process in the revocation of his good conduct credits, we find that plaintiff’s 

complaint stated a claim for common-law writ of certiorari with regard to his due 

process claims. A common-law writ of certiorari is the general method for 

obtaining circuit court review of administrative actions when the act conferring 

power on the agency does not expressly adopt the Administrative Review Law (735 

ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2014)) and the act provides for no other form of review. 

Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill. 2d 268, 272 (1996). The statutory provisions 

pertaining to prison disciplinary procedures neither adopt the Administrative 

Review Law nor provide any other method of judicial review. See 730 ILCS 

5/3-8-7 to 3-8-10 (West 2014). Accordingly, properly pled allegations of a denial 

of due process in prison disciplinary proceedings are reviewable in an action for 

certiorari. We therefore reverse the circuit court’s judgment dismissing plaintiff’s 

due process claims with prejudice and remand to the circuit court for further 

proceedings on that claim.

¶ 68 Finally, we note that plaintiff has filed a cross-appeal challenging the appellate 

court’s finding that plaintiff was not entitled to mandamus or a writ of certiorari

based upon his allegations that defendants violated sections 504.60(a), 

504.80(h)(4), 504.80(f)(1), 504.80(b), and 504.80(d) of the Department 

regulations. We have already rejected the argument that Department regulations 

have the force and effect of law, which would allow plaintiff to bring a cause of 

action for a violation of those regulations. Accordingly, we need not again consider 

whether plaintiff was entitled to relief based upon defendants’ alleged failure to 

follow those regulations. We therefore affirm that portion of the appellate court’s 

order finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim for mandamus or a writ of 

certiorari with regard to those regulations. 
- 24 - 

¶ 69 CONCLUSION

¶ 70 For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court’s finding to the 

extent it held that plaintiff failed to state a claim for mandamus or common-law

writ of certiorari for alleged violations of Department regulations. We reverse that 

portion of the appellate court’s order finding that plaintiff did state claims for 

mandamus and common-law writ of certiorari based upon alleged violations of 

other Department regulations. We affirm the circuit court’s finding dismissing 

plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil 

Procedure based upon violations of the Department’s regulations, but we reverse 

the circuit court’s order with regard to plaintiff’s claim that defendants violated his 

right to due process in revoking his good conduct credits and remand the case to the 

circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

¶ 71 Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. 

¶ 72 Circuit court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. 

¶ 73 Cause remanded.

¶ 74 JUSTICE BURKE, specially concurring:

¶ 75 The plaintiff, Aaron P. Fillmore, is an inmate serving a term of imprisonment in 

an Illinois prison. In 2014, he was subject to a disciplinary proceeding before a 

prison administrative tribunal. At the conclusion of the proceeding, he received the 

following punishments: the revocation of one year of good conduct credits, one 

year in segregation, one year of contact visit restrictions, one year of restricting his 

commissary expenditures to $15 per month, and one year of C-grade status, which 

meant that plaintiff was denied certain prison privileges (see 20 Ill. Adm. Code 

504.130, amended at 27 Ill. Reg. 6214 (eff. May 1, 2003)). Plaintiff sought 

administrative relief, which was denied. He then filed, pro se, a three-count 

document in the circuit court of Sangamon County seeking judicial relief from his 

prison discipline. Count I sought a common-law writ of mandamus, count II sought 

a common-law writ of certiorari, and count III sought declaratory relief.2 The 

 2

Plaintiff does not contend in this court that he is entitled to declaratory relief.
- 25 - 

circuit court denied plaintiff relief on all three counts. The appellate court affirmed 

in part and reversed in part (2017 IL App (4th) 160309), and this appeal followed. 

¶ 76 The majority, in addressing plaintiff’s request for a writ of certiorari, takes an 

unusual first step. Instead of beginning its analysis with the controlling principles 

of certiorari review, the majority begins with the United States Supreme Court’s 

decision in Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Supra ¶ 39. This is unusual 

because Sandin is not a certiorari case. Sandin addresses the circumstances under 

which an inmate challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding may bring a due 

process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Unlike a petition for writ of certiorari, 

which is a means of obtaining judicial review of a lower tribunal’s decision, a 

complaint brought under section 1983 is an independent, original cause of action; it 

is not a review proceeding. Stratton v. Wenona Community Unit District No. 1, 133 

Ill. 2d 413, 428 (1990) (citing Hameetman v. City of Chicago, 776 F.2d 636, 640 

(7th Cir. 1985)). On its face, then, Sandin has nothing to do with the standards that 

govern the issuance of a writ of certiorari. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487 n.11. 

Moreover, the majority repeatedly refers to plaintiff’s request for certiorari review 

as a “cause of action” and ultimately concludes that plaintiff has failed to state a 

“cause of action” for certiorari. See supra ¶ 55. This language makes it unclear if 

the majority is describing the pleading standard for an independent, original cause 

of action or certiorari review. Ultimately, the majority’s reliance on Sandin is 

confusing because the majority opinion never explains how Sandin fits within the 

framework of our state certiorari law. 

¶ 77 This court’s analysis of whether plaintiff is entitled to certiorari review must 

begin with certiorari law. The common-law writ of certiorari is a means by which 

a petitioner who is otherwise without an avenue of appeal may obtain limited 

review over action taken by a lower court or a lower tribunal exercising 

quasi-judicial functions. Stratton, 133 Ill. 2d at 427. The purpose of the writ is to

have the entire record of the inferior tribunal brought before the court to determine, 

from the record alone, whether the tribunal proceeded according to applicable law. 

If the circuit court, on the return of the writ, determines from the record that the 

inferior tribunal proceeded according to law, the writ is quashed; however, if the 

circuit court determines the tribunal did not comply with the law, the judgment and 

proceedings shown by the return will be quashed. Id. Where the Administrative 

Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2016)) has not been expressly 
- 26 - 

adopted, the actions of agencies and tribunals exercising administrative functions 

may be subject to review by writ of certiorari. Stratton, 133 Ill. 2d at 427. 

¶ 78 Importantly, there is no absolute right to certiorari review. Id. at 428. The 

purpose of the writ is to prevent injustice, and therefore, the writ should issue only 

if the petitioner can show that he or she has suffered “substantial injury or 

injustice.” Id. Further, the writ should not issue where it would operate inequitably 

or unjustly. Id. 

¶ 79 In any individual case, the issuance of a writ of certiorari is a matter within the 

discretion of the court. Id. Moreover, because the writ of certiorari is a creature of 

common law and the scope of certiorari review is a subject left entirely to the 

judiciary, this court may, in appropriate circumstances, limit the reach of the writ as 

a matter of law. Tanner v. Court of Claims, 256 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1092 (1994) 

(citing Deslauries v. Soucie, 222 Ill. 522, 524 (1906)). It is on this basis that Sandin

is relevant to this case.

¶ 80 As the majority notes, Sandin held that, to determine whether there is a 

protected, state-created liberty interest with respect to certain conditions of 

confinement, courts must look to whether the conditions impose “atypical and 

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison 

life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. Sandin based this result, in part, on concerns that 

arise solely in prison discipline cases. Prison is a unique and volatile environment, 

and courts should afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials that 

are charged with managing that environment. In addition, as a general matter, 

courts should not be involved in the day-to-day operation of prisons, and it is thus 

unwise to permit court challenges to every instance of minor prison discipline, 

many of which result in only the revocation of prison privileges. 

¶ 81 These same concerns support a limitation on certiorari review in prison 

discipline cases. And it is on the basis of these concerns that the Sandin standard 

may be incorporated into our state certiorari law. This is effectively what the 

majority has done in this case. Thus, as a matter of law, in prison discipline cases, a 

“substantial injury or injustice” (Stratton, 133 Ill. 2d at 428) will only exist for 

purposes of granting a writ of certiorari if the prisoner can show that the 

punishment received “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in 

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” (Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84). 
- 27 - 

¶ 82 Here, plaintiff has alleged an atypical and significant hardship in that, as a result 

of his disciplinary proceeding, one year of his good conduct credits have been 

revoked. Also, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged, for purposes of bringing the record 

of the disciplinary proceeding before the circuit court, that the revocation was done 

in violation of principles of due process and governing administrative regulations 

and was therefore unlawful. Accordingly, this cause must be remanded to the 

circuit court to determine, on the record, whether the revocation of plaintiff’s good 

conduct credits was in accordance with the law.

¶ 83 Plaintiff’s pro se filing also requested the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Like 

the writ of certiorari, the writ of mandamus should only issue if it would 

accomplish “substantial justice” that outweighs any disruption the writ might 

cause. People ex rel. Stettauer v. Olsen, 215 Ill. 620, 622 (1905). Thus, in prison 

discipline cases, the same concerns that justify limiting the scope of the writ of 

certiorari to punishments involving atypical and significant hardships also justify 

similarly limiting the scope of the writ of mandamus. In this case, it would be 

premature to determine whether any writ of mandamus must issue with respect to 

the revocation of plaintiff’s good conduct credits. The circuit court may order an 

entirely new disciplinary hearing regarding the revocation, and if such a hearing 

should be ordered, any mandamus relief would be unnecessary.

¶ 84 For the foregoing reasons, I specially concur.

¶ 85 JUSTICE NEVILLE joins in this special concurrence.