This book is the rare and welcome exception, a genuine breath of fresh 

air. It is the kind of project that should become the norm in Washington, 

challenging all of us to look beyond what one participant describes as the 

tyrannies of the in-box, the demand for immediate results, the focus on a 

single sector, and reliance on uni-dimensional measures of success. It should 

become an annual exercise.”

Anne-Marie Slaughter

Bert G. Kerstetter ‘66 University Professor of Politics and International Affairs 

Princeton University 

Former Director of Policy Planning, United States Department of State

“Perhaps the most embarrassing failure of international development 

agencies has been their excessive focus on programming for past problems 

instead of anticipating the challenges of the future. Black swans have 

derailed many a development budget by forcing the reallocation of scarce 

resources to address game-changing events no one anticipated. This 

thoughtful and timely book remedies this failure and provides some useful 

guidance to policymaking on how to catch the next black swan before it 

catches us.”

Andrew S. Natsios

Executive Professor

George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service

Former USAID Administrator

“Development assistance is one of our most powerful and cost-effective 

tools of national power to promote global democracy and economic 

growth. Yet, it is often behind the curve, focused only on today’s challenges, 

or last month’s crisis. Development practitioners must be in the vanguard, 

not the rear-guard, when it comes to trends in population, migration, 

urbanization, natural resource depletion, and science and technology or 

become obsolete. Today’s world is moving too fast, is too complex, and 

inaction too detrimental not to make futures analysis the leading edge of 

development thinking.” 

E. William Colglazier

Science and Technology Adviser to the Secretary of State

Futures Cover.indd 1 

i

The Future Can’t Wait

Futures text.indd 1 8/12/13 
ii

U.S. Department of State

U.S. Agency for International Development

National Defense University

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

First printing, September 2013

Futures text.indd 2 8/12/13 
iii

Over-the-Horizon Views on Developmen

Edited by Steven Gale and Sarah Jackso

Futures text.indd 3 8/12/13 
iv

vi	 Acknowledgements

Part 1: Introduction

2	 Foreword Donald Steinberg 

4	 Chapter 1 About the USAID Symposium and Book Roadmap

Sarah Jackson 

10	 Chapter 2 Going Long and Short Too

Steven Gale

Part 2: The Four Symposium “Tracks”

22	 Populations Panel Synopsis

24	 Chapter 3 The Future out to 2030: According to Demography

Richard Cincotta

42	 Science and Technology Panel Synopsis 

44	 Chapter 4 Technological Change and Sustainable Development

Linton Wells 

52	 Chapter 5 Future Trends: Science, Technology, and Engineering

for Development

Andrew Reynolds

64	 Politics and Economies Panel Synopsis

66	 Chapter 6 Beyond Traditional Foreign Assistance:

USAID’s Future Role with Middle-Income Countries	

Daniel Runde

76 Chapter 7 The United States, Latin America, and the Caribbean:

Securing Recovery and Prosperity through Deeper

Economic Partnership	

Leonardo Martinez-Diaz

86	 Environment Panel Synopsis

88 Chapter 8 The Periphery Isn’t Peripheral: Addressing Future Trends

Through Integrated Analysis and Development	

Geoffrey Dabelko

Contents

Futures text.indd 4 8/12/13 
v

Part 3: Conclusion

96	 Chapter 9 Strategic Vision: Foresight Research for Development	

Leon Fuerth

104	 Chapter 10 Can Global Development Progress Continue?

Three Future Scenarios and What They Depend On	

Steven Radelet 

113	 About the Contributors

Futures text.indd 5 8/12/13 
vi

This book was developed by the U.S. Agency for International Development

(USAID) under an initiative of the Office of Science and Technology (OST) and

based on the Agency’s first-ever Symposium on Future Development Challenges

held in Washington D.C. on Nov. 4, 2011. The symposium was co-hosted by the

U.S. Department of State, the National Defense University, and the Woodrow

Wilson Center for International Scholars. This book was the natural outcome of

the symposium, but it also reflects a larger interest among the sponsoring

organizations and the individual chapter authors to go beyond the event itself

and look further ahead to address future development challenges.

	 We would like to thank Dr. Alex Dehgan, Science Adviser to the USAID

Administrator, for his continued support for the symposium, and for his

steadfast encouragement to make futures analysis an integral part of the Agency’s

evidenced-based analytic efforts. We are also indebted to Tallie Faircloth, now at

Stanford University, for conceiving the symposium format, recruiting world-class

speakers, and for performing many essential behind-the-scenes activities to make

the symposium a success. This work would not have been possible without the

continued feedback provided by Susan Reichle, Assistant to the Administrator

for the Bureau of Policy, Planning and Learning (PPL) and Larry Garber, PPL

Deputy Assistant Administrator. Special recognition also goes to a handful of

very talented analysts including Dr. Michael Crosswell, Tish Butler, Dr. Tjip

Walker, and Kenneth Lanza who encouraged futures analysis thinking from the

very start and who served on the symposium steering committee. We owe sincere

thanks to Steven Fondriest who co-managed the symposium and provided

valuable insight at every step. Finally, the editors acknowledge the outstanding

technical support received from Natanaelle Orisma at USAID’s Knowledge

Services Center.

We benefitted immeasurably from the guidance and experience of our

symposium co-hosts at the U.S. State Department, notably Dr. Susan Nelson,

Director of Outreach at the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and Dr. Anne

Cheever, along with outstanding intellectual support from Dr. Lin Wells, Neyla

Arnas, and LouElin Dwyer at the National Defense University. The Wilson

Center’s Dr. Geoff Dabelko, now at Ohio University, and Kayly Ober, now a

student at the London School of Economics, were instrumental in bringing

forward the very best ideas about futures analysis as well as vital logistical support

to our partnership.

The book was edited by Dr. Steven Gale of USAID’S Office of Science and

Technology and Sarah Jackson of USAID’s Knowledge Service Center.

Acknowledgments

Futures text.indd 6 8/12/13 
vii

Video clips of the symposium and interviews with speakers and participants can 

be found at: http://kdid.org/events/symposium-future-development-challenges

To provide feedback, comments or for questions on futures analysis at USAID, 

please contact Dr. Steven Gale, USAID Office of Science and Technology at 

Sgale@USAID.gov

Disclaimer

The opinions expressed herein are those of the Author(s) and do not necessarily reflect 

the views of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Department of 

State, the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, or the National 

Defense University. 

This publication was made possible through support provided by the Office of Science 

and Technology (OST), U.S. Agency for International Development, under the terms 

of Purchase Order No. AID-OAA-O-12-00079. 

Futures text.indd 7 8/12/13 
Part 1 

Futures text.indd 8 8/12/13 
Introduction

Futures text.indd 1 8/12/13 
On November 4, 2011, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

hosted the first-ever “Symposium on the Future of Development Challenges” in

Washington, D.C. Along with our partners at the Department of State, the

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and the National Defense

University, we brought together development theorists and practitioners,

economists and demographers, scientists and futurists to explore and discuss

emerging development trends that will shape our collective policies and

programs long into the future.

	 It was an inspiring day. The symposium’s goal was to use futures analysis to

help USAID and other development organizations turn our vision from our

current portfolio of projects and programs, and extend our gaze out over decades

to come. In so doing, we were seeking to catch up with our counterparts in the

private sector, the intelligence community, and the military, who have been

engaging in futures analysis for years. A brief view of development trends over

the past two decades suggests how important this exercise can be.

	 Today, the technology available to every person on the planet in a personal

digital assistant is more advanced than super-computers in 1990. Breakthroughs

in science and innovation applicable to global health, food security, and climate

change adaptation and remediation occur daily. The flow of capital to developing

countries — about $1 trillion each year — now dwarfs development assistance,

making public-private partnerships ever more important. Child mortality rates

are plummeting throughout the developing world at rates even the most

optimistic experts could not have anticipated, producing a so-called

“demographic dividend.” The wave of democratic governance has accelerated:

when the Berlin Wall fell, only two of our development partners in Africa were

democracies; today, more than 20 enjoy that status.

Many of these past trends will continue into the future, but as we know

from investment prospectuses, past performance is not necessarily an indicator of

future developments. The many outstanding presenters and discussants at the

November 2011 symposium stretched our imaginations and forced us to reassess

our developmental, demographic and foreign affairs assumptions.

	 As I launched the symposium, I could not help but think back to the work

of Isaac Asimov, the American biochemistry professor and renowned science

fiction author. In 1951, Asimov published the novel Foundation, the first of seven

volumes released as part of his Foundation Series. In these books, Asimov

introduced the concepts of “mathematical sociology” and “psycho-history.” He

suggested that studying the collective actions and tendencies of societies —

2

Foreword

Futures text.indd 2 8/12/13 
filtered through probability theory — can help predict the future. In his series, a

group of the world’s greatest scientists and thinkers came together to form the

Foundation, an institution that seeks not just to foresee the future, but to gently

guide it into more prosperous, peaceful, and democratic directions.	

	 At the USAID symposium, attendees explored new development frontiers

using futures analysis and turned the event into a virtual reality of Asimov’s

Foundation. True, our time-frame was a bit shorter than that of the Foundation,

which looked 30 millennia in advance, but the lesson is the same. Traditional

short-term development plans are no longer sufficient, and longer-term plans

must be grounded in thoughtful analyses of future trends. This message is

particularly important as we consider new development goals for the next

generation in the follow-up on the Millennium Development Goals.

	 I am immensely proud of USAID’s status as a pre-eminent learning

institution and a thought leader in futures analysis for development. Working

with our development partners in governments, multilateral institutions, the

private sector and civil society, USAID seeks to elevate the importance and draw

from the lessons of futures analysis. I hope you will find inspiration in the

thought-provoking chapters in this book to work with us to make Asimov’s

vision of a Foundation not just a fantasy, but a reality.

Donald Steinberg Former USAID Deputy Administrator

3

Futures text.indd 3 8/12/13 
The first-ever USAID Symposium on Future Development Challenges was held Nov.

4, 2011 in Washington, D.C. and brought together experts from a number of

different disciplines to focus on an integrative, multidisciplinary approach to

futures analysis. The symposium was divided into three sessions: Evolutions,

Revolutions, and Vision 2025. These three sessions were distinguished by their

outlook. Evolutions focused on gradual “evolutionary” changes consistent with

traditional trends and futures analysis. Revolutions looked at unexpected

“revolutionary” events and the shocks to the system that produce game-changing

effects, often jump-started by new technological advances. The third session,

Vision 2025, built on the first two sessions and explored a combined “vision” of

what development will look like in 2025 and beyond. Each of these three sessions

prompted heated discussions about the future of development agencies such as

USAID and sparked debate about the steps development practitioners will need

to take in order to adapt their perspectives and adjust their policies and programs

to meet a changing and evolving world. The symposium was not about predicting

the future, but rather about looking systematically at alternative future scenarios

to facilitate better planning and project implementation for global development.

Within each of these three sessions, four cross-cutting tracks were used

to help organize and focus the day’s discussions. These tracks were: populations,

science and technology, politics and economies, and environment. Populations

examined the changing demographics of developing countries and the

implications of this change. Science and technology focused on the rapidly

4

About the USAID 

Symposium and Book 

Roadmap

C H A P T E R 1

Futures text.indd 4 8/12/13 
changing technological advances in society and their impact on development.

Politics and economies addressed issues such as regional integration, the shifting

donor landscape, and a changing global economy. The environment track

addressed issues such as climate change, resource scarcity, and rising energy needs.

The symposium’s “3x4” format encouraged discussion on present trends,

near-future possibilities, and far reaching future scenarios.

In the following chapter, Going Long and Short Too, Steven Gale, the symposium

organizer and co-editor, makes a compelling case for why futures analysis must

become an integral part of how USAID operates and should inform everything

— from project design to program planning to policy formulation and decisionmaking. Futures analysis, a term used throughout this book, is the systematic

assessment of upcoming events, trends, and data projections that enable an

institution like USAID to have more impactful and resilient development

programs. Futures analysis is only worth doing if policymakers are willing to take

action. Futures analysis combined with actionable next steps, Gale argues, can

enable Agency leadership to uncover emerging trends, envision alternative

scenarios, and achieve better development results.

Part 2 of this book is comprised of six chapters authored by six different

subject matter experts from the symposium. Each was a keynote speaker on a

panel or a lead discussant. We asked the authors to use the symposium

discussions as a starting point for their chapters, but gave them the flexibility to

either expand upon or build out the ideas that were raised during the event.

	 The six chapters are divided into four sections that model the four tracks of

the symposium described above. Each section is prefaced by a synopsis that

highlights main ideas and key themes that arose during the symposium panels.

These synopses were gleaned from the notes and audio recordings of the

symposium and thus do not include citations.

	 Chapters begin with highlights of the issues that arose during the

symposium, but they each go on to cover new ground and new developments

that have taken place since the event. Richard Cincotta covers the populations

track; Lin Wells and Andrew Reynolds address the science and technology track;

Dan Runde and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz tackle the politics and economies

track; and Geoff Dabelko explores environmental issues. 

Richard Cincotta discusses how population age-structure and demographic

projections can be used to examine future scenarios as well as how these

predictions can and ought to shape U.S. policy. In particular, he explores how

four different types of country age-structure categories (youthful, intermediate,

mature, and post-mature) impact development initiatives, arguing that some of

these categories appear to be more “favorable” for managing a modern state than

others. He also highlights some of the shortcomings of interpreting age-related

data in isolation and notes the importance of other factors at play such as

5

Futures text.indd 5 8/12/13 
6

ethno-religious demographic shifts.

Lin Wells and Andrew Reynolds provide important insights into how the

advancement of science and technology (S&T) has already changed, and will

continue to change the future of development. Wells’ chapter emphasizes that

advancements in S&T are spurring unprecedented innovation and that

investments in technological development are in the best interest of the

American people and the global community. He discusses a select number of

specific technological advancements that are likely to shape the near future,

emphasizing that the use of technology is more important than its existence, and

notes that an understanding of the value of S&T must be leveraged to improve

policymaking and governance.

Reynolds’ chapter discusses S&T from a less technical, but more

development-oriented viewpoint. He focuses on exploring how the development

assistance landscape must change as the S&T revolution — particularly in

regards to information communications technology (ICT) — increases global

connectivity. The chapter closely profiles the key ideas that emerged at the

symposium and emphasizes how traditional assistance organizations must adapt

to the new collaborative environment and leverage the powerful 21st century

“aidscape” partnerships that universities and the millennials are trailblazing.

Wells’ chapter, like Reynolds’, also emphasizes the importance of ICT. But he

goes on to categorize the larger technological transformations taking place

globally in terms of what he refers to as BRINE: Biotechnology, Robotics,

Information, Nanotechnology, and Energy. Wells is quick to point out that

building social networks and enhancing trust with local populations is just as

important as any technological breakthrough to achieve development success.

Daniel Runde and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz both deliver two great chapters

concerning how the world’s shifting political and economic landscape will

impact future development. Both chapters focus on the new role the United

States must assume in the coming years, but the themes discussed are certainly

applicable to other governments and government agencies throughout the world.

Runde’s chapter articulates how USAID must change the way it provides

assistance, particularly to middle-income countries. In light of budget cuts and

the rise of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, otherwise known as the BRICs,

USAID and other development agencies must find a way to transform the

traditional donor-recipient relationship into more of a partnership model. Runde

emphasizes the potential role of increased trade, legacy mechanisms, scenario

planning, triangular cooperation, and new collaboration as these partner

relationships begin to take shape. Martinez-Diaz’s chapter is unique in that it

offers a regional lens to the topic of futures analysis. He highlights the

importance of regional cooperation between Latin America and the Caribbean

(LAC) and the United States, suggesting that close economic links are critical for

U.S. growth and job creation as well as for LAC’s economic potential.

Futures text.indd 6 8/12/13 
7

Advocating deeper economic engagement, Martinez-Diaz describes a number of

factors that make the LAC region a good future economic partner for the United

States and briefly touches on the steps that the U.S. Treasury is taking to make

better cooperation a reality.

Geoff Dabelko tackles environmental issues and cuts right to the core of

today’s shortcomings in development thinking and approaches. Unrealistic

expectations and analytic inadequacies hinder development efforts around the

globe. Dabelko focuses on the need to use integrated analysis, not single-sector

approaches, in order to understand and solve today’s complex and intertwining

development challenges. He identifies “four tyrannies” that impede more

effective development outcomes, not just in the environmental space. The

“tyranny of the inbox” overwhelms aid practitioners by demanding their

immediate attention and hinders in-depth analysis. The “tyranny of immediate

results” demands outcomes before meaningful results can be achieved. Dabelko’s

“tyranny of the single sector” highlights the need for complex, integrative

analysis. As a follow-up, Dabelko points to the “tyranny of the uni-dimensional

measurement of success” which can cause program implementers to inadequately

measure impact. The good news, according to Dabelko, is that these tyrannies

are losing ground. In the chapter, he points out some success stories in Asia and

Africa that speak to this growing shift.

In Part 3, Leon Fuerth and Steven Radelet contribute vital, forwardthinking insight in the concluding section of the book. Fuerth defines and

discusses the significance of foresight research for development. For

policymakers, he argues, linear models of causal relationships are no longer

sufficient. Today’s challenges require USAID and other government entities to be

prepared to deal with policies and consequences that are interactive and

concurrent. In other words, forward-thinking complex analysis is vital to the

success of future development initiatives. The second half of Fuerth’s chapter

judiciously and articulately outlines the basic lexicon related to futures analysis so

that readers are clear about concepts that are often confused and confusing.

Steven Radelet’s concluding piece highlights the momentous progress

global development has made over the past 20 years. He outlines six key

dimensions of change that have and will continue to impact the future of

development. He then details three forward-thinking scenarios that describe

what the world might look like in the near future. These three scenarios: the

continuation of rapid global development, the derailment of development by

conflict, and increasing pressure on the planet, are compelling and plausible.

Radelet closes by describing several factors that will come into play as

policymakers attempt to steer the world towards the least destructive of these

scenarios and towards a better future for all.

Overall, this book aims to stimulate further learning and discussion about

the future of development. Futures analysis has the potential to greatly facilitate

Futures text.indd 7 8/12/13 
8

international development; academics and practitioners alike must grasp this

opportunity to improve the planning, implementation, impact, and assessment

of development interventions. USAID and other development actors must start

planning ahead to identify emerging trends — further ahead than ever before.

The goals and aims of the development community are much more likely to be

achieved if strategies, programs, and policies take these future trends into

consideration. We must begin to think and plan about alternative futures now so

that greater, more sustainable, and more resilient development impacts are

witnessed in the future.

Sarah Jackson U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

Futures text.indd 8 8/12/13 
9

Futures text.indd 9 8/12/13 
Going Long

Less than 10 years ago, most energy specialists, along with the nation’s top

economists, saw the future of U.S. energy consumption as being almost entirely

dependent on importing hydrocarbons from the usual places around the globe

— not at home or from our neighbors. Another long-held view was that the

United States would experience only a modest increase in domestic oil and gas

production over the next decade. Consequently, domestic and global energy

companies were building on-shore storage facilities for liquefied natural gas

(LNG), constructing off-loading littoral LNG platforms, signing multi-year

shipping contracts to transport fuels to U.S. and close-by ports, and a ratcheting

back in hydro carbon-related industries and the manufacturing of energy-related

equipment for domestic use. The future, 10 years out, looked clear.

	 As we now know, the future energy picture looks sharply different today.

There is an alternative world view in the making on energy production.

Hydraulic fracking and other drilling innovations are likely to make the United

States a net exporter of liquefied natural gas over the next five to seven years or

possibly sooner, and domestic oil production data reveals a 25 percent spike since

1980.1 In North Dakota, legendary for its expansive farmlands and rich

10

C H A P T E R 2

Going Long and Short Too

Steven Gale, Symposium on Future Development 

Challenges organizer and book co-editor, makes a 

compelling case for why futures analysis must become 

essential to how USAID operates. By constantly 

monitoring emerging trends and re-calibrating 

programming, the Agency can stay ahead of the 

development curve.

1 Daniel Yergin, “The Real Stimulus: Low-Cost Natural Gas,” The Wall Street Journal, October 23,

2012, available at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044473480457806233119902985

0.html>.

Futures text.indd 10 8/12/13 
agricultural bounty, oil-production and petroleum-related industries are looking

more like the state’s economic destiny, not soybeans, corn, or wheat production.

Keeping with this energy theme for just a bit longer, it appears that the largest

source of U.S. oil imports today, Canadian oil sands, did not even exist on a

commercial basis prior to the 1970s.2 Whether or not oil sands will top the U.S.

import list is still being debated, but there is little doubt about a U.S. energy

renaissance. According to forward-thinking global analysts on Wall Street, in

Paris at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

(OECD), and at the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in

Vienna, it is generally agreed that in less than a decade the United States will

become the largest global oil producer — overtaking Saudi Arabia by the mid

2020s and becoming a net oil exporter by 2030.3 It is fair to say that many

mainstream thinkers were simply caught off guard by these emerging energy

trends. These energy surpluses, and their inherent opportunities, were not an

unforeseen black swan or the consequence of some entirely unpredictable or even

startling mix of whirlwind events.

	 Are there lessons development practitioners can learn from our colleagues

in the energy world about the need to always be looking at alternative futures?

Two obvious points come to mind. The first is that things change at lightning

speed in today’s fast-paced globalized world and “looking down” at today’s

challenges rather than “looking ahead” at emerging trends is a bad investment.

Second, outcomes of interest are often unanticipated and rarely straight forward,

but serious evidence-based, future-oriented analyses can help detect trends even

if they are faint and inconclusive. Development interventions may not be subject

to as abrupt or as dramatic a switch as the current energy revolution portends,

yet not focusing on future development trends is a risky and bad policy. Looking

at trends and alternative futures can only be ignored at our peril and, more

importantly, at the expense of those we are trying to empower around the globe

to have better and more productive lives.

	 The question development professionals should be addressing is, what if

some of the hottest development enhancing interventions and technologies today

— like e-readers, bed nets, micro grid technology, and smart phones4 — were found

not to meet the rapidly changing needs of intended beneficiaries? What if

development-solving products manufactured outside host countries were entirely

supplanted by endogenous home-grown innovations over the next 7 to 10 years?

11

2 Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World (New York:

Penguin Press, 2011).

3 World Energy Outlook 2012, International Energy Association, November 12, 2012, available at

<www.worldenergyoutlook.org>.

4 The smart phones transformation is already under way. See Steven Gale and James Ehlert, “Tools

for Peace: The Emerging Role of Science and Technology,” in Strategic Realities in Irregular 

Conflict, 169–190, ed. Franklin D. Kramer and Melanne Civic (Washington, DC: Center for

Naval Analyses, January 10, 2013), available at <www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Irregular_

Conflict.pdf>.

Futures text.indd 11 8/12/13 
12

5 Thomas Campbell, Christopher Williams, Olga Ivanova, Banning Garrett, Could 3D Printing 

Change the World? Technologies, Potential, and Implications of Additive Manufacturing, Strategic

Foresight Report (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council, October 2011); Connor M. McNulty,

Neyla Arnas, and Thomas A. Campbell, Toward the Printed World: Additive manufacturing and 

Implications for National Security, Defense Horizon 73 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology

and National Security Policy, September 2012).

6 Andrew Shepherd et. al. “A Reconciled Estimate of Ice-Sheet Mass Balance,” Science 338, no. 6111

(November 30, 2012), 1183–1189.

7 Against the Grain: Land Grabbing and Food Sovereignty in West and Central Africa (Barcelona,

Spain: GRAIN, August 2012), available at <www.grain.org/article/entries/4575-land-grabbing-andfood-sovereignty-in-west-and-central-africa>.

8 Laura Pappano,” The Year of the MOOC,” The New York Times, November 2, 2012, available at

<www.nytimes.com/2012/11/04/education/edlife/massive-open-online-courses-are-multiplying-ata-rapid-pace.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>.

9 Mihail C. Roco, Chad A. Mirkin, Mark C. Hersam, Nanotechnology Research Directions for Societal 

Needs in 2020: Retrospective and Outlook Summary, World Technology Evaluation Center,

December 2010, available at <www.wtec.org/nano2>.

Could any of those trends have been foreseen? What about upcoming new

technologies like “3D-Printing”— which some say will revolutionize

manufacturing in small-to-medium size enterprises or SMEs5 — so often the

target of donor economic growth strategies? On the natural resource leger,

environmentalists and others have long pointed to future harmful impacts on

biodiversity, degraded forests, and sea level rises, along with other negative global

impacts on agriculture and food production resulting from global climate

change. Fluctuations in precipitation patterns attributed to climate change have

also been linked to increased risks, especially in the developing world, resulting

in droughts, floods, storms, and tsunamis that can seriously undercut the

sustainability and resilience of development projects. For example, the latest

comprehensive scientific data show that polar ice sheets are melting at accelerated

rates, raising sea level by almost a half inch since 1992.6

These and other emerging trends are already changing the shape of

development interventions. But much less attention, if any, has been focused on

other imminent trends, ranging widely from the massive private sector and

government purchase or lease of farmlands in Africa,7 to unparalleled changes in

higher education involving free, massively open online courses (MOOCs),

available to millions of students globally, who only need Internet access,8 not

traditional brick and mortar buildings and resident on-site faculty and

instructors.

Similarly on the technology front, development professionals focused on

promoting interventions revolving around off-grid energy, climate change, and

water scarcity will need to pay much closer attention to ongoing and future

advances in nanotechnology for example. Those innovations, some say, will

revolutionize water purification, hydrogen storage, carbon capture, and

agricultural systems with predictions that solar energy conversion will be cost

competitive by 2015 and water desalinization by 2020.9 Nanotechnology

products and applications are quickly coming of age and could have profound

Futures text.indd 12 8/12/13 
13

near and mid-term influences on sustainable development interventions

producing cheaper, better, and more scalable solutions. For example, a recent lab

experiment suggests that using specific light-absorbing nanoparticles —

combined with just sunlight — can generate steam, which in turn, could fuel

portable compact generator anywhere in the developing world to desalinate

water, sterilize medical equipment, and increase food safety.10

Today versus Tomorrow

Focusing on future trends is just as much a challenge for the economic elites of

the industrialized world as it is for developed, developing and emerging donors.

Focusing only on proximal challenges is necessary, but short sighted. Let’s look at

Africa today as an example. Despite the emergence of new demands arising in

Africa, many development practitioners essentially see big challenges revolving

around ending malaria, preventing HIV/AIDS transmission, and curbing other

infectious diseases like tuberculosis, avian influenza, and neglected tropical

diseases. These are indeed some of today’s most daunting health problems, but

what about tomorrow’s? Over the next decade, non-communicable diseases like

obesity, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease will likely become the continent’s

next great health challenges. What other alternative futures should we be

examining right now?

	 On the economic front over the past decade, Africa has recorded the second 

fastest regional growth in the world, just behind emerging countries in Asia, with

42 percent of the workforce already engaged outside commonly viewed traditional

low-wage agricultural jobs.11 Governance too is changing across the continent

where there is a remarkable upswing with more than 20 democracies today in

sub-Saharan Africa alone, from a low point of just three in 1989.12 Africa is

changing fast, and to keep up with future scenarios, donors and public and

private partners must not only be on top of emerging development trends, but

also be contributing substantively to the ongoing discussion. There is a general

consensus, for example, that many of tomorrow’s megacities will be in Africa.

This means we must rethink how we envision future cities, not just in Africa. Are

they just hubs for traditional economic growth strategies? What new

infrastructure will be needed and how will education, water, power, and other

essential government services be provided for these new megacities? To get a

sense of the rapid global population rise in urban areas, think about adding the

10 Oara Neumann, Alex Urban, Jared Day, Surbhi Lal, Peter Nordlander, and Naomi J. Halas, “Solar

Vapor Generation Enabled by Nanoparticles,” ACS Nano 22, no. 1 (January 22, 2013), 42–29.

11 David Fine et. al., Africa at Work: Job Creation and Inclusive Growth, McKinsey Global Institute,

August 2012, available at <www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/Insights%20and%20

pubs/MGI/Research/Labor%20Markets/Africa%20at%20work/MGI_Africa_at_work_

August_2012_Full_Report.ashx>

12 Steven Radelet, Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries are Leading the Way (Washington, DC: Center

for Global Development, 2010).

Futures text.indd 13 8/12/13 
14

equivalent of seven cities the size of Chicago, or five the size of London, annually

over the next dozen years.13 What future below-the-radar implications need to be

addressed now and over the next 10 to 15 years when thinking about these new

cities? For example, today’s global forecasts of urban expansion show dramatic

implications for land use that threaten biodiversity and other ecosystems.14 If we

expand the use of development-focused futures analysis, and its related tools such

back-casting, gaming, horizon scanning, etc., we can help connect emerging

trends and their development requirements with the present.15 Using the suite of

futures tools, moving analyses to policy, and moving policy to action will ensure

that the projects and programs being designed today will help address future

critical needs, not obsolete ones.

Major Players

Which big institutions and organizations are really focused on tomorrow’s

over-the-horizon trends? Some would say that futures analysis was born after

World War II at the request of the U.S. military. It was quickly adopted and

advanced by the private sector, mainly the oil industry16 and over time, futures

analysis became a central feature of today’s U.S. intelligence community

reporting.17 Outside the United States, a remarkable exception to promoting and

using futures analysis resides within the Government of Singapore.18 This

country has been a leader in utilizing analytic tools, visualization techniques, and

scenario planning to “scan the horizon” to track emerging national security issues

and distilling the findings for policymakers.19

Regardless of the exact genesis of futures analysis, it is clear that others

outside the development community have intently and consistently focused on

identifying emerging trends that impact their strategies, budgets, clients, and

13 Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, National Intelligence Council, NIC2012-001, December

2012, available at <www.dni.gov/nic_2030>.

14 Karen C. Seto, Burak Guneralp, and Lucy R. Hutyra, “Global Forecasts of Urban Expansion to

2030 and Direct Impacts on Biodiversity and Carbon Pools,” Proceedings of the National Academy 

of Science 109, no. 40 (October 2, 2012) 16083–16088.

15 Steven Gale, Connecting the Future with the Present, USAID, June/July 2011, available at <www.

usaid.gov/press/frontlines/fl_jun11/FL_jun11_FUTURES.html>.

16 Ben Ramalingam and Harry Jones, Strategic Futures Planning: A Guide for Public Organizations,

the Overseas Development Institute, September 2007, available at <www.odi.org.uk/

publications/216-strategic-futures-planning-public-sector-organisations>.

17 Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, National Intelligence Council, NIC2008-003, November

20, 2008, available at <www.acus.org/publication/global-trends-2025-transformed-world>.

18 Other foreign governments using futures analysis include Finland, France, South Africa and South

Korea. See Jerome C. Glenn, Theodore Gordon, and Elizabeth Florescu, 2011: State of the Future,

The Millennium Project, Washington, DC, available at <www.millennium-project.org/

millennium/2011SOF.html>.

19 The International Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Symposium Report 2011, Government of

Singapore, October 18, 2011, available at <http://app.rahs.gov.sg/public/www/home.aspx>.

Futures text.indd 14 8/12/13 
15

national interests. The development community has only just begun to take

futures analysis seriously. USAID must become a wiser steward of tax payers’

foreign assistance dollars. The Agency’s programs must be more impactful, and

more resilient. To achieve these goals, futures analysis must become an

indispensable part of our analytical approach for development in every phase of

our planning cycle, policy formulation, and on-the-ground programming. This

recognition, along with support from top USAID leadership, was the driving

force behind the Symposium on Future Development Challenges held in

Washington in late 2011.

Early but Limited Success

To be accurate, there were some notable early attempts at futures analysis in the

civilian world. Back in 2005, the U.S. State Department and USAID, along

with over two dozen civilian counterpart Federal agencies, dove head-first into

futures analysis by asking about different alternative “world scenarios” such

as growing and widespread food insecurity, emerging pandemics, mounting

climate change threats, and other global circumstances likely to face the U.S.

Government over the next 10 to 20 years. Project Horizon, as it was called, also

focused on examining interagency capabilities to deal with alternative future

worlds, building internal analysis capacity by conducting scenario-planning

exercises, and strengthening interagency coordination to deal with 2025 global

possibilities.20 Project Horizon was way ahead of its time by recognizing that

while accurately forecasting the future was not always possible, developing plans

for a range of alternative futures was absolutely vital.

In the end, Project Horizon was short lived. It found little traction after its

initial two-year-long set of meetings and joint exercises. It is more “natural”

inside civilian government agencies to focus on here-and-now realities like

budget threats, staffing issues, and the inevitable consequences of changes in

administrations and leadership direction. Regrettably, the tyranny of today’s

issues is hard to successfully and consistently buck in most institutions. Two

other factors which dealt Project Horizon a short “half-life” was not being

threaded from the start into the political agenda of top agency leadership nor

connected to ongoing business processes.

	 It takes a concerted ramp-up effort to build futures analysis capabilities and

assign responsibility for who will take it on, year after year after year. And, it

takes an even greater effort to sustain and grow futures analysis capabilities to

withstand the perennial organizational re-makes. For futures analysis to have a

chance of succeeding, buy-in is needed from top-level agency political leadership

and from bottom-level career practitioners. Even when futures analyses are

20 Project Horizon Progress Report (Washington, DC: Interagency Strategic Planning Coordinating

Conference, 2006).

Futures text.indd 15 8/12/13 
16

conducted and made available to decision-makers at all levels, there is no

guarantee they will use it. Part of the solution at USAID therefore must be to

communicate the significance of the trends, the perils averted if we take them

into consideration, and then incentivizing use of the information by those in

Washington and among our 80-plus field missions.

It is worth noting that a number of the future scenarios posited by Project

Horizon are today’s realities, such as a diminished problem-solving role for the

United States globally, the sometimes chaotic and unexpected paths of new

democracies (does this sound familiar?), and an upswing in non-state actors (both

good and bad) on the global scene. Before letting Project Horizon go, one final “Big

Idea” that emerged, and was applicable across all the scenarios, was the outsized

role that Federally-funded science, technology, and engineering investments could

play in addressing long-term global challenges combined with academic and

private sector partnerships. This notion of leveraging the scientific know-how of

Federal labs like those at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), National

Science Foundation (NSF), National Institutes of Health (NIH), and Department

of Defense (DOD) today has found a permanent home today at USAID,

becoming an essential pillar of the Office of Science and Technology.21

Emerging Development Trends

The goal of the Symposium on Future Development Challenges was to wrestle

with emerging trends and unknown challenges not easily predicted by past

events, un-hitched from traditional linear thinking, and freed from looking at

just low-risk, incremental — rather than high-risk but game-changing —

development solutions. In the very broadest terms, USAID had previously

identified six key likely trends that are quickly reshaping — and will continue to

shape — the global development landscape.

•	 Economic spurts: The global economy is growing at multiple speeds;

•	 Population shifts: Demographic trends are complicating development

challenges;

•	 Knowledge entree: Knowledge access is growing exponentially as

connectivity explodes globally;

•	 Event speed-up: Shocks are reverberating more quickly and more widely

than ever before;

•	 Escalating good governance: Democratic governance is expanding

21 See USAID Office of Science and Technology, Homepage, available at <http://transition.usaid.

gov/scitech/>.

Futures text.indd 16 8/12/13 
17

globally, but haltingly; and,

•	 Changing development ecosystem: A new “aidscape” is briskly emerging

with new partners, new approaches, and new models.22

These development-focused trends laid the foundation for the symposium on

which this book is anchored. We also borrowed unabashedly from the findings of

the U.S. National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) in-depth trends analysis to

expand the symposium and stimulate discussions on issues such as the

unprecedented rise of emerging political players and economic powerhouses like

Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Indonesia, and the chance for major economic

downswings in sub-Saharan Africa where USAID is heavily engaged.23 The NIC

report also pointed to sizable demographic shifts over the next 20 years, with

virtually all real population growth occurring in Africa, Asia and Latin America

and youth bulges in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle-East. Again, these trends

raised concerns as many countries within these geographical regions are current

recipients of significant USAID development assistance. Beyond these economic

and demographic trends, the NIC report highlighted a number of future climate

change trends in the development space that USAID has been engaged in for

many years, including water management, agricultural production, and natural

resource management practices.

From a purely developmental perspective, the NIC report underscored the

exceptional speed at which technology was advancing in the developing world.

USAID’s own future trends analyses, combined with the NIC’s assessment, led to

building the symposium around four distinct tracks: population; science, 

technology, and society; politics and economies; and environmental issues.

While the NIC’s report focus was predominantly on national security

issues, their analyses have proved to be a highly valuable guidepost to future

development trends. This is not a surprise as the once hard edges between

defense, diplomacy, development and intelligence have become less clear cut.

Findings from the latest NIC report highlight such issues as a rapidly aging

population for some countries versus an increasing youthful population for

others; a rising consuming class in most countries with attendant demands for

political change; and the emergence of more than a dozen “disruptive

technologies” — from precision farming to distributed power — aimed at

addressing growing global challenges from rapid urbanization, energy shortfalls,

water and food scarcity, among other stressors.24

22 USAID Policy Framework 2011–2015 (Washington, DC: USAID, 2011), available at <http://

transition.usaid.gov/policy/USAID_PolicyFramework.PDF>.

23 Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, National Intelligence Council, NIC2008-003, November

20, 2008, available at < http://www.acus.org/publication/global-trends-2025-transformed-world>.

24 Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, National Intelligence Council, NIC2012-001, December

2012, available at <www.dni.gov/nic_2030>.

Futures text.indd 17 8/12/13 
18

Going Short

Building futures analysis capabilities and simultaneously creating incentives for

decision-makers to use is vital for impactful development assistance aimed at

fighting poverty, reducing hunger, increasing livelihoods and advancing good

governance. Thus far, the intention of this chapter has been to make a strong case

that more focus and attention needs to be devoted to addressing emerging

development trends like the youth dividend, urbanization, the senior bulge, and

looming threats to biodiversity. Adjusting programs accordingly is equally

important; otherwise the development interventions we are operationalizing

today will be way out of synch with the future needs of those in the developing

world. At the same time, if we do not also focus our analytic capabilities on

better digesting the reams of existing development data now increasingly

available, so-called Big Data, we will likewise fall short of our real goal. “Going

Short” refers to the need to have reliable and accurate real-time feedback for

newly implemented and ongoing development projects combined with deep-dive

analyses of current data from multiple sources to help understand the current

development challenges.

Big Data, one way or another, has been around for some time but the

digital age has brought with it a quantum leap in the volume and complexity of

what is available to support development analysis and decision-making. It is not

only the sheer volume of development and related data that is available, but the

growing diversity of data generators. From an expanding circle of individual data

users via mobile phones, Tweets, and blogs to traditional institutional data, these

resources are now being made openly and widely available by the World Bank

and U.N. agencies. That includes data from USAID to support the agencies

“open development” initiative. Add to that information reservoir, volumes of

figures, facts, trends and statistics from remote sensing via satellites, computer

mapping, geographic information systems, and quantitative modeling and you

begin to get an inkling of what Big Data is all about.25 Most of this data is from

public sources, but the real gold mine is the yet untapped data streams in the

private sector. For example, it has been reported that Walmart transmits more

than 1 million transactions an hour into its corporate databases estimated at more

than 2.5 petabytes.26 “Going Short” will allow development planners to carefully

analyze current data flows that are already changing reality.27

25 For a discussion of sweeping changes in how big data for development is being optimized see

Aniket Bhushan, “Big Data” in USAID Frontiers in Development, Rajiv Shah and Steven Radelet,

ed, 152–156 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, May 2012).

26 Dan Brody, Big Data: Harnessing a Game-Changing Asset, Economist Intelligence Unit,

September, 2011, available at <www.sas.com/reg/gen/corp/1583148>.

27 Emmanuel Letouze, Big Data for Development: Challenges and Opportunities, United Nations

Global Pulse (New York: United Nations, May 2012).

Futures text.indd 18 8/12/13 
19

Two Final Thoughts

Optimal outcomes sought by the development community and our partners in

the private sector, philanthropic, and foundational worlds will benefit from fresh

thinking and subsequent actions that better recognize the importance of

emerging trends to achieve long lasting impacts, build resilient communities, and

empower governments at every level to improve the quality of life for all their

citizens. Futures analysis should not be a “day” you set aside for a symposium,

but rather something that development professionals do every day. Futures

analysis should be at the very heart of the discipline and science of development.

In the end, “Going Long” must be accompanied by “Going Short” in that

long-term thinking must complement new breakthrough analytics emerging

from Big Data. Development professionals have increasing access to more and

highly sophisticated data than ever before, but the trick is turning it into useful

and actionable insights. Both long and short approaches rely on the increasing

need for development planning to be more evidenced-based and anticipatory.

The development community must also continue to break free from the

near-linear thinking that has dominated our past. Future worlds will surely be

more complicated and problematic. Today’s solutions to solve tough

development problems were born of a more ordered, structured, logical and

stable world. The future will have more players, events will be more intertwined,

the speed of change more swift, and the problems more “wicked” to solve.

Greater focus on futures analysis will give us a leg-up to have more impactful

and resilient development programs now and over the horizon.

Steven Gale Senior Advisor for Strategic Opportunities, Office of Science and 

Technology, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

Futures text.indd 19 8/12/13 
Part 2 

Futures text.indd 20 8/12/13 
The Four Symposium 

‘‘Tracks’’

Populations

Science and Technology 

Politics and Economies

Environment

Futures text.indd 21 8/12/13 
22

The Population Reference Bureau 

projects that by 2025, 27 

megacities will exist. Twenty-one 

of these will be in less developed 

countries, mainly in Africa and 

Asia. It is clear that current and 

future demographic trends will 

have a profound impact on 

development today and into the 

next decade. During the populations panels, issues concerning 

changing demographics, transnational networks, urbanization, 

governance mechanisms and 

strategies needed to cope with 

these changes received considerable attention. 

Much of the day’s discussion 

focused on the demands created 

by growing resource scarcity. 

Population growth coupled with 

urbanization and climate change 

will, according to the panelists, 

put significant stress on water, 

food, and energy. A rising middle 

class in many developing countries will mean increased demand 

for more goods and services. 

Participants emphasized the 

importance of anticipating these 

shortages using futures analysis 

tools and other methods and of 

developing policies and plans to 

meet these challenges. Planning 

for food security, disaster 

resilience, and adaptation, for 

example, will be imperative in 

order to synchronize development aid and population needs. 

A related theme that dominated discussion was that of 

migration both within countries 

and beyond national borders, 

from which two trends emerged. 

First, people are moving to cities 

in record numbers. As cities 

expand, so do the informal settlements that surround them. 

Seventy-two percent of the 

urban population of Africa lives 

in slums. This creates both 

challenges and opportunities for 

development work. On the 

one hand, populations living in 

informal settlements can be 

difficult to track and monitor. 

Improving sanitation, clean water, 

and educational services presents 

major challenges for urban 

planners. At the same time, 

information dissemination 

campaigns and family planning 

initiatives can be extremely 

successful because organizations 

can reach so many people 

Populations

There are now 7 

billion people on the 

planet, and more 

than half of them live 

in urban areas. 

Futures text.indd 22 8/12/13 
23

S Y M P O S I U M PA N E L S Y N O P S I S

without having to travel miles 

and miles. 

The second trend of migration that was highlighted involves 

people moving away from their 

homelands. Natural disaster, 

conflict, and economic gain are all 

drivers of human migration. As 

climate change continues to 

impact the globe, there will be 

continued drought in the Sahel 

and increased flooding in 

Southeast Asia. Coastal cities are 

particularly vulnerable because of 

their proximity to rising sea 

levels as well as high population 

density. In the wake of natural 

disasters, will these people 

relocate or will they rebuild? And 

if they rebuild, what guidance and 

advice can development agencies 

provide to increase resiliency? 

Another theme discussed was 

what many refer to as the “youth 

bulge.” One in five people are 

between the ages of 15 and 24. 

The vast majority of these youth 

live in less developed countries. 

While some argue this “youth 

bulge” poses a threat to stability, 

many of the panelists highlighted 

the importance of leveraging the 

“demographic dividend.” The key, 

they argued, is to empower these 

youth to become agents of 

positive social change. In order to 

do this, development initiatives 

need to focus on requisite 

education, creating better job 

opportunities, and widespread 

economic growth. 

Speakers went beyond 

discussing future megatrends like 

population growth and their 

associated perils. One area of 

concern revolved around the 

need for aid organizations to 

develop or refine existing policies 

to accommodate and even 

anticipate these changes. 

There was also major 

discussion about how development organizations like USAID 

might place increasing emphasis 

on programs and projects that 

involve the latest urban planning 

tools, youth employment 

strategies, and the wider distribution of public services. Geographic information systems (GIS) 

tools, for example, can provide 

new ways to map and analyze 

population movements and other 

demographic shifts. It was also 

noted that public-private 

partnerships are more important 

than ever as they can work to 

address these challenges.

Transnational networks 

resulting from human migration 

were also discussed. New ideas 

on the issue of resettlement are 

needed now. For example, are 

there alternatives to traditional 

refugee camps? Other issues that 

surfaced included growing donor 

fatigue, an aging population with 

declining tax revenue but 

increased medical and health 

demands, and the potential for 

population and migration-induced 

ethnic and religious conflict.

Futures text.indd 23 8/12/13 
It came as no surprise that the mention of demography generated lively

discussions during all three themes at the U.S. Agency for International

Development’s (USAID’s) Futures Symposium. Demography arose not only in

the session focused on populations as some might expect, but also in discussions

of the future of science and technology, the session on politics and economies, and

throughout discussions of future threats to the environment. These discussions

highlighted the cross-cutting nature of the demographic transition from high to

low rates of birth and death, political stability, social and educational progress,

institutional capacity, and urbanization patterns.

Because the effects of the demographic transition are enmeshed deeply in

such a broad range of development issues, published projections — data

generated by theorists to quantify the demographic future — offer a valuable

tool for development-centered futures analysis. Updated biennially by the United

Nations Population Division and less regularly by the U.S. Census Bureau’s

International Program Center, demographic projections perform with reasonable

accuracy over at least two decades. Given the steadily improving track record of

these two sources of demographic projections since 1980,28 USAID’s policy

analysts and foresight researchers may find it worthwhile to consider the

demographic methods used in this chapter as tools to support improved program

planning and country-level strategizing.

24

C H A P T E R 3

The Future out to 2030: 

According to Demography

Richard Cincotta expertly lays out how population 

age-structures and demographic projections are vital, 

yet rarely examined, indicators for future developmentfocused programming and decision-making.

28 Nico Keilman, “How Accurate Are the United Nations World Population Projections?” Population 

and Development Review 24, supplemental (1998) 15–41.

Futures text.indd 24 8/12/13 
	 The chapter begins with an overview of the most salient conclusions of

recent research in political and economic demography. It then outlines a

framework that should help policymakers apply these conclusions, describes in

detail the framework’s four discrete age-structural “stages,” and maps the global

distribution of these stages, both in 2010 and in 2030. The chapter highlights

factors arising within each age-structural stage that contribute favorably to,

or bear unfavorably on, the management of states and their institutions. The

dynamics of ethno-religious age structures at the sub-national level are also

discussed. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the broader implications

of demographic research for futures analysis.

Major Conclusions 

Recent research in political and economic demography indicate that the degree

of age structural “maturity” (the relative distribution of children, adolescents,

working-age adults and seniors in a country’s population, which is reflected by

the median age) has significant effects on a country’s political, economic and

social conditions, and future trends. Age-structural maturation, advances in the

median age, has largely been the product of declines in women’s fertility. The

trend toward longer life expectancies at old age has also contributed to shifts

toward more mature age structures.

Some configurations that evolve during the transition from younger to

more mature age structures, the age structural transition, appear to be more

“unfavorable” than others. In other words, some age structures are associated

with conditions that make governance and development difficult, while other

more “favorable” age structures make economic and social progress less of a

challenge. Empirical evidence indicates that the most challenging age structures

predominate during the earliest (youthful) stage of the age-structural transition,

where more than half of the population is at, or below, 25 years of age.29 Over

the past four decades, states with a youthful age structure have proven to be the

most vulnerable to outbreaks of intra-state conflict and political instability.30

Theoreticians expect age-related challenges to governance to also surface in the

25

29 The selection of the median age of 25.0 years as the border for the most youthful age-structural

stage is a conversion from other highly correlated “youth-bulge measures” is drawn from Henrik

Urdal. “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence,” International Studies 

Quarterly 50, no. 3 (September 2006), 607–629; Richard P. Cincotta and Elizabeth Leahy,

Population Age Structure and Its Relation to Civil Conflict: A Metric, Report 12 (Washington, DC:

Environmental Change and Security Program, 2006–2007), 55–58; Christian G. Mesquida, and

Neil I. Wiener, “Male Age Composition and the Severity of Conflicts,” Politics in the Life Sciences 

18, no. 2 (2001), 181–189. Also see: Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, National Intelligence

Council, NIC2012-001, December 2012, available at <www.dni.gov/nic_2030>.

30 Henrik Urdal. “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence,” International Studies 

Quarterly 50, no. 3 (September 2006), 607–629; Richard P. Cincotta and Elizabeth Leahy,

Population Age Structure and Its Relation to Civil Conflict: A Metric, Report 12 (Washington, DC:

Environmental Change and Security Program, 2006–2007), 55–58; also see Richard Cincotta,

Robert Engelman and Daniele Anastasion, The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict 

After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Population Action International, 2003).

Futures text.indd 25 8/12/13 
26

latest (post-mature) stage, and for these economic and administrative difficulties

to be linked, in various ways, to the extraordinary fiscal demands and program

constraints posed by the emergence of large proportions of seniors and elderly,

characteristic of this stage of the age-structural transition (a median age greater

than 45 years).31

Current demographic projections suggest that the coming two decades will

be a period of substantial, if not unprecedented, age-structural change. Projected

outcomes will pressure some states and international institutions to use their

political power and financial resources to avoid, reduce, mediate and react to

detrimental demographic conditions — specifically, those precipitated by an

unfavorable age structure and those with a shifting ethno-religious composition.

Thus, many of the methods used in this chapter should be of interest to

development analysts and policymakers alike. Many of the demographic conditions

discussed in this chapter can be forecasted using demographic projections, giving

analysts and policymakers an objective view of a future two decades hence.

	 Several noteworthy forecasts can also be drawn from age-structural political

demography:

Instability

By 2030, youthful age-structural conditions will likely continue to contribute to

instability in the Middle East (Yemen, Iraq, West Bank and Gaza), South Asia

(Afghanistan, in the peripheral regions of Pakistan and perhaps in several states

in north-central India), across the tropical mid-section of sub-Saharan Africa

(West, Central and East Africa), and in the island states of Timor-Leste (East

Timor), Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands along the Pacific Rim. For

the vast majority of those states that retain youthful populations into the future,

there is a low probability of a rise to, or maintenance of, high levels of

democracy. For those that succeed, there are likely to be high costs in

government resources, lives and property.

Democracy

Current age-structural projections suggest that some countries of North Africa,

specifically those of the Maghreb (Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco), are likely to

continue to trend toward democracy. In the early and mid-2020s, analysts should

expect further political changes in Muslim-majority states in the Middle East

(the Mashreq) and Central Asia (the ex-Soviet Asiatic republics) as their age

structures mature. During the 2020s, analysts should also expect to witness the

31 Richard Jackson, and Neil Howe, The Graying of the Great Powers: Demography and Geopolitics in 

the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008). Nicholas

Eberstadt and Hans Groth, Demography and Public Debt: Time for a “Demographic Stress Test” for 

the Western Economies. What Does It Mean for Switzerland? (St. Gallen, Switzerland: University of

St. Gallen, 2010); Also see: Richard Cincotta, “Demography: A Development Perspective,” in

Security and Development in Global Politics: A Critical Comparison, ed. Joanna Spear and Paul D.

Williams, 291–310, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press 2011).

Futures text.indd 26 8/12/13 
27

devolution of monarchical power among the remaining Middle Eastern

monarchies.

Latin America

The projected pace of age-structural maturation in Latin America indicates that

many of the region’s states should be expected to trend toward increasing

economic stability and democratization. For the larger states of the region —

including Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia — this trend should translate to greater

geopolitical power. In this region, development is likely to be slowest in

Guatemala, which is projected to remain youthful through 2030. Haiti,

Honduras and Bolivia, although slowly maturing, will likely lag behind the rest

of Latin America in assessments of social, economic, and political progress over

the next two decades.

Aging Populations

For advanced aging populations in Japan and Europe, one should expect rising

political clamor triggered by pension and tax reforms, and realignments of

government-provided services as states maneuver through the fiscal pinch caused

by rising old-age dependency. That said, even as their workforce size declines,

these human-capital-rich nations may witness novel institutional and

technological adaptations that could shift future economic trajectories. As

economic growth becomes increasingly decoupled from job growth, slow declines

in workforce size could have fewer negative impacts than currently assumed.

Ethno-Religious Patterns

When strategists look to the world of 2030, they should consider the implications

of ongoing ethno-religious shifts, particularly in the Central Andes, in parts

of the Middle East, and in Western Europe. These shifts may ultimately have

national and even international political significance.

Age-Structural Transitions 

Countries that are transitioning from high to low levels of fertility and longer

adult life expectancies are, as a result, being driven through an age-structural

transition — a succession of age distributions of increasing median age. While

the level of fertility and the pace of its decline are the principal drivers of changes

in population age distribution, other demographic forces — childhood mortality,

inter-country migration, and premature adult mortality, such as through AIDSrelated death, exert more subtle effects. These and the passage of time influence

the position of countries along the path of the age-structural transition (Figure 1).

When USAID began its bilateral assistance programs in the mid-1960s,

roughly 80 percent of all independent states — virtually all of the developing

Futures text.indd 27 8/12/13 
28

Country-level population age structures

0 10 20 30 40 50

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Percent 65 years and older

Percent younger than 30 years

Year 2010

Brazil

10 8 6 4 2 00 2 4 6 8 10

10 8 6 4 2 00 2 4 6 8 10

10 8 6 4 2 00 2 4 6 8 10

10 8 6 4 2 00 2 4 6 8 10

Percent of Total Population

Males Females

10 8 6 4 2 0 2 64 108

Age

100+

95–99

90–94

85–89

80–84

75–79

70–74

65–69

60–64

55–59

50–54

45–49

40–44

35–39

30–34

25–29

20–24

15–19

10–14

5–9

0–4

Hungary

Afghanistan Nigeria

Japan

Futures text.indd 28 8/12/13 
29

world — experienced age structures with more than 60 percent of their

population under age 30. At that time, not a single state had accumulated a

proportion of seniors (over 65 years old) that was greater than 15 percent of the

total population. By 2010, just over 40 percent (80 states) remained in that

youthful condition, whereas 23 states had matured beyond the point where

seniors comprised more than 15 percent of the population.

Although the age-structural transition is a continuous process, the

differences in state behaviors that occur at various positions along this lengthy

continuum can be better understood by breaking the transition into four “stages”

(Figure 2). Each stage spans a 10-year interval of median age (the age of the

person for whom 50 percent of the remaining population is older, and 50 percent

is younger).33 The four discrete stages of this categorical system, and their range

of median ages are: youthful (with a median age equal to, or less than 25 years),

intermediate (greater than 25 and equal to, or less than 35 years), mature (greater

than 35 and equal to, or less than 45), and post-mature (greater than 45 years).

For most independent states, the use of the country-level median age works

sufficiently well to indicate the maturity of a country’s age structure. Values for

this indicator are estimates and projections published by the U.N. Population

Division (for an alternative source, see the U.S. Census Bureau’s International

Data Base (IDB)).34 For the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain,

Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) the analysis

discussed in this chapter uses the median age of citizen residents only, rather than

Figure 1

The distribution of country-level age structures in 2010, graphed by the proportion below age 30, 

and the proportion 65 years and older. The principal direction of movement along this path has 

been down and to the right, driven by fertility decline and longer life spans. As the graph suggests, 

some country-level populations have moved, at various instances, in other directions — to the left, 

to the right, or even upwards, driven by the forces of migration, increasing adult mortality, and 

decreasing infant mortality. Data are estimates from the United Nations (UN) Population Division’s 

2010 Revision.32

32 World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision (New York: United Nations, 2011), available at

<http://esa.un.org/wpp/>.

33 Richard P. Cincotta and Laurel Hummel, “Africa’s Youthful Age Structure and Its Security

Implications,” in Africa’s Strategic Geography, ed. Amy Richmond Krackowa and Laurel Hummel,

257–282 (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College and U.S. Military Academy, 2009); for alterative

systems see Elizabeth Leahy, Robert Engelman, Carolyn G. Vogel, Sarah Haddock, and Tod

Preston, The Shape of Things to Come: Why Age Structure Matters to a Safer, More Equitable World 

(Washington, DC: Population Action International, 2007); Bo Malmberg and Lena Sommestad,

“The Hidden Pulse of History: Age Transition and Economic Change in Sweden, 1820–2000”

Scandinavian Journal of History 25, no. 1,(2000), 131–146; Monica Buvinic, Monica D. Gupta, and

Ursala Casabonne, “Gender, Poverty and Demography: An Overview,” World Bank Economic 

Review 23, no. 3 (2009), 347–369.

34 Population data, by age and sex, published by the United Nations are available online and in CD

format. See World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision (New York: United Nations, 2011),

available at <http://esa.un.org/wpp/>; Similarly structured data are available online from the U.S.

Census Bureau via the International Program Center’s International Data Base, available at <www.

census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php>.

Futures text.indd 29 8/12/13 
30

the mixture of citizen and non-citizen residents that are aggregated in the U.N.

and U.S. Census Bureau estimates and projections.35

Before describing these specifics of each of the four stages, it is useful to

discuss the general pattern that emerges from the results of political and

economic research comparing countries at different positions along the agestructural transition. This transition is a “bad news, good news, bad news story.”

Virtually all of today’s independent states were first established with agestructurally unfavorable conditions — at median ages below 20 years, and with

high levels of fertility and low levels of educational attainment. By and large,

the arrival of states into the intermediate and mature stages of the age-structural

transition has generally been associated with increasingly favorable economic,

social and political conditions. Most analysts foresee the aging of populations

into the post-mature category as a shift to generally unfavorable economic

and political conditions. How unfavorable will these age structures become in

the future, and how well can they be managed? That remains to be seen.

Youthful Age Structures

Sustained high fertility (typically five children per woman and above) was a social

1935 Youthful

Percent of total population

Age

100+

95–99

90–94

85–89

80–84

75–79

70–74

65–69

60–64

55–59

50–54

45–49

40–44

35–39

30–34

25–29

20–24

15–19

10–14

5–9

0–4

810 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10

Males Females

1970 Intermediate

Percent of total population

Age

100+

95–99

90–94

85–89

80–84

75–79

70–74

65–69

60–64

55–59

50–54

45–49

40–44

35–39

30–34

25–29

20–24

15–19

10–14

5–9

0–4

810 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10

Males Females

Figure 2 

Japan’s age-structural transition, 1935 (estimates) to 2025 (projections, UN medium fertility 

variant). Whereas the age-structural transition is a continuous process, this figure uses Japan’s 

transition to illustrate the four discrete age-structural stages that are employed in the analysis.

35 The citizen-resident median age for each of the Gulf Cooperation Center states was calculated

from unpublished disaggregated data used by the U.S. Census Bureau’s International Program

Center to produce country-level estimates and projections for these six states.

Futures text.indd 30 8/12/13 
31

fixture of all human history. Due to state-financed improvements in water

quality and sanitation, declines in infant mortality began to take hold in Europe

in the latter decades of the 18th century and spread worldwide in the two

centuries thereafter. The result: even more youthful age structures than ever

before. During the 20th century, the median age of some countries dropped to a

median age of 15 (for example, Kenya in the 1980s) or below (Yemen in the

1990s). Even now, that youthfulness — and its associated challenges — prevail

along the tropical midriff of sub-Saharan Africa, in parts of the Middle East and

South and Central Asia, and among the Islands in the southern Pacific. Some of

it is projected to persist past 2030 (Figure 3).

For developing states, youthful age structures present unparalleled

challenges. Their high proportions of children, adolescents, and young adults

and the rapid rate of these groups’ advancement into schooling and job markets,

undermine education and health infrastructure, constrain governmental and

parental investments, and outpace the supply of new jobs. Recent ethnographic

literature highlights mutual reinforcing relationships between large family size

(high fertility), risk-averse extended family networks, and clan-based and

factional patron-client arrangements.36 Others have linked these arrangements to

nepotistic corruption37 and to the power of political entrepreneurs who can

destabilize states.38

Those who have focused on the politics of youthful age-structural

2025 Post-Mature projected

Percent of total population

Age

100+

95–99

90–94

85–89

80–84

75–79

70–74

65–69

60–64

55–59

50–54

45–49

40–44

35–39

30–34

25–29

20–24

15–19

10–14

5–9

0–4

810 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10

Males Females

1990 Mature

Percent of total population

Age

100+

95–99

90–94

85–89

80–84

75–79

70–74

65–69

60–64

55–59

50–54

45–49

40–44

35–39

30–34

25–29

20–24

15–19

10–14

5–9

0–4

810 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10

Males Females

36 Onipede Wusu and Uche C. Isiugo-Abanihe, “Interconnections Among Changing Family

Structure, Childrearing and Fertility Behaviour Among the Ogu, Southwestern Nigeria: A

Qualitative Study,” Demographic Research 14, no. 8 (2006), 139–156; Daniel J. Smith,

“Contradictions in Nigeria’s Fertility Transition: The Burdens and Benefits of Having People,”

Population and Development Review 30, no. 2 (2004), 221–239.

37 Benjamin C. Mbakwem and Daniel J. Smith, “Returned to Sender’: Corruption in International

Health,” in The Practice of International Health: A Case-Based Orientation, ed. Daniel Perlman

and Ananya Roy, 217–230 (Oxford: Oxford University, 2008).

Futures text.indd 31 8/12/13 
32

conditions assume that the surge of young adult males depresses the costs of

political mobilization.39 This dynamic sets up a recruitment contest —

competition between state and non-state actors who, by appealing to identity

and ideology, vie to mobilize young-adult males to advance their political and

military goals. Statistically, youth-bulge states suffer an elevated risk of a violent

outbreak of intrastate conflict40 and, as a group, experience reduced odds of

attaining and maintaining a stable liberal democracy when compared to more

demographically mature states.41

The “25-and-younger” criterion serves as a useful marker for states at risk of

various forms of internal violence and political instability, now and over the

coming decade. Since 1970, states with a youthful population have comprised

about 80 percent of each decade’s newly emerged intrastate conflicts.42 Notably,

revolutions during this transitional stage can be extraordinarily violent and, if

successful, may end with the near-complete dispossession of the political,

commercial, and military elites. After states have surpassed the median age of 25

years, analysts should expect them to be less likely to initiate a new intrastate

conflict, more likely to experience the winding down of an ongoing civil or

ethnic war, and more likely to experience sustainable democratization.

Intermediate Age Structures 

Should fertility continue to fall, youthful countries enter the intermediate stage

of the age-structural transition, a more economically and politically “favorable”

series of intermediate age structures (a median age from 25 to 35 years) that are

proportionally dominated by relatively young working-age adults, and fiscally

encumbered by relatively few childhood dependents or elderly. These are the age

38 Roel Van Der Veen, What Went Wrong With Africa: A Contemporary History (Amsterdam: KIT,

2004); Fatton, Robert,“Bringing the Ruling Class Back In. Comparative Politics,” 20, no. 3 (1988),

253–264; James C. Scott, “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,”

American Political Science Review 66, no. 1 (1972), 91–113.

39 Henrik Urdal, “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence,” International Studies 

Quarterly 50, no. 3 (2006), 607–629; Richard P. Cincotta, “Demographic Challenges to the State,”

in Security and Development: Searching for Critical Connections, eds. Necla Tschirigi, Michael S.

Lund, and Francesco Mancini, 77–98 (New York: Lynne Reinner, 2009); Hannes Weber,

“Demography and Democracy: the Impact of Youth Cohort Size on Democratic Stability in the

World.” Democratization 20 ̧no. 2 (2013), 335–357.

40 Henrik Urdal, “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence.”

41 Richard P. Cincotta, “How Democracies Grow Up,” Foreign Policy (March/April 2009), 80–82;

Richard P. Cincotta, “Half a Chance: Youth Bulges and Transitions to Liberal Democracy,”

Environmental Change and Security Program Report 13, (2008/2009), 10–18, available at <www.

wilsoncenter.org/publication/half-chance-youth-bulges-and-transitions-to-liberal-democracy>;

Richard P. Cincotta and John Doces, “The Age-Structural Maturity Thesis: The Youth Bulge’s

Influence on the Advent and Stability of Liberal Democracy,” in Political Demography: How 

Population Changes Are Reshaping International Security and National Politics, ed. Jack A.

Goldstone, Eric Kaufmann and Monica Duffy Toft, 98–116 (Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Weber, 2012); Timothy Dyson, On the Democratic and Demographic Transitions, (London: London

School of Economics, 2012), 19.

42 Richard P. Cincotta and Elizabeth Leahy, “Population Age Structure and Its Relation to Civil

Conflict: A Metric,” Environmental Change and Security Project Report 12 (2006/07), 55–58.

Futures text.indd 32 8/12/13 
33

structures that many identify with a demographic bonus. Countries in this stage

typically experience the rapid accumulation of educated and skilled young

workers (human capital) and some also benefit from high rates of household and

government savings.43

Within countries moving through the intermediate category, the majority

of newly established households are converging on a small family size, affording

greater parental and government investments in education and health per

child, and opportunities for women to engage in employment. Such changes are

likely to strain extended-family networks and could weaken clan and patronclient systems.44

Among the export-oriented East and Southeast Asian states, entry into this

stage of the transition led ultimately to growth in wages, to the entrance of a

large proportion of women into the workforce,45 and to the broadening of the

middle class. Because Latin America’s fertility decline lagged behind East Asia’s,

and the region’s governments, on the whole, were slower to invest broadly in

public education,46 economists have raised questions about how much of an

economic boost or a demographic dividend their intermediate age structures will

ultimately deliver.47 While some analysts see signs of an impending economic

take-off, it is still early — much of Latin America, particularly Mexico and other

Central American states, are in the early portions of the intermediate stage of the

age-structural transition.48

While youthful intrastate conflicts often persist into the intermediate

category, insurgencies faced with withering recruitment tend to withdraw from

troop-intensive operations — as in the case of the Provos49 in Northern Ireland

in the late-1980s,50 the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka in the 2000s,51 and now the

FARC in Colombia.52 As recruitment and retention becomes more costly, the

43 Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason. “What is the Demographic Dividend?” Finance and Development

43, 3 (2006), 16–17; David E. Bloom, David Canning, and J.P. Sevilla, The Demographic Dividend: 

A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of Population Change (Santa Monica: RAND,

2002).

44 Daniel J. Smith, “Contradictions in Nigeria’s Fertility Transition: The Burdens and Benefits of

Having People,” Population and Development Review 30, no. 2 (2004), 221–239.

45 John G. Bauer, “Demographic Change, Development, and the Economic Status of Women in

East Asia,” in Population Change and Economic Development in East Asia: Challenges Met, 

Opportunities Seized, ed.Andrew Mason, 359–384 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

46 Nancy Birdsall, David Ross, and Richard Sabot, “Education, Growth and Inequality,” in Pathways 

to Growth: Comparing East Asia and Latin America, ed. by Birdsall, Nancy and Frederick Jaspersen,

93–130 (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 1998).

47 Nancy Birdsall, David Ross, and Richard Sabot, “Education, Growth and Inequality,” in Pathways 

to Growth: Comparing East Asia and Latin America, ed. by Birdsall, Nancy and Frederick Jaspersen,

93–130 (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 1998).

48 See Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, National Intelligence Council, NIC2012-001,

December 2012, available at <www.dni.gov/nic_2030>.

49 The Provisional Irish Republican Army, which was active in Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1997.

50 Jonathan Tonge, Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change (New York, Longman, 1996).

51 Anton Balasingham, War and Peace: Armed Struggle and Peace Efforts of Liberation Tigers (London:

Fairmax, 2004).

Futures text.indd 33 8/12/13 
34

movement’s smaller reintegration-resistant hard core tends to shift to lethally

disruptive technologies to ply against the state, or drifts into the more lucrative

sphere of organized crime.53

Mature Age Structures

Invariably, with the passage of time, intermediate age structures transition to

their mature stage (median age from 35 to 45 years). Most Western European

2010

Figure 3

Maps showing the global distribution of the four 

age-structural stages in 2010 (estimates). Median age 

data are from the UN Population Division’s 2010 

Revision, with the exception of the six states of the 

Gulf Cooperation Council. Median ages of the Council 

states are drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 

unpublished estimates and projections of citizen-resident populations

■ Youthful 25.0 or younger

■ Intermediate 25.1 to 35

■ Mature 35.1 to 45.0

■ Post-mature Greater than 45.0

Category	 	 Median Age

52 Jeremy McDermott, “Columbia’s Rebels: A Fading Force?” BBC News, February 1, 2008, available

at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/7217817.stm>

53 One demographic note on intermediate age structures: they are inherently instable. While keeping

one of this categories age structures would be ideal, it is difficult to do. Given many developing

states’ propensity to get to replacement fertility levels and then continue lower, and the global

trend toward longer lives, many countries that have enjoyed the economic benefits of intermediate

age structures have done so for a rather brief period—27 years for Japan, 22 years for China, less

than 20 years for both South Korea and Taiwan (Iran is currently projected to speed through in

less than 20 years, as well).

Futures text.indd 34 8/12/13 
35

states have dwelt in this demographic range for the past three decades. Although

they have been able to achieve modest rates of economic growth and maintain

political stability, they have also had to adjust to the fiscal liabilities of a steadily

increasing proportion of seniors and a gradual decline in the size of the prime

working-age population — those between ages 25 and 45; a sub-population that

typically demonstrates the sharpest mental and physical skills.54 Some European

states have adjusted more successfully than others.

Recent research suggests that, for those states that invested intensely in

human capital, moderate rates of savings and worker productivity growth are

likely to linger on — what has been called a second bonus.55 But as the working54 Vegard Skirbekk, “Age and Productivity Potential: A New Approach Based on Ability Levels and

Industry-Wide Task Demand,” Population and Development Review 34 supplemental (2008),

191–207.

Futures text.indd 35 8/12/13 
36

age population ages, and the prime-age population begins to decline, institutions

are likely to assume more expansive roles in the economy, particularly selffinancing institutions like those in the private sector.

Perceiving an approaching fiscal crunch as the rolls of retirees swell, agestructurally mature states are briskly turning to reforming under-funded state

retirement systems, setting-back the retirement age and curbing no-longeraffordable patterns of state spending. In Western European capitals, political

debates increasingly focus on “if and when” to accept immigrants, and whom to

encourage. Both European and East Asian efforts to boost fertility from subreplacement levels have recently picked up pace.

2030

Figure 4

Maps showing the global distribution of the four 

age-structural stages in 2030 (projections). Median age 

data are from the UN Population Division’s 2010 

Revision, with the exception of the six states of the 

Gulf Cooperation Council. Median ages of the Council 

states are drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 

unpublished estimates and projections of citizenresident populations

■ Youthful 25.0 or younger

■ Intermediate 25.1 to 35

■ Mature 35.1 to 45.0

■ Post-mature Greater than 45.0

in 2030 map

Category	 	 Median Age

55 Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason. Fertility, Human Capital, and Economic Growth over the 

Demographic Transition, National Transfer Accounts Working Papers (Washington, DC: National

Institutes of Health, 2010)

Futures text.indd 36 8/12/13 
37

Post-Mature Age Structures

European and East Asian populations that have sustained exceptionally low levels

of fertility (below 1.6 children per woman) are advancing rapidly toward the

post-mature stage of the age-structural transition (median age greater than 45).

This set of age structures is only now evolving and its implications, therefore, are

not fully understood.56 Analysts will soon shed their ignorance. As of 2012, Japan

and Germany are probably past the 45-year mark. Italy, Portugal, and Austria

could enter the post-mature category before 2020.

Most analysts who have studied the preparedness of European and East

Asian systems for oncoming population aging foresee a future of fiscal, economic

and political challenges for these states. The greatest threat is to pension and

healthcare systems that are funded principally by current payroll contributions

56 World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision (New York: United Nations, 2011). 

Futures text.indd 37 8/12/13 
38

(pay-as-you-go). These are bound to become unviable as the proportion of

seniors grows large and the workforce shifts to a smaller profile. Nonetheless,

most European governments have been slow to organize and implement needed

reforms, and their citizens have been reluctant to support them.57

Geriatric healthcare costs appear to be the most difficult to control.

As these costs rise, seniors’ obligations will increasingly compete for scarce tax

dollars with younger generations’ demands for quality education and

infrastructure. While it is not hard to foresee the day when, in some liberal

democracies, organized retirees and workers hold their government’s “feet to the

fire” over broken pension and healthcare promises, the chances that aging will

lead, on its own, to political turmoil seems slim. Several thoughtful analyses

predict that, with aging, European powers will retreat from their international

roles in development assistance and regional defense.58

	 The most noteworthy characteristic of post-mature countries will likely be

their demand for, and attractiveness to, labor migrants, and their chronic

susceptibility to shifts in ethnic and religious composition. While demographic

aging, by itself, produces only scant opportunities for divisive political

entrepreneurs, many more possibilities abound when immigrant communities

find it difficult to integrate or when they resist integration themselves, and when

nativist groups erect social and economic barriers to integration. Intense nativist

politics have already made significant inroads into the political spectrum of

Western Europe’s mature-category states, where ethno-religious residential

segregation and cultural tensions have become, over only a few decades,

established features of urban life.59

Some difficult-to-answer questions are surfacing as European median ages

approach and pass the entrance to post-maturity. While aging economies are

assumed to suffer from a shortage of workers, just the opposite is happening:

some aging European states are experiencing high rates of unemployment at all

professional and technical levels. It just may be that the industrial era, during

which an increasing or stable labor force was needed for economic prosperity, is

slipping away. The coming reality is very different: state-subsidized salaries are

increasingly deemed unaffordable; and workers, assisted by various

microprocessor-controlled devices and supplied with an Internet-full of

information, are expected to accomplish and produce more on their own — and

without concomitant rewards. As their median age increases, advanced

economies seemingly require fewer workers with more skills, and there is every

reason to believe that this trend will continue.

57 Richard Jackson and Neil Howe, The Graying of the Great Powers: Demography and Geopolitics in 

the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008).

58 Jack Goldstone “The New Population Bomb: the Four Megatrends That Will Shape the Global

Future,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 1 (2010), 31–43; Mark L. Haas, “A Geriatric Peace? The Future of

U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations,” International Security 32, no. 1 (2007), 112–147.

59 Eric Kaufmann, Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth? (London: Profile Books, 2010).

Futures text.indd 38 8/12/13 
39

Ethno-Demographic Shifts

While there is no shortage of theories that evoke a demographic cause for political

turmoil and state weakness, at this date only two have gathered a significant

amount of supporting evidence: the case of youthful age structures, discussed

earlier, and shifts in ethno-religious composition. Understanding where and why

these ethno-religious shifts are occurring, and what impacts on state capacity

they may generate will clearly be important to development planners and

foresight researchers. Three models provide a theoretical backdrop for discussing

this type of demographic contradiction in individual states:

Ethno-Religious Subpopulations

In countries with populations composed of socially and reproductively distinct

ethno-religious subpopulations, decline from high to low levels of fertility and

infant mortality most often occurs first among the most urbanized and educated

ethnic groups, particularly among groups with rising incomes and where women

exercise significant autonomy.60 These staggered transitions have led to

differences in fertility, producing diverging rates of population growth.

Women

In some parts of Europe and East Asia, changes in marital behaviors and the

liberalization of women’s roles have been associated with declines in fertility to

levels that are now well below replacement.61 In states where the government and

private sector encourage immigration to overcome perceived shortages in workers

and reduce wage inflation, shifts in ethno-religious composition can be expected.62

Dissonant Minorities

The minority demographic security dilemma63 — a political hypothesis that is not

inconsistent with either of the other two models — contends that the economic

and social marginalization of dissonant minorities tends to promote social and

reproductive segregation and delay the minority’s transition to low fertility.

This model predicts that when governments are unwilling, or unable, to break

down barriers that obstruct the full economic and political participation of

minorities, rapid minority population growth ratchets up majority-minority

tensions and strengthens these barriers.

Some current state and regional cases of ongoing shifts in ethno-religious

composition where USAID is active provide examples of several types of political

60 Joseph Chamie, Religion and Fertility: Arab Christian-Muslim Differentials (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1981).

61 Ron Lesthaeghe, “The Unfolding Story of the Second Demographic Transition,” Population and 

Development Review 36, no. 2 (2010), 211–251.

62 David Coleman, “Projections of the Ethnic Minority Populations of the United Kingdom

2006–2056,” Population and Development Review 36, no. 3 (2010), 441–486.

63 Christian Leuprecht, “The Demographic Security Dilemma,” Yale Journal of International 

Affairs 5, no. 2 (2010).

Futures text.indd 39 8/12/13 
40

tensions that can be associated with this phenomenon. In the central Andes

Region (Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia) and Paraguay, and the central isthmus of Central

America (Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua), regions populated principally by

Native Americans (Indios) remains at higher levels of fertility than more

urbanized areas populated by the Euro-Latinos who founded these states, and

have since dominated politics and the economy. Analysts should expect the

growth and political mobilization of Indios communities, in these countries, to

favor the election of leftist governments.

In Israel, the proportional size of the political center — a heterogeneous

group of secular and traditionally religious Jews — is slowly being eroded by the

growth of Israeli Arabs and Ultra-Orthodox Jews.64 In the case of Israel’s UltraOrthodox Jewish communities, clerical leaders pursue marginalization,65 opting

for social and locational segregation and a lower standard of living, which —

when coupled with the circumscription of women’s roles — has maintained a

high fertility norm, above six children per woman.66

Due to a delayed fertility decline, Lebanon’s youthful rural Shiite

population has eclipsed the lower-fertility Christians, Sunnis, and Druze.67

While a drift from political extremism to moderation and integration should

occur as the Shiite population matures, the pace of this almost inevitable political

transition will be mediated by the funding of Hezbollah’s foreign patrons, as well

as the strength of Lebanon’s economic recovery.

In India, where USAID is currently active, the population is better thought

of as two populations of very different demographic conditions and trends. Each

of the four Dravidian-language-speaking southern states is near or somewhat

below replacement-level fertility, as are India’s major urban centers. However, the

slow fertility decline that occurred in the central northern states of Uttar Pradesh

and Bihar has stalled near four children per woman.68 The resultant growth

should raise concerns about the scale of influx of poor and semi-literate migrants

to India’s cities and to South India. Not only are unskilled northerners a

mismatch for the labor demands of the Indian industrial and service sectors, in

large numbers they might also be unwelcome in parts of the southern states.

64 Richard P. Cincotta and Eric Kaufmann, Uncompromising Demography in a Promised Land,

National Intelligence Council, NIC 2010-05, Washington, DC, 2010, available at <www.

foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4956>.

65 Noah J. Efron Real Jews: Secular vs. Orthodox and the Struggle for Jewish Identity in Israel (New

York: Basic Books, 2003).

66 Sergio DellaPergola, “Jerusalem’s Population, 1995–2020: Demography, Multiculturalism and

Urban Policies,” European Journal of Population 17, no. 2 (2001), 165–199; Eli Berman, “Sect,

Subsidy, and Sacrifice: An Economist’s View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews,” (Jerusalem: Maurice Falk

Institute for Economic Research in Israel, 1998).

67 Joseph Chamie, Religion and Fertility: Arab Christian-Muslim Differentials (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1981).

68 Carl Haub and O. P. Sharma, The Future Population of India: A Long-range Demographic View

(Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, 2007).

Futures text.indd 40 8/12/13 
41

Beyond the Future

Are there roles for political demography and its forecasts in foreign policy and

development planning? There should be. By positioning states according to their

median age, and arranging them within the context of the four age-structural

stages discussed earlier, policy analysts and foresight researchers generate images

of the global distribution of favorable and unfavorable age structures. By using

available demographic projections to peer one or two decades into the future,

these analysts can obtain a “first approximation” of the identity of states in which

the potential for political stability and developmental progress will arise, where

that potential will remain strong, and where its strength will diminish. This

system provides a much more nuanced and realistic categorization of states and

their pace of progress than the increasingly misleading dichotomy of “developed

countries” landscape versus “developing countries” that pervades the current

discussion. This now-dated nomenclature remains anchored to per-capita income

levels of countries during the decades following the close of World War II.

USAID and its development partners are well advised to place greater emphasis

on age-related structures.

The underlying thesis of current demographic research — that “some

age-structural conditions are much less conducive to building, maintaining and

exercising state capacity than are others”— has major implications for how

development planners and foreign affairs policymakers go about their business.

Yet, because university curricula in political science, international relations and

international development rarely require a course in demography, most students

will graduate without understanding the degree to which the age-structural

transition, family size, and fertility decline bear upon the focus of their studies.

Unless this omission is corrected, America’s next generation of foreign affairs

analysts and development practitioners will be deprived of a window through

which they might better understand the present behavior of states, and glimpse

critical features of the global future.

Richard Cincotta Demographer-in-residence, The Stimson Center

This chapter is included and reproduced with the permission of the author. The chapter or any 

part of it may not be reproduced in any form without the written permission of the author except 

that reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any use of the United States Government 

or those acting on its behalf.

Futures text.indd 41 8/12/13 
42

Science and technology (S&T) 

has facilitated incredible advances 

in international development 

such as oral rehydration therapy, 

wind and solar power, mobile 

banking, and geographic information systems. In short, S&T has 

improved the lives of millions and 

made development initiatives 

more efficient and cost effective. 

The USAID Futures Symposium 

panels on “Science and Technology” brought together a number 

of experts to discuss important 

topics such as the explosion of 

information communications 

technologies, proliferation and 

access to data, and the “democratization” of science and 

technology. 

Panelists noted the challenge 

of mapping future S&T trends is, 

in large part, due to a surge in 

innovation targeted at the 

developing world combined with 

unprecedented rapid change. In 

2002, for example, there were 

just two countries in the world 

with mobile cellular penetration 

over 100 percent. By 2010, almost 

100 countries had mobile cellular 

penetration over 100 percent 

and 17 countries had penetration 

over 150 percent. Rapid developments such as these make futures 

analysis even more essential. 

Panelists stressed the importance 

of thinking ahead to stimulate 

future innovations. 

Speakers highlighted the explosion of information communications technology (ICT). ICT is 

currently helping practitioners 

address some of the most 

compelling development challenges throughout the world. It is 

widely recognized that Facebook 

played a game-changing role 

during the Arab Spring, particularly in orchestrating the revolution in Tunisia. It is estimated that 

more than three quarters of the 

world’s population has access 

to mobile phones; nearly 5 billion 

of the 6 billion mobile subscriptions belong to individuals in 

developing countries. Mobile 

devices, including short messaging services, otherwise known as 

SMS, and applications are being 

used to improve access to health 

care, to facilitate making cash 

payments (limiting corruption), to 

expedite humanitarian assistance 

and disaster relief, to improve 

literacy, and to assist the monitoring and evaluation of development projects. 

Conversations about the 

ICT revolution sparked a second 

set of discussions about data 

Science and 

Technology

Science and technology 

can empower countries 

and their citizens, and 

can transform society. 

Futures text.indd 42 8/12/13 
43

S Y M P O S I U M PA N E L S Y N O P S I S

proliferation. With increasingly 

varied and numerous ways in 

which to collect data, we now 

have access to more information 

from multiple sources than ever 

before. The challenge is how to 

use this data to understand the 

development challenges, design 

on-target programs, and monitor 

progress. How do we analyze all 

of this data once it is collected? 

For example, Frontline SMS, an 

open source platform that helps 

non-governmental organizations 

lower barriers to positive social 

change, receives 192,000 texts 

per second. These texts constitute an enormous amount of 

potentially useful information. 

However, these messages are 

neither searchable nor stored in 

an accessible way. Indonesia 

represents the largest national 

population using Twitter. People 

tweet about looking for work, 

migrating, getting sick, and rice 

prices. This information, if 

harnessed, could be used to map 

development-related trends and 

address future challenges. 

The importance of building 

new partnerships was also 

highlighted. It was noted that 

two-way communication between institutions and individuals 

will be vital if science and technology is to truly impact development. The World Bank, for 

example, is becoming a much 

more open institution, and in 

2012, threw an “Apps for Climate” competition and awarded 

$55,000 to the finalists. USAID 

and other development organizations are creating competitions 

to pull in new actors such as 

universities, and the private 

sector, and intelligent individuals. 

Finally, there was considerable 

discussion about the benefits of 

the “democratization” of science 

and technology. With the spread 

of the mobile phone and broadband, new inventions can come 

from anyone, anywhere in the 

world. This individual empowerment has enormous potential for 

good. The developed world must 

act as a catalyst rather than just a 

disseminator of technology. 

Countries should be empowered 

to tackle development issues 

independently but cooperatively; 

the transfer of knowledge and 

education is more important 

than ever. 

Futures text.indd 43 8/12/13 
Panels on the topic of science and technology at the Symposium on Future

Development Challenges focused on next generation technological innovations

and their potential to increase mobilization, globalization and connectivity. Some

of these innovations, such as improved tools for irrigation and food productivity,

and innovations for better disease diagnosis, prevention, and treatment, are

destined to become game-changers for development. At the same time, it was

noted that the evolution and field application of other technologies, like

nanotechnology, were promising, but much less certain to realize positive

development impacts, at least in the near term. The most highly discussed topic

regarding science and technology innovations was unsurprisingly the

unprecedented growth of information and communications technology (ICT).69

The potential of hand-held devices to improve the quality of life was emphasized

frequently. Mobile devices, for example, can increase access to modern health

care, safely move money digitally, and foster learning by increasing literacy.

There is no doubt that technology is changing the world in which we live

faster than in any other period in human history. Technological advancements

affect every aspect of society. The proliferation of science and technology (S&T)

is helping to create tools that are cheap, widely available, and easy to use.

The individuals, corporations, and governments that best make use of these new

44

C H A P T E R 4

Technological Change and 

Sustainable Development

Linton Wells highlights the importance of the fastchanging trends in biotechnology, robotics, information 

sciences, nano-technology, and energy that are 

re-shaping tools for development success.

69 Information Communication Technology (ICT) is the preferred term, as opposed to Information

Technology (IT), because it includes broadcast radio, which serves as a principle means of mass

communications in many parts of the developing world.

Futures text.indd 44 8/12/13 
technologies will have the opportunity to determine tomorrow’s economic

winners and losers, reshape political power structures and profoundly change the

developing world. S&T will revolutionize the way the next generation of

children learn, how families receive health benefits, and the quality and quantity

of the water they drink and the food they consume. Aid organizations that fail to

grasp the revolutionary power of S&T will be left in the dust.

	 Fostering the development of cutting edge technology is in the vital interest

of the American people. The Obama Administration has paid a great deal of

attention to science and technology, understanding the important role it plays in

advancing our national security interests and helping to stimulate innovation and

economic growth. Viewed in this light, the challenge that policymakers face over

the next two decades is how to develop a strategy that simultaneously maintains

the United States’ technological edge while detecting emerging technologies and

discovering new ways to employ these technologies to improve the lives and

livelihoods of those in the developing world. Before a workable strategy can be

developed, however, it is necessary to understand the different types of

technological developments that are underway.

Parallel Revolutions in Science and Technology

Several parallel scientific and technological revolutions are in motion. The

information revolution is obvious. ICT has not only increased the speed with

which we communicate, it also has fundamentally altered the way in which we

communicate. ICT and cellphone-based services have helped to improve

everything from education to maternal care, particularly in the most remote areas

of the world. The 2010 Haiti earthquake, 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami,

and 2012 Hurricane Sandy show how advancements in ICT can help to save

lives and make a difference on the ground.70 Likewise, when policymakers and

practitioners look at the future of aid and development, ICT is an area

commonly cited as a catalyst to deliver and administer assistance more effectively

and efficiently. Crowd-sourced71 information increasingly is being used in

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief for everything from damage

assessments to locating unexploded ordnance and linking citizens to first

responders. These examples highlight the value of having educated users who

45

70 John Crowley and Jennifer Chan, Disaster Relief 2.0: The Future of Information Sharing in 

Humanitarian Emergencies (Washington, DC and Berkshire, UK: UN Foundation and Vodafone

Foundation Technology Partnership, 2011), available at <http://issuu.com/unfoundation/docs/

disaster_relief20_report>; Lois Appleby, Connecting the Last Mile: The Role of Communications in 

the Great East Japan Earthquake (London: Internews Europe, undated), available at <www.

internews.eu/News/Japanreport/>; and “GIS Technology Saves Lives in Hurricane Sandy,”

Information Technology Blog, American Sentinel University, October 29, 2012, available at <www.

americansentinel.edu/blog/2012/10/29/gis-technology-critical-in-hurricane-sandy/>.

71 Crowdsourcing, here, is shorthand for a variety of open-source, social-media-enabled, approaches

to take advantage of the collective wisdom of large groups. Technologies used range from blogging

to SMS text messaging, from social media platforms (Twitter, Facebook, hi5, others) to the

integration of open source data onto satellite base maps.

Futures text.indd 45 8/12/13 
46

understand how to use technology in new ways to solve problems.

Yet, information technology is just one part of a larger technological

transformation occurring throughout the world. Collectively, much of the

change will be driven by a group of technologies known as BRINE:

Biotechnology, Robotics and human performance enhancements, Information

(as referenced above) and cognitive science, Nanotechnology and new materials,

and Energy.72 These technologies have the potential to dramatically change the

way we live and how long we live — in the United States and around the world.

BRINE concepts, outputs and interactions will also have a profound impact on

the global development sphere where USAID works. Each of these revolutions

warrants a closer look:

•	 Biotechnology is changing even faster than information technology in

many respects. Synthetic biology offers extraordinary promise, peril and

ethical issues, and biomedical engineering majors now command the

highest starting salaries of recent college graduates.

•	 Robotics brings increasingly capable unmanned military vehicles,

exceptional tools for scientific exploration and new approaches to

manufacturing. However as robots become more independent in action,

this also poses conceptual, operational and ethical dilemmas.

•	 Information through neurocognitive research is opening new insights

into how we think, how people interact and how to treat brain injuries.

•	 The very small products of nanotechnology research are finding their way

into everything from new types of materials to cancer treatments to

energy storage.

•	 Energy itself is another revolution. The search for alternatives to

hydrocarbons, learning to use the fuels we have better, and

understanding related environmental impacts shape technical, economic

and political agendas around the world.

	 It may be possible to expand BRINE by adding developing technologies

such as additive manufacturing (also known as 3D printing) which allows for the

creation of complex three-dimensional objects by laying down successive layers

of material in a printing device based on a Computer-Aided Design. This

technology will likely have a huge impact on international logistics and supply

chains, moving traditional manufacturing from industrial centers to more

localized environments.73 This will have implications for development planners

72 See Linton Wells, II, “Tech Changes Affect U.S. Security,” Defense News, January 22, 2012,

available at <www.defensenews.com/article/20120122/DEFFEAT05/301220002/Tech-ChangesAffect-U-S-Security>.

73 See Neyla Arnas, Tom Campbell, and Connor M. McNulty, Toward the Printed World: Additive 

Manufacturing and Implications for National Security, Defense Horizons 73 (Washington, DC:

NDU Press, September 2012).

Futures text.indd 46 8/12/13 
47

as urbanization, smart cities, innovation hubs and new infrastructure become

even hotter topics in development thinking and program implementation. Other

revolutions may also arise such as discoveries in dark matter or dark energy, but

the BRINE technologies are likely to stimulate discovery and spur innovation

globally over the course of the next 20 years.

The Strategic Challenge of Technological Development 

The velocity of change is also an important factor to consider. Technology is

moving at a much faster pace than many realize. By some measures, the number

of transistors on a computer chip is doubling about every 18 months (one

formulation of the famous “Moore’s Law”). This means that in the eight years

until 2020, this reflection of computing power alone will increase by 4,000 to

5,000 percent. Speed, mobility, commoditization, big data, and the cloud will

drive the future ICT environment.74 Biotechnology is changing even faster than

information technology in many respects. Genes can be sequenced in a fraction

of the time and cost of even a few years ago. Their influences will continue

to grow, and the opportunities and risks they provide need to be addressed as

strategic issues. Linear projections based on current trends cannot work in

this world.75

	 The variety of scientific and technological revolutions, and to some extent

the way they are distributed geographically (geotechnology), are also changing.

Tools for international aid and development will be increasingly distributed. For

instance, three of the 10 fastest super computers are located in the United States,

but the lead has changed several times in the past two years.76 In the past, most

of the world’s centers for innovation were located in the United States. The fact

that Silicon Valley was physically located in California gave the United States a

competitive advantage, allowing for closer collaboration among developers,

innovators, and educators. However, the future centers of technological

development are likely to be located in many nations across the developed and

developing world. As more robust science and technology capabilities develop

globally, the United States will no longer be the preeminent driver of

innovation.77 Research in other nations, such as the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India,

74 Linton Wells, II. Managing Network Risk in Times of Rapid Change: Implications for DOD IT 

Investments and Enterprise Architectures, unpublished article.

75 See Linton Wells, II. “Tech Changes Affect U.S. Security,” Defense News, January 22, 2012,

available at <www.defensenews.com/article/20120122/DEFFEAT05/301220002/Tech-ChangesAffect-U-S-Security>.

76 “Nuclear weapons supercomputer reclaims world speed record for US,” The Daily Telegraph, June

18, 2012, available at <www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/9338651/Nuclear-weapons-supercomputerreclaims-world-speed-record-for-US.html>.

77 Tim Coffey and Steven Ramberg, Globalization of S&T: Key Challenges Facing DOD, Defense &

Technology Paper 91 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy,

2012), available at <www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DTP91%20Globalization%20of%20

SandT.pdf>.

Futures text.indd 47 8/12/13 
48

China) countries and Singapore, which is actively seeking to become a worldclass biotechnology center through its international research and development

facility Biopolis,78 will produce world-class results.

The Humanitarian and the Machine: 

Leveraging Technology is as Important as its Development

While BRINE technologies can have a major impact on societies, technology

alone is not enough. Consider the case of developing countries, humanitarian

aid, and disaster relief. Given the number of stakeholders who have equities in

the deliverance of aid, building social networks and developing trust with local

populations is critical. There have been countless examples of failed development

projects due to the fact that the local population could not sustain the technology

being used. Solutions need to be designed from the bottom-up focusing on

the needs of the local population rather than the interests of aid providers.79

Unless local populations in developing and emerging countries can sustain

technologies in their own worlds and with their own resources, these countries

will only continue to be dependent on outside development assistance.

The aid and development landscape is changing. In order to utilize

technologies more efficiently, we have to develop robust networks in advance.

No one organization has a monopoly on good ideas. Increased collaboration and

shared situational awareness among disparate stakeholders can help improve

readiness for, and responses to natural disasters, instabilities, insurgencies, food

crises, and other emergencies. An example of one such approach is the

Transformative Innovation for Development and Emergency Support (TIDES)

approach,80 a U.S. Department of Defense research project at the National

Defense University. TIDES has developed an integrated, whole-of-government

approach based on low-cost, crosscutting solutions. The project supports four

Defense Department mission areas: steady state initiatives to shape security

environments and engage with partners; post-conflict stabilization and

reconstruction; Foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (FHA/DR);

and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) at home. One of TIDES’

most valuable assets is its ability to engage talent and tap into innovation

through the global STAR-TIDES network.81 The project encourages publicprivate, whole-of-government and transnational approaches for an unpredictable

78 For more information on Biopolis, see <http://www.biopolis.es/en/inicio/index.php>.

79 Linton Wells II, Walker Hardy, Vinay Gupta, Daniel Noon, STAR-TIDES and Starfish Networks: 

Sharing Sustainable Solutions for Populations under Stress, Defense Horizons 70 (Washington, DC:

NDU Press, available at <www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DH%2070.pdf>.

80 This research project is coordinated at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy

(CTNSP) at the National Defense University (NDU), which is part of the Department of

Defense. See the homepage, available at <www.star-tides.net>.

81 TIDES is part of a broader network called STAR (Sharing to Accelerate Research). The STARTIDES network is a global community consisting of over 1500 members.

Futures text.indd 48 8/12/13 
49

and complex world. For example, after the 2010 Haitian earthquake, the project

helped catalyze cooperation and information sharing between government

agencies and civilian technologists.

	 In addition to building networks it is also important to understand how to

convert policy and doctrine into effective field operating procedures. This is

especially important for aid development programs and projects. It is not enough

to have high-level policy doctrine. People must understand what to do in the

field in order to implement activities effectively. It is also important to

understand the legal and regulatory constraints that surround operations.

Different scenarios will require different resourcing approaches, ranging from

immediate crisis response to long-term capacity building, sustainability, and

resilience. The average stay in a refugee camp is over seven years, which requires a

different set of solutions than immediate responses. Finally, lessons are never

learned until behaviors change. Training, exercises, and education are critical to

changing behaviors.

	 Organizational culture can be an impediment that creates resistance to

change, causing groups to shun new ideas and work less productively. Culture is

a delicate and important aspect of every organization, academic institution and

local population. One needs to look no farther than the military departments

to understand the importance of culture in an organization’s daily life. The same

is true for development donors like the U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID) and other aid players along with the private sector. The

innovative use of new technologies may clash with existing cultures. However,

the lack of attention to culture will likely weaken any project’s effectiveness. The

challenge will be convincing relevant organizations and individuals to adopt new

methods within their cultural norms and learning how to change cultures at an

appropriate pace to think differently. This will require new approaches to training

and education as well as increased collaboration with various stakeholders.

The Basis for Future Strategy

In an age of fiscal austerity and declining budgets, development assistance will

play an important role in helping to advance American interests abroad. From

challenge competitions, such as USAID’s Grand Challenges for Development

initiative82 to the Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) on Global Development,

the Obama Administration has done a great deal to elevate the role of

development as “a core pillar of American diplomacy.”83 Similarly, the

Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) is a first attempt at

helping the U.S. Department of State and USAID look beyond today’s problems

82 See Grand Challenges for Development, Homepage, available at <www.usaid.gov/grandchallenges>.

83 On September 22, 2010, President Barack Obama signed a Presidential Policy Directive on Global

Development to elevate the role of development as a core pillar of American power.

Futures text.indd 49 8/12/13 
50

to achieve future aid and development goals.84 While policymakers have started

to advocate strategies that focus more on solving long-term development

challenges, strategic guidance is needed to help agencies make sense of the parallel

revolutions taking place and their impact on the global development sphere.

Our investment in and understanding of key technological opportunities

and risks should be as much a part of global strategy debates as geopolitics,

demographics, economics, and the nature of conflict. These effects deserve the

attention of policymakers, ambassadors, commanders, and USAID

Administrators and Agency mission directors, not just specialists or technologists.

Information age technologies need to be fully integrated into policy, doctrine

and operating procedures. Just as in business, new technologies and better

coordination of efforts helps to maximize efficiency. A nation that has taken this

type of approach is Singapore. A closer examination of the methods Singapore is

employing is instructive to understand potential solutions.

	 Singapore has long been focused on achieving a “Whole-of-government”

and “Whole-of-society” approach, involving the deputy secretary-equivalents

from across the government to discuss emerging issues and to share experiences

on foresight initiatives.85 This type of system allows leaders to think strategically

and to learn from each other instead of episodic engagements like quadrennial

reviews. Organizations such as the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the

Defense Science Board also are looking at technology trends in detail, but

coalitions across all sectors of government must be built. USAID and the NIC,

for example, are increasingly cooperating to better understand emerging

development-related trends.

	 Translating Singapore’s “Whole-of-government” and “Whole-of-society”

approach into practice means that the United States should develop connections

at all levels, between government officials, international organizations, academics

and local actors before events occur instead of on an ad hoc basis. Information

sharing can help identify vulnerabilities, devise better defenses, establish best

practices, and detect and mitigate future attacks. The aid landscape with be filled

with new players, each with different priorities, methods, and perspectives for

engagement with the local population. In the years ahead, civil-military

coordination will be critical in helping to solve future development challenges.

Sustained engagement, agility, commitment and coordination among different

parties is essential to achieve sustainable and lasting aid and development goals.

84 See Richard L Kugler, New Directions in U.S. National Security, Strategy, Defense Plans, and 

Diplomacy (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2011), available at <www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/

docUploaded//New%20Directions.pdf>.

85 S. Ramesh, “Singapore forms strategic futures network to discuss emerging risks,” Singapore

News, September 13, 2010, available at <www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/

view/1080932/1/.html>.

Futures text.indd 50 8/12/13 
51

Conclusion

While advancements in science and technology will continue to have a profound

impact on the global development community, the future will be filled with

complexity, uncertainty and interdependency. S&T must be integrated into

policy and planning to help set national priorities and shape future development

initiatives. We must design solutions that are affordable and sustainable as

priorities shift and we face a more austere fiscal environment. New forms of

public-private cooperation will be essential to ensure long-term sustainability.

The QDDR emphasizes the need to build global coalitions to address global

problems.86 The government cannot keep up with the scale and velocity of

commercial innovation. Entrepreneurs need to be encouraged to cooperate with

one another to ensure the success of projects and sustain local capacity.

The challenge ahead for policymakers is to look beyond today’s issues to

understand how the converging revolutions in S&T will intersect with future

development efforts. Agility and resilience must be factored into the planning

process to prepare for future shocks and allow for a faster recovery. Preexisting

networks that are ready to be deployed at a moment’s notice should be the

hallmark of future technology strategies. Building these human connections

prior to an emergency will only help to strengthen the United States’ competitive

edge and save lives. Prospects for success in diverse missions from disaster

response to building partnership capacity to stability operations can be increased

if authorities treat science and technology as critical infrastructures and essential

services.

Dr. Linton Wells II Director, Center for Technology and National Security Policy,

National Defense University

86 The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR): Leading Through Civilian

Power (Washington, DC: Department of State, September 2010), 23, available at <www.state.

gov/s/dmr/qddr/index.htm>.

This chapter is included and reproduced with the permission of the author. The chapter or any 

part of it may not be reproduced in any form without the written permission of the author except 

that reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any use of the United States Government 

or those acting on its behalf.

Futures text.indd 51 8/12/13 
It was no surprise that there was standing-room-only during the three Science

and Technology (S&T) panels at the U.S. Agency for International

Development’s (USAID’s) Futures Symposium. The ever-increasing number of

headlines, blogs, YouTube videos, and Tweets that flooded the airwaves and

broadband this year about game-changing S&T tools poised to revolutionize the

impact, sustainability, and scale of development assistance was unheralded. In

reality, this explosion in social networking represents “the new normal.” These

tools ranged widely from the use of “concrete tents” for humanitarian assistance

and disaster relief to the first-time availability of crop insurance by private

companies targeted to small-scale farmers. Localized data from satellites

combined with computerized on-ground sensors grabbed headlines as did

exponential surges in cell phone banking, money transfers and microcredit

schemes. Cheaper, faster, and more accurate medical diagnostics have been made

possible by hand held devices. By all accounts, this was the year for S&T

development breakthroughs.

This chapter documents major themes that arose during the Science and

Technology panel of the USAID Symposium’s Vision 2025 Session.87 The

52

C H A P T E R 5

Future Trends: Science, 

Technology, and Engineering 

for Development

Andrew Reynolds provides insights into how 

the advancement of science, technology, 

and engineering are radically re-shaping the 

development assistance landscape.

87 At the USAID Symposium on Future Development Challenges, the thematic panels were

organized into three sessions: Evolutions, Revolutions, and Vision 2025. More on these sessions

can be found in the introduction to this book. While the Evolutions Session examined current

trends and recognizable patterns, the Revolutions Session considered future possibilities and

potential game-changing events. The Vision 2025 Session built from the first two sessions, and

combined these ideas and more to examine what development might look like in 2025.

Futures text.indd 52 8/12/13 
speakers at this third session expanded on ideas that arose during the Evolutions

and Revolutions Sessions to examine how S&T will change the global “aidscape”

by 2025. With the rapid expansion of global connectivity and the resulting

increased human empowerment potential, how must actors in the development

sphere adapt in order to be relevant and effective in the future? Panelists and

participants addressed the relevance of futures analysis and capacity building for

USAID as well as for other donor organizations.

Previous U.S. Government Initiatives 

The Obama Administration’s National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial

Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) provides deeper context for the

discussion, as does the U.S. State Department and USAID joint budget and

resource planning process.88 In these strategic planning exercises, several themes

are emphasized:

•	 Transnational issues and global challenges require interdisciplinary

approaches and solutions for successful U.S. diplomacy and development

policies and programs;

•	 Science, technology, engineering and innovation are seminal for

addressing these challenges and empowering the related policies and

programs; and,

•	 Public-private partnerships are also critical to success for development

programs, especially in a period of acute budget constraints.

Strategic forecasts made over the past decade, such as those provided by State/

USAID Project Horizon 2025 and various editions of the National Intelligence

Council Global Trends Reports, reached similar conclusions about major trends

that will impact the future.89 Several trends worth noting include:

•	 Science, technology, and engineering will be indispensable to address

grand challenges, but will face economic, social and ethical boundaries

and limits;

•	 Growing population and increased human needs will collide with

resource constraints;

•	 The assault on the global commons could become more intractable as

53

88 National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), available at <www.

whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf>; The First 

Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR): Leading Through Civilian Power

(Washington, DC: Department of State, September 2010), available at <www.state.gov/s/dmr/

qddr/index.htm>.

89 Project Horizon Progress Report (Washington, DC: Interagency Strategic Planning Coordinating

Conference, 2006); Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, National Intelligence Council,

NIC2012-001, December 2012, available at <www.dni.gov/nic_2030>.

Futures text.indd 53 8/12/13 
54

national and international institutions may not be capable of providing

adequate leadership and governance; and,

•	 The information revolution is empowering individuals and non-state

actors in unforeseen and unprecedented ways, challenging the status quo

and traditional institutions and spurring a new generation of special

interests and entrepreneurship.

	 In the strategic forecasts of Project Horizon 2025 and Global Trends 2030,

science and technology were cited as critical drivers for future prosperity and

economic development, potentially disruptive in both positive and negative ways

and seminal for addressing global challenges in food security, human health,

management of water and other natural resources, energy, environmental and

biodiversity conservation, and climate change.

Practitioner Viewpoints 

During the symposium panel, a number of speakers made a strong case for the

notion that S&T will have irreversible impacts on the future of development.

Monumental gains in communication assets and the related use of social media

will lead to the gradual erosion of formal institutions and the rise of individual

data generators and consumers. While the World Bank and other institutions

like USAID have been transforming to embrace new ideas like open data, prizes,

and competitions, their leadership knows that over time, these and other “brick

and mortar” institutions must adapt and will likely become another powerful

online node in the global development space.

Traditional development institutions like USAID are seeking to break their

insularity and listen to the “outside world” to foster more discourse, dialogue and

improve information exchanges about development needs — especially those

that arise from people best placed in the developing world to understand them.

These institutions will retain their capacity to advocate and lobby governments

and other stakeholders to further open such channels. In short, the effectiveness

of traditional development institutions in the new “aidscape” will be based on

how well they generate and foster genuine dialogue.

	 Thirty-five billion devices like PCs, mobile phones and iPads in the world

represent a huge, “two-way radio capability” that can be leveraged to hear the

voices of people using the cell phone as a microphone to voice their development

needs and aspirations. The availability of over 50 billion devices, predicted by

2020, will make this voice ubiquitous.90

	 While there was general consensus on the ability to use futures analysis for

development, some voiced skepticism and called for caution. One panelist

90 Networld to CISCO predictions available at <http://www.networkworld.com/news/2011/071511-

cisco-futurist.html>

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suggested that experts are no better than “dart-throwing monkeys” at predicting

the future. Policymakers, he argued, should focus on identifying and achieving

ambitious and achievable goals, rather than attempting to predict solutions.

	 During the session, panelists and participants alike discussed setting goals

for policymakers. A number of thought-provoking future-focused questions

emerged. For example, is it possible to:

•	 Move beyond carbon-neutral energy sources to scalable high capacity

energy ones?

•	 Increase the utilization of existing vaccines and develop new ones?

•	 Build new formats for behavior change communication to propel public

health information?

•	 Boost agricultural productivity gains while facing reductions in the

arable land needed to feed more people?

•	 Speed development of mobile devices to provide information needed to

answer top priority questions?

•	 Roll out more USAID programs based on an “experiment, validate, and

scale” approach?

•	 Envision new tools such as grand challenges, open innovation platforms

to create demand for new products and services?

•	 Strengthen partnerships between government and the private sector,

NGOs, and individuals to better design, launch and sustain collaborative

efforts?

There was lively discussion at the session on the recent launch of the United

Nations Global Pulse research and development laboratory.91 This, and others

labs like it, have the capacity to capture real-time data for a more agile approach

to development practice involving big data and social media as a jumping off

point. It was said that Global Pulse arose due to the fact that current economic

responses and development tools are seriously out of date. In addition,

traditional surveys and national statistics take too long to process and evaluate,

and are costly. This slowness and high unit cost inhibits quick responses in

determining development success or failure. The Millennium Development

Goals, for example, will not provide measurable results until 2019 according to

Global Pulse. Moreover, these experts claim that close to 90 percent of the

world’s existing data was created in last two years; so, unless we use new tools,

development practitioners will forever be behind the curve.

91 To learn more about the United Nations’ Global Pulse lab, see their Homepage, available at

<www.unglobalpulse.org/>.

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	 It was emphasized repeatedly that social networking represents a great

opportunity to help address this data deluge. Indonesia, for example, a current

recipient of USAID development assistance, has a large number of Twitter users.

In fact, Jakarta is the world’s most active Twitter city.92 Citizens tweet about

looking for employment and share information about a variety of topics such as

migration, health services, and prices for rice and other commodities. Much of

this information is public and can be useful as metrics for development

programs. Retrospective analyses are being conducted on mobile calling patterns

from 2008, before the global economic crisis hit, to discern trends in health and

economic issues and possible correlations or patterns that could have been used

predictively in 2009–2010.

	 Private data networks and mobile calling trends can also provide “digital

smoke signals” to identify issues of consumption behavior and well-being

throughout the developing world. While the use of aggregated data can be made

anonymous to protect personal security and privacy, more effort needs to be put

into working with private industry to foster greater “data philanthropy.” Private

industry has begun to realize that putting data into a “commons” to provide

information for examination of possible solutions is a solid business strategy and

will protect future economic investments. Session participants also pointed out

that social media may be instrumental in helping development practitioners

know whether or not a project worked immediately after its implementation

and down the road following completion. The impact of development assistance

will be more dynamic as more aid recipients provide timely feedback.

	 Other practitioner points that arose during the session focused on the rise

and changing nature of the aid individual or client, who both provide solutions

and receive benefits in the new world of development assistance. The future role

of development agencies like USAID and the World Bank will be to serve as

connectors to solutions, not just providers of experts as in the past. Open

innovation will be imperative, no longer just an option. The development field,

it was generally agreed, must overcome the collective challenge to look at issues

collectively rather than in isolation and to seek cross-cutting solutions for

development problems. These new approaches and analytic potentials, once

adopted, will help harness innovation for development and lead to breakthroughs

in low-cost solar energy use, cheaper housing, and more drinkable water.

	 Discussion about the role of universities also drew considerable attention

during the symposium. For example, it was noted that universities are

demonstrating an increasing interest in development studies, both in

undergraduate and graduate levels and, in particular, in the area of global health.

Harvard University has implemented a cross-cutting program that strives to

92 “Jakarta is ‘world’s most active Twitter city,’” Al Jazeera, August 1, 2012, available at <www.

aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2012/08/201281141334716.html>.

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tackle the challenge of malaria.93 The private sector has also witnessed an

increased level of interest and participation in development. Many exported

goods are sold in the developing world and stable societies combined with

healthier people means a bigger potential market for needed goods and services.

There was a general consensus among participants that there was an

impending shift in solution providers as fewer government entities, and more

individuals and communities, participate in the 21st century development space.

Accelerating growth in information sharing via Internet-based platforms will

yield better access to resources all around the world.

Four Thematic Highlights and Conclusions

Traditional stakeholders and institutions like USAID will still be vital in the

future development space. At the same time, individuals are becoming more

critical, empowered by modern information and communication technologies,

social networking and open innovation platforms. Traditional assistance

organizations and facilitators need to become more attuned to local stakeholder’s

needs to identify the best solutions for local problems. With those points as

context, four main conclusions can be drawn from the session about the future

role S&T and engineering can play in development. These are briefly described

as follows:

1)	Traditional and changing institutional cultures and codes of conduct for

development;

2)	The role of universities in development;

3)	The imperative for institutional cultural change to embrace development

in the new, 21st century paradigm and to serve as connectors for and

between individuals and all stakeholders;

4)	The importance of metrics and new administrative approaches and

funding modalities for development.

Institutional Culture and Codes of Conduct: 

the World Bank and the United Nations Must Change

On organizational culture, it was asked rhetorically if the World Bank is a “bank

with brains or a university with money?” In response, it was stated that “learning

and lending are connected and the job now is to connect practitioners.” The

World Bank Institute is an arm for capacity building, but the World Bank as a

93 Harvard Malaria Initiative, Harvard School of Public Health, Homepage, available at <www.

hsph.harvard.edu/research/hmi/>.

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whole has a limited role as a “global university” and must serve more as a

facilitator for information exchanges between countries about best practices in

training, content and other capacity-building endeavors. Culturally, the World

Bank is still structured around old paradigms, and according to some, reform has

been uneven at best. It has been difficult, for example, for the World Bank to

break away from the traditional approach of providing “first world solutions” for

“third world problems.” However, progress is being made to cultivate an open

innovation team approach to shift from closed development (i.e., North/South

knowledge exchange and work with governments) to open development (such as

multi-modes of learning where lending is but one tool utilized with many

participants). This type of institutional culture reform is also needed in other

international development banks.

	 The same challenges face U.N. organizations. It is now widely recognized

that institutional cultural changes are required to meet future needs, and

organizations must either adapt or perish. Bureaucracies have a tendency to slow

down decisions and punish mistakes through commission, yet they do not

punish inaction or traditional habits of omission. In the brave, new world of

empowered individuals, open sources and social networking, bureaucracies

are being held more accountable and must react, for example, to negative Tweets

and other social network observations about the organization. In addition, it

is the people at the ground level in the bureaucratic trenches that are often

the best representatives of their organizations, not the senior officials. These front

line “troops” are in better touch with opinion makers who Tweet about their

discussions, thus creating a new environment of blended private-public

information generation and sharing.

Notwithstanding these new alignments, governments will always have a

seminal role to play in development. Practically speaking, the U.N.

“stakeholders” are 193 sovereign nations that will continue to establish and

regulate standards for commodities, health products and technologies, and will

provide training and education resources for citizens. But it is clear that

governments must adapt to the new world of social networking and individual

empowerment, and they must engage more deeply and transparently with their

people and recognize that citizens are becoming more educated and sophisticated

in all facets of civil society and governance.

The Role of Universities

USAID is tapping the university community more and more effectively,

particularly through regular high-level faculty and student exchanges and joint

research programs. Universities are unique because they can bring a breadth of

specialists from many different disciplines and with different viewpoints to

address a problem. As a general matter, universities can generate great ideas, but

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technology transfer concerns and modalities to bring products to market are also

critical issues to address. For example, some universities are successful at moving

software and health care services to market, but less experienced in providing

development solutions.

	 Improvements and cultural change at USAID have been underway for

several years, but the last two years have been extraordinary, especially with

regard to university engagement. Early on in April 2008, USAID, the State

Department, and the Department of Education hosted a Summit on Higher

Education attended by over 300 university presidents and provosts from the

United States and abroad to discuss new modalities for cooperation.

Subsequently, four regional conferences provided momentum for the summit

and helped to further strengthen networks between universities, governments

and other stakeholders.

Many faculty members are already pioneering and using new tools for

development solutions, but universities still need better guidance on how to

define problems and focus on the most important development questions.

USAID’s widely acclaimed Higher Education Solutions Network (HESN) is

already providing opportunities to cultivate such guidance. At the same time, it

will also foster new partnerships between universities, USAID, and foreign

development counterparts while tapping into the outsized contributions made by

student engagement. As part of the HESN initiative, a first cohort of seven

universities was selected for funding in November 2012 to provide a range of

expertise in value-added agriculture, health services, geospatial data management,

disaster recovery and assistance, and entrepreneurship and innovation.94

	 In the modern context of “soft power” for diplomacy and development, it

is now widely appreciated that some of America’s best ambassadors are scientists

and engineers. Development institutions need to take better advantage of these

individuals. Assets for USAID and State are also being augmented through

professional fellowships. American Association for the Advancement of Science

(AAAS) Fellows and Jefferson Science Fellows, for example, bring fresh energy

and impetus to science and engineering challenges in diplomacy and

development.95 In addition, a great reservoir of U.S. immigrants — the diaspora

— is also a powerful asset through which development activities are being

94 To learn more about the Higher Education Solutions Network, see the HESN Homepage,

available at <www.usaid.gov/hesn>.

95 American Association for the Advancement of Sciences (AAAS) are Ph.D.’s in their fields recruited

annually by AAAS to serve in 1–2 year assignments in the executive branch and Congress. They

bring experience from the academic, research and public and private sectors, and many are hired

by their host institutions, including USAID and State Department, on a permanent basis.

Jefferson Fellows are tenured professors of science and engineering embedded at USAID and State

for one-year assignments and, upon returning to their universities, remain available as subject

matter experts for an unlimited period. These professors can engage their own global research and

academic networks to support and influence US diplomacy and development initiatives and

programs.

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cultivated, including activities that support the empowerment of women and

youth who view naturalized American role models from their countries with

great respect, especially in the sciences and engineering fields.

Institutions and Millennials as Connectors

Assistance institutions, facilitators, and convener organizations such as USAID,

international development banks, and U.N. organizations, must evolve to better

connect people and assets in order to provide sustainable, scalable and resilient

development solutions. For example, USAID’s suite of Grand Challenges

demonstrates the power of defining a problem, not dictating a solution, and then

using crowdsourcing to identify viable, impactful, and scalable solutions.96

	 Development institutions should not abandon their traditional programs.

Infrastructure for water, energy and communication services, schools, food

staples, vaccines and medicines, for example, cannot be provided by the “Twitter

sphere” alone. Traditional programs will continue to require further support and

funding even as they become more sustainable. However, with new paradigms

evolving, development institutions will increasingly partner with other actors

such as private companies and universities. Together, these actors will create

“centers of excellence” that are capable of addressing multiple development issues

with multidisciplinary approaches, rather than treating scientific or technical

challenges in isolation.

Students and millennials97 all around the world are hungry with idealism

and passion for addressing development issues and helping the less fortunate.

They are connected to one another in unprecedented ways through their formal

education and exchange programs, fields of research and social networking spaces

and online communities that are second nature to them. In the developed world,

and increasingly in developing countries, millennials are worldlier and more

traveled than their parents were at their age. In short, American students and

their foreign counterparts are quickly becoming global collaborators and

innovators and they represent perhaps the single most powerful new asset in the

21st century development sphere. Traditional institutions and stakeholders must

cultivate and harness this potential as quickly as possible.

96 USAID’s Grand Challenges for Development Initiative aims to define problems, identify

constraints, and provide evidence-based analysis. Thus far, four Grand Challenges have been

launched. For more information about USAID’s Grand Challenges, see the homepage, available at

<www.usaid.gov/grandchallenges>.

97 The Millennials are current teens and twenty-something’s transitioning into adulthood. For more

information on Millennials, see Paul Taylor and Scott Keeter, ed., Millennials: A Portrait of 

Generation Next (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, February 2010, available at <www.

pewresearch.org/millennials/>.

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Metrics, Administrative and Programmatic Challenges 

USAID and its stakeholders and funders should be more open to the value of

strategic planning for development in the medium- to long-term, particularly in

the science, technology, and engineering spheres where long lead times are

needed for success. At the same time it is critical to serve stakeholders’ needs for

measureable program milestones and results in the shorter term of one to three

years. Data analysis is critical to answer these needs, particularly metadata

analysis in an era when raw information and knowledge are increasing

exponentially. Better metrics are also needed to inform policymakers and donors

about the importance of incorporating science, technology, and engineering into

development programming.

Funding mechanisms also pose administrative challenges, particularly when

attempting to provide resources to non-traditional institutions and individuals.

Procurement changes are also needed to move USAID from its tradition of

funding large contractors who meet all specifications to a more flexible model for

funding more experts with innovative approaches with smaller awards. Small and

medium enterprises can also be targeted to harness smaller, “off-grid”

technologies with excellent potential for development applications including, for

example, small-scale renewable energy platforms, water purification technologies,

health services technologies and mobile phone and broadband systems. It is said

that innovation is easy, but procurement is hard. USAID is already beginning to

embrace many of these new, non-traditional funding approaches to leverage

investments in the faster cycles of the modern “aidscape.”

	 Other U.S. Government agencies can serve as excellent development

partners. For example, the National Science Foundation’s Partnerships in

Enhanced Engagement in Research (PEER) program with USAID funds

meritorious scientific and technical research between USAID and developing

country counterparts, and it is already underway.98 The Agency has also

cultivated a similar partnership with the National Institutes of Health. The

elevation of development on equal footing with diplomacy and defense — as

called for in the National Security Strategy and the QDDR — is critical to the

United State’s economic and national security interests. Furthermore, the

QDDR has called for “Whole-of-government” and even “Whole-of-society”

partnerships to achieve our diplomacy and development objectives. USAID has

opened a large aperture of cooperation to engage in the modern aidscape with

the U.S. Geological Service, the Department of Energy, the Department of

Agriculture and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and efforts

with NGOs and academia are moving ahead briskly in parallel.

98 For more information about Partnerships in Enhanced Engagement in Research, see their

Homepage, available at <http://sites.nationalacademies.org/pga/dsc/peer/index.htm>.

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Last Word

The 21st century “aidscape” presents enormous challenges and opportunities for

all development stakeholders. Open architecture for information and data

exchange, analysis and new modalities of cooperation and innovation characterize

the new “aidscape.” Governments remain vital funders and facilitators for

development, but they and other traditional development organizations must

adapt to the shifting development landscape and the global information society

or risk losing relevancy and influence. In particular, they must change

organizational behavior to become better facilitators and connectors for and

between these numerous individuals and new stakeholders. Entrepreneurs among

these stakeholders, including small and medium enterprises with innovative

approaches and technologies yet untapped for development, should be identified

and targeted for special attention. Their contributions to development also

represents a new generation of trade opportunities for the United States.

While it is true that “there are no facts about the future,”99 strategic

planning and analysis of medium- and long-term trends provide important

context for development priorities and programs. Building a strategic planning

and futures analysis capacity at USAID to consistently examine alternative

scenarios, challenges and opportunities should be at the very heart of a revitalized

science based Agency.

	 Finally, a new generation of citizens and passionate millennials are being

empowered by increased global connectivity and the mobility of intellectual

capital resulting from the rapid deployment of communications technology and

internet services. These individuals represent some of the most powerful, new

potential assets for the development sphere. It is in the self-interest of the

development community to embrace and leverage these assets, especially in the

face of limited development resources. Traditional development organizations

such as governments, the United Nations, international development banks, and

non-governmental organizations will need to reach out to these new partners in

order to adapt to this new reality and to harness the enormous opportunity these

partners represent to shape the 21st century aidscape.

Andrew Reynolds Senior Advisor, Space and Advanced Technologies, Bureau of 

Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department 

of State

99 Administrator Lincoln E. Moses, Preamble to The Annual Report to Congress—1978, DOE/

EIA-0036/1 & 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, February 1978).

This chapter is included and reproduced with the permission of the author. The chapter or any 

part of it may not be reproduced in any form without the written permission of the author except 

that reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any use of the United States Government 

or those acting on its behalf.

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Developing countries and 

economies in transition are 

shifting the balance of power on 

the world’s economic stage. The 

World Bank reports that almost 

half of the world’s economic 

growth can be attributed to 

developing countries. In 2009 and 

2010, China issued more loans to 

developing nations than the 

World Bank. In terms of political 

change, the implications of the 

Arab Spring, which changed the 

political landscape of the Middle 

East, are yet to be fully assessed. 

The civil war in Syria and the 

insurgency in Mali are testaments 

to the notion that political 

change can be unpredictable and 

destabilizing. All of these factors, 

economic and political, will 

impact the way the global 

community does development. 

During the “politics and 

economies” panels at the USAID 

Symposium, these issues drew 

considerable discussion. Panelists 

engaged questions on topics such 

as shifting donor-recipient 

relationships, economic uncertainty, the role of political 

institutions, and a growing 

number of new strategic partnerships. Throughout the discussion, 

several key changes and challenges emerged. 

One topic that dominated 

discussion was the changing role 

of the nation-state. Although 

states remain key actors, the 

‘playing field’ has diversified 

dramatically in recent years, and 

many other stakeholders now 

have the power to influence the 

future of development. Panelists 

discussed the importance of 

engaging not only national 

governments, but also regional 

and local governing bodies as 

well as institutions, civil society, 

and the private sector. With the 

spread of information communications technologies, citizens 

throughout the world are making 

their voices heard. Despite the 

increased number and power of 

non-traditional actors, it was 

noted that ultimately, success is 

unlikely if key political decisionmakers are not involved in 

processes. 

A second discussion trend 

which surfaced in this track was 

the high degree of interconnectedness of current trends and 

the increased complexity of the 

development landscape in 

Politics and 

Economies

Over the past few years, 

the world has witnessed 

dramatic shifts in both the 

global economy and in 

worldwide political trends.

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S Y M P O S I U M PA N E L S Y N O P S I S

general. For example, issues 

pertaining to water, land, agriculture, migration, and rising 

inequality all require the attention of governance. One panelist 

stated that food insecurity is a 

direct result of poor governance. 

Another pointed out the fact 

that fragile new democracies 

often find it difficult to provide 

basic services to citizens. The 

technology to produce food 

exists; droughts and famine, for 

the most part, are predictable. 

Governments must develop the 

institutional capacity to make 

public goods accessible to their 

citizens. Rapid urbanization is 

another demography-related 

phenomenon that is tied to 

governance. Megacities in particular create a unique challenge for 

governments striving to provide 

basic goods and services to their 

populations. If development 

challenges such as these are to 

be overcome, political will must 

be present. 

The importance of forging 

strategies to mitigate economic 

shocks was also underscored. 

Developing countries, not unlike 

developed ones, will face sizable 

challenges to sustain economic 

growth and to cope with rising 

demand for goods and services 

from a newly emerging middle 

class. The global community must 

learn to better predict and 

prepare for economic downturns 

in order to bolster microeconomic resilience. One strategy 

for doing this would be to create 

stronger regional integration 

among countries. 

Finally, one of the most 

salient trends discussed in these 

panels involved the shifting 

donor landscape. USAID regularly graduates countries from 

development assistance. These 

“graduates” become success 

stories, such as South Korea and 

Costa Rica, and in many cases, 

they become donor countries 

themselves like Brazil and India. 

Trilateral cooperation is becoming more frequent and is a great 

way to leverage available knowledge and resources. Additionally, 

the BRICs are changing the face 

of international development. 

While spending on foreign 

assistance by developed countries is stagnating, foreign 

assistance from emerging 

economies like China, Brazil, and 

India is growing fast. Western 

donors must learn to cooperate 

and collaborate with these 

economies. The challenge over 

the next 25 years will be to 

widen the team of nations 

supporting international development initiatives and to forge 

strategies together that will 

support a more equitable and 

prosperous world. 

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The foreign assistance landscape has changed drastically over the past several

years. With the rise of emerging donors, unprecedented levels of private sector

engagement, an expanded role of foundations, and the explosions of publicprivate partnerships, the foreign assistance landscape of yesterday has become a

memory. The size and velocity of private capital flows to the developing world,

peer-to-peer philanthropy, and other economic spigots have forever changed the

financial role of traditional donors. All of these issues sparked lively discussion at

the USAID Symposium on Future Development Challenges. This was especially

so in the “politics and economies” forum where time and again speakers asked:

What will USAID’s role be in the future, and how will it mobilize still sizable

resources — capital and human — to meet the development challenges of the

21st century? Participants were quick to point out that while much has changed,

persistent challenges like illiteracy, under-nutrition, and corruption are still

widespread. New trends like global climate change and rapid urbanization are

posing their own unique challenge to sustainable development.

	 By all accounts, the Agency’s programming and planning efforts have

traditionally focused on aid delivery over the shorter term. Country strategies,

for example, usually map assistance two to five years into the future. But the pace

of change in the development landscape has skyrocketed as seemly distant events

such as rapid urbanization and climate change arrive upon the Agency’s front

doorstep. New players in the development arena, huge shifts in the economic

balance of power, unpredictable political changes and other developments will

66

C H A P T E R 6

Beyond Traditional Foreign 

Assistance: USAID’s Future 

Role with Middle-Income 

Countries

Daniel Runde discusses new approaches that are 

necessary to dramatically transform a now outdated 

and ineffectual donor engagement strategy. 

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force USAID to become more flexible, innovative, and future focused in order to

stay afloat and to thrive. In short, the traditional donor-recipient model is out

of date and ill-equipped to address today’s economic and political realities.

The role of trade, often undervalued for development, new funding mechanisms

and partnership opportunities, and a greatly expanded role for science and

technology all emerged as front and center issues at the symposium. Keeping all

of these developments in mind, this chapter explores a new role for the now

50-plus- year-old development agency.

Today’s Budget and Strategic Realities

Official development assistance is at a crossroads, and the U. S. Government is

one of many traditional donors having to make difficult choices about the

direction and extent of their assistance programming. Budget cuts during recent

years of austerity have affected every sector of government, including

development agencies. The U.S. Agency for International Development

(USAID), despite using only a small fraction of the federal budget, has had to

make do with less-than-ideal budget realities.

	 Yet shrinking budgets are only one aspect of the changing nature of

development assistance. Many traditional recipients of foreign aid from the

United States and other OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and

Development) countries have made tremendous strides in terms of economic

growth, announcing themselves as equal players with the rich countries of the

Global North. China, India, and Brazil are just a few examples of countries that

have undergone economic transformation, lifting hundreds of millions of people

out of poverty in the last two decades. Continuing to provide such powerful

nations with traditional foreign assistance is therefore incongruous with today’s

economic and political realities. In fact, many countries that have reached or

surpassed middle-income status have established their own bilateral foreign aid

agencies or agendas, to varying degrees of sophistication, such as the Brazilian

Agency for Cooperation (ABC) and the Indian Development Partnership

Administration. Traditional U.S. assistance to these countries, some with

multitrillion dollar economies, is not only less effective as far as meeting global

development goals, but less strategic from a broader U.S. foreign policy

perspective as well.

	 Although U.S. Government development resources are focused in the

world’s poorest regions and countries, and in conflict and disaster-affected zones,

this is not to say that there is no longer a need for assistance to middle-income

countries. On the contrary, certain USAID activities, such as its democracy and

governance programming in non-democratic countries (such as, until recently, its

support for Russian civil society organizations), merit continuation even when

economic realities suggest otherwise. Rather, the U.S. Government should begin

67

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shifting its relationships with middle-income countries from a donor-donee

approach towards more of a partnership model. USAID is already assuming the

role of facilitator for these transitions, such as in Panama, but these efforts should

be scaled up and across the breadth of USAID’s reach, as the phenomenon of

rapid economic growth is visible on every continent. As will be described below,

helping these emerging players become better donors should be a vital

component of USAID’s engagement strategy. In a number of countries,

including Brazil, USAID is already pursuing this, with promising results.

Boosting Trade

Another way to expand U.S. partnerships with middle-income countries is

to do away with trade restrictions, and in select cases, work towards free trade

agreements (FTAs). The U.S. Congress last year ratified FTAs with Panama,

South Korea, and Colombia,100 all countries with very positive experiences with

U.S. assistance (the USAID mission in Panama completed its activities, as

scheduled, in September 2012).101 It is certainly no coincidence that in places

with a strong legacy of U.S. development assistance, a powerful trade

relationship with the United States has blossomed. As Table 1 shows, middleincome countries that underwent effective transitions out of traditional USAID

assistance witnessed exponential growth in their trade with the United States,

a trend that holds to this day.

	 Transitioning from traditional foreign assistance and pursuing a partnership

with a country is nothing new for the U.S. Government, but it remains, as

always, a challenging proposition. Transitions in the past, as a result, have yielded

mixed results in the long term.

One of the most important considerations for pursuing a transition away

from traditional foreign aid is whether the transition threatens to undermine

USAID’s legacy in that country. USAID has been operating in some countries

for decades and has made fundamental contributions to the long-term prosperity

of those countries. For instance, USAID was instrumental in bringing the Green

Revolution to India, which turned that country into an agricultural exporter.102

Also in the agricultural sphere, USAID helped the Brazilian Government start up

Embrapa,103 which is now among the most innovative agricultural research

agencies in the world.

100 “U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement,” Office of United States Trade Representative, accessed January

31, 2012, available at <www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta>.

101 Carol Elron, “Welcome to our website,” USAID Panama, 2011, <www.usaid.gov/pa/Information/

Documents/Message%20from%20the%20Acting%20Mission%20Director_FINAL.July%206%20

2011.pdf>.

102 “Great USAID Projects in History: IFFCO,” ACDI/VOCA, available at <www.acdivoca.org/site/

ID/Feature-Great-USAID-Projects-in-History-IFFCO>.

103 Isadora Ferreira, “From Famine to Feast in Brazil,” USAID Frontlines, November/December 2011,

available at <www.usaid.gov/press/frontlines/fl_nov11/FL_nov11_50_BRAZIL.html>.

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Table 1 Moving from Aid to Trade, 1985–2011 

	 As USAID draws down its traditional assistance in places like Brazil and

India, it is critical that the transitions are not so abrupt as to make a clean break

with the countless contributions that USAID missions have made over the years.

This caveat is not an exaggeration of the risk, as a number of transitions in the

past were not so smooth, particularly with respect to transitions in several

Sources: “U.S. Trade in Goods by Country,” U.S. Census Bureau, available at <www.census.gov/

foreign-trade/balance/; Larry L. Burmeister>, “Development Dilemma: Trade Pressures and 

Agricultural Sector Adjustment,” Asian Survey 30, no. 7 ( July 1990), 711–723. 

Costa Rica

1985 923.0

1990 1,991.7

1996 (USAID transition) 3,790.6

1997 4,347.7

1999 6,348.5

2011 16,236.5

Portugal

1985 (USAID transition) 1,240.5

1986 1,189.9

1990 1,754.2

2005 3,460.6

2011 3,903.0

South Korea

1980 (USAID transition) 9,118

1983 12,952

1985 15,969.6

1990 32,889.6

2001 57,362.2

2011 100,140.5

Lithuania

1998 143.0

1999 163.0

2000 (USAID transition) 194.6

2001 264.2

2005 1,023.9

2011 2,186.3

Tunisia

1993 273.0

1994 (USAID transition) 381.2

1995 285.3

2000 383.2

2011 938.0

Country and Year	 Bilateral Trade in Goods with the United States	

millions of dollars, on a nominal basis

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African countries in the 1990s. In some cases, both USAID partners and

employees felt that the nature of the transition did not do justice to the legacy of

USAID work in the countries in question.

	 In cases such as South Korea, Costa Rica, and Portugal, planning in

advance allowed USAID and its partners to establish bi-national legacy

institutions that have worked to carry the bilateral relationship forward, even

many years after USAID ended its activities there. While bi-national institutions

may not be feasible in every case, they present a sustainable and powerful

instrument for both sides, donor and recipient. These institutions are generally

entrusted with an endowment, with contributions from the private sector, and

therefore require no further taxpayer funding going forward. At a time when it is

increasingly difficult to secure support for important development programming,

legacy instruments are perhaps an underappreciated approach to reshaping the

U.S. relationship with middle-income countries. However, securing endowment

authority from the U.S. Congress is in itself a challenging task as well; thus, it is

important to explore the potential for endowment authority for a series of

countries as soon as possible.

Scenario Planning

Another reality that USAID history teaches us is that foreign assistance

transitions often cannot be planned exactly too far in advance. On more than

one occasion, there has been an attempt to formulate some sort of objective

metrics for determining when a transition should take place, looking at social

and economic indices to come up with “magic numbers.” These efforts have been

inconclusive, however, and in general, attempting to identify clear-cut rules for

transitions is probably asking the wrong question. The focus, rather, should be

on being prepared to transition at any moment, as the ultimate decision to do so

will be influenced by political or budgetary realities, often outside the scope of

USAID policy. What happened in Russia in September 2012 starkly illustrates

this situation. USAID was forced to stop funding all activities in Russia because

of what the Russian Government demanded, not because of strategic planning

by USAID. Fortunately, USAID had been strategically reducing the scope of its

activities in Russia over the last several years, narrowing its focus sectors one by

one, but USAID goals and partners alike were hurt by the abrupt farewell. It is

quite possible that other governments will make similar demands of USAID in

the coming years, for various reasons, and the Agency needs to be prepared for

both the best- and worst-case scenarios. This is why scenario planning, a vital

component of futures analysis, must become central to USAID thinking.

Nevertheless, a number of countries can be readily identified where U.S.

foreign assistance is likely to wind down over the next decade, and in these cases,

programming should immediately be focused towards establishing a long-term

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bilateral cooperation partnership rather than following the traditional model of

development assistance. Although there can be no objective rubric for

determining when exactly the time for transition has come, as mentioned above,

there are a number of indicators that are handy points of reference. When a

country possesses a sophisticated space program, its own foreign assistance

agency, a sovereign wealth fund, and/or membership in the G-20, then it can

safely be said that traditional USAID programs do not have a long future in that

country. At the same time, these indicators suggest that the country in question

is ready (and eager) for a broadened cooperation partnership with the United

States. Brazil, which recently became the sixth-largest economy in the world,

is a prime example of this phenomenon.104 Countries like Brazil are eager to

shed the traditional foreign aid relationship with the United States and pursue

deeper cooperation.

Linking Communication and Transition

In all assistance transitions, communication is key; a fact attested to by USAID

officials who were involved with such transitions in the past.105 In addition to

USAID, these transitions involve a variety of actors: other U.S. Government

elements (including Congress), partner non-governmental organizations (NGOs,

local and American), recipient-country government ministries, and multilateral

institutions. Effective transitions, historically, have involved close coordination

between USAID and these other stakeholders, well in advance of the ultimate

transition. In addition to USAID, the U.S. Government has a number of

other non-traditional development instruments at its disposal, such as the U.S.

Trade and Development Agency, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation,

and the Export-Import Bank. These agencies all have important roles to play

in any assistance transition, and USAID should further expand its cooperation

with them. These non-traditional assistance giving actors have the added benefit

of advancing U.S. interests and yielding development returns with little to

no extra cost to the American taxpayer. The Development Credit Authority

(DCA), an instrument of USAID itself, accomplishes development goals

with similarly cost-effective methods.106 DCA should be expanded and applied

in more settings.

104 Philip Inman, “Brazil’s economy overtakes UK to become world’s sixth largest,” The Guardian,

March 6, 2012, available at <www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/mar/06/brazil-economy-worldssixth-largest>.

105 Interview with William Paupe, former senior USAID official present at the close of the South

Korea mission, September 21, 2011.

106 United States Agency for International Development, Office of Development Credit, Credit Guarantees: 

Promoting Private Investment in Development—2010 Year in Review (Washington, DC: USAID,

2010), available at <www.usaid.gov/our_work/economic_growth_and_trade/development_credit/

YIR_2010.pdf>.

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Fostering Cooperation

The post-foreign assistance partnership can also take the form of development

cooperation. Triangular cooperation is an increasingly popular form of delivering

foreign assistance, and USAID is already exploring this approach. In triangular

cooperation, two donor countries partner together for development projects

in a third country. The two donor agencies leverage their comparative advantages

in order to achieve a greater development outcome than either could

individually. These comparative advantages include access to a wide range of

capabilities and resources, whether financial, technical, cultural, or even

linguistic. In Lusophone Africa, for example, USAID and Brazilian partners are

pursuing triangular cooperation.107 USAID has also partnered with the Indian

Government in Africa,108 and such collaborative development pursuits are likely

to increase in the near future.

	 Of course, coordinating two (or more) donors is never easy. The

experiences of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,

which has sought to coordinate donors for decades, can attest to this challenge.

As a result, the extent and impact of triangular cooperation have been limited to

date. Results will certainly improve moving forward, as all sides gain experience

with this still novel approach. Triangular cooperation’s shortcomings so far can

be explained in part by the differences in capabilities across various development

agencies. Some new donor countries do not have a distinct bilateral development

agency like USAID, while others that do (such as Brazil) are still newcomers

to the field. Until agencies such as the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation mature

to more closely match USAID’s scale, coordination will likely remain difficult.

This discrepancy nevertheless offers USAID the opportunity to help strengthen

and expand other countries’ nascent development programs. Certainly, USAID

already does so to an extent. In Brazil, USAID and ABC are currently

implementing an exchange program, in which employees from one agency spend

time at the other in order to learn, teach, and bring the two agencies closer

together. Such collaboration is encouraging, and ideally, more exchange

mechanisms can be set up, not only in other countries, but also in such a way

that allows officials from other countries’ development agencies to spend time at

USAID headquarters in Washington.

	 Every country’s needs and desires, with respect to its relationship with the

United States, are unique. However, there are a number of sectors in which the

majority of middle-income countries want to expand their cooperation with the

United States. Science and technology, for instance, continues to be an area of

strong interest throughout the world. As one of the global leaders in

107 “Brazil, the U.S. and Mozambique Sign Agreement for Trilateral Cooperation,” U.S. Agency for 

International Development, January 23, 2012, available at <http://brazil.usaid.gov/en/node/1368>.

108 “A Partnership for an Evergreen Revolution,” U.S. Agency for International Development, available

at <www.usaid.gov/indiatrip/evergreen_revolution.pdf>.

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this field, the United States has much to offer middle-income countries, but it

can gain a great deal from them as well. USAID has helped many countries

expand their capabilities vis-à-vis science and technology, and recipients of U.S.

assistance are hungry for more collaboration in this area. Recently, USAID

and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry launched an

initiative around “frugal innovation,”109 India’s unique brand of low-cost,

high-impact technologies. U.S. development goals would certainly benefit from

bringing products inspired by frugal innovation to scale in the developing world.

U.S. relationships with middle-income countries, especially in a post-foreign

aid context, should have plenty of room for partnerships around science and

technology. In 2010, USAID established a new Office of Science and Technology

in the Bureau of Policy, Planning, and Learning; this was a giant step in the

right direction.

On a related note, educational and professional exchange programs with

the United States are also extremely popular among emerging countries. Personto-person exchanges are in fact among the best ways to link two societies

together. In the past, USAID-supported exchanges of Americans and South

Koreans built the personal relationships that inextricably link the United States

with South Korea in one of the strongest alliances. Now the U.S. Government

and those of other countries alike are recognizing the importance of sponsoring

such mechanisms. Brazil launched its Science Without Borders initiative,

which is supposed to supply 100,000 Brazilian students and researchers with

scholarships to travel abroad, with most likely to come to the United States.110

The U.S. Government introduced a similar program — 100,000 Strong in the

Americas — to send just as many Americans throughout the Western

Hemisphere.111 There is much appetite for this type of collaboration in other

parts of the world as well, and USAID can help lay the groundwork for

broadening bilateral partnerships on this front.

	 As the number of global donors increases and the capabilities of middleincome countries rise, there is still at least one area in which the United States

offers a unique development export: civil society. American civil society is

extremely active and well-developed compared to most countries,’ especially

emerging ones. USAID, unsurprisingly, has implemented some of the most

extensive and successful civil society development programs throughout the

world, including in countries where the growth of native civil society is extremely

hindered by political or other restrictions. In addition to supporting and

professionalizing the NGO sector, USAID also has much to offer emerging

109 “USAID and FICCI Announce Millennium Alliance,” Federation of Indian Chambers of

Commerce and Industry (FICCI), December 20, 2011, available at <www.ficci.com/

pressrelease/846/press-ficci-dec20-USAID.pdf>.

110 “Brazil’s Science Without Borders Program: About the Program,” Institute of International

Education, available at <http://www.iie.org/en/Programs/Brazil-Science-Without-Borders/About>.

111 Phillip Kurata, “U.S., Brazil Expand and Deepen Cooperation,” United States Diplomatic Missions 

to Brazil, April 9, 2012, <http://brazil.usembassy.gov/usbrexpand.html>.

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countries in terms of creating an architecture of philanthropy. Unlike in the

United States, many societies lack the incentives (such as an effective tax code)

that encourage philanthropy. Bringing some of the American experience to these

countries would help their civil societies flourish the way their economies have,

and there is still much work to be done in this realm. Even if USAID missions

lack the resources or time to undertake this challenge, they can engage the right

partners to pursue this important work, or help establish bi-national institutions

that can house these activities long-term.

	 Overall, it is becoming more and more important for USAID to become

highly more creative and innovative, and to shed traditional approaches and

models of thinking, particularly with respect to middle-income countries. To a

large extent, USAID has risen to the challenge, but there remains much work to

be done to position the Agency even more effectively. USAID will have to tread

more lightly, engage outside partners more actively and strategically, and find

more non-traditional sources of support than ever before, in order to

simultaneously serve international development goals and U.S. foreign policy

interests at a time of shrinking resources and changing global realities.

Daniel F. Runde Director, Project on Prosperity and Development and William A. 

Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis, Center for Strategic and International Studies

This chapter is included and reproduced with the permission of the author. The chapter or any 

part of it may not be reproduced in any form without the written permission of the author except 

that reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any use of the United States Government 

or those acting on its behalf.

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The Futures Symposium session on “politics and economies” raised a number of

powerful arguments for the positive development impacts of a growing and

robust uptick in world-wide trade. This is one trend that seems likely to continue

unabated over the next decade.

	 Considerable discussion focused on new trading partnerships among

regions, especially between African countries. Also in play were issues on

evolving trade between Africa and Asia. Serious debate was generated over the

challenge of building future trading partnerships while expanding existing ones.

A number of speakers highlighted the importance of reducing economic

uncertainties in developing and middle income countries along with developing

strategies to mitigate unforeseen economic shocks. Another prevalent issue

discussed was how to prepare nations to anticipate and prepare for economic

downturns in order to strengthen their economic resilience. One approach that

received sizable discussion revolved around how the United States could facilitate

more durable economic regional integration among countries and between

developing, middle income and emerging donor countries.

	 With these issues as a backdrop, this chapter aims to shed light on the

complex and ever tightening economic links that connect the United States and

the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. Understanding the nature of

these links is important if we are to promote the kind of future economic growth

that will help the countries of the Western Hemisphere secure prosperity and

address central development challenges in the coming years. While the region has

experienced a deep and mostly positive economic, political, and social

C H A P T E R 7

The United States, Latin 

America, and the Caribbean: 

Securing Recovery and 

Prosperity through Deeper 

Economic Partnership

Leonardo Martinez-Diaz examines the growing 

economic trends that are strengthening links between 

the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean.

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transformation in the past 25 years, important challenges remain, including how

to ensure that globalization leads to broad-based growth in all our countries. In

addressing those challenges, the United States, Latin America, and the Caribbean

will need one another more than ever before.

	 This chapter is divided into three parts. The first section argues that closer

economic links with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean will

be critical if we are to accelerate and sustain U.S. economic growth and job

creation. The reason is that changes in the hemisphere are making many of

those economies more dynamic and resilient than ever before, and their policy

frameworks have made them more credible, responsible, and reliable

economic partners.

	 The second section argues that the U.S. economy will prove indispensable

for the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean if they are to achieve their

full economic potential in the coming years and join the ranks of the world’s

most prosperous societies. This is because the United States will continue to offer

the biggest and most open markets for goods and services, the deepest and most

liquid capital markets, and a unique capacity for innovation and

entrepreneurship. The last section provides some examples of how the U.S.

Government, and the U.S. Treasury in particular, is working to deepen economic

relationships with the hemisphere.

Latin America’s Importance to American Growth and Recovery 

The United States is more interconnected to Latin America and the Caribbean

than any other region in the world. Fifty million people — one in six Americans

— identify as Hispanic or Latino and trace their roots to Latin America or the

Caribbean. The United States exports to the region $370 billion worth of goods

and services per year — three-and-a-half times more than the United States

exports to China and 30 percent more than it exports to the European Union.112

A third of global imports of crude oil come from Latin America, and nearly a

fifth of high-skilled migrants admitted into the United States every year through

the H1B visa program are from Latin America and the Caribbean. These

immigrants fuel innovation and growth in the U.S. economy.

A Quarter-Century of Progress

Given the long-standing relations between the United States and other countries

in the hemisphere, it is easy to lose sight of how much the Latin American and

Caribbean economies have individually evolved in the last two decades. At the

112 Francisco J. Sanchez, Doing Business in Latin America: Positive Trends but Serious Challenges,

Testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western

Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics, 112th Congress, July 31,2012, available at <www.

foreign.senate.gov/hearings/doing_business-in-latin-america-positive-trends-but-seriouschallenges>.

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beginning of the 1990s, Latin America was emerging from a “lost decade” of zero

net growth. Poverty and inequality were stubbornly high, and hyperinflation was

common. Fiscal imbalances were dangerously unsustainable, and banking and

currency crises were chronic.

Since then, the region’s economy has more than doubled in real terms,

inequality has declined, and poverty has fallen significantly, from 48 percent in

1990 to 30 percent in 2011.113 Inflation is mostly in the single digits, financial

systems are generally stable, and macroeconomic frameworks in most countries

sound. Several countries in Latin America are even engines of inclusive,

sustainable, and balanced growth in a world economy that badly needs it.

	 Latin America and the Caribbean will prove critical for accelerating and

sustaining U.S. growth and job creation for several reasons. First, the region is

expected to continue growing, and to do so at a faster rate than the mature

economies and many emerging ones. One of the clearest reasons this growth

matters to the United States is trade. Exports to Latin America alone made a

significant contribution to U.S. growth in the period immediately preceding the

2008 crisis. And in the aftermath of the crisis, exports to Latin American

economies have contributed more to U.S. recovery than exports to any other

region of the world.

	 Another reason why the region will be critical for U.S. growth is that Latin

America’s already large middle class is expected to keep expanding. According to

the United Nations Economic Commission114 for Latin America and the

Caribbean, the number of middle-class households in the region grew by 56

million in the past two decades. The region’s middle class population has

expanded by some 150 million people, the equivalent of half the population of

the United States. Sustained growth, even if at slower rates, will enable Latin

America’s middle class to keep growing.

	 And third, an unprecedented level of resilience is evident in many countries

of the region. Latin American economies were highly vulnerable to negative

shifts in global economic conditions in the 1980s and 1990s. Weak financial

systems and unsustainable debt structures magnified external shocks — when the

United States caught a cold, Latin American countries would get pneumonia.

But the region’s experience in 2008 reflects an historic shift. Colombia and

Peru maintained positive growth throughout the crisis, and most of those that

did suffer downturns have experienced quick recoveries. Many economies in the

region are better-equipped to absorb external shocks and capitalize on positive

global conditions than in the past. As downturns affect other regions of the

world, the countries of Latin America act as sources of stability and support for

the global economy, and thereby contribute to recovery in the United States.

113 Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean (New York: United Nations, 2002).

114 Osvaldo Rosales and Mikio Kuwayama, China and Latin America and the Caribbean: Building a 

Strategic Economic and Trade Relationship (New York: United Nations ECLAC, 2012), 111.

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	 No economy is immune to the risk of temporary reversals, but Latin

America and the Caribbean are poised to maintain strong growth in the medium

and long term because their growth is underpinned by four powerful factors:

demographics, competitiveness, capital, and prudent economic policy.

Demographics

The region’s demographic advantage, relative to the rest of the world, becomes

clearest after analyzing dependency ratios, which measure the number of

working-age persons in an economy relative to those that are not in the labor

force. According to U.N. projections, Latin America has 20 years before there are

50 dependents for every 100 persons of working age.115

	 Then, the ratios will start to rise, but the slope of that curve will only

become steep after 2040. By comparison, in 2035, China’s dependency ratio will

equal Latin America’s, and then rapidly exceed it. This translates into a twodecade demographic dividend in Latin America and the Caribbean, during

which conditions will be favorable for saving and investing in activities that

increase future economic growth.

Competitiveness

Latin American manufacturing, particularly in Mexico, is becoming increasingly

competitive relative to China and other East Asian economies. Recent statistics

suggest that wages in Chinese manufacturing grew by an average annual rate of

19 percent in dollar terms from 2005-10, and anecdotal evidence suggests wages

are still rising due to tightening labor market conditions.116 In contrast, Mexican

manufacturing wages measured in dollars remain very competitive. Though

China has seen stronger productivity gains that offset a substantial portion of the

rising cost of labor, the closing wage gap will make some Latin American

countries increasingly attractive as bases for investing and manufacturing,

provided that they make the necessary investments.

Global Capital 

Global capital flows into Latin America and the Caribbean will likely continue to

grow. Expectations about relatively high future growth rates, coupled with slower

growth in some mature economies, will push capital in search of higher returns

to the region, as long as adequate policy frameworks remain in place. These

capital flows will make up for low savings rates in many countries, and help the

region capitalize on its demographic dividend.

115 Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, Latin America: Coming of Age (World Policy Institution, 2008), 222,

available at <www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2008/10/fall-latin-americamartinez-diaz/fall_latin_america_martinez_diaz.pdf>.

116 Harold L. Sirkin and Michale Zinser, Made in America, Again: Why Manufacturing Will Return to 

the U.S. (Boston: Boston Consulting Group 2011), 7.

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An Emerging Latin American Framework for Stability and Growth

The last — and arguably most important — driver underpinning Latin America’s

bright prospects is related to policy choices. A very similar economic policy

framework is taking root simultaneously in many countries across the region, in

countries as diverse as Mexico, El Salvador, Uruguay, Peru, and Brazil. This

framework is above all pragmatic and home-grown. It is being embraced by

governments of all political stripes across the region, and its advantages over

alternative frameworks are quickly becoming clear to all.

The framework spreading across Latin America has two components. The

first is a stability component, which has several elements.

Fiscal discipline and transparency are enabling countries to avoid

unsustainable debt burdens, secure reliable access to international capital

markets, and provide room for countercyclical fiscal policies. In addition, credible 

monetary anchors, such as inflation-targeting regimes, have been implemented by

seven Latin American economies, including the two largest, Brazil and Mexico.

Well-contained inflation has allowed countries to adopt more flexible exchange

rate regimes. In turn, greater exchange rate flexibility has afforded these countries

more room to manage external shocks at lower cost in terms of growth and

employment, discourage dangerous buildups of foreign debt and currency

mismatches in the private sector, and avoid speculative attacks. Well-regulated 

and capitalized financial systems have been critical in helping the region weather

the 2008 global crisis. However, there remains much to be done if the financial

systems are to be both stable and sufficiently developed to support sophisticated,

globally integrated economies.

	 The second component of the Latin American economic framework has to

do with promoting sustainable, inclusive growth. Large and well-focused

investments in education, infrastructure, and R&D, which are widely recognized as

essential for competing effectively in the global economy, are vital for growth.

Further, most countries in the region now recognize that private enterprise is the

most powerful engine for growth and innovation, even where the state retains a

significant presence in the economy. For this reason, they are adopting regulatory 

frameworks that encourage private entrepreneurship. Countries as diverse as

Jamaica, Honduras, and Colombia have embraced rules-based, open trading 

regimes, which have proven instrumental in helping emerging market countries

take advantage of global opportunities.

	 Openness to capital flows, in the context of effective financial regulation, is

another element essential for sustainable growth. In 2011, Latin America and the

Caribbean received $113 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI), continuing a

strong upward trend that is providing the region with the capital it needs to keep

growing.117 Measures to mitigate inequality of opportunity and protect the most

117 Foreign Direct Investment: in Latin America and the Caribbean (New York: United Nations

CEPAL/ECLAC, 2011), 24.

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vulnerable populations are essential for broad-based economic growth.

Conditional cash transfer programs, pioneered by Mexico and Brazil, have been

implemented to great success throughout the region. Efficient and increasingly

progressive tax regimes are being embraced both for equity considerations and to

ensure that the state can deliver key services, especially to the poorest citizens.

Finally, stabilization funds and other measures to protect economies from

declines in commodity prices have been adopted by, or are being considered in,

many Latin American countries.

The U.S. Economy’s Importance to Latin America’s Development

Although much has been achieved in recent years, it is important not to

obscure the fact that Latin American and Caribbean countries still face enormous

economic and development challenges. In many places, poverty remains endemic,

income and wealth inequality alarmingly high, social exclusion pervasive, and

vulnerability to natural disasters a constant preoccupation.

In the Caribbean, there is concern of a self-reinforcing triangle of low

growth, deteriorating fiscal positions, and financial-sector stress. Mexico and

Central America face crime and insecurity that risk undermining institutions and

draining economic dynamism. In countries such as El Salvador, insecurity may

be costing the economy as much as 8 percent of GDP every year,118 and that

does not take into account the direct human cost. And while there are stories of

economic dynamism in Latin America, the reality is that real GDP per capita has

grown much too slowly in the last 25 years, especially when compared to the

most successful emerging-market economies, those in East Asia.

Effectively addressing these challenges will require growth that is strong,

sustained, and inclusive. And that will depend on how the countries of the

region adapt to a changing global economy and leverage its most valuable

opportunities.

In the coming years, the United States will provide many of these

opportunities. Deeper economic engagement with the United States will be

critical for Latin American and Caribbean countries as they seek to become

societies that are more prosperous, fair, and secure.

Trade Diversification

The United States is the world’s largest market and is geographically close to the

region. In addition, U.S. markets remain among the most open in the world,

providing ample opportunities to Latin American exporters, even as protectionist

currents emerge in other parts of the world. The United States will play a

particularly important role for countries looking to diversify their export baskets.

118 Rodrigo Serrano-Berthet and Humberto Lopez, Crime and Violence in Central America: A 

Developing Challenge (Washington, DC: The World Bank 2012), 6.

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	 Brazil is a case in point. Brazil’s trade with China has grown dramatically in

the last decade, but the composition of that trade has come to resemble that of

U.S.-Brazilian trade in the 1950s. Over 85 percent of Brazil’s exports to China are

basic goods and raw materials, while more than 90 percent of Brazil’s imports

from China are manufactured or capital goods. In 2011, Brazil ran a deficit in

manufactured goods trade with China that exceeded $25 billion, up from $800

million in 2003.119

	 The Brazilian and U.S. economies are complementary in a different way.

About half of Brazilian exports to the United States are manufactured goods —

regional aircraft, auto engines, cellular phones, and machinery. In turn, Brazil

imports from the United States large commercial aircraft, semiconductors, and

computer equipment. If the European economy grows more slowly in years to

come, the U.S. market will become even more important as a source of

opportunities for Brazilian industry, and as a solution to Brazil’s need to diversify

its exports and move up the value chain.

The Brazilian case is not unique. A similar story exists in Peru, where 80

percent of China-bound exports are metals and minerals, but 40 percent of

U.S.-bound exports are higher-value,120 non-traditional goods. Trade with the

United States helps Peru diversify exports and create jobs.

Source of Capital and Investment Opportunities

In addition to vital international trade, the United States will also remain an

indispensable source of capital for Latin America. The United States is the

largest investor in the region, providing nearly a fifth of all foreign direct

investment (FDI) each year. U.S. companies have over $200 billion invested in

Latin American and Caribbean countries,121 and U.S. capital markets, which

remain the deepest and most liquid in the world, continue to help the region’s

governments and companies raise financing.

At the same time, the United States will prove an important source of

investment opportunities for Latin American and Caribbean investors and

entrepreneurs seeking new horizons. In 2010, outward FDI from Latin America

and the Caribbean reached an all-time high, of $43 billion.122 Most of these

investments were by multinational companies based in Mexico, Brazil,

Colombia, and Chile. Mexico-based Grupo Bimbo is now the largest baking

goods company in the United States, with 34 bakeries in 13 states, employing

119 “Brazil’s Trade Policy: Seeking Protection,” The Economist, January 14, 2012, 1, available at <www.

economist.com/node/21542780>.

120 Osvaldo Rosales and Mikio Kuwayama, China and Latin America and the Caribbean: Building a 

strategic economic and trade relationship (New York: United Nations ECLAC, 2012), 15.

121 Survey of Current Business (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic

Analysis, 2012), 139.

122 Foreign Direct Investment: in Latin America and the Caribbean (New York: United Nations

ECLAC, 2011), 12.

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15,000 workers.123 The Brazilian steelmaker Gerdau, which produces steel in 19

American states, employs 10,000 workers.

Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Networks

Finally, the United States remains home to over 50 million people who trace

their roots to Latin America and the Caribbean. These communities represent

one of the greatest potential collective assets for the United States. Diaspora

communities link the United States with Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia,

El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Haiti, and other countries. They

support their home countries by sending more than $40 billion in remittances

each year.124 Perhaps more importantly, diaspora communities have increasingly

become agents of change in private enterprise, combining American business

know-how with knowledge of local markets in Latin America to build successful

businesses — both in the United States and in their countries of origin — that

generate growth and connect the hemisphere.

Seizing the Opportunities 

The U.S. Treasury will support countries implementing the stability and growth

framework described above through various tools. These include bilateral and

multilateral policy dialogues, policy actions in the executive boards of the IMF,

World Bank Group, and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and

Treasury’s technical assistance capability. Currently, this assistance is helping

build institutional capacity in 10 Latin American and Caribbean countries

through dozens of programs.

	 The Treasury will continue to strengthen economic and financial

partnerships with the region’s largest economies. In Brazil, the ministerial-level

Economic and Financial Dialogue seeks to forge stronger collaboration on

infrastructure finance and international macroeconomic issues. Mexico, one of

the Treasury’s closest partners on a range of economic and financial issues, will

remain connected through rigorous dialogue as the country has become a

global leader in advancing financial inclusion. The Treasury is committed

to strengthening and deepening its relationship with G-20 member Argentina

after it addresses concerns in a variety of areas, including engagement with

international institutions and payment of final International Centre for

Settlement of Investment Disputes awards and Paris Club debt. The Treasury

also works with regional G-20 partners to advance common interests,

including resisting protectionism in trade and investment and addressing

123 Christopher Wilson, Working Together: Economic Ties between the United States and Mexico

(Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2011), 25.

124 R. Maldonado, N. Bajuk, M. Hayem, Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean: Regaining 

Growth, Multilateral Investment Fund (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Fund,

2011), 5.

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global imbalances.

The Treasury will also continue to support and collaborate with Latin

American- and Caribbean-led efforts to build more effective regional economic

institutions. The United States supported a historic capital increase for the IDB,

the largest provider of multilateral investment in Latin America, as well as

replenishment of the Fund for Special Operations, which supports the region’s

poorest countries. The capital increase has doubled the IDB’s annual

disbursement capacity, from $6 billion to $12 billion. The Treasury will continue

to encourage the IDB to sharpen its focus on tackling poverty in the hemisphere,

building public-private partnerships, and advancing regional integration

initiatives, particularly in infrastructure.

The United States welcomes the growth of effective and innovative regional

institutions, such as the Andean Development Corporation (CAF), which has

recently been rebranded as the Development Bank for Latin America. CAF has

emerged as a leading regional provider of capital for infrastructure investment.

Further, the Integrated Latin American Market, or MILA, is an ongoing effort to

pool the stock markets of Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico. If successful, the

MILA would provide an effective mechanism for deepening capital markets in

member economies and attracting equity investment from across the region and

the world. The Treasury also plans to engage more closely with regional

institutions in the Caribbean, especially the Organization of Eastern Caribbean

States and the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank.

Looking forward, the Treasury will also endeavor to promote development

and resilience for the poorest and most vulnerable populations in the

hemisphere. President Barack Obama has affirmed this commitment. At the

Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago in 2009, Obama launched the

MiGroFund, an innovative public private-partnership to help ensure access to

capital for microfinance funds strained by the financial crisis. During the G-20

Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME) Finance Challenge in 2010, the

Treasury marshaled over $500 million to support innovative proposals to improve

access to finance by SMEs. Together with Canada, Spain, Mexico, and

Colombia, the United States launched the multi-million dollar Crossroads Fund

to support high-impact cross-border infrastructure projects in Central America

and the Caribbean. And, through the Administration’s Partnership for Growth

(PfG) efforts, the Treasury is working with El Salvador to identify and eliminate

constraints to economic growth.

Finally, the Treasury will deepen its work with the U.S. private sector and

the financial community to raise awareness of hemispheric opportunities, and to

remove barriers to doing business in the region. Lately, it is often noted that U.S.

businesses are not as engaged in the region as they once were, or as they should

be, given Latin America’s economic potential. Indeed, while the United States

remains the largest single source of FDI in the region, its share of the total has

declined significantly in recent years. This is ironic, given that Latin America

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85

today offers not just competitive rates of return, but also a more politically and

economically stable environment than ever before. In collaboration with

colleagues at Commerce, State, and the United States Trade Representative the

Department of the Treasury will continue to work with U.S. businesses and

investors to ensure that they can compete on an even playing field and are

well-informed of the valuable opportunities that exist in the hemisphere.

This is a special moment of opportunity that must be seized, both in the

United States and across the hemisphere. A deeper, more mature economic

relationship between countries will prove increasingly important for economic

growth and job creation in the United States. And, at the same time, access to

the opportunities the U.S. economy provides will help countries throughout

the region capitalize on this auspicious period of stability and growth to address

key development challenges.

Leonardo Martinez-Diaz Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for the Western 

Hemisphere

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part of it may not be reproduced in any form without the written permission of the author except 

that reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any use of the United States Government 

or those acting on its behalf.

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Rapid and widespread environmental changes will impact 

development in a number of 

significant ways. Growing 

resource scarcity, population 

movements, increased risks of 

communicable diseases, and 

increased conflicts are just a 

few of the potential consequences of a changing environment. 

Concurrently, biodiversity 

promises to serve as a buffer 

against some of the detrimental 

effects of climate change. 

Topics such as climate change, 

decreasing biodiversity, resource 

scarcity, and the importance of 

resilience were discussed. 

The most central question that 

guided the conversation was: 

How do we do development 

work without sacrificing global 

environmental sustainability? 

How can future gains be achieved 

without damaging the environment, especially in the face of 

global climate change? 

Although climate change has 

often been lumped in with 

discussions about the environment, it was noted that these 

two issues need to be considered 

separately. Climate change is not 

something that needs to be 

protected, nor is it an outcome 

that should be achieved. It is a 

force that can severely damage 

resources that need protecting, 

and its effects such as rising sea 

levels, forest degradation, and 

species destruction undermine 

development efforts. The effects 

of climate change are cross-sectoral, and it can impact the way 

we think about population, 

agriculture, economic growth, 

health and conflict. Climate 

change is clearly a phenomenon 

that must be viewed as a very 

broad development issue, not 

just as a narrowly defined 

environmental one. 

Also discussed was the 

problem of sharply decreasing 

biodiversity. Changes such as 

population growth, economic 

development, and climate change 

combine to impact the availability 

of water, soil, timber, and energy 

resources. Desertification in the 

Sahel is taking place at an 

alarming rate and a large portion 

of the African population is 

currently living in dry, increasingly 

unfertile places. Roughly 20 

percent of the global population 

lives in water scarce areas. It is 

estimated that by 2030, that 

number will grow to 47 percent. 

Simultaneously, tropical forests 

across the world are shrinking in 

Environment

Climate change is 

substantially affecting 

countries around 

the world. 

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87

S Y M P O S I U M PA N E L S Y N O P S I S

size and entire ecosystems are 

disappearing. 

Lively discussions centered 

on in the interconnectedness of 

water, food, and energy scarcity 

and the need to approach these 

issues collectively. All of these 

resources are highly integrated, 

and the development community 

must thus work to ensure that 

solutions are also integrative. The 

potential of using public-private 

partnerships to achieve development goals was also highlighted. 

Major companies such as 

Coca-Cola, Adidas, and IKEA are 

now incorporating environment 

programs into their corporate 

social responsibility policies and 

view issues such as environmental degradation, energy scarcity, 

and climate change as business 

risks. Public and private sector 

actors will have a greater chance 

of engaging governments, 

changing policies, and making an 

impact if they work together. 

Efforts to improve conservation and strengthen resilience 

must be simultaneously topdown and bottom-up. Without 

political will, legal frameworks 

that can help protect the 

environment will not be implemented. Without the help of 

NGOs and local communities, 

information dissemination 

campaigns about the importance 

of minimizing environmental 

harm will not be successful. 

It was suggested that development professionals learn to 

make better use of science and 

technology to tackle difficult 

environmental challenges. 

Geographic information systems, 

for example, can be used to 

provide information to help 

development practitioners 

monitor forest fires, floods, and 

drought. Mobile banking projects 

and cell phone technology can be 

used to help farmers implement 

adaptation strategies. Investments 

in wind and solar power can 

provide electricity to populations 

living in informal settlements in 

cities such as Nairobi and 

Mumbai which are experiencing 

dramatic growth. 

Panelists concluded with five 

policy-oriented questions: How 

can USAID, as a bilateral agency 

in a trans-boundary world, 

develop regional links to increase 

program resilience? What should 

be done now to strengthen 

cooperation between U.S. 

Government agencies to improve 

capacity-building to address 

climate change? Can more 

effective resource management 

overcome some of these 

environmental challenges? What 

role can science and technology 

play in mitigating these threats? 

What changes are needed in 

national and local government to 

minimize environmental threats?

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Bureaucratic stovepipes undermine international development efforts to improve

human well-being and the environment. These problems are fundamentally

interconnected, but development aid for addressing pressing environmental and

human security concerns — such as climate change, food shortages, fresh water

access, and global health threats — rarely matches the reality on the ground in

the developing world. The shortcomings of bureaucratic stovepipes pervade not

only the environmental realm but also all development sectors. Understanding

and responding to these challenges are key to achieving lasting success in

development. These concerns were among the top issues that surfaced at the U.S.

Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Symposium on Future

Development Challenges held in Washington in 2011.

Development efforts aimed at addressing these long-term trends, whether

spearheaded by multilaterals, bilaterals, or non-governmental organizations, are

commonly devoted to single-sector approaches. There are many reasons for this

narrow focus: finite resources, tight funding streams, simple and discrete

indicators of success, and institutional and professional development penalties

for those who conduct integrated work. But integrating problem-solving

initiatives across traditional environmental and health categories may not only

improve the efficacy of development efforts, but also better improve lives in

target communities.

	 Integrated analysis of environmental, demographic, political, economic,

and health trends and development programs that combine environmental and

health interventions offer many potential benefits:

C H A P T E R 8

The Periphery Isn’t Peripheral: 

Addressing Future Trends 

Through Integrated Analysis 

and Development

Geoffrey Dabelko addresses the unrealistic expectations 

and analytic inadequacies that are hindering global 

development progress on the environment.

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•	 Incorporating a wider range of critical variables, both within and outside

their traditional disciplines, will allow researchers to fully realize the

potential of long-term trend analysis.

•	 Understanding how trends in other sectors could intersect with their

programs will help practitioners avoid unintended consequences; for

example, a program should ensure that a climate intervention does not

inadvertently spur conflict, or a health intervention does not account for

the impact of climate change.

•	 Combining environment and health efforts in integrated development

programs for example can not only save practitioners money and time,

but also produce better results due to greater community buy-in.

If integrated analysis offers so many benefits to analysts and researchers,

communities on the ground, and the development workers in the field, why is it

so hard to do? Why is there such a big mismatch between the nature of the

problems and the bureaucratic solutions typically deployed?

Barriers to Integrated Development: The Four Tyrannies

Four main barriers impede more effective response to long-range, complex, and

multi-scale health and environmental challenges. These “tyrannies” often prevent

development workers from conducting integrated, long-term analysis and

developing integrated programs.

•	 The “tyranny of the inbox” for the development practitioner, no matter

where one works, is ever-present. The necessity of responding to the

immediate crisis or the hot political priority blocks long-term diagnosis,

design, and response. These priority items commonly add up to more

than a full-time job for the development practitioner, especially in an

agency such as USAID that is only beginning to recover from historical

efforts to eviscerate its workforce. At the same time, the velocity of

today’s changes means that over the horizon challenges with sizable

development implications receive much less attention.

•	 The “tyranny of immediate results” is driven by absurdly short timelines

for both projects and funding. The expectation that research or projects

produce positive and meaningful results within a year or two does not

pass the laugh test in terms of a sustainable and successful approach. The

demand for immediate results coupled with the heavy workload

generates the common lament that development practitioners do not

have time to think about long-term trends and projects do not have time

to produce meaningful results.

•	 The “tyranny of the single sector” dominates the tool box despite

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growing rhetoric and occasional forays into integrated approaches that

reflect the complex, interconnected challenges of development. That very

complexity encourages practitioners to “stay within their wheelhouse”

thus reinforcing disciplinary or bureaucratic homogeneity. Many often

feel that “my issues are tough enough” without introducing other drivers

or responses to the equation.

•	 The “tyranny of the uni-dimensional measurement of success” is the

logical extension of the single-sector focus. The admirable focus on

results and indicators of success has also pushed a reductionist approach

that cannot handle the messiness of multi-topic indicators. For example,

clear and immediate health indicators — such as vaccination rates — do

not combine easily with long-term conservation indicators, where

success may be actions not taken, such as deforestation avoided. Add in

measuring impact at ecosystem or atmospheric scales, and impact and

evaluation assessments for integrated projects become even more

challenging.

All four of these tyrannies (and there are probably more) impede integrated

analysis of long-term trends across issue areas and scales, and prevent

development practitioners from acting on these insights to design and implement

integrated programs.

Integration in Practice: Success Stories

These tyrannies can be conquered, as demonstrated by some notable successes.

A few integrated development programs in Asia, the Philippines, and the

Democratic Republic of the Congo illustrate how integrated trend analysis is

critical to understanding future development and demonstrate ways to address

these challenges in an integrated fashion.

Asia’s Future Trends: Before tackling integrated programs, we should start with

a better understanding of health and environment trends and the

interconnections among them. USAID Asia Bureau staff recognized that a wide

set of climate, energy, economic, governance, and conflict issues affected their

core biodiversity and water portfolios, even if they did not have the time,

expertise, or resources to investigate those issues in detail. Trends that appeared at

first glance (and certainly by budget line) to be in the periphery were not

peripheral to planning and designing programs for long-term success.

	 Working with the Woodrow Wilson Center, USAID engaged experts on a

diverse set of topics normally considered outside their portfolios. The resulting

workshop series and report Asia’s Future: Critical Thinking for a Changing 

Environment led to a deeper understanding of the possible impacts of these

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future trends, such as the potential consequences of increased Himalayan glacier

melt and Chinese hydropower plans on food security and biodiversity programs

in the lower reaches of the Mekong River.

Bringing analysis from these topically and geographically remote areas into

local-level development planning is a process that requires practitioners to be

willing to go outside the typical bounds of their brief. More simply, if you know

everyone at the meeting or on the project team, you are not doing your job.	

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): Mercy Corps has

successfully pursued cross-sectoral programming as part of a larger effort to be

more holistic in its humanitarian and development responses. In war-torn eastern

DRC, Mercy Corps brought practitioners with expertise in natural resource

management into what has historically been an emergency relief mission. In

particular, the Mercy Corps mission fused humanitarian assistance with longerterm development efforts such as enhanced environmental stewardship. For

example, the use of fuel-efficient cookstoves eases pressure on local forest

resources by reducing the demand for firewood, and improves respiratory health

by lowering air pollution. The project scaled up the effort through resources from

further integration, with carbon credits from avoided emissions being sold

through a local broker to the European cap and trade market. These resources in

turn helped finance more cook stoves. If integration and long-term efforts in

climate change can be practiced in the highly unstable regions of eastern Congo,

then such integrated projects and marrying long-term development and shortterm crisis response could be possible in other difficult settings.

Philippines: The PATH Foundation Philippines’ Integrated Population and

Coastal Resource Management (IPOPCORM) initiative uses an integrated

approach to address health, population, and environmental concerns in coastal

communities. Their “basket of services” includes establishing a locally managed

protected marine sanctuary to allow local fish stocks to recover, promoting

alternative economic livelihoods outside of the fishing industry, and improving

access to local health services and commodities, including family planning. To

date, IPOPCORM has yielded several notable improvements, among them

reduced program costs and improved health and environmental outcomes as

compared to side-by-side single sector interventions. According to a peerreviewed study, IPOPCORM’s integrated efforts yielded better results than

single-sector interventions in cost and most of the indicators tracked.

Reaching the Center: The Integration Imperative

What has been on the periphery of our portfolios is no longer peripheral. Crosssectoral programming demands that old problems be addressed in innovative and

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perhaps unfamiliar ways, requiring the addition of new capacity in development

organizations and better coordination within and between agencies. Still,

significant hurdles remain standing in the way of regular and effective

integration. To overcome them, we must:

Get out of our comfort zone: Development practitioners need to work across

disciplinary, topical, and geographic groupings to become conversant — if not

fluent — in the languages, tools, and goals of communities reflecting the many

trends that bear on environmental challenges. Moving beyond the stereotypes,

suspicions, and ignorance about other communities can come through a much

more meaningful investment in human resources and their development.

Find better ways to collaborate: Policy practitioners must have greater facility

with science, and scientists must better understand policy processes. We must be

willing to develop non-traditional partnerships that bring other skill sets to the

table. We must transition from integrated analysis of problems (where we are

improving) to integrated actions (where we still struggle).

Lower the transaction costs: We must incentivize, rather than punish, crossdisciplinary or cross-sectoral approaches; put a premium on multiple wins and

co-benefits from single or coordinated interventions; and foster measurement

that allows for different time frames and multiple indicators.

Build flexible institutions: We are so focused on incremental change that it is

difficult for us to understand the connections and changes that are occurring. We

must build organizations for which variability, and not stasis, is the norm.

Think long-term: We need to stay ahead of the development curve in today’s

fast-paced world. The velocity of change demands that we look more closely at

emerging trends five, 10, and 15 years out because these development trends

require action today. We must build and sustain the capacity to do future trends

analysis to support anticipatory efforts.

	 This essay offers only a glimpse of what integrated analysis and

programming can look like if the tyrannies are conquered and the imperative

answered. Integrated efforts are not only responding to long-term trends inside

and outside the environment sector. Fundamentally, they are responding to the

interconnected realities of the world’s poor.

The author thanks Woodrow Wilson Center colleagues Russell Sticklor and Meaghan 

Parker for their contributions to this article. Portions of this article originally 

appeared in Russell Sticklor, “There Is No Choice: Climate, Health, Water, Food

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Security Must Be Integrated, Say Experts,” New Security Beat, August 9, 2010,

available at <www.newsecuritybeat.org/2010/08/there-is-no-choice-climatehealth-water-food-security-must-be-integrated-say-experts/>.

Geoff Dabelko Professor and Director of Environmental Studies at the George V. 

Voinovich School of Leadership and Public Affairs at Ohio University

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part of it may not be reproduced in any form without the written permission of the author except 

that reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any use of the United States Government 

or those acting on its behalf.

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Part 3 

Futures text.indd 94 8/12/13 
Conclusion

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Strategic vision is the conceptualization of an alternative future, deemed to

have such major societal benefits as to be worthy of the risks, sacrifices, and

tenacity required to secure it. Foresight research can be described as a process for

systematically identifying plausible alternative futures, and for studying on a

comparative basis the ways in which short-term behavior can influence longterm, strategic consequences. Simple, linear models of causal relationships,

which have profoundly influenced the substance of public policy and the

organization of governance, are both common and wrong. Complexity theory

offers a far more accurate description of these relationships, with major

implications for strategic vision and foresight research, for substantive policy

and for policymaking systems.

Strategic Vision, Foresight Research 

and International Development

There is without doubt a moral imperative behind American and most other

forms of bi-national assistance for development. Certainly this imperative is a

major factor behind the activities of religious groups and other donors as

reflected in their programs on education, health care, nutrition, etc. The moral

imperative is also central to the activity of major privately established

foundations. Likewise, the moral imperative has also been important in the

development activities of multinational institutions such as the United Nations.

It’s fair to say, however, that the development of international assistance as

C H A P T E R 9

Strategic Vision: Foresight 

Research for Development

Leon Fuerth, one of the leading thinkers and foresight 

research advocates, analyzes why current linear thinking 

about today’s development challenges is a dead end. 

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practiced by the U. S. Government owes much more to its perceived utility as a

factor in geo-strategic competition, with strong commercial and ideological

undertones.

International development seemed destined to proceed in a “linear” fashion

(a term further explored later in this chapter) as the result of an accretion of

progress in areas such as agricultural productivity, infant mortality, female

economic empowerment, and a numerous other factors. The world has made

progress in each of these endeavors, but there is still a long way to go.

Humankind is in the midst of an intensely transformative period in

development. The next industrial revolution is already underway, emerging

from the abrupt appearance of new systems of finance and production, with

profound consequences extending well beyond near-term economic and geostrategic competition. For example, climate change has already begun to

have a sizable impact. We are no longer in a race to prevent it from happening,

but rather, to prevent its effects from exceeding the adaptive capacity of

industrial civilization. Furthermore, a spontaneous merger of human and

artificial intelligence is underway. Natural evolution is being displaced by human

design and intervention. We must come to grips with new, “ultra-long range”

policy issues relating to the potential of the human species, and even more to

its prospects for survival.

These events are unfolding with such velocity as to telescope the long-range

future of development and short-range planning in ways that the international

community should now be grappling with. The United States should be leading

the way. A new American strategic vision is needed, and the key to it is foresight

research (which is also described in detail later in this paper). Within the U.S.

Government, USAID’s strategic mission places it at the point of intersection

between the old, linear conception of development and the new complex,

non-linear development reality that has taken hold. USAID can help to inspire

the nation and the larger global community by pioneering the application of

foresight research to its own planning and operations.

USAID must analyze how traditional activity areas such as human rights,

agriculture, nutrition and health, workforce development, disease prevention,

and environmental protection relate to the ongoing global revolutions that are

creating new challenges and opportunities across the world. In this context,

various new questions arise. What do human rights mean, stacked up against the

doctrine that suggests “corporations are people?” Is there a path to higher

agricultural productivity, other than genetically modifying crops whose seeds do

not reproduce? How should increasing demands for protein be balanced against

the impact of withholding grains from human consumption to serve as cattle

feed or fuel for automobiles? What are the feedback effects of climate change on

agricultural practices? How shall disease control be managed to deal with

plunging effectiveness of antibiotics overused to stimulate meat production?

What can be done to protect local environments against planetary scale climate

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change? When should programs of adjustment be readied to compensate for

climatic disruption? The list of urgent questions alone could fill many pages.

	 In Chemistry 101, one learns that there is a difference between endothermal

and exothermal reactions: the former require an external source of energy in order

to keep running; the latter have passed a tipping point, beyond which they

self-generate enough energy to continue. This is a useful distinction to keep in

mind, when thinking about the kind of transition that has only recently occurred

in international development. Bilateral international assistance is endothermal

in the sense that when it ceases, the processes that it set in motion also tend to

die out. However, in some parts of the world development has abruptly shifted

to something that looks much more like a self-sustaining, exothermal process

— for example, the extraordinary growth of the Chinese economy and other

emerging economies such as Brazil and India. This marks a new stage in a global

economy whose center of gravity is shifting from the strictly western form

of capitalism, of which the United States is the avatar, to the variant which is

evolving in China and elsewhere. In the course of this abrupt transition,

development has shifted from an essentially linear process to one that is

accelerating and increasingly complex.

	 In the face of new global developments such as the rapid growth of

megacities in Africa and Asia; the growing demand for food, water, and energy

resources; the explosion of science and technology; and a dynamically changing

world-power landscape, it will be vital for USAID to have a foresight process

in place to facilitate long-term thinking. It will also be important for USAID to

take the lead role in encouraging developing countries and emerging economies

to develop foresight research on their own, or to tap into capabilities that

already exist. In light of trends that clearly point to the need for global efforts to

deal proactively with the consequences of accelerating global change, achieving

strategic vision is especially important for governance in both developed and

developing countries. This is not something that can work on a top-down basis.

The prior linear relationship between donors and recipients does not help

either group come to terms with the fact that they are mutually entwined in a

complex global system.

The U.S. Government, unfortunately, does not currently have this

capability in place. Perhaps the next Administration will recognize and respond

to the need. In the meantime, there is good reason for USAID to experiment

with it at its own level. Much of the world’s misery comes from bad or ineffective

governance, rather than from the way nature and history dealt the cards. In the

globalized world, knowledge and vision beget development. USAID must shift

away from linear analyses in order to tackle today’s global challenges.

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The Basic Lexicon

Terms such as strategy, strategic vision, foresight, foresight research, national

interest, national security, stability, sustainability, etc. are used frequently — but

not always precisely — in futures analysis and theoretical discourse about policies

that have measureable, life-changing consequences not only for Americans, but

for hundreds of millions of other people.

U.S. National Security 

National security, development assistance, and diplomacy are inextricably linked.

American thinking about national security was formed during the second half of

the 20th century by the experience of World War II and the Cold War. As a

result, national security is often conflated with national defense. In the 21st

century, however, it is clear that national defense is actually a subset of national

security. If raw military power is the key to security, America has little to worry

about. But what does it mean if the country is skirting economic failure, despite

being armed to the teeth? What does it mean — in a world where information

literally is power — if primary and secondary education is failing to lift the

minds of tens of millions of the youngest students, while higher education is

only available to millions of college age students, in exchange for the equivalent

of indentured servitude to commercial lenders? What does it mean when the

nation is so bitterly divided that government cannot deal with the most

fundamental public needs, other than by a series of patchwork compromises that

buy time but solve no problems? And what does it mean when the rest of the

world — friends and enemies alike — view the United States as mired in this

condition? A broader definition of national security is clearly needed. National

security is the integral sum of sustained, world-class American performance in all

domains that contribute to the general vitality of the United States: economic

power, military power, human resources, and moral confidence.

American Strategy and Strategic Vision

The basic strategy of the United States is to indefinitely preserve a wellfunctioning republic which is able, under demanding and continuously changing

circumstances, to safeguard the security, the freedoms, and the well-being of

Americans under the rule of law, by employing the mechanisms of selfgovernment as laid out in the Constitution. The national interest is to acquire

and to safeguard assets that are conducive to the vitality of the nation as a whole,

measured in terms of its economic growth, its cohesion as a society, and its

ability to maintain national security. American strategic vision, which began with

the idea of attaining a “more perfect Union,” now acknowledges that the national

destiny is inseparably entwined with that of others. Thus, it is in America’s

interest to pursue goals that address universal aspirations. This translates into a

more just and stable global order based on democracy, the rule of law, respect for

human rights, and private economic initiative in a sustainable physical

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environment. Stability is often included as part of the American strategic vision,

but it is a tricky concept. Perfect stability does not exist in any political system,

unless an effort is made to suppress change by force. Dynamic equilibrium, on

the other hand, can be maintained providing there is periodic, consensual

adjustment. This underscores the importance of democracy as a strategic goal.

Foresight and Foresight Research

Foresight research was a central discussion point at the Symposium on Future

Development Challenges and came up in each of the session panels. Foresight is

the capacity to visualize alternative futures, based on models of how these forces

may interact. Foresight research is a systematic effort to acquire information

about the future, presented as an array of alternatives, by using methodologies

that are transparent to all interested parties and subject to critical evaluation by

them. Foresight is analytic, and estimative rather than predictive. It requires a

fusion of capabilities: historical awareness, systems awareness, and forecasting

methodologies. Foresight aims to be dispassionate about particular outcomes,

concerning itself with description rather than prescription. In this regard,

foresight is absolutely distinct from prophesy, which relies on inspiration as

opposed to analysis. Foresight may be the product of individual imagination, or

of a large collective effort. Either way, however, it does not stand on authority

but on propositions that must be demonstrated. It is therefore an offset to the

nearly prophetic certitudes of political life. Effective leadership requires strategic

vision, but good management requires foresight.

Complexity: Strategic Vision, Foresight Research and Systems

As cited earlier in this chapter, understanding the non-linear relationship

between global events and trends is essential. Political discourse today, however,

assumes that the world is a collection of linear relationships — much like the

world of Newtonian physics. In this world, inputs and outputs — actions and

consequences — can be segregated and dealt with on the basis of an underlying

mathematical relationship. Changes of input produce proportionate and

predictable changes of output; relationships between input and output hold true

across a very broad range of conditions over long periods of time. But in reality,

especially in a global development context, relationships are far from linear. They

are complex — much as they are in the worlds of relativistic and quantum

physics. Inputs and outputs — actions and consequences — cannot be isolated.

At any given moment all the elements of a complex system are simultaneously

interacting: both the drivers and the driven. Changes of input at any point can

produce disproportionate changes of state across the entire system. These changes

can involve catastrophic disruption of patterns to which we are habituated. For

example, changes in trade policy might have multiple unpredictable implications.

The relationships that govern the world, and the place of the United States

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within it, are not linear systems in which actors may decide whether or not to

engage, but complex systems into which they are embedded, simultaneously

driving events and being driven by them. Complexity theory125 has profound

implications for American policy (including development policy) at all levels and

in all substantive domains: domestic and international; defense and economics;

and short and long term. It also has implications for our systems of governance.

In linear systems, policies and their consequences can, in theory, be studied in

isolation, and their management can be handled by vertically organized

departments. In a complex system, however, policies and their consequences are

interactive and must be studied and acted upon concurrently. Complexity

undermines any assertion that a policy can be perfect and permanent. All policies

are imperfect at the moment of inception and will become more so over time.

Management becomes the art of knowing how to bring about timely adjustment

to changing circumstances, rather than the practice of an ill-advised consistency.

Disruptive Change

Starting in the late 20th century, and increasingly in the early period of the 21st

century, the dominant characteristics of societal development became complex

and began to accelerate. If there is a theoretical reason for this, most likely it

would be Moore’s Law, which describes the geometric increase in computer

speed and its inverse consequence: the geometric decline in the cost of computerbased transactions, which, in turn is the basis for the explosive spread of the

Internet, under the impulse of venture capitalism. Governance has been unable

to keep pace. This is partly due to the severe politicization that now affects

decision-making. But it is also a consequence of the fact that our systems of

governance were organized on a linear basis, reflecting methods typical of the

“high” industrial age: vertical organization; top-down management; informationhoarding, and the like. Bureaucratic functions are adapted for incremental

responses to incrementally changing conditions. They cannot handle disruptive

change, which is the kind of change actually taking place. At home, public

confidence in our form of governance has been badly damaged. The same is true

of public opinion in the European Union. In the developing world, democratic

governance is not looking good in contrast to its main alternative: Chinese

capitalism. That in turn, will make it much harder for the United States and its

allies to mobilize support for the kind of global order that would be most

suitable for the maintenance of the American way of life and the practice of

development assistance.

125 Of all the sources for Complexity Theory that I might identify, the late James N. Rosenau, not

only my personal friend but a validator, a sounding board, and a colleague was deeply at home in

the search for meaning and wisdom in human affairs. See James N. Rosenau, Distant Proximities: 

Dynamics Beyond Globalization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).

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Forward Engagement

Current information systems serving senior levels of government are generally

sufficient (although not always) for planning for the short term. They are

absolutely deficient for long term planning. At their current capacity, they are

incapable of tracking the transition of events from prospective to actual. More so

than ever before, trends are transitioning more rapidly, and possible events are

becoming occurring events in the blink of an eye. These types of transitions have

the potential to overwhelm the adaptive capacities of our governance system — 

presenting major challenges that mature at a rate far in excess of the rate at which

we might adjust. The amount of time and effort required to shift the course of

opinion, programming, and operations, has increased exponentially —

notwithstanding the tremendous national advantages enjoyed earlier in U.S.

history. America could be badly damaged by a powerful emergent development

recognized too late for effective repositioning.

Anticipatory Governance

The fusion of foresight and policy is at the heart of anticipatory governance.

Anticipatory governance requires upgrades to existing White House processes in

three areas: systems to encourage a constant interaction between long-term

foresight and short-term decision-making; systems to facilitate “whole of

governance” responses to complex issues; and systems to apply the concept of

feedback, to the management of policy, in light of results. My recent report on

Anticipatory Governance, published by the National Defense University,

represents a major effort to bring theory and practice together for the first

time.126 One of the precepts of this work was that all recommendations must be

applicable under realistic circumstances: very light on resources, implementable

under existing presidential authorities, and compatible with the existing

processes in government. Although the report focused on the U.S. executive

branch, many of its conclusions about the kind of governance needed to deal

with accelerated change are clearly applicable to international development in

general, and to the operations of all agencies of the U.S. Government that are

stakeholders in the process, especially USAID.

Conclusion

The days of creating policy based on a linear conceptualization of world events

and global trends are at an end. U.S. policy, to meet today’s realities, requires

complex analysis that is forward thinking and focused on the long term. The

future of development — once visualized in terms of all things made

proportionately better, in a world more or less still recognizable in social,

126 Leon S. Fuerth, with Evan M. H. Faber, Anticipatory Governance Practical Upgrades: Equipping the 

Executive Branch to Cope with Increasing Speed and Complexity of Major Challenges (Washington

DC: NDU Press, October 2012). The report is available at www.forwardengagement.org.

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economic and political terms — has turned out to be a wave of change sweeping

hundreds of millions of people into unknown territory. In a best case scenario,

we will find ways to adapt to this rate of change and might “surf ” it to a new

world, better than the old. In a worst case scenario, chaotic, non-linear change

will bring about extreme social turbulence in the midst of an increasingly

inhospitable planetary environment. Strategic vision, linked to foresight research,

is needed in order to facilitate decision-making domestically, internationally, and

ultimately at the level of the complex global system that is establishing itself as

the basis for planetary-scale development.

Leon Fuerth Research Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University

This chapter is included and reproduced with the permission of the author. The chapter or any 

part of it may not be reproduced in any form without the written permission of the author except 

that reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any use of the United States Government 

or those acting on its behalf.

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With the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) holding the

first-ever Symposium on Future Development Challenges in Washington in

late 2011, the Agency has turned a page by focusing significant analytical

energies and Agency leadership attention on the importance of identifying

emerging development trends. The Agency is beginning to ask this fundamental

question: What will the future of development look like in 2025? To put

that future view into a sharper perspective, it makes sense to begin with a

current assessment.

	 Let us start with a key observation, often missed: There has been greater

progress in global development and poverty reduction in the last 20 years than at

any time in the history of the world. Developing countries are experiencing

unprecedented reductions in poverty, increases in income, improvements in

health and education, and in many cases, shifts towards democracy and

improved governance. Of course, many other countries (and regions within

countries) continue to make little or no progress at all. The two clearest patterns

among developing countries since the early 1990s are vast improvement and

divergence. A growing number are achieving important development gains while

many others are being left behind.

In the midst of these improvements, and partly because of them, the global

context for development is changing rapidly. Incomes and capabilities are rising

quickly, private capital flows to developing countries have grown enormously,

there are far more democracies with more capable and accountable governments,

C H A P T E R 1 0

Can Global Development 

Progress Continue? 

Three Future Scenarios and 

What They Depend On

Steven Radelet makes a convincing case that the global 

context for development is changing exponentially and 

explores three starkly different future scenarios.

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cell phones and other technologies are creating tremendous new opportunities,

and a plethora of new donors and foundations have entered the scene.

Developing country progress during the last 20 years provides a strong

foundation for further economic growth and poverty reduction to continue and

possibly even accelerate in the future. But there is no guarantee that this progress

will be sustained, much less accelerated and spread to other countries. Significant

new development challenges are arising, including tensions from rapid economic

powers, religious and cultural divisions, and growing environmental pressures

from demographic shifts, resource demands, and climate change. What might

the future of development look like? Can the progress be sustained, or will it be

derailed? And what do these outcomes depend on?

A Snapshot of Global Development Progress

During the 1960s a growing number of low-income countries began to achieve

rapid growth and poverty reduction. The progress was centered in East Asia, as

countries deepened their trade and integration with a resurgent Japan and with

the United States. In 1980 the re-awakening of China opened vast new

opportunities for 1 billion of the world’s poor, and India began to surge in 1990.

While progress centered in Asia, it was not exclusively an Asian phenomenon.

Countries such as Botswana, Mauritius, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic,

Turkey, Tunisia, and others made significant gains.

Since the mid-1990s, both the pace and the breadth of global development

progress have accelerated markedly. The big change came with the end of the

Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Strong forms of state control and

socialism lost credibility, authoritarian dictators began to disappear in favor of

democratically elected governments, and more countries began to integrate with

the global economy. Development progress spread more widely to Eastern

Europe, Central Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Whereas during 1960–95 there

were 31 developing countries that achieved more than 2.2 percent per capita

growth, the long-term North American and European average, since 1995 more

than twice that number, 73 developing countries, have exceeded that benchmark.

In just 15 years in these countries, real incomes have increased 60 percent, infant

mortality rates have plunged 35 percent, and gross primary school enrollment

rates jumped 13 percent. Democracy is much more widespread. In sub-Saharan

Africa alone, the number of democracies has grown from three in 1989 to more

than 20 today.127 And most dramatically, the number of people living in extreme

poverty (with incomes less than $1.25/day) has fallen sharply from over 1.9 billion

in 1993 to less than 1.3 billion in 2008, a reduction by one-third in just 15 years.128

127 Steven Radelet, Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries are Leading the Way (Washington, DC: Center

for Global Development, 2010).

128 Steve Radelet, Rachel Bahn and Sarah Lane, “Rising Out of Poverty,” USAID Impact Blog, May 8,

2012, available at <http://blog.usaid.gov/2012/05/rising-out-of-poverty/>.

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	 Of course, despite this huge progress, the global development picture is far

from universally positive. Many other countries (or regions within countries)

have made little or no progress, with stagnating or declining incomes and little

change in poverty. After all, there are still 1.3 billion people living on $1.25 a day,

and nearly 2.5 billion that live on less than $2 a day. And while democracy has

swept across developing countries like never before, the gains have slowed in

recent years, and many countries still live under tyranny, dictatorship, or in the

midst of conflict. Sadly, some of the world’s most difficult development

challenges have not yet been tackled.

The Changing Context for Development

While understanding the past is important, our real concern must be with the

future of development. New forces are rapidly changing the global context for

development. The development challenges facing countries today is far different

than it was just 20 years ago. Future success will depend on understanding the

past, but even more so in taking advantage of new opportunities and preparing to

meet emerging threats and challenges. Six key dimensions of change stand

out.129

First, as outlined above, there are enormous and growing differences in

performance across countries. High performing countries have an expanding

middle class, higher saving rates, larger markets, more government revenue, more

trained and capable workers, and more foreign investment. Some emerging

markets — especially the so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) are

becoming some of the largest markets in the world, while the old reliable richcountry markets in Europe, the United States, and Japan are under enormous

pressure. The result is a dramatic change in the global economic balance. But at

the same time, other developing countries remain stuck with slow growth, little

investment, stagnant revenue and saving, few new economic opportunities, and

often greater conflict.

Second, democracy has expanded rapidly, especially following the end of

the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Democracy emerged in

countries as diverse as South Korea, Indonesia, Poland, South Africa, Ghana,

Brazil, and El Salvador. To be sure, these democracies are fragile and far from

perfect, but never before have so many low-income countries attempted to

become democracies in so short a time.

Third, in just 10 years between 2001 and 2010, net private capital flows to

developing countries grew six-fold from less than $200 billion to over $1 trillion.130

129 For a discussion of some of these trends, see USAID Policy Framework 2011–2015 (Washington,

DC: USAID, 2011), available at <http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/USAID_PolicyFramework.

PDF>.

130 Global Development Finance: External Debt of Developing Countries (Washington, DC: The World

Bank, 2012), available at <http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/gdf_2012.pdf>.

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Investors are arriving from around the world, including middle-income emerging

economies such as China, India, Malaysia, Brazil, Russia, South Africa, and

many others. These capital flows create some risks, but overall create huge new

opportunities for job creation, skills transfer, and growth in developing countries.

They now dwarf official aid flows.

	 Fourth, new technologies are changing the development process. Cell

phones have become ubiquitous, and Internet access is growing quickly. The cost

of shipping goods and moving people is far lower than it was just 20 years ago.

These technologies are creating new economic opportunities, helping to deliver

basic services, facilitating political debate, and improving transparency and

accountability, all of which strengthen the prospects for continued progress

in many low-income countries. And their influence will only grow in the years

to come.

	 Fifth, pressures are growing from demographic trends, resource demand,

and climate change. By 2050, the world’s population will grow to around 10

billion people, with the fastest growth in developing countries, and more

specifically, in urban areas of developing countries. Demand for critical resources,

especially water, land and energy, will grow rapidly. Global demand for food and

water is likely to increase by 50 percent in just the next 20 years. Climate change

will only add to these challenges.

Sixth, religious and ethnic tensions are rising in many parts of the world,

creating disputes and conflicts that are disrupting or, in some cases, reversing

development. The tensions are obvious in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan,

Iraq, and many other places. They are a major undercurrent in the still-unfolding

Arab spring, and more recently have become major problems in other countries

such as Mali and Egypt.

Three Scenarios for the Future of Development

With these dramatic global changes unfolding, the future for developing

countries is uncertain. There are at least three forward-thinking scenarios for the

future, which I will only attempt to outline broadly and stylistically.

Scenario 1: The continuation of rapid global development. The trends of

the last 20 years expand and accelerate. The BRICs continue their ascendancy,

with several other middle income countries following closely behinds, including

Turkey, Indonesia, Thailand, South Africa, and Chile. Many low-income

countries continue to expand their economies and reduce poverty, such as

Ghana, Tanzania, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, the Philippines, and

Bangladesh. As more countries succeed, markets for trade grow between

developing countries, allowing markets to expand regionally and beyond.

Moreover, pressure grows in the countries left behind to follow the examples of

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their more successful neighbors. Technologies, experiences, and ideas that

succeed in one country spread easily to another. Cell phone use continues to

expand, the Internet (and the opportunities it creates) makes an even bigger

impact on the poorest countries, and new research leads to an expansion in

agricultural productivity. Countries that have been “stuck” begin to turn around,

including Cote D’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Egypt. Who would have even considered

Burma as a turnaround candidate two years ago?

	 Along with this growth, the extraordinarily rapid advances in global health

continue, with a halt in the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, reductions in

malaria, the extermination of polio, and the elimination of preventable

childhood diseases. Global poverty rates continue to decline sharply. Democracy

continues to spread — although haltingly and imperfectly — with more

countries embracing accountability, transparency, and good governance. Some

countries continue to stagnate, but their number becomes smaller, and they

increasingly become the exception rather than the norm.

Scenario 2: Global conflict derails development. Global tensions rise

sharply, either based on economic strains from the rise of Asia and decline of

Europe, or based on religious or ideological frictions. Countries move into new

geo-political spheres, replacing the two old Cold War spheres with blocks aligned

around traditional western powers, an ascendant China, an empowered India,

and a coalition of Muslim countries. Conflict in the Middle East explodes, and

quickly spills over to South Asia, North Africa, and Central Asia. Economic

disputes between a rising Asia and a diminishing West decay into major trade

wars, and an aging and frustrated West becomes more tempted to use the threat

of advanced weapons to keep others in check. Tensions within Asia rise over

territorial waters and claims to undersea resources.

In short, the world goes to war. Those who think this is far-fetched need

only remember that the last great era of global development, the expansion of

Europe and the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, ended

abruptly with the descent into the first World War, followed shortly thereafter

with the Great Depression and World War II. Obviously, this scenario would

result in the complete derailment and reversal of global development.

Scenario 3: Increasing pressure on the planet. The combination of rising

urban populations and increasing incomes puts growing pressures on water

supplies, energy, demand for minerals, and air quality — challenges created in

part by the recent great success of global development. Climate change

undermines agricultural productivity and diminishes food supplies while global

demand for food reaches an all-time high. Commodity prices rise steadily, while

food prices accelerate their recent trends of both extreme volatility and steady

increases. As agricultural productivity falls in many developing countries, poverty

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rates halt their decline and begin to rise again. This scenario then morphs into

Scenario 2. Pressure on the planet and the demand for scarce resources (such as

water) lead to an explosion of conflict and the end of global development as we

know it.

What Can Be Done?

It is unlikely that any of the scenarios outlined above will take place exactly as

predicted. But in a broad sense they capture some of the major choices and

futures that the world faces. Which will it be? What do these outcomes depend

on, and what can we do to influence them? In my view, the answer depends on

four broad factors: technology, connectivity, policy choices, and governance and

institutions.

Technology: Thomas Malthus famously predicted that population growth

would result in famine, disease, and unrelenting poverty. What Malthus

overlooked — not surprisingly since he was writing in the early 19th century —

was the power of technology to increase agricultural productivity, create new

economic opportunities, and improve health. Today the world comfortably

supports far more people with a higher standard of living and lower rates of

poverty than in Malthus’s day largely because of improvements in technology.

From the industrial revolution to new energy sources to improvements in

transportation to new vaccines to cell phones and the Internet, technology has

been the key to allowing the planet to support more and more people.

Consequently, investments by both private companies and governments in new

agricultural technologies, health, and other areas will be central to whether the

planet can continue to support a growing number of people. But developing

technologies is neither automatic nor guaranteed. It will take strategic

investments and creative public-private partnerships to succeed.

Connectivity: The more countries trade, share ideas, connect through the

Internet, share technologies, and otherwise increase connectivity, the more the

world economy grows, and the more we depend on each other for shared

prosperity. The two most powerful engines for global growth since the industrial

revolution have been trade and technology. Both require integration and

connectivity (some might use the word globalization here, but it is an overused

word that means all things to all people). The economic gains from trade are well

known, but I believe trade is extremely important politically as well in terms of

getting different cultures, markets, institutions, peoples, and societies engaged

with each other and benefitting and learning from each other. The more that

different parts of the world are integrated and connected economically, the less

likely we are to have large conflicts, since we will all have too much to lose as we

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are in this together. In short, trade provides everyone a growing stake to work

together to find solutions to common problems. Continuing global growth and

development will require increasing regional and global trade ties, including

finalizing the Doha round (or something like it) and subsequent trade

agreements in the future. Doing so will require deepening regional trade among

developing countries, and reducing barriers to cross-border investment. It will

require sharing of ideas, especially towards developing the technologies needed to

address key global challenges.

Perhaps the wisest observations about this point were voiced 236 years ago

by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations. He foresaw that increased trade would

be the vehicle not only for raising incomes but for creating mutual respect and

reduced conflict and injustice: “Hereafter...the inhabitants of all the different

quarters of the world may arrive at that equality of courage and force which, by

inspiring mutual fear, can alone overawe the injustice of independent nations

into some sort of respect for the rights of one another. But nothing seems more

likely to establish this equality of force than the mutual communication of

knowledge and all sorts of improvements which an extensive commerce...carries

along with it.”131 As usual, Adam Smith had it right.

Policy choices: Much of the future will depend on the policy choices that

individuals, communities, and countries make in key areas. Allowing prices to

move to reflect scarcity values and true costs creates powerful incentives to shift

behavior. For example, removing fuel subsidies and moving towards taxes on

fossil fuel use and carbon emissions is not only fiscally responsible, but will

dampen the use of fossil fuels and will begin to mitigate climate change. At the

same time, choices to invest in alternative fuels with a much smaller

environmental footprint — gas, solar, and wind — will move in the same

direction. As discussed above, investments in new agricultural, health, and

energy technologies will be critical, but societies need to make the active choices

to do so. Similarly, choices to invest in education, health, and family planning

will help keep countries on the right path as we move towards greater global

prosperity. But all of these choices require sacrifice and involve shifting away

from easy, current consumption. Instead, we need to focus on making greater

investments in the future.

Governance and institutions: Continuing widespread global development will

require strengthening institutions and governance both nationally and

internationally. The more the world moves towards accountable, transparent,

inclusive, democratic institutions, the more likely we will be to continue the

move towards global prosperity. The evolution of democracy has been a key force

in mitigating conflict and facilitating choices that have kept the world broadly at

131 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (London: J.M. Dent, 1910), 280.

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peace and moving towards prosperity in recent decades. People need to have

their voices heard and to feel that choices are being made fairly. Inclusive

democracy is the best system to facilitate the debates and choices we need to

make to continue global prosperity.

Democracy is far from perfect. But Winston Churchill had it right when

he said “democracy is the worst form of government except all those other

forms that have been tried from time to time.”132 The question of which causes

the other — inclusive democracy or sustained growth and development —

is almost beside the point. I believe the causality can and has run both ways in

different countries, with each reinforcing the other. We need both. The key

is to establish institutions that create leadership that is accountable and can make

decisions that will benefit societies as a whole in the long run. Democracies,

for all their weaknesses, are the best system we have that will help leaders make

those choices.

At an international level, the key global institutions — the United Nations,

World Trade Organization, International Court of Justice, World Bank,

International Monetary Fund, and G-8 — were established at an earlier time in

history to face different challenges in the context of a different global structure.

In many ways, for all the criticism heaped upon them, they have been

enormously successful in contributing to the goals for which they were

established — maintaining global peace and moving the world towards shared

growth and prosperity. But they must evolve quickly and responsibly to reflect

both changes in the global structure and changes in the key problems we face.

The balance of power and decision-making in these institutions must reflect the

rise of emerging powers and relative decline of Europe. The traditional Western

powers must embrace and include these rising powers in order for these countries

to buy into these institutions so that they maintain their legitimacy and their

ability to collectively solve major challenges. Similarly, traditional donor groups

must actively reach out and include China and other rising donors to join them

at the table, rather than excluding them. These global institutions must also

adapt to reflect the evolution of key issues. From the Cold War, to keeping the

peace after World War II, to dealing with the new economic balance of power

and rising religious and ideological tensions, priorities have changed. These

institutions have begun to change as well, but there is a long way to go to fully

equip them, especially the United Nations, to deal effectively with the global

issues that will face us in the coming decades.

	 Obviously, the margin of error is wide in the scenarios and

recommendations listed above. No one can predict the future with precision. But

thinking about these issues and about potential future scenarios helps us to

individually and collectively confront and address tomorrow’s global challenges

132 Winston Churchill, Speech to the House of Commons, November 11, 1947, available at <http://

hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1947/nov/11/parliament-bill>

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and gives us the opportunity to continue fighting poverty and widening the

circle of global prosperity and development.

Steven Radelet Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Development Georgetown 

School of Foreign Service, Formerly Chief Economist, USAID

This chapter is included and reproduced with the permission of the author. The chapter or any 

part of it may not be reproduced in any form without the written permission of the author except 

that reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any use of the United States Government 

or those acting on its behalf.

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Richard Cincotta, PhD is the demographer in residence at the Stimson Center in 

Washington, D.C., a consultant to the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Environmental 

Change and Security Project, and a frequent contributor to the National Intelligence 

Council’s strategic foresight efforts. Cincotta served as the director of Demographic 

and Social Science Programs in the National Intelligence Council’s Long Range 

Analysis Unit (2006–09), and was an AAAS Diplomacy fellow and public health 

fellow in the Policy and Evaluation Division, USAID’s Office of Population and 

Reproductive Health (1992–96). His current research focuses on demographic and 

age-structural transitions, and he has published on their relationships to the politics of 

ethno-religious change, the onset of civil conflict, regime type and political stability, 

natural resource dynamics, and population policies. His publications on these topics 

appear in Foreign Policy, Current History, Nature, and Science, and in several 

edited volumes on political demography and human ecology.

Geoff Dabelko, PhD is professor and Director of Environmental Studies at the 

George V. Voinovich School of Leadership and Public Affairs at Ohio University in 

Athens, Ohio. From 1997–2012, he served as Director of the Environmental Change 

and Security Program (ECSP), a nonpartisan policy forum on environment, 

population, and security issues at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 

Scholars in Washington. His recent research focuses on climate change and security as 

well as environmental pathways to confidence building and peacemaking, with a 

special emphasis on management of fresh water resources. Dabelko is co-editor, with 

Ken Conca of Green Planet Blues: Four Decades of Global Environmental Politics

and Environmental Peacemaking. He is a member of the United Nations 

Environment Programme’s Expert Advisory Group on Environment, Conflict, and 

Peacebuilding, an editorial board member of Global Environmental Change, and a 

contributing editor of Environment. Dabelko is a lead author for the 5th assessment 

of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 

Leon Fuerth is the founder and Director of the Project on Forward Engagement, 

distinguished research fellow at the National Defense University, research professor of 

International Affairs at the George Washington University, and the former national 

security advisor to Vice President Al Gore. During the Clinton Administration, 

Fuerth served simultaneously on the Deputies’ and Principals’ Committees of the 

National Security Council, and created and managed five bi-national commissions. 

Fuerth holds a Bachelor’s Degree in English and a Master’s Degree in History from 

New York University, as well as a Master’s Degree in Public Administration from 

Harvard University.

About the Contributors

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Steven Gale, PhD is Senior Advisor for Strategic Opportunities in the Office of 

Science and Technology at the U.S. Agency for International Development where he 

focuses on innovations to accelerate development and using futures analysis to inform 

decision-making on emerging global trends. Gale was a Brookings Legislative Fellow 

on the House Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign 

Operations from 2009–2010, and the founding director of USAID’s Global 

Development Commons. He served as USAID’s principal advisor for Strategic 

Communications from 2005 to 2008 and deputy to the Interagency Policy 

Coordination Committee (PCC) on Public Diplomacy from 2007–2008. Gale was 

formerly the Director for Afghanistan at the National Security Council (NSC) under 

Condoleezza Rice (2004–2005) at the White House. Earlier in his career, he served as 

Chief of Evaluation at the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food and Nutrition 

Service. Gale was a National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Columbia University 

post-doctoral fellow (1977–1979), earned his Doctorate of Philosophy in Experimental 

Psychology from the Graduate School, City University of New York (1977), and his 

Bachelor’s Degree from Hobart College in 1969. 

Sarah Irene Jackson is an information officer at USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign 

Disaster Assistance. Previously, she served as a research analyst specializing in conflict 

and humanitarian assistance at USAID’s Knowledge Services Center. She has worked 

at the United States Institute of Peace and Georgetown University. She holds a 

Master’s Degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and a Bachelor’s 

Degree in International Studies from the University of Richmond. 

Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, PhD is Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 

the Western Hemisphere. In this role, he oversees the Treasury Department’s 

engagement with Latin American and Caribbean countries, as well as with Canada, 

and plays a leading role in shaping Treasury and U.S. Government policy toward the 

Hemisphere. Previously, he served as Director of the Office of Policy at the U.S. 

Agency for International Development. He was a fellow and Deputy Director of the 

Global Economy and Development Program at the Brookings Institution and has 

consulted for the IMF and the World Bank. Dr. Martinez-Diaz specialized in 

International Political Economy, receiving a Master’s of Philosophy Degree in 2001 

and a Doctorate of Philosophy in 2007 from Magdalen College, Oxford University, 

where he was a Marshall scholar. He graduated with honors from Northwestern 

University in 1999 with degrees in Economics and Political Science, and was a 1998 

Truman Scholar.

Steven Radelet, PhD is distinguished professor in the Practice of Development at 

Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He formerly served as Chief 

Economist at the United States Agency of International Development (USAID). 

From 2002 to 2010, he was a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development 

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where his work focused on poverty reduction, foreign aid, debt and trade. He served 

as an economic advisor to the President of Liberia from 2005 to 2009 and was 

founding co-chair of the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network. From 2000 to 

2002, he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Africa, the Middle East 

and Asia. From 1990 to 2000, he was a fellow at the Harvard Institute for 

International Development, director of the institute’s macroeconomics program, and a 

lecturer on economics and public policy. He holds a Master’s and a Doctorate of 

Philosophy degree in Public Policy from Harvard University, and a Bachelor of 

Science in Mathematics from Central Michigan University. 

Andrew W. Reynolds is Senior Advisor for Space and Advanced Technologies in 

the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs at the 

U.S. Department of State. A career civil servant at the U.S. Energy and State 

Departments, Mr. Reynolds has focused on Science and Technology and engineering 

fields, strategic planning, disruptive technology forecasting and assessment, and 

cooperative research. He served as Department of Energy representative at the U.S. 

Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris 

from 1983–1986 and Science and Technology Counselor in the U.S. Embassy in Rome 

from 1996–2000. From 2000–2011, he was deputy adviser in the Office of the Science 

and Technology Adviser to the Secretary of State and led efforts to hire Science and 

Technology personnel, strengthen partnerships with the global S&T community, and 

foster joint, strategic planning between State, USAID and the U.S. Government. Mr. 

Reynolds earned a Bachelor’s Degree from the University of Virginia, and Master’s 

Degrees in Energy Technology Management from George Washington University and 

Strategic Intelligence from the National Intelligence University. 

Daniel Runde is the Director of the Project on Prosperity and Development and 

holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies. Previously, Mr. Runde was head of the Foundations Unit 

for the Department of Partnerships and Advisory Service Operations at the 

International Finance Corporation, the private sector arm of the World Bank Group. 

From 2005–2007, Mr. Runde was the Director of the Office of Global Development 

Alliances at the U.S. Agency for International Development. Earlier in his career, Mr. 

Runde worked for CitiBank and BankBoston in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and started 

his career with Alex Brown & Sons, Inc. Mr. Runde received a Master’s in Public 

Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and holds a 

Bachelor’s Degree, Cum Laude, from Dartmouth College.

Donald Steinberg served as Deputy Administrator at USAID, providing overall 

direction and management for the Agency. He previously served as deputy president 

for policy at the International Crisis Group and as a Jennings Randolph senior fellow 

at the U.S. Institute of Peace. During his 30 years with the U.S. Government, 

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Steinberg served as Director of the State Department’s Joint Policy Council, White 

House deputy press secretary, National Security Council Senior Director for African 

Affairs, Special Haiti Coordinator, and U.S. Ambassador to Angola. He also served 

as officer-in-charge at the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria during South Africa’s transition 

from apartheid and has held postings in Mauritius, Brazil, Malaysia and the Central 

African Republic. Steinberg has published more than 100 articles on foreign policy, 

gender issues, children and armed conflict, and disarmament. He holds Master’s 

Degrees in Journalism from Columbia University and Political Economy from the 

University of Toronto, and a Bachelor’s Degree from Reed College. 

Linton Wells II, PhD is Director of the Center for Technology and National 

Security Policy, distinguished research professor, and Force Transformation Chair at 

the National Defense University (NDU). He has served in the Department of 

Defense for 47 years. During 26 years as a naval officer he served in a variety of 

surface ships, including command of a destroyer squadron and guided missile 

destroyer. Before NDU he spent 16 years in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

serving last as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and 

Information Integration). He has thrice been awarded the DOD medal for 

Distinguished Public Service.

Lanfordesign

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This book is the rare and welcome exception, a genuine breath of fresh 

air. It is the kind of project that should become the norm in Washington, 

challenging all of us to look beyond what one participant describes as the 

tyrannies of the in-box, the demand for immediate results, the focus on a 

single sector, and reliance on uni-dimensional measures of success. It should 

become an annual exercise.”

Anne-Marie Slaughter

Bert G. Kerstetter ‘66 University Professor of Politics and International Affairs 

Princeton University 

Former Director of Policy Planning, United States Department of State

“Perhaps the most embarrassing failure of international development 

agencies has been their excessive focus on programming for past problems 

instead of anticipating the challenges of the future. Black swans have 

derailed many a development budget by forcing the reallocation of scarce 

resources to address game-changing events no one anticipated. This 

thoughtful and timely book remedies this failure and provides some useful 

guidance to policymaking on how to catch the next black swan before it 

catches us.”

Andrew S. Natsios

Executive Professor

George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service

Former USAID Administrator

“Development assistance is one of our most powerful and cost-effective 

tools of national power to promote global democracy and economic 

growth. Yet, it is often behind the curve, focused only on today’s challenges, 

or last month’s crisis. Development practitioners must be in the vanguard, 

not the rear-guard, when it comes to trends in population, migration, 

urbanization, natural resource depletion, and science and technology or 

become obsolete. Today’s world is moving too fast, is too complex, and 

inaction too detrimental not to make futures analysis the leading edge of 

development thinking.” 

E. William Colglazier

Science and Technology Adviser to the Secretary of State

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