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THE IRAN–SYRIA NEXUS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

FOR THE REGION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 31, 2013

Serial No. 113–51

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable John Bolton, senior fellow, American Enterprise Institute 

(former United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations) ..... 6

Mr. Mark Dubowitz, executive director, Foundation for Defense of Democracies ..................................................................................................................... 14

Daniel Brumberg, Ph.D., senior program officer, Center for Conflict Management, United States Institute of Peace .............................................................. 36

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable John Bolton: Prepared statement ................................................. 8

Mr. Mark Dubowitz: Prepared statement .............................................................. 16

Daniel Brumberg, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ...................................................... 38

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 70

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 71

(1)

THE IRAN–SYRIA NEXUS AND ITS 

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 31, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. After 

recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes 

each for our opening statements, I will then recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 minute and I hope that you do give 

a statement. We will then hear from our witnesses. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. And without objection, 

your prepared statements will be made a part of the record, and 

members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions for 

the record subject to the length limitations and the rules. 

The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

As the conflict in Syria continues, the numbers become even 

more staggering every day: Over 100,000 killed, 1.85 million refugees have fled the country with over 1⁄2 million going to our friend 

and ally Jordan, placing an extreme burden on our ally as it struggles to cope with the pressure of this mass influx and as the conflict threatens to cross its borders, and an additional 4.5 million 

Syrians have been internally displaced. Assad remains defiant and 

in fact his intransigence has become further entrenched thanks to 

the support from his allies such as Iran and Russia. 

Iran along with North Korea has been cooperating with Syria 

and the Assad families for decades now, aiding Syria with its nuclear and chemicals weapons program, as well as its ballistic missile program. Damascus is Iran’s linchpin in the Middle East. 

Tehran reportedly helped finance Syria’s secret nuclear plant, designed and built by North Korea and destroyed, thankfully, by the 

Israelis in 2007, and has also been linked with helping Assad expand his chemical weapons stockpile. According to assessments by 

the U.S. intelligence community, it judged with high confidence 

that chemical weapons were used by Assad on numerous occasions 

against the opposition, further amplifying the threat to the region 

and our national security interests. 

Tehran has provided Assad billions of dollars in direct funds and 

recently extended an additional $4 billion line of credit to help fund 

2

his brutal campaign against the opposition. Iran has sent military 

advisers and personnel to help Assad. Members of Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guard have been sent to advise and fight along side 

Assad’s forces as well as to help recruit external forces to come to 

the aid of the regime, including a large number of Iraqi Shiite militants and of course its proxy Hezbollah. 

The Obama administration continues to take the misguided approach that negotiating with Tehran will bear fruit, but the actions 

of the regime say otherwise. Due to the lack of urgency on this administration’s part to prevent Iran from becoming nuclear capable, 

I am also concerned that it is not giving the Iranian threat the priority and the immediate attention it requires. 

Last Congress I authored and the President signed into law the 

toughest sanctions yet on record against the regime in Iran. Later 

this afternoon the House will vote on and we hope to pass today 

or tomorrow Chairman Royce’s and Mr. Engel’s Nuclear Iran Prevention Act, which will further strengthen sanctions against Iran 

and sends the Supreme Leader the message that a nuclear Iran is 

not an option. 

So it is perhaps fitting that we are here today discussing this 

subject, especially with our distinguished panel of experts. But as 

we all know, Iran along with Russia has been a key arms supplier 

for Assad’s forces. There are daily flights from Iran to Syria filled 

with arms and supplies for the regime. These flights continue to fly 

over Iraq with mere impunity and the United States must do more 

to urge al-Maliki and the Iraqis to interdict and prevent these 

arms deliveries from reaching Syria. 

The Iran-Syria nexus has very serious consequences for our 

friend and ally, the Democratic Jewish state of Israel. The conflict 

is threatening to spread to Israel’s borders and the fear of Assad’s 

chemical weapons being moved and falling into the wrong hands is 

very real. Yet the Obama administration, prodded by some in Congress, has decided to send small arms and ammunition into the 

war zone. 

I have always been and continue to be opposed to arming any 

rebels in Syria. I remain opposed to doing so. Instead of sending 

more arms, we should be looking at ways to stop the arms flowing 

into Syria from Iran, from Russia and we should be looking at 

breaking the Iran-Syria nexus. We must keep the pressure and increase sanctions on Iran and Syria. 

In the wake of last month’s election in Iran I must continue to 

caution the administration on offering more concessions to a State 

Sponsor of Terrorism that continues to undermine the stability in 

the region. No concessions and no waivers should be issued by the 

Obama administration until we see concrete and verifiable proof 

that Iran has begun to dismantle its nuclear program. 

I must reiterate that this new leader is not the moderate that 

many have been so eager to believe in Iran. It is the Supreme 

Leader who still calls the shots and his nefarious ambitions have 

not been altered. 

And with that, I am pleased to yield to the ranking member of 

our subcommittee, my colleague Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding this 

hearing. Thanks to the witnesses for being here. Iran’s destaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:46 Sep 23, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\_MENA\073113\82308 HFA PsN: SHIRL
3

bilizing influence in the region, particularly in Syria, threatens to 

reshape the future of the Middle East by strengthening extremists 

by undermining moderate states and by fueling a dangerous arms 

race. 

In its current state Syria is slowly on its way to a worst case scenario. With the help of Iran and Hezbollah, Assad appears to have 

stabilized his grip on western portions of the country, ensuring continued Iranian influence at least for the foreseeable future. Factor 

in the use of chemical weapons and the spillover of violence in the 

neighboring states, and we are dealing with a staggering political 

and humanitarian crisis. 

The stats speak for themselves: In a country of 21 million inhabitants, nearly 8 million need humanitarian assistance, at least 

100,000 have been killed, 41⁄2 million internally displaced and 1.8 

million sought refuge in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt. 

A shocking average of 8,000 people flee Syria every day, a rate of 

refugee outflow unseen since the 1994 Rwanda genocide. 

Amid all the human suffering, it is difficult to remember that the 

Syrian conflict was once a mass civic movement advocating for 

greater political freedom. Now it has morphed into a civil war between an externally armed insurgency and a brutal regime backed 

by Iran. Essentially, Syria has become a proxy war for competing 

regional forces like Iran. From the beginning Iran has provided 

arms, military advisers, and enormous financial assistance to bolster Assad. The opposition estimates that Iran is providing Assad 

with more than $500 million a month, and is flying in about 5 tons 

of military cargo per day. 

Earlier this spring my colleagues and I sent a letter to Prime 

Minister Maliki asking him to inspect Iranian planes using Iraqi 

air space. This coupled with Secretary Kerry’s efforts have led the 

Iraqi Government to inspect about a third of the Iranian flights. It 

is a good step by the Maliki government but we know this isn’t 

good enough as Iran is able to manipulate their flight schedules to 

ensure that their weapons go to Syria unabated. Therefore, we 

must therefore continue to press the Iraqis to search all flights, to 

actively prevent weapons from flowing to Assad’s forces. 

The removal of Assad would deal a devastating blow to the Iranian regime’s ability to get heavy weaponry into Lebanon. From 

terror attacks in Europe and Latin America, Hezbollah has long 

done Iran’s bidding around the world. In Syria, Hezbollah has 

openly intervened on Assad’s side with more than 5,000 fighters 

and is largely responsible for Assad’s reclaimed territory in the 

areas around Damascus and the City of Homs. Simply put, 

Hezbollah’s operations in Syria have become a game changer. Iranian Hezbollah intervention has spurred greater sectarian tension 

with almost daily calls from regional Sunni leaders for a jihad 

against Iran and Assad. However, we have seen the Gulf Coast 

countries react constructively with planned sanctions against 

Hezbollah. It is likely that these sanctions will be more potent than 

those imposed by the EU. 

Europe has taken an important step, but they and we can go further in sanctioning Hezbollah. Unfortunately, the secondary outcomes of this conflict are far more negative than positive. Lebanon 

and Iraq, two states with tenuous power sharing agreements, are 

4

seriously threatened by a spillover of sectarian violence. The economic burden of hosting refugees is threatening to destabilize Jordan. And Hezbollah’s involvement has only furthered a frightening 

arms race among the region’s extremists. For example, last month 

a group of hardline Islamists in Kuwait auctioned off cars to raise 

cash to arm 12,000 Syrian rebels with guided missiles, heat seeking missiles, and tandem warheads. My colleagues and I are right 

to worry about how arms might end up in extremists’ hands. We 

have got to face the facts, the extremists already have them, so 

what is next? We know that if the Syrian regime survives 

Hezbollah will be strengthened and Iran’s interventionist policy 

will only result in more aggressive behavior. Yet numerous questions remain. How do we safely support any moderates in Syria? 

What, if any, change will a new President have on Iranian decision 

making in Syria? And finally, in an economy that is being struggled by sanctions, how do we put more pressure on the Iranian regime to end their support for Assad? What more can we do to pressure the Iranians? 

Thank you, and I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on 

these and many other questions. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch, for your 

opening statement. 

The following members have requested 1 minute statements. If 

you are not on the list, please let us know. Mr. Chabot and then 

Mr. Schneider and Mr. Kinzinger. We will start with Mr. Chabot 

of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have a markup in Judiciary so I will be leaving, being back and forth. So I apologize for 

that in advance. 

The terror imposed by the Syrian people by the Assad regime 

with the help of the Iranian mullahs is horrifying. Since last spring 

estimates suggest nearly 90,000 people have been killed and the 

mass exodus of refugees to neighboring nations continues 

unabated. The humanitarian crisis is getting worse by the day. In 

previous hearings over the last year or so some of us have expressed skepticism about the steps that the Obama administration 

was taking or not taking in Syria and concerns that U.S. efforts 

would not ultimately result in Assad’s removal from power. 

Here we are today and the Assad regime is still thriving because 

of the supply of weapons, fighters and cash from Iran creating an 

even more dangerous environment which is destabilizing the entire 

region and threatening the security of nations like Israel, Jordan 

and Lebanon. Iran wants Assad to win this fight because his removal would be a decisive setback for its own nefarious plans in 

the region. Consequently the mullahs in Iran are doing whatever 

they can to ensure it preserves its influence no matter what happens in Syria. And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank, you and thank you to the witnesses for 

joining us today. 

The insertion of foreign fighters, weapons and financial support 

from the Iranian Government into Syria in support of the Assad regime has been well documented. We know definitively that Iran 

5

has also worked through its proxy Hezbollah to further assert its 

influence over the current conflict in Syria has seen some success 

in swinging the momentum that once appeared to favor the opposition forces. 

I look forward to hearing from the panel on several related topics, including how prolonged Iranian influence could contribute to 

the breakup of the current Syrian state, and the implications for 

long-term U.S. interest and interests of our regional allies. 

I am increasingly concerned that the fighting between Kurdish, 

al Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra, opposition forces and other militias in 

Syria will only provide greater space for Iran to exert its influence 

over the future state of Syria, to the detriment of our interests and 

that of our allies. 

I look forward to hearing from the panel on these issues, and I 

yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have been very vocal 

about my concern about the lack of policy and the lack of focus of 

this administration when it comes to the Middle East. 

The situation in Syria is one that many of us were discussing 2 

years ago, 100,000 lives ago. And I believe that then was the time 

for action to be taken at a point when you had a moderate opposition and we had the ability to get in there and ensure that Assad 

didn’t survive. 

When I was in Iraq as a military guy, one of the worst kept secrets in Iraq was the role that Iran was playing in that war and 

the lives that Iran has personally cost American soldiers. I have 

been concerned at the lack of a clear red line for this administration when it comes to Iran’s nuclear weapons, when it comes to 

Iran’s support for bad people all around the globe. And I think it 

is important that this administration be very clear that Iran will 

not get nuclear weapons. And now that we see the joining of forces 

between Iran and Syria and Assad, I think this administration 

needs to be deadly clear that continued relationships like that will 

have long-term devastating results for the Iranian regime. 

With that, I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Any other members seek recognition? If not, I am so pleased to 

welcome our witnesses. First, we welcome back to our subcommittee Ambassador John Bolton, a Foreign Policy Senior Fellow 

at the American Enterprise Institute. Ambassador Bolton was appointed as the Permanent Representative to the U.N. in 2005 

where he was a leading voice for—I would say the only leading 

voice, but maybe there are others, for institutional reform at the 

U.N. and also against international proliferation and terrorism and 

a strong advocate for human rights. Prior to this the Ambassador 

served as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security from 2001 to 2005. 

Thank you for your service and welcome back, sir. 

Next we are so pleased to welcome Mr. Mark Dubowitz, the Executive Director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 

where he leads projects on sanctions, nonproliferation and countering electronic repression. Mr. Dubowitz is the coauthor of eight 

6

studies on economic sanctions against Iran and he is also the cochair of the Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy. 

We welcome you, Mr. Dubowitz. 

Third, we welcome Dr. Daniel Brumberg, a Senior Program Officer with the Center for Conflict Management at the U.S. Institute 

of Peace, where he focuses on issues of democracy and political reform in the Middle East and the wider Islamic world. Dr. 

Brumberg is also an associate professor at Georgetown University, 

a member of the editorial board of the Journal of Democracy, and 

the chairman of the Foundation on Democratization and Political 

Change in the Middle East. 

Welcome gentlemen, and as I said, your statements have been 

made a part of the record. If you could keep your remarks to 5 minutes, that would be good. 

Ambassador Bolton.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN BOLTON, SENIOR 

FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (FORMER 

UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE 

UNITED NATIONS) 

Ambassador BOLTON. Madam Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. 

I thought perhaps it might be useful to look at the Syria-Iran 

nexus from the strategic perspective of the entire region in the 

Middle East because so much is going wrong, almost all of it adverse to American interests, from the disintegration of Libya after 

the over throw of Khadafi to the turmoil in Egypt, the civil war in 

Syria, the disintegration of Yemen, the political turmoil in Bahrain 

and other countries, the effective loss of representative government 

in Iraq, and obviously the ominous presence of Iran. Events in the 

region I think are closer to slipping out of control and becoming 

more adverse to the United States than in any historical period I 

can think of since the 1956 Suez Canal crisis, that period up until 

the Six-Day War in 1967. 

And yet we have at the moment in Washington and in Europe 

a return to the notion that if only you could solve or at least make 

progress in the Israel-Palestinian issue, that somehow everything 

else would be easier to resolve. And yet if you look at each and 

every one of the crises gripping the region that I mention, all of 

them taken together have almost nothing whatever to do with the 

Israel-Palestinian issue. And if tomorrow we learn that the negotiators had resolved the Israel-Palestinian issue, that would have 

almost no consequence whatever for the ongoing threats to stability 

in the region and American interests. 

So given that there are only 24 hours a day and given that everybody has to prioritize, I think from the perspective of protecting 

American national interests we have to ask ourselves what are the 

key priorities, what are the main threats to our interest in strategic stability in the region? And while they are not responsible for 

everything that is going wrong, it seems to me that all of the major 

problems we face stem from Iran, from its pursuit of geographic 

and political hegemony, the arc of influence it has created from 

Iran itself through the al-Maliki regime in Iraq, the Assad regime 

in Syria and terrorist Hezbollah in Lebanon. One element is Iran’s 

7

continuing support for terrorism, Hezbollah now, as before Hamas 

in the Gaza Strip, Iran for decades has been the world central 

banker of terrorism supplying arms and other assistance as well. 

And then the third major threat obviously is Iran’s nuclear weapons program, 20 years in the search for deliverable nuclear weapons capability. 

Virtually all of Iran’s objectives are being pursued without an effective response from the United States. The sanctions that we 

have pursued have in the words of the Director General of the 

International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano, just a month 

ago, effectively had no consequence on the Iranian program. Personally I think the sanctions are a good idea because they put pressure on the regime and our ultimate objective should be bringing 

the regime in Tehran down. But nobody should be under any illusions that Iran is determined enough to have nuclear weapons and 

the sanctions won’t deter it. 

It is also no surprise that Iranian Revolutionary Guard officers 

and others and now Hezbollah have come into the conflict in Syria. 

Iran was always prepared to shed a lot of Syrian blood to keep the 

Assad regime in power, and it will continue to do that because the 

influence it has over Syria fits all three of its objectives, including, 

I believe, more that we will find out in the area of nuclear, biological and chemical warfare. The Al-Khobar reactor destroyed by the 

Israeli Air Force in September 2007 didn’t get there accidentally 

and there may well be other aspects of Iranian influence. 

And I think it is critical for Iran to maintain the viability of 

Hezbollah as a threat to Israel. Indeed, if Israel makes the critical 

decision that it is now facing whether to take preemptive military 

action against the Iranian nuclear weapons program, the third 

time in its history that Israel will have done so in its own self defense, I think the most likely Iranian response will be to unleash 

Hezbollah and Hamas to rocket targets inside Israel, which simply 

makes this question that much more difficult for Israel. 

And yet in response to all this, the American policy is not just 

ineffective, it is very sadly lacking. I think we are in for much 

greater danger in the coming years. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Bolton follows:]

8


82308a-1.eps

Testimony of 

John R. Bolton 

On 

The Iran-Syria Nexus and Its ImpJications for the 

Middle East 

B~fore the 

Suncommittee on the lVliddle East and North Africa 

Huu~c Committee 011 Foreign Affairs 
9


82308a-2.eps

Thank you, Madam Chairman, and Members ofihe Subcornmit!ce, for the opportunity 10 

appear before you today to testify on the lran,Syria nexus and its impliciltions for the broader 

Middle Fast. 

SincE' the overthrow of Saddam filLSsein a dl'cade ago, there has been no greater threat to 

imernational peace and security ill the Middle Em,t, and perhaps worldwide, than the regime in 

Tehran. Both as the central banker for, and leading state sponsor of, international terrorism, and 

through its relentless pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction ("\\'MD") and 

their delivery systems, Iran poses a direct threat to key American ill!erests, ii'iends ano allies in 

the region and globally, The ayatollahs are pursuing geographic hegemony OWr' th~ other oilprcducing ::;tatC3 of the T'diddle East, rdigi()u~, ::ll1d idcolngicd pre-cmin~:rl(:c \\'i1hin thl' Islml1ic 

world, and a larger rok on the global stage directly contrary to fundamental American interests 

in virtnally every aspect. 

In the region, Iran has established an arc of domimmce that extends from its own territory 

through the al-Maliki regime in Iraq, and includes the Assad tamilyiBa'alh Party regime in Syria 

and terrorist Ilezhollah in Lebanon, Tehran's progrum of at subversion targets Bahrain and other 

Arab states across the Gulf as well as providing money, weapons [\nd other support for terrorist 

Hamm, in the Gaza Strip, In lht: recent past, Iran has engaged in, among other things, arming, 

financing, training, and in some cases leading terrorists who attacked U.S, and other coalition 

forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well a, making c~tcn.sive efforts 10 inllucTlce the internal 

politics of those two countries, among others, 

Iran is an equal-oPPOliunity state sponsor of terrorism, aiding Shia lerrorists in Iraq and 

Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as SmUli Hallias in Uaza and Taliban in Afghanistan. The 

regime's mullahs are fully willing ami capable of he having opportunistically even with sworn 

enemies in their region and religion to he ahle to oppose the United States and its allies more 

effectively. They are ruthless opponents whom we underestmnte at our peril. And many are 

duing .lust thelL \.Vilh their naIve ass-css!nents of Iran's new PrcsiJr.:nL Hassan Rouhani. 

In the nuclear-weapons field, Tehran has for (wenty years been pursuing the objective of 

secJring deliv~rable nuclear capabilities, and todaY;1 is perilously close to achieving that goaL 

han is bllildill~ a broad and deep Huckar crnd ballistic-missile- iltfra"lnKhlre. not 

one or two nuclear devices. It has slIcceeded in making progress 

nuclcar-fuel cycle despiTc economic sanctions, and it has successfiJlly launched 

sc\'"erul eanh satellites. 

Tehran may well have facilities and capabilitlcs that ,1m intelligence has missed or 

underestimated, 1mn ancI North Kurea, for cXclmplc, have cooperated ,"tensivc1y tl)r at least 

li!1ccE years oc their respective ballis!ic missile l"herc i~ ever) rcaSUll tu believ,' that 

the;> as well in the nuclear field. woulJ hcll'e, anloTlg uther things. a very 

cffc(:t in llndcrestimJting h(nv close han ll1 lh.: nllclear ~1ll1hi1i()ns, Thi".~ AlKire\]' reactllr under constnlction'by North Korea, destroyed bv bombing in Seplem\)cr, 

2007, was very likely an C'(3mple of just sllch cooperation. 

ACCOl'dillgly, viewed in light ot'lran's regional <,nd ideological objectives, the civil war in 

S) ~'ia is ahout more than sin~ply whether the Assad regime remains in power or not. For 

2 
10


82308a-3.eps

Iran, the loss of influence in Syria represented by Assad's j~,ll would be a serious g'costrategie 

setback. Simply as a matter 0 I' logistics and l'perations. replacing A"ad with a Sunni regime in 

Damascus would separate Hezbollah from its major so\Uces of supply and vital transit routes for 

weapons, personEe1 and money, and jeopardize Hezbollah's continruing viability in Lebanon. 

Moreover, there are substantial reasons to believe that Syria has long partnered with Iran 

in numerous highly sensitive efforts, most notahly the nuclear reactor destroyed in 2007. l'vladam 

Chairman, yon wlll reeall that ten years ago, ! testified before your committee on Svriull \V.\1D 

programs, incillding Syria's palpable interest in nuclear weapous. You also chaired a sepalate, 

dassiilcd session where I prcsented a detailed assessment ofW:vm activities in Syria, a 

\<;stim"ny [hat mur;y in the but'cac,,:mcy k,cd to block because they disputed the "viden".' 

about Syrian WM!) efforts. Ten years later, stand by that testimony. I understand that this 

Committee holds the sole remaining copy of this classiiied hearing. 

Some, including then-Senator Joseph Biden, objected to my analysis at that time, on the 

ground that Syria did not have the financial resources to sustain its ovm nuclear-weapons 

pwgrmll. Obviously, as we noW know, someone was funding construction of that nuclear reactor 

in Syria, und it almost certainly did not involve North Korea providing its designs and workers 

pro bono. The obviolls answer to any financial shortfall by Syria, if that was the case, would be 

for Iran to assume the costs, which Iran would have considerable incentive to do. 

In short, the AI-Kibar reactor could ,veil have been the business ofa three-way joint 

venture among lmn, Syria and North Korea, inuring to the benetit of all three in different ways: 

-- hard .. cQrrcncy eamings for Pyongyang and possibly a<:eC8S to spent fuel th,111 the 

reactor for reproccssin8 to. extract rlutonjun-~; 

'- a clandestine nuclear reactor for Telml11 und possibly additionall'roj·ects on 1'oth the 

front llnd back enels of the nuclear-fuel cycle, all hidden from international surveilbnce: 

and 

" participation in " rapidly progressing nudear weapons pm gram for Damascus. 

Such a relationship would also have clearly enhanced the alrcady large Iranian role in Syriill1 

defense and sGcuriry matters., thus tightening Iran's hold over the Assad regime. 

We have mueh murc to learn on this subject, including what othcr lluelear-rl'lakd 

adiviLic~ hcyond the reactOr might have been llndervvay (or stiH areL Syrials continued., indeed 

adnmant rd'usaltn allow ,my but the mosT. CUNlry inspections hy the International Atomic 

Energy A~encv ("'lA1::,4 "':- the that more was on, although we remail' in 

the dark as to cxac·tly \vhal be For the im'clligcl'1cc cOllln,urlily 

assessed thal :.he a>K:bar rea(1or '<vas clo::-;e tu start-up in 

h~ld ~t1r('ndy C(IIlsttllctt'd \lrpUrChi.bcc] uranium rud ruds, Ifsu, wheT\.:' Jill those rll(~1 ro'.::') Ulm( 

from, and v, here are tbey ioday'l 

Conli-uIltcd, thclefore, Iwu years ago with a spontaneous, llJ(l1g'~n')ll.' 

Assnd regime in Iran re;.wkJ predictahly. nlaking it clear that 

of Syrian blood to regime in power. Aid in material t'Oml" and 
11


82308a-4.eps

by omeers of the Inmian Revolutil1Jlary Uumds Corps and others, and now the open, 

unambiguous presence in Syria ofIlezbollah fighters, makes it dear that Iran has nol wavered in 

the slightest in supporting Assad. 

Similarly, Russia has been steadfast in providing suppon for the Ba'ath Party 

dictatorship, hoping thereby to maintain in power its olle sllre ally ill the Arab world, as well as 

access to the Tarllls naval facility, which could well playa vital role in an expanded, morcaggressivc Russian naval posture across the Mediterranean Sca and throughout North Africa and 

(he Middle East. Russia's interests in Syria do not entirely coincidt wilh Iran's, but they 

converge sufficiently to make them the most important "triends of Assl1d's Syria.·' 

Those who believed that Russia could be a partner in casing Assad oul of pewier, 

including the Obmna Administration, lherefore. never fully underslOoci or appreciated these vital 

interests of Russia and [nUL Even aft"r Russia and China cast double \'etoes against proposed 

Security Council sllnctions resolutions on three separate occasions, Ih", Obama Administration's 

rhetoric continued to stress its reliance on cooperation with Russia to resolve the Syrian conflict. 

Accordingly, having seen the United States waste over two years in diplomacy with Russia 

doomed to failure, we must now unfonunately conclude that the chao, m Syt'ia today may be 

beyond the point where outside intervention at any realistic level can make a material ditTeren(;c. 

Joint Chiefs ofStarrChaim1an Manill Dcmpsey's recent statements 011 U.S. military options 

underline precisely this point. 

Had the United Slates acted decisively to aid lhe Syrian opposition much earlier, there is 

at least a tbeoretical possibility tllHt we could have made a differcncc, flut taking on ,\ssad even 

at the o,rtset ineluctably meant taking on Iran, and it ,cems clear that the Oba'na Administration 

was ullwilling to do 'mylhing that would jeopardize ils long",ought clbjeciive "fnegotiatiolls with 

lran over it-; nuckar-weupons program. Since I bclj~ve that dipknna1ic- dTurts \'lith han are\ at 

best, a waste of time, the loss of the prospect ofnegoliations should not have been troubling, 

For well or ill, however, all of these potential historical scenarios are now unavailable to 

LIS. 'Vie SCl' Iran nwking steady, seemingly inexorable progress toV'tard Dbtaining deliverable 

I1llckm weapons. And because ofihe growing si,e of its nude:1r e,tahlishment. when the clay 

comes that Iran announces it is a nucicar-,,·eapons state, it w:ll not do so with a handful of 

nuclear weapons in its arsenal, but with scores or even hundreds. And the ChllOS in Syria only 

grows worse, with the TJnileJ Nations lJO\V estllnating the deatll toll y~ars of fighting 

HJ exceed IOU,I)UO. America's range of options is accordingly much and far less 

:,l1rnctivt. 

So what should Lnited States policy be') offer the rCllluwl:Jg rec()]IlT:leIlJatinns: 

1. vVc should overth .. and covertly supuott rc~im(: c,kl.!llie iJ11rdfbJ~"yJlQll1i~_~dlv 

sllppOrfim . .r the lntllian opposition and providil:U it material ::lssisL"lllce. ~~('gotiations 'xith Tehran 

will nevcrdis$U8ne the mullahs from their patn toward nuclear '.\\~(lPO:lSl nor \vill sanctions work 

in lime to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear \\·capons state. Indeed. viewed ohi,cCllivl:JY. 

continued emphasis on these policy options simp!}' w"rks til Tehran's ::(I\antage. 

the time ayailable to it to make progress on its \,capons and bv po:;i[.><oning 

inevitable day ofrecko111ng lO a time \:i,·'hcn It \vill be lnost lldv(1111ag.c':JllS 

4 
12


82308a-5.eps

I'«scists in Iran. Hilssan Rouhani ciemomtmted his ability to pursue precisely this kind oi strategy 

as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator in 2003-2005, later boasting openly about how he and the 

regime deceived European Union C'EU"j tliplomats and Ihe United States. 

I heoretically, sanctions massively applied, universally adhered to, and strictly enforced 

ten years or S() ZlgO, might have made a difference. But no longer. Ironically, even the 

incremental, piecemeal sanctions against Iran have devastated its middle class, one of the 

primary sources of opposilion to the regime. And in any case, as the Treasury Tkpilrtment 

announced last week, the Obama Administration 10 actually easing 1I.S. sanctions under the 

misguided view that so will facilililtc Iranian concessions. Both the White House and the 

EU are sigrl8iill" tI,e ,ernes to Iran that there is a prospect for still It'r'hel 

easing longed-for negotiations make "progress," Moreover, recellt press rcpmts indicate 

thal European COLIn, arc opening large Jlotential loopholes in Ell sanctions, in particular 

wea kening the constraints against Iranian financial institutions. 

Nonetheless, the mullahs' regime is highly unpopUlar inside Iran, and had we been at 

work to overthrow it for the last ten years, we might well be ilJ a very different place today. 

Supporting the Iranian oppc)sirion does not imply military action by th,~ United States of a.ny son 

We are not talking "hout another vvm in the Middle East. We are instead simply recognizing 

that, given material support and time, Iranians themselves can bring this the()craC) down. 

2. We should support an Israeli decision to attack Iran's nuclear weapons program. 

While regime change may be the preferred optioIl, the highest U.s. interest is preventing Inm', 

nuclear weapons program ji~om achieving its objective, and time is not on our side, The Ohama 

Auministmti()n says repeatedly that "all options are on the table" regarding the Iranian program, 

no one seriously believes today thilt President Obama will ever approve the use oi"military three. 

Certainly, neither Iran nor Israd believes it. 

That is is on 1srael, which mLlst almost certainly make a decision in the 

very near iiltur" take pre-elliptiw military action against this hostile nuclearweapons program, as it hns d(1ne twice before in its history. Otherwise, the already likely 

outcome that Iran \vill indeed get nuclear weapon, will become essentially a reality. If lsrael 

does strike. we should provide il political, military, and intelligence support before, during and 

after the attnck, and he prepared to defend Israel at the Ul\ and elsewhere for what will be a 

thoroughly legitimate exercise of lsrael's inherent righl to selt~dej'msc. 

LIn SvriQ.Jh~ Jlnitcci Sl3T~,hoeld provide.political and non-lethal material sill1l191t lo 

oppo,ition leader' and glOUp, 01,1..,. 011 at least two cxplici; conditions: that they commit nul 

to ~nl:{aging in a hloodba111 ngainsl til.,: Alawik, Druze and Christinn in Syria if the 

Assad faiL. md thai tbn ,c'·wt:id respect the rights of all rdigi()lls and cthnic 

ancl \2~' th.]\ they cllmmit m o\'er to the United Stales or international 

organization~ acceptable lu tile United Slat05 Jll \\/MD prograrns\ components and 

assets) anu n:tlkc ~i\nllahk: al! kncwledgC.1hlc scientists. technicians, milltury personnel and 

othcrs \0 assist in tracking the connections of these pmgrams internationally. 

i The Llnite.u S.t:Jtes shQiil..d llIQ,l,jdchumanitarian assistance to refugees trom Syria and 

displaced per'ill.!1'Ll\i1bin )he COUtEIhJnn it should not Q[ovicie militarv assiSTance to the Svrian 
13


82308a-6.eps

ODoosl1ioll V/halever the theoretical arguments for arming the opposition. or providing direct 

U.S. involvement two years ago, those options have he en lost forever. The Syrian opposition 

today is fragmented and unreliable, and even if we could find leaders 'A'hom we trusted. there is 

no guarantee that they can maintain control over whatever weapons we might provide, and keep 

them llut of terrorist hands, 

5, The United States should take all necessary steps to 'lrevent :')~'s chemical weapons 

assets and other \l .... M!) from escaping the count!'\' and falling into tho hands of <II Qacda or other 

terrorist "roups. Keeping Syria's wr,m capabilities from falling. imo the wrong bands for 

potential use worldwide is the clearest, most-important int<'ltst the United State, and its allies 

no'.,\ h:,w i~ the Syrian conflic!. Dealing witl, Syria's or chc,,,ic21 ag'cnt-:, PH'ClIIS<ll;' 

and wcaponized materials is extremely dangerous, but the of these materials into the 

hands ofterrorists or weapons traflickers is even worse, 

There arc many other lessons we should leam about the Iran-Syria nexus, not least of 

which involve our nnderstanding of the Putin regime in Moscow, the direction of Russian 

foreign policy, and why the Ohama Administration's "reset button" hasn't worked. But tbese 

and many other issues em await another hearing. 

For now, Ivladam Chainnan, I would be bappy to answer any questions you and other 

Mcmb<efs of the Subcommittee may hav,," 

6 
14

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Dubowitz.

STATEMENT OF MR. MARK DUBOWITZ, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member 

Deutch, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 

inviting me to testify and for having this hearing on the Iran-Syria 

nexus. 

The more we talk about Iran’s machinations in Syria as a window into the soul of the Iranian regime the better. The Iranian regime does not want the world to talk about its involvement in the 

massacre of tens of thousands of Syrians. As we are only 4 days 

away from the inauguration of Iranian President-elect Hassan 

Rouhani, I will focus on the consequences of his election for Iran’s 

role in Syria and the appropriate U.S. policy response. 

Election victory of Mr. Rouhani has revived a myth as old as that 

of the revolutionary theocracy itself, the myth of moderation. Were 

Mr. Rouhani a truly different kind of Iranian leader, he would insist that Iran and its terrorist subsidiary Hezbollah stop assisting 

the Assad regime to murder Syrians, he would end the repression 

of Iranians and fully comply with Iran’s nuclear obligations under 

international law. This optimism, however, may not be warranted. 

And indeed if his moderation is only aspirational on our part, 

Washington could easily allow Iran to solidify its grip on Syria and 

develop an irreversible nuclear capability. I would argue that it 

would be naive to expect a significant shift in the foreign and security policies of the Islamic republic. 

To summarize the conclusions of my written testimony: Number 

one, maintaining significant Iranian influence in Syria and expanding its nuclear weapons program are both strategic priorities for 

Tehran. In both cases Iran is successfully testing the red lines of 

the United States and the international community. 

Number two, Iran’s Supreme Leader handles Syria policy with 

operational control in the hands of Major General Qassem 

Suleimani, the Revolutionary Guard’s Quds Force commander. 

Most Iranian Presidents, including Rouhani, have little say over 

Tehran’s foreign and national security policies. The exception was 

former President Rafsanjani during his first term when Ali 

Khameni was still consolidating his position as the Supreme Leader. 

During the duration of the Syrian war, Mr. Rouhani has been the 

personal representative of the Supreme Leader to the Supreme National Security Council. In this role, if Mr. Rouhani has had any 

influence on the regime’s Syria policy then he has been complicit 

in the slaughter of tens of thousands of Syrians. 

Even if he has influence, Mr. Rouhani’s public statements reveal 

that his conspiratorial anti-American and anti-Israel positions on 

Syria are closely aligned with Iran’s Supreme Leader and the 

IRGC. His few statements against so-called extremism, terrorism 

and foreign interference reflect Assad’s position, which is to label 

the entire uprising against his rule as terrorism and not a genuine 

popular uprising. 

Unlike on the issue of Syria, Mr. Rouhani has been publicly critical of how his predecessors have conducted nuclear negotiations. 

15

His record, however, reveals that he has been a practitioner of nuclear deceit and suggests that he cannot be trusted on the Syria file 

either. 

Finally, if Mr. Rouhani wants to prove himself an influential and 

reliable interlocutor, he must end Iran’s nefarious military and financial activities in Syria. But let’s be clear, stopping the massacre 

of Syrian, Muslim and Christian women and children should not be 

rewarded with concessions, it should be the definition of moderation. 

U.S. policy should be designed to treat Iran-Syria nuclear policies 

in the same way that Tehran views them, as two sides of the same 

coin, and essential strategic elements of Iran’s dry for regional hegemony. Washington must respond to tangible action, not political 

rhetoric, and be cautious of opportunities for Rouhani to engage in 

strategic deceit at the proposed Geneva II conference on Syria and 

at the next round of diplomatic talks of the P5+1. 

U.S. policy should be designed to accomplish the following five 

objectives: Number one, resist diplomatic linkage between Iran’s 

nuclear program in Syria. Linkage will only give Tehran more concessions with which to trade and undercut our negotiating leverage 

over Iran’s nuclear program. 

Number two, massively intensify sanctions pressure on Iran. 

Right now is exactly the wrong time to be offering meaningful 

sanctions relief. 

Number three, enhance the credibility of military force. Targeted 

U.S. strikes against Iranian backed assets in Syria similar to what 

Israel has reportedly undertaken or through carefully vetted U.S. 

proxies will enhance Washington’s negotiating leverage on both the 

Syrian and nuclear tracks. 

Number four, avoid a negotiated settlement that allows Iran to 

retain a critical capability, either in the form of an Iranian backed 

Alawistan when industrial sized nuclear capacity of undetectable 

breakout. 

And finally, number five, resist the political pressure to sweeten 

the deal on the assumption that this will strengthen Mr. Rouhani’s 

moderate position in the Iranian political structure. 

We should not be negotiating with ourselves. Put the onus on 

Mr. Rouhani to demonstrate his influence in moderation. Only 

when Washington has reversed Iranian strategic gains on Syria 

and its nuclear program can there be any negotiated settlement 

that protects the security interest of the United States and its Middle Eastern allies. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dubowitz follows:]

16


82308b-1.eps

The Iran-Syria Nexus and its Implications 

for the Region 

Mark Dubowitz, Esq. 

Executive Director 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 

Hearing before the 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

Washington, DC 

July 31,2013 
17


82308b-2.eps

Mark Dubowitz July 31,2013 

Introduction 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and distinguished Members of the 

Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today about Iran's influence in Syria, 

U.S policy, and regional implications. 

Thank you for having this hearing specifically on the topic of the Iran-Syria nexus. The 

more we talk about Iran's machinations in Syria as a window into the soul of the Iranian 

regime, as well as its regional intentions, the better. The Iranian regime does not want the 

world to talk about its involvement in Syria. 

As we are only a few days away from the inauguration of Iranian President-elect Hassan 

Rouhani, I will focus my testimony on the consequences of his election for Iran's role in 

Syria, what Rouhani's past positions on the Syrian conflict and Iran's nuclear program 

reveal about possible policy changes, if any, under a new Iranian government, and 

recommendations for the appropriate U.S. policy response. 

Everyone who seeks a free and democratic Iran, a peaceful resolution to the ongoing war 

in Syria, and an end to the nuclear crisis with Tehran should welcome the end of the 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad era. But the election victory ofMr. Rouhani as the new president 

of the Islamic Republic of Iran has revived a myth as old as that of the revolutionary 

theocracy, itself: The myth of moderation. 

In Iran and abroad, Mr. Rouhani's electoral victory has created an atmosphere of 

optimism not seen since Mohammad Khatami's presidency (1997-2005), which ended in 

disappointment for those who believed Mr. Khatami would transform the Islamic 

Republic into a more moderate regime. 

It is understandable to hope that Mr. Rouhani's victory might usher in more freedom for 

Iran's brutalized people, and that his purportedly moderate policies might even lead him 

transform Tehran's policies on Syria and on Iran's nuclear program. Indeed, this is the 

real test of Mr. Rouhani's moderation. Were he a true moderate, he would insist that Iran 

and its terrorist subsidiary Hezbollah stop assisting the Assad regime to murder Syrians, 

free all political prisoners in Iran, end the brutality and repression of Iranians, and fully 

comply with its nuclear obligations under international law. 

This optimism, however, may not be warranted. And, if indeed, his moderation is 

aspirational on our part and not real when it comes to Syria or the nuclear file, crafting 

misguided policies that allow Iran to consolidate its grip on Syria, or pennit Iran to dash 

to a nuclear weapon, could be irreversible and a grave danger to the U.S. and our allies. 

While Iran's long suffering people and a weary international community are cheering 

desperately for Mr. Rouhani to emerge as a champion of moderation, he is likely to meet 

resistance from other power centers such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the 

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (lRGC). This was the fate of Mr. Khatami, who was 

politically emasculated by Khamenei and the lRGc. 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 
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82308b-3.eps

Mark Dubowitz July 31,2013 

But even if he could successfully exert influence over Iran's foreign policies, I regretfully 

would argue that Mr. Rouhani is not a moderate capable of forging genuine 

compromises, as an examination of his record will demonstrate. Rather, he is regime 

loyalist, and a master of nuclear deception, who has played an intimate role in the 

belligerent foreign policies of the Islamic Republic since its founding. As such, Mr. 

Rouhani can be expected to maintain course on two of the most troubling Iranian 

policies: the mass killings in Syria and the illicit nuclear program. 

The testimony concludes that: 

1. Mr. Rouhani will have little in±1uence on both the Syria and nuclear files, which, 

as two of the Islamic Republic ofTran's most important strategic priorities, remain 

in the hands of Iran's Supreme Leader. 

2. Mr. Rouhani is not a moderate on Iran's Syria policy; his public statements reveal 

that his worldview and positions on Syria are closely aligned with Iran's Supreme 

Leader and the IRGC. 

3. While Mr. Rouhani's nuclear track record reveals public disagreement with how 

his predecessors have conducted nuclear negotiations with the P5+ 1, he has been 

a practioner of nuclear deceit and subterfuge, who has misled the international 

community while relentlessly pursuing a nuclear weapons program. His nuclear 

track record suggests that he cannot be trusted to deliver on any Iranian 

commitment to end the bloodshed in Syria. 

4. There are concrete steps, however, that Mr. Rouhani can take on Syria if he wants 

to prove himself as a peaceful, reliable and transparent interlocutor with the 

international community. By taking seven specific steps to end Iran and 

Hezbollah's role in Syria, he could prove both his willingness and ability to depart 

from the policies of Khamenei and the lRGc. But stopping the massacre of Syrian 

Muslim and Christian women and children should not be rewarded with sanctions 

relief or any other concession. It should be the definition of moderation. 

5. US. policy should be designed to treat Iran's Syria and nuclear policies in the 

same way that Tehran views them: As two-sides of the same coin and essential 

strategic elements of Iran's drive for regional hegemony. But Washington must 

resist all efforts by Tehran to combine these two files in diplomatic talks and 

leverage one against the other in trading concessions. 

6. Only massively intensified pressure from Washington and its allies - through 

crippling sanctions, aggressive diplomacy, and the credible threat (and selective 

application) of force, either directly or through the support of allied proxies - can 

help Washington reverse the strategic gains that Tehran has made in both Syria 

and on its nuclear program. Only then can Washington possibly convert its 

leverage into any negotiated settlement on both fronts that protects the security 

interests of the United States and its Middle Eastern allies. 

Is President Rouhani Likely to be in Charge of Iran's Foreign and Security Policy? 

It would be naive to expect a significant shift in the foreign and security policies of the 

Islamic Republic because of the outcome of the presidential election. 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 

2 
19


82308b-4.eps

Mark Dubowitz July 31,2013 

With the exception of President Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's first term in office, a 

time when Ali Khamenei still was consolidating his position as the Supreme Leader, 

Iran's history does not provide any other example of presidents making strategic 

decisions on their own. Rather, the Supreme Defense Council in the 1980s and the 

Supreme National Security Council since the end of the Iran/Iraq war (1980-1988) have 

made all the strategic decisions. Tn the Supreme National Security Council, Supreme 

Leader Ali Khamenei and the TRGC, particularly the Quds Force, the extraterritorial 

operations branch of the Revolutionary Guards, dominate the executive branch. 

Iran's decision-making concerning Syria provides a case in point: 

The Iranian regime views Syria as a fundamental strategic priority, and, as a result, Syria 

policy is handled by Iran's Supreme Leader with operational control in the hands of 

Major General Qassem Suleimani, the Revolutionary Guards Quds Force commander. 

Suleimani has on numerous occasions made it clear to the United States military that he 

alone makes the final decisions with regard to Iran's policy in the Middle East and North 

Africa.! By comparison, President-elect Rouhani would have little say concerning 

Tehran's policy towards Syria. 

Hezbollah, a subsidiary of the lRGC, is a tool at Suleimani's disposal for Syria. 

Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, paid a visit to Tehran on April 29, 2013, on the eve 

of Hezbollah's offensive in Qusayr, which proved to be a key battle in reversing the 

momentum of the Syrian rebels. His visit underscored Syria's importance to the Supreme 

Leader. As my FDD colleague and Syria expert Tony Badran observed: "Nasrallah had to 

travel to Tehran and meet with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Quds Force 

commander Qassem Suleimani. There, he was reportedly told to go all in, regardless of 

the cost.,,2 

A reporter close to Hezbollah added that during this trip, Nasrallah received the necessary 

religious ruling from Khamenei for the Hezbollah offensive in Syria3 This is in keeping 

with the doctrine of l'ilayat-e faqih to which Hezbollah adheres, and which establishes 

Khamenei's primacy as the key decision-maker. No one consulted President Mahmoud 

Ahmadinejad, because, as the head of the executive branch, he has no say in strategic 

questions (and, by then, had fallen out of the Supreme Leader's favor). 

As Iran's president, Rouhani will defer to Khamenei and Suleimani on Syria policy, 

while busying himself with the diplomatic responsibility of presenting Iran's case to the 

world. 

1 "CENTCOM in 2010: Views [rom General David H. Petraeus," Institute [or the Study o[War. 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 

3 
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82308b-5.eps

Mark Dubowitz July 31,2013 

Is Hassan Rouhani a "Moderate" on Syria? 

Even if Mr. Rouhani can exert influence on the Islamic Republic's Syria policy, his 

record does not suggest that he would take it in a "moderate" direction. Mr. Rouhani is a 

supreme loyalist, and a true believer, who lived in Paris in exile with Ayatollah Ruhollah 

Khomeini and followed him to Iran in 1979. He was a political commissar in the regular 

military, where he purged some of Iran's finest officers. He was a member of the 

Supreme Defense Council responsible for the continuation of the Iran-Iraq War, at great 

cost in Iranian lives, even after Iran achieved its tenitorial goals. He rose to become both 

Iran's chief nuclear negotiator (2003 to 2005), under former Iranian presidents Akbar 

Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and his successor Mohammad Khatami (1997 to 2005), 

secretary of Iran's powerful Supreme National Security Council (1989 to 2005), and the 

representative of the Supreme Leader to the Secretary of the Supreme National Security 

Council (200S-present). 

As a trusted advisor to Khamenei, and, since 2005, the representative of the Supreme 

Leader to the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Mr. Rouhani remained 

a regime insider during the two-and-a-half years of Syria's bloody war, which began in 

2011. During this time, there is no indication from the public record that Mr. Rouhani 

fundamentally disagreed with the path charted by Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei 

and lRGC Quds Force leader Qassem Suleimani, Iran's operational commander in Syria. 

Foreign policy decision-makers in Washington and abroad have asked for patience before 

judging Mr. Rouhani's record. They point to Mr. Rouhani's election campaign rhetoric, 

as compared to his competitors, where Mr. Rouhani ran on a "policy of reconciliation and 

peace," and where, on the nuclear issue, he criticized nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili and 

Ahmadinejad for reckless diplomacy that united the international community in support 

of unprecedented global sanctions. 

However, in contrast to his public criticisms of the way in which Jalili and Ahmadinejad 

had conducted nuclear negotiations - and this is a question of style not substance as I'll 

make clear below - there is little evidence of similar criticisms by Rouhani of the 

regime's Syria policy. Rouhani's frequent and lengthy statements on Syria, including 

some issued during the election campaign, are revealing about how he will govern as 

president; his relative influence in the Iranian power structure, and his strategy in 

upcoming nuclear negotiations with the P5+ 1. 

These statements reveal a conspiratorial worldview not unlike that espoused by 

Khamenei and the TRGC; they provide no evidence of any disagreement with the Iranian 

regime's Syria policy; and they underscore the clear contradiction between Rouhani's 

sometimes less-belligerent rhetoric and his support for the regime's operational brutality. 

As my FDD colleague and Iranian scholar Ali Alfoneh has revealed through translations 

and analysis, Rouhani's statements on the Syria conflict depict a worldview, which is (1) 

based on a core conspiracy theory that all international affairs are controlled by Israel and 

the United States; (2) Iran-centric with a belief that Iran is the eternal victim of that 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 

4 
21


82308b-6.eps

Mark Dubowitz July 31,2013 

conspiracy; and, (3) largely corresponds with the worldview of Supreme Leader 

Khamenei and TRGC leaders. 

However, unlike the crude and offensive language of his predecessor Mahmoud 

Ahmadinejad, Rouhani is an effective strategic communicator, deploying soft and 

sophisticated language, where appropriate, to appeal to a global audience, and using 

social media tools such as Twitter and Facebook to amplify his message. 

Rouhani',~ Matements on Syria reflect an underManding of all international politic,~ as 

a conspiracy against Iran 

On October 28,20 II in an interview with the daily F'temad, Rouhani discussed the antigovernment uprising in Syria. 4 In the course of the interview, Rouhani depicted Syria as a 

regional anomaly rather than as part of the Arab Spring, or "Islamic Awakening," as it is 

called in the ot1icial Islarnic Republic parlance. "Developments in Syria are totally 

different than in other countries," Rouhani said. 5 "In all these countries, the revolt is 

against authoritarianism and foreign colonialism, but in Syria, the issue is sectarian 

This is why we are opposed to certain activities in Syria. We see that the neighboring 

countries are intervening, and such interventions are not desirable from our point of 

view.,,6 

Rouhani also elaborated on the motivations of external powers to intervene in the conflict 

in Syria, which he fundamentally depicted as an American and Israeli conspiracy aimed 

at undermining the "resistance" to Israel 7 Rouhani explained that the cont1ict in Syria, in 

reality, was a conspiracy against Iran. He argued that, as a result of the U.S. "failure" to 

Jadid-c Gharb Alayh-e Iran Be Revayat-c Doktor Hassan Ronhal1i," [The West's 

l'~.,, __ ;.~_.. Iran Dr. Rouhal1iJ. }o"temad (Iran), October 28,2011. 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 

5 
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82308b-7.eps

Mark Dubowitz July 31,2013 

mobilize a unanimous vote against Iran at the U.N. Security Council, and in light of the 

Arab Spring, which swept away Western allies in the Middle East and North Africa, 

Washington had no choice but to bring down the Assad government: 

"Their [the West's] main problem is that they are unsuccessful in the Security Council, 

meaning that they can't advance the sanctions against Iran as they wish," Rouhani said, 

adding, "As they are losing their allies in the region, we feel that the Zionists and the 

Americans are attacking the 'front of resistance' and countries which resist the 

Zionists .. "R 

Elaborating on the role of Israel, Rouhani said: "Behind the scenes, the Zionist pressure 

in the United States, is because Israel has lost its main friends in the region. [Egypt's 

Hosni] Mubarak and [Tunisia's Zine al-Abedine] Ben Ali were overthrown and in Jordan 

too the situation is not suitable ... The raid against the Israeli embassy in Egypt [in 2011] 

is a disaster for the Israelis. The Israelis see that what they have built in the past fitTeen or 

twenty years has all been lost.,,9 

As demonstrated below, Mr. Rouhani' s views echo those of the Supreme Leader and the 

IRGc. 

Roulutni's worldl'iew largely corresponds with tlte paranoid worldl'iew of Supreme 

Leader Ali Kltamenei, and tlte Ts/amic Rel'o/utionary Guards Corps (TRGL) 

Though otten described as moderate, Rouhani's perspective largely corresponds with the 

paranoid worldview of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the TRGC, and other hardliners. A 

few examples illustrate these similarities: 

Statement by Rouhani: "Developments in Syria are totally different than III other 

countries [which experience the' Islamic Awakening], .,,10 

Jadid-e GIl3lb A1ayh-e !ran Be Revayat-e Doktor Hassan Rouhani," [The West's 

Co Llsp,irwcy Jmn Dr. Rouhanil. E 'temad (Jmn). October 28.2011. 

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Similar statement hy SlqJreme leader Khamenei: "The essence of the 'Islamic 

Awakening' in the region is an anti-Zionist and anti-American movement, but in the 

events of Syria, the hand of the United States and Israel is visible.,,11 

Statement hy Rouhani: "As they are losing their allies in the region, we feel that the 

Zionists and the Americans are attacking the 'front of resistance' and countries which 

resist the Zionists .. ,,12 

Similar statement by 5,'upreme Leader Khamenei: "The reality of the atIairs in Syria is 

some governments led by the United States and some other powers waging a war per 

proxy against the government of Syria, aiming at securing the interests of the Zionist 

regime and dealing blows to the 'resistance' in the region."n 

Similar statement hy Brigadier General Ramezan 5'harif, Revolutionary Gllard~ l'uhiic 

Relations commander: "There is no doubt about the fact that the Guards considers Syria 

the frontline of 'the resistance ... ' Today, the Global Arrogance is trying to crush the 

frontline of the struggle against Arrogance, and the Islamic Republic of Iran considers 

this a threat to all Muslims ... Syria is paying the price for defending the Palestinian nation 

and defending all Muslims in the face of the 'tront of Arrogance.' It is natural that we 

support them and extend assistance to it." 14 

Statement by Rouhani: "Machinations of the West in Syria are conspiracies against 

Iran.,,)5 

Eslami Dar Keshvarha-ye Mantaqeh .... ' [The Essence of the Islamic Awakening 

l!lIefa-h'ie'W1ir-ye Dajiar-e Afaqam-e Afoazzam-e Rahbari (Iran), June 30, 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 

Iran Be Rcvayat -e Doktor Hassan Rouhani," rThc West's 

Dr. Rouhani J, }:"temad (lran), October 28, 2011. 

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Similar statement hy Major General Rahim Sqfcll'i (!l the mGc: "External enemies such 

as the United States and the Zionists - who are the sworn enemies of the revolution -

along with some Arab countries and Turkey, are trying to pressure Syria in an attempt to 

topple its government before the [presidential] election in Tran." 16 

Indeed, only a month after Rouhani issued a statement opposing terrorism and foreign 

interference inside Syria (more below on the real meaning of that statement), he publicly 

pledged his support for the Assad regime, and Hezbollah, reat11rrning that Iranian-Syrian 

ties will be able to confront "enemies in the region, especially the Zionist regime."l7 

As these examples demonstrate, Rouhani's worldview and statements do not differ 

significantly from those of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards. 

This does not bode well for the prospects of a more moderate Syria policy with Rouhani 

at the helm of the executive. 

Roulwni, like Khamenei and the TRGC sees Syria as a strategic priority where Tran's 

interests must he pursued relentles,~ly. 

Rouhani's rhetoric reveals several important insights into Syria's importance to the 

Iranian regime: First, the almost identical talking points, repeated across the board by 

regime ot11cials, suggests a strategic message crafted or approved by Khamenei and 

disseminated throughout Iran's power structure. Second, this message discipline, in turn, 

re±1ects the reality that Syria is a matter of the highest strategic importance for Khamenei 

and the Iranian regime as a whole. Third, in viewing Syria as the exception to the other 

Arab revolts - which they viewed as the overturning of the pro-American regional order 

and the toppling of U.S. regional allies - statements by Rouhani and other regime 

statements reveal that Iran's power elite regard Syria as a key front that they must defend 

in order to preserve their interests and continue the push for regional primacy. 

While Iran is made up of 34 provinces, Mehdi Taeb, a member of the Supreme Leader's 

inner circle, labeled Syria "the 35th district of Iran." Taeb went on to say that Syria "has 

greater strategic importance for Iran than Khuzestan," referring to one of Iran's outlying 

provinces. "If we lose Syria we will not even be able to keep Tehran." In other words, in 

the eyes of Iran's leaders, Syria is already a part of Iran.l~ 

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Iran's Syria policy and its nuclear policy are two sides of the same coin. They both 

represent essential components of the Iranian regime's drive for regional hegemony. In 

both cases, the regime is playing to win, while it may perceive, (not without justification) 

that its adversaries are simply playing not to lose. 

Rouhani ',~ statements on Syria reveal a clear contradiction between moderate rhetoric 

and operational brutality. 

Rouhani's more moderate-sounding statements on Syria need to be understood in a 

broader strategic context to understand their real meaning. This will help explain the 

striking contradiction between these statements and the regime's policy in Syria. 

Stopping the killing and conji'm/ting extremism and terrorism 

In June 2013, Rouhani said: "[Iran's] first priority is to stop the killings [in Syria] and 

confront extremismlterrorism ... ,,19 While this may appear to be a moderate statement, it 

actually echoes Assad's rhetoric, and is deliberately coded. It reflects Assad's position, 

which is to label the entire uprising against his rule as "terrorism." 

In November 2012, Rouhani said "The most important problem is the .. activities of 

terrorist groups in this country [Syria],,20 In reality, Iran is sending in the Iranian-backed 

terrorist group Hezbollah,21 Iranian-backed Iraqi militias,22 as well as units of its own 

IRGC23 to join the massacre against Syrian opposition forces and civilians. In a show of 

support for Hezbollah, Rouhani sent a cable just last week to Hezbollah leader Hassan 

Nasrallah praising the terrorist organization's "jihad" against Israel, adding further that 

Hezbollah is the "hope ... for victory against Israel.,,24 

Opposition to foreign interference in Syria: 

19 (o).HassanRouhani, "#Rouhani: #Syria has been/is at front with Israe1..our first priority is to stop killing, 

confront extremism/terrorism." TIYitter, June 3. 2013. 

Gozasht" [Iran Will Under No 

·/n.i>n;nn,_" Esfr<7te2chik (Iranl. November 13, 

Michael R. Gordon & Steven Lee Myers. "Iran and Hezbollah Support [or Syria Comphcates Peace-Talk 

" The New York Times. May 21, 2013. 

country). July 24. 

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Tn June 2013, Rouhani said: "We're opposed to ... foreign interference [in Syria].,,25 Tn 

reality, Tran's deployment of TRGC Ground Forces into Syria - Tran's internal security 

forces typically responsible for domestic operations inside Tran and which are rarely 

deployed abroad - is a notable expansion ofTran's military force beyond its borders26 

Tn October 2011, Rouhani chastised the Saudis who "pursue the overthrow of the Bashar 

government," because they are "displeased" with "consolidation" of Bashar al-Assad's 

rule in Syria. Rouhani also accused the Turkish government of miscalculating the balance 

of power in Syria,27 and lectured the Turks not to be "the advance guard of NATO, but 

take a position as a neighboring Muslim country,,,28 when dealing with the crisis in Syria. 

What Rouhani is suggesting, consistent with the Khamenei and the TRGC's position, is 

that Iran's regime is opposed to any interference other than its own (or Russia's), which 

is designed to ensure Assad's survival. They want to ensure that Syria remains their 

exclusive sphere of int1uence. 

Operational support.for the continued massacre of Syrians 

While remaining the personal representative to the Supreme Leader on Iran's most 

powerful foreign policy and national security body, Rouhani has been complicit in the 

slaughter of tens of thousands of Syrians. Iran has armed29 and trained30 thousands of 

Syrian regime forces and paramilitary auxiliaries. In recent months, Iran has significantly 

stepped up military support to Assad, a fact acknowledged by Iraq's foreign minister who 

25 (ojHassanRonhanL "The ones who should decide future of $Syria are Syrian people themselves. We're 

to terrorism aud foreign #inlerference." Twiller, June 17, 

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noted that Iranian flights are using Iraqi air space to bring military aid to Assad. 31 

Without such support, it is unlikely that Assad could sustain the fight 32 

There is no evidence that Rouhani disagrees with his Supreme Leader and the 

Revolutionary Guards on the importance of advancing Iranian primacy in the region, 

especially in Syria. Rouhani appears to be in full agreement that Syria is the key 

battleground, and a critical element of the regional balance of power. 

Maintaining sign!ficant lranian influence in Syria and expanding its nuclear weapons 

program are both strategic priorities for Tehran. 

Much like Iran's determination to expand its role within Syria, the expansion of its illicit 

nuclear weapons program is also a key Iranian strategic priority. The Iranian regime's 

strategy is to establish facts on the ground in pursuit of an end game, which it can use to 

further its goal of regional hegemony. Its nuclear policy is predicated on reaching critical 

nuclear capability, with an industrial-size nuclear program, and undetectable breakout to 

multiple nuclear weapons. In pursuit of this goal, in violation of multiple UN Security 

Council resolutions, IAEA demands, and U.S. and international sanctions, it continues to 

enrich uranium at Natanz and Fordow, install thousands of new, advanced and more 

etlicient centrifuges, engage in suspicious activities with respect to a heavy-water reactor 

at Arak, and refuses to disclose to the IAEA the military dimensions of its nuclear 

program. 

Iran has publicly identified Syria as vital to its geopolitical interests. Tehran violates U.S. 

and European sanctions and heads off UN sanctions by relying on the veto power of 

Russia and China, while relentlessly pursuing its interests through the financing and 

arming of the Assad regime and an extensive on-the-ground operational support structure 

and robust proxy network controlled by the IRGC's Quds Force. 

In both cases, in Syria and through its nuclear program, Iran is successfully testing the 

red lines of the United States and the international community. 

What we can learn about Rouhani's Syria strategyfrom c.'((lmining his nuclear record. 

Given the parallels between Iran's Syria and nuclear policies, it is instructive to examine 

Rouhani's record as Iran's lead negotiator with the EU3 - Britain, France and Germany -

from 2003 to 2005. It is a record of deception rather than moderation, and is helpful in 

assessing whether Rouhani should be trusted to end Tehran's development of its illicit 

nuclear weapons program, and deliver on an Iranian commitment to end his regime's 

sizable contribution to the bloodshed in Syria. 

2013. 

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Ahmadinejad, and Iran's most recent nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, were infamous for 

their bluntness. By contrast, Rouhani has masterfully wielded temperate rhetoric to the 

same end: the expansion of Iran's nuclear program. In 2004, Rouhani described Iranian 

nuclear policy as a twin strategy of "confidence-building and ... build[ing] up our technical 

capability," with the goal of "cooperating with Europe" in order to divide Europe from 

the United StatesJJ He further described this approach as key to the development of a key 

nuclear facility: "While we were talking with the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing 

equipment in parts of the nuclear conversion facility in Isfahan. By creating a calm 

environment, we were able to complete the work there."J4 

Rouhani's media savvy deputy at the Supreme National Security Council, Seyed Hossein 

Mousavian, described this as the "widen the transatlantic gap" strategy35 In the third 

presidential debate of the most recent election, in a discussion on Iran's nuclear program, 

Rouhani bragged that Iran was able to "import foreign technology from abroad," and 

stressed that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei guided his nuclear diplomacy. J(, 

In 2008, former Khatami administration spokesman Abdollah Ramezanzadeh described 

Rouhani's nuclear strategy during a panel debate covered by Iran's Fars News Agency: 

"During the confidence-building era we entered the nuclear club, and despite the 

suspension [of uranium enrichment], we imported all the materials needed for our nuclear 

activities of the country ... The solution is to prove to the entire world that we want the 

power plants for electricity. Afterwards we can proceed with other activities ... ,,17 

Ramezanzadeh further elaborated on Iran's strategy: "As long as we were not subjected to 

sanctions, and during our negotiations we could import technology, we should have 

negotiated for so long, and benefited from the atmosphere of negotiations to the extent 

that we could import all the technology needed. The adversary wanted the negotiations to 

come to a dead end and initiate a new phase. But we wanted to continue negotiations 

until the U.S. would be gone from the circle ofnegotiations.,,38 

Ramezanzadeh summed it up this way: "We had one overt policy, which was one of 

negotiation and confidence building, and a covert policy, which was continuation of the 

activities .. .in the field of confidence building, Japan is the most advanced country in the 

world but Japan can produce a nuclear bomb in less than a week. ,,39 

" A. Savyon, "Iran's Nnclear Policy Crisis," The Afiddle East Aledia Research Institute. September 21. 

2004. (http://www.memri.orgireport/en/0/0/0/0/010/1222.hun) 

31 Dr. Chen Kane, "Nuclear Decision-Making in Iran: A Rare Glimpse." Hrandeis lfniversitv. May 2006. 

Alunari. "Chronic Antagonists." The July 20. 2012. 

(http://online.wsj.eom/article/SBl0001424052702304022004577514852558385294.ht1nl) 

3(. "Third Televised Debate of the Presidential Elections in Iran." Halllshahroi Online. Jtme 13.2013. 

"Ramezanzadeh: The Behind the Scenes Policy of the Khatami Administration was the Continnation of 

(Iran), June 14, 200K 

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Indeed, it was during the "moderate" presidencies of Rafsanjani and Khatami that Iran 

moved ahead in planning and development of key components of its nuclear program, 

including clandestine facilities at Natanz and Arak. Rouhani was secretary of Iran's 

Supreme National Security Council during the planning or construction of these key 

facilities. In the case of the Fordow enrichment site, another clandestine enrichment 

facility only declared when the Iranians were caught red-handed, there is a dispute 

between Iran and the IAEA on the timing of the construction of the site. The TAEA has 

not accepted Iran's declaration that it started construction of Fordow in 2007. The IAEA 

alleges that there was evidence of construction between 2002 and 2004, which then 

resumed in 200640 

In that case, the decision to build Fordow also occurred when Rouhani was still on the 

Supreme National Security Council. Tn none of these cases, notwithstanding Rouhani's 

claims of transparency with respect to Iran's nuclear program, did he or any ofIran's top 

otlicials voluntarily disclose the existence of these clandestine facilities as required under 

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. On the contrary, they hid them from the IAEA. 

In supporting the argument for Rouhani's moderation, much is made of his role in Iran's 

decision to temporarily suspend uranium enrichment in 2004, and, even, it is, claimed in 

temporarily terminating Iran's clandestine weaponization activities 41 But it is worth 

remembering that this decision was not only a diplomatic feint to head off sanctions 

while importing nuclear technology, and constructing covert facilities. It likely was also 

inspired by a genuine fear that President George W. Bush would target Tehran after 

quickly disposing of Sad dam and the Iraqi military in 2003. 

This suggests that, perhaps, only the credible threat of U. S. military force in support of 

the Syrian opposition and/or against Iran's nuclear program could possibly shift the 

calculus of the Iranian regime. 

Testing Rouhani's Intentions 

Roulumi can demonstrate that he is willing to depart from the regime's policies 

through a series of concrete steps. 

Rouhani has a long career as a regime loyalist who has been a faithful servant to both of 

Iran's Supreme Leaders. If Rouhani wants to prove himself as a peaceful, reliable and 

transparent interlocutor with the international community, Syria presents an opportunity 

to prove both his willingness and ability to depart from the policies of Khamenei, 

Suleimani and the TRGC. There are at least seven ways he must do that: 

40 International Atomic Energy Agency. "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant 

provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006). 1747 (2007), IXOJ (200X). and IXJ5 (200X) in the 

Islamic o[]raI~" the Direelor General, 16 November 2009. 

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Mark Dubowitz July 31,2013 

1) Ceasefimding a/military a~sistanee andfinaneing to S'yria. 

Iran continues to supply Assad with military assistance and financing estimated at $500 

million a month, according to opposition sources 42 Iran has also extended a credit line to 

the Assad regime valued at $4 billion with the possibility of an additional $3 billion. 4J 

2) Cease training of5,'yrian regular and non-regularforees in iran 

The Syrian government is sending members of its irregular militias for guerrilla combat 

training at a base in Iran. Iran is helping to train at least 50,000 militiamen and aims to 

increase the force to 100,00044 

3) Remove alliRGCfurcesfrum Syria. 

Iran's lRGC Ground Forces and lRGC Quds Force services are advising and assisting the 

Syrian military in order to preserve Assad's hold on power. 45 While the Guards Corps 

and the Quds Forces typically operate separately - with the Guard Corps focusing on 

internal Iranian affairs and the Quds Forces exerting Iranian influence beyond its borders 

- both anned wings of Iran appear to be working together in the case of Syria. 

IRGC Quds Force Commander, Major General Qassem Suleimani, plays a prominent 

role in Iran's Syria policy. After his recent defection, former Syrian Prime Minister Riad 

Hijab said that, "Syria is occupied by the Iranian regime The person who runs the 

country is not Bashar aI-Assad but Qassem Suleimani, the head of Iranian regime's Quds 

Force.,,46 The extent of the Quds Force's involvement in Syria became clearer in 

February 2013 when high-ranking Iranian Brigadier General Hassam Shateri was 

assassinated in the Damascus countryside while traveling to Beirut, after having traveled 

to AleppoH 

"Martyrdom of the Head of the Lebanon Reconstmction Committee by the 

Mercenaries:' AHNA. Febmary 13, 2013. (lillJ).:.iiDJJ.na.cQlQi:l!il.8SlLZlilDlC1 &iQ'C2.'!.E;i!uJ 

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Mark Dubowitz July 31,2013 

The TRGC Ground Forces are also involved in the mission inside Syria to support the 

Assad regime. Following the January 2013 release of 48 Tranian nationals kidnapped near 

Damascus, it was revealed that, among those released, were high-ranking current 

commanders of the TRGC Ground Forces. 48 

-/) Prohihit the transler of technology and material to S'yria that is used to repress the 

Syrian people. 

A number of U. S. Department of the Treasury designations in 2012 indicate that Iranian 

intelligence organizations have been involved in the effort to suppress anti-regime 

protests throughout Syria. The organizations designated included the Law Enforcement 

Forces (LEF), the Ministry of Tntelligence and Security (MOTS), and the large defense 

contractor Iran Electronics Industries (IEI).49 

5) instruct Nasrallah to remove Hezbollahforcesfrom Syria. 

Hezbollah, with assistance from the IRGC Quds Forces, is training government and proAssad forces inside Syria, 50 sending its fighters into Syria to confront the Sunni 

opposition,51 and facilitating the passage of Iranian arms shipments to Syria52 Hezbollah 

militants participate in a number of direct support activities in Syria, including sniper and 

counter-sniper operations, facility and route protection, joint clearing operations, and 

direct engagement with opposition forces, often in coordination with Syrian forces and 

pro-government militias. 53 

6) Stop the recruitment of iraqi Shi 'a militias for the Syrian war. 

Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi'a militias, including Kata'ib Hezbollah and Asa'ib Ahl al Haqq, 

have established close relations with the IRGC Quds Force and are also fighting in Syria 

in support of Assad. Iraqi Shi'a leaders told The New York Times, in October 2012, that 

Iran assisted in the recruitment, transportation, armament, and payment of Shi'a fighters 

travelling to Syria from Iraq. According to the report, some Iraqi Shi 'a fighters are 

U.S. Department Press Release, "Treasury Designates Iranian Ministry o[Intelligence 

and Sccurity [or Human Rights Abuscs and [or Terrorism," February 16, 2012. 

U.S. Department of the Treasury. Press Release, "Treasury Designates Syrian Entity, Others Involved in 

Arms and C.ommunications Procurement Networks and Identifies Blocked Iranian Aircraft." September 19, 

2() 12. (111111://\I/1,V\". .trCJsun;, go\-/prcss-centcr/prcss-re!('ases/Pages/tg 1714,8Spx) 

53 Matthe,,,, Levitt. "The Hezbo11ah Connection in Syria and Iran," Council on horeign Relation">', February 

15, 2 () 13. (bI1I'LlYW\'t<m:gljIimiJ.lQ.bo 11<1 h::.<;lli!!l~0jsm5y.rj.il: i fa l1i pl!1llil.=1) 

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traveling to Tehran before being flown into Damascus, while others are being transported 

from Najaf, Iraq into Syria54 

7) Cease [ranian expansionism inside Syria. 

Iran is fighting to preserve its interests in Syria. Arab media outlets have reported 

recently that Iran is seeking to ethnically alter the landscape of the Middle East by 

granting Syrian nationality to 750,000 Shiites from throughout the Middle East. The 

reports also state that Tehran is spending billions of dollars to purchase land in Syria. 55 

Iran's offensive in Syria demonstrates that Tehran will use force, diplomacy, economics, 

and covert action to advance its interest, even if it's at the level of a "Plan Boo - to 

preserve what my FDD colleague Tony Badran has called an Iranian-backed "Alawistan" 

enclave in Western Syria, from the Alawite heartland to Damascus via Horns, adjoined to 

Hezbollah in Lebanon. 56 

These are seven steps that Rouhani can take to demonstrate that he is a different kind of 

Iranian leader. But stopping the massacre of Syrian Muslim and Christian women and 

children should not be rewarded with sanctions relief or any other concession. It should 

be the definition of moderation. 

U.S. Policy Options 

U.S. policy options must be flexible enough with the new Iranian government to take 

advantage of diplomatic openings but sufficiently hardheaded to avoid falling into the 

traps set by Iran's Supreme Leader and his new president. 

Rouhani's record on Syria reveals a hardliner who is committed to the regime's Syria 

policy. However, he also is a sophisticated communicator and may end up being a 

godsend for the Supreme Leader, who can now offer up a more soft-spoken, 

cosmopolitan, and diplomatic president. Rouhani's task will be to convince the West to 

ease sanctions, limit its involvement in the Syria conflict, and not resort to military force 

against Iran's nuclear weapons program, even while Khamenei is unprepared to 

fundamentally change his Syria policy or relinquish his nuclear program. 

The reality is that Rouhani is only the most moderate of the eight hardline candidates 

who were hand selected by Khamenei to run in Iran's recent election. And even if he 

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truly were committed to a change in Tran's Syria policy or to nuclear reconciliation, 

Rouhani, like Ahmadinejad, lacks the power to alter Iran's traj ectory in these two foreign 

policy areas, which are strategic priorities for the regime. Khamenei remains in charge of 

both Iran's Syria and nuclear policies. 

U.S. policy must be based on tangible action not political rhetoric. While it is reasonable 

to test the intentions ofRouhani and his ability to influence Khamenei and the IRGC, U.S 

policymakers must be cautious of two opportunities for Rouhani to engage in strategic 

deceit while advancing Iran's interests: The proposed "Geneva II" conference on Syria 

and the next round of diplomatic talks with the P5+ I. Tn both cases, Khamenei will likely 

allow Rouhani to engage in negotiations. If Rouhani starts sounding too conciliatory, 

Khamenei will blame his new president for selling out Tran's interests. 

But he also could allow Rouhani to rope-a-dope the international community by offering 

a deal on both Syria and Iran's nuclear program designed to undercut international 

pressure. Tehran may try again to persuade the P5+ 1 to tie Syria and Iran's nuclear 

program together as a combined tile in the diplomatic negotiations 57 This ploy always 

must be rejected; it is an attempt to expand the scope of the P5+ 1 negotiations over its 

nuclear program so that it can trade Syrian concessions in exchange for relief on 

sanctions tied to its nuclear program. It could also be an Iranian attempt to otTer nuclear 

concessions in exchange for sanctions relief, linked to an agreement by the Western 

powers to recognize Iranian hegemony in Syria and elsewhere in region. 

OtTers on Syria and on its nuclear program, if presented by Rouhani as a step toward 

"reconciliation and peace," may be enough to tie up the West for sufficient time for 

Tehran to support a complete, or partial, victory by Assad that, at a minimum, would set 

up an Iranian-backed enclave in Syria - "Alawistan"S8 - on Iranian tenns; maintain 

territorial contiguity with Hezbollah in Lebanon; protect its interests through a network of 

reliable proxies even in the case of a de facto partition of Syria; undennine international 

support for sanctions; get Iranian oil flowing again; stabilize the Iranian economy; and, 

even help Rouhani deliver on his election promises. But because the stakes are so high at 

this critical time, U.S. policymakers need to be wary of any offers that do not sufficiently 

arrest Iran's influence in Syria or its nuclear weapons development. 

Iran's new president will negotiate to widen the gap between the members of the U.N. 

Security Council, and other interested countries, on both Syria and Iran's nuclear 

program. He will remain focused on objectives that he, Khamenei, Rafsanjani, Khatami, 

Ahmadinejad, and the Revolutionary Guards have been committed to for years: 

57 Helene Cooper and Mark Landlcr, "U.S. Officials Say Iran Has Agreed to Nuclear TaIks.·' New York 

Times, October 20,2012. 

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(I) Maintaining Iran's presence in Syria as a vital strategic area of influence, either 

through Assad, or through a new pliant Syrian leader, backed by Hezbollah, the Quds 

Force and other Iranian-backed militias; and, 

(2) Playing for time in order to reach an industrial-size nuclear weapons capacity and a 

nuclear breakout, which will allow Iran, without detection, to produce enough weaponsgrade uranium or separated plutonium for one or more bombs. 

To .~trengthen the U.S. policy options on both the positions on Syria and Iran's nuclear 

program, the Obama administration should: 

I. Resist pressure to broaden the P5+ 1 diplomatic negotiations over Iran's nuclear 

program to include Syria, or any other disputed issue. 

2. Massively intensify sanctions pressure on Iran to enhance its political leverage. It is 

premature to be otIering meaningful sanctions relief or any other concessions, including 

on Syria, to Iran before Tehran has satisfied all of its nuclear obligations under 

international law. 

3. Massively intensify sanctions pressure on any person assisting the Assad regime, Iran, 

Hezbollah, or Iranian-backed militias in circumventing U.S. sanctions, while also 

imposing sanctions on any person providing support to extremist Sunni elements in Syria. 

Accelerate the designation of extremist elements on both sides of the Syria conflict and 

sanctions persons in Russia, Qatar, Turkey and elsewhere supporting these designated 

entities. 

4. Enhance the credibility of military force against Iran's nuclear program and against the 

Iranian Quds Force, Hezbollah, and Iranian-backed militias. Selective and targeted U.S 

strikes against Iranian-backed assets in Syria, similar to what Israel has reportedly 

undertaken, or through carefully vetted US. proxies, will send a signal of increased 

American resolve and enhance Washington's negotiating leverage on both the Syrian and 

nuclear tracks. 

5. Avoid a negotiated settlement, at a Geneva 11 conference or during the P5+ I nuclear 

talks, that allows Iran to retain a "critical capability" on either the Syrian and nuclear 

tracks. It will be tempting to make concessions on Iranian demands that are presented by 

Tehran as non-negotiable (for example, some type of international recognition of Iranian 

control, directly or indirectly, of "Alawistan" territories at a peace conference, or Iranian 

demands for the P5+ 1 to concede a "right of enrichment" or retain domestic enrichment). 

Despite the urgency of resolving the Syria crisis and rolling-back Iran's nuclear program, 

a "bad deal" is worse than no deal. It will only embolden the regime, undercut the 

reliability of American leadership in the region, and reduce Washington's leverage when 

it invariably has to address the harmful results of these agreements. 

6. Resist the political pressure to "sweeten the deal" on the assumption that this will 

strengthen Rouhani's "moderate" position in the Iranian political structure. We should 

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not be negotiating with ourselves. Rouhani must be judged by the results he delivers, not 

the political rhetoric he espouses. If he is a moderate, with the requisite influence inside 

the regime, he must demonstrate that he is a different Iranian leader by taking the 

concrete steps outlined above to decrease Iranian involvement in the Syrian war. If he is a 

moderate, he must agree to meet all of Iran's nuclear obligations as outlined in multiple 

UN Security Council and IAEA board of governors' resolutions. The nuclear file must 

remain the US. priority: IfIran already feels emboldened to act with relative freedom in 

pursuit of its interests in Syria, its ability to act with impunity once it has a nuclear 

weapons capability will be catastrophic for the region and US. national security. 

Conclusion 

Iran's Syria policy and nuclear policies are two sides of the same coin and essential 

strategic elements of Iran's drive for regional hegemony. Iran does not view these two 

policies separately; neither should the United States. But Washington should resist all 

etJorts by Tehran to combine these two files in any diplomatic talks and leverage one 

against the other in trading concessions. 

Washington should remain skeptical of the intentions and influence of Iran's new 

president, Hassan Rouhani. His record is not encouraging on either the Syria or nuclear 

track. Mr. Rouhani is a loyalist of Iran's Supreme Leader and a master of diplomatic 

deceit and doesn't appear to be the elusive moderate who will get the United States any 

closer to rolling back Iranian influence in Syria, or stopping Iran's nuclear drive. Syria 

and nuclear policy remain in the hands of the Supreme Leader who has shown no 

willingness to compromise. 

Washington should test the new Iranian president by focusing on results not rhetoric. The 

Obama administration must look for signs of diplomatic opportunity but remain deeply 

cautious that the Iranian election has changed anything with respect to Tehran's Syria or 

nuclear policies. Today, Washington's leverage on both files is waning as the trajectories 

of the Syrian contlict and of Iran's nuclear program continue to beat Western economic 

and political pressure. The perception is that Iran is playing to win while the United 

States is playing not to lose. This makes a diplomatic resolution in America's favor 

increasingly remote on both files. 

Only massively intensified pressure - through sanctions, aggressive diplomacy, and the 

credible threat (and selective application) of force, either directly or through the support 

of American proxies - can help the US. reverse the strategic gains that Tehran has made 

in both Syria and on its nuclear program. Only then can Washington possibly convert 

enhanced leverage into a negotiated settlement that protects the security interests of 

America and its Middle Eastern allies. 

On behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, I thank you for the opportunity 

to testify today. 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 

19 
36

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Dr. Brumberg.

STATEMENT OF DANIEL BRUMBERG, PH.D., SENIOR PROGRAM 

OFFICER, CENTER FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, UNITED 

STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE 

Mr. BRUMBERG. Thank you very much. Good afternoon, Ranking 

Member Deutch and other members. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Turn on your mic. 

Mr. BRUMBERG. So sorry, I am going to start again. Good afternoon, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch and other 

members of this subcommittee. I am honored to have this opportunity to testify today before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa. 

Today I would like to place the question of Iran’s relations with 

Syria and Lebanon’s Hezbollah in a wider framework. Indeed, the 

question I will address is how the June 14th election of Hassan 

Rouhani to the presidency might shape Iranian foreign policy or aspects of it. I should emphasize that the views expressed in this testimony represent my own assessment and do not reflect the positions of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not take 

policy positions. 

Both before and after his election Rouhani stated that he and his 

new government would strive to regain the trust of citizens at 

home and to rebuild Iran’s frayed relations abroad. By ‘‘reform’’ 

Rouhani seems to mean opening space for the return of those political leaders and groups that were previously excluded from politics 

and ensuring that these groups and the wider populace of some 

basic civil rights. But he also argues that pursuing these domestic 

goals requires diminishing international conflicts that former President Ahmadinejad and his hard line allies used to justify repressing the reformists. Rouhani and his allies appear to believe that reducing international tensions will facilitate a reopening of the domestic political arena. 

The chances of Rouhani achieving limited success in the domestic 

front are not bad. If only because a wide spectrum of groups, including some in the so-called principalist camp that had supported 

the former President, now argue that reviving the economy and regaining the people’s trust are vital to reviving the Islamic Republic’s battered legitimacy. 

But on the international front, moving from confrontation with 

the West to real cooperation will face significant obstacles. Those 

obstacles include ultra hard liners who are loath to see the 

reformists use success on the international stage to strengthen 

their popularity at home. 

Given the influence of these hard liners, Rouhani and his allies 

are unlikely to depart from the national consensus regarding national security issues. Thus he will not risk provoking retaliation 

from hard liners and certainly the Supreme Leader by advocating 

a fundamental change in Iran’s approach to Syria or Hezbollah. 

But even as he pays close attention to these red lines, Rouhani will 

probably continue looking for opportunities to promote a more flexible foreign policy, one that might ease the political situation at 

home. 

37

My bottom line is this: While the U.S. should be cautious we 

should not dismiss such efforts out of hand or take actions that inadvertently reinforce opponents of the political opening. We should 

instead test Rouhani and his government, pushing I believe for a 

Palestinian-Israeli deal I still think is important and pursuing negotiations on comprehensive nuclear agreement might offer two 

tests. How Rouhani and his new government might respond to such 

tests is unclear. The fact that he has nominated former Iranian 

U.N. Ambassador Javad Zarif to be Foreign Minister and he has 

nominated impressive technocrats to take charge of economic policy 

are both fairly encouraging signs. 

Now these developments reflect long-term social and political dynamics. Indeed reformists and moderate leaders from the 

principalist camp itself have been trying to seek an alliance as far 

back as 1999. Among other reasons they sought this alliance in a 

bid to repair the economic damage to Iran that resulted from the 

previous policies of Ahmadinejad. Rouhani and his allies have stated that advancing these economic reform agendas will require a 

new engagement with the West and quite possibly with the U.S. 

One key objective in pursuing engagement will be to remove 

international sanctions, but division in an agenda that Rouhani favors is larger than that. To reiterate, Rouhani and his allies see 

success at the home front as depending partly on success abroad. 

Rouhani’s previous role as chief negotiator on the nuclear issue 

gives him some credibility, certainly at home. Moreover, the fact 

that Rouhani and his allies hold that moving or mitigating international sanctions is crucial to advancing their domestic agenda 

suggests an opening for U.S. diplomacy. 

The U.S. wants to make progress on crucial security issues, particularly the nuclear question, but it also is important to encourage 

realistic changes for a reopening of Iran’s political arena. After 

years of repression Iran’s reformist leaders and the wider electorate which elected Rouhani gave praise to such domestic change. 

But they also know that the struggle for change will take years 

and will only come through making accommodations at home. 

It is in the interest of the U.S. to find ways to make the task 

of long-term political change possible in Iran while addressing our 

fundamental security interests. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Dr. Brumberg. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brumberg follows:]

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United States Institute of Peace 

An independent institution established by Congress to strengthen the nation's capacity 

to promote peaceful resolution to international conflicts 

liThe Iran-Syria Nexus and Its Implications for the Region" 

Testimony before the 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa 

Daniel Brumberg 

United States Institute of Peace 

July 31, 2013 

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39


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Good afternoon, Chainnan Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch and other Members 

of the Subcommittee. I am honored to have this opportunity to testify today before the House 

Foreign AtTairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa. 

My objective here today is to address how the June 14,2013 election of Hassan Rouhani 

to the presidency of Iran might reshape that country's foreign policy and, in turn, affect Iran's 

relations with Syria and Hezbollah. The views expressed in this testimony represent my own 

analytical assessment, and do not renect the positions of the United States Institute of Peace 

(USIP), which does not take policy positions, or of Georgetown University, where I am CoDirector of Democracy and Governance Studies. 

Rouhani's Election and the Nexus of Domestic and Foreign Policy 

Both before and after his election, President Rouhani has stated that his new government 

will regain the trust of Iran's citizens at home, and rebuild Iran's frayed relations abroad. He has 

called for domestic "reform," by which he seems to mean the renewed inclusion of political 

leaders and groups that were previously excluded from politics and the provision of some basic 

civil rights to these groups. He has also arb'lled that pursuing these domestic goals requires 

diminishing international connicts that fonner President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his hardline allies used to justity the repression of Iran's Reformists. Thus, Rouhani and many of his 

allies seem to envision a more nexible foreign policy that would reduce international tensions 

sufficiently to enact these domestic reforms 

The chances that Rouhani will achieve some limited success on the domestic front are 

good, if only because a wide spectrum of groups -- including some within the "Principlist" camp 

that had previously supported Ahmadinejad -- now argue that reviving Iran's economy and 

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regaining the trust of the people are vital to reviving the Islamic Republic's battered legitimacy. 

However, Rouhani and his allies are unlikely to depart from the overall national consensus 

regarding security issues. If Rouhani seeks to move away from confrontation with the West to 

engagement and cooperation, he is likely to face significant domestic obstacles. These obstacles 

include ultra-hardliners who are loathe to see moderate rivals use success on the international 

stage to strengthen their popularity at home. Rouhani is unlikely to risk provoking retaliation 

from hard-liners - and the Supreme Leader - by advocating a fundamental change in Iran's 

approach to Syria or Hezbollah. But even as he pays close attention to these red lines, Rouhani 

will probably continue looking for opportunities to promote a more flexible foreign policy - one 

that in tum might ease the political situation at home. 

My bottom line is this: while the United States should be cautious, we should not dismiss, 

out-of-hand, opportunities to engage Rouhani or take actions that undercut Rouhani or 

inadvertently reinforce opponents of a political opening. Instead, the United States should test 

him and his new government and see whether a negotiated settlement is possible. Pushing for a 

Palestinian-Israeli deal and pursuing negotiations on the nuclear issue could offer two such tests, 

as I will explain below. 

Rouhani's Surprise Victory 

In order to identify opportunities for United States policy it is important to understand the 

social and political struggles that set the stage for Rouhani's surprising June 14, election victory. 

These dynamics can be summed up as follows: 

1. Rouhani's election owes much to the "boomerang" effect of the repression visited 

upon the Green Movement following June 2009 elections. Although Ahmadinejad and 

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his hard-line allies succeeded in shutting down the Green Movement, their repressive 

policies produced two unintended consequences. First, these policies reinforced the 

determination of political leaders who had once been part of the system itself, such as 

former Presidents Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani, to forge common strategies for 

reviving the push for political form. Second, they generated a widespread legitimacy 

crisis for the regime itself. This legitimacy crisis induced some leaders in the Principlist 

Camp who had previously supported Ahmadinejad to break with him, and to start 

envisioning how the political system might be reopened to forces formerly excluded from 

it. One of these leaders was Rouhani himself. 

2. The regime's legitimacy crisis was compounded by the negative effects of 

Ahmadinejad's disastrous economic policies, which were amplified by international 

sanctions. The negative effects of the welfare, fiscal and pseudo-privatization policies 

pursued by Ahmadinejad exacted high costs for important business groups. Indeed, many 

Principlists who had previously backed Ahmadinejad now assailed him for his 

"bombastic" language. That language, they claimed, had helped to isolate Iran and justify 

onerous sanctions, thus undennining their own business interests. This critique linked the 

domestic struggle against the hard-liners to the international arena. Indeed, many 

refonnists argue that their capacity to push for sound economic policies required getting 

rid of sanctions. 

3. The 2013 elections opened a chance to widen the anti-Ahmadinejad alliance. Tn the 

lead-up to last month's election, influential Principlists such as Nateq Nour (who had run 

against Khatami in the 1997 presidential election), prominent reformists such former 

Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami, and Hassan Khomeini (grand-son of Ayatollah 

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Khomeini), joined ranks to support Rouhani's candidacy. Rouhani's bold challenge to his 

three Principlist opponents in national TV debates cemented a last minute surge of 

popular support. In what must have been a surprise to Rouhani himself, he slipped past 

the remaining divided field of Principlists with 50.7 percent of the 36 million votes cast, a 

turnout of 72.7 percent. 

The Wider Social and Political Significance of Rouhani's Election 

What can we expect from Rouhani and the new government he is assembling? First, it is 

important to recognize that Rouhani's election was in some senses a fluke, partly brought on by 

the hubris of his rivals. Moreover, past official positions, statements or writings are not clear 

guides to his emerging foreign policy orientations. However, by considering the evolving social, 

political and economic conditions that helped make his election possible, we can begin to make 

some educated guesses about what Rouhani' s domestic and global agendas might look like, and 

the steps he might take to advance them. 

In the domestic arena: 

1. Rouhani will try to respond to the reenergized electorate that propelled him into the 

presidency, while trying to reassure hard-liners that his reforms are consonant with 

the overall interests of the Islamic Republic. His efforts to walk this fine line will be 

risky: Rouhani will probably seek to revive the mechanisms and norms of popular 

representation that the hard-liners had previously tried to strip away. But he will do so 

knowing that hard-liners might try to shut down another effort at internal reform. 

2. In balancing popular expectations and hard-line pressures, Rouhani will have to 

accommodate the Supreme Leader Khamenei, or at least gain his tacit acquiescence 

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to his policy initiatives. This will not be easy because Rouhani represents social and 

political interests that are distinct from those of the Khamenei and some of his closest 

allies. Still, the Khamenei was not only surprised by Rouhani's last minute surge: 

Khamenei was probably unwilling to intervene lest he preside over a repeat of June 2009 

and thus further erode the regime's legitimacy. Thus Khamenei may have an interest in 

reaching an accommodation with Rouhani. 

3. Given Rouhani's long-standing ties to the clerical establishment, he will have to 

make his agenda palatable to the clerics. This represents a significant challenge. 

Rouhani only garnered 38 percent of the vote in the seminary capital of Qom. Ultimately, 

the clergy views him as a politician and cautious reformer whose policies mayor may not 

be favorable to the clerics themselves. We should expect a complex dynamic of 

negotiations between Rouhani and the clerics whose ultimate outcome is hard to predict. 

4. The challenges of reaching internal accommodation among diverse forces will 

prove especially tricky when it comes to the Revolutionary Guards. It is true that the 

Guards have extended their reach and power in recent years. Still, their ranks remain 

vulnerable to many of the social and political fault lines that have divided the broader 

Principlist Camp. This fact was amply demonstrated when a section of the Guards voted 

for Rouhani. Rouhani may try to find ways to reach out to this potential constituency. 

The fact that the Principlist Camp itself is now in disarray, and that some in their ranks 

are reaching out to Rouhani himself, may help Rouhani deflect pressures from the 

Revolutionary Guard. 

5. Ronhani's priority will be to address the negative effects of the previons 

government's economic, welfare and "privatization" policies. Focusing on economics 

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is smart politics because a diverse array of groups are clamoring for economic changes. 

Rouhani will probably try to reduce rampant spending and expansion of the money 

supply, while trying to reverse the effects of a corrupted privatization scheme that 

funneled "welfare shares" to favored cronies of the previous regime. 

6. The success of these economic reforms will partly depend on the future of the 

international sanctions imposed on Iran. Rouhani has made it clear that reducing or 

removing these sanctions is fundamental to any effort to repair the damage of the 

previous government and to creating a climate that will benefit both private and public 

sector businesses, whose fates are tied to the international, Western·oriented global 

economy. 

In the foreign policy arena: 

Given the balancing act that Rouhani wil1 have to pursue in the domestic area, we should expect 

_. particularly at the outset _. a cautious foreign policy that pivots around the fol1owing: 

1. Rouhani will not break with what Iranian leaders consider Iran's key strategic 

interests. Thus it is hardly surprising that he has reiterated his principled support for 

Iran's alliance with Hezbollah and with Syria's current government as represented by 

Beshir Assad. Nor it is surprising that Rouhani has defended Iran's Non Proliferation 

Treaty "rights" to create a "peaceful domestic nuclear program" that includes domestic 

uranium enrichment. To stray from these positions now would provoke his rivals and 

undermine his longer·term domestic reform agenda. 

2. Whether in the longer run Rouhani has the capacity to demonstrate greater 

flexibility on these and other foreign policy issues remains to be seen. Escalating 

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conflict between Iran and the international community would complicate this task. In the 

past, hard-liners tried to justify the repression of reformers by arguing that their desire for 

an opening to the West would weaken Iran, or by arguing that reformers were a front for 

Western influence. Because international conflict reinforces the leverage of hard-liners, 

Rouhani's efforts to open up the political system at home will partly depend on reducing 

Iran's disputes with its neighbors and the wider international community. His own 

statements suggest that he is aware of this challenge and he means to address it. 

3. As Rouhani creates his cabinet -- assuming he gains the parliament's backing for 

this cabinet -- he might use domestic leverage to show flexibility on some foreign 

policy questions. Rouhani has stated his opposition to international intervention of Syria. 

But he has adopted the Russian/Chinese formula calling for respecting the "ultimate 

wishes of the Syrian people" and their right to determine their own destiny. Rouhani's 

call for a more cooperative relationship in the regional and global arenas comes on the 

heels of rising concerns -- expressed by Iranian leaders -- regarding escalating Shi'iteSunni sectarian conflict in the Gulf and Levant. Iranian leaders face the task of balancing 

their support for Hezbollah with the need to prevent another civil war from erupting in 

Lebanon. Such a civil war could destabilize the entire region, and Iraq in particular, 

where Sunni-Jihadists are escalating their attacks on the government. Similarly, Iran's 

leaders must balance their support for Shi'ites in the Gulf with their need to maintain 

trade and financial linkages with the region. Rouhani may try to create a new foreign 

policy team that has the experience, knowledge and instincts to address these multiple 

challenges and interests. The apparent appointment of former Iranian UN ambassador 

Javad Zarifto the position of Foreign Minister is an encouraging signal. 

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4. The most likely area for innovation from Rouhani and his allies is on the nuclear issue. 

Having previously served as Iran's chief negotiator on nuclear issues, and having assailed the 

previous government's "mishandling" of these issues, Rouhani will probably push for a more 

robust process of negotiations with the West. The question is whether this will be merely 

tactical maneuvering or a reworked strategic approach that might create the basis for a 

mutually acceptable compromise. On this question, it is worth noting that during the 2013 

election campaign, Rouhani and former Foreign Minister Velayati (a prominent Principlist) 

assailed Saeed Jalili, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, for considering concessions without an 

overall road map of the ultimate shape of a final agreement. The fact that Iran's leaders, and 

Rouhani in particular, may now press for such a roadmap, and that they might be willing to 

define their bottom lines, presents both an opportunity and a challenge for Western and 

American diplomacy in particular. 

The United States Response: Testing Rouhani and his Allies 

How should the United States respond to possible changes in Iranian policy and 

behavior? I suggest the following observations: 

1) On the nuclear issue, for many years, the United States and Iran have avoided any 

serious discussion of the parameters of a final agreement. Because Rouhani and his 

allies see progress on the nuclear front as crucial to advancing economic and 

political reforms at home, they might be ready to define Iran's bottom line and on 

that basis, seek a more comprehensive nuclear deal. If Rouhani' s new government 

moves in that direction, the United States must also have its ultimate goals clearly in 

mind and be willing to test Iran's intentions by offering significant incentives to reach an 

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agreement. These incentives must include a road map for ultimately removing 

international sanctions against Iran. 

2) Absent the readiness of either or both sides to make the concessions necessary for a 

comprehensive nuclear deal, the United States should consider modest sanctions 

relief that it could offer in response to positive moves by the new government to step 

away from the hard-line positions of past regimes. We should remember, however, 

that "positive incentives" (as they are called in the negotiating business) such as 

incremental sanction relief may not have the intended positive effect unless -- at some 

point or other -- both sides can start talking about the shape of an ultimate deal. 

3) Beyond the nuclear issue, the most important way the United States can effect 

change in the foreign policy direction of Rouhan's new government is to change the 

strategic context in which Tran is operating in the Middle East. If United Statesfacilitated Palestinian-Israeli negotiations lead to an agreement, Rouhani's government 

will be under considerable pressure to accept it. After all, the international community, 

and Western Europe in particular, will rebuff Rouhani's efforts to engage on the political 

and especially economic fronts if he rejects a peace deal agreed to by Palestinian and 

Israeli leaders. Former President Khatami's formula -- according to which Iran will 

accept any negotiated outcome acceptable to the Palestinians -- may provide Rouhani 

with the political cover he needs to accept a Palestinian-Israeli deal in order to sustain his 

other foreign policy initiatives. 

In conclusion 1 would offer the following thought. The United States wants to make 

progress on crucial security issues, parti cuI arl y the nuclear question. It is also important to 

support realistic chances for reopening Iran's political and economic arenas after years of 

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repression. Iran's reformist leaders - and the wider electorate -- know that the struggle for 

change will take years, and that it will only come by reaching accommodations and making 

compromises. Rouhani and his allies are seeking the domestic and international space to 

tackle these challenges. It is in the interest of the United States to find ways to make the task 

of long-term change possible, while at the same time addressing our fundamental security 

interests. It is time to begin a conversation as to how we might pursue both aims. 

Thank you and I am happy to take questions. 

The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author and not the u.s. Institute of Peace, which 

does not take policy positions. 

{Dr. Brumberg Testimony - House For Affairs MidEast and North Africa Subcmt 7-31-13 vI} 10 
49

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I will ask questions about seeing Rouhani as 

a moderate, Russia’s role in Syria and what will Iraq do. 

Ambassador Bolton, you said that those who had been labeling 

Rouhani as a moderate are naive in their assessment. And Mr. 

Dubowitz, you agree that Rouhani isn’t the moderate that the 

world is so eager to say he is, yet the administration has been willing to accept a narrative of him as a moderate and has even begun 

to offer concessions on sanctions against the regime ahead of its 

next failed round of P5+1 negotiations. And just this morning the 

Institute on Science and International Security assessed that Iran 

is expected to achieve the critical capability needed to produce 

weapons grade uranium by mid-2014 without being detected. 

So as Iran continues to support Assad by reportedly agreeing to 

supply Assad with $3.6 billion in oil in exchange for the regime to 

have the right to investments of various kinds in Syria, I think it 

is wise to be reminded that in the past this so-called moderate has 

boasted of his ability to deceive, as you pointed out, and mislead 

the international community on Iran’s nuclear program when he 

served as the chief negotiator, and he continues to support the brutality of Assad. 

Given what we know about Rouhani and these latest reports, 

why would the United States risk our national security and the security of the region by offering concessions to the regime when it 

is clear that there will be no change in Iran’s nuclear position and 

its role on Syria? And will the administration—do you believe—

now allow Iran to use Syria as a bargaining chip for its nuclear 

program? That is what I see in the horizon. 

Now Russia, along with Iran and China, has been flooding Syria 

with arms for the Assad regime, has had a key strategic interest 

in selling arms to Assad, having access to all of that region through 

the Syrian naval base. Moscow has moved to stonewall U.S. efforts 

in calling for Assad to step down, and continues to obstruct our 

sanctions against Syria and Iran. It has got this veto power at the 

Security Council. So it is clear the administration’s reset policy 

with Russia has not resulted in any progress whatsoever; it has actually weakened our position relative to Moscow. So given this, in 

light of this and Russia’s continued cooperation with Assad and 

with Iran, what steps should the United States take regarding our 

policy toward Russia? 

And on Iraq, we have been saying that we have called on Iraq 

to act, and stop, and inspect the planes that are routinely flying 

militants and militia to fight along Assad, but in only a few cases 

has Iraq actually done this inspection. And in addition, the Iraqi 

Government continues to ignore our request to honor its commitment to protect the people of Camp Liberty through its Memo of 

Understanding of 2011 and continues to put their lives in danger. 

Does the U.S. have any leverage with Iraq to force it to act on any 

of these issues? 

Ambassador Bolton. 

Ambassador BOLTON. On the first point, Madam Chairman, on 

Rouhani as a moderate. I mean, I think his career demonstrates he 

has been a man of the regime for 30-plus years. He wouldn’t have 

been allowed to run for President unless it was clear he would hue 

50

to the policies, particularly in the nuclear area, of the Supreme 

Leader and the Revolutionary Guard. 

I have watched him in action very closely during the period of 

2003–2005 when he was Iran’s nuclear negotiator. And he was very 

smooth, charming, Western European diplomats just loved to deal 

with him, and he took them to the cleaners day after day after day 

negotiating a supposed suspension of Iran’s enrichment program 

that was suspended because of the failures of the program itself, 

difficulties in the uranium enrichment process and even more importantly difficulties in the uranium conversion process that allowed Iran during this period of good will to fix the problems, then 

break the suspension and return to its nuclear weapons program. 

So I think he has shown he knows how to do it once before and 

have no doubt he would like to do it again. Would he like to 

see——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Let me turn to Mr. Dubowitz for Russia’s 

role or Iraq’s role. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Let me talk a little bit about this question of his 

record. Let’s remember that he was nuclear negotiator and/or the 

Secretary of Supreme National Security Council when Iran did not 

voluntarily or transparently disclose Natanz, Fordo, or Isfahan. 

On the issue of sanctions, I support massively intensified sanctions on Iran to bring it to the verge of economic collapse. I think 

it is the only way to put the Supreme Leader to a fundamental 

choice. But I think the sanctions relief that I am most concerned 

about are not the humanitarian sanctions that Treasury clarified 

last week. It was a statement of clarification, they were not new 

sanctions, but the fact that there have been sanctions on the books 

that have not enforced like the gold sanctions that have given Iran 

up to $7 billion in just under a year of vital foreign exchange reserves. And the unwillingness to entertain new sanctions, it is the 

non-enforcement of existing sanctions which is sanctions relief. We 

are already giving Iran sanctions relief and we are getting no nuclear concessions in return. 

And finally, on the issue of linkage, I think the issue of linkage 

is very important, Madam Chairman. And that is that the Iranians 

will try to expand the negotiations to include Syria and their other 

interests so that they can trade concessions. And we have to be 

very careful not to link the Syria issue with Iran’s nuclear program. 

On Russia and Iraq they are both sanctions busters. We are not 

enforcing sanctions against either country and they are both in violation of our financial and energy sanctions. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you, gentlemen. My time is over. 

Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Mark, I just wanted 

to follow up with Mr. Dubowitz with where you left off. What is it, 

and I throw this up to all three of you, what is it that needs to 

happen for sanctions to have the best chance of working? We are 

going to pass legislation this afternoon that will only strengthen 

the sanctions. We can give you, all of us sitting here can give you 

the statistics about the successes that the sanctions have yielded 

in terms of really tightening the economy in Iran. And yet the 

51

numbers, the statistics about what Iran is doing in Syria, the 

amount of money, the amount of supplies are staggering. How is 

that happening, first of all, given where their economy stands? Is 

there any issue of public pressure that may help with Iran’s involvement in Syria? We know the Iranian people are frustrated 

with the state of their economy. It was an issue for Rouhani in the 

election. Are they aware of the extent of Iranian involvement in 

Syria and the cost ultimately to them? So that is the second question. The first question though is sanctions generally, what more 

can be done? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. So I agree with Ambassador Bolton that sanctions are not going to be a silver bullet. There is no evidence that 

they have slowed Iran’s nuclear program. But I think that we can 

fundamentally change the calculus of this regime by massively intensifying the sanctions and increasing the credibility of the military threat. 

With respect to sanctions the only number that I think matters 

is the size of Iran’s accessible foreign exchange reserves, because 

that is their principal hedge against a balance of payments crisis 

and economic meltdown. If we don’t know that number then we 

don’t know when they economically drop dead. And we have no way 

of comparing that number to David Albright’s number, which is 

Iran’s obtainment of undetectable nuclear breakout by June 2014. 

We have to know which comes first. And I think by going after the 

foreign exchange reserves, denying them access to overseas accounts, going after their oil export revenue, their commercial trade, 

we have to get Iran closer and closer to the brink of economic collapse but we need to know that number. And if we don’t know that 

number, we don’t know where we are at. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Dr. Brumberg. 

Mr. BRUMBERG. Well, I will have to disagree with my distinguished colleague. I think that the dependence on sanctions is a 

flight from reality. The notion that by increasing sanctions we are 

going to compel Iran to do something it doesn’t want to do is simply a substitute for a strategic policy. It is not a policy, it is easy 

to agree on, it is easy to get consensus on, but it is not an effective 

policy. It hasn’t worked so far. I see no evidence that if you put a 

gun to the heads of the Iranian leadership they are going to say 

we will do what you want us to do. It hasn’t been successful. And 

when something doesn’t work you don’t keep repeating it. That is 

not a policy. 

Now sanctions, there are two ways we can think about sanctions. 

Sanctions are always a means for some sort of end. Sanctions can 

be a means of a war policy. From the vantage point of Iran and 

if the Iranian leaders were listening to the presentations today, 

they would say well, clearly the point of view, and our colleagues 

have basically said this, the point of view of sanctions is regime 

change. Now if that is your message, then that is your message. 

Then of course if you want to make war you make war. But if sanctions is an adjunct for negotiations and is a bargaining chip, then 

you have to be ready at some point or other to conceive of a deal 

in which you are going to remove sanctions, because sanctions are 

there in order to compel your adversary to make peace, and that 

means a dual track approach. 

52

So I am not saying that one or the other is best. I think we have 

to decide what we want to do. And ultimately if we want to go to 

war, we go to war. Because this is what has been advocated here 

today in effect. But if we don’t, we have to recognize that concessions will come down the way. And at some point or another we 

will deal with this regime because it is not collapsing today or tomorrow. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Ambassador Bolton, a lot of us sitting up here believe that sanctions haven’t yet caused the Supreme Leader to 

change his commitment to nuclear weapons because they have not 

been strong enough, right, isn’t that the alternate argument?

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, that is the theory. I actually agree 

with Dr. Brumberg up until the point when he started talking 

about going to war. The sanctions are not working and they are not 

going to work. There is a theoretical case that economic sanctions 

can work with three conditions, that they are utterly comprehensive, everything is covered, number one. Number two, that they are 

complied with by every major power in the world, and three, that 

they are enforced by military force. None of those three things 

apply to Iran nor will they ever. The nuclear weapons program is 

not expensive enough for the sanctions to have an effect on and the 

proof of the pudding is Korea. North Korea, the most heavily economically sanctioned country in the world, has detonated three nuclear devices. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Madam Chairman, may I ask for 30 seconds for Mr. 

Dubowitz to respond to the suggestion that North Korea is an example here. You have spoken to the need for strengthening sanctions. You have spoken to the opportunities that we have to further 

tighten the economic noose so that the Supreme Leader changes 

his ways. 

Can you speak to ultimately the potential effectiveness of that 

that your two colleagues on the panel seem to argue against? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, there is no doubt that sanctions will not 

work on their own. We have all stated that. But I think that it is 

actually wrong to say that sanctions can’t put enormous pressure 

that we can convert into negotiating leverage at the table. If Iran 

only has $20 billion of accessible foreign exchange reserves and 

those reserves are being depleted rapidly, Iran is facing economic 

collapse. Now if economic collapse cannot break the nuclear will of 

Mr. Khamenei, nothing will and there will be no nuclear deal with 

no concessions that Mr. Brumberg would at all entertain. On the 

other hand, we need to try. And I think that we don’t need military 

force to enforce sanctions. We need to massively ratchet up the current sanctions regime, which is putting enormous economic pressure on the regime and get those FX reserves down to a level 

where the Supreme Leader does not have the money to support 

economy. 

Mr. Rouhani was elected because the Iranian people are sick of 

the sanctions, they are sick of the economic pressure and they are 

sick of the nuclear intransigence that Mr. Khamenei has shown. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Madam Chair, and again to the witnesses, thank you for being here. I will take just a very slight issue 

53

with what Dr. Brumberg said. I think actually it is not necessarily 

that we are advocating for war, I frankly think Iran has been at 

war with the United States for a very long time. I mentioned in 

my opening statement I am a veteran of Iraq, I flew planes, and 

if I could say in this setting, which I can’t, I don’t think, but I will 

say that a lot of energy was focused on Iran basically being involved in the war in Iraq and in some cases some have suggested 

that almost half the U.S. casualties were the direct result of Iranian technology and Iranian action. 

And I just want to say too at the outset, I am not critical of this 

administration because I am a Republican, I am not critical of this 

administration because there is any partisan politics involved. If 

this were a Republican administration with the same policy, I 

would be saying the exact same thing. But I am a believer that 

when the leadership around the globe retreats something has to 

follow. And if there is no other leader that is stepping up or able 

to step up, which in this case there isn’t, when the United States 

retreats from engagement from around the world I think chaos follows. And I think that is what we are seeing in the Middle East 

as a result of frankly a lack of American engagement. 

I will give you some examples on that. We look at Egypt, the 

day—and I want to ask this question, but I want a second—the day 

there was this change in Egypt our administration was not really 

focused on going out and stressing support for the Egyptian people, 

stressing support for their change into a democracy. I look at the 

example of Benghazi and what happened there. I look at the status 

of forces agreement in Iraq and basically the ease to give up there 

and the quickness at which we walked away from the negotiating 

table. And today you look at Iraq and it is basically in chaos again, 

which to me personally is very disturbing. 

And you look at the administration floating the idea, even if they 

don’t follow it, floating the idea of a zero troop option in Afghanistan after 2014, that does nothing but embolden our enemy. That 

does nothing but embolden the forces that would fight against the 

United States. We have been fighting these proxy wars against 

Iran, against terrorists for a very, very long time. And this is from 

somebody, by the way, one of six Republicans that voted to give the 

President authority to go into Libya because I believed that was 

the right thing to do. 

But a couple of big questions. First off, I want to ask you, Ambassador Bolton, specifically about the—and I know this is an exactly on topic, but the message sent the day that change happened 

in Egypt. What do you think the Egyptian people saw in the 

United States’ kind of lack of engagement on that transition? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think they see an incoherence in 

dealing with events in Egypt that has unfortunately characterized 

the response to the entire Arab Spring. If you go back to Mubarak’s 

fall, I counted in the 31-day period from the time demonstrations 

began in Egypt to the time Mubarak stepped aside that the administration had four distinct positions. And the net of that, and I 

think essentially we saw a repetition when the demonstrators went 

into the streets in late June and early July, and the military finally 

stepped in on July 3rd. The result is nobody knows where we 

stand. We don’t gain points with any of the various competing facVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:46 Sep 23, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\_MENA\073113\82308 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tions or persuasions in the struggle. And overall we are left impotent as the situation deteriorates. And I think the debate we are 

having now over continued foreign assistance unfortunately helped 

show that. And I think the signal that it sounds throughout the region combined with an absence now of having done anything effective since September the 11th in Benghazi is that America is uninterested, that we are declining in our ability to shape events in the 

region. And I think that is something that our adversaries and our 

friends alike both see and they are calibrating their policies accordingly, unfortunately, for our interest. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. I will ask each of you if you can answer with basically just one quick answer, what is more important 

to Iran a healthy economy or nuclear weapons? I’ll start with you, 

Dr. Brumberg. 

Mr. BRUMBERG. Well to the forces——

Mr. KINZINGER. Just very quickly. 

Mr. BRUMBERG. When you say Iran I am not sure what you 

mean, but if you are talking about the forces. 

Mr. KINZINGER. The regime. 

Mr. BRUMBERG. Nuclear weapons. I think that Iran is much more 

than a regime and I have to say this because this is not the conversation we are having. There was a force that brought Iran to 

power. This is the force of the electorate. They want economic and 

political change. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, that is great and we have been talking 

about that for 20 years, the fact the regime is in charge and the 

regime is the one chasing nuclear weapons. Dr. Brumberg. 

Mr. BRUMBERG. Well, we may have some disagreement on that. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Would you say healthy economy or nukes? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Regime survival. And if they think that a nuclear 

weapon can guarantee the survival of the regime they will pursue 

it. If they think that there is a fundamental choice between a nuclear weapon and the survival of the regime, we may have a chance 

of breaking their nuclear will. But we need enhanced leverage, we 

can’t be naive, this isn’t the Harvard Negotiation Project. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Mr. Ambassador. 

Ambassador BOLTON. They want nuclear weapons and I would 

say please don’t believe the official economic statistics. These are 

expert smugglers with—the largest Iranian diplomatic facility in 

the world is in Caracas, Venezuela. Because of their close cultural 

ties? No, because they are laundering their money through the 

Venezuelan banks. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. I have a million more questions but 

my time is up. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to the 

witnesses. I would like to pick up essentially where we left off. But 

as you talked about, Mr. Dubowitz, the desire of the Iranian regime 

is survival and we saw in the recent election what to them appears 

to have been a surprise outcome with the election of Rouhani. How 

much impact, and this is everyone, do you believe the economic 

struggles of the Iranian people having influence on the outcome of 

the election if at all? 

55

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, thank you for the question. I think the Supreme Leader doesn’t fear the United States, he doesn’t fear Israel. 

He fears his own people. He knows what he has done to his own 

people. He has brutalized them, he knows the sense of despair. And 

I think he was shocked by the election results. I mean he was 

shocked that his preferred candidate, Said Jalili, lost and that 

Rouhani won, not because it was a pro-Rouhani vote but it was because it was an anti-Khamenei vote. And the vote was based on a 

sense of despair and depression and frustration with the nuclear 

intransigence that has led to the economic demise of a proud nation 

that otherwise should be powerful and rich and influential. And so 

for that reason I do think these sanctions are working, not in slowing down Iran’s nuclear program, because that is clearly not happening, but in embittering the Iranian people not against the 

United States but against the Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary 

Guard and a regime that has held them hostage for 30 years. 

Again, these sanctions can give us leverage. That is all they can 

give us is leverage, and how we use that leverage remains to be 

seen. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Dr. Brumberg, you are nodding your head. 

Mr. BRUMBERG. Well, I agree with that. Sanctions will get Iranian leadership to the table. What you decide to do at the table is 

the question. Whether you want to negotiate on the kinds of concessions that you ultimately want to provide, including on the sanctions relief, that is the debate we need to have. What kind of relationship do we ultimately want with the Islamic Republic around? 

Assuming that we are not advocating regime change. If we want 

to find some way to live with this regime, which in many respects 

has ben a repugnant regime. That is a conversation I think we 

often avoid, the strategic conversation we need to have. 

I also want to say on this issue of Rouhani and whether he is 

a moderate and we have these debates that go on forever. Rouhani 

is not really the story here. The story is the political social forces 

that brought him into power that have been struggling to be heard 

and they count in the Islamic Republic system. I have been studying the system for years. It is not simply the Supreme Leader. And 

the office of the President, which everybody predicted would be 

abolished is not going to be abolished. There will be parliamentary 

elections in 2 years. The one thing the reformists desperately want 

is a peace process between the U.S. and Iran to create the space 

that they need for the long-term struggle for human rights in that 

country. Now we have to decide whether we take that struggle seriously. Do we want to help to foster it, because short of regime 

change the change in Iran will happen through not against us. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. In a sense of time, I only have 2 minutes left. 

Out of this committee and going to the floor today or tomorrow is 

a bill that strengthens the sanctions regime, that hopefully gives 

us that leverage to try to force the hand and change the course 

away from progress toward a nuclear capability, and it seems what 

I am hearing is that those sanctions have had an effect on the 

economy, and the effect on the economy has had an effect on the 

politics on the Iran. And so it seems to me that we should be pursuing more sanctions or stronger sanctions. 

Am I missing something? 

56

Mr. BRUMBERG. I think the sanctions have had an effect on the 

politics, there is no doubt about it, but alone the sanctions will not 

compel the Iranians to do what we think they should do. They will 

not do it by themselves. We have to sit down and negotiate and decide ultimately whether we are going to be living with sanctions 

forever or real incentives in return for a deal that we and the Iranians can accept. That is the conversation I don’t think we are having. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Sanctions are a means to an end. Sanctions 

aren’t the goal——

Mr. BRUMBERG. Yes. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Preventing Iran from having a nuclear weapon 

is the goal. 

Mr. Dubowitz. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, there is a lot of talk in Washington about 

sweetening the offer and that we are not being generous enough to 

the Iranian regime. There is an offer on the table, it was presented 

at al-Mahdi. It is a very good offer despite the fact that administration officials go on background as describing the sanctions relief as 

modest. The offer says gold sanctions and petro sanctions, chemical 

sanctions relief worth tens of billions of dollars, 20 percent, and the 

suspension of 20 percent enrichment. That is increasingly an irrelevant nuclear concession if you believe David Albright and nuclear 

experts who say we are moving to undetectable nuclear breakout. 

So there is an offer on the table. Let Rouhani respond to it before 

we talk about sweetening that offer or offering generous sanctions 

relief. We should be enhancing our negotiating leverage not diminishing it before we show up for the negotiations. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And my time is up as well. I have many more 

questions. But again, thank you for your time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir. Mr. Weber of 

Texas. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am going to follow up 

on that. Winston Churchill, Mr. Dubowitz, said, an appeaser is 

someone who feeds the crocodiles his friends one at a time, hoping 

it will eat him last. Is that what is going on here? We are simply 

trying to appease them in the sanctions process and they are going 

to get the nuclear weapons? That is your best opinion? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. You know, I don’t like to use the word ‘‘appeasement’’ because I think that everybody who has engaged in this has 

the best of intentions and is trying to figure out how to deal with 

a very complicated diplomatic issue. I do think that we tend to take 

a very Western approach to this. You know, we are all trained in 

sort of negotiating tactics that we want to have a good relationship, 

we want to expand the community of interests, we want to look for 

different options, we want to find a deal. The fact of the matter is 

we are negotiating against hardened negotiators who employ 

brinksmanship. 

Mr. WEBER. One who has already misled the United States and 

boasted about it. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. They have absolutely done so. So this 

Rouhaniphoria that has followed the election of Mr. Rouhani I 

think has to be treated with a high degree of skepticism, not because only of his track record, but the track record of the Supreme 

57

Leader and the fact that these are men who understand the nuclear file and have forgotten tricks we haven’t even learned. 

Mr. WEBER. All right. Let me move from that to one of my colleagues, Mr. Deutch, down on the other side of the podium here 

said that they were, I believe, sending Iran $500 million a month 

into Syria and 500 tons of cargo a day, if I remember him correctly. 

Were you all aware of that? And you think that is pretty accurate? 

Based on $500 million a month, now you talked about their surplus 

I think, how long can they do that? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, I think that is the essential question. I 

mean, if we know what the size of their accessible foreign exchange 

reserves are and we know how much money they have got in the 

bank, then we have a pretty good sense of how long they can do 

that. 

Mr. WEBER. So do the math. How long is it? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, you know, that is the question you need to 

ask the administration in a classified setting. 

Mr. WEBER. Let me move over to Ambassador Bolton. 

Ambassador BOLTON. I don’t think we know what Iran’s foreign 

exchange reserves are. I don’t think they have been honest over the 

past decade in declaring what their reserves are and where they 

are. I don’t think they are being honest today about their oil exports. I don’t think they are recording as official exports the oil 

they are trucking through Kurdistan into Turkey. I don’t think we 

are calculating the oil they are shipping through Iraq as Iraqi oil. 

Mr. WEBER. In other words, you think they would purposefully 

mislead us. 

Ambassador BOLTON. I know it is shocking. 

Mr. WEBER. Golly. Let me move on. 

Ambassador BOLTON. That is the way it goes. 

Mr. WEBER. Let me move on. So you say if the Israelis have that 

air strike, if they issue that strike, that Iran will most assuredly 

will retaliate. And I think you said by unleashing Hezbollah into 

just an unbelievable rocket barrage. Of course we have the Iron 

Dome in place. Any idea of what kind of sustained barrage and 

how long that would go on? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think the Iranian calculus, although you can never be sure with a regime of that nature, is that 

they can intimidate Israel into not acting by threatening Israel’s civilian population. And I think the supplies and the personnel that 

they have put into the Bekaa Valley for Hezbollah since the end 

of the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006 is very, very frightening. I 

think their efforts, which are continuing, to put at least a modest 

missile capability in Hamas’s hands in the Gaza Strip, all make 

this an extraordinarily difficult decision for Israel, which is what 

it is calculated to do. And I think that is why we have to look at 

this from the perspective that there is not much time for Israel to 

make a decision whether it is going to——

Mr. WEBER. Well, it is just delayed annihilation, if you will. I 

mean, they can either go ahead and stop the process now or be confronted with it later. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Or they can risk the very real possibility 

that we have all miscalculated, and that Iran has facilities we don’t 

know about, or that they are working with North Korea, or many 

58

other things that put them much closer, not just to one or two nuclear weapons, but to scores of nuclear weapons. 

Mr. WEBER. No, I would agree with that. Now let me move back 

to you Mr., is it Dubowitz or Dubowitz? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Dubowitz. 

Mr. WEBER. Dubowitz. You said earlier that not killing Christians, women, and children should not be the framework for concessions in your prepared remarks. Would you reiterate that? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, what I said is that if Mr. Rouhani and this 

regime would actually demonstrate their moderation, they should 

stop killing Syrian women and children. But we shouldn’t reward 

them for that. 

Mr. WEBER. So you are not saying that we are negotiating with 

that right now. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. No, we are not negotiating with that right now. 

What I am suggesting is that we try to view Mr. Rouhani through 

the prism of the nuclear file all the time. And I think what we try 

to do in this hearing, given the nexus, is to view him through the 

prism of Syria, where Mr. Rouhani and this regime are complicit 

in the slaughter of tens of thousands of Syrians, including women 

and children. And that should give us pause when we sit down 

with this man. 

Mr. WEBER. Oh, absolutely. And that is a great point. I appreciate you making it. Madam Chair, I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. My Florida colleague, Ms. 

Frankel. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you all for your 

service. To me, this is an example of very smart, committed people 

with very different opinions on things. And I just wanted to say as 

an aside that I am personally happy that our Secretary of State is 

trying for peace in the Middle East. And I hope, and I expect that 

he will not lose focus on Iran and Syria and the rest of the chaos. 

Mr. Bolton, I think I heard you say that you do not believe, as 

to Iran, that sanctions are working. So I want to just ask you specifically are you suggesting a military intervention to stop a nuclear power? And let me ask my other question. And then, I think, 

Mr. Dubowitz, I think I heard you say that you think we should 

have more sanctions. But the sanctions should just be related to 

Iran trying to obtain nuclear power, but should not be related to 

its action in Syria. I think you said that. No, you didn’t say that. 

Well, maybe you could explain that. Let’s start with those two 

questions, and then we will go from there. 

Ambassador BOLTON. There is simply no evidence that the sanctions have had any impact on Iran’s nuclear weapons program. And 

given that with the amount of uranium they have enriched to reactor grade already, if they were racing to create nuclear weapons, 

they could do it within about 4 months. So the notion that continuing to ratchet up the sanctions at some point will prevent them 

from getting nuclear weapons simply misses the reality. I think, 

and I want to say this very carefully, objectively speaking, focusing 

on sanctions almost guarantees that Iran will get nuclear weapons 

because they are that close. 

I do believe that the only option is a preemptive military strike 

against Iran’s nuclear program. I have believed that for quite some 

59

number of years. And I know this is a very, very unattractive option. But it is a far worse option to contemplate Iran with nuclear 

weapons, not only because of what that regime could do with those 

weapons, but because it doesn’t stop with Iran. As Secretary of 

State Clinton said over a year ago, if Iran gets nuclear weapons, 

so will Saudi Arabia, so will Egypt, so will Turkey, so will others. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Mr. Bolton, can I just ask the other two gentlemen 

to comment on that? And give me your opinion of a scenario of 

what would happen if there was a military intervention? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. I think there is another scenario, which is not 

necessarily to launch a military strike, but actually to enhance the 

credibility that we were serious about using the military option if 

all other options were exhausted. I mean, I think one of the fundamental problems of our Iran policy has been that the Supreme 

Leader does not believe the United States, and I don’t think even 

believes Israel that we are serious about using military force to destroy his nuclear facilities. I think if he thought so and actually believed that, we would have a much better chance of finding a 

peaceful resolution to this problem at the negotiating table through 

a combination of economic pressure and a credible military threat. 

We may not actually have to launch those military strikes in order 

to get that deal, but we have got to enhance the credibility of the 

threat. 

Ms. FRANKEL. How is that done? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. It is done through the rhetoric of the President, 

it is done through the positioning of military assets, it is done 

through selective leaks, it is done through arming our allies, it is 

done through a variety of ways that signals to the Iranians that 

this President is serious about using military force to stop a critical 

nuclear capability, not just a nuclear weapon. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Dr. Brumberg? 

Mr. BRUMBERG. Well, I have to admit I am not an expert on 

these strategic matters. I have spent, however, a lot of time sitting 

with the experts here in Washington, and, I might add, in Israel, 

talking about this very subject. And I have not run into serious 

people who do serious work on this question who would argue that 

using force is an obvious or inevitably successful strategy. In fact, 

quite the contrary. I hear it over and over again that it will be a 

boomerang. Why? Because a serious military strike is not something that you have overnight and disappear. It takes weeks. You 

have to make sure the Iranians cannot retaliate. 

So when you talk about a strike, understand what we are talking 

about. We are talking about going to war. Now, that is what I was 

saying before. I am not advocating going to war. But I think the 

discussion just gets around what the real options are. We have to 

stand up and say if we want war, then make the argument. It is 

no point in threatening war unless you are ready to go to war. And 

from what I can tell, again, working with my Israeli friends, the 

debate in Israel is rich and complex. And the military people there 

are not convinced that the military strike is the obvious way to go. 

And moreover, they don’t necessarily believe that it is possible for 

them to do it without the U.S.’s involvement in a major sustained 

set of strikes lasting weeks, if not longer. 

60

So if this is the solution, and we think at the end of the day we 

will resolve this, with all the costs to the region, and the costs to 

the hopes of reform in Iran, then let’s make that argument. But if 

we don’t really want that outcome, then let’s talk about the real 

possibilities. And I think that often the conversation doesn’t get 

down to the nitty gritty. And while I obviously disagree with Ambassador Bolton in some respects, I respect his readiness to at least 

articulate what he thinks the ultimate real option is, which is war. 

And if that is the way we want to go, then let’s make the argument. But I don’t think it is the obvious solution. And I think that 

threatening war when you know the consequences are going to be 

very bad isn’t an especially good idea. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Remembering that this is an Iran-Syria nexus 

hearing, remember there are Iranian assets in Syria as well. I 

mean, the Revolutionary Guard assets could force assets in Syria. 

The Israelis have reportedly launched four air strikes against assets in Syria, Hezbollah assets in Syria. They have penetrated Syrian air defenses. There has been no blowback, no consequences. 

They have lost no planes, no pilots. It does suggest that the U.S. 

has other strike options that may not entail blowing up Iran’s nuclear facilities, but, in fact, may entail going after Iranian assets 

in Syria selectively to once again send a message of resolve. I don’t 

think it is an either/or between, you know, appeasement and a fullscale military intervention with 150,000 soldiers climbing through 

the mountains of Iran. There are other options as we look at this 

trajectory. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And my other Florida colleague, 

Mr. DeSantis. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. You know, I appreciate the testimony. I was reading in the paper when they had 

the Iranian election, and Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, I 

mean, all of them, moderate wins Iranian election. And we even 

have a letter now that is circulating amongst my colleagues in the 

House, I think there is over 130 of them, who have said, hey, this 

guy’s a moderate, this is a chance to get some negotiations. And I 

just find that to be incredibly naive. To describe him as a moderate 

in a way that we would kind of think of it here is very misleading. 

So Ambassador Bolton, what is your sense on Hasan Rouhani 

and this idea that he is some kind of a moderate? Do you agree 

with that? And do you think that it is worth negotiating with this 

regime? 

Ambassador BOLTON. No, I don’t think it is worth negotiating. 

We have negotiated for 10 years. And you know, at some point you 

can say how much longer do we have to wait? The criticism of 

Ahmadinejad when he was President by the so-called moderates 

had nothing to do with his objective to get a deliverable nuclear 

weapons capability. It was that he talked about wiping Israel off 

the face of the Earth, that he boasted about the nuclear weapons 

program, that he went on public relations tours of the centrifuge 

facility at Natanz, that he kept talking about it. 

And the argument by leaders like Rafsanjani and others was stop 

talking about it. You are getting the West agitated. They are paying attention to it. And I think Rouhani is perfectly positioned to 

play exactly that kind of strategy to allay the fears, to have negoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:46 Sep 23, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\_MENA\073113\82308 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tiations, to make meaningless concessions, all the while Iran’s nuclear infrastructure grows broader and deeper. And just one piece 

that we haven’t talked about today, the IAEA, in its last quarterly 

report, estimates that the heavy water production facility and the 

heavy water reactor at Iraq will be on line next year. And that is 

an even more efficient way to produce plutonium for the plutonium 

route to nuclear weapons. There is no power generating capacity in 

Iraq to use the output of the heavy water reactor. It can only have 

a weapons purpose. And it is going right along. 

Mr. DESANTIS. With respect to Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons 

and Israel’s response, you know, you talked about an Israeli strike. 

I think in your testimony you meant a strike on the actual reactors. One of the gentlemen up here mentioned some of their other 

assets in the region. So Ambassador Bolton, do you think a strike 

against some of these other assets in the region, but not necessarily 

a strike on the Iraqi—or on the Iranian nuclear facilities itself 

would be effective or sufficient? 

Ambassador BOLTON. No, I don’t. I think what any strike has to 

do is break Iran’s control over the nuclear fuel cycle at certain key 

points. You don’t have to destroy all their facilities. But at a minimum, I think you need to prevent their capacity to enrich uranium 

and the even more vulnerable link, their capacity to convert uranium from a solid into a gas. This is the Isfahan conversion facility. 

We know where it is. It is all above ground. We don’t think there 

is an alternative. The risk of not acting, as every day goes by, is 

simply that Iran increases the potential to have redundant facilities that we don’t know about. And for all this discussion that we 

have had here today and we have in the general public debate, we 

ought to be a little bit more humble about our intelligence about 

what is actually going on in Iran. 

We have had problems overestimating our accuracy before. And 

that is why the notion that we have an essentially unlimited time 

to negotiate is very, very dangerous. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And I know this is about the Syrian-Iran nexus, 

but with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian issue I think it is relevant because it kind of feeds into this idea that we can get further 

in negotiations and we may have to. I know Israel has agreed to 

give up 100 or so Palestinian prisoners, terrorists. And it is frustrating to me because I think that sends the wrong signal to the 

Palestinians, almost a reward in some ways. I don’t think that that 

is going to lead to any type of lasting settlement. But what are 

your thoughts on what is going on with that situation? 

Ambassador BOLTON. No, I think the release of the prisoners was 

clearly as a result of the pressure of the United States. I don’t 

think that will fundamentally change the negotiating dynamic. And 

I think the ultimate outcome is that we are going to be left pretty 

much in the place that we were before. I do think to the extent that 

it reflects an investment of American prestige in an effort that is 

almost certainly doomed to failure, it will leave the United States, 

when that occurs, in yet even weaker a position in the region as 

a whole than we are already. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I appreciate that. And thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Mr. Connolly of Virginia. 

62

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And you may 

not remember that I was once a Senate staffer on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. But in 1981, I staffed the nomination 

hearing for a young person named John Bolton. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. He was young once? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. He was young, he had no gray hair. He still had 

the moustache, though. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Much like you. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right. He aged. I don’t know what happened to me. Well, starting with you, Mr. Ambassador, you sound 

pretty gloomy. You have no faith in the restart of peace negotiations undertaken by Secretary Kerry, and you think that there is 

really no alternative but to a preemptive strike to take out the nuclear capability that is being developed in Iran. Is that correct? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Yeah. It is a very, very unattractive alternative. But I think you have to look at it this way. If the choice 

were between the world as it is today compared to the world after 

an Israeli strike, we would all prefer the world as it is today, of 

course. But that is not the choice that Israel faces or that the 

United States faces. The choice is between the world after an 

Israeli strike compared to a world where Iran has nuclear weapons. 

And it is in that circumstance where that is the decision that the 

resort to preemptive military force, as Israel has twice before done 

against this program, I think is the only other option. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So the Israelis should, in your view, and we 

should encourage them by extension, I assume, undertake this preemptive action. Any kind of timeline? 

Ambassador BOLTON. The sooner the better. I mean, look, the 

Israelis unambiguously would prefer that the United States do this 

because they know our capacity is much greater, our ability to sustain the operation over a long period of time is much greater. And 

it is true that the United States has said, in both the last administration and this one, that all options are on the table, but nobody 

believes that. Nobody believes it in Israel and nobody believes it in 

Iran. That is why the spotlight is on Israel. They don’t want it on 

Israel, but that is the choice. And I think if they don’t act in the 

very near future, then the almost certain outcome is that Iran gets 

nuclear weapons and very, very soon. And if that happens, as I 

said a moment ago, I think at least three other countries in the region move quickly to get nuclear weapons themselves. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. What about trying, before you sort of undertake 

a preemptive strike, presumably you have got to do some calculus 

about the consequences. Now, some have posited that this is very 

different from taking out a capacity in Syria or the previous taking 

out of a reactor in Iraq. This is very different, and that you are 

talking about potentially region-wide, you know, reactions that 

could be deeply and profoundly injurious to the interests of Israel, 

and by extension, us. So how would you address that, Mr. Ambassador, since you have called for the preemptive strike? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Yeah. Well, I have written, and I will try 

and summarize what I think the Iranian reaction would be. But let 

me say, first, in terms of the reaction in the region, the Arab states 

of the peninsula on the other side of the Gulf would welcome the 

elimination of the Iranian nuclear weapons program. They may not 

63

say that publicly, but in private, they fear Iran with nuclear weapons almost as much as Israel does. I think that Iran itself, then, 

would have some hard decisions about how to respond. I do not 

think that they would close the Strait of Hormuz. I do not think 

they would attack deployed American forces in the region or the 

Arab states on the other side of the Gulf because that would bring 

us in. 

And as I said before, you can never be certain with this regime. 

But I think by process of elimination you conclude the most likely 

Iranian retaliation is to have Hezbollah and Hamas attack Israel, 

which is why prompt American support, if Israel does decide to attack, is so important to resupply the planes they will undoubtedly 

lose in large numbers over Iran so that they can gain air supremacy over the Bekaa Valley and the Gaza Strip to suppress that 

rocket fire. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Madam Chairwoman, if you would allow Mr. 

Dubowitz and Dr. Brumberg to simply have the opportunity to respond. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Congressman, I actually think that there is another risk, that the Iranians may not dash to a nuclear weapon 

quickly, prompting a—or at least before that, prompting Israel and 

the United States to have to move quickly. The Iranian end game 

actually may have a middle point. And the middle point is to establish critical nuclear capability where they are at the point of 

undetectable nuclear breakout, where they can break out without 

the IAEA and Western intelligence knowing about it. And then in 

doing so, establish an industrial size nuclear capacity so they can 

produce not one weapon, but multiple weapons, and then stop. And 

at that critical point where they have the ability to turn a screw 

and build a nuclear weapon, they stop and they say to the international community we now have an industrial-sized program with 

undetectable breakout, and here are our demands: Massive sanctions relief, recognize our interests in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, 

Bahrain and elsewhere, and don’t force us to build a bomb. You 

know, the Supreme Leader has this supposed fatwa against a nuclear weapon. Well, we don’t want a nuclear weapon, so don’t force 

our hand. And in doing so have all of the leverage and turn the 

tables on the international community, get massive sanctions relief, 

get the oil flowing, get the economy stabilized, and then at some 

point, because I think it is absolutely in the Supreme Leader’s 

DNA, then dash to a weapon with a strong economy and without 

sanctions in place. That may be a potential end game that I think 

we should be very conscious and very wary of. 

Mr. BRUMBERG. Well, if this discussion illustrates anything, it is 

the lack of good alternatives. I mean, I think we all recognize, listening to this discussion as we are trying to work out a very difficult situation, that many of the alternatives are worse than the 

other. The Israelis themselves, from what I know, speaking to the 

experts, don’t believe that they have the ordnance to undertake an 

effective strike by themselves. And therefore, there is no such thing 

as successful or effort to be successful on the military front without 

64

a concerted, extended, protracted bombing campaign supported by 

the U.S. 

And again, there is no guarantee that it will be successful. And 

it may have regional effects that we can’t imagine and maybe disaster. And that is disastrous. That is why the Israelis are so worried, and are not necessarily adamant for making the kinds of 

moves that some are advocating. I might also just add one more remark here, and that is when you talk about the Iranians looking 

for capacity, having the capacity, what that means. It is a very 

complex issue. Can we negotiate under those circumstances an 

agreement that we can accept? Perhaps not. Perhaps so. We don’t 

really know. This is a matter to be addressed through negotiations, 

unless we simply don’t want to have negotiations. Then the war option is really the only one, and it is not a good one either. 

So I think that all the alternatives are bad. I myself have made 

the argument that we should, at the very least, test the opportunity before us. The situation cannot be reduced to one man or 

one position, but is a complex one in which we have a serious process of change going on in Iran, and let’s not blow that up as well. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. I hope your cold 

gets better. And Mr. Deutch and I have packed this subcommittee 

with Floridians. So very pleased to yield to Dr. Yoho of Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate the opportunity, and I enjoy you guys and your testimony. What I see as our 

foreign policy is a circle. It is like a tiger chasing its tail for the 

last 25 to 30 years. You know, stop Iran from developing a nuclear 

weapon, sanctions, the threat of war, the IAEA inspectors in the 

hopes that Iran will not develop a nuclear war. 

Mr. Bolton, or Ambassador Bolton, in your book, Surrender is 

Not an Option, for over 20 years we and other nations of the world 

have attempted to dissuade Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, but yet they get closer, decade by decade, year by year, day by 

day. And we send the IAEA in there, and they get hoodwinked, and 

Iran says we are not doing it, but we know they are and they have 

been. I mean, the proof is in the pudding right now. 

What other strategies, other than the sanctions we have talked 

about and the threat of war, would you recommend? And this is for 

all three of you. And what, in your opinion—and I know this is 

crazy, but play along with me here, because the last 30 years have 

been kind of crazy. And this has happened before with Pakistan developing a nuclear weapon and then India. Said it couldn’t be done. 

And then North Korea and China. What would happen if, as Mr. 

Dubowitz said, the end game, if they were allowed—not allowed, 

but if they developed that and then we had a different strategy, 

thinking outside of the box, and say you know what, if you have 

that, you just better be careful how you use it because the rest of 

the world is going to respond. I mean, I know that is—I have not 

heard anybody talk about that. But yet you said your end game is 

getting Iran that close to developing a nuclear weapon. And if they 

get that close, they have the negotiation power. And it sounds to 

me like they are going to get that anyways. So what happens if we 

change the policy and said you know what, if you get that, you 

65

need to be very, very careful? I would like to hear your comments 

on that. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, I think the idea that if they get nuclear weapons they can be contained and deterred is a strategy 

that is doomed to leave Israel and our Arab friends in the region 

in grave peril forever. And in fact, given Iran’s support for international terrorism over the years, would lead to the potential of 

them assisting terrorists in exploding a nuclear device anywhere on 

Earth, whether they ever get the ballistic missile capability to deliver it that way or not. 

And as I said a moment ago, once that happens, even if I am 

wrong that you cannot contain and deter a nuclear Iran, it doesn’t 

stop there. You have got the proliferation to the Saudis, to Egypt, 

to Turkey, and others that takes an already very dangerous environment in the Middle East and ratchets it up to half a dozen nuclear weapon states in a relatively short period of time. And that 

too is a prescription for disaster. 

So that is why I think it has been so important to focus on stopping Iran in the first place. And the idea that there is some level 

that people would allow them to be comfortable with but not actually, for example, testing nuclear weapons, I think is a mistake because I think the proliferation will occur anyway. If you have trouble sleeping some night just read books about India’s recessed deterrent policy——

Mr. YOHO. I have. 

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. In the decades before they detonated weapons in 1998. They did have everything but turning the 

last screw, and everybody knew it, and that is why Pakistan got 

nuclear weapons. And that is proliferation at work. That is why, 

as I say, the ultimate conclusion has to be to stop Iran in the first 

instance. And we are very nearly out of time do that. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, I absolutely agree. I mean, I think Iran as 

a threshold nuclear power would be as dangerous as Iran with nuclear weapons, which is why we must ensure that they don’t get 

there. And these notions of giving Iran the right to enrichment, or 

having it have domestic enrichment I think are fanciful, because 

ultimately, this is a regime that has shown itself willing to rapaciously cheat and deceive. And if it has domestic enrichment, it will 

do so. 

Just to add to your question, sir, I think that there is more we 

can do to show the Supreme Leader that we are serious. I mean, 

if you look at it from his perspective, Iranian provocation in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, around the world, including trying to blow up a 

restaurant in Georgetown, Washington, has been met with nothing. 

No response. Court hearings. Prosecutions. Angry words. And even 

on the sanctions front, targeted sanctions, graduated sanctions, focused sanctions. We haven’t responded in a massive way. On the 

sanctions side, it needs to be massive sanctions leading to economic 

collapse. We should be responding in places like Syria not with 

U.N. Council recommendations or Geneva two peace conferences, 

but with actually killing Iranian IRGC Quds Force commanders in 

Syria. I mean they are there, they are on the ground. We should 

be taking them out. That will send a message that we are serious. 

Mr. YOHO. Madam Chair, can the next witness answer that? 

66

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Absolutely, Dr. Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, ma’am. 

Mr. BRUMBERG. Well, I think you put your finger on the question, and that is, is there any level of enrichment that we can live 

with in a negotiated settlement? Now, from the perspective of the 

United States and our European allies, if there is no level of enrichment on Iranian soil acceptable, there is no basis for an agreement and we should simply stop negotiating and consider the options which we have already talked about. I am not convinced that 

this is the basis for a negotiation. And I don’t think whatever administration was sitting in the White House would necessarily 

agree to that premise. Because it only narrows your options and 

precludes negotiations. 

So once again, this is really about ultimately what is the end 

game of a negotiation. What are you prepared to live with? And 

that is a discussion that neither the Iranians nor the Americans 

are very likely or happy to have. We keep dancing around it. In 

some sense, we are making progress here because at least we are 

having that discussion. But that is really the ultimate question. 

And we can have a useful debate about that. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Messer, you are 

our cleanup batter hitter. Come on, out of the ballpark. 

Mr. MESSER. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. I certainly appreciate the testimony today, and have learned a lot listening. I think 

in the last couple of questioners, you know, often when we go 

through these conversations, we assume that it is a given that Iran 

cannot, we cannot have a nuclear Iran, and yet then don’t talk 

about the consequences of what that really means. I think in the 

last couple of questioners we managed to get there. So I will skip 

through that, the questions I was going to ask there, and just say, 

in my view, I think shared by at least two of the three on the 

panel, there is no world in which it is acceptable to have a nuclear 

Iran. The world would be forever changed. And we have to do 

whatever we can, even the most unsavory of options, to make sure 

that that doesn’t happen. 

This hearing is about the nexus between Syria and Iran. And obviously in the world we live in today, there is an awful lot of events 

happening in Syria. So I would just ask the panelists to assess 

where they see events in Syria today, the stability of the Assad regime, and how does this nexus change in a world if Assad falls. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Well, let me just address one aspect we 

haven’t talked a lot about in connection with Syria. And that is the 

effective confluence of interests between Iran and Russia in keeping Assad in power. I think that is very important for a lot of reasons. And I think that is why you see the momentum, the dynamic 

in the conflict having shifted these past several months. Certainly 

not over yet. We have been up and down and all around in Syria 

over the past 2 years. I don’t think you can predict at this point 

even yet what the outcome will be. But Russia and Iran have 

worked effectively to keep the Assad regime propped up when it 

looked like it was about to go down. And that is significant I think 

because of the larger regional implications. Russia and China cast 

three double vetoes in the Security Council of U.S. and European 

67

proposed sanctions. They are going to do whatever they can to keep 

Assad in power, as Iran will. 

And that is one reason why I worry, in the midst of all this chaos 

in the other countries in the region, that the Russians see an opportunity, maybe not to get back to where they were in Soviet days 

before the—before Sadat took office in Egypt, but they see the potential to expand Russian influence in the region that they haven’t 

had in a long time. 

And so that is why this conflict in Syria is so important to them. 

And I think we have missed this in the last 2 years. We believed 

for a long time we could negotiate with Russia to ease Assad out 

of power. It was never going to happen. And I think the Obama administration was reluctant to take Iran on in the early days of 

Syria because that would tank whatever prospects there were of 

negotiating with Iran about the nuclear weapons program. That is 

the linkage point right there. 

So I think it is a very, very troubling time from that perspective, 

and that Russia and Iranian cooperation isn’t ending in Syria. You 

are going to continue to see it as the Russians for reasons of their 

own, and very mistakenly in my view, but as they continue to fly 

political cover for Iran on this issue. 

Mr. MESSER. Thanks. The other panelists. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, with respect to Syria, I mean again, I think 

the Iranian game there is to establish a different kind of critical 

capability, in that case, to establish what my FDD colleague Tony 

Badran has called Alawistan. So Assad is winning. Assad will probably not have control over all of Syria. But if he can control a land 

mass that stretches from Latakia in the north to Tartus on the border of Lebanon in the south, includes Homs and Damascus, with 

territorial contiguity with Lebanon, which provides a land bridge to 

Hezbollah, then he has Alawistan, he has a land mass, a launching 

pad for Iranian influence in that region. And that is a different 

kind of critical capability than we talked about on the nuclear side, 

which is threshold critical capability. 

I think on the issue of how we deal with this, and this is a response to my friend over here, I think we make a big mistake when 

we negotiate with the Iranians in responding to an Iranian declaration that something is nonnegotiable by saying, okay, it is nonnegotiable, then we will take it off the table. So the right to enrichment, 

domestic enrichment, nonnegotiable, we won’t have a deal unless 

we——

Mr. MESSER. Particularly when the result is nonnegotiable. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, that is right. And I think that that is just 

a big mistake in negotiating with men who employ brinksmanship. 

Everything is negotiable. And in fact, what we need to be doing is 

what the Iranians are doing, creating facts on the ground in the 

way that they create centrifuges on the ground, enrichment stockpiling, and critical territory in Syria. We need to be creating our 

own facts on the ground to use as leverage in a negotiation process 

where we can actually come to some peaceful determination. 

Mr. MESSER. Okay. Madam Chair, with your permission Dr. 

Brumberg. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Absolutely. Without objection. 

68

Mr. BRUMBERG. I think we all can agree the situation in Syria 

is disastrous on many levels, one of which we have already mentioned briefly, and that is it has been the basis for an escalation 

of a sectarian war between the Sunnis and the Shiites throughout 

the region. And that is feeding the jihadist movements everywhere, 

including, of course, now in the Sinai, which has become a huge 

problem. And what is interesting is that in Iran, there is a considerable debate about this. Because they know the blowback of their 

so-called success in Syria will come to haunt them. This has implications for Iran’s own security. If Lebanon falls apart, and 

Hezbollah is completely dragged into a sectarian war, Iran’s own 

interests will not be defended, and in fact, will be undermined. 

So the Iranians are having an interesting debate about this. The 

incoming President and the people around him are surely aware of 

it. They have talked about it. And they are going to have to deal 

with the unintended consequences of their so-called victory in 

Syria. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. I thank the witnesses 

for excellent testimony. And I do agree with Ambassador Bolton, in 

an ideal world, peace between Israel and the Palestinians, is always a wonderful thing. But meanwhile, we can only have so many 

hours in the day. You have to focus on what is happening. We have 

got Egypt in crisis. We have got Iran close to nuclear weapons. We 

have got bloodshed in Syria. And look what this administration is 

doing. Anyway, with that, the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank 

you gentlemen. Thank you to the audience as well. 

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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82308n.eps

SlJBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATiVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee ou the Middle East aud North Africa 

Ileaua Ros-Lehtiueu (R-FL), Chairmau 

July 29,2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

AfIairs to be held by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa in Room 2172 of 

the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

viwvi.foreignaffairs.house.gov): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, July 31, 2013 

2:30 p.m. 

The Iran-Syria Nexus and its Implications for the Region 

The Honorable John Bolton 

Senior Fellow 

American Enterprise Institute 

(Former United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations) 

Mr. Mark Dubowitz 

Executive Director 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 

Daniel Brumberg, Ph. D. 

Senior Program Officer 

Center for Conflict Management 

United States Institute of Peace 

By Direction of the Chairman 
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82308m-1.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MJNUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ___ S:::,::::,b.:::co:.::"=""::::i',,,,,,:.::.e.:::Uf:.::.' '",Ii:.::.e fr"'l::::id:::dl:.::.':;:E=a':.::.':='ln:::.dcc,''-'''o:cr,:.c'''''/!p'''n:.:'ca=--__ HEARlNG 

Day Wednesdsav Date, __ -,1I,-,7:.c'l3,-,1"-!=c1::..0,-,13,-_~Room, ___ -,1,,,1,-,-7,,-1 __ _ 

Starting Time 2·10 n HI Ending Time 4:04 p.m. 

Recesses , __ , ( __ 10 __ 1 L-to __ 1 L-to __ 1 L-to __ J L-to __ I L-to __ ) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Chairman Ileafla Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) 

Check all of lire fnllowing lhal apply: 

Open Session [Z] 

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TITLE OF HEARING: 

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Stenographic Record IZI 

The Iran~)ria Nexus and its Implications for tire Re{(ian 

SUBCOMlVUTTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

(See attached attendance list) 

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~~!V~ Su committee SfaffDirecfor 

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82308m-2.eps

Hearing Attendance 

Hearing Title: The Iran-Syria Nexus and its Implications for the Region 

Date: 07/31113 

Member Present Member 

Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana (FL) X Deutch, Ted (FL) 

Chabot, Steve (OR) X Connolly, Gerald (VA) 

Wilson, Joe (SC) Higgins, Brian (NY) 

Kinzinger, Adam (IL) X Cicilline, David (RI) 

Cotton, Tom (AR) 

Grayson, Alan (FL) 

Vargas, Juan (CA) 

Weber, Randy (TX) X 

Schneider, Bradley (lL) 

Desantis, Ron (FL) X 

Kennedy, Joseph (MA) 

Radel, Trey (FL) Meng, Grace (NY) 

Collins, Doug (GA) Frankel, Lois (FL) 

Meadows, Mark (NC) 

Yoho, Ted (FL) X 

Messer, Luke (IN) X 

Present 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X