J-S15038-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SHIANNE DAWN WESTBROOK 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1725 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 14, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0000531-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: AUGUST 7, 2023

Shianne Dawn Westbrook (“Westbrook”) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence following her plea of nolo contendere to conspiracy to commit 

criminal use of a communication facility.

1

 Additionally, Westbrook’s counsel 

(“Counsel”) has filed a petition to withdraw and an accompanying brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth 

v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We grant Counsel’s petition to 

withdraw and affirm.

The relevant factual and procedural history of this case is as follows. On 

November 14, 2022, Westbrook pleaded nolo contendere to criminal use of a 

communication facility arising from an incident during which she and an 

accomplice robbed a man at gunpoint when the man arrived at a previously 

agreed-upon location to exchange money for sex with Westbrook. See N.T., 

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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903(a), 7512(a).
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11/14/22, at 5. In exchange for Westbrook’s guilty plea, the Commonwealth 

agreed to nolle pros the remaining charges, including, inter alia, robbery,2 and 

the trial court sentenced Westbrook to, among other things, one-year-lessone-day to two-years-less-one-day of imprisonment, with five years of 

consecutive probation, a $100 fine, $120 in restitution to the victim, and court 

costs. See id. at 2, 15-16. The trial court made Westbrook eligible for work 

release. See id. at 15. 

Westbrook filed a post-sentence motion to withdraw her guilty plea on 

November 28, 2022.3 The trial court denied the motion. See Order, 

12/13/22. Westbrook failed to report to the Lancaster County Prison on 

December 14, 2022 to begin her sentence, as ordered by the trial court. See 

N.T., 11/14/22, at 15-16 (trial court permitting Westbrook to delay for thirty 

days reporting to the prison for her sentence). The trial court issued a bench 

warrant for Westbrook’s arrest on December 21, 2022. See Order, 12/21/22. 

In the interim, Westbrook, via counsel, timely filed an appeal from her 

judgment of sentence. See Notice of Appeal, 12/14/22. Westbrook’s counsel 

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2 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. 3701(a)(1)(ii).

3 Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1) requires post-sentence motions to be filed within ten 

days following the imposition of sentence. Because the trial court sentenced 

Westbrook on November 14, 2022, the ten-day deadline fell on November 24, 

2022. However, November 24, 2022 was Thanksgiving. We note the county 

courthouse was closed on Thursday and Friday, November 24 and 25, 2022. 

See 

https://www.court.co.lancaster.pa.us/DocumentCenter/View/1195/2022-

Court-Calendar. Accordingly, the next business day was November 28, 2022. 

Westbrook’s post-sentence motion was thus timely filed. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 

1908 (excluding holidays and weekends from time computations).
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indicated his intention to file a motion to withdraw on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4), and the trial court issued an opinion pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the 

merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to 

withdraw. See Commonwealth v. Garang, 9 A.3d 237, 240 (Pa. Super. 

2010). Pursuant to Anders, when counsel believes an appeal is frivolous and 

wishes to withdraw from representation, he or she must do the following: 

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has

determined the appeal would be frivolous; (2) file a brief referring 

to any issues that might arguably support the appeal, but which 

does not resemble a no-merit letter; and (3) furnish a copy of the 

brief to the defendant and advise him of his right to retain new 

counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional points he deems 

worthy of this Court’s attention. 

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 906 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(internal citation omitted). In Santiago, our Supreme Court addressed the 

second requirement of Anders, i.e., the contents of an Anders brief, and 

required that the brief: 

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; 

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably 

supports the appeal; 

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and 

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, 
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controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. “Once counsel has satisfied the [Anders] 

requirements, it is then this Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the trial 

court’s proceedings and render an independent judgment as to whether the 

appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.” Edwards, 906 A.2d at 1228 (internal 

citation omitted).

Here, Counsel avers in his petition to withdraw that he has reviewed 

the record and determined that no non-frivolous issues exist. See Petition to 

Withdraw, 3/2/23, unnumbered at *1. Counsel has further averred that he 

mailed Westbrook a copy of his petition to withdraw along with his Anders 

brief; he has advised her of her right to proceed, with private counsel or pro 

se, and to present to this Court any other information or documentation 

relevant to her appeal. See id. at Ex. A. Counsel’s brief includes a summary 

of the factual and procedural history of the case, identifies the issue that could 

arguably support Westbrook’s appeal, and explains his reasons for concluding 

the appeal is frivolous, with analysis of the pertinent facts and applicable law. 

See Anders Brief at 8-9. As Counsel is in technical compliance with Anders 

and Santiago, we proceed to conduct an independent review to determine 

whether this appeal is wholly frivolous.

Counsel identifies the following issue for our review: Whether the trial 

court abused its discretion in denying Westbrook’s post-sentence motion to 

withdraw her guilty plea? See Anders Brief at 8.
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Our standard of review is as follows:

It is well-settled that the decision whether to permit a 

defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is within the sound discretion 

of the trial court.

The term discretion imports the exercise of judgment, 

wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, and 

discretionary power can only exist within the framework of the 

law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the 

will of the judges. Discretion must be exercised on the foundation 

of reason, as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice 

or arbitrary action. Discretion is abused when the course pursued 

represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the 

judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not 

applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.

Commonwealth v. Kehr, 180 A.3d 754, 757 (Pa. Super. 2018) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted; formatting altered).

Initially, we note that a plea of nolo contendere is treated the same as 

a guilty plea. See Commonwealth v. Jabbie, 2000 A.3d 500, 505 (Pa. 

Super. 2018). Generally, “upon entry of a guilty plea, a defendant waives all 

claims and defenses other than those sounding in the jurisdiction of the court, 

the validity of the plea, and what has been termed the legality of the sentence 

imposed.” Id. (internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).

We have previously summarized the law governing post-sentence 

motions to withdraw guilty pleas:

Post-sentence motions for withdrawal are subject to higher 

scrutiny since courts strive to discourage entry of guilty pleas as 

sentence-testing devices. A defendant must demonstrate that 

manifest injustice would result if the court were to deny his postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Manifest injustice may 

be established if the plea was not tendered knowingly,
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intelligently, and voluntarily. In determining whether a plea is 

valid, the court must examine the totality of circumstances 

surrounding the plea. A deficient plea does not per se establish 

prejudice on the order of manifest injustice.

Kehr, 180 A.3d at 756–57 (internal citation and brackets omitted). The law 

presumes a defendant who entered a guilty plea was aware of what she was 

doing, and the defendant bears the burden of proving otherwise. See Jabbie, 

200 A.3d at 505 (internal citation omitted). Additionally, a defendant is

bound by the statements which [s]he makes during [her] plea 

colloquy. Therefore, a defendant may not assert grounds for 

withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when [s]he 

pled guilty, and [s]he may not recant the representations [s]he 

made in court when [s]he entered [her] guilty plea. Moreover, 

the law does not require that a defendant be pleased with the 

outcome of [her] decision to plead guilty. The law requires only 

that a defendant’s decision to plead guilty be made knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently. 

Id. at 506 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The comment to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 590 provides the topics that should 

be covered during a guilty plea colloquy:

(1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to 

which he or she is pleading guilty or nolo contendere?

(2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?

(3) Does the defendant understand that he or she has the right to 

trial by jury?

(4) Does the defendant understand that he or she is presumed 

innocent until found guilty?

(5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible range of sentences 

and/or fines for the offenses charged?
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(6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by the 

terms of any plea agreement tendered unless the judge accepts 

such agreement?

(7) Does the defendant understand that the Commonwealth has 

a right to have a jury decide the degree of guilt if the defendant 

pleads guilty to murder generally?

Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, cmt. Accord Jabbie, 200 A.3d at 506 (discussing and 

applying Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, cmt.).

Following our review, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in determining there would be no manifest injustice in denying 

Westbrook’s post-sentence motion. The record reveals that Westbrook was 

informed of and understood the nature of the charges. See N.T., 11/14/22, 

at 4. Westbrook agreed to the factual basis. See id. at 6. The trial court 

informed her of her right to trial by jury and also that she was presumed 

innocent until proven guilty. See id. at 3. The trial court informed Westbrook 

of the maximum applicable sentence as well as the applicable guidelines. See 

id. at 4. The trial court further made Westbrook aware that the court would 

be bound by the terms if it accepted the agreement. See id. at 10. The trial 

court also found that Westbrook was “certainly intelligent enough to 

understand” the nature of the proceedings, and concluded that Westbrook was 

entering her plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. See id. at 13-15. 

Lastly, Westbrook reviewed with her attorney, and then signed, an extensive 

written colloquy. See id. at 5; see also Colloquy, 11/14/22; Trial Court 

Opinion, 1/27/23, at 7-9 (trial court analyzing Westbrook’s issue and 
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concluding it is meritless); Kehr, 180 A.3d at 756–57 (requiring a showing of 

manifest injustice on the part of an appellant seeking to withdraw her guilty 

plea). Westbrook thus cannot establish the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying her post-sentence motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Therefore, we 

conclude the sole issue identified in this appeal is frivolous, and our 

independent review of the record reveals no additional issues of arguable 

merit in this appeal. Accordingly, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and 

affirm the judgment of sentence.

Petition to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/7/2023
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